1953

Summary of Major Events and Problems, Intelligence, Security, and Safety Office, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Department of the Army, 1 January - 30 June 1953

Robert Bolin, depositor
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, rbolin2@unl.edu

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Summary of Major Events and Problems
Intelligence, Security, and Safety Office
Office of the Chief of Ordnance
Department of the Army
1 January – 30 June 1953

This is a digital version of a portion of a report. As the name indicates the Intelligence, Security, and Safety Office (IS&S) had diverse responsibilities within the Office of the Chief of Ordnance (OCO). That report is in the National Archives, Record Group 156: “Records of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance … Histories of Staff and Operating Offices and Divisions of the Chief of Ordnance, 1946-1954, IS&S Office, July 195 thru June 1953,” Box C 8.

This is a digital version of the sections of the document concerning the Technical Intelligence Branch within the IS&S. Those pages were copied by Robert Bolin at the National Archives in the early 1990s.

Personal Note: I was interested in Army Technical Intelligence and not in other activities of the Ordnance Corps. Other material about the history of the Ordnance Corps is available at the National Archives. – Bob Bolin
SUMMARY OF MAJOR EVENTS AND PROBLEMS

for the period

1 January - 30 June 1953

From:

Executive Office
Intelligence, Security and Safety Office
Office, Chief of Ordnance

13 August 1953

Approved by:

ROBERT S. CALES
Lt Col, Ord Corps
Executive Officer, IS&S Office
## CONTENTS

### CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilities</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER II: TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 - 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan - 30 June 53</td>
<td>7 - 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsolved Branch Problems</td>
<td>9 - 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER III: SECURITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Section</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Secret Control Section</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Relations Section</td>
<td>14 - 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Section</td>
<td>16 - 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER IV: PROVOST MARSHAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 - 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Security Section</td>
<td>20 - 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Investigation Section</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER V: SAFETY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Safety Council Award</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of Safety Responsibility</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Army Waivers</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosives Safety Standards for Piers and Wharves</td>
<td>26 - 27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

The mission of the IS&S Office from 1 January 1953 through 30 June 1953 remained unchanged (Current functional sheet attached as Appendix A, Incl. 1).

Facilities

The facilities available to IS&S Office were, in general, adequate. However during the summer months the office space assigned to the Technical Intelligence Branch on the fourth floor of the Pentagon Annex No. 2 is inadequate. This office space is directly under a flat, tarred roof and the temperature and humidity frequently reached a point where it is unbearable. Therefore personnel in the Technical Intelligence Branch had to be released during such periods of unbearable heat and humidity. A project was initiated to air condition this office space, the equipment was procured, but funds for installation of the equipment were not available. The equipment has been in storage since October 1952. The inadequacy of this facility creates a health hazard, an unnecessary loss of manhours, retards production of intelligence and the accomplishment of this branch's assigned mission. The cost involved in the installation of air-conditioning would be compensated for, by the full efficiency of the personnel working in this facility without loss of manhours for which they are compensated unnecessarily due to a situation beyond the control of this office.

Activities

The Executive Administration Office continued to function normally during the period, such as procurement of personnel, discussions on 1955 budget estimates, and general office administration, etc.
Personnel

On 1 January 1953 an authorized strength of 58 civilians and 14 officers was allocated to this office, reflecting an increase of 1 civilian and 5 officers. The bulk of the officer spaces were provided the Provost Marshal Branch to complete that staff in order to carry out the Provost Marshal functions and mission charged to the Chief of Ordnance. The increase of 1 civilian has not relieved the inadequacy reported during the previous reporting period.
Background

The mission of the Technical Intelligence Branch might be summed up briefly as that of procuring, collating, evaluating, producing, and disseminating intelligence concerning all foreign ordnance capabilities. This function is required of all Technical Services under the Army Intelligence Program.

The ancestor of the Technical Intelligence Branch was the Military Intelligence Section of the Research and Engineering Division, which was afforded little opportunity to fulfill this mission when it was founded back in the late 1930’s. A minor storehouse of reports, most of which were obsolescent and of little ordnance value, the unit suffered from a shortage of channels of information and an almost complete absence of direct liaison with these channels. Following the establishment of separate intelligence organizations for each technical service in August 1940, the Ordnance Military Intelligence Section was enlarged and was assigned the mission of collating, digesting, and disseminating Ordnance intelligence derived from Military Attaché reports.\(^1\) In June 1942 the unit was raised in status to the Technical Intelligence Branch to coordinate its activities with the newly created Ordnance Intelligence Teams; the unit continued to expand without any major change in organization until the close of World War II.

Following VJ-Day, however, the trend was reversed sharply. The Technical Intelligence Branch was reduced to a section; its production unit was decreased from thirty-three employees to seven, its collection and dissemination unit to one employee—withstanding the fact that some 2,500 Ordnance intelligence reports continued to flow into the unit each month. The section operated during the immediate post-war years in what might be termed a shadowland of Ordnance intelligence. The unit somehow managed to pass along information of foreign developments to interested offices, but it was impossible for the handful of employees to collate and evaluate the mounting storehouse of raw intelligence into basic and staff intelligence. The commencement of the National Intelligence Survey Program in 1948 placed the Ordnance Corps in the embarrassing position of being unable to furnish its segment of intelligence, as required of all technical services. On the eve of the Korean operation, the section was supplying about 10% of the material requested by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Between 10,000 and 15,000 foreign and domestic reports were stored without adequate index cards, so that the section was two to three months behind in filling requests for these reports.

The advent of hostilities in Korea found the Ordnance Corps unable to evaluate the enemy's materiel or its ordnance capacity. On 18 July 1950 Ordnance Corps Order Number 27-50 was issued to make a long overdue correction of a bad situation and to preclude the recurrence of this

2/ See letter to Civilian Executive Officer, OCO, from Chief, Technical Intelligence Section, in Ord. Tech. Int. Branch files.
state of affairs. Again elevated to branch status, the Intelligence Branch (since renamed the Technical Intelligence Branch) was placed along with the Security and Safety Branches in the newly created IS&S Office. Its enlarged Collection and Dissemination Section immediately commenced the operation of cataloging and abstracting the tremendous backlog of old intelligence and the ever mounting number of new reports. The section was charged under the new organisation with procuring and distributing all available technical intelligence reports pertinent to the Ordnance Corps; maintaining a library of these reports, and an appropriate locating system; conducting liaison with G-2 and other intelligence offices in the Washington area and arranging for the mutual exchange of intelligence information; and numerous other coordinating functions. An example of the scope of the unit's operations can be gleaned from the fact that by the end of 1952 approximately 50,000 documents had been circulated and distributed and some 1,500 individual requests for reports on Ordnance information had been satisfied.

The branch's Technical Intelligence Section (since renamed the Material Section) was assigned the task of collecting, maintaining, producing, and disseminating technical intelligence concerning the capabilities, performance, design, and development of foreign ordnance materiel. The section was also charged with the responsibility of providing technical guidance for Ordnance Technical Intelligence Teams and preparing technical aids required for the maximum exploitation and use of ordnance material. Additional duties included coordination with
exploitation program, and maintenance of inventory records for the collation of requirements, receipt, and disposition of all captured foreign material needed by the Ordnance Corps for intelligence and test purposes. The Material Section is augmented by the branch's Ordnance Technical Intelligence Office, located at Aberdeen Proving Ground. By the end of 1952, the two units had issued 28 works on Soviet ordnance materiel. These included 11 firing tables for mortars and field, antiaircraft, and combat vehicle artillery; 4 users' guides for machine guns and mortars; 8 pamphlets dealing with ammunition markings, ammunition interchangeability, and weapons field stripping; 4 training charts on rifles, machine guns, and antitank rifles; and a catalog of all known types of Soviet ammunition.

The branch's Strategic Section (since renamed the Logistics Section) was established in order to furnish the Ordnance segment of intelligence required of all technical services under the Army Intelligence Program. In addition to producing intelligence specifically requested by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, under this program, the section was also charged with the responsibility of compiling country studies of evaluated intelligence on foreign ordnance holdings; supply and storage, maintenance, manufacturing facilities, research and development, and all factors that would affect Ordnance operations abroad. The need for such a service had been foreseen by the Chief of

3/ See Appendix B, Inclosure 1 -- Organization Chart, Technical Intelligence Branch.
Ordnance long before the commencement of Korean operations, but budget limitations had precluded its establishment until mid-1950. By the end of 1952 the Logistics Section had compiled 15 ordnance country studies, of which the more important were published and distributed to Department of Defense offices concerned. The others were retained in draft form in the section files for future use in Ordnance operation planning and plan execution. In fulfillment of the Army Intelligence Program, the Logistics Section had produced 11 NIS contributions and numerous reports, O-2 Intelligence Review articles, and special studies.

1 January - 30 June 1953

The first six months of the year 1953 constituted a period in which operations continued generally unchanged, except for revisions instituted to perfect office techniques and improve unit services. The Collection and Dissemination Section compiled an SOP covering all phases of the section's operations. Four months were required to complete the manual, which is 349 pages in length. This work, together with an up-to-date functional chart, has greatly simplified work procedures, has standardized operations wherever possible and has afforded the section's personnel ready access to the details of everyday procedure and office policy. During this period the section received, cataloged, abstracted, and circulated within the Ordnance Corps over 12,000 reports.

1/ See letter from Chief of Ordnance to Intelligence Division, dtd 8 September 1948, in Ord. Int. Branch files.
of which over 5,000 were routed to the production sections of the
branch. The unit also processed almost 500 requests for information
from offices outside of the branch, and performed numerous functions
necessary for the efficient operation of an intelligence collection
and dissemination facility.

The Material Section, in conjunction with the Ordnance Technical
Intelligence Office at Aberdeen Proving Ground, continued the production
of technical publications in addition to its other duties. During this
period, Volume X of Section I (USSR) of the Department of Army Pamphlet
on Foreign Military Weapons was produced. Other publications included
the Soviet Fuze Manual; the Soviet Projectile Identification Guide;
Complete Round Data for Soviet Ammunition, Bombs, Grenades, and Rockets;
and contributions to the Frankford Arsenal Memorandum on Metallurgical
Examination of Soviet Cartridge Cases, the Watertown Laboratory Reports
on Metallurgical Examination on Soviet Production, and the G-2
Intelligence Review. A special text on Soviet rifles and carbines was
receiving final editing at the Aberdeen OTIO at the end of June. A
compilation of items of captured material needed by the Ordnance Corps
for intelligence and test purposes, was completed, and the first list
was published and distributed on 1 July 1953. This project will be
continued in order to keep field collection agencies informed of current
requirements; a second list is scheduled to be published and distributed
early in October 1953.
The Logistics Section, during this period, forwarded to the G-2 office two NIS contributions on Communist China, and one each for Bulgaria, Burma, Nationalist China, Iraq, and Poland. NIS contributions on six other countries were being prepared at the end of June. The section also reviewed drafts for the Ordnance portion of Series A Handbooks on France, Turkey, and Yugoslavia; submitted two feature articles to the G-2 Intelligence Review; wrote special reports as requested by G-2; briefed and debriefed Military Attaches and MAG personnel; and compiled an SOP for the Logistics Section. An ordnance country study on Portugal was published and disseminated during the first half of the year and a similar work on the Netherlands was in the hands of the printer at the close of the period. At the end of June, country studies were being readied for publication on Norway, Italy, and the Communist Zone of Germany. A study on the United Kingdom was awaiting final review, pending the receipt of information requested from the Military Attache; country studies were also being prepared on Communist China and Bulgaria.

Unsolved Branch Problems

The outstanding and apparently unsurmountable obstacle thwarting maximum efficiency continues to be the shortage of personnel at various levels. In spite of every effort by the supervisory staff to streamline procedures and eliminate extraneous operations, the continuation of the rigid personnel ceiling had hindered the implementation of several basic
Supervisors and Intelligence Specialists are frequently compelled to type their reports and to perform other incidental duties because of the shortage of typists and clerks.

The Collection and Dissemination Section is unable to prepare an inventory of all file cases and to properly retire obsolete files to the Archives. The section has also been unable to keep its locator system reasonably current.

The Material Section, faced with the task of covering all foreign Ordnance material with a staff of only five Research Specialists, has concentrated on equipment of the USSR. The coverage of ordnance material of other countries -- Satellite, friendly, and neutral -- has suffered accordingly. A partial solution to this problem, but hardly a satisfactory one, has been achieved by condoning the performance of some functions in other offices less qualified to produce Ordnance intelligence. Thus, the fields of mines and explosives are covered by the Intelligence Branch of the Engineer Corps. A similar situation exists in the Logistics Section. The NIS segment dealing with the armament industry is being produced elsewhere, notwithstanding the fact that this section is best qualified to produce the required intelligence. A maintenance program on Ordnance country studies cannot be instituted because of the higher priority assigned to the production of new country studies and the fulfillment of G-2 requests under the Army Intelligence Program. Moreover, fifteen country studies on areas of lesser
In spite of the personnel shortages, and the adverse summer working conditions in Pentagon Annex II, the Technical Intelligence Branch is continuously improving its production effort so far as quality and quantity is concerned. This has been made possible by the selection of employees more than casually interested in their work, by the emphasis placed upon personnel training, and by the constant effort to devise better methods to accomplish the branch mission.
Project Number: NND 911590

RG  Entry No.  Box No.
156

RG 156: RECORDS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE

Executive Office

Historical Branch


IS & S Office

July 1951 thru June 1953

BOX C 8