Counter Intelligence Corps, History and Mission in World War II

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
HISTORY AND MISSION
IN WORLD WAR II

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HISTORY AND MISSION
OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
IN WORLD WAR II

CIC School
Counter Intelligence Corps Center
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change to..............under the jurisdiction of the 201st (I Corps) Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and the two were operating under the supervision of the 224th (XXIV Corps)....On 11 January, the 201st.................
1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE. The material in this manual is designed to furnish information on the historical development of the Counter Intelligence Corps. It covers the period from 1917 to 1945, with special emphasis on the war years. An attempt has been made, from the documents available, to describe the history and mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the various theaters of operations.

2. THE CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE POLICE. During World War I the Intelligence Section, American Expeditionary Force, recommended and the War College Division sanctioned the establishment of the Corps of Intelligence Police. Authority for such action was contained in the provisions of Section II of an Act of Congress (approved 16 May 1917) giving the President the power to increase the Army to meet the national emergency. This Corps of fifty men in the rank of sergeant of infantry was to report for counterespionage duty under the Commanding General, American Expeditionary Force. On 13 August 1917, the Corps of Intelligence Police was officially established by War Department General Orders.

a. A French-speaking officer with experience in police work was given the mission of recruiting the men. He traveled to New Orleans and New York City where he advertised in the local newspapers for men who could speak French to do intelligence work in France. He accepted all candidates who could pass the Army physical examination and answer a few simple questions in French.

b. On 25 November 1917, the Corps of Intelligence Police, fifty strong, arrived in St. Nazaire, France. Some were sent to British Intelligence at Le Havre for further training. The others were assigned to the rear area under the control of General Headquarters or were merged with divisional intelligence sections. The Le Havre Detachment worked at copying British suspect lists and counterespionage summaries and began indexing these lists. This training continued until a short while before the Armistice.

c. In January, 1918, the Corps opened its office in Paris and began work on its central card file, securing names from British, French, and American sources. At the end of the war this file contained some 50,000 names.

d. The first actual counterespionage work was done at St. Nazaire where enemy agents were reported to be active. Agents apprehended by the Corps of Intelligence Police were immediately turned over to French authorities for disposition. Civilians were screened, travelers
checked, and passports examined. In addition to work of a counter-
espionage and security nature, the Corps of Intelligence Police also did
investigative work for the Department of Criminal Investigation by con-
ducting fraud and graft investigations. Members of the Corps of Intelli-
gence Police were assigned to the American Peace Delegation in Paris.
One detachment was assigned to guard President Wilson’s residence while
he was in France.

e. In January, 1918, authorization was granted to increase the
Corps gradually to an eventual strength of 750 men. One year later,
there were 405 agents on duty with the American Expeditionary Force.
However, the allotted 750 vacancies were never filled because of the
Armistice and demobilization of the Corps.

f. Meanwhile, during the years 1917-1918, the work of the
Corps of Intelligence Police in the continental United States was carried
out under the Chief of the War College Division, General Staff. On 28
November 1917, the Corps was increased to 300 men, 250 of whom were to
work within the United States. In March, 1918, with the abolition of
the War College Division of the General Staff, the Corps of Intelligence
Police was transferred to the control of the Military Intelligence Branch
of the Executive Division of the General Staff.

g. The next increase in strength came in an order from The
Adjutant General dated 4 September, 1918. This was deemed necessary be-
cause of the rapid increase in the number of investigations being con-
ducted throughout the United States and the territorial departments.

h. However, these goals were never reached, for by January,
1920, of a total of 600 men who had been on duty in the Corps of Intelli-
gence Police, only 18 remained. This caused serious concern among those
who saw the menace of failing to provide a permanent place for the Corps
of Intelligence Police in the organization of the Army. Many saw the
necessity for such personnel in New York, Washington, and the Western
and Southern Departments for investigation and guard duties of a strictly
confidential nature. Therefore, authority was requested to detail not
more than 24 sergeants of the duly authorized organizations of the Army
for intelligence service. These were to be evenly divided among the
Eastern, Western, and Southern Departments, and the District of Columbia.
The Adjutant General granted the authority for such action on 7 February
1920. These men were to be subject to the orders of the Department Com-
mander in whose territory they were assigned, except for the six men on
duty with the Western Department who were to be subject to the orders of
the Director of Military Intelligence. However, this order did not create
a permanent status for the Corps of Intelligence Police in the organiza-
tion of the Army.

i. A series of memoranda, prepared by the Director of Intelli-
gence, pointed out the necessity for such a body of men, requested a
permanent organization for the Corps of Intelligence Police, and set
forth the quotas for the Corps Areas and Departments. The quota of 45
sergeants allotted by the resultant order was not as great as had been
desired by the various Corps Areas and Departments, but it did give the Corps of Intelligence Police a permanent foothold in the organization of the Army.

j. Duties of the Corps of Intelligence Police were outlined by the War Department in the spring of 1921. All individuals who might be suspected of operating against the Military Establishment were to be closely observed. In addition, the Corps of Intelligence Police was directed to report on radical activities in political and industrial fields. This was a tremendous assignment for a handful of men whose number was reduced to a mere 30 in 1922 when the Army was cut to 125,000 men.

k. The policy of isolationism that swept the country at that time made it impossible to increase the Army in general and the Corps of Intelligence Police in particular. Although there was important work for the Corps, the policy of the Army prohibited the Corps of Intelligence Police from growing large enough to control subversive activity in, or directly affecting, the Military Establishment. However, in 1926, when it became clear that the Corps of Intelligence Police would have to expand rapidly in an emergency, a "Mobilization Plan" for the Corps was drawn up. The initial strength of the Corps was set at 250 men with provision for increments as the mobilization progressed. The functions of the personnel were outlined more clearly, and a promotion plan was formulated.

l. Despite the best intentions of men who were aware of the real value of the Corps of Intelligence Police, a further decrease occurred in 1926, which brought the total to 28; and in November, 1933, strength was decreased to 15. This curtailment of essential personnel was effected as an economy move in the days of the depression. It was argued that the grades held by the men were too high for the clerical duties they were performing. It was even suggested that other military personnel or civilian employees replace the Corps of Intelligence Police in certain localities. To this, the Philippine Department answered: "This Department presents a special case in that its distance from the homeland, its close proximity to World Powers, its heterogeneous mixture of foreigners, and the uncertainty of the future, all tend to emphasize the importance of keeping the Commanding General fully informed at all times. In order to perform this important duty, the scope of the organization charged with its execution is wide and varied... All of the present members of the Corps of Intelligence Police are men of proven ability, loyalty, and experience... Were any of these agents replaced by civilians or military personnel, it would confront this office with the necessity of building a new organization and discarding one which has reached its present state of efficiency after years of intelligence effort and experience."
m. From 1934 to 1939, with but a single increase of one man authorized for work in the Philippine Department, the Corps of Intelligence Police existed precariously with its small quota. Meanwhile, continued reports indicated that Japanese and Nazi activity were on the upswing in the Panama, Hawaiian, and Philippine Departments. Finally, in June, 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a proclamation which stated that the control of all matters of an espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage nature would be handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The Directors of these three agencies were ordered to function as a committee to coordinate their activities.

n. One year later, the chiefs of the three agencies involved drew up an agreement as to jurisdiction, with particular emphasis given to foreign operations. Further revision of this agreement, defining clearly the work to be handled by each agency, was made in February, 1942. This has become known as the Delimitations Agreement of 1942.

o. Expansion of the Corps began almost immediately. In June, 1940, authorization was granted to bring in an additional 26 men. In December, 1940, the allotment was increased to 188 men. Although some difficulty was experienced in recruiting, because of a lack of definite standards of qualifications, it was soon established that only men of the highest integrity with a high school education or better would be selected. On 20 February 1941 a total of 260 men was reached. A total of 18 agents was allotted to the important Panama Canal Department. By 31 May the over-all total swelled to 513, and by 17 February 1942 the Panama Canal Department alone could count 59 men on duty there.

p. In January, 1941, the office of the Chief of the Corps of Intelligence Police-Sub-Section, Investigating Section, Counter Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, was established. On 24 February 1941, the Corps of Intelligence Police Investigators School became operational in the Army War College and, after two classes, was moved to Chicago. By April, Technical Manual 30-215 (Tentative) was published, thereby creating a definite and consistent procedure of training for all personnel in the Corps.

q. On 6 December 1941, the eve of Pearl Harbor, the Corps of Intelligence Police was a permanent organization of the Army, organized under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Staff. It had authorization for 513 enlisted men, and had begun the task of expanding its work under the policies set forth in the Delimitations Agreement. Suddenly the days of begging for men and money had come to an end. The problem was now to grow as rapidly as possible, procure and train men, and do a professional job simultaneously.
CHAPTER 2
ORGANIZATION FOR WAR

3. THE CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE POLICE IS GEARED FOR ACTION. The out-
break of World War II called for an immediate increase in the authorized
strength of the Corps of Intelligence Police. The total strength of the
Corps was set at 1,026 non-commissioned officers, and all its members
then in the Enlisted Reserve Corps were ordered to active duty "with
the least practical delay." The War Department then set out to produce
a well-staffed and well-trained organization for this branch of intelli-
gence work.

4. THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS. On 13 December 1941, a letter
from the office of The Adjutant General officially changed the name of
the Corps of Intelligence Police to the Counter Intelligence Corps, to
be effective 1 January 1942. This was a change in name only. However,
many organizational changes were made during the first two years of
existence of the Counter Intelligence Corps on the basis of lessons
learned from field experience.

a. At the outset of the war, there were many Military Intelli-
gence Division officers supervising the Corps of Intelligence Police
who were not experienced in their duties. This deficiency was early
recognized by the War Department, and constructive steps were taken
immediately. All officers selected for duty with the Counter Intelli-
gence Corps had to be cleared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
before serving with the Corps. Furthermore, commanders of all Corps
Areas, Departments (except the Philippine and Hawaiian Departments),
and Base Defense Commands were directed to submit without delay to the
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, a roster of all commissioned personnel
on duty with the Corps of Intelligence Police.

b. In order to provide the most proficient and experienced
counterintelligence commissioned personnel to supervise the activities
of the Counter Intelligence Corps, it was recommended that "a complement
of commissioned officers be specifically authorized for the Counter In-
telligence Corps." It was also deemed advisable to increase the com-
misioned strength of the Corps to 543 in field and company grades and
to bring the total non-commissioned strength to 4,431.

c. A tentative plan of organization for Counter Intelligence
Corps detachments to serve with tactical and headquarters units down to
and including divisions was also drawn up. In outline, the detachments
were to be composed in the following manner:

<table>
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<td>Army Corps</td>
<td>2 Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 Enlisted men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Field Army
6 Officers
49 Enlisted men

Air Forces
5 Officers
17 Enlisted men

Defense Command
4 Officers
26 Enlisted men

In addition, Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters, the Training School, the Washington Field Office, and the Replacement Pool were authorized officer and enlisted vacancies.

d. At this time, each service command was given a temporary and permanent allotment by The Adjutant General. The temporary allotment was to cover procurement when an overseas detachment was to be activated, the men therein to be transferred from the service commands. When men were transferred from the service commands for this purpose, the temporary allotment for the new detachment was reduced by The Adjutant General and the new detachment simultaneously set up.

e. In October, 1942, the system of temporary allotments to the service commands was discontinued, and all such allotments were transferred to the War Department Reserve Pool. This Reserve Pool was then apportioned among the service commands for procurement purposes. When a tactical detachment was activated, an allotment was provided from the service commands as before; and the apportionment of the War Department Reserve Pool decreased by the grades of the men transferred.

f. It was anticipated early in 1942 that the constant loss of men in service commands, because of the demands of overseas units, would seriously hamper operations. Consequently, on 14 May, the corps areas (service commands) were directed by Military Intelligence Section to submit a list of special agents considered "key personnel" with a brief explanation of the positions these men held. Because of a tendency on the part of the corps areas to include a large number of men on such listings, it soon became necessary to limit "key personnel" in the corps areas to 10% of the total personnel in each command.

g. In April, 1943, it was determined that since all Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were chargeable to War Department overhead, they should be assigned to the War Department and attached to the various service commands for administrative purposes. Consequently, the allotments to the service commands were rescinded, and two months later the allotments to the theaters of operations were rescinded. In September, 1943, TM 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps," set forth a T/O basis for assignment of personnel to the theaters of operations. The balance of the Counter Intelligence Corps personnel was to be assigned to Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, and other utilizing units.

h. The increase in personnel made it necessary to expand the Counter Intelligence Corps administrative machinery to meet the new
demands. In December, 1942, the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, was divided into six sections: Supply, Operations, Fiscal, Plans and Training, Personnel, and Army Air Forces Liaison.

i. The procurement and training of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel for overseas duty became the primary mission of the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps. Demands for assignment of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments, both to units scheduled for immediate departure to overseas duty and for units already in combat in the theaters of operations, were steadily increasing. To meet these demands and to facilitate training, the War Department, on 29 October, 1942, instructed all Bases, Departments, and Service Commands (except the Ninth) to establish preliminary Counter Intelligence Corps training schools in their respective commands.

j. In an attempt to make the administration of the Counter Intelligence Corps more definitive, the Deputy Chief of Staff, on 25 November, 1943, directed that certain recommendations made by the Inspector General be carried out. These included the following:

(1) Two changes in basic policy:

(a) The Counter Intelligence Corps was to be utilized, with certain limited exceptions, in theaters of operations.

(b) Personnel of the Corps were to be released from War Department overhead assignments, distributed on a T/O basis, with G-2 exercising no command function over the Corps.

(2) Three specific continuing responsibilities relative to the Counter Intelligence Corps charged to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department:

(a) The establishment of policies and over-all supervision of counterintelligence activities.

(b) Coordination of the procurement and shipment of Counter Intelligence Corps units.

(c) The administration of specialized training prior to assignment of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to theaters of operations.

(3) Certain specific actions relative to the Counter Intelligence Corps:

(a) The Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland, and the Counter Intelligence Corps Staging Area were to be eliminated.
(b) G-2, War Department, in collaboration with the three major commands, and G-3, War Department, were to submit for approval a plan for procurement of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel.

(c) Counter Intelligence Corps units were to be organized on a T/O basis included in troop quotas.

(d) Command channels were to be used and command responsibility emphasized.

(e) Shipment of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel overseas was to be in accordance with approved requests of theater commanders.

(f) Basic training of counterintelligence personnel was to be provided by Army Service Forces.

(g) Counter Intelligence Corps specialized training was to be given by Military Intelligence Division at Camp Ritchie, Maryland.

(h) Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in permanent detachments of Service Commands were to be transferred for assignment to those Service Commands by 31 December 1943.

k. On 14 December, 1943, War Department Circular No. 324 transferred the counterintelligence functions within the zone of the interior to the Provost Marshal General. The investigative functions hitherto performed by the Counter Intelligence Corps and those of the Provost Marshal General were consolidated, and it was directed that these functions be performed by a single staff agency under each Service Command. This agency was later designated the Security and Intelligence Division.

1. Since the Counter Intelligence Corps was no longer to be the organization conducting investigations of espionage and sabotage cases for the Military Intelligence Division in the continental United States, it was necessary that the responsibility for discharging these functions be placed with the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and designated areas. The assignment of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to the Service Commands, where they became part of the newly formed Security and Intelligence Division under the jurisdiction of the Provost Marshal General, was also provided in War Department Circular 324. The assignment of personnel from War Department overhead to the using commands with instructions to activate under T/O&E 30-500 was an entirely new concept for the Counter Intelligence Corps, and great administrative difficulties attended this change of activity.
On 22 May 1944 a reorganization within the Military Intelligence Section replaced the office formerly known as the Counter Intelligence Corps Branch of the Military Intelligence Section with the title of the Counter Intelligence Corps Section. A G-2, War Department Policy Staff was created. This staff was responsible for policy decisions on intelligence functions, including the Counter Intelligence Corps. No important alterations in policy or duties accompanied this redesignation. However, since the function of the Counter Intelligence Corps Section was considered to be of an administrative and operational nature rather than a true staff function, on 1 August 1944 the Section was transferred from the control of the General Staff, War Department, to the Army Service Forces.

By this time the Counter Intelligence Corps had operated successfully overseas in every combat area and had obtained a troop basis of 4,308. These were allocated in the following manner:

- Theaters of Operation, Base Commands, and other overseas installations...................... 3,000
- Army Ground Forces in United States.................. 485
- Army Air Forces in United States and Air Transport Command................................. 623

TOTAL........ 4,306

The overseas allotments increased as additional Army Ground Forces units were trained and shipped to combat. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments were assigned to their respective units and became an integral part of divisions, corps, armies, overseas administrative commands, theater headquarters, and of the A-2 Sections of the Air Force commands and installations.

On 1 December 1944 the Counter Intelligence Corps became a separate branch of the Intelligence Division of the Army Service Forces. Under the Army Service Forces the policy of assigning all Counter Intelligence Corps detachments to using units was continued. The only Counter Intelligence Corps detachments working within the zone of the interior were those units specifically allowed to do so by the War Department.

5. PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT. The administrative difficulties that were met in the early days of the Counter Intelligence Corps were paralleled by an equally difficult task of procuring desired personnel. On 21 October 1942 the power to initiate Counter Intelligence Corps personnel investigations was placed within the Service Commands. The commands were also empowered to assign and transfer personnel as Counter Intelligence Corps agents in the grade of corporal, and as Counter Intelligence Corps clerks in the grade of private first class. Control over the assignment and transfer of Counter Intelligence Corps special agents, the promotion of personnel from the rank of agent to special agent, and all matters concerning the assignment or transfer of
commissioned personnel remained with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

a. A backlog of investigations to be conducted on prospective Counter Intelligence Corps personnel developed during this period. Until June, 1943, Counter Intelligence Corps agents and clerks had been recruited by the theater commanders in overseas areas on the same basis as in the Service Commands. However, on 26 June, the allotments to theaters were discontinued. TM 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps," published 22 September 1943, limited the responsibility for procurement and assignment of officers and special agents to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, and of agents and clerks to the Director of Intelligence in the Service Commands within the zone of the interior. All Counter Intelligence Corps personnel procured in theaters of operations were to be approved by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

b. As an aid in spotting potential Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, the classification "301 Investigator" was introduced into the Army classification system early in 1942. The names of all men under this classification were referred to the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, for review and selection of prospective personnel. Men who were given the classification of "213 Stenographers" were also brought to the attention of this office so that from this group suitable clerks might be procured. When the procurement of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel was decentralized to the Service Commands in October, 1942, the names of men in the 301 and 213 classification were reported directly to the Service Commands by the reception centers. During 1942 and 1943, the office of The Adjutant General furnished the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, extracts from qualification cards on all linguists inducted into the Army.

c. The largest percentage of Counter Intelligence Corps agents was obtained from personnel already in the Army. At the reception centers newly inducted personnel with basic Counter Intelligence Corps qualifications were interviewed by Counter Intelligence Corps agents to determine their suitability for assignment to Counter Intelligence Corps duty. Civilian and government organizations which employed investigators were requested to submit information concerning former investigators in their employ who had been inducted into the military service. In the early days of the organization of the Counter Intelligence Corps, men occasionally applied for admission to the Corps prior to their induction into the Army. If application was approved, they were immediately "tabbed" and shortly thereafter transferred to the Counter Intelligence Corps. This method was not widely used because it resulted in personnel being transferred into the Corps without basic military training. Lack of basic training later proved to be a handicap to these agents when they were assigned to tactical detachments.

d. To meet the demands for qualified men, recommendations were accepted from post intelligence officers, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, and any other military personnel who knew of men with
basic Counter Intelligence Corps qualifications. All commanding officers throughout the Army were encouraged to submit names of men with the basic qualifications for Counter Intelligence Corps duty.

e. In the early recruitment, emphasis was placed on investigative or legal experience. Later, men with adequate education, good character, and loyalty were accepted even though they had neither legal nor investigative experience. Some linguists were procured, but this qualification was not an exclusive one. Men were drawn from all types of civilian occupations, and the Counter Intelligence Corps became an organization which included representatives of virtually every profession and nationality. In spite of the fact that most of these men worked as corporals or sergeants, the organization obtained outstanding men. The lure of the word "intelligence" and the prospect of working in civilian clothes was tempting bait; but if the men of the Corps had not been carefully selected, their records in the war would have been less impressive. Counter Intelligence Corps men have always relied upon their own initiative. This has been borne out by the nature of their work in the United States and, to an even greater extent, by the record they have made in overseas operations.

f. For the most part, men selected for the Counter Intelligence Corps were well suited for their tasks, but one major weakness in the recruiting program was very noticeable. Not enough emphasis was given to procuring and training linguists. The problem of obtaining men fluent in French, German, Italian, Japanese, and other foreign languages was made more difficult because of War Department policy which directed that no persons of close foreign background would be assigned to or retained in the Counter Intelligence Corps. Many naturalized Americans, both in and out of the Army, were fluent in several languages, but the Counter Intelligence Corps was unable to use this source of language personnel because of this strict policy. When the war in Europe came to an end, the Army was faced with the overwhelming task of procuring a large number of men fluent in foreign languages. This necessity brought a quick reversal of policy and, thereafter, close foreign relations alone ceased to be considered sufficient to disqualify a man for the Corps.

6. THE PROBLEM OF RANK. The rank of the agent was at best a partial secret within the Army. Counter Intelligence Corps men were instructed to conceal their actual rank by using the term "agent" or "special agent." Concealment of rank in the zone of the interior was not too great a problem since agents worked in civilian clothes. The average civilian respected Counter Intelligence Corps credentials and was not concerned with the actual rank of the bearer.

a. When his mission was changed from the zone of the interior to foreign theaters of operations, the Counter Intelligence Corps agent, in some cases, wore the military uniform indicating his status. This factor was a disadvantage in dealing with officers of the United States Army and officers of the Allied Forces. The low rank of the leaders of some detachments often had a hampering effect, especially in their relationships with allied services in the theaters and with coordinate
agencies in the United States. In many theaters this difficulty of rank was overcome by the adoption of a uniform similar to that of war correspondent which showed no rank.
CHAPTER 3
THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
IN THE ZONE OF THE INTERIOR, 1941-1943

7. THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. As a result of the De­
limitations Agreement of 1939, the counterintelligence system was cen­
tralized under three agencies. The task assigned to the United States
Army covered both the Military Establishment and a large percentage of
the munitions industry. The primary counterintelligence effort was the
organization of a security system which would prevent access of hostile
agents to our facilities.

a. Countless security surveys were made. Safeguards were de­
veloped, and identification systems were established. Thousands of per­
sonnel investigations were conducted; and, as these proceeded, steps
were taken to place persons whose loyalty was in question on work where
they could not injure our war effort.

b. There were individual cases of sabotage and these, of


course, became the immediate subject of intensive investigation. A few
saboteurs and spies were captured and convicted. Even in cases where
investigation failed to uncover the perpetrator, exhaustive investi­
gation resulted in the development of better security measures.

c. A special effort was made to safeguard military information.
Counter Intelligence Corps personnel operated the security system for
the headquarters that planned the North African campaign. In many cases
where the Counter Intelligence Corps found improper safeguarding of mili­
tary information, strategic plans were changed or revoked.

d. During the years 1942-1943, agents of the Counter Intelli­
gence Corps made thousands of loyalty investigations on military per­
sonnel and civilians assigned to duties requiring access to classified
material. The transfer of certain investigative functions from the Mili­
tary Intelligence Division to the Provost Marshal General in October,
1941, did not relieve the Corps of the duty of investigating personnel
already in military service who were working with classified material.
 Typical examples of such personnel were cryptographers; certain Signal
Corps personnel in other types of work; Military Intelligence personnel
(civilian and military); and, of course, as a large part of the last
mentioned category, potential Counter Intelligence Corps personnel.

e. The forms used and the extent of the investigations varied
in accordance with War Department and Service Command policy. Investi­
gations of prospective Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were always
exhaustive.

f. Loyalty Investigations which involved no suspicion of dis­
loyalty consisted of an examination of personal history, education,
employment, and associations. Each subject of a personnel investigation
was required to complete a Personal History Statement. In each personnel investigation, a check was made of the local police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division files. Copies of each memorandum report were sent to the Service Commands interested, the Military Intelligence Division, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

g. Investigations of military personnel suspected of disaffection, espionage, treason, sedition, sabotage, or of violations of AR 380-5, "Safeguarding Military Information," were reported on War Department Form CIR 1 (Counter Intelligence Report No. 1). This form contained a summarization by the investigating agent, a detailed outline of the subject's personal background, and a recommendation for disposition of the subject in accordance with the purpose of the investigation.

h. The Service Command Counter Intelligence Corps detachments were divided into several field offices, each having investigative responsibility for a certain geographic area of the Service Command. In certain less populated areas, single representatives were used and designated as resident agents. In metropolitan field offices with many agents, the personnel operated in separate sections and squads under the direction of special agents of proved experience and ability. These sections performed specific types of investigations. Agents became specialists in one type of investigation, developed local contacts of value in their particular field, and accumulated a general knowledge of organizations and individuals in the area considered subversive or of questionable loyalty.

i. Exclusive of background investigations, the largest volume of investigations consisted of disaffection cases. Disaffection has been defined as a state of mind indicating a lack of affection for the United States Government. Such cases usually concerned persons with German, Italian, or Japanese backgrounds.

j. In the field of suspected sabotage and espionage, the Counter Intelligence Corps performed investigations which often employed the use of technical investigative equipment. The Counter Intelligence Corps mission in the zone of the interior was not as dramatic as that of federal agencies which apprehended espionage agents. The efforts of the Counter Intelligence Corps, however, denied access to vital industrial plants and to highly secret military installations to many persons whose loyalty to the United States was dubious. What damage these persons might have wrought on the war effort is only a matter of conjecture.

k. In the fall of 1943, the Inspector General conducted an extensive examination of Counter Intelligence Corps activities in the Service Commands. The resultant recommendations brought about a reorganization of the Corps both in its activity in the Service Commands, and in foreign theaters. Of special import was the suggestion that Counter Intelligence Corps personnel
"... be specifically procured and trained for utilization in theaters of operation; that they be so utilized that Counter Intelligence Corps activities within the Zone of Interior be performed by the Security Intelligence Corps of the Provost Marshal General's Department."

1. Since the future Counter Intelligence Corps mission would be entirely overseas, it was necessary to administer the program of the Counter Intelligence Corps and train and procure the personnel especially for that purpose. The largest source of personnel, the Service Command detachments, was no longer available, thereby necessitating a new method of procurement. The office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, in Baltimore, Maryland, was discontinued, and all administration was handled by the Counter Intelligence Section of the Counter Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service. The staff of this office was much smaller than it had been in the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps.

m. After a period of training and reorganization, the Counter Intelligence Corps was sent to the combat zones. It was here that the real value and meaning of the Corps became known to combat commanders. The record and achievements of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel brought added prestige to the Corps and to the Armed Forces of the United States.
Part Two

OPERATIONS OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
IN THE PRINCIPAL THEATERS

CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONS IN NORTH AFRICA

8. THE MISSION. The Counter Intelligence Corps mission in combat was to protect troops, equipment, and installations from enemy espionage and sabotage. North Africa was the scene of the first tactical use of the Counter Intelligence Corps.

9. THE LANDINGS. After a period of several months' intensive training and orientation, the Counter Intelligence Section, G-2, Western Task Force, began its activities on 8 November 1942 by making the landing in French Morocco with the assault troops. The landing was made at Fedala with elements of the 3rd Division. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were successful in the capture of a mass of documents in a hotel that was used as headquarters by members of the German Armistice Commission. Brigadier General Arthur R. Wilson appropriately evaluated the captured material in one sentence: "Hitler's Armistice Commission has saved the American Army a great deal of work." In addition, the Counter Intelligence Corps captured a group of Italian nationals at Fedala whose presence there was a source of danger to the security of the American Army during the initial assault.

a. A Counter Intelligence Corps contingent accompanied the 9th Infantry Division when it landed at Port Lyautey. The 11th Armored Division with its Counter Intelligence Corps component and elements of the 9th Infantry Division made the landing at Safi under heavy fire. In Algiers, the Counter Intelligence Corps landed with the first boats and seized a number of Nazi suspects as well as important documents. At the close of the first day of operations, the Counter Intelligence Corps had established positions stretched over some seven hundred miles of coastline.

b. On 11 November the Counter Intelligence Corps, with elements of the 3rd Division, took part in the encirclement of Casablanca. At Casablanca, among the documents seized were German lists of French Axis sympathizers as well as a complete Italian Secret Service list of French Intelligence Service members. Consequently, these compromised French agents were replaced by men unknown to the enemy.

c. In these early operations against the enemy, the Counter Intelligence Corps made a favorable impression with the troop commanders. The Corps proved that it was not just a rear echelon organization. For their heroism under fire, many of its members received decorations which included the Soldier's Medal, the Silver Star, and the Legion of Merit award.
10. ORGANIZATION FOR OPERATION WITH COMBAT TROOPS. After the landing, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were relieved from attachment to divisions and were attached to Western Task Force Headquarters. They were then deployed on a territorial basis in various cities along the Moroccan seaboard. Shortly thereafter, the Western Task Force was dissolved and its Counter Intelligence Corps personnel briefly joined the First Armored Corps. On 9 February, they were attached to Headquarters, Fifth Army, a new army which had been organized in North Africa only the previous month.

a. The Counter Intelligence Corps then assumed counterintelligence jurisdiction over all French Morocco except those portions covered by the Atlantic and Mediterranean Base Sections. Eventually, a part of Algeria was included as well. Freedom of action was curtailed, however, because under the terms of the Armistice Agreement the French retained the powers of arrest and search. As a result, Counter Intelligence Corps operations in North Africa after the Armistice were conducted under the closest advisement of the French intelligence agencies there.

b. During the occupational phase in North Africa, the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps slowly began to crystalize. Every precaution was taken to prevent enemy communications in the occupied area. As a means of neutralizing the efforts of Axis sympathizers, a diligent search was carried out for all caches of arms, ammunition, or other contraband. Investigations were carried out on all suspicious persons and incidents reported by units. By interrogation and from relevant documents, a great deal of security information was amassed. From the intelligence thus collected, the Counter Intelligence Corps was able to give assistance and advice to the combat troops in the application of security precautions to vital installations such as ports, utilities, dumps, communications, and other areas.

c. One of the tasks performed by the Counter Intelligence Corps in forward areas was the search of enemy headquarters and local administrative and police offices. This made it necessary for Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to arrive on the scene in time to protect documents from destruction and dissipation. In the performance of these duties Counter Intelligence Corps sections were sent well forward, and in some instances were the first troops to enter towns and villages. They performed functions varying from those of the mayor of a town to those of the infantryman.

11. OPERATIONS IN LIBERATED AREAS. The Counter Intelligence Corps North African operations were difficult in the liberated areas due to the fluid political situation. Precautions had to be taken to prevent enemy communications. Civilian telephone calls were subject to spot monitoring; and when certain telephone users incurred suspicion, the telephones were monitored continuously. At Fedala, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel discovered that Axis-paid agents had installed a monitoring board to cover American Headquarters. This board was neutralized before it had begun to operate. Cooperation was also given to the Signal Intelligence Service in the interception of short-wave radio
transmitters. The Counter Intelligence Corps furnished leads to Signal Intelligence which located the transmitters, and the stations were promptly raided. Continuous monitoring was necessary because enemy transmitters changed frequencies and often would broadcast no more than fifteen minutes a day, and then at irregular intervals.

a. The enemy attempted to infiltrate agents through Spanish Morocco in an effort to gain information concerning the movement of troops and troop concentrations. These agents were intercepted by a frontier control system established soon after the landing phase. Similar attempts were made at the French Border Control Stations. Counter Intelligence Corps agents worked with the French in checking applications for border passage. In one instance, the border agents were informed that an Arab woman, employed by a German agent, would attempt to cross the border with short-wave equipment concealed in her voluminous dress. The tip was correct and the equipment was seized.

b. The Counter Intelligence Corps was also assigned the task of providing protection of supplies, installations, and personnel. To carry out this function, Counter Intelligence Corps agents installed and supervised pass systems at ports, conducted security surveys, and investigated port personnel. Working with the Navy at one port, the Counter Intelligence Corps established a pass system which cleared more than 3,000 French and native workers daily without incident. Informant nets facilitated this work. Many of the native informants worked with labor gangs.

c. In conjunction with these duties, the Counter Intelligence Corps gathered information concerning the trend of political thinking in occupied and friendly territories. This was carried on by Counter Intelligence Corps agents in plain clothes. In addition, because of the exigencies of war, United States censorship in French Morocco was for a time placed in the hands of the Corps. Perhaps the most important duty assigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps in this Theater was the security preparation and supervision of the Roosevelt-Churchill Casablanca Conference. The bodyguard was provided by the Secret Service. Security for the area was a duty assigned to Counter Intelligence Corps agents in plain clothes aided by a battalion of Military Police. The success of these multitudinous tasks was achieved only by close cooperation with other agencies.

12. LIAISON WITH UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. The Counter Intelligence Corps North African experience proved that American forces could operate successfully as a team. There was close cooperation between the Counter Intelligence Corps and the Psychological Warfare Board, Signal Intelligence, Office of Naval Intelligence, the Allied Force Headquarters Documents Section, Allied Military Government, Prisoner of War Interrogation Teams, and the Office of Strategic Services.

13. LIAISON WITH ALLIED INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. Liaison was sought with the French Service de Renseignements, Contre-Espionage,
Offices of the Securite Militaire, Police Administration, Bureau de Surveillance du Territoire, and others. However, in many instances in the interior of French Morocco, these French agencies did not make available to the Counter Intelligence Corps all the information at their disposal. This was not true in the frontier regions where close cooperation continued to exist among the American, British and French agencies. In the interior, all counterintelligence matters were left in the hands of the French. Freedom of activity was exercised by the British and Americans only over their own installations and personnel. This difficulty continued to be a thorn in the side of many detachment commanders who sought to eliminate duplications of effort.

14. LESSONS LEARNED THROUGH EXPERIENCE. Operations in liberated areas proved that the most successful personnel device was a linguist agent and a non-linguist agent working as a team in surveillances and interrogations. In the matter of wearing civilian clothes, it was found that the best results were accomplished by consistency on the part of the individual agent. During this phase of operations, some experience was gained in the use of technical equipment which included cameras, typewriters, fingerprint sets, and telephone taps. Monitoring control boards came to be used with increased frequency in the maintenance of security controls.

a. It was impossible to build a defense so perfect that the enemy could be completely prevented from gaining any intelligence. There are two reasons for this: First, no human arrangements can be perfect; second, a perfect defense would result in halting all operations. The end to be achieved was the concealment of operations.

b. It became apparent, however, that a barbed wire barricade did not necessarily net an enemy agent in every instance and that the counterintelligence officer spent "99 percent of his time devising, building, arranging, and inspecting ways and means of forcing the enemy to expose himself." Security had to be devised in a manner that would not interfere with operations. The more difficult it was to penetrate the defense system, the more effort the enemy agent had to make; and the more activity indulged in, the more he exposed himself. Sooner or later the alarm system had to go off.

15. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DURING THE TACTICAL PLANNING PHASES. The planning of a new operation, particularly a water-borne assault, took several months. The first task was the security of the perimeter and a rigidly controlled pass system for visitors. In addition, a series of lectures to officers and clerical personnel was of value in safeguarding documents and telephone conversations. A list of officers, nominated to discuss the plan with other sections or headquarters, was of prime importance. It tended to prohibit leaks from doubtful personnel.

a. During the planning period, the counterintelligence officer was required to produce detailed plans and arrangements for the security of training, concentration, staging, and mounting of troops. The most difficult task encountered was the production of a plan for
counterintelligence and security procedure during the coming campaign. All details were settled at this time and the commanders' instructions disseminated to troops. All staff sections and troops concerned studied instructions; consequently, later misunderstandings were avoided. By constant interview, conference, and correspondence with all concerned, the counterintelligence officer produced his plan and instructions.

16. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DURING MOUNTING PHASE OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS. During the mounting phase, troop commanders required assistance in their staging and mounting areas. It became the duty of the Counter Intelligence Corps during this phase to assist the appropriate headquarters in such capacity as the commander deemed appropriate. A list of suggestions was made up as an aid to the various commanders in the interest of complete security of movement. It was required that all possible compromises of security be reported promptly. Tactical or strategic surprise was the paramount consideration of all commanders. Care was taken also to avoid all indications among the civilian population that an operation was pending.

17. CONCLUSIONS. In the North African Operation, the Counter Intelligence Corps learned many lessons, but this was only a testing ground for the real work that lay ahead in Italy and later in France and Germany. In Italy, the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps and the value of the Corps came to be more fully recognized by division, corps, and army commanders.
CHAPTER 5

OPERATIONS IN SICILY

18. PRE-INVASION PROGRAM. By April, 1943, a central Theater Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters to handle the administration of the Counter Intelligence Corps had been established at Allied Force Headquarters. The only drawback in this new set-up was the absence of a Table of Organization. This created many problems, chief among which was a lack of adequate technical supplies. In May a Counter Intelligence Corps field training school was established near Oran in anticipation of the coming Sicilian and Italian campaigns. With few exceptions, every officer and enlisted man coming over from the United States after the capture of Tunisia attended the school. Instructors were chosen from among those Counter Intelligence Corps and other intelligence officers who had combat and actual field experience. British Intelligence loaned an officer who had been through the campaigns in France, Greece, Crete, and Libya.

19. STAGING AREA PREPARATIONS AND DUTIES. Agents were dispatched to division, corps, and army headquarters to live with troops with which they would be working. They were attached to a company (usually a service company) for rations and quarters, and their detachment commander was attached to the headquarters of the organization. Each Counter Intelligence Corps officer prepared an operational plan for the troop unit to which his detachment was attached. Operational plans were prepared for each province in Sicily, and target areas were mapped out for each city of consequence.

   a. Security surveys were conducted for the staging area, embarkation points, and areas adjacent to the mounting areas. The Counter Intelligence Corps also assisted in maintaining security in the staging areas. All officers and agents began to educate troops in security, and troops were instructed to bring any seized documents and maps to Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters. Moreover, they were warned to observe censorship rules. The dangers of souvenir hunting and methods of dealing with booby traps were also discussed.

   b. Counter Intelligence Corps teams continued their own training which consisted of physical exercise, handling special equipment, and a detailed study of the Counter Intelligence Corps operational plan. All agents were given specific instructions as to their conduct if captured. In addition, operational plans were expanded into a "Standing Operating Procedure" by each detachment. This document included specific duties for each man.

   c. These Counter Intelligence Corps teams were attached to the field army, corps, divisions, and an Army group, by Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps, Allied Force Headquarters. A total of 16 Counter Intelligence Corps officers and 76 Counter Intelligence Corps agents were distributed among Seventh Army (Headquarters and Field Army Section),
II Corps, VI Corps, 1st Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, and 9th Infantry Division. For embarkation, the sections were divided so that no more than four Counter Intelligence Corps agents were on any one vessel. This was done to minimize casualties in the event of sea attack.

20. OPERATION WITH COMBAT TROOPS. The general plan followed by detachments with attacking forces was for divisional and a part of corps personnel to move forward with assault troops. As towns were taken, the divisional detachments continued forward with assault troops while corps personnel performed Counter Intelligence Corps functions in the captured towns. This method varied; however, division detachments generally operated with reconnaissance and assault troops to be in a position to obtain vital information for the G-2.

a. Counter Intelligence Corps agents participated in the invasion at Gela and Licata. The 2nd Armored Division captured Palermo, and the task of providing security for that city was assigned to its Counter Intelligence Corps section. The Seventh Army Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment relieved them and this change-over remained the pattern that was followed by divisional detachments whose normal stay in any town was from one to three days.

b. Several times Counter Intelligence Corps sections even entered towns ahead of other troops. When Agrigento, a city of 40,000, was evacuated by enemy troops on 17 July, seven Counter Intelligence Corps soldiers were there alone for at least five hours immediately after the Germans' withdrawal. The agents found a hysterical, fear-crazed mob looting and rioting. These agents, through the aggressive use of city officials, Carabinieri, firemen, and priests, had the situation under control by the morning of the 16th. In any event, the Counter Intelligence Corps was prepared to use force to stop food riots, especially prior to the arrival of AMGOT personnel.

c. By D plus 2, Counter Intelligence Corps sections had obtained overlays of the major mine fields in Sicily. This information was immediately relayed to G-2's. Army engineers quickly neutralized these fields, with the result that many thousands of American lives and tons of equipment were saved.

d. In many cases the rapid advance resulted in a complete lack of Army personnel, and it was necessary to detail guard functions to the Carabinieri. Aggressive instruction by Counter Intelligence Corps officers and agents brought satisfactory cooperation. With no American guard available, documents which could not be transferred immediately to proper authority were placed in a room and a seal placed on the door with a written warning that anyone breaking the seal would be shot. In over 200 cases where the seal was used, not one was broken other than by proper authority.

e. Problems appeared and multiplied with each new situation, but the Counter Intelligence Corps met them. The mission of the
Counter Intelligence Corps ceased to be a theory after the landing on the beaches of Sicily. It had crystalized into a working principle easily adaptable in this type of warfare where armies depend almost exclusively on intelligence for successful operations.

f. The effectiveness of the security provided by the Counter Intelligence Corps was attested to by the capture, in November, of a group of admitted pro-Fascists and saboteurs. Agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps in Trapani, Sicily, uncovered this organization which was founded to reorganize the Fascist Party in Sicily and Italy and to sabotage Allied installations. The group, financed by a wealthy girl, consisted of twenty-eight persons. Two of the original founders readily admitted sabotaging a communications line near Trapani. The Counter Intelligence Corps agents had known of the activities of this group since early October. They were closely watched until all of them could be taken into custody at one time.

g. Upon entry the Counter Intelligence Corps section immediately took over control of the city pending the arrival of either a control group from Division or from AMGOT. Immediate steps were taken to control the municipality, the Carabinieri, the police and prisons, business activities, public utilities, and military and political organizations and their headquarters. The Church was asked to cooperate; and after necessary conferences with the leading military, civil, and religious authorities, a proclamation was issued imposing the necessary restrictions on the civil and political life of the community. Everything was done to assist the local reepresentative of the Division Commander, and later of AMGOT, in bringing the community back to normal without interfering or delaying the accomplishment of the combat mission of the Division. The work of the section was completed when it turned over its responsibilities to either the Corps Counter Intelligence Corps section, or the representative of AMGOT.

h. By the end of July every large town in the Seventh Army sector had been entered and was under investigation by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel. Smaller towns in outlying regions were placed under investigation as time permitted. With the conclusion of Operation Husky, the Counter Intelligence Corps was exercising counterintelligence control over the entire conquered territory. Operation outside of towns was restricted to searching the known or suspected locations of enemy headquarters.

i. By the time Operation Husky came to an end, it was evident that the various G-2’s had come to rely very heavily upon Counter Intelligence Corps personnel and that there very definitely was a Counter Intelligence Corps mission with tactical units in such operations. This was a tribute to an organization that learned its lesson quickly on the battlefield.

21. OPERATION IN THE STATIC SITUATION. The rapid advance of United States forces in Sicily made the change-over of counterintelligence control of towns and areas from one team to another extremely difficult. It was the procedure of division sections to remain with
Their divisions even though the division passed quickly through a town. This gave the section little opportunity to do effective work in the town. Often elements of the corps section were late in arriving or failed to arrive until after the division section had left. Even at best, there existed a continual change-over from division to corps to army sections, which caused considerable confusion to all concerned and much duplication of work on the part of the detachments.

a. With the cessation of hostilities and the definition of defense areas, Counter Intelligence Corps sections reverted to the static type of Counter Intelligence Corps work, involving civil as well as military counterintelligence. Later, however, four port detachments were combined to form a permanent static group for the American half of Sicily. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments with tactical units thereupon turned over their civilian files and civil security responsibility to the new group and devoted themselves exclusively to military security matters.

b. The static group undertook more elaborate security precautions and surveys than the tactical sections had. Personnel were divided on a territorial basis within the four Western provinces. In each of these provinces, a Counter Intelligence Corps office was established with the responsibility for all Counter Intelligence Corps activity in the province. For convenience the offices were located at the provincial capitals, with small sub-offices at smaller cities. This administrative set-up provided a firm basis for effective counterintelligence coverage of the areas and expedited the transmission to Theater Headquarters of the information obtained.

c. In addition, surveys of vital military and civilian installations were made for organizations responsible for their security. Liaison was established with the intelligence officers and Counter Intelligence Corps section of the tactical units located in the areas, with a view toward coordinating activities, effecting a mutual exchange of information, and providing for common assistance. Coordination of activities with those of AMG was maintained. Investigations of purely political matters or other matters falling within the jurisdiction of AMG were undertaken only upon the request of that organization. In general, close liaison with the Military Police, local police, and other enforcement agencies was established; and informants were developed and cultivated.

22. OCCUPATIONAL PHASE BEGINS. In the occupation of Sicily the Counter Intelligence Corps had complete freedom of action within its jurisdiction. It was found necessary to have agents in every major town secure information on political activity of every description. Every effort was made to effect complete liaison of the Seventh Army Counter Intelligence Corps with all other detachments at all times; and care was taken to provide for immediate reversion to the tactical situation, should such a contingency arise. Furthermore, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel of port detachments were placed within easy reach of each other and in continual operation. Complete coverage of the occupied areas followed a definite pattern.
a. In the cities of Sicily the Counter Intelligence Corps set up local Counter Intelligence Corps headquarters, if only for a temporary period, where friendly persons could come to give information. Usually these offices were plainly marked "COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS," and officials were advised where to direct those desiring to talk to its personnel. Contacts among the friendly elements of the population were established for possible use as informants, and the names of suspects thus received were checked and double-checked against other informants. Persons found to be dangerous were confined. In many instances the Parish Priest was found to be the most valuable source of information.

b. The major effort of the Counter Intelligence Corps was made in captured towns. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel restored order; secured documents, critical installations, and supplies; arrested leading Fascists; and investigated the civil administrators. AMGOT officers were kept informed of the political situation, and replacements were recommended for officials arrested. During the interim between capture by combat troops and the taking over of the communities by AMGOT personnel, many civil problems related to security were met.

c. By 1 August, The Counter Intelligence Corps had taken more than 500 political prisoners, among whom were members of the OVRA (Opera Volunatria Repressioni Anti-Fascismo), the Squadra DiAzione (the strong-arm men of the Fascist Party notorious for their "castor-oil treatment" of anti-Fascists), and members of the other numerous Fascist organizations. Fascist officers and leaders who had fled from the larger cities returned, and many of these returnees were recognized from captured documents. Arrests continued daily.

23. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. Division Counter Intelligence Corps sections were charged with the securing of captured documents. Daily reports of immediate value to the division Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, were submitted. These contained descriptions of roads beyond the enemy lines, information on enemy concentrations, state of enemy morale, locations of enemy mine fields and road blocks, and detailed data concerning enemy strength, disposition, and movement.

a. Included in the information culled from the documents captured were copies of the order of battle of enemy units operating in Sicily and in the Balkans. Complete records of the prison system controlled by the Italian Prisoner of War Group and their informant system were uncovered, as well as the location of all prisoner of war camps in Sicily and Italy. Invaluable information was obtained also from impounded mails by the Seventh Army G-2.

b. Document collection was left largely to other intelligence agencies due to lack of transportation for the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments. Only the 1st Division, which had additional G-2 personnel to use for the purpose of securing these documents, produced outstanding results. In some instances, the II Corps Detachment was able to secure valuable material left by the hastily withdrawn enemy.
LESIONS LEARNED THROUGH FIELD EXPERIENCE. One of the gravest problems was a lack of sufficient Italian-speaking Counter Intelligence Corps personnel; and though many attempts were made to adjust it, none was satisfactory. In some cases local civilians were pressed into service as interpreters with the help of the Carabinieri. In other cases soldier interpreters were secured from replacement depots, and since the linguistic and intellectual standards of the latter group were unsatisfactory, many had to be returned.

a. A lack of proper transportation and equipment was also noted. Without transportation on hand when needed, a detachment was handicapped in accomplishing its mission, and many regions remained without proper Counter Intelligence Corps coverage. Some provision was found to be necessary whereby this equipment could be procured immediately after the initial assault.

b. Often, much time was taken in doing AMG work prior to the appearance of AMG representatives in cities and towns. This was highly necessary, but was performed by the Counter Intelligence Corps in emergency situations and at the expense of its own work. Further, there was the tendency of some G-2's to employ Counter Intelligence Corps personnel on combat intelligence missions having no bearing on security. Because of the shortage of specially qualified personnel, G-2's should have allowed their Counter Intelligence Corps sections to concentrate on their security functions and not hinder them with missions which had no connection with their specialized field. This condition was further aggravated by the nebulous line of demarkation between the responsibilities of AMGOT and our Military Police, local military commanders, and the Counter Intelligence Corps. To offset some of these problems, it was recommended that a liaison officer of AMG accompany the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment in the initial occupation.

c. A recommendation was made to the effect that the commanding officer of the highest Counter Intelligence Corps echelon engaged in an operation coordinate the activities of all sections attached to lower echelons. He should supply lower sections with personnel from his section who would enter towns in the process of capture and remain there semi-permanently to afford Counter Intelligence Corps coverage. Such a plan would have eliminated to a large extent the multiple transfer of Counter Intelligence Corps control and duplication of effort.

d. It was recommended that a large pool of Counter Intelligence Corps operatives be retained under the control of the theater commander, with a small detachment in each division. In some cases no other operatives were available when division Counter Intelligence Corps left an area, and it became necessary for later arrivals to do again much of the work of gaining contact with informants.

e. An outstanding contribution to Counter Intelligence Corps activities in Sicily was the employment of United States buttons rather than insignia of rank by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel. This
was a decided step forward from the North African campaign where agents wore the insignia of rank and, as a result, the task of enlisted personnel in dealing with Allied officers was rendered difficult.
CHAPTER 6
OPERATIONS IN ITALY

25. PRE-INVASION PLANNING. By July, 1943, Operation Avalanche (Italian) was in the planning stage, and Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps was assigned the operational counterintelligence phase. This was a notable departure from the situation prior to the North African landings where the Counter Intelligence Corps was completely in the dark even as to where it was going. A heavy cut in supply personnel for Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps during the Sicilian operation was necessitated by the demands of Fifth Army for personnel to do border control work after Fifth Army left North Africa. The Counter Intelligence Corps detachment that accompanied the Fifth Army to Italy had a strength of 27: 5 officers and 22 enlisted men.

26. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DURING THE INVASION. The 36th Division Counter Intelligence Corps and VI Corps Counter Intelligence Corps landed in Italy on D-Day. The bulk of the Fifth Army Detachment embarked for Italy at Oran on 1 September, leaving a small rear echelon behind to bring on transportation and other equipment which could not be lifted in the early convoys. The Detachment landed on 11 September (D plus 2) near Paestum on the Salerno Beachhead under heavy enemy fire.

a. For the first week after the landing, the tactical situation was very fluid. At one point there was serious danger that the Fifth Army would be thrown off the beachhead by vigorous German counterattacks. The area covered was very small and sparsely settled, further limiting Counter Intelligence Corps operations during this phase. The Army Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment lived in foxholes during this period. Shortly after the landing, detachments of the 3rd Division, 34th Division, and the 45th Division received indoctrination from the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps.

b. The general atmosphere at this time was one of uncertainty. On one occasion a German attack almost captured the Army Advance Command Post, and Army Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were placed in the line to defend it. On another occasion a group of Army Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were surrounded and cut off by German tanks while attempting to enter the town of Battipaglia to conduct preliminary security work there. They escaped and ultimately reached the town only to find it completely evacuated and destroyed.

c. On 14 September a group of Army Counter Intelligence Corps and British Counter Intelligence Section (FSS) personnel went to the Sorrento Peninsula to handle counterintelligence work with the Rangers there. A number of arrests of consequence were made, including prominent Fascists who had been signaling information to the enemy. A small detachment was also sent to cover the adjacent islands of Capri, Ischia, and Procida, from which enemy agents were infiltrating Allied territory. During this entire period the Counter Intelligence Corps supplied the
Army G-2 with combat intelligence since the Office of Strategic Services espionage services were not yet operating.

d. On 1 October Naples fell, and the Army Counter Intelligence Corps moved in with advance elements of the 82nd Airborne Division. For three weeks the 305th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment (Fifth Army Detachment) was in charge of counterintelligence in that city. Naples was the largest which had ever been handled by a Counter Intelligence Corps detachment anywhere in the world up to that time. Important documents and material were obtained from German espionage agents and their headquarters. A number of important security arrests were made, including several Italian generals who had gone underground. On 24 October, counterintelligence jurisdiction over Naples was turned over to the Counter Intelligence Corps (Peninsular Base Section), and the Fifth Army Detachment moved to Caserta.

27. FROM THE VOLTURNO RIVER TO ROME. After the fall of Naples the long static period began, centering around the siege of Cassino which was highlighted by the landing at Anzio in January, 1944. During this period the Army Counter Intelligence Corps began the work of security coverage. The Army area was divided into zones with a squad of Counter Intelligence Corps agents responsible for each zone. Security surveys of every town of consequence were prepared, and important Fascists and other security suspects were arrested and interned.

a. At this time the work of the Counter Intelligence Corps was of a countersubversive nature directed against post-occupational enemy agents. From this standpoint this work was carried on successfully, since the arrest and internment of key Fascist figures removed points around which subversive groups might form. The absence of subversive activity during the campaign was attributable to the Counter Intelligence Corps.

b. During the period October to December, 1943, Army Counter Intelligence Corps was reinforced by the II Corps' Counter Intelligence Corps and 1st Armored Division Counter Intelligence Corps in addition to French and English counterintelligence personnel.

c. In December, 1943, an event occurred to ease the personnel situation. An Italian counterespionage organization SIM CS (Sicurezza Informazione Militare, Contro-Spionaggio) was attached to the Fifth Army and placed under the operational direction of the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps. This unit proved itself invaluable in the conduct of undercover counterintelligence missions which would have been practically impossible for the Counter Intelligence Corps to accomplish. This unit averaged about 50 men, of whom 30 operated with Army Counter Intelligence Corps. The others were deployed with the Corps and Division Counter Intelligence Corps detachments.

d. A major development in the operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps was the establishment in December of the Fifth Army Refugee Interrogation Post. The principal task of this new organization
was the interrogation of civilian suspects who had not been identified as enemy agents by the arresting units. Some 40 enemy agents were detected by the Refugee Interrogation Post which, through continuous interrogation, had acquired exceptional knowledge of the many German Intelligence Service organizations in Italy, their personalities, and set-ups. The work of the Fifth Army Refugee Interrogation Post received many commendations from Allied intelligence authorities in this theater.

e. During the winter of 1943-1944, Counter Intelligence Corps activities centered around Naples and the beachhead at Anzio. Continual liaison was maintained with detachments in Sicily, and from time to time various members of the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment were dispatched to the beachhead for varying periods of duty. At Anzio, these agents handled the cases of two enemy saboteurs apprehended there and provided for the security of the advance Army Command Post.

f. In the early part of April, 1944, Army Counter Intelligence Corps moved from Caserta to Sparanise where the Counter Intelligence Corps sub-sections were also deployed around the Army area to provide area coverage. Here a system of civilian control was introduced which later culminated in successful counterintelligence activities. Carabinieri road blocks were established throughout the area. Coastwatching posts were established to supervise all landings. Counter Intelligence Corps screening units also were set up at the ANG Refugee Camps. Persons registering at hotels or boarding houses in towns throughout the area were subject to investigation, as were persons obtaining new identity cards or ration cards. Spot checks were made of strangers, and roving patrols of countersabotage or Counter Intelligence Corps personnel supplemented the stationary Carabinieri check-posts along the highways. This control system grew as Counter Intelligence Corps experience gradually increased.

g. On 24 May, 1944, most of the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment joined the Rome "S" Force at a concentration area near Naples, leaving behind only a skeleton force to cover the Army area during their absence. The purpose of the "S" Force was to enter the city with the first troops and provide immediate intelligence and counterintelligence action against personality and building targets. The security personnel consisted of about 100, of whom 50 were American Counter Intelligence Corps personnel (from Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps, Counter Intelligence Corps Peninsular Base Section, and Counter Intelligence Corps Combat Advance Section, and the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment newly organized to handle Rome after its capture), and the remaining 50 were British Field Security personnel. All of the security personnel were placed under Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps direction.

h. The "S" Force moved to Anzio by boat at the end of May and entered Rome on schedule on the night of 4-5 June. During the first 15 days in Rome, its Counter Intelligence Corps and FSS personnel seized a vast amount of important intelligence and counterintelligence documents and apprehended a considerable number of known enemy agents. Counter
Intelligence Corps personnel with this Force received written commendation from the „S” Force commander for their work. On 17 June, the Counter Intelligence Corps, Fifth Army, left „S” Force, moving to Tuscania where it resumed its normal functions.

28. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES DURING THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN. The success of the Counter Intelligence Corps was due in part to administrative changes that had taken place as a result of recommendations made by conscientious detachment commanders. As the Fifth Army extended its lines, Counter Intelligence Corps jurisdictions in the occupied areas were expanded to meet the exigencies of the new situations. With the Army north of Naples in November, 1943, were the Counter Intelligence Corps sections attached to Fifth Army, II Corps, VI Corps, 3rd Infantry Division, 34th Infantry Division, 36th Infantry Division, 45th Infantry Division, and 1st Armored Division. In Sicily, Counter Intelligence Corps detachments were attached to the Seventh Army, 9th Infantry Division, and 2nd Armored Division. These units were expected to depart from this theater for the European Theater of Operations at any time. The 1st Infantry Division had already departed. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel formerly attached to the Fifteenth Army Group were now part of the Counter Intelligence Corps Section, Insular Base Section. They afforded Counter Intelligence Corps static coverage for the four Western provinces in Sicily which were under American control. The Fifth Army Base Section was redesignated Peninsular Base Section with jurisdiction extending southeast from the rear boundary of the Fifth Army and covering the Western portion of Southern Italy. With the advance of the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps, control of the Naples area was taken over by the Counter Intelligence Corps Section, Peninsular Base Section.

a. The Counter Intelligence Corps Peninsular Base Section was organized to cover the largest amount of territory of any detachment in Italy. Territorial jurisdiction extended from Naples to Pisa with the exclusion of the City of Rome. Counter Intelligence Corps Peninsular Base Section maintained a sub-section at Rome to handle Peninsular Base Section territory immediately north and south of Rome province. Although the area extended inland only to an average of 25 miles, the security responsibility was actually doubled, for in addition to land side there were 300 miles of coast line which presented a constant threat to security. In emergencies Counter Intelligence Corps Peninsular Base Section was set up to relieve the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps in case new tactical situations created new counterintelligence obligations for them. Close cooperation and liaison was maintained at all times between the two sections.

b. In May, 1944, under authority of T/O&E 30-500, the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps was reorganized into three separate Provisional Detachments which continued to operate as a single unit, since the senior detachment commander of the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment had administrative supervision over all three detachments. In addition, it provided for commission vacancies and opportunities for grade promotions.
29. FROM ROME TO THE ARNO RIVER. On 19 July, one provisional detachment entered the city of Leghorn (Livorno) as part of an "S" Force similar to that which entered Rome. This "S" Force was small and compact. Little of counterintelligence interest developed, since the town was a virtual ghost-town, largely evacuated, and heavily mined throughout the center. At the end of August, Army Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters moved to Tavernelle where it was to remain until the end of December. Early in September, Army Counter Intelligence sub-detachments entered Pisa and later Lucca with the assault troops which took those cities. Neither city was considered large enough for a regular "S" Force, but Army Counter Intelligence Corps performed the same function as an "S" Force would have done, in addition to establishing regular security coverage of these cities.

30. THE GERMAN ESPIONAGE PROBLEM. The drive from Rome to the Arno River was too rapid to permit effective counterintelligence. It was possible only to skim the surface in order to move along with the troops. Because of the few captures of enemy agents, there was actually a dearth of information about the German Intelligence Service (GIS) in Italy. Little was learned concerning its methods and techniques, and without this information it was extremely difficult to capture German agents. However, the enemy also was hungry for some intelligence concerning Allied plans and operations, since it was evident to him that the Allied advance would steam roller through the Italian peninsula. To obtain this information he decided to dispatch trained agents behind the Allied lines.

a. Beginning October, 1944, a mass assault of German espionage and sabotage agents on the Fifth Army area began. Some were parachuted in, some landed by boat on the coast, but the majority were line-crossers, most of whom entered the Fifth Army area in the thinly held Western sector.

b. Fortunately, by this time the Counter Intelligence Corps had tightened its system of controls and was constantly improving the system. Dr. Kora, the German officer in charge of Abwehr Kommando 190, which ran large numbers of espionage agents into the Fifth Army area confessed after capture that not a single one of his agents had returned between October, 1944, and January, 1945. Similar admissions were made by other captured German officials.

c. From October, 1944, to April, 1945, a total of 200 trained enemy agents were captured in Fifth Army areas, an average of over one a day. The Counter Intelligence Corps represented less than half of the operational counterintelligence personnel in that area. The excellent control systems of the 92nd Division and IV Corps Counter Intelligence Corps made the capture of a great many of these agents possible, and those that filtered through were frequently caught by the Army Counter Intelligence Corps. In addition, the Army Counter Intelligence Corps was able to ferret out a number of post-occupation espionage agents, some of whom had built up good cover stories. Interrogation of enemy agents captured by the 305th Counter Intelligence
Corps Detachment made possible the capture of a considerable number of
other agents outside the 305th's area by other counterintelligence
agencies.

d. After the initial assault the German Intelligence Service
was forced to rely on emergency measures to recruit new agents to re-
place those who had not returned. In Northern Italy the Abwehr opened
several spy schools, recruiting poor peasants, black-market operators,
Fascists, and former officers of the Italian Air Force and Navy. Their
recruits ranged from twelve-year old boys to middle-aged men and women.
There was even a half-wit, an innocent soul who agreed to cross the
lines for two dollars in Italian lire. These recruits were given a
short three-week course in espionage and sabotage and then dispatched
to the front lines to do their work. They sought quantity rather than
quality. The German pattern became so methodical and exact that the
American Counter Intelligence Corps stood in wait for these agents to
cross the lines.

e. American Counter Intelligence Corps agents, through their
personal interrogation of captured enemy agents, had become familiar
with the complicated German Intelligence Service's Italian set-up and
with those characteristics which distinguished its agents.

f. To insure counterintelligence coverage, the 35th Division
provided for a Counter Intelligence Corps team to accompany each regi-
mental combat team. Since the troops of this Division were occupying
areas already covered by sub-sections of the IV Corps and Fifth Army
Counter Intelligence Corps, its Counter Intelligence Corps detachment
established liaison with those Counter Intelligence Corps units already
in the area. Emphasis was placed on the importance of apprehending all
suspicious or unidentifiable persons for questioning by the Counter
Intelligence Corps. Due to the continual advance into enemy territory,
and because of the frequent replacements of personnel in Divisions, it
was necessary to provide the combat troops with constant training in
security and to reemphasize the basic rules of security and how they
were related to the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps.

g. In late December the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps
Headquarters moved from Tavernelle to Campi Bisenzio effecting little
change in the area of coverage since the various detachments were pro-
viding coverage for one another in most areas.

31. THE FINAL BREAKTHROUGH. By mid-April the Fifth Army Counter
Intelligence Corps was ready to perform its usual "S" Force mission in
the major cities along the line of advance. On the 21st Bologna fell,
and the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps entered the city as the
"S" Force. During the first four days of intensive activity, numerous
persons of security interest, as well as German Intelligence Service
officials, were apprehended. After five days in which the Counter In-
telligence Corps had been engaged in handling these captured enemy
agents and officials, as well as effecting the capture of valuable in-
telligence documents, the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps moved
to Verona, the headquarters of the German Intelligence Service in Italy. Thereafter the Germans retreated rapidly out of Italy, and on May 25, the war in Italy came to an end. This, however, did not terminate the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps which continued to seek out the German Intelligence Service officials who had gone into hiding.

32. LESSONS LEARNED ON THE BASIS OF FIELD EXPERIENCE. Under conditions as they existed during the Italian campaign, where large sections of the population were pro-Allied, it was possible and often necessary to use the services of natives to infiltrate through enemy lines in order to obtain information concerning the military situation of the enemy. To be assured of the intentions of these agents it was necessary to establish and improve informant nets. This was one of the outstanding achievements of the Peninsular Base Section whose General Investigative Squad had, by early November, 1943, reached a point in the cultivation of their confidential informants, where they could be checked against each other as a means of evaluating their information.

a. Another important achievement of the Peninsular Base Section was the establishment of the Allied Identification Center (AIC) in the Leghorn area. It was evident to the Counter Intelligence Corps that an organization such as the Allied Identification Center was necessary in order to expedite the screening of all persons seeking employment with Allied installations and those requesting food ration cards, replacement of identity documents, and port passes. The supervision of the Allied Identification Center and its personnel consisted of two Counter Intelligence Corps agents. The Allied Identification Center handled approximately 200 applications daily, and the name and description of each applicant was checked against the suspect file. The Fascist records of Livorno were also checked, after which persons were interrogated briefly by a Counter Intelligence Corps agent or an FSP. The creation of this organization resulted in an economy of security personnel needed for other duties, and it met the exigency created by the great demand for labor in the area.

b. It became a standing operating procedure for the Army Counter Intelligence Corps to move ahead of Corps and Division Counter Intelligence Corps to perform the initial counterintelligence work when large cities were captured. This was desirable because of the larger size of the Army Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment and its greater experience in handling large population centers.

c. The importance of liaison was the principal lesson learned in Sicily, and it was continually improved in Italy. Here, there was an increasingly wider dissemination of information among detachments as well as among other Allied operational counterintelligence units. This speeded up the flow of information that otherwise would have gone slowly through echelons of command. Close liaison was maintained with the Office of Strategic Services and with the American Military Government. Generally speaking, Military Government in Italy cooperated more closely with the Counter Intelligence Corps than had been the case in Sicily. By the end of 1943 the Peninsular Base Section Counter Intelligence
Corps Detachment had its own sub-section placed with AMG at the latter's request to investigate present and potential office holders.

d. In view of the fact that there was an increasing association between the Counter Intelligence Corps and the American Military Government, as well as other Allied intelligence agencies, a detailed knowledge was necessary on the part of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel of the structure, problems, and methods of operation of these organizations. It was felt that a precise knowledge of these details would considerably increase the ability and confidence of the agent and minimize the operational inefficiency caused by the necessity of training new Counter Intelligence Corps agents in local fundamentals. Moreover, it was recommended that an increased emphasis be placed on the laws of evidence and that Counter Intelligence Corps personnel be instructed in the procedure of Allied Military Courts. When suspected enemy agents or security violators were brought to trial, Counter Intelligence Corps agents could be thoroughly prepared to present their points clearly, and results could be speedily accomplished.

e. To bring about an effective system of controls it was necessary to coordinate the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments. This could be expedited by the flow of information from one detachment to another. Prior to October, 1944, this had not presented too great a problem; but after the mass assault by the German Intelligence Service, the situation became extremely dangerous unless each detachment kept abreast of what was happening. To be effective the information had to be easily accessible and presented in a convenient form. It was necessary to get information into the hands of the people who were operating on the ground. One of the devices used in the dissemination of information was the "Patterns Report" devised by the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment and widely adopted by other Allied agencies. It was simply a Modus Operandi of enemy agents. This was considered of such import that many detachments recommended that Counter Intelligence Corps agents be thoroughly schooled in the patterns of behavior of enemy agents.

f. The Counter Intelligence Corps was quick to learn that, unless some uniformity of plans and operations was adopted, many of its successes might be neutralized. This was clear especially in the issuance of passes to Italians. Passes were issued by various organizations to such an extent that it became practically impossible to determine their authenticity. Many of these passes were issued by numerous Italian officials in different forms so that it became an easy matter for enemy agents to obtain them. This procedure was altered because of the efforts of some vigilant detachment commanders who recommended that a standard form be used which would be recognized by Allied military and security personnel.

g. On the basis of field experience, many other recommendations were made by the various Counter Intelligence Corps detachment commanders, and while it was possible to follow the advice of some, it was impossible to carry them all out.
CHAPTER 7

OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

33. ORGANIZATION. In June, 1942, the United Kingdom was divided into four base sections: Southern, Eastern, Western, and North Ireland, with London exempted from such control. Base Section boundaries were made to coincide with the boundaries of the British home “Commands” in order to effect closer coordination between British and American forces. North Ireland Base Section was the scene of the original staging area for American Forces in the spring of 1942; then it became inactive except as an air ferry base in 1943, but became the scene of a secondary troop concentration in late 1943 and early 1944.

a. When organized, each Base Section was allotted an intelligence officer, per Army Regulations and European Theater of Operations, United States Army order, but the position was not made of general staff rank until the spring of 1943. Moreover, the Counter Intelligence Corps organization in this theater had been neglected for some time. The office of the detachment commander was not current on the Counter Intelligence Corps directives which had been issued. Each detachment had been left to shift for itself without coordination, and the situation became so confused that the office of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, European Theater of Operations, from time to time did not know where the detachments were. However, by late November every organization in the theater was devoting most of its energies to reorganization and preparation for future operations.

b. In the port areas the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments worked operationally under the Port Intelligence Officer in the same manner as the Base Section detachments worked operationally under the G-2's of the Base Section, but their reports and administration were handled through the Base Sections in which the port areas were located. Personnel in the port areas met incoming ships and mingled with the crews to pick up any disaffection which might have been apparent. They gave security lectures to incoming crews and, in some instances, to the officers. In the main, the value of the work performed was to be found in the training which Counter Intelligence Corps personnel received in port security work which they would later have to perform.

34. LIAISON WITH BRITISH INTELLIGENCE. The ultimate responsibility for counterintelligence in this theater rested with the British and their civilian organizations, supplemented in some instances by the military, and they were well set up to handle it. The Counter Intelligence Corps, in its work, confined itself to matters relating directly to United States military personnel and was particularly careful to avoid any intrusion into British jurisdiction. Except for local instances of cooperation, there was little joint work with the British. Liaison was maintained with Scotland Yard at all times as an important part of the investigative work that was carried on. However, the
greatest handicap suffered by all intelligence officers up to the time of the Normandy invasion was a lack of trained personnel. By 25 May 1944, there were approximately 800 agents and 100 officers available for duty.
CHAPTER 8

OPERATIONS IN FRANCE AND THE LOWLANDS

35. PRE-INVASION PLANNING: Starting in early spring, 1944, amphibious exercises on varying scales were held generally on the Southern coast of England. These exercises served a dual purpose. They enabled all personnel to profit from the experience gained in "dry runs." They also served a security purpose, for exercises were soon regarded as an accepted affair. Deficiencies in the security system were noted and corrected each time an exercise was held. The final security procedure for Operation Overlord was largely composed of corrective measures submitted by the Counter Intelligence Corps agents who served as intelligence personnel on the staff of each camp commandant.

a. The Counter Intelligence Branch (CIB) staff planning for counterintelligence coverage of mounting operations began in September, 1943, following the first meetings of the "Overlord" Sub-committee. To smooth out any deficiencies which might appear in the coming operation, each Counter Intelligence Corps team was required to send in a separate report following an exercise, embodying all phases of security work within its area, with recommendations for correction.

b. As a basis for counterintelligence planning, all First United States Army Group, First United States Army, and 21st British Army Group operational plans were thoroughly studied and pertinent parts extracted for incorporation in the Third United States Army Counterintelligence Plan. Monthly visits were made by counterintelligence officers to London and Bristol where conferences were held on security problems. From these visits incorporating studies of available information, gaps in the counterintelligence plan were closed with definite information.

c. According to this plan, the commander was made responsible for all counterintelligence within his command, and the appropriate Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was assigned the responsibility for the immediate direction of the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment attached or assigned to his unit. Stress was laid on the employment of the Counter Intelligence Corps to combat espionage, sabotage, and subversion; to prevent leakage of information to the enemy; and to deliver security lectures to troops. Close liaison and cooperation was to be maintained among all counterintelligence agencies, Civil Affairs, and the Provost Marshal.

d. In addition to normal counterintelligence duties within Army, Corps, and Division in the field, Counter Intelligence Corps detachments were to perform tactical Counter Intelligence Corps functions, such as search of enemy command posts and the questioning of civilians, informers, and agents in occupied territory. The Army detachment was to conduct rear echelon missions including safeguarding military information, security against the activities of enemy agents, and rear
echelon counterintelligence functions in general. To the Corps and Division detachments were assigned the field security missions performed in forward echelons.

e. To provide continuous coverage, provisions were made for the reinforcement of Corps and Division detachments from the Army detachment pool as the necessity arose. Since this transfer of personnel might have proved difficult from an administrative standpoint, the plan required that Army Counter Intelligence Corps personnel revert to Army control as soon as the pre-determined counterintelligence objectives were reached. While in Corps and Divisions, Army personnel would be placed under command of Corps or Division Counter Intelligence Corps detachment commanders. If the necessity for reinforcement were to arise in critical areas, provision was made for the transfer of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel from Corps or Division to Army Counter Intelligence Corps detachments pools. However, Corps and Division detachments were not to be reduced below a strength of 1 officer and 7 enlisted men.

f. In Sicily, it was proved that only confusion and needless repetition of effort resulted when Division Counter Intelligence Corps turned over control to Corps and then to Army, without coordination to provide continuous coverage. The difficulty of providing higher echelons with immediate information concerning Counter Intelligence Corps activities in areas under Division control was not forgotten. To remedy this situation the plans of the 21st British Army Group, First United States Army, and Third United States Army contained a provision whereby Army CIC personnel would be placed with division detachments entering a town, to remain there through the period of both Corps and Army control until relieved by communications zone Counter Intelligence Corps personnel. Similarly, a "Town Counterintelligence Plan" was evolved in mimeographed form to be forwarded to Divisions, Corps, and Army Headquarters within forty-eight hours of entry into a town. This not only contained information of conditions in the town and missions accomplished, but served as a check list for Counter Intelligence Corps agents.

g. In March, 1944, the recently appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, ETOUSA, arranged with the Third United States Army for the temporary release of nearly 100 Counter Intelligence Corps officers and agents to supplement security personnel on duty in the more and more congested Southern and Western Base Sections. The Counter Intelligence Corps sought to furnish all possible staff and administrative assistance to the two Base Sections involved in the mounting of "Overlord." The headquarters from which counterintelligence functions were operationally controlled was the Base Section.

36. OPERATIONS WITH COMBAT TROOPS. Before dawn on D-Day, 6 June, 1944, six Counter Intelligence Corps detachments had landed in Normandy. Officers and agents of the 101st and 82nd Airborne Division came by parachute or glider along with the first troops of their Divisions. Other detachments made the amphibious landing with assault troops of
the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 29th Infantry Divisions. Within a week the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments of the 2nd and 90th Infantry Divisions were also ashore, along with those from V, VII, and VIII Corps elements of the First United States Army Detachment. An advance party of the 9th Air Force Detachment was supported by reserve units from the Twelfth United States Army Group. Several port teams were assigned to the forward echelon (advance section) of the Communications Zone.

a. On D-Day the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments was clear and concise: to locate, seize, and place under guard all important communications centers and to take charge of civilian traffic control. The extent to which the teams had been briefed for the mission varied. Some Divisions provided every member of the detachment with maps, indicating targets and lists of persons to be arrested, and other Divisions entrusted only the commanding officer of the detachment with this information. Wherever possible, these detachments established contact with, and made use of, resistance groups.

b. Aided by this service, some of the detachments moved forward almost immediately after the landing. As each new town or village was taken, Counter Intelligence Corps agents rushed to communication centers to make certain that telephonic, telegraphic, and radio communications had been stopped, and impounded mail in the post offices. Cherbourg, the first major counterintelligence target, was entered on 27 June, 1944, by elements of the 4th Infantry Division Counter Intelligence Corps. Documents captured in this city were so voluminous that they were turned over to the VII Corps Order of Battle Team for evaluation and dissemination. Each phase of this work was handled with comparative ease in June and July when the advance was slow, but with the breakthrough in August and September, resulting in the rapid liberation of large numbers of villages in a single day, it was impossible to do more than to skim the surface.

c. With a Division in combat, Counter Intelligence Corps duties also included security surveys and screening of all civilians who were overtaken by the Allied advance, or who later made their way back through German lines into Allied territory. An increasing number of TOE workers and other categories of impressed labor were encountered who further complicated counterintelligence problems. Individual Counter Intelligence Corps teams spent much time in interrogating hundreds of civilians who were sent to the Division Civilian Cage. Every precaution was taken to apprehend and question German deserters in civilian clothing.

d. Other duties of the Counter Intelligence Corps were to locate the offices of various German Army units and French collaborationist organizations. From a security standpoint it was of extreme importance to seize all records for delivery to the G-2; to stop any and all publications; to safeguard vital installations and records in gendarmeries; and to arrest persons whose names appeared on Black Lists. This latter duty was made considerably more simple in Normandy by the thoroughness of resistance groups who, by the time the Counter
Intelligence Corps arrived, had usually arrested all collaborationists who did not withdraw with the Germans. These groups of Maquis were recognized as members of the FFI and they were generally permitted to retain the arms they carried.

e. From the vast number of persons arrested by the United States Army and by French groups, it was the task of the Counter Intelligence Corps to isolate those of a real counterintelligence interest. These persons were subjected to an intensive interrogation and, where it was deemed advisable, they were transferred to the United Kingdom where the most thorough interrogation could be given at the Office of Strategic Services Camp. From these interrogations a great deal was learned about German schools for saboteurs and spies in France; German plans for sabotage and espionage before and after occupation; and the locations of sabotage dumps and rendezvous points for enemy agents. This led to the location and seizure of secret stocks of sabotage material and the arrest of other agents and persons incriminated thereby. Furthermore, such questioning resulted in lists of students and instructors at sabotage schools.

f. Every phase of Counter Intelligence Corps activity was closely coordinated to preclude overlapping jurisdiction. Close coordination existed between the counterintelligence staffs and Counter Intelligence Corps personnel of the Air Force. For example, the Air Force Counter Intelligence Corps was responsible for the immediate security of the air fields. All cases involving investigation of civilians outside of air field areas were turned over to the ground force Counter Intelligence Corps detachment having area jurisdiction. In addition, Air Corps Counter Intelligence Corps set up certain definite procedures for close supervision of air travelers to and from the liberated areas.

37. OPERATIONS IN NORMANDY. Liaison was maintained at all times with Military Government and local authorities throughout Normandy. Splendid cooperation was received from the mayors, the police, and local resistance groups. Information from reputable groups was more reliable than that of the independent informant who invariably appeared in every village to volunteer information against neighbors.

a. Since the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps were a continuous duty which did not end with each phase of the advance, it was necessary to maintain a strict policy of continuous coverage in each area. An effort was made to maintain continuity of counterintelligence application in specific localities by having agents from the Corps detachments go ahead on loan with Division detachments, or by having agents with Division detachments remain behind with Corps detachments. The same sort of exchange was effected between Corps and Army and between Army and Army Groups. Moreover, lower echelon teams left behind records of informants, suspects arrested, and cases investigated for the use of the teams which relieved them. Provisions for this fusion of effort were contained in the First United States Army Group Standing Operating Procedures, dated 23 June 1944.
b. When the allied armies and the Communications Zone headquarters moved east across France, Counter Intelligence Corps work in Normandy and Brittany was left to teams operating under the jurisdiction of the Normandy and Brittany Base Sections, and to other detachments with tactical units which remained to cope with the isolated pockets of Germans along the Atlantic coast. As time went on, permanent coverage was simplified by the use of the counterintelligence Bi-weekly Report made up by the Army from the bi-weekly reports of each echelon. This was then forwarded to the Army Group for examination, and with the complete picture, deficiencies could be rectified immediately.

c. In accomplishing its mission, the Counter Intelligence Corps overcame a number of problems, one of which was the shortage of linguists and trained interrogators. A program of local procurement brought considerable relief, and a large number of qualified linguists was transferred from tactical units into the Counter Intelligence Corps. This reliance upon local procurement was in keeping with directives from Washington insisting that "special operations units" be filled locally from personnel on hand there.

d. In August, 1944, the 12th Army Group Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment became operational. With the liberation of Paris imminent, a Counter Intelligence Corps team from this detachment was attached to the "T" Force (corresponding to the "S" Force of the Italian campaign) of that Army Group and entered the city on 24 August with the assault troops. Thereafter, Counter Intelligence Corps agents accompanied the "T" Forces as they swept across Europe.

e. To ease the tremendous problems of administration created by the advance, the Channel Base Section was activated in September, 1944, with headquarters at Le Havre. The Counter Intelligence Corps work there was put under the control of the Port Intelligence Officer. At this Base Section the Counter Intelligence Corps was concerned with port control and loyalty checks for civilian personnel. A short time later a similar detachment was attached to the auxiliary port of Rouen.

38. OPERATIONS IN NORTHEASTERN FRANCE, BELGIUM, LUXEMBOURG, AND HOLLAND. In the Third United States Army Area, static tactical conditions during the month of September brought about a series of counterintelligence problems.

a. Now for the first time since the Army had become operational, large numbers of refugees, evacuees, and impressed former German laborers were encountered in the combat area. These people had been released by the enemy so that they would float back through the front lines, cause congestion, and obtain information. It was soon discovered that many German soldiers, left behind in the German retreat, had changed into civilian clothing and mingled with these people. Some of them had donned civilian attire as stay-behind agents, while others were merely stragglers in the retreat and used this means of concealing their identity as enemy soldiers.
b. Many reports with respect to German soldiers in civilian clothing proved to be false, although a large number of apprehended soldiers admitted that they had been sent through the lines to seek information. As the Third United States Army drew closer to Germany, this problem became increasingly serious, and as a result 14 Camps were set up with a capacity of approximately 14,000. The Counter Intelligence Corps handled the task of screening personnel passing through these camps to determine whether they were enemy agents operating in disguise, enemy soldiers in civilian uniforms, civilian nationals, or bona fide refugees.

c. The first phase of Counter Intelligence Corps work in France had been the combat phase. The territory wrested from the Germans was tactically within Army areas, and military necessity required complete operational control by the Counter Intelligence Corps. The second phase was that immediately following liberation when the French authorities were in the process of stabilizing their control and when the intervention and backing of the Counter Intelligence Corps, frequently needed by the French, was of mutual benefit. The third phase of this work, which began in October, was that following the successful reorganization of the French Government, when the Counter Intelligence Corps found its duties and powers becoming more and more restricted to cases involving United States Army personnel. Small sections of France still remained in German hands, separated from the rest of the country by narrow areas of French territory which fell under United States Army jurisdiction. A sharp contrast existed between the work of the Counter Intelligence Corps in such areas and that in rear areas, where the clearing of pro-German elements was practically completed in September. Almost 100% of the population could be relied upon.

d. In Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland, it was found that the best working arrangement was to permit local authorities, after their loyalty had been determined by the Counter Intelligence Corps, to take over as soon as possible. Only in areas extending a few miles back from the battle lines did the Counter Intelligence Corps desire a complete operational control of security measures. Most of the persons on the counterintelligence Black List fled with the Germans or were killed or arrested by resistance groups. Those who remained were usually arrested by local authorities at the request of the Counter Intelligence Corps or turned over to local authorities as soon as possible after arrest and interrogation by the Counter Intelligence Corps.

e. Meanwhile, the Third United States Army advance continued to result in the movement of large numbers of civilians from forward areas to the rear. By the month of November the Counter Intelligence Corps was far from the realization of its primary mission; i.e., the neutralization of the activities of enemy intelligence. The enemy policy makers and other key personnel of the Abwehr had all withdrawn with the German Army.
f. In December the counterintelligence mission was divided into two phases centering around the Moselle River sector. During the first phase, counterintelligence agencies continued their work in German territory with emphasis equally divided between military and civil security. There were no outstanding developments during this period, and the functioning of counterintelligence agencies in the field was greatly facilitated by excellent coordination and cooperation on the part of the Military Government, Military Police, and local indigenous police.

g. The second phase of counterintelligence operations commenced when the enemy launched his counteroffensive in the Ardennes-Eifel area on 16 December. The emphasis then reverted to the military security phase of counterintelligence operations. The use by the enemy of American uniforms and equipment in the First United States Army Area called for a concerted effort on the part of all counterintelligence agencies.

h. The move of the Third Army to the North necessitated the expansion of the counterintelligence control line to include the new zone of operations. Constant patrolling by mobile counterintelligence patrols and the increasing security-consciousness of combat troops hampered enemy agent operations. The nearness of the enemy, coupled with reports of threatened infiltration of enemy agents in Allied uniforms and using Allied equipment, required a rigid counterintelligence control comparable to control in a newly liberated area.

i. This German breakthrough completely nullified, for the time being, all the efforts to establish a reliable informant net. The threat of brutal reprisals made the situation hopeless in so far as informants were concerned. It also stopped all assistance from the citizenry in matters pertaining to Military Government.

39. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE. Meanwhile, the Seventh United States Army entered France in mid-August through the German Mediterranean defenses, and was soon fighting in the Vosges Mountains and in Alsace. This Army, coming later under the Sixth Army Group and ETOUSA, together with the Base Sections which supplied it, brought Counter Intelligence Corps teams experienced in the campaigns of North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. Seventh Army Counter Intelligence Corps teams were confronted with counterintelligence problems not found by First and Third Army detachments. They received a less enthusiastic reception; faced a greater number of suspect persons, together with strong evidence of Nazi indoctrination, vestiges of subversive groups, and many native French in the employ of the Abwehr.

a. The Abwehr method of recruiting agents in the occupied areas was usually through black-market activities. The black-market avenue of approach was chosen because it established contact and rapport with prospective agents. It also gained the subject's confidence and gratitude for extensive favors. After a subject had thus become thoroughly involved and attempted to withdraw from espionage work, he
was usually made to realize he had no choice but to continue to deliver information.

b. Black-listed individuals in this sector, fearing capture by the Americans, made their way toward Spain and Switzerland. To prevent this and to safeguard against the penetration of enemy agents through these fronts, the Counter Intelligence Corps established a system of controls on the German-Swiss and the Franco-Spanish frontiers.

c. Within a few weeks of the Southern D-Day, a detachment was dispatched from Delta Base Section at Marseilles to the Franco-Spanish frontier for border control work. This detachment had been preparing for this particular assignment, having performed similar duties along the border between French and Spanish Morocco. Styled as the Pyrenees Border Control Group, it came under the direct jurisdiction of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Another Counter Intelligence Corps detachment with the 44th AAA Brigade was charged with counterintelligence security of the nebulous front between Southern France and Northern Italy, a front extending from the Mediterranean coast to the Swiss frontier.

d. Control of these borders created many problems; and although many sabotage and espionage agents were apprehended, some may have been successful in crossing the lines. So successful was the security control established by the VI Corps Counter Intelligence Corps that they were commended. By mid-September the Seventh United States Army had made contact with the Third United States Army.
CHAPTER 9
OPERATIONS IN GERMANY

40. OPERATIONS DURING THE ADVANCE. Counterintelligence methods in Germany required complete revision from those employed in friendly countries. Considerable time was devoted to the formulation of plans for dealing with a population known to be hostile.

a. The first problem was the urgent need for additional personnel. This was solved in part by creating additional Reserve Teams and by local procurement. The second move was the establishment of Counter Intelligence Corps coverage on an area basis. Instead of assigning the Army Reserve Teams to specific large towns, these detachments were given responsibility for a section of the Army area. A further method of getting around the difficulty of personnel shortage was to use the medium of "house arrest," thereby obviating the use of additional men to guard suspected persons. This was simply a moral restraint on suspects who were advised not to leave their houses or to receive visitors. As soon as a person was placed under "house arrest," it was immediately recorded on his Military Government registration slip.

b. As the advance continued, security of the troops became a matter of increasing concern. One of the primary security precautions was the prompt registration of former members of the German Army. This was especially true upon entry into new sectors where the military situation permitted a sufficient stay in the area. The procedure for handling former Wehrmacht members was carefully outlined in various intelligence instructions. By thus keeping tabs on former German soldiers, in addition to the restrictions imposed by local curfews, and the threat of further restrictions for violations of military directives, the security of the troops, troop movements, and installations was tightened.

c. As the Divisions moved rapidly from one area to the next, a Division Counter Intelligence Corps detachment had no time to spend on lengthy investigative practices and methods. In some instances the Counter Intelligence Corps received the assistance of German-speaking personnel from the IPW (Interrogation of Prisoners of War), MI1 (Military Intelligence Interpreters), and OB (Order of Battle) Teams in the screening of civilians.

d. In some instances the daily movement of Divisions ranged from twenty to thirty miles. Accordingly, detachment personnel devoted themselves to the neutralization of communications between Allied and enemy territory, the arrest of Nazis and other Germans whose presence in the area constituted a threat to the security of Allied operations, and the sealing of party buildings in order that the records therein would remain intact for future use by occupational forces.
e. High-ranking party officials, SS and SD personnel, and other persons liable to categorical arrest, were usually found to have fled from the larger towns; whereas in the smaller towns, the local "VIP's" were usually still to be found, apparently assuming that they would be overlooked. In a few cases party members committed suicide—in one case, an Ortsgruppenleiter killed his whole family prior to eliminating himself, and in another, a Kreisobmann shot himself just after a Counter Intelligence Corps officer had entered his home to make the arrest.

f. By early April, as important counterintelligence targets were rapidly overrun, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel found they could keep pace only by directing their attention towards the highest priorities of work such as the security of the Armed Forces and the apprehension and neutralization of SD (Security Service) and Abwehr agents. Subversive activities were limited to certain areas notably in the First United States Army Area.

g. On 30 April, the 97th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment reported the capture of Colonel Krueger, former Commandant of the Heereschule Fur Sonderaufgaben, together with 28 members of an organized sabotage group. Krueger related that a school was created on 16 September 1944, in the town of Turkenberg, to train men to fight in small units. The students were instructed to stay behind, evade capture, and then harass and destroy supply lines of United States troops in the rear.

h. When, in January, 1945, it became apparent that the Allied Forces would move into Germany proper, the German Government formed an organization around which a future underground could be moulded. This was the "Werewolf" organization which set up a school to train members in resistance techniques. Little trouble was encountered from this quarter because they did not have time to organize. By the end of May all indications of the existence of such an organization had disappeared. Other subversive organizations of the Nazis remained silent.

i. As VE-Day drew closer, the number of captured key Nazi personnel grew larger. The shrinking refugee space and fear of the approaching Russians brought to a halt the eastward migration of these people, and Counter Intelligence Corps arrest totals increased sharply. These included many hundreds of automatic arrestees as well as an even greater number of Wehrmacht deserters. Although not of primary counterintelligence interest, atrocity perpetrators and war criminals continued to be apprehended by the Counter Intelligence Corps.

41. OPERATIONS IN THE STATIC SITUATION. During the fall and winter of 1944, plans were already under way for the organization of a Counter Intelligence Corps detachment which would carry on the occupational phase of the war. By 10 May 1945, the 12th Army Group Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was activated by orders from Theater Headquarters, and the new phase of operations was launched. The
personnel of this detachment were prepared for their assignment, both
by experience and instruction.

a. After the unconditional surrender of the enemy to the
Allied Forces, greater emphasis was placed on the de-Nazification of
Germany. Divisional areas were divided into sectors with a Counter In-
telligence Corps team for each, and those party offices and buildings
which were sealed during the advance were reopened and thoroughly
examined. Informants in each area were developed and leads were
secured which led to the arrest of many persons of high rank and posi-
tion in the Nazi regime.

b. Largely through the efforts of informants, many former
Gestapo and Abwehr agents were apprehended, who otherwise might have
escaped the notice of the Counter Intelligence Corps. In the crowded
cities of Germany, it was almost impossible to ferret these people out
without the aid of the native informant who worked undercover. Many
individuals of counterintelligence interest were also found in the
rural areas where the Counter Intelligence Corps, due to a lack of
transportation facilities, did not conduct any stringent investigations
during the early stages. By minutely combing these areas, many leading
Nazi officials were apprehended.

c. The problem of dealing with the SS (the protective guard
for the NSDAP) had to be solved. Where once it had been illegal, hence
forced to conduct its activities underground, the SS, after 1933, be-
came an organization whose duties were defined officially as "protecting
the internal security of the Reich." The difficulty of dealing with
this body became more acute because it permeated the entire German
social structure and because it could easily revert to the underground
status whence it sprang. It was plainly evident that the SS could not
be demobilized; consequently, every effort was made to neutralize it
and to destroy its influence wherever it had penetrated.

42. CONCLUSIONS. In general, the mission of the Counter Intelli-
gence Corps was to secure our forces from espionage, sabotage, and sub-
version and to destroy all enemy intelligence services.

a. Generally, it had been found that of the persons included
in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force directives as
automatic arrestees, only the lower echelon remained in place, while
the higher Nazi Party members moved on. Many of those remaining, often
older men, appeared to be shoved into office with the expectation that
they would be arrested instead of the more fanatical officials.

b. The success that was obtained by the Counter Intelligence
Corps in these operations was due in large part to the cooperation,
coordination, and liaison that was maintained at all levels of command.
In many cases, operations were brought to a successful conclusion be-
cause of the rapid and concerted action of several detachments, or
elements thereof, and cooperation of Military Government and Military
Police.
c. The lack of personnel with linguistic ability and a knowledge of the countries where the campaigns were conducted was a serious handicap to the Counter Intelligence Corps. Documents of counterintelligence interest could not be exploited on the spot. The solution of attaching interpreters was not satisfactory as they lacked counterintelligence training and investigative technique. Counter Intelligence Corps trained linguists would have eliminated this problem.

d. The Counter Intelligence Corps in France and in Germany did its job well. The security which the Corps afforded to the armed forces was one contributing factor toward the eventual victory of the Allies.
CHAPTER 10
OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AREAS

43. NORTH ATLANTIC OPERATIONS. The global nature of World War II made precautions necessary to keep Germany and her co-partners from seizing effective jumping-off places off the coasts of America and to prevent them from extending their influence in bordering lands.

a. In the North Atlantic, three Base Commands were established to afford additional protection to the rear of the troop concentrations in Europe, and to provide security against the possible seizure by Germany of the large land areas of Iceland, Newfoundland, and Greenland.

b. The responsibility for the security of Newfoundland rested mainly with the Canadian military and naval forces, with the exception of several United States military installations there. The only safeguard in existence was the report of the natives to the nearest Newfoundland Ranger, who in turn notified the Alien Registry Bureau. Landings could easily be effected from the Free-French Islands of Miquelon and St. Pierre, only ten miles away. In the main, the Counter Intelligence Corps was concerned with the security of the United States military installations and with the detection of possible subversive activity.

c. The importance of Greenland to the security of the North Atlantic was not overlooked by the strategists in their over-all plans. The Greenland Base Command was established early in 1942 and was composed of four camps situated in different parts of the country. The importance of this area lay not only in its strategic position but also in the Kryolite mining industry there.

d. During the period that civilian contractors and employees were engaged in the construction of army installations, precautionary measures were kept in force because of the possibility of sabotage. The possibility was heightened by the long hours of darkness in winter, an item which could afford any possible saboteur sufficient cover. Continuous security checks were necessary because the people, mostly of Danish origin, were distinctly anti-British and without confidence in the American war effort. This lack of sympathy was quickly dispelled after the invasion of North Africa.

e. These factors made it imperative for the Counter Intelligence Corps to maintain a constant vigil. Port security was of great importance because of the accessibility of the fjords. In one instance a United States Army post located near a fjord was only a few miles from an Eskimo island village which could easily have been used as a transmission point for enemy intelligence. Due largely to the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps, the enemy found no advantages in this area.
f. Of immediate concern to the security of American troop movements too was the country of Iceland where the possibility of invasion by Germany was imminent. Iceland Base Command had a provisional Counter Intelligence Corps detachment attached to it which functioned until it was split into five separate detachments on 12 July, 1944.

g. At the inception of the Counter Intelligence Corps in Iceland, few trained men were available, so permission was obtained to draw men from units in Iceland and to train them locally. Most of the men so procured were subsequently sent to the United States as officer candidates, and some were sent to the active combat zones of continental Europe. Here, as elsewhere, the problem of personnel procurement remained acute.

h. Counter Intelligence Corps headquarters was located in the capital city of Rekjavik, and its jurisdiction extended over more than 75,000 civilians. In addition to personnel administration, Headquarters maintained close contact with all outlying posts, and directed operations and activities in them. Duties which demanded the attention of the Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were security control through censorship of the civilian press and radio, security liaison at airfields, port security, and control of the affairs of eighty-nine German nationals.

i. In the conduct of these activities commendable work was done by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in the interrogation of German prisoners of war captured in or brought to Iceland. During 1944, Counter Intelligence Corps agents interrogated 60 Germans captured at or near Greenland by United States forces there. On 6 and 7 October of that year, 28 Germans were interrogated after having been captured by the United States Coast Guard off the coast of Greenland. Of this group, 12 were members of a weather observation party, while the remaining 16 were crewmen of the scuttled trawler, the "Kehdingen." Considerable information of a military nature was gained during these interrogations, among them the exact locations of factories manufacturing electrical systems and radios for the Germans.

j. Experience in this Command showed conclusively that only through the use of cultivated and trusted informants could specific and detailed information be obtained. For this reason more emphasis was placed on the use of informants, while the method of "door-to-door" interview, which was customary in the Zone of the Interior, was discarded. It was difficult to secure the cooperation of the natives in this method of interview because of the dislike of Icelanders to give information relative to one of their compatriots, regardless of the use to which such intelligence would be put. However, in every instance of enemy landings or the breach of security, civilians were found eager to notify the Counter Intelligence Corps for prompt and appropriate action.

k. On the whole the situation in these areas, from an operational point of view, remained relatively quiet. Some cases of sabotage attempts and subversion were reported, but none of these constituted any real threat to the war effort. Continuous liaison was
maintained by these commands with the European Theater of Operations and with interested Allied intelligence agencies. The situation in the North Atlantic did not hold the latent possibilities of danger as was the case in the Caribbean areas.
CHAPTER 11

OPERATIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN AREAS

44. BACKGROUND. The Corps of Intelligence Police made its debut in the Caribbean Defense Command with the dispatch of two agents to the Panama Canal Department in the summer of 1922. These men and their successors were to remain the only Intelligence Police in the area until the growing crisis in Europe forced the recognition for great intelligence coverage. On 6 April, 1939, the quota of agents for the Canal Zone was increased to three. On 27 November of the same year, one agent reported to the newly activated Puerto Rican Department to supplement the counterintelligence work begun by the 65th Infantry while the island garrisons were still under the Second Corps Area. On 31 July 1941, Puerto Rico’s allotment of the Corps of Intelligence Police personnel was increased to 25 men.

a. To meet the emergencies that had arisen, G-2's were authorized to place such members of the Corps of Intelligence Police as they considered necessary on duty with the Intelligence Office of any post, camp, or station within their commands. The mission included investigation of all cases involving espionage, counterespionage, sabotage and subversive activities in the military establishment.

b. A major counterintelligence problem was created by the influx of civilian contractors and War Department employees who were engaged in the expansion of existing defenses of the Canal and on the leased bases and other fortifications in the Antilles. Laborers were recruited with no regard to intelligence screening; turn-over was high; and there were few effective measures to prevent enemy agents from obtaining complete information as to the defenses under construction, or from interfering with the work by sabotage. As a direct consequence, on 31 July 1941, Puerto Rico's allotment of the Corps of Intelligence Police personnel was increased to 25 men.

45. OPERATIONS IN THE CANAL ZONE. In November, 1941, all but the most important cases were dropped, and all agents received priority "A" assignments to learn the location of the Japanese population of the Republic of Panama. The Japanese here were mostly young men, and the majority of them seemed to be operating or working in barber shops.

a. The attack on Pearl Harbor started a new phase in the work of the Corps of Intelligence Police in the Panama Canal Department. Agents in Panama City and in the Atlantic Coast city of Colon performed excellent work in rounding up the Japanese in their areas. At the same time, roving tours by agents were started in an attempt to keep track of the activities of the legations in Panama City, with special attention being paid to the German and Japanese deputations.
b. Employees of the Canal were required to carry identification provided by the Central Labor Office, while residents of Panama were provided with cedulas by their Government. The December, 1941, round-up of enemy aliens and other persons of doubtful loyalty was reasonably effective. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were engaged in the enforcement of measures requiring satisfactory identification of travelers entering the Republic and the Zone.

c. During 1942 the force of enlisted Counter Intelligence Corps personnel was increased from 24 to 59, and a Counter Intelligence Corps detachment was organized on a territorial responsibility basis. This comprised the Pacific sector which included the Pacific half of the Canal Zone together with Panama City and its environs; the Atlantic side and the Province of Colon; and the sector comprising the interior of the Republic of Panama exclusive of the other sectors.

d. Espionage investigations were in the majority because of the military importance of the Panama Canal and the large amount of Allied shipping passing through it. Reports of suspects expected to pass through the Zone were received from the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Bureau of Censorship, Military Attaches, and Military Intelligence Service. These names were placed on the Counterintelligence Watch List; and upon arrival, suspects were placed under surveillance, and their contacts closely investigated. Disaffection investigations of Panama Canal employees, contractor employees, and United States Army employees also made up a large percentage of the total investigations. Many cases of sabotage of ships calling at the Canal Zone ports were made, and clandestine radios and signal lights were tracked down by our agents.

e. The Counter Intelligence Corps operated in this area only by permission of the Panamanian Government, for no agreement had been made for an American secret or investigative force to operate in Panama. Any cooperation given to the Counter Intelligence Corps was secured locally, for, although Panama had declared war on the Axis nations, any rights or privileges extended to the American Army were outlined by specific diplomatic agreements which applied only to specific defense sites and highways. The Counter Intelligence Corps was the only agency which conducted investigations of espionage, sabotage, disaffection, treason, and sedition in the Panama Canal Zone.

46. OPERATIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ANTILLES. Falangist and Nationalist activities, together with a very well-established German Fifth Column, made the situation in Puerto Rico very serious. Here the difficulty was concerned with the disaffected elements of the population, Axis sympathizers, encouraged by Axis successes which could not be concealed by censorship. The Antilles Department (Trinidad and Puerto Rico) was virtually blockaded, and many ships were sunk during the first half of 1942.

a. These conditions produced a mass hysteria which resulted in numerous charges of espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activities.
Emphasis was shifted from investigations to counterespionage and
countersabotage measures, and not until the landings in North Africa was
the tension eased. Submarine warfare in the area then declined, and
the possibilities of a direct attack on the Panama Canal were considerably
lessened.

b. By the end of the year the strength of the Counter Intelli-
ligence Corps in the Caribbean Defense Command increased to 112 men, and
the department began to feel the problem of overstrength. Varying case
loads, the uncertainties of Latin politics, and changes in the tactical
situation made it difficult to gauge Counter Intelligence Corps
personnel requirements accurately. However, experience was to prove
that Counter Intelligence Corps personnel needs would bear a more direct
relation to the area to be covered and the number of military in-
stallations in it than to over-all troop strength or to the presence
or absence of enemy naval units in adjacent waters.

c. For the next sixteen months the general plan of operations
of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments in the Caribbean remained the
same. Security education of the troops, counterespionage, and counter-
sabotage remained the primary concern of the Counter Intelligence Corps.
The security provided for this area was sufficient proof that the
Counter Intelligence Corps could adapt itself to each new contingency
as it arose. The end of the War in Europe brought a tightening rather
than a relaxation of security measures, and the latter part of May,
1945, was devoted to plans to meet the counterintelligence problems
raised by the passage of large bodies of troops en route from the
European to the Pacific Theater. These precautions were also taken
by the South Atlantic Theater Counter Intelligence Corps.
CHAPTER 12
OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC THEATER

47. ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES. Initially, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in this Theater were assigned to South Atlantic Wing, Air Transport Command, and later operated out of USAFSA Headquarters located in Recife, Brazil. When the first Counter Intelligence Corps Special Agents arrived in Brazil in May, 1942, that country was not yet a belligerent, but its Government was cooperating fully with the Allies in permitting us the use of her bases for operations against the enemy. Consequently, the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps had to be safeguarded with the utmost security so as not to jeopardize our cordial relations with that Government. When these agents were returned to the United States in November for further training, the War Department set up a Counter Intelligence Corps detachment for Air Transport Command, Foreign Wings, and it took up its duties in Brazil early in 1943. A short time later this detachment was assigned to USAFSA Headquarters.

a. The detachment was divided into three sections: countersabotage, counterespionage, and liaison. The basic functions of the countersabotage section were to check on all possible attempts at a sabotage of planes and material passing through the Wing. Its personnel were to continue with the development of all leads received through the countersabotage system and to maintain observation on the acts and sentiments of Brazilian employees within the military bases.

b. The liaison section was to maintain liaison with the Brazilian agencies for the purpose of coordinating the control and evacuation of suspected subversive Brazilian civilians from military installations. It had to secure the cooperation of that Government for investigations into the loyalty of native employees within the United States Army installations. This section also performed administrative functions for the detachment.

c. The counterespionage section performed various duties which made it necessary for agents to wear civilian clothing. These men investigated leads developed by the countersabotage section, developed contacts both among American and Brazilian civilian employees in the Army installations, and in turn gave leads to the countersabotage section. This interchange of information provided complete coverage over all types of cases. A great deal of time was spent by this section checking on rumors of stolen or forged passports and other vital statistics.

d. This detachment (comprising all three sections) functioned until February, 1944, when it was replaced by another which remained on duty until 23 May. The latter concerned itself with the security of the base and investigated all possible sabotage cases as well as American and Brazilian personnel. Its members wore a semi-military uniform and represented themselves as War Department inspectors.
e. The third Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment took over jurisdiction on 23 May 1944, and remained on duty throughout the war. Thereafter, a careful finger was kept on the political pulse in that country, and a discreet observation was maintained over such activities in North Brazil as might have affected the security of American installations and American international policies. Control of suspected subversive civilian personnel was complete. Additional duties included the detection of unauthorized personnel in or near United States Army installations. Reports were received by this Detachment from other contributing investigative agencies relative to the movements of such suspects. Through the exchange of information with these agencies, a fairly accurate account was maintained of the whereabouts and activities of suspected individuals. All intelligence concerning such persons was coordinated with the Brazilian police, Brazilian Naval and Military Intelligence Services, and the American Consul.

f. The Counter Intelligence Corps spread a wide net which nullified any attempts to injure the successful prosecution of the war.
CHAPTER 13
OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

48. CONDITIONS EXISTING IN THE AREA. Headquarters USAFME had jurisdiction over the Balkans, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and North East Africa, a strategic semi-circle which included the important city of Istanbul and the Suez Canal. The widespread use of Axis propaganda, religious and racial differences, and political and economic conditions in this section formed a chaotic background for Counter Intelligence Corps operations. Operations were hampered by different people with 12 major differences in political beliefs, approximately 57 variations of religious faiths, and at least 20 languages or dialects. The Counter Intelligence Corps, aside from its usual duties, was forced to engage in some positive espionage, in political reporting, in racial activities, and to become thoroughly cognizant of existing political and religious activities.

49. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION. In this area Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were assigned to Theater Headquarters and to the Persian Gulf Command. The first Counter Intelligence Corps detachment arrived in the Theater in September, 1942, and two offices were established: one at Basra, Iraq, and one at Teheran, Iran. The Counter Intelligence Corps then began to fan out into various sectors of the Theater with the exception of Greece and Bulgaria, where it was decided that the Office of Strategic Services would take over operations in conjunction with the British. Within five months the Counter Intelligence Corps was stationed in many places in the Middle East.

50. ACTIVITIES IN AN AREA OF MULTIPLE JURISDICTIONS. The British were technically in control of the Middle East but had more to do than they could handle and were willing to have the assistance of the Counter Intelligence Corps. All information gained by the Counter Intelligence Corps was usually turned over to the British Intelligence for action. The Counter Intelligence Corps maintained a liaison officer with the British SIME at all times where he had access to all files.

a. To coordinate activities with our Allies, agents were given liaison assignments to the various authorities in areas where field offices were established. All matters of mutual interests were channelled through the Liaison Desk.

b. One Counter Intelligence Corps officer was stationed on the Turkish border on a semi-permanent basis. Many refugees, who were of security and counterespionage interest crossed the border which was controlled jointly by the British and French. But here, as in other areas, the British maintained the upper hand by virtue of their responsibility for the tactical security of British troops and installations. The existence of American organizations in the area was dependent on British and French courtesy.
c. At the Interrogation Centers, positive intelligence matters were covered by other agencies of the Military Intelligence Service, while countermeasures were taken care of by the Corps. These centers were located at Aleppo, Suria, Haifa, Palestine, Alexandria, and Bari. The center at Aleppo covered all refugees crossing the Turkish border, while the one at Haifa accommodated all Jewish refugees brought into Palestine by the Jewish agency. The one at Alexandria was for Yugoslavs and Greeks; and at Bari, it served as a clearing house for all persons crossing over from Yugoslavia, Albania, or Greece.

d. These areas constituted a hotbed of espionage activity where nationalistic uprisings might have flared at any moment. Every precaution was taken to prevent the penetration of American installations.

e. The Middle East achieved historical significance because of the numerous conferences that were held there to determine Allied strategy. The Counter Intelligence Corps provided security at all meetings. The conference at Cairo was an Allied operation, and responsibility was shared jointly with the British. The Teheran Conference was also of a joint security nature which included Russian as well as American and British responsibility. As an aftermath to the Yalta Conference, a meeting was held at Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal area where President Roosevelt met King Faruk of Egypt, the Emperor of Ethiopia, and the King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. This last conference was solely an American operation.

51. LESSONS LEARNED. The most interesting and important lesson learned in USAFIME was the method of cooperation between the Counter Intelligence Corps and the British SIME. The Counter Intelligence Corps learned from the experience of the English in this area. British Intelligence had been operative for decades in the Middle East; and valuable records and background, as well as trained career personnel, had been developed. The Counter Intelligence Corps in this Theater operated as a counterpart of SIME, although the Counter Intelligence Corps was really the counterpart of Field Security Service which was an echelon below SIME and was the organization of uniformed security investigators. In this Theater the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps was stretched to include some positive intelligence missions, a condition which proved that the principles inherent in the mission were elastic enough to enable Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to meet new contingencies.
CHAPTER 14

OPERATIONS IN THE
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

52. ACTIVITIES IN INDIA AND BURMA. Counter Intelligence Corps experienced no more than the usual difficulties of language, terrain, and spheres of political influence while establishing itself in this Theater. For the most part, Counter Intelligence Corps detachments were engaged in providing security for troops and installations.

a. Inasmuch as India and Burma were British possessions, matters of subversion, disaffection, and politics were naturally of primary interest to them. Counter Intelligence Corps detachments operated with the British so as to insure the maximum intelligence coverage.

b. During the early months of 1944, all efforts were directed toward the deployment of detachments to their proper stations. Base sections in Bombay and Delhi were ready to assume their duties by the end of June.

c. By August, Counter Intelligence Corps investigative work was in full swing. At Delhi the work continued to be primarily security education and publicity among the troops, but the increasing volume of military traffic passing through necessitated that the Bombay Detachment direct its attention more and more to port security. The Calcutta Detachment, in addition to sabotage and espionage investigations, had begun a survey of the gasoline pipe-line and communications lines from Calcutta to Dhubri. Chinese agents of this detachment participated with the British Security Control in the interrogation of Chinese employees of the Bengal Air Depot. Toward the end of the year the Counter Intelligence Corps had established a central file containing vital statistics on all civilians employed by United States Forces in this theater, as well as a regular program of security lectures which were attended by the British.

d. During the spring and summer of 1945 the detachments stationed in Assam and Burma, which covered the territory through which the Stilwell Road passed, found the security of movements over the Road a major problem. Security surveys were made of all important installations along the Road, and recommendations for improving security were submitted. One agent accompanied a typical convoy from DooM DooM, Assam, to Kunming, China. From information gathered on this ten-day trip, specific recommendations were formulated and a general security plan evolved. In addition, units which had been in rear areas were briefed in security responsibility before they moved into areas where Japanese intelligence was believed to have been in operation.

e. A problem similar to that of the Stilwell Road was that of the pipe-lines in the area. Sabotage in the form of pilferage reached serious proportions in China, and there were numerous instances of the
same thing in Burma and India. As time went on, the local populace gained some knowledge of the line and became skillful in dismantling the couplings. Gasoline, which was at a premium in Burma, was valued by the natives for many purposes, ranging from illumination to barter with the Chinese for eggs, chickens, and salt.

6. Extensive security surveys by Counter Intelligence Corps agents were made of the entire length of the pipe-lines from Bengal to the Chinese Border. Through the aid of the civil authorities, a plan of village responsibility was devised whereby a collective fine could be imposed on a village. To warn the civilian populace of the serious consequences of sabotaging the line, a notice signed by the Deputy Chief of Civil Affairs in Burma and printed in the various languages of the area was posted at intervals along the line in Burma. The Counter Intelligence Corps helped organize a twenty-four hour guard system and investigated all pipe-line breaks.

g. In the Indian rear areas during the final months of the war, emphasis was placed on a program of security education and security enforcement, in addition to the investigation of specific cases of suspected enemy Fifth Column activities. The maintenance of a high standard of military security among Theater troops was a continuing problem. As Allied successes increased, military personnel tended to forget that carelessly disclosed information might reach Japanese intelligence. Efforts were increased to educate personnel in their responsibility for safeguarding military information by means of radio announcements, weekly security reminders, and lectures and films.

h. With the cessation of hostilities in Southeast Asia, a large number of American prisoners of war were released from jails and camps in Java, Singapore, Burma, Thailand, and French Indo-China. These ex-prisoners were taken to Calcutta where hospital treatment was administered and preparations were made for their return to the United States. The Counter Intelligence Corps was designated as the investigative agency to gather what information they could from these men for the War Crimes Branch of the Judge Advocate General's office.

63. ACTIVITIES IN CHINA. As activity increased in this Theater, it became apparent that new installations and expanded facilities had to be undertaken in order to accommodate additional personnel and material. Fortunately, the Counter Intelligence Corps was present in the Theater at this time and was able to execute its mission (security of installations against enemy activities) simultaneously with the expansion, rather than come in afterward as had been the experience in the past.

a. As Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were relieved from assignment in Burma and India, they were transferred to the Chinese Area where Counter Intelligence Corps detachments were operating with the Chinese troops. Relationships with the Chinese commanders depended on the individual agent; these remained cordial. There were some isolated acts of violence against American personnel, but these were due to a
lack of information on the political character of Chinese units and communities.

b. When the Counter Intelligence Section, Office of the Theater G-2, was created in February, 1945, a sub-section was established to deal with the security of plans and operations. This office was staffed with G-2, not Counter Intelligence Corps, personnel. By May it had become apparent from numerous instances of loose handling and compromise of Top Secret information that if effective protection were to be given additional measures would be necessary. The Theater G-2 recommended that a special detachment of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel be created to extend the activities of the security of Plans and Operations Sub-section throughout the Theater, working through the G-2, and under the special direction of the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Section.

c. The recommendation was approved by the Theater Commander who issued credentials to each member of the special detachment authorizing them to have access to all operational and Top Secret information. The first task of the detachment was a survey of existing conditions and the submission of recommendations. Recommendations were submitted on 21 June. It was the opinion of all the participating agents that while the general application of stringent security measures would partially remedy the situation, constant daily supervision and planning of the security of such information would be necessary to provide effective protection. This work proceeded successfully during the remaining months of the war.

d. With the increasing tempo of the war, there grew a corresponding increase in the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps. On 8 June a Counter Intelligence Corps detachment was assigned to work with the Chinese Combat Command. This was an experimental project to provide the maximum security of American installations, security education for all Chinese units being trained by the Command, and the gathering of intelligence and counterintelligence information under combat conditions. Two teams were immediately dispatched to the Eastern and Central Commands to put the program into operation. The plan itself had not been put completely into effect at the time of the cessation of hostilities, but it did assist Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in creating a security consciousness among the various headquarters with which they were working.

e. A third team had been briefed for work with the Kwangsi Command, and finally, results were beginning to come in from the work of the team with the Central Command. These results generally proved that Counter Intelligence Corps teams could operate effectively in conjunction with the Chinese armies.

54. SOUTHEAST CHINA PROJECT. In May, 1945, plans were formulated to place a detachment of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in Eastern Kwantung Province, east of the Japanese-held corridor. Its purpose was to gather counterintelligence information through their own efforts and
through such available sources as the United States Navy Group, the Office of Strategic Services, the 14th Air Force, and the various Chinese military and civil authorities friendly to the Central Government.

a. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel, well qualified for such an assignment, were available in sufficient numbers. Chinese-Americans, fluent in the Cantonese and Hakka dialects prevalent in this area, were selected and staged in Kunming. Appropriate discussions were held with the recently appointed mayor of Canton and, after several preliminaries, the plan emerged as a joint Office of Strategic Services and Counter Intelligence Corps enterprise. As a result, the Counter Intelligence Corps gained access to a vast accumulation of Black-List information from the Office of Strategic Services.

b. The termination of hostilities found the China Theater increasing its offensive momentum, and intelligence agencies of all kinds were planning expanded operations rather than a program of post-war activity. This was quickly changed with a clear definition of the post-hostilities mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps in China. The mission of the United States forces in the China Theater was to help the Chinese, however, and not to carry on independent operations against the enemy. The jurisdiction of the Counter Intelligence Corps was limited to activities directly involving American personnel and installations. In such circumstances the principal danger zones from a security viewpoint were outside the jurisdiction of the Counter Intelligence Corps, and complete reliance had to be put in the Chinese counterintelligence agencies.
55. **INTRODUCTION.** The Pacific phase of the war extended the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps from Alaska to the Philippine Islands. The Counter Intelligence Corps operated in areas where the people, language, and customs were almost unknown; and although there were no large cities or towns, the security of the American installations was maintained. The responsibilities of the Counter Intelligence Corps in these areas were equal to those of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the European Theaters.

56. **ORGANIZATION.** Intelligence activities in Alaska prior to the development of a large military force were carried out by the S-2 of the Alaskan Defense Command. Emphasis was placed on the establishment of an extensive informant system in the towns of the Territory and included both military and civilian personnel. The wisdom of this was demonstrated during the subsequent military development and expansion.

   a. In July, 1941, two special agents of the Corps of Intelligence Police arrived in the area; one being assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the other to the Post Intelligence Office, Fort Richardson. Early attention was given to the investigation of individuals and organizations whose loyalty to the United States had been questioned. Vital military and semi-civilian installations closely connected with the military program were safeguarded.

   b. On 1 January 1942, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel numbered nine special agents, all of whom were on detached service with Headquarters Alaskan Defense Command from Western Defense Command, and Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, California. By 1 May 1943, there were 18 special agents and four officers on duty with the Alaskan Defense Command. All of the Counter Intelligence Corps officers had served as special agents prior to being commissioned. Throughout the history of the Corps in Alaska, it had not always been possible to procure officers who had been especially trained in Counter Intelligence Corps work. Authority to recruit agents from within the Alaskan Department was granted by the War Department on 15 August 1944.

57. **OPERATION AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE.** Jurisdiction and responsibility for all intelligence matters within the Territory of Alaska and within the jurisdiction of the War Department were the sole responsibility of the Commanding General, Alaskan Department. This jurisdiction and responsibility was recognized regardless of the military command immediately concerned with the intelligence activity. However, the division of intelligence functions and responsibilities among the Counter Intelligence Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Naval Intelligence had followed the dictates of the appropriate War Department directives.
a. Throughout the course of the campaign in this Theater, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel had not been directly utilized in combat operations. However, numerous counterintelligence functions had been performed by the detachment which were directly associated with the Attu and Kiska campaigns and with the continuous combat operations of the 11th Air Force.

b. Much of the time Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were engaged in the enforcement of the enemy alien control which was set up early in the war period. All enemy aliens were placed in internment camps and the Counter Intelligence Corps was called upon for recommendations relative to the advisability of permitting them to return to their homelands. In addition to these duties, the Counter Intelligence Corps conducted investigations on all types of cases, and security was sufficiently tight that there were no cases of enemy inspired acts of sabotage or espionage. Moreover, considerable investigative work was performed in this area for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Treasury Department, and other Federal and Territorial agencies.

c. During this campaign, frequent requests were received by the Counter Intelligence Corps from other agencies for investigative assistance. In many instances the duties requested had not been of a strict counterintelligence nature, but in all cases they had a direct bearing on the successful prosecution of the war effort. Immigration and Naturalization Service relied entirely upon the reports of investigations prepared by the Counter Intelligence Corps to determine the suitability of enemy aliens for United States citizenship. The close cooperation that existed among the various agencies was an important contributory factor to the successful conclusion of operations in the Theater.
CHAPTER 16
OPERATIONS IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

58. INTRODUCTION. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the Corps of Intelligence Police already had plans in readiness for a rigid security control. While enemy planes were still active over Hickam Field, Japanese residents, known to be strongly pro-Japanese in their sentiments, were apprehended and placed in custody. From that beginning until the end of the war, constant pressure was maintained in varying degrees on persons of alien ancestry or citizenship, particularly the 160,000 Japanese residents of the Territory. Investigation of suspected subversive elements not only resulted in the apprehension of the majority of persons likely to be of danger to internal security, but it made potential subversive elements aware that Counter Intelligence Corps agents were constantly on the alert. These activities made it necessary to spot agents over all the island in the Group and to provide effective administration over their activities.

59. ORGANIZATION. In the early phase of the war the Hawaiian Department was under the jurisdiction of the Central Pacific Base Command, and later under the Middle Pacific Area (MIDPAC). Until that time all the efforts of the Counter Intelligence Corps had been turned toward the local scene and to the maintenance of the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands. Combat detachments were left to fend for themselves almost totally. When the Counter Intelligence Corps was brought directly under the Middle Pacific Base Area, it was realized that forward area detachments required as much attention as local units, and that their functions were to be increasingly important. Consequently, direct contact was immediately established with them and Headquarters Detachment set up the machinery to supervise their activities. This detachment acted as a central agency for all counterintelligence information in the Middle Pacific Base Area and circulated this intelligence to all detachments and to the War Department.

a. One of the first two overseas Counter Intelligence Corps units was activated in Honolulu on 1 January 1942, and was assigned to G-2 Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. This detachment, together with others that came to the Islands subsequently, were concerned with operations in that area until August, 1944, when the Counter Intelligence Division began to participate in the combat phases of the war. From then on Counter Intelligence Corps detachments were dispatched from the Islands to Iwo Jima and Saipan.

b. In the meantime, agents had received additional training in the Counter Intelligence Corps school on the mainland which had been in operation since August, 1941. Stress was placed on the principle of security control in the Islands, an item which the Counter Intelligence Corps was to face many times as United States Forces landed in different areas in the Pacific.
60. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS CONTROLS IN INSULAR AREAS. Strict
control of all travel to and from the Territory and between the islands
was maintained by close cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In connection with the
security checks and surveys, a series of lectures was given to military
personnel and Department of the Army civilians working closely with
them. Army units stationed there were assisted in keeping equipment,
classified information, and stations inviolate by a series of security
tests conducted by the Counter Intelligence Corps. All this was
necessary because of the imminence of danger from such sources as enemy
agents, disaffected persons and saboteurs.

a. For the first year and a half of wartime Counter Intelligence
Corps operations in this area, martial law was in effect. This
gave the Counter Intelligence Corps the right of search and seizure.
Hundreds of persons were apprehended and examined (including citizens
of the United States). On 25 October 1944, martial law was ended and
citizens were no longer detained. Of the 1,599 persons that had been
apprehended by September, 1945, 1,466 were Japanese. The rest were
114 Germans, 17 Italians, and 2 French. Most of these persons had been
released or paroled, repatriated, or relocated by this time, and only
494 remained in custody.

b. When martial law was dispensed with, the Counter Intelli-
gence Corps responsibility increased. Not only were all cases involving
espionage, sabotage, subversion, treason, etc., made the responsibility
of the Corps, but it was also called upon to prosecute all security
violations. In addition, the Counter Intelligence Corps continued the
work of preparing all internment and exclusion cases and was designated
as the agency to coordinate the activities of all investigative organiza-
tions in the territory. All inter-Hawaiian travel was placed under
the continuous supervision of the Counter Intelligence Corps. This was
greatly facilitated by the appearance on 9 January 1944, of an Air
Force Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment which could operate with
equal ease in both rear and forward areas. Unquestionably, the Counter
Intelligence Corps activities in the Territory of Hawaii contributed
significantly to the fact that there was no known espionage, nor a
single case of enemy-inspired sabotage, there during the war.

c. Counter Intelligence Corps operations on Saipan, Iwo Jima,
and Okinawa were launched from Hawaii. On Iwo Jima, the Counter In-
telligence Corps, because of the absence of a civilian population, de-
veloped no tactical mission, and personnel were used as an escorting
party for visiting dignitaries over the island. On Saipan, perhaps for
the first time, an Air Force Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was
utilized in the assault phase of an invasion. The Counter Intelligence
Corps on this island, together with Tinian and Guam, carried out the
specific mission of neutralizing the efforts of enemy agents who might
threaten the security of Air Force installations.

d. The Battle of Okinawa opened on 1 April 1945. It marked
the last operation for Counter Intelligence Corps detachments in forward
areas under this command. As the Philippine campaign drew to a close, Counte r Intelligence Corps experience gained on Okinawa became of value, since here the American Forces came in direct contact with Japanese citizens in their homeland. Several agents lost their lives in the battles for possession of the island.
CHAPTER 17

OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

61. EARLY ORGANIZATION. At General MacArthur's Headquarters in Australia, intelligence responsibilities were allocated in accordance with the command structure. By the end of April 1942, the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), began operating primarily as a counterintelligence agency with a nucleus of 14 officers and men. Shortages of personnel and official directives on which to base training and operations were felt from the beginning. These first fourteen men were given a three-week Counter Intelligence Corps course in the first Counter Intelligence Corps school to be organized in Australia.

a. Procurement of desired personnel for this school training proved difficult because of the highly selective policy then in force. Moreover, many preferred to go to the Officers Candidate School which opened in Australia. To encourage recruits, considerable informality was practiced. Preference was accorded to lawyers, newspaper men, insurance adjusters, and the like.

b. In early spring and summer of 1942, large numbers of troops arrived in Australia. The G-2 Section of the United States Army Forces in Australia undertook to develop counterintelligence activities at base sections level. Seven base sections had been organized by the time of the inception of the GHQ. By July the G-2 Section had succeeded in having intelligence officers appointed in the five major bases, and Counter Intelligence Corps agents were assigned to the base intelligence offices as they became available. Although the base intelligence officers administratively were responsible to the base commanders, counterintelligence functions were under the operational control of G-2, United States Army Forces in Australia. All phases of the Counter Intelligence Corps mission were of equal concern in these bases as they were the gateways to Australia.

c. The mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps at this time was limited in scope. The Corps was to assure the security of all personnel and materials; conduct investigations of disaffection, sabotage, and espionage; and indoctrinate troops in security matters. Continuous liaison and cooperation were maintained with the Australian and other interested agencies in establishing the security of installations, documents, and materiel. Australian Security Service naturally assumed the leadership in anti-espionage work on the Australian mainland. Because of the distant lines of communications and the sparsely settled parts of Australia, a greater dependence was placed on the Counter Intelligence Corps for adequate coverage.

d. Beginning in mid-summer, Allied Headquarters launched its strategic plan of meeting the Japanese thrust north of Australia. Operations north of the Australian mainland commenced on 17 October at
Port Moresby, New Guinea, which was then designated as the Advance Base. After the Japanese were expelled from the Milne Bay area, the Sub-Advance Base was established there. The opening of Advance Base offices introduced a new era in Counter Intelligence Corps field activities. Now with the enemy lines not far away and with his agents or collaborators at work within Allied lines, active countering of enemy espionage and sabotage efforts was necessary and, as a consequence, additional officers were assigned to the Port Moresby office.

62. REORGANIZATION OF THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS. The first Counter Intelligence Corps combat personnel to reach the SWPA theater arrived in Australia in April, a detachment of 5 officers and 39 agents destined for the Sixth United States Army. During the following months, detachments arrived for the other major tactical units in the theater, and this personnel was assigned directly to the units with which they were to operate. They were under the administrative supervision of the commanding officer of the unit and under the operational control of the unit intelligence officer. This was similar to the procedure followed in the base sections where base commanders exercised control over agents working out of the base intelligence offices. The administration, employment, training, and operating procedures of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel depended on the judgment of commanders of units to which they were assigned. This policy threatened the stability of organization as well as the efficiency of Counter Intelligence Corps activities, and as a consequence several administrative changes were made.

a. The first major change in Counter Intelligence Corps organizations in the theater occurred on 30 March, when the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, was made directly responsible to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army Forces in the Far East. This was followed by another change on 18 May, when the War Department relieved all Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in SWPA from their unit assignments and assigned them to Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Far East, and immediate steps were taken to reorganize. On 26 June, as a result of a conference held in the office of the G-2, United States Army Forces in the Far East, to determine the delegation of counterintelligence responsibilities to subordinate intelligence agencies, the Counter Intelligence Corps in the theater was made the direct responsibility of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps.

b. In the meantime, plans were under way to overcome the problem of personnel shortage by the introduction of a permanent Counter Intelligence Corps training school in the theater. At this school, agents recruited within the theater were given the necessary training, and agents previously trained in the United States were given advanced training in subjects peculiar to the local areas. Reports received from the relatively few agents on duty in New Guinea indicated their lack of adequate preparation for combat; and, to offset this, a course was instituted at Counter Intelligence Corps Headquarters in Brisbane on 28 June 1943 to provide advanced training. The quality of instruction at this school was improved by experts from various Australian
intelligence and field agencies. They enabled the students to obtain information from the best available authority on SWPA combat conditions. The gratifying results of the school's program led to its permanent status.

c. The school instructors' task was eased by the appearance of Technical Manual 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps." This helped in the development of the Counter Intelligence Corps because basic principles of operation were laid down and command responsibilities in intelligence work were described in detail.

d. A counterintelligence conference was called on 8 September, at which plans were laid down for Counter Intelligence Corps participation in combat operations. The formation of detachments to accompany Sixth Army task forces into action was made a joint responsibility of the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, and the G-2, Sixth Army. Actual control of operations was to be the responsibility of the Detachment Commander under the supervision of the Army or task force intelligence officer.

e. By the end of 1943, Counter Intelligence Corps operations extended throughout the theater from Sydney to New Guinea. There were 26 units in operation. Four were with combat divisions, two with Sixth Army Headquarters, one with I Corps Headquarters, five with the Fifth Air Force, and the remainder with the American Service of Supplies (USASOS) bases and sub-bases. Counter Intelligence Corps work was still being carried on under base and unit intelligence officers, and there was constant liaison between United States Army Service of Supplies base offices and G-2, United States Army Forces in the Far East. Later that year, the flow of troops to the north reached such proportions that the administrative machinery required revision.

f. To meet these new requirements, the War Department on 24 January 1944, published T/O&E 30-500, authorizing the establishment of Counter Intelligence Corps detachments and teams. On 14 March all Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were relieved from assignment to the War Department and assigned to the theater in which they served. On 20 April the 5227th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment (Provisional) was created to operate under the supervision of G-2, Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Far East; and the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, became the commanding officer. With this change, central control of Counter Intelligence Corps operations and personnel was at last achieved. Plans were formulated for organizing personnel at bases and units into Counter Intelligence Corps detachments responsible only to the commanding officer of the Provisional Detachment. Combat detachments were organized for tactical units varying in size proportionate to the unit to which attached. The growth of the Counter Intelligence Corps paralleled the growth in troop strength.

63. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS IN COMBAT IN THE ADMIRALTY ISLANDS.

The first Counter Intelligence Corps combat detachment to enter the SWPA as a complete unit was that which came overseas with the First Cavalry
Division in July, 1943. The members of this detachment were put through an intensive six-weeks' course covering duties of a combat counterintelligence team, weapons, and jungle lore. Prior to the invasion of the Admiralty Islands the team instituted a training program for all troops in the task force. Included in this course were lectures on security, censorship, handling of prisoners of war, collection of documents, and the comparative quality of enemy equipment.

a. One member of this detachment landed on Los Negros Island in the Admiralties Group on 29 February 1944 with advance reconnaissance elements; and together with a member of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), he gathered several hundred pounds of documents and dispatched the first report on Counter Intelligence Corps combat activities with assault troops. As a result of the effort of the Counter Intelligence Corps and the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, information was obtained which facilitated the landing in strength on Manus Island. Other members of this detachment landed with additional elements of the 1st Cavalry Division. The entire campaign was heavily contested and casualties ran high among the troops. However, the Counter Intelligence Corps unit survived unscathed and made an excellent record as the first Counter Intelligence Corps detachment to participate in a complete operation. Considerable patrol work resulted in the capture of many valuable documents and considerable amounts of enemy materiel which were turned over to the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section.

b. In the ensuing operations, the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section became possibly the most important single intelligence agency of the Pacific phase of the war. Its basic mission was the translation of captured documents and the interrogation of prisoners of war. This was accomplished through the effective pooling of an initially small number (35) of Allied linguists. The organization remained inter-Allied and inter-service in character from the time it was organized on 19 September 1942 until September, 1945, when its strength exceeded 1,900 officers and enlisted men.

64. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS IN THE NEW GUINEA OPERATIONS. The American troop concentrations rose from 21,901 in June, 1943, to 60,045 in March, 1944, in New Guinea, and this number was increased as the Army advanced.

a. The 32nd Division Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment landed at Saidor, and agents were assigned to regiments and Regimental Combat Teams. Because of the large area to be covered, some of the agents operated as "free lancers" and covered patrols and other specialized operations, while the combat teams carried on with routine duties. Five men participated in the landing operations at Yalaw Point, going in with the second wave and making immediate contact with the forward troops. Their activities along the Yaganon and Yokai Rivers and in the village of Kubuk yielded a large quantity of Japanese documents including technical and training manuals and a casualty record book. In addition to their other duties, these agents conducted front line lectures to the troops on the importance of taking prisoners.
b. On 22 April 1944, the 24th Division Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment initiated its activities at Tanah Merah Bay, Hollandia, with the assistance of a detachment of 4 Allied Translator and Interpreter Section men. At this point a highly effective native police-boy system was inaugurated in cooperation with the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA). These youths contacted village chiefs, led reconnaissance patrols, helped interrogate native suspects, and assisted in special investigations and in maintaining an informant network. Considerable information of a tactical and counterintelligence significance was obtained from these sources.

c. The 41st Division Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment together with the I Corps Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment performed distinguished service at Hollandia and Biak early in July. Both of these detachments maintained close liaison during these operations which netted close to 2,000 pounds of documents found hidden in caves. Personnel of these detachments, with the aid of Dutch Counter Intelligence Corps personnel at Netherlands Indies Civil Administration Headquarters, conducted daily interrogations of natives and other persons recently liberated; and, as a result, valuable tactical and counterintelligence information was obtained. The services performed during this operation was considered of such importance that the commanding officer of I Corps Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was awarded the Bronze Star on 28 July.

d. Toward the end of July, members of the 6th Division Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment landed with the advance elements at Sansapor on Dutch New Guinea. During most of the month the Detachment operated in the Maffin Bay sector of the Wadke-Sarmi front. Agents continued to be attached to regiments and often operated under harassing enemy fire. While in the Maffin Bay area this detachment set up an effective system for the interception of enemy documents and equipment which were being carried out of the forward areas by the troops; and with the cooperation of the Military Police, all vehicles en route to the rear areas were inspected. The Counter Intelligence Corps in SWPA suffered its first casualty in this operation.

65. OPERATIONS IN THE SOLOKON ISLANDS. After the expulsion of the Japanese from Bougainville, comparative quiet set in and the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps combat team there were limited to the bivouac area. Agents enforced rules of censorship and formulated an SOP for handling classified documents. Security procedures were strictly enforced; and from early June, 1944, on, there was little danger of infiltration by the enemy. During the entire period of occupation of Guadalcanal by the American Forces, there were no instances of espionage or suspected espionage activity. This situation, however, was not unusual because of the total absence of any white population and the presence of a relatively small native population which had not been under Japanese domination long enough to have been influenced in favor of the Nipponese. The one source of possible espionage activity, the traffic of ship personnel to shore and shore personnel to ships laying in the harbor, was quickly recognized as
dangerous, and immediate steps were taken to neutralize it through additional measures of port security.

66. OPERATIONS IN NEW HEBRIDES. The Counter Intelligence Corps in New Caledonia operated in liaison with the local French Gendarmerie, and they were primarily concerned with the Japanese population there. The Counter Intelligence Corps of the Island Command and the 25th Division provided coverage for the island which included observations and investigation of certain French civilians as well as the Japanese elements there. Various reports of Japanese submarine landings on the island were investigated by the Counter Intelligence Corps, but no positive evidence was ever obtained that any Japanese were landed in this way. Orientation and training of troops occupied a great deal of the time. These activities were carried on through the summer of 1944.

a. Reconnaissance patrols demonstrated how easily the enemy could land on the various New Hebrides Islands without being detected. Because of this situation, Counter Intelligence Corps offices had, by September, been established in strategic areas within the geographical limits of the New Caledonia Island Command for the purpose of providing complete security coverage and for expediting the transmission of counterintelligence information to this Headquarters. These district offices maintained close liaison with the local French authorities, with chiefs of the French Militia, and with French Army and Navy coast-watching stations.

b. District Offices were likewise charged with the responsibility of maintaining periodic contact with French and native informant systems that had been set up in those areas. An informant network was built up that reached into most tribes, villages, and outlying districts of the islands. This proved to be a lucrative and valuable channel of counterintelligence information.

67. OPERATIONS IN THE FIJI ISLANDS. In these islands the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps were limited because of the curtailment of military activity there and the attendant large scale reductions in personnel. However, the utilization of Fiji as an important supply base warranted the retention of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel to preserve the security of warehouses and other supply facilities. Moreover, the large Indian element in the population, which represented a potentially anti-Allied sentiment, was a matter of concern to the Corps.

68. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THESE ISLAND ACTIVITIES. By September, 1944, the Counter Intelligence Corps had learned that it was sound policy not to land before Battalion Headquarters during an invasion. After an invasion the disposition of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel depended on the tactical situation, transportation, conditions of roads, etc. In perimeter defense and when transportation was available, it was found that personnel could operate from higher Headquarters. When the troops were advancing, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel accompanied Regimental and Battalion Headquarters at all
times, leaving a small reserve of personnel with higher Headquarters so that proper distribution of agents could conform to new tactical situations which might arise.

a. A tremendous amount of intelligence information came from the documents captured during these early operations. The collection of these documents was made possible by the painstaking efforts of Counter Intelligence Corps in the conduct of numerous lectures to the troops on the importance of each scrap of written matter.

b. As the combat phase of hostilities subsided, Counter Intelligence Corps detachments conducted a thorough security program. Headquarters, message centers, communications facilities, and field offices were surveyed regularly; and daily inspections were also made to insure that outgoing patrols carried nothing of intelligence value to the enemy in the event of capture or casualty. By the end of July, 1944, many Counter Intelligence Corps combat detachments were operating or about to be activated under the authority of the 5227th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment (Provisional) in the Southwest Pacific Theater. These were created because of the topography of the areas of operations.

c. In these operations in Micronesia, it was learned that during the first stages of any invasion little evidence of enemy sympathizers and collaborators could be found. Only after hostilities had ceased and an area was made secure by United States troops did natives make any effort to report suspected persons or activities to Allied Government officials. All personnel, war correspondents, photographers, and the like were under orders to report to the Counter Intelligence Corps detachment in their area to prove the authenticity of their mission and credentials.

d. Operationally, the foremost task prior to the invasion of the Philippines was the development of the Counter Intelligence Corps combat program, procuring and training the personnel, and the determination of the mission of the Corps in combat. A feeling of tension, of hurry, increased as the time approached for major blows against Japan.

e. At the outset it was agreed that until American forces were operating in United States territories, the Counter Intelligence Corps would work in close conjunction with the governments holding sovereignty and with their intelligence agencies. In the Australian mandates, liaison was fostered and maintained with the Australian New Guinea Administrative Units (ANGAU). Upon entering the Netherlands East Indies, close coordination developed with the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) and with the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NIFS), especially regarding civilian and native control. Once action had begun on a landing, the work of the Counter Intelligence Corps broadened in many directions. Seizure of enemy documents and equipment, control of movements behind the lines, interrogation of prisoners for counterintelligence information, and many other tasks occupied counterintelligence officers and agents.
f. By October, 1944, on the eve of the invasion of the Philippines, detachments had taken some part in every important action. They had been in the field with two armies, four corps, fifteen divisions, and one regimental combat team. Combat operational methods had to be worked out as new missions were assigned. During this ten-month period more than half the total of Counter Intelligence Corps personnel in the theater had been in combat or attached to tactical units.
CHAPTER 18

OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

69. PRE-INVASION PLANNING. A Counter Intelligence Corps Training School was established at Palmarosa House in Brisbane, July, 1944. To provide first-hand information, persons familiar with the Philippines were invited to address the classes; and for the first time in this theater, instruction in the national language of the islands, Tagalog, was provided. The school's curriculum was aimed at solving those problems facing an American investigator in the Philippines; viz, language, customs, habits, character and traits of the natives, names of geographical locations, local laws, methods of investigation, secret societies, etc.

a. On 24 August, 50 Filipinos from the 2nd Filipino Battalion were enrolled for a four-weeks' course in preliminary Counter Intelligence Corps training. Upon graduation these men served as instructors for the entire Battalion. So successful were the results of the training received in this school that by the end of September plans were already drawn up for the operation of three schools in the theater.

b. These preparatory plans entailed also the vital responsibility of the Counter Intelligence Corps to secure the staging and movement of a quarter of a million troops and their equipment into the largest areas of the islands, while insuring a maximum element of surprise. This was effectively accomplished, but only at the expense of a twenty-four hour vigilance by officers and agents over the principal points of information leakage.

c. Before leaving New Guinea, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were thoroughly briefed on the tactical features of the coming operation and the duties to be performed. Agents were given lists of the political officials and guerrilla leaders which had been prepared by the Counter Intelligence Section in a "Who's Who" of the Philippine Islands. While on board the transports, lectures on Counter Intelligence Corps functions and proper distribution of enemy equipment and documents, as well as lectures on security, were given frequently.

70. THE LANDING PHASE. One of the most sensational tactical surprises of the war was achieved with the invasion of Leyte on 20 October, 1944. The shift of dates and direction from Mindanao to Leyte, and the tactical feints employed by the Navy, were largely instrumental in effecting this surprise. The preservation of security by American troops must be given due credit as well. Considering the large number of ships and personnel involved in the operation and the fact that secrecy was maintained, this stands out as a major security accomplishment.

a. More than 70 Counter Intelligence Corps officers and agents together with attached Filipinos made the initial landings with elements
of the Sixth Army, Xth and XXIVth Corps, and 7th, 24th, 96th, and 1st Cavalry Divisions. The 7th and 96th Divisions entered Leyte under the XXIVth Corps from the Central Pacific Theater. The task of coordinating Counter Intelligence Corps activities and maintaining constant liaison with Army and Navy officials was assigned to the 306th (Sixth Army) Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment which acted in a supervisory capacity during the combat phase. All the detachments were broken down into teams, some of them going forward with the regiments, some remaining with the command posts, and others setting up Headquarters in the towns or villages.

b. The 224th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was among the first detachments ashore, landing on A-Day in the vicinity of Dulag, 20 miles south of Tacloban on Leyte Gulf. Tactical circumstances prevented the introduction of counterintelligence measures during the first few hours. The civilian situation in Dulag was critical, and the first few days were spent interrogating persons in the civilian enclosure. Teams in the vicinity of the Barrio of San Jose contacted prominent men in the area, especially pre-war municipal officials, from whom a list of names of pro-Japanese civilians as well as loyal Filipinos was obtained and used as a basis for investigation and for the establishment of an informant net. Agents located the Dulag branch of Kempei Tai (Japanese equivalent of the German Gestapo), searched it, and uncovered a considerable amount of valuable data concerning its operations. Additional counterintelligence information was obtained from guerrillas operating in that area.

c. Members of the 210th (Xth Corps) Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment landed during the assault at San Pedro Bay where they were pinned down on the beach for 36 hours. A compound was built in cooperation with the Engineers and Military Police where civilians were placed in order to seek out any Japanese who might have infiltrated. Agents of this detachment assisted the 459th Area Detachment in a systematic search of the buildings in Tacloban which resulted in the collection of some seven hundred pounds of documents which were immediately dispatched to the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section.

d. Other agents of the 210th moved inland with Xth Corps troops and operated in Alangalang, Jaro, San Miguel, Pastrana, and Palo. Municipal police systems were installed in those towns by the Counter Intelligence Corps with the cooperation of the Civil Affairs Section. Officials and suspects in the towns were screened and a number of investigations were initiated, and all enemy and public installations were searched. Of all the problems which faced the members of this detachment, the most difficult was that of civilian control which was enhanced by the large number of alleged collaborationists accused by both civilians and guerrillas. In this connection, Counter Intelligence Corps and Public Civil Affairs Units (PCAUs) worked together. These persons were processed at the Prisoner of War stockade in Pawing. Those who were found guilty of giving aid and comfort to the enemy were detained at Corps and, after a thorough investigation, were sent to the Area Detachment in Tacloban with instructions for their
incarceration in the provincial jail until their cases could be heard by the Commonwealth Government.

e. Tacloban was the scene of the 301st (1st Cavalry) Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment's activities in the initial operation. Personnel landed on A-Day at Cataisan Point just south of Tacloban and on the following day entered the city, following closely on the heels of the assault troops. These agents conducted searches of the provincial capitol, the Kempei Tai Headquarters for Leyte, and Japanese General Makino's command post. On the following day the First Cavalry was forced to withdraw from Tacloban and all initial successes were thereby neutralized.

f. To the agents of the 459th Counter Intelligence Corps Area Detachment fell the responsibility of conducting investigations of public officials and prospective officials. As a result of several conferences with Commonwealth Government representatives, including the President, arrangements were made whereby the Counter Intelligence Corps was to check all potential appointees to public offices prior to appointment. The arrangement included all constabulary and municipal personnel which gave the Counter Intelligence Corps at the outset a firm and reliable control over the appointments. The activities of the 459th laid the foundation on which the Government could erect a reliable body of public officials and a trustworthy law enforcement organization.

g. The 77th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment entered Ormoc with the assault troops of the 77th Division and soon after transferred its activities to Valencia, leaving jurisdiction over Ormoc to the 7th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. Continuous liaison was maintained with the guerrillas who assisted the Counter Intelligence Corps in the maintenance of port security to prevent infiltration of enemy agents from neighboring islands.

LESSONS LEARNED. It was found in the Leyte operations, particularly in the initial stages, that Counter Intelligence Corps detachments were literally overrun by guerrillas and other zealous citizens anxious to denounce "spies" and "collaborators." In detaining these people, the Counter Intelligence Corps adhered to the criterion of the security of American operations and installations. In the confused early stages of the operation, expediency dictated the detention of suspects on scant evidence.

a. Some knowledge of civil affairs was found to be necessary on Leyte where the Counter Intelligence Corps had to carry on those functions during the early days of the invasion.

b. In addition to carrying out its own duties, as outlined in the Standing Operating Procedure, the Counter Intelligence Corps organized a temporary police system, arranged for food, medical aid, and shelter for the civilian population until civil affairs personnel arrived.
72. OPERATIONS IN LUZON. The first Counter Intelligence Corps personnel landed on Lingayen Gulf on S-Day, 9 January 1945, within an hour after the initial assault troops forged a beachhead along the coast of Pangasinan Province. By S plus 2, nine Counter Intelligence Corps combat detachments, with a total complement of 22 officers and more than 100 agents, were fully operational. As in the initial phase of the Leyte campaign, Counter Intelligence Corps operations were under the control of the 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment.

a. At the outset of the Luzon campaign, four combat detachments operated under the jurisdiction of the 214th (I Corps) Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and two were operating under the supervision of the 201st (XXIV Corps) Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. On 11 January, the 234th assumed responsibility for securing the area selected for GHQ; and as a means of coordinating and disseminating information received, preparation was made for the periodic distribution of a "Counter Intelligence Summary." This was sent to its sub-detachments and to those of I Corps. In general, the summary contained five sections which included lists of wanted persons, suspects, information desired on individuals and organizations, a report of the guerrilla situation, and a general summary. Continuous liaison was maintained among the various detachments and other interested agencies.

b. As the campaign progressed, the Counter Intelligence Corps found itself deluged with work concerning the guerrilla movement. This consisted mainly in locating them and, after interrogation, some means of control over their activities had to be devised. Though the workload of the interrogation teams was increased, the Counter Intelligence Corps was rewarded for its efforts by obtaining information on enemy psychological warfare and propaganda techniques, economic and political conditions, and the whereabouts of military targets. As a result of all this intelligence, the G-2 office of United States Army Forces in the Far East completed an authentic picture of the Japanese Kempei Tai and other enemy counterintelligence groups. A roster was also compiled of personnel who had been reported disloyal during the Japanese occupation.

c. In this connection, officers and agents were compelled to move with moderation because many of the persons accused of disloyalty had been, in reality, quite loyal to the Philippine Government. In order to insure fairness and justice to the accused, the Counter Intelligence Corps instituted a Legal Board of Review to look into these cases. This board was composed of lawyers who examined the files to determine whether a prima-facie case of collaboration had been established. The findings of the board were coordinated with the G-2, United States Army Forces in the Far East.

d. As the Counter Intelligence Corps moved into towns during the advance, many detachments such as the 6th took the initiative in reorganizing towns and barrios in the wake of combat troops prior to the arrival of Civil Affairs Unit. The officer in charge generally called together the mayor, city policemen, and other civil officials,
whereupon the detachment conducted an on-the-spot check of their loyalty. The mayor was then instructed to call a meeting of local officials (past and present), of civilian and Philippine Army personnel, including local guerillas. The purpose of this meeting was to orient the townspeople, reassure them, and generally to stabilize a panic situation. These, and many other similar measures that were instituted by the Counter Intelligence Corps, provided rear echelon security which was necessary for the successful operation of the troops nearing the city of Manila.

73. THE ENTRY INTO MANILA. The first Counter Intelligence Corps headquarters in Manila was established at Bilibid Prison. When it became evident that the city would fall, steps were immediately taken to centralize and combine into one unit GHQ, SWPA, and United States Army Forces in the Far East Headquarters.

a. Counterintelligence activity, though previously heavy, reached the peak for the war following the capture of Manila. The greatest burden fell on the Counter Intelligence Corps when it faced the task of investigating and recommending the disposition of those persons guilty of collaborating with the enemy. In addition, the fall of the puppet government left the people without the machinery for the administration of public affairs. Thousands of Filipinos required investigation; some to act in official capacities, others to be employed in the United States Army installations.

b. There was also the continuous necessity of searching and seizing enemy espionage agents and of maintaining security. During the period of "last ditch" fighting in the city, hundreds of suspects were interned as security risks. Even after many were cleared and released, there remained at the end of March 1,216 internees in the Manila area. They fell mostly into the classification of collaborationists, puppet officials, enemy nationals, and Kempei Tai agents.

74. THE FINAL PHASE. After the close of the combat phase of the Philippine campaign, the work of the Counter Intelligence Corps units fell into two major categories: investigations, especially of suspected collaborationists; and training for the Japanese invasion. As the enemy's organized groups were pushed further north on Luzon, the enemy employed infiltration, espionage, and guerrilla warfare tactics more and more. Infiltrators were a problem for the Counter Intelligence Corps through 1945. Even after the official surrender, stragglers estimated in the thousands continued to make forays from their mountain hideaways. It became evident during the planning for the invasion that there was a dearth of knowledge concerning the Japanese, their customs, government, and social systems. Immediate steps were taken to obtain this information from the authorities on Japanese affairs who were available in the Philippines. In June, 1945, a program of lectures by such authorities was begun, in addition to a complete education program for the troops.
CHAPTER 19

CONCLUSION

75. CONCLUSION. In 1941 there were few personnel and so few directives that the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps was vague. The United Nations had chosen to project the main attack initially against the German armies. Most of the problems confronting the Counter Intelligence Corps in the Pacific, therefore, were solved through utilizing the experience and lessons learned in the field by the Counter Intelligence Corps world-wide.

a. The surrender of the Imperial Japanese Government on 15 August 1945 terminated one phase of Counter Intelligence Corps activity, but new duties developed during the early days of the occupation of Japan. Based on studies made by G-2, GHQ, the Counter Intelligence Corps apprehended the first group of war criminals and interned Axis nationals. As the occupation progressed, the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment became a consolidated central unit covering all of Japan and followed the pattern developed within the European Theater of Operations in Germany. The 441st became the general procurement agency for subsidiary Counter Intelligence Corps organizations and undertook the establishment of a central training school in Tokyo. Geographical command subdivisions such as the XXIV Corps (Korea) and FILIPCOM (Philippines and Okinawa) developed Counter Intelligence Corps units which became locally autonomous but revealed replacements from the 441st in Japan.

b. As time went on and the Counter Intelligence Corps gained more experience in the field, it became evident that additional training and preparation of agents was necessary to meet the problems that were expected in the new areas. To fill this need, training schools were established in the different theaters of operations, the purpose and scope of which were determined by the existing situation in each theater.

c. At Oran the school sought to redefine the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps which, at best, was rather vague in the minds of everyone concerned.

d. Some lessons had been learned as a result of the activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps during and after the invasion, chief among which was the recognition that agents should be selected on the basis of ability to operate in certain areas. As a result, the school acted as a screening agency and the men were assigned to their new tasks on the basis of adaptability and, by and large, this screening process was successful.

e. The schools at Brisbane, Australia, performed a similar function for SWPA and the Philippines. In this theater the need for men trained especially in the language and customs of the Filipino population was clearly recognized and fulfilled. Moreover, the schools
made use of the experiences that were gained as a result of operations in the theater. As in Oran, the staff was made up of men who were qualified both by training and experience in the field.

f. The most noteworthy of these training schools was the European Theater Intelligence School (ETIS), introduced in France and later transferred to Oberammergau, Germany. Its purpose was to give training to intelligence personnel who had not been adequately trained to meet the problems of occupation. Under the capable leadership of men with scholarly backgrounds and experience in intelligence work, the school functioned successfully in the preparation of men for the complex tasks involved in the occupation of former enemy territory.

g. These schools, created as a result of the efforts of far-sighted men who saw the need of preparation for any eventuality, were unique products of World War II. They were designed not so much to give us experts in the field, but to meet efficiently and adequately the problems that might arise. The results achieved by the men who were so trained are a tribute to the leaders who had the courage of their convictions and the ability to project themselves into the future. Though the Counter Intelligence Corps entered the war period with little experience and training, it emerged with a definite plan, considerable experience, and personnel trained to cope with the inevitable consequences of war.