Hermeneutica gloriae vs. hermeneutica crucis: Sebastian Franck and Martin Luther on the Clarity of Scripture

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Hermeneuta gloriae vs. hermeneuta crucis
Sebastian Franck and Martin Luther
on the Clarity of Scripture*

By Priscilla Hayden-Roy

Martin Luther maintains throughout his work, and with special emphasis in *On the Bondage of the Will*, that Scripture is clear. Unlike Erasmus, who warns that we should avoid obscure parts of Scripture that, like the Cave of Corycos, would lure us too close to terrors beyond our comprehension, Luther argues that Scripture has been placed in the clearest light by the coming of Christ, in whom all of Scripture’s mysteries have been revealed. If we were to look for a contemporary of Luther’s to represent the opposite pole, the obscurity or ambiguity of Scripture, it would not be Erasmus for whom Corycian caverns become the hermeneutical starting point of Scriptural exegesis. The spelunker of the darkened word is Sebastian Franck. For this Spiritualist the truth of Scripture is hidden: its meaning lies in puzzles and paradoxes decipherable only by those few spiritually-minded members of the invisible church.

In the course of this discussion we shall examine the anthropological faculties on which Franck and Luther base human knowledge of spiritual matters and how both thinkers define the nature and content of this knowledge. By this means we shall arrive at the concept of the clarity of Scripture in the thought of Franck (I) and Luther (II).

I.

The Spiritualists of the 16th century were heirs to a tradition of mystical theology in which the anthropological seat of spiritual enlightenment was located in the *synteresis voluntatis et rationalis*, or the *Seelenfinklein*. Sebastian Franck stands in this tradition and carries it perhaps with the greatest rigor of his contemporaries to its logical conclusion.

Before we examine the hermeneutical implications of this anthropological faculty we must situate it in Franck’s thought, specifically in the framework of Neo-Platonic mystical theology as he received it from the 14th century Dominican preacher, Johannes Tauler (1300-61), and the 15th century anonymous tract, the *Theologia Deutsch*.

Franck begins with an ontological concept of God. God is being, the simple and all-encompassing unity of all things; his Logos, or Word, is that word which embodies his essence and is also the means by which he wills all things to be. Thus God is the creator of all things, and his Word is the means by which he creates. In this way we see the anthropological, or human, seat of spiritual enlightenment stands in this tradition and carries it perhaps with the greatest rigor of his contemporaries to its logical conclusion.

Using Franck as the representative of the latter; Karl-Heinz zur Mühlen: *Nos extra nos: Luthers Theologie zwischen Mystik und Scholastik* (Tübingen, 1972), esp. 235-243 (this book was especially helpful for my work on Luther).


6. Franck quoted both sources frequently. He also wrote a Latin paraphrase of the *Theologia Deutsch*; see Alfred Hegler: *Sebastian Francks lateinische Paraphrase der Deutschen Theologie* (Tübingen, 1901).
uncreated Word superceding all particular knowledge and all limitations: "God is all in all, the nature, the pleasure, the being of all being, virtue of all virtue, in whom all things are contained. All things live and move in him, by his hand he imparts being to [wesen] all things and rules over them." This uncreated being emanates divine essence into the world by speaking the divine Word. By this word the invisible, transcendent spirit enters into and sustains the finite, material world:

"Now the tool, instrument and means whereby God created all things is this almighty word alone, which was with God in the beginning and was God himself ... Therefore there is only one word of God in which all things subsist and are supported, sustained and nourished, [even] as they are created. Alone this is necessary—that all things must proceed from this [word]."* The relationship between the word and the world carries over into language: the inner word, or res significata, is contained in the outer word (the letter), or res significans. Just as the world derives its being from the divine word, so the letter has its true significance in the spiritual, inner word.

How do these basic assumptions in Franck's thought determine how he addresses the soteriological question? In order to gain access to God one must turn away from the outer world, from the particulars; one must turn away from outer sacraments, from the written word, from the dead letter, and plunge into the realm of the invisible spirit, the uncreated word. This would be an impossible task if humankind were defined strictly as non-spirit, that is, if the results of original sin were understood to have corrupted humankind utterly. However, by defining God as being, and creation as the emanation of divine being, the mere fact of one's "beingness," of entity, precludes the possibility of utter sin by defining God as being, and creation as the emanation of divine being, the outer sacraments, from the written word, from the dead letter, and plunge into original sin were understood to have corrupted humankind utterly. However, according to the spirit he is the Word and God himself. And Scripture calls this image of God, and this divine character of God's word, will, son, seed, hand, light, life, and the truth in us. Thus we are capable of being divine [gottes volhig], and to a certain extent we are, in accordance with this image, of divine nature." With the mystical notion of the inner spark (zundel, or syncretis) Franck posits a continuum between God and the individual. The spark is both an extension of divine being, and an epistemological faculty for spiritual knowledge. When this faculty is activated, the individual grasps spiritual truths immediately: the need for any mediating structures between the individual and God is obviated. Franck even subjects his Christology to this syncretis theology. Christ's task was not to atone for sin, but to remind humankind of the word within their hearts: "But the same [God's word] is contained in all human hearts, Deut. 30 [:14], Romans 10 [:8], although few read the tables of their hearts. Therefore Christ came, God became a person, so that he point us toward these tables and remind us of that which was already in us, but of which we wished to know nothing." Christ demonstrated to humankind the possibility of living according to this inner nature and thus transcending the limitations of the flesh. Franck insists that the diastasis between inner and outer word be maintained strictly even in the deus incarnatus. Christ is more Christ according to the inner person than according to the outer. According to the flesh he is only a picture of God, but according to the spirit he is the Word and God himself.11

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7. Paradoxa, No. 91 (P3v): "Gott ist alles in allen / die natur / das glück aller wesen / aller tugent Tugent / inn jm ist alle ding beschlossen. Es regt sich / webt / und lebt alles inn jm / in seiner handt weset und wendet er alle ding."

8. Paradoxa, No. 50 (J4v): "Nun der werkzeug / instrument / und mittel dar durch gott alle ding geschaffen hat / ist allein disz almechtig wort / das im anfang was bei Gott / und Gott ia selbs ... Darumb ist auch nur ain wort gottes in dem alle ding bestehen / getragen / erhalten / uff ernärt werde / wie erschaffen. Das ist allain von nöten / ausz dem allain müß alle geheen."


10. Paradoxa, No. 118 (T4v): "Dasselbig aber ist in aller menschen hertz Deur.30. Roma.10. eingewickelt / ob schon gar wenig die Taffel jres hertzten lesen / und darumb Christus kommen ist / Gott ain Mensch worden / das er uns in disse Taffel weise / und erhitnet des / so vorhin in uns war / wir aber nit wissen wolten."

11. Paradoxa, No. 99 (R1v): "Und nach disem besten tag der gotthait / ist Christus mer Christus / dann nach dem essern schwächsten teil des flaischs / wie ain mensch nach dem innern menschen mer ain mensch ist / daß nach dem essern / da er nur ain bildlich mensch ist / unnd allain ain figur des rechten wesentlich menschens Also ist Christus nach dem flaisch nur ain bild uff auszdrucken Gottes / Heb.1. Nach dem gait aber unnd gotthait / das Wort und gott selbs / Ioan.1." - On Franck's Christology, see Alfred Hegler: Geist und Schrift bei Sebastian Franck: Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Spiritualismus in der Reformationzeit (Freiburg i. B., 1892), esp. 185-202. Part of Franck's polemic against the magisterial reformers was Christological: they clung, according to Franck, too much to Christ's flesh, rather than to his spirit. As Hegler notes (192f.), this criticism attacked specifically the doctrine of satisfaction; Franck condemned this notion of salvation extra nos, because it encouraged moral turpitude.
This same argument carries over to the hermeneutical discussion. Just as Christ did not become flesh, but rather was covered by it like a shawl, or rind, or blanket, in the same way the divine Word does not really and essentially become Scripture. Franck explicitly refutes the concept of *predicatio identica de diversis naturis* in this context. He argues that the diastasis between flesh and spirit makes any essential commingling between the two impossible. For this reason the outer word, including Scripture and all the teachings of the fathers, cannot mediate between God and the soul. At most these words "bear witness" to the inner, invisible Word. The individual must forsake them and read the tables of his heart inscribed directly by the spirit of God.

This deficiency of the outer word is no stranger to orthodox medieval theology. Augustinian hermeneutics, which dominated medieval hermeneutic, distinguished between the word in its merely significative function, the *res significalis*, and the transcendent reality, the *res significata* toward which the word pointed. Thus the sign belonged to the domain of the sensible, the flesh, while the *res significata* was located in the intelligible or spiritual realm. Ebeling has noted that the Scholastic tradition underlines the inadequacy of linguistic communication by maintaining that: "... the true means of grace is not the word but the sacrament. For the word keeps man at a distance from God and God at a distance from man. The sacrament, however, unifies man with the divine itself. Grace is infused into man in form of a created reality, as *habitus* of the soul; it becomes a property (*virtus*) of man ... To this corresponds, moreover, that the word basically [*is*] considered as weak and dark. It is inadequate and must be explained." Thus Scholastic hermeneutics and the hermeneutics of heterodox mysticism are to be distinguished not in terms of the former's "higher" view of the word, but rather in terms of how each claims to have access to the inner word hidden in the outer word. On the one hand enlightenment requires the special grace of church and sacraments, on the other immediate illumination circumvents all need of institutional mediators of the word.

While direct access to the divine is a human possibility according to Franck, he seems to have been obsessed with the observation that this potential remains unrealized in the vast majority of people. They do not read the tables of their hearts, but instead define themselves and God according to the outer word, the letter. They mistake outer ceremonies for true spiritual worship—a point Franck includes the whole scope of divinely instituted sacrificial rites of the Old Testament and the ceremonial rituals of the medieval church. Because these are visible and outward, they are of the flesh, and therefore are categorically opposed to true spiritual worship. Only a scattered minority of spiritually-minded persons perceives the invisible realm of God. For these the church remains invisible, uncarnated. Here the consistency of Franck's thought supercedes that of his contemporary Spiritualists, for whom the invisible Spirit invariably spilled over into visible, "fleshy" manifestations, be they sects, the Münster theocracy, or the Peasants' War. Franck's spiritually-minded persons discover the Word not in visible groups, not in political action, not in fixed words of doctrine, but hidden in paradoxes and puzzles. They know that

12. ME ("Encomium: Ein Lob des Thoreschten Göttlichen worts / was das sei"), t2r: "Wie nun flaish / das Wort nit ist gewesen / sonder ain deck und grosses sacrament des Worts. Also ist die Schrifft aigentlich nit das Wort / sonder die schal / rind / und deck oder sacrament des worts."

13. ME ("Encomium"), t2r: "Das Wort ist gleichow flaish worden / durch die anmung / aber nit durch die verschmischung. Also ist also das Wort die Schrifft worden / nit warlich und wesenhafter Predication (predicacione identica) sonder als ininem sigel." See also below, n. 45.

14. On Scripture as "witness" (*Zeugnis*) of the Word, see Hégely, *Geist und Schrifft*, esp. 223–228. As Hégely notes (225 f.), in this concept of "Zeugnis" lies " ihr [Scripture's] positiver Wert und ihre Grenze. Die Schrifft soll uns als ein Zeugnis von dem unmittelbarren Wirken des göttlichen Geistes in uns selbst und in Gott weisen; so wird manchmal ihr Zeugnis dem inneren des Gewissens koordiniert. ... Das Zeugnis vermittelt nicht selbst die Sache ... Was Zeugnis ist, hat streng genommen keine heilsschaffende Kraft, darum kann es auch nicht die höchste Auctorität sein."


17. Paradoxa, No. 89 (O4r): "Die Welt aber so zü mal in argem ligt / und Gott wie er ist nit erkennet / weiss sie von kainen andern Gotsdienst / dann von eüserschem ceremonisch / Judischem gotsdienst / mit singen / wellen / beten / Pater noster tragen / Kirchen gehen / fasten / Bildern / unnd allerlai Ceremonien."


19. Thus Franck explains the title of his *Paradoxa* (Introduction, 1v–2r): "Nu hab ich disz mein Philosophi Paradoxa intitulit / und Paradoxum ain Wunderred / oder Wunderwort / vertetscht / weil die Theologei / der recht siñ der Schrifft (so allain gottes
every word can be understood either according to the spirit or the flesh. Each *res significans* is equivocal, or to use Franck's more visual designation, every word is Y-shaped: "All things are equivocal [zuwerlai], right and wrong. These are equivocal: love, prayer, faith, detachedness, zeal—everything. Thus it does not suffice to pray, fast, believe, know, etc., because all things are split, they are forked like the upsilon, the letter of Pythagorus, 'Y', which Virgil interpreted as the crossroads where the two paths of virtue and vice part."

The *res significans* points to two *res significatae*: a spiritual *res*, which is the invisible, true being of the sign, and the fleshly *res*, which is the visible, false meaning given to the sign by the world. The spiritually-minded are able to discover the inner *res* by "judging according to the opposite," that is, by reversing the outer, fleshly meaning given to the word by the world: "For all things are different in truth from their appearance viewed from the outside. In all things God holds the counterpart of the world and judges according to the opposite. Thus as the world holds, names, believes, speaks, wills one thing, so when you grasp the opposite, the counter-judgment, you have grasped God's Word, wisdom and will." So absolutely opposed to each other are the two meanings of the word that a simple reversal of language according to the definitions given by what Franck would call "outer," "worldly" political and ecclesiastical authorities, brings one to that inner meaning held in the heart. For the spiritually-minded the Y-shaped puzzle of the word is solved, the sense is clear. However, he does not perceive the literal or conventional, grammatical sense, but rather an invisible, anti-conventional word unveiled in his heart by the spirit. Moreover, this truth can never "surface" and affix itself to language, for as soon as the truth is identified with the letter, it becomes dogma and loses its spiritual quality. The inner word must remain hidden, hidden in dark, paradoxical statements. Conversely, all that can mark truth externally is linguistic obscurity, for language ultimately is incapable of presenting spiritual truth. Paradoxical language, while failing to present spiritual truth univocally, leads the spiritually-minded reader to find the spiritual, ineffable Word in his heart. Not surprisingly, then, Franck upholds Scripture not for its clear exposition of truth, but because it is a book "sealed with seven seals." He levels criticism at the magisterial reformers, who maintain that the letter of Scripture is clear and equate Scripture with the word of God. They grasp only the fleshly letter of Scripture, says Franck, and make that Scripture into an idol by calling it divine.

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22. One of countless examples of this equivocal language appears in Franck's discussion of the words "rich" and "poor" as they are defined according to the spirit and the flesh. *Paradoxa*, No. 35 (G4r-v): "Suñia got hält gleich eben die weisz mit den seinen / in seiner art / wie die welt pflegt zu handlen mit den jren / in jer art / off baiden örtten wirt nur den reichen / so vorhin gnug haben / zu getragen / geholfen / und geben / V[e(]r)stehe aber mit den reichen üb gewaltung in got / sonst hält es Gott mit den armen / schwachen am flaisch / und ist baides zugleich war. Gott hält es mit den armen und reichen / mit den gaiß armen am gut und müß / und mit den gaistreichen in got. Satan hält das widerspl / er gafft inn die høhe nach dem Reichen am flaisch / veracht die armen des gaists." The confusion this equivocation generates is apparent: "rich" can mean both "rich in spirit" and "rich in the flesh." The rich in spirit are those poor in the flesh. Thus Franck can hold an apparently contradictory or paradoxical statement to be true: God treats the rich (in spirit) and the poor (in flesh) alike. The source of this equivocation lies in the spirit-flesh diastasis inherent in the word; it is exponentiated by the same diastasis in the exegete, as Hegler writes (Geist und Schrift, 77): "Die Schrift ist dunkel und ungehüendet, weil sie als Buchstabe den Geist nicht zum Ausdruck bringt und der Mensch als ein aus Geist und Fleisch zusammengesetztes Wesen stets die Möglichkeit hat, sie mit den Augen des Fleisches anzuzeigen."

23. The image of a book sealed with seven seals is taken from Revelations 5. One of Franck's books, a collection of contradicting quotations from the Bible, is entitled: *Das verbüschert mit iben Sigeln verschlossnen Büch / das recht niemandt ausfühlln / verstehen / oder lesen kan / dann das lamb / end die mit dem Thauo bezeichnet / das lamb angehören* (Augsburg: Heinrich Steiner, 1539). Hegler emphasizes (Geist und Schrift, 68f.) Franck's distance to Luther at this point and notes that Franck speaks of the "clear word of holy Scripture" only ironically, when quoting an opinion differing from his own.

24. See Sebastian Franck: *Chronica Zeitschrift unnd Geschichtbible* (Ulm: Hans Varnier, 1536; repr. Darmstadt, 1969), Oovic-i (lxxixii-i): "Also machen vil yetz ein Abgott ausz der schirft / die sy doch nit nach dem sîh Christi oder geist ... sunder nach dem todten bächstäb verston allenthalben / wie sy mit helfen wonen klingt und laut / Gott nit ein mal bitten / das er uns sein geheimnissz (das er für war nit an weg für die sâw in offnem bächstäben hat gelegt / sunder vil meier mit dem verdreckt) / eer / auszieg / unnd den todten unnd tûdtenden bächstäben / geyst und leben inn uns mach / dann die schirft / wie gött sy ymmere zûr seligkheit / kann sy doch kein bôsz hertz ändern oder lebendig machen / sunst wären die schriftglerten die frûmbsten gewesen." See also Alfred Heg-
Franck’s spiritual sense is divorced from the letter to the point where revelation is completely private, incapable of being verified through any institution or dogmatic standards. The *illuminati* of the inner word are united in an eternal, necessarily invisible, church. The clarity of the word lies in a continuum between the heart and divine being. It cannot affix itself to the impermanence and limitation of linguistic convention, or of any historical phenomena. Thus the inner, spiritual word gives Franck access to a “hermeneutica gloriae,” but at the expense of clear language. The only adequate bearer of the inner word is dark, equivocal, paradoxical language.

II.

As Franck’s hermeneutics followed directly from his anthropology, the same holds true for Luther. Ozment has maintained that, “Luther’s Reformation theology originates and develops as a highly polemical answer to the anthropology of late medieval theology.” He argues that Luther consistently “desubstantiates” medieval anthropological concepts, stripping them of all “natural” soteriological capability and placing the burden of salvation exclusively upon God. Luther defines human faculties not in terms of their inherent power, or an ontological similitude or identity with God, but in terms of their object, which for Luther is God’s work of salvation. Thus Luther writes in his *Dictata super Psalterium*: “In the Holy Scriptures understanding takes its name from the object rather than from any capacity, the opposite of what is in philosophy. ... In brief this is nothing else than the wisdom of the cross of Christ, which is folly to the Gentiles and a stumbling block to the Jews, namely, to understand that the Son of God was incarnate and crucified and put to death and raised for our salvation.” Similarly, Luther redefines memory, which in Platonic philosophy is the seat of the knowledge of eternal norms, as reflection upon the history of the saving works of God. The *affectus*, which in mystical theology is the *synteresis voluntatis* that longs for God, becomes the hope in God’s testimonies or promises.

This shift from an inwardly situated ontological point of contact to an exclusively external source of salvation renders the human faculties soteriologically impotent. Recognition of the self as *peccator*, as *iniustus*, thus constitutes the “highest” form of self-recognition. This leads the young Luther to redefine the mystical notion of “ecstasy.” No longer does it afford knowledge of the similitude between self and the godhead. In the *Dictata*, ecstasy occurs when the self recognizes its utter sinfulness before the righteous God. Confronted with the self *coram Deo*, the individual recognizes his or her complete dependence upon God. Salvation lies *extra se* in the promises of God, which can be grasped only by faith. Here congruence between God and the individual is found – albeit not in greatest similitude, as in the *uni mystica* – but in greatest dissimilitude: “He who is ‘unlike’ God is one with God.” Conversely, to posit similitude

27. See Ozment, *Homo Spiritualis* (110f., 114–117) on *memoria* and *affectus*. In both instances Ozment argues that for Luther it is not the power of the faculty, but the object toward which it is directed, i.e., the saving work of God *extra se*, which defines and supports its functioning: “Memoria is not taken by Luther as a ‘quiddative’ ground of the powers of the soul (any more than *cor* or *conscientia*), but as a comprehensive description of the *perseverantia* of the whole man as he lives meditatively (*intellectus*) and affectively (*voluntas*) in and from the *opera dei*, i.e. in and from a “Zeugungsgrund” which is outside himself” (ibid., 110, n. 2). By contrast Franck maintains that Christ’s role was to uncover the inner word *already within* the heart. Hegler writes on this point (Geist und Schrifte, 195): “So erhalt bei Franck der alte platonische Gedanke, daß alles Lernen Erinnerung ist, die Form, daß aller Erwerb der göttlichen Kraft Wiedererwerb der ursprünglich innegehabten und nur dem Bewußtsein verloren gegangenem Kraft ist. Das Licht, dessen Leuchten durch das grobe Fleisch verfinstert ist, hat Christus wieder helle gemacht.”


29. Mühlen (*Nos extra nos*, 51 f.) discusses the mystical background of the notion of “extasitis extra se,” noting also how the concept takes on a new definition in Luther’s hands. On Luther’s use of the term “raptus” Obermann writes (“Simul gemitus et raptus,” 236 f.): “Raptus is the reliance on the righteousness of Christ outside ourselves (*extra nos*) and can be described as a complete transformation into Christ (*in Christum plane transformati*). ... *Extra nos* and *raptus* indicate that the *ininitia Christi* – and not our own powers – is the source and resource for our righteousness.”

30. See Ozment, *Homo Spiritualis*, 180. Note that this recognition of self as *peccator* is not to be confused with the monastic virtue of *humilitas*; it does not function in Luther’s thought as the *praeparatio* by which the individual would earn God’s grace. Obermann makes this point (“Simul gemitus et raptus,” 238 f.) with regard to the *gemitus*: “Gemitus
with God, or soteriological potential in the human faculties, demonstrates nothing but the concupiscence (curvitas in se) that has perverted both spirit and flesh since the fall.31 Curved into self, the individual equates his or her own virtue with godliness. Luther’s redefinition of anthropological vocabulary is in fact the beginning of his battle against “enthusiasm” as he defines it broadly in the Smalcald Articles: “Thus we shall be protected from the enthusiasts—that is, from the spiritualists who boast that they possess the spirit without and before the Word and who therefore judge, interpret, and twist the Scriptures or spoken Word according to their pleasure.”32 It is a battle that first had to be directed against his own theological language holding him captive within himself. Luther replaces ontologically defined intellectual substance with substance that lies explicitly extra se in the promises of God revealed in Christ.33

This brings us to the second limitation of human knowledge. Even when enlightened by the Holy Spirit, the intellect does not grasp the deus nudus et absconditus in maiestate sua. Insofar as God has chosen to hide himself, he is not and cannot be known, as Luther insists in On the Bondage of the Will: “To the extent, therefore, that God hides himself and wills to be unknown to us, it is no business of ours.”34 The concept of the deus absconditus serves as a boundary for theological inquiry35 which is to concern itself only with the deus revelatus.

... presupposes faith and does not refer to a stage of preparation or to a virginal sinproof part in man, but to the life of faith itself; as does Ozment in his discussion of expectare and siamare as forms of praeparatio: “In this context, praeparatio has no refined Pelagian overtones. ... Crying, expectation and hope point both to the absence—the soteriologically de-substantial nature of human life—and the reality—the promises of God, ‘outside’ man’s power” (Homo Spiritualis, 182). Steinmetz argues (Luther and Staupitz, 93) that both Luther and Staupitz “agree that humility is not a virtue prior to justification.”

31. Luther’s understanding of original sin as concupiscence establishes man’s sinfulness as radical, persisting even after Baptism; this is in contrast to the Scholastic notion of original sin as privation, for which the sacraments compensate. Thus for Luther justification never resides within man as a habitus, but is external, in Christ. Intra se man remains a sinner. See Mühlen, Nos extra nos, 116-124.


33. Gerhard Ebeling has pointed out the shift in the definition of “substance” from the quidditative understanding of medieval theology to the qualitative concept found in Luther’s Dictata. Here substance is the ground under one’s feet (substaculum, subsidentia); rather than being within one, it is what bears one up, namely, the hope of salvation. See his “Die Anfänge von Luthers Hermeneutik,” Zeitschrift für Theologische Theologie und Kirche 48 (1951): 192 f.

34. LW 33: 139. WA 18: 685.5-6: “Quatenus igitur Deus sesi abscondit et ignorari a nobis vult, nihil ad nos.”

35. Thus Regin Pretert maintains: “Die betreffenden Aussagen über die Verborgen-

For this reason Luther directs an indefatigable polemic against the enthusiasts and contemplatives who, in their mystical ascent to the deus nudus, are either driven to despair (the only possible reaction to God’s glory), or fall prey to the deception of the devil.36

The concept of the deus absconditus serves also to guarantee the absolute power of God. He is the will behind the God who freely chooses to bind himself to his word. The distinction between deus absconditus and deus revelatus is roughly comparable to the distinction favored by Nominalist theology between the potentia dei absoluta and the potentia dei ordinata. This distinction served likewise to free God from the necessity of the established means of grace, thus insuring that he not be construed as a debtor to humankind. Seen in light of his absolute power, God is not bound to effect salvation; by his ordained power he chooses to be bound to a particular, fixed means of grace. This much of the distinction is compatible with Luther’s theology. However, having conceded hiddenness and inaccessibility to the deus absolutus, the God revealed by his ordained power was so much the more accessible to Nominalist theologians. They argued that while the individual has no condign merit which could make God his debtor, God chooses by ‘means of his ordained powers to accept the actions of “the one who does his best” (qui facit quod in se est) as meritorious.’37

In his Disputation Against Scholastic Theology Luther clearly refutes this doctrine. Man’s disposition towards God both morally and rationally consists in
rebellion and ignorance. Luther redefines the term “potentia dei ordinata” in strictly Christocentric terms. God's ordained power lies in the “incarnate Son,” as he writes in the Genesis Commentary: “We must reflect on God's ordered [or ordained] power, that is, on the incarnate Son, in whom are hidden all the treasures of the Godhead (Col. 2:3). Let us go to the child lying in the lap of His mother Mary and to the sacrificial victim suspended on the cross; there we shall really behold God, and there we shall look into His very heart. We shall see that He is compassionate and does not desire the death of the sinner, but that the sinner should 'turn from his way and live' (Ezek. 33:11)." It is Christ crucified and raised from the dead who is the means of salvation revealed according to God's ordained power. Thus Luther has effectively lowered the roof of spiritual knowledge from the deus absolutus (or deus absconditus) to the deus revelatus. Here the mysteries of salvation are revealed. More one need not know about God. Furthermore, even within this restricted sphere the intellect is impotent. For by nature it is curvus in se and seeks salvation within. The intellect enlightened by the Holy Spirit sees the absolute difference between God and self, and only at this point can the individual respond in faith to the revealed salvation which lies extra se.

Given these restrictions, Luther's hermeneutical self-assuredness is startling. If humankind by nature is ignorant of God, and if the intellect enlightened by grace perceives only the revealed God, and if this limited knowledge itself is epistemologically foreign to the human intellect, how can Luther flatly assert that Scripture is clear? On what basis can this hermeneutical cripple make such a statement? Or is what he asserts to be clear so restricted as to make the claim trivial?

We recall that according to Augustinian hermeneutics, the outer word (res significans) served to point to the inner, spiritual meaning (res significata). The relationship of letter to meaning corresponded to that between flesh and spirit, so that the letter, because of its externality, was judged deficient over against its spiritual, signified meaning in the mind of God. Spiritual understanding was achieved only when the intellect detached itself from the transitory realm by divine illumination and became linked to the eternal, divine mind. Luther, however, maintains that the final res significata behind all res significantes is not the mind of God, but the Word of God, deus revelatus in Jesus Christ. He places both res significans and res significata within the potentia dei ordinata. There is no break between visible flesh and obscured, transcendent spirit as the sign points to its meaning. Both sign and signified are flesh, revealed. For this reason Luther can maintain that Scripture is clear.

Yet the problem remains that despite the clarity of Scripture, a soteriologically impotent intellect cannot grasp this clarity. Thus Luther distinguishes between two kinds of clarity in On the Bondage of the Will: "There are two kinds of clarity in Scripture ...: one external and pertaining to the ministry of the Word, the other located in the understanding of the heart. If you speak of the internal clarity, no man perceives one iota of what is in the Scriptures unless he has the Spirit of God. All men have a darkened heart, so that even if they can recite everything in Scripture, and know how to quote it, yet they apprehend and truly understand nothing of it. ... For the Spirit is required for the understanding of Scripture, both as a whole and in any part of it. If, on the other hand, you speak of the external clarity, nothing at all is left obscure or ambiguous, but everything there is in the Scriptures has been brought out by the Word into the most definite light, and published to all the world." External clarity pertains to the grammatical clarity of the words (signa, or res significantes) as they illumine Christ (the res, or res significata). Here Luther claims that we find indisputable clarity except in those places obscured "due to our ignorance of certain terms and grammatical particulars," and "not to the majesty of the subject."41 He adds that when the res, Christ, is in the light, it does not matter if one or the other sign (signum) is in darkness, just as a fountain in the market place is clearly visible even if it cannot be seen from a side alley.42 Philological investigation obviously takes a leading role in furthering external clarity. Luther's freely acknowledged indebtedness to humanistic philology as well as his own translating of Scripture are prompted by his concern for augmenting the external clarity of Scripture and making it accessible to the common folk. But what does Luther mean by internal clarity? Only those who have the spirit, he says, have internal clarity. Is Luther introducing with this category an epistemological point of contact between God and the believer? Does a hermeneutica gloriae finally sneak into Luther's understanding of the

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38. Ibid., 130. For the relevant portions of the Disputatio, see WA 1: 225-226 (LW 31:11).
39. LW 3: 276f. (WA 43: 73.3-8). Significantly, this admonition follows Luther's warning against the enthusiastic speculations of the contemplative tradition and of his contemporary, Caspar von Schwenckfeld. (See above, n.36.)

40. LW 33: 28 (WA 18: 609.4-9, 11-14).
42. WA 18: 606.35-39 (LW 33: 26): "Iam nihil refert, si res sit in luce, aliqquod eis signum sit in tenebris, cun iterim multa alia eisdem signa sint in luce. Quis dicit fontem publicum non esse in luce, quod hi qui in angiporto sunt, illum non vident, cum omnes qui sunt in foro videant?"
The believer must see his own intellect condemned under the cross of Christ as frail, because it is concupiscent, impotent: it is not required to possess the spiritual meaning of the outer word, but to accept that the divinely ordained word to human reason, a process of which Luther finds Wycliffe guilty when he repeats, "'Das' auff den beutel, Aber weil der beutel und das wortlin 'das' auff den beutel, Aber weil der beutel und gelden etlicher masse ein wesen sind, als ein klumpe, so trifft zu gleich auch die gelden, Der weise nach greiffe ich ein fas an und spreche, das ist Reinsch wein, das ist roter wein. Item, ich greiffe ein glas an und spreche: das ist wasser, das ist bier, das ist salbe." (WA 26: 444.1-3 [LW 37: 301 f.]) And with his affection for everyday speech Luther gives a few examples of what the grammarians mean: "Als wenn ich einen sack odder beutel zeige odder dar reiche, sprech ich: Das sind hundert gelden, da gehet das zeigen und das wortlin 'das' auf den beutel. Aber weil der beutel und gelden etlicher masse ein wesen sind, als ein klumpe, so trifft zu gleich auch die gelden, Der weise nach greiffe ich ein fas an und spreche, das ist Reinsch wein, das ist roter wein. Item, ich greiffe ein glas an und spreche: das ist wasser, das ist bier, das ist salbe." (WA 26: 444.3-9 [LW 37: 302]) In the same way the words of institution draw on this linguistic convention: "Weil denn nu solche weise zu reden beyde inn der schrifft und allen sprachen gemein ist, so hindert uns ym abendmal die predicatio identica nichts ... und umb der sacramentalen einigkeit willen [wird] recht gered. ... 'Das ist mein leib', mit dem wortlin 'Das' auffs brod zu deuten, Denn es ist nu nicht mehr schlecht brod umm backofen, sondern fleischbrot oder leibsbrod, das ist ein brod, so mit dem leibe Christi ein sacramental wesen und ein ding worden ist." (WA 26: 444.39 f., 445.8-12 [LW 37: 303]). The words are clear, even if the intellect cannot grasp how this sacramental unity of body and bread actually takes place. But to try to explicate this "how" is to subject the divinely ordained word to human reason, a process of which Luther finds Wycliffe guilty when he denies the possibility of the predicatio identica. In dealing with God's words and works, maintains Luther, we are to render our reason and all cleverness captive, we are to blind ourselves and let ourselves be led and taught, so that we do not become judges of God's words (WA 26: 439.31-36 [LW 37: 296]). The believer is to accept the words of institu-

43. Luther maintains that the believer is not to substitute his own words for God's words: "Denn wir werden gewitzlich feylen, wo wir nicht einfeltiglich yhm nach sprechen; Denn der text mus ia einerley und einfeltig sein und einen einigen gewissen verstand haben, sol er klar und einen gewissen artikel gründen." (WA 26: 262.31-3 [LW 37: 163]). That the words are univocal is an unmetaphysical assertion whose proof lies concretely in the conventions established by the linguistic community: "Denn wenn ich sage: Christus ist Gottes lamb, kans nicht sein, das einer durchs lamb einen wollf, der andern ein schaff verstehe, einer mus liegen, Und ist nicht beydes vom heiligen geist." (WA 26: 264.27-30 [LW 37: 165]). Applying that most basic logical rule of contradictions, Luther argues that the word "lamb" cannot be mistaken for the meaning "wolf"—language as a given order does not allow for this confusion. In the same way Luther argues against Oecolampadius, who sets "sign of the body" in place of "body": the word "body" as it stands in linguistic convention does not mean "sign of the body," and to assert their identity would be as foolish as saying Christ is Belial, or Paul is Judas (WA 26: 279.14-20 [LW 37: 176]). Later on in the discussion Luther addresses the question of the predicatio identica de diversitii naturis, which Wycliffe maintained was an impossibility (WA 26: 439.21-23 [LW 37: 295]). For Luther the problem requires no metaphysical speculation, but only the common sense of a grammarian: "Solche weise zu reden von unterschiedlichen wesen als von einerley, heissen die grammatic synodochonen, und ist fast gemein nicht allein ynn der schrifft, sondern auch ynn allen sprachen." (WA 26: 444.1-3 [LW 37: 301 f.] And with his affection for everyday speech Luther gives a few examples of what the grammarians mean: "Als wenn ich einen sack odder beutel zeige odder dar reiche, sprech ich: Das sind hundert gelden, da gehet das zeigen und das wortlin 'das' auff den beutel. Aber weil der beutel und gelden etlicher masse ein wesen sind, als ein klumpe, so trifft zu gleich auch die gelden, Der weise nach greiffe ich ein fas an und spreche, das ist Reinsch wein, das ist roter wein. Item, ich greiffe ein glas an und spreche: das ist wasser, das ist bier, das ist salbe." (WA 26: 444.3-9 [LW 37: 302]). In the same way the words of institution draw on this linguistic convention: "Weil denn nu solche weise zu reden beyde inn der schrifft und allen sprachen gemein ist, so hindert uns ym abendmal die predicatio identica nichts ... und umb der sacramentalen einigkeit willen [wird] recht gered. ... 'Das ist mein leib', mit dem wortlin 'Das' auffs brod zu deuten, Denn es ist nu nicht mehr schlecht brod umm backofen, sondern fleischbrot oder leibsbrod, das ist ein brod, so mit dem leibe Christi ein sacramental wesen und ein ding worden ist." (WA 26: 444.39 f., 445.8-12 [LW 37: 303]). The words are clear, even if the intellect cannot grasp how this sacramental unity of body and bread actually takes place. But to try to explicate this "how" is to subject the divinely ordained word to human reason, a process of which Luther finds Wycliffe guilty when he denies the possibility of the predicatio identica. In dealing with God's words and works, maintains Luther, we are to render our reason and all cleverness captive, we are to blind ourselves and let ourselves be led and taught, so that we do not become judges of God's words (WA 26: 439.31-36 [LW 37: 296]). The believer is to accept the words of institu-

45. A brief look at Luther's defense of his interpretation of the words of institution, "This is my body," in his Vom Abendmahl Christi, Bekenntnis (1528) illustrates how this hermeneutics of the cross works. Luther begins with the uncompromising assertion that the text is clear: "Denn der text mus ia einerley und einfeltig sein und einen einigen gewissen verstand haben, sol er klar und einen gewissen artikel gründen." (WA 26: 262.31-3 [LW 37: 163]). That the words are univocal is an unmetaphysical assertion whose proof lies concretely in the conventions established by the linguistic community: "Denn wenn ich sage: Christus ist Gottes lamb, kans nicht sein, das einer durchs lamb einen wollf, der andern ein schaff verstehe, einer mus liegen, Und ist nicht beydes vom heiligen geist." (WA 26: 264.27-30 [LW 37: 165]). Applying that most basic logical rule of contradictions, Luther argues that the word "lamb" cannot be mistaken for the meaning "wolf"—language as a given order does not allow for this confusion. In the same way Luther argues against Oecolampadius, who sets "sign of the body" in place of "body": the word "body" as it stands in linguistic convention does not mean "sign of the body," and to assert their identity would be as foolish as saying Christ is Belial, or Paul is Judas (WA 26: 279.14-20 [LW 37: 176]). Later on in the discussion Luther addresses the question of the predicatio identica de diversitii naturis, which Wycliffe maintained was an impossibility (WA 26: 439.21-23 [LW 37: 295]). For Luther the problem requires no metaphysical speculation, but only the common sense of a grammarian: "Solche weise zu reden von unterschiedlichen wesen als von einerley, heissen die grammatic synodochonen, und ist fast gemein nicht allein ynn der schrifft, sondern auch ynn allen sprachen." (WA 26: 444.1-3 [LW 37: 301 f.] And with his affection for everyday speech Luther gives a few examples of what the grammarians mean: "Als wenn ich einen sack odder beutel zeige odder dar reiche, sprech ich: Das sind hundert gelden, da gehet das zeigen und das wortlin 'das' auff den beutel. Aber weil der beutel und gelden etlicher masse ein wesen sind, als ein klumpe, so trifft zu gleich auch die gelden, Der weise nach greiffe ich ein fas an und spreche, das ist Reinsch wein, das ist roter wein. Item, ich greiffe ein glas an und spreche: das ist wasser, das ist bier, das ist salbe." (WA 26: 444.3-9 [LW 37: 302]). In the same way the words of institution draw on this linguistic convention: "Weil denn nu solche weise zu reden beyde inn der schrifft und allen sprachen gemein ist, so hindert uns ym abendmal die predicatio identica nichts ... und umb der sacramentalen einigkeit willen [wird] recht gered. ... 'Das ist mein leib', mit dem wortlin 'Das' auffs brod zu deuten, Denn es ist nu nicht mehr schlecht brod umm backofen, sondern fleischbrot oder leibsbrod, das ist ein brod, so mit dem leibe Christi ein sacramental wesen und ein ding worden ist." (WA 26: 444.39 f., 445.8-12 [LW 37: 303]). The words are clear, even if the intellect cannot grasp how this sacramental unity of body and bread actually takes place. But to try to explicate this "how" is to subject the divinely ordained word to human reason, a process of which Luther finds Wycliffe guilty when he denies the possibility of the predicatio identica. In dealing with God's words and works, maintains Luther, we are to render our reason and all cleverness captive, we are to blind ourselves and let ourselves be led and taught, so that we do not become judges of God's words (WA 26: 439.31-36 [LW 37: 296]). The believer is to accept the words of institu-
In summary we find that the tension between Franck's and Luther's hermeneutics arises from their differing anthropologies. Franck posits a Seelenfünk-lein, which, because it is ontologically identical with divine being, is capable of knowing the inner, spiritual res significata within the outer res significans. The "spiritual" or privileged nature of this inner word proves itself in its opposition to the outer word, i.e., to conventional language. Conventional language is the bearer of inner truth only insofar as it is unclear, paradoxical. The spiritually-minded exegete must overcome conventional language in his hermeneutical journey to the word hidden within the letter and, most properly, within himself. Luther, on the other hand, allows no ontological or epistemological continuum between God and humankind. First, he lowers the roof of theological knowledge to the potentia dei ordinata, thereby excluding the possibility of overcoming the word (deus revelatus in Christ and in Scripture) and reaching God himself (deus nudus). Scripture is clear because its object, Christ, has been revealed, and because it follows the rules of conventional language. Because the external word is a reliable, God-ordained witness of truth, Luther promotes the visible, institutional church in its office of proclaiming the word. But Luther, like Franck, must then explain why, if Scripture is clear, every church-goer, every person who hears the word, is not illumined by it. To explain this he distinguishes between the external and internal clarity of the word. This distinction rests on an application of his dual anthropology of simul iustus et peccator and does not introduce a spiritualistic hermeneutica gloriae. Human understanding is darkened because it seeks to define the res significata of Scripture within itself. Believers grasp salvation, for them Scripture gains internal clarity, only when they render their own intellect captive and receive that res significata lying extra se. This they do by "repeating" or confessing the words that God has already spoken through Christ, i.e., through Scripture. The burden of signification rests on God, and the believers deny themselves their own hermeneutical position.

In an age when political authority was still intertwined with, and dependent on, religious authority as in sixteenth-century Europe, the implications of Franck's hermeneutics were far more dangerous than in our own day. With the marginalization of religion to the private sphere and the institutionalization of religious tolerance in Western democratic constitutions, Franck's concept of the inner word seems to be more at home in our age than his own. His linguistic scepticism and concomitant criticism of all institutionalized authority also strike the modern as anticipatory, since criticism has, since the Enlightenment, become the preferred intellectual method of exposing ideology.

Luther's affirmation of conventional language contains, by contrast, a certain linguistic pragmatism that has facilitated the institutionalization of his theology in the form of a Lutheran Church. But his hermeneutical model finds little resonance in the two most dominant discourses of the modern era: that of science and that of individualism. Both of these offer a self-contained system of signification: science verifies its language through empirical observation, while individualism verifies its language with an appeal to the subject. Luther's model resists appropriation into either of these discourses because it is by intention not self-contained, but depends on an authority posited outside itself and outside the bounds of human reason or feeling.

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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Anthropologie: Dem wesentlich sündhaften Menschen wird die Schrift erst dann klar, wenn er seinen eigenen Verstand gefangen gibt und die res significata extra se durch den Glauben annimmt. Durch das Nachsprechen von Gottes Wort bekennt der Gläubige die Wahrheit des Wortes; er verzichtet auf eine eigene, in sich selbst gegründete hermeneutische Position. Schließlich trägt allein Gott die "Signifikationslast" des Wortes.