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The Sociology of Harriet Martineau in EASTERN LIFE, PRESENT AND PAST: The Foundations of the Islamic Sociology of Religion

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The Sociology of Harriet Martineau in EASTERN LIFE, PRESENT AND PAST:

The Foundations of the Islamic Sociology of Religion

by

Deborah A. Ruigh

A THESIS

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The Sociology of Harriet Martineau in EASTERN LIFE, PRESENT AND PAST:

The Foundations of the Islamic Sociology of Religion

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This paper is a critical analysis of Harriet Martineau’s philosophical stance and epistemological modes, her systematic sociological methodology, her use of this methodology, and her sociology of religion. *How to Observe Morals and Manners* (1838), *Eastern Life, Present and Past* (1848), and other relevant works will be used to examine Martineau’s evolving epistemological modes as well as her sociology of religion. *How to Observe*, Martineau’s treatise on systematic sociological methodology and cultural relativism, will serve as an exemplar for analysis of Martineau’s methodological practice as evidenced in *Eastern Life*. The research problem herein is three-fold: (1) to examine the epistemological modes employed by Martineau in select works; (2) to determine if Martineau followed her own methodology as set forth in *How to Observe* while subsequently observing in the historical Middle East as evidenced in *Eastern Life*; and 3) to define the characteristics of Martineau’s sociology of religion.
DEDICATION

To Mary Jo Deegan and Michael R. Hill, Sociologists, Methodologists, Mentors
AUTHOR’S ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To my thesis advisor Mary Jo Deegan, Professor, Sociology Department, University of Nebraska—Lincoln, whose knowledge of sociological theory is incomprehensible; I am indebted for not only mentorship but my introduction to Harriet Martineau as well. Aware of my intellectual affinity for the study of Muslim culture and historical sociology as an undergraduate, Mary Jo introduced me to *How to Observe Morals and Manners* and *Eastern Life, Present and Past* and guided me toward my now truly profound appreciation for Martineau, the first female sociologist, first sociologist to present a systematic methodology, and first sociologist to explicate a sociological theory of religion. I am equally indebted to Michael R. Hill, PhD, Editor, Sociological Origins, Lincoln, Nebraska, for his voluntary intellectual support, archival research, and unofficial position as a member of my thesis committee, not to mention the gift of a two-volume first edition of Martineau’s 1877 autobiography and the loan of his Martineau library. Together, Mary Jo and Michael guided me in my “liminal journey of self” as I navigated the straits and rapids of academia, scholarship, and professional and personal doubt.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

In her introduction to *Harriet Martineau: First Woman Sociologist*, Susan Hoecker-Drysdale (1992: 1) describes Martineau as an “English public educator, sociologist, historian, and journalist” who has been seen “generally as a fiction writer and popular educator.” Martineau wrote tens of thousands of pages during her lifetime including poetry, short stories, novelettes, and novels, in addition to non-fiction works on the topics of religion, economics, history, sociology, social psychology, and geography. Her life’s work, which she pursued through her pen, was social justice and reform for the sake of social progress. With her writings, Martineau sought to educate her readership on the social problems of the time including slavery, women’s issues, and poverty, as well as the nature and current state of social institutions such as industrialism, capitalism, marriage, and religion.

As a Victorian woman born into the Age of Enlightenment, Martineau’s vast accomplishments adopt special meaning. She was a “genuine Victorian oddity: a self-supporting yet respectable single woman, an internationally influential professional writer, and a strong-minded free-thinker unafraid to challenge such entrenched cultural institutions as aristocratic privilege, parliamentary law, organized religion, and the medical establishment” (Logan 2002: 12). In pursuit of these achievements, Martineau (1877) made acquaintance with many of the great thinkers of her time including, but not limited to, Charlotte Brontë, Auguste Comte, Charles Darwin, Ralph Waldo Emerson, William Godwin, Thomas Malthus, Florence Nightingale, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and William Wordsworth.
Despite the distinction she enjoyed during her lifetime in literary, political, and scientific circles, Martineau is a relatively obscure figure, especially with regard to her sociological contributions (Hill 1989a; Logan 2002). This obscurity, however, is in no way a reflection of the value of her contributions, which must be taken seriously. “The history, sophistication, innovativeness, and continuing resonance of her work and ideas are dramatic, engaging, and impressive by all of the yardsticks used to assess the merit and importance of our sociological founders” (Hill 2001a: 191). The overall purpose of this thesis is to analyze not only her contributions as the first female sociologist and first systematic sociological methodologist but to present and recognize Martineau as the first sociologist to formulate a sociological theory of religion.

**Influences**

The formation of Martineau’s sociological perspective was greatly influenced by the character of her family and her childhood faith. Martineau was also influenced by certain acquaintances she developed during her lifetime. The nature of these influences is discussed in this section.

**Family and faith**

Descended from the religiously and politically persecuted French Huguenots of the sixteenth century, the Martineau’s were a politically liberal and progressive middle-class family that enjoyed the culture and sophistication of Norwich, England, then known as the “Athens of England” (Hoecker-Drysdale 1992: 7). Born in 1802, Martineau (1877, i: 7) nearly starved to death during the first three months of her life due to the deception of her wet nurse whose “milk was going or gone.” Martineau (1877, i: 8) experienced certain deficiencies as a young child, which her mother attributed to this deception.
“Sight, hearing and touch were perfectly good in early childhood; but I never had the sense of smell; and that of taste was therefore exceedingly imperfect” (Martineau 1877, i: 10). By the age of twelve, Martineau (1877, i: 55) recognized the onset of a hearing problem.

The first distinct recognition of my being deaf, more or less, was when I was at Mr. Perry’s,—when I was about twelve years old. It was a very slight, scarcely-perceptible hardness of hearing at the time; and the recognition was merely this;—there was a large space between the class and the master’s desk or the fire, I was excused from taking places in class, and desired to sit always at the top, because it was somewhat nearer the master, whom I could not always hear further off.

In addition, Martineau (1877, i: 8) secretly endured anxieties, fears, and phobias as a child, referring to herself as “a poor mortal cursed with a…beggarly nervous system.”

Following her early setback as an infant, Martineau was sent to convalesce with the Merton’s of Carleton, England. Mr. Merton, “a Methodist or melancholy Calvinist of some sort”, and Mrs. Merton were devout in their faith (Martineau 1877, i: 9). Martineau (1877, i: 9) fully embraced their Protestant ethic, becoming the “absurdist little preacher of [her] years (between two and three) that ever was.” By the time she was a toddler, Martineau (1877, i: 9) was known for her recitation of Protestant maxims, collecting them wherever she could, from the Merton’s and strangers alike. In her autobiography, Martineau (1877, i: 9) recalls, “I used to nod my head emphatically, and say ‘Never ky for tyfles’: ‘Dooty fust, and pleasure afterwards’.”
Martineau’s love of her maxims led her to embark upon a lifelong relationship with the written word. “Almost before I could join letters, I got some sheets of paper and folded them into a little square book, and wrote, in double lines, two or three in a paper, my beloved maxims. I believe this was my first effort at book-making” (Martineau 1877, i: 9). With the Merton’s, Martineau (1877, i: 9) found not only her Protestant ethic and the impetus for her career as a professional writer but an intense religiosity, as well, informed by the Merton’s faith which she later characterized as a “bad sort.”

Young Martineau’s (1877, i: 13-14) Unitarian faith was her “only support and pleasure” as she longed for justice in her family, which was “least understood” when it came to “servants and children.” At the age of seven, Martineau (1877, i: 22) spent the summer at her maternal grandparents’ home in Newcastle, England, a period she referred to in her autobiography as her “memorable Newcastle journey.” During that summer, Martineau was befriended by fourteen-year old Ann Turner, the daughter of the local Unitarian minister. Ann’s “exclusively religious” tendencies, the practicality of her Unitarian faith, and her unsolicited friendship gave direction to Martineau’s sense of justice and braced her then-lacking sense of self-worth (Martineau 1877, i: 22). Martineau was less impressed, however, by Ann’s father in his ministerial role.

Mr. Turner’s sermons on the obligations of justice troubled Martineau (Martineau’s emphasis, 1877, i: 16-17), about which she lamented in her autobiography. My passion for justice was baulked there, as much as any where [sic]. The duties preached were those of inferiors to superiors, while the per contra was not insisted on with any equality of treatment at all. Parents were to bring up their children “in the nurture and admonition of the Lord,” and to
pay servants due wages; but not a word was ever preached about the justice due from the stronger to the weaker. I used to thirst to hear some notice of the oppression which servants and children had (as I supposed universally) to endure, in regard to their feelings, while duly clothed, fed, and taught: but nothing of the sort ever came; but instead, a doctrine of passive obedience which only made me remorseful and miserable.

Martineau’s discontent with religion began in Mr. Turner’s church at the tender age of seven alongside her developing passion for social justice.

Upon her return to Norwich, Martineau began what would become a lifelong pursuit of knowledge. Martineau’s (1877, i: 20) parents, devoted to raising productive children, “exercised every kind of self-denial to bring [their children] up qualified to take care of [themselves]” and to facilitate their meaningful participation in society. Under the tutelage of her older siblings, Martineau (1877) studied the classics and learned composition, arithmetic, French, and Latin, reading history, biographies, and classical works as well.

At the age of eleven, Martineau (1877) embarked on her formal education at a small, local school and at sixteen was invited to attend her aunt and uncle’s boarding school in Bristol, England. In addition to her formal studies at boarding school, Martineau (1877) immersed herself in private study of rhetoric, logic, poetry, Greek, Italian, and German. During her stay in Bristol, Martineau (1877) discovered a spiritual kinship with the newly appointed Unitarian minister, Dr. Lant Carpenter. Martineau (1877, i: 79) was inspired by Carpenter’s “Notes and Observations on the Gospel
History,”¹ which set her on a path of Biblical scholarship and lifelong interest in the study of religion. In addition, Carpenter introduced Martineau (1877) to her earliest philosophical influences including the works of David Hartley, Joseph Priestley, and John Locke.

*Philosophy*

During her intellectual youth, in addition to those of Hartley, Priestley, and Locke, Martineau’s philosophical inclinations were also informed by the writings of Isaac Newton, Francis Bacon, Immanuel Kant, and Dugald Stewart (Hoecker-Drysdale 2001). Of these, Martineau (1877) was influenced predominantly by Hartley, Priestley, and Locke.

Attributing any particular philosophical concept to one original source is difficult at best. Hartley, Priestley, and Locke are three among many contributing to the necessarian version of natural law which Martineau (1877, i: 85) found “so irresistible that, when once understood, it is adopted as a matter of course.” Martineau’s necessarian perspective recognizes the “influence of natural laws on human existence” as well as the “moral responsibility and agency of each individual” (Hoecker-Drysdale 2001: 185-186). This perspective is readily apparent in *How to Observe Morals and Manners* (1838) (hereafter referred to as *How to Observe*), Martineau’s (1838a) treatise on systematic sociological methodology and cultural relativism in which her utilitarian perspective is also apparent.

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Utilitarianism, a theoretical branch of consequentialism that views human action in terms of right and wrong in relation to its consequences, originated with the insights of ancient Greek philosophers and was further developed by the philosophical thinkers of the late seventeenth century (Driver 2009). Utilitarianism refines the consequentialist view in that it sees human action as morally right when it produces the most good. Martineau does not explicitly express an allegiance with utilitarianism, but even the most superficial examination of *How to Observe* reveals that she was clearly informed by this school of thought. For Martineau, “the whole point of knowledge, progress, and a rational moral existence is the improvement and well-being of members of society” (Hoecker-Drysdale 2001: 186). In this regard, Martineau’s philosophical perspective is similar to that of Auguste Comte, another influential figure in Martineau’s life.

Similarities between Martineau’s and Comte’s philosophical view might lead one to assume that she derived hers from his, especially considering her translation and condensation of Comte’s *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. This would be an erroneous assumption. Prior to 1851 when she began her first study and subsequent translation, Martineau had only a “vague notion of the relation of [Comte’s] philosophy to the intellectual and social needs of the time” (Chapman 1877: 57). Martineau had long before demonstrated her philosophical stance in numerous works as well as her epistemological perspectives, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

**Conclusion**

Martineau’s upbringing, intellectual capacity, and indomitable love of knowledge led her on a path of scholarship that resulted in her status as the first female sociologist
and first systematic sociological methodologist. Martineau is also the first sociologist to explicate a sociological theory on religion, for which she has yet to be recognized.

This thesis has four specific objectives. First, it will examine Martineau’s epistemological transformation through critical analysis of the epistemological modes employed by Martineau in select works. Second, it will explain Martineau’s systematic sociological methodology as presented in How to Observe. Third, it will determine if Martineau followed her own methodology while subsequently observing in the East as evidenced in Eastern Life, Present and Past (1848) (hereafter referred to as Eastern Life). Finally, this paper will define Martineau’s sociology of religion as a theoretical construct through an examination of select works.
CHAPTER II: MARTINEAU’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION

Introduction

In his introduction to the sesquicentennial edition of *How to Observe*, Hill (1989a) outlines the stages of Martineau’s epistemological transformation from theological metaphysicist to positivist to critical epistemologist. In this chapter, using Hill’s (1984; 1989a) outline and model of knowledge-producing systems to characterize Martineau’s epistemological stages, several of Martineau’s works are examined to illustrate the progression of her transformation.

Hill’s (1984) model of knowledge-producing systems has three components: metascientific worldview, methodology, and theory. Metascientific worldview refers to the “philosophical ground plan, beliefs, traditions, values, logic, and evaluative criteria” of a given epistemological mode (Hill 1984: 62). The methodology component in Hill’s (1984: 63) model refers to the “procedural rules which guide researchers in the active exploration of selected dimensions of social behavior and experience.” The theory component of the model is the organizing logic informing a particular epistemological mode based on “conceptual frameworks formulated under the auspices of a given metascientific worldview…which reveal or assert that selected dimensions of social behavior or experience are related in particular ways” (Hill 1984: 63). Using these three components as points of reference, Martineau’s epistemological transformation will become apparent.

Theological metaphysicist

Martineau’s earliest works, three of which are examined here, reveal her initial epistemological mode. Martineau (1877) wrote three essays in response to an
advertisement posted by the Committee of the British and Foreign Unitarian Association in 1830. The association was offering a prize for each of three tracts introducing Unitarianism to Catholics, Jews, and Muslims, “ten guineas for the Catholic, fifteen for the Jewish, and twenty for the Mohammedan essay” (Martineau 1877, i: 114).

Martineau’s essays were selected for publication in 1833. For Catholic believers, Martineau wrote *The Essential Faith of the Universal Church, Deduced from the Sacred Records* (hereafter referred to as *Essential Faith*). For Jews, she wrote *Providence as Manifested through Israel* (hereafter referred to as *Providence*). Addressing Muslims, Martineau wrote *The Faith as Unfolded by Many Prophets: An Essay* (hereafter referred to as *Faith as Unfolded*).

In *Essential Faith* and *Providence*, Martineau’s literary style is rational non-fiction. Martineau speaks to her Catholic audience in *Essential Faith* with an apparent awareness of the tradition of scholarship within the Catholic Church. In her opening remarks, Martineau (this author’s emphasis, 1833a: 25-26) gives an outline of her proposed argument.

All that, from the *study* of the *records* of Revelation, we hold to be the primary and essential doctrines of Christianity, stand forth conspicuously in the teachings, are confirmed by the deeds, and illustrated in the lives of the Saviour and his followers. We propose to bring them forward, with their *evidence*, in the following order.

I. The strict Unity of God.
II. The unlimited nature of the Redemption by Christ.
III. The existence of a Future State.
From these, various subordinate *principles* may be derived, some of the most important of which we shall afterwards specify; and then proceed to treat of the temporary sanctions and institutions of Christianity, in distinction from its permanent *principles*.

For her Jewish audience, Martineau (this author’s emphasis, Martineau 1833c: 3-4) is aware of a similar tradition of scholarship and presents an equally logical introductory proposal in *Providence*.

The best *method* by which an individual can pursue such an *inquiry* as is now proposed, is to collect all the *evidence* he can obtain, and *deduce* from it the *truth* he seeks. This is the *mode* in which a solitary student should proceed. But when several inquirers are invited to advance together, and are conducted by one who has gone over the ground before them, the *method* may advantageously be reversed, for the sake of proceeding in a clear and orderly manner: as in the schools, where a definite *object* is first placed before the view of the students, and the *sources of evidence* are laid open to them by which they may establish the *truth* for themselves. Such a *method* will now, for the sake of clearness, be pursued. The apparent design of the Eternal in his providence towards the Hebrew nation will be first disclosed, and *evidences* of this design will be afterwards offered to your consideration.

In both passages, select words are italicized to illustrate Martineau’s empirical approach, even in the context of a theological argument, in her use of sociological rhetoric in a reasoned line of thinking.
In *Faith as Unfolded*, Martineau’s literary style is rational fiction, “the use of fiction to illustrate theoretical principles,” a literary style with which she was intimately familiar² (Hill 1989a: xxvi). Martineau’s use of this style for her Muslim audience is unique in contrast to *Essential Faith* and *Providence*. It is unclear why she chose rational fiction over the non-fiction style she employed in the other two essays. There was certainly a tradition of scholarship in Islam³ at that time. Regardless of her motivation or purpose in employing this particular literary style, *Faith as Unfolded* is no less logical and reasoned as a work of fiction. A quick review of the table of contents in *Faith as Unfolded*⁴ reveals the structure and logic behind Martineau’s theological argument in which she systematically addresses Islam’s six articles of faith⁵ and five pillars of belief⁶ within the body of the essay.

Through a fictional dialogue between Eber and Havilah, the main characters of the story, Martineau (1833b) methodically speaks to the doctrinal similarities and differences between Unitarianism and Islam employing sociological rhetoric. Most importantly, Martineau confronts Muhammad’s status as the final prophet of God, the

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⁴ See Appendix A for the table of contents excerpted from *Faith as Unfolded*.

⁵ Ayoub, Mahmoud M. 2004, *Islam: Faith and History*. Oxford, England: Oneworld Publications. Islam’s six articles of faith are belief in (1) one God; (2) the angels of God; (3) the books of God, especially the Quran; (4) the prophets of God, especially Muhammad; (5) the Day of Judgment (or the afterlife); and (6) the supremacy of God’s will (or predestination).

⁶ Ibid. Islam’s five pillars are (1) faith or belief in the oneness of God and the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad (shahadah), (2) establishment of daily prayers (salat), (3) concern for and almsgiving to the needy (zakat), (4) self-purification through fasting (sawm), and (5) pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj).
basis of Islam, through a hermeneutic analysis of Biblical and Quranic doctrines on God’s progressive revelations to his prophets.

Martineau (1833b) contends that Unitarianism and Islam agree that Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus received revelations from God, citing and comparing passages from the Bible and the Quran in support of her argument. Martineau (this author’s emphasis, 1833b: 79-80) suggests, however, that Muhammad did not receive God’s revelation.

As I have said, replied Eber, Mohammed was wise, and many things which he said were true: but I believe that those truths had been told before, and that his wisdom was not from above. Read again, and meditate as thou hast meditated this day, and it shall be plain unto thee that there is nothing true, or pure, or lofty, which may not be found in the teachings of Jesus; nothing just, or mild, or holy, which was not in his character; nothing awful, which was not in his mission; nothing that righteous men can desire, which that mission had not secured to them. Tell me of any mighty sign which Mohammed has done, and which Christ did not surpass: tell me of any innocent desire which Mohammed was more ready than Jesus to fulfill; of any hope or fear given by Jesus, which Mohammed hat exalted: tell me of any new truth displayed by your Prophet, of which Jesus was not aware; show me that his dispensation is more certain to last, and more fit to be spread abroad in the earth than that of Christ,--and then I will own that there may

---

7 Based on her footnotes, Martineau used George Sale’s translation of the Quran (first published in 1734) as her source for this essay. It is not clear, however, which edition of Sale’s translation Martineau employed.

be a better faith than that of Christians, and a great prophet than Jesus. Let us
read and think, and by their own deeds and words let each prophet be judged.

Throughout *Faith as Unfolded*, Martineau again uses sociological rhetoric in a reasoned
line of thinking in the context of a theological argument. The italicized words above
illustrate Martineau’s expectation that even in the framework of fiction the reader is
“obligated to inspect, analyze, and critique” what is presented for consideration (Hill
1989a: xxv).

In terms of Hill’s (1984) model of knowledge-producing systems, each of these
easays is theologically metaphysical in its metascientific worldview; systematic in
methodology using logic, reason, and hermeneutic analysis; and ethnocentric in its
theoretical approach. By the time she began work on *How to Observe* one year after the
publication of the essays, Martineau had experienced an epistemological shift.

**Empiricist**

*Empiricist*

Martineau (1838a) began writing *How to Observe* during her voyage to America
in 1834. The purpose of her trip was both personal and professional in that she intended
to rest, collect information on social welfare practices in American society, and
systematically observe while touring the United States (Hill 2001b). Following her two-
year tour of America, Martineau (1877: 405) published *Society in America* in 1837, her
most widely recognized sociological work, the original title of which she’d intended to be
“Theory and Practice of Society in America.” Immediately following its publication,
Martineau (1877: 405) was unhappy with the theological and metaphysical character of
*Society in America*. She felt it was too abstract in its conception of her observations of
American society. Martineau (1838b, i: v) reformulated her approach, having been
“strongly solicited to communicate more of [her] personal narrative,” and published *Retrospect of Western Travel* in 1838, a concrete empirical articulation of her observations in America. *How to Observe* was published later that same year.

In *Society in America, Retrospect of Western Travel, and How to Observe*, there is evidence of a lingering theological orientation. Each book is littered throughout with references to God as the arbiter of human happiness. In *Society in America* and *Retrospect of Western Travel*, much of her discourse on the topic of human happiness derives from her encounters with slavery in America. These encounters were formative for Martineau. In *Memorials*, Maria Weston Chapman’s addendum to Martineau’s autobiography, Chapman (1877, ii: 285) reflects on Martineau’s American experience.

It seldom happens that men reap precisely what they expect from any carefully planned course. Harriet Martineau’s American harvest was certainly to her an unexpected one. She had merely hoped to gather seed for English sowing,—to scatter in her own land those principles of justice and mercy to the least favoured classes which ours was thought to have discovered; and she found herself obliged, by her allegiance to all that is just and merciful, to put her hand to the breaking of our stubborn clods, for the implanting of the common principles of mercy and justice to a sixth part of our whole population, composing a class utterly overlooked except in the estimate of property, or in the scramble for office, when planters must be propitiated in proportion to the amount of their human stock. Such an experience as hers in America, besides being incalculably blessed to our people, was influential on all her after life.
Martineau’s (1877) observations of slavery in America, which led her to become an ardent abolitionist, convinced her of the philosophical import of her utilitarian principle of the “grand” consideration in relation to the study of cultures and societies. The preceding passage speaks to Martineau’s shift from an ethnocentric mentality to a mentality founded in cultural relativism. It is important to recognize, however, that Martineau’s intent while observing in America was not to conduct a cultural comparison. Rather, she intended to objectively experience American society (Hill 2001b).

Using Hill’s (1984) model of knowledge-producing systems, Martineau’s epistemological stance as evidenced in Society in America, Retrospect of Western Travel, and How to Observe is still theologically metaphysical in its metascientific worldview. Her methodology remains systematic but is now based on direct, empirical observation. Martineau’s theoretical orientation has shifted from ethnocentrism to cultural relativism.

**Philosophical atheist**

It was Martineau’s American tour that was formative of her utilitarian principle of the grand consideration, but it was her tour of the East ten years later that formalized this aspect of her philosophical perspective. In Eastern Life, Martineau (1848) no longer refers to God as the arbiter of human happiness and defining source of morally right action. Instead, Martineau (1848) views the source of human happiness as being the result of opportunities for and execution of individual productivity within a social system, a view most informed by the Egyptian leg of her tour.

While in Egypt, Martineau (1848) observes the effects of political oppression, resulting in inadequate opportunities for economic productivity and educational
attainment among a populace fearful of corvée labor and conscription. Under such conditions, individual productivity is limited to such an extent as to prevent the realization of human happiness. Martineau (1848) also observes similar effects with regard to religion when used as a tool of persecution and discrimination. Further, Martineau (1877) is convinced by her observations in the East that religion is a stage in human development, which discussed in detail in Chapter 4, a realization not disclosed in *Eastern Life* but revealed three years later in *Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development* (Atkinson and Martineau 1851), as well as in her autobiography.

From the perspective of Hill’s (1984) model, Martineau’s epistemological mode in *Eastern Life* demonstrates another shift. Martineau’s metascientific worldview at this stage is philosophically atheistic in character. Her methodology remains systematic and empirical through the use of direct observation. Theoretically, Martineau’s orientation is now decidedly that of a cultural relativist.

**Positivist and critical epistemologist**

As discussed in Chapter 1, Martineau was first exposed to Comte’s positivism in 1851 through her translation of *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, which resulted in a condensed two-volume English translation of Comte’s six volumes in French. While they share similarities in their positivist perspectives, Martineau is selective in her affinity for Comtean principles of positivism. Hoecker-Drysdale (2001:185) outlines the tenets of Comte’s positivism most significant for Martineau.

(1) That empirical facts and their laws are the basis of all knowledge

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(2) That there is a methodological coherence to the sciences, of which social science and sociology will be the latest representatives.

(3) That the organization of knowledge, and therefore, of the human mind is unfolding logically and unfolding historically in accordance with the Law of Three Stages\(^\text{10}\).

(4) That science is important for practical social needs, as well as for theoretical/intellectual purposes.

(5) That theory and empiricism are interlocked; neither is useful or meaningful without the other.

(6) That the possibility of an objective understanding of the world exists if previous theology and metaphysics are surpassed.

(7) That societal progress must be scientifically based.

While Martineau shares with Comte certain aspects of his positivist perspectives on empiricism, methodology, the evolution of human understanding, and science as means to social progress, Martineau rejects Comte’s perspectives on “women, workers, children, and his privileging of men and power elites, be they scientists, industrialists, or engineers” (Hoecker-Drysdale 2001:186). Martineau is critically selective in her epistemological views.

In the summation of his analysis of Martineau’s epistemological transformation, Hill (1989a: 1) points to her “zeal for metaphysical housekeeping” saying, “[S]he was ever vigilant, guarding against the dangers of unwarranted metaphysics. She was, for

example, uncomfortable with the ‘religious’ direction taken by Comte in his later work. Darwin, for whom she had such great admiration, was fair game too if he crossed the line.” Immediately following her praise for the *Origin of Species*, Martineau was critical of Darwin’s references to “the Creator” viewing such as a philosophical error in the presentation of his argument (Hill 1989a: 1).

**Conclusion**

Martineau’s sociological research influenced her both personally and professionally. Her epistemological transformation was the result of her lifelong rational, reasoned approach to the study of cultures and societies. Martineau (1877, i: 119) was well aware of her transformation and heartily regretted her initial epistemological orientation saying, “Of course, I had no conception at that time of the thorough weakness and falseness of the views I had been conveying with so much pains and so much complacency.” Martineau was referring specifically to her prize-winning religious essays and her then-theological metaphysical orientation, which is discussed further in Chapter 4.
CHAPTER III: MARTINEAU’S SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY DEFINED

Introduction

Martineau is seldom recognized for her contribution to sociological methodology. As Hill and Hoecker-Drysdale (2001:12) astutely observe, *How to Observe* “predates Durkheim’s *Rules of Sociological Method* by sixty years but is also ‘nearly analogous’.”

As a treatise on sociological systematic observation of “morals” and “manners”—in today’s vernacular, societal values and patterns of behavior—*How to Observe* presents a sophisticated three-part approach to ethnographic study. Part I of *How to Observe* is Martineau’s presentation of the requisites for accurate observation. Part II is a primer on what to observe, and Part III is a how-to guide for recording observations. In this chapter, Martineau’s methodology is explained.

Requisites for observation

In her introduction to Part I, Martineau (1838a: 13) stresses the need for intellectual preparation and training on the part of the observer.

A child does not catch a gold fish in water at the first trial, however good his eyes may be, and however clear the water; knowledge and method are necessary to enable him to take what is actually before his eyes and under his hand. So it is with all who fish in a strange element for the truth which is living and moving there: the powers of observation must be trained, and habits of method in arranging the materials presented to the eye must be acquired before the student possesses the requisites for understanding what he contemplates.

In other words, the untrained observer must be willing to acknowledge ignorance when it comes to the study of “principles of morals” and “national manners” (Martineau 1838a:}
Further, the neophyte observer must avoid peremptory decision making and hasty generalization, which can and will lead to misinformation. The observer who makes such generalizations contributes to prejudiced understanding that “becomes the work of a century to reverse” (Martineau 1838a: 19). To forestall inaccurate observation, the observer must meet three requisites for observation: philosophical, moral, and mechanical.

**Philosophical requisites**

Martineau’s (1838a: 23) philosophical requisites are based on the essential understanding that there are two parties involved in observation, the observer and the observed.

This is an important fact which the traveler\(^{11}\) seldom dwells upon as he ought; yet a moment’s consideration shows that the mind of the observer—the instrument by which the work is done, is as essential as the material to be wrought. If the instrument be in bad order it will furnish a bad product, be the material what it may.

Based on this understanding, the observer must possess an intellectual principle of observation based on three considerations (Martineau 1838a: 24-25).

The first two considerations involve observational criteria. First, what does the observer want to know? Second, what elements and agents in a social system are to be observed to gain that knowledge? The third consideration, what Martineau (1838a: 25) calls the “grand” consideration, involves evaluative criteria: how the observed elements and agents in a social system contribute to human happiness.

\(^{11}\)Martineau uses “traveler,” “traveller” and “observer” interchangeably.
The two considerations just mentioned must be subordinated to the grand one,—the only general one,—of the relative amount of human happiness. Every element of social life derives its importance from this great consideration. The external conveniences of men, their internal emotions and affections, their social arrangements, graduate in importance precisely in proportion as they affect the general happiness of the section of the race among whom they exist. Here then is the wise traveller’s aim,—to be kept in view to the exclusion of prejudice, both philosophical and national.

Martineau (1838a: 26) argues that observation must be conducted based on this “high and broad principle, and not…that of a low comparative practice.” In other words, the study of the morals and manners of a particular society must be based on a “reference to the essentials of human happiness” rather than a comparison to the morals and manners of the society of the observer (Martineau 1838a: 26).

Application of this intellectual principle of observation involves what Martineau (1838a: 29) calls liberality of mind: sympathetic observation aimed at understanding observations in their context.

The true liberality which alone is worthy to contemplate all the nations of the earth, does not draw a broad line through the midst of human conduct, declaring all that falls on the one side vice, and all on the other virtue; such a liberality knows that actions and habits do not always carry the moral impress visibly to all eyes, and that the character of very many must be determined by a cautious application of a few deep principles.
The falseness of believing that “right and wrong are fixed and immutable” destroys the substance present in any observation (Martineau 1838a: 33). Failing to appreciate the influence of time and space on social context leads the observer to inaccurate conclusions. “[E]very man’s feelings of right and wrong, instead of being born with him, grow up in him from the influences to which he is subjected” (Martineau 1838a: 35).

“Right” and “wrong,” then, are two ends of the continuum of moral action at which making others happy and tormenting others needlessly are respectively found. Martineau (1838a: 36) contends these two contradictory actions are the only universal feelings about right and wrong.

Martineau (1838a: 38) argues that universal feelings about right and wrong result in certain modes of human conduct, some parts of which are guided by general rules. Prevalent modes of conduct in a particular society are to be understood based on two general principles according to Martineau. The first principle is that humankind can only be judged based on the “law of nature” and the second is “that every prevalent virtue or vice” exists because of and is defined by the “gigantic circumstances” present in a given social system (Martineau 1838a: 38, 39, 50).

To summarize, Martineau’s philosophical requisites for the objective study of cultures and societies are: (1) possession of a culturally relativist intellectual principle of observation; (2) possession of a philosophical understanding of the origin of human feelings of right and wrong; and (3) an awareness that human behavior is the result of all forces operating within a social system.
**Moral requisites**

Martineau’s moral requisites are quite simple, yet far from easy: perfection and sympathy. “An observer, to be perfectly accurate, should be himself perfect” (Martineau 1838a: 51). The perfection Martineau (1838a: 51) demands refers to the setting aside of “[e]very prejudice, every moral perversion.” Acknowledging the practical difficulty of achieving this form of perfection, Martineau (1838a: 54) recommends the observer continually reflect upon his or her personal biases to determine their impact on accurate observation. Armed with self-awareness, the observer is then able to interpret his or her observations sympathetically. “Unless a traveller interprets by his sympathies what he sees, he cannot but misunderstand the great part of that which comes under his observation” (Martineau 1838a: 54). The astute observer who observes what he or she perceives to be an anomaly of values will recognize it to be of significance and discover not only a rule of a given social system but the substance of that rule as well.

**Mechanical requisites**

Martineau’s (1838a) mechanical requisites require the observer to investigate directly the object of study. The ability to do so is literally a function of the form of travel the observer employs as well as the path traveled. “No philosophical or moral fitness will qualify a traveller to observe a people if he does not select a mode of traveling which will enable him to see and converse with a great number and variety of persons” (Martineau 1838a: 61). To observe effectively, the observer must travel not only the well-traveled routes but the less traveled as well. The observer must also make him or herself accessible to that which he or she aims to study. Martineau (1838a: 63) encourages the observer to travel commonly not royally, declaring pedestrian travel best.
Conclusion

In their totality, Martineau’s philosophical, moral, and mechanical requisites constitute the fundamentals of what is recognized today as objective, culturally relativistic, ethnographic sociological research. With these requisites met, the observer is prepared to investigate cultures and societies, both familiar and foreign knowing there is truly no distinction between the two, with the greatest challenge being investigation of one’s own culture and society. Objective observation and interpretation of the familiar, like that of the foreign, must be based solely upon empirically-derived facts.

What to observe

In her introductory remarks in Part II, Martineau (Martineau's emphasis, 1838a: 73) states that the “grand secret of wise inquiry into Morals and Manners is to begin with the study of THINGS, using the DISCOURSE OF PERSONS as a commentary upon them.” By “things,” Martineau is referring to institutions and records. Martineau (1838a: 74) defines institutions as the political, economic, religious, and social organization of society. The records of a society are its “architectural remains, epitaphs, civic registers, national music, or any other of the thousand manifestations of the common mind which may be found about every people” (Martineau 1838a: 74). In combination, the things found in any given society are evidence of its morals; and its manners are expressions of those morals, observations of which are supplanted and confirmed by the discourse of persons.

Martineau (1838a: 77) provides five general categories of observation—religion; general moral notions; domestic state; idea of liberty; and progress, actual or in prospect—which are described below as is her characterization of discourse with persons.
Martineau (1837, ii: 314) defines religion as the inclination of human nature toward the supernatural, the moral character of which can be determined through observation. “The rule of examining things before persons must be observed in ascertaining the religious sentiment of any country” (Martineau 1838a: 89). The things to be observed in the case of religion are “Places of Worship, the condition of the Clergy, the popular superstitions, the observance of Holy Days, and some other particulars of the kind” (Martineau 1838a: 89). With regard to places of worship, the observer should make note of their location in a community, their number, their diversity with regard to doctrine, and their architectural design (Martineau 1838a: 93). The observer should also make note of the clergy, their political and intellectual status among their congregants and communities as well as their own understanding of their role as leaders (Martineau 1838a: 94-95).

The superstitions of a society, meaning its intangible beliefs manifested in irrational behaviors, become apparent through deliberate observation of such behaviors, which are suggestive of its moral state (Martineau 1838a: 99). For example, the wearing of talismans or religious medals as forms of protection are indicative of a belief in a supernatural struggle between forces of good and evil (Martineau 1838a: 102).

Martineau (1838a: 103) also recommends that the observer make note of societal attitudes toward suicide, which are also indicative of religious sentiment. “Every society has its suicides, and much may be learned from their character and number, both as to the notions on morals which prevail, and the religious sentiment which animates to or controls the act” (Martineau 1838a: 105). In other words, the observer should
contemplate not only the frequency of suicides, but the method employed and motivation behind the act.

Martineau (1838a: 108) contends that religion, as one of the primary institutions of society, must be studied for three reasons. First, religious sentiment is a cultural universal existing in all societies. Second, personal morals are dependent upon religious sentiment. Finally, the philosophy and morals of a society’s government are directly related to the state of religion in that society. In sum, religion is a fundamental aspect of all cultures and societies.

*General moral notions*

General moral notions are the cumulative values of a particular culture or society as evidenced by its social institutions (Martineau 1838a: 109). Cultures and societies that value spiritual attainment hold religion in high regard. Societies that value personal freedom embrace democratic governance. Societies that value intellectual achievement cherish institutions of higher learning. Societies that value strict social order attach great importance to law and punishment. Evidence of general moral notions abounds in literature, art, music, laws, physical institutions, civic records, and cemeteries (Martineau 1838a).

Martineau (1838a: 120) contends that the observer can also find evidence of a society’s general moral notions through discourse with children to determine the “aspirations of childhood” and with the elderly to determine “what is good in the eyes of those who have passed through the society.” The discourse of criminals is also informative in that the causes of crime and the “disorders of society” emerge through conversation (Martineau 1838a: 137).
The idols of a particular society are also telling of its general moral notions. Martineau (1838a: 125-126) identified two types of idols, the dead and the living. The dead idols are those whose worth has been determined by the test of time, and the living idols are those who exert contemporary influence on morals and manners. In either case, the character of a society’s idols is indicative of that society’s general moral notions.

Martineau (1838a: 129-130) points out that the epochs of a society further inform the observer with regard to general moral notions. The observer should make note of the events and people who characterize defining eras including great leaders, natural disasters, and wars. In America, for example, the Revolution and the Civil War delineate epochs of self-determination and conflict and are associated with the achievements and valor of Paul Revere and Abraham Lincoln respectively (Martineau 1838a: 130).

Martineau (1838a: 149) contends that the general moral notions of a society represent its agreed upon rules on what is right and wrong, change in response to the influences and outcomes of internal and external circumstances, and are the yardstick of principles by which the distinctive organization of a given society is measured.

*Domestic state*

Martineau (1838a: 159) characterizes the domestic state of a society by its economic and social structures, the status of women and children, and its overall physical health, all of which occur in the context of that society’s “aspect,” meaning its geographical settings. The aspect of a country might seem an unusual consideration in determining the domestic state of a society; but as a dominating force that cannot be controlled, only tolerated, it dictates the possibilities of economic productivity (Martineau 1838a: 164). Economic productivity, in turn, contributes to class hierarchy and affects
the status of women and children as well as the physical health of a society (Martineau 1838a).

In determining the domestic state of a society, Martineau (1838a: 164) instructs the observer to make note of economic opportunities. Are they strictly agricultural in nature or is there manufacturing and commercial enterprise? What is the condition of the individuals who comprise these economic categories? What sort of homes do they inhabit? Are they well fed? Are they educated? What are a society’s practices relating to marriage? Are the children healthy? Do women work? Are women and children treated with respect? To answer these questions, Martineau (1838a: 161, 168) encourages the observer to visit homes, workplaces, and schools and examine registers of births, marriages, and deaths whenever available. Also, cemeteries are a useful substitute in the absence of such registers in that grave markers provide a wealth of information about economic attainment and social status in addition to lifespan, marriages, and family size (Martineau 1838a: 171).

Through observation of these categories of facts, Martineau (1838a: 186) argues that the observer can determine the nature of the “private life of a community,” which is essential to a full understanding of any society.

Idea of liberty

By the idea of liberty, Martineau (1838a: 187-192) means ideas of freedom in relation to personal independence, forms of persecution, ownership of property, and governance. To observe the idea of liberty present in a given society, the observer should make note of the presence or absence of constraints imposed on any form of freedom through policing practices, laws, social class, and practices of servitude and slavery.
Evidence of such constraints can be found in newspapers, civic records, and the physical character of the population (Martineau 1838a). The overarching question is whether persecution is present. To answer this question, Martineau (1838a: 207) directs the observer to make note of the treatment of the poor, the religious community, the intellectuals, women and children, and any evidence of inconsistencies and preferential treatment within the society as a whole. The idea of liberty is one of two significant categories of observation in terms of the grand consideration, in that human happiness is impeded by persecution and discrimination (1838a: 207). This impediment also affects the progress of society, the second category of observation important to the principle of the grand consideration.

**Progress**

Martineau (1838a: 77) concedes that determining the state of progress in a given society, “actual or in prospect,” is not an easy task. As elusive as it may be, the determination can be made through the study of the words of the poets and philosophers of that society. They are the “prophets” and “analysers of the fate of men” (Martineau 1838a: 210). The observer can learn of a society’s “present strength and…the promise of its growth” by examining the thoughts of its great thinkers (Martineau 1838a: 211).

Points of consideration with regard to the conditions under which progress must occur in a given society are its geographical character, state of independence, and the homogeneity or heterogeneity of its population (Martineau 1838a: 212-215). With these three considerations in mind, the observer should note certain “facts which indicate progress or the reverse,” namely charity, arts and inventions, and the multiplicity of objects (Martineau 1838a: 215).
Martineau asserts that the nature of charity in a particular society is indicative of that society’s state of progress. The “lowest order of charity”, which occurs in “young and rude countries” is dispensed on an individual basis from one to another to address an immediate need (Martineau 1838a: 216). In more advanced societies, charity is a function of a coordinated collective effort “which makes provision on a large scale for the relief of such distress; as when a nation passes on from common alms-giving to a general provision for the destitute” (Martineau 1838a: 216). The provision of charity in a given society is a measure of its prevailing “spirit of justice (which is ultimately one with charity)” (Martineau 1838a: 218).

With regard to arts and inventions, their characteristics are also telling of a society’s state of progress (Martineau 1838a). Martineau asks the observer to note whether the arts and inventions “enhance the luxury of the rich, or…benefit the whole society” (Martineau 1838a: 219). Do the arts tell stories of the successes of the elites or of the struggles of the poor? Do the inventions serve the passions of the wealthy or the needs of the underprivileged?

The multiplicity of objects, by which Martineau (1838a: 221-220) means literally a plentiful supply of things that meet a particular need or satisfy a certain interest, is evidence of an advanced state of progress. A society’s focus on the production of such objects is indicative of the falling away of misdirected pride, jealousy, and anger in favor of a “fraternal spirit” concerned with a “need for mutual aide” (Martineau 1838a: 221). Observation of a society’s state of progress is essential to determining its vitality and potential for moral growth, which is essential to human happiness (Martineau 1838a).

12 Martineau’s use of “young” in this context is not a chronological reference, rather a reference to a state of progress.
Discourse

In Martineau’s (Martineau's emphasis, 1838a: 73) remarks on the “grand secret of wise inquiry into Morals and Manners” favoring “the study of THINGS, using the DISCOURSE OF PERSONS,” she seemingly discounts the value of interpersonal discourse. This is not the case. Such discourse is valuable as a supplement to and confirmation of observations. Martineau (1838a: 223) states that the “discourse of individuals is an indispensable commentary upon the classes of national facts which the traveller has observed.” The value Martineau (1838a: 223) finds in the discourse of individuals as confirmation of observations is that it “becomes illustrative where before it would have been only bewildering” had it been the primary source for observation rather than secondary.

Martineau (1838a: 223) states that the observer “must seek intercourse with all classes of the society he visits,—not only the rich and the poor, but those who may be classed by profession, pursuit, habits of mind, and turn of manners.” The content of discourse serves not only as confirmation of observations but also as an indicator of those things most interesting to certain categories of people encountered. Politicians will speak of politics; the poor will speak of poverty; and the wealthy will speak of economic opportunities and pursuits (Martineau 1838a). What is unique in the discourse of each category of people is the society through which they experience life. The observer “must bear in mind that there are a few universal interests which every where [sic] stand first, and that it is the modification of these by local influences which he has to observe” (Martineau 1838a: 226). With that in mind, Martineau (1838a: 227) issues a caveat on the value of the discourse as an observational tool in the study of the morals and manners.
The chief reason why the discourse of individuals, apart from the observation of classes of facts, is almost purely deceptive as to morals, is that the traveller can see no more than one in fifty thousand of the people, and has no security that those he meets are a sample of the whole. Nevertheless, the advantage of particular conversations is that they provide the opportunity to obtain “knowledge of and light upon particular questions” and discover “intimate connexion of certain modes of opinion” (Martineau 1838a: 227, 228).

Conclusion

With regard to Martineau’s (1838a: 222) methodology, she states that “manners have not been treated of separately from Morals” for good reason. “[M]anners are inseparable from morals, or, at least, cease to have meaning when separated. Except as manifestations of morals, they have no interest, and can have no permanent existence” (Martineau 1838a: 222). In other words, the values of and patterns of social behavior in a given society are not mutually exclusive; in fact, they are interdependent. Further, they are not fixed and immutable but subject to the influence of time and space.

Mechanical methods

In her discussion of mechanical methods in Part III of How to Observe, Martineau outlines what contemporary sociologists refer to as data collection methods. Above all, Martineau (1838a: 239) maintains that the observer must adhere to disciplined practices in the collection of facts and impressions tempered by sympathetic observation in order to come away with a truthful account.

Mechanical methods are nothing but in proportion to the power which uses them; as the intellectual accomplishments of the traveller avail him little, and may even
bring him back less wise than he went out,—a wanderer from the truth, as well as from home,—unless he see by a light from his heart shining through the eyes of his mind.

To arrive at a truthful account, Martineau (1838a) insists upon the employ of three data collection tools: a query list, a journal, and a notebook. Each tool serves a specific purpose.

The function of a query list is to guide and focus the observer and “stimulate his flagging attention” (Martineau 1838a: 232). A well-organized query list is replete with categories of inquiry to be reviewed prior to each day’s observation. The query list is for the observer alone, “a catechism on the facts which indicate morals and manners” (Martineau 1838a: 233). The query list is a living document to be updated with new lines of inquiry as they arise during observation. The query list should be unique to each culture and society observed because a “set which would suit one nation would not completely apply to another” (Martineau 1838a: 233).

The journal, which Martineau (1838a: 234) recommends be kept distinctly separate from the query lists, is to be used as a log of observations, to “reflect the mind of a traveller, and give back to him hereafter the image of what he thought and felt day by day.” Martineau warns the observer, however, that the journal should be a record about the observed not the observer. “The simplest method seems to be to set down what is most likely to be let slip, and to trust to memory what the affections and tastes of the traveller will not allow him to forget” (Martineau 1838a: 234). Like the query list, the journal is for the observer’s eyes only and dealt with on a daily basis, what Martineau (1838a: 236) refers to as the “daily duty”.
The observer’s notebook is better thought of as a sketchbook. Without the modern conveniences of photography and videography, Martineau (1838a: 237) relied upon sketches of unique groups and scenes.

If [the observer] can sketch, he should rarely allow a characteristic group of persons, or nook of scenery, to escape his pencil. If he cannot use the pencil, a few written words will do. Two lines may preserve for him an exemplification which may be of great future value.

Martineau (1838a) insists that such impressions be recorded on the spot for accuracy and later reference when updating query lists and journalizing. With the repository of data present in query lists, journals, and notebooks, the observer is fully prepared at the conclusion of study to interpret observations and provide a truthful account.

Conclusion

Martineau’s sociological methodology is thoroughly systematic and culturally relativistic. She provides not only a clear explanation of the mechanics of observation but a sophisticated explication of the fundamental philosophical and moral requisites of accurate observation. The philosophical and moral stance and mechanical methods Martineau demanded of the would-be nineteenth century observer are akin to the ethical and scientific requirements demanded of today’s sociologists (Neuman 2006). The question remains whether Martineau followed her own methodology while observing in the East.
CHAPTER IV: MARTINEAU’S SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY APPLIED

Introduction

In 1846, Martineau (1848: iii) was invited by “Mr. and Mrs. Richard V. Yates, to accompany them in their proposed travels in the East.” In her autobiography, Martineau (1877) revealed her reluctance to make the journey having only recently taken up residence in the home she had built in the Lake District of Ambleside, England. After declining the invitation, Martineau (1877, i: 531) was encouraged to take advantage of an “opportunity too fine to ever recur.” As an enticement, English publisher Charles Knight offered to publish her travel story in his “Weekly Volume.” Martineau (1877, i: 536) eventually recognized the prospect as an “inestimable privilege” and accepted the invitation.

Martineau had no preconceptions at the outset of her journey as to the content of her story. Rather, she received her inspiration for *Eastern Life* as she traveled between Petra (Sinai) and Hebron (Palestine) and shared her inspiration with a member of her travel party.

I told him that I had just been inspired with the main idea of my book about the East. “That is,” said he, “you think it the best scheme till you prefer another.”

“No,” I replied; “there can be but one perfect one; and that completely answers to my view. My book will illustrate the genealogy, as it appears to me, of the old

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14 The Weekly Volume is a literary series of books published by Knight beginning in 1844 comprised of 126 volumes, including Martineau’s *Forest and Game-Law Tales* (1845) (Encyclopædia Britannica 11th ed., s.v. “Charles Knight (1791-1873)”.)
faiths,—the Egyptian, the Hebrew the Christian and the Mohammedan.

(Martineau 1877, i: 538)

Martineau’s (1877) inspiration was owing to the geographical progression of the party’s tour of the East, which began in Egypt, continued next into Sinai, then Palestine, and concluded in Syria—the geographical and chronological path of the emergence and evolution of the three Abrahamic faiths, which originated in Egypt, if you concede the origination of Judaism with Moses. 

Martineau’s (1848, i: 541) observations in the East led to a long-coming conclusion, one she knew would not be well received by a portion of her readership, that “the theological belief of almost every body [sic] in the civilized world is baseless.” Aware of the controversy it would stir, Martineau (1877) did not reveal this conclusion in Eastern Life which she felt would detract from the book’s purpose. Martineau forewarned her publisher John Murray of her plan to present Eastern Life from a secular perspective. Murray expressed no initial concern and “offered his terms afterwards with so much good will, that [she] never dreamed of difficulty” (Martineau 1877, i: 551).

Murray’s good will was short lived. Following his receipt of the first two volumes of the

15 See Appendices B and C for timelines and maps, respectively, of Martineau’s Eastern tour.
18 Martineau, Harriet. 1877. Harriet Martineau's Autobiography, edited by Maria Weston Chapman. Boston: James R. Osgood and Company. Martineau gives no account of her reasons for first offering her Eastern Life manuscript to Murray and then Moxon rather than Knight, previously referenced, other than to say that Murray’s father had approached her more than once about his interest in publishing her travel account.
manuscript, Murray promptly returned the manuscript to Martineau with “a curt note [of rejection] which afforded no explanation” (Martineau 1877, i: 551). Martineau (1877, i: 552) soon learned that those who had reviewed the manuscript for Murray had informed him that *Eastern Life* was a “conspiracy against Moses.” She offered the manuscript to another publisher who enjoyed with her the financial success of *Eastern Life*. Martineau (1877, i: 552) learned years later that Murray had “heartily regretted his mischance” with regard to *Eastern Life* once the “success of the book was secure.”

Turning now to an analysis of *Eastern Life*, the remainder of this chapter examines Martineau’s methodological preparation, mechanical methodology, and philosophical and moral perspectives while observing in the East. The character of Martineau’s observational techniques will be analyzed to determine if Martineau in fact adheres to her own methodology as set forth in *How to Observe*.

**Methodological preparation**

On November 20, 1846, Martineau (1848) arrived at Egypt’s Alexandria port armed with her methodological guidelines, which she first tested during her tour of America. As part of her intellectual preparation, Martineau (1848) read widely on Egypt, Sinai, Palestine, and Syria prior to her arrival in Alexandria. Further, she traveled with a well-chosen reference library. Martineau (1848) brought numerous books and maps including, but not limited to, an edition of Arabic scholar Edward William Lane’s *Arabic-English Lexicon*, DeSacy’s (1810) French translation of Abdallatif’s *Relation de l’Egypt*, select works of explorer and Egyptologist Sir John Gardner Wilkinson,¹⁹,²⁰

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French traveler Leon de Laborde,\textsuperscript{21} and Swiss traveler John Lewis Burckhardt.\textsuperscript{22,23} In addition, Martineau (1848) referred to select travel accounts written by contemporaries who had visited the region, including that of Isabella Francis Romer who had just published an account of her recent tour of the East.\textsuperscript{24} Martineau consulted these sources, and more, during her tour of the East and while she penned *Eastern Life*.

While fluent in French, Latin, Greek, Italian, and German, Martineau did not speak Arabic. For that reason, Martineau (1848: iv) relied upon, in addition to the services of her travel party’s dragomen,\textsuperscript{25} Lane’s *Arabic-English Lexicon*, then recognized as the authority on the Arabic language.

In regard to that difficult matter,—difficult to those who do not understand Arabic,—the spelling of the names of places and persons in Egypt and Arabia,—I have done what every one [sic] will allow to be the safest thing;—I have followed the authority of Mr. Lane wherever I could. If any English reader complains of me for altering the look of familiar Egyptian names, it is enough to reply that Mr. Lane knows better than anyone, and that I copy from him. If I have departed from his method anywhere, it is merely because I had not his authority before me in those particular instances.


\textsuperscript{23} Also known as Johann Ludwig Burckhardt and Jean Louis Burckhardt.


\textsuperscript{25} Dragoman, from the Arabic *terjuman*, a travel guide, often also an interpreter, used by travelers in Middle Eastern countries. (Encyclopædia Britannica 11th ed., s.v. “dragoman”)
Martineau (1848) also utilized Lane’s translation of *One Thousand and One Nights* in her understanding of certain aspects of *Relation de l’Egypt*.

Martineau (1848) found DeSacy’s translation of Abdallatif’s *Relation de l’Egypt* an invaluable tool in her understanding of historical Egyptian society and culture. In the late 12th century, Abdallatif visited Egypt for an extended period of time and “afterwards wrote an admirable account of whatever he himself saw” (Martineau 1848: 22). As an Egyptian traveler, Martineau (1848: 58) experienced an intellectual kinship with Abdallatif, about which she said,

> There is something very interesting in meeting with a fellow-feeling in ancient travelers so strong as may be found in the following passage from Abdallatif with that some of modern Egyptian voyagers. The passage is almost the same as some entries in my journal, made when I had never heard of the Bagdad physician.

The passage to which Martineau (1848) refers, which she quoted at length, relates to Abdallatif’s observations while at Memphis. Martineau (1848) similarly quotes Abdallatif in his observations of Pompey’s Pillar, the Sphinx, the pyramids, and Thebes. Martineau (1848) also quoted Abdallatif at great length on the horrors of famine resulting from the seasons of the Nile, which at one point led the Egyptian people to cannibalism.

It is apparent to the reader of *Eastern Life* that Martineau read thoroughly DeSacy’s translation of Abdallatif’s *Relation de l’Egypt*, the significance of which is

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27 Arberry, Arthur John. 1960. *Oriental Essays*. London: George Allen & Unwin. Lane’s translation of *One Thousand and One Nights*, which Martineau referred to as *Arabian Nights* in *Eastern Life*, was originally published in monthly parts in 1838 and 1840 and subsequently published in three volumes in 1840. Following Lane’s death in 1876, Lane’s great nephew Stanley Lane-Poole in 1883 published separately Lane’s encyclopedic annotations to *One Thousand and One Nights* as *Arabian Society in the Middle Ages*. 
DeSacy’s referencing of Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) and inclusion of two excerpts, in Arabic, of Khaldun’s *Muqaddima*, the introduction to Khaldun’s treatise on the planned history of the world.28,29 Khaldun is recognized by some experts as an Arab sociologist and historian (Sorokin 1947). Khaldun, among others, contemplated “uniformities in the relationship between geographic conditions…and sociocultural phenomena,” including the “emergence, evolution, and decline of civilizations” (Sorokin 1947: 23). While Martineau (1848) does not reference Khaldun specifically, she certainly acknowledges and expicates in *Eastern Life* the interdependence of the geographic conditions and the sociocultural phenomena she observed in Egypt, which is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. Therefore, by way of Abdallatif as a reliable source who made significant use of Khaldun, Martineau and Khaldun are definitively intellectual peers.

In *Eastern Life*, Martineau (1848) provides an ongoing critique of the reference library she employed, using the methodology she presented in *How to Observe* as the yardstick by which she measures the character of the observations of her contemporaries, of whom Romer suffered the most scathing critique. Martineau (1848: 204) was disapproving of, if not offended by, Romer’s “methodology” in terms of the abuse of her privilege as traveler in Egypt.

And what shall we say to a traveler (Mrs. Romer), who coolly reports, without any apparent shame, that she has brought away from Benee Hasan the head and shoulders of a figure which she does not doubt to be that of a Jewish captive;—

29 Ibid. DeSacy also include as appendices, in Arabic, excerpts of the works of Abdallatif’s (1162-1231) contemporaries Ibn Abi Osaiba (1203-1270) and Gregoire Bar-Hebraeus (1226-1286). See pages 534-551 and 552-557 respectively.
her dragoman having cleverly detached from the wall this interesting specimen of antiquity! Where are our hopes for the monuments of Egypt, if passing travelers are to allow their servants, (who know no better,) to commit thefts for them in such a way as this? Who will undertake to say what may be the value of any one head and shoulders in a group which may be made unintelligible by its absence! It is mournful enough to see what scientific antiquarians do;—how one saws through the middle of a tablet of inscriptions; and another knocks down one pillar of a series; and another carries away a group,—symbolical and necessary in its own place: but there really seems no hope left if desultory travelers are to pick and steal at their fancy from a repository where everything has its place, and is in its place.

Martineau’s characterization of Romer’s self-reported theft as “desultory” leaves little doubt in the reader’s mind with regard to Martineau’s philosophical and moral expectations of Romer as an observer as well as her views on Romer’s unethical methodology.

In contrast, Martineau (1848) found Wilkinson a tremendous resource during her tour of Egypt. “It is really cheering to find that any one [sic] can be so accurate, and on so large a scale, as his works proved him to be” (Martineau’s emphasis, Martineau 1848: iv). Martineau (1848) referred regularly to Wilkinson’s Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians, originally published in 1837, and Modern Egypt and Thebes, first published in 1843. Martineau (1848) observed many of the same social and cultural patterns reported by Wilkinson, including the Egyptian preoccupation with death and the curious practice of hastening the eminent death of kings, in antiquity and modernity alike.
Both Wilkinson and Martineau (1848: 127) in their accounts of their Egyptian travels noted receiving reports of a “custom [which] still remains in a higher region of Ethiopia, where it is thought shocking that a king should die a natural death...the kings of this tribe, when they believe themselves about to die, send word to their ministers, who immediately cause them to be strangled.” In total, Martineau (1848) cited Wilkinson thirty-three times in *Eastern Life*. Martineau (1848: iv) and her party, “[aft]er making the fullest use of his ‘Modern Egypt and Thebes,’” differed with Wilkinson on “only about a half-a-dozen points.”

During the Sinai leg of her tour of the East, Martineau referred to Laborde’s (1836) maps of his travels of the region, one of which Martineau (1848: 352-353) was critical.

When on the top range of the seats of the theatre, I called one or two of my companions to witness the inaccuracy of the view from the point, given by Laborde. We were on the precise spot whence the sketch\(^\text{30}\) was taken, as was shown by a number of neighboring objects. It was the distance that was in fault. Before us rose a lofty barrier of rock which, of course, closed in the view: but in Laborde we have, in place of this rock, a fine retiring distance, and long perspective of façades, and a spacious valley with a meandering river, such as was never yet seen in Petra. It is a serious matter giving false impressions of a place at once so remarkable and little visited as this. In marking, in his plan, the Sîk as “the only entrance to the town,” Laborde may have followed Diodorus, who says there was but one way in, and that artificial: though he should not have repeated

\(^{30}\) See Appendix C for Laborde’s sketch of Petra.
this without verifying it: but the elaborate view, with its non-existent valley and
stream, is a gratuitous piece of misleading, for which I see no excuse.

Like Laborde, Martineau’s (1848) party entered Petra through the Sîk\(^{31}\) but in contrast
left by way of an ascent of Mount Hor, a route of departure Laborde either failed to
acknowledge or discover. Martineau (1848: 345), reflecting upon her Petra experience in
*Eastern Life*, lamented her loss of the conception of Petra she had derived from her
reading of Laborde and others saying, “When, at night, I looked back upon my morning
notion of Petra, it was like looking back from middle age to one’s teens.”

In addition to Laborde’s maps, Martineau (1848) referred frequently to
Burckhardt’s (1822) maps and accounts of his travels of the Sinai region. Martineau
(1848: 311) found Burckhardt’s recorded observations most enlightening saying that he
“seems to elucidate everything he touches.” Martineau (1848: 313) confirmed several of
Burckhardt’s observations, including his account of the library at the Convent of St.
Catherine on Mount Sinai and a curious tale about a “thundering noise,\(^{32}\) like repeated
charges of heavy artillery…heard at times in these mountains [around the convent].”

Conversely, Martineau (1848: 315) was unable to corroborate Burckhardt’s description of
the “head of the golden calf,\(^{33}\) transmuted into stone,” which she quoted.

[I]t is somewhat singular that both the monks and the Bedoueens call it the cow’s
head (Ras el Bakar), and not the calf’s, confounding it perhaps with the ‘red

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\(^{31}\) See page 353 in Martineau, Harriet. 1848. *Eastern Life, Present and Past*. Philadelphia: Lea and
Blanchard. Martineau’s account of the Sîk: “[T]he most extraordinary entrance to a capital city, from its
indomitable wilderness, that was probably ever seen. This main street of Petra is about two miles long. Its
width varies from ten to thirty feet; and it is enclosed between perpendicular rocks which spring to a height
of from one hundred to seven hundred feet.”

\(^{32}\) Ibid. Both Martineau and Burckhardt assumed this thundering noise to be the echo of lightening during
thunderstorms.

\(^{33}\) A reference to the Biblical story of Aaron’s golden calf in Exodus 32.
heifer’ of which the Old Testament and the Kurán speak. It is a stone half buried in the ground, and bears some resemblance to the forehead of a cow. Some travelers have explained this stone to be the mould in which Aaron cast the calf, though it is not hollow but projecting: the Arabs and monks, however, gravely assured me that it was ‘the cow’s’ head itself.’

Martineau’s (1848: 315, 316) observations of the “stone in which Aaron moulded the head of the golden calf” differed substantively from Burckhardt’s in that the stone shown to her party was hollow and somewhat in the shape of a cow’s head, and “certainly represented to [Martineau’s party] as the mould in which the head of the calf was cast.” Martineau’s (1848) explanation for their disparate observations was that Burckhardt’s guide must have shown him a different stone.

In addition to Wilkinson, Laborde, Burckhardt, and others, Martineau (1848) consulted certain works of American Biblical Scholar Edward Robinson (1794-1863) and American Protestant missionary and scholar Eli Smith (1801-1857),34 English Biblical scholar John Kitto (1804-1954),35 and English scholar Francis William Newman (1805-1897).36 Martineau (1848) found their works useful in that each offered objective analyses of what they observed in relation to Biblical accounts of significant events at particular locations, adjudging the likelihood of the accuracy of such accounts.

In terms of methodological preparation, Martineau consistently adhered to the methodology set forth in How to Observe. “The observer of Men and Manners stands as

much in need of intellectual preparation as any other student” (Martineau 1838a: 14).

Martineau’s intellectual preparation for her tour of the East and her ongoing use of her reference library during her tour, as well as her extensive erudition of linguistic, literary, and historical subjects provided her with a vast body of information upon which to draw as she observed. With regard to mechanical requisites and methods, Martineau also demonstrated an adherence to the mechanical requisites and methods first explicated in *How to Observe* as the toured the East.

**Mechanical Requisites and Methods**

The mechanical requisites and methods presented by Martineau in *How to Observe* call for systematic methodological practice on the part of the observer. There are two aspects to such practice. First, the observer must make every effort to observe directly; and second, the observer must record observations objectively and consistently. While both aspects of Martineau’s methodological practice seem simple in concept, neither is easy in terms of practical application.

**Modes of Travel**

Recall in Martineau’s (1838a) discussion of the mechanical requisites of observation that she admonishes the observer to travel commonly, not royally, to facilitate direct observation. There was nothing royal about Martineau’s (1848) modes of travel while observing in the East. Martineau (1848) and her companions traveled by bus, boat, donkey, camel, horse, and on foot. Each mode of travel, as an aspect of her methodological orientation toward diverse methods of data collection, impacted not only the character of her observations but her data collection as well.
During her tour of America, Martineau (1837) traveled alone with a research assistant. Having no pre-established timelines, Martineau was free to linger in a particular locale to satisfy her observational interests. This was not the case while touring the East. Martineau (1848) and her three travel companions, none of whom served as a research assistant, were required to adhere to a fairly strict schedule as they traveled through Egypt, Sinai, and Palestine in order to arrive on time at their final destination in Beirut (Syria). Martineau’s ability to observe was not impeded, however. As coequal, independent travelers, Martineau’s (1848) positive experience with group travel owed to the fact that each member of the party was concerned with not only the group’s collective interests but their individual interests as well.

Martineau (1848: iii) called upon her travel companions to validate “the facts which came under [her] observation,” frequently reading her journals to them during their tour. Martineau made further use of her travel companions with regard to their gender. Martineau (1848) and Mrs. Yates were able to visit at length in the harems at Cairo and Damascus, an opportunity in which Mr. Yates and Mr. Ewart were not allowed to participate for reasons of social convention. Conversely, Mr. Yates and Mr. Ewart were able to orchestrate certain aspects of their travel, including accommodations and visits with certain dignitaries, something at which neither Martineau nor Mrs. Yates would likely have had success being English women in an Eastern culture. The gentlemen of Martineau’s party also provided insights that were useful to Martineau in her understanding of a variety of experiences, notably the ascent of the first cataract of the Nile.
As Martineau (1848: 75) and her party prepared to ascend the first cataract of the Nile, they insisted on remaining on their boat.\textsuperscript{37}

Such an event as the ascent of the Cataract can happen but once in one’s life; and we would not hear of going ashore on any such plea as that the feat could be better seen from thence. What I wanted to was to feel it…I would not refuse the fortune of being on board.

Martineau (1848: 75) was captivated by the “savage faculty” employed by the “dusky natives” as they steered the boat through the cataract’s treacherous rocks and forced it against the Nile’s violent current, a feat that took over four hours. Martineau’s (1848: 77) assessment of the skills of these natives was confirmed by Mr. Ewart, “who has great experience in nautical affairs” and “said that nothing could be cleverer than the management of the whole business.”

Martineau (1848) took every possible opportunity to observe directly, often venturing off from her party in order to obtain the best vantage point for observation. As they traveled up and down the Nile, Martineau regularly disembarked from her party’s boat to investigate and explore more deeply the sites about which her contemporaries had written, at times simultaneously confirming and disconfirming their observations. Martineau (1848: 35-36) discovered that they reported what they observed based on superficial vantage points.

At all times, the view of the interior from the Nile must be very imperfect, and quite insufficient to justify any decision against the beauty of the great valley.

\textsuperscript{37} Martineau, Harriet. 1848. \textit{Eastern Life, Present and Past}. Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard. Martineau and her party were eventually compelled to go ashore by during the navigation of the final and most dangerous passage of the cataract.
This arises from the singular structure of the country. Everywhere else, where a river flows through the centre of a valley, the land either slopes from the base of the hills down to the river, or it is level. In Egypt, on the contrary, the land rises from the mountains up to the banks of the Nile: and where, as usually happens, the banks are higher than the eye of the spectator on the deck of his boat, all view of the interior, as far as the hills, is precluded. He sees nothing but the towns, villages, and palm-proves on the banks, and mountains on the horizon. My attention had been directed upon this point before I went by the complaints of some readers of Eastern travels that, after all their reading, they knew no more than what the Egyptian valley looked like than if it had never been visited. As this failure of description appeared regard Egypt alone, there must be some peculiar cause for it: and thus we found it. The remedy was, of course, to go ashore as often as possible, and the mount every practicable eminence. I found this so delightful, and every wide view that I obtained included so much that was wonderful and beautiful, that mounting eminences became an earnest pursuit with me.

Martineau (1848: 52) also discovered that the accounts of her contemporaries were influenced by temporal perspective.

When Sir G. Wilkinson visited the caves [at Manfaloot], the river [Nile] was so far off as to leave a breadth of two miles between it and the rocks: and Mrs. Romer, who was there the year before us, describes the passage to the caves as something laborious and terrific: whereas when we visited the caves on our
return, we found the river flowing at the base of the acclivity; and we reached the tombs easily in twelve minutes.

Martineau’s use of multiple reference sources provided her, as well as the reader of *Eastern Life*, with temporal and contextual understanding of her observations in contrast to the observations of others.

As previously mentioned, Martineau (1848) and her party, in addition to traveling by boat, traveled by bus, donkey, camel, horse, and on foot. While each provided a uniquely distinct observational perspective, there were consequences as well. The crowded bus in which Martineau (1848) and her companions traveled from Alexandria to the Mahmoudieh Canal apparently afforded her little in the way of observational material as she gave that very brief leg of their trip only a portion of one sentence in *Eastern Life*. Compared to the bus ride, Martineau (1848) was more impressed with the experience of donkey riding, finding the pace pleasant and proximity to the ground useful, being similar to that of pedestrian travel. However, with the rental of a donkey came the employ of its handler and the inevitable request for baksheesh,\(^{38}\) of which Martineau (1848) grew weary. Martineau (1848: 19) was significantly less impressed with camel riding, about which she said,

> Nothing can be uglier, unless it be the ostrich; which is ludicrously like the camel, in form, gait and expression of face. The patience of the camel, so celebrated in books, is what I never had the pleasure of seeing. So impatient a beast I do not know—growling, groaning and fretting whenever asked to do or bear anything—looking on such occasions as if it longed to bite, if only it dared.

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\(^{38}\) Ibid. Arabic for “gratuity,” for which Martineau and her party were constantly assailed.
Aside from the camel’s disagreeable countenance, camel riding was not conducive to conversation between Martineau and her travel companions. Martineau’s (1848: 282) deafness made it “impossible for [her] to listen from the ridge of a camel, and note the objects of travel at the same time.”

As much as Martineau (1848: 19) favored the “willing, intelligent and proud service of the horse,” the ill-tempered camel proved to be a far superior mode of travel in the desert by virtue of “its ability to work without water.” It is interesting to note that Martineau, prior to her experience with camel riding, expressed a different perspective on travel by horse while observing in America. “A horse is an anxiety and a trouble. Something is sure to ail it; and one is more anxious about its accommodation than about one’s own” (Martineau 1838a: 63). Above all, however, Martineau (1838a; 1848) preferred pedestrian travel over all other modes of travel during her tour of the East as was the case during her tour of America.

**Pedestrian Travel**

In *How to Observe*, Martineau (1838a: 63) extolled the value of pedestrian travel, saying “the wisest and happiest traveler is the pedestrian.” Traveling by foot affords the observer the freedom to thoroughly appreciate and investigate not only the physical environment but the social environment as well. Martineau (1838a: 65) contends that pedestrian travel provides the observer with an opportunity to gain knowledge of and familiarity with the people found at a particular location.

What is most to our present purpose, however, is the consideration of the facilities afforded by pedestrian travelling of obtaining a knowledge of the people. We all
remember Goldsmith’s\textsuperscript{39} travels with his flute, his sympathies, his cordiality of heart and manner, and his reliance on the hospitality of the country people. Such an one as he is not bound to take up with such specimens as he may meet with by the side of the high road; he can penetrate into the recesses of the country, and drop into the hamlet among the hills, and the homesteads down the lanes, and then spend a day with the shepherd in his fold on the downs; he can stop where there is a festival, and solve many a perplexity by carrying over the conversation of one day into the intercourse of the next, with a fresh set of people; he can obtain access to almost every class of persons, and learn their own views of their own affairs. His opportunities are inestimable.

In \textit{How to Observe}, Martineau (1838a: 64) also contends that the “pedestrian journey presupposes abundance of time” allowing the observer the flexibility of resting “in villages on rainy days, and in the shade of a wood during the hours when the sun is too powerful.” While this was certainly the case during her tour of America, Martineau did not have this luxury during her tour of the East because of her party’s fairly strict travel schedule.

Martineau (1848: 334) took every opportunity that presented itself to travel by foot, regardless of environmental conditions, even preferring it to the “evil” of camel riding, choosing instead to walk “fourteen miles, in excessive heat” because she “had a rough-paced camel.” Such was the case during the entirety of her Eastern travels.

Martineau (1848: 160) consistently abandoned available comforts in favor of

opportunities to observe directly and experience firsthand the character of the physical environment, on occasion absentmindedly risking her own safety in her lust for an observational experience.

As for myself, I walked much on shore, and was frequently wandering away by myself among the ruins or in the fields: and I had no reason to consider myself imprudent—except indeed about the dogs. I was incessantly forgetting that Egyptian dogs are dangerous—being trained to attack strangers.

Martineau’s preference for direct observation was almost limitless, and she did not permit the observance of social convention to prevent her from doing so.

Intending to investigate the Egyptian temple at Adfoo, Martineau (1848: 150) and her party walked “about a mile through millet patches, stubble, and dust.” Upon their arrival, they discovered the only access to the temple chambers was by way of a “hole like entrance” (Martineau 1848: 150). They found themselves “crawling about, like crocodiles, on the sand within, there being barely room, in some places, to squeeze one’s prostrate body between the dust and the roof” (Martineau 1848: 150). Martineau’s (1848: 150) characterization of this experience as “something of an adventure” is remarkable when one contemplates this Victorian woman wearing the cumbersome garb of her day while low-crawling her way through narrow, dusty passages. Martineau (1848) gave a similar account of her party’s investigation of the Great Pyramid at Geezah. Clearly, Martineau sought to maximize her observational powers at every turn, favoring the vantage point of the pedestrian over all others. Martineau’s motivation for her dedication to direct observation was to enhance the quality of the data she collected.
**Documentation**

In *How to Observe*, Martineau (1838) is adamant about the necessity for diligent, structured documentation on the part of the observer. To be an astute observer, one must utilize three tools: a query list, a journal, and a notebook. Martineau (1838: 232) acknowledges the tedium associated with data collection but reminds the observer that adhering to this methodological practice will “guard against some of the effects of the seizures of apathy.” Of the three tools at the observer’s disposal, Martineau (1838: 232) argues that the query list is most useful in stimulating “flagging attention.”

While Martineau does not explicitly mention the use of query lists in *Eastern Life*, she does imply their use. “I hardly know what it is in these Eastern countries which disposes one to reverie: but I verily thought, that the whole journey through, and especially at Cairo, that I was losing my observing faculties,—so often had I to rouse myself…to heed what was before my eyes” (Martineau 1848: 245). Regardless of the challenges she met while observing, Martineau (1848) was diligent in recording her observations and relied upon her documentation fully while writing *Eastern Life*, reporting only what she believed to be true based on direct observation, which she verified against the observations of her travel companions.

In addition to her use of query lists, Martineau (1848: 298) was committed to journalizing, burdensome as she found it.

One’s journal is the chief nuisance in such travel as ours. There is no pleasure in it, one way or another... a perpetual irritation and mortification. It is such a mockery! When one’s whole soul has been full and glowing for hours among marvelous scenes and new experiences, the only result in one’s journal is a couple
of pages of record which one wants to tear out as soon as written, in indignation at its poverty. But the deepest mortification of this kind is better than not keeping a journal.

In *Eastern Life*, Martineau (1848: 298) admitted to twice letting “two or three days pass” without journalizing. Aside from these lapses, Martineau adhered to her daily duty as well as regular use of her notebook.

Martineau (1848) mentions using her notebook (recall its purpose being for sketching) only a handful of times in *Eastern Life*; however, one need only to read any one of the plethora of detailed accounts of all that she observed while traveling in the East. One of Martineau’s (1848: 115) most notable descriptions is that of her observations of the Colossi along the Nile, quoted here only in part as it spans more than four pages.

The small figures which stand beside the colossi and between their ankles, and which look like dolls, are not, as sometimes said, of human size. The hat of a man of five feet ten inches does not reach their chins by two inches. These small figures are, to my eye, the one blemish of this temple. They do not make the great Ramases look greater, but only look dollish themselves.

This passage is selected only as an illustration of Martineau’s obvious attention to objective detail. Martineau’s entire account of her observation of the Colossi is not only objective but demonstrative the rich literary style for which Martineau (1848: 115) is known.

*Available editions of Eastern Life* do not include the drawings that Martineau reports making during her tour of the East. There is no doubt, however, that she made
them based on the richness of detail in her report. Martineau (1877) did not begin writing *Eastern Life* until some months after her return from her Eastern Tour. It is unlikely that she was able to “draw” such precise, detailed verbal “sketches” from memory alone. Martineau’s visual and verbal “sketches” serve as evidence of an innovative methodological practice that has become a major ethnographic tool since Martineau’s era.

Also lacking in *Eastern Life* is an explicit timeline of Martineau’s tour of the East. While Martineau mentions precise dates of arrival at and departure from certain locations, she does so irregularly which challenges the reader to do so on her behalf in order to fully appreciate the chronological progression of her observation. This is especially challenging for the reader in relation to her party’s return visit to Cairo in February 1847. In her account of that visit, Martineau seemingly provides inaccurate dates, which confuses a reader’s understanding of when her observations were made (i.e., during the first versus second visit to Cairo). It is unclear as to why this possible inaccuracy may have occurred, but it is likely owing to Martineau’s flagging attention while in Cairo as previously mentioned, which she acknowledged as one of several methodological problems she encountered while observing in the East.

*Methodological Problems*

Being unable to speak Arabic, Martineau was keenly aware of her disadvantage in not being able converse directly with the people she encountered. “Nothing need be said on a matter so obvious as the necessity of understanding the language of the people visited…[d]ifference of language is undeniably a cause of great suffering and difficulty, magnificent and incalculable as are its uses” (Martineau 1838a: 67-68). The “great suffering and difficulty” to which Martineau refers is that of misunderstanding. Even if
the observer is able to learn the language spoken by the people visited, or if the people visited have learned the language of the observer, there is always miscommunication. Both the observer and the observed may rely too heavily upon the choice of words and inflection used, reading linguistic nuance into the conversation where there is none and missing nuance when there. Martineau (1848: 69) cautions the observer that during “this process, a common and almost unavoidable mistake is to suppose a too solemn and weighty meaning in what is expressed in an unfamiliar language” leading the observer to make too “much of mere trivialities, because they reached him clothed in the mystery of a strange language.” The responsibility of understanding falls upon the observer; and if understanding is not possible through conversation, the observer must rely upon other sources of data.

While Martineau (1848: 71) conceived of her premise on the linguistic challenges of observing in a foreign culture while traveling from England to America, it was confirmed in comical fashion as she and her party traveled up the Nile.

It was impossible to obtain any information from the Arabs. Pantomime may go a good way with any people in Europe, from a general affinity of ideas, and of their signs, which prevails over a continent where there is nearly uniform civilization. But it avails nothing, and is even misleading, between Europeans and the natives of Oriental countries. Our gentlemen were much given to pantomime, in the absence of an interpreter; and it was amusing to me to see, with the practiced eye of a deaf person, how invariably they were misunderstood; and often, when they had no suspicion of this themselves. They naturally employed many conventional signs; and, of course, so did the Arabs: and such confusion arose out of this that I
begged my friends never to put down in their journals any information which they believed they had obtained by means of pantomime.

In addition to the disadvantages of being unable to converse with Arabic speakers during her tour of Egypt, Martineau (1848) was equally disadvantaged in relation to written Arabic, which was apparent during their passage through the Sinai region.

Martineau’s (1848) party traveled through Sinai by way of passage through numerous wadees.40,41 The walls of rock lining many of the wadees were inscribed with Arabic script, none of which Martineau could read. Nonetheless, Martineau (1848) was not deterred. It is apparent that Martineau (1848: 316) either sketched the script or took etchings as she was able to detect variations among the wadees.

From this time, we saw many inscriptions on the rocks, as we passed up through the narrow wadee called El Ledja. The character is of the same unreadable kind as in Wadee Mokatteb42 and at Mount Serbal, and proves that scribes of the class that went there had been here also.

In this instance, Martineau demonstrates one approach available to the skilled observer for overcoming a linguistic challenge and deriving information from unfamiliar written language by taking note of the variation in Arabic script.

As previously mentioned, Martineau, being deaf, met with certain challenges as an observer. However, Martineau found her deafness advantageous at times, which is

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41 Martineau, Harriet. 1848. *Eastern Life, Present and Past*. Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard. The wadees through which Martineau and her party traveled were dry, carrying water only during episodes of rainfall.

apparent in her “pantomime report.” Martineau’s (1848: 63) use of an ear trumpet proved to be a fascination to the natives she encountered along the Nile.

Here, as everywhere, my ear trumpet was handled and examined with quick curiosity; and in almost every case, from Nubia to the Lebanon, the immediate conclusion was the same. The inquirers put the small end to their lips, and gave a satisfied nod. It was clearly a pipe, with an enormous bowl! At Aswan, however, we staid long enough for the people to discover what the trumpet was for; and from the moment of the discovery, they did their best to enable me to do without it.

Martineau (1848: 268) had a similar experience while visiting with the women of a harem in Damascus.

But the greatest amusement was my trumpet. The eldest widow, who sat next me, asked for it, and put it to her ear; when I said “Bo!” When she had done laughing, she put it into her next neighbor’s ear, and said “Bo!” and in this way it came round to me again.

In both cases, Martineau was able to engage with people under circumstances that would not have come about for a hearing observer.

Martineau (1838) contends that the deaf observer has a distinct advantage with regard to human discourse. “The Deaf Traveller is able to furnish us with more knowledge of foreign people than Fine-Ear himself could have done without the accompaniments of analytical power and concentrative thought” (Martineau 1838a: 27).

Martineau (1838: 27) concedes, however, that “deaf travelers must suffer under a deprivation or deficiency of certain classes of facts.” In which case, Martineau relied
upon her travel companions and tangible sources of information for validation of such facts.

Martineau did find her ear trumpet bothersome under certain circumstances. “I was unwilling to carry my trumpet up the Pyramid—knocking against the stones while I wanted my hands for climbing” (Martineau 1848: 217). Curiously, Martineau (1848: 217) reports that during her party’s three-hour exploration of the Great Pyramid at Geezah she did not miss the trumpet at all saying that she had “heard as well without it as with it, all that time.”

In addition to her deafness, Martineau was also disadvantaged as an English woman traveling in Egypt where veiling was common in certain communities. Martineau felt that veiling as an English woman was disingenuous and did not do so. As she and her party made their way among the bazaars of Aysoot, Martineau bore the weight of this decision.

I now began to feel the misery which every woman has to endure in the provincial towns of the East,—the being stared at by all eyes. The staring was not rude or offensive, but it was enough to be very disagreeable; at least to one who knew, as I did that the appearance of a woman with an uncovered face is an indecency in the eyes of the inhabitants…yet, I would not advise any Englishwoman to alter her dress or ways. She can never, in a mere passage through an Eastern country, make herself look like an Eastern Woman; and an unsupported assumption of any native custom will obtain for her no respect, but only make her appear ashamed of her own origin and ways. It is better to appear as she is, at any cost, than to attempt any degree of imposture. (Martineau 1848: 42-43)
While in Cairo, Martineau (1848) experienced similar but more overt expressions of disapproval, being spit upon by one passerby and slapped in the face with a millet-stalk by another. While Martineau’s (1848: 42) decision not to veil, the “greatest penalty of [her] Eastern travel,” was based on principle, it was also a choice founded in her desire not to “omit seeing anything on account” of a veil.

As she traveled in the Sinai desert, Martineau (1848) made two attempts at veiling. Feeling encumbered by “the weight of an umbrella and the stifling of a veil,” Martineau (1848: 313) opted instead to wear wire-mesh goggles and a brimmed hat, willing to allow her fair skin to tan in order to maximize her observational abilities. Martineau’s two trials at wearing a veil in Sinai were the only times she did so.

Despite her experiences with veiling, being an English woman in a foreign culture had its advantages. Martineau (1848) and Mrs. Yates were permitted extended visits at harems in Cairo and Damascus, an experience the men of her party were denied. Only male family members and eunuchs working within as servants were permitted access to harems. While Martineau (1848) despised the notion of a harem, she felt “it would be wrong to pass them over in an account of my travels; though the subject is as little agreeable as any I can have to treat.” Martineau’s disdain for harems was not based on any form of religious or cultural intolerance. Rather, Martineau (1848) was appalled by the constraints of the harem as a social institution placed upon not only the women of the harem but the eunuchs as well, which is discussed at greater length later in this chapter.

Martineau also experienced methodological challenges as a woman in terms of safety beyond that of the aggressiveness of Egyptian dogs. The wildness of the Sinai region presented a particular challenge to Martineau’s safety. In fact, had Martineau and
her travel companions attempted passage through Sinai without a guide, they would have likely met an ill fate. Even with their guide, Sheikh Hussein who proved to be unscrupulous, Martineau (1848: 368) and her party experienced a close brush with death as they traveled north from Petra through the desert north toward Palestine.

Then, what a hubbub there was! The guards were mustered, the camels driven together in a mass, the sheikhs flying about, and giving notice that we were to be attacked by Bedoueens from behind the sandhills. The matchlocks were made ready, and swords and knives looked [sic] too…Long afterwards, when we were in Syria, we learned that the matter was indeed serious. Sheikh Hussein was smuggling us through the territory of a tribe with whom he should have shared the money paid for our passage. [Sheikh Hussein] was really terrified, but pacified the Bedoueens by some means, so that they let us pass now: then they rose on him, on his return, shot his beautiful horse under him, and killed six of our escort.

Poor fellows! It was no fault of theirs. There is no doubt that Martineau, had she been traveling alone, would not have been able to navigate the peculiarities of the Sinai desert culture as a woman, especially having no understanding of Arabic.

The mechanical requisites and methods presented by Martineau in *How to Observe* call for systematic methodological practice on the part of the observer. There are two aspects to such practice. First, the observer must make every effort to observe directly; and second, the observer must record observations objectively and consistently. While both aspects of Martineau’s methodological practice seem simple in concept, neither is easy in terms of practical application, especially that of recording observations.
Martineau (1848) found it challenging to journalize and sketch while riding donkeys, horses, and especially camels. During her travels through the Sinai region, Martineau (1848) frequently elected to dismount her camel and walk through the desert, apart from her travel companions. This resulted in many uninterrupted hours of solitary observation, which is methodologically problematic in terms of verification of her observations. While she was observing directly, she and her travel companions were not observing simultaneously and they, therefore, could not confirm or disconfirm her recorded observations.

In terms of mechanical requisites and methods, Martineau consistently adhered to the methodology set forth in *How to Observe* as she observed in the East, making it possible for her to overcome the majority of the methodological challenges with which she met. However, Martineau’s adherence to mechanical requisites and methods alone were not sufficient to demonstrate faithfulness to a systematic methodology of observation. The skilled observer must also adhere to philosophical and moral requisites.

**Philosophical and moral perspectives**

Martineau argues that mechanical methods are useless if the observer fails to employ sound philosophical and moral perspectives. “He may see, and hear, and record, and infer, and conclude for ever [sic]; and he will still not understand if his heart be idle, —if he have not sympathy” (Martineau 1838a: 239). The sympathy to which Martineau refers is based on a philosophical and moral understanding one’s intellectual orientations and biases and how they might color one’s observations.
Philosophical

The truths at which Martineau arrived following her tour of the East were based on critical observations grounded in her adherence to the philosophical and moral requisites set forth in her methodology. Philosophically, Martineau’s perspectives as she observed were that of cultural relativism, necessarianism, and utilitarianism. In combination, these perspectives comprise the requisite philosophical principle Martineau employed as she observed.

As she traveled the Nile, Martineau was deeply inspired by the monuments of the ancient Egyptians, so much so that she devoted an entire chapter in *Eastern Life* to presenting a historical sketch of ancient Egyptian civilization. In doing so, Martineau demonstrated the necessity for a culturally relativistic perspective when searching for the truth as an observer. Martineau (1848: 107) offered an eloquent argument to that end, quoted here at length.

> With all Men’s tendency to praise the olden time,—to say that the former times are better than these,—we find that it is usually only the wisdom of their own forefathers that they extol;—merely a former mode of holding and acting upon their own existing ideas. They have no such praise for the forefathers of another race, who had other ideas, and acted them out differently. Instead of endeavouring to ascertain the ideas, they revile or ridicule the manifestation which was never meant to meet their conceptions, and can never be interpreted by them. Thus we, as a society, take it upon ourselves to abhor and utterly despise the ‘Idolatry’ of the Egyptians, without asking ourselves whether we comprehend anything of the principles of Egyptian theology. The children on their stools by
our firesides wonder eternally how people so clever could be so silly as to pay homage to crocodiles and cats: and their parents to often agree with them, instead of pointing out that there might be, and certainly were, reasons in the minds of Egyptians which made it a very different thing in them to cherish sacred animals from what it would be in us. Everybody at home talks of the ugly and grotesque character of the Egyptian works of art: and no wonder, if they judge, with English mind and English eyes, from broken specimens in the British Museum. One can only ask them to trust something to the word of travellers who have seen such works in their plenitude, in their own locality and proper connexion. Probably some people in Greece were talking of the ugly and grotesque character of such Egyptian decorations as they might have heard of, while Herodotus was gazing on them on their native soil, and declaring in his own mind, as he afterwards did to the whole world and to all time, that they were “admirable and beyond expression.” I would ask for the considerations to be borne in mind, not only for the sake of justice to the earliest philosophers of the human race, (as far as we know) but because it is impossible to appreciate the monuments,—I may say impossible to see them,—through any other medium than that of a teachable mind, working with a sympathising heart.

It was Martineau’s “teachable mind” and “sympathizing heart” that allowed her to embrace the ideas presented in and among the ancient Egyptian monuments. These two qualities represent Martineau’s culturally relativistic stance as an observer.

The “ideas of mankind” is a recurring theme throughout *Eastern Life* and evidence of Martineau’s necessarian perspective. For Martineau, the monuments
themselves in addition to the art and inscriptions in and upon them constitute the history books of the ancient Egyptians. Martineau (1848: 89) classifies “two orders of ancient historians,—both inestimable in their way, —the Poets who perpetuate national Ideas, and the Historians who perpetuate national Facts.” Martineau (1848: 89) argues that it is the observer’s job to “separate the true ideas from their environment of fiction.” While she observed in the East, this is exactly what Martineau set out to do.

Martineau observed not only evidence of the ideas of ancient Egyptians and those of then contemporary Egyptians but the origins of those ideas as well. Collectively, the cultures and societies of ancient and contemporary Egypt which Martineau studied and observed were greatly influenced by their geographical situation, about which she said,

[T]he sand of the desert has, for many thousand years, shared equally with the Nile the function of determining the character and the destiny of a whole people, who have again operated powerfully on the characters and destiny of other nations. Everywhere, the minds and fortunes of human races are mainly determined by the characteristics of the soil on which they are born and reared.

(Martineau 1848: 46)

This passage serves as an exemplar of Martineau’s understanding of the relationship between geographic conditions and sociocultural phenomena. Martineau viewed this relationship between the Egyptian people, the desert, and the Nile as both influence and outcome of intervening forces at work, the very essence of necessarianism.

Martineau’s perspectives of cultural relativism and necessarianism in combination are the theoretical orientation from which she makes her observations and then tests from a utilitarian perspective. Martineau’s grand consideration is the evaluative criteria by
which she measures the character and nature of her observations. In *Eastern Life*, there are two notable examples of such an evaluation, her interpretation of her observations on ideas of liberty with regard to harems and polygamy and *corvée* labor and conscription.

Martineau (1848) devoted an entire chapter to the topic of harems and polygamy, both of which she viewed as cultural artifacts. Her critical assessment of harems and polygamy was not an indictment of Muslim culture. Rather, Martineau (1848: 260) was critical of the “accursed system.” The lives of men and women alike had been co-opted in service of an oppressive cultural practice. Martineau viewed the harem as a violation of the grand consideration in that human happiness through full employment of one’s body and mind was not possible.

According to Deborah Logan (2010), Martineau has been characterized by contemporary Muslim feminist scholars as anti-feminist and ethnocentric. Martineau’s (1848: 259, 266) comparison of harems to “Lunatic Asylums, or even Prisons” certainly smacks of a Western ethnocentric attitude as does her characterization of polygamy as “virtual slavery.” However, when considering the entirety of Martineau’s corpus, such criticism is superficial and unwarranted. Martineau (1838a) was a lifelong advocate for human rights and social justice. Martineau’s concern was not with adherence to Western cultural customs and practices but with the maximization of individual happiness and productivity regardless of cultural context.

With regard to *corvée* labor and conscription, Martineau witnessed firsthand the influence of oppressive governance while traveling the Nile. Egyptian people engaged in self-mutilation to avoid both under Ibrahim Pasha (1789-1848), about which Martineau (1848: 26) said,
There must be some ground for the horror which impels a whole population to such practices as are every day seen in Egypt, to keep out of the reach and the ken of government:—practices such as putting out an eye, pulling out the teeth necessary for biting cartridges, and cutting off a forefinger, to incapacitate men for army service. The fear of every other sort of conscription, besides that for the supply of the army, is no less urgent; and it is a common practice for parents to incapacitate their children for reading and writing by putting out an eye, and cutting of the forefinger of the right hand. Any misfortune is to be encountered rather than that of entering the Pasha’s army, the Pasha’s manufactories, the Pasha’s schools. This can hardly be all baseless folly on the part of the people. If questioned, they could at least point to the twenty-three thousand deaths which took place in six months, in the making of the Mahmoudieh Canal.

Aside from patterns of physical abnormalities among the Egyptian people, Martineau observed institutional evidence of the influence of corrupt governance.

While touring the bazaars at Aswan, Martineau (1848) inquired as to the town’s population and learned that it had not been possible to conduct a census. Because of the people’s fear of not only conscription but also increased taxation, Martineau (1848: 64) concluded that the “last thing that can be learned of any Egyptian town or district is its population.” In the case of corvée labor and conscription, both represent for Martineau extreme violations of the grand consideration.
In both examples of her observation-based interpretations, Martineau’s philosophical perspectives are apparent. She demonstrates sensitivity to and awareness of cultural and social context while strictly adhering to the utilitarian principle of the grand consideration as she interprets. Martineau also demonstrates an adherence to the moral requisites of her methodology.

*Moral*

Martineau consistently strove for the requisite liberality of mind necessary to maintain an awareness of her personal biases as she observed, about which she commented several times in *Eastern Life*. Martineau (1848: 90) warned other observers to do the same saying, “Modern inquirers must beware of interpreting what they see by their own favourite ideas.” Prior to observing in harems in Cairo and Damascus, Martineau was aware of the challenges she would face as she did so, about which she said,

Before I went abroad, more than one sensible friend had warned me to leave behind as many prejudices as possible; and especially on this subject, on which prejudices of Europeans are the strongest. I was reminded of the wide extent, both of time and space, in which Polygamy had existed; and that openness of mind was as necessary to the accurate observation of this institution as of every other. I had really taken this advice to heart. (Martineau 1848: 260)

While deliberately cognizant of her potential biases with regard to harems and polygamy, Martineau did fall upon her own “favourite ideas” during her tour of the East and acknowledged as much.
As her party approached Hebron, Martineau (1848: 380) experienced “momentary ill-will” as she observed the presence of a mosque built over the Cave of Machpelah.43 “I was presently ashamed of the absurd and illiberal emotion; and, as I looked upon the minaret, felt that the Mohammedans had as much right to build over sacred places as the Empress Helena: though one must heartily wish they had all let it alone” (Martineau 1848: 380). Martineau’s self-awareness in this instance is commendable, but she overlooked a similar error in thinking. In her criticism of a Dr. Abbott of Cairo who had possession of the gold ring of Cheops, Martineau (1848: 226) declared that “precious ring…ought to be in the British museum.” Such a declaration is telling of a colonial mentality.

In addition to admonitions against cultural bias, Martineau (1848) also cautioned observers to be wary of allegiance to personal beliefs in the presence of contradictory facts. In her historical sketch of ancient Egyptian civilization, Martineau (1848) challenges what today is referred to as Young Earth Creationism, which posits that the Earth is approximately six thousand years old (Roberts 2006). Using classical and contemporary sources, Martineau (1848) presents a hermeneutical analysis denying the validity of such a hypothesis which likely earned Eastern Life its reputation as a “conspiracy against Moses.” Aware of the radical nature of her analysis, Martineau (1848: 90) said encouragingly, “People who enter Egypt with the belief that the human race has existed only six thousand years…must undergo a …revolution of ideas.” Martineau experienced such a revolution while observing in the East, which is discussed in detail in the section on Martineau’s sociology of religion.

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43 The Cave of Machpelah is Abraham’s burial site according to Biblical scripture (Genesis 23; 25:9; 49:30; and 50:13).
Conclusion

While observing in the East, Martineau adhered to the methodology she set forth in *How to Observe*. Martineau’s methodological preparation was thorough. She maintained a rigorous mechanical method of recording her observations. Moreover, Martineau’s observations as presented in *Eastern Life* reveal a consistent philosophical and moral stance founded cultural relativism and necessarianism which she tested against her utilitarian principle of the grand consideration. In short, Martineau adheres to the systematic sociological methodology she set forth in *How to Observe* while observing in the East.

Martineau’s account of her travels in *Eastern Life*, aside from standing as an exemplar of her employment of her systematic sociological methodology, is more importantly a treatise on the social institution of religion. Martineau acknowledges the ubiquitous nature of religion as a social institution but does not find it fully supportive of progress or the development of humankind. The entirety of Martineau’s sociological conception of religion, however, spans a variety of her works which will be more closely examined in the next chapter.
CHAPTER V: MARTINEAU’S SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION

Introduction

Of her tour of the East as a whole, Martineau (1877, i: 538) said in her autobiography that “when reconsidered in the quiet of [her] study…[she] obtained clearness as to the historical nature and moral value of all theology whatever”. Some years before, Martineau (Martineau's emphasis, 1877, i: 546) had begun to question the usefulness of religion.

As it was, I was very religious (far beyond the knowledge and intentions of my parents) till I was quite grown up. I don’t know what I should have done without my faith; for I was an unhealthy and most unhappy child, and had no other resource. Yet it used to strike me often, and most painfully that, whatever relief and comfort my religion gave to my feelings, it did not help me much against my faults.

Martineau felt that religion excluded moral action from the basic obligations of social existence in that adherents give authority over their behavior to God rather than assuming any personal obligation to moral action.

Martineau judged the effectiveness of religion as a moral compass by the state of the society in which it existed. In a letter to her intellectual confident Henry George Atkinson dated November 7, 1847, written five months after her return from the East, Martineau (Martineau's emphasis, 1877, i: 541) declared,

I must speak as diffidently as I truly feel, and as simply as possible. One thing (which I am to work out tomorrow) I cannot be wrong in;—in claiming for the old heathens the same rule we claim to be judged by. If
we refuse to have our faith judged by our state of society, we must not conclude on theirs by their state of society. If we estimate our moral ideas by the minds of our best thinkers, we must estimate theirs by their philosophers, and not by the commonalty. Insisting on this, I think I can show that we have no right to despise either their faith or their best men.

Using this perspective as she observed in the East, Martineau (1848) came to realize the subjective nature of religion as a social institution, understood and expressed based on individual and collective interpretations of social values. As formative as it was, Martineau’s sociological study of religion as a social institution began long before her Eastern experience.

Based on her observations in America ten years prior, Martineau established the basis of her sociological theory of religion, which she set forth in Society in America. Martineau (1837, ii: 314) characterized the universal belief in the supernatural as the “‘tendency of human nature to the Infinite ;’ and its principle is manifested in the pursuit of perfection in any direction whatever.” To understand this manifestation, Martineau (Martineau's emphasis, 1837, ii: 329) distinguished between religious spirit and practice and theology or the “science of religion.”

RELIGION has suffered from nothing, throughout all Christendom, more that from its science having been mixed up with its spirit and practice. The spirit and practice of religion come out of morals; but its science comes out of history also; with chronology, philology, and other collateral kinds of knowledge.
Religious spirit and practice is “exclusively private and individual” and a function of individual morals (Martineau 1837, ii: 314). Religious spirit and practice is available to all. The science of religion, on the other hand, is for the few who have the “comprehension of mind and range of knowledge which are requisite for investigating spiritual relations” (Martineau 1837, ii: 329). Martineau (1837, ii: 329) contends that the sociological investigation of religion must be dependent upon the study of “all its manifestations in individuals and societies” in order to arrive at a truthful conclusion. Through her study of religion in multiple contexts, Martineau (1837; 1848) concluded that religion as a social institution is unique to the character of the individuals, cultures, and societies in which it resides.

While Martineau did not present her sociological theory of religion comprehensively in one singular treatise, an examination of certain of her works, specifically *Society in America*, *How to Observe*, and *Eastern Life*, reveals a theory based on three premises: (1) a universal belief in the supernatural, (2) the subjective meaning of that universal belief in particular societies based on prevailing experiences and ideas, and (3) the evolution of that subjective meaning in relation to extra-religious influences. Belief in the supernatural, expression of that belief, and the influence of social context contribute to and define religion and its administration and spirit.

**Religious Administration and Spirit**

Martineau leans heavily upon her necessarian perspective in her conceptualization of the origins and influences of religious administration and spirit. Martineau (1877, i: 541) contends that “[m]en’s faculties exist complete, and pretty much alike, in all ages.” Based on that understanding, Martineau (1837) attributes the diversity of religious
administration and spirit to individual agency in certain cultural and social contexts and the dialectic relationship between ideas and experiences.

Religious administration and spirit are separate but not mutually exclusive realms from Martineau's point of view. The organizing principle is a universal belief in the supernatural; but in both realms, orientation toward the supernatural is distinct (Martineau 1837). Religious administration, meaning its organization as a social institution, is grounded in its outward orientation to and understanding of the supernatural and is a reflection of its subjective meaning in cultural and social context (Martineau 1837). In their respective social contexts, each form of religious administration exists as the cumulative product of historical knowledge and tradition and the contemporary influences of its religious leaders who serve as organizational administrators (Martineau 1837).

Religious spirit, on the other hand, is the domain of the individual and is grounded in spiritual attitudes that have no basis in the supernatural but instead are dependent upon the subjective understanding of the individual’s cultural and social context (Martineau 1837). The religious spirit of the individual is oriented inwardly toward some form of self-perfection. This inward orientation exists and is outwardly expressed in context. If this were not the case, one would expect all religious spirit as well as all forms of religious administration to be universal in character. Martineau’s explication of charity illustrates this point.

Martineau (1838a: 216) contends that charity is a universal moral characteristic; the “form which this charity takes is the great question.” As a universal characteristic of religious administration, Martineau (1848) witnessed the varying character of charity
among the cultures and societies she observed in the East. Martineau attributed this variation to the prevailing faith and unique qualities of each respective culture and society.

In Egypt and Nubia, charity was given on an individual basis to meet immediate needs, what Martineau (1838a: 216) classifies as the “lowest order of charity.” Martineau observed and participated in this form of charity throughout the entirety of her Eastern tour. Martineau and her party were continually assailed for “baksheesh” (alms) by the Egyptians and Nubians as they traveled the Nile. While in Jerusalem, Martineau (1838a: 216) observed a higher order of charity, which she characterizes as “that which makes provision on a large scale.” Plans were being made to organize a “House of Industry” (Martineau 1848: 405) in support of Jews who had been ostracized by their community following their conversion to Christianity. Martineau’s (1838a: 216) classification of charity includes a third form, “higher still…when such provision is made in the way of anticipation.” Martineau (1848: 500) observed this highest order of charity in Syria in the form of an established Christian leper hospital in Damascus. The significance of the variation in the forms of charity centers on the context in which each is found.

As a universal characteristic of religious administration, one would expect to find consistencies in the nature of charity regardless of culture, society, or faith. Instead, the forms of charity Martineau observed in the East were dependent upon the spiritual attitudes of the people as individuals as well as the social context of their respective cultures or societies. In this way, Martineau demonstrates that charity is a subjective aspect of religious administration within a given culture or society as well as a subjective
expression of religious spirit of its members. While religious doctrine in general universally promotes the practice of charity, its practical application is subject to the moral character of the prevailing form religious administration as well as the moral character of its respective adherents, both of which vary in relation to “typologies of spirit.”

**Typologies of Spirit**

In *How to Observe*, Martineau (1838a: 78) presents three religious typologies: licentious, ascetic, and moderate. The distinction among the three is not based on doctrinal characteristics. Rather, Martineau characterizes these as typologies of religious spirit. Licentious spirit worships “unspiritualised nature,—material objects and their movements, and the primitive passions of man” (Martineau 1838a: 78). In other words, licentious spirit worships natural phenomena as sources of good and evil through ritualized behavior focusing on self-indulgence. “It may show itself,” for example, “among the Hindoos dipping in the Ganges, or among Christians who accept absolution” (Martineau 1838a: 79).

Ascetic spirit “despises nature, and worships its [own] artificial restraints” (Martineau 1838a: 78). Also ritualistic in nature, ascetic spirit worships its own “extravagant self-denial” as “proofs of holiness” and devotion (Martineau 1838a: 79). Martineau (1838a: 79, 80) gives as examples those who “serve God by a slothful life in monastic celibacy” or the Fakirs (Muslim Sufi ascetics) who allow “their nails [to] grow through the back of their hands.”

Moderate spirit worships “spiritualized nature,—God in his works, both in the material universe, and in the disciplined human mind with its regulated affections”
Moderate spirit, according to Martineau (1838a: 80), is the least ritualized of the three typologies, concerned not with pursuit of worship but a temperament of worship striving toward purity of spirit.

In addition to aspects of ritualism, Martineau characterizes each typology with regard to the nature of its associated morals. “The dependence of morals upon the character of the religion is clear” (Martineau 1838a: 80). Licentious and ascetic spirit have a low moral state, according to Martineau, evidenced by their concern with “self,” self-indulgence in the case of licentious religion and self-denial for ascetic. In either case, there is little regard for morally right action based on the grand consideration, meaning how religion as a social institution contributes to the greatest amount of human happiness in a society. Religious spirit among licentious and ascetic believers is not driven by an orientation toward the supernatural as the motivating source of morally right action. Rather, it is driven by individual understanding of the supernatural in culturally and socially specific contexts of religious administration. Moderate spirit, on the other hand, is characterized by a higher moral state by virtue of its focus on and concern for morally right action. Only the moderate typology of spirit, according to Martineau (1838a), has potential for satisfying the grand consideration.

Martineau (1838a) argues that morally right action is the basis of social progress, which is significant in terms of her typologies of spirit in relation to cultural and social evolution. Lengermann and Niebrugge (2001:95) contend that Martineau “does not tie [these typologies] to a system of evolution of the whole society”. However, a close examination of Martineau’s works reveals the opposite.
Religion and Progress

Martineau does not explicitly discuss societal evolution in relation to her definition of the typologies of spirit. Were one to evaluate Martineau’s characterization of these typologies only in the context within which they appeared, meaning in How to Observe, they might seem disconnected. The typologies are, however, part of her sociological theory of religion, which becomes apparent when examining her conceptualizations of religion across time.

The organizing principle in Martineau’s sociological theory of religion is, as stated, a universal belief in the supernatural. How that belief is expressed is dependent upon the prevailing values of a given culture or society as shaped by the environmental and geographical context in which that culture or society exists as well as its temporal context. The importance of the relationship between time and space as influences on religion in relation to societal evolution cannot be overstated. To understand Martineau’s perspective in this regard, it is necessary to appreciate her focus on the grand consideration in terms of societal progress.

Above all else, Martineau held the progress of humankind in highest esteem. The collective development of humanity is possible only when each individual culture or society functions with the grand consideration as its fundamental purpose. Each individual must be allowed to function to his or her highest potential, both physically and intellectually. Martineau (Martineau's emphasis, 1838a: 209) argues that when this highest order of individual utility is muted then societal progress is impeded.

HOWEVER widely men may differ as to the way to social perfection, all whose minds have turned in that direction agree as to the end. All agree
that if the whole race could live as brethren, society would be in the most advanced state that can be conceived of. It is also agreed that the spirit of fraternity is to be attained, if at all, by men discerning their mutual relation, as “parts and proportions of one wondrous whole.”

In relation to this fraternal spirit, Martineau (1838a: 217) asserts that charity is central to this fraternal spirit.

When a culture or society’s state of progress is such that individual utility is impeded, for whatever reason, charity supplants the individual’s ability to achieve success. “As long as there are, in every country of the world, multitudes who cannot by any exertion of their own redeem themselves from hardship, and their children from ignorance, this is quite enough for justice and charity to do at home” (Martineau 1838a: 210). As a universal characteristic of religious administration and spirit, charity is necessary to promote the development of humankind. Charity is the “one great principle of...religion which has ever nourished the morals of mankind” (Martineau 1838a: 210). In this way, Martineau associates religion with social progress.

Taken together, Martineau’s explication of religious administration and spirit, typologies of spirit, and the relationship between religion and social progress constitute her conceptualization of religion as a social institution. In addition, Martineau (1877, i: 538) characterizes religion as a stage in human progress.

It was evident to me, in a way which it could never have been if I had not wandered amidst the old monuments and scenes of the various faiths, that a passage through these latter faiths is as natural to men, and was as necessary in those former periods of human progress, as fetishism is to the
infant nations and individuals, without the notion of being more true in the
one case than in the other.

Martineau’s positivist views are apparent in this passage. She arrived at this
collection based on principled, empirical observation.

Preeminence

While she does not present an organized sociological theory of religion in one
complete volume, Martineau’s (1837; 1838a; 1848) conceptualizations of religion in
*Society in America, How to Observe*, and *Eastern Life*, as well as her autobiography,
represent one of the earliest if not the first explication of religion from a sociological
perspective, predating those of Durkheim (1915) and Weber (1963 (1922)) by decades,
both of whom are typically held to be the founders of the “sociology of religion.”

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Martineau’s (1838a) systematic sociological
methodology precedes Durkheim’s (1895) almost identical methodology by sixty years.
Both Martineau and Durkheim relied upon their respective methodologies which call for
empirically-based observation in their sociological study of religion. Both studied
primitive forms of religion, Martineau that of the ancient Egyptians and Durkheim of
Australian tribes (Durkheim 1915; Martineau 1848). Both conclude that religion and
religious values derive from society and social values and vice versa (Durkheim 1915;
Martineau 1837; Martineau 1838a).

There are notable similarities between Martineau and Weber as well. Both
Martineau and Weber rely upon conceptions of the supernatural in their sociological
theories of religion (Martineau 1837; Weber 1963 (1922)). Both contend that human
understanding of the supernatural influences human thought and behavior (Martineau
1837; Martineau 1838a; Weber 1963 (1922)). Both utilized typologies in their characterization of forms of religious spirit (Martineau 1838a; Weber 1963 (1922)). Both studied Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Martineau 1837; Martineau 1848; Weber 1963 (1922)). In the case of the latter, Weber was much less unsuccessful (Ruigh (forthcoming)).

Weber is believed to have written a significant monograph on Islam but it has never been found (Collins 2001). In contrast to the quality and thoroughness of his scholarship on Protestant ethic, Weber’s few available writings on Islam seem poorly informed. Weber (1963 (1922): 263) mischaracterizes Islam as a feudal, warrior religion founded on social class and thirteen “chief ordinances.” The supposition in this regard is that Weber relied upon secondary and tertiary sources which were themselves in accurate (Ruigh (forthcoming)). In this manner, Martineau and Weber differ vastly in that she relied upon empirical observation in her interpretation of social phenomena whereas Weber’s sociological methodology was not at all conducive to empirically-based research.

**Conclusion**

In her sociological theory of religion, Martineau delineates the origins and influences of religious belief derived from longitudinal, empirical observation. The most interesting feature of Martineau’s explication of her theory is its linear development and cohesiveness considering the breadth of time during which she studied religion as a social institution and formulated her theoretical stance.

As she observed in America from 1834 to 1836, Martineau developed her definition of universal belief in the supernatural, characterizations of typologies of spirit,
and the distinction between religious administration and practice. Martineau’s observations during her tour of the East in 1846 and 1847 led to her conceptualization of religion as a social institution subjectively influenced by the context of natural environment and individual agency over time. In her autobiography, Martineau presents her concluding sociological analysis of religion as a socially constructed phenomena and evolutionary stage in human development and progress. Regardless of its protracted development, Martineau’s sociological conceptualization of religion characterizes it as a social institution which is culturally and societally subjective and an evolutionary stage in human development.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

Harriet Martineau: Sociologist

Harriet Martineau was widely known in her time as a prolific professional writer and traveler. Even though she remains an obscure figure in sociological circles, Martineau is definitively a forerunner of sociology if not a founder, contributing the earliest known systematic sociological methodology and one of the earliest sociological accounts of American society. That Martineau is seldom recognized as such is likely owing to her multidimensional approach to the study of societies and cultures, conducted prior to the establishment of disciplinary boundaries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. An argument could be made that Martineau is more an anthropologist than a sociologist because of her study of the origins and organization of societies and cultures foreign to her own. However, examination of her corpus of work reveals that she also studied her own society and culture extensively. Further, Martineau focused not only on the origins and organization of certain societies and cultures but also on their institutions and how they influenced and contributed to their overall condition and development.

Martineau’s sociological contributions are remarkable considering her emergence on the scene as a Victorian woman during the Age of Enlightenment, an era when women enjoyed little opportunity in terms of intellectual development and public platform in patriarchal society. While she enjoyed literary and public fame during her lifetime, Martineau’s sociological corpus has yet to be fully appreciated. With How to Observe, Martineau provided her sociological peers and successors with a thoroughly systematic, scientific methodology, long before Durkheim articulated his celebrated methodological
framework. In addition, Martineau’s *Society in America, Retrospect of Western Travel*, and *Eastern Life* represent the seminal launch of scientifically-based, culturally-relativistic ethnographic study of the societies and cultures in America and the East. Moreover, Martineau formulated a sociological theory of religion based on direct, theoretically-founded, methodological observation well before Durkheim and Weber.

Käsler (1981) articulated five criteria for determining an individual’s status as a sociologist:45 (1) occupying a chair of a sociology department and/or teaching sociology; (2) holding membership in a sociological organization; (3) authorship or coauthorship of sociological articles or textbooks; (4) self-definition as a sociologist, and (5) definition by others as a sociologist. Of these criteria, only one needs to be met for an individual to be classified as a sociologist. Martineau did not hold membership in a sociological organization, self-identify as a sociologist, or occupy a chair of a sociology department, but not without good reason. The discipline of sociology had not yet been formally established. Martineau does, however, meet three of Käsler’s five criteria.

First, Martineau authored a vast number of sociological articles. The most notable example being a series of articles published in twenty-five installments as *Illustrations of Political Economy* (Martineau 1832-1834) (hereafter referred to as *Illustrations*). With *Illustrations*, Martineau’s (1832-1834) intent was to educate the British public at large on political economy, meaning the nature of the economic principles of production, buying, and selling as they relate to laws, customs, and government in addition to the distribution of national

income and wealth. Martineau presented these principles in the form of rational fiction in all but the last installment of the series, which was written as a non-fictional theoretical presentation of the key concepts of the science of political economy. Even if one considers only *Illustrations* and its immense popularity among her vast British audience, Martineau can certainly be considered a teacher of sociological concepts and theory. Second, *How to Observe* is undoubtedly a sociological textbook in that it presents a systematic, scientifically-based approach to objective, direct observation of society and culture, which remains today as a major position in contemporary sociology. Third, Martineau is recognized by numerous scholars as one of the earliest sociologists (Deegan 1991; Hill 1989b; Hoecker-Drysdale 1992; Lipset 1962; Rossi 1973; Spender 1982). Martineau is a sociologist.

**Harriet Martineau: Critical epistemologist**

When evaluating select works of Martineau, specifically her early sociological contributions in contrast with later works, one is struck by the transformation of her philosophical orientations and epistemologies. At the onset of her sociological career, Martineau’s philosophically theological orientation, which located the source of human happiness in God, was challenged by the truth she derived from her observations. Martineau’s experiences with reasoned, logical, objective, systematic observation of societies and cultures resulted in an epistemological shift. She came to view human happiness as an outcome of how the observed elements and agents in a social system work together. Martineau’s (Atkinson and Martineau 1851; 1877) epistemological shift to philosophical atheism was completed during her tour of the East.

Martineau revealed the fullness of her transformation three years after the publication of her account of her Eastern tour. With the publication of *Letters on the*
*Laws of Man’s Nature and Development* (Atkinson and Martineau 1851), Martineau self-identified as a positivist. She did not, however, fully align with Comte’s perspectives on women, workers, children, and the privileging of those in positions of power. Martineau was critically selective in her epistemological views.

**Harriet Martineau: **Methodologist and preeminent sociological theorist on religion

As Martineau toured the East, she observed the origins and genealogical progression of the Abrahamic faiths, making methodologically rigorous observations as she toured the nations of Egypt, Sinai, Palestine, and Syria. The progression of Martineau’s trip, which aligned with the geographical and chronological emergence of the Abrahamic faiths, led Martineau (Atkinson and Martineau 1851; 1877) to the conclusion that religion as a social institution is a stage in human development. The basis of Martineau’s conclusion was her interpretation of her observations with regard to religion and its effectiveness as a moral compass and therefore moral action.

Martineau asserts that morally right action is the basis of social progress. Martineau’s observations throughout the East, in addition to those made during her tour of America, led to her conclusion that two factors contribute to the effectiveness of religion as a social institution in the promotion of social progress: its administration and its typology of spirit. For religion to promote progress, it must possess a prevailing fraternal spirit oriented toward the individual’s ability to achieve success. Martineau argues that charity is not only central to this fraternal spirit but also a universal characteristic of religious administration and spirit.

Martineau observed variation in the character of charity among the societies and cultures she observed in the East, which she attributed to the prevailing faith and unique
qualities of each respective society and culture. In regions of Egypt and Nubia, where the state of progress was minimal, Martineau observed the lowest order of charity, meaning common alms-giving on an individual basis. In Palestine, where progress was more apparent, Martineau observed a higher order of charity which took the form of a Christian organization that supported Jews who had converted to Christianity and were subsequently ostracized by their former Jewish community. In Syria, where the level of progress was higher still, Martineau observed anticipatory charity which took the form of a Christian leper hospital in Damascus.

Martineau’s positivist perspective on religion as a stage in human development is apparent. Less apparent is how that perspective is informed by her understanding of charity as a universal characteristic of religious administration and spirit. Martineau associates the origins and genealogical progression of the Abrahamic faiths with the variation in forms of charity she observed during her tour of the East. Did Martineau assume that religion as a social institution would evolve into another form, leaving behind its orientation toward the supernatural in favor of an emphasis on progress based on the grand consideration? Or, did Martineau assume that religion would simply be discarded? In either case, what did Martineau see as the catalyst for change? We do not have answers these questions because a thorough study of Martineau’s sociological stance on religion has yet to be conducted.

Harriet Martineau in the sociological canon

Martineau’s research stands today as the earliest example of the conduct of theoretically-grounded, objective, culturally-relativistic, and systematic sociological research and deserves to be recognized as such: “Giving Martineau her due is no minor
matter and no small challenge. The eventual consequences for a discipline long socialized to honor only white western males as its revered founders are, of course, unpredictable” (Hill and Hoecker-Drysdale 2001:3). The consequences to which Hill and Hoecker-Drysdale (2001) refer include the exclusion of Martineau’s work from the sociological canon.

Even though Martineau is the first to explicate a systematic sociological methodology and one of the first to present a sociological theory on religion, she is rarely included in the cadre of founding sociologists whose works comprise today’s sociological canon. Martineau is not often recognized as an early founder, or even forerunner, of sociological methodology and theory. The question is why. In answer to this question, one can only speculate. It is possible that Martineau’s chronological position in the emergence and lifespan of the discipline of sociology is partly to blame. It is also possible that Martineau’s exclusion is related to her geographic position in the spread of sociology which is held to have originated in France with Comte. Another contributing factor may be Martineau’s status as a woman in what was then, and for many years to come, a masculine discipline. What is likely the most significant factor is the public’s reaction to Martineau’s later works.

Following Martineau’s translation project of Comte’s *Cours de philosophie positive*, formerly supportive members of the American and English clergy denounced Martineau for her translation of Comte’s work (Hill 1989b: xliv-xlv). While Martineau enjoyed the appreciation of certain circles of Comte’s supporters, she suffered under the assumptions of many that she agreed *in toto* with Comte’s philosophy, which she did not.
Regardless of all such consequences, Martineau’s sociological contributions are worthy of not only recognition but comprehensive study within the discipline.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A

Excerpted from *The Faith as Unfolded by Many Prophets: An Essay* (1833).

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APPENDIX B

(See Appendix C for corresponding maps of Martineau’s tour)

(Arabic spellings are those used by Martineau in *Eastern Life* and may not be consistent with contemporary spellings.)

Timeline of Martineau’s Egyptian Tour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Stopover</th>
<th>Locale</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Mode of Travel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 20, 1846</td>
<td>5 days</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>Trip preparation, travel</td>
<td>†††</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 25, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Alexandria to Atfeh</td>
<td>Traveling to Mahmoudieh Canal</td>
<td>Bus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 25, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Atfeh to Werdan</td>
<td>Traveling, passed</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 26, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Werdan to Cairo</td>
<td>Traveling, passed</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 26, 1846</td>
<td>6 days</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>Trip preparation, travel</td>
<td>Donkey, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Cairo to Benisooef</td>
<td>Traveling, passed</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 3, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Benisooef to Minyeh</td>
<td>Traveling, passed</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 4, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Minyeh to Melawee</td>
<td>Traveling, passed</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 5, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Melawee to Manfaloot</td>
<td>Traveling, passed</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 6, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Manfaloot to Aysoot</td>
<td>Traveling, moored</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 7, 1846</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>Aysoot</td>
<td>Visiting bazaars</td>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 9, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Aysoot to Antaeropolis</td>
<td>Traveling, passed</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 10, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Antaeropolis to Soohadj</td>
<td>Traveling, moored</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Soohadj to Girgeh</td>
<td>Traveling, moored</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 14, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Girgeh to Chenobscion</td>
<td>Traveling, moored</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 18, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Chenobscion to Kenneh</td>
<td>Traveling, passed</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** represents the absence of a stopover. ††† represents the absence of travel.
## APPENDIX B (continued)

### Timeline of Martineau’s Egyptian Tour (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Stopover</th>
<th>Locale</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Mode of Travel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 19, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Kenneh to Thebes</td>
<td>Traveling, passed</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 21, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Thebes to Luxor</td>
<td>Traveling, moored</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 21, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Luxor to Isna</td>
<td>Traveling, passed</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 23, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Isna to Adfoo</td>
<td>Traveling, passed</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 25, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Adfoo to Aswan</td>
<td>Traveling, moored</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 26, 1846</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>Aswan</td>
<td>Visiting bazaars, side trip to Mahatta</td>
<td>Pedestrian, donkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 27, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Aswan</td>
<td>Side trip to Elephantine Island</td>
<td>Boat, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 28, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Aswan to First Cataract of Nile</td>
<td>Traveling, moored, side trip to Philoe</td>
<td>Boat, donkey, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 29, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>First Cataract of Nile to Philoe</td>
<td>Traveling, moored</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 30, 1846</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Unknown location near Philoe</td>
<td>Visiting mud huts</td>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 31, 1846</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Philoe to Korosko</td>
<td>Traveling, passed</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Korosko to Aboo-Simbil</td>
<td>Traveling, passed</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 4, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Aboo-Simbil to Wadee Halfa</td>
<td>Traveling, moored, side trip to Rock of Abooseer</td>
<td>Boat, donkey, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 5, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Wadee Halfa to Aboo-Simbil</td>
<td>Traveling, moored</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 7, 1847</td>
<td>1/2 day</td>
<td>Aboo-Simbil</td>
<td>Visiting temples of Aboo-Simbil</td>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 7, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Aboo-Simbil to Dirr</td>
<td>Traveling, moored, visited</td>
<td>Boat, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 8, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Dirr to Subooa</td>
<td>Traveling, moored</td>
<td>Boat, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 9, 1847</td>
<td>1/2 day</td>
<td>Subooa</td>
<td>Visited temple of Ramases</td>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Italics represent an estimated date. *** represents the absence of a stopover.*
### Timeline of Martineau’s Egyptian Tour (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Stopover</th>
<th>Locale</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Mode of Travel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 9, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Subooa to Dakkeh</td>
<td>Traveling, moored</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 10, 1847</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Dakkeh</td>
<td>Visiting temples</td>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 11, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Dakkeh to Dendoor</td>
<td>Traveling, moored, visiting</td>
<td>Boat, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 12, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Dendoor to Philoe</td>
<td>Traveling, moored, visiting</td>
<td>Boat, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 13, 1847</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Philoe</td>
<td>Visiting temples, side trip to Aswan</td>
<td>Pedestrian, donkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 14, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Philoe to Kom Umboo</td>
<td>Traveling, moored, visiting</td>
<td>Boat, donkey, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 15, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Kom Umboo to Adfoo</td>
<td>Traveling, moored, visiting</td>
<td>Boat, donkey, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 16, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Adfoo to El Kab</td>
<td>Traveling, moored, visiting</td>
<td>Boat, donkey, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 17, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>El Kab to Isna</td>
<td>Traveling, moored, visiting</td>
<td>Boat, donkey, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 18, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Isna to Thebes</td>
<td>Traveling, moored, visiting</td>
<td>Boat, donkey, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 19, 1847</td>
<td>8 days</td>
<td>Thebes</td>
<td>Visiting temples</td>
<td>Donkey, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 27, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Thebes to Kenneh</td>
<td>Traveling, moored, visiting</td>
<td>Boat, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 28, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Kenneh to Benee Hasan</td>
<td>Traveling, moored</td>
<td>Boat, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** represents the absence of a stopover.
**APPENDIX B (continued)**

**Timeline of Martineau’s Egyptian Tour (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Stopover</th>
<th>Locale</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Mode of Travel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 4, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Benee Hasan to Masgoon</td>
<td>Traveling, moored, visiting pyramids</td>
<td>Boat, , donkey, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 7, 1847</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Masgoon</td>
<td>Visiting pyramids</td>
<td>Donkey, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 8, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Masgoon to Geezah</td>
<td>Traveling, moored</td>
<td>Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>February 9, 1847</em></td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Geezeh</td>
<td>Visiting pyramids</td>
<td>Donkey, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>February 14, 1847</em></td>
<td>9 days</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>Visiting through city, including harem, travel arrangements</td>
<td>Donkey, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Italics represent an estimated date. *** represents the absence of a stopover.*
APPENDIX B (continued)

Timeline of Martineau’s Sinai Tour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Stopover</th>
<th>Locale</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Mode of Travel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 23, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Cairo to Bissateen</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 24, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Bissateen to Suez</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Suez to Howara</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Howara to Wadee Shelal</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 4, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Wadee Shelal to Wadee Magara</td>
<td>Traveling, observing Wadee Mokatteb, lodged at Convent of Mount Sinai</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 5, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Wadee Magara to Mount Sinai</td>
<td>Visiting Convent of Mount Sinai (St. Catherine's), mosques, churches</td>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 6, 1847</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td>Mount Sinai</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 10, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Mount Sinai to Wadee El-Ain</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 11, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Wadee El-Ain to Wadee Weeter</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 12, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Wadee Weeter to shore of Gulf of Akaba (Nouebe)</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 13, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Nouebe to Wadee Negabad</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 14, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Wadee Negabad to Akaba</td>
<td>Swimming in Gulf of Akaba, exploring in desert, visiting castle</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Akaba to Wadee Gharendel</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** represents the absence of a stopover.
**APPENDIX B (continued)**

**Timeline of Martineau’s Sinai Tour (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Stopover</th>
<th>Locale</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Mode of Travel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 18, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Wadee Gharendel to Wadee Musa</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 19, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Wadee Musa to Petra</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 19, 1847</td>
<td>5 days</td>
<td>Petra</td>
<td>Visiting temple, treasury</td>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 24, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Petra to Mount Hor</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting Aaron's tomb</td>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 25, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Mount Hor to Wadee Araba</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 26, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Wadee Araba to foot of pass of Sufa</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 27, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Pass of Sufa to near Hebron</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 28, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Near Hebron to Hebron</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Pedestrian, camel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** represents the absence of a stopover.
APPENDIX B (continued)

Timeline of Martineau’s Palestinian Tour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Stopover</th>
<th>Locale</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Mode of Travel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 29, 1847</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>Visiting tombs, synagogue, mosque, natural pools</td>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 30, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Hebron to Bethlehem</td>
<td>Traveling, lodged at Latin convent at Bethlehem</td>
<td>Camel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 31, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Bethlehem to Jerusalem</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting Biblical sites, lodged at Salvador's hotel</td>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1, 1847</td>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>Visiting Biblical sites</td>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 4, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Jerusalem to Valley of Jehoshaphat</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting Biblical sites</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 5, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Valley of Jehoshaphat to Convent of Santa Saba</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting Biblical sites</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 7, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Convent of Santa Saba to Jerusalem</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting Biblical sites</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 8, 1847</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>Visiting Biblical sites, side trip to Bethlehem</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 12, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Jerusalem to Nablous</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting Biblical sites</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 13, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Nablous to Djeneen</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting Biblical sites</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 14, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Djeneen to Nazareth</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting Biblical sites</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Nazareth to Mount Carmel</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting Biblical sites</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 17, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Mount Carmel to Acre</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting Biblical sites</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 18, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Acre to Nazareth</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting Biblical sites</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Italicics* represent approximations. *** represents the absence of a stopover.
APPENDIX B (continued)

Timeline of Martineau’s Palestinian Tour (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Stopover</th>
<th>Locale</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Mode of Travel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 19, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Nazareth to Cana</td>
<td>Traveling, private lodging, halted travel due to excessive heat</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 20, 1847</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Cana</td>
<td>Resting</td>
<td>†††</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 21, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Cana to unspecified location at Pashalics guard station</td>
<td>Traveling</td>
<td>Horse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** represents the absence of a stopover. ††† represents the absence of travel.
### Timeline of Martineau’s Syrian Tour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Stopover</th>
<th>Locale</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Mode of Travel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 23, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Unspecified location at</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting tombs, shrines, lakes</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pashalics guard station to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nimrod's tomb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 24, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Nimrod's tomb to Damascus</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting historical sites</td>
<td>Horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 25, 1847</td>
<td>8 days</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>Visiting city sites, mosques, chapels, cathedrals</td>
<td>Pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 3, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Damascus to Baalbec</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting historical sites</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 5, 1847</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>Baalbec</td>
<td>Visiting historical sites, Temple of the Sun</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 6, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Baalbec to Dayr-el-Akmar</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting historical sites</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Dayr-el-Akmar to Lake Limoun</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting historical sites</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Lake Limoun to Kadeesha</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting historical sites, Cedars of Lebanon</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 9, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Kadeesha to Jebail</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting historical sites</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 10, 1847</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Jebail to Bierut</td>
<td>Traveling, visiting historical sites</td>
<td>Horse, pedestrian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** represents the absence of a stopover.
APPENDIX C

Map of Martineau’s Egyptian Tour

APPENDIX C (continued)

Map of Martineau’s Sinai Tour

APPENDIX C (continued)

Laborde’s sketch of Petra

Map of Martineau’s Palestinian and Syrian Tour

- **March 19-24, 1847:** Petra
- **March 28, 1847:** Hebron
- **April 1-4 & 8-12, 1847:** Jerusalem
- **April 14 & 18, 1847:** Nazareth
- **April 15-17, 1847:** Mount Carmel & Acre
- **April 25-May 3, 1847:** Damascus
- **May 8, 1847:** Cedars of Lebanon
- **May 10-17, 1847:** Departure, Beirut
- **May 24-26, 1847:** Departure, Beirut
- **May 8, 1847:** Damascus
- **May 10, 1847:** Departure, Beirut