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South Dakota Bison Go to War:  
Preservation Success and the Politics of Surplus

By

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**ABSTRACT**

By 1920, the recovery of the American Bison was assured. Due to the biology of buffalo, the question facing managers of the protected herds in South Dakota was how to manage population growth. In response to the mandate of the South Dakota State legislature for economic self-sufficiency, Custer State Park chose to develop a market in meat. In the 1930s, Wind Cave National Park distributed surplus animals to the Pine Ridge Reservation, creating another herd. With the entry of the United States into World War Two, the demand for bison meat escalated as a result of shortages in the domestic food supply. The end result was a viable and profitable market for Custer State Park and the elimination of the Pine Ridge herd. The story of the Pine Ridge herd involves the end of New Deal programs, issues of tribal sovereignty, and the entry of a wartime entrepreneur into the bison market. The animals of Wind Cave were not immediately affected by the war, although the demise of the tribal herd signaled the end of distributing the surplus to Indian tribes. Buffalo went to war, and in the process exposed the intersection of environment, economy, and culture in the mid-20th century. Although different rationales justified the creation of the herds, by 1950 market demand provided common ground for their management.
In the winter of 1923, a chain of Iowa butcher shops advertised the sale of buffalo meat. This notice caught the attention of Norman Hinkle, who wrote a letter to the editor of the *New York Times* expressing his shock that “they are already beginning to slaughter this noble animal.” Hinkle’s letter generated a response from Marten Garretson, the Secretary of the American Bison Society, who pointed out that people had never ceased slaughtering bison. He went on to suggest that the animals were safe from extinction, highlighting the role of the American Bison Society in the creation of nine governmental preserves with an aggregate population of around 1,400 head.

It is not surprising that Hinkle was unaware of the recent return. Just fifteen years earlier the American Bison Society solicited funds for the animal’s preservation. If Hinkle had investigated the matter, he would have discovered there were bison in 41 of the then 48 states. In 1924, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Biological Survey estimated there were 4,500 buffalo in the U.S. A year later, the Department of the Interior, “with the future of the buffalo assured,” began offering live animals for sale at the bargain rate of $115.

The rapid recovery of bison left South Dakota managers with a difficult dilemma. The protected herds tended to outgrow their limited enclosures. Each year brought a new yield of calves, resulting in as much as a 20 percent annual increase. The issue for Custer State Park was not whether to dispose of surplus animals, but how to do so with the best financial return as generating revenue for its own operating costs was part of the park’s mandate from the South Dakota state legislature. The issue of growth was a problem for Wind Cave by 1923, and in 1934 it transferred forty-four bulls and thirty-two cows to the Pine Ridge Tribal pasture, two miles north of Allen, in Bennett County.

Wind Cave provided the animals, but the Indian New Deal provided the ideological foundation for the return of bison to the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier authorized the creation of the bison pasture, similar to one already established on the Crow Reservation. Collier hoped that the herds would help the Indians to become self-sufficient, but believed that “even if the experiment has chiefly a sentimental value it will be worth undertaking.”

Despite the historic and abiding relationship between the Lakota and buffalo, their reunion in 1934 occurred under quite different conditions, dictated by federal policy. The tribe had limited control over how the herd was managed. The spiritual ceremonies that linked the animals to the people were restricted. Even the land had been taken out of the official reservation boundaries. The herd was an example of the limitations of reform brought by the Indian New Deal. The war years would stress those conditions to the breaking point.

Within months of Pearl Harbor, bison meat became a commodity very much in demand, radically altering the management discussion for all South Dakota herds. Briefly, the change began with the restructuring of the American economy to meet wartime demands. To supply growing military needs, a rationing system on meat was imposed. However, game was excluded from the list of rationed goods because it was not part of domestic agricultural production. Bison was classified as game, and that designation led to an increase in consumption. As fresh meat, especially the better cuts of beef, became harder and harder to acquire, Americans searched for alternatives. Buffalo was one source.

Planning of the wartime economy required new federal organization. The Office of Price Administration (OPA) was established to prevent inflation and protect the civilian econ-
omy from product shortages. The OPA was committed to rationing as an indispensable tool of price control from the start. In 1942, the OPA began rationing sugar and coffee.7

Although American agricultural production was at an all time high, the demands of the war ensured a reduction in civilian consumption. The burden of supplying the United States military was substantial. In addition, the Lend-Lease program further taxed American agricultural supplies. These two factors consumed a quarter of U.S. food production during 1943.8 Meat appeared on the list of rationed goods effective March 29, 1943.9 The purchase of buffalo meat did not require ration coupons, and the meat was therefore referred to as “point-free.”10

The demand for fresh meat brought significant changes to Custer State Park (CSP). For the first time in its history, the park failed to fill all of its meat orders during the winter of 1942.11 The following year, however, work began on a new processing plant. The old plant was too small and the equipment needed updating. The new facility had state-of-the-art slaughtering, cooling, and freezing equipment. The freezers were the most important upgrade, because orders were now coming in during warmer weather, in addition to the usual Christmas demand. The strategy of selling meat that started in the 1920s was now paying dividends.12

At the same time that Custer State Park (CSP) expanded its operations, wartime demand for bison meat threatened the continued existence of the Pine Ridge tribal herd. Over a two-year period, the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council (OSTC) voted several times to remove the buffalo from the reservation. The substance of these votes never changed, but the Office of Indian Affairs (OIA) repeatedly asked the council to pass resolutions stating its intention. In part a reflection of the council’s lack of real authority, these successive votes also suggest the tension among voting members on keeping the herd.

The Tribal Council passed the first resolution to remove bison from Pine Ridge in autumn of 1942. Early in 1943, W.O. Roberts, Superintendent of Pine Ridge Agency, wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs informing him of the situation. Roberts made four arguments why the OIA should authorize the reduction of the herd. The first argument was logistical. The herd had been fenced and maintained with Civilian Conservation Corps funds, but Congress terminated that program in 1942.13 The fences needed continuing maintenance in addition to the manpower required for the daily operation. Roberts felt neither his office nor the Tribal Council could afford those costs. The second reason was opportunistic. Because of the wartime demand, the herd could be sold for a reasonable return with little difficulty. He contrasted this with the prewar period when it was difficult to sell even a few of the animals. Then, Roberts offered a practical justification. During normal market conditions, cattle were a better economic choice. Although there was a demand for buffalo during the war, after the war cattle would provide more economic advantage to the tribe. Finally, Roberts offered a cynical reason for elimination of the herd. He stated that there was some conflict on the council over the herd, and removal would settle the issue.14

Soon, the OIA was asking the Tribal Council to clarify its position. In what would prove to be an understatement, William Woehkle, Assistant to the Commissioner, advised that the resolution passed by the council would not be sufficient in itself to effect the removal of the animals. The pasture represented a substantial investment on the part of the federal government “which cannot be lightly disregarded or canceled.” Woehkle agreed that the replacement of bison with cattle
would be more profitable, but several other factors should be considered. First, if the buffalo were removed, the tribe would again be reliant on the National Park Service or the division of Fish and Wildlife for animals, and that supply was uncertain given the current demand. Additionally, the tribe received social, recreational, and ceremonial benefits in the animals. However, Woehlke stated that keeping the herd at its present size was “presumptuous” of the Indian Service, given the success of other federal agencies in preserving the species.15

The QSTC responded by requesting the transfer of ownership to the tribe. Perhaps because a similar request had been denied in 1940, the council informed Francis Case, a South Dakota Congressman, of its request. His inquiry on the behalf of the council did not change the outcome. The appeal was denied based on the same logic used in 1940. The maintenance and operation of the herd would be a serious drain on tribal funds, and the tribe would receive no increased benefits as a result.16

Denied ownership, the council again voted to remove the bison in two different resolutions passed on July 15, 1943, one for the Pass Creek pasture, another for the Allen pasture. These two areas were connected by a narrow causeway and served as the winter and summer ranges, respectively. The council voted unanimously to terminate the Allen pasture, and the motion for Pass Creek passed by an eleven to seven margin. These votes represented a clear consensus on reducing the size of the operation. The seven votes against the termination of the Pass Creek pasture suggest that some members of the council felt the continuation of a smaller herd was prudent. Although the council had spoken, the bureaucratic wrangling would continue. It seems that the power of the OIA was not absolute, itself mitigated by the political clout of individual Congressmen.17

The council passed one more resolution in the summer of 1944 clearly stating its desire. The title of the declaration left little room for interpretation. The “Resolution of the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council Regarding the Termination of the Tribal Buffalo Reserve and Proposing that the Area be Utilized as a Part of the Livestock Breeding Program” was even more explicit in its wording:

Whereas it is believed that the operations of the buffalo herd does not contribute materially to the best economic development of the tribe, ...the tribal council hereby authorizes and instructs the Superintendent of the Pine Ridge Indian Agency to take such steps as necessary to terminate the activities of the buffalo herd.18

The council wanted the bison replaced with cattle, and the entire herd eliminated. As Roberts agreed with this decision, it seemed the end was in sight, despite the wishes of the Office of Indian Affairs to keep a few animals.

The wartime demand for bison again changed the nature of the debate, presenting an actual opportunity to reduce the herd. In August of 1944, Ed Butters of Cold Water, Michigan, offered to purchase the entire tribal herd of 285 head. When this proposal was discussed with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Collier was still considering the gradual reduction by slaughtering a few animals a year and distributing the meat to needy Indians. M.G. Ripke, Acting Superintendent of Pine Ridge, wrote a detailed three-page letter arguing for the acceptance of Butters’ proposal. In light of the fact that several resolutions by the tribal council called for the removal, Ripke recommended the sale. He felt that a piecemeal
distribution scheme was impractical, and keeping even a few animals would require resources in land and manpower that could be better used to maintain cattle, which corresponded to the expressed wishes of the council. Ripke asked for an immediate decision. He would be disappointed.\footnote{19}

Ed Butters unwittingly complicated the process in a fact-finding visit to Custer State Park. In order to learn more about handling large numbers of bison, Butters visited Custer State Park and Wind Cave. In what he termed a “costly misappraisal” of E.L. Burns, Superintendent of CSP, Butters set off a protracted bureaucratic battle over the eventual destination of the Pine Ridge animals.\footnote{20}

Before the issue was settled, Burns involved the highest levels of the South Dakota government in the discussion. Previous to Butters’ purchase offer, William Zimmerman, Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs, had proposed the sale of the Pine Ridge bison to CSP. After meeting with Butters, Burns was concerned about the potential loss of animals and the competition. He reminded Zimmerman that the park had built up a market for buffalo meat in the last ten years, and now had customers in thirty-eight states, several of which were near Michigan. In addition to contacting Zimmerman’s office, Burns recruited M.Q. Sharpe, the Governor of South Dakota, and Congressman Case to lobby his cause. In the ensuing conversation, the issue of keeping a few head on the reservation again surfaced.\footnote{21}

The debate over the tribal herd now had four factions, with some overlap of desired outcomes. The Tribal Council wanted the herd replaced with cattle. The Office of Indian Affairs, despite the numerous statements of the council, wanted to keep a number of animals on the reserve and held that if the herd were eliminated the tribe would soon regret the action. Ed Butters wished to purchase the entire herd. CSP also desired the entire herd. Superintendent Roberts considered the three plans. He recommended that if the OIA was going to ignore the request of the tribal council and keep a few animals, a definite plan was needed if the herd was to continue. He tried to remain impartial, but argued that Butters’ offer should be accepted. He reminded Zimmerman that there was a time when there was no demand for bison, and Butters’ offer was for a considerable sum. Additionally, he did not want to be party to granting a monopoly to Custer State Park. He advised that if Butters’ offer was to be rejected, the sale should be advertised and opened to more bidders. The wishes of the Tribal Council remained a secondary consideration; the power to decide the fate of the herd rested somewhere in the federal bureaucracy.\footnote{22}

In October, a new proposal came out of a meeting at the Pine Ridge Agency. In attendance were Congressman Case, E.L. Burns of CSP, members of the South Dakota Park Board, and Superintendent Roberts. The proposal was that either a portion or the entire herd would be added to CSP; a set number would be slaughtered annually and the meat made available to the tribe until adequate reimbursement was achieved. Roberts argued that this proposal made good economic sense, as transporting butchered animals would be much cheaper and easier than moving live ones. Roberts forwarded this idea to William Zimmerman, in the hopes that the matter might be finally settled.\footnote{23}

When Butters learned of this proposal, he made a personal visit to the Office of Indian Affairs in Chicago to plead his case. He reiterated his understanding that in August his purchase offer was accepted, and as a result he had contracted with companies in New York to provide bison meat. Butters acknowledged the wishes of Custer State Park and agreed to accept part of the herd, despite his initial bid to purchase the
entire group. In light of this good faith effort, the OIA recommended that Butters receive favorable consideration in acquiring at least part of the herd. Additionally, Roberts was authorized to proceed with sale to the highest bidder.  

After years of protracted negotiations, the official sale of the Pine Ridge buffalo was set for December 8. On November 25, Roberts mailed five invitations to bid on two lots of 125 animals. In addition to Butters and Custer State Park, three other bids came from Nebraska and South Dakota. Butters was the only party to make two separate bids, one for 125 animals at $7505 and another for 250 head at $12,505. Custer State Park’s bid was for the whole lot and was five dollars less than Butters. E.L. Burns, Superintendent of the park, was present at the opening. Not surprisingly, Burns immediately engaged in a letter writing campaign to secure the rejection of Butters bid.  

Burns’ campaign was partially successful, and another sale was set for December 28. The OIA accepted Butters’ December 8 bid for 125 head at $7505 and rejected the others. The OIA then advertised another sale by bid for December 28, 1944. William Zimmerman confided to Case that the whole situation was “somewhat embarrassing,” given that his office had previously proposed a transfer of the animals to CSP. Additionally, Zimmerman explained to Governor Sharpe that this action would allow Butters to meet his obligations while giving the Park the opportunity to acquire some of the animals. When the bids for the second sale were opened, Butters submitted the only bid. He increased his offer to $9410 for 125 head, assuming that the second bid would be more competitive. Inexplicably, Burns and Custer State Park submitted no bid.  

Despite the failure to place a bid for the second sale, Custer State Park eventually procured some of the Pine Ridge herd. After Butters removed his buffalo, forty-one animals remained on the reserve. Congressman Case intervened on behalf of the park in January of 1945 with a personal visit to William Zimmerman, who told him that these animals could likely be transferred to the park if an agreement was reached whereby the park would reimburse the tribe with a few bison each year. In April, the tribal council approved the removal of the final buffalo. The vote for this resolution was far from unanimous, with thirteen for and twelve against. In July fifty head were moved from Pine Ridge to CSP. Although the physical disposition of the bison herd was finally settled, the issue of legal title was not.  

An act of Congress finally ended the saga of the Pine Ridge buffalo. The tribal council had twice requested the transfer of ownership from the federal government. In all of the discussion about the sale of the animals, the issue of ownership was never resolved. The proper remittance of the proceeds from the sale was still in question in 1947, when it was discovered that the money paid by Butters was improperly credited to the tribe. Two years later, Congress finally approved the transfer of this sum. The bill also provided for the granting of unrestricted title for any future tribal bison herds. For the Pine Ridge, this decision came nine years too late. Had the tribe received title when first requested in 1940, the fate of the herd may have been quite different. As it was, the Tribal Council was not interested in continuing a pasture for animals it did not own and could not control.  

For most of its existence, little was certain about the Pine Ridge tribal herd. Superintendent Roberts concluded in 1944 that the “herd has been handled in a haphazard, makeshift, and uneconomical way.” He later admitted that there was no evidence that the tribal council ever formally endorsed its creation. The tribe never owned the animals or controlled the
management of the herd. When buffalo returned to the Lakota in the 20th century, there was nothing “natural” or assured about the relationship. The reintroduction of bison occurred under immense restrictions on Lakota spirituality, sovereignty and autonomy. The Oglala Sioux Tribal Council was not allowed to use the buffalo as it saw fit. Ultimately, it favored their replacement with cattle.\(^2\)

With the arrival of a viable commercial market in the 1940s, CSP officials sought to maximize their profits. It would be easy to view their actions as crass commercialism, but it is important to remember that buffalo are not cheap to maintain, and the state legislature required the park to generate its own operating revenue. Meat was a solution to the pragmatic issue of population control and the economic question of operational costs. In order for the Park to maintain bison, it was necessary to sell them.

The solidification of this management strategy was a historical accident, given impetus by the conversion to a wartime economy. World War Two brought tremendous change to America. Buffalo management was not exempt from this transformation. The war created what fifty years of human management could not: a viable commercial market for buffalo. Although the wartime restrictions were relatively short lived, the resulting changes for the animals and the industry were profound and enduring. Within a generation, buffalo ranching would spread across the nation.

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