12-2011

GREETED LIKE LIBERATORS: MEDIA, METAPHOR, AND MYTH IN THE RHETORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

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Journalistic performance in covering the presidential argument to undertake Operation Iraqi Freedom drew almost instantaneous criticism from within the profession. The general line of criticism held that journalists failed a “watchdog” standard of applying scrutiny to the rhetoric of public officials in terms of fact-based and legitimate argumentation. Alleged causes were usually rooted in al-Qaeda’s September 11, 2001 terroristic attacks inside the United States. Some critics submitted that post-attack journalistic “patriotism” granted President George W. Bush an overly-generous benefit of doubt in framing an American response. Others faulted journalistic norms. But the criticism in itself is open to critique as limited, however admissible.

My thesis is directed at expanding the discussion by considering how journalists might have used the classical theories of rhetoric as a watchdog aid in covering President Bush’s rhetorical war on terror. Three key speeches channeled a part of that war towards an invasion of Iraq. Chapters One through Three concentrate on breaking down those speeches as Aristotle, Cicero, and other ancients might have. Metaphor’s ability to
function as a fact in rhetorical reality is particularly stressed as the president often used metaphor related to World War II. Approaching the speeches in this fashion raises watchdog questions journalists could have raised at the time working solely with the Bush texts.

Chapter Four explores the use of Operation Iraqi Freedom in the convention acceptance speeches of the two major party nominees for the 2004 presidential contest. This allows the chance to consider convention rhetoric on a war in the first election in sixty years featuring an incumbent wartime president standing for re-election.

Chapter Five concludes that a variety of reasons contributed towards making journalistic failure here a failure, in part, from taking rhetorical language at the most superficial level. Ignoring metaphor was particularly unfortunate as the figure over time steered the legitimate Bush rhetoric downward from the classical theory.
Acknowledgments

Filing the names of everyone who helped me get here into a list seems somehow an underwhelming mode of expression in acknowledging the contribution each has made. No one, however, least of all myself, seems to have thought of a better way. I begin with the project at hand.

My adviser, Dr. John Bender, shared time, expertise, and patience virtually beyond measure. Probably few advisers are also as tolerant towards one’s occasional lapses into stream-of-consciousness in working out the point to be discussed. He saw my project through on likely more levels than I will ever be able to imagine.

Thanks to his colleagues on my committee. Professors Charlyne Berens and Barney McCoy understood a subject and approach to it that I sense are not often undertaken in the discipline. I also need to thank them for staying with a project that took quite the while to develop.

Traces of the interests of a few professors outside my home college can be found in the thesis. Thanks to Dr. Ronald Lee in the College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Communication Studies, for first throwing the term “rhetorical criticism” my way. In the same college, Department of History, Dr. Benjamin Rader, for his wide-ranging courses in American intellectual, social, and cultural history and thought. In that college’s Department of Modern Languages, French section, Drs. Thomas Carr and Jordan Stump, for their infectious enthusiasm and standards for things literary in a different culture, and for indulging my constant mistakes and malapropisms in the basic grammar of a second language.

Debts of acknowledgement outside the university are almost too numerous to
even organize. For taking chances on professional association, or extending friendship, or both: Jerry Chizek, Bernie Glaser, Kevin Duffy, and Neal Erickson; Kandra Hahn; Kim Robak; Jeff and Mary Brown; Ron and Diane Withem; Tim and Loretta McNally; Jerry Prazan; Dave Newell; Chris Beutler. Also, in this regard, to Dr. D. Paul Hartnett, state senator emeritus, for backing his encouragement of my “non-traditional” pursuit of higher education with allowing one-third of his staff to go on reduced hours to attend classes. Thanks also to my Hartnett staff colleagues, Bill Stadwaldt and Sally Schultz, for support even after discovering they were also, so to speak, “doing the school thing” with me. Thanks to Jennifer Hart for providing a place where I could come to undisturbed grips with finishing the project.

To my parents, Jeannine and the late Lanny Bisbee; and my brothers, Randall Eugene Bisbee, 1963-1991; and Christopher Lee Bisbee, USN (ret.).

I am lucky in having two wonderful friends who happen to be in the next generation. Thanks to Marianne Worthington for being who she is, and many long I-29 journeys to plant literal and figurative boot when and where needed. Thanks finally to Jessica Kolterman, for being who she is, for fending off barbarians at the gates and wolves at the door while my project passed from the contemporary to the historic, and for sharing the depth of her belief in the human being.
CONTENTS

Abstract..................................................................................................................ii

Introduction...........................................................................................................1-36

Chapter 1. Mission.................................................................................................37-73

Chapter 2. Mission in Iraq.....................................................................................74-117

Chapter 3. The Shadow Lurks.............................................................................118-140

Chapter 4. Convention!........................................................................................141-168

Chapter 5. Streetcar Fare for Mr. Lippmann......................................................169-183
Introduction

Metaphor, Myth, Meaning

I wonder about the finding of objective fact more and more. I wonder whether there is a fact out there. I know there is. Tokyo is the capital of Japan. There are facts. But so much of what we argue about, weapons of mass destruction, the threat from Iraq, are arguments [sic]. They’re not facts.

-- Chris Matthews, host, MSNBC’s Hardball

Seattle Times editors chose the Sunday edition for April 18, 2004 to publish their Operation Iraqi Freedom exclusive. The front-page photograph disclosed more than twenty aluminum boxes, draped by American flags signifying them as coffins, inside a cargo plane. A blurred foreground figure in the near edge of the blunt backlighting was securing the braces. A caption noted the plane’s location as Kuwait International Airport and the date as April 7. Staff reporter Hal Bernton’s accompanying story detailed the honor guard “ritual” held whenever remains of American fallen in Iraq arrived there from Baghdad in beginning the journey home. “‘The way everyone salutes with such emotion and intensity and respect,’ ” Bernton quoted the photographer, Seattle resident and cargo worker Tami Silicio. “‘The families would be proud.’”

Bernton’s story also touched on the exclusivity aspect in saying that “photographs of [military] coffins returning to the United States have been tightly restricted … during
the conflict in Iraq.” Referenced here was a Pentagon regulation barring “media coverage of deceased military personnel” at all “interim stops” from duty stations on through Dover Air Base, Delaware, where morticians prepared remains for family (Milbank, “Curtains”; Vandan). On Thursday, April 22, Bernton reported that employer Maytag Aircraft had discharged Silicio from her contractor position. Company president William Silva said the military shared “‘concerns’ ” he did not specify over Silicio’s “actions [in taking the photograph] violating government regulations.” Maytag was then three weeks into providing cargo and support services under its six-month Kuwait Air Terminal Operations contract with the U.S. Air Force’s Air Mobility Command (Czyzyk).

Related events broke elsewhere the same morning. In Tucson, Arizona activist Russ Kick posted to a Web site not one but 361 photographs of flag-draped coffins slugged “from Dover.” Kick received the photographs April 14 pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for “‘all photographs showing [military] caskets… at Dover AFB’ ” (Carter; Fuchs and Blenton n. pag.). Approving the request was the stateside headquarters responsible for Dover among other bases – those of the Air Mobility Command (Kornblut and Bender).

That afternoon, in Washington, DC the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) held a briefing on its “remains transfer policy” and the media ban implemented in February 1991. The Dover media ban was “what the families told us they would like,” said John Molino, deputy undersecretary of defense. Its spanning three administrations of different parties “gets [it] away from a political aspect.” Twice the federal courts had sustained it against challenges on First Amendment grounds. Molino also took a media question on
“this situation where a woman [is] fired for taking a photograph.” The response was that, to his knowledge, “[Maytag] made that decision on their own” (U.S. “Deputy” n. pag.).

Later that evening, in New York, ABC and NBC newscasts led with stories combining Silicio’s firing, Kick’s photographs, and Pentagon reaction. “This is the picture that got Tammy [sic] Silicio fired,” ABC’s Terry Moran opened in voice-over. Seattle Times executive editor Michael Fancher said that Silicio’s “motivation was that she was quite taken with how respectful this whole process was. And that’s a really compelling story.” Moran further reported that the photographs in Kick’s possession were taken by Air Force personnel. A “military official” was quoted that the photographs were meant for “‘internal working purposes. We want[ed] to see how we did [Dover honor guards at coffin transfer from a plane to the mortuary], how the people were placed [,] how it looked.’” Anchor Peter Jennings closed the piece with the Pentagon “[saying] today that [the release to Kick] was a mistake” (“Portraits” n. pag.).

NBC tacked more tightly on Silicio. Correspondent James Hattori cited a Maytag statement that the company “‘deeply regrets [Silicio’s] actions and fully concurs with the Pentagon policy.’” Leona Silicio, Tami’s mother, said her daughter’s photograph “‘was not a statement against the war.’” She was followed by Max Boot of the Council of Foreign Relations. “‘This is a war of images and a war of ideas,’” Boot said. Silicio’s photograph “‘gives the other side what it wants’” (“Seattle Times” n. pag.). The dueling contentions over meaning foreshadowed the next few hours on the network’s cable outlets.
Seattle Times managing editor David Boardman, live on CNBC and by tape on MSNBC, drew two interesting distinctions within the policy. The first held that it focused on arrival of coffins at Dover and “that can be a private moment”\(^1\) while “departure of those bodies [from Kuwait] wasn’t at all a private moment” (“The News” n. pag.). The second was that the ban “is on the taking of photographs. They can’t tell us whether to publish. And we felt it was so compelling journalistically [and] a very important visual image of what’s happening in this war that the American public hasn’t had the right and opportunity to see yet.” Thus the decision to publish was “not political.” Boardman added that Silicio saw the photograph “as capturing…the respect and the honor…given these fallen soldiers.”

But NBC military analyst Jack Jacobs labeled Silicio’s intentions irrelevant. “She’s not allowed to [take photographs].” Commentator Pat Buchanan agreed. “People who break [the regulation], even for high motives, are I think rightly removed.” Buchanan allowed, however, that “as a publisher…I would use [the Silicio and Kick photographs]. I find them moving and not invasive” (“Scarborough” n. pag.). On “Hardball,” Chris Matthews asked guest Laura Ingraham to explain the “discrepancy” of Silicio’s firing “for telling the American people the cost of this war, whereas the people who gave us false reasons for going to war, none of them were fired” (n. pag.). Commentator Ingraham claimed unfamiliarity with the photographs the media were making “wide use” of that April 22 (Carter).

\(^1\) Families could be present at Dover.
On Friday, April 23, Senator John Kerry, the presumptive Democratic nominee for president, posed a declarative variant of Matthews’ question. Speaking at a newspaper publishers and editors gathering, Kerry linked the Silicio photograph and the Kick photographs to “the truth a president shares with the American people” (Kerry, “Remarks” n. pag.). President George W. Bush saw the photographs and felt “the sensitivity and privacy of the families of the fallen must be the first priority,” Bush spokesman Trent Duffy said (Chase). The Pentagon meanwhile ordered the Air Force to release no more coffin photographs as the policy was “under review” (Kornblut and Bender).

Just hours after Kerry’s speech, on Friday, April 23, PBS’ News Hour, in its story on the Silicio photograph, advised that Kick’s 361 photographs included seventy-three representing the astronauts killed February 1, 2003 in the Columbia space shuttle disaster. NASA had issued a press release saying CNN, The Washington Post, and “a number of media outlets” were misidentifying the Dover Columbia photographs as photographs concerning casualties in Iraq. “ ‘We went to [a Web] site, grabbed the pictures, and wrote about them,’ ” Post “picture editor” Michel duCille said (Whalen).

On Sunday, April 25, the Seattle Times reported the backstory. The coffins’ array made the plane’s cargo hold “feel more like a shrine.” Having followed the coffins into the plane, Silicio took and later uploaded the photograph and, “startled and shaken,” she e-mailed it to her best friend, Amy Katz, in Chicago. Unbeknownst to Silicio, Katz e-mailed it to Silicio’s hometown newspaper, and helped the Times locate Silicio for permission to run it. Photo editor Barry Firzsimmons “worked with Silicio in more than 40 … e-mails and fractured phone calls” and warned Silicio that she could lose her job
with publication. Silicio “hoped that a respectful presentation of the photo and the story
would minimize” risk of job loss. She was not paid for it (Herndon and Rivera).

On Tuesday, May 4, CNN’s Paula Zahn interviewed Silicio. She was “unaware”
of the Pentagon regulation, Silicio said, but “I would take that photo again.” Agreeing to
publication, “I practically thought that, okay, local newspaper, it will run for one day and
it will be over [...] Then it was on the [paper’s] Web site. I was being really naïve”
(“Paula” n. pag.).

Silicio’s naïveté included not understanding her photograph’s rhetorical
capability. Therein lies how and why she and her photograph came to cross the
blogosphere, the 24-7 media maw, the 2004 presidential campaign, the Pentagon, the
White House, policy polysemy, postmodernist excuses for journalistic blunder, argument
regarding the war in Iraq, and the war’s partial privatization. Classical rhetoric’s ancients
suffused the front-page image loosed from Silicio’s Nikon 2.3 Coolpix mega pixel digital
camera. The ancients’ broad rhetorical currency informs this study of a contemporary
American war on terror rhetorically summoning a road Silicio took to Kuwait and the
United States into Iraq.

Aristotle defined *rhetoric* as “detection of the persuasive aspects” in matters
“where precision is impossible and two views can be maintained.” Rhetorical language
consequently “invent[s]” expression of corollary proofs to influence an audience
accordingly. Three types are available. Establishing speaker credibility conveys one.
Inducing correspondent audience emotion provides another. “Demonstration” argues
evidence and inductive example, and structures deductive probabilities and signs into
coupled premises creating a conclusion beyond them. “Proofs alone are intrinsic to the art” (1354a-1357b).2

Photography likewise extracts a “proof” from the circumstances it surveys. The image’s “perfect analagon” of a “literal reality” simply obscures the invention practiced in particularizing a subject and including and excluding objects relative to it.3 Choice also decides arrangement and style. Arrangement constitutes an ordered sequence of a speech’s elements, such as introduction, narration and so on (Cicero, Orator 50-1); the photographic equivalent happens in the relation of the objects formed by position and prominence (Scott 253, 266-67). Style affects “the way things should be said” and angle, lighting and focus serve its function of “contribut[ing] to [the argument’s] character.” Invention, arrangement, and style encapsulate “the three things that must be worked on in connection with the speech” presenting rhetorical proofs (Aristotle 1403b). Their presence in the photograph enables it rhetorically.

We can now begin considering the Silicio photograph as rhetorical entrée into the larger mediated debate over the war in Iraq. The coffins’ organization advanced proof of her argument’s probability that the military takes time and effort amid a war theater to respectfully tend the fallen. A background focus on the coffins while misting the foreground soldier created arrangement. The touch of roughness emulated an identifiable style the ancients theorized.

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2 Citations of Aristotle are from his Rhetoric unless otherwise noted.

3 This point derives from Barthes’ essays “The Photographic Message” and “Rhetoric of the Image.” See also Trachtenberg xiv.
“Style” sometimes had a double sense in classical theory. Generally it designated a speech’s “tone” or “pattern” (Quintilian 12.10.59-63). Three styles each matched one of the orator’s “functions.” The “plain” style was held to be best for proof or narrating information. A “middle” or “intermediate” style pleased the audience’s emotions. “Grand” style had “vigor” to rouse the audience towards being persuaded (Cicero, *Orator* 69-70; Quintilian 12.10.59). Language respectively escalating from “ordinary” to “ornate” marked the style in use (Cicero, *Orator* 76; 97). The speaker in actuality would likely mix styles to suit “circumstances” of the case (Quintilian 12.10.67) and the “character of both the speaker and the audience” (Cicero, *Orator* 71). The restrained style,4 for instance, advantaged instruction “to make clear what was hidden.” But instruction that included “something that must be acted on” required a grand style (Augustine 4.10.25-14.30).5

The ancients’ *figures* comprised a second sense of “style” understood today as authorial mode of language within composition. Figures categorized “the use of single words … and their combinations” in any “innovative form … produced by some artistic means” (Cicero, *Orator* 134; Quintilian 9.1.14). The discussion shows “how [the ancient] rhetoricians’ interest in style had grown into a highly developed system” since Aristotle (G. Kennedy 125) undertook its first explication (Tancred-Lawson 40). Equating style in both senses with invention and arrangement was cognitively rational to Aristotle (Tancred-Lawson 42) and definitely practical in Roman thought. Style contributed to:

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4 “Restrained” was simply Augustine’s word for “plain.”

5 Demetrius (38) devised four styles by ignoring the intermediate for the “forceful” and the “elegant.” Much on the “forceful” transfers to Cicero’s “grand” (*De Oratore*) while the “elegant” divides between humor and poetry. Rhetoricians rarely adopted the “unusual” four-style approach (G. Kennedy 89).
arousing approval, either by making the speaker’s character attractive, or with the object of winning favor for the cause, relieving boredom by xxx variety, or hinting at certain points in a more seemly or less risky way … it is effectiveness … that makes [figures] useful. (Quintilian 9.2.1-8).

The extent that the plain style filled the Silicio photograph as a by-product of her hurried point-and-click method matters not to the style’s contribution to real effect. Audiences believe war photography in ratio to lack of artistry (Sontag 26-7) – as the ancients would predict from the style’s definition. No one attacked the photograph as staged in plainly revealing what was “hidden” literally by the Dover ban. Reaction was free to concentrate on the coffins partly because of their salience by number and focus in arrangement. The style was then rhetorically instrumental to rejecting the probability of Silicio’s argument so as to invent alternative probable propositions of meaning.

A rush to invention that was reaction on April 22 and 23 no less deployed style than did the Silicio photograph. Boot, Boardman, Jacobs, Buchanan and Matthews each presumptively interpreted the Silicio photograph as demonstration-by-example to reason inductively towards larger issues involving “the other side,” press freedom, insubordination, or the war’s rationale.6 The presumptions reflect the influence of the figure synecdoche, the “understanding [of] many things from one, [a] whole from [a] part[,] the consequences from the antecedents, and vice versa” (Quintilian 8.6.19-20). The subsequent synecdochic move to a propositional whole or consequence from the part of casualties or the antecedent of the photograph itself internalizes the figure metonymy,

6 One might observe that Matthews and the others were arguing over what rhetorical argument the photograph advanced.
based on “contiguity” (Fiske and Hartley 26; Hall 77), as “fallen” for casualties or saying “that a sacrilege and not a ‘sacriligious person’ has been caught” (Quintilian 8.6.23-6).

The ancients following the Silicio story the week of April 18, 2004 would easily recognize the illustration that “what we say [invention] and how we say it [style] … and in what order” [arrangement] are inextricably “essential” to “meaning” (Quintilian 3.3.1-2).

They would further detect a third figure evident. Classical rhetoric’s metaphor “transfer[ed]” nouns and verbs from their “proper places” to “supply [language] deficiencies,” affect audience emotion, or to “brighten our style” and set things “before our eyes” (Quintilian 8.6.4-20). Resemblance is the common basis (Cicero, Orator 92). Matthews’ arguing the war’s “cost” as casualties metaphorically transferred the word from a “source domain” of finance to a “target domain” through the resemblance of expense as sacrifice. Silicio’s arguing the coffins represent an interrelation of respect and sacrifice is again saying “this is that” (Aristotle 1409b). The arguments are metaphor as a proof of meaning.

Metaphor, then, is “fundamental” to invention (Cole 141), in itself constitutive of “reality” (Foss 299), and is the ultimate crucible of language and thought, style and content. The figure, when “constructed by a combination of words,” roots synecdoche and metonymy (Cicero, De Oratore 3.41-2) as well as enigma (Quintilian 8.5.14). Simile, analogy, irony, and proverbs were all subsumed by metaphor in Aristotle’s classification (1404b). A metaphor attributing “action and feeling to … objects” attains even the

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7 I am borrowing “domain” and “source” from the work of Lakoff individually and in collaboration with M. Johnson. The terms are in general circulation among rhetoricians.
sublime (Quintilian 8.6.11). “[M]uch the greatest asset” in speaking, Aristotle understandably summarized in *Poetics*, “is a capacity for metaphor [since] to use metaphor is to discern similarities” (1439a).

The “contemporary theory of metaphor” (Lakoff) largely accentuates the ancients’ thinking. Metaphor so permeates “everyday” thought and abstract thinking – on “time, quantity, state, change, cause, action, purpose” – that its use as a structural concept (Lakoff 204-12) may be “unconscious” (Quintilian 8.6.5).

Public policy rhetoric displays the same tacit use of metaphors. There, metaphors are generative frames defining problems and proposing solutions (Schön 137-9). *Frames* are “the selecting and highlighting [of] some facets of events or issues, and making connections [similarities] among them to promote interpretations[s]” of cause, judgments, and solutions (Entman 5). The definition holds regardless whether a metaphorical frame is at play in rhetoric or media.

We see a private metaphor taken public in Bush’s initial framing of al-Qaeda’s September 11, 2001 attacks of mass terrorism in New York and Washington (9/11). Bush’s diary entry for the date metaphorized the attacks as the “Pearl Harbor of the [twenty-first] century” (Woodward, *Bush* 37). The referent was the Japanese military attack December 7, 1941 on American naval forces at Pearl Harbor. The metaphor went public nine days later before a joint session of Congress in Bush’s address announcing a “war on terror” as the United States 9/11 policy response (joint session speech).

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8 All further citations of Woodward are from *Plan of Attack* unless specifically noted.
Other presidential administrations, of course, have metaphorically transferred history to their foreign policy. The administration of Bill Clinton regularly invoked “Munich” and Holocaust imagery to support western military action against Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s “ethnic cleansing” in 1999 (Paris). George H.W. Bush analogized 1991’s Operation Desert Storm to the World War II Allied campaign against Nazi Germany (“Remarks” 1483). In 1984, Ronald Reagan analogized opponents of aiding Nicaraguan “contras” to 1930s “isolationists” (“Address” 665). Lyndon Johnson obliquely deployed comparable metaphor in a 1964 speech announcing he would seek congressional authorization for military action “in southeast Asia” (498).

The “minds of the audience” are metaphorically drawn to “way[s] in thought” on the subject under rhetorical consideration, Cicero noted (De Oratore 3.40-1), as if sensing frame theory. Context is metaphor’s sole justification (Quintilian 8.3.38). My thesis explores historic metaphor in presidential and media discourse of rhetorical moments that scholars and journalists have identified as crucial to the 2001-04 Operation Iraqi Freedom debate. How does metaphor function as frame? How does metaphor function as “fact”? How and why did metaphor help or hinder the Bush discourse moving a “war on terror” into Iraq? How did the news media engage the Bush administration’s metaphors? Questions of language and rhetorical theory seem rarely raised in journalism studies. Nor is there much literature on Bush metaphor over time.

Virtually all public deliberation begins in an indefinite question needing to be
answered first. “Should man marry . . .? I ought one to take part in government?” I concentrate on the joint session speech and its double service as “foundational” (Domke 30) to the “war on terror” and “likely the greatest [speech] of [the Bush] presidency” (Suskind, “Faith” 50). The critical locus is the classical rhetoric “theorized for us by Aristotle, practiced by Cicero, taught by Quintilian, and … transformed by [Longinus]” (Barthes, *Semiotic Challenge* 21). We would expect Bush to address the indefinite question by genre, style, placement of metaphor, and so on.

Resolved indefinite questions become definite questions “of facts, persons, times[.]” Should Cato marry? “Ought one to take part in government under a tyranny?” (Quintilian 3.5.8). For this discussion of the “war on terror,” the definite question became this: Does an American “war on terror” extend to undertaking an American war in Iraq? Chapter Two’s period is the forty-five days from the August 26, 2002 speech of Vice President Richard Cheney to the U.S. Senate’s war resolution on October 10.

Administration rhetoric is keyed to Bush’s October 7 speech, a “stern, methodical […] grand summation” in “culminating the campaign” for the war (Isikoff and Corn, 143-6; Ricks 61).

Definite questions come to “adding reasons” of honor, expediency, and practicality “for doing [or] not doing something.” Should Cato marry Marcia? (Quintilian 3.8.16-22; 3.5.13-14). The additional reasons and practicality of the war became these questions: Under what circumstances should the United States wage war in Iraq? To what

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10 Texts of the speeches that are the foci of Chapters One, Two, and Three are taken from the *Public Papers of the Presidents*. Other Bush communications, and Cheney’s speeches, are mostly taken from the texts in the Bush White House Web site archived at americanrhetoric.com, a site maintained by the Communications Department of the University of Texas at Tyler. Historic speeches and some miscellany are sourced from the same site. Analysis is based on paraphrased summary.
end? Chapter Three opens on the 2003 State of the Union moment and closes on Bush’s May 1 remarks popularly known as “Mission Accomplished.” I highlight Bush’s “embracing … idealistic, neo-Wilsonian rhetoric” February 26 for his argument that “the overthrow of Saddam [Hussein] would be a catalyst for change in the Middle East” (Isikoff and Corn 191). That would make the speech revelatory of “a disconnect between the president’s most heartfelt objective in going to war” and reasons the American people would support (McClellan 131). Marshall McLuhan’s work on the nature of television will be helpful here.

Chapter Four goes to Boston and New York for the rhetorical handling of the war by the candidates accepting their parties’ 2004 nominations for the presidency. Studies of the Bush first term war rhetoric, or various aspects of the war, little relate either to the Bush and Kerry campaigns. But the campaigns’ managers have publicly agreed that the war in Iraq “was a big concern” and “did affect the campaign[s]” in strategic and daily thinking (Institute of Politics 190-91). Augmenting the chapter is G.P. Mohrmann and Michael Leff’s finding that the American campaign speech shapes a rhetorical genre of “identification” outside ancient theory (464). Kenneth Burke’s earlier writings on rhetoric and “identification” (20-3) will also be helpful.

The convention weeks offer an opportunity to review media coverage of the rhetoric previously detailed. Multiple reasons allow Time and Newsweek to represent “the media.” The magazines enjoy “mainstream status within the larger [United States] mediascape.” Their estimated combined readership was roughly 40 million during the period (Gasher 212). Precedent exists to see them as source material for scholarly research (Fedler, Smith, and Meeske; Gans; Gasher; Hutcheson et al.; Merrill). Weekly
publication should have allowed the periodicals’ journalists more scope than their national media colleagues had to scrutinize the Bush discourse and its metaphors.

Analysis that begins with the founding works on rhetoric, and proceeds to media matters, concludes with two of the founding works of journalism studies. Walter Lippmann’s 1920 *Liberty and the News* remains “unusually prescient” in more ways “than [Lippmann] could have realized” (Rozzen 1-2). His better known and more complex *Public Opinion* “discussion of stereotypes and propaganda in the modern media … has hardly been improved upon by seven decades’ worth of subsequent writers” (McClay xiv-xv).11 Chapter Five submits that the Dover ban exemplified Lippmann’s definition of “propaganda.”

Lippmann keenly diagnosed his era’s sociopolitical afflictions. Contemporary society was “too big, too complex, too fleeting” for individuals to experience it directly (11-19).12 They therefore used “absolutes” (*Liberty* 24) and culturally created stereotypes to negotiate the “pseudo environment” of reports, rumors, and opinions to arrive at opinions that absolutes and stereotypes predetermined (*Liberty* 24; *Public* 50-51). Experiencing a sunset is experienced as the painting of a sunset as “we pick recognizable signs out of the environment. The signs stand for ideas, and these ideas we fill out with our stock of [stereotyping] images” (58-59).

Command of sign, symbol, and image thus commands “mastery” in public affairs

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11 Lippmann’s use of “stereotype” metaphorically transferred the word from the newspaper composing room to social psychology. Noelle-Neumann called the shift a “crystallization” of thought (144). In other words, metaphor in invention produced a frame.

12 Further citations of Lippmann are from *Public Opinion* unless otherwise noted.
as the process of meaning remains intact in moving from sunsets to civic affairs. A streetcar fare increase is symbolized as “un-American. It insults the revolution. An additional three cents profanes the memory of Lincoln. The Great War dead would resist” (Lippmann 133). Thus, per Lippmann:

If one man dislikes the League [of Nations], and another hates Mr. Wilson, and a third fears labor, [they may unite around] a symbol which is the antithesis of what they all hate. The symbol in itself signifies no one thing in particular, but it can be associated with almost anything. And because of that it can become the common bond of common feelings, even though these feelings were originally attached to disparate ideas (132).

*Semiotics* – “the modern theor[y] of representation” (Fowler 223) – bolsters Lippmann’s observations. The theory began in studies of language as a sign system. A “signifier” is the “sound image” [word] making “an impression on the mind” of a denoted “signified” by working as a “sign” of the “associative total” between the two (Saussure 66-67; Fiske and Hartley 10). That the sign is a “common cultural experience” shared between speaker and audience (Fiske and Hartley 2-3) allows us to endow it with meaning selected from the common stock of stereotypes and images. A culture of English language speakers would grasp the signifier “dog” as denotatively signifying a canine.\(^\text{13}\)

Signs can also slide “along a chain of connotative signifiers” (Hall 81). The sign’s “associative total” connotatively extends “dog” from a canine to Snoopy and the

\(^{13}\)The terms can be found in the ancients’ expounding on Aristotelian signs. “There is no reason for us to signify something (that is, to give a sign) except to express and to transfer to another’s mind [something] in the mind of the speaker” (Augustine 2.2.3-4).
Baskerville hellhound, “underdog,” “lucky dog,” “yellow dog journalism,” “watchdog journalism,” “lapdog journalism.”

A sign like “the left” carries Al Gore, Bill Clinton, and Fidel Castro (McChesney 102). “Conservative” carries Trent Lott, Jacques Chirac, and Vladimir Putin (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 12). “The media” carries everything from The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal to any publication on a supermarket checkout rack. The “war on terror” carries Osama bin-Laden, an “axis of evil,” and Saddam Hussein. A sign carries the League, Wilson, and “labor.” Notice that the sign’s initial move from denotation to connotation recreates the sign as a metaphor. It matters not whether the sign started as a canine, sunset, a streetcar fare amount, flag-draped coffins, or 9/11. By dint of what is missing in Lippmann – a theory of language – Lippmann was right about the use of language in the public square.

Roland Barthes called signs “myths” because they are social constructions outside nature (Mythologies 117). A more traditional view of “myth” might be a narrative that resolves contradictions, explains past, present, and future, “consists of all its versions,” and survives even bad translations (Lévi-Strauss 206-31). Uniting the two senses of myth broaches Barthes’ idea that texts refer to other texts intertextually or “to other sites of the culture” extratextually (Barthes, Semiotic Challenge 225-31). Sophocles and Freud are read in terms of each other in studying the Oedipus myth (Lévi-Strauss 217-18). Susan Faludi has persuasively argued an instance apropos the war in Iraq.

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14 Rhetorical signification by connotation seems to me advertising’s fundamental design. One sells pianos by promoting the idea of a music room. The “associative process” suggests to the customer the purchase of a piano (Bernays 77-9). At play is setting before the customer’s eyes the sign “music room.”

15 None of these ideas or terms appears in her work. She nonetheless writes a textbook illustration.
Initial media coverage of the April 1, 2003 Special Forces “rescue” of Pfc. Jessica Lynch from a Nasiriya hospital echoed classic “captivity” narrative in Faludi’s view. Generally, the narrative features “vulnerable and grateful women” rescued from captivity by “stalwart” white men. Its origins lie in “America’s wilderness history.” Initiating the genre was Mary Rowlandson’s 1682 account of her weeks seven years earlier as a hostage of the native Narragassettts after their attack on the colonial settlement at Lancaster, Massachusetts. Frequent narrative elements are “violence [and] humiliation” in this genre central to “the English literature of America” (Faludi 200-07; Sayre 4-5). The point is to restore “faith in our invincibility through fables of female peril and the rescue of ‘just one young girl’ ” (Faludi 200-07).

Lynch was captured nine days earlier when her unit, the 507th Maintenance Company, was in a convoy, missed a turn, and then ambushed. Eleven of its thirty-three soldiers were killed (Ricks 119). News reports based on military briefings and anonymous sources portrayed Lynch suffering gunshot wounds while “heroically emptying her weapon at her captors.” But subsequent [military] investigations determined that Lynch was injured in a vehicle crash while under attack, her weapon jammed before she could fire, and the hospital “was already in friendly hands when her rescuers arrived” (Kirikpatrick).

Faludi’s intertextual narrative for the Lynch story is Cynthia Ann Parker. The seven-year-old was seized in an 1836 Comanche raid on the Parkers’ Texas home. The incident is largely seen as inspiring Alan LeMay’s 1954 novel *The Searchers* and director John Ford’s film adaptation with the same title. Faludi held:
Like Lynch … Parker was a young white woman who fell hostage during a bloody battle and was subsequently held in the desert by people her countrymen viewed as rapacious non-Christian murderers, until she was rescued in a gunfight trumpeted as heroic, though it was not. As with Lynch, her fabricated rescue would be played and replayed in breathless newspaper accounts …. and as with Lynch, these accounts would eclipse Parker’s actual experience, with consequences for an American culture eager for her myth, though not her truth (200).16

Consequently, Faludi concluded, “the public Jessica Lynch would have to exist within the parameters of the transferred Cynthia Ann Parker story” (207).17 However, in a “media-government-popular culture” (Artz 10) pseudo-environment, the extratextual parameter could just as easily be Evangelina Cisneros, Birth of a Nation’s Flora Cameron, The Searchers’ movie Debbie Edwards, or Star Wars’ Princess Leia. The narrative is a culturally created American mythical twist on saving Helen of Troy.18

“We define, then see,” Lippmann wrote (54-55), in perhaps another instance of not realizing all he captured, here in four words. But we define not only by sign and

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16 Faludi did not address male captivity. Authors in that genre range from John Smith to Frederick Douglass to Terry Anderson in Den of Lions. Anderson’s and Betty Mahmoody’s work Not Without My Daughter were 1980s narratives shifting “the villain’s role from the American Indian to Arab Muslims” (Sayre 10).

17 Recall Lippmann’s point that the symbol is devoid of specific meaning. Captivity narrative intertextually created the symbol “Jessica Lynch” as “captive” with nothing of Jessica Lynch in it. The myth survives the bad translation defining her as heroic and then seeing her as unfortunate but still heroic.

18 The Lynch narrative ironically underscored Faludi’s other point that female captivity narrative implies “botched male efforts at protection” in the first place (211). Military police had responsibility for securing routes such as the 507th travelled. Police commander Col. Teddy Spain alleged he was denied the number of troops he had requested. Otherwise, “Lynch would [not] have happened” (Ricks 123).
symbol as our “knowledge” of the world. We define intertextually and extratextually by myth, metaphor, and the metaphors that others bring before our eyes. Jacobs defined the Silicio photograph as insubordination and then chose not seeing as his way of seeing. Buchanan could define the Silicio and Kick Air Force photographs as respectful because of cultural life experience that includes experiencing the texts of other war photographs. Bush might define the “war on terror” as the “task of our generation” (Bush 2001). Thirty-two months later, Americans saw, in places like Fallujah, the consequences from the antecedent metaphorical definition.

Chapter Five ultimately grounds assessing the Bush administration’s historical metaphors, particularly its use of World War II metaphor, by the parsimonious standards the ancients bequeathed. Metaphors must have “affinity” and proportionality [between source and domain] and produce clarity (Aristotle 1404b-1405a). They must “express … meaning better” than could be expressed without metaphor (Quintilian 8.6.6). Affinity, proportionality, and clarity create the ultimate standard that metaphor’s justification is contextual. A semiotic theory of language helps evaluating contextual justification by allowing us to look at what signs the metaphor is using internally and what its total sign frames. Studying the frame’s intertextually and extratextually provides one answer of how it might have been contextually understood by its audience – including the media audience – at the time.19

Such a study is possible because metaphor is identifiable without having to reach to some supposed hidden meaning of the text. “Any differentiable part, any isolable

19 Apel, for example, read the Abu Ghraib photographs by the “pornography” (93) of lynching photographs.
element of [a text] can become the focus of independent interest and inquiry, and discussed in connection with any number of [extratextual] things linguistic, social, political....” (Battersby 194). The questions – were the metaphors justifiable and how the metaphors functioned as frame in the argument for Operation Iraqi Freedom – drive a critical approach. They are questions of “style” and “argument” and, as such, rarely amenable (Medhurst 225) to a prism like content analysis. The core idea of content analysis is achieving an objective and quantifiable “representation of a body of messages” by equally random selection of any individual message within the set as determined by frequency of terms or “behaviors.” (Wimmer and Dominick 141). Two problems are readily apparent.

First, “frequency … does not necessarily make that element the most important” in the messages (Wimmer and Dominick 141). Searching the Bush rhetoric for such terms as “war,” “terror,” and “greatest generation” could bypass the joint session speech.20 A content analysis keying a term like “flag draped coffins” into the larger set of “American casualty photographs from the war in Iraq” could completely miss the Silicio photograph.

The second problem is so much more severe as to be fatal. Content analysis “by definition emphasizes content at the expense of context” (Anden-Papadopoulos 9). A content analysis possibly finding the Silicio photograph still could not tell us anything of its rhetorical construction. Expecting a content analysis to explain how metaphor functioned as frame in the context of September 20, 2001 and Bush’s joint session speech is expecting the impossible.

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20 Especially with an administration that had archived 900 speeches just by December, 2002 (Jarratt 99).
Content analysis has, however, been used conditionally on presidential rhetoric. David Domke used content analysis on a set of Bush 2001-03 speeches and found the rhetoric constituted “political fundamentalism [or] an intertwining of conservative religious faith, politics, and strategic communication” (6). The set mixed the domestic political agenda, the “war on terror,” the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq because Domke’s project was a search for something like Bush’s political essence. Naturally, missing are press conferences, interviews, and other administration figures. Naturally missing as well is Bush’s June 1, 2002 speech at West Point – where he announced “an astonishing departure from decades of [foreign policy] practice and two centuries of tradition” (Ricks 38). That speech concluded the indefinite part of the question (and thus why Chapter One finishes with it). The absences illustrate how the questions being asked determine methodology.

Other content analyses that do tell us something about presidential rhetoric are usually not pure content analyses anyway. Thomas J. Johnson et al content analyzed Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1934-40 state-of-the-union speeches against the backdrop of issues publicized in newspapers Roosevelt scanned almost daily. The conclusion – “that Roosevelt reacted to previous [pre-speech] coverage in the newspapers more than he influenced subsequent coverage” (167) – combined content analysis, comparative analysis, and agenda-setting theory. Elvin Lim conducted a content analysis on twenty-seven 1933-44 Roosevelt speeches identified as “fireside chats” by Roosevelt or his staff. This study discovered their rhetorical base was “patrician authority” (446), that Roosevelt

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21 “Agenda-setting” holds that concentrated media attention on an issue raises public awareness of it (McCombs and Shaw).
“did not hesitate to verbally abuse and denigrate his political opponents,” and that the speeches explained “harsh realities” (455). Again, the content analysis was combined with comparative analysis, and close textual reading as much as mathematical formulae accounts for the claim of “patrician authority.”

The Johnson et al. and Lim studies show the gains possible from combining a centering core method of studying texts – whether content analysis or classical rhetoric – with other approaches essentially intertextual or extratextual. For example, the finding that Roosevelt’s “fireside chats” were not as intimate as often thought is deepened when read through McLuhan’s essay on radio’s nature as a medium, Kathleen Hall Jamieson’s work on the “attack” within her history of presidential campaigns, and the oratory politicians used during Roosevelt’s youth.

Tracing expressions “from one discursive context to another [asking] why particular [ones] achieve value and salience is an extended case study in intertextuality” (Montgomery 151). The study of isolable metaphor prevents criticism from becoming “whimsical” (Mohrmann and Leff 465). Both close analysis and intertextuality and extratextuality address more recent critical trends (Lucas 246; Leff). Intertextuality can look at the “historically specific case” of the Bush rhetoric from a larger perspective than “getting bogged down in … Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s ruminations or President George Bush’s prayer meetings” (Artz 10). The overall goal is to “apprehend

22 Lim also found that, contrary to popular impression, fewer than half were delivered on Sunday evening. The term “fireside chat” was invented in a CBS press release and used by the press even when the speech was delivered in the summer (437-8). One could argue the “objective” press invented a metaphor.

23 The comparisons were with other Roosevelt speeches and speeches of Herbert Hoover and Harry Truman.
[the speech text] from the inside out” (Lucas 253) as I have tried to do with the Silicio photograph. Criticism “break[s] down [a text’s] rhetorical elements so completely as to determine how they function individually and to explain how they interact as a strategic [and] artistic response to the exigencies of a particular situation. This kind of study [is] intensely analytic and highly interpretive[.]” A single theory usually will not “realize” explicative analyses to the fullest extent (Lucas 253). More philosophically, textual explication provides an open analysis inviting the audience to participate (Warnick 57-9).

Scholars dissecting the Bush “war on terror” rhetoric by the individual speech or by themes and patterns have agreed on its “Manichean” quality. Analyses were also unique. Denise Bostdorff contended that the joint session speech paralleled Puritan rhetoric calling for renewal of commitment to covenant and community. John Murphy argued the speech was positioning Bush “as the voice of America” (620) by genre blending and the use of synecdoche. David Zarefsky saw the speech as a “closed” argument by definition (153). The speech and the early “war on terror” rhetoric following it were also proclaimed Churchillian (Cohen), Lincolnian (Broder), and Wilsonian (LaFeber) – all on The Washington Post editorial pages.

Other scholars looking at different speeches and asking different questions expectedly served different interpretations. Bruce Lincoln did a comparative analysis of Bush’s speech of October 7, 2001 – announcing the start of military action in Afghanistan – and bin-Laden’s anticipatory response released hours later. The two

24 Anker 33; Cole 144; Jarratt 96-7; Lincoln 20; Murphy 614; Zarefsky 144. The referent is the doctrine of the third century theologian Mani. The doctrine held that the good Forces of Light and the evil Forces of Darkness co-exist within each other. Good’s two-fold task was expunging the evil inside it while extracting and redeeming what of good had been subsumed by evil (Lieu 5-13. See also Burkitt 16-27).
speeches were mirroring “subtle, complex rhetorical performances” in using “terrorist” and “infidel” as “key signifiers,” expressing concern for children, and issuing inverse but similarly constructed appeals to secular citizenship and religious belief (19-32). Douglas Kellner charged outright that the Bush rhetoric betrayed a “hatred of language” (xiv). Susan Jarratt held that Bush’s rhetoric on September 11, 2002, “homogenized” victim identity to advance policy – a rhetorical move comparable to Pericles’ funeral oration one year into the Peloponnesian war (101-06). Timothy Cole’s study of twelve Bush speeches and four press conferences through the 2003 state-of-the-union speech maintained that metaphor obscured or ignored the difficulties of fighting in and occupying Iraq.25

Language always includes “surprises of meaning.” Variation is “not anarchic,” however, because the sociocultural knowledge [including the experience of other texts] available to the audience must respond to material “worked on, chosen, composed” (Barthes, “Rhetoric” 46-47; “Photographic Message” 19). Media must report what was said. We thus ignore theories of language and we denigrate rhetoric at our peril.

Someone who attends to … a thing which is meaningful but remains unaware of its meaning is a slave to the sign….Since rhetoric is used to give conviction to both truth and falsehood, who could dare to maintain that truth … should stand unarmed in the fight against falsehood? This would mean that [some] would know how to use an introduction … descriptions that are succinct, lucid, and convincing … fallacious

25 Cole did not demonstrate how metaphor framed exclusions at any one moment. His and Jarratt’s findings of rhetorical displacement will be elaborated in Chapter Five’s discussion of the Dover ban and the ancients on narrative.
arguments … while we would bore our listeners, cloud their understanding, [and] be too feeble to refute what is false (Augustine 38.11-19, 4.2.3).26

Few would dispute a proposition that media coverage and probing of the Bush first term “war on terror” rhetoric was feeble. Performance by “an easily cowed press” was “embarrassing [for] the American news media” (Rich 221-25).27 The era “was one of the more dismal chapters in American journalism” (Ricks 35). Journalists obsessed “on the play-by-play at the [United Nations],” failed to address the “Bush doctrine” of “pre-emptive war” separately from a war in Iraq, and failed to exercise “exacting” or even “elementary skepticism” (Mooney 30-33). The press “self-muzzled … intimidated by the administration and its foot soldiers at Fox News [FNC],” said CNN’s Christiane Amanpour (“Topic” n.pag.). Media so focused “on covering the campaign to sell the war [that they were] complicit enablers” of it (McClellan 125).

“Patriotism” is a blame candidate (Domke) for this alleged state of affairs. “George Bush is the president … and you know, as just one American, wherever he wants me to line up, just tell me where[,]” CBS News anchor Dan Rather famously told David Letterman a week after 9/11 (Rather, Letterman n.pag.). Rather later said that he was worried by “patriotism run amok” (Rather, Holt n.pag.). But perhaps Rather was merely personifying “an honest account of the position of most American journalists” (Jensen 71).

26 Compare to Mills on gaining a “clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by [a] collision with error” (76). Also compare to Milton’s “[l]et [truth] and falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?” (50).

27 Citations of Rich are from Greatest Story unless otherwise noted.
Most journalists are “citizens of the nation that they cover [and] possess many of the same cultural values and beliefs [of the society] – values that act as ethnocentric filters…particularly [in covering] international events” (Domke 21-22). The “ethnocentrism” operates so pervasively even in normal times and domestic affairs as to be an “enduring value” in the news (Gans 42). “Ethnocentrism” is at least a somewhat more precise word than the rather abstract “patriotism.” A state of mind is a better description of “patriotism” than a dictionary definition.

Loyalty to the nation is a high form of altruism when compared with lesser loyalties and more parochial interests. It therefore becomes the vehicle of all the altruistic impulses and expresses itself, on occasion, with such fervor that the critical attitude of the individual toward the nation is almost completely destroyed … Altruistic passion is sluiced into the reservoirs of nationalism with great ease … [M]an projects his ego upon the nation. So the nation is … a check upon, and a final vent for, the expression of individual egoism (Niebuhr 91-3).

So it is hardly surprising to find a discerning Lippmann complaining in 1920 that editors believed “their highest duty is not to report but to instruct, not to print news but to save civilization … to patriotism, as they define it from day to day, all other considerations must yield. That is their pride” (Liberty 10-12). Patriotism “happens.” Moreover, in the case of 9/11, when was “patriotism” to stop and “skepticism” to begin? On June 1, 2002 when Bush announced a first-strike “doctrine”? On August 26, 2002 when Cheney made the “war on terror” about Iraq? A “patriotic” press is a legitimate
observation. A “patriotism vs. journalism” argument is a generalized shallow distraction from an antidote to a future embarrassing journalistic era.

Institutional media failure in covering war could be seen more discretely in instances of ethnocentrism. Americans have always romanticized technology (Carey). If Mike Gasher’s study of *Time* and *Newsweek* during the opening of Operation Iraqi Freedom found in the coverage a focus on weaponry that “read like … advertisement[s]” (214), Daniel Hallin and Todd Gitlin’s study of CNN during two months of Operation Desert Storm found the “potency of American technology” a recurring theme (153). CNN anchor David French proclaimed himself “wide-eyed” after riding in an F-15 on January 18, 1991; CNN anchor Kyra Phillips proclaimed herself “amaz[ed]” after riding in a Navy FNA fighter jet on May 1, 2003 (Hallin and Gitlin 155; “President to Declare” n. pag.).

Failure might also be attributable to the media’s own use of conceptual metaphor as news. NBC News coverage during the two weeks before the start of the war in Iraq consistently used the metaphor of a “game: between Bush and Hussein (Lule 100); NBC News coverage of “Operation Desert Storm” used the metaphor of a “showdown” between Bush and Hussein (Hallin and Gitlin 152-54). On April 9, 2003, CNN and FNC coverage throughout the day of the toppling of the Hussein statue in Baghdad’s Firdos Square emphasized dramatic close-up over wide shots to “consistently exaggerate” crowd size, generating thereby a victory [metaphorical] frame (Aday, Cluverius, and Livingston 321-4). Television coverage of a 1951 procession through downtown Chicago

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28 Iraq was personalized as Hussein by the use of metonymy (Lule 100). Thus, as Cicero would predict, the metaphor was constructed.
by General Douglas MacArthur consistently used close-ups to “disseminat[e] … an image of overwhelming public support for the general” (11) disproportionate to the actual number and experience of on-site spectators (K. Lang and G. Lang). If *The Washington Post* of 2002 and 2003 was overwhelmed by “the sheer mass of information…[to] digest” (Kurtz), the news of 1920 was “an incredible medley of fact, propaganda, rumor, suspicion, clues, hopes, fears … and guesses” (Lippmann, *Liberty* 44, 50). If *The New York Times* “hyped the notion that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction” (McChesney 121), *The New York Times* eight decades earlier was an “organ” of the Wilson administration (Lasswell 39).

Ricks and Rich tethered failure to operational factors and institutional culture. “Lapses” and “failures” of oversight occurred in Congress, among “cowed” Democrats in the congressional minority, and “in the inability of the media to find and present alternate [to the administration] sources of information about Iraq” (Ricks 4, 88). Rich assigned equal responsibility to an “often disingenuous political opposition” and a 24/7 “mediathon environment” blurring “truth and fiction” and prizing “drama … more than judicious journalism” (224-25). The mediathon orients the press “towards ferrying allegations rather than ferreting out the truth” to meet a demand to “‘have something’” (Kovach and Rosenstiel 6-7). In the prewar discussion of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the mediathon’s media penchant for answers of “yes” or “no” deprived the public of understanding how Iraqis “would react to an American occupation” (Al-Marashi 113, 118).

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29 Adey et al also note the Lang and Lang study (32).
Today’s pseudo-environment in which the media work could be characterized as the “terrain” between objectivity and postmodernism (Jameison and Waldman xiv).

“Objectivity” can be distilled into “the pursuit of verifiable facts” (Stephens 229) and has been a journalistic “moral philosophy” coincidentally or implicitly birthed from Progressivism (Schudson, Discovering 8-9; Gans 204-06). The plane containing the flag-draped coffins was or was not in Kuwait on April 7, 2004. Hussein had or had not weapons of mass destruction. A dog is or is not a canine. Tokyo is or is not the capital of Japan.

“Postmodernism” is less easily defined. “Fabulation … simulacra … pastiche [and] eclectic nostalgia” (Baldick 201-02) are postmodernism’s hallmarks to express the contemporary shattering of time and space (Potter 89) and the belief that all reality is socially constructed (Jameison and Waldman xiv; Kaplan 139).31 Bernton’s April 18, 2004, story co-constructed “reality” with Silicio, fitting a common cultural argument to a sign, and simultaneously borders the postmodern because the “reality” it presents does not exist without a rhetorically constructed image. The audience watching Moran’s April 22, 2004 story saw as news “reality” a television image of a newspaper image of an e-mailed image of the image Silicio created in her camera. The Washington Post “grabbing” some pictures of flag-draped coffins and “writing about them” is a postmodernist slave to a sign of simulacra.32

30 A trait shared with “patriotism.”

31 “Simulacra” is understood as appearance and simulation. See Baudrillard.

32 Another example of the line from the ancients to the moderns.
A good candidate for an origin point of a postmodern pseudo-environment is a blog item appearing in the dark hours of a January in 1998. At about 2:00 a.m. EST, on January 18, the “Drudge Report” posted that *Newsweek* spiked a story alleging a Clinton “sexual relationship” with a young female intern ("*Newsweek Killed*"). The item was discussed within hours on ABC’s *This Week* ("Weekly Roundtable n. pag."). On January 19, *The Washington Post* re-circulated the “*This Week*” discussion (Kalb 6-7). Ergo, pastiche reporting on pastiche punditry on a pastiche blog item on reporting that did not occur.

Team Bush had experienced the mediathon’s postmodernist aspect as an advantage. A Bush “movie set” ranch (Rich 15) that “never existed beyond the … façade of *Giant*’s Reata” would be represented as “real” Texas culture (Ennis) in the mediathon. A sham White House correspondent in the personage “Jeff Gannon” (Rich, “White House”) could and did pass. “Real” video news releases could feature actors as “reporters” reading public relations scripts as “stories” (Barstow and Stein). The creation of reality could be boasted as reality. A “senior adviser to Bush” explained to journalist Ron Suskind that action and the creation of reality were the same thing. While objective journalism studied the reality of the moment, “we’ll act again, creating other new realities,” leaving journalists “just to study what we do” ("Faith” 51).33 34 The media’s eventually catching up with Jeff Gannon and video news releases was journalism in the dust of its own mediathon.

33 Further citations of Suskind are from *One Percent Solution* unless otherwise specifically noted.

34 Rich contended that the statement made an article paragraph reporting it “the single most revealing paragraph anyone … reported about the Bush administration” (3).
Suggesting that media covering the Bush “war on terror” rhetoric embarrassed themselves by means of objectivity unable to confront Bush administration postmodernist traffickers in simulacra and pastiche is too simplistic. Neither has pursuit of the fact decayed into the misbegotten (Martin Kaplan 139). The matter is instead simply recognizing that “any contemporary discussion of representation, truth, and fact construction must address the debates in postmodernism” (Potter 88).

The objectivity Lippmann bequeathed (Liberty 72) for media’s extraction of fact from the pseudo-environment might be modified as a starting point in today’s mediathon pseudo-environment. Extraction of fact today means journalistically recognizing and engaging rhetorical language itself as an administration’s construct of reality. Metaphors set before our eyes as conceptual frames are rhetorical facts. Media failure during the prewar debate of Operation Iraqi Freedom was frequently failing the “watchdog” role of scrutiny (Sabato 26) by simply neglecting the Bush administration’s language. Media thusly often missed its incumbency to expand debate (Lasch, Revolt 161-75).

Journalist Jim Lehrer inadvertently offered a case in point. Lehrer was asked why the media never raised prewar issues of postwar Iraq. “It just didn’t occur to us,” Lehrer said. “We weren’t smart enough to do it.”35 Imagine a media apprehending, from the textual inside out, the administration’s usual metaphor for its postwar vision. No “activist” media, sometimes posted as objectivity’s opposite, would have been required.

Regard similarly Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 5, 2003 address at the United Nations. “Considerable grounds existed at the time … to question” Powell’s

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assertion that Iraq tried to obtain nuclear material in Niger. The speech was nonetheless largely endorsed by major media, “though they couldn’t possibly [have] know[n] for sure that Powell was right. In short, they trusted him” (Mooney 31-3; emphasis in original). That trust was built “more than anything [on] Powell’s personal credibility” (Ricks 93). A reading of Aristotle might have catalyzed a different media perspective than, say, The Denver Post’s editorially likening Powell’s appearance to “Marshall Dillon facing down a gunslinger” (“U.N.”) 36

Speaker credibility as a proof “must come about in the course of the speech, not through the speaker’s being believed in advance to be of a certain character” (1356a). Powell’s speech had “little” that was new (Ricks 93). At least one other recycled allegation also used shaded wording.

Bush, in his Cincinnati speech months earlier, alleged “intelligence” had discovered Iraq possessed “unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs] that could … disperse chemical or biological weapons … targeting the United States” (1753). Powell showed a slide of a machine and carefully said it was “illustrative of what a UAV would look like.” Isikoff and Corn reported that the evidence for the Bush allegation was of a photo of a Czech UAV “like the ones [the administration] believe[d] Saddam” had (145) – classic postmodernist reasoning from an image that could look like something to what might be a relative fact. Media could not have known that. But knowing Aristotle’s insistence on the text might have caught Powell’s wording.

A more egregious example of ignoring language and the ancients’ admonitions

36 The piece, however, did offer a good example of journalism’s own use of extratextual metaphor as news.
arose just weeks later in one of the most vaunted news venues. On March 16, NBC’s Tim Russert interviewed Cheney on “Meet the Press.”

Russert: … how will the United States be perceived [in Iraq]?

Cheney: … my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators ….

Russert: If we do in fact go into Iraq, would a military operation be successful without the apprehension or death of Saddam Hussein?

Cheney: Our objective will be, if we go in, to defeat whatever forces oppose us, to take down the government of Saddam Hussein, and then to follow with … eliminating … weapons of mass destruction ….

Russert: If … we’re not greeted as liberators, but as conquerors, and the Iraqis begin to resist, particularly in Baghdad, do you think the American people are prepared for … significant American casualties?

Cheney: I don’t think it’s likely to unfold that way, Tim, because I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators.

“Liberator” invokes for an American audience “the historical imagery of American soldiers being joyously greeted by flower-throwing Italian and French citizens as they pushed the Nazis back towards Germany” in World War II (Aday et al 318). The sign “liberator,” then, manufactures setting the metaphorical imagery before our eyes. Semiotics, metaphor, conflation of “content” and “style,” extratextuality, and framing are all here encapsulated. Russert’s third question indicated that he sensed a metaphorical assertion was being set before his eyes as a fact. But the question was a hypothetical – in search of a prediction to be later measured “objectively” – allowing Cheney to reassert an extratextually “factual” metaphorical frame minimizing American casualty potential.
Suppose Russert asked Cheney to detail the resemblance between the Paris of 1944 and the Baghdad of 2003. Suppose Cheney were asked in essence to see, then invent and define. Would the metaphorical frame for Cheney’s minimalization have broken down? Part of the administration’s metaphorical argument might have collapsed – by the ancients’ standards of resemblance and proportionality.

Rhetoric is an exercise in the “interdependence of aesthetics and politics” (Furniss 151). A “rhetoric reporter” (Cunningham) would “educate the public [in its] art and in the standards [of] assess[ment]” (Campbell 6). The reporter would realize that analysis begins before the rhetoric and its elements have jelled as “fact” pastiche. Likely the would realize that a certain inevitability attached to Bush’s sliding the metaphorical sign “war on terror” along a chain of connotations through the indefinite to the definite to action. It began with metaphor, myth, and meaning. It “trapped … Hussein in a shrinking box” (McClellan 143). It trapped Bush “in a box of his own making” (Rich 62). It took the United States – and Iraq – with it.

Thus I disagree with Aristotle’s emphasis on invention virtually alone as the purpose and, implicitly, the ultimate evaluative standard of rhetoric. Cicero’s opinion that persuasion must be the standard if it is the orator’s “chief business” (Brutus 15) is also too limited. “Courtesans, flatterers, corrupters … money [and] influence” all can persuade (Quintilian 2.15.7-11). The art, the artist, and the work comprise rhetoric. When a speaker has “spoken well, even if he does not win, he has fulfilled the demands of his
[sic] art.” The ancients provided aids to launch evaluation of speaking well, without which analysis lolls too anemic to invite the audience to participate.

Dismissing “rhetoric” as a subject does not dismiss human reason facing uncertainty. “If … assemblies and councils of all kinds were made up of the wise, if hatred, influence, prejudice, and false witness had no power, the scope for [rhetoric] would be very small. But … audiences are fickle; we must [use] the weapons of art” (Quintilian 2.17.28-30). The ancients remain with us. Their understanding of rhetoric as a “parallel activity to dialectic” (Aristotle 1356a) allows us to understand rhetoric as a way of “existing in the world … with the vicissitudes of human existence” (Medhurst 219). They understood that rhetoric would be equally available to a Tami Silicio who “struggled through high school” (Bernton and Rivera) and to an Ivy League graduate elected to be the forty-third president of the United States. Cicero’s comment on the Greeks (De Oratore 2.36) applies to all the ancients: “When they offered to teach … how to penetrate the most obscure subjects, to live virtuously and to speak eloquently, [it] is … irrational … not to pay them some degree of attention.” If only Lehrer and his colleagues had thought of it.

37 Quintilian 2.14.5; 2.17.23-4; 2.14.16-17.
38 Compare to Madison’s “[i]f men were angels, no government would be necessary” in Federalist 51 (260).
Chapter One

Mission

In the evening of September 20, 2001 the forty-third president of the United States, George Walker Bush, stood before a joint session of Congress in the U.S. Capitol. Approximately eighty million Americans watched via television (Woodward, *Bush* 107) as a president not known for “rhetorical prowess” (Zarefsky 138) was about to explain 9/11. The president began simply.

“We have seen … the American people” already give the state of the union report the president normally delivers to a congress jointly assembled, Bush said. Airline passenger Todd Beamer was mentioned and his widow, Lisa, introduced. Recalled media vignettes sketched American compassion. Thereby the state of the union stood strong.

Bush then thanked congressional leaders for their service. He recognized British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s presence. America and Britain were “again joined in a great cause.” Only on “a single Sunday in 1941” had freedom been attacked as on 9/11.

The speech moved to a series of questions and answers for its narrative framework. Who attacked us? Evidence pointed “to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda … and its leader – a person named Osama bin-Laden[.]” Al Qaeda maintained links to other organizations harboring sleeper terrorists in more than sixty countries. Its influential support of Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban regime effected a repressive Islamic extremism jailing citizens for owningtelevisions and barring women from education. This radical network and sheltering governments – not
representative of true Islam – were the enemy. “Our war on terror … will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”

Why do they hate us? The terrorists and their self-appointed leaders hated “our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.” They followed the ideological path of Nazism. History would doom them no less.

How will we fight and win this war? By mobilizing all resources of diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, financial influence, and the military. The military side would be of longer duration and less visibility than Gulf War I. “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” Being with the terrorists included providing sanctuary. Any government so choosing “will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”

What is expected of us? To live our lives, to pray for terrorism victims, to participate in the American economy. Hard work, creativity, and enterprise “were the strengths of our economy before September 11th, and they are our strengths today.”

America needed policy initiatives. Flight security required new measures and direct assistance to the airlines. Law enforcement anti-terrorism tools, intelligence capabilities, and America’s economy needed strengthening. The president pledged to rebuild New York City. He summarized:

Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom – the great achievement of
our time, and the great hope of every time – now depends on us. Our
nation – this generation – will lift a dark threat of violence from our
people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts,
by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.

Carrying the “police shield of a man named George Howard, who died at the
World Trade Center trying to save others,” reminded him, Bush said, of the endless task
that was the new war on terror. “I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging
this struggle for freedom and security for the American people.” The conflict’s outcome
was certain. “Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we
know that God is not neutral between them … may He watch over the United States of
America.”

The speech was well received in the news media among the audience. NBC’s
Tom Brokaw and Tim Russert respectively found it eloquent and excellent. CBS’ Dan
Rather and Bob Schieffer agreed with Brokaw and each other on its being eloquent. On
CNN, clergyman T.D. Jakes called the speech powerful and profound; musical artist
Cheryl Crow called it comforting. Republican Sen. John Warner speculated that it was
“maybe the greatest speech ever given by any president.” Democratic Sen. Dianne
Feinstein less effusively found it nonetheless unifying. Historian Stephen Ambrose told
NBC it was Churchillian. Editorialist Richard Cohen also made the comparison to
Winston Churchill for the pages of The Washington Post. Columnist David Broder
pronounced the Bush speech Lincolnian for the pages of The Washington Post.

39 “America,” NBC n pag.; “President,” CBS n pag.; “Reaction,” CNN n pag.
Alternative analysis might have noted the speech’s fulsome cohesion of classical construction, style, and figures. An introduction, narrative, and conclusion (Aristotle 1414b) were clearly demarcated. Plain, intermediate, and grand style mixed. At least nine figures appeared. Two instances of the most powerful figure – metaphor – structured what was said and infused arrangement. Crucially, Bush also entered into the world of genre.

Aristotle distinguished three rhetorical genres by audience role. The audience is either a “spectator” or a judge (1358b). Forensic asks the audience to judge past events; its goal is justice; its proofs, syllogisms, since the past “is particularly amenable to the demonstration of cause and effect.” Deliberation asks the audience to assess a future course of action proposed on behalf of the audience’s best interests. Proofs lay in example. Epideictic casts the audience as “spectator” of the speaker’s credentials to blame and censure for adducing the honorable in “how things are” at present. Narration will be “sectional” rather than the usual “continuous” narrative nature of forensic and deliberation. “Amplification” is the frequent rhetorical tactic (1356a-1368b; 1416b).

The speaker strengthens a single argument by dwelling upon details (Longinus 10; Quintilian 8.4).

Modern thinking expands classical theory by granting epideictic a somewhat larger functional scope. Epideictic inherently carries a definitional function surfacing when we “insist on rhetoric [in order] to find meaning” in the unexpected (Condit 288; 40 The ancients interchanged the terms “epideictic,” “display,” and “panegyric.” Some modern scholars also use the term “ceremonial” to highlight a frequent occasion for the genre. I use “epideictic,” when not quoting the ancients directly, as the term more inclusive and Aristotelian.

41 Recall that the text determines whether speaker credibility exists.
Zarefsky 137). The speaker defines the event through a contextualizing filter of core values and beliefs. Such “definitional authority” may ground later argument (Condit 288). Again the ancients resonate. A simple “change of expression” can transform deliberation or epideictic into each other. “That we should pride ourselves on the effects not of chance but of ourselves” as a deliberative suggestion becomes encomia in stating one is proud not of effects of chance but of initiative (Aristotle 1368a). But all the genres are often as interdependent in a speech as styles are mixed. “Justice and expediency come up in encomia, honor in deliberation, and one rarely finds a judicial case in part of which something of [these] themes…cannot be found” (Quintilian 3.5.16). The Beamers offered a classical case in point. The state of the union was the virtue of the citizenry.

We have seen …. the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save others on the ground, passengers like an exceptional man named Todd Beamer. And would you please help me to welcome his wife, Lisa Beamer, here tonight.

Todd Beamer’s story erupted in the media during the four days preceding the speech. The thirty-two-year-old computer software sales manager and father from Cranbury, New Jersey was aboard the hijacked Newark-to-San Francisco United Flight 93. He called GTE Airfone. Operator Lisa Jefferson answered. “ ‘We’re going to do something,’ ” Beamer reportedly told her. Jefferson and Beamer recited the Lord’s Prayer. Next, Jefferson heard Beamer ask ‘ “Are you guys ready?” ’ He followed it with

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42 As in the case of the Silicio photograph. The Dover ban made it an unexpected photograph of “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Speakers contextualized the photograph – and by extension the war – through the core values of honoring the fallen soldier or the censurable values of insubordination and aiding the enemy.

43 “Encomia” refers to praise.
“‘Let’s roll.’” Chaos was heard over the phone until the line went dead. The plane crashed near Shanskville, Pennsylvania, about eighty miles southeast of Pittsburgh. Lisa was pregnant with her and Todd’s third child on 9/11.\(^4^4\)

Details of Flight 93 did not need recalling. Coverage created the necessary condition of stipulated and generally well-known facts for launching epideictic discourse (Aristotle 1416b). Citing Todd Beamer specifically so early met the need of an epideictic introduction to set the speech’s “tonic key” (Aristotle 1416b). Lisa Beamer’s presence allowed Bush to already begin the epideictic strategy of amplification (Aristotle 1414b-1415a). A personified symbol of a changed America from the reach and aftermath of 9/11 connected Bush’s subject to its “most intimate” part. Such a move in an introduction\(^4^5\) lends the speaker’s cause “the greater weight” of uniqueness. One option comes in a matter that is “cruel, or heinous, or undeserved, or pitiable … or unprecedented” (Cicero, *De Oratore* 2.78-9). Simply showing a “fragment of reality” outside rhetorical invention (Barthes, *Semiotic Challenge* 53) sufficed for Bush to directly proceed with amplification.

We have seen the state of our union in the endurance of rescuers[.] We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the saying of prayers – in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief of strangers their own … the state of our union is strong.

\(^4^4\) Lane, Phillips, and Snyder; Faludi 57-63; 9/11 Commission Report 10-14. “At least ten passengers and two crew members” also made calls to the ground (9/11 Commission 13). Media focused largely on Beamer and fellow passengers Jeremy Glick and Thomas Burnett (Faludi 56-7).

\(^4^5\) In any of the genres.
Evident in the passage is the plain style the ancients recommended for giving information. The plain style need not banish figures altogether (Cicero, *Orator* 81). The “force” of figures in combination (Demetrius 208) predictably enlivened the imagery. “We have seen” flexes *anaphora*, successive clauses or sentences beginning or ending in the same words. The second sentence’s successive clauses of roughly equal length allowed the “excellent” figure *isocolon* (Quintilian 9.3.80) to etch each image distinctly by fashioning a sentence with “signposts and resting places” (Demetrius 202). Omitting conjunctions in that sentence engaged the ability of the figure *asyndeton* to then multiply a few images into the numerous (Quintilian 9.3.50). Thereby, Bush achieved the *energia* of vivid description.

Vividness by details exercises audience imagination to add its own details “into the bargain” (Quintilian 8.3.63-72). *Isocolon*, *asyndeton*, and sentence structure gave the audience ample opportunity to add their own details escalating Todd and Lisa Beamer into the *climax* of a loving and giving American people. Almost immediately, Bush fulfilled epideictic mandate to “make the listener think that he [sic] is joined in the praise, either in … self … or family … or in his [sic] practices … or some other way” (Aristotle 1415b).

The president’s next amplification seemed to signal the beginning of narrative. Figures again helped establish reality. The return of conjunctions is the figure *polysyndeton* working in the passage its usual purpose of insistence (Quintilian 9.3.50-54).

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46 Cicero, *Orator* 135; Lanham 11; Quintilian 9.3.30.
Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.

Pronouns pack emphasis. “We” and “our” elevate what previously was a speech any official could offer to one where George W. Bush assumed speaking as Murphy’s (610) synecdochic presidential voice of the people. Conduplicatio, a repeating of the same word in a successive clause (Cicero, Orator 135), insistently marked “anger,” “bring,” and “justice.” The “mirror inversion” of chiasmus (Lanham 33)47 takes “justice” into the speech’s second climax.48 The figures link to the earlier figures significantly.

Anaphora, isocolon, polysyndeton, conduplicatio, and chiasmus can be seen as forms of repetition. The purpose of repetition is “to fix some points in the mind” (Quintilian 9.2.4). Bush had begun to fix two points for the post-9/11 world. The first positioned the we of the United States now facing the them of an enemy. The second was the definitional fluidity of response. Defending freedom could take any form. Justice could take any form. The importance of genre becomes apparent in epideictic’s ability to seed policy definition almost invisibly for an audience occupied with praise and blame. The importance of figures as reality construction comes in Bush’s repetition by subtle varying of figures available to fix points in the mind. What will become apparent in the

47 The ancients apparently overlooked this figure.

48 Quintilian submitted that climax should be used sparingly (9.3.54-7). It reappeared only once more in the speech.
speech’s course is the emergence of some favorite rhetorical tactics of the forty-third
president.

The delay of narrative for ensuing *apostrophe* actually made sense at this point.
An introductory interlude addressing persons in the audience conveys urgency (Quintilian
4.1.63-72). The urgency here comingled the cause Bush had advanced with his
presidential legitimacy. Thanking individually by name the majority and minority leaders
of both houses for their “service to our country” leveraged the simulacra of a state of the
union occasion that, according to Campbell and Jameison (52), highlights the
constitutional executive. Amplification by elongation destroyed any vestige of the 2000
election tumult four times over. The military language of “service to our country”
amplified the presidential role to commander-in-chief. Adding recognition of the
attendance of British Prime Minister Tony Blair amplified president and commander-in-
chief to world leader. The United States and Great Britain were “once again … joined in
a great cause.” Assigning that cause no specificity provided rhetorical room for Bush to
take it anywhere. He took it towards inlaying the speech’s defining frame by the most
powerful of all figures.

On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war
against our country. Americans have known wars – but for the past 136
years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941.
Americans have known the casualties of war – but not at the center of a
great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks
– but never before on thousands of civilians. All this was brought upon us
in a single day – and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

Bush segued to the speech’s narrative in categorizing 9/11 as an act of war. The opening sentence also “slipped in as fact” without antecedent argument that the United States was already at war with an ideologically-driven enemy (Murphy 614). Essentially what started the narrative was an assertion. Aristotle allowed (1394a) that an assertion can be filled out by posteriorly adding “what precedes it.” Bush tied his “most significant rhetorical decision” about 9/11 (Zarefsky 143) to two metaphors. One organized what was said. The other organized arrangement.

Anaphora and the synonymy (Quintilian 8.3.16) of “a … Sunday in 1941,” “surprise attack,” and “peaceful morning” left only one route of amplification. Invoking Pearl Harbor metaphorically had to pursue the larger World War II. Definitional hyperphora could now amplify automatically. What was 9/11? An act of war. What kind of attack? Pearl Harbor – the synonymy’s three resembling significations told us so. Invoking the darkest hour of America’s previous largest war hitched the second metaphor of the last sentence.

The rhetorical use of light and dark, like the rhetorical use of sex and death or heat and cold, constitutes an archetypal metaphor in Michael Osborn’s formulation. Archetypal metaphors embody timeless motivations based on experience in objects, actions, or conditions. Light and dark, for example, relate to a “fixed chronological

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49 The context of Aristotle’s discussion is the maxim. He equated maxim and assertion in the sense that neither offered a prior argument supporting a declarative sentence.

50 The figure of asking and answering questions (Lanham 87). Longinus (18) believed it effective when one’s own questions were asked as if by another. Bush’s what, who, why, and how questions prefaced by “Americans are asking” both played this role and reinforced the president as synecdochic speaker.
process” under which seeing or not seeing determines agency or helplessness. Thus a speaker uses light and dark in combination to pose inevitability within a situation of “simplistic” and diametrically opposed binaries. Good and evil, threat and reassurance are “bald” instances where the rhetorically constructed binaries are subsequently used to offer alternatives to the audience. One can adopt or reject the speaker’s suggested action or attitude. The role of the individual is enhanced; the audience may feel well disposed to the speaker for being given a part in an “elemental conflict” posed as a particular historical moment rather than an endless process. Assumed here in western discourse is an “invisible axiom [that] material conditions follow from moral causes … qualities of good or evil” in a person or state “assure a radiant future [or] correspondingly opposite material conditions” (115-19; emphasis in original). Presumably, the same qualities in the audience influence what choice will be made toward what, as Quintilian would put it, consequences.

Scholarly pronouncements of the Bush discourse as Manichean now become clearer. Who were the enemy? Haters of freedom of speech, religion, and franchise. Character and ideology obviated cause and effect. Bush illustrated by example.

We have seen their kind before. The [terrorists] are the heirs of all the murderous technologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to

51 A deconstructionist critic, along lines suggested by Jacques Derrida (40-42), would likely explore analysis if “good” were posited as extant only in terms of “evil.” Deconstructionism challenges binary discourse by arguing that an inherently subordinated term in a pair is rather the governing term of the thinking. The practice seems to me of dubious value to the working journalist, the concern here, but is possible with the Bush rhetoric. Domke also mentioned it (33).

52 Note 21, page 24.
power, they follow in the path of fascism and nazism [sic] and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends, in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.

Similarity is an optional basis for definition (Quintilian 5.10.73; 7.3.30). The stakes, too, must be the same if the old enemy has returned. The now familiar combination of anaphora and isocolon proposed another world war allusion.

This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.

Perhaps not coincidentally, as narrative moved here to conclusion, the style moved from the intermediate to the grand. The style is made for such subject matter as large threats, missions, generational commitment, freedom, and fear (Augustine 4.20.41-2; Quintilian 12.10.63-4). Isocolon was more sophisticated than before. “We will not tire; we will not falter; and we will not fail” used both that figure and anaphora and isocolon to link to reuse in a later paragraph by a form of a relatively more involved figure of recurrence than before. Epanados splits repetition with intervening material (Quintilian 9.3.35). Bush spoke of Howard and then continued:

I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people.

The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we
know that God is not neutral between them .... may He watch over the United States of America.

Scholars have more precisely limited the adjective “Churchillian” solely to the conclusion. Botsdorff (306) compared the “I will not tire” anaphoric isocolon triad to the conclusion of Churchill’s “Give Us the Tools” war speech of February 9, 1941. Churchill addressed Roosevelt from London:

Put your confidence in us .... We shall not fail or falter; we shall not weaken or tire. Neither the sudden shock of battle, nor the long-drawn trials of vigilance will wear us down. Give us the tools, and we will finish the job (6: 6350).

Murphy (624) similarly found “Churchillian verve” in the same isocolon. Any similitude seems to me to exist in both speakers using stylistics, style, and genre the ancients posited. But the stylistic figure of metaphor was particularly important to Bush. Everything built towards or away from the coupling of the Pearl Harbor and light/dark metaphors. The speech’s plain style introduction focused on the light of a strong state of the union in the present. The Pearl Harbor metaphor launched the dark/light metaphor for the intermediate style turn into dark sectional narrative of the enemy defined by example of others in the past and the enemy’s own past. The grand style conclusion moved into the light of future successful action that was plausible because the war after Pearl Harbor was successful. Aristotle had a point about metaphor.

Many of the rhetorical devices have taken on in recent years “psychological reality” from research in language comprehension (Fahnestock 174). Metaphor has drawn
some special attention from psychological and cognitive neuroscience researchers. Study participants with healthy brains are usually tested for speed of recognition and understanding of metaphor in single sentences or as a narrative’s conceptual frame. Tasks range from judging the plausibility or implausibility of metaphors and literal statements at the sentence level (Bottini et al 1243.); judging whether a narrative’s conclusion was metaphor, irony, or literal (Eviatar and Just 2350); providing analogical mappings for certain words within a narrative that opens with an incomplete metaphor (Spellman and Holyoak 915); and assessing a narrative’s concluding congruity with an opening metaphorical frame in single and dual topic narratives (Allbritton, McKeon, and Gerrig 612-19).

Findings consistently return to Aristotle’s observation that command of metaphor is a speaker’s greatest rhetorical asset. Brain imaging of participants encountering metaphor indicates right hemisphere activity, in areas thought responsible for memory and imagery, in addition to the left hemisphere’s general dominance in processing language (Bottini et al. 1241-2, 1250; Eviatar and Just 2356). Two-thirds of participants in one study in fact self-reported conscious use of imagery to assess metaphor – twice the number reporting use of imagery to grasp literal statements (Bottini et al. 1248-9). \(^{53}\) The ancients would easily understand such right hemisphere activity and use of imagery as unique and special to metaphor. Part of metaphor’s functions involve setting things before the eyes (Quintilian 8.6.4-20)

\(^{53}\) Right hemisphere activity is also noticeable in identifying irony (Eviatar and Just 2352-5).
No less borne out is the ancients’ holding that figures have practical effect (Quintilian 9.2.1-8). David W. Allbritton, Gail McKeon, and Richard J. Gering extended tests confirming a priming-target relationship in simple sentences. Different participants read a narrative that opened with a metaphor and contained mid-point sentences, concluding sentences, and words within the concluding sentence varied to match the metaphor or the topic in general. Participants were then presented a series of sentences and asked whether the sentence or a word within a sentence was congruent or not with the participant’s judgment of the narrative. Faster “recognition” times of congruity were found with matching sentences or words “cued” by the metaphor rather than the topic. The researchers thus eliminated pre-existing “semantic relatedness” of words as a factor affecting the results. They concluded that a metaphor-based narrative schema can “link elements within a text” or, in other words, metaphor shapes text as consistent or not for the audience.

Barbara Spellman and Keith Holyoak tested war metaphor in real time during the four days of 1991’s Operation Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi post-invasion occupation. College freshman psychology students were asked to provide analogical mappings for George H.W. Bush, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait given the president’s metaphor of Saddam Hussein as Adolph Hitler. Two-thirds of those providing a complete set of mappings mapped Bush to Franklin Roosevelt and the United States to the United States of World War II. The remainder mapped Bush to Churchill and the

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54 See Higgins, Baugh, and Lombardi. Participants constructed short sentences from word strings, performed an interference task such as counting backwards by three-digit numbers, and then chose a descriptive word for a person in an ambiguous narrative. The variable was the interference task length – a variant way to test epanados. Prime-target results were significant but weakened with longer delays.
United States to World War II Great Britain. Both groups mapped Iraq to [World War II] Germany or Germany and Japan.

The equivalent of primes for an American audience (the United States, Bush, Iraq) carried through to a statistically significant shift in a target in Saudi Arabia. Those choosing a Bush/Roosevelt/United States mapping analogized Saudi Arabia to Great Britain the ally; those choosing a Bush/Churchill/Britain mapping analogized Saudi Arabia to France the next likely target. The authors concluded that “cognitive processes” for metaphor strain towards coherence by preferring isomorphic analogies. Here, World War II metaphor, or a “popular story of World War II … imposed a set of roles on the target Gulf situation by selectively emphasizing the most salient relational parallels between the two situations” (923). Cicero knew that resemblance alone can create a metaphor sufficient to arouse and direct “ways of thought” on the subject.

George W. Bush’s audience had a far clearer popular story of World War II available as a source domain for the president’s metaphor than did George H.W. Bush’s audience. The war popularized in recent media, running from 1990’s Memphis Belle through 2001’s Pearl Harbor, was repeatedly one of “a noble military mission … despised enemies … individual courage [and] military triumph” (Boggs 455).

The process began in the 1980s with a first step to myth. Films such as

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55 Mappings of Kuwait were widely diverse under either analogy. Austria, Poland, both, or both plus some [unidentified] third country all appeared in the results.

56 Fewer than ten percent of responses were a cross-mapping of Bush to Roosevelt and the United States as Great Britain or Bush to Churchill and the United States as World War II America. Moreover, a computer programmed to search for analogies in varying input World War II narratives produced results “qualitative[ly] … consistent” with the students’ choices (916-20).
the decade’s *An Officer and a Gentleman* and *Top Gun* revised the Vietnam-era “destruction of the nation’s unsullied perception of its military establishment” into American belief that “its fighting men [sic] could meet any challenge” (Suid, *Guts* 502). Then came President George H.W. Bush, Hussein-is-Hitler metaphor, and Operation Desert Storm. The media-government-popular culture matrix treated the American public to the sight of the fabled World War II USS *Missouri* at battle trim in the Persian Gulf. Once more its sixteen-inch guns blazed at enemy targets in a seemingly seamless blending of 1945 Iwo Jima and 1991 Kuwait (Schmitt; “Interesting”).

The following year, Stephen Ambrose’s *Band of Brothers* recounted the story of Easy Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, in World War II Europe. The fiftieth anniversary, three years later, of the war’s end, supported its virtual return. Buick, the Franklin Mint, Motorola, and Zippo promoted World War II-themed advertising campaigns. Stroh Brewery backed a nationwide tour of a B-17 Flying Fortress and a B-24 Liberator. All three networks, and three cable channels, ran specials. *Time* reprinted its V-E Day special issue. *American Heritage*, the *New York Daily News*, *The New York Times Magazine*, and *Newsday* all ran original special issues (Elliott). Tom Brokaw’s *The Greatest Generation* and film director Steven Spielberg’s *Saving Private Ryan* appeared within weeks of each other in 1998. The film *The Thin Red Line* was released in January, 1999. The Brokaw sequel *The Greatest Generation Speaks* was issued. Retro swing reigned in Manhattan’s nightclubs (Goldstein; Marin). Dog tag designer jewelry soon hit the market (Marin). Ambrose’s World War II museum opened June 6, 2000, in New

57 Joining the *Missouri* was the same USS *Wisconsin* that shelled Japan in 1945. Bolstering the seamlessness was both ships additionally firing Tomahawk cruise missiles (Schmitt; “Ship’s History”) alongside their World War II guns.
Orleans (“National WWII”). The film *U-571* also opened during that year. War anniversary still was not done.

Disney’s *Pearl Harbor* – the “peak … of the World War II nostalgia … obsession” (Rich 10) – flooded into national release on roughly one of every 10 domestic indoor screens58 over Memorial Day weekend of 2001. *Newsweek* gave the film a cover story (Horn). Concurrently, Emily Rosenberg has noted (169-73), Pearl Harbor specials ran on ABC, and the cable Discovery, History, MSNBC, and National Geographic channels; John Ford’s 1943 documentary *December 7th* appeared in a restored version; and any number of Pearl Harbor books hit bookstores. Pearl Harbor was sufficiently “ubiquitous in American culture by the summer of 2001 that a stranger to the planet might have imagined that the bombs had just been dropped” (Rosenberg 173). Then, on September 9, 2001, as a sort of denouement to the nostalgia’s peak, HBO premiered its miniseries *Band of Brothers* adaptation of Ambrose’s book.

History in rhetoric was cautiously approved by the ancients. Like metaphor, history was useful in unraveling problems (Augustine 2.38.43-39.46), just as Bush’s historic metaphor unraveled a meaning of 9/11. Knowledge of history provided “facts and parallels” and freed one from dependency on others’ interpretations of it (Quintilian 10.1.34). Describing historic events in the present produced a vividness contributing to the sublime (Longinus 25).

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58 Or 3,000 (Lyons) of the 34,000 indoor screens in the United States (National Association: Number).
Caveats, however, mattered. Tempting overuse or misuse of history often fictionalizes (Cicero, *Brutus* 20.62). Inserting history into narrative often obfuscates the present question (Quintilian 10.1.31-3).

More embracing and less careful of history were the news and entertainment media in the years preceding 9/11. “‘The distinction between news and history is not much of a leap,’” *Time* executive Jack Haire observed, commenting on media interest in the semi-centennial of the Allied victory in World War II (Elliott). War history in particular is “highly dramatic … [and makes] great narrative [and] outstanding television … we can reconstruct the appearance of the past,” according to Taylor Downing, producer of ITV’s *The Great War* series (8, 14). Haire and Downing had a point; *Pearl Harbor* was the third most popular film in commercial release in the United States on September, 10, 2001. By measure of the World War II the film depicted, the ancients might have written the reproving reviews penned by Roger Ebert and any number of his colleagues.

*Pearl Harbor* did “get a few things right. The Japanese … bomb[ed] Hawaii on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.” Their attack group’s flagship was the *Akagi*. Jimmy Doolittle did lead sixteen B-25s on a raid over Tokyo on April 18, 1942 (Suid, “Pearl Harbor: Bombed”). Almost everything else is inane – or missing.

The inane starts with a love triangle of pilots and a nurse lifted from a Hollywood fondness for the triangle-and-historic-calamity plot anteceding Pearl Harbor. Early films

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59 One might think Downing had read Longinus on vividness.

60 In terms of year-to-date box office gross. Ahead of it on September 10 were *Shrek* and *Rush Hour 2* (“Box Office: September 3”).
in the hybrid genre were 1936’s *San Francisco* and *Charge of the Light Brigade*. The contemporaneous World War II film *Flying Tigers* concerned a pilots-and-a-nurse triangle resolved when one of the pilots dies a heroically sacrificial death in action – exactly as in *Pearl Harbor*. Director Michael Bey said his triangle-and-calamity model for *Pearl Harbor* was 1997’s *Titanic* (Horn 37). The fictional familiar berths the historically fancied and mythical.

Bey’s film flourished a surfeit of both. Hills border Army Air Corps training fields on Long Island and in Florida. Cigarettes are unknown to Disney’s 1941 U.S. military and to Disney’s Franklin Roosevelt. An American combat pilot successfully bypasses his dyslexia to dogfight enemy aircraft. Japanese planes are downed by deck machine gunners clearly aiming at neighboring ships. Purple Hearts never awarded (Suid, *Guts* 662) are awarded. Funeral services never held (Suid, *Guts* 664) are held. Identified historical figures are placed where they never were and repeat fictitious lines from other movies (Suid, “Pearl Harbor: Bombed”; *Guts* 655, 660). A CNO\(^{61}\) war warning message received by Pearl Harbor’s Admiral Husband Kimmel ten days before the attack (Prange 406) is received by *Pearl Harbor*’s Admiral Kimmel after the attack.\(^{62}\) A Navy nurse monitors the top secret Doolittle raid – and, by radio transmissions never made (Suid, *Guts* 666). So much is so grossly inaccurate in the film’s Doolittle raid that Lawrence Suid’s excellent corrective analysis needs four dense pages (*Guts* 664-8).

Of equal moment is the mostly missing. Disney’s 1941 Hawaii misses any substantive presence of Asians or Hawaiians (White 112). Noncombat scenes involving

\(^{61}\) Chief of Naval Operations.

\(^{62}\) An instance of dramatic license confusing historical issues of responsibility.
the Japanese bypass humanity to creak along borderline “kitsch” (Dower, “Innocence”). Casualties also lack humanity; if following a Japanese bomb into the USS Arizona blurs war and video game, not following American bombs into Tokyo becomes all video game; the game imagery twice denies the audience empathy. No mention is made of the fate of the Doolittle raiders captured by the Japanese when empty fuel tanks forced crash landings in China. Missing above all, despite a couple of mumbled lines, is the history and ideology of the Japanese and American competition for Pacific hegemony, the factors colliding at Pearl Harbor. “If you have the slightest knowledge of the events in the film,” Ebert wrote, “you … know more than [the film] tells you. There is no sense of … context.”

Suid has argued that Disney’s entitling the film Pearl Harbor raised audience expectations for a history balancing accuracy and entertainment. Contrastingly, “Pearl Harbor contains more than enough factual errors and distortions … to pique [anyone] without having to resort to picking on reasonable cinematic license” (Guts 661). The ridiculous, the missing, the distortions and the errors subsumed a $140 million budget delivering what Variety’s Todd McCarthy dubbed “a Classics Illustrated fifth grade” Pearl Harbor. Approximately 38 million domestic film patrons purchased its tale of “evil Japanese, motivated by sheer imperial designs, carry[ing] out a sneak attack on peace-loving Americans at their tropical outpost” (Boggs 463).63 Thus the “longest, most expensive, most ambitious, and most technically sophisticated” of all Pearl Harbor

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63 The attendance figure is calculated simply by dividing the average 2001 movie ticket price of $5.65 into the $195 million year-to-date domestic gross reported by Variety on September 10, 2001 (National Association, “Average”; “Box Office: September 3”). The figure roughly equals fifteen percent of the U.S. population in 2000 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce).
movies through 2001 showed us only that the Comanches of 1941 had Zeros for raiding the innocent Parker homestead on America’s western frontier.  

Retrofitting Pearl Harbor and World War II into that western narrative of attacking savages and heroic response – captive narrative without the captive – sheared the contradictions and complications of “historic specificity” (Boggs 452). Lévi-Strauss’ definition of myth now subsumed the significations “Pearl Harbor” and “World War II.” A war myth swollen into “the default symbol of national virtue” (Noon 343) perfectly suited a genre aimed in part precisely at the praise of virtue (Aristotle 1366a). Bush’s using the myth as 9/11 metaphor reheated it with an active past-present-future meaning.

Whether Bush’s audience had the knowledge to escape slavery to the significations on September 20, 2001, might be indeterminable. Knowledge of knowledge of World War II is scant and equivocal. A 1991 Gallup survey found that thirty-six percent of Americans stated both “Pearl Harbor” and “Japanese attack” when asked what significant event in American history occurred on December 7, 1941. Of those who said only “Pearl Harbor” and were then asked what the event was, however, seventy-one percent said “Japanese attack” or “Japanese bombing.” (Gallup 240-44). Gallup found in 2004 that sixty-three percent of respondents identified Germany as the country of the forces faced by “US and Allied forces on D-Day” and about the same percentage identified Normandy as the site (Newport n. pag.). A 2011 Newsweek survey

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64 See pages 19-20 for the Parker saga.

65 See pages 17-18 for a discussion of Lévi-Strauss and myth.

66 See the quote from Augustine on page 26. The quote is also referenced on pages 30-21 in discussion of The Washington Post’s photo mix-up.
had sixty percent of respondents correctly identifying World War II’s three “axis” countries (Romano 58). *Pearl Harbor* enjoyed a ninety-five percent awareness factor as it opened (Rich 9).

The Gallup organization ventured in its 2004 poll that “the bulk of Americans’ knowledge about D-Day” came from word-of-mouth and popular culture as much as from history (Newport). Both polls unsurprisingly found the least World War II knowledge among those 18 through 29 years of age (Gallup 241; Newport). That very same *Pearl Harbor* target audience (Lyons) had a September, 2001 expanded chance to imbibe the “*Our Weekly Reader* version” of a World War II formatted as recycled narrative, bloodless video game, and “bodacious nurses [and] flyboy fashions” (McCarthy; Rich 9). The film went from 116 screens on September 9 to 1,036 screens on September 16 (“Box Office: September 3”; “Box Office: September 10”).67

Bush’s audience then had years of extratextual World War II myth available and peaking when he invoked Pearl Harbor.68 Gallup’s suggestion that popular culture’s fictions are to some extent history suggests by extension that the audience – of a median age of 35 in 200069 – might have taken *Pearl Harbor*’s flawed simulacrum for December 7, 1941. Incorporating 9/11 under *Pearl Harbor* would be as instinctive, for an audience two generations removed from the war, and raised on imagery of all things, as moving

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67 The timing of the resurgence in play was a pre-9/11 marketing decision (DiOrio). Visibility is still visibility.

68 See pages 18-20 for a discussion of extratextuality.

69 U.S. Dept. of Commerce.
from a Crawford ranch to Reata to a mythical “real” Texas. The audience had already used superficial resemblance to assume that one set of photos of flag-draped coffins was another set of photos of flag-draped coffins. We define, then see.

Bush, of course, did not invent the myth. But its centrality to the speech went beyond definition and arrangement. Defining the new enemy $x$ as ideologically the old enemy $y$ could ignore American policy because such an enemy could not know expediency. The president did not have to address “why in so much of the world there is antipathy to global capitalism or to some aspects of American culture” (Zarefsky 143) because the heirs of Nazism could not understand an American people praiseworthily giving and loving. Freedom of speech, religion, and franchise could be “recited in such a way that strongly resembled … Roosevelt’s four freedoms” (Murphy 615) while ignoring freedom from fear and freedom from want. No denotative or culturally connotative meanings filled “this generation” except by association – with the myth. Defining God as America’s co-pilot in saving civilization mooted such mundane earthly questions at the outset of the very war being defined.

How this brought Lincoln to mind must remain something of a fancy from a rhetorical consideration. Broder, the then-“so-called dean of the capital press corps” and the pacesetter for [Washington’s] conventional wisdom” (Rich 30), did not quote Lincoln in heralding Bush’s speech as Lincolnian. Neither did Broder quote Bush. President John Kennedy

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70 The reference is to the Reata of Giant. See page 31.

71 The referent is a Roosevelt speech delivered January 6, 1941, popularly known as the “four freedoms” speech.

72 Fear had to be omitted because it was used in the speech.

73 Bostdorff (306) also noted the phrase’s ambiguity.
was quoted quoting Lincoln to make a situational analogy of the 1860 and 1960 issues of a bifurcated world. Columnist Broder then outlined why he decided the Bush “rhetoric is Lincolnian.”

… a common thread joins Lincoln, Kennedy and Bush. They came to the presidency after brief and less-than-notable careers in public office, were installed after elections that showed more division than unity in the land and were clearly conscious of the doubts millions of their fellow citizens held about them. But each responded to forces threatening the citadel of freedom ….

Rutherford Hayes, Woodrow Wilson, and Richard Nixon could join the list, given some or all of Broder’s historic criteria. The argument remains as questionable rhetorically if the criteria are rhetorical occasions more comparable than the joint session speech and a campaign speech four decades earlier. The 1865 Second Inaugural address was also largely epideictic and given amid a war. Lincoln was charier of both victory and God than Bush. The sixteenth president went no further than “the progress of our arms … is … reasonably satisfactory and encouraging … no prediction in regard to [the war’s outcome] is ventured.” God’s position on a war to end slavery could not be known. We knew only that God had not answered the Union’s prayers fully. But if we supposed that God has willed slavery’s end, then we had to assume that God could will the war to continue as the means, and the divinity and righteousness believers ascribe to God stood. Lincoln reasoned towards, but demurred from claiming to totally grasp, the rhetorical plausibility of a complexly deist God. Bush saw an activist God with a known history. The difference between views of the Deity apparently escaped Broder. So did the
difference between qualified and asserted theodicy. The sole commonality of the sign
“God” in both presidents’ rhetoric rendered Bush’s discourse no more Lincolnian in itself
than commonality of figures meant that George Bush was channeling Winston Churchill.

“Play to me and the people,” Cicero advised a young orator, “that those who hear
… may be sensible of the effect of … eloquence, while I amuse myself with remarking
the causes that produce it” (Brutus 50; emphasis in original). The news media entered the
evening of September 20, 2001 severely disadvantaged from benefitting by Cicero’s
counsel. They pack a propensity for ethnocentrism in international affairs (Gans 42) and
were only nine days away from attacks on their country. They endow presidents with
moral leadership (Gans 62-3) and faced a president intermixing epideictic morality with
the trump card of commander-in-chief definition. They prefer narratives of individuals
succeeding over adversity (Gans 50) and found one “in which the immature leader of
September 10 was transformed overnight into a giant by a single scripted speech” (Rich
30).

They also heard the same speech everyone else heard insofar as no reason exists
to suppose that the journalistic brain physiologically reacts to spoken language differently
from anyone else’s brain. Merely covering the speech put them in the rhetorical moment
when “everything is alive and stirring; we welcome every fresh thought as it is born …
and are moved … by the risks run by the speaker” (Quintilian 12.10.61; 10.1.17-19).
They heard a speech climactically flourishing the grand style that carries the audience
“away with its mighty torrent however much [they] resist; it will force [the audience] to
go wherever it takes [them].” Even a “middling orator, possessed of any degree of
eloquence, will always captivate.” An able orator will be credited with truth (Cicero,
Brutus 50-2). A speaker on a forceful subject will be thought forceful (Demetrius 240). When “the whole audience is either flushed with joy, or is overwhelmed by grief,” and seized by the emotions, among others of fear and hope – primarily the emotions inlaid with the light, dark, light structure of Bush’s text – “we are ashamed to disagree” and distrust our own judgment of the speech (Cicero, Brutus 50; Quintilian 10.1.18-19). Public approval of this level of oratory crosses classes (Cicero, Brutus 50).

Manichaeism’s “broad definition of evil” may still lure the same cross-educational appeal in the contemporary world as Lieu (151) maintained it held for the ancient western world’s intellectual elites and masses. The jet ride74 this time was rhetorical. “Churchillian” and “Lincolnian” were but conveniently available adjectives to satisfy the same striving towards isomorphic analogical mappings as Spellman and Holyoak’s college students showed. The news media result of values under the influence of language was sometimes mislabeled critically as “patriotism” by ostensible resemblance to Niebuhr’s description.

Chances of Cunningham’s rhetoric reporter75 weathering the ride’s torrent would thusly seem problematical. Questions arise of the probability of losing one’s cultural ethnocentrism in foreign affairs or rejecting a professional value in order to disinvest a president with moral leadership. Nonetheless, if the ideal does not exist, Quintilian held, “it is disgraceful to despair of anything that is possible” (1.10.8). He would hope for critical judgment’s return in second or third-day, or weekly magazine, coverage. Reading

74 See page 29.

75 See pages 34-5.
text away “from the noisy cries of the applauding audience” has a salutary effect on the critical faculties (10.1.18). Pacesetting conventional wisdom might be revised.

The rhetoric reporter, since we are not permitted to despair, might thusly begin consideration of Bush’s speech by engaging its genre. The speech discharged a classically epideictic address. Questions and answers constructed Aristotle’s predicted sectional narrative for Bush to amplify American virtues and values by dwelling on detail of who attacked and why, and what response America would pursue. The 9/11 context supported the move from the who and why to the response of war as a definition of the new, unexpected, and major shared experience (Zarefsky 137; Condit 289) of 9/11. The Manichean metaphor-within-World War II metaphor was one rhetorically legitimate way of being in the post-9/11 world. Certainly, Manichaeism as Bush used it advanced rhetoric’s objective of judgment and brought “the giver of judgment into [the] condition” (Aristotle 1377a) here of legitimating a presidency that would execute a war. The summary total comported with Cicero’s observation that “whatever is assumed in speaking” inquires after “what has been done, or is being done, or will be done, or of what nature a thing is, or how it should be designated” (De Oratore 49; 44). Quintilian similarly but perhaps more economically submitted that all rhetorical matters are either cause or question (2.21.23). In the text, per Cicero’s terms, 9/11 catalyzed short-range responses readying the United States for a war to meet the war declared upon it by evil. In Quintilian’s terms, the speech addressed both the cause of defending the United States against terrorism, and how to accomplish that defense.

The apparent limitation that an audience can judge epideictic speech only by whether its art establishes the proof of speaker credibility still thusly allows scope for
journalistic analysis if the rhetoric reporter is not Broder. The reporter, for example, might also probe the genre’s penchant for foundational definition for later policy since the enemy was rigidly defined and the response fluidly defined. Bush’s concomitant use of style and figures could also be explored. The opening’s plain style was Augustine’s giving of information on the light of the state of the union in epideictic praise. The narrative’s intermediate style effected emotion by its expected rich use of metaphors (Quintilian 12.10.60) and other figures to vividly condemn the dark evil again confronting civilization. The conclusion’s grand style turned to the light of the union’s resolve through displaying George Howard’s shield and fulfilling the style’s potential to r “even raise the dead” (Quintilian 12.10.61). The reporter might dare to call collegial attention to grand style ability to force the audience to go wherever it takes them.

Stylistic figures advanced key points within the speech’s fusion of classical structure, governing metaphor, and Manichaeism. Anaphora told us the state of the union; metaphorized 9/11 as Pearl Harbor; assured us that we would come together to strengthen the economy, law enforcement, intelligence capability, and airline security; revealed the terrorists’ plans to overthrow governments and drive Israel from the Middle East, and Christians and Jews from Africa and Asia; asked the civilized world to join an American-led coalition; and sculpted the president’s pledge. The hyperphora of “Americans are asking” swanned into many of the definitions. Some were antitheses. The terrorists hate “a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed,” the president said. “They stand against us, because we stand in their way.” The word “stand” bolsters the Manichean world of contrast and antithesis with the figure ploce, where a word’s repetition after intervening material carries a different sense (Lanham 116; Quintilian
9.2.40-2) or, one might say, signification. The reporter might remark upon Bush’s frequent repetition by varying the figures for it, and upon the use of ambiguous phraseology such as “this generation,” and abstract words such as “freedom.”

Metaphor is the figure the rhetoric reporter would most need to query. The ancients’ strictures on clarity, proportionality, and placement prove salient.

Pearl Harbor as a metaphorical frame obscured the differences between December 7, 1941 and September 11, 2001. Two of the three targets hit on 9/11 were civilian. Most 9/11 casualties were civilian. Many nationalities were represented. Roughly thirty percent more died than at Pearl Harbor.

The clarity the Pearl Harbor metaphor did provide lived within the speech. Highlighting only the simulacra by synonymy empowered the Manichean definition of the new enemy in the metaphor’s larger World War II terms. Totalitarianism, Nazism, and fascism had attacked Pearl Harbor and declared war upon the United States. The heirs of Nazism would want to destroy Israel. The heirs of totalitarianism would hate freedoms guaranteed by a constitution. The heirs of the dark world’s fascism would jail arbitrarily and indiscriminately. The heirs must first be feared just as the forebears had first to be feared. The emotion flowed easily from early seeing the 9/11 widow Beamer and just as easily into the same Manichean world. We fear suffering when the speaker points to peers who have suffered or are suffering from unexpected quarters at unexpected times (Aristotle 1382b). What befell Lisa Beamer and George Howard from terroristic hands one peaceful morning could befall us all from Nazism’s heirs in a world
remade in a morning. The same had befallen our own innocent forebears from unexpected quarters one Sunday morning in 1941.

Fear’s opposite is confidence. One condition projecting speaker confidence is certainty of success (Aristotle 1383a-1383b). Lisa Beamer’s post-speech CNN interview (“Reaction” n. pag.) and Richard Cohen’s post-speech Washington Post column alike pronounced Bush confident. Jakes and Crow used related words. Our mission and our moment connected back to the Pearl Harbor metaphor from history become a decade of extratextual World War II myth. Exactly who was the generation that would fight the war could rest unsaid because unleashing the myth in epideictic connected everyone to the greatest generation that had suffered and overcome Pearl Harbor and Nazism. The myth Bush unleashed told us that success in our moment would be certain. Our success might even bring fun and military chic and bodacious nurses.

World War II metaphor raised, as well, metaphorical proportionality. Bush said four days earlier that Americans were accustomed to seeing beachheads and deserts and military targets in their wars. “That may occur. But right now we’re facing people who hit and run. They hide in caves” (“Remarks on Arrival” 1116). The war on terror’s future “liberator” language – invoking the imagery Adey et al. suggested of GIs greeted with flowers and champagne – would seem hardly befitting. Tanks dashing across the desert and into the enemy’s fallen capital hardly suited an enemy that had to be “smoke[d] out” from their caves (Bush, “Remarks to Employees” 1119). The proportionality issue was thusly that any legitimacy to Bush’s assessment of a cave-dweller enemy threatened to delegitimate the “good war” metaphor of a transcendent mission against the old evil. One half-solution arrived in November. Its tread appeared in August.
Familiarity with classical rhetoric could thus unpack the Bush speech structurally, linguistically, and in terms of what figures deployed to what purpose. Obviously, per Lippmann, journalism’s best instincts cannot arise if journalists cannot see what is before them. What was set before the eyes on September 20, 2001, was a mythicized metaphor made almost entirely of language rather than history and situation. Imagine a journalistic commentary that recalled Quintilian on the use of history and metaphor in narrative. Imagine recalling – while the journalistic frame of the speech was settling in place – the idea of extratextuality to ask after the political uses of myth in general and in this instance. Imagine refusing slavery to the sign and to simulacra.

On October 7, 2001 Bush announced the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, to disrupt terrorists’ locating bases there (“Presidential Address”). The operation’s American-led military strikes were tactically supporting the goal by aiming at al-Qaeda training camps and military installations of the ruling Taliban government. Sustained operations would drive the terrorists out of caves “they may burrow into” initially among other hiding places. They would then be brought to justice. But Afghanistan was not the only front in the war on terrorism.

Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril.
Bush spoke in the plain style entirely “unembroidered” (Lincoln 30) in any obvious way. He had already defined and declared the war on terror; now, he reaffirmed the Manichean element of the joint session speech with different extratextuality. As Bruce Lincoln noted, in his analysis of the Afghanistan speech and bin-Laden’s response, the two speakers mirrored each other as righteous defenders rallying their aggrieved people to great causes. Bush’s cause was civilization against terrorism and terrorism’s supporters. Osama bin-Laden’s cause was a war between the two camps of faithful and infidel, and the infidel’s postcolonial allies. The difference was that a president of an officially secular state is inherently constrained from bin-Laden’s sort of overtly religious language even as Americans variously embrace religion. Lincoln contended that the tension rhetorically arose for Bush from the combined pressure of post-9/11 “popular piety” and evangelicals amid his base to “acknowledge the importance of religion.” Bush resolved the matter by metaphor. Hiding in caves, Lincoln noted, “gestured toward a climactic scene in the Apocalypse” (30) describing those hiding “in the dens and the rocks of the mountains” (Revelations 6) upon the opening of the sixth seal of doom of divine wrathful judgment. “Killers of innocents” referenced Herod’s actions in Matthew 2. Terrorist supporters following on the lonely path of peril were following the godless of Job 8 and Isaiah 59 on the paths of perdition. But familiar secular metaphor soon returned — framing a new issue.

On November 10, 2001, Bush starkly brought up a transcendent mission above politics in a Manichean world. “In a second world war, we learned there is no isolation from evil,” Bush told the United Nations. “We resolved” in that war that the wicked must be opposed. Bush continued:
That evil has returned, and the cause is renewed …. It is our task – the task of this generation – to provide the response to aggression and terror … we did not ask for this mission, yet there is honor in history’s call … this calling is worthy of every life, and worthy of every nation. (“First Address” n. pag)

On November 18, 2001 Richard Perle, chair of the president’s advisory Defense Policy Board, said on ABC’s This Week that the Iraqi state supported terrorism. Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction to hand to terrorists. The situation posed a “fundamental threat” to the United States.

And we ought to go after him. I don’t think it has any bearing at all on al-Qaeda whether we go after Saddam or not. And if we are successful, and I believe we will be, the people of Iraq will regard us as liberators .... (n. pag.)

Perle’s untangling Iraq and al-Qaeda proposed the rhetorical half-solution to the issue of proportionality and the lesser issue of clarity. Sending the US military across Iraq’s deserts and into Baghdad to get Hitler’s heir could look like World War II. The new war that the president had said was ideologically the old war could look the World War II extratextual myth. News could look like history for great narrative television. The signs “terror,” “terrorist,” and “terrorism” still applied as the enemy. They just slid to Iraq.

On November 26, Bush said that Saddam Hussein had to choose between allowing United Nations weapons inspectors into Iraq or facing consequences
(McQuillan and Slavin). On December 9, on Meet the Press, Vice President Dick Cheney said “it’s been pretty well confirmed” that 9/11 terrorist leader Mohammed Atta had met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague. Cheney also said that Hussein was pursuing weapons of mass destruction and had a chemical and biological weapons program. On January 29, 2002, in the State of the Union address, Bush labeled Iraq, North Korea, and Iran an “axis of evil.”76 All three states were pursuing or “arming with” weapons of mass destruction that could be given to terrorists or used directly to attack or attempt to blackmail the United States. The country “will do what is necessary to ensure our … security” (“President Delivers” n. pag.).77 On May 1, The Washington Post reported that no credible evidence existed that Atta had ever met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague (Pincus). Then, on June 1, the president addressed graduating cadets at the US Military Academy at West Point.

Bush opened with a few light jokes on his own college record. West Pointers walked in the tradition of Dwight Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and George Patton. Their wartime commander, George C. Marshall, had addressed the class of 1942. Like those graduates, the class of 2002 was “commissioned to history.”

The new enemy was ruthless and resourceful. The threat had no precedent. Technology obviated the need for the enemy to maintain “great armies.” Deterrence

76 The “axis” metaphor was invented by Benito Mussolini for a speech he gave November 1, 1936 (Shirer 298).

77 Among those present at the State of the Union address was Afghanistan president Hamid Karzai. Chirs Matthews used extratextuality for a “journalistic” introduction of Karzai. “He’s a good guy …. this guy’s Victor Lazlo from Casablanca” (“Hardball” for January 29 n. pag.).
meant nothing against terrorist networks. Containment was impossible when unbalanced
dictators had weapons of mass destruction.

The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the
battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before
they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the
path of action. And this nation will act.

The new war, Bush said, was not a clash of civilizations. All civilized nations
were united by common threats of terrorism. Murder and brutality are always wrong for
any culture at any moment in history. “We are in a conflict between good and evil, and
America will call evil by its name.”

*The Washington Post’s* Woodward has related an anecdote of a journalistic
colleague complaining to Bush staff that the speech lacked news and said nothing about
Iraq (132-33). In fact, to paraphrase Woodward’s *Post* colleague Thomas Ricks (38-9),
Bush had said quite a bit about Iraq. The administration’s only extensive portrayal of an
unstable dictator with weapons of mass destruction concerned Saddam Hussein. Ricks
(38-9) was absolutely correct to read the speech as an intellectual doctrinal basis for
attacking a target named a few months earlier in the State of the Union. Bush reached
back to the Monroe Doctrine.

On December 2, 1823, President James Monroe asserted as a “general principle”
that any European power attempting to claim any country in the American continents that
had proclaimed independence risked war with the United States (81-3). In 1947,
President Harry Truman announced that the United States would provide aid to overseas
democracies resisting external communist aggression (176-80). Bush was saying that the United States would now choose to directly strike anywhere in the world against a perceived terroristic threat. The astonishing doctrine needed only four sentences.

The United States would not go to war to make good on the metaphor preceding the “Bush doctrine” for months. But neither would the metaphor fade away, like MacArthur’s old solider. Following the metaphor ended the indefinite question on the West Point speaker’s platform.
Chapter Two

Mission in Iraq

What in our world is not hateful to [the barbarians]? When have they given the Hellenes a moment’s respite from their treacherous plots? … We must pursue that course of action which will enable us to dwell in our several cities with security … we must … transfer the war with all speed from our boundaries to the [barbarian’s] continent … [they] are now plotting against us … [so] this war will be more like a sacred mission than a military expedition … [we] gather together in the cause of the liberty of our allies ….

-- Isocrates

Bush’s address to the West Point cadets did not necessarily swoop all the way back to Isocrates’ counsel on proactively settling affairs with the Persians. But one author suggested the president made it to the seventeenth century. On August 11, 2002 former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger syndicated an op-ed column addressing Iraq in a larger context. Kissinger averred that the 9/11 attacks were possible only with the “tacit cooperation” of societies tolerating terrorism. “Immediate policy must demonstrate that … terror[ism] or a systematic attack on the international order produces catastrophic consequences” for perpetrators and supporters alike. The immediate case for eradicating Iraq’s “capacity of mass destruction” was “extremely strong.” Saddam Hussein was a “ruthless autocrat” hoarding weapons of mass destruction in defiance of United Nations resolutions. Hussein had a record of aggression toward neighboring nations and of hatred
for the United States. Externally-imposed regime change might cause “the Arab street” to rethink jihad’s benefits.

Regime change “as a goal for military action” simultaneously posed a “revolutionary … challenge” to 350-plus years of the “principle of non-interference in [a nation’s] domestic affairs.” That principle was first recognized in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia ending Europe’s religious wars (Kissinger, “Beyond Baghdad”). Today the principle is summarized as “sovereignty … supreme authority” exercised by a government within a territory. Sovereignty is global and its norms “enshrined” in the United Nations charter itself (“Sovereignty n. pag.). One of the norms noted by Kissinger holds that a first-strike action on a sovereign state is justified only as self-defense against an actual [already emerged] threat. He argued that the Bush administration thusly needed a “comprehensive strategy for itself and a clear declaratory policy for the rest of the world” on striking a threat, in the president’s phrasing, before it emerged. Regime change should be “subordinated” to threat removal – as in the case of Iraq. Policy specific to Iraq additionally needed to demonstrate that Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction impeded all political matters in the region and not just American security. An American war in Iraq likewise required a program of long-term postwar reconstruction to convey that the war was of “necessity and that we seek the world’s interests” (Kissinger, “Beyond Baghdad”).

Already, about two months earlier, Bush had directed staff to develop what he was now calling the “doctrine” outlined first at West Point into the national security strategy presidents are statutorily required to submit to Congress (Sanger, “Bush to Outline”). The administration meanwhile insisted no decision had been made on
attacking Iraq (Sanger, “Bush to Formalize”). Amid “a sense that no one’s thought about much more than … we’re going to do something” about Hussein, said U.S. Sen. Christopher Dodd, the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee opened “the first major public hearing[s]” on the issue on July 31 (Slevin and Dewar). Two days of hearings drew little detail from invited think tank representatives (Kesler and Pincus). On August 4, the committee chairman, U.S. Sen. Carl Levin, said on CBS’ *Face the Nation* that proponents of attacking Iraq had not considered an invasion’s complexity, Hussein’s likely responses, or a post-war Iraq. Fellow guest U.S. Sen. Chuck Hagel metaphorically focused Levin’s first point. “If you think you’re going to drop the 82nd Airborne into Baghdad and finish the job, I think you’ve been watching too many John Wayne movies.” Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to President George H.W. Bush, appeared on the show separately and said invading Iraq would turn the Middle East into a “cauldron” (“Senator Carl Levin” n. pag.).

Kissinger’s piece thus honed scattered elite opinion to Bush’s West Point address by embedding a derived *enthymeme*. Aristotle used the word as a definition of the syllogism in rhetoric to demarcate rhetoric’s propositions of probabilities from dialectic’s propositions of certitude. The process of deductive reasoning from propositions to conclusion to furnish argument was otherwise the same (1355b-1357b). Kissinger took as

78 Hagel’s extratextual metaphor paralleled that of Matthews. The Republican Hagel and erstwhile Democratic speechwriter Matthews thus at least inadvertently showed together extratextuality as non-partisan in its commonality as thought.
a major propositional premise the Bush argument that terroristic threats warrant first-strike eradication. Saddan Hussein was a terroristic threat. The “something beyond” to which propositions lead as their conclusion was obvious. Speakers need not state the syllogistically obvious.

Accepting the major premise set the frame for leaving only the minor premise of Hussein’s status as a terroristic threat open to argument. Ushering Hussein’s past into that argument was classically compatible. Aristotle held example the proof of probability most apt for the kind of deliberation Kissinger implicitly offered towards securing America’s best interests in the uncertain post-9/11 world. Roman rhetoricians agreed with Aristotle’s definition of example – that “something is so from many similar cases” (1356b). Dionysius’ seeking bodyguards could be argued as exemplifying intent to seize power because “Pisistratus attained power in the same way.” History was ripe with availabilities for rhetorical invention from example (Quintilian 5.11.7-16). The administration’s reasoning inductively from examples of Hussein’s history would soon trek the ancient route to the “new” kind of war. A layered meaning of the West Point speech emerged. Debate imploded. The ancients would hardly be surprised.

On August 15, a Scowcroft Wall Street Journal op-ed mutely acknowledged Kissinger’s framing. Scowcroft argued two main points. The first was that Saddam Hussein had no known ties to 9/11 or other terrorist acts. The second was that an American attack might cause Hussein to attack Israel to deliberately escalate the war in

79 Aristotle’s discussion of example also mentions Dionysius seeking bodyguards. All cases falling under the principle that “he who is plotting tyranny asks for a bodyguard” are examples because the relation is part to part (1357b; emphasis in original).
hopes of a Middle East Armageddon. An American war in Iraq therefore risked becoming a major diversion from the war on terror. Hussein could be better left to renewed United Nations weapons inspections of the Iraqi capabilities.

On August 16, the Washington Monthly’s September issue appeared, brandishing former NATO commander Wesley Clark’s article critiquing the Bush administration on the war on terror. Clark argued for less unilateralism and more internationalism than he saw in the Bush approach to date. American forces pursuing bin-Laden in Afghanistan and elsewhere would find greater local cooperation had the United States secured a United Nations indictment of terrorism as a crime against humanity. NATO must be involved in any war in Iraq in order to secure European political commitment to a campaign there. Otherwise the United States was close to a “might makes right” policy consciously rejected at the close of World War II (21-23).

On August 18, The Washington Post’s Dana Milbank wrote that the Bush administration’s hesitancy to endorse forcefully removing Hussein’s regime ceded debate to alternative policies towards Iraq. Clark’s article was but the “latest caution” against military action specifically (“White House Push”). The next few days’ public discussion seemed to underscore Milbank’s point. The next month’s rhetoric changed everything.

On August 24, retired general Anthony Zinni, former Central Command commander, publicly disagreed with the president he was currently serving as special envoy to the Middle East. The Middle East “peace process” remained a higher priority

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80 Central Command was formed by the Reagan administration. At the time of Clark’s command, and the start of the war in Iraq, the Command had responsibility for U.S. military operations in Africa, the Mideast (except Turkey), Egypt, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In 2008, responsibility for operations in sub-Saharan Africa was transferred to the newly-formed Africa Command (“U.S. Central Command” n. pag.).
for American interests than deposing Saddam Hussein. “Focus” would also be better shifted from Iraq to an Iranian youth movement wanting to overthrow “the mullahs … fund[ing] Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations” and sculpt a more secular nation. Nonetheless planning a war in Iraq had to “make a good case for … spending billions of dollars [on] reforming Iraq … [stretching a military] already stretched too thin … [keeping] a security force there forever … [and] fight[ing] with other countries in the region to keep Iraq together” from Kurd and Shiite post-Hussein separatist sentiment. Debate will and should be “confusing because the issues are confusing.” Media covering Zinni’s remarks to the Economic Club of Florida could not obtain administration reaction (“Remarks” n. pag.; Salinero).

On August 25, President George H.W. Bush’s secretary of state, James Baker, weighed in via New York Times op-ed. Hussein’s “outlaw regime” potentially had global reach because his acquiring weapons of mass destruction he sought meant proliferation possibilities. “We owe it to our children and grandchildren” to assume moral responsibility in checking both those weapons and Hussein on behalf of peace. The only question that therefore mattered was the right way to effect regime change in Iraq. Covert action in Iraq had failed. Iraqi groups of opposition to Hussein were effectively too weak. Inserting a “small rapid-strike force into Iraq to … take out the top leadership” required extreme luck. The president should first seek to subject Iraq to a United Nations weapons inspection program more intrusive and arbitrary than was done in the 1990s. That would allow America to claim “moral high ground” transferable to a self-defense strike should the United Nations reject the proposal. Only the threat or application of a large-scale American occupying force could realistically topple Hussein.
On August 26, neoconservative William Kristol opined on “appeasement” in his online *Weekly Standard*. The Bush administration had not done well in making a case for military action in Iraq. Reasons other than a vacuum, however, were afoot in an “axis of appeasement” running from *The New York Times* to Scowcroft to Hagel. “The appeasers … cosmopolitan sophisticates of all types” variously just did not like a morally grounded foreign policy, or were appalled that character can be policy, or queasy over a global advancement of American principles. They had now mobilized to prevent a Bush foreign policy of “moral clarity and global leadership.” A similar “cornered establishment” had attacked Winston Churchill on the eve of World War II. No other intellectually honest alternatives to the Bush doctrine existed except wistfulness or isolationism.

On August 28, Vice President Cheney moved the discussion from editorial pages and white collar forums into the hinterlands of Nashville, Tennessee. Cheney took the stage there before attendees at that year’s annual Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) convention. Saddam Hussein, Cheney said, was a case study in the ruthlessness and resourcefulness of America’s terrorist enemies. United Nations inspectors of Iraqi weaponry through 1998 were routinely diverted by Hussein’s “game of cheat and retreat.” The dictator pursued weapons of mass destruction to the extent that “many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.” Resuming inspections now sanctions a false sense of security because Hussein “would continue to plot.” Nothing in the last dozen years had deterred Hussein’s pursuit of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to dominate the Middle East and threaten and blackmail America. International ostracism of Hussein had not worked. “Four days of bombings by
the U.S. in 1998 had not worked. An unfettered Hussein intended to use his once and future weapons “against our friends, against our allies, and against us” in time.

Hussein’s history and character attested to “the concerns I am raising.” His forces routinely shot at American and British planes patrolling the no-fly zone. He was the same man who ordered President George H.W. Bush assassinated [in 1993]. He was the same today as when he invaded Iran [in 1980] and Kuwait [in 1990]. “In the face of such a threat, we must proceed with care, deliberation, and consultation with our allies.” We would also profit from reviewing our own history.

There are a lot of World War II veterans in the hall today. For the United States, that war began on December 7, 1941, with the attack on Pearl Harbor and the near-total destruction of our Pacific Fleet. Only then did we recognize the magnitude of the danger to our country … To this day, historians … speculat[e] on how we might have prevented Pearl Harbor … asking what actions might have averted the tragedies that rate among the worst in human history.

America in the year 2002 must ask careful questions, not merely about our past, but also about our future. The elected leaders of this country have a responsibility to consider all the available options … we will not simply look away … weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror

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81 The reference was to Operation Desert Fox. Clinton ordered strikes on weapons facilities December 16 through 19 (DoD “Chronology” n. pag.; “Clinton Statement”).

82 Cheney spoke in the singular. Iraq was under two no-fly zones. One was north of the 36th parallel to facilitate a safety zone for the Kurds. The other was along the 32nd parallel to prevent Iraqi air attacks on the Shiites. Confrontations occurred in both zones (DoD “Chronology” n. pag.; Woodward 10).
network, or a murderous dictator, or the two working together, constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined. The risks of inaction are far greater than the risks of action (n. pag.).

Inaction in Saddam’s case risked allowing him to become a nuclear-armed imminent threat. The United States “will not live at the mercy of terrorists or terror regimes.” Regime change in Iraq, rather than creating a Middle East cauldron, would galvanize “freedom-loving peoples of the region [into] promoting the values that can bring lasting peace.” Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan had shown the world “America acts not to conquer but to liberate,” and remains in friendship.” America would act “with the same spirit” in Iraq. The goal would be “an Iraq that has territorial integrity, a government that is democratic and pluralistic, a nation where the human rights of every ethnic and religious group are recognized and protected.” Beyond the war on terror laid a safer and better world.

The vice president spoke at a moment when public knowledge of Iraqi weaponry was virtually frozen in October, 1998, when Hussein suspended cooperation with United Nations weapons inspectors. Inspectors were subsequently recalled the next month (“(DoD Chronology” n. pag.; Crosette). Cheney filled the resultantly open definitional field with three fronts. The first was the assertion of unambiguous American knowledge acquired since 1998. The second was an encore demonstration of the importance of something as seemingly innocuous as a pronoun. The third was the vision of a future

83 Compare to Franklin Roosevelt’s D-Day speech of June 6, 1944. American soldiers “fight not for the lust of conquest. They fight to end conquest. They fight to liberate” (D-Day” n. pag.).
Iraq. All three answered to a controlling metaphor placed just as crucially as in Bush’s joint session speech. Each collapsed without it.

Cheney structured his speech on a present-past-future timeline similar to Bush’s joint session speech. “There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.” Double anaphora in “there is no doubt” and “against” combined to climax moving Hussein’s weapon use on “friends” to “us.” Immediately next reciting Hussein’s past glossed over the lack of specifics about either the weapons or how we knew Hussein’s current capabilities. Subsequent transition to addressing the audience presence of World War II veterans smoothly channeled apostrophe’s urgency to America’s past. “For the United States, [World War II] began on December 7, 1941 with the attack on Pearl Harbor and the near-total destruction of our Pacific Fleet.” A slight problem was that fact cloaked exaggerated narrative.

Approximately ninety ships moored at Pearl Harbor on the day of infamy. Twenty-one were sunk or damaged by the attack. Among them numbered all eight battleships present. The USS *Arizona* alone from the total would remain at rest. Five salvaged battleships fought in major combat operations during the war.\textsuperscript{84} The Japanese neglected the dry docks. Three aircraft carriers designated prime targets were at sea at locations beyond Japanese planes (Boggs 462; “Overview” n. pag.).\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{84} The *Maryland, Tennessee, Nevada, West Virginia, and California* (“Online Library” n. pag.).

\textsuperscript{85} The *Enterprise, Lexington, and Saratoga* (“Pearl Harbor Attack” n. pag.).
Neither were Americans totally unaware of the magnitude of the dangers in the December, 1941 world. Public opinion measured by the Gallup organization was ambivalently “isolationist” and resigned. Gallup’s April poll that year, for example, found that eighty-one percent of respondents favored the United States staying out of the war. Eighty-two percent also agreed that “the United States will go into the European war before it’s over.” The same poll found that sixty-eight percent of respondents favored the United States going into the European war “if it appeared there was no other way to defeat Germany and Italy.” A Gallup poll conducted over the five days beginning November 27, 1941 reported fifty-two percent of respondents agreeing that “the United States will go to war against Japan in the near future” (G. Gallup 227-311).

Attack statistics and post-attack history thus belie a reading of “near-destruction” as simply “not true” (Boggs 462) and closer to the frontier narrative myth that often includes a “massacre” (Rosenberg 13) as catalyst. Poll numbers suggest Rosenberg’s holding (17-18) that American “sleeping isolationism … appallingly ignorant of a dangerous world” was a metaphorical element of an “infamy story” (emphasis added) shaping pre-Pearl Harbor America to World War II America. Cheney had fashioned a Pearl Harbor from the Pearl Harbor mold. The result in the speech pushed a mythic lack of contradictions to a metaphorically isomorphic mapping to the speech’s Iraq.

The ancients said little about a “strain upon the facts” that is the figure hyperbole (Longinus 38.2). Longinus argued hyperbole as a first-rank figure for achieving the sublime, a “transport [of the audience] out of themselves,” if constructed in a manner

86 As in the Rowlandson and Parker stories and, to a lesser extent, the first reports on Jessica Lynch.
“conceal[ing] the very fact of its being … hyperbole” (1.4; 38.3). An ideal circumstance for such concealment is a “great crisis” (38.3). Cheney’s Longinus move was exact. Simply using “and” to conjoin the date of the Pearl Harbor attack to a hyperbolized result could also be overlooked in a speech imaging nuclear weapons fired at the United States.

Quintilian would likely prove surlier. The sole mention he made on hyperbole allowed it the scope of wit but otherwise referenced the figure as discussed in his work on “the causes of the decadence of eloquence” (8.6.74-76). His linkage is easily understood given the ancients’ strictures on clarity and proportionality as the duties of style. He had additionally warned about history’s obfuscating potential in narrative. Cicero had warned about abusing historical fact.88

Manufactured Pearl Harbor likeness to Pearl Harbor and myth, placed just short of the speech’s midpoint, worked retroactively as a metaphorical equation of inspections and limited bombings with the “false security” parallel of 1930s unawareness Likeness to history in the metaphor also projected forward. Pearl Harbor, as in Bush’s joint session speech, evoked the larger World War II concomitant myth. Thus the metaphor pointed forward in the speech to one obvious question. “A narrative in which a nation suddenly loses its childlike innocence suggests that maturity and manhood, symbolized in military force, will surely follow” (Rosenberg 18). Vice President Cheney could not initiate advocacy of military action. Speaker Cheney did not have to state the obvious.

What he could do was still bring it to the audience’s imagination. The step

87 Long lost (G. Kennedy 189-90; Russell 4-5).

88 See pages 54-55.
was the double stresses contained in declaring that the United States would not live at the mercy of terror or terrorist regimes contained two stresses. The use of the figure *polyploton*, repetition of a word with a change of case (Quintilian 9.36-8), slid the root “terror” along the chain of connotation\(^\text{89}\) to implicitly include Hussein. Secondly, the line clearly meant action, and both points followed the cue of the Bush rhetoric. Elaborating the form and issues of action was as purposively missing in the speech as Hussein’s exact weapons and the foundation of our knowledge. The omission granted plausibility to Cheney’s assurance of the United States acting in the same “spirit” as in Afghanistan because similar conditions could then be assumed. Unspecified different conditions, of course, might lead “spirit” to many manifestations.

The omission also covered Cheney’s vision of what regime change could catalyze. Ignored actual fighting of a war moved relatedly to ignored questions of postwar occupation(s). Cheney reconnected to his Pearl Harbor metaphor through World War II metaphor to put before the audience’s eyes a post-Hussein Iraq of likeness to postwar Germany and Japan. His vision of a democratic and pluralistic Iraq could be built without any sustained assisting presence of the American military. Iraq could be overridden\(^\text{90}\) to found a mirror image of the United States on asyndeton, synonymy, and climax.

The speech’s approach therefore protected the ever-undefined “we” as a piece. The pronoun ran throughout the text to mean the United States alone, or the United States in some future coalition of convenience.

\(^{89}\) See page 17.

\(^{90}\) This was an almost inevitable result of a toying with history imposed on a future.
Reaction grasped the speech as a flung gauntlet. Cheney had cancelled outright
the Scowcroft and Baker alternatives. Clark’s call for multilateralism was sidelined to
“maybe” status by a pronoun. Zinni’s somewhat convoluted argument could be shelved
because a Cold War strategy did not comport with World War II metaphor. The effect of
Cheney’s “bold and clear assertions” expressed in “frightening rhetoric” (Isikoff and
Corn 28-29) forced any critic to prove him wrong (Ricks 49-51). “ ‘When the vice
president stood up and said “We are sure” – well, who are we to argue?’ ” said a “senior
military intelligence official” Ricks quoted (49-51). No other alternative than an invasion
of Iraq remained in the speech without Cheney’s ever having called for it explicitly. The
speech’s “deep-seated certitude, even arrogance” (McClellan 138) actually skated on
long-term “thin ice” (Suskind 168). For the moment, however, a speech entirely
dependent on manufactured likeness in metaphorical myth, helping mask omissions,
swung consequential momentum to the administration.

The public pace of the definite question of going to war in Iraq now quickened. In
the morning of September 4, Bush very publicly gave a private briefing on Iraq to
eighteen members of Congress (Woodward 169-71). Bush told journalists later that day
he would seek congressional approval “necessary to deal with the [Hussein] threat.” The
goal was not returning United Nations inspectors to Iraq but disarming Hussein
(“Remarks Following a Meeting” 1523-24).

In the afternoon of September 4, DoD Secretary Donald Rumsfeld held a private
briefing for the entire Senate (Isikoff and Corn 30). The briefing had not gone well
new. The Post also reported that, on September 4, congressional Republican leadership
said at a private party meeting that a vote on a war resolution would be scheduled before Congress recessed in early or mid-October (Kane and Bresnahan).

On September 5, Cheney and CIA Director George Tenet privately briefed the House and Senate majority and minority leaders. Senate Democratic majority leader Tom Daschle commented enigmatically that the session was “helpful.” Senate minority leader Trent Lott called it “troubling” (Graham).

On September 7, Bush made a brief public appearance before journalists with British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Bush was asked if he had any conclusive new evidence on Hussein’s nuclear capability. “I would remind you that when the [United Nations] inspectors first went into Iraq and were denied … access … a report came out of the IAEA that they were six months away from developing a weapon. I don’t know what more evidence we need” (“Remarks by the President and Prime Minister Tony Blair” n. pag.).

On September 7, The New York Times reported that “White House officials” said that planning began in July for an “Iraq rollout … to persuade the public … of the need to confront the threat from Saddam Hussein.” The administration knowingly hazarded a summertime “appearance of disarray” to wait until after Labor Day and more closely coincide with Bush’s announced speeches for September 11 and 12.91 “‘From a marketing point of view,’ ” Bush Chief of Staff Andrew Card said, “‘you don’t introduce new products in August’” (Bumiller).

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91 Suggesting that Milbank’s August 18 piece was at least somewhat in the dark.
On September 8, *The New York Times* reported that American intelligence officials were concluding that Hussein had an active nuclear program. An intercepted shipment of aluminum tubes to Iraq found their specifications followed a European design allowing use in centrifuges enriching uranium to nuclear weapon standards. “Hard-liners” were alarmed that discovery of the tubes revealed a chronic American underestimation of Hussein’s weapons abilities. “The first sign of a ‘smoking gun,’ they argue, may be a mushroom cloud” (Gordon and Miller).

On September 8, Cheney appeared on NBC’s *Meet the Press*. Cheney said that the *Times* story made it public knowledge that Hussein had reconstituted a nuclear program. He also reminded host Tim Russert that “if you harken back” to 1990, Hussein might have been “within six months to a year of actually building a nuclear weapon.” Asked if there was evidence linking Iraq to 9/11, Cheney answered he could not make that allegation, only that it was “credible” if “unconfirmed” that Mohammad Atta had met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague.

On September 8, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice appeared on CNN’s *Late Edition*. Rice took on the same question as Cheney had on how close Iraq was to having a nuclear weapon.

…. We do know there have been shipments going into Iraq of … high-quality aluminum tools that are really only suited to nuclear weapons … centrifuge programs. We know that [Hussein] has the infrastructure [and] nuclear scientists to make a nuclear weapon. And we know that [during] the Gulf War, he was … maybe six months from a crude nuclear device.
The problem here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud (n pag).\(^9^2\)

On September 8, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell appeared on FNC’s *Fox News Sunday*. Powell said “we saw in reporting just this morning, [Hussein] is still trying to acquire, for example, some of the specialized aluminum tubing one needs to develop centrifuges that would give you an enriched [uranium] capacity.” The issue in Iraq was regime disarmament. “And we believe that regime change is the surest way to make sure that it’s disarmed.” Hussein’s “proclivity towards terrorist activity” made him a part of the war on terror.\(^9^3\) He was irrational and threatened American interests in the Middle East and American allies there.

On September 11, Bush gave a fairly subdued 9/11 anniversary address. The president spoke from Ellis Island; the backdrop was the Statue of Liberty. Themes from the joint session speech echoed. The 9/11 attacks hit “our deepest national belief … that every life is precious … more than anything else, this separates us from the enemy ….” America had entered a great struggle on behalf of all defenders of human liberty. No terrorist or tyrant would be allowed to threaten civilization with weapons of mass murder. “Our generation has heard history’s call, and we will answer it.” (“President’s Remarks to the Nation” n. pag.).

\(^9^2\) The “smoking gun” metaphor was popularized through Richard Nixon’s Watergate tapes. See Schudson, *Watergate*, esp. pages 20, 177-79, and 197-98. The smoking gun/mushroom cloud metaphor was not spontaneous. Senior Bush staff discussed it in a meeting three days earlier (Isikoff and Corn 35).

\(^9^3\) Another instance of policy by polyploton with “terror.”
That morning’s online *Wall Street Journal* included a 9/11 elegy by erstwhile Reagan speechwriter Peggy Noonan. The day’s ceremonies of a “last and heartbreaking look at what happened” marked the beginning of putting the memories away, Noonan wrote. A “certain coldness” was now needed in the year ahead. The case for attacking Hussein’s Iraq needed facts. “‘Saddam is evil’ is not enough. A number of people are evil, and some are even our friends.” Many countries had weapons of mass destruction. Only hard data could “demonstrate conclusively that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction which he is readying to use” on the United States or the West (“Time” n. pag.). Bush’s answer was already prepared. Noonan, and the rest of the world, received it the next day.

On September 12, Bush spoke rather robustly to the United Nations. One place and one regime – Iraq – concentrated the aggression of outlaw groups and regimes to interchange technologies aimed at killing on a mass scale. Bush initially refrained from mentioning Saddam Hussein by name. Instead, “Iraq” or the “Iraqi regime” had defied multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions against that government acquiring nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. That government had not complied with weapons inspections as promised. Iraq had just lately attempted to buy aluminum tubes to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Acquisition could mean an Iraqi nuclear weapon within one year. History, logic, and facts lead to one conclusion: the “Saddam Hussein regime is a grave and gathering danger … the first time we may be certain he has nuclear weapons is when, God forbid, he uses one.” Would the United Nations act on its resolutions or be irrelevant? (“Address to the United Nations” 1572-77).
On September 14, *The New York Times* reported that congressional Democrats roiled in disarray over Iraq. Daschle wanted answers on whether a war in Iraq would debilitate the war on terrorism; on plans for a postwar Iraq; and whether “an incursion into a country that had not struck first create[d] a precedent for India to strike Pakistan.” Sen. John Edwards wanted “decisive action.” Sens. Joe Biden and John Kerry favored only a multilateral strike on Hussein. Democratic pollster Mark Mellman said the mid-term elections would turn on domestic issues rather than Iraq. “Some strategists are advising party leaders to … authorize the use of force quickly … to [return to] the domestic issues the Democrats consider their strengths” (Mitchell).

On September 20, the White House released the document Bush asked in June be prepared apropos his West Point speech. *The National Security Strategy of the United States* prioritized disrupting and destroying “terrorist organizations of global reach” and state sponsors of terrorism attempting to gain or use “weapons of mass destruction or their precursors.” The stakes were “our democratic values and way of life. Freedom and fear are at war, and there will be no quick or easy way to end this conflict.”94 The campaign need “not be sequential to be effective.” International cooperation would be sought but would not supersede acting unilaterally “to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against terrorists … to prevent them doing harm against our people and our country.” A preemptive doctrine of “anticipatory self-defense” had a long history in international law. Terrorism obsolesced the doctrine’s traditional imminent threat standard of the visual mobilization of forces preparing to attack. The United States would adapt accordingly. Even if uncertainty fogged “the time and place of the enemy’s

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94 See summary of the joint session speech on pages 38 and 39. War between freedom and fear is a reprise.
attack,” the United States would act preemptively against a perceived threat in order to “forestall or prevent such hostile acts” (6-15). The president’s introduction warned that history “will judge harshly those who saw the coming danger but failed to act” (n. pag.).

On September 22, Clinton vice president Al Gore, Bush’s opponent in the 2000 presidential election, questioned the preemption doctrine in a speech at the San Francisco Commonwealth Club. The doctrine, Gore said, was not needed for a strike on Iraq. But the larger issue was the document’s open-ended nature. The logic “suggests a string of military engagements against a succession of sovereign states: Syria, Libya, North Korea, Iran.”95 A war resolution on Iraq would work in tandem with the strategy to create a precedent for preemptive action “anywhere or anytime” as decided by a “single individual, albeit head of state.” Gore said that a better course would be a focus on al-Qaeda and Afghanistan while building an international coalition to eventually deal with Saddam Hussein.

On September 25, Bush was by asked reporters whether al-Qaeda or Hussein was the “biggest threat” to America. Bush said both were risks. “The danger is that al-Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddam’s madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world.” Comparison was not possible because the two could not be distinguished from each other (“Remarks Prior to Discussions” 1657).

On September 25, Rice appeared on PBS’ News Hour, and was asked about Iraq’s connections to al-Qaeda. Suspects in American detection on suspicion of being terrorists

95 This would be policy polysemy, as mentioned on page 6.
have said that Iraq provided some training to al-Qaeda in chemical weapons development. So, yes, there are contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda.” Some al-Qaeda personnel were in Baghdad. The administration was not alleging that Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11. That story was “unfolding … and we’re learning more” (“Rice on Iraq” n. pag.).

On September 26, Rumsfeld was asked if a distinction existed between “preemption” and “prevention,” as the national security strategy interchanged the terms. Rumsfeld acknowledged that international law made a distinction. He then mixed the two words in an example.

What would you call the Cuban missile crisis action by President Kennedy? In my view, establishing what he called a quarantine, what the world thought of as a blockade, and preventing … the Soviet Union from placing missiles in Cuba, that was certainly anticipatory self-defense, it was certainly preventative … he engaged in preemption.

Rumsfeld on Iraq seemed Cheney. “We know they have weapons of mass destruction. We know they have weapons of mass destruction programs. There isn’t any debate about it” (“DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Pace” n. pag.).

On September 28, in the president’s weekly radio address, Bush said he and the Congress were “moving toward” a resolution authorizing force to disarm Hussein pursuant to United Nations resolutions. Iraq was building facilities to increase its extant biological and chemical weapons arsenal and, “according to British intelligence,” could launch biological or chemical attacks within forty-five minutes of an order. Hussein’s
regime was seeking a nuclear bomb. If he acquired fissile material, he could have one within a year. The dangers America faced would only worsen unless Hussein was stopped (“Radio Address” n. pag.).

On October 1, Gallup reported that support for a war in Iraq had fallen from a high of seventy-four percent eleven months earlier, yet was still registering a majority fifty-seven percent. Support did not arise from an “attitudinal vacuum.” Hussein’s ninety-six percent negative rating in a 1998 survey was the worst ever recorded in Gallup polling history for a public figure. “Iraq itself” had received an eighty-eight percent unfavorable rating. Partisan affiliation and age also conditioned support. About eighty percent of Republicans favored “sending American troops to topple Hussein’s regime” compared to about forty percent of Democrats. Adults over age fifty favored a war in Iraq by forty-eight percent compared to “two-thirds” those aged thirty to forty-nine and sixty percent of those between ages eighteen and twenty-four. Overall, fifty-four percent of respondents expected a “long war” in Iraq,96 and sixty-eight percent thought the war would be “difficult.” Margins of nearly two-to-one favored United Nations approval for a war in Iraq or a multilateral approach compared to acting without approval or unilaterally. Looking to the midterms, fifty-two percent to thirty-three percent said the Republicans would handle Iraq better than the Democrats. Fifty-five percent said the Democrats would handle the economy better than the Republicans (“Nine Key Questions” n. pag.).

96 Gallup noted that an almost identical fifty-one percent of respondents in a December, 1941 poll said the war with Japan would be “long.”
On October 2, Bush and House Democratic leader Richard Gephardt announced agreement on the wording of a war resolution. Hussein’s Iraq was an “urgent threat,” Bush said. Terrorist cells and terrorist states “are different faces of the same evil.” Gephardt said his goal “has been to insure that Iraq is disarmed, and to lessen the likelihood that weapons of mass destruction can be passed by terrorists.” He said nothing direct about regime change (“President, House Leadership” n. pag.).

The Bush-Gephardt deal reached into the Senate to kill a Biden-Hagel alternative. Their proposal required the president to secure United Nations or congressional prior to sending the American military into Iraq for the sole purpose of destroying weapons of mass destruction. Republicans with whom Biden was working felt that voting for Biden’s tighter plan would now leave them politically untenable by appearing “left” of House Democrats (Isikoff and Corn 127-28). Split Senate Democratic sentiment suddenly lacked any alternative point of potential coalescence as the war vote fast approached. Democrats altogether were also acutely aware that “no Democrat who had been in the party’s majority opposing the 1991 [Gulf] war was able to make headway in [the] presidential politics” of the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections (Ricks 62).

On October 2, the CIA presented the Senate Intelligence Committee a classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq (Woodward 199; Gordon). Various committee members, over, apparently, September 8 through 11 requested the report be done before a vote on a war resolution.97 Senators had also asked, in a seeming coincidence of a request from the Bush administration, for a declassified report for public

97 Isikoff and Corn 42; Ricks 52; Woodward, Plan 195.
release (Isikoff and Corn 42; 138). The public report was based on the classified NIE (Isikoff and Corn 138). What the public thus learned about the weaponry of Hussein’s Iraq was calibrated to be “‘in sync’” (Isikoff and Corn 138) with a classified report done “unusually quickly” and done “… in the wake of Cheney’s high-profile” VFW speech and Bush’s United Nations address (Ricks 52; Woodward 195).

On October 4, the CIA released the public report (Isikoff and Corn 138), under the definitive-sounding title *Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs*. On October 5, *The New York Times* duly journalized it. Post-1998 Iraq, since weapons inspections ended, “‘has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program[,] and invested more heavily in biological weapons,’” Michael Gordon’s story quoted from the report’s page one. “‘Most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.’” Gordon’s story noted from the same page that Hussein remained intent on acquiring nuclear weapons. The report’s page one finding that “all intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons” was paraphrased properly. Iraq’s seeking “proscribed aluminum tubes” constituted prime evidence according to Gordon’s accurate quotation. “‘Most intelligence specialists’” believed Iraq wanted the tubes for a centrifuge function to enrich uranium. “‘Some’” analysts nonetheless thought the tubes’ intended use was for conventional weapons. But use for uranium enrichment could mean an Iraqi nuclear weapon within a year, the report, and Gordon’s story on it, said.

Gordon also recorded that the public report said “all key elements” of Iraq’s offensive biological weapons program “are active.” Iraq was stockpiling chemical weapons including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin and VX (*Iraq’s Weapons* 2; Gordon). Trainer aircraft were being converted into biological and chemical UAV launching
platforms that could “threaten the [United States] if brought close to, or into … the homeland” (*Iraq’s Weapons* 17; 2). The CIA’s public “slick document on glossy magazine-style paper” (Isikoff and Corn 138) included reconnaissance photos of weapons production facilities and three color maps separately locating those nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons facilities. Gordon’s story was headlined “CIA Says Iraq Revived Forbidden Weapons Program after the UN Inspectors Left.”

“‘At some point, they [the Bush administration] are going to have to talk to the people,’ ” Reagan communications strategist Michael Deaver observed in early September. “‘People expect to hear from their commander in chief’ ” (Bumiller). Just like Demosthenes faced the assembly, and Edmund Burke pleaded before Parliament, and William Jennings Bryan harangued his Chautauqua crowds, Bush had to make the case. That moment now fell between the release of the CIA’s public “white paper” and the beginning of congressional debate. The “big speech” (Isikoff and Corn 143) came October 7.98

Bush packed several advantages for the speech before a “few hundred invited guests” (Isikoff and Corn 143) in Cincinnati’s Union Terminal museum. Debate from the outset conceded the Bush propositions. No one argued first-strike preemption. No one said Saddam Hussein should not be deposed. No one sought to defend the indefensible Hussein’s history. No one said the American military could not effect regime change. Scowcroft et al seemed to have read the West Point speech far more completely than a

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98 One year to the day since the announcement of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
media proclaiming it everything from irrelevant to Iraq to revolutionary. Knowing elites understood its announcing the very doctrine of prevention that would enter the forthcoming national security strategy. The standard was significantly different than the term “preemption” the media generally applied to the strategy even before it was released (Sanger, “Bush to Outline”).

Rumsfeld’s non-answer on the strategy’s scrambling “preemption” and “prevention” artfully preserved the surface “preemption” interpretation. Bush’s West Point speech illustratively mentioned the classic preemptive instance in the observable massing of “great armies.” Preemption holds an ample international history partly influenced by American thinking.

The secretary’s “anticipatory self-defense” descends from Aquinas’ assemblage of Augustine’s scattered generalizations on war. Aquinas argued that a “just war” could only be waged by lawful authority having the “rightful intention … [of] the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil.” The instigation could only be punishing attackers for inflicting wrong or a society “‘refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects’” (2: 1359-60). Bacon’s seventeenth century essays moved closer to the modern preemptive idea that “an imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of war” (61). U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster moved closer still in “issuing the classic statement” for justified preemptive war in the early 1840s (Gray 9). Webster’s test was impractical or unavailing “admonition or remonstrance” coupled with a “necessity of self-defense instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means [and] no

99 Entman (110-12) seems fairly typical in finding a summer, 2002 Iraq debate “pitting Republicans against each other.” The reading holds as far as it goes – excluding the prevention/preemption discussion.
moment for deliberation” (“Letter” n. pag.). Preemptive war is thusly noncontroversial because choice has already been reduced to Webster’s implicit “receiving the first blow or striking first” (Gray 10).

Elihu Root, former U.S. secretary of state, former U.S. senator, and later advocate of “preparedness,” amended Webster in 1914 to assert a sovereign state right to prevent “‘a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself’” (qtd. in Gray 9). “Preventive” action entails discretionary choice to check an adversary’s present activities lest inaction result in an adverse future balance of power shift (Gray v-vi). Contingencies of time, character, means, and distance govern when and how to strike or whether to strike at all. Choices, for example, range from tolerating a future shift to trying preventive diplomatic, economic, or subversive means. War “can be viewed as [the most] muscular application of Root’s … doctrine of prudence” (Gray 12). Intelligence then need be only “‘good enough’” to assign the military achievable specific goals (Gray 36-39). Prudent suspicion entitles shooting (Gray 16).

Prevention’s “unwillingness to live with certain kinds of risk” makes it a standard motive among specific others for a war (Gray 13; 23). Andrew Jackson overthrew the sovereign Spanish government of Florida in an 1818 campaign on the claim of preventive self-defense from raiding Seminoles encamped under that government’s protection (Remini 1: 341-77). Much American westward expansion advanced through a series of partly preventive wars upon the natives. America’s 1940 raw materials embargo on Japan aimed at denying the means of war in order to prevent Japanese expansion into Indochina. America’s World War II “Germany first” policy intended to prevent Hitler from his signaled intention of taking the war global (Gray 23-27). Nixon essentially reran
Jackson’s reasoning to launch a 1970 American incursion from Vietnam into Cambodia to ostensibly prevent American casualties from Viet Cong attacks originating there. Gray (27) argued America undertook Operation Desert Storm in part to “prevent Iraq proceeding from its easy conquest of Kuwait to the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and the small Gulf states.”

The national security strategy’s blurring of preemption and prevention thus ratified “the so-called Bush doctrine” as “historically unremarkable … notwithstanding all the excitement it occasioned in 2002” (Gray 27). Ricks’ diametrically opposed conclusion on the “Bush doctrine” announced at West Point merely exemplified excited media mis-framing the strategy preemptive. With the war on terror turning to the definite question of Iraq, Cheney’s speech simultaneously capitalized on and grounded prevention as the real standard for first-strike action. Intelligence in the conditional was good enough to assert prudent suspicion. Distorted metaphor brushed aside the Scowcroft, Baker, and Clark economic and diplomatic proposals as rashly isolationist prevention. The advantage to the October 7 speech was that the consistent administration-and-media preemption dressing of prevention better fit the myths than did America’s prevention adventures. Jackson’s First Seminole War and Nixon’s Cambodian incursion did not fit heroic response to absorbing the first blow of savages evilly

100 Suskind (150-51, 163) also discussed preemption, prevention, and standards of evidence. His concern was the administration’s internal politics. Mine is the public record at the time.

101 See page 73.

102 I am not suggesting that media mis-framing was intentional in itself or as an aide to the administration’s selling. Gray suggested (7) that journalists merely are “not usually well-educated in strategic theory [or] inclined to self-discipline in the exact and proper usage of strategic ideas.” Ethnocentrism [see page 27] would allow for media susceptibility to the myths of war history as a substitute.
attacking innocence. American prevention embargoes did not fit Pearl Harbor, *Pearl Harbor*, or Cheney’s Pearl Harbor. The new war that was the mythcized old war indeed needed little intelligence more precise than the myth’s metaphors.

Proposing preventive war defaults eventually to “moral judgment [of] the claims advanced for anticipatory self-defense … and … the interests and popular feelings at stake in a conflict” (Gray 13; 35). The administration deployed more metaphor as pragmatic claims during the weeks to the Cincinnati speech. “Mushroom cloud” set before the eyes historically familiar extratextual imagery rich in fire and death. Thus the metaphor, for the administration’s purposes, argued danger’s proximity far more efficiently than arguing that oceans no longer would protect from Hussein. Aristotle argued that danger induces fear from “proximity of the frightening.” Indications of danger include hostility and anger of those capable of taking action, “those able to do wrong to those able to be wronged … and those who attack their inferiors.” Fear leads to deliberation – in cases where action is plausible (1382a-1383a).

The “gripping” (Isikoff and Corn 205) mushroom cloud metaphor could thus stand alone without the support base of the aluminum tubes. Rumsfeld’s Cuban missile crisis metaphor conjured an imminent threat in an almost primordial sense. The president’s introduction to the national security strategy bundled the potent Munich metaphor of “appeasement” as a waiting brand on opponents as “moral equivalent of Neville Chamberlain fools at best, knaves at worst” (Ricks 16). The advantage to the

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103 Conveniently also redirecting media attention from the one question sensing prevention at work.
October 7 speech was that the administration had effected the political form of anticipatory self-defense for the case.

Noonan’s “just the facts” prod towards Iraq gifted the administration differently but no less bountifully for the Cincinnati speech. The facts included Cheney’s story of Atta’s Prague meeting now allowed to stand on “credibility” without query on the change from the earlier “confirmed.” The facts were Rice’s advancing the evidence of aluminum tubes unquestioned. The facts were the unfolding story of Iraq’s chemical weapons assistance to al-Qaeda. The facts were the metaphors, Pearl Harbor, and nostalgically retrospective 1990s World War II myth swelling a revamped 1980s military that could do anything\textsuperscript{104} into new American invincibility (Rich 9). The facts were the imagery of technology’s simulacra of imagery. Inability to see much of anything in reconnaissance photographs (Isikoff and Corn 124-25) mattered little. Leaping from a Crawford movie set ranch to Reata to Texas\textsuperscript{105} acclimated postmodernist leaping from a fuzzy Czech UAV that looked like a UAV that might be in Iraq.\textsuperscript{106} Leaping from example demonstrating that something is so from many similar cases to something might be so from Hussein’s singular case was good enough under prevention. Leaping from preemption to prevention could equally accommodate any “defensive” action since Rumsfeld had preserved the terms. The advantage to the October 7 speech was that audience imagination of fear and fact allowed Bush to keep the case simple.

\textsuperscript{104} See page 53.

\textsuperscript{105} See pages 31 and 60.

\textsuperscript{106} Note 35, page 32.
Thus the rhetorical field was well cleared for Bush. Debate teetered to counsel by accepting prevention. Disaffected Senate Democrats spun without political alternative or cover and no leadership of authoritative national voice. The public’s fixed opinions of Hussein lolled likely ready to be tapped. On the record lay the CIA public report stating that all agencies agreed Hussein was after nuclear capability. On the record was the administration-confirmed Times report of Hussein’s intent materialized in aluminum tubes. On the record loomed metaphorical imagery of Pearl Harbor, destruction, mushroom clouds. Long on the record was the popular narrative of innocent America attacked by savages and evil. Bush’s rhetorical challenge arrived appreciably eased. He had only to pour “facts” and the record and popular feeling into a moral case that looked like America faced no-choice preemption.

A minimalist nod to his immediate audience befitted the occasion. The president’s frame appeared encapsulation.

Tonight I want to take a few minutes to discuss a grave threat to peace, and America’s determination to lead the world in confronting that threat. The threat comes from Iraq. It arises directly from the Iraqi regime’s own actions. Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons. It has given shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror against its own people ….
We must also never forget the most vivid events of recent history. On September the 11th, 2001, America felt its vulnerability – even to threats that gather on the other side of the earth. We resolved then, and we are resolved today, to confront every threat, from any source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America.

The speech hereafter adapted the joint session speech’s pattern of expanded epanados. Questions became paraphrased statements of what had been asked. The answers were what we knew. Some asked how Iraq differed from other “countries or regimes that also have terrible weapons.” Iraq concentrated the worst dangers. A murderous tyrant there controlled weapons of mass destruction. The same tyrant had terrorized his own people, and hated the United States. We know the tyrant Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. He has used the weapons to kill twenty thousand Iraqis. “Every chemical or biological weapon that Iraq has or makes is a direct violation of the truce that ended the Persian Gulf War.” Intelligence has discovered that Iraq has a UAV fleet requiring “only a small container or one terrorist or Iraqi intelligence operative” to configure a UAV to target chemical or biological weapons at the United States. Iraq had provided haven to terrorists such as Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas. We know that Iraq and al-Qaeda share the common enemy of the United States of America. They have had high-level contacts with each other. If we know these things – “and we do – does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him while he grows stronger[?]”
Some argued that a war in Iraq would distract from a war on terror. American security requires confronting terror cells and outlaw regimes that are “different faces of the same evil.” The American military can confront both.107

Many have asked whether Saddam Hussein is close to having nuclear weaponry. We lack an exact answer. “The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting a nuclear weapons program.” Iraq is pursuing aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. A softball-sized amount of uranium would be a nuclear weapon available within a year. Saddam Hussein could then dominate the Middle East. He could threaten America. “And Saddam Hussein might pass nuclear technology to the terrorists.” Enemies willing to crash airplanes into buildings have the will to use a nuclear weapon.

Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. As President Kennedy said in October of 1962[:] ‘Neither the United States of America, nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, either large or small. We no longer live in a world,’ he said, ‘where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril.’

The worst has to be assumed. Some believe weapons inspections can be reinstated. Weapons inspections were met with deception. The world has tried economic sanctions, and Iraq still funds weapons purchases. The world has tried limited military

107 Assignable goals under prevention.
strikes, and weapons facilities have been rebuilt. The world has tried no-fly zones, and Iraq has fired on American and British military pilots more than 750 times. Containment, inspections, sanctions, and limited military action have not deterred Saddam Hussein from seeking more weapons.108

“Saddam Hussein must disarm himself, or for the sake of peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.” Only Iraq’s fulfilling certain conditions can avoid conflict. “Iraq must end its support for terrorism. It must cease the persecution of its civilian population.” It must account for missing Gulf War personnel.109 We have little reason, however, to expect those choices will be made. If we have to act, “we will plan carefully. We will act with the full power of the United States military. We will act with allies on our side, and we will prevail.”

Some have argued we should wait. The risk is too great. Failure to act emboldens others. American security cannot depend on a dictator’s whims. The United Nations would prove itself hollow to its own founding purposes. Regime change could not make the situation worse for Iraqis. “Freed from the weight of oppression, Iraq’s people will be able to share in the progress and prosperity of our time … people everywhere prefer freedom to slavery, prosperity to squalor[.]” The United States and its allies will help Iraq economically rebuild “and create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its neighbors.”

108 A reprise from the Cheney speech.

109 The reference was apparently to Capt. Scott Speicher, a Navy pilot shot down over Iraq’s Anbar province on January 17, 1991, and still officially unaccounted-for at the time of Bush’s speech. Bush never again made the demand in a major speech. Remains found in August of 2009 were identified by the military as Speicher’s (Jaffe; Shanker).
We will accept the present challenge like other generations of Americans. “This nation, in world war and cold war, has never permitted the brutal and the lawless to set history’s course.” Our resolve will give strength to others. Our courage will give hope to others. Our actions will secure peace, “and lead the world to a better day.”

The rhetoric reporter might note that Bush’s adapting the joint session speech traced roughly the same plain-intermediate-grand style progression. But the earlier speech largely addressed epideictic definition. Bush here necessarily essayed deliberation. The plain style tarried longer than in the joint session speech so that the appearance of giving information\textsuperscript{110} blanketed the comingling of stipulation and assertion.

Consider the narrative detailing of Hussein’s character and history as flowed from the summary opening. The United Nations had imposed a host of restrictions upon Hussein’s Iraq to formally end the 1991 Gulf War. On October 6, 1998 the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) for weapons inspections reported that Iraq had practiced a “large scale” concealment program “pervasive” across all weapons systems and weapons production facilities. Documents were withheld, personnel reassigned beyond UNSCOM reach, inspectors denied access to facilities and all aerial weapons, and UNSCOM aircraft rerouted to land inconveniently distant from Baghdad. Iraq had further demanded that UNSCOM offer pre-inspection proof of the existence of prohibited weapons. Analyzed wipes of warheads cast “significant doubt” on Iraq’s claim that it had not weaponized VX. Documentation of VX production and current quantity could not be

\textsuperscript{110} See page 8.
verified. Iraq’s denial that it possessed biological weapons was followed with documentation of biological weapons production (United Nations “Report” n. pag.).

Hussein had unleashed a 1988 chemical attack on Iraq’s Kurdish population, killing approximately twenty thousand, and maiming untold thousand more (Iraq’s Weapons 8; Goldberg n. pag.). He had fired Scud missiles into Saudi Arabia and Israel during the 1991 war (Browne; Brinkley). Terrorist Abu Nidal, cited by the American government as responsible for about nine hundred deaths in terrorist attacks by his Fatah Revolutionary Council, had lived in Baghdad from 1998 until his death a few weeks before the Cincinnati speech (Schmemann). Under Hussein’s protection, Abu Abbas, mastermind of the October, 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro, during which wheelchair-bound Leon Klinghoffer of Brooklyn was killed, lived in Baghdad in 2002 (Burns). Undeniable history offered the form of Aristotelian example for rhetorical rifling as Quintilian predicted.

Bush blended the history with an assertive present on the record. Hussein’s current possession of chemical and biological weapons, for example, repeated the CIA public report Gordon quoted. Bookending the assertion with amplificatory repetition of Hussein’s attack on the Kurds gave it an authoritative ring all the more tonally authentic in the plain style’s restraint. Placement accomplished even more. Twice juxtaposing the past around either side of the present assertion realized Longinus’ historic present of “events in past time as happening at the present moment” to obtain “vivid actuality” (25).

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111 See page 46 for Aristotle on assertion. Woodward (95), and Fritz, Keefer, and Nyahn (6), have also noted Bush’s penchant for assertive blurring. Their journalistic discussion lies outside rhetorical critique.
The omission of naming the Kurds for the euphemistic “his own people” allowed the audience to exercise imagination for meaning of attacking one’s own people. Vividness thusly accentuated the frequent effect of inference of the audience coaxed the role of the speaker’s witness (Demetrius 222) – here, to an assertion, conceivable as a future probability. Seeming veracity and seeming probability were then strengthened by the audience role of witness to the appended actuality that Hussein’s possession of chemical weapons violates United Nations resolutions in force.

The passage continued by reversely duplicating the rhetorical maneuver of assertion and fact. Assertion now surrounded fact. The CIA’s public report said (22) that Iraq attempted in the past, and was attempting again, to convert aircraft into UAV weapons delivery. “UAV” as a sign here semiotically slid into the all-but surreal UAVs of the reconnaissance photographs now UAVs waiting for terrorist operation at Hussein’s whim. The then asserted specter of UAV-launched weapons hitting the United States fronted the factual Nidal and Abbas residencies in Baghdad to put terrorists on Iraqi ground. Their presence affirmed Hussein’s hatred of the United States of America as a given that he shared with al-Qaeda. The illusory stipulation carried an interesting slant.

Moving from the “United States” to the “United States of America” reshaped for the audience’s eyes the threatened literal heartland into the full symbol of the freedoms terrorists hated. Hussein and al-Qaeda’s shared hatred of the symbol implied a unity Bush carefully did not categorize as actionable. The unity was one of the ideological kinship Bush had consistently maintained. Credibility rested on assigning Hussein and al-Qaeda the same position as Lippmann’s theoretical men of differing agendas uniting in a common emotion of hatred projected onto a symbol. The variation that the symbol was
congruent and not antithetical was exactly what would engage audience imagination a second time in one passage. Hatred without permutation would fall within the ability of the human condition’s direct experience to picture.

Bush’s extended passage of assertion and fact as mutually reinforcing imprimatur served refuting the Noonan argument that Hussein was just another dictator. The ancients so much assumed refutation’s rhetorical presence that they would have been astounded over the joint session speech bypassing it. Refutation was simply an innate part of the orator’s task. Counter-arguments must be answered to enlighten the audience of the hidden (Augustine 4.20.39-40). Roman rhetoric classified refutation as a distinct section of the speech (Cicero, De Oratore 1.31; Quintilian 3.9.5). The Bush speech followed Aristotle’s simpler organization to fold refutation into the proofs of narrative (1418b). Regardless, efficacy required both confirmation and refutation because “your own statements cannot be confirmed unless you refute the allegations on the other side” (Cicero, De Oratore 3.81). Summer’s administration silence emerged here in having advantageously spared Bush a first speaker’s burden to anticipate “other questions which may arise” (Augustine 4.20.39-40). The other questions’ understanding of the prevention doctrine virtually guaranteed that additionally going first made for a non-challenge of the major premises. Assertion – a lesser form of proof (Quintilian 5.12.12) – appeared as real refutation in the intermix of Hussein’s history. Each bloc of apparent refutation could seem even stronger from the effectiveness of immediate conjunction with what was being refuted (Cicero, De Oratore 3.81). Epanados in extension finally allowed Bush the luxury of taking accumulated arguments separately (Quintilian 5.13.8-9). Emotion generally has a role in that approach (Quintilian 5.12.5).
The second bloc of refutation moved quick and short. A war in Iraq would not distract from the war on terror because Hussein had to be confronted. Hussein, in other words, was *there*. His history and character were known. Asserting that the American military could handle both wars dispatched a Zinni argument to secure the plausible practicality necessary to persuasion towards available action (Quintilian 3.8.16-17). The retrospective 1990s World War II myth swelled a 1980s military that could do anything into American invincibility (Rich 9). Myth’s modern and extratextual relation to practical politics could scarcely be starker.

Refutation three addressed the nuclear issue minus Bush’s September recall of the weapons inspections uncovering that Hussein was within six months of having a nuclear weapon in the 1990s. One possible reason involved an all-too rare instance of media fact-checking amid the Bush argument. A September 27 *Washington Times* story reported that Deputy Press Secretary Scott McClellan said Bush was referring to a 1991 report of the International Atomic Commission (IAEA). The *Times* quoted IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky saying no such report existed. “‘We’ve never put a time frame,’ ” Gwozdecky said, on Hussein’s obtaining nuclear capability. The six-month time frame came from an unofficial opinion of a single weapons inspector relayed in the July 16, 1991 *London Times*. ¹¹² Gwozdecky added that the IEAE’s 1990s weapons inspection team destroyed all “key buildings and equipment” of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. No substantiated post-1998 evidence existed on a current Iraqi nuclear weapons program, Gwozdecky said (Curl).

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¹¹² Cheney had used the six-month time frame in his September 8 *Meet the Press* appearance. Pages 89-90.
The CIA public report agreed that the IAEA “made significant strides towards dismantling Iraq’s nuclear weapons program.” In 2002, according to the report, Iraq’s nuclear program consisted of four factors. Hussein’s intent to acquire nuclear weapons counted as one. Others were a “cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians,” withheld data on the nuclear weapons program, and attempts to buy aluminum tubes. Most experts agreed that the tubes could be used in a centrifuge program [enriching uranium]. “Some believe” the tubes would be used for conventional weapons. But the program’s “principal hurdle” was acquiring needed fissile material. Acquisition could lead to an Iraqi nuclear weapon within a year (1; 6).

Bush did not merely read or restate the CIA report. He amplified the tubes into enriched uranium in the imagery of being “a little larger than a single softball.” The softball could wreak the terrible consequences of Hussein dominating the Middle East and threatening America. Hussein might pass the technology to terrorists. The imagery of tossing a nuclear softball to terrorists bordered dark comedy and latched seriously onto 9/11. That day’s horror was why Hussein had to be confronted now. Appended 9/11 imagery to the nuclear softball imagery fired amplification of destruction. Bush then moved to a metaphor to justify action Rumsfeld had blurred as preemption and prevention.

Rice interestingly told The New York Times in June that she would not apply the Cuban missile crisis metaphor her boss now applied to Iraq. Her reasoning’s absence from the story (Sanger, “Bush to Formalize”) was not overly important. Anyone even cursorily familiar with the history might supply enough differences to render the
metaphor a case of Quintilian’s warning on obscuring narrative. The Soviet Union’s siting of nuclear missiles in Cuba did not provoke a presidential call for ousting Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev in the Kennedy speech Bush cited. Soviet missiles were far more easily known than what Iraq might have. The United States and the Soviet Union maintained diplomatic relations throughout Kennedy’s demand for the missiles’ removal. Overall American policy towards the Soviet Union was directed at checking Soviet expansion by the mode of containment Bush said was passé. No 9/11 was linked.

What might be noted here is the overriding continuation of the war on terror’s foundational joint session speech. Manichaeism would not see 1962 Cuba and 2002 Iraq as finite events with significant differences. Starting with “as President Kennedy said” emphasized that threats to the United States laid on a continuum where particularities were irrelevant. “Terror” easily slid between al-Qaeda and Hussein as both were Nazism’s heirs in that continuum. The missile crisis metaphor thus functioned in the speech at hand in respects similar to the Pearl Harbor metaphor in the earlier speech and in the Cheney speech. Bush’s audience both witnessed Hussein and, as in the joint session speech, were summoned to a timeless challenge posed as unique to the “generation” to which they all belonged. Within the speech, as within the Cheney speech, metaphor was suffixed reasoning to assertion. Bush escalated towards it by arranging the nuclear question last of the biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons trio.

The metaphor then covered what would be said as the speech shifted into the intermediate style of the present and of figures intermixed lightly with epideictic.

113 Page 55.
Anaphora of what the world had tried repetitively fixed in the mind that the reasonable and the noble did not work on an evil outlaw dictator. The president was self-positioning well as having no choice except to issue an ultimatum. Hussein had to remove his weapons or risk being forcibly “disarmed.” Only the untried option of war in Iraq could bring about forced disarmament. Acting with “full power” euphemistically elided using the word “war.”

Ultimatums, of course, are the province of presidents, and the grand style. Another subject for the grand style is the generational commitment Bush now invoked by generational authority. “This nation, in world war and Cold War, has never permitted the brutal and lawless to set history’s course.” Bush expanded the American history available for his rhetoric inasmuch as the phrasing “in world war” included World War One. Obviously also called on was World War II myth that historical chronology allowed him to conjoin to the very different Cold War. The ever-ambiguous “this generation” could take its turn in a sweeping blur of America’s war history of nobility and bodacious nurses114 and no Korea and no Vietnam complicating focused moments of triumph. Establishing the speech’s conclusion forced the conclusion to be consistent. VE Day, VJ Day, the Soviet Union’s acquiescence to Kennedy’s demand, and the fall of the Berlin Wall, could not rhetorically implicate a post-Hussein Iraq of chaos. The grand style, as in the Cheney speech, swept past actual fighting and actual occupation. Concluding the case for a war in Iraq in grand style unleashed without comment Cheney’s Pearl Harbor, UAVs, aluminum tubes, Atta in Prague, the national security strategy, the Munich metaphor, the indistinguishability of al-Qaeda and Hussein, all his administration had

114 Page 59.
said the previous six weeks, and interweaved with 9/11 imagery. Staked in the onrush a consequence from the antecedent\footnote{See the discussion of Quintilian on page 9.} of Bush’s rhetoric.

The grand style’s torrent may have swept up Bush himself.\footnote{Grand style is discussed on pages 8, 47, and 63.} Bush mobilized the style before Congress to commit America to a war on terror. He had used it at West Point to announce what he felt was a doctrine. Now, in Cincinnati, grand style might take George W. Bush of Crawford, Texas, where it wanted. War and ultimatums and generational causes making the stuff of grand style had to lead somewhere. Grand style demanded it for rhetorical legitimacy. The demand would be greater when the facts fit so easily. A speaker and his style – the art, artist, and work in Quintilian’s formulation\footnote{See page 35.} – suggested Rich’s observation that Bush was in a box.\footnote{See page 35.} The ancient theory equally withstood modern pliability and modern presidents. Preemption as prevention, glissading fact and assertion, distorted metaphor and questionable metaphor, may have too easily overlooked Cicero’s admonition on ignoring the first theories of rhetoric.

On October 10, the House voted 293 to 133 to approve the war resolution developed by Bush and Gephardt. On October 11, in the early morning, the Senate approved the resolution 77 to 23 (\textit{Cong. Rec.} 20490; Mitchell and Hulce).\footnote{Biden, Daschle, and Kerry voted in support (\textit{Cong. Rec.} 20490).} The specific authorization for the president allowed use of the military to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat from Iraq” and to “enforce all relevant
United Nations Security Council” resolutions regarding Iraq (“Joint Resolution” n. pag.).

White House records documented that 161 House members and seventy-one senators had attended at least one administration briefing (Woodward 205). “Not more than a half-dozen or so” senators were known to have read the classified NIE. The non-reading senators were in high company. Among those who also apparently never read the full NIE was the forty-third president of the United States (Isikoff and Corn 137; 205).
Chapter Three

The Shadow Lurks

The president’s next few weeks’ public itinerary included time for some domestic campaigning. Bush staked more political capital of credibility than any presidential predecessor ever on midterm congressional elections. He stumped for Republican candidates in fifteen states in just the last five days before those elections on November 5 (Ceaser and Busch 48-9). Post-election analyses reached divergent conclusions on Bush’s success in posing the elections as a national referendum and his influence on electing candidates as personal, presidential, or related to issues. All agreed on the results’ arithmetically historical noteworthiness. The incumbent president’s party gained midterm House seats for only the third time since the Civil War (Jacobson 2). A Republican gain of two Senate seats meant more than election night braggadocio over registering the first Senate midterm win for a president’s party since 1934. The gains bolstered the existing House majority, and just sufficed to create a Senate majority, for a president with a war authorization.

On November 10, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved a Bush administration proposal demanding Iraq’s agreement to renewed weapons inspections. The Council’s Resolution 1441 said that the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was to have unrestricted access to

120 J. Campbell (205), Jacobson (21), and Keele, Fogarty, and Stinson (829) all held that the 2002 midterms conformed to postwar historical patterns of a president’s having carried a state or district as the best predictor of midterm results favorable to a president. Campbell (205) and Jacobson (8-11) also emphasized decennial redistricting as a factor favoring Republicans in 2002. Jacobson argued also (6-8) that the state of economy did not help Democrats expand beyond their base because Republican candidates successfully prioritized “foreign policy and defense” issues.
all sites, records, and personnel. The resolution carried a warning of “serious consequences” should Iraq engage in deception and less than full cooperation (n. pag.). On November 27, UNMOVIC inspectors entered Iraq (Isikoff and Corn 158). Reinstated inspections were linked in a *Washington Post* story to Blair and Powell securing Bush’s August agreement to provide Iraq what the resolution termed a “final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” through the United Nations. Bush’s earlier United Nations speech could now be seen as a process step in that light (DeYoung).

On December 7, pursuant to Resolution 1441’s section three, Iraq filed a 12,000-page weapons inventory with the United Nations. UNMOVIC chair Hans Blix pronounced it less than satisfactory (Isikoff and Corn 163; “Transcript” n. pag.). On January 19, ABC News reported that UNMOVIC inspectors were asking for “perhaps” months’ more time to complete their task (“Interview: Donald Rumsfeld” n. pag.). On January 21, *The Washington Post* quoted French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin saying that no justification for a United Nations war resolution existed while inspections were ongoing. The same story also reported that 125,000 American troops had been ordered, since December 24, to deploy to the Persian Gulf (Kessler and Lynch).

On January 27, Blix addressed the United Nations. Blix said that Iraqi cooperation on facilities access was “good” and that the UNMOVIC team had capability for daily multiple inspections throughout Iraq. UNMOVIC was so far neither contending that “weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq” nor excluding the possibility. Interviews with Iraqis involved with weapons research and production were confined to the presence

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121 UNMOVIC was the successor organization to UNSCOM. The IAEA was the “point” agency for nuclear-related inspections.
of Iraqi officials. Discrepancies remained in Iraqi accounts of the current quantity and potency of weaponized VX. Discrepancies remained between Iraqi accounts and Iraqi documents on the quantity of chemical bombs. No “convincing evidence” had been provided on destruction of anthrax. Documents had been found “relating to … the enrichment of uranium” (“Transcript” n. pag.).

On January 28, Bush gave 2003’s State of the Union address. Roughly one-third the speech concerned the Iraq question. Outlaw regimes seeking or possessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons posed the greatest contemporary threat to American and world security. Such regimes could sell or give the weapons to terrorists. America’s duty to confront the new threat was familiar. Twentieth century history was replete with “small groups of men [who] seized control of great nations” to advance ambition by limitless cruelty and murder.

In each case, the ambitions of Hitlerism, militarism, and communism were defeated by the will of free peoples, by the strength of great alliances, and by the might of the United States of America. Now, in this century, the ideology of power and domination has appeared again, and seeks to gain the ultimate weapons of terror. Once again, this nation and all our friends are all that stand between a world of peace, and a world of chaos and constant alarm. Once again, we are called to defend the safety of our people, and the hopes of all mankind. And we accept this responsibility.

America’s effort is broad and determined. We support Iranians risking death in the causes of liberty, democracy, and human rights. We are working with Asian countries
to convince North Korea to end nuclear weapons pursuits violating 1990s agreements. A brutal dictator in Iraq will not be permitted to dominate the Mideast and threaten America. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed, destroyed, nor disarmed from biological and chemical weapons. “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” American intelligence says that he has sought high grade aluminum tubes. The uranium and the tubes are for a nuclear weapon.

“And this Congress and the American people must recognize another threat.” Intelligence sources, communication intercepts, and detainee statements reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists and members of al-Qaeda. Imagine the 9/11 hijackers having other plans and supplied by Saddam Hussein with weapons “without fingerprints.” Containment cannot stop “shadowy terrorist networks” slipping one canister of virus into the United States to wreak a day of horror. Waiting until “the threat” emerges fully imminent renders all actions as too late. Trusting Hussein’s sanity is not an option. He has already used the world’s most deadly weapons on Iraq’s own citizens. The people of Iraq know that the end of their enemy regime is the day of their liberation.

America no longer accepts a mounting threat from Iraq. The United States will ask the United Nations Security Council to convene February 5 on the “facts of Iraq’s ongoing defiance of the world … we will consult. But let there be no misunderstanding.” Saddam Hussein will disarm or face an American-led coalition to disarm him for America’s safety “and the world’s peace.” Peace and liberty must be defended. Liberty is God’s gift to humanity. We can trust the ways of Providence. We can be confident “in the
loving God behind all life, and all of history. May He guide us now. And may God continue to bless the United States of America.”

Only the allegation that Hussein was seeking uranium in Africa seemed conspicuously new. The charge originated in a British report similar to the CIA’s public report\(^{122}\) and posted by Blair’s government on the Prime Minister’s website (Hoge) the last week of September 2002. The CIA’s public report made no mention of it.

A specific allegation approaching even the dramatic perhaps would obscure more nuanced contours of overall argument. The passage coming just before the allegation installed some new markers in the Bush rhetoric to point a war in Iraq towards a larger moral purpose. Figures expectedly helped. Making the move as the speech shifted from the plain to the intermediate style of greater use of figures fell no less expectedly within the parameters of classical rhetoric.

The move’s debut came in a triad of Hussein’s ideological forebears. The joint session speech’s similar triad for terrorists was “fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism.” Metaphor of Hussein’s Iraq as a historical outlaw regime gave him the historical root of “Hitlerism, militarism, and communism.” Personalizing Hussein as Hitler allowed his audience to make a direct association easily from years of Hussein-is-Hitler metaphor and World War II and World War II movies. Whether “militarism” applied to Imperial Japan or like regimes in general mattered less than its working to fuse Hitler militarism and World War II to communism. Bush was polishing the move he began in Cincinnati. Blurring had its test run in that earlier speech’s blurring of assertion and fact. Fusing

\(^{122}\) *Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Assessment of the British Government.* The uranium allegation was discussed on pages 6 and 17.
World War II into the Cold War and now pushing the fusion into 2003 continued the good war to mythically overwhelm any ambiguities to a war in Iraq. The audience was likely habituated to the move as artless. Its media had objectively shown them the 
Missouri in World War II mode shelling the Iraqi military in 1991. Its media had “objectively” scurried them from a Crawford movie set ranch to all things connotative in the sign “Texas.”

Asyndeton and climax taking the move into the sentence’s finish thus jointly reaffirmed figures as important and Quintilian’s point on figures’ effectiveness. The asyndeton of “by” held the will of free peoples, great alliances, and the might of the United States of America each necessary to winning the old wars. But a first among equals was suggested in placing “the might of the United States of America” climactically last. “Might” in itself climaxed “will” and “strength” through implicating will and strength as possibility deficient to an end unless in an exercise of power. Contextually here, power meant American military power, a power of the United States of America. The old wars’ revival in the new war would then make the use of the American military an inexorably historical inevitability.

Inevitability was then reinforced by the single word “all” repeated in the next sentence. The figure *ploce* repeats a word to imbue it a different inflection or meaning after the intervention of other words (Quintilian 9.3.40-42; Lanham 116).123 America and “all” its friends became “all” in the sense of “only” as the only check on outlaw regimes. The terrorists stand against us, because we stand in their way. Asyndeton, climax, and

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123 See page 65.
place blurred the rhetorical inevitability rooted eighteen months earlier into historical inevitability in a disjunctive world of binary good peace and evil chaos.

Binary construction expounded the good and evil theme with a shift to the joint session speech terms of fear and confidence. Hussein seeking uranium for a nuclear weapon situated fear. Asking the audience to imagine terrorists unleashing a virus in the homeland reprised Aristotle that fear involves imagining those able to inflict harm on those on whom harm can be inflicted. Bush drove the point home by asking the audience directly to supply Aristotle’s fear ingredient of imagination. The audience certainly had enough material to hand. Bush still took care, however, to guide imagination and pre-existing opinions to Hussein and Hussein’s Iraq and less on Iraq “itself.” Reminding his audience that the Iraqi people awaited liberation partly fulfilled that purpose.

The line’s other and interlocked purposes were to retrieve the opening for segue into a grand style conclusion. The rhetoric of liberation was not solely for the ostensible application to the Iraqi people. An American audience of 2003 would conjure the World War II association, and by extension, World War II myth. Bush and his audience would mimic Murphy’s Churchillian “one” in blurring the myth into the encore reality of an American-led coalition fighting an overseas war to save civilization. The extent to which the blurring was virtually invisible as a rhetorical construction added weight to Longinus’ observation on concealed construction. Using the conjunction “and” relinked the blurring’s headiness into the introduction’s positing America’s fate as one with the

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124 See pages 67 and 102.
125 See page 49.
126 See page 84.
world’s. “Once again, we are called to defend the safety of our people, and the hopes of all mankind.”

Bush went still further. “May God continue to bless the United States of America” was the same closing tag line from the October 7, 2001 speech announcing the inauguration of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Bruce Lincoln’s analysis of that speech included noting that the line said “the United States has enjoyed divine favor throughout its history” (30). God, as Bush said, was behind all history. The continuum of good and evil must therefore be part of the ways of Providence we could trust without knowing. Providence’s ways were still making America the co-pilot was fortuitous as Operation Iraqi Freedom loomed. Bush would soon return to the theme in yet another permutation. For the moment, World War II as mythicized metaphor had come quite far just since Pearl Harbor.

Some challenge to the metaphor had recently been heard. On the previous October 11 – the day after the war resolution cleared Congress – The New York Times reported that the administration’s model for postwar Iraq was postwar Japan. The top American commander on the ground would assume a MacArthur-like role as head of a provisional military government (Sanger and Schmitt). On October 27, the paper ran a sharp op-ed rebuke from John Dower, a leading scholar on Japan in the 1945-52 period. Dower’s piece listed several reasons why postwar Japan was an inappropriate metaphor. Japan differed from Iraq in being isolated as an island. Its few natural resources attracted little interest from outside investors. Japan’s surrender was unconditional. The American

127 See pages 37 and 38.
occupation enjoyed the investiture of global legitimacy. Emperor Hirohito had also endorsed the American occupation; the Japanese committed no acts of terrorism against the Americans. MacArthur subsequently had an effective fiat to implement plans his staff spent the entire span of the war years developing. Many of those plans “that continue to define Japanese democracy today reflected liberal New Deal policies that now seem testimony to a bygone age.” Few, if any, of the same conditions would likely prevail in postwar Iraq. Taking postwar Japan as model and metaphor was, therefore, more “hubris” than realism.

Author James Fallows was more sweeping in the November *Atlantic Monthly* appearing around the time as Dower’s op-ed. Fallows discussed the Nazi Germany metaphor in senses overlapping Dower on postwar Japan and anticipating Ricks later. The metaphor had a “trumping effect … making doubters [of invading Iraq] seem weak … Neville Chamberlains.” He went on to make exactly the point Quintilian made nearly two millennia earlier on the possibilities of historical metaphor in narrative clouding debate on a question of the present.128 “I [have] ended up thinking that the Nazi analogy paralyzes debate about Iraq rather than clarifying it.”129 Iraq was unlike Nazi Germany in lacking an industrial base and nearby military allies. Regional, religious and ethnic differences within Iraq paled “Nazi Germany’s simple mobilization of ‘Ayrans’ against Jews.” Decade-old international sanctions had precluded Iraq from Nazi Germany’s expansion. A “huge imbalance” prevailed between the United States and Iraq in scale and power. Not since the Spanish-American War had the United States undertaken a “large

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128 See page 55.

129 One of the questions raised later by Cole, page 26; and Mooney, page 32.
war” of “few or no allies.” The possible immensity of unforeseen consequences made World War One the more proper historical metaphor (53-54).

Only one institution seemed to share Fallows’ concerns. The institution was not the news media either repeating Bush’s metaphors as part of news coverage or accepting the metaphors by the silence of not probing them. In early February, the U.S. Army War College released a study suggesting that World War II was at best minimally useful for Iraq, at least in terms of an occupation. Postwar occupations of Germany and Japan benefitted from years of interagency planning and enjoyed virtually unlimited authority in both instances. In Iraq, by contrast, American forces would be forced into adjudicating barely comprehensible conflicts among a “fragmented population [and] weak political institutions.” Americans would also face deep-seated hostility from suspicion of American ties to Israel and a perceived hidden agenda for invading. The best historical source for planning an occupied postwar Iraq was what “went wrong” with 1990s American occupations in Haiti and Kosovo. America should be prepared for a “multi-year military commitment and a national commitment to nation-building” (Crane and Terrill 1-18).

The obvious problem with the few questions of the metaphorical frame was that they all appeared when the possibility to expand the debate was long receded in debate’s end. For example, each provided factual detail to the points Levin and Hagel made in early August, but left at generalities. Events now moved ahead without even August and September’s mild swirls of mild demureness.

\[130\] See page 76.
On February 5, Powell made his speech to the United Nations. On February 13, erstwhile Rumsfeld aide Ken Adelman, a “neoconservative defense intellectual,” (Woodard 164-5; Isikoff and Corn 212) argued in The Washington Post that Hussein’s forces were far weaker than in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Liberating Iraq “would be a cakewalk.” On February 24, the United States, Britain, and Spain presented a war resolution to the United Nations Security Council (Barringer). On February 26, “White House officials” said the administration would not make a prewar estimate of the war’s budget cost (Allen and Weisman). That same evening, at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Bush made his last major prewar address.

Bush opened his speech with conventional preliminaries. He then directly moved to the war on terror. The greatest danger in the war, Bush said, was “outlaw regimes arming with weapons of mass destruction.” America would not permit the dictator in Iraq to amass weapons of mass destruction to dominate the Middle East and “intimidate the civilized world.” The danger must be confronted. Whether Saddam Hussein disarms peacefully under United Nations resolutions, or whether force would be necessary, “this danger will be removed.” America’s safety depends upon it. Action would also contribute greatly to the stability of “our world.” The United States and coalition forces were ready to liberate Iraq, and the United States would remain Iraq “as long as necessary” to rebuild Iraq and help Iraqis institute a post-Hussein government. The precise form of a new government was not an American decision. “Yet, we will insure that one brutal dictator is not replaced by another. All Iraqis must have a voice in the new government.” All Iraqis were entitled to the protection of their rights to live free of oppression. History has shown the appeal of liberty and democracy. America’s “interests in security, and our belief in
liberty,” both lead to a free and liberated Iraq. A liberated Iraq could transform Middle East discord. The commitment America would make had been made in the aftermath of a world war.

There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. They are mistaken. The nation of Iraq is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom …. A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example for other nations in the region …. Success in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace, and set in motion progress towards a truly democratic Palestinian state.

Acting in Iraq would be demanding. The enemy has terrible weapons and is capable of any crime. “Yet, the security of our nation and the hope of millions depend on us, and Americans do not turn away from duties because they are hard.” We had met great tests in other times. We would meet the test of our time.

Bush spoke almost entirely in the plain style. Hardly anyone could miss the main point. Few would likely disagree with Isikoff and Corn’s interpretation (191) that the speech tacked to Wilsonianism. The Bush rhetoric over time might cast the speech as not quite the sudden revelation of a “real reason” for a war in Iraq that McClellan (131) held it.

Henry Kissinger argued in his *Diplomacy* that America has always invested foreign policy interest with high moral purpose. Kissinger traced it to what he interpreted
as a Founders’ belief that the United States was the world’s exemplar of democracy.¹³¹

Thus, the United States had a “special duty” to export democratic values in the interest of its safety as a nascent republic, as its contribution to world peace, and to “act in behalf of all mankind.” The result was a unique “and very American type of anguish” when the “necessities of survival” conflicted with high-minded principle. The historical solution was to rhetorically project American democratic values as universal. Monroe first expressed it in declaring the entire Western Hemisphere a sphere of influence for the United States. America had found the “power to prevail – over the Indians, over Mexico, in Texas – in good conscience” (30-36).

The rhetoric of Woodrow Wilson domestically appealed “to the exceptional nature of American ideals” (44-45) to take the projection of American democratic universality as justification to act in World War One (44-45). An address Wilson made to West Point’s 1916 graduating class submitted the warrant.

…. America came into existence for a particular reason. When you look upon [the countryside] you remember that, while it had aboriginal inhabitants, while there were people living here, there was no civilization which we displaced. It was as if, in the Providence of God, a continent had been kept unused and waiting for a peaceful people who loved liberty and the rights of men [sic] more than they loved anything else, to come and set up an unselfish commonwealth. It is a very extraordinary thing … now,

¹³¹ One might trace it back earlier. John Winthrop’s famous 1630 sermon declared that the eyes of the world were upon New England “as a city upon a hill” in a covenant with God (n. pag.). See also Matt. 5.14: “Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill cannot be hid.”
what we are preparing to do is to see that all of [America’s] force is behind its moral ideas, and mankind is going to know that … America means what she says (Link 213-14).

Wilson’s war address of April 1917 sounded the clarion of altruism. The pragmatic exercise of hard national interests in a balance of power with others was to be shunned as guiding principle (Kissinger 46-50). America had to enter the war on behalf of humanity oppressed by a ruling elite.

We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and responsibility … shall be observed among nations … that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states. We have no quarrel with the German people. The war … was determined upon … by their rulers in the interest of dynasties. We are glad … to fight … for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included; for the privileges of men [sic] everywhere to choose their way of life … the world must be safe for democracy (n. pag.).

In the case of Germany, in other words, Wilson proposed regime change. In the sweep of American history, Kissinger argued, all American presidents after Wilson have invoked “unselfishness” as the standard for foreign policy. All presidents since have also inherited the same set of inherent questions (44-50). Unselfishness and rectitude as standards asked whether survival was subordinate to morality. Embracing democracy as a universal begged whether all acts committed in the name of democracy were moral.
Whether process or result was to be the subject of judgment also arose (14).

Identifying the elements within the speech that are “Wilsonian” still stops short of engaging McClellan’s reading the speech as an agenda Bush had not previously revealed. The speech in fact held to what was an almost remarkable degree of Bush consistency virtually from his joint session speech. The Manichaeism Bush had declared in his joint session speech moved easily to the Wilsonian “messianic” (D. Kennedy 388) transcendent mission of his first address to the United Nations. Returning to that frame maximized a war in Iraq as more inevitable than optional by regressing it to an item within the larger – and open – Bush sharing of the Wilsonian schema. The fall rhetoric of a first strike was now being regressed to a Wilsonian liberation of Iraqis as a mandatory American duty.

Bush was able to press Wilsonianism into service because of familiarity. Wilsonian ideas have continuously informed American foreign policy (Kissinger 46-50; D. Kennedy 387-89). In Vietnam, of course, Wilsonianism led to the “ideological stake” that a communist victory compromised “the exemplary nature of American democracy” (D. Kennedy 389). Domino metaphor was central to that war’s rhetoric. President Dwight Eisenhower outlined the metaphor in 1954 remarks on America’s possibly losing access to Indochinese economic resources under unfriendly governments.

.... you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the ‘falling domino’ principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have the
beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound 
influences …. it turns Japan, Formosa, the Philippines … it moves in to 
threaten Australia …. (383).

The Bush speech proposed something like reverse domino metaphor theory. 
Hussein’s fall would be the first domino to fall to the rise of democratic governments 
throughout the region. The popular culture’s obliteration of Vietnam now proved an 
eextratextual asset available for reviving domino theory. Bush could move American 
history from 1945 to 2003 with the same image seamlessness as the Missouri steamed 
across nearly five decades. The move was quite the grand finesse.

Casting the entire Middle East in the mold of the irrefutable history of postwar 
Germany and Japan was purely asserted metaphorical tissue over such differences as 
Fallows and the U.S. Army War College raised. Quintilian’s point on the obscuring effect 
of misuse of history would point here to raising the question of \( a \) as \( b \) that Russert should 
have raised shortly with Cheney. Russert would not challenge Cheney’s minimizing 
American casualties under a “liberation” analogy posing 2003 Baghdad as 1944 Paris.\(^\text{132}\) 
The scrutiny of watchdog journalism might here probe how the \( a \) of postwar Iraq was the 
\( b \) of postwar Germany and Japan. A good rhetoric reporter would catch Bush’s now 
sliding that \( a \) as \( b \) metaphor into the \( c \) of a postwar democratic Iraq being the first domino 
wreaking the \( d \) of a Middle East self-determining for democracy like so many dominos 
moved by the first. A war initially posed as a war necessary to American security was

\(^\text{132}\) See pages 33-34.
now a war of altruistic Wilsonianism going right this time.133

On February 26, 2003 the improbability of a United Nations war resolution freed a president with congressional war authorization to make a more American speech than might have been possible if tied to Security Council politics. Bush could further bedeck the Wilson shadow lurking about the AEI podium with an advantage Wilson never had.

Murphy’s consideration of the joint session speech partly argued that epideictic’s definitional functions appeal to presidents for reasons of television. Amplification of a defined world “mesh[es] nicely with the display and entertainment functions of a televisiual culture” (610). Deliberative also has an advantage for television.

The future orientation of deliberative rhetoric fits Marshall McLuhan’s explanation that television emphasizes a process of something “about to happen.” The impact of a medium is the “change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces in human affairs” (20). Television demands involvement because the screen’s low definition compels viewer attention towards completing the television image. The physiology of sensate involvement with the image merges with finding a sociocultural meaning. Good television allows scope for the viewer’s involvement in “depth interplay” by complementarily presenting “some process to be completed.” Bad television contrastingly defines the subject with socioculturally density that denies viewer participation. Television thusly disdains a “type” to favor an “everyman.” For example, in the 1960 campaign, Nixon on television looked “slick, glib, legal,” while Kennedy

133 See page 27 for Niebuhr on altruism as the foundation to catalyze a “patriotism” clouding the audience’s critical judgment. A good rhetoric reporter would know Quintilian’s admonition on the salutary method for restoring critical judgment of text. See page 64.
seemed a “pleasantly tweedy blur.” Kennedy’s presidency understood involving the nation in the office “as an operation and as an image via television” (413-45).

McLuhan allowed, without elaboration, that television’s changing to high definition would not be the medium of television he was describing. Television would more resemble film (418). The image packs so much information that the viewer follows a sequence rather than participating in meaning completion (383-84). Either way, the audience follows something about-to-happen, and the good speaker fosters audience involvement in narrative. The speaker allows the audience to complete an unstated obvious (Aristotle 1357a) or, to return to Demetrius, to make an inference and thereby become the speaker’s favorable witness. The audience is “made aware of [its] own intelligence” by the speaker providing “the opportunity to be intelligent” (222).

Bush’s Cincinnati speech may have been his complete case to undertake a war in Iraq. The AEI speech ended the particulars of details in Wilsonianism for action at hand. The something-about-to-happen was in Bush’s own statement that either the United Nations or the United States would disarm Hussein. The United States would fight a war or would not fight a war. An American-led war had American safety and the hopes of the world rode on “our” not turning away from duty. “We” would not tolerate a successive dictatorship. The freedom that was God’s gift to humanity would be delivered by the instrument of America using its power.

Dispute was virtually impossible under these terms. Critics could no longer cite any one reason for the war as the reason for the war. To single one out was to question America’s purpose, the special status with God, justice for Lisa Beamer, Hussein’s
arsenal, or war myth. A policymaker posing any such question might even be worse than a Neville Chamberlain knave. Secular reasoning could only be futile, given the looming adventure of a messianic mission, and God’s presence.

Thus the actual war itself need not much concern the audience. A logic moving history from 1945 to 2003 moved the about-to-happen war to an Iraq in the image of something-we-knew. Deliberative rhetoric in McLuhan’s logic of television could move from first act to finale. F. Scott Fitzgerald was more right than he could have anticipated that Americans do not “do” second acts anyway (Brucoli 58).

On March 5, United Nations Security Council members France and Russia, joined by Germany, announced they would block a war resolution. The grounds were that the weapons inspection program under Resolution 1441 was making progress (Richburg and LaFraniere). On March 6, Bush held his last prewar press conference. Bush said the American people understood that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and that “we really don’t need anybody’s permission” to effect American security. On March 7, the United States presented the Security Council an amended war resolution, asking that Iraqi be declared out of compliance with Resolution 1441 by March 17, absent full cooperation. On March 8, Blix told the United Nations that Iraqi cooperation had recently “accelerated.” A “substantial measure of disarmament” had occurred in the past few weeks (Barringer). But the overall quality and quantity of biological and chemical

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134 See page 102.

135 I am expounding upon a point by Wander. I should also probably note that Ricks used the word “adventure” to describe Operation Iraqi Freedom.
weapons remained an open question. No timetable could be set on completing the inspection program. IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei co-reported “no indication of resumed [Iraqi] nuclear activities.” IAEA tests on the type of aluminum tubes Iraq sought showed “that it was highly unlikely” the tubes could be adapted to centrifuge uranium enrichment. No evidence existed that Iraq intended the tubes for that purpose. The agency’s inspection found the documents used in the charge that Iraq was trying to buy uranium were bogus. Iraq had not “attempted to import uranium” since 1990 (“In a Chief Inspector’s Words”).

On March 14, the Los Angeles Times reported that a classified U.S. State Department study concluded that a domino theory of Mideast democracy was not credible. Regional and ethnic rivalries, and cultures valuing community and conformity over individual rights, would “undermine” the necessary stability. Electoral democracy in any event would be “‘subject to exploitation by anti-American elements.’”136 Greg Miler’s story noted that “it was unclear” whether the president had seen the study.

On March 16, Bush was in the Azores, and there held a press conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Spanish President Jose Anzar. Bush said “we’ll be working the phones” on behalf of the amended war resolution (“Monday” n. pag.). On March 16, Cheney appeared on Meet the Press, saying everything had been done to “organize” a United Nations war resolution. A Hussein left in power would be about trying to reconstitute his nuclear program. ElBaradei was wrong. Hussein “has, in fact,

136 Kissinger’s third question, discussed on page 131.
reconstituted nuclear weapons.” Russert did not ask the vice president to clarify whether Hussein was trying to develop nuclear weapons or already had nuclear weapons.137

On March 17, Bush addressed the nation, saying that Hussein and his sons had to leave Iraq within forty-eight hours or face military conflict. Iraq would not disarm with Hussein in power. No other claim was possible. The day of Iraqi liberation was near. The United States accepts its duty to advance liberty and peace. “May God continue to bless the United States of America.”138 On March 18, The Washington Post reported that “diplomatic sources” claimed a telephone survey of United Nations Security Council members “within hours” of Bush’s March 16 statement showed virtually no support for a war resolution (DeYoung and Lynch). The Bush administration that evening advised UNMOVIC inspectors to leave Iraq. On March 19, in the evening, Bush announced that Operation Iraqi Freedom had commenced.139

On April 25, NBC ran news anchor Tom Brokaw’s exclusive hour-long interview with Bush. Almost the entire hour was given to the war in Iraq. Brokaw commented that the April 1 rescue of Jessica Lynch “seemed to accelerate the momentum of coalition troops … and lift the president’s spirit.” Bush agreed it “was a joyous moment.” The conversation then turned to whether the threat was overstated.

137 Pincus and Milbank noted the apparent contradiction in a March 18 Washington Post piece.
138 “President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq within Forty-Eight Hours.”
139 “President Bush Addresses the Nation.”
Bush: …. I think time will prove … [Hussein] had terrorist connections. And secondly that he had a weapons of mass destruction program. We know he had a weapons of mass destruction program.…

Brokaw: But it is important to find the weapons of mass destruction, or evidence that he had a massive program, isn’t it?

Bush: Yes. I think we will. I’m pretty confident we will.

Brokaw said that the war’s “iconic moment” came April 7 [sic] when American troops entered Baghdad. The war was successful and “effectively over.” Had the president thought about a Bush doctrine to deal with weapons of mass destruction and preemptive strikes on rogue nations? Bush said that his previous speeches comprised a Bush doctrine “that people who harbor weapons of mass destruction will be dealt with.” Diplomacy, Bush added, was the preferred method (“Inside the White House” n. pag.)

On May 1, Bush addressed the nation from the flight deck of the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, anchored just off San Diego. A banner behind him unfurled the message “Mission Accomplished.” The president said that “in the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.” The enemy did not expect, and the world had not seen, an operation carried out with such precision, speed, and boldness. “The daring of Normandy … the fierce courage of Iwo Jima … is fully present in this generation.” America’s commitment to liberty was declared at our founding. That mission continues. The terrorist cause is lost. “This generation of our military” has accepted the high calling of history to defend America “and protect the innocent from
harm ... may God bless you all, and may God continue to bless America” (“President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations Have Ended”).
Chapter Four

Convention!

*Newsweek* and *Time* apparently could not resist one more stroll through World War II nostalgia by way of anniversaries. Both magazines’ editions for Memorial Day, 2004, featured accounts and reminiscences of the Allied landings at Normandy in the June of sixty years earlier. Sidebars inevitably commented upon the good war’s use in the discussion of the Operation Iraqi Freedom now in its fourteenth month. *Time*, on the eve of the war, had quoted Douglas Feith, undersecretary of defense for policy, saying outright that the president’s metaphor of postwar Germany and Japan was “not the model” for postwar Iraq. “Pentagon bosses … likely cringed” at the metaphor inasmuch as undertaking a like occupation of years non-enthused the military (McGeary et al).

Sidebar focus in the magazines for the week of May 31 now centered upon the American-British alliance. In *Time*, the alliance’s current reality shared more the often overlooked fractiousness in the relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill than unity (McAllister et al.). In *Newsweek*, Bush’s “incurious[ity] about the world” and disdain for “complexity” shared nothing with either of the earlier leaders. But the scope and scale of World War II mitigated its metaphorical applicability to the war in Iraq in the first place. Vietnam, the French experience in Algeria, and the aftermath of World War One might be closer. Operation Iraqi Freedom’s “early returns” were at least troubling. “There is still no convincing evidence of Iraqi ties to terrorism, no weapons of mass destruction have been found, we have not been greeted as liberators, and more Americans have died” since the “Mission Accomplished” speech than before (Meacham, Lipper, and Wolfe).
The experience in Iraq, in other words, was proving to be an unpleasantly prosaic unraveling of much of the president’s rhetoric. At least three polls showed public approval of Bush’s handling of his signature issue had fallen below fifty percent in the weeks before the holiday weekend. At-best minority approval settled over the summer as the conventions approached for the year’s presidential election.

Nicks in the president’s and his administration’s rhetorical credibility were incrementally accruing for some time. On October 21, 2002 *The New York Times* reported that the Cezch government had advised the White House that no Prague meeting between Mohammed Atta and Iraqi intelligence ever occurred (Risen). On February 8, 2003 the paper reported that the British government admitted its September public report on Iraq was largely plagiarized from old public material. The report’s two main sources were *Jane’s Intelligence Review* and a 2002 al-Marashi graduate paper describing Iraqi intelligence operations in 1991 (Lyall).¹⁴⁰ In March came the challenges of the Blix and ElBaradei reports. On July 6, in a *New York Times* op-ed, former ambassador Joseph Wilson wrote that he had travelled to Niger more than a year before on the CIA’s behalf to investigate the uranium charge. Wilson said he had reported to the American Embassy there, and to the CIA, that no selling of uranium to Iraq had occurred or was occurring. On July 11, Rice said that the NIE was the basis for the charge, and that the CIA had cleared the speech (“Press Gaggle” n. pag.). On July 12, CIA Director George Tenet said he was responsible for any CIA clearance of presidential speeches, and that the allegation should not have been in the 2003 State of the Union address (Sanger and Risen).

¹⁴⁰ See page 290 for Al-Marashi’s view of the mediathon.
That same month, a *Vanity Fair* profile on Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz quoted him as saying that the Bush case for a war in Iraq centered on weapons of mass destruction “because it was the one reason everyone could agree on” (Tanenhaus n. pag). On August 10, *The Washington Post* reported that the allegation linking Iraq’s sought-after aluminum tubes to a revived nuclear weapons program was arrived at similarly. Experts at the Departments of Energy (DOE) and State never agreed that Iraqi-sought aluminum tubes were for centrifuges for uranium enrichment. The allegation in the NIE and the CIA’s public report that “most analysts” believed so resulted from a majority vote among the agencies responsible for the report (Gellman and Pincus). That same news cycle carried an Associated Press report debunking other administration prewar claims. No anthrax or VX stockpiles, no weaponized weapons, and no UAVs were being found (Hanley).

On September 3, the *Washington Times* reported that a leaked secret report for the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that war planning had been rushed and gave no attention to postwar Iraq (R. Scarborough). On September 14, Cheney said on *Meet the Press* that the United States could neither confirm nor deny a Czech allegation that Atta had met in Prague with Iraqi intelligence – applying an even lower standard than “credibility” to an apparent non-denial denial of the October report. On September 17, Bush said that “we’ve had no evidence” that Hussein was involved with 9/11, only that Hussein “had al-Qaeda ties” (“Remarks by the President” n. pag.). On December 16, Bush argued that America was a safer country because Hussein was gone (“*Primetime Live*” n. pag.). On January 20, 2004, Bush’s State of the Union address argued that the world was a safer
place in Hussein’s absence. The war in Iraq ended Hussein’s weapons of mass
destruction programs (n. pag.).

On January 28, David Kay, the former U.S. weapons inspections chief, told the
Senate Armed Services Committee that “we were all wrong” about Iraq having weapons
of mass destruction (“Transcript: David Kay” n. pag.). On March 2, UNMOVIC’s new
chair, Demetrius Perricos, said that Iraq had no significant weapons of mass destruction
after 1994. The American inability to find any weapons simply mirrored the United
Nations experience (Nichols). Two days later, on March 4, U.S. Sen. John Kerry won
nine of ten primaries in an accelerated Democratic process for nominating a presidential
candidate. Kerry now had enough delegates to be Bush’s presumed opponent in
November.

Then, the rhetorical war and the war on the ground in Iraq escalated virtually in
tandem. On March 4, at a Bush-Cheney fundraiser, Bush made no direct mention of the
war in Iraq. What he offered was an electoral link between the war on terror and the
domestic economy. “The man who sits in the Oval Office will set the course of the war
on terror and the direction of our economy … my opponent has not offered … strategies
to win the war, or policies to expand our economy.” Only “old bitterness and partisan
anger” came “from that side” (“Remarks by the President” n. pag.). On March 5, the
Bush campaign opened a $5 million ad buy in seventeen states. The theme was Bush’s
leadership on allegedly inherited problems. Three of the four advertisements included
footage of the smoldering World Trade Center towers on 9/11 just before their collapse.
Bush political strategist Matthew Dowd said the campaign would later “move to a more
confrontational phase” (Rutenberg, “Bush Ad”).
On March 16, Kerry began a campaign swing in West Virginia. That same day, the Bush campaign ran an ad in West Virginia accusing Kerry of being “wrong on defense,” citing a Kerry vote on October 17, 2003, against an $87 billion emergency appropriation for reconstruction in Iraq (Rutenberg, “Jab”; Alberts). The bill also contained specifications for new body armor for troops and pay increases for National Guard personnel mobilized into Iraq. Kerry had earlier voted for a failed amendment covering the appropriation by repealing Bush tax cuts (Rutenberg, “Jab”). Kerry commented that he had “‘actually voted for the $87 billion before I voted against it’” (G. Johnson, “Kerry”). On March 18, the Bush campaign had added video of Kerry’s statement to the ad. The campaign also expanded the ad buy to national cable networks (Kurtz, “For Both Sides”).

On March 21, the since-resigned White House counterterrorism chief, Richard Clarke, appeared on 60 Minutes to promote a book. Clarke said he had told Bush, apparently in April of 2001, that no connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda existed. Rice deputy Stephen Hadley said, “[W]e cannot find any evidence” documenting such a conversation (Stahl n. pag.).

On March 25, major fighting between American troops and Iraqi insurgents erupted in Fallujah (Vick and Nourri). On April 1, The Washington Post reported that four American civilian contractors had been ambushed and killed in the town (Chan). On April 13, Bush held a press conference. The president said in an opening statement that “we will finish the work of the fallen” in Iraq. “I want to know why we haven’t found a weapon yet,” Bush said in response to questions. “But I still know that Saddam was a threat, and the world is better off without Saddam Hussein.” Bush also said he could not
spontaneously name his “biggest mistake since 9/11.” He did know he would still “have called upon the world to deal with Saddam Hussein.” Weapons might still be there. “We’ll find out the truth” (“President Addresses the Nation” n. pag.).

On April 18 – the day the Seattle Times ran Silicio’s photo – The Washington Post’s Bob Woodward appeared on 60 Minutes to promote his book Plan of Attack. Woodward claimed Bush told Rice on September 16, 2001 that he was “determined to attack Iraq.” Woodward said he had twice interviewed Bush for the book and that the president was “frustrated” with the United Nations report of January 2003. The president’s team did not foresee the problems of postwar Iraq (Wallace). CNN reported that Woodward’s book also said that Tenet told Bush on December 21, 2002, that the weapons of mass destruction case was a “ ‘slam dunk’ ” (“Woodward” n. pag.).141 Tenet, according to Woodward’s book, had told the British earlier not to claim that Hussein could launch a biological or weapons attack within forty-five minutes of an order (190).

On April 28, 60 Minutes II broke the story of abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghriab (“Abuse”). On April 30, on ABC’s Nightline, anchor Ted Koppel read the names, to their photographs, of every American killed to date in Iraq (n. pag.). On May 12, The New York Times reported that video was streaming on the Web of “five masked men” decapitating Nicholas Berg, one of the contractors captured in March in Fallujah (Filkins et al.). On June 17, the staff of the commission appointed by Bush to investigate 9/11 reported that “no collaborative relationship” existed between Iraq and al-Qaeda. CNBC reported that the commission determined that no meeting between Iraq intelligence and

141 The quote appears on page 249 of Woodward’s book.
Atta took place in Prague (Murray n. pag.). On June 17, Cheney appeared on CNBC’s Capital Report, and was asked about the finding by co-host Gloria Borger.

Borger: Well, let’s go to Mohammad Atta for a minute, because … you have said in the past that [a meeting in Prague with Iraqi intelligence] was, quote, pretty well confirmed.

Cheney: No, I never said that.

Borger: OK.

Cheney: I never said that.

Borger: I think that is –

Cheney: Absolutely not. What I said was the Czech intelligence service reported after 9/11 that Atta had been in Prague on April 9 of 2001, where he allegedly met with an Iraqi intelligence official. We have never been able to confirm that nor have we been able to knock it down (Murray n. pag.).

Borger: Well, this report says it didn’t happen.

Cheney: No, this report says they haven’t found any evidence.\(^{142}\)

\(^{142}\) The 9/11 Commission report said the Czech source [Cheney cited] was “a single source of the Czech intelligence service.” The Commission concluded “no evidence support[ed]” Atta’s presence in Prague in April of 2001 (228-29). The CNBC introduction to Borger’s Cheney interview did simplify somewhat.
Five weeks later, the Democratic National Convention opened in Boston. The convention plans of both parties notched some history. Boston never before hosted a national political convention (“It’s Official”). The Republicans chose New York City for the first time in the party’s history (Archibold). Their scheduled September 2 opening was also the latest-ever for a Republican convention (Nagourney and Stevenson). In the context of the 2004 campaign, Kerry entered the convention under Democratic decisions of 2002 that slid into classic instances of unintended consequences, peculiar to the 2004 nominee.

The first unintended consequence dogging Kerry was that the convention site’s local culture combined with events beyond his control to drive the convention’s timing. Boston had submitted its convention host bid in early 2002 based on a mid-July convention date to preserve late summer hotel room availability for vacationers and returning college students (G. Johnson, “DNC”). The campaign also had to consider television media slating attention to the Olympics for the two weeks beginning August 13 (“Conventions” n. pag.). Convening after the Olympics would push the convention into the national Labor Day weekend holiday (G. Johnson). The eventual July 26 start date thusly opened a month-long gap between the two conventions.

The second unintended consequence involved the Democratic 2002 selection of a site that by happenstance was their 2004 presidential nominee’s hometown. “Massachusetts” connotatively meant “left-of-center” in the media. Additionally, any image of Kerry’s Beacon Hill home seriously undercut his “populist campaign rhetoric” designed for swing states where unemployment was an issue (Holloway 32). The sign
“liberal” was palpable.143

A third unintended consequence unveiled that a media campaign launched by one side’s funding advantage could swamp what seemed a traditionally sound tactical political decision. Democrats decided in January 2002, to compress their primary schedule to decide the nomination contest by early March. The goal was avoiding 2000’s month-long gap between primaries that put the Democrats in media limbo while the Republicans reaped free media in holding competitive successive primaries. The nominee would also have more time to concentrate solely on the Republican opponent (Shephard, “Democrats”). Competing against multiple candidates in twenty-nine primaries before March 4 (“America Votes” n. pag.) left the Kerry campaign negative legacies of depleted resources and a candidate untested in response as the object of a substantive attack.

By early March, the campaign was, quite simply, broke (Mellman, Institute 82) – unable to buy media time at the exact moment Bush’s campaign team opened their March ad blitz. “We knew the financial situation they were in,” Dowd later recalled. “That’s why we did what we did” (Institute 83). The Bush ads were timed to nullify Kerry’s credibility at the moment when the de facto Democratic presidential nominee was still hazy to many (Thomas et al. 60) and before he could begin self-definition for the general election (Institute 83). “It [was] just sort of Campaigning 101,” said Bush ad strategist Mark McKinnon (Thomas et al. 58).

Another situational factor helped the practice of Campaigning 101 in the spring of 2004. Kerry’s “rapid emergence” in a front-loaded primary schedule largely spared him,

143 See pages 16 through 18.
and his Senate record, from critical scrutiny. He “might have been helped” had he been so tested before facing Bush (Ceasar and Busch 80). His explanation of his appropriation vote, for example, lapsed into “senatorial procedural shorthand” (Thomas et al. 62) doubly subject to ridicule as arcane and as abstruse when detached and decontextualized.

Essentially, then, the unfunded Kerry presented a ripe target for an opposition ad blitz. The relatively unknown Kerry was ripe for definition by those opposition ads. The nationally untested Kerry dropped a line for an opposition team adept enough with the new technology of TiVo and Blackberry and uplink to premiere a second ad in a West Virginia market 1,000 miles away within twenty-four hours (Thomas et al 62-3). “Rapid response” was dwindling to minutes in 2004. Kerry’s eventual May ad flight seemed ineffectual because Bush had already “introduced” him (Shepherd, “Kerry Launches”). The acceptance speech Kerry delivered July 29 to the Democrats assembled can thus be seen as a transparent attempt to reclaim definition. He had to simultaneously answer the Bush campaign’s core positive argument that Bush was a wartime president (Edwards 88).

Before the speech came the obligatory biography film. The film’s structure was strictly chronological. Morgan Freeman’s narrating a photographic montage was intercut with testimonials. Included was Kerry’s own home movie footage of his 1969 tour of duty in Vietnam captaining a Naval Swift boat. Footage of his 1971 anti-Vietnam War testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee followed. The film’s balance covered his family and his Senate service.
Proceedings then underwent a lull of five minutes or so. Finally came an introduction by former U.S. Sen. Max Cleland of Georgia, a Vietnam veteran, and triple amputee from wounds suffered there. Kerry appeared afterward, walking through the delegates, and on to a stage podium surrounded by his Swift boat comrades (Holloway 46).

The candidate saluted as he began: “I’m John Kerry and I’m reporting for duty.” He linked being home again to “home where our nation’s history was written in blood, idealism, and hope.” His World War II veteran father, and his mother, “were greatest generation parents” who inspired him to service. The actual call to service was issued by President Kennedy. But the promise of those years remained unperfected. “We have it in our power to change the world, but only if we’re true to our ideals, and that starts by telling the truth to the American people.”

A telling of truth served as Kerry’s platform for subsequent narrative. He would not “mislead” the country into war. “Saying there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq doesn’t make it so.” The truth was that we needed to “restore America’s respect and leadership” to summon allies to get the terrorists. A smarter and more effective war on terror was possible. “We need to make America once again a beacon in the world.” The future belonged to freedom.

And tonight we have an important message for those who question the patriotism of Americans who offer a better direction for our country. Before wrapping themselves up in the flag and shutting their eyes to the truth and their ears … they should remember what America is all about …
the great idea of freedom for which so many have given their lives. Our purpose now is to reclaim democracy itself … we are here to affirm that when Americans say America can do better … it is the heart and soul of patriotism.

An America doing better was an America shifting in the speech to a more or less standard Democratic agenda. Incentives to revitalize manufacturing, and insuring a level playing field in trade, would bring better wages. The country needed middle class tax cuts and tax credits for attending college. Health care was an American right. It was time to ask “what if” – America could cure the worst diseases, had a president who believed in science, insured that children were safe after school. That was the “kind of America I will lead … an America where we are all in the same boat.” The next horizon beckoned. The country’s best days were ahead.

The speech’s staging was standard and the speech itself on the whole unremarkable. Like many acceptance speeches, details were absent, keeping vision pristine for the like-minded. “We have it in our power to change the world” modulated “we have it in our power to begin the world over again” from Thomas Paine’s addendum to his 1776 Common Sense (n. pag.). Making America a beacon to the world nodded to John Winthrop’s New England Puritan sermon.144 Advancing that American democracy to the world is as democracy does at home was virtually Jeffersonian. The problem was that modulating and coding the originals fell short of connecting them as American bedrock to a grand and bold reclaiming of democracy.

144 See note 128 on page 130.
Probably no other presidential nominee still contemporaneous to 2004 made the connection rhetorically clearer than Ronald Reagan. His acceptance address at the 1980 Republican National Convention used the Paine and Winthrop lines unadulterated, and with attribution. Paine’s remaking the world connected to remaking the American world by the Reagan agenda requisite to redeeming the organic hill city depicted as gone morally adrift in Democratic stewardship. Moral drift caused pragmatic international weakness. Redemption was thus doubly necessary as the only option. America’s endemic rescue narratives were presumptively now political salvation. Kerry’s imagery of an egalitarian boat was, of course, as legitimate a worldview as Reagan’s “revolution,” or Wilson’s altruism, or Bush’s Manichaeism. It simply did not connect well in the speech to any transcendent sense of America. That left it incapable of rising to a real alternative amid the 2004 scene of ongoing casualties as God’s war instrument smiting evil with democracy.

One result was that an equally legitimate smarter, more efficient war on terror, with allies, had nowhere in the speech to go. Kerry could not return to it. A similar fate befell his service motif. The “greatest generation” was never rhetorically capitalized. “Telling the truth” thus never blossomed as an epideictic value. Epideictic was one of the two ways, according to Kenneth Burke, by which a speaker might reach “identification” with a hearer who begins listening as a non-partisan of the speaker’s cause. Burke held that the other way was pointed by Demetrius’ observation of the speaker incorporating the audience as one’s witness. Kerry’s excursion into jobs, the economy, and education was too redolent with a familiar Democratic litany to offer anything fresh there for real attention. His plain style thus fell flat because it was bereft of new information and the
rebuttal to Bush of “telling the truth” remained back on the wayside. If Mohrmann and Leff were right that Burkean identification defined the American campaign speech, the Kerry speech, bluntly, failed.

Where the speech did not fail for Kerry non-partisans was the introduction. Kerry’s emphasis on his Vietnam service compensated too much for what followed by over-definition in McLuhan’s terms. The invitation to scrutiny he virtually asked was accepted. Kerry was about to experience a vicarious return to a war perhaps not quite obliterated from American memory after all.

On August 5, a group calling itself “Swift Boat Veterans for the Truth” (SBVT) opened an attack on Kerrey’s accounts of his Vietnam service. Their attack was in the form of a sixty-second television spot that began running on that date in smaller markets in two of the ten states targeted by both the Kerry and Bush campaigns (Balz VandenHei). Over the next week, the ad would run on twenty-seven states across Green Bay and La Crosse/Eau Claire in targeted Wisconsin; in Toledo, Dayton, and Youngstown in targeted Ohio; and in West Virginia’s Charleston/Wheeling market. The five markets collectively shared about two percent of the nation’s population. The ad’s 739 airings cost about $500,000 and represented a little more than one-tenth of one percent of all ads aired to date by the two campaigns and supporting independent

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145 See page 14 for Mohrmann and Leff’s on Kenneth Burke’s “identification” as central to the American campaign speech.

146 See pages 134 and 135 for McLuhan’s discussion of television and definition. May concluded (83) that it was “unclear” whether SBVT would have even existed had Kerry not touted his Vietnam record.

147 Toledo, Dayton, and Cincinnati were among the top ten markets for 2004 presidential campaign ads (McClintock). Ohio was a targeted state for Democrats. Wisconsin was targeted by Republicans.
committees (Gilbert; Ruttenberg, “Anti-Kerry Ad”). On August 5, as the ad was just
going to air in the small markets, the Kerry campaign labeled it “garbage” (Sammon and
Dinan); U.S. Sen. John McCain issued a statement asking Bush to denounce the ad as
“dishonest and dishonorable” (Fournier); Bush Press Secretary McClellan responded by
calling for an “immediate cessation” of all independent committee advertising, and not
commenting on the SBVT ad. The media firestorm was on. By August 16, the University
of Pennsylvania’s Public Policy Center found, thirty-seven percent of the national
electorate had seen the ad and an additional twenty-four percent claimed having heard
about it. Forty-eight percent of those watching cable news five to seven days a week had
seen the ad (Jameison and Stroud). By month’s end, just the three major cable news
operations had together run over 250 SBTV stories. SBVT stories on broadcast network
news rose from two in the period May-July to thirty-nine for August. A LexisNexis
search of “United States newspapers” for August turned up over eight hundred such
stories (May 90-91).148

The ad disputed Kerry’s claim that he had pulled a Green Beret officer from the
water while under fire and wounded during a Swift Boat flotilla raid March 13, 1969, on
the Bay Hap River. Kerry had won a Bronze Star for his actions and been awarded a
Purple Heart for his wound (Dobbs). The officer, Jim Rasmussen, had a public reunion
with Kerry during the Iowa caucuses (Thomas et al. 24-25) and was now campaigning
with him.

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148 May’s search terms were “Swift+Boat+Truth falling within five characters of each consecutively.”
SBVT started as a nine-member group organized at a Dallas public relations firm on April 4, 2004, under Swift Boat veteran John O’Neill, a Houston attorney, and retired Admiral Roy Hoffman, overall commander of Swift Boat operations during Kerry’s service (Coolloff n. pag.; May 84). Most were “livid” over historian Douglas Brinkley’s recently-published Kerry biography *Tour of Duty*. Some still resented Kerry’s 1971 antiwar testimony. O’Neill had debated the war with Kerry that year on the *Dick Cavett Show* (Coolloff n. pag.; May 84). In May, the group filed papers with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as an independent committee, and quickly raised over $1 million from those who had donated to the Republican Party and the Bush campaign in the current or past two election cycles (Coolloff n. pag.; May 93-5). On July 9, thirty of the veterans met in a Washington studio to film their ad. The veterans simply talked to a camera. The spot that opened in August was pared from about thirteen hours of footage (May 98). None of the sixteen veterans in the ad had been on Kerry’s boat during the Bay Hap action. Two of the veterans were in different boats of the five-boat flotilla (Dobbs; “Republican-funded Group” n. pag.). O’Neill, who appeared in the ad, had arrived in Vietnam after Kerry left (Coolloff n. pag.).

The ad opened with a cut from a speech by Kerry running mate John Edwards. “If you have any questions about what John Kerry is made of,” Edwards said in voice-over, “just spend three minutes with the men who served with him.” On the screen was a black-and-white photograph of Kerry. The ad then faded out, and came back on a veteran. “I

149 Kerry testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 22, 1971. A transcript is available at nationalreview.com (“Kerry’s Testimony”).

150 See May (76-77) for a good explanation why SBVT initially filed with the IRS rather than the FEC. The complexity of federal election law governing independent committees in 2004 lies beyond the concerns here.
served with John Kerry,” said John French. The fade-out-and-in process repeated throughout the ad while a series of background photos showed Swift boats and their crews in Vietnam. The next veteran said the same. Veteran three said “John Kerry has not been honest about what happened in Vietnam.” Veteran four: “He is lying about his record.” Each one line from each veteran built on the charge of “lying.” He lied about his Purple Heart. He lied about his Bronze Star. John Kerry was not a leader. John Kerry was not a war hero. He dishonored the country. John Kerry cannot be trusted (“Any”; Reyes 582-83). The background photographs at this point were of Kerry with 1971 antiwar protesters. Simplicity of assertion and allegation, the mere presence of the veterans, and the photographs combined into a very powerful message.

G. Mitchell Reyes identified the ad’s three essential rhetorical moves. Antistrpephon and repetition substituted for narrative (582). Antistrephon is turning an opponent’s words to one’s own advantage (Lanham 16). Quintilian, not identifying the figure specifically, allowed that turning on an opponent by the opponent’s previous words or known actions was effective to impute “odium.” Description was a particularly useful topic for the move (9.2.38-9).

Turned on opponent Kerry in this case was not the Brinkley book. Rather, turned on the opponent was his own ad recounting his Vietnam tour. That ad featured Rasmussen saying Kerry “risked his life to save mine (“Republican-funded Group”). The SBVT ad did not attack Rasmussen or other Kerry crew members who had done Kerry ads or were campaigning for him. The ad did not say that the military awarded Kerry his medals on the basis of a lie. Each line repeated an attack on character by amplifying the base charge to fix in the audience mind that Kerry was dishonest.
The third essential move was the ancients’ metonymy. The “realism” of the photographic subject endowed the veterans with authority as witnesses testifying from non-partisan professionalism. Description emerged from the words blended with the image of veterans blended with images from Vietnam. Each fragment thus worked on its own to lessen the veteran’s statement as assertion and more as “objective” eyewitness recollection backed by the photographic “evidence.” We might now add another effect Reyes rightfully argued. Each “narrative fragment” metonymically [also] suggested itself as part of a larger range of meanings of “Vietnam” for Americans (Reyes 584-85). One might note that the range of total possible meanings of Vietnam was really condensed to the American-centric binary of “GI” and “protestor.” Strengthening the binary was that the photograph of Kerry amid war protestors appeared very closely timed with the allegation that Kerry “betrayed us.” Kerry’s appearance as “GI” and his appearance amid war protestors suggested the binary as the entire range of meanings possible. The rhetorically created “testimony” and photographs made for an illusion of authenticity telling us so. Popular culture was now on the scene.

The “GI/protestor” binary would have been familiar to audiences from the way with which Hollywood had haltingly come to terms with Vietnam. Reyes argued that films such as *Rambo* and *Rambo II, Platoon, The Deer Hunter* and *Apocalypse Now* presented the war from a cynical viewpoint “rendering untenable [the themes of] patriotism, war, glory … [and] transcendent notions such as democracy or freedom” (579). The consistent storyline basing that viewpoint involved the “veneration” of a good and loyal GI in the hands of inept or corrupt institutions and an indifferent society. The soldier survived from pairing command of military skill with moral conviction (579-80).
In 2004, the SBVT veterans in the ad represented the good soldier, and the ad’s totality\textsuperscript{151} affirmed the military skill side of the equation. Their statements comprised the equation’s balance in that the good solider professional-as-witness was overlaid with the moral conviction of Kerry as unfit to serve as commander-in-chief. Kerry’s “betrayal” was doubly worse because his antiwar protest played off his background in the Establishment elite – the source of corruption of the good soldier ethos. Yet the thing was incomplete. A more subtle factor may have applied as well.

The *Rambo* films\textsuperscript{152} and *The Deer Hunter* all had rescue elements. The rescue that basis captivity narrative has variously but frequently functioned as a subtheme in America’s basic war myth of unprovoked actual or threatened attack-and-heroic response. The good solider Rambo of innocence and altruistic heroism preserved the myth even through the cynicism directed at institutions. “Betrayal” in the ad thus suggested that Kerry had betrayed the myth as well. Antistrophe, metonymy, and repetition implied related torts of social, cultural, and historical turpitude. The rhetorical moves in the SBVT attack ad made Kerry – not SBVT – responsible for subjecting the myth to the threat of ambiguity.\textsuperscript{153}

On August 12, as the ad was finishing its run, Bush said he had not seen it (Hillman). On August 16, the independent committee MoveOn PAC, opposed to Bush’s

\textsuperscript{151} See pages 32 and 33 for Aristotle’s holding that speaker credibility, when an issue, arises from the text. The text of the SBVT ad, as perhaps with all ads, is the sum of all its elements.

\textsuperscript{152} See especially *Rambo III*.

\textsuperscript{153} See the discussion of Lévi-Strauss on page 17. Rambo rescued not only POWs. He had rescued the myth from the worse-than-bad translation of disastrous “Vietnam” as cultural metonymy for the entire American experience in Vietnam.
re-election, opened a two-day, $78,000 ad buy in the same markets where the SBVT ad played. MoveOn’s ad said Bush “went missing” from his 1972 service as a pilot with the Texas Air National Guard. The charge was apparently based on payroll gaps in Bush’s record. MoveOn’s ad did not note that Bush’s military records showed he had “fulfilled his obligations” (Memmott).

On August 18, Kerry himself finally answered the SBVT ad. Kerry said that the group was a “front” for the Bush campaign. That Bush had not denounced the ad “tells you … he wants them to do his dirty work.” Official Navy records documented his service, Kerry said. “Thirty years [sic] ago, that was the plain truth. It still is” (“Kerry August 19” n. pag.). On August 20, the Kerry campaign said it would file a formal compliant with the Federal Election Commission (FEC), alleging SBVT violated election law by coordinating activities with the Bush campaign (Justice and Rutenberg). On August 20, SBVT launched a second ad in a $1 million buy on national cable channels. The new ad featured Navy combat pilot and Vietnam POW Paul Galanti saying that Kerry’s 1971 antiwar testimony demoralized him and fellow POWs. “‘John Kerry gave the enemy for free what I, and many of my comrades … took torture to avoid saying,’ ” Galanti said (Orin). SBVT member Joe Ponder said that Kerry’s testimony “hurt me more than any physical wounds I had” (“Interview with Bob Dole Interview” n. pag.). On August 21, the Kerry campaign launched an ad saying that Bush’s campaign “‘supports a front group attack[ing] John Kerry’s military record [with] smears [and] lies’ ” (“Ad Watch” n. pag.). On August 22, Bush said the SBVT ad and all independent committee ads should be stopped (“Remarks by President Bush” n. pag.). On August 23, the Kerry campaign said Bush’s statement did not specifically “‘condemn the smear campaign
against John Kerry’s military record.’ ” (Stallsmith). O’Neill said SBVT would not stop (Roth).

SBVT’s second ad finished airing on September 2. By coincidence or not, September 2 was the last date SBVT could advertise and defer filing an IRS or FEC disclosure statement listing contributions and contributors’ identities, and expenditures, through that date (May 103-04). On September 2, in the evening, Bush gave his speech accepting the Republican nomination for the presidency of the United States.

The impact of the SBVT on the Kerry campaign and on the election dynamic as they existed on September 2 eludes neat poll data interpretation. Kerry’s overall numbers fell two percent in the period from the beginning to the end of the Democratic convention. The numbers dropped another two percent by September 2. Gallup’s September 2 numbers tabbed forty-six percent support apiece for Kerry and Bush (Freedman 174). A Battleground poll taken after the first ad’s run had Kerry at forty-nine percent to Bush’s forty-seven percent. A Los Angeles Times poll through August 24 had Bush at forty-nine percent and Kerry at forty-seven percent. Analysts seemed similarly split. Republican pollster Ed Goeas argued that each candidate’ support was intense and solid” enough that the story “only played around the edges” of voters’ perceptions. Democratic strategist Bill Carrick argued a like point while crediting the ads with impact on the Kerry campaign. Kerry was being deflected from devoting time to swing voters’ 2004 concerns (Kuhnhenn).

The advantage that deflected onto Bush was not in poll numbers. Overall support stayed relatively constant throughout the SBVT campaign. The advantage was being off’
the media stage as he went into the convention. The claim of Hussein’s forty-five minute ability to launch biological and chemical attacks had never been repeated in a major speech. The Cincinnati demand for an accounting of missing Gulf War personnel had never been repeated in a major speech. The United Nations had cancelled the Cincinnati claims that Hussein had stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations and the 9/11 Commission had cancelled the Cincinnati claims that Iraq and al-Qaeda had connections. The 9/11 Commission’s finding on the Atta-in-Prague saga had left Cheney to brazen out a surreal moment with Gloria Borger. The Bush administration itself had withdrawn the Niger saga. The World War II “liberators” metaphor was, as *Newsweek* somewhat gingerly noted, not proving true. Neither was Bush’s AEI Wilsonianism, as *Newsweek* also somewhat gingerly pointed out, going well. On August 30, Bush had called the war on terror ultimately unwinnable (Lauer n. pag.). If Kerry could run a smarter, more efficient war, the Republicans would run a smarter, more efficient convention.

The obvious theme of 9/11 and the war on terror, for example, contrasted to the Democratic convention’s lack of focus on any one issue. Republicans had selected New York City and timed the convention (Nagourney and Stevenson) so that a motif of Bush leadership flowed as literally as possible into the third anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. First evening speakers addressed the war on terror. Third evening speakers limned Bush as a leader. Fourth evening activities treated viewers to small steps that pushed convention stage management to new levels.

Like the Democrats, the Republicans ran a biographical film on the candidate as prelude to the acceptance speech. The film presented Bush as rising to the challenges of
history. The Republican choice of narrator, actor and former U.S. Sen. Fred Thompson, read the script live from the stage (Holloway 62-64). Unlike the Democrats, the Republicans thus leveraged the immediacy of live television, and its concomitant mimicry of intimacy by telling a story in the present tense. Bush also had the incumbent’s advantage of being able to bypass biography in the film for blurring his character into the security issue. On all counts, planners of the evening’s proceedings thus seemed to have consulted Longinus. The effectiveness of history-in-the-present for engaging the audience in the sublime had just descended through the millennia from the ancient assemblies into Madison Square Garden.

The Republicans’ next move seamlessly brought in the moderns. No lulls were risked. The stage screen faded to black for just the barest instant when the film ended. Screens shimmering with American flags slid in from the wings to meet at center stage as Bush walked down a specially-constructed ramp onto the convention floor to deliver his speech (Holloway 64). He took a center position amid the delegates surrounding him as if they were an arena audience assembled to see an event. The staging was next-best to Bush’s materializing incarnate directly from the screen image of president and leader Bush. Longinus would likely approve.

The Bush speech was a convex reflection of Kerry’s. The president began with a domestic agenda, and then moved to the war on terror. A conceptual metaphor of expansion set the frame. “The story of America is the story of expanding liberty, an ever-widening circle, constantly growing to reach further and include more,” Bush said. “Our nation’s founding commitment is still our deepest commitment.” His plan was rooted in “providing the security and opportunity of a growing economy.” Restrained federal
spending and permanent tax cuts would encourage investment and expansion. Community college funding would be increased to help workers find higher-paying jobs in the expanding economy. Opportunity zones would expand opportunities to individuals in poor communities of high unemployment. Tax credits and health care savings accounts would expand the obtaining of health care through small business or by individual initiative.

Bush then added the metaphor of an ownership society. Social Security would be honored for senior citizens while younger workers could come to own their retirement accounts by saving into private plans. A secondary education with mandatory testing, and emphasis on mathematics and science, would leave no child behind on a path to reaching to the limit of vision and character. We all lived in “changing times … of expanding opportunity.” Senator Kerry was opposed to all such “progress.” His fundraisers with Hollywood celebrities did not uphold conservative values. His [alleged] opposition to the Defense of Marriage Act did not uphold conservative values. His opponent, said Bush, could not put himself forward as a candidate of conservative values.

The election will determine “how America responds to the continuing dangers of terrorism.” The Bush administration was working to advance liberty “in the broader Middle East, because freedom will bring a future of hope and the peace we all want.” We would prevail. Many have joined America’s leadership. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia were fighting terror and arresting terrorists. The program required diplomacy, “clear moral purpose, and some tough decisions.”
And the toughest came in Iraq. Everyone knew Saddam Hussein’s record of aggression and support for terror. We knew his long history of pursuing, and acquiring, weapons of mass destruction. And we know that September the 11th requires our country to think differently. We must, and we will, confront threats to America before it is too late.

Members of both political parties, including his opponent, had supported the war authorization. We stood with the people of Afghanistan and Iraq in a historic cause of helping them move to democracy. “Our troops know the historic importance of our work.” The opponent took a different approach, and voted against $87 billion in funding for bullets and fuel and body armor. The opponent then said he voted for the funding before he voted against it. There was nothing complicated “about supporting our troops in combat.”

The wisest use of American strength was the advancement of liberty. America had done this sort of work in postwar Germany and Japan. This “moment in the history of our country will be remembered.” Future generations will know if we kept the faith and seized the moment for the freedom of many and the security of the United States. “Like generations before us, we have a calling from beyond the stars to stand for freedom.” We are renewing America’s everlasting dream. We could be confident in the future of Earth’s greatest nation. “May God continue to bless our great country.”

Bush, like Kerry, spoke mostly in the plain style. He was also like Kerry in providing no details. Unlike Kerry, Bush found a balder interpretation of the Founding, and its economical expression made for a clearer frame. Greater quantities of symbolic
words dotted the speech. “Liberty” appeared at least four times. “Freedom” appeared at least five “Terror” by itself or in root form appeared at least five times. “Security” wrapped the domestic agenda. Using symbolic words of such power in the abstract came closer than did Kerry to Burkean identification in that the audience had room to attach its own preferred definitions.

Given the convention’s location and timing, 9/11 itself was rather sparingly used, but used importantly to bookend the speech. The opening analogized the time since 9/11 as a hard journey from a deep valley. Imagery of a “flag over the ruins … three miles from here” moved to the imagery of “resurrection” in New York City’s recovery to link America, 9/11, and the spiritual towards the conclusion. For example, Bush recapitulated the link a few sentences later in speaking of a charge beyond the stars. We went forward under the aegis of that charge.

Bookending in the large appeared in miniature in the handling of Iraq. The war in Afghanistan that hardly anyone questioned appeared on either side of the war in Iraq. The speech’s only stark reference to 9/11 appeared here, as umbrella for Iraq, and for reaffirming preemption-as-preventive first strikes. The succeeding few lines actually on Iraq made no mention of Hussein’s current or potential nuclear capability. No mention was made of chemical or biological weapons. No mention was made of Iraqi ties to terrorism or al-Qaeda or of what Hussein might have done. No mention was made at all, in fact, of the last fourteen months or of the present. Bush confined the war in Iraq to Hussein’s past and Iraq’s future. Iraq was then blurred with Afghanistan. What mattered about Kerry’s appropriation vote was only that he was not supporting the troops tasked with realizing America’s global mission. Bush did not need to invoke the SBVT or the
language of betrayal. The partisans would fill it in. Independents and those “leaning Republican” could more patently rest assured that the mission in Iraq related somehow to 9/11.

About two weeks after the speech, Fareed Zakariah, writing in Newsweek, agreed with Bush’s goals, and took him to task for the metaphor. Zakariah noted Bush’s Wilsonianism in what he lauded as “the idea that America should stand for something in the world.” The advancement of democracy in Bush’s convention speech was an “accurate way to think about the war on terror” because Middle East terrorism thrived under dysfunctional dictatorships. The problem was considering Iraq as Iraq. “If the president really thinks that Iraq today looks like Germany in 1946 – an advanced industrial country” experienced in capitalism and liberalism and lived by a population fully cooperative with American occupation – “then he’s in for a rude surprise.” Bush did not realize that Arabic hostility to the United States compromised America as a herald of democracy154. Bush’s perseverance under such non-awareness was partly responsible for the current chaos in Iraq. Sheer perseverance did not trump error.

Zakariah’s piece represented, curiously, the only post-9/11 analysis of a presidential speech appearing through its date in either Newsweek or Time. The two magazines gave extended coverage to the joint session speech (Fineman and Brant; Elliott). The articles were far more concentrated on the behind-the-scenes making-of-the-speech than on what Bush actually said or how he said it. No analytical coverage appeared for any of the three State of the Union addresses since. More importantly, in

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154 Exactly the point made eighteen months earlier by the U.S. Army College. See page 27.
terms of Operation Iraqi Freedom, no analysis was made of the Cincinnati speech. Newsweek enfolded lines from the AEI speech into a larger piece on Bush’s “born again” moment more than a decade earlier, and the religious element in his rhetoric. No mention was made of the Wilsonianism vital in that speech and of fair importance in the convention speech. Convention coverage was condensed into picture spreads. Neither did the magazines attend to Kerry’s convention speech. No contemporaneous journalistic record thus exists in the magazines of analyses of, and reaction to, key rhetorical moments as the war on terror moved into Iraq and casualties mounted in the first year of occupation. The interspersion of Normandy anniversary issues raised the question of the president’s rhetoric matching the reality in Iraq, but only in sidebars dissipating discrepancies within a look at the American-British alliance. The media ideally suited for the rhetoric reporter seemed to not realize it. Under the circumstances, in early September 2004, Bush could not have asked more.
Chapter Five

Streetcar Fare for Mr. Lippmann

Look at this street. All cardboard, all hollow, all phony, all done with mirrors. You know, I like it better than any street in the world.

-- Sunset Boulevard

In May 2009, Newt Gingrich, a former speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, addressed congressional Republicans in Washington. The Republican Party, Gingrich said, was facing as great a challenge as future presidential nominee Abraham Lincoln faced in 1858 and future presidential nominee Ronald Reagan faced in 1976. The challenge was moral. The Republican Party, and America, had to openly debate the nature of reality. Failed Democratic policies of the Carter, Clinton, and Obama presidencies were destroying the economy to the point of threatening national security. The world was full of people and governments who want to destroy us. The threat was terroristic, economic, and educational. Reducing government spending and taxes on business were vital to a strong national economy. Only a strong economy could compete with China. Only a strong economy and education towards scientific and technological leadership could sustain military leadership. American history had to be made a mandatory subject for all in secondary education. The challenge against the nay-sayers would be difficult. But the party had the opportunity to build red, white, and blue majorities.

I hope that each of you will leave here tonight, dedicated for your
children, for your grandchildren, and for your country, to reaching out to
every person you can touch, to making the decision we will win in 2010, in 2012 .... Before you say it can’t be done, let me remind you of Jon Voight’s great quote: ‘Do not tell me it can’t be done.’ If it was true for FDR, it was true for us (“Newt’s Speech” n. pag.).

Gingrich had accurately quoted a line from Voight’s portrayal of Franklin Roosevelt in *Pearl Harbor*. The particular scene is set shortly after the attack. Roosevelt dresses down his military chiefs for arguing that America cannot yet launch an offensive. America, says Roosevelt, cannot abide such defeatism. He slowly rises from his chair. Placing one finger on the table gives him enough support to draw himself to his full height. He delivers the line that his action has made metaphorical.

One problem bubbled in the scene. It was not true for FDR. The polio he suffered rendered him unable to stand on his own (E. Roosevelt 142; Suid, *Guts* 664). Nor have historians recorded that any such meeting occurred. No historian has recorded that Roosevelt said any such thing to the military. If *Pearl Harbor* was the *reductio ad absurdum* of the World War II nostalgia of its time (Rich 10), the scene was the *reductio ad absurdum* of *Pearl Harbor*. Gingrich’s use of absurd historical fantasy perforce reduced all the preceding “reality” of the great moral challenge to absurdity. Perhaps he was thus still right in calling for compulsory education in American history.

Pressing a Roosevelt who never was into symbolic inspiration for a party to which Roosevelt did not belong, however, hardly seemed a move original or unique to the erstwhile speaker who spoke. The historical something called “World War II” had
by 2009 long been tossed about as cultural pastiche. Consider the *Pearl Harbor* premiere in Hawaii a week before the film’s national release. The U.S. Navy directed the aircraft carrier USS *John C. Stennis* from San Diego to Honolulu in order to serve as “the world’s largest and most expensive theater” for the Disney event. The seventy planes normally aboard were left behind (Dao). Disney occupied the ship’s four acres of flight deck with a movie screen four stories high, rows of bleachers, and a recreated 1940s nightclub (Ryan and Kakesako). Also on the deck were makeup tables “where [television] reporters primped” (Hebert) for their media reports on media using the medium of film as product. Around 5:00 p.m., Disney began unspooling its *Weekly Reader December 7, 1941* on the ship moored just aft of the USS *Arizona* Memorial (Ryan and Kakesako; Hebert).

Five months earlier, in Washington, George Walker Bush entered upon the office of the presidency. Twenty-nine months later, he, too, transformed an aircraft carrier deck into something of a stage set. His show was titled “Mission Accomplished.” Bush arrived on the USS *Abraham Lincoln* off San Diego in a Navy FNA-18 fighter. He clambered out of the co-pilot’s seat (Blitzer et al. n. pag.) and was wearing a flight suit adorned with the presidential logo. The president, having changed into a suit, spoke a little later. The speech had been timed for dusk so that “magic hour” light of gold and amber fell just right for a good television shot. The White House had also assured that the sailors arrayed as props behind Bush wore color-coordinated shirts (Bumiller, “Keepers”; “Proclamation”). Bush moved “in a way that just conveys a great sense of authority and command,” David Broder intoned on *Meet the Press*. He has “an aura of leadership … this fellow’s won a war” (“David Broder” n. pag.). One might think that perhaps John
Wayne had come back to get the job done in the persona of the George Bush sporting an updated *Flying Tigers* costume.¹⁵⁵

Wayne’s Jim Gordon could easily have stepped from *Flying Tigers* into Bush’s audience. Bush’s second term war rhetoric kept 1941 and World War II metaphor rolling along like so many caissons over hill and dale. Movement back and forth between Operation Iraqi Freedom and the war on terror was axiomatic. The metaphor apparently disappeared only when another metaphor was available, or the mission changed, or when the stars sporadically seemed not aligned right for America’s God-chartered mission.

On September 12, 2005 the president said America had the patience to stay in Iraq through the establishment of democracy. “We’ve done this kind of work before; we must have confidence in our cause. In World War II, the free nations defeated fascism and helped” Germany and Japan become democracies now allied with the United States (“Press Conference” n. pag.).

On September 11, 2006 the larger war on terror was the president’s subject. “Freedom” was a supporting metaphor.

One of the strongest weapons in our arsenal is the power of freedom. The terrorists fear freedom … they know that people will choose freedom over their extremist ideology. So their answer is … raging against the forces of freedom … we’re fighting for the possibility that good and decent people across the Middle East can raise up societies based on freedom and

¹⁵⁵ See page 76 for Hagel’s extratextual Wayne metaphor referenced here. Wayne had starred as a fighter pilot in the 1942 film *Flying Tigers*, mentioned on page 56.
tolerance and personal dignity. We are now in the early hours of this struggle between tyranny and freedom … we [have] committed America’s influence in the world to advancing freedom and democracy as the great alternatives to repression and radicalism.

America had confronted and defeated evil before. “When Franklin Roosevelt vowed to defeat two enemies across two oceans, he could not have foreseen D-Day and Iwo Jima – but he would not have been surprised at the outcome.” We would lead the way to a shining age of liberty (“President’s Address” n. pag.).

On October 26, 2006 reporters asked Bush if the United States was winning a war in Iraq lasting longer than World War II. “This is a different kind of war” than the war against the fascists of three nation-states, Bush said. “This is a war against extremists and radicals who kill innocent people.” The definition of victory was now modified for a war not World War II redux. A victory in Iraq, within the unwinnable war on terror, was a nation that can “sustain and defend itself, and serves as an ally” (“Press Conference” n. pag.). Neither the democracy nor pluralism Cheney’s 2002 speech required might any longer be applicable.

On December 20, 2006 the unwinnable war nonetheless still had a calling. The war on terror is “the calling of a new generation.” The enemy “can’t run us out of the Middle East” (“Press Conference” n. pag.).

156 The president’s comments were unclear on whether or not he meant a new generation arisen since the joint session speech.
On August 22, 2007 the president returned to World War II metaphor. The enemy attacking on 9/11 despised freedom and wanted regional control. The story was familiar “except for one thing. The enemy I have just described … is the war machine of Imperial Japan, its surprise attack on Pearl Harbor,” and its designs on empire. The United States prevailed in World War II. Doubters that democracy could thrive in Japan were as wrong as today’s doubters about democracy in the Middle East (“President Bush Attends” n. pag.).

Continuing the metaphor, of course, continued the problems with the metaphor as a frame. Consistency, to paraphrase Zakariah, might persist in error. Bush’s shifting the metaphor from 9/11 to the war on terror to the war in Iraq shattered the contextual justification Quintilian warned was metaphor’s sole justification.\(^{157}\) Pearl Harbor metaphor was understandable enough in the aftermath of 9/11. The joint session speech’s ensuing Manichaeism, amplified in epideictic definition, was a rhetorically legitimate way of being in that darker world\(^{158}\) that evil had brought to the homeland. The subtle seeded problem was that substantive differences between Pearl Harbor and 9/11 were cancelled by the similarities created inside a generally legitimate speech. Figures helped by their effectiveness for repetition and reinforcement, the grand style provoked the roaring approval the ancients predicted, and thus the generation everyone apparently belonged to had its Pearl Harbor.

What the audience also had was *Pearl Harbor*. The ancients understood extratextuality as a source of example. They did not have a conception of living

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\(^{157}\) See pages 12 and 13 for the ancients on metaphor in terms of context, clarity, and proportionality.

\(^{158}\) See the discussion of Medhurst on page 36.
extratextuality as a *faux* reality. Thus they did not foresee the early twenty-first century American experience of reality. Journalist Matt Bai related an instructive anecdote from walking the Ohio exurbs with 2004 Bush volunteer Jim Ashenhusrt.

Our first stop was a development called Times Square Apartments. As we approached the first set of doors, I mentioned to Ashenhurst that I was heartened to see quaint little stores thriving near the town entrance, like Old Stuff Antiques and the Casual Gourmet. ‘Oh, those stores aren’t real,’ he said with a smile, and when I looked closer, I saw … they were merely decorative store windows, a few feet deep at the most, designed to create for residents the warm aura of a bustling town square. Later, when we drove across the road to ‘The Farms,’ I was surprised to see that the horses peering out over white picket fences … were rusted re-recreations … the developers had designed communities [as] theme park … nostalgia (n. pag.)

We no longer even had to bother to go to the movies. Everyday experience was Betty Schaefer’s *Sunset Boulevard* midnight stroll through the Paramount back lot sets. Town Park Apartments’ façades were close enough to a town square to be the communitarian environment that John Dewey159 submitted as the keeper of the democratic flame. A Crawford movie set ranch *was* Reata *was* Texas. A Czech UAV in a fuzzy photograph that *might* be a UAV that *might* be in Iraq that Hussein *might* modify and *maybe* move closer to the homeland *was* a weapon threatening the United States. The

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159 See esp. pages 211-18 in Dewey.
metaphor of Americans greeted like liberators thus assumed that the audience’s sociocultural experience of simulacra would fill in the 1944 Paris of American World War II movies for Baghdad. *Pearl Harbor* assured that World War II meant, after all, metaphor-compatible video game, military chic, and the availability of bodacious nurses.160

Ron Suskind’s anonymous White House adviser dropped a clue as to why Russert’s not probing the metaphor may not have been necessarily a failing of Russert. The adviser had shared the administration’s understanding that the mediathon moved the journalist from the fourth estate into the audience. Journalists less presented created, worked-on material to the audience and more responded to the administration’s created, worked-on realities.161 The ancients told us how the audience reacts when the material presenting reality is rhetoric.

Reconsider the joint session speech, for example, purely as a speech. A journalist/audience member would react as any average audience member. Contemporary experimenters have affirmed the ancients that an audience processing metaphor searches for isomorphic mappings.162 Pearl Harbor metaphor as a frame, proximate to a “once again” American-British alliance facing an evil ideology, pointed to World War II as the only possible mapping. Amplification by epideictic values was drenched in figures coinciding with some of Churchill’s favorite figures. Grand style would sweep the journalist/audience member towards pronouncing the speech “Churchillian” and so on.160

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160 I am slightly elaborating the Rich summary of *Pearl Harbor* on thesis page 59.

161 The “worked-on” language is from Barthes. See page 29.

162 See the discussion on pages 49 through 52.
The speech’s well-rhetorically Manichaeism arrived to the happy coincidence of the American war myth apotheosized in the World War II simulacra of the good war’s recent nostalgia boom. Bush could especially be Churchillian if Roosevelt could stand.

Remnants of the “fact-based media” that the White House adviser disdained would sometimes try, as in the prewar days, to catch up. A New York Times effort to journalistically catch up with “Mission Accomplished” mostly replicated catching up with Jeff Gannon or finding actors playing “correspondents” in video news releases. Elisabeth Bumiller made a Herculean effort to find the person or persons responsible for the idea, the banner, and the banner’s costs. In response, the U.S. Navy finally identified a Lincoln officer – who was unavailable for comment. Bumiller’s subsequent story was a story about trying to do the story (“Proclamation”) – a simulacrum of journalism.


Bumiller, in Lippmann’s terms, was looking for a baseball score. Lippmann argued that journalism performed well where a “machinery of record” can be consulted. Journalism performed less well when the subject involved undocumented but chronic conditions or “states of mind” (216-17). Thus, the print journalism Lippmann was considering performed well in tracking who was and who was not on Kerry’s boat or
what MoveOn omitted from the Bush military record easily and long available. Journalists were frustrated upon discovering that campaign finance laws did not require independent committees to file contributor disclosures in real time. Frustration hit again on encountering a byzantine IRS web site where the SBVT records were both legally filed well after-the-fact and scanty in detail, and difficult to access (May 82; 93-94; 105-06). The “Mission Accomplished” banner was only an illusory suggestion that a record behind it should be exist and be locatable.

Lippmann understood the course of public discussion when a “fact” was not a record but the symbol and sign that a streetcar fare increase was “un-American” and an insult to fallen veterans. Probably he would be the least-surprised journalist in America to see journalism either embracing the president’s World War II metaphor or unable to cope with things like “Mission Accomplished.” Likely, he would be less astonished than was Suskind with the Bush adviser’s view of reality. Public Opinion was influenced heavily by his experience of World War I propaganda, and he would understand that the mediathon’s simulacra of journalism functioned as a more subtle and equally effective Committee of Public Information. Scott McClellan had a point in labeling it as “enabling” of the Bush rhetoric.

The journalism of the 2001-04 period failed the watchdog role because it did not have the understanding Lippmann would have had of metaphor as fact. Keeping one step

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163 See pages 156 and 160.

164 An entity Wilson created by an executive order of April 1917 to implement a government-run program of mass communications disseminating the administration’s views on the war.
ahead of the mediathon was not much of a stretch for an administration that knew the World War II metaphors, if evaluated at all, would be evaluated by simulacra. The administration understood simulacra as reality whether in the newsroom or in the cultivated “wild country,” replete with fake horses, of Ohio exurbia. The administration thus did not need to fear that media could move from metaphor to untangling rhetoric in general. Thus, the administration introduced the definite question of Iraq while the indefinite question of responding to 9/11 was still open. They narrowed the argument to the particulars of multilateralism or unilateralism while the definite question of undertaking a war in Iraq had yet to be formally put to Congress. Being one step ahead of the media was routine because it could be routine.

The Bush administration also understood Lippmann back. The media taking the Crawford movie set ranch for Texas was still a media that would not address chronic conditions undermining Texas as Reata. Journalist Micahel Ennis’ *Texas Monthly* piece, on the media doting over Crawford, detailed Texas “states of mind” in personalities less publicly ebullient than Bush, and that did not interest media. Bush’s following the same practice seemed evident in Rich’s documenting non-war related instances of Bush photo-ops designed to disguise the effect of his policies (16).

Moving the concept of “off agenda” from the rhetoricized war and domestic politics into the actual war was also not much of a stretch. The Dover ban’s war without casualties would not have surprised Lippmann. *Public Opinion* economically defined *propaganda*. Governmental propaganda involved denial of access to events and information and manipulating environmental variables (26-28; 153). A report of the French manipulating the appearance of the Verdun battlefield to show only German dead
(24) seems to have been influential. Thus, when the ban was re-imposed in March 2003, he had already seen the memo.

In January 2000, Gen. Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said American wars needed to “pass the Dover test.” Public support for a war should be a factor in public policy of war, Sheldon said. One way of testing whether public support was continuing for a war was allowing the public to see flag-draped coffins en route through Dover (Gilmartin n. pag.). In 1998, the public saw media covering flag-draped coffins, containing the remains of ten American civilians killed in a bombing of the American Embassy in Kenya, arriving at Washington. President Bill Clinton and a military honor guard were present (Meserve n. pag.). In October 2000, the public saw media covering the arrival at Dover of flag-draped coffins of victims of the terrorist bombing of the USS Cole (Randall n. pag.). Media in March 2002 covered flag-draped coffins arriving at Ramstein air base in Germany in transit from Operation Enduring Freedom (Harris n. pag.). Media in March 2003 photographed the loading of six flag-draped coffins in Kabul, Afghanistan, destined for Dover (Fuchs and Blenton n. pag).

Reading the ban as political propaganda imposed on Operation Iraqi Freedom seems inescapable. The ban’s history shows press coverage of the arrival of flag-draped coffins at Dover generally allowed prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, notwithstanding that the policy was still technically in effect. The ban’s re-imposition in March, 2003 raised inconsistency. Presidential presence at the arrival of coffins cannot be cited as a factor in deciding whether to allow or deny coverage because coverage has been allowed when presidents were present and when presidents were not present. The presence of military
honor guards cannot be a factor because honor guards have always been present. A distinction between military and civilian casualties cannot be made, as a factor in allowing or denying coverage, because coverage had been allowed in both instances. Molino’s statement that the policy’s existence through three presidencies makes it non-political was technical sophistry. The facts are that coverage had been allowed in two different presidencies – before abrupt denial. “Privacy” began to fade when the Air Force began taking photographs, and faded more when the Air Force released those photographs in a FOIA request.

The Silicio affair also surfaced vagueness. The possibility of widely divergent interpretations was realized when Air Mobility Command stateside personnel released the photographs to Kick while Command personnel in Kuwait used the policy to press Silicio’s firing. The Air Force made no distinction between whether military personnel taking photographs, or civilian personnel taking photographs, was a deciding factor in “privacy.” Arguing that the courts twice upheld the ban did not address the courts’ evasion of First Amendment issues.\textsuperscript{165} The policy was bleeding vagueness, inconsistent application, and polysemy.

Indeed, the policy’s only consistency is with Lippmann’s definition of propaganda. Propaganda as Lippmann conceptualized it further opens another window on the Bush rhetoric.

Umberto Eco distinguished three types of rhetoric. Rhetorical discourse seeking to persuade another to one’s point of view “even if other options remain available” is an

“honest and productive exercise.” The discourse often causes the speaker to re-examine premises (75). Rhetoric in this sense seems much as the ancients intended. The second and third types mark rhetoric “in a natural stage of degeneration.” The speaker skips argument for a purely emotional appeal difficult to criticize. The other option for degenerate rhetoric recurrently deploys a combination of connotatively rich emotion and ideology as figures. Political use of the third type is often a form of code (76-78).

The rhetorical turn of the war on terror into a war in Iraq pushed the administration at least very close to Eco’s degenerate rhetoric. That turn-within-the-turn began with Cheney’s August 2002 speech. The speech fit both of Eco’s subspecies because the asserted certitude gained plausibility from the closed meaning of a distorted framing metaphor. Masking prevention as preemption was a disingenuous way of handling the admissible prevention doctrine Bush’s rhetorical invention created from the circumstances as he surveyed them. His AEI speech tangled Wilsonianism in World War II metaphor in an attempt to tamp down, again, an otherwise admissible argument. The Dover ban was patently degenerate rhetoric because it was a straight imposition of will seeking to quash the very kind of argument over meanings of the war that erupted with the Silicio photograph. Ironically enough, Silicio’s photographic rhetoric put into circulation the sort of facts that Chris Matthews wanted.

Bush’s varied statements in 2005 and 2006 bared that using World War II in the most powerful of figures at least bordered degenerate rhetoric by obfuscating the premises for the war in Iraq. Nostalgic and generational views of history always lead to simplifying history (Lasch, True 107-18). When Wilsonianism was again not working out, when postwar Iraq was not looking like postwar Germany, the joint session speech
analogy of the enemy as Nazis largely disappeared. When postwar Iraq was not looking
like postwar Japan, analogies to totalitarianism disappeared. The metaphor’s re-
emergence in 2007 sounded, by then, like a mantra divorced from its origin.

Lippmann had seen this movie before. He had observed, in reflecting upon World
War I, that war aim often degenerates into war effort. Overuse of assertion is often the
cause (Liberty 52). In Bush’s second term, we were now fighting fascism so as not to be
run out of the Middle East. Sporadically reusing the old metaphor of the war aim for the
war effort seemed inevitable – especially once degenerate rhetoric approached.

The ancients had warned us about metaphor. We ignore them at our peril.
Lippmann warned us additionally on the power of symbols let loose in media. We ignore
Lippmann at our peril.
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