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The Lack of Conviction: Why Human Traffickers Remain Free

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The Lack of Conviction: Why Human Traffickers Remain Free

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Research Question

- Why are some countries more successful at convicting human traffickers than others?

Prior Research

- **Lack of Comprehensive Anti-HT Laws**
(Pearson 2002; Goodey 2004; Haynes 2004; UNODC 2009)
- **Weak and Inefficient Institutions**
(Craig 1983; Haynes 2004; UNODC 2009; Guth 2010)
- **Lack of Victim Cooperation**
(Anti-Slavery International 2002; Goodey 2004; Gallagher and Pearson 2010)
- **Offender Demographics**
(Mosher and Hagan 1994; Reynolds 2008)

Theory & Hypothesis



H1: The more ambiguous a country's law is, the lower the likelihood of obtaining a human trafficking conviction.

Research Design

<i>General</i>		
Component	Parameter	Sample
Space	Country	60
Time	2007	
Unit of Analysis	Country	

<i>Operationalization</i>		
Concept	Variable	Source
Conformity	Anti-HT Law	Cho et al. (2011)
Volume of HT	Flow of HT	Bales (2005)
Legal Inequity	Inequity in Family Law	WomanStats
Victim Assistance	Protection	Cho et al. (2011)
State Capacity	Total tax % GDP	World Bank
Corruption	CPI	Transparency Int'l
Wealth	GDP pc	World Bank
Ratification of PP	Binary	UNODC

<i>Methodology</i>		
Logistic Regression		

Findings

Variable	Odds Ratio	Standard Error	P-value
Anti-trafficking law	13.378	10.976	0.002***
Volume of trafficking	1.822	1.079	0.311
Inequity of family law	2.474	1.758	0.202
Victim assistance	1.238	.722	0.714
State capacity	.922	.082	0.362
Corruption	3.990	2.884	0.056*
Wealth (GDP pc)	1.000	.000	0.139
Ratify Palermo Protocol	.607	1.178	0.797

Note: N = 60. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Conclusion

- Signature or ratification doesn't imply enforcement
- HT definition matters at all levels
- Corruption may be another driving force



Questions or Suggestions?