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A New Racial Threat in the New South? 
(A Conditional) Yes

Byron D’Andra Orey

This paper examines three competing hypotheses: racial threat, social contact and racial resentment. Using individual level and aggregate level data, these three hypotheses are tested by examining white racial attitudes, and a variety of contextual variables, on the prospective vote for a white racially conservative candidate. The evidence provides support for all three of these hypotheses. Racial threat is found to be conditioned by the black population density and the resentment that whites direct toward African Americans. The probability that a white person will support a racially conservative candidate does not depend solely on the black population. Indeed, it is reported here that racially sympathetic whites, who live in areas with high black population densities are highly unlikely to support a racially conservative candidate, providing support for the social contact hypothesis. On the other hand, whites living in the same context, but who express resentment toward African Americans, are almost certain to support the racially conservative candidate. These findings point to an innovative approach to examining the racial threat hypothesis.

Giles and Buckner (1993) contend that race no longer plays “the central defining role in southern politics” (711). To be sure, the South no longer serves as the haven for racist demagogues and the home of Jim Crow laws. Similar to the rest of the country, overt racism is no longer tolerated in this region. Despite the change in the way that white racial attitudes are expressed, however, inequalities continue to persist. Whites in the South, for example, remain overrepresented in almost all elected positions in the political process, while blacks remain grossly underrepresented (Reeves 1998). This phenomenon can largely be attributed to racially polarized voting (Bositis 1998; Kleppner 1985; Loewen 1990; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989), where whites vote for the white candidate and blacks vote for the black candidate. Because blacks constitute a minority in many jurisdictions, they are unable to elect the candidate of their choice. Arguably, the transformation of the region from a Democratic stronghold to a Republican stronghold at the presidential level (Black and Black 1992), the change in party identification from Democrat to Republican by many white southern elected officials and the massive resistance to majority black districts by white southerners, point to a different type of racism that ultimately produces similar ends as those encountered in previous eras. Indeed, Sears et al. (1997)
conclude that even after the passage of civil rights legislation, "considerable racial inequality remains in many areas of the society, such as in income, wealth, educational attainment, health, crime, and so forth" (16).

This article expands on the author's previous work examining white racial attitudes on the prospective vote for a white racially conservative candidate by developing competing hypotheses. In a prior study, Knuckey and Orey (2000) examined the 1995 Louisiana Gubernatorial race featuring an African-American liberal and a white conservative. These authors contend that the white candidate used subtle racist tactics to capture the vote from racial conservatives. These tactics are argued to be different than those employed by racial demagogues of the past. Even in a Deep South state like Louisiana, whites no longer believe that African Americans are biologically inferior to whites (e.g., "redneck racism"). The old racism of yesterday has transformed into a new belief that African Americans simply do not live by the work ethics espoused within the United States (see, Howell 1994). This new form of racism has acquired many names, including "symbolic racism" (Sears and Kinder 1971), "modern racism" (McConahay 1986), "subtle racism" (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), "racial resentment" (Kinder and Sanders 1996) and "Laissez-faire racism" (Bobo 1997). It does not take the blunt form associated with the old racism, but it is more subtle (see Edsall and Eddy 1991, Ch. 10).

In addition to examining white racial attitudes, a contextual analysis is conducted in an effort to test the “black density” or “racial threat” thesis. Recent studies in the area of race and politics have drawn conclusions noting the failure of the racial threat hypothesis in explaining the white vote for a racially conservative candidate or the white vote against an African-American candidate (see e.g., Voss 1996 and Carsey 1995). Here, I take the position that these analyses are incomplete and that the conclusions are premature. This research is argued to be incomplete because of data limitations. Studies that have included aggregate level data fail to test competing theories of racism as explanations for white vote choice. Those studies using individual level data, on the other hand, also have been hindered by data limitations because these data are often secondary and do not contain questions relating to racial attitudes (although, see Kinder and Sears 1981).

Kinder and Sears (1981) state that, “although theories of racial prejudice have been extensively catalogued, empirical confrontations between competing theories are surprisingly rare in the social sciences” (414). Following the lead of these authors, the research at hand investigates the impact of racism and racial density in explaining the intended white support for a racially conservative white candidate. The 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial race, featuring an African-American candidate, Cleo Fields, and a white candidate, Murphy J. “Mike” Foster, is a case in point. Three theoretical frameworks are examined here: racial threat, derived from the political behavior literature, social contact, derived from the social psychology literature and racial resentment, derived from the political psychology literature.

Black Threat, Social Contact and Racial Resentment

According to Key (1949) “The hard core of the political South—and the backbone of southern political unity—is made up of those counties and sections of the southern states in which Negroes constitute a substantial proportion of the population. In these areas a real problem of politics, broadly considered, is the maintenance of control by a white minority (S). He went on to note “Those whites who live in counties with populations 40, 50, 60, and even 80 percent Negro share a common attitude toward the Negro (Key 1949, 5). Moreover, “[i]f the whites of the black belts give the South its dominant political tone, the character of the politics of individual states will vary roughly with the Negro proportion of the population (Key 1949, 5).

Based on the analysis conducted by Key (1949), white support for racist candidates was found to be strongest in those black belt counties where there were high concentrations of blacks. This phenomenon has since been labeled "black threat" (e.g., Giles and Hertz 1994). Wright (1977) confirms Key’s thesis in an analysis assessing the white vote for Wallace in the 1968 presidential election. Using individual level data and an aggregate measurement of black density, Wright concludes that black density has an indirect effect on the white vote for Wallace. Giles and Buckner (1993, 1995) find support for the racial threat hypothesis in their examination of the white vote for David Duke across parishes in Louisiana in the 1990 United States Senate race.

According to Campbell (1965), whites are threatened by the real possibility of African Americans infringing upon their social, political and economic hegemony. This type of threat has been categorized as a realistic group conflict between blacks and whites. Based on this notion, conflict is expected to be highest when groups are competing over limited resources. Given this scenario, the black threat hypothesis predicts that whites will view any gains made by blacks as a zero sum game. Contrary to the racial threat hypothesis is the social contact hypothesis. This hypothesis holds that as majority group members interact with members of the minority, they become more racially tolerant. According to Lazarsfeld et al. (1968, 137), “voting is essentially a group experience. People who work or live or play together are likely to vote for the same candidate.”
Carsey (1995) provides empirical support for the social contact hypothesis. The author reports that, the higher the black density in precincts in New York City and Chicago and boroughs in New York City, the higher the probability that a white person voted for the black candidate. These findings seem to indicate that race played only a benign role in the two elections that were examined, given a reliance solely on the black threat hypothesis. It is argued here, however, that such a conclusion is premature due to data limitations. In other words, the data used by Carsey do not allow for an alternative explanation of racism, as suggested by Kinder and Sears (1981). Voss (1996) also provides some support for the social contact hypothesis by reporting a negative estimated effect of racial density on vote choice for parishes (the name for counties in Louisiana) in Louisiana that are at least 75 percent urban. Voss reports that those whites in Louisiana who resided in urban areas, and areas with high black densities, were least likely to have voted for David Duke in the 1990 U.S. Senate race, the 1991 gubernatorial open primary, and the 1991 gubernatorial runoff. Again, as was the case with Carsey, Voss’s analysis is constrained by data limitations, in that he is unable to test a competing hypothesis of racism (i.e., does not provide for an alternative explanation of racism).

Symbolic racism (same as racial resentment), a concept originally articulated by Sears and Kinder (1971), posits that white racial attitudes are no longer shaped by “biological racism,” the notion that blacks are an inherently inferior race to whites. These authors note that individuals who possess symbolic racial attitudes believe “that blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline” (Kinder and Sears 1981, 416). According to Sears (1988), symbolic racism is comprised of an antiblack affect and traditional American moral values. One of the principal architects of the symbolic racism concept, Kinder, (see Kinder and Sanders 1996, Appendix A), has reconsidered his decision to use symbolic racism to describe these attitudes and has opted (along with Sanders) to use “racial resentment” as a description for such attitudes. The research here follows the lead of Kinder and Sanders and employs racial resentment as the label for the racial attitudes described in this paper.

The following questions are adopted by Kinder and Sanders (1996, 106-107) to operationalize racial resentment:

Blacks should work harder. (1) Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without special favors. (2) Most blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if they tried (1986 NES). (3) It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

Denial of continuing racial discrimination. (4) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class (1986 and 1992 NES).

Undeserved advantage. (5) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve (1986 and 1992 NES). (6) Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black person than from a white person (1986 NES).

Among the questions presented above, Howell (1994) uses questions 1, 2, 4 and 5 to operationalize symbolic racism. The research at hand follows the lead of Howell.

There have been a number of criticisms regarding the face validity of the symbolic racism concept. Sniderman and his colleagues (Sniderman and Hagen 1985; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986) argue that the symbolic racism construct fails because it confounds the racial attitude with the policy choice (e.g., affirmative action). Said differently, these authors suggest that the dependent variable (affirmative-action) is not much different than the independent variable (symbolic racism), thus making the relationship between the two a “tautology” (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986, 135). The research here is able to avoid this concern because the dependent variable is vote choice. Additionally, Sniderman and his colleagues criticize proponents of the symbolic racism concept for not including such race neutral controls as individualism and egalitarianism in their examination of the impact of racial attitudes on racial policy and the vote choice for racially conservative candidates. Both of these controls are included here. Moreover, by including these two variables we can test whether an antiblack effect is present. Sears (1988, 70) states that, one way to determine if an antiblack effect is present is to test the effects of “symbolic racism (or racial attitudes in general)” while controlling for nonracial attitudes.

Despite its criticisms, however, symbolic racism has served as a strong explanatory variable for a variety of individual-level political attitudes (Howell 1994; Gilens 1995; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears et al. 1997; Alvarez and Brehm 1997; Huddy and Virtanen 1998). Sears and Kinder, along with their colleagues, have attempted to address most of these criticisms. For example, Kinder and Sanders (1996, 117-120) find racial resentment to outperform such control variables as individualism and egalitarianism, in the explanation of white American’s opinions on race policy. These authors also find biological racism and racial resentment to be distinct
concepts. In addition, Sears, Laar, Corrillo and Kosterman (1997) find symbolic racism to be a strong explanation for whites’ opposition to equal opportunities for blacks, even when controlling for such nonracial values as individualism, morality/sexuality and authoritarianism. Howell (1994), controlling for both old-fashioned racism and symbolic racism, reports that symbolic racism outperforms old-fashioned racism. While symbolic racism is highly significant in each of her three models examining the vote for David Duke, old-fashioned racism fails to achieve statistical significance. Alvarez and Brehm (1997) find symbolic racism to be a strong explanation for opposition to racial policies, even when controlling for rival hypotheses such as authoritarianism and individualism.

The 1995 Louisiana Gubernatorial Election

Two weeks prior to the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial primary, a white candidate, Murphy J. “Mike” Foster, converted from the Democratic party to the Republican party and made strong appeals to the white electorate. This conversion increased his self-proclaimed image as a conservative. Foster’s campaign included a call to repeal affirmative action, support for the plaintiffs in the Hays v. Louisiana case challenging the majority African-American congressional district in which Cleo Field was the incumbent, and opposition to the federal Motor Voter law, all of which have potentially negative repercussions for the African-American community. Foster also campaigned heavily for the right to carry a concealed weapon and pushed hard on issues relating to crime. Foster refused to repudiate the endorsement he received from former Ku Klux Klan leader and white supremacist David Duke. In addition, Foster admitted to having paid $150,000 for Duke’s mailing list.

Although the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial election campaign did not entail the overt racism present during Key’s (1949) research, there were detections of racial coded language used by Foster. Hagen (1993) charges... have a very low crime rate” (cited in Ott 1995, 2).

Hypotheses

This study is designed to examine the impact of racial and non-racial attitudes on the prospective vote for a racially conservative candidate. The hypotheses below are introduced to test whether racial threat, social contact or racial resentment contribute to our understanding of the white vote for a racially conservative candidate.

Racial Resentment

H1: It is asserted that an increase in racial resentment scores will increase the probability of a white person voting for Foster.

Social Contact Hypothesis

H2: It is asserted that an increase in black density will decrease the probability of a white person voting for Foster.

Racial Threat

The traditional racial threat hypothesis is based on the notion that an increase in black density will increase racial conservatism among whites. That is, in areas where African Americans are highly populated (compared to whites), whites will attempt to maintain their social, political and economic hegemony.

H3: It is asserted that an increase in black density will increase the probability of a white person voting for Foster.

According to Voss (1996), whites should be most threatened in majority black cities where they have lost their political edge and in areas where poverty and crime have the potential to “... exacerbate racial strife” (1163).

H4: It is asserted that the probability of a white person indicating a vote for Foster will increase as both black density and the percent urban population increases, simultaneously.

Bonacich (1976) contends that working class whites, who are in direct competition with African Americans, are likely to be racially conservative. These whites view job competition as a zero sum game, whereby African
Americans are given an edge through such programs as affirmative action and as a result, whites lose.

**H5:** It is asserted that an increase in unemployment in high black density areas will increase the probability of a white person voting for Foster.

The final hypothesis examines the impact of black density and racial resentment on the prospective vote for Foster. It is argued here that black density and racial resentment work as a tandem team to explain the white intended vote for the racially conservative candidate. This interaction is said to capture what Kinder and Sanders (1996) refer to as a “perceived threat.”

**H6:** It is asserted that the probability of a white person indicating a vote for Foster will increase as both racial resentment and black density increase.

Data and Methods

The data base for this effort combines two separate components: a survey of white registered voters conducted in 1995, and 1990 parish level (same as county) census data for the respondents merged with the survey data. Thus, measurement is at the level of individual respondents, but an aggregate level contextual measure is obtained for each respondent. The survey data employed in this paper are drawn from the 1995 Gubernatorial Runoff Survey conducted by the University of New Orleans Survey Research Center. It is a telephone survey in which respondents, consisting of registered voters statewide, were selected through random digit dialing (see Frey 1989). The Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) system was used to record the data. The sample closely reflects the total population distribution and the racial make-up of the state. In this analysis only white respondents are examined because this paper is only interested in white racial attitudes.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the intended white vote for Foster. It takes on a value of one, meaning an intended vote for Foster and zero otherwise. Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression for a binary variable is employed.

Independent Variables

Recent research, mainly taken from the social psychology literature (see for example, Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986), reveals that whites still possess negative attitudes toward African Americans, however, they are careful as to how they display these feelings. In the current research, questions tapping racial resentment were carefully chosen so that the antiblack nature of the question is not made obvious to the respondent. The Likert-type items employed to measure racial resentment are drawn from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research’s (ICPSR) National Election Study (NES) surveys and the 1985 NES Pilot Study and are combined to create an additive index scale (see Appendix C). This is an ordinal level variable ranging from zero to one, with zero representing racially sympathetic whites and one representing whites who express resentment toward African Americans. Based on the descriptive statistics, whites score extremely high on the racial resentment scale. Out of a possible score of 1.00, the average score obtained by whites is .71. It is expected that racial resentment will have a positive coefficient, suggesting that those individuals possessing resentment towards African Americans will vote for Foster, *ceteris paribus.*

Black density is employed as a contextual variable and is operationalized as the percentage of the black population in the respondent’s parish (the name for counties in Louisiana). The total black population is employed rather than the percent black registered voters, because the threat that blacks pose to whites is based on the perception of blacks as a whole, and not black-registered voters. If black threat is valid, we expect to find a positive relationship with intended vote for the racially conservative Republican candidate, Mike Foster, everything else being equal. On the other hand, a negative relationship would lend support for the social contact hypothesis. In addition to black density, two additional parish-level contextual variables are included: unemployment levels (Giles and Buckner 1993; 1995; 1996) and the percentage of the population that is urban (Abrahamson 1980).

Voss (1996) recommends that an interaction be included to capture the threat that would exist between inner city blacks and whites. Thus, an interaction between the urban variable and black density variable also is included as an independent variable.

Partisanship is measured by self-identification on a three-point scale where Republican identification is high. Similarly, ideology is measured so that conservative identification is high. Individualism is measured based on a single Likert-type item consisting of a three point scale running from “The government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living” at one end (zero), to “The government should..."
just let each person get ahead on their own” at the opposite end (one) (see e.g., Gilens (1995, 1003)). According to Tuch and Hughes (1996), egalitarian beliefs reject the notion of social inequality, while placing emphasis, instead, on “equality of racial outcomes and promoting action to reduce persisting inequalities” (727). This variable was measured based on the following Likert-type item: “Government should help minorities or they should help themselves?” It is operationalized as a three-category variable that takes on a value of zero if the respondent indicated that minorities should help themselves, a value of .5 represents a response of “in-between” and a value of one if the respondent indicated that government should help minorities.

In addition to the above independent variables, the model also controls for other variables found to be related to vote choice. These variables include gender (Howell and Pelinka 1994), age (Morin and Balz 1989; Tuch 1988), income (Giles and Evans 1985; Kinder and Sanders 1996), level of educational attainment (Bobo and Licari 1988). Gender takes on a value of one for males and zero for females. Income and education are ordinal variables ranging from zero to one, where zero takes on the lowest level and one takes on the highest level. Age is measured as an ordinal level variable in the survey, ranging from zero to one (see Cohen and Dawson 1993).

Given the expected correlation between some of the aforementioned variables, auxiliary regressions were performed for the purpose of detecting multicollinearity. The results indicate that there is a high level of multicollinearity amongst the interaction terms and their component variables. High levels of multicollinearity result in large standard errors and low significance levels. The remedy employed in this paper “centered” the component variables about their means prior to constructing the interaction terms (Cronbach 1987; Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan 1990). This approach will result in reduced standard errors, however, it will not affect the magnitude of the coefficients of the interactions, nor the calculated slopes for the component variables.

Black Density, Racial Resentment and Vote Choice

The probability of voting for Foster increases as racial resentment increases among whites, the respective scores for those with low, moderate, and high racial resentment being .32, .65, and .88. Someone who is racially sympathetic, meaning that they possess a racial resentment score of zero, is much less likely to vote for Foster than someone with a high racial resentment score of one. In fact, the difference between these two categories is 56 points.

The results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 1. As expected, racial resentment is highly significant and in the posited direction. Both the black density variable and the interactions between percent urban and black density, fail to achieve statistical significance, however, the coefficient of the interaction term between racial resentment and black density does achieve statistical significance. The interaction takes on a positive sign, indicating that those individuals who live in parishes with high concentrations of African Americans, and who possess high levels of resentment towards African Americans are likely to vote for Foster. This finding supports the notion that a tandem relationship exists between racial density and racial resentment in these two variables on the white prospective vote. These results run counter to the work of Kinder and Mendelberg (1995). According to these authors, “... under conditions of racial proximity, the role played by racial prejudice in white public opinion is considerably reduced” (Kinder and Mendelberg 1995, 419). In addition, the interaction between black density and unemployment achieves statistical significance, but it is in the wrong direction. These findings indicate that whites who live in areas with high concentrations of blacks and where the unemployment level is high, are less likely to support Foster. Based on Hypothesis 5, such findings are counterintuitive. This is an important point that is discussed more fully below.

Nagler (1991) recommends two methods for examining interactive effects. The author states that we can either include an interactive (multiplicative) term (applied in Table 1) or employ a disaggregation method. The second method is recommended by Nagler, and it can assist us in better understanding the impact of the conditional effects of racial resentment and black density, and, black density and unemployment, on the white prospective vote. In this case, the black density variable is disaggregated to include two categories, whereby the racial resentment and unemployment coefficients are examined. The two categories were determined a priori, based upon Key’s notion that massive resistance toward blacks occurred in those counties (in this case parishes) with black populations over 40 percent. The first Model in Table 2 represents parishes with black populations less than 40 percent. According to Table 2, Model 1, the racial resentment coefficient for this threshold is 1.94 and highly significant at the .01 level. The second threshold, Model 2, represents those parishes with a black population greater than 40 percent. The racial resentment coefficient here, increases to 8.33 and also is highly significant at the .01 level, despite an N of only 77. The unemployment coefficients are even more illuminating. Table 2, Model 1, reveals that the unemployment coefficient takes on a positive value, suggesting that the likelihood of whites, who live in low black density areas, voting
Table 1. Logistic Regression Results for a Model Predicting the Intended Vote for Mike Foster in the 1995 Louisiana Gubernatorial Election (White Respondents Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Maximum Likelihood Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment</td>
<td>2.69*** (.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Density</td>
<td>-15 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-64 (1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-02 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment X Black Density</td>
<td>.76* (.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment X Black Density</td>
<td>-3.06*** (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban X Black Density</td>
<td>02 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.88** (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td>.92*** (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td>.37 (.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
<td>-.09 (.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.39 (.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>1.38*** (.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.83* (.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.34 (.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.31** (.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Log Likelihood</td>
<td>476.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is coded 1 for the intended vote for Foster and 0 otherwise. *p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01

Table 2. Results of Logistic Regression Analysis Based on the Percentage of Black Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1 % Black &lt; 40</th>
<th>Model 2 % Black &gt; 40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MLE (robust standard errors)</td>
<td>MLE (robust standard errors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment</td>
<td>2.14*** (.567)</td>
<td>8.33*** (2.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td>.158 (.384)</td>
<td>2.96* (1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.873** (.452)</td>
<td>-.59 (.1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td>.807*** (.303)</td>
<td>1.43 (.392)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
<td>-.222 (.383)</td>
<td>1.44 (.1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-.011 (.030)</td>
<td>.110 (.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>2.29** (.972)</td>
<td>-8.24** (3.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.131 (.536)</td>
<td>-.111 (.1.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.493 (.473)</td>
<td>-.168 (.1.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>1.30*** (.510)</td>
<td>.488 (.1.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.90*** (.1.12)</td>
<td>-2.58 (.3.93)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 391 77
-2 Log Likelihood 451.63 66.63

*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01

for a racially conservative candidate increases as unemployment increases. According to Model 2, however, the exact opposite occurs. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the .05 level. Again, such a finding runs counter to our expectations. In particular, these findings suggest that, whites who live in high black density and high unemployment areas are unlikely to vote for Foster.
to African Americans are almost certain not to vote for Foster. As racial resentment increases, however, the probability of voting for Foster increases. In short, a white who possesses the highest level of resentment toward African Americans is almost certain to vote for Foster. The probability of voting for Foster is higher for whites who live in low black density areas, when compared to whites who live in high black density areas, when racial resentment is low. As racial resentment scores increase beyond the .5 level, however, whites who live in areas with high black densities are more likely to vote for Foster than are whites who live in low density areas. In fact, whites who live in high black density areas are almost certain (probability is equal to .99) to vote for Foster when their racial resentment score is perfect (i.e., one).

Substantively, these findings can be interpreted to mean that whites who might rely on the government in their time of distress (e.g., unemployed), will vote rationally. In other words, given their self-interests, these voters will vote for a liberal candidate who is perceived to be more sympathetic during their time of distress. An alternative interpretation could be that whites who live in close proximity to African Americans and who live under the same conditions as African Americans will vote like African Americans.

On the other hand, the results suggest that some whites may not have the “exit option” (e.g., Tiebout 1956; Hirschman 1970) to relocate or escape areas containing high concentrations of blacks. Said differently, some whites may not live in high black density areas because they desire to do so, they may live there because they do not have the option to “exit” (e.g., cannot afford to move . . .). As a result, we would expect those voters whose desires are to “exit,” given their resentment toward African Americans, to vote for the racially conservative candidate. In addition, Hirschman (1970), in Exit, Voice and Loyalty, argues that one may feel a sense of loyalty to his/her community and opt not to exit. It is possible that these people might not be directly threatened by African Americans, but they may resent them and therefore “voice” their resentment with their vote (see, e.g., Hirschman 1970). Such reasoning captures the heart of what Kinder and Sanders (1996) call a perceived threat, whereby racial resentment and racial threat work as a tandem team to explain the intended vote for a racially conservative candidate. Indeed, these authors conclude that “the perception of racial threat . . . is less connected to real circumstance, and it is much more a reflection of racial resentments” (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 68). Whether this threat is considered to be perceived or not, it clearly provides us with a new way of examining racial threat.
Conclusion

The title of this article poses the question, is there a new racial threat in the "new" South? The answer, based upon the findings here, is a conditional yes. It is conditional, that is, on the percentage of African Americans that live within a given parish and the level of racial hostility that they direct towards African Americans. While some may argue that there is nothing new about the racism in the South, it is clearly the case that racial demagogues are no longer taken seriously as viable candidates for political office. Indeed, it is the case that ethnocentric candidates, such as David Duke, no longer use overt racism while campaigning on the stump. The racist demagogue has been replaced by candidates who use racial coded language. The case employed here presented an opportunity to examine attitudes toward a racially conservative white candidate who employed subtle racist tactics to gain the support of racially conservative voters.

The 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial race is an important contest to examine, given that it included both a white and a black candidate. The inclusion of this contest is consistent with the original work conducted by Sears and Kinder, in 1971. Indeed, much of the research investigating symbolic racism and racial threat has employed contests that have featured only white candidates. The findings here corroborate previous analyses that find racial resentment to outperform alternative explanations for white support for a racially conservative candidate and white opposition to racial policy.

The threat reported in this paper differs from the threat of old. The threat described by Key was one of actual conflict. The threat described here, on the other hand, is described to be a perceived threat. Indeed, it is the case that whites who live in high black density areas and high unemployment contexts are less likely to vote for the racially conservative candidate. Such findings point to the potential for blacks to build coalitions with neighboring whites, who live under similar unfavorable circumstances, to defeat racially conservative candidates. Moreover, the findings reported here are argued to represent a true contextual effect. Unlike previous analyses that have relied solely on the results yielded by the black density variable being operationalized as a continuous variable, the disaggregation method allows us to examine each threshold separately. This analysis examines only one state, Louisiana. Therefore, it might lack external validity. Despite this limitation, these findings provide strong support for racial resentment as a tandem explanation, along with black density, for the intended white vote for a racially conservative candidate. It is recommended that future research be conducted to include a larger sample size including other states.

Appendix A

Coding of the Control Variables

The control variables and their coding are as follows:

Racial resentment: Coded as a 17 category variable where 0 represents racially sympathetic whites and 1 represents racially resentful whites.

Individualism: Coded as a three category variable where 0 = the government should see to it that every person has a job ...; .5 = In between; and 1 = the government should just let each person get ahead on their own.

Egalitarianism: A three category variable where 0 = Minorities should help themselves; .5 = In between; and 1 = Government should help minorities.

Ideology: A three category variable where 0 = liberal; .5 = moderate; and 1 = conservative.

Party Identification: A three category variable where 0 = Democrat; .5 = Independent; and 1 = Republican.

Education: A five category variable where 0 = Through 8th grade; .25 = Grades 9-11; .50 = High School graduate; .75 = Some College; and 1 = College Degree.

Age: A five category variable where 0 = 18-19; .14 = 20-29; .29 = 30-39; .43 = 40-49; .57 = 50-59; .71 = 60-69; .86 = 70-79; 1 = age 80 and over.

Gender: 0 = Female, 1 = Male.

Income: A six category variable where 0 = <$10,000; .17 = $10,000-25,000; .33 = $26,000-40,000; .50 = $41,000-60,000; .66 = $61,000-80,000; 1 = Over 80,000.

Contextual Variables:
- % Black Density/10
- % Unemployed/10
- % Urban/10
- % Black Density X % Urban
- % Racial resentment X % Black Density
- % Black Density X % Unemployment
Appendix B

The Wording of Questions Tapping Racial Resentment

Now I am going to read several statements. After each one, I would like you to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly.

Receive Less: Over the last few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
(Disagree)

- Agree Strongly: 5.5
- Agree Somewhat: 13.4
- Neither Agree Nor Disagree: 9.5
- Disagree Somewhat: 26.5
- Disagree Strongly: 39.7

Minorities Overcame Prejudice: Irish, Italians, Jewish and other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (Agree)

- Agree Strongly: 39.3
- Agree Somewhat: 27.5
- Neither Agree Nor Disagree: 7.7
- Disagree Somewhat: 13.6
- Disagree Strongly: 3.2

Try Harder: It's really just a matter of some people not trying hard enough. If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. (Agree)

- Agree Strongly: 39.3
- Agree Somewhat: 27.5
- Neither Agree Nor Disagree: 7.7
- Disagree Somewhat: 13.6
- Disagree Strongly: 8.3

Slavery Created Conditions: Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (Disagree)

- Agree Strongly: 11.9
- Agree Somewhat: 20.6
- Neither Agree Nor Disagree: 3.6
- Disagree Somewhat: 21.3
- Disagree Strongly: 38.7

Appendix C

Descriptive Statistics

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<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D</th>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.34</td>
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</table>

NOTES

1This is consistent with the extant literature because much of the contemporary work on racial threat has employed Louisiana as a case study (see, e.g., Voss 1996; Giles and Buckner 1996, 1995; and Giles and Hertz 1994).

2Giles and Hertz (1994) contend, that this competition is “conceptualized as contextually conditioned” (317). In other words, “In contexts where the threat posed by a minority group is high, the dominant group’s response is predicted to be more hostile than in contexts where that threat is low” (Giles and Hertz 1994, 317).

3As it relates to the research here, as the minority population increases, we would expect the white electorate to begin forming coalitions with the minority electorate.

4According to Sears (1988, 56), symbolic racism is operationalized based on three categories: antagonism, resentment and denial of continuing discrimination. The questions adopted in this paper do not possess an antagonism category, according to the requirements set forth by Sears (1988, 57). In addition, it is argued here that the questions adopted by Kinder and Sanders (1996, 106-107) support their decision to use racial resentment as a description of white racial attitudes. So, while I adopt the questions used by Howell (1994), unlike her, I use racial resentment to describe these racial attitudes because they seem to really be tapping white racial resentment toward African Americans.
Intuitively, one could posit a two-stage model where black density is posited to impact racial resentment and both racial resentment and black density are posited to impact the prospective vote choice. Indeed, Glaser (1994) employs symbolic racism (same as racial resentment here) as an endogenous variable. However, his findings yield no support for a causal relationship between black density and those instruments traditionally used to measure symbolic racism. In a separate analysis, not reported here, I employed a two-stage model where black density was modeled as an antecedent to racial resentment. This relationship did not hold. Finally, an analysis also was conducted to determine if party identification was a function of black density (see e.g., Giles and Hertz 1994), in addition to being an explanation for vote for Foster. There is no support for such a relationship.

One of the criticisms of the racial resentment variable is that it is not valid (i.e., it does not encompass an antiblack affect). While feeling thermometers have been used in the extant literature (see e.g., Sears 1988) to make this case, data limitations have prevented me from using such a measure here. As a result, I have employed a candidate evaluation variable for Cleo Fields as a proxy. In an effort to purge this variable of its nonracial components, an analysis was conducted whereby the Fields' Image variable was regressed on a number of nonracial independent variables that have been used to examine candidate evaluation. The residuals from this analysis were saved and a new variable was created, now argued to be purged of the perceived nonracial effects. This new variable was then employed as an explanation for racial resentment. The results indicate that the variable is statistically significant and in the posited direction. These findings support the notion that racial resentment does encompass an antiblack effect and is therefore a valid construct.

Cronbach's alpha is employed to examine the reliability of this construct and achieves a value of .68. Sears et al. (1997, 26) report alpha reliabilities that range from .65 to .78, using a variety of data sources.

See Appendix C for each of the individual questions and the response rates for each of the possible answers.

The contextual variables have been divided by 10, therefore, the regression coefficients represent the change in the dependent per 10 percentage points change in the independent variable. These transformations were made in order to avoid very small coefficients and standard errors.

There has been some debate as to whether robust standard errors should be used in logistic regression. Sribney (1998) indicates that robust standard errors should be employed in logistic regression primarily when the model has been poorly specified (i.e., the model fails goodness-of-fit tests). As a precautionary measure, robust standard errors are estimated.

In a separate analysis not reported here, candidate evaluation models were examined using ordinary least squares. The racial resentment variable was the only independent variable to achieve statistical significance in all three of these models. Further, after examining the standardized beta coefficients, racial resentment clearly dominated all of the other variables that achieved statistical significance.

REFERENCES


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