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HANDBOOK ON THE

CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY (u)

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT of the ARMY, Washington 25, D.C.

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Chinese Communist Army flag and star. The flag is red, with the star and symbols in yellow. These symbols are a conventionalized form of the Chinese characters "8-1". The figures "8-1," signifying the eighth month and first day (1 August 1927), commemorate the founding of the Chinese Communist Army. The five-pointed star is red with yellow border. The inscription is the Chinese characters for "8-1".
HANDBOOK ON THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Chapter 1. The Armed Forces

Section I. Introduction

1. Composition of the Armed Forces

The Armed Forces of Communist China—the People's Liberation Army (PLA)—consist of ground, naval, and air elements. The ground forces total approximately 2,600,000 and contain about 90 percent of the total manpower of the PLA; the navy and air force comprise only approximately 2 percent and 3 percent of the PLA strength, respectively.

2. Control of the Armed Forces

The Minister of National Defense directly commands the Chinese Communist Armed Forces through six, or perhaps eight, staff departments which serve as a “general staff” within the ministry (fig. 2). Immediately subordinate to the ministry and its staff departments are the Air Force Headquarters, Naval Headquarters, Public Security Forces Headquarters, Air Defense Command, and at least six headquarters for ground arms and services—Armor, Artillery, Engineer, Railway Engineer, Signal, and Technical Services Headquarters. There is no overall “Ground Force Headquarters” or “Infantry Headquarters” as such; in addition to performing “general staff” functions for the Armed Forces as a whole, the staff departments of the Ministry of National Defense also serve as ground force and infantry headquarters. This directly reflects the essentially infantry and ground force character of

Figure 1. Chinese Communist Infantrymen.

1 The terms “Chinese Communist Army”, “CCA”, and “Army”, as used herein, are synonymous with ground forces as distinguished from the “People's Liberation Army”, which is the Chinese Communists' term for their Armed Forces as a whole.
the original PLA and its officers. It is also characteristic of the present military establishment, which is essentially an infantry force with specialized service and support elements, and to which have been added relatively small air and naval components. The Ministry of National Defense, the staff departments, and the subordinate headquarters of arms and services comprise, in sum, the command and administrative organization to which the Chinese Communists refer as "Headquarters, People's Liberation Army".

3. "THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY"
a. Ground Forces of the "People's Liberation Army". The Chinese Communist ground forces have traditionally played the dominant role in the Armed Forces. Their primary missions are the defense of China, maintenance of internal security, and the implementation of Chinese Communist international policies by force if necessary. The principal peacetime ground force commands are the military regions which control the armies, independent divisions, and

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![Diagram of Armed Forces Organization](image-url)
separate units. In time of war, the ground forces are organized into integrated combat commands which function independently from the military regions.

b. The Naval Forces of the People’s Liberation Army. Communist China’s navy has been slow to develop beyond a coastal defense force. Equipment is limited and experience almost lacking except for the last 10 years when the Communists’ area of influence included China’s coastline. The various fleets, aviation units, marines, bases, and depots are directly under the naval district commands which are under Naval Headquarters of the Headquarters, PLA. The district commands are subdivided into Base Commands for command of specified areas. In addition to a limited capability for coastal defense, the Navy has a small amphibious lift and deep-water capability.

c. The Air Forces of the People’s Liberation Army. The Chinese Communist Air Force began with the arrival of Soviet advisory and material assistance in 1950. Since that time it has increased in size but is still relatively inferior in pilot training. The Air Force Headquarters controls the air units which are organized into air divisions, independent air regiments, and logistical units. Air headquarters are located in each military region, but their function is usually limited to administration. However, in some instances, particularly those requiring a defensive reaction, regional air headquarters commanders have operational control of units within their area.

d. Para-Military Forces. The para-military forces of Communist China include the militia, the production and construction units, and the National Defense Athletic Club. The militia, totaling about 30,000,000, is the largest of this group and includes a large percentage of the physically fit young men and women who are considered politically reliable. The production and construction units are primarily engaged in agricultural production and conservation and construction projects. The National Defense Athletic Club, found almost entirely in the cities, is an organization providing young people with instruction and experience in activities that might prove useful to the military; e.g., gliding, marksmanship, radio, and camping.

Section II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

4. ORIGIN OF THE ARMY

a. During the many years of struggle for control of China, the PLA has been the military arm of the Chinese Communist Party. The PLA leaders have also been Party leaders, especially since 1931, and the histories of the PLA and of the Party are inseparable. The Party’s first big opportunity to build its strength came in 1923, when Nationalist leader SUN Yat-sen, after his appeals for aid from the West had been rejected, accepted Soviet offers of military aid.

b. In return for this Soviet aid, the Nationalists agreed to cooperate with the Chinese Communist Party. The Communists actively participated in the program of the new Whampoa Military Academy, which, upon Soviet recommendation, had been established in 1924 to furnish the Nationalist Army with a modern and politically indoctrinated officer corps. Many members of the PLA’s present high command were either faculty members or students at Whampoa during the years 1924 to 1926. Through their connections with the Academy, the Communists were able to influence the assignments of Communist and pro-Communist graduates and thereby build up strong cadres of Communist officers in selected Nationalist units, commanded by sympathetic generals.

c. Following a break between the Nationalists and the Communists in 1927, Chinese Nationalist Army units, commanded by Communist and pro-Communist officers, revolted at Nanchang on 1 August 1927. This revolt marked the birth of the Chinese Communist Army, (fig. 3).

2 The Chinese system of giving an individual’s family or surname first and his given names last will be used in this study. When a person’s full name is given, his surname will be in capital letters.
This army fought against the Nationalists in a desperate struggle to survive in the years 1927 to 1936, gained strength during the years of war with Japan from 1937 to 1945, and in the renewed civil war from 1946 to 1949 was able to drive the Nationalists from the mainland of China.

5. DEVELOPMENT OF GUERRILLA TACTICS

a. From 1927 to 1931, the majority of the Chinese Communist Party leaders and the Third International planned for revolution in China around the classic Soviet doctrine of uprisings of the industrial workers—the urban proletariat. This strategy, however, resulted in serious setbacks for the Chinese Communist movement, including the loss of the most of its followers among the urban workers. In 1931, the Chinese Communist Party decided to stake the future of its movement upon the Chinese peasant and an agrarian revolution. This reversal of the basic Communist political strategy had far-reaching military consequences, for from this decision the Chinese Communist Army's basic doctrines of strategy, organization, and tactics were developed.

b. The leading advocates of this new Communist strategy were MAO Tse-tung and CHU Teh, two ranking leaders in Communist China today. In 1931, these two collaborated in establishing a Communist base, complete with army and civil administration, in mountainous southeastern China. MAO's early Communist Party activities had centered around organizing peasants in his native province of Hunan. CHU was an experienced army officer who had learned his first lessons in guerrilla warfare while fighting bandits on the China-Indochina border. The MAO-CHU strategy was based on the fact that, from the earliest period of its history, China had been ruled from the strongholds of about a thousand walled towns, which
were the seats of government and wealth, and headquarters of military garrisons. The Communists reasoned that, if they could organize the peasants in the villages—arming them for their own defense—they eventually could isolate the walled cities from a Communist-controlled countryside. The mission of the Communist Army was to extend and to protect the areas of Communist control.

c. The MAO-CHU strategy required that the Communist Army establish a firm community of interest with the peasants to insure for itself recruits, food, and security against surprise attacks. In return, the Communist Army initially offered the peasant land—at the expense of the landlord—and, by Chinese standards, an efficient government, equitable taxes, humane treatment, some voice in his government, and protection against his enemies. This Communist strategy was built around the concepts of "biding one's time", of striking where the enemy is weak, and of heavy dependence on the militia and other local forces.

d. MAO Tse-tung studied the classical principles of warfare and analyzed their application to the situation facing the Communists in China. His Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War, published in 1936, became the handbook of all Communist field commanders. MAO summarizes his strategic concepts as follows:

    "We are against guerrillaism [sic] . . . yet we must admit the Army's guerrilla character. We are opposed to protracted [individual] campaigns . . . while we believe in campaigns of quick decision and a strategy of protracted war. Since we are opposed to fixed operational fronts and positional warfare, we believe in unified operational fronts and a war of maneuver. We are against simply routing the enemy, and we believe in a war of annihilation."

e. Between 1930 and the end of 1933, the Communists in southeastern China were subjected to a series of five military offensives. The last campaign substantially reduced the Communist-held territory, inflicted heavy losses on the Communist forces, and left them encircled and vulnerable. Faced with probable extermination, the Communists decided to break through the Nationalist cordon and establish a new base elsewhere. In October 1934, the Communist forces, numbering about 90,000, began their epic "Long March". In October 1935, after a march of more than 6,000 miles during which they were under almost constant attack, about 20,000 survivors arrived in the arid and poverty-stricken hill country of Shensi Province in northwestern China. Toward the end of 1936 the Nationalists were about to launch a military campaign against the Shensi base area. Only the formation of the "United Front" against Japan prevented the launching of this campaign, which probably would have either "exterminated" the Communist forces or forced them to begin another "long march".

f. By the end of the "Long March", MAO and CHU were firmly in control of both the Chinese Communist Party and its Army. Following their basic strategy of "biding their time", these leaders in 1935 and 1936 urged a joint Nationalist-Communist "United Front against Japan". There was, at this time, strong sentiment among many of the Nationalist commanders in favor of directing the Nationalist military effort against the Japanese rather than against the Communists. In December 1936, Nationalist leader CHIANG Kai-shek was kidnapped by a group of his commanders and forced to agree to a truce with the Communists and to a "United Front".

6. THE WAR WITH JAPAN

a. The Sino-Japanese War offered the Chinese Communists an excellent opportunity to apply their strategy of building their strength in the countryside and to expand their Army for the final showdown with the Nationalists. Under the "United Front" agreements, the Communist Army was nominally integrated into the Chinese National Army and acquired a new name, the Eighth Route Army. This force was nominally subordinate to the Nationalist Headquarters in North China. In fact, however, the Communists remained independent of Nationalist control even though the fiction of "joint cooperation" against Japan was maintained until after the Japanese surrender in August 1945.

b. When the Japanese Army overran most of North China in 1937, the three divisions then comprising the Communist Eighth Route Army
stayed behind to organize guerrilla resistance throughout the area. The Nationalists first approved, but later opposed, this expansion of the Communist zone of operations. The Communists ignored Nationalist protests, however, and exploited the confused situation in North China by expanding and consolidating their positions there. Outside the Japanese areas of control in North China, the Communists absorbed Nationalist and local anti-Japanese elements where they could and drove out or destroyed those that resisted. By August 1945, virtually all Nationalist elements in North China either had been eliminated or absorbed by the Communists, or had joined the Japanese as “puppets” to administer or garrison Japanese-held lines of communication. The Communists generally avoided large battles against the Japanese, but, by a process of continued attrition, they narrowed the areas of Japanese control to the principal cities and relatively narrow zones along main lines of communication.

c. Thus, between 1937 and 1945 the Chinese Communist Army expanded rapidly through application of the strategic principles developed earlier by MAO and CHU. In 1937 the Communist Army had numbered only about 100,000, and it controlled barren areas containing a poverty-striken population of about 2,000,000. By 1947 the Communist Army had grown to over 1,000,000 regulars, with a reserve of over 2,000,000 local troops and militia, and it controlled a population of 90,000,000 in one of the richest agricultural areas of China. This zone of Communist domination in 1945 cut across the Nationalists’ lines of approach from their Yangtze River Valley positions in central China to the northern cities of Peiping and Tientsin, and to the strategic northeastern provinces.

7. DEFEAT OF THE NATIONALISTS

a. Immediately following Japan’s surrender in August 1945, the Nationalists and Communists began a struggle for control of North China and Manchuria. At the time of her surrender, Japan was in control of all the principal cities, most of the more important walled county seats, and all of the railroads in North China. Most of the Communist troops were located in North China, whereas most of the Nationalist armies were still south of the Yangtze River. The Japanese Army in China received orders to surrender only to the National Government troops, and their Chinese “puppet” troops were to be incorporated into the Nationalist Army. Some Nationalist armies were airlifted to Peiping, Tientsin, and Tsinan, while others attempted to drive northward from Hankow and Nanking via the railroads.

b. The Communists countered by cutting the railroads. By the end of 1945, the military situation was a temporary stalemate, with the Nationalists unable to move their forces forward and the Communists incapable of doing more than holding the Nationalists where they were.

c. During the winter of 1945 and the spring and summer of 1946 the Nationalists and Communists engaged in negotiations under the chairmanship of General George C. Marshall. The negotiations were aimed at preventing a civil war by effecting a cease-fire, a coalition Government, and the integration of the Communist Army into the Nationalist military establishment. Fighting continued sporadically during these negotiations, and the Communists used this period to reorganize and regroup. When the cease-fire negotiations finally broke down in the summer of 1946, the Nationalists launched their first concerted drive to clear the approaches to North China. The Nationalists achieved limited initial successes, but they failed to destroy the Communist forces and to establish overland communications with their forces in north and northeast China. In the course of these failures, the Nationalists lost a large number of their best divisions.

d. During the summer of 1947 the Communists overran southern Shensi Province. Later they launched bold attacks against the Nationalists between the Yellow and the Yangtze Rivers. During this period the Communists seized the strategic initiative, an advantage which they never lost. Communist operations during this period subjected the Nationalist forces to further attrition and prevented them from implementing any effective plan of operations.
During this period the Communist leaders demonstrated their mastery of the principles of surprise, mobility, flexibility, and economy of force, and proved that they were learning the art of employing large forces successfully.

During the struggle for North China, the Nationalists and Communists were battling also for control of Manchuria. Following Japan's surrender, selected Communist cadres marched overland into Manchuria from North China or were carried by junks from Shantung Province via Soviet-held Dairen. The Nationalists water-lifted their best United States-trained and -equipped armies from Shanghai and Canton to North China ports. Initially the Soviets prevented the Nationalist units from occupying Manchuria by postponing their own withdrawal; they subsequently withdrew from key areas after Communist forces were in position and the Nationalists had to fight their way in. By the end of April 1946, the Nationalists held most of southern Manchuria and had recovered central Manchuria up to the Sungari River, north of Changchun. The Communists, however, still controlled agriculturally rich northern Manchuria and dominated the Nationalists' flanks.

The Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria in 1946 was so timed as to permit a large stock of captured Japanese weapons to fall into Communist hands. The Soviets also denied Dairen and its port facilities to the Nationalists. The situation in Manchuria eventually worked out in favor of the Communists and against the over-extended Nationalists. The Communists had a base area which included adequate food resources and manpower, plus an arms supply sufficient to equip an army of nearly 500,000 men. Of still greater importance, for the first time in their 20 years of fighting, a Communist Army was in possession of a network of railroads and highways, giving it the capability of supporting large-scale operations. The Communists built up an army of more than 400,000 in Manchuria and employed large units against Nationalist positions. By the end of 1948, they had destroyed the United States-equipped Nationalist armies in Manchuria, thereby acquiring large quantities of United States weapons and equipment. It was this Communist Manchurian Army that later was designated the Fourth Field Army and which initially supplied the backbone of the Chinese Communist "volunteer" forces in Korea.

In September 1948, the Communists began what was to become the decisive offensive. The Communist forces severed the corridor connecting North China and Manchuria. The Communists, on 30 October, occupied the principal Nationalist stronghold following the total destruction of 14 Nationalist divisions that were attempting to break through southward into North China.

From November 1948 to January 1949 the main forces of the Communist and Nationalist armies around Hau-cho, 200 miles north of Nanking, were locked in the largest single battle of the civil war; each side committed an estimated 500,000 men. The Nationalist armies were cut off, surrounded, and destroyed. In North China, Communist troops from Manchuria appeared before the gates of Peiping on 14 December 1948, after a swift and undetected march through the mountains of Jehol Province, and caught the Nationalists with their forces widely dispersed. Tientsin fell to the Communists on 15 January 1949; Peiping surrendered on 22 January. From this time on, the Communist forces outnumbered those of the Nationalists.

Under a strong public pressure to end the civil war, CHIANG Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China, "retired" on 21 January 1949. He was succeeded by General LI Tsung-jen, the Vice President, who sent a commission to Peiping to negotiate with the Communists. Meanwhile, the Communists proceeded to extend and consolidate their control over the remaining territory north of the Yangtze River, and by April 1949 they were poised for a crossing of the Yangtze.

The Communists, on 18 April 1949, issued an ultimatum demanding that the Nationalists surrender by 20 April and that the Communist forces be permitted to occupy certain key areas on the south bank of the Yangtze. This ultimatum was rejected, and the Communist forces crossed the Yangtze in force during the night of
20-21 April and moved swiftly to surround the Nationalist forces or force them into retreat. Nanking fell to the Communists without a fight on 24 April; they occupied Hanchow, south of Shanghai, on 5 May. Shanghai, where a Nationalist force of from 200,000 to 300,000 offered half-hearted resistance, was occupied by the Communists on 25 May. Of the Nationalist troops in Shanghai, it is estimated that only 50,000 managed to escape and reach Taiwan.

The remaining campaigns of the civil war were, in effect, mopping-up operations. The Communist armies now numbered approximately 2,500,000 men. The Nationalists—now holding only Taiwan and a few small islands along the China coast—had been able to salvage a force totaling 500,000 to 600,000.

For the Chinese Communist forces, the period 1947 through 1949 was one of gradual transition toward more orthodox and more nearly uniform organization. In early 1947, the Chinese Communists had three major commands, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the Northeast People's United Army. By mid-1947, the units had been reorganized and renamed the People's Liberation Armies designated according to the geographic areas in which they were operating, such as the “East China People's Liberation Army”. Subordinate tactical units of the armies were designated as numbered “Columns”, which were composed of a variable number of either divisions or brigades, none of which had either uniform strength or organization. During early 1949, the area-designated Liberation Armies were reorganized into five major commands, the First to Fifth Field Armies. Under the Field Armies were Army Groups serving as administrative headquarters for several armies which had been reorganized and redesignated in numerical sequence from the old “Columns”. The armies were organized triagonally into three divisions of three regiments each. The Fifth Field Army subsequently was deactivated, but the basic Field Army-Army Group-Army-Division-Regiment structure remained. The 1949 reorganization did not entirely eliminate either inequalities in unit strength or the nonuniformity of organization, but the irregularity was reduced and the trend toward more nearly uniform and orthodox organizations was established. The Chinese Communist forces were, however, still deficient in artillery, armor, transport, and other supporting services.

8. STATUS AT THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR

a. The Communist Army which emerged from the civil war was far from being a modern army. Its high command had demonstrated a sound grasp of the principles of warfare and a high degree of flexibility in their application. The Communist leaders had achieved and exploited superior mobility and taken full advantage of the opportunities for maneuver offered by the terrain of mainland China.

b. Capabilities in other phases of warfare, however, remained to be tested. The Communists had had little experience in penetrating strongly defended positions and even less experience in the protracted defense of a geographically restricted area. They had never developed a supply organization capable of giving logistical support to these phases of warfare. In their constant emphasis on retaining a maximum degree of mobility, they had discouraged elaborately organized lines of communications. Communist armies in the field tried to live off the country and depended to a large extent for arms and ammunition upon captured supplies. In brief, the Communists had yet to develop a logistical organization capable of sustaining their forces in modern military operations.

c. In October 1949, the Chinese Communists established the People's Republic of China (fig. 4). On 14 February 1950, they entered into a 30-year “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance” with the Soviet Union, and by early March major contingents of the Soviet advisory missions began arriving in China.

9. THE KOREAN WAR

a. The Chinese Communist Army in 1950 was still essentially a mass of infantrymen armed with rifles and small quantities of automatic weapons. It had inadequate artillery support and an extremely haphazard logistic service. Nevertheless, to prevent the collapse of the Communist regime in North Korea, the Chinese
Communist forces crossed the Yalu River to attack United Nations forces in late November 1950. By so doing, they bear the unique distinction of being the only force openly to challenge the United Nations in military operations.

b. The first Chinese Communist troops committed in Korea came from the Fourth Field Army. This “volunteer” contingent, composed of veterans who had participated in much of the fighting against the Chinese Nationalists from Manchuria to South China, was considered the elite of the Chinese Communist Army. Troops from other field armies soon entered the conflict; and, by the summer of 1953, when the truce was signed about one-third of the Chinese Communist Army was in Korea.

c. The Chinese Communists in Korea were successful initially, because of their overwhelming numbers. At the outset, their “human sea” tactics kept the numerically smaller United Nations forces off balance. However, because of logistic weaknesses the Chinese Communists could sustain their offensive less than 10 consecutive days, after which the troops were forced to regroup and wait for resupply. Reliance on the “human sea” tactics finally proved inadequate against forces possessing adequate firepower and logistic support, and the Chinese Communists were unable to fulfill their pledge to “drive the enemy into the sea”. Their experience in Korea reemphasized to the Communists that their Army needed much improvement before it could compete successfully against a modern, well-organized, and well-equipped military force.

10. THE ARMY REORGANIZES

a. The history of the Chinese Communist Army has been one of continual evolution. In late 1950, with advisory missions and modern equipment from the Soviet Union, the Communists undertook a new program, which reached its climax in late 1952 and early 1953, and which had the following three objectives:

(1) To form a well-balanced army by creating service and support units and providing for better training and control over these units.

(2) To weed out over-age and disabled personnel and former Chinese Nationalists who had failed to respond to Communist indoctrination, and to replace them with younger, more physically fit, and more politically reliable men.

(3) To establish an effective fighting force by reducing the number of units and by increasing the strength of remaining units.

b. The program resulted in a sharp reduction in the number of infantry units between 1950 and 1955, but a slight concurrent increase in overall strength attributable in part to the formation of new noninfantry units and in part to the increased strength of the remaining infantry units. Since the Chinese Communists already had sufficient trained infantrymen, their chief concern was the creation of support elements such as artillery, armored, engineer, and signal units. These new organizations were designed to fill gaps in capability and to enhance the effectiveness of the remaining infantry units.
formed around cadres provided by existing units. The Soviet Union furnished some of the instructors and most of the equipment for these new units. Headquarters were established at the PLA level for the supporting arms and technical services to develop the tactical doctrine and training programs for their respective arms or services. Operational control of units, however, remained with the regional commanders.

c. The new program resulted in a significant expansion in heavy firepower. This was accomplished by a substantial increase in the number of artillery units and a change to larger caliber artillery. Artillery technique, although considerably improved over that of 1950, still lacked flexibility because of poor communications, concept of employment, and technical deficiencies.

d. During the Korean War, most of the equipment from the Soviet Union was issued to forces in Korea, and personnel of many units in China proper were used as replacements for the forces in Korea. Consequently, as units in China fell far below authorized strength, some were deactivated and their personnel used to bring the remaining units up to strength. CHU Teh, in an Army Anniversary speech on 1 August 1953, summarized the developments as follows: "A regular training program is being carried through in the People's Liberation Army, and the great historic transition of the People's Liberation Army from its lower stage to a higher stage has begun."

Section III. THE ARMY TODAY

11. GENERAL

The Chinese Communists have organized, equipped, and trained a modern army of over 2,500,000 men, in addition to a steadily improving Navy and the fourth largest Air Force in the world. The ground forces only now are reaching approximately the level attained by those of Western Powers during World War II. They depend heavily on the Soviet Union for logistical support, but in size they rank second only to those of the Soviet Union and would constitute a formidable opponent.

12. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

a. The greatest strength of the Chinese Communist Army lies in China's huge manpower resources. In addition, the expansion of the militia program since mid-1958 has given limited training to many potential recruits. Since 1954 the conscription system has permitted the release of some 500,000 to 800,000 trained men a year into the reserves, ready for call in an emergency. The average soldier is outstanding in stamina, endurance, and the ability to withstand the most adverse conditions. Lack of a technical background in its recruits, however, will continue for some time to complicate the training problem of the CCA and to be its greatest personnel weakness.

b. In organization and equipment the CCA has taken great strides forward since the Korean War. The Soviet Union, by furnishing great quantities of material and the example of Soviet organizational patterns, has been of immeasurable assistance. Actual organization of units, however, is still far from the ideal table of organization in many cases, and equipment still falls far short of the quantity required for an Army of the size maintained by the Chinese Communists. Although Communist China is increasing its capability to fill some of its own needs, continuing Soviet support will be necessary for the indefinite future; in any operations of the scale of the Korean War or larger, massive Soviet aid would be required.

c. Discipline and esprit de corps in the Chinese Communist Army are maintained by indoctrination and political control by the Party at every echelon. An estimated 90 percent of the officers of field grade or above, 30 percent of the junior officers, and 10 percent of the noncommissioned officers are Party members. Youth Corps membership, in the lower ranks, is even more widespread. These affiliations ensure close Party supervision of every aspect of daily activity and even of thought and attitude throughout the Army.
CHAPTER 2. THE MILITARY SYSTEM

Section I. THE HIGH COMMAND

13. GENERAL

a. Top control of the Armed Forces is vested constitutionally in the National People's Congress (legislature) or, when the Congress is not in session, in its Standing Committee. The Congress elects the Chairman of the People's Republic of China who is *ex officio* Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the National Defense Council—a policy-making advisory and planning organization whose membership is chosen by the Congress upon recommendation of the Chairman of the People's Republic. The National People's Congress, or its Standing Committee, selects the members (Premier, Vice Premiers, Ministers, and Heads of Commissions) of the State Council (cabinet), of which the Ministry of Defense is a part (fig. 5).

Figure 5. The High Command.
b. Overall policy for the Armed Forces is formulated by the Chinese Communist Party through its Politburo and the Party's Military Affairs Committee which makes all important military policy decisions with Politburo approval. Policy control of the Armed Forces is effected through the Party's control of the composition of the National People's Congress, its Standing Committee, and the State Council, and through the direct Party control of political organization within the Armed Forces.

14. HEADQUARTERS, PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

a. General. The Ministry of National Defense, its “general staff” departments, and the headquarters of the arms and services comprise the top command and administrative organization generally known as “Headquarters, People's Liberation Army” (fig. 2).

b. The Minister of National Defense directly commands the Armed Forces. The position has been held by a Marshal since 1954 when the position was established, and the Minister has served, concurrently, as a Vice Premier of the State Council and a Vice Chairman of the National Defense Council. He is assisted by several Vice Ministers who, concurrently, hold high rank in the Armed Forces, and most of whom are members of the National Defense Council. Most of the routine functions of the Ministry are conducted by the “general staff” departments and by the headquarters of the arms and services which serve as the principal planning, coordinating, and executive agencies of the Ministry and which have technical chains of command to counterpart departments and headquarters in the subordinate echelons.

c. The Headquarters, PLA has no “General Staff” in the generally accepted sense of the term. Instead, the Ministry of National Defense has a number of staff departments, most of which are designated as “General” departments, which perform for the Armed Forces the functions usually performed by a “General Staff”.

(1) The General Staff Department is the principal agency for coordinating the combat operations of the major services, commands, and ground arms. It contains divisions that are concerned with operations, military intelligence, and tactical organization. This department is headed by the Chief of General Staff; but, just as the General Staff Department is not the General Staff but only one of the several departments performing general staff functions, the Chief of General Staff is not the Chief of the General Staff but only Chief of the General Staff Department.

(2) The General Political Department probably is the most powerful of the “general staff” departments. It is the senior agency within the PLA through which the Chinese Communist Party exercises political control and surveillance over policy and personnel. It performs its functions through its own separate channel of administration and command which parallels the military command channel. According to the Party Constitution, the General Political Department administers Party ideological and organizational work in the Armed Forces under the leadership of the Party's Central Committee. It is responsible for the Party organization, propaganda, education, cultural activities, and personnel security within the Armed Forces and for the organization of the civil populace (military government) in time of emergency.

(3) The General Rear Service Department is the logistical department for the Armed Forces. It is responsible for logistical planning and the delegation of logistical responsibilities to subordinate commands. It determines the major materiel requirements, manages the military establishment's procurement plan, and is responsible for matters pertaining to the Armed Forces budget. The Department has divisions for quartermaster, medical, veterinary, ordnance, transportation, supply, and fuel services. It may include a finance
Figure 6. Communist China's Leaders.

LIU SHAO-CHI
(Chairman, People's Republic of China)

MAO TSE-TUNG
(Chairman, Chinese Communist Party)

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division, although, for at least a brief period in the mid-1950's, finance was the responsibility of a General Finance Department which may no longer exist.

(4) The General Training Department formulates overall policies for the training of the Armed Forces and for coordinating the military education of Armed Forces personnel. It exercises staff supervision over the national military schools controlled by the Ministry of National Defense, over the training installations of the military area commands, and over the training programs developed by the headquarters of the various arms and services.

(5) The General Cadres Department is responsible for the routine personnel administration for Armed Forces personnel other than political personnel who are administered by the General Political Department.

(6) The Armed Forces Supervisory Department monitors combat readiness throughout the military establishment and assures that military training is properly planned and executed. The inquiries of this department probably do not include inspection of the activities of the General Political Department and its subordinate agencies, and probably is not concerned with morale, grievances, fiscal matters, or general administration.

(7) The status of the General Ordnance Department and Mobilization Department is not known. The General Ordnance Department was, and still may be, a separate staff department, probably responsible for liaison with the First Ministry of Machine Building which is responsible for military production. If this department no longer exists, its functions probably were returned to the General Rear Service Department which previously had them. The Mobilization Department, sometimes referred to as the General Mobilization Department, was primarily concerned with formulation and supervision of policy for the militia and reserves. There is some doubt as to whether the department still exists or whether its functions have been absorbed by other departments.

d. The headquarters of the arms and services at the PLA level include the Air Defense Command: Air Force Headquarters; Naval Headquarters; Public Security Forces Headquarters; and a headquarters for armor, artillery, engineer, railway engineer, signal, and technical services. There is no separate headquarters for the ground forces or for the infantry arm, but the several general departments of the Headquarters, PLA serve as overall headquarters for the ground forces and as headquarters for the infantry in addition to performing the “general staff” functions for the Armed Forces as a whole. The headquarters of the arms and services were added to the original, essentially infantry, ground force organization as the other, specialized forces and support and service elements were formed for which special skills and doctrines were required. The Air Defense Command is the joint tactical and administrative headquarters exercising operational control over assigned ground, naval, and air elements comprising Communist China’s air defense force. The other headquarters of the arms and services, in conjunction with the “general staff” departments, are responsible for the development of tactical doctrine and training programs for their respective arm or service and for the administration of their personnel but normally exercise no operational control.

15. CHAIN OF COMMAND

The chain of command on operational matters normally extends from the Minister through the appropriate staff department of Headquarters, PLA to commanders of military regions and theaters of operations. However, the departments and headquarters of arms and services at Headquarters, PLA level also have separate and important administrative and technical chains of command to their respective counterparts in lower headquarters and
The Director of the General Rear Service Department, for example, deals directly with the chief of the Rear Service Department of a military region. Similarly, the Commander of Artillery Headquarters deals directly with the Commander of Artillery of a theater or military region commander’s staff. In addition to this seemingly dual chain of command is a third and more important channel, that of the Communist Party. The Party chain of command tends to offset any possible conflicts between the other two chains of command. In case of insoluble conflict, the region commander, the staff commander, and the Party unit chief may appeal to their superiors at Headquarters, PLA.

Section II. TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION

16. GENERAL

Because of its vast size, large number of troops, and limited transportation facilities, Communist China is divided geographically into military regions, districts, subdistricts, and garrison commands.

17. MILITARY REGIONS

Communist China is divided into 13 military regions, 10 of which are named after the cities in which their headquarters are located and 3 of which coincide with the major autonomous regions—Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang. The military regions and their headquarters are shown on the map (fig. 7).
Figure 7. Communist China—Territorial Organization.
The commander of a military region usually holds the rank of colonel general and is subordinate to the Minister of Defense through the Chief of the General Staff. He directly commands the regular military forces subordinate to his region and is responsible for the operational control, training, and administrative and logistic support of these forces. He is also responsible for operation of logistical installations; for administrative and logistical support of forces which are subordinate to special commands but are located within his region; for supervision, training, and support of militia units and reserves; and for certain phases of conscription, mobilization, and veterans affairs. He also may command the air and naval units in his region through the regional air and naval headquarters. (The organization of a military region command is shown in fig. 8.)

18. MILITARY DISTRICTS

Military regions that include two or more provinces are divided into military districts the boundaries of which coincide with the provincial boundaries. The military regional commander probably delegates responsibility for local administrative and logistical operations and for mobilization, conscription, reserve, militia, and veterans matters to the military district commanders.

![Organization of a Military Region Command](image_url)
19. MILITARY SUBDISTRICTS

Military districts are subdivided into military subdistricts the boundaries of which generally coincide with special administrative districts. Responsibility for mobilization, conscription, reserve, militia, and veterans affairs and for some logistical functions probably is delegated to subdistrict commanders.

20. MILITARY GARRISON COMMANDS

Military garrison commands have been established for the principal cities. Their mission is to defend these cities and assure the regime’s control over these population centers. The garrison commander is in charge of all ground force units in his area. These units may vary in size from companies to armies. Under special conditions he may also command the Naval and Air Force units stationed in his city. According to the size of the city, the garrison command reports directly to either the military district or military region.

21. THE MILITIA

a. Traditionally, the Chinese Communists always have relied on the support of a local peasant militia. While the Communists were winning the mainland, the militia formed guerrilla forces that harassed the enemy, helped to consolidate the gains in newly won areas, and provided additional manpower for the Army. After gaining control of the mainland, the militia was used as a security force to maintain public peace. During the Korean War, the militia provided large numbers of “volunteers” for the Chinese Communist forces in Korea. However, the militia remained a poorly equipped, virtually untrained organization based upon the local civil administration.

b. With the advent of the communes in 1958, the militia was greatly expanded, using as a nucleus the servicemen who had been demobilized after completing their three years of army service. However, the militia is still far from being an effective “military” organization. Of the 200,000,000 that the Chinese Communists claim to have enrolled in the militia an estimated 7,000,000 men have fired their rifles in practice, and 30,000,000 men have received rudimentary military training. It is believed that Communist China’s military reserve forces have been combined with the militia. The military laws provide for reserve service for all who have completed their tour of active duty. These ex-servicemen probably constitute the backbone of the militia by providing the leadership and training for the expanded organization.

c. The peacetime role of the militia remains that of maintaining local security and of functioning as a local police force. It also supports the regular forces in operational situations such as the one now existing near the Offshore Islands. In these situations, the militia provides transportation and performs guard duty. In time of war, the militia units in rear areas would increase their internal security role and perform rear service duties. Those near the front would perform patrol duties and give active support to combat units. The militia would be used as a reserve force to furnish replacements for the regular Armed Forces when necessary.
CHAPTER 3. MILITARY DOCTRINE

Section 1. GENERAL

22. THE MILITARY THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG

a. Chinese Communist military doctrine is the product of more than 30 years of development. It is based on longstanding Chinese ideas of "the art of war" as modified by the concepts of Clausewitz and Lenin considered fundamental in the Soviet Union. MAO Tse-tung's influence has been strong at every stage of this development, and in the end his ideas prevailed. His military thought is the result of careful study and of trial and error under the most varied conditions. The works in which he has expressed his views are basic texts for study by every member of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces.

b. No discussion of MAO's military thought can ignore the political element that permeates and determines its overall strategic concepts. The Army is, in Communist eyes, a tool of the Party, and the Party's objectives determine how the Armed Forces are to be employed. There are, however, certain military principles which can be derived from MAO's works and which, in various applications, will govern the combat operations of the Chinese Communist Army. These can be summarized under 12 headings:

1. The aim of war. War aims at destroying the effective strength of the enemy rather than at holding areas or cities.
2. Security. The conservation of the strength of one's own forces is essential to any military operation.
3. Mobility. Withdraw before the enemy's advance; pursue the enemy's withdrawal; disperse or concentrate one's own forces swiftly on a wide and flexible battlefield.
4. Local superiority. Concentrate overwhelming strength against the enemy's weaker points; accept a decisive engagement only with from two to six times the enemy's strength.
5. Offensive action. Attack is the vital method of destroying the enemy; surround the enemy and attack from at least two directions.
6. Singleness of direction. Strategically, there must be only one main direction at a time; tactically, there must be a single objective.
7. Flexibility. Tactics must be ingenious and flexible, suited to the time, the place, and the situation.
8. Surprise. One's own forces must be assembled in secrecy and must attack at the time and place which the enemy least expects.
9. Initiative. Always seize the initiative, preserve one's own liberty of action, and force the enemy to react.
10. Unity of command. Unified command is essential to success, particularly in the coordination of guerrilla and regular forces.
11. Preparation. Combat requires meticulous preparation to avoid entry into battle without assurance of success.
12. Confidence. Victory is determined by the confidence of commanders and troops in the inevitable triumph of their cause. (This is the basis of MAO's statement that "imperialists and reactionaries are all paper tigers", in spite of his appreciation of the material shortcomings of his own forces; he sees all Communist forces, under the historical dialectic, as ordained to ultimate triumph, while the
“capitalist forces” must fall apart because of their own ideological poverty.)

c. The Chinese Communists tactics have been strongly influenced by years of guerrilla warfare, but with their present Army they will not necessarily continue to employ the tactics designed for out-numbered, poorly armed troops operating in the hinterlands. Their current doctrine envisages conventional warfare by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, coordinated with guerrilla warfare by units organized from the masses of the Chinese people. However, there would probably be no extensive employment of the “human sea” tactics which they were forced to use early in the Korean War, although the resulting casualties would be accepted in critical stages of a war that required utilization of relatively untrained recruits.

Section II. BASIC TACTICAL DOCTRINE

23. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

a. The Soviet Union has had a strong influence on Chinese Communist tactical concepts. Nevertheless, Chinese Communist military leaders have emphasized that the development of the great armies of the West must be studied carefully and that no principles will be blindly accepted if they are not consistent with Chinese thought and conditions peculiar to China.

b. The precepts advanced as “the military thought of MAO Tse-tung” are rigidly observed in both planning and in execution. They provide for deliberate, detailed prior planning, and swift execution when the planning is complete. Modification of plans is permitted only within prescribed limits, thus assuring control of the combat action at the expense of some flexibility. The overall commander of a tactical operation develops and issues detailed tactical plans for combat from which little deviation is permitted. However, the commander himself may make rapid and complete changes of plan, still in accordance with MAO's doctrine, when conditions dictate.

c. Since the Chinese Communist ground force is essentially an infantry army, tactics are designed to exploit infantry capabilities. Supporting arms are centrally controlled and plans for their employment are usually formulated at top levels.

24. EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT ARMS

a. Infantry. As the basic combat arm of the PLA, infantry is considered capable of employment under any conditions of climate or terrain and at any time. The possibility that future conflicts may involve nuclear warfare has not changed Peiping's concept of the significance of the infantry arm. The doctrine of mobile warfare and the increase of the infantry's firepower, mobility, and communication capabilities, moreover, make the Chinese Communist infantry more adaptable to the requirements of future war.

b. Armor. Although the quantity of armored equipment presently in Communist China is severely limited, the military leadership has accepted the Soviet doctrine of the mass employment of armor as the decisive arm within a balanced ground forces team. This accept-
Figure 10. Armor and Infantry.

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ance, however, can be little more than theoretical at present, since domestic production of tanks requires substantial augmentation by the Soviet Union, and since there still exists a critical shortage of technically trained armor personnel within the PLA. Gradual expansion and modernization of the PLA's armored elements will, in time, allow closer adherence in practice to Soviet doctrine.

c. Artillery. In the Chinese Communist combined-arms team, artillery holds an important place. It is organic at every echelon from army to regiment. There are also independent artillery units, the allocation of which is the responsibility of the Artillery Headquarters, PLA, but the employment of which is the responsibility of the military region or army command to which they have been attached. In actual operations, combat groups of artillery units are formed and directly attached to the infantry units they are to support. This organization of the artillery combat group is the staff responsibility of the artillery officer of the headquarters concerned; tactical employment, however, is in the hands of the commander of the unit to which the artillery is attached, and fire control is under the designated commander of the combat group (fig. 11).

25. AIR SUPPORT

Tactical air support of the ground arms has received increased emphasis in maneuvers during recent years (fig. 12). Although Chinese Communist close air support elements are limited and probably need much additional training, their doctrine includes the engagement of targets beyond the range of artillery and the reinforcement of artillery fires in crucial areas. Little information is available on the methods and effectiveness of air-ground coordination.
Section III. THE OFFENSE

26. BASIC PRINCIPLES

a. The basic military principles of the Chinese Communists for offensive action stress that—

(1) The purpose of offensive operations is the destruction of the Armed Forces of the enemy rather than the capture and retention of territory;

(2) There is complete assurance of victory only when a vastly superior force strikes at any given point.

b. Current tactical doctrine emphasizes night operations and infiltration either to the enemy’s flanks and rear or into positions from which to block the withdrawal of enemy forces.

27. FORMS OF OFFENSIVE ACTION

a. The Chinese Communist concept of offensive action is best exemplified by the catch phrase Four Fast—One Slow. The “One Slow” portion of the phrase refers to the commander’s responsibility for careful evaluation, planning, and inspection prior to the attack. The “Four Fast” portion of the phrase relates to speed in execution of the attack:

(1) Speed in preparation, including reconnaissance.

(2) Speed in the advance, to flank or encircle the enemy.

(3) Speed in exploitation of gains, to prevent enemy regrouping.

(4) Speed in pursuit, to overtake and destroy a retreating enemy.

b. The One Point—Two Sides tactical technique is the launching of a number of separate attacks against one objective (fig. 13). It is considered to be distinct from an envelopment in that the coordinated attacks are made by separate units which have deployed prior to the beginning of the battle.
ATTACK

a. Against an enemy in a defensive position

b. Against an enemy on the move

Figure 13. One Point—Two Sides Tactics.

(1) One Point means to concentrate overwhelmingly superior strength and attack a selected weak point.

(2) Two Sides means that when making an attack, two or more efforts of attacking forces are necessary, but it does not mean the attack is limited to only two sides.

c. The isolation and subsequent detailed reduction of individual strong points of a defensive zone are called the Divide-and-Destroy tactical method. It is based on the theory that no defensive system can be equally strong everywhere and that weak spots exist which, if captured, will permit an attack from the flank or rear on adjacent strong points.

d. Strategic penetration is defined as a massive frontal attack against an enemy in a fixed defense line, the flanks of which are secure. The operation is designed to breach the defense at selected locations, create flanks, and permit passage of mobile forces deep into the enemy rear, to envelop and destroy him. As with the other forms of offensive maneuver, destruction of the opposing force is paramount.

28. PHASES OF OFFENSIVE ACTION

a. Approach March Phase and Attack Positions. The approach march of any unit begins

Figure 14. Comparison of Chinese Communist and U. S. Army Phases of Offensive Action.
when it deploys from the next higher echelon to which it is assigned or attached. The approach march ends when the unit occupies its attack position, or when it deploys its subordinate units under enemy fire, as in a meeting engagement. The attack position of a unit is defined by the Chinese Communists as that location where the commander issues the attack order to his subordinate units and designates their attack or assault positions. Attack positions are utilized only by regiments and smaller units; divisions and larger forces accomplish their deployment in successive assembly areas. Regimental, battalion, and, in some cases, company attack positions in a Chinese offensive are intermediate areas used for successive deployment of subordinate echelons between assembly areas and assault positions.

b. Attack Phase and Assault Positions. In Chinese Communist doctrine, the attack phase begins with the departure from company attack positions and ends with the occupation of company assault positions. It is normally employed only when it is necessary to fight to reach the assault position. Although the attack phase is planned in detail, it is dispensed with when assault companies can make an unobserved approach march (under cover of terrain features, darkness, fog, or smoke) directly from the battalion attack position to assault positions. Assault positions are areas in which companies or platoons receive final instructions, deploy, and prepare to launch the assault on the objective. Assault positions are located as close as possible to the objective and are disposed to facilitate the assault from several directions simultaneously, the main effort being pointed, if possible, at the flanks or rear of the hostile position.

c. Assault Phase. The assault phase begins when units move out in the assault and ends when the initial objective has been overrun and consolidated.

d. Combat-in-Depth Phase. The Chinese Communist combat-in-depth phase commences with the continuation of the attack from the initial objective and includes all subsequent action by fire and maneuver to seize intermediate and final objectives or to force the enemy to retreat so a pursuit can be initiated.

e. Pursuit. The Chinese consider pursuit second only to destruction in place as a means of annihilating the enemy. Intermediate and final objectives for the combat-in-depth phase are selected to facilitate the initiation of the pursuit; if hostile forces become disorganized and commence their retreat prior to the seizure of final objectives, subordinate commanders are directed to commence the pursuit immediately, without completing the combat-in-depth phase.

29. MISSIONS

a. Tactical missions are assigned by combat orders which frequently give detailed instructions to commanders several echelons below the issuing headquarters. For example, it is common practice for army combat orders to assign missions directly to specified infantry regiments. Tactical orders assign both immediate and subsequent missions to subordinate commanders, a practice adopted at the expense of flexibility, to improve control over subordinate units despite limited communications.

b. The immediate mission of the division in the army attack echelon is to break through the enemy main battle position and destroy regimental reserves and artillery positions. Initial division objectives are two to two and a half miles behind the enemy main line of resistance, and their seizure assists in destruction of hostile forces in the enemy main battle position. The subsequent mission normally requires the attack division to develop the breakthrough into the depth of the enemy main defense zone, in coordination with forces in the army support and reserve echelons. Seizure of final division objectives—some six to nine miles deep—should result in destruction of enemy division reserves and heavy artillery, and occupation of terrain from which to support or participate in an attack on the enemy's second defense zone.

c. The immediate mission of the division in the army support echelon is to support the breakthrough of the enemy main battle position by fire and maneuver, or to complete it if
necessary. The subsequent mission usually requires the support division to spearhead the attack through the depth of the hostile main defense zone.

d. In the army attack plan, the army reserve commander is assigned only a general mission which requires him to follow behind the attack and support echelons, prepared to counter a hostile threat or exploit success upon order.

e. The division commander assigns immediate and subsequent missions to his subordinate units—down to and including infantry battalions—indicating the tasks to be accomplished by each. The immediate mission of an assault unit in a Divide-and-Destroy maneuver is normally the capture of an objective in the forward enemy positions. For an assault unit in an envelopment or One Point—Two Sides action, the mission is usually the seizure of an objective that will prevent withdrawal or reinforcement of the enveloped hostile force. The subsequent mission in a penetration may be the seizure of an objective that widens or deepens the gap affected by action in accomplishing the immediate mission, a flanking sweep to isolate certain hostile elements, or a penetration in a new direction to help divide into smaller segments a hostile element already isolated by previous action. In an envelopment, the subsequent mission may be the seizure of an objective that facilitates division of hostile forces already isolated, an attack in a new direction to help isolate additional enemy elements, or the initiation of a pursuit. A unit’s subsequent mission is normally designed to facilitate the accomplishment of the immediate mission of the next higher echelon.

Section IV. THE DEFENSE

30. BASIC PRINCIPLES

a. The defensive is assumed in the face of a superior hostile force to permit concentration and employment of troops in a more decisive sector or to lure the enemy into an area that will facilitate offensive operations against him. The defensive may also be assumed to await a more favorable opportunity for launching a general offensive.

b. Chinese Communist defensive strategy stresses mobile warfare based on localized tactical offensive by subordinate echelons of the force assigned the defensive mission.

c. Where applicable, the Chinese Communist concept of defense includes such measures as trading space for time; complete abandonment, frequently in conjunction with a scorched-earth policy, of areas of little importance; concentration of defensive strength in critical areas; conduct of extensive guerrilla activities in hostile rear areas; and emphasis on psychological warfare to strengthen popular support at home and in rear areas or to promote dissent and unrest among the troops and civilian population of the enemy.

31. TYPES OF DEFENSE

a. The Chinese Communists employ both mobile defense and position defense, but favor the mobile defense since it is best suited to their concept of mobile warfare.

b. Mobile defense tactics are employed when there is sufficient space to trade for time, meanwhile preserving their own forces and inflicting substantial losses on the enemy. Mobile defense tactics are frequently employed to lure an extended hostile force into an engagement where it can be annihilated by overwhelmingly superior forces waiting in ambush.

c. Position defense is employed only when absolutely necessary to deny a vital area to the enemy. The concept is one of firm resistance without retreat from a continuous defensive perimeter; it does not include delaying action on successive positions. In extreme cases, when a prepared position has been overrun by the enemy, the defending forces will fall back into bunkers, call artillery fire and tactical air support onto their own position, and wait to join with counterattacking forces to drive off the enemy.
d. When the frontage assigned a unit exceeds the capability of the unit to organize a continuous position defense, the commander assumes a defense on a wide front. The organization of the sector assigned, however, is based on holding critical terrain features that control adjacent ground rather than on establishing a continuous defensive perimeter. Again there is no idea of falling back to successive positions.

e. Defense against CBR attack includes warning, countermeasures to break up the enemy attack, local activities to protect troops against the effects of CBR agents, and activities to eliminate the effects of contamination subsequent to the attack. Recent Chinese Communist training maneuvers have emphasized training in CBR defense.

32. ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE

da. Army and higher echelons organize their defense from front to rear into three basic zones—the advance zone, the main defense zone, and the second defense zone (fig. 15). The advance zone includes security forces and the combat security positions; the main defense zone includes the main and second battle positions; and the second defense zone is organized and occupied by those troops of the overall commander not otherwise committed. Additional or alternate defense zones farther to the rear are prepared as time and the situation permit.

b. Division and smaller units organize for defense by establishing security positions, main defense positions, and positions in depth. A unit's main defense position and position in depth together comprise the next higher unit's main defense position (zone). The forward edges of all main defense positions (division and below) and zones (army and above) are coincident and delimit the forward edge of the overall commander's main battle position.

33. ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUND

da. As soon as troops arrive in the areas they are to defend, they immediately begin to organize the ground. Organization continues so long as the position is occupied, except during periods of actual combat. Among the first priority construction tasks assigned in the defense zone are—

1. Construction of antitank and antipersonnel mine fields and obstacles and field fortifications in front of the main defense zone.

2. Clearing of fields of observation and fire.

3. Construction of field fortifications, antitank defenses, and connecting trenches in the battalion defense area in the main defense position.

4. Construction of field fortifications, antitank defenses, and connecting trenches in the remainder of the defense zone.

5. Construction of artillery-firing and tank positions.

6. Camouflage and concealment.

b. Fortifications are to be properly located to meet tactical requirements and constructed in depth to permit mutual support and maneuver of troops. In addition they are unusually strong, well concealed, appropriate in size, and have a low silhouette. The importance of field fortifications in executing defensive operations, preserving lives, and protecting supplies and equipment is stressed by Chinese Communist commanders.

c. Wherever possible, defensive positions are established on terrain that itself constitutes an obstacle. Additionally, natural obstacles are improved and artificial obstacles installed, including minefields and antitank ditches.

d. Emphasis is placed on camouflage during preparation for and conduct of the defense. Units disposed within the main defense position especially are required to conceal their positions and troop activities. Commanders at all levels use field expedients and locally available materials to camouflage trenches, bunkers, and individuals. Deceptive camouflage activities are continued even after positions are evacuated.

34. RETROGRADE MOVEMENTS

da. The overall aim of retrograde movements is to facilitate the initiation or resumption of
Figure 15. Simplified Diagram of a Defense Zone on a Normal Front.
the offensive. They are employed in both offensive and defensive operations.

b. Security is stressed as the primary requisite for a successful withdrawal. Consequently, there is strict enforcement of active and passive measures for defense against air, airborne, CBR, and armored attack. Massing of troops, equipment, and supplies in open areas is prohibited. Whenever possible, withdrawals are conducted at night since it reduces the risk of being forced, prematurely, into a decisive engagement and facilitates the undetected movement of large bodies of troops.

c. The Chinese Communists execute what corresponds to a retirement in United States Army doctrine when they wish to decline combat or move to the rear subsequent to a successful relief or withdrawal. If forces executing the retirement are in contact, the initial phase of the action is a withdrawal. After contact with the enemy is broken, the retirement becomes a tactical march away from the enemy; the final assembly area for the march is the terminus of retreat.

d. The Chinese Communists fight a delaying action when they are at a disadvantage and wish to gain time and wear down the enemy. The overall purpose of such an action is to launch a counterassault when the enemy is at a decided disadvantage.

35. THE COUNTERATTACK

a. If the enemy succeeds in penetrating the main defense position of a unit on line, the commander of the next higher echelon strives to contain the enemy by massed fire and to secure the flanks in the sector of the enemy breakthrough. Then, by counterattacks executed by his reserve, he attempts to destroy the enemy in his zone and restore the situation.

b. Whenever possible, the counterattacks are executed in two coordinated thrusts, and at night; each action is initiated early enough for it to be completed before daylight. Counterattack tactics are similar to those employed in offensive operations. The counterattack is supported by all supporting artillery groups that can be brought to bear and by air strikes in close support of ground maneuver elements.

Section V. SPECIAL OPERATIONS

36. INFILTRATION

a. The Chinese Communists in their guerrilla actions, in the operations against the Nationalist forces after World War II, and in the Korean War made frequent and effective use of infiltration. Their doctrine specifies that infiltration tactics, in addition to being used for the collection of intelligence, are intended to create confusion in enemy rear areas; to harass enemy communications, supply lines, and vehicular traffic; to destroy command posts, depots, supply dumps, and key installations; and to delay enemy reinforcements or prevent the withdrawal of defending units.

b. Small units often infiltrate their members individually under cover of darkness and re-group them at a previously designated point. The size of the infiltrating force may vary from a few individuals to a regiment, depending on the mission. Firepower of the infiltrating force
is increased by the issue of additional automatic weapons, light mortars, and grenades. The operation may last from a few hours to several days. Reconnaissance personnel, specially trained for such operations, reportedly often infiltrate in civilian clothes. Airborne units are trained to perform such missions, usually in platoon or company strength, after being dropped into the enemy rear.

37. AIRBORNE

Airborne operations probably will follow the Soviet doctrine which envisages raid-type missions, in strength from platoon to division, rather than massive coordinated airborne assaults. Such operations are planned either as the brief reconnaissance harassing actions discussed above, or as part of a quick link-up plan in coordination with conventional ground forces.

38. AMPHIBIOUS

Amphibious training in the Chinese Communist Army has received increasing emphasis since the well-planned and -executed attack against Nationalist-held I-chiang in January 1955. Equipment and techniques have been steadily modernized. While any large-scale amphibious operation will rely heavily on the use of motorized junks and sampans, Soviet-type landing craft play a large part in current training and are available for actual operations. The Chinese Communists have practiced putting tanks and heavy artillery ashore in addition to the infantry (fig. 18). The I-chiang operation and subsequent landing exercises have included close coordination with naval and air elements.

39. JUNGLE WARFARE

The Chinese Communist ground forces have acquired considerable experience in jungle warfare tactics through operations in Burma and along the southern border of China during World War II, through participation by instructor-observer groups with Viet Minh troops in the Indochina War, and through border defense operations since 1950. Methods used by the Chinese Communist Army for jungle warfare probably would include the employment of streamlined infantry divisions (without armor and heavier artillery); extensive use of infiltration, ambush, and guerrilla tactics in which any single engagement would involve only small units; and close coordination with civilians or
irregular Communist forces for intelligence and logistic support.

40. RICE-FIELD WARFARE

The Chinese Communists have had long experience in combat through areas covered extensively by rice fields. Recently they have made studies on adaptation of past experience to the use of modern heavy weapons across such terrain and claim to have evolved effective methods for overcoming to a large extent the limitations to mobility imposed by rice fields (fig. 19). Such tactical developments would weigh heavily in their favor in the event of any large-scale hostilities in mainland China, Southeast Asia, or Korea.

41. MOUNTAIN WARFARE

a. Some 60 percent of the land area of China is mountainous. Korea, Taiwan, and the areas of Southeast Asia contiguous to China, all possible areas of Communist Chinese military action, are also extremely mountainous. PLA organization is readily adaptable to mountain warfare, and many commanders, at all levels, are qualified by experience in the use of the special tactics required for campaigns in rugged terrain.

b. The Chinese Communist Army, in mountain warfare, has shown a strong preference for night attacks and for advances over ground which might be considered impassable. Objectives are usually hill masses or ridges commanding the routes of communication against which mass attacks are launched, preferably after they have been completely surrounded. Defense is in great depth, where feasible, and immediate counterattacks are mounted to regain any lost ground. Strategically, the Chinese Communists prefer to take advantage of mountainous terrain for the full exploitation of mobile warfare both in the attack and in the defense.

42. WINTER WARFARE

All Chinese Communist combat units are considered capable of winter operations, and some have received specialized ski training (fig. 20). Winter maneuvers throughout Northeast, North, and Northwest China, as well as in the mountainous terrain of Tibet, Tsinghai, and Sinkiang, stress tactical operations under conditions of extreme cold.

43. GUERRILLA WARFARE

Communist China's doctrine for guerrilla warfare has been developed through the years of conflict in which Communist forces faced numerically superior, better trained, and better equipped enemies. Although the PLA has grown to over 2,500,000 well-trained men and is equipped with increasing quantities of modern materiel, its guerrilla capability is still nurtured and considered a valuable addition to its capability for conventional warfare. All ground force units are expected to be prepared for employment in guerrilla warfare, and the militia would be called on to participate in guerrilla
Figure 20. Ski Troops on Winter Maneuvers.

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actions within the borders of Communist China. In Southeast Asia, the terrain, the political situation, and the logistics-communications problems would require almost exclusive reliance on guerrilla tactics. Weapons would be no heavier than those which can be carried by their crews with a minimum of animal transport; the units committed probably would be battalion-size or smaller. Control at the strategic level, however, would coordinate every aspect of such a campaign. In physical stamina, organization, equipment, and leadership, the Chinese Communist Army is eminently suited for this type of warfare.
CHAPTER 4. ORGANIZATION OF THE FIELD FORCES

Section I. DEVELOPMENT AND TRENDS

44. PAST REORGANIZATIONS

Four successive reorganizations have established the Chinese Communist Army in its present form. In 1949 the primarily guerrilla forces were in a gradual process of transition toward more conventional organization. Beginning early in 1951, a sweeping reorganization adapted these armies for participation in the Korean War. In 1953, with the Korean cease-fire, further modifications took place. Finally, in June 1955, as a result of the combat experiences of the previous few years and the receipt of increased quantities of modern materiel from the Soviet Union, a formal reorganization was undertaken which has not yet been completed, but which will probably set the standard for the foreseeable future (fig. 21).

45. PRESENT STATUS AND TRENDS

a. Notwithstanding efforts to standardize, there is still considerable variance within units. The materiel being provided by the U.S.S.R. and produced in China is insufficient to equip all units according to a standard TOE, and quantities of nonstandard items captured from the Nationalist Chinese forces, from the Japanese, or from the United Nations forces in Korea are still in use. Although a standard TOE has been adopted, commanders are given considerable flexibility in the organization of their forces to meet special tactical situations or terrain and weather conditions.

b. The two highest tactical and administrative echelons in wartime and the theater of operations, or equivalent, and the field army or army group—consisting of several armies each. These organizations are currently nonexistent, but they, or their equivalents, would probably be reconstituted in the event of a prolonged, major operational situation.

c. The trend of the latest reorganization was toward a general adaptation of Soviet models to the Chinese situation. Staff and overhead personnel have been reduced, and service and sup-

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Figure 21. The Modern Chinese Communist Army—Infantry-Armor Attack.
Port elements have been strengthened. Increased firepower and the addition of engineer, chemical warfare, antiaircraft, and motor transport components have considerably improved operational flexibility and combat effectiveness.

Section II. ARMS AND SERVICES

46. INFANTRY

Infantry still constitutes the overwhelming bulk of the Chinese Communist Army, though supporting arms and services are steadily increasing. The infantry arm has no separate headquarters at PLA level; as the essential element of the ground forces it is controlled directly by the staff departments of PLA Headquarters rather than through a separate headquarters at PLA level as are some of the other arms and services. Each Chinese Communist army (fig. 22) is composed of three infantry divisions, each comprised of three infantry regiments, a tank-assault gun regiment, and an artillery regiment, plus headquarters and support elements (fig. 23).

47. ARMOR

Armored forces in the Chinese Communist Army include tank and assault-gun units plus those involved in the maintenance and support work normally handled by ordnance personnel in the United States Army. Armored elements of the CCA include armored divisions (fig. 24), separate tank regiments, and the tank-assaultgun regiment organic to the infantry division. At the PLA level, Armor Headquarters is responsible for the purely branch aspects of administration, logistics, and training.

Army

Army

Strength 56,400

Headquarters

And Staff

1,900

Reconnaissance

Battalion

500

Guard

Battalion

400

Infantry

Division

17,600

Engineer

Battalion

500

Signal

Battalion

300

Notes: 1. Strengths are those of units under full wartime TOE rounded off, not those of actual units at present.

2. There may be an organic smoke and flame-thrower battalion at army level.

3. Artillery is normally allocated to the army for further allocation to lower echelons as required.

Figure 22. Chinese Communist Army.
NOTE: Strengths are those of full wartime TOE, rounded off.

Figure 23. Chinese Communist Infantry Division.
Figure 24. Chinese Communist Armored Division.
48. ARTILLERY

a. General. The term artillery, as used by the Chinese Communists, includes conventional field artillery weapons, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, and recoilless rifles (fig. 25). Organizationally, some of this equipment is found in infantry units as well as in field, antitank, and antiaircraft artillery units. Field and antitank artillery, other than that organic to line units, is allocated to subordinate echelons by the Artillery Headquarters at the PLA level. The three types of artillery are organized as indicated below.

Figure 25. 152-mm Howitzers.

b. Field Artillery. There are two types of field artillery divisions in the CCA: One, the Howitzer Division (fig. 26(2)) is the Chinese parallel to the Soviet Breakthrough Division; the other, the Gun Division (fig. 26(1)), is similar to the Soviet Gun Division. There are also field artillery regiments organic to infantry and armored divisions—and perhaps to army—and artillery (heavy weapons) battalions organic to public security divisions and infantry regiments. Truck-mounted multiple rocket launchers are organized, according to TOE, into one regiment in each Howitzer Division; rocket launcher divisions, observed in Korea, may still exist. Self-propelled artillery units are considered by the Chinese Communists to be armor.

c. Antitank Artillery. Antitank artillery is organized in independent divisions (fig. 27), in battalions organic to the infantry division, and in companies organic to the heavy weapons battalion of the infantry regiment.

d. Antiaircraft Artillery. Antiaircraft artillery organization provides for divisions with a flexible organization (fig. 28) and for separate regiments. Some of the units are composed of Army personnel, some of Air Force, and some of Navy; the Air Defense Headquarters at PLA level exercises over-all control and coordination.
Figure 26. Chinese Communist Artillery Division.

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NOTES: 1  Strengths shown are those of full wartime TOE, rounded off.

2  24 antitank guns per regiment; one regiment of 57-mm. guns, one of 85-mm. guns, one of 100-mm. guns and one of 57-mm. and 76-mm. guns mixed.

Figure 27. Chinese Communist Antitank Artillery Division.
Figure 28. Chinese Communist Antiaircraft Artillery Division.
Figure 29. Chinese Communist Cavalry Division.
49. CAVALRY
There are a few cavalry units in the CCA, intended primarily for employment in the rugged terrain most common in western and northwestern China. They are organized in divisions (fig. 29) and possibly in independent regiments. They are primarily a mounted light infantry force, with excellent reconnaissance capabilities.

50. AIRBORNE
The CCA has airborne troops organized in divisions. They are equipped along Soviet lines (fig. 30) and use the Soviet doctrine for small-scale employment followed by rapid link-up with conventional ground forces. In addition to troops in airborne units, Communist China has a large number of partially qualified parachutists trained through the civil and military athletic programs.

![Figure 30. Chinese Communist Airborne Troops.](image)

51. PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES
The public security forces of the PLA are distinct from the civil public security agencies which are under the Ministry of Public Security. They are organized in divisions and regiments (fig. 31), classified according to mission as Border Defense or Internal Security units. According to the Chinese Communists, they are "an armed political enforcement agency and a further armed force in time of war". In organization they are similar to regular infantry divisions and regiments, but their armament is lighter and less standardized. They are not considered capable of independent, sustained, full-scale combat operations.

52. ENGINEERS
a. There are two principal types of engineer units in the CCA. One type, considered by Peiping to be combat units, consists of the engineer regiments employed at army level, the engineer battalions organic to army and infantry divisions, and the engineer companies organic to other combat units. The missions of these units include the preparation of fortifications, laying and removing mines and obstacles, demolition work, bridging, and highway maintenance in the combat zone. Railway engineer divisions may be included within this type, since their wartime mission requires them to keep rail lines open throughout the combat zone; their peacetime work is principally the repair, improvement, and expansion of the rail communications net on the Chinese mainland.

b. The second type of engineer unit is a quasi-military rather than a combat unit. It includes construction engineer divisions and agricultural divisions, and it has the mission of contributing to the national economy more than to the operations of the Armed Forces. They are composed largely of drafted civilian labor and demobilized servicemen, although they are under PLA control and are organized along military lines.

53. SIGNAL
The Chinese Communists regard the PLA signal units as combat elements. They comprise the independent regiments that are usually employed at the army level, the battalions organic to armies and infantry divisions, and the companies organic to other combat units. In addition to the normal military functions of signal units, they make substantial contributions to the civil communications network in China.

54. MOTOR TRANSPORT
CCA units have considerably less organic motor transport than have comparable United States Army units. It is organized into the transportation battalions of the armies and divisions, and into independent motor transport regiments (fig. 32). The latter augment the former in meeting army and division transportation requirements and provide the transpor-
Figure 31. Chinese Communist Public Security Division.
Regiment:
20xTrk, 1/4 Ton
525xTrk, 4x2/6x6
14xTrk, Wrecker

Battalion: 5xTrk, 1/4 Ton
140xTrk, 4x2/6x6
4xTrk, Wrecker

Figure 32. Chinese Communist Motor Transport Regiment.
tation support for the many units still lacking organic motor transport. The military motor transport units are also used in meeting the transportation requirements of the national economy.

55. CHEMICAL WARFARE

Chemical warfare units in the CCA are organic to other tactical units, and the Chinese Communists regard them as combat elements. A chemical warfare company is organic to the division, and a chemical warfare platoon is organic to the regiment. Their missions are primarily CBR reconnaissance and decontamination, but they also operate flamethrowers and smoke-generating equipment, and presumably are responsible for handling local storage and distribution of toxic materials.

56. MEDICAL

Medical units are organized under the rear service departments of the army, division, and regiment. The army has a battalion-size medical section capable of operating from two to five mobile field hospitals. There is a medical battalion at division level and a medical company at regimental level. Medical troops also staff the military hospitals throughout China, probably with considerable civilian augmentation.

Section III. COMMAND AND STAFF

57. GENERAL

Inasmuch as the armed forces are an instrument of the Chinese Communist Party, command and staff responsibilities in the CCA are exercised through two parallel chains—one military, the other political (fig. 33). Coordination is achieved informally by the personal relationships of individual commanders with their political counterparts, and formally by the operation of the Party Committees at the various levels, insuring Party control throughout.

58. THE MILITARY STAFF

Military staffs in the CCA operate down through the battalion level. Their functions are much the same as those of similar staffs in Western Armies except that some phases of intelligence work are the responsibility of the political staffs and administration is considered to be on a level somewhat below operations, training, and logistics.

59. THE POLITICAL STAFF

A political department, in a direct chain of command under the General Political Department at PLA Headquarters, is organic to every headquarters down through regiment. There are political commissars and their assistants as counterparts of the commanders and deputy commanders at every echelon from army down through regiment, and political officers and their assistants as counterparts of the commanders and assistant commanders at battalion and company level. The CCA is thus threaded through with a political organization charged with the indoctrination and “cultural” education of all personnel; with surveillance; with some security, intelligence, and counterintelligence functions; and with supervision of the Party’s interests in personnel matters relating to assignments, promotions, disciplinary action, awards, and reenlistment.

60. POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

Party control is considered as essential in the Armed Forces as it is in the national government. Such control is attained by giving important assignments to Party members, and by the political system which parallels the military chain of command and in which the political officers and military commanders share command responsibility. The commissar and political officer are expected to be fully qualified militarily as well as soundly indoctrinated in ideological background. Differences in viewpoint between commanders and their political counterparts are known to have arisen, particularly over such matters as military versus political training or the exercise of command during maneuvers. In such instances the political department usually dominates. At each level in the Armed Forces—of which the commander is a member—the Party Committee is the ultimate organ of policy.
Figure 33. Double Staff Organization, Chinese Communist Infantry Division.
Section IV. EVALUATION

61. IMPORTANCE OF PRESENT STANDARDIZATION

The Chinese Communist Army has improved significantly since facing the United Nations Forces in Korea. It is better equipped, better organized, and better trained. The new organization has been the single most important factor in improving combat effectiveness of the CCA by providing for the efficient use of increased quantities of materiel and by facilitating standardization of intensified training throughout the Armed Forces.

62. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

The total strength of Communist China’s Armed Forces probably will remain relatively stable for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, continuation of the reorganization and modernization processes may result in further modifications within the PLA. As sufficient armor becomes available all infantry divisions may have the tank-assault gun regiment, and additional armored divisions may be organized. With the availability of more transport aircraft, some infantry divisions may be converted into airborne divisions. Increases in amphibious transport capabilities may lead to the formation of an amphibious command. Such developments, however, probably will be effected within the flexible framework already established by the military reorganization of 1955.
CHAPTER 5. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

Section I. THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER

63. GENERAL

Traditionally the Chinese soldier has been of peasant background—physically sturdy, accustomed to hardship, possessed of sound common sense but naive, practically illiterate, and little interested in matters not directly affecting himself, his family, or his village. His obedience was insured either by fear or by intense personal loyalty to his commander; his profession was regarded with contempt by the general populace. The Communist regime has attempted to improve this situation and has been largely successful.

64. PRE-SERVICE BACKGROUND

a. Most Chinese Communist conscripts are, as in the past, drawn from the peasants who constitute some 80 percent of China's population. Their physical condition is usually excellent, they are better educated than were the conscripts of the pre-Communist period, and all have been subjected to intensive political indoctrination.

b. Where previously the literate private was a rare exception, the present conscript generally has had enough basic education to enable him to understand the simpler troop publications. Constant indoctrination and Party activities in the recruit's home village have made him aware of the value of membership in the Youth Corps or in the Party, and have accustomed him to the patterns of Party control. Theoretically, loyalty to the Party has supplanted loyalty to individual commanders (fig. 35). Standards of technical background are being improved gradually, but the lack of technically proficient conscripts will continue to be a major handicap for the Chinese Communist forces for some time. Finally, a determined campaign to enhance the prestige and social standing of the military service as a whole has largely overcome the traditional contempt for the soldier.

65. CHARACTERISTICS

a. In the service, the individual soldier is integrated into a politico-military system which leaves little time of his own and virtually no privacy. Every minute of his day is spent under the supervision either of military superiors or of political personnel. Under basic policy specifying the ascendancy of political guidance over the military, he is subjected to a pervasive and continuous indoctrination designed to shape every aspect of his thought and action. The efficacy of this indoctrination on personnel who are both naive and possessed of strong common sense is difficult to assess; there is, however, no evidence of any overt discontent within the lower ranks of the Armed Forces.

b. The Chinese Communist soldier is a hard
and willing worker, able to improvise under a wide variety of conditions. Strong appeals are made to his national pride and Party loyalty. Fear of ideological criticism presumably serves as further motivation. In literacy and technical proficiency he still falls below Western standards; however, in physical condition and ability to bear hardships he is probably superior to the average Western soldier. Properly trained and led, he makes an outstanding fighting man.

Section II. RANK AND PAY STRUCTURE

66. RANK

a. Until 1955, the Chinese Communist Armed Forces had no system of personal rank. Instead, positional rank was used to designate an individual's position within the Army. Personnel holding positions from assistant platoon leader up were considered officers and those occupying positions of squad leader and assistant squad leader, or their equivalents, were considered noncommissioned officers. Two regulations passed in 1955 formally established an officer corps and introduced noncommissioned officer grades in the service.

b. The laws established four classes of commissioned officers:

(1) Marshal (two grades);

(2) general (four grades);

(3) field (four grades); and

(4) company (four grades).

There since has been established a rank of warrant officer, which is the equivalent of sublieutenant and is believed to be used in command positions rather than in administrative positions. The three grades of noncommissioned officers are senior sergeant, sergeant, and corporal. There are three grades below corporal—private first class, private second class, and recruit.

c. The rank of Senior Marshal, which as yet has not been conferred, is reserved for those who distinguished themselves in the civil war against the Nationalists. The rank of Marshal,
so far conferred only on 10 of the top military leaders, also appears to be an honor given for past revolutionary services. All other officers fall into one of eight categories: Command, political, technical, quartermaster, medical, veterinary, judge advocate, and administrative. Command and political officers are those holding positions in infantry, armor, cavalry, artillery, engineer, railway, signal, technical service, public security, air defense, air and naval units.

67. PAY

a. By Western standards, military pay is low, but service personnel enjoy a higher standard of living than the average civilian in Communist China. Compensation for the recruits and privates compares favorably with the purchasing power of the Chinese peasant, and the pay of noncommissioned officers approximates that of semiskilled and skilled civilian factory workers. The pay of officers is close to that of professional civilians. The following table presents the ranks and estimated pay structure of the Chinese Communist Army as standardized in 1956 and modified in 1958. In addition to the base pay shown, there are certain fringe benefits and allowances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese Communist rank</th>
<th>United States equivalent</th>
<th>Estimated monthly pay (U. S. dollar equivalent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Marshal</td>
<td>(None)</td>
<td>(Unknown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshal</td>
<td>General of the Army</td>
<td>(Unknown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior General</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>(Unknown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Colonel] General</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>(Unknown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Major General</td>
<td>(Unknown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Brigadier General</td>
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<td>(Unknown)</td>
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<td>Colonel</td>
<td>$85.00</td>
</tr>
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<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
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<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal [Junior Sergeant]</td>
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<td>$2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recruit</td>
<td>$2.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section III. MANPOWER AND PROCUREMENT

68. GENERAL

Manpower is not a factor that limits the size of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces. Of a total population of 667,560,000 (as of 1 January 1960), there are an estimated 173,760,000 males of the ages 15 to 49, of whom 84,850,000 are considered physically fit. As of the end of 1959, about 7,000,000 had had military service.

69. THE CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM

a. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution in 1954 and the passage of the Military Service
Law in 1955, manpower for the Chinese Communist Armed Forces was obtained by a so-called "volunteer" system. "Volunteering" was induced by appeals to patriotism, pressures on the recruit's family, threats, or resort to "pressgang" methods. Local authorities were given quotas to fill, and certain categories tended to be exempted. Enlistment was for an indeterminate period with no promise of ever being permitted to leave the service.

b. The new Constitution of 1954 stated: "It is the sacred duty of every citizen of the People's Republic of China to defend the homeland. It is an honorable duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to perform military service according to law." Almost immediately a test was made of the proposed conscription law which was subsequently enacted on 1 July 1955.

c. The Military Service Law of 1955 prescribes that when a male citizen reaches the age of 18 he is liable for military service and must register. The individual registers with the village councils or city police stations, and the registrations are forwarded through the local and provincial administrative agencies to Peiping where provincial conscription quotas are determined and are assigned to provinces by the State Council. Provincial military service committees further assign quotas to political subdivisions within the provinces. At the lowest level, military service committees select individuals for conscription according to criteria set forth in the military service laws and regulations. Those selected are given a physical examination and inducted by military service bureaus of local military territorial commands. The military service law makes no provisions for voluntary enlistment although young men desiring to enlist probably can arrange for their selection with their local military service committee. Conscripts have no choice of service, and the vast majority of selectees are assigned to the ground forces. The conscription year runs from 1 March through 28 February of the succeeding year. The annual registration and draft period is from 1 November through 28 February of the succeeding year. Female specialists may be drafted into the peacetime reserve and mobilized in time of need.

d. The term of service is three years for the Army and public security forces, four years for the Air Force and Naval security forces, and five years for Naval forces. The term of service may be extended as much as four months without specific authority, and the Ministry of National Defense may further extend an individual's term of active service. Although no provisions are made for reenlistment, a small number of selected specially qualified enlisted men are permitted to remain on extended active duty.

e. Officer personnel are obtained by commissioning service school graduates and noncommissioned officers who pass selective examinations or who have attended special training courses. In wartime, battlefield commissions may be given. Most new officers under present conditions have at least an elementary school (six-year) education acquired either prior to their entry into the service or by off-duty schooling in the Army. Age criteria for commissioned personnel are established by the military service law. Promotions to and within general-officer grade are made by the State Council, to and within field grade by the Ministry of National Defense, and within company grade by the military region commanders or chief of the appropriate arm or service. Authority to place general and field-grade officers on the reserve list or retire them lies with the Premier and Minister of National Defense, respectively. Similar authority over company-grade officers is vested in the field commanders and chiefs of the arms and services.

Section IV. TRAINING AND SCHOOLS

70. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TRAINING

Training in the ground forces is divided formally into three categories: Military, political, and "cultural". The first is the responsibility of military commanders, under the supervision of the General Training Department of Headquar-
ters, PLA; the latter two are the responsibility of political officers under the General Political Department. In practice, however, the General Political Department takes precedence and exercises an indirect supervisory function over the General Training Department, even in training matters that are purely military. Within the various units, moreover, political influence dominates every phase of the training program.

71. THE TRAINING CYCLE

a. There is one standard training year for all PLA units, freely modified to accord with type of unit, geographical or climatic conditions, and operational responsibilities. This training year consists of 140 training days in 7 training months so scheduled through the calendar year that the intervals between training periods will coincide with the periods when troops will be needed for production or construction duties.

b. Under the training cycle, each month is composed of four training weeks of five training days each. However, training is also conducted on Saturdays and Sundays and on the last two or three days of each month. Most such days are used for extra or make-up training or for unit housekeeping. Sunday, theoretically the Chinese soldier’s “day off”, is usually spent in semisupervised study and military or political activities.

c. The training year begins in April, after the receipt and processing of the annual crop of recruits, and progresses through individual and small unit training (fig. 36); then through company, battalion, and regimental training; and culminates in regimental, divisional, or higher level maneuvers in November and December. Testing, of both individuals and units, is a continuing process, terminating in end-of-the-year inspections. Units are allowed, on occasion, to accelerate their training programs, but examination standards are not lowered, and it appears that the required number of training hours must be spent on each prescribed subject.
72. TRAINING METHODS AND TRENDS

a. The Chinese Communists recognize that the effectiveness of any training program is dependent on the qualifications of the instructors. They have met this problem in their Armed Forces by providing courses for instructors prior to the beginning of the training year, by establishing off-duty schools to give middle-school and specialized college educations to all cadres, and by leaning heavily on "old soldiers" to instruct recruits in the elements of drill, military customs and courtesies, and the handling of weapons (fig. 37).

b. Concurrent training in the field receives special emphasis, with a view to combining instruction in many subjects in as short a time as possible under realistic conditions. Night training is considered of great importance (fig. 38). Each unit participates in a campaign for "one specialty and many skills", in which each
soldier is expected to become proficient in several jobs.

c. The "Military Thought of Mao Tse-tung" (par. 22) is considered the basic guidance in all training and in all strategic or tactical planning. It is actually a compendium of MAO's studies on strategy, tactics, and politico-military relationships from the late 1920's to date. Training doctrine states that, at various stages of the Chinese Communist revolution, MAO provided specific solutions for immediate military problems, but that these past solutions are not intended to be applied blindly to present or future conditions. The "fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism", applied by MAO under previous circumstances, are to be studied and reapplied, to present conditions, after the manner of MAO.

73. OFFICER AND NCO TRAINING

a. Noncommissioned officers in the CCA are drawn primarily from the conscripts in their second or third year of service. Privates who have shown promise, militarily and politically, are sent to the division training battalion where they receive a three-month course to qualify them as squad leaders. Graduates return to their units and are assigned as squad leaders or assistant squad leaders in the grade of corporal. Subsequent training, except in technical specialties, is on the job.

b. Junior officers are drawn from two sources—civilian school graduates who have a technical or administrative background and are commissioned as specialists, and noncommissioned officers who have demonstrated their command ability and political reliability and have successfully completed a basic course at a service school. Political officers receive on-the-job training in military specialties, and all officers attend off-duty schools to raise their educational level and increase their professional competence.

c. Commanders and political officers above company level and staff officers, specialists, and administrative cadres are required to spend several months each year as privates or as platoon or company officers (fig. 39). This program is regarded as both political and military training, intended to improve officer-enlisted relations and to familiarize those going "back to the ranks" with current problems, activities, and attitudes at basic levels in the armed forces.

74. THE MILITARY SCHOOL SYSTEM

The Chinese Communists have established an adequate and well-coordinated military school system, providing for branch training of officers of all levels, and for technical training of specialists in such fields as engineering, motor mechanics, radio or radar operation and repair, medicine, and chemical warfare. The curricula include necessary "cultural" courses (literacy, basic mathematics, and history), military courses varying with the type of school, and the omnipresent political courses. Soviet advisors, though formerly present in some numbers, seem to have been withdrawn from most schools. The entire system is under the joint supervision of the General Training Department and the General Political Department of the Headquarters, PLA. A strong effort is being made to improve military schooling and thus increase the technical and leadership potential of the Armed Forces.
75. TROOP LABOR VERSUS TRAINING

a. The Chinese Communist Armed Forces are considered a tool of the Party both for combat and for “socialist construction”. Under a January 1959 directive of the PLA General Political Department, every troop unit is required to spend from one to two months annually on agricultural or industrial projects (fig. 40). Such utilization of the man-power pool available in the Armed Forces is intended to contribute to the national economy by making troop units partially self-sufficient and by using troop labor to fill gaps in the overall production effort. It is further intended to improve relationships between the military and the civil populace.

b. Since intervals between phases of the annual training cycle are scheduled to coincide with periods when the demand for labor is greatest, and since the schedule is sufficiently flexible to permit considerable readjustment, the troop labor program presents no serious obstacle to accomplishing the prescribed training goals. Disaster relief, emergency projects, and operation requirements may also demand considerable rescheduling of training, but the training time actually spent by the PLA compares favorably with that spent by United States Forces.

Figure 40. Troops Building a Reservoir.
CHAPTER 6. LOGISTICS

Section I. GENERAL

76. GENERAL

The Chinese Communist Army, with Soviet material and advisory assistance, has been re-organizing since 1954 to provide increased technical and logistical support at all levels. Although considerable improvement is evident in comparison with Chinese Communist units employed in Korea, Chinese Communist units still are not so well equipped or logistically supported as were United States units during World War II. The Chinese Communist Army is primarily equipped with Soviet-type material, and its logistical system and practices generally follow those of the Soviet Army. The Chinese Communists were, in the past, able to satisfy only the minimal logistic requirements of their forces. With modernization, however, there will result a greater strain on the transportation network and supply system than heretofore because of dependence on heavier equipment. It is believed that the increased logistic requirements in any future major operation would severely tax their logistical system.

Section II. PROCUREMENT AND STORAGE

77. PROCUREMENT

a. Materiel and Supply Categories. The Chinese Communists have four categories of supply:

1. Rations;
2. Clothing and equipment;
3. Fuels; and
4. Ammunition and ordnance equipment.

Rations include both food and forage. Organizational and individual clothing and equipment, excluding ordnance and major engineer equipment, fall within the second category. Fuels are divided into POL and solid fuels, i.e., coal, charcoal, and wood. The fourth category includes both individual and crew-served weapons, ammunition, vehicles, small parts for weapons and vehicles, demolition materials, chemical bombs, gas masks, and protective clothing.

b. Priorities and Allocations. The State Council determines basic policies for fiscal allocations and apportioning of material resources for national defense. Within the State Council, the First Ministry of Machine Building is believed to control the nation's defense industries and to establish the priorities for production and procurement of military supplies. Allocations to the various services within the Armed Forces are established by the Ministry of National Defense subject to approval by the State Council. The General Rear Service Department of the Headquarters, PLA is charged with overall logistical responsibility. Specific requirements and procurement programs probably are prepared by the headquarters of the arms and services.

c. Procurement Sources. Local procurement still is common and probably is coordinated by the rear service staff and its agencies. Rations are frequently purchased locally, and troop units are encouraged to grow their own vegetables and to raise animals for meat with which to supplement regular rations (fig. 41). Regional commands maintain close liaison with civilian manufacturing plants and warehouses and are permitted to make purchases within their budgetary allowances. Individual and organizational clothing and equipment is produced both by clothing factories under state control and by the production section of the General Rear Service Department. POL re-

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Figure 41. Troop Units Provide Much of Their Own Food.

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sources are limited and depend to a great extent on imports. Other fuels are procured locally by rear service units. Military vehicles are procured from both domestic and foreign sources. The Chinese Communists produce much of their small arms, mortars, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, light and medium artillery pieces, and ammunition. They are producing trucks and have recently developed the capability to produce limited numbers of Soviet-type medium tanks. However, they are still dependent upon the Soviet Union and the Bloc countries for much of their armored equipment; heavy artillery and its ammunition; and specialized technical equipment.

78. STORAGE

a. System of Storage. The storage and issue of supplies is believed to be accomplished through supply depots maintained by the military region command under the supervision of the region rear service department (fig. 42). Each military region may have three or more major supply depots to which supplies are transported directly from the factories, arsenals, and civilian warehouses, or from the railhead if the items have been imported. From the depots, supplies are distributed to subdepots or to army-level supply installations from where they are further distributed to division or regimental dumps (fig. 43). In each of these distributions, the senior echelon is responsible for transportation of the supplies to the subordinate echelon.

b. Stockpiles. In view of the modernization program which began in 1954, stockpiles probably are limited to minor quantities of older items which have been removed from service. Not all units are standard-equipped with major items, and it is doubtful that any significant stockpiling has been accomplished. Rations and clothing are generally procured on a yearly production basis with little opportunity for stockpiling. Not all units have received the newer weapons and heavy equipment, including armor, a fact which indicates that production of these items has not yet matched demand and that they are not being stockpiled. Ammunition production exceeds normal training requirements and current operational expenditures and probably has permitted some stockpiling.

79. RESPONSIBILITY

The quartermaster section of the rear service departments is responsible for the supply of both individual and organizational clothing and equipment. POL is requisitioned by the region rear service department, whereas solid fuels are the responsibility of the food and forage section of the rear services unit at army level. Ammunition is requisitioned directly from arsenals.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{ Military Regions are within mainland China and generally are adaptable to a peacetime situation. Fronts and theaters are organized in wartime and for logistics purposes may be considered similar to military regions.}\]
and stored in military region dumps for distribution by the regional command ordnance officer. Vehicles, spare parts, and tools are also requisitioned by the regional command ordnance officer. Water supply is a function of the engineer in each organization.

80. SUPPLY CHANNELS

The region commander, through his rear service staff, combines overall theater logistical planning with the operation of the supply system. This arrangement provides the initial tactical link between the armed services and national sources of war materiel. From theater sources, supplies are moved directly to army-level logistics facilities in or near the combat zone, from which the army rear service staff is responsible for moving supplies forward to using units. Supply responsibilities are maintained at each subordinate echelon within the normal chain of command with requisitions being consolidated by the higher headquarters. The impetus for supply movement is forward from the higher to the lower commands.

Section IV. MOVEMENT

81. GENERAL

a. The Chinese Communists move troop units by rail, by motor, by air, and by foot both in China and in theaters of operations. Reserves and reinforcements in combat are moved as far forward as possible by rail or motor vehicles, often assuming tactical march formations after they detrain or detruck. The limited number of aircraft probably would restrict air movement to airborne operations and to the administrative movement of command and technical personnel.

b. Troop movements are divided into two general categories by the Chinese Communists: movement by transportation means and marches. Transportation means are used to move units from one place to another when there is little or no threat of ground attack. Marches are most often conducted in the forward area of a combat zone.

82. RAIL MOVEMENTS

Troops traveling by rail are, for the most part, carried in 30-ton freight cars, with the platoon serving as the basic unit of car loading. Notwithstanding the varying size of platoons, an average of 48 persons, their personal weapons and equipment, and the platoon’s organizational equipment are loaded in a boxcar. Heavier or more bulky items, such as tanks, artillery, and trucks, are hauled on 30- to 50-ton flatcars (fig. 44); animals ride in high-sided gondolas. A typical train of both troops and equipment will average 30 cars and carry the equivalent of 1 infantry battalion. As a result of POL shortages and the inadequacies of the roads, probably at least 85 percent of the long-distance moves on the mainland are accomplished by rail.

83. MOTOR MOVEMENTS

a. The Chinese Communists generally lack experience in large-scale motor marches, and their overall efficiency is relatively low. However, Communist recognition of the flexibility and speed of concentration offered by motor transportation, coupled with increased numbers of vehicles for the ground forces, probably will result in increased use of the motor march. In most areas of densely populated China, highways parallel railroads; however, they are not well maintained and they are not all-weather in many instances. As a result, only five percent of troop movements are believed to be made by motor transport. Short hauls accomplish the movement of tremendous tonnages but do not
compare favorably with rail movement on a ton \times mile basis.

b. Operating over typical Chinese roads, military convoys average 15 miles per hour during daylight and travel about 120 miles per day. At night the speed is reduced to about 10 miles per hour. A typical truck load consists of 13 to 16 men, their personal gear, and a proportionate share of organizational equipment (fig. 45).

84. AIR MOVEMENT

Not much is known of Chinese Communist capabilities to make administrative air movements for non-airborne troops. It is believed, however, that only high-priority equipment and personnel would be airlifted because of other demands for the limited number of aircraft. The tactical movement of airborne troops is possible; however, the limited capacity of available aircraft precludes the airdrop of heavy equipment (fig. 46).

85. WATER MOVEMENT

Military water movement is normally limited to the transport of supplies except in the employment of troops in a waterborne operation. The limited standard lift capability, utilizing
military-type invasion craft, could be augmented by the thousands of junks which are available in coastal areas and could carry troops with light equipment (fig. 47). The waterways often restrict the size of the craft that can be utilized and add to the shipment time owing to the slow rate of travel. However, in $tons \times miles$ about 10 percent of the military movement of supplies is by water.

86. FOOT MOVEMENTS

Prior to the increase in motor transport units, the Chinese Communists considered the foot march the most reliable method for large-scale troop movements, and great emphasis still is placed on march conditioning (fig. 48). Now, however, administrative marches are made only when transportation is lacking. The normal march day is 7 to 8 hours; a march of 10 or 12 hours is regarded as a forced march. The maximum for forced marches is 16 hours per day. Daylight marches average 3 miles per hour over roads, whereas night marches average 2 miles.
per hour. Cross-country march rates are reduced to 1 mile per hour. Modification of these rates is necessary if great distances are involved; for instance, in Korea large units marched 200 to 300 miles but averaged only 20 miles per day.

Section V. MATERIEL REPAIR, MAINTENANCE, EVACUATION, AND SALVAGE

87. RESPONSIBILITY

Repair and maintenance of equipment is a command responsibility; however, standards are low, facilities limited, and trained technicians are few. The Chinese have three categories of maintenance and repair—"minor", "medium", and "major"—but there is no clear distinction between these categories. It appears that the ability or inability to perform the maintenance and repair, rather than the category, determines the echelon at which it is performed.

88. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT

The maintenance of individual clothing and equipment below army level is the responsibility of the quartermaster section of rear service units. "Minor" clothing repairs are accomplished by the individual soldiers; and, prior to seasonal issues, "major" repair programs are undertaken by theater or military region command installations utilizing civilian facilities within the area (fig. 49).

89. ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT

a. Individual and crew-served weapons and vehicles comprise the major items of equipment in this category that require maintenance. Using units at company and battalion level begin the process by performing necessary preventive maintenance. Regimental units perform "minor" repairs, which include periodic checks, replacement of subassemblies, and fabrication of simple tools. "Medium" repairs are performed at division and major army unit level. Neither parts nor facilities are available at division level or below for "major" repairs.

b. Repair at army level is minimal since army units must remain mobile in time of combat (fig. 50). Materiel which cannot readily be repaired at army level is either cannibalized for parts or sent to a salvage and rebuild installation of the theater or military region command.
Major items of equipment damaged in combat seldom are replaced except during prolonged engagements, and even then replacement parts frequently may not be available. Therefore, attrition rates are high in comparison with those of Western Armies.

c. Recovery of equipment from the battlefield is stressed by the Chinese Communists. Theater technical service chiefs are responsible for instituting a recovery program. The army transportation officer is responsible for recovering vehicles in coordination with the army ordnance officer, and the latter also supervises the collection of other ordnance equipment. At army and division level each service maintains a collecting point for salvage materiel at rear area supply installations. Below division a single point is established for salvage of all classes of material. Special regimental, battalion, or company teams are organized to search the battle area and collect materiel for salvage (fig. 51).

Section VI. MEDICAL SERVICES

90. EVACUATION

a. The Chinese Communists' medical evacuation program emphasizes saving of the wounded for future combat rather than upon the saving of human life. By Western standards, evacuation, medical care, and the quality of medical personnel are poor. Within the wartime theater command, there are three echelons of evacuation: (1) To regiment (2) to army, and (3) to army group or theater.

b. Initial evacuation of a casualty from the battlefield is accomplished by company aid men who also administer first aid (fig. 52). Battalion teams evacuate from company areas to the battalion aid station where doctors provide emergency treatment prior to evacuation to regiment, where more doctors and medical personnel are available for emergency operations, classification, and record administration (fig. 53).

c. Evacuation from regiment to army is accomplished by utilizing returning supply vehi-
the wounded until they have recovered or are evacuated to hospitals in the zone of the interior. The theater rear service department may include specialized medical service units that may provide evacuation service by road, rail, or air.

91. BURIAL AND GRAVES REGISTRATION

The army surgeon is responsible for burial and graves registration services. Combined political, medical, and transportation sections supervise the clearing of the battlefield, select burial sites, and perform necessary ceremonies. Detailed records are kept for field-grade and general officers, and their bodies are shipped home for burial. All others are interred by mass burial, sometimes in a common grave. Casualty reports are forwarded through command, political, and medical channels to provide the basis for requests for replacements and for pension payments to the serviceman’s survivors.

Figure 53. Evacuation by Litter Bearers.
CHAPTER 7. WEAPONS

Section I. GENERAL

92. GENERAL
The Chinese Communist Army currently is in the midst of a materiel modernization program. The progress of this program in the field of conventional weapons is evident from the continuing identification of modern Soviet-type weapons in the hands of CCA units. Some of the newer, more complex conventional weapons continue to be imported from the U.S.S.R., but others are produced in local factories which previously produced Soviet World War II-type weapons. The Chinese Communist production includes infantry weapons, artillery weapons up to 152-mm caliber, and some medium tanks. While self-sufficiency in the production of all weapons is undoubtedly a goal of the Chinese Communists, it has not yet been achieved. As newer weapons become available, the older weapons are relegated to the militia or to reserve stockpiles.

93. EVALUATION
The Chinese Communist Army is essentially an infantry army, but in recent years the increased availability of heavy weapons has resulted in more effective artillery and armored support. Prior to 1950, the Army was equipped with a heterogenous collection of weapons of diverse calibers and origins which aggravated the problems of maintenance and ammunition supply; now, however, with Soviet aid, standardization has greatly reduced the number of types of spare parts and calibers of ammunition required. It must be noted, however, that with the addition of armor and heavier artillery the Army has become far more road bound than it was prior to 1950. Thus, there has been an accompanying increase in logistical requirements and a marked decrease in cross-country mobility. With weapons currently available, the Army has improved its capability for engaging in a fast moving, all-weather, non-nuclear war on the mainland of Asia.

Section II. INFANTRY

94. PISTOLS
a. The Soviet 9-mm pistol Makarov and the 9-mm machine pistol Stechkin are believed to be standard. The Makarov, an enlarged version of the pre-World War II German Walther pistol, is a double-action, self-loading semiautomatic pistol. The Makarov is blowback operated, has an 8-round magazine, and is effective up to 50 meters. The Stechkin is a far more imposing weapon than the Makarov. It is a true machine pistol capable of either automatic or semiautomatic fire, is a lethal weapon at 100 meters, has a 20-round magazine, and is blowback operated.

b. The Chinese Communists still have in service large quantities of the old Soviet 7.62-mm TT-M1933 pistol and the Chinese-made copy thereof, the Type 51 (fig. 54). Both are simplified versions of the United States caliber .45 mm 1911 Colt, fed by an 8-round magazine.

95. SUBMACHINEGUNS
The Soviet 7.62-mm AK (Chinese Type 56) submachinegun in two versions—one with a fixed wooden butt and the other with a folding metal butt—is the standard shoulder arm of the Chinese Communist Army (fig. 55). The AK fires the Soviet 7.62-mm intermediate-size M43
The same cartridge used in the Chinese Type 56 squad light machinegun and the Soviet SKS (Chinese Type 56) semiautomatic carbine. The AK is fed by a 30-round, curved, box magazine. Large quantities of the older Soviet 7.62-mm PPSh-41 and PPS-43 submachineguns and their Chinese copies the Type 50 and Type 54, respectively, are still in service but are being replaced by the AK (figs. 56 and 57). The older 7.62-mm weapons fire pistol ammunition and have an effective range of 220 yards in short bursts and 110 yards in long bursts of automatic fire.

96. RIFLES AND CARBINES

Although the standard Chinese Communist shoulder arm is the Soviet 7.62-mm AK (Chinese Type 56) submachinegun, the Chinese also use fairly large quantities of the limited standard Soviet 7.62-mm SKS (Chinese Type 56) semiautomatic carbine (fig. 58). This weapon, which would be classified as a rifle by U.S. standards, was produced in quantity by the Soviets but has been dropped from the Soviet Army infantry weapons family in recent years. It is gas operated and is fed by a 10-round box magazine. It is as accurate at normal combat ranges as any U.S. rifle in service use in 1958. There are still large quantities of the older Soviet 7.62-mm M1944 (Chinese Type 53) carbine (fig. 59), also a rifle by U.S. standards, in service, but it is believed that both the M1944 and the SKS will be eliminated in favor of the AK.
Figure 57. Chinese Communist 7.62-mm Submachinegun, Type 43 (Soviet PPS, M1954). Also shown are Chinese Communist Stick Hand Grenades.

Figure 58. Chinese Communist 7.62-mm Semiautomatic Carbine, Type 56 (Soviet SKS).

Figure 59. Chinese Communist 7.62-mm Carbine, Type 53 (Soviet M1944).
The standard squad light machinegun of the Army is the Soviet 7.62-mm RPD (Chinese Type 56) light machinegun (fig. 60). This weapon is a gas-operated, belt-fed, bipod-mounted automatic weapon which fires the same 7.62-mm cartridge as the AK (Chinese Type 56) submachinegun and the SKS (Chinese Type 56) semiautomatic carbine. The standard company-level light machinegun is the Soviet 7.62-mm RP-46, also gas-operated, belt-fed, and bipod-mounted, but heavier than the RPD and firing the older long 7.62-mm rimmed cartridge. The older Soviet 7.62-mm DP and DPM are still in service but are being replaced (fig. 61). At battalion level, the 7.62-mm Soviet Goryunov, M1943 (Chinese Type 53) heavy machinegun is standard (fig. 62). It is an air-
cooled, gas-operated weapon, mounted on
wheels, and can be used for antiaircraft fire.
It is fed by a 250-round nondisintegrating
metal-link belt. The older Soviet 12.7-mm
DShK, M1938 and M1938/46 (Chinese Type
54) (fig. 63), the new 14.5-mm ZPU-2 dual and
ZPU-4 quadruple antiaircraft machineguns are
used primarily as antiaircraft weapons against
low-level air attack but are also used as ground
support weapons (fig. 64). The ZPU models do
not have off-carriage fire control; traverse and
elevation are manual.

Figure 64. Soviet 14.5-mm ZPU-4 Heavy Machinegun.

Figure 65. Chinese Communist 90-mm Rocket Launcher,
Type 51 (U.S. M20).

98. INFANTRY ANTITANK WEAPONS

a. The standard infantry antitank weapons
are a rocket launcher and two recoilless rifles,
all Chinese-made and based on early post-World
War II U.S. designs. The Chinese 90-mm, Type
51, antitank rocket launcher is a copy of the
United States 3.5-inch M20 but is less effective
than its United States prototype because of in-
ferior ammunition (fig. 65). The 57-mm recoi-
less rifle, Type 36, a copy of the U.S. M18, was
manufactured by the Nationalists and con-
tinued in production by the Communists (fig.
66). It can be fired from the shoulder or from
a Chinese copy of a Czechoslovak light machine-
gun tripod. Although of crude external work-
manship, the weapon is rugged and dependable.
The 75-mm recoilless rifle, Type 52 is a copy of
the U.S. 75-mm weapon but is mounted on a
carriage of Chinese design (fig. 67).
Figure 66. Chinese Communist 57-mm Recoilless Rifle, Type 36, (U.S. M18).

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The Chinese Communists are believed to be obtaining some modern Soviet infantry antitank weapons and probably will produce Chinese copies of the Soviet RPG-2 antitank launcher and the 82-mm and 107-mm recoilless antitank guns. The RPG-2 is a smooth-bore, shoulder-fired weapon which is essentially a recoilless grenade launcher and is a standard squad antitank weapon. It fires an 82-mm HEAT grenade and has an effective range of 165 yards. The Soviet smooth-bore 82-mm B-10 and 107-mm recoilless guns are the tactical equivalents of the U.S. 75-mm and 106-mm recoilless rifles, respectively.

99. MORTARS

The Chinese Communists use mortars extensively, often as a substitute for artillery. The Soviet 82-mm M1937 (fig. 68), 120-mm M1943 (fig. 69), and 160-mm M1943 (fig. 70) mortars are standard and are being produced locally. The 82-mm mortar can fire conventional 81-mm mortar ammunition used by the United States and other countries; it can be broken down into a three-man or one-animal load. The 120-mm mortars, despite their size, are relatively light, highly mobile, and can easily be manhandled.
short distances; for transport, a light two-wheeled carriage is provided. The 160-mm mortar is breech loaded and trigger fired, and is transported on permanently attached wheels. The 60-mm mortar Type 31, a Chinese Nationalist copy of the United States 60-mm M2, is no longer standard in infantry divisions.

100. GRENADES

The Chinese Communists show a preference for stick grenades and have manufactured an assortment of offensive/defensive types as standard items (fig. 71). Despite the variations of shape and type, all of them follow the basic design of the German Model 24 and Japanese Type 98 stick grenades. Soviet grenades and Chinese copies of Soviet grenades in use include the F-1 defensive hand grenade, which is similar to the United States Mk II fragmentation grenade; the RG-42 offensive grenade, which has a heavy blast and light fragmentation effect; the RPG-43 HEAT hand grenade, which will penetrate up to 3 inches of armor; and the RPG-6 HEAT hand grenade, which will penetrate up to 4 inches of armor (fig. 72). Soviet-type grenades will replace the stick grenades in service, and Chinese production of Soviet-design grenades is a logical development in order to conform to the Sino-Soviet Bloc standardization and modernization program.
Section III. ARTILLERY

101. FIELD ARTILLERY

a. Chinese Communist artillery pieces range in caliber up to 152-mm. All standard pieces above 57-mm are of Soviet World War II or later design, and many are of local manufacture. The principal artillery pieces now considered standard are the Soviet 85-mm field gun D-44 (fig. 73), the Soviet 122-mm howitzer M1938 (fig. 74), the 122-mm gun D-74 (fig. 75), and the 152-mm gun-howitzer D-20 (fig. 76). The 85-mm field gun is quite mobile. Maximum range is 17,000 yards, and armor penetration is up to 5.4 inches at 550 yards. The 122-mm howitzer is a well-designed weapon with good combat characteristics; maximum range is 13,000 yards, and its HEAT round can penetrate up to 4 inches of armor. The 122-mm gun and 152-mm gun-howitzer are also modern well-designed and mobile pieces. The 152-mm weapon is the principal weapon for counterbattery and other long-range destructive and interdictory fire. Its maximum range is 19,000 yards.

Figure 73. Soviet 85-mm Field Gun, D-44.
b. The Chinese Communists have recently acquired the 130-mm gun M–46 from the Soviets (fig. 77). The 130-mm gun is a modern, conventional weapon with a maximum horizontal range of 29,200 yards. In addition to being used as medium field artillery, this gun can also perform direct fire missions against ground targets, including armor.

c. In addition to the standard weapons discussed above, the Chinese Communists still employ the older Soviet 76-mm field gun M1942 (Chinese Type 54) (fig. 78), which has a maximum range of 14,300 yards and armor penetration up to 5 inches; the Soviet 122-mm gun M1931/37 (fig. 79), which has a maximum range of 22,800 yards and armor penetration
of 6.5 inches; and the Soviet 152-mm Howitzer M1943 (fig. 80), which has a range of 13,560 yards and penetrates up to 3.4 inches of armor at 550 yards. The varied assortment of old mountain and light artillery pieces in the inventory probably are being declared obsolete as a result of the standardization effort and inability to obtain replacements and parts.

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Figure 78. Chinese Communist 76-mm Field Gun, Type 54 (Soviet M1942).

Figure 79. Soviet 122-mm Field Gun, M1931/37.

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102. ANTITANK ARTILLERY

The standard Chinese Communist antitank guns are the Soviet 57-mm antitank gun M1943 and its Chinese copy, the Type 55 (fig. 81), and the Soviet 85-mm field gun D–44 and its Chinese copy. The 57-mm antitank gun is an excellent piece for its class, although of limited value against heavy armor. Its principal disadvantage is a somewhat excessive weight for an infantry antitank gun which must be manhandled. Maximum range with HE is 9,000 yards, and it can penetrate up to 5.5 inches of armor at 550 yards. The characteristics of the 85-mm field gun D–44 and the 76-mm field gun M1942 are discussed in the paragraph on field artillery.

103. ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

The principal standard antiaircraft artillery pieces are the Soviet 57-mm antiaircraft gun S–60 (fig. 82) and the 100-mm antiaircraft gun KS–19 (fig. 83). The older 37-mm antiaircraft gun, M1939 (fig. 84), some of which are still in service, was domestically produced and is called the Type 55. The 85-mm antiaircraft gun M1939 (fig. 85) is used with the Soviet PUAZO–3 antiaircraft director which dates from World War II. The 37-mm and 85-mm guns are being phased out in favor of the 57-mm and 100-mm guns.
Figure 83. Soviet 100-mm Antiaircraft Gun, KS-19.

Figure 84. Chinese Communist 37-mm Antiaircraft Gun, Type 55 (Soviet M1939).
Figure 85. Soviet 85-mm Antiaircraft Gun, M1939.
104. ROCKET AND MISSILE WEAPONS
The standard field rocket launcher is the Soviet 140-mm (16 round) BM-14 which fires spin-stabilized HE rockets to a range of 9,900 yards (fig. 86). This electrically fired weapon is mounted on a 6 x 6 truck. Some of the older Soviet 132-mm BM-13 rocket launchers are in service but are being phased out in favor of the 140-mm BM-14. The Chinese Communists are not believed to possess Soviet-made missiles or to have developed the capability to produce their own.

Figure 86. Soviet 140-mm Rocket Launcher, BM-14.

Section IV. ARMORED VEHICLES

105. TANKS

a. Although in process of replacement by the Soviet T-54 and a Chinese copy thereof, the principal medium tank of the Chinese Communists is the Soviet T-34 (85), which is found in all armored units (fig. 87). Although of World War II design, its 85-mm gun, well-shaped armor, low silhouette, and good cross-country performance make this tank an effective weapon. It has a maximum speed of 35 miles per hour, is powered by a 12-cylinder V-type diesel engine, and weighs 35 tons. It mounts an 85-mm gun, which can penetrate up to 7 inches of armor, and it has two 7.62-mm machineguns. Fifty-six rounds are carried for the 85-mm gun. The tank’s two major deficiencies are inferior steering and relative brittleness of its armor.

Figure 87. Soviet T-34(85) Medium Tank.

b. The appearance of the T-54 in Chinese armored units will bring the armor combat capabilities of the Chinese Communist Army more nearly in line with those of other world Powers. The T-54, which will become the main battle tank, mounts a high velocity 100-mm gun (fig. 88). Its well-designed turret incorporates slopes of 50 degrees or more at the front, thus providing optimum protection from frontal attack.
Figure 88. Chinese Communist T-54 Medium Tank.
c. The Chinese Communists have only a limited number of Soviet JS–1 and the JS–2 heavy tanks (fig. 89). These early models of the “Joseph Stalin” series, now obsolescent in the Soviet Army, both mount a 122-mm gun, carry 28 rounds of ammunition for the gun, have a maximum speed of 23 miles per hour, weigh 51 tons, and have three 7.62-mm machineguns. The 122-mm gun can penetrate up to 6 inches of armor. The JS–2 has better frontal armor than the JS–1.

Figure 89. Soviet JS–2 Heavy Tank.

106. ARMORED ASSAULT AND SUPPORT WEAPONS

The Chinese Communists use the Soviet SU–76 and the SU–100 self-propelled guns as their principal armored assault and support weapons (figs. 90 and 91). These weapons, of proven quality, are employed as assault guns in support of infantry and as direct fire support weapons in armored operations. They are found primarily in armored divisions and independent tank regiments. The SU–76 weighs 12½ tons, has a maximum speed of 28 miles per hour, carries 60 rounds of ammunition, and its 76-mm gun can penetrate armor of up to 5 inches. The SU–100 is a 100-mm field gun mounted on a T–34 medium tank chassis. It weighs 33 tons, has a maximum speed of 35 miles per hour, carries 34 rounds of ammunition, and the gun is capable of armor penetration up to 8½ inches. The Chinese Communists also have small numbers of the Soviet JSU–122 and JSU–152 assault guns (figs. 92 and 93), both of which are mounted on the JS (“Joseph Stalin”) heavy tank chassis. The JSU–122 weighs 50½ tons, has a maximum speed of 23 miles per hour, carries 20 rounds of ammunition, and can penetrate up to 5½ inches of armor. The JSU–152 mounts the 152-mm gun-howitzer M1937.

Figure 90. Soviet SU–76 Self-Propelled Gun.
Figure 91. Soviet SU–100 Self-Propelled Gun.

Figure 92. Soviet JSU–122 Self-Propelled Gun.

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107. ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES

The Chinese Communists use Soviet BTR–40 and BTR–152 armored personnel carriers as standard equipment in the armored units (figs. 94 and 95). The BTR–40 is a scoutcar-type vehicle consisting of a light, welded-armor body on a GAZ–63 truck, 4 x 4. It is a radio-equipped and mounts a 7.62-mm machinegun. The BTR–152 weighs 72 tons, has a maximum speed of 43 miles per hour and is armed with a 7.52-mm or 12.7-mm machinegun and carries 12 men. There is little evidence of Chinese Communist utilization of armored vehicles designed for special purposes, i.e., flamethrowing, mine field clearing, etc.

Figure 94. Soviet BTR–40 Armored Personnel Carrier.

Figure 95. Soviet BTR–152 Armored Personnel Carrier.

108. GENERAL

Chinese Communist ammunition is, except that for the Chinese infantry antitank weapons, a direct copy of the Soviet prototype. Like Soviet ammunition, it is simple, rugged, and effective, and compares favorably with that of other major powers. They possess at present a wide assortment of ammunition types, most of
which are suitable for the purpose for which they are intended. The Chinese Communists produce all types of small-arms ammunition used by their forces, ammunition for mortars of all calibers they use, and much of their artillery ammunition. To facilitate manufacture, utilization, and maintenance, emphasis is placed on simplicity and ruggedness coupled with a minimum use of strategic materials. Chinese Communist doctrine, based on Soviet doctrine, strongly emphasizes a high degree of interchangeability. This leads to great stress on the use of multipurpose weapons; for example, artillery weapons up to 152-mm caliber are provided with antitank ammunition.

109. AMMUNITION TYPES

a. Standard 7.62-mm Soviet type M43 small-arms ammunition is interchangeable between the AKI submachinegun, the SKS carbine, and RPD squad light machinegun. The Soviet-type 7.62-mm M08/30 rounds are used with the DP, DPM, RP-46 light and the Goryunov SG-43 and SGM heavy machineguns. Various combinations of anti-personnel, armor-piercing, tracer, and incendiary cartridges are available as are dummy and blank rounds.

b. Chinese Communist mortar ammunition is of the conventional teardrop-shape, stabilized in flight by metal fins, and uses point-detonating fuses. Propellant charges are adjustable for desired ranges. The types of mortar ammunition known to be in use include fragmentation, high-explosive, smoke, leaflet, incendiary, chemical, and illuminating.

c. Chinese Communist artillery ammunition, like its Soviet prototype, is classified as fixed or separate loading, the latter being subdivided into cartridge-case and powder-bag types. The major types of artillery projectiles used by the Chinese Communist forces include high explosive, armor-piercing, high explosive antitank, high velocity armor-piercing, concrete-piercing, incendiary, chemical, illuminating, and propaganda. The characteristics of these shells are similar to those of the United States, but their performance is below the United States standards. Artillery fuses are of orthodox design and classified as point detonating and base detonating and by their type of action, i.e., impact, time and impact, and time. The Chinese are not believed to be producing the more sophisticated types of fuses, such as proximity (VT) fuses.

Section VI. FIRE CONTROL

110. ARTILLERY

Chinese Communist field and antitank artillery fire control equipment includes on-carriage telescopes and telescopes and associated equipment, such as aiming circles, aiming posts, binoculars, gunner's quadrants, BC scopes, protractors, and slide rules. Separate telescopes are designed for the antitank and artillery pieces; both are obsolete by United States standards, but have greater accuracy than the weapons they serve.

111. ANTIAIRCRAFT

The Chinese Communists are dependent upon Soviet-supplied antiaircraft fire-control instruments. They use the Soviet WHIFF fire-control radar (fig. 96), a copy of the United States SCR-584, which can track aircraft at 20 nautical miles and is used with the Soviet 85-mm AA gun M39. The Puazo-3 gun director, which relies on visual tracking and is therefore obsolete, is used with the WHIFF. It has a slant range of 13,000 yards and a height range of 31,000 feet. They also use a later improved Soviet gun director, the Puazo-6, and a later fire-control radar, the FIRE CAN. These newer models have a greater range and accuracy and are used with the 57- and 100-mm antiaircraft guns.
112. MINE TYPES

a. The Chinese Communist ground forces are capable of waging extensive mine warfare. However, until the Korean War they had no standard mine warfare equipment and were thus forced to rely on improvised and captured mines. Standard mines are all of basic Soviet design and include both Soviet- and Chinese-manufactured versions of the following: Wooden antitank mine, TMD–B (fig. 97); metallic antitank mine, TM–41 (fig. 98); wooden antipersonnel mine, PMZ–6 (fig. 99); and the antipersonnel mine, POMZ–2 (fig. 100). These mines all use TNT as the explosive, and all are used for both offensive and defensive operations and are employed both singly and in fields. Chinese Communist doctrine follows Soviet practices very closely, and engineer troops are used for all mine work except for the emplacement of some hasty-type minefields.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Wood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explosive</td>
<td>TNT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>17.0 lb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimensions</td>
<td>L - 13.4; W - 11.5; Ht. - 5.0 in.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 97. Chinese Communist Wooden Antitank Mine, M1951 (Soviet TMD-B).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Wood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explosive</td>
<td>TNT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>14 oz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimensions</td>
<td>L - 7.5; W - 3.5; Ht - front 2.5; rear 2.0 in.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 99. Chinese Communist Wooden Antipersonnel Mine (Soviet PMD-6).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Metal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explosive</td>
<td>Amatol 80/20 or flaked TNT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>12.0 lb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimensions</td>
<td>Dia - 10.5; Ht - 5.8 in.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 98. Chinese Communist Metallic Antitank Mine (Soviet TM-41).*

b. Mines improvised from bangalore torpedoes, artillery and mortar shells, aerial bombs, and hand grenades are frequently used (fig. 101). They also use explosive-filled containers, such as tin cans, wooden boxes, fuel drums, barrels, glass bottles, clay pots, and other containers and packages. The three general types of improvised mines which may have mechanical, chemical, or electrical fuses, are classified according to the external action necessary to detonate them, as follows:

1. *Trip-wire mines.* These mines are fitted with either pull wires or taut tension-release wires.

2. *Pressure mines.* These mines may have either a pressure or pull fuse, or an improvised circuit-closing device.

3. *Automatic mines.* These mines normally have an electric firing circuit broken by a time-delay device in the form of a clock or a makeshift time-delay circuit closer.
Case: Cast iron
Explosive: TNT
Weight: 4.4 lb
Dimensions: Dia - 2.4; Ht - 5.3 in.

Figure 100. Chinese Communist Antipersonnel Mine (Soviet POMZ-2).

OPERATION

Fragmentation grenade (with pin removed) is placed in tin can, which is anchored to ground or tree. The grenade is attached to trip wire.

1 Grenade in can.

Figure 101. Chinese Communist Improvised Mines.

OPERATION

Fragmentation grenade is placed in mud-ball. When mud dries, pin is removed from grenade; actuated by breaking mud.

2 Grenade in dried mud.

Figure 101—Continued.

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OPERATION

Pressure or pull fuze is placed in mortar shell, and mortar shell is buried.

3 Mortar shell mine.

Figure 101—Continued.

113. MINE DETECTION EQUIPMENT

Communist China is not known to produce mine detectors but imports limited quantities of the Soviet electronic mine detector, VIM–203 (fig. 102). Engineer troops are instructed in the use of this detector which will detect metallic mines to a depth of not more than one foot. The primary methods, and by far the most widely used for detecting mines, are probing for buried mines and feeling with the hands for trip wires. Probes are issue items, and many more probably are improvised. Such probes are usually limited to a stout bamboo or other wooden pole with a sharpened wire end. Probing is accomplished by teams which divide the area and stick the probes into the ground to a depth of from 2 to 5 inches.

Figure 102. Soviet Mine Detector, VIM–203.
114. MINE LAYING, MARKING, AND RECORDING

a. Minefields are sited in order to permit maximum benefit from surrounding terrain. Specific placing is done by the use of a spacing cord or by pacing (fig. 103). Standard minefields are elementary and therefore easily laid by poorly trained troops. The officer in charge can, however, determine the pattern and thus may vary from the standard. While there is little uniformity of pattern, they generally fall into two general categories, the antitank-road pattern and the field-antitank and field antipersonnel patterns, which are described below.

(1) Antitank-road.

(a) "W" pattern. In this pattern, mines are placed diagonally across a road in the form of a "W". The mines are spaced 10 to 16 feet apart, and the legs of the "W" may join or may be spaced as far as 75 feet apart at the closed end and 225 feet apart at the outward end (fig. 104).

(b) 3-2 box pattern. The mines are spaced 3 to 10 feet apart across a road in rows that are from 7 to 75 feet apart. Generally there are 5 rows, the first row containing 3 mines, the second row 2 mines, etc. (fig. 105).

(c) Box-pattern. This pattern generally contains 8 mines. These are placed 2 mines, 3 to 13 feet apart, in a row with 4 rows 3 to 33 feet apart.

(d) Square pattern. In this pattern, there are 2 rows of 3 or 4 mines spaced 10 to 13 feet apart. These rows run across the road, and the distance between rows is equal to the width of the road.

(e) Isolated triangle pattern. In this pattern, 3 mines are placed at a distance of about 10 feet from each other. These triangles may be placed at distances from a few feet to several miles apart.

(2) Field patterns, antitank and antipersonnel.

(a) Zig-zag pattern. This is the primary pattern of which most others are variations. In this pattern, antitank mines are placed 10 feet apart parallel to the front, in a row 10 feet deep. Antipersonnel mines are usually placed 3 feet apart in a row 3 feet in depth. Any group of 3 mines in this pattern forms a triangle (fig. 106).

(b) Double zig-zag pattern. This pattern is similar to the zig-zag except that a row gives the appearance of being 1½ rows of the zig-zag pattern. In this double pattern, distances are the same for both antitank and antipersonnel mines. The distances between mines parallel to the front vary between 6.5 feet and 33 feet, and the depth of the row is the same as the distance between the mines (fig. 107).

(c) Saw-tooth pattern. This may take the form, in its basic rows, of either the zig-zag or double zig-zag pattern. It has one row parallel to the front, a second row behind the first but at an angle to it from right to left, and a third row behind the sec-
ond at an angle from left to right (fig. 108).

(d) **Antipersonnel trip-wire box pattern.** This is a rectangular pattern using four mines placed 3 to 27 feet apart. The trip wires are attached from one mine to the next around the perimeter of the box pattern.

(e) **Mixed minefields.** There are no standard procedures for mixing antitank and antipersonnel mines within a single minefield. The mixing of mines is left entirely to the discretion of the officer in charge of the laying party.

\[\text{Figure 104. Antitank-Road "W" Pattern.}\]

\[\text{Figure 105. Antitank-Road 3-2 Box Pattern.}\]

\[\text{Figure 106. Antitank- or Antipersonnel-Field Zig-Zag Pattern.}\]

\[\text{Figure 107. Antitank- or Antipersonnel-Field Double Zig-Zag Pattern.}\]

\[b.\] Minefields in forward areas are not marked, except when friendly troops are to be withdrawn through them. In this instance, individual mines are marked until the friendly troops have passed through, then the markers are removed. In areas farther from the front, minefield boundaries may be marked with dead branches or rocks placed around the field or with poles at the corners with rope strung between them. Minefields outside the combat zone are marked with flags or by wooden markers bearing the Chinese characters for "danger" lettered in black.

\[c.\] A minefield record with all relative data is maintained for all deliberate minefields. Hasty minefields are not recorded or reported.
Figure 108. Antitank- or Antipersonnel-Field Saw-Tooth Pattern.
Section VIII. CHEMICAL WARFARE WEAPONS

115. AMMUNITION

Chinese Communist chemical ammunition holdings are of Soviet origin or design. Prior to receipt of this ammunition from the Soviets, the Chinese Communists had only the Japanese and U.S. smoke rounds which they had captured from the Japanese and the Nationalists. Mortars and artillery pieces of most calibers are adaptable to the use of chemical rounds, and training is conducted in both offensive and defensive use of toxic and bacterial agents. At present, the Chinese Communists do not have large stocks of toxic and bacterial agents and would be unable to conduct more than a small-scale operation. Smoke shells are believed to be plentiful for mortars and artillery pieces. During the Korean War the Chinese Communists demonstrated an excellent smoke screening capability. They also use a small 13-ounce Soviet toxic smoke pot which contributes appreciably to the smoke screening potential, but adds little to the offensive toxic capability. The Chinese Communist inventory also includes several other Soviet-supplied smoke pots some of which weigh up to 97 pounds.

116. FLAME WEAPONS

The Chinese Communists' flame warfare potential is growing, but it is still only moderate. Their principal flame weapons are the Soviet-type portable and emplaced flamethrowers. They use the portable ROKS-3, which weighs 50 pounds and can fire 6 to 8 bursts from 35 to 40 yards, and the LPO (fig. 109). The latter is the latest model Soviet portable flamethrower, and needs no separate pressure tank as does the older ROKS-3. No mechanized flamethrower weapons have been reported in use by the Chinese Communist forces.

Figure 109. Soviet LPO Flamethrower.
CHAPTER 8. EQUIPMENT

Section I. GENERAL

117. GENERAL

Communist China has a balanced Army of battle-tested units equipped primarily with World War II-type materiel of Soviet manufacture or design. Local manufacture of military equipment is increasing; the bulk of it, however, is still imported from Bloc countries. The lack of skilled personnel often results in poor maintenance. To overcome the maintenance deficiencies, field commanders rely heavily on the individual soldier’s inherent skill at improvising. The ground forces are believed sufficiently equipped to maintain internal security and to conduct large-scale conventional warfare; however, they lack the equipment required for nuclear warfare.

Section II. UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIA

118. GENERAL

Chinese Communist Army uniforms are patterned along the lines of Soviet Army uniforms and consist of two principal types: The service and field uniform for all personnel and the dress uniform for officer personnel (fig. 110). Officers wear the service and field uniform for social functions, field training, and maneuvers, whereas the dress uniform is worn for parades, on official occasions, and at ceremonies. Enlisted personnel wear the service and field uniform for all occasions. The summer and winter service and field uniforms are dark olive-drab; however, nonstandard colors are in use which vary from brown to olive-green. The officers’ winter dress uniform varies from dark blue to bluish green; the summer dress uniform is ivory-colored. Special-purpose uniforms are designed for chemical decontamination, for armored forces, for paratroopers, and for camouflage and rain protection for all troops. Women’s summer uniforms substitute a skirt and beret for the trousers and cap, but the women’s winter uniforms are similar to those worn by the men. Insignia of rank and insignia of branch are both worn on collar tabs of the service and field uniform. Shoulder-boards are worn on the officers’ dress uniform.

119. SERVICE AND FIELD UNIFORMS

a. Summer Uniforms. The summer service and field uniforms are generally made of wool or silk material for officers and of cotton material for enlisted personnel. Officers wear either black low-cut leather shoes or black leather boots when wearing this uniform, while enlisted personnel wear a low-quarter, light olive-drab rubber and canvas “tennis” shoe, and reportedly a black or brown leather low-quarter shoe for garrison duty. Officers through field grade wear a Sam Browne belt; enlisted personnel wear a plain leather waist belt. The usual headgear for officers is the service cap and for enlisted personnel the garrison cap. The service cap has a chin strap of gold braid for marshals and generals and black leather for all other officers. Both officers’ and enlisted personnel’s uniforms are similar in design, except that the coat of enlisted personnel has no lower pocket.

b. Winter Uniforms. The winter service and field uniform is similar to the summer uniform in design and is made of cotton material, quilted on the inside with cotton padding for all ranks. Officers’ overcoats are made of part wool material and are smartly cut. Enlisted personnel’s overcoats are quilted on the inside with cotton padding.
padding, are made of cotton material, and are bulky and shapeless in appearance. Fur or pile-line caps, closely resembling the Soviet cap, are worn by all personnel in cold weather. Officers may wear either black leather boots or fur-lined olive-drab canvas boots with the winter uniform, while enlisted personnel have a brown leather boot and the canvas boot. Cotton padded gloves or mittens with a recess for thumb and trigger finger, and a halter so that they may hang around the neck when not in use, complete the winter uniform.

120. SPECIAL-PURPOSE UNIFORMS

a. Communist China has purchased a number of chemical and nuclear warfare protective covering suits, gloves, rubber shoes, and masks from Bloc nations and distributed them to some units. Both armored troops and paratroops have distinctive uniforms similar in design to the respective Soviet uniforms i.e., coveralls for armored troops and paratroops and a wide leather belt and close-fitting crash helmet for paratroopers (fig. 111).

b. A one-piece winter camouflage coat made of white cloth and a Soviet-style summer camouflage two-piece mottled suit are issued for use by patrols, observers, and snipers. The winter uniforms usually have a white inner lining of cotton which may be turned inside out for use in snow-covered areas. Reliance also is placed on improvisation, e.g., sewing loops on the uniforms for attaching foliage, straw, etc., and smearing dirt or mud on the clothing and person to blend with the terrain.

c. There are three items of rainwear: A raincoat, a waterproof cape, and a poncho-shelter half. All are white on the reverse side. The raincoat has a hood which can be drawn about the head with a drawstring. It is fastened down the center front with five buttons, of which four are covered with a flap when the coat is closed. The waterproof cape, like the raincoat, has a hood which fastens about the head by means of a drawstring. There is a slit on each side for the hands. The poncho-shelter-half can be worn as a hooded cloak and serves as a combination windbreaker and raincoat. The hood covers the head and is held by means of a drawstring. The front can be closed by means of snaps, or buttoned by wooden pegs sewn on the shelterhalf.

121. INSIGNIA

a. Insignia of Grade. Officers' insignia of grade consists of a combination of stars and longitudinal stripes on either collar tabs or shoulderboards. On the field and service uniform, company-grade officers wear from 1 to 4 silver stars on a red collar tab that is trimmed with yellow piping and has a single yellow longitudinal stripe; field-grade officers wear from 1 to 4 silver stars on a red, yellow-trimmed collar tab with 2 yellow longitudinal stripes; general officers wear from 1 to 4 gold stars on red collar tabs trimmed with gold piping (fig. 112). On the dress uniform, the grade insignia consists of combinations of silver stars on yellow shoulder boards that are trimmed in red (fig. 113). The shoulderboards for company-grade officers have a single red longitudinal stripe; those for field-grade officers have 2 red longitudinal stripes; those for general officers have no longitudinal stripes. Enlisted insignia of grade consists of small silver stars worn on untrimmed red collar tabs; noncommissioned officer tabs have a narrow yellow longitudinal stripe (fig. 112).

b. Branch Insignia. The Chinese Communist infantry has no branch insignia but is identified by the plain red collar tabs upon which the insignia of grade is worn. All other branches are identified by metallic branch devices—gold for officers, silver for enlisted personnel—worn on the collar tabs with the insignia of grade (fig. 114). The collar tabs for the Air Force and parachute troops are sky blue; those for the Naval forces are black.

c. Headgear Insignia. The headgear insignia worn by officers consists of a gold-edged five-pointed star in relief on a blue background on a circular metal convex disk, with a wreath of gold rice heads and partial cog wheel in relief at the base of the disk. The center of the star bears Chinese characters in gold which read "Eight One", commemorating 1 August 1927, the date of the Chinese Communist Revolution and the birth of the Chinese Communist Army.
Figure 110. Chinese Communist Uniforms.

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Figure 111. Chinese Communist Army Uniforms—Special Purpose.

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Figure 112. Chinese Communist Army Collar Tab Insignia of Grade for Field and Service Wear.
Figure 4.—Chinese Communist Army Shoulderboard Insignia of Grade for Dress Wear.

Figure 113. Chinese Communist Army Shoulderboard Insignia of Grade for Dress Wear.
IN SIGNIA OF BRANCH OF SERVICE

CAVALRY
ARMOR
ARTILLERY
ENGINEER
TECHNICAL CORPS
SEARCHLIGHT
ANTI AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
(Not Confirmed)
MOTOR TRANSPORT

MEDICAL CORPS
VETERINARY CORPS
(Not Confirmed)

ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS
JUDGE ADVOCATE CORPS
(Not Confirmed)
PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES

RAILWAY
SIGNAL CORPS
AIRBORNE

NOTE: Metallic devices are gold for Officers and silver for Enlisted Men.

Figure 114. Chinese Communist Army Insignia of Branch of Service and Headgear Insignia.

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The headgear insignia of supreme marshals and marshals has a wreath of gold colored leaf ornamentation encircling the metal disk. Enlisted personnel's headgear insignia is similar to that worn by officers, except that it is smaller (fig. 114).

122. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

a. Chinese Communist military decorations are awarded for heroism, achievement, and exemplary service. Normally, they are worn on the left breast and are arranged in order of importance, beginning at the top on the inner side. Campaign medals usually are metallic broaches of different shapes and sizes. Reportedly, service ribbons may be worn in lieu of decorations.

b. The principal decorations and service medals awarded to Army personnel are listed below in their probable order of precedence, and are illustrated in figure 115. The second and third class medals of the Order of August, Order of Independence and Freedom, and Order of Liberation, which are similar to their respective first class awards, and the Military Hero's Decoration are not illustrated. Color descriptions of the decorations and awards are not available.

(1) Order of August 1 (first, second, and third classes)—awarded to personnel who distinguished themselves in the Chinese Communist Revolutionary War during the period from 1 August 1927 to 6 July 1937.

(2) Order of Independence and Freedom (first, second, and third classes)—awarded to personnel who distinguished themselves in the Revolutionary War during the period of the anti-Japanese War from 7 July 1937 to 3 September 1945.

(3) Order of Liberation (first, second, and third classes)—awarded to personnel who distinguished themselves in the Revolutionary War during the period of the Liberation War from 3 September 1945 to 30 June 1950.

(4) Military Hero's Decoration—awarded only to a special group recognized as elite soldiers, termed "Combat Heroes" and "Model Troops". Combat Heroes are nominated for the title by their own unit, and Communist commanders regularly give verbal and written recognition for outstanding feats.

(5) Soldiers' Distinguished Merit Medal Grade 2—awarded for the cause of the Fatherland.

(6) Medal for Bravery—awarded for the liberation of North China.

(7) Northwest China Campaign Medal—awarded for participation in the liberation of Northwest China.

(8) North China Campaign Medal—awarded for participation in the liberation of North China.

(9) Southwest China Campaign Medal—awarded for participation in the liberation of Southwest China.

(10) South and Central China Campaign Medal—awarded for participation in the liberation of South and Central China.


(13) Manchurian Campaign Medal—awarded for participation in the liberation of Manchuria.

(14) Triumphant Crossing of the Yangtze River Medal—awarded for participation in the triumphant crossing of the Yangtze River.
Figure 115. Chinese Communist Army Awards and Decorations.
Section III. QUARTERMASTER

123. RATIONS

The individual Chinese Communist soldier is issued approximately 3 pounds of food per day as his ration, but during an offensive, this is reduced to 2.2 pounds per day. Although inferior to that of most Western Armies, the diet is rated considerably superior to that of the average Chinese civilian. The average meal prepared in unit kitchens consists of a combination of rice, kaoliang, millet, and soybeans. To supplement this diet, radishes, other vegetables, and meat are sometimes included in the menu. The principal combat ration is a baked mixture of soybean, corn, millet, and kaoliang that is soaked in water prior to consumption. Before an operation, each individual is issued the equivalent of from 5 to 7 days' rations, a part of which is precooked combat ration sufficient for 2 days. These rations are carried in a ration bag, 3 inches in diameter and 4 feet long, wrapped around the soldier's waist. In field operations small groups and individuals usually prepare their own meals. However, in rear areas central cooking facilities are generally used in feeding a sizable number of troops (fig. 116). The Soviet one-pot type field kitchen may be used, but often the only equipment for small groups is a small pot or two.

124. INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT

Quartermaster supplies for the individual include clothing, bedding, and personal equipment. A man entering the service receives an initial issue of a seasonal uniform. Thereafter, during the months of February or March each year, he receives 2 cotton summer uniforms; in September or October, he is issued 1 cotton-quilted winter uniform. Approximately every two months, he receives a pair of rubber-soled canvas shoes. These items last the wearer from issue to issue. The individual is allowed to retain his summer uniform but is required to turn in his winter uniform when he receives each new summer issue. He is also given an initial issue of a cotton blanket, three towels, a leather belt, a raincoat, rice bowl, canteen, cup, spoon, and a cloth carrying bag.

125. ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Quartermaster supplies in this category are quite different from those of the United States Army quartermaster supplies. It includes such items as medicines; signal communications equipment; accessories for ordnance equipment, such as muzzle covers, gun covers, and holsters; construction materials; hand tools other than engineer tools; mess and office equipment. No laundry or bath equipment is known to exist. Tentage is generally limited to higher echelon command installations when other facilities are not available (fig. 117).
126. GENERAL

The Chinese Communists use Soviet signal equipment of both World War II and postwar design but in insufficient quantities to meet unit requirements. The quality of this equipment varies greatly; some of it, however, is of the latest and best Soviet design. There are an extreme shortage of competent technical personnel and a lack of appreciation of signal communications by many senior commanders.

127. RADIO

a. The tactical signal doctrine for radio communications of the Chinese Communists is similar to that of the Soviet Army. Radio equipment is generally in short supply. Moreover, the Chinese have been reluctant to use radio for fear of compromising tactical information, and possibly because the equipment is old and their personnel untrained. Radios are classed as man-packed, vehicular, mobile, and relay. The man-packed radios weigh from 20 to 96 pounds and have a range of 3 to 30 miles (fig. 118). They are used for communication from regiment to battalion to company and by forward observer parties. Two of these man-packed sets are similar to the U.S. SCR-300 and SCR-284, both World War II models; others are similar to Soviet models, while some are composites of several different models. Both code and voice transmissions are possible with these sets, some in combination and some singly.

b. Vehicular radio sets are for tanks and other armored vehicles and can transmit on
voice only, while receiving on both voice and code (fig. 119). Their range is from 3 to 13 miles. Both of the known sets are patterned after Soviet models. Mobile radio sets are generally similar to Soviet models although one model is similar to the U.S. SCR-399 and SCR-499. They have a wide range, from 12 to 1,000 miles, and can transmit in either code or voice. Radio relay sets are line-of-sight and can be used in relay for long distance communications. The models known to be used by the Chinese Communists are imported from East Germany.

128. WIRE

a. The lack of radio sets forces the Chinese Communists to rely heavily on wire communications, but equipment is believed to be in short supply. Wire equipment is mostly of simple and conventional design (fig. 120). Field switchboards and telephone are of World War II design and varied quality. Soviet equipment is replacing U.S. equipment which is now obsolescent.

b. The U.S. EE-8 and a Chinese copy are used, probably as standard equipment. The Chinese copy is inferior to the U.S. model. Several Soviet World War II telephone models are in use, one of which has a range of about 12 miles and is a fairly effective phone. These sets weigh less than 10 pounds, and all work on dry cell batteries. Switchboards, similar to those of U.S. World War II design, have 6-line and 12-line capacities, and Soviet 10-line and 30-line models are also in use.

Section V. ENGINEER

129. GENERAL

The Chinese Communists have limited quantities of most types of engineer equipment. They must, however, rely heavily on Bloc aid, captured materials, and field improvisation to meet wartime demands. The critical lack of modern power equipment results in much of the engineer work being accomplished by sheer manpower.

130. EXPLOSIVES

The most commonly used explosives are TNT, picric acid, and dynamite. The use of dynamite as a combat explosive indicates a shortage of more suitable military explosives. These explosives are packing as paper-wrapped blocks, metal-covered prepared charges, and bangalore torpedoes. These items along with both electric and nonelectric accessories such as blasting caps, wire, and fuzes are manufactured in China, but production is sufficient only for peace time requirements.

131. BRIDGING AND STREAM-CROSSING EQUIPMENT

The Chinese Communists either improvise or use newly acquired fixed bridge equipment in crossing both water and dry gaps. Some old-model Soviet stream-crossing equipment has recently been issued to Chinese engineer units. This equipment includes pneumatic 5-man re-
connaissance boats; footbridges of hay or strawwrapped waterproofed floats (fig. 121); light wooden ponton boats of .3-short ton or 21-man capacity suitable for ferrying or bridging (6.6 to 33-short ton capacity); steel ponton boats of .6-ton or 25-man capacity (fig. 122) also suitable for ferrying (fig. 123) or bridging (6.6 to 82.5-short ton capacity); and wheeled amphibians resembling the United States 6 x 6 DUKW with 25-man capacity. In addition to undetermined numbers of the above equipment, there is an almost inexhaustable supply of civilian-type wooden boats ranging from 1-man fishing boats to large junks. For dry-gap bridging, Soviet practices of improvisation are being followed. Bamboo and timber are being used in constructing short-span fixed bridges suitable for tanks and artillery. An unknown quantity of Bailey-type bridging is also available to the engineers.

132. CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT

The Chinese Communists do not have an adequate supply of heavy construction equipment and, therefore, are dependent upon hand labor. Their limited construction equipment, mostly
imported from Bloc countries, includes tractors (fig. 124), crane-shovels, scrapers, road rollers, air compressors, diesel, engines, rock crushers, and concrete mixers. These items are generally lightweight types with small capacity, and they suffer from inadequate maintenance and a lack of skilled operators.

133. SPECIAL-PURPOSE EQUIPMENT

Communist China either does not have or does not rely on many items of special-purpose engineer equipment. Infrared equipment is not manufactured locally or believed to be in possession of troop units. Water supply and purification equipment is not used; however, the individual soldier is issued purification tablets for use in his canteen. Camouflage nets and garnishing materials are available in small quantities, but almost complete reliance is placed on the use of natural materials. Electric equipment is inadequate. Most of the identified topographic equipment, including surveying, drafting, plotting, and map reproduction items, has been imported from both Bloc countries and Free World countries. Little of it is high-precision equipment.

Section VI. CHEMICAL

134. GENERAL

The Chinese Communists place more emphasis on CBR defensive tactical doctrine than on offensive doctrine and are increasing their efforts to train all units how to meet CBR attack. Training programs are emphasizing the instruction of the individual soldier in protection, detection, and decontamination. Protective equipment, some of which offers excellent protection, is an assortment of captured, Soviet-furnished, and Chinese-manufactured material including masks, clothing, capes, first aid, and self-aid devices and decontamination equipment.

135. GAS MASKS

The current standard protective mask is a copy of the Soviet ShM–1 model which provides protection against standard CW agents. The assortment of old masks still in use will not protect against the newer gases because of age and leakage.

136. PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Chinese Communist troops have been issued World War II Japanese and Soviet items of protective clothing. These suits, made of lightweight rubberized fabric, are still serviceable and offer good protection against liquid agents. Quantities are believed adequate for training and possibly for a full issue to CBR personnel. Shelter halves have been recommended for protection against airplane spray attack, and capes have been issued to troops for training (fig. 125). A one-time-use reinforced paper garment, which would protect against most of the liquid agent, has been reported. Rubberized gloves and footwear are not in general use for crossing contaminated areas.

137. DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT

Some supplies of United States ointment and large quantities of World War II Japanese individual decontamination kits are available. They are effective against mustard only, and nothing is known of other protective devices. Field bathing facilities and clothing decontamination facilities, both of which require a
source of heat, still appear to be scarce, so that large-scale decontamination of personnel and clothing would be difficult if not impossible. For immediate field use, the Chinese Communists have an undetermined number of Soviet man-pack decontamination kits. They have a 3-gallon capacity and are similar to a garden insecticide sprayer (fig. 126). Cistern trucks are available which could be converted for decontaminating terrain.

138. DETECTION EQUIPMENT

CW agent detector kits available are believed to be of Soviet design and capable of detecting current standard United States CW agents. No device for early warning of BW aerosol attack is available. Soviet radiation detection equipment is mentioned in Chinese Communist open military publications frequently enough for it to be assumed that the supply is sufficient for training and for at least a partial issue to radiation reconnaissance personnel (fig. 127). This equipment is somewhat bulky by United States standards, but is sturdy and dependable in the field.
Section VII. TRANSPORTATION

139. GENERAL

Motor transport, although increasing in quantity and increasingly important in the Chinese Communist ground forces, is not ample to meet all demands. Wherever possible, and particularly for long distance movement, railroad transport is utilized; animal and human portage still is employed for movement over shorter distances. Available motor transport decreases rapidly from higher to lower echelons, but in addition to those tactical units in which character and mission make transport essential (e.g., heavy artillery and armored organizations) there are truck platoons in Infantry Division Rear Service Departments.

140. WHEELED VEHICLES

The principal vehicles in army use are the Soviet 2 1/2-ton 4 x 2 GAZ 51 (fig. 128) and the 4 1/2-ton 4 x 2 ZIS/ZIL 150 trucks (fig. 129) and their military versions—the 4 x 4 GAZ 63 (fig. 130), the 6 x 6 ZIS/ZIL 151, (fig. 131) and the 6 x 6 ZIS 157 which has the newer single high flotation tires on each axle. The Soviet GAZ 67B and GAZ–69 jeep-type vehicles are also employed. Communist China now pro-
duces a copy of the ZIS–150 truck called the “Liberation” (CA 10) (fig. 132). A number of other types of trucks, buses, automobiles, and three-wheeled motorcycles are being tested and produced in limited quantities. Most vehicles now in use are Soviet supplied. To supplement their military vehicle pool the Chinese Communists requisition from the civilian economy.

141. PRIME MOVERS

The principal prime movers for light field and antiaircraft artillery are 4½-ton trucks. The Soviet AT–S and the Hungarian K–800 are used for towing medium and heavy artillery weapons (fig. 133).

142. AIRCRAFT

The Chinese Communist Army uses Soviet light aircraft. Locally manufactured copies of the Soviet COLT fixed wing aircraft (fig. 134) and of the HOUND helicopter (fig. 135) are also in service.

Figure 134. COLT.

Figure 135. HOUND.
APPENDIX I. CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVAL FORCES

Section I. GENERAL

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Chinese Communist Navy (Naval Forces of the People's Liberation Army) was organized in 1949 when PLA troops gained control over large segments of the China coastline and a number of naval shore facilities fell into Communist hands. Some Nationalist warships, such as the light cruiser CHUNGKING, defected to the Communists along with a considerable number of Nationalist naval personnel. These vessels provided the nucleus for the Chinese Communist naval forces. Naval surface elements which consisted of all sorts of vessels were deployed in conjunction with ground formations against the withdrawing Nationalist units. Throughout its existence, the Navy has been a branch of the PLA, and trusted senior Communist Army officers have been in control of these improvised naval forces with former officers of the Nationalist Navy receiving subordinate assignments in the new service. These ex-Nationalist officers, however, have since been largely replaced, as reliable Communists were trained to fill their assignments.

2. CURRENT STATUS

The Chinese Communist Navy has improved both the quantity of its vessels and the quality of its personnel with Soviet equipment and technical assistance playing a major role. While the Chinese have made considerable progress in their Navy during the last 10 years, they are still clearly inferior to major Western navies. However, its rapid and continuing growth presents an increasing threat to undisputed Western control of the waters of the western Pacific.

3. MISSION

The mission of the Chinese Communist Navy is primarily defensive, with its main responsibility the defense of the China coast. The Navy is improving its deep-water capability, as evidenced by construction of long-range submarines (fig. 136), but it is still hindered by a lack of equipment and experience. The Navy also must be prepared to conduct amphibious operations.

4. CAPABILITIES

The Chinese Communist Navy is able to maintain limited coastal patrols, and it can conduct reconnaissance by utilizing both its air arm and junks disguised as fishing vessels. The Navy is capable of mine-laying operations, using either crude, handmade mines or modern mines supplied by the Soviets. However, the Chinese Communists would rely, for the most part, on static coastal defense installations and the ground forces to defend against an amphibious attack. From the standpoint of offensive amphibious operations, the Communists can assemble a vast flotilla of improvised craft such as junks, sampans, and towed barges and rafts which would be difficult to stop.
5. GENERAL

The Chinese Communist Navy is essentially an auxiliary arm of a basically ground force organization. Although the long range submarine force is being developed, the Navy is a defensive force, and its principal vessels are defensive types—destroyers and destroyer escorts (fig. 137), motor torpedo boats (fig. 138), submarine chasers (fig. 139), and various other patrol and escort vessels of various types and national origin. Naval bases along the China coast permit operations at close range in the vicinity of Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan.

6. ORGANIZATION

The Navy is organized as a major branch of the Ministry of National Defense, and Naval Headquarters operates directly under the Headquarters, People's Liberation Army. Subordinate to this Headquarters are the fleets, which are the operating forces of the Chinese Communist Navy, and the naval shore districts which provide fleet support and are responsible for coastal defense. Naval bases, schools, naval stores, and perhaps marine-type units are subordinate to these naval shore districts.

7. FLEETS

Each of the fleets of surface craft, as well as the submarine fleet, is controlled by a naval
commander who is directly subordinate to the Naval Headquarters of Headquarters, PLA. Each naval shore district is charged with fleet operational support and coastal surveillance of a specific sea defense region. Defense regions are divided into defense patrol areas, the defense of which is the responsibility of coastal surveillance craft.

8. NAVAL AIR ARM

The naval air arm was formed near the end of the Korean War after the Air Force of the PLA was well established. The naval air arm is all land-based and includes jet fighters, jet light bombers (fig. 140), and piston-type transport aircraft. Although the number of naval aircraft is small, the ratio of aircraft to surface vessels is adequate and the present organization could serve as the nucleus for future expansion. The naval air regiments are primarily defensive; they provide air support for the several fleets and for the defense of coastal areas and shipping.

9. SHORE BASED UNITS

Approximately half of the personnel strength of the Chinese Communist Navy serves ashore in various headquarters and training and base facilities. In addition to personnel supporting the operating forces or fleets, there are an undetermined number of personnel in coastal defense and naval infantry units. Naval infantry or marine-type units are generally similar to the Army infantry units in organization, weapons, and equipment. These units provide the Navy with an amphibious assault capability that could be employed in large combined operations or separately in minor seaborne operations.
APPENDIX II. CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR FORCE

Section I. GENERAL

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

a. The Chinese Communist Air Force was organized in 1946 when a training center was established at Chiamussu, in eastern Manchuria, using Japanese air personnel and Japanese aircraft and other equipment. However, insufficient and inadequate equipment resulted in only slight progress and little actual training from 1946 to 1948.

b. During the latter stages of the civil war with the Nationalists, in 1948–1949, increasing numbers of United States-trained Chinese Nationalist air personnel defected or were captured with their aircraft. These new additions to the Chinese Communist Air Force made it possible to organize a central training installation in south-central Manchuria, with one or more subsidiary units in eastern Manchuria.

c. After the establishment of the “People’s Republic of China” on 1 October 1949, the “People’s Air Force Headquarters” was established as the top echelon of the Chinese Communist Air Force. This headquarters did not begin to organize systematically, however, until after the signing of the Sino-Soviet 30-Year Mutual Assistance pact in February 1950. At that time, the Soviet Union began to furnish the necessary technical guidance, aircraft, and equipment to develop a modern, effective air arm as an integral part of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces.

d. During the Korean War, Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists increased, and the Air Force expanded rapidly during 1950 and 1951. The poor showing made by the Chinese Communist pilots against United Nations aircraft is attributed to inadequate training rather than to a shortage or inferiority of equipment. After the Korean War, the Chinese Communist Air Force continued to expand until it became the fourth largest air force in the world.

2. CURRENT STATUS

The combat elements of the Chinese Communist Air Force are equipped with Soviet jet fighters and jet light and medium bombers. The backbone of the Air Force is the jet fighters, principally the MIG-15 (FAGOT) and MIG-17 (FRESCO) (figs. 141 and 142).
They have recently acquired a limited number of MIG-19's (FARMER) (fig. 143). For
ground attack and support operations, the Chi­
nese Communists use the propellor-driven Il-
10 (BEAST). Their bomber force is equipped
with two types of light bombers—the jet Il-28
(BEAGLE) (fig. 144) and the propellor-driven
Tu-2 (BAT). The Air Force has only a few
Tu-4 (BULL) medium bombers, which are
Soviet copies of the U.S. B-29 (fig. 145). The
principal transport aircraft of the Chinese Com­
munist Air Force are the Li-2 (CAB), which
is a Soviet copy of the U.S. C-47, and the Il-12
(COACH). In addition to providing most of
the Air Force's materiel, the Soviets continue
to assist with training, but the Chinese Com-

Figure 143. MIG-19 (FARMER).

Figure 144. Il-28 (BEAGLE).

Figure 145. Tu-4 (BULL).

munists are moving toward self-sufficiency in
this sphere. Nevertheless, continued Chinese
Communist dependence upon the Soviet Union
for equipment and aviation fuel results in con­siderable Soviet influence over the development
of the Air Force. The principal weakness is
the low level of pilot proficiency demonstrated
during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis when the
Chinese Communist formations were repeatedly
defeated by the outnumbered Chinese National­
ists.

3. MISSION

The Chinese Communist Air Force has the
tactical mission of providing air defense, pro­
viding close support for the ground forces, in­
derdition of battle areas, and the airlift of
personnel and supplies in support of ground
operations. Although the Air Force is organ­
zied and equipped primarily for the defensive
and tactical role, its medium bomber components
have a limited strategic mission which would
include attacks against enemy lines of com­
munication, rear area supply concentrations,
manufacturing complexes, and communications
centers. The light bombardment elements would
be employed tactically to disrupt forward com­
munications and supply installations. Because
of the lack of an appreciable long-range force,
the capability of the Air Force to accomplish
these missions is contingent upon both the
area in which it is operating and the quality
of the forces opposing it.
Section II. ORGANIZATION

4. GENERAL

The Air Force is a major component of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces which are predominantly ground force in character. The Air Force is controlled from the Air Force Headquarters within the Headquarters, People's Liberation Army. The Air Force is dominated by the ground forces, inasmuch as the Headquarters is subordinate to the staff departments of the Headquarters, PLA, and former ground force officers still occupy senior positions within the Air Force. Within the PLA command and administrative structure, the Air Force Headquarters occupies a position generally comparable to the Naval Headquarters and the headquarters of the various other branches of service, i.e., armor, artillery, etc.

5. COMMAND STRUCTURE

The Air Force Headquarters within Headquarters, PLA, maintains general operational and administrative control over all Air Force units and installations. However, the Air Headquarters of the Military Region has considerable freedom in local administration, and the commander of the regional air headquarters has a large measure of control over the air operations of tactical units within his region. In peacetime, the Air Force Headquarters at the PLA level may directly command tactical units in the field. In an active wartime theater, the theater commander has operational control of the air units assigned to his command.

6. TACTICAL ORGANIZATION

The basic combat unit in the Air Force is the air regiment, which normally is equipped with 37 aircraft. The regiment is further divided into three squadrons for tactical control. The largest combat organization is the air division, believed to consist of from two to three regiments. These air units are supported by independent aircraft maintenance and airfield operating elements, and ground-controlled intercept units.

Section III. OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GROUND FORCES

7. GENERAL

Although the principal mission of the Air Force is air defense, its potential for offensive operations is growing, and it can be expected to support the offensive and defensive operations of the ground forces in any future operational situation that may develop. Their operational doctrine is patterned after that of the Soviet Union, particularly in the dominance of ground commanders in air-ground coordination.

8. CONTROL AND COORDINATION

Chinese Communist air support doctrine indicates that overall control is centralized at the wartime army group level or theater level. Coordination is insured through the exchange of air and ground liaison personnel. Target areas and time of attack are determined by the ground commander. The detailed planning of the air support mission is the responsibility of the air commander, and the operations are directed from his command post or from the command post of the ground commander through air staff representatives. The air liaison officers detailed to the command post or headquarters of the tactical ground commander assure continued coordination between air and ground units in the battle area and transmit the requirements of the ground commander to the air commander. The air liaison officer keeps the air commander informed of all changes in both the ground and air situation.

9. OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS

Air support of the ground attack is provided by both ground attack and bomber aircraft. Air strikes are either preplanned, executed upon the request of the ground commander, or carried out on the initiative of the air commander. Strikes are synchronized with the lifting of friendly artillery fire. The air offensive action includes the neutralization of enemy
weapons, target spotting, impeding enemy counterattacks, disruption of the routes from the enemy rear to the battle area, and protection of friendly troops from air attack at the point of main effort.

10. DEFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS

In the defense, air units support the actions of both the general and combat outpost forces and the forces in the main defense zone. In the defensive situation, the ground commander utilizes combat aviation to attack the enemy during his approach march and in his assembly areas; to support the defensive fire plan; to strike at enemy artillery, tanks, forward airfields, and reserves; to attack an enemy force that has broken through or penetrated in depth; and to protect friendly forces from air attack.
APPENDIX III. THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

1. THE GENERAL PATTERN OF THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN CHINA

The Chinese Communists rule more than 650 million people who live in an area one-fourth larger than the area of the United States. Communist China is a monolithic dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party; the Chinese Communist Army is the principal instrument through which the Party gained and currently maintains control. The Chinese Communist Government, Party, and Army are, in effect, inseparable, and the same small group of Communist leaders dominates all three. Since 1949, the Chinese Communist regime has consolidated its control over the mainland of China through a policy of incentives and repression and large-scale mobilization of the masses.

Communist China is bound to the Soviet Union by close ideological, economic, and military ties and has been playing an important role in the spread of international Communism in Asia. The Chinese Communist Armed Forces may be expected to continue to take a significant part in the development and execution of Communist military programs in eastern Asia.

The rapid development of the Chinese Communist Army within the last 30 years, from a small guerrilla force to one of the world's largest armies, is reflected in the nature of the leadership, organization, tactics, and equipment of this Army today. The Chinese Communists, however, have had control of the mainland of China for just over a decade. Hence, in a study of the nature and potential of the relatively young Chinese Communist Army, it is desirable to have at least a general understanding of China's history, geography, economy, and people.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

a. Historically, China was for several thousand years the center of civilization and culture in east Asia. China is separated from Europe and south-central Asia by mountain barriers and desert wastes, and it was not until the 19th Century that China was strongly influenced by developments in the Western world. China's modern relations with the West developed during the 19th Century, when major European Powers demanded and received special privileges or grants of territory on long-term leases from the weak and decadent Manchu rulers of China. The partitioning of China by European Powers into spheres of influence was checked mainly by strong United States support of China's territorial integrity. The principal external threat to China during the first four decades of the 20th Century came from the expanding Japanese Empire, which had extended its control over a large part of China prior to Japan's surrender in 1945.

b. Simultaneously with strong external pressures upon China during the last century, the country was undergoing a series of internal political and social upheavals. The ruling Manchu dynasty, weakened by internal rebellions and defeated in war by several European Powers and Japan, was overthrown in 1912, and the Republic of China was established. The new Republic was beset by many pressing domestic and foreign problems, the most important of which after 1931 were Communist revolution and Japanese aggression.

c. Although World War II removed the Japanese threat to China, it also seriously weakened the Government of the Republic and presented the Communists with the long-awaited opportunity to build up their strength for a final showdown with the Kuomintang (National People's Party) which was in control of the Government. The Chinese Communists, in 1949, succeeded in driving the Nationalist Government from the mainland of China. Taiwan, present seat of the Government of the Republic
of China, is also claimed by the Communists as a part of their "Peoples' Republic of China," which was proclaimed on 1 October 1949. Since the Communists gained hegemony over the mainland, they have striven to develop China into a modern industrial country. Considerable progress has been made but at the cost of almost complete regimentation of the Chinese people.

3. CHINA'S GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING

a. Communist China encompasses an area of 3,500,000 square miles. It is a country of great geographic diversity varying from heavily forested mountains of the semitropical North Vietnam-China border area to the barren tundra plateaus and rugged mountain ranges of northern Manchuria and from densely populated temperate plains and river basins in East China to the gravel land and sand deserts of the Northwest. Throughout history, China's physical isolation has hampered communication with neighboring States and has retarded internal development. With improved internal transport, however, and the resettlement of large numbers of Chinese in border areas a gradual change of basic orientation from a maritime Power to a continental land Power is taking place. This reorientation is already reflected in the regime's strategic thinking and in relations with neighboring States.

b. Between 75 and 80 percent of the Chinese people are farmers, who live mainly in the fertile basins of the Yellow River in North China, the Yangtze River in Central China, and the West River in South China. These heavily populated areas are contained in what generally has been known as "China proper".

c. Peripheral areas, including Tibet, Sinkiang, and Inner Mongolia, in southwestern and northwestern China, are dominated by lofty mountains, high plateaus, and broad deserts, which render them generally unsuitable for extensive agriculture. These areas are relatively thinly populated, but migration to these areas is increasing. Manchuria, China's northwestern frontier, however, has rich agricultural and industrial resources, and its population is probably increasing even more rapidly.

4. ECONOMIC TRENDS

a. The backbone of the Chinese economy is agriculture. Although only 10 to 12 percent of China's total area is arable, the regime is making a concerted effort to bring marginal lands under production by the construction of irrigation projects and the use of fertilizers. Communist China remains, however, a country of too many people on too little cultivated land. Furthermore, the pressure of the people on the land is increasing steadily from year to year. Today, the average Chinese farm family belongs to a commune. Members cultivate the land of the commune in primitive fashion. After obligatory state collections are made in kind from the total production of the commune, the average family is allotted enough to keep it at a bare subsistence level until the next crop is harvested. Rice is the main crop in the moist southeastern and east-central China, and wheat, millet, and other cereals are the principal crops in relatively dry northern and northeastern China.

b. China has significant mineral reserves, but they are to a large extent untapped mainly because of inaccessibility and the lack of adequate equipment and technicians. China's petroleum resources are also larger than first believed but remain in large part unexploited. Industry is concentrated in the more accessible coastal areas, but a program is well advanced to develop industrial cities inland near newly located strategic commodity reserves and away from the more vulnerable coastal areas. China's industrial output is now weighted on the side of heavy industry since the building of large steel complexes in the northwest and in central China and the implementation of the campaign to construct spare-time or backyard steel furnaces. Industrial output of consumer goods, even though overshadowed by the expansion of heavy industry, remains important with the cotton textile industry being preeminent.

c. The Chinese Communists produce most of their small arms and ammunition, and they are producing artillery pieces and motor vehicles in limited quantities. However, they are still dependent upon imports from other Bloc countries.
for most heavy weapons, armored vehicles and complex equipment.

d. Communist China has a tremendous manpower potential, but most of her manpower is only partially trained at best. Shortages of engineers, technicians, doctors, and other types of technically skilled personnel still exist, but these shortages are being overcome in part by recent graduates from Chinese institutions of higher learning and individuals sent to the U.S.S.R. for advanced schooling. Efforts to overcome the shortages in trained manpower by advanced schooling are offset somewhat by the disproportionate amount of time spent in political indoctrination.

5. THE PEOPLE OF COMMUNIST CHINA

a. About 90 percent of the people living in Communist China are of Chinese stock. The remainder are from various minority nationality groups including the Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans, Koreans, Turkomans, and many others. The Chinese people themselves are a mixture of many stocks, for, through their long history, they have absorbed many invaders and aboriginal peoples. The Manchu and Mongol strains are more prevalent in northern China, where the average Chinese generally is taller and more rugged than his southern neighbor.

In southern China, the people are smaller, more temperamental, and less amenable to discipline. It is significant that Chinese revolutions usually have had their roots in southern China and that the greatest resistance potential to Communism in China today probably is centered in this area.

b. Although written Chinese is universally understood by educated Chinese, the Chinese people have no universal spoken language. Mandarin, the dialect of the northern Chinese, has been adopted as the official national language among the educated Chinese and government officials. But among the peasant population, from which most Communist troops are drawn, there is a variety of dialects. Each dialect usually is understood only by the natives of a particular area. In the armed forces, efforts are made to minimize this language problem by grouping individuals speaking a common dialect into one unit.

c. The most recent innovation in the field of the written language is the current program to introduce Pinyin, a national phonetic language system, to replace Chinese characters. This effort to romanize and thus simplify the Chinese language has been made necessary by the requirements of modern technology and the need to eradicate widespread illiteracy among the people, so they can be politically indoctrinated in the shortest time possible.
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