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Matthew Walker
University of Nebraska - Lincoln

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THE LOST ART OF INTERDEPENDENCY: UNITED NATIONS LEADERSHIP IN THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956 AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS IN WORLD AFFAIRS

By
Matthew Walker

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THE LOST ART OF INTERDEPENDENCY: UNITED NATIONS LEADERSHIP IN THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956 AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Matthew Walker, Ph.D.
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Advisor: Thomas Borstelmann

The following study examines the relationship between competing national interests and the implementation of multilateral diplomacy as characterized by the United Nations. Although primary attention focuses on the events Suez Crisis of 1956, the scope of work analyzes this dichotomy from the Suez Canal’s construction to the post-Suez era of the 1960s. Adopting a more comprehensive approach to understanding the crisis and its impact on international diplomacy provides adds a new and timely perspective to scope of the crisis and the complexities of conflict resolution.

In many respects, the diplomatic maneuvering of the nineteenth century remained a constant in diplomatic exchange leading up to the Suez crisis. As the canal’s architect, Ferdinand de Lesseps marginalized international differences in order to win support for the fulfillment his own ambitions. De Lesseps’s tactics gained in popularity throughout the remainder of the century as British politicians and early Zionists presented their particular interests as broader, universal goals. This became the operational model for many twentieth century leaders and diplomats. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, President Eisenhower, and U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles used similar methods to in order to enlist support for their Cold War agenda. Egyptian Prime Minster Gamal Abdel Nasser and other nationalists usurped pluralistic initiatives to serve state
interests. Virtually all of these efforts heightened international tensions within and between blocs of interests.

Concomitant with these developments, some members of the international community engaged in more genuine multilateral diplomatic pursuits. International civil servants inside the United Nations, including UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, advanced ideas that placed the international interest above the agenda of any single country. During the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Lebanon Crisis of 1958, and the Congo Crisis of 1960, this diplomatic alternative helped defuse tensions.

Rather than encourage independent multilateralism, national leaders established closer relations with non-government organizations through which they could continue to exercise influence without sacrificing control. After the Suez crisis, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the European Economic Community (EEC) all sought greater conformity. The sense of interdependency was lost.
A multitude of masters is no good thing; let there be one master, one king . . . .

--Agamemnon from *The Iliad*
For Friends and Family
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Introduction

At various stages throughout international history, competing interests have exerted themselves to influence a larger whole. World leaders during the Suez Crisis of 1956 and many historians since then have examined the event as a competition between various spheres of influence or conflicting perspectives within like-minded blocs. While insightful, these arguments often overshadow the United Nations and the pivotal role it has played in quarantining crisis. The following study probes this relationship by investigating the effects of intolerant interests throughout the history of the Suez Canal, how the United Nations reversed these effects ever so briefly during the height of the Suez crisis in 1956, and the return to the status quo ante bellum as national leaders created new institutions supplanting the UN’s success. Understanding the Suez crisis from this perspective demonstrates the successful interaction of viewpoints inside the United Nations that recognized the need for more inclusive diplomacy, how multilateral dialogue resolved this particular conflict more effectively than traditional methods, and the various lengths to which national leaders attempted to monopolize multilateral diplomacy.

As United Nations Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld dedicated himself to transforming the United Nations into an independent institution responsible for providing an internationalist alternative in the mediation of crises. He stressed the monumental discipline international civil servants required in order to maintain their objective integrity. During a lecture at Oxford University in 1961, Hammarskjöld remarked that the international civil servant must remain cognizant of his or her “sympathies” and must
prevent them from influencing the individual’s actions. Should conflict arise from upholding this perspective, Hammarskjöld argued, then it would be the result of adhering to neutrality rather than deviating from it.\(^1\) The organization’s success lay in the ability of its member states to abide by similar principles. When he became UN Secretary General in 1953, Hammarskjöld called for member states to subordinate national interests to broader international interests.\(^2\) Operating from this premise required that vigilant attention be paid to policing one’s own interests and segregating them from influencing the interests of the international community.

Instead of embracing this viable alternative, national leaders sponsored initiatives portraying national interests as emblematic of a broader, multilateral agenda. As historian A.G. Hopkins proclaims, “Where international themes are recognized, they are often treated as spare parts that have to be bolted on to the national story.” This leads to “nationalizing internationalism, by treating the wider world as an extension of narrower national interests.”\(^3\) Many policy-makers from around the globe operated from this presupposition. As John Ikenberry contends in his book, *After Victory*, America’s post-World War II policy-makers imbued multilateralism with an understanding of “the American experience and a thoroughly going understanding of history, economics, and the sources of political order.”\(^4\)

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National leaders from around the globe viewed international affairs from a similar self-interested perspective. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and several of his advisers maintained intrusive imperialist policies in the Middle East that preceded his administration by roughly seventy-five years. Such intransigence stemmed from the colonial possessions both British and French officials considered essential for economic recovery following World War II. Meanwhile, emerging nationalists, such as Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser, extended influence by nationalizing domestic institutions and industries while simultaneously attempting to monopolize pan-Arab organizations including the Arab League. During the Suez crisis, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion took a hard-line Zionist approach as adamant in its stance over the Sinai region as Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalism.


In many respects, these leaders simply wished to create the best circumstances for fulfilling their respective national interests. These motives are understandable and continue to dominate the scope and scholarship of international relations. The competing national interests involved in the Suez crisis have been thoroughly researched and analyzed. Peter Hahn’s investigation of U.S., British, and Egyptian relations addresses the factors and personalities that directed U.S. foreign policy making in the Middle East during the first decade of the Cold War. Hahn argues that the Eisenhower administration’s Cold War focus was responsible for failures in U.S. foreign policy in the region.\(^6\) In her book *Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy*, Diane Kunz discusses the interconnectivity between “guns and butter” and uses various events throughout the Cold War, including the Suez crisis, as case studies. With regard to economic policies, Kunz concludes that British and Israeli economies were particularly susceptible to U.S. sanctions while the Egyptian economy was “totally immune.” The successful resolution of the crisis, and the perceived role the U.S. played in it, left Eisenhower’s successors and their fellow Americans inflating the strategic value of economic sanctions. As Kunz put it, “Sanctions appeared to offer all the benefits of military action with none of the disadvantages.”\(^7\) Although Hahn and Kunz analyze different aspects of the Suez crisis, both scholars agree that, the Cold War policies


initiated by the U.S. government bare some of the responsibility for the escalation of the Suez crisis.

What has received less attention is the repeated efforts made by these competing national interest and their attempts to represent a broader, international interest as it relates directly to the Suez crisis. The prevailing context in which the Suez crisis occurred was one where national leaders interchanged their specific national agendas with international peace and security. As John Ikenberry points out in his study of the U.S.’s relationship to multilateralism, “institution building” has served as a cornerstone in U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy-making of the twentieth century. Ikenberry concludes that U.S. policymakers understood the benefits of limiting their own “policy autonomy,” that membership in international organizations required, in order to “[lock] other states into enduring policy positions.” The underlying assumption, as described earlier, is that the “other states” must adhere to the U.S.’s perspective of multilateralism.

When states or organizations strayed from this underlying assumption, U.S. policymakers reacted with considerable ambivalence, if not outright condemnation. Given this highly-conditional context, U.S. foreign policy has worked at cross purposes. As Stewart Patrick, Research Associate at New York University, surmised, “the [U.S.] has been the world’s leading champion of multilateral cooperation and, paradoxically, one of the greatest impediments to such cooperation.” The Suez Crisis of 1956 exposed this paradox not only with regard to U.S. policymakers, but also regarding the policymakers of numerous other countries.

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The divide emerging during the Suez crisis, between Hammarskjöld’s internationalist orientation and the dominant interests of particular national leaders, raises provocative questions that deserve close attention. Placed within an international context where national governments advertised their own brands of multilateralism, how could Hammarskjöld and the United Nations play such an effective role in crisis resolution? What were the competing visions of multilateral diplomacy and how convincing were they in the eyes of the international community? What is the history behind these views as they relate to the Suez crisis? What are the lasting effects of the Suez crisis as seen from this internationalist perspective? These are some of the more pressing questions that this examination addresses.

Attention to conformity, as expressed in matters of national security, wreaked havoc with more popular matters promoting international opinion. After 1945, world leaders adopted policies that desperately tried to disguise internationally unpopular national agendas with internationally popular notions of interdependency. The Suez crisis reflected this strategy. Writing in 1961, historian Daniel Boorstin described the phenomenon as advancing a particular nation’s “‘prestige’” by making the country’s worldview palpable to others.10 For example, British officials adjusted their post-1945 colonial policy-making to convey “a benign imperial image [to] assuage the latent forces of anti-imperial opinion.”11 Clearly, such an approach hoped to undermine anti-imperial

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sentiment around the globe—but equally important was the fact that this policy also manipulated popular opinion to serve Britain’s national interest.

II

Evidence supporting nearly universal attitudes of conformity date back to the Suez Canal’s construction; but post World War II events, including the Iranian crisis of 1953 and the creation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, directly contributed to the Suez crisis. Mohammad Mossadegh’s election as Iran’s Prime Minister in 1951 signified that country’s impulsive desire for self-determination. Soon after taking office and hearing of British business leaders’ rejection of proposals calling for more equitable oil profit-sharing, Mossadegh nationalized Iran’s oil production, snatching oil industry possessions from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s (AIOC) control without compensation. The frustration American officials felt towards their British counterparts yielded to urgent fears over the effect Iranian nationalization might have on other oil-producing states holding U.S. concessions. Truman and Eisenhower administration officials responded by boycotting Iranian crude oil shipments and halting Justice Department investigations into anti-trust activities within America’s largest oil companies.12 International criticism of Western business practices led to greater domestic consensus in the United States

When Mossadegh attempted to bluff the West into ending its boycott by making overtures to the Soviet Union, U.S. officials organized the overthrow of Mossadegh’s government. Iran’s new and Western-friendly regime created a “multinational [oil]

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consortium” consisting of four countries: Iran, the United States, Britain, and France. Together, the United States and Britain reconsolidated their control over 80% of Iran’s oil production. Using “ multinational” agreements as a front permitted great powers to legitimize and protect national interests at the expense of the Iranian peoples’ desire for greater autonomy.

Formation of a regional security network served as the next opportunity for using multilateral means to achieve unilateral ends. Installation of a nationalist-oriented regime in Egypt, in which Nasser played a prominent role, led to a 1954 treaty requiring the withdrawal of British forces from Egypt by 1956. Eager to compensate for its loss of influence in the most powerful Arab country, British officials searched for alternative allies in the Middle East. Attention centered on Iraq after U.S. officials looked to include Iraq in a defensive military alliance designed to prevent communist infiltration into the Middle East. Known as the Northern Tier, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan would form the backbone of the Middle East Command (MEC). Within a month of its creation, Britain joined what it referred to as the Baghdad Pact in the spring of 1955.

Through this mutual defense agreement, British officials satisfied two key security concerns. First, British military strategists retained the right to intervene in Middle Eastern affairs. Any act of aggression against Britain’s Middle East interests was subject to legitimate retaliation under this agreement. Second, they could exert influence without deploying their own military resources needed to enforce it. The Middle East

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15 The alliance of these states goes by several names including the Northern Tier, the Baghdad Pact, the Middle East Command (MEC), the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).
Command was an American Cold War initiative; the United States was responsible for providing it with the necessary military hardware. As a result, British officials could execute strategic objectives without depleting their own military resources.

The British government’s success in securing a continued presence in the Middle East also succeeded in raising the stakes among competing national interests by superseding international unity. In many respects, this strategy perpetuated the status quo. Since the end of the First World War, British and French competition for power in the region led British officials to encourage Arab protests against French rule while simultaneously accentuating British benevolence in the region. After the Second World War, the British government yielded to U.S. and French demands for greater access to the Middle East and its oil reserves. L.J. Butler, a scholar in contemporary British history, contends that this realization strengthened amicable relations between Britain and the Arab world.

The undermining of a regional collective security arrangement detracts from Butler’s conclusion, however. American allies cringed after hearing of British participation in the Baghdad Pact. Old colonial relationships that had exploited Arabs tainted efforts to construct new Cold War alliances. Under these circumstances,

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18 Historians debate America’s tolerance of the colonial policies of their Western European allies. John Lewis Gaddis argues that Eisenhower and Dulles walked a tight-rope between imperialist and anti-imperialist activity. “The United States,” he writes, “found itself . . . in the awkward position of having to balance its anti-colonialism against its alliances [with imperial powers]. Tilting too far in either direction—by alienating new friends in the Middle East or old friends in Western Europe—could create openings for a Soviet threat that would endanger them both.” See John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 165. Richard Immerman shares similar views but sees the matter as one dominated by America’s anti-communist interests. See Richard Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1999), p. 155. Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley draw similar conclusions by
nationalists such as Nasser saw little incentive to endorse Cold War agendas or, more importantly, to sacrifice his own interests in exchange for perceived British benevolence. Apprehensive of Nasser’s involvement in Algeria’s war for independence and further imperial erosion, French officials disapproved of any type of Middle East military alliance. British policy-makers may have addressed pressing security concerns, but they did so at the cost of international clout among allies and adversaries alike.

French efforts to keep its North African colony of Algeria in 1954 only confirmed Nasser’s suspicions. Where British strategists perfected the art of subtle, diplomatic maneuvering in the Arab world by the 1950s, French officials unleashed the full fury of their military to rein in Algerian separatists. As one historian put it, “the Algerian War was . . . a conflict of peculiar brutality which helped institutionalize torture in the armies, police and security forces of countries that purported to be civilized.”


Egyptian arms shipments to Algerian rebels further infuriated French commanders. In addition to fulfilling Nasser’s pledge to assist Arab neighbors in need, Egyptian weapons shipments combined with French torture accelerated the pace with which French strategists were losing control of the war. Faced with the news that Nasser agreed to barter Soviet munitions for Egyptian cotton, French officials wrestled with the prospect that the Algerian conflict could become a war of attrition.

The proliferation of conventional weapons in the Middle East added to the sense of insecurity in the international community. Ever since Israel’s independence in 1948, policy-makers in Washington aimed to thwart moves towards a regional arms race between Arabs and Israelis. Maintaining this precarious status quo proved illusive. As early as 1950, American and British diplomats had tried unsuccessfully to create a military alliance with Egypt. The prospect of Egypt’s military acquiring modern, Western weapons was tantalizing to Egyptian officials; but President Eisenhower’s insistence that Egyptian leaders place Cold War regional interests above national interests made the proposed tripartite coalition untenable. Eager to retaliate against Nasser for Egypt’s support of Algerian rebels and Egypt’s securing Soviet munitions, the French government—with American consent—authorized the selling of weapons to Israel in early 1956. Much like British policy, Washington’s leaders experienced an ironic twist

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where American policies of enforcing an arms embargo conflicted with its attempts to build regional alliances.\textsuperscript{25}

To their credit, American officials attempted to entice Nasser with modernization projects such as providing funds for construction of the Aswan Dam. Infrastructural improvements such as this one aimed to limit Soviet influence in Egypt while providing humanitarian relief through socio-economic development. Regrettably, the terms American, British, and World Bank officials applied to the loans undercut the proposal’s intent. Nasser welcomed the West’s aid in advancing Egyptian self-sufficiency, but could not agree to the West’s intrusive terms. World Bank involvement in the affairs of the Egyptian treasury resurrected disturbing memories of foreign domination. In order to participate in socio-economic development, Nasser had to conform to Western standards of international finance. Additional stipulations calling for an Arab-Israeli peace agreement contributed to Nasser’s distain.\textsuperscript{26} While perhaps reasonable to Western interests, interference in financial and security matters could not be interpreted by Nasser as anything other than a loss of Egyptian sovereignty.

In both foreign and domestic matters, Eisenhower’s chief concern was focused on maintaining order. Much like his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, the president operated from a mindset where enforcing order would be restrained so long as everyone agreed to his brand of authority and amenable to his pace of change. With regard to the process of decolonization, Eisenhower adopted a protracted approach. Although the

\textsuperscript{25} Historian John Lewis Gaddis draws similar conclusions. See footnote #8.

\textsuperscript{26} Although Douglas Little credits Nelson Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger, and Walt Rostow with wielding development aid as an instrument to combat communism, it is easy to see that such policies stemmed from the Eisenhower administration. Regardless of form, American initiatives remained fixated on self-interest by making modernization synonymous with Cold War conformity. See Little, \textit{American Orientalism}, pp. 169 and 195-196. Peter Hahn identifies how American officials continued “subordinating” Egyptian nationalism to the needs of U.S. regional security concerns, which persisted throughout the Suez crisis. Hahn, \textit{The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956}, pp. 243, 246-247.
president’s pace of change differed from that of international allies, such as Britain and France, and domestic ones, such as southern segregationists, Eisenhower afforded a greater degree of leniency. Those provoking greater suspicion, including Nasser and other members of the non-white world, were rebuked more readily. One reason for this intolerance stemmed from the fact that, according to anti-colonist Aimé Césaire, Africans and Asians requested modern facilities while the West remained noncompliant. “The colonized man [wanted] to move forward, and the colonizer [held] things back.”27 Given this context, the premise that Eisenhower required others to submit to his sense of order and worldview, and the racial bias accompanying it, only perpetuated the protests of those he alienated.28 As Albert Memmi wrote in his classic work *The Colonizer and the Colonized* first published in 1957, “racism . . . is the highest expression of the colonial system and one of the most significant features of the colonialist.”29 In an era defined in part by the pace of decolonization, Eisenhower’s actions were responsible in part for the escalation of unrest.

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III

Failure to recognize and respond to the particular interests of other countries exacerbated tensions and, therefore, the potential for conflict. By the spring of 1956, American and British policy-makers began distancing themselves from Nasser. The West’s withdrawal of funds for the Aswan Dam project in mid-July showed a lack of consideration for Nasser’s concerns. With few resources at his disposal, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. Redirecting canal tolls from the Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal to the Egyptian treasury meant that Nasser could still prepare for the Aswan Dam’s construction, all while flaunting his authority as an Arab leader in the face of European imperial impotence. For these reasons, the circumstances proved ideal for Nasser. His public declaration on 26 July 1956 transformed the last monument to British imperial authority into a symbol of Egyptian and Arab empowerment.

While Nasser’s act may have appeared bold and rash, it served also as a designation of the lengths to which world leaders went to guarantee their own interests. In preparation for his socio-economic coup, Nasser kept his intentions even from his own advisers. When he unveiled his plan, he did so not to invite debate but to enlist support. Dissenting voices were quieted.\(^{30}\) Indeed, Nasser’s governing philosophy left little room for alternative perspectives. For example, in outlining his strategy for Egypt and its Arab neighbors, Nasser’s plea for greater Arab unity required a more homogeneous “public

\(^{30}\) Mohamad Heikal, *Cutting the Lion’s Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes* (New York: Arbor House, 1987), p. 124. This is not to say that Nasser’s plan was flawed. Indeed, he demonstrated considerable ingenuity and resolve. However, the process by which he arrived at his decision reflects those of his rivals.
opinion.”\textsuperscript{31} Dissension from Nasser’s pan-Arab ideology was impermissible.

Independence movements such as the ones in Algeria and Palestine became early instruments of Nasser’s pan-Arab cause. Arab institutions that competed against Nasser became targets for reprisal.\textsuperscript{32} Much like Eisenhower, Nasser was not alone in his desire to consolidate consensus.

Rather than work towards peaceful accords, the initial rounds of diplomacy during the Suez crisis operated from the presupposition that Egypt must relinquish control of the canal. During a National Security Council meeting in early August 1956, Vice President Richard Nixon suggested drafting “management contracts . . . providing for Egyptian sovereignty and Western management.” Citing evidence to support his case, Nixon described how successful negotiations between the U.S. and the Philippine government permitted U.S. use of military bases in the pacific archipelago in exchange for respecting Philippine sovereignty.\textsuperscript{33} Dulles broadened the scope of this idea by proposing that the Suez Canal function as an international waterway, governed by the international community.

The negotiations that endorsed Dulles’s scheme, known as the First and Second London Conferences, provided little hope of avoiding conflict. Interpreting any collective administration of the canal as “‘joint colonialism,’” Nasser refused to


participate in a conference that rejected Egypt’s claims of unconditional ownership of the canal.\textsuperscript{34} When a diplomatic mission presented Nasser with the conferences’ recommendations, tempers flared.

British Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s decision to initiate military preparations only compounded the degree of disingenuousness. Within a week of Nasser’s seizing the canal, Eden and his advisors began concentrating forces and supplies needed for an invasion.\textsuperscript{35} The coordination Israel’s invasion of the Sinai Peninsula and Western Europe’s response calling for a cease-fire and deployment of military personnel to secure the Suez Canal alarmed the international community.\textsuperscript{36} The prospect of British and French forces occupying the Canal Zone overshadowed and discredited their sense of moral legitimacy of acting on the international community’s behalf. Yet, this was precisely the argument French and British delegations made in defense of their countries’ actions.

Fearing a rapid escalation of hostilities, matters surrounding the Suez crisis moved to the UN Security Council and then to the General Assembly. Ironically, the

\textsuperscript{34} The term “‘joint colonialism’” was also quoted as “‘collective colonialism’” or “‘international colonialism.’” See Schnee to State Department, Cairo, “‘Collective Colonialism’ phrase,” 17 August 1956, RG 59, General Records of the State Dept., #974.7301/8-1756, Box #5354, National Archives, Washington, D.C.


\textsuperscript{36} Such was the case for Britain’s enemies and allies. As T.B. Millar writes word of the British and French ultimatum “was a shock to [fellow members of the British Commonwealth.]” See T.B. Millar, \textit{The Commonwealth and the United Nations} (Sydney, Australia: Sydney University Press, 1967), p. 65.
British and French delegations’ posturing used diplomatic channels to legitimize the need for military intervention rather than prevent it. Unconvincing as these arguments were, French and British status as permanent members of the Security Council guaranteed deadlock. The non-permanent Yugoslav delegate’s motion to move debate to the General Assembly marked a pivotal shift in the resolution of the crisis, however.

Decision-making shifted from smaller, exclusive groups, which the London Conferences and UN Security Council characterized, to a larger, inclusive, and more multilateral forum. As Uruguay’s UN Representative Enrique Rodrigues Fabregat opined during the General Assembly debates, “We [UN member states] all thought that after the signing of the UN Charter in San Francisco the use of force in the old arbitrary way had become a thing of the past.” India’s UN delegate Arthur Lall echoed his colleague’s views saying that “this violent approach to the safeguarding of vital interests is . . . plunging the world into chaos.”37 These sentiments resonated throughout the UN General Assembly during the emergency sessions pertaining to the Suez crisis. Besides focusing attention on a renewed faith in international diplomacy, this popular perspective challenged the subordinate status multilateral diplomacy played in advancing national interests.

IV

This new role for the United Nations evolved from several sources that challenged the prevailing trends preoccupied with securing self-interested conditions. For example,

the Asian Relations Conference (ARC) of 1947 provided a forum whereby newly independent Asian countries, including most notably India and China, discussed regional security concerns free from their respective interpretations of world order. According to historian A.W. Stargardt, attendees to the ARC voiced their own individual concerns, enhancing the diversity within national delegations, while simultaneously diminishing advocacy for a particular national interest. ARC’s chairperson Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru understood nationalism’s role but argued that “it must not be allowed [to obstruct] international development.” Contemporary historians interpret these thoughts as the earliest expressions of post-WW II “globalization.” In addition to enhancing international dialogue, the mentality emerging from the ARC offered an alternative to the rigid, doctrinal assumptions of states preoccupied with their own security concerns.

The goodwill emanating from the ARC helped inspire the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the launching of the non-aligned movement. This new collection of states emerged independently from U.S. and Soviet Cold War paradigms, European colonialism, and other contexts where national interest reigned supreme. While susceptible to ideological bickering between communist and anti-communist perspectives, the Bandung Conference represented more eclectic interests that challenged Cold War or colonialist ambitions. As Sir John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon, put it during his opening remarks at Bandung:

> The pass to which humanity has been brought by the domination and doctrine of force is the most vivid demonstration of the bankruptcy of

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force. Of what advantage is it to hold sway over vast territories, to have at one’s command innumerable armies, to be able at the touch of a button to unleash the deadliest weapons science can invent, if, with all this, we are unable to rid ourselves of fear and hysteria and despair?  

Put another way, the methods powerful nations used on weak ones were self-defeating. Instead of assimilation, blind pursuit of national interests only bred international anxiety. In many cases, international organizations such as the United Nations acted as a counterweight combating these fears by intervening in crises on behalf of a more collective set of interests.

The complexities surrounding the UN’s mission also reflected those aspects of its new leadership. After his election as United Nations Secretary General in the spring of 1953, Dag Hjalmar Agre Carl Hammarskjöld began moving the organization in the direction of this new pluralistic philosophical approach. However, the transformation was not as smooth as previous analysts have depicted. As so many scholars have described, Hammarskjöld was somewhat of an enigma. On the one hand, he entered office with a dedicated sense of “interdependent principles.” On the other hand, he based these principles on his traditional European heritage of “liberal democracy.” Unapologetic in wanting to assert UN authority, Hammarskjöld nevertheless respected traditional avenues of direct diplomacy between states. He understood the United Nations’ paradoxical role as a forum where states willingly transferred power to the

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41 Taken from Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain*, p. 143.
world body to pressure member states into obeying the principles of the UN Charter. Hammarskjöld revered the Charter, proclaiming at one point that the principles within the Charter eclipsed the organization responsible for enacting them. As a result, Hammarskjöld remained, on the one hand, a deeply committed international civil servant who, on the other hand, seemed reluctant to seize the initiative yet wielded it skillfully once invited to do so. While contradictory, these dynamic qualities contributed to Hammarskjöld’s uncanny ability to gain a multilateral understanding of international conflicts.

Hammarskjöld’s upbringing and early career influenced his philosophical approach to international affairs. As the son of Sweden’s one-time Prime Minister and accomplished scholar of law and economics, Hammarskjöld developed an early sensitivity to politics and the diplomatic skills that came with it. His early professional experience was a blend of serving as a “nonpolitical [Swedish] civil servant” and as a representative to international institutions including the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. According to his biographer, Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld struggled with an unfulfilled sense of self that was not satiated “until he became [UN] Secretary General.” Hammarskjöld’s apolitical mindset, spurred on by his sense of destiny, served him well as the world’s leading international civil servant of the 1950s.

Evidence of Hammarskjöld’s pioneering efforts to reform the United Nations emerged within weeks of his taking office. Faced with Senator Joseph McCarthy’s

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Republican-Wisconsin) allegations of subversive conduct among the UN’s American staff members, Hammarskjöld trod delicately to win concessions allowing him to evaluate UN employees according to an independent set of standards instead of one dictated by UN member states. By 1955, Communist China’s sentencing of American airmen captured during the Korean War and Algeria’s revolt against French colonial rule, launched about the same time, provided Hammarskjöld and the UN with opportunities to represent a broader diplomatic perspective. Indeed, Hammarskjöld’s philosophy took root within the UN’s international bureaucracy precisely when national leaders were pursuing doctrinal world order most earnestly.

V

Critics of UN effectiveness may argue that the United Nations’ role during the Suez crisis merely reflected the status quo remedies of national interests acting through the General Assembly rather than the more traditional venue of the Security Council. To the critics’ credit, Hammarskjöld’s initial reluctance to assume a leading role in managing the crisis suggests that he wished for the Great Powers to resolve the dispute. As debate progressed in the General Assembly, however, a more dynamic set of delegates seized the initiative intent on galvanizing consensus. As Canada’s Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson negotiated with other UN delegations to enlist support for a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to re-establish peace in the wake of the Suez crisis.

War. While diplomatically creative, skeptics argue that Pearson’s ulterior motives sought to satisfy his national interests of repairing the breach in Anglo-American relations that the war had precipitated.\textsuperscript{48} However, other historians point out that Canadian officials disagreed with their British and American counterparts over the extent of UN participation as early as February 1956.\textsuperscript{49}

Equally important was the way in which Pearson campaigned for creating the UNEF. Instead of presenting his idea as a \textit{fait accompli}, Pearson canvassed delegates of the General Assembly for their input.\textsuperscript{50} Additionally, India’s representative to the UN, Arthur Lall, along with representatives from over a dozen other UN member states, championed the idea that Hammarskjöld organize cease-fire efforts in the Middle East. These proposals enjoyed overwhelming support in the General Assembly. Once charged with leading the peace effort, Hammarskjöld shed his hesitancy, committing his full attention and energy to the task at hand.

These initiatives proved particularly effective. The degree of transference and multilateralism exhibited in the peace agreements served as the main reason for successful conflict resolution. The diligent efforts of Pearson and Lall as well as many others oversaw deployment of the UN-sponsored emergency force designed to bring


peace to Suez while vowing to respect Egyptian sovereignty. In return, Nasser agreed to honor the canal’s significance as an international artery of world trade. As a result, the international community—including Britain and France—recognized Egypt’s jurisdiction while Egyptian officials enforced nearly unfettered access to the Canal Zone. In other words, the differing parties labored to uphold the interests of each other, leading to a more resilient peace agreement.

Steps taken towards enacting an Arab-Israeli peace agreement proved more complex. Deployment of the UNEF meant that a considerable portion of Egyptian-Israeli national security concerns became the UN’s responsibility. Though slow to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, Israeli forces respected the UNEF mandate establishing a buffer zone that separated the belligerents. UNEF diligence during its decade in the field virtually eliminated the abundant number of border clashes that had contributed to the heightening of Arab-Israeli tensions prior to the Suez crisis. The Arab-Israeli conflict remained, but the presence of UNEF succeeded in providing a measure of regional stability that has rarely been rivaled.

As the Suez crisis abated, leaders of the major powers moved rapidly to re-gain the initiative. The first step in doing so returned the United Nations to its subordinate status. The Eisenhower administration contributed to this effort when the president issued his foreign policy doctrine authorizing U.S. intervention in any confrontation in which Middle East countries requested assistance in defending against international

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51 Admittedly, the Egyptian government continued to deny canal access to Israeli ships or to those ships containing cargo bound for Israeli ports. Critics may conclude that Egyptian officials violated the spirit of the UN peace accords as well as other international agreements such as the Constantinople Convention of 1888, which guaranteed uninterrupted access to the Suez Canal at all times. However, this practice proved to be the norm rather than the exception. During both World Wars, British officials deprived German vessels access to the canal. See Arthur Goldschmidt, *Historical Dictionary of Egypt* (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1994), p. 77.
communism. Besides shoring up the U.S.’s national interests in the region, the Eisenhower Doctrine conveyed a remarkable lack of confidence in the UN’s ability to handle international crises.

When tensions flared in Lebanon in the summer of 1958, Hammarskjöld and the UN respected Eisenhower’s lead. The opportunity for multilateral action was lost. Lebanese Prime Minister Camille Chamoun could not afford to seem any less resolved than his country’s internal instability made him seem. Though beholden to UN principles and wishing to remain independent from pan-Arab regional politics, Chamoun was forced to request American intervention. Bound by its doctrine, the U.S. government could not entertain the suggestion of ideological input other than its own. Hammarskjöld respected these motives as he always had and—perhaps—as he should have; yet doing so marginalized the good faith upon which multilateral diplomacy constituted itself. Chamoun’s first choice to remain independent of alliances with more powerful states who could manipulate the Lebanese government was no longer an option. Had the United Nations acted in a capacity similar to that of the Suez crisis, Chamoun may have had an alternative that catered to his specific needs.

The United Nations enjoyed somewhat greater latitude in the Congo crisis of the early 1960s. At the dawn of the new decade, the Congo’s transition to independence was becoming a more erratic affair. As Belgian bureaucrats relinquished control, internal dissent between rival factions split the loyalties of the international community. The domestic and international rift posed new challenges for UN officials. Though successful in securing peace, UN efforts led by Hammarskjöld and Ralph Bunche came at a tragic cost. The organization’s prestige declined with Hammarskjöld’s unexpected death in

1961 and the refusal of some UN member states to fulfill their fiscal responsibilities in protest over the outcome of the Congo crisis. According to historian Jim Haskins, UN member states appeared to be “losing their commitment to world government.” The culmination of these circumstances makes the Congo crisis somewhat of a Pyrrhic victory for the United Nations.

VI

With the loss of the UN’s interdependent architect, world leaders turned their attention to expanding their influence over intergovernmental and quasi-governmental organizations in both domestic and international spheres. Domestically, Egyptian President Nasser monopolized numerous professional associations in pursuit of his monolithic, pan-Arab ambitions. Internationally, Nasser utilized the United Arab Republic and the Arab League to minimize dissenting voices from within the Arab world. By 1960, however, rival institutions such as the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) succeeded in dividing the Arab world between oil-rich and oil-poor states. France’s leaders embraced their European neighbors during the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EEC).

Numerous scholars have investigated the effects of private interests on globalization. Several specialists, such as John Lonsdale, conclude that private sector

exploitation has resulted in a “decivilizing form of globalization.” Like so many other post-Suez organizations, the EEC championed greater economic, social, and cultural unity among its members while simultaneously encouraging the integration of developing countries into the world community. Acceptance in the “world community” often involved newly independent countries strengthening ties to their one-time imperial overseers. For example, in 1958, French Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle created the French Community, where former French colonies were encouraged to seek reconciliation with France. “Such ties,” writes Frank Costigliola, “would demonstrate France’s worldwide interests and sympathy for former colonial peoples.” The resulting paradox left EEC members hailing the emergence of independent states in Asia and Africa while simultaneously marginalizing their significance by creating a new and exclusive supranationalist framework. U.S. policy-makers followed suit by creating institutions designed to advance the country’s ideological, cultural, and commercial interests. In doing so, senior government officials persisted in creating outlets where self-interest could be disguised in broader, universal terms.

Specialized institutions such as OPEC, the EEC, and others challenged more inclusive organization such as the United Nations in pursuing a multilateral agenda. These new international structures represented a narrow set of interests that world leaders favored over broader consensus located within the UN General Assembly. As a result,

decision-making within these exclusive circles replaced genuine debate within more multilateral forums. Thus, the single most important lesson emanating from the Suez crisis—the importance of open exchanges of diplomacy in crisis management—was lost.

VII

Several notable historians and other scholars of the Suez crisis have overlooked this aspect. Historians such as Peter Hahn, Cole Kingseed, Salim Yaqub, Amos Yoder, and others give varying degrees of credit to President Eisenhower and his administration for taking matters to the United Nations. Typically, the United States is cast as playing a leading role thwarting British, French, and Israeli belligerence. Matthew Holland argues that direct, unilateral military intervention on the part of the United States “could have prevented the British and French invasion and made America an Arab hero.” Only

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President Eisenhower’s campaign for re-election and Secretary of State Dulles’s severe health problems let this opportunity slip. The historical record, however, proves that these conclusions may be oversimplified. The administration’s initial inclination was to handle the matter through the London Conferences, which as mentioned earlier, placed preconditions on negotiations. Once the crisis turned to conflict, the U.S. delegation to the United Nations disagreed with the General Assembly’s mandated deployment of an impartial peacekeeping force. Instead, America’s UN ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. called for returning the Middle East to the status quo ante bellum. Yet, the deployment of the UNEF marked a significant shift in the status quo. Additionally, of all the calls for a cease-fire, including one by U.S. officials, the UN’s appeal was the only one all parties observed. Under these circumstances, the Eisenhower administration played a minor role in rallying the General Assembly and maximizing its influence.

Other historians use different means to reach similar conclusions. In his chapter titled “The United Nations Fails,” Herman Finer accuses Dulles of “‘stringing along’” Britain and France to mask his own cowardice in the face of “Russian power.” Contrary to more contemporary assessments, Finer implies that UN ineffectiveness in averting war resulted from decisions made by U.S. cabinet officials. By attributing UN success to U.S. actions, Finer disregards the General Assembly’s role as well as that of Hammarskjöld, Pearson, and Lall. Frederick Marks pays generous credit to Hammarskjöld’s abilities during the crisis but maintains that the United Nations remained

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59 Holland, *America and Egypt*, p. 121.
ineffective because national interests remained dominant.\textsuperscript{61} While accurate in assessing the aftermath of the Suez crisis, Marks’s analysis deprives the United Nations of due credit during the crisis itself. The multilateral diplomacy practiced in the early weeks of November 1956 superseded the interests of any one nation, however brief it may have been.

Non-Western historiography accentuates many of the same attitudes as Western historians. Similar to American scholars, Mohamed Heikal, one of Nasser’s most trusted advisors, agrees that the U.S. was largely responsible for organizing world pressure to force the removal of Israeli troops from Sinai. In another instance, Heikal describes a scene where Nasser implied that Hammarskjöld was little more than an unwitting puppet of American and Israeli interests.\textsuperscript{62} As a Senior Fellow at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem, Michael Oren describes a similar situation from the Israeli perspective. Defining the relationship between Israeli Prime Minister David-Ben Gurion and Hammarskjöld as “ambivalent adversaries,” Oren points out how Israel “harbored great resentment toward the UN.”\textsuperscript{63} According to historian Mark Kramer, the Soviets interpreted UN actions in Suez as a sign to accelerate unilateralist policies in Hungary.\textsuperscript{64} Clearly, numerous historians of the Suez crisis say little that is positive regarding United Nations involvement and relegate the world body to a dependent and often ridiculed role.

\textsuperscript{61} Frederick Marks, \textit{Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles} (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), pp. 128-129.
Comprehending the crisis from a multilateral perspective requires an overview of events relating to the Suez Canal and the UN’s involvement in the Suez crisis. Chapter One of my paper provides an overview of the relationship between national interests and multilateral dialog from mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. Particular attention addresses Ferdinand de Lesseps’s undaunted negotiations in promoting the Suez Canal project, its effects on British policy-making as well as an impressionable Zionist movement, and the various initiatives that contested this prevailing mindset as a more genuine multilateral perspective emerged in the postwar, post-colonial world. At a time when adversarial world powers huddled in their respective spheres of influence, new rival powers such as India and China initiated a dialog at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference (ARC). The ARC’s constructive meetings conveyed a willingness to negotiate openly, which slowly grew in popularity.

Chapter Two examines the continued growth of these popular trends and the concurrent pursuit of enforcing a stricter sense of world order by the leading world powers. During the Eisenhower administration, America’s Cold War security interests to preserve the status quo clashed with British and French imperial interests as well as Arab nationalist fervor and Israeli security concerns. These attitudes dictated policy formation and responses among the Western powers that escalated the likelihood of conflict. Rather than accommodate nationalist movements in Iran and Egypt and the diplomatic latitude that they required, leaders of Western governments interpreted these events by using their own nationally-interested criteria. Nasser’s adoption of identical standards in the case of
the Algerian War, the Czechoslovakian arms deal, the proposed Aswan Dam deal, and antagonizing border raids between Egypt and Israel made regional security nearly impossible. The irony involved in the headlong pursuit of security interests leading to greater insecurity left few alternatives for the genuine reconciliation of differences.

Fortunately, efforts to implement these rigid agendas coincided with the United Nations’ shift toward engaging in more multilateral diplomacy. When Dag Hammarskjöld was elected to the post of Secretary General, the organization succeeded in diffusing crises that individual nations had promulgated. One such example concerned American pilots held as prisoners in Communist China ever since the Korean War. Acting on behalf of international opinion and in the interest of good faith, Hammarskjöld negotiated the pilots’ release. Quick to transform their compliance into their own public relations victory, however, Chinese officials touted their benevolent goodwill at the Bandung Conference.

Named for the Indonesian city where the conference convened, the Bandung conference of 1955 became a forum where independent acclaim and interdependent cooperation co-existed. On the one hand, several prominent world leaders from the African-Asian bloc, including Nasser and Communist China’s Premier Zhou Enlai, manipulated the event to further their own goals. On the other hand, the meeting symbolized the emergence of the non-aligned nations’ intent on achieving socio-economic independence and exerting influence through international institutions such as the United Nations. Both the UN’s actions under Hammarskjöld and the Bandung Conference of 1955 demonstrated the complex divide between national interest and multilateralism around which the Suez crisis revolved.
The next three chapters address the Suez crisis and the concurrent Hungarian crisis. A meticulous investigation of the diplomatic deadlock encountered between Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 and the eruption of hostilities three months later reveals that static and erroneous perceptions only heightened tensions. Analysis of the London Conferences and the diplomatic maneuvering both outside and inside these meetings demonstrates how no national leader approached the problem with an adequate sense of objectivity. America’s preoccupation with re-establishing an antiquated status quo was mired in futility. British and French imperial interests secretly supported Israel’s quest for territorial security. Meanwhile, the Arab community in the Middle East consolidated themselves under Nasser’s pan-Arab banner. So self-consuming were these various interests that the UN played no role in the Suez crisis until October 1956. Once recruited to handle the crisis, UN officials focused on the alarming disintegration of border security between Israel and its neighbors rather than wade through the exhaustive ideologically-charged arguments.

Similar circumstances existed behind the Iron Curtain. Contrary to his spring 1956 speech in which he championed the concept of pluralist consensus, Nikita Khrushchev faced his own crisis when Poles and Hungarians began plotting a more independent course. Like Western leaders, Khrushchev stoked the fires of crisis by masking his desire for order beneath an illusive veneer of multilateral legitimacy. The resulting confusion dispirited Communist party subordinates who initially withdrew Soviet troops from Hungary only to return days later as the Suez crisis turned violent. The key difference between the Hungarian crisis and the Suez crisis was the UN’s temporary ascendance to power in Middle East matters.
Chapter Four focuses on the General Assembly’s discussion of the Suez crisis in late October and early November. The extensive emergency sessions leading to compromise and the creation of the first peacekeeping force demonstrate that agreement was not based on the assumptions of a select few, but rather reflected a broader consensus. As architect of the UNEF, Canada’s Foreign Minister Lester Pearson built a wide base of support prior to announcing his proposal. In conjunction with Pearson’s plan, India’s UN representative, Arthur Lall, and delegates from eighteen other nations introduced their own draft resolution charging Hammarskjöld with the task of overseeing the cease-fire process. As a result, re-establishing stability through more inclusive means promoted the likelihood of establishing a more resilient resolution.

Yet, as examined in Chapter Five, the triumph of multilateral diplomacy receded as national leaders manipulated the UN’s diplomatic success to benefit national interests. Short- and long-term consequences of the Suez crisis shared in marginalizing the UN’s role as a more dynamic, independent institution. The Eisenhower Doctrine and Treaty of Rome set the course for U.S. and European policy priorities. French reconciliation with Germany aimed to establish an economic order independent of American infringement. With British backing, America’s policy in the Middle East pursued well-established Cold War objectives hoping to contain communism via proxy allies. The Lebanese crisis of 1958 serves as an excellent example of how these Cold War concerns deprived Lebanon’s political leaders of alternatives that could be tailored to address their concerns. The Soviets followed much the same course as the Americans for the remainder of the Cold War. Pan-Arab nationalism quickly lost focus, consumed by more immediate local

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concerns: petroleum, the plight of the Palestinians, and the growing appeal of Islamic fundamentalism.

The growth of non-governmental and quasi-governmental organizations proved especially pivotal in advancing national interests. As a result of these efforts, the international harmony generated by the UN’s initiatives yielded to new, rival organizations. Appointed by the leadership of participating countries, executives within organizations such as OPEC and the EEC promoted uniformity of interests while ignoring serious ruptures within and between communities. OPEC paid little attention to matters outside the petroleum trade, leaving a seriously divided Arab society to cope with the new commercial classification between oil-producing and non-oil-producing states.66

In addition to commercial concerns, states began consolidating cultural authority. Where Europe’s Treaty of Rome supported economic development in places such as Africa on the one hand, the treaty promoted European supranational solidarity by coordinating social and cultural programs among its members to distinguish itself more clearly from the international community. Nasser employed similar tactics when implementing strategies to guarantee popular compliance with his political agenda. To thwart domestic infiltrations by political rivals such as the Society of Muslim Brothers, Nasser created a network of government-sponsored professional associations. By 1965, members of the United States Congress proposed federal funding for private organizations to extend cultural and economic goodwill around the globe.

Not surprisingly, some scholars warned of the consequences that disguising government policies as private initiatives might have on society and self-identity.

Assessing Hannah Arendt’s 1958 book, The Human Condition, scholar and author Peter

Watson believes that Arendt identifies “the essential difficulty with modern society:” people were becoming increasingly disconnected with politics and frustrated with the idea that an individual could not affect change in an increasingly interconnected world.67

In other words, the masses turned their backs on the promise of independent internationalism and reverted to finding sanctuary in the advancement of national interests. Astute intellectuals understood the dire consequences of such sentiments.

Writing in 1961, Daniel Boorstin warned that the United States suffered most from its “illusions” and urged his countrymen not to “make the world in our image.”68 Others, including Neil Postman, reiterated these concerns in the 1980s.69

IX

The warnings of past decades appear to be coming to fruition. Numerous scholars note the “intrinsic” role private organizations play in government policy making.70 While some organizations have aided in hard fought struggles for freedom and

equality and thereby enhanced “civil society,” these institutions have done so by creating an international relations environment emblematic of the governments sponsoring their activities. Instead of one, primary institution, such as the United Nations, where differing interests converge and negotiate, an abundance of institutions advance the principles of a particular set of interests. Where some historians herald the arrival of these NGOs as evidence of a burgeoning “global consciousness,” others describe how they can undermine moderate governments. 71 Contrary to the UN’s role during the Suez crisis, private associations act as the most popular instrument for states to antagonize other states rather than promote compromise. By 1998, government funding accounted for roughly 40 percent of NGO budgets. 72 Equally disturbing is the paradoxical nature of having a multitude of private groups encouraging economic and ideological uniformity while an institution such as the United Nations negotiates less successfully between disparate groups. 73 Eager to remain relevant, the UN works closely with private organizations at the expense of its own influence. As a result, interdependency among differing points of view becomes a lost art.

Comprehensive investigation of the Suez crisis from this perspective requires the use of several archival resources. Transcripts of UN Security Council and General
Assembly meetings including analysis of emergency sessions pertaining to the Suez and Hungarian crises are extremely valuable. These records are available electronically at various regional repositories including the New York Public Library and the Library of Congress. UN Annual Reports also offer additional insight into Hammarskjöld’s sense of institutional mission. Records within the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library provide a thorough understanding of the attitudes taken by senior executive branch officials as well as cabinet and national security staff. Materials located at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland record the views and perspectives of U.S. embassy staff and provide first-hand reactions to international developments. Combined with the wealth of narratives, biographies, and collected primary documents regarding the Suez crisis and its aftermath, the lost art of interdependent diplomacy becomes a matter deserving greater attention as the effects of international affairs grow more immediate.

Viewed from this perspective, a new understanding emerges from the UN’s involvement in the Suez Crisis of 1956. More than any other example, the organization’s participation in resolving the crisis demonstrated its ability to act independently of any one set of interests—particularly the interests of the five permanent members of the Security Council. With this in mind, world order is a concept that is better achieved through multilateral diplomacy rather than through the nationally-interested concerns of a particular nation. More inclusive approaches, involving the UN’s perceptive leadership and the exchange of international opinions within the UN General Assembly, create a more robust sense of international commitment. This multilateral approach not only facilitated circumstances necessary for resolving the Suez crisis, but also provided a successful course of action for the enforcement of peace. While world leaders agreed to
the UN’s conditions for peace, they rejected the means by which it was achieved. Since 1956, world leaders redoubled their efforts to redefine multilateral discourse by monopolizing circumstances surrounding diplomatic negotiation. Much like trends emerging from the late nineteenth century, perceptions of multilateralism remain beholden to public and private interests within nations rather than the interactions between nations. In many cases, the new definition cultivates crisis by ostracizing alternative perspectives and undermining the efforts of creating a vibrant international system. Over half a century later, the Suez crisis demonstrates the need for national leaders to respect multilateral diplomacy rather than re-create it in their own self-interested image.
Chapter I

Disingenuous Consensus: the Subjugation of Multilateral Diplomacy from the 1850s to the 1950s and Its Impact on the Suez Crisis of 1956

In many respects, the diplomatic maneuvering that led to the Suez Canal’s construction in 1869 factored into the positions of national leaders taken during the Suez Crisis of 1956. As the canal’s chief lobbyist and architect, Ferdinand de Lesseps appealed to a host of conflicting national interests to gain support for the canal, which was to serve as an example of internationalist harmony. Ignoring the irony, de Lesseps forged ahead with creating the Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal. Originally conceived as a multi-national conglomerate, the company enjoyed little official support from European powers, including Great Britain. Stubborn political opposition in London waned over the course of the next decade as Britons reconsidered the canal’s economic and strategic benefits.
As sentiments changed, British politicians and policy-makers began mimicking de Lesseps’s campaigning technique. Witnessing de Lesseps’s ability to influence governing officials by catering to their national interests, observers realized that the Frenchman had also fused these independent interests together to convey a sense of multilateral destiny that the canal would generate, thus fulfilling his own entrepreneurial interests. Nineteenth century British policy-makers employed similar measures to extend their own unilateral economic, strategic, and colonial interests over the canal. British policy remained largely unchanged during the events comprising the Suez Crisis of 1956. To those officials who inherited this mindset, the Suez crisis loomed as an incident without end, mainly because the more inclusive and, therefore, authentic multilateral tack required for successful conflict resolution was antithetical to British interests.

Meanwhile, early Arab and Jewish nationalists followed de Lesseps’s strategy in marshaling heterogeneous sentiments to suit their own hegemonic purposes. Unfortunately, for Egyptian nationalists such as Ahmed Urabi, efforts to thwart British and French incursion in the 1880s failed. Zionists, on the other hand, enjoyed greater success. De Lesseps’s organizational and diplomatic skills inspired those such as Theodore Herzl, who were eager to establish their own non-governmental interest groups. Herzl used de Lesseps’s Suez Canal Company as a model for his own Zionist ambitions. The combination of national and ethnic interests directly affected the animosities fermenting in the long ascent to the Suez crisis. The progression of these events and the characteristics shared among them demonstrate how the Suez Crisis of 1956 served as the culmination of a series of crises where key leaders disguised their particular sense of world order beneath a more palpable, multilateral perspective.
Over the course of its lifetime, the Suez Canal has helped redefine the relationship between governmental and non-governmental interests. The growth of entrepreneurial influence encroached rapidly upon matters once relegated to traditional diplomacy. This new development benefited de Lesseps greatly. Once in the service of France’s elite diplomatic corps, Ferdinand de Lesseps left public service to become the self-proclaimed ambassador of the Suez Canal project by the 1850s. Favorable personal relations with the French imperial family and the head of the Egyptian government provided de Lesseps with an advantage in carrying out his colossal business proposition.

Like any good businessman, de Lesseps used any means of nationally-interested flattery to convince his audience of the importance of his engineering marvel, the Suez Canal. When addressing his cousin Eugenie de Montijo, wife of the French Emperor Louis-Napoleon, de Lesseps described the proposed canal as a monument to French imperial industrialization. To woo the Egyptian viceroy Muhammad Pasha al-Said, whom de Lesseps had known since childhood, the Frenchmen thought that the canal would serve as “a glorious record for [Mohammad Said’s] reign” and “an inexhaustible source of wealth for Egypt.” Continuing on in somewhat of a non-sequitur, de Lesseps described how the canal would also revitalize the Ottoman Empire, thus demonstrating that its better days lay ahead.74

The common theme running throughout these presentations illustrates the mutually exclusive means de Lesseps used to garner support from the various parties. While these tactics were neither original nor surprising, de Lesseps’s methods generated a false sense of consensus from contradictory interests. Instead of working to bridge gaps among competing national interests, de Lesseps tailored his ambitions and diplomatic strategy to serve these competing interests. As a result, de Lesseps’s approach helped fuel later confrontations by misrepresenting consensus. By 1956, American and Soviet cold war security, British and French imperialism, as well as Egyptian and Israeli nationalism collided in their presentation of self-interest as selfless interest.

In addition to forming the basis of de Lesseps’s sales pitch, delusion also pervaded his business model. Nearly four years after acquiring the rights and titles to build the canal and collect canal tolls over the course of a ninety-nine year lease, de Lesseps set about creating the Suez Canal Company responsible for completing construction. Ideally, de Lesseps hoped to have “all Western Powers” participating as major shareholders of his company’s stock. All of the 400,000 shares would be divided between eight countries. Minor shareholders such as the United States and Portugal had access to 20,000 shares a piece. France and Britain each had 80,000 shares set aside. When the stocks were made available in November 1858 at a sum of 500 francs per share, however, de Lesseps’s scenario disintegrated. According to historian Hugh Schonfield, “the issue [of stock] would have failed completely had it not been for the fine response of France and Egypt.” Although disseminated more broadly across nineteen countries, France and Egypt controlled over ninety-six percent of all the company’s shares. Of the nineteen countries that bought initial stock in the Suez Company, only six
held 1,000 shares or more. Yet, despite high concentrations of company securities, de Lesseps insisted that the canal would benefit international commerce and communication. When combined with de Lesseps’s penchant for presenting plans to fit his audiences’ ambitions, the incompatibility between a national interest-oriented sense of world order and a more multilateral dialogue becomes clear. Support for the canal operated from interests that not only competed with one another, but also contested any sense of multilateral harmony. Rather than comprehend these divergent complexities, de Lesseps believed that they were interconnected. He manipulated both for his own purposes, but the very nature of his approach was, at best, disingenuous toward constructing a more genuine consensus. For de Lesseps, the citizens of nineteen different countries wanting a preverbal “piece of the action” represented an international mandate. He remained less concerned about where the bulk of shares resided or what impact that could have in international affairs.

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75 Hugh Schonfield, The Suez Canal in Peace and War, 1869-1969 (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1969), p. 35. The eight countries de Lesseps included in his ideal disbursement consisted of the United States, Portugal, Denmark, Russia, Austria, Great Britain, France, and Egypt with additional shares reserved for the Egyptian government. Seven of the nineteen countries that actually bought canal shares at the initial public offering each held 100 shares or less.

76 Karabell, Parting the Desert, p. 4. Other notable historians have analyzed the impact global infrastructure such as the Suez Canal had on cultural diversity. In the words of Edward Said, completion of the project meant “there was only ‘our’ world, ‘one’ world bound together because the Suez Canal had frustrated those last provincials who still believed in the difference between worlds.” Hugh Schonfield describes Egypt as a geopolitical enigma. Acting as “the gateway between East and West” established Egypt’s global significance in world trade while robbing it of its sovereignty and ascendance to world power status. See Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), p. 92; and Schonfield, The Suez Canal in Peace and War, pp. ix-x.
Apathy within the British government turned to alarm once it learned that almost all of the profits from canal traffic would be consolidated in French and Egyptian treasuries. England’s Prime Minister, Lord Henry John Temple Palmerston, remained the project’s chief opponent. As a nineteenth century liberal, Palmerston thought that economics, not politics, should determine the issue. As Palmerston’s biographer, Herbert Bell, points out, the prime minister opposed not so much the canal, but the conditions under which it was conceived and the ramifications it would have on Europe’s balance of power. Palmerston argued that France had pursued the canal project “in hostility to the interests and policy of England.” He feared that the canal would transform the Mediterranean Sea “into a French lake” threatening British imperial security and access to India. Lastly, Palmerston fretted over implications the canal held for the Ottoman Empire. Britain supported the Turks as a bulwark against Russian ambitions in eastern and central Asia. Completion of the Suez Canal would make Egypt more independent from Turkish control, thus weakening Britain’s regional ally, while simultaneously bringing Egypt under French influence and providing Russia with an additional target should it wish to invade the Middle East. Palmerston might have succeeded in thwarting de Lesseps’s plans had it not been for a divided British public. For a time, Parliament and the British people agreed, but small cracks in the public support became large fissures by 1858 and 1859.

Advocates for the Suez Canal included Palmerston’s political opposition and the public’s perception of British world dominance once cultivated, ironically enough, by Palmerston himself. One of Palmerston’s critics was William Gladstone who objected to the prime minister’s Anglo-centric outlook. Another parliamentarian, sensing political opportunity, took more extraordinary measures to not only criticize government policy, but also facilitate its collapse. On a visit to Paris in December 1856, the aging Member of Parliament Benjamin Disraeli became friends with Ralph Earle, a young British attaché at the Paris embassy. As biographer Sarah Bradford puts it, both men were highly critical of Palmerston’s government and shared a “passion for secrecy and intrigue.” From 1857 through 1858, Earle supplied Disraeli with “secret information” for use as political ammunition against Palmerston. Political intrigue became diplomatic intrigue when Earle began passing information on to French officials and reporting his encounters to Disraeli. According to Robert Blake:

[Earle] gave [Napoleon III] a summary of the case which might be published by the French Government against Palmerston, and advised the [French] Emperor to revive the Suez Canal scheme . . . in order to emphasize British dependence on French goodwill in the East. In effect, [Earle] was inciting Napoleon to pursue an anti-British policy in the hope that the resulting fracas would bring down Palmerston . . . . The absence of clear evidence about Disraeli’s attitude cannot absolve him from complicity. It is very unlikely that Earle would have written as he did unless he had good reason to expect a favorable reception.

By December 1859, such intrigue had not removed the prime minister from office, but it had fractured the nation’s public opinion. The Times favored construction of the canal as long as it was “essentially British.” Days later, Palmerston wrote J.T. Delane, the

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78 Schonfield, *The Suez Canal in Peace and War*, p. 36.  
80 Blake, *Disraeli*, pp. 371, 373.  
newspaper’s editor, to repeat his objections.\textsuperscript{82} Nearly eight months after construction on the canal began Palmerston’s arguments against political involvement in the project were disintegrating.

To some extent, Palmerston was responsible for his political predicament. According to another of his biographers, the prime minister became a victim of his own popular success. To buoy his mass approval prior to 1859, Palmerston acquiesced to popular perceptions “of Britain’s giving the law to the world,” but this mentality did not dictate Palmerston’s meticulously crafted and pragmatic foreign policy.\textsuperscript{83} In many respects, Palmerston maintained the diplomatic practices established during the Congress of Vienna. After 1815, harmony among Europe’s leading states required a measure of latitude between honoring an international “pact of restraint” while preserving a nation’s freedom of self-interested “mobility.”\textsuperscript{84} Keeping within these perimeters helped maintain peace—not by imposing order—but by appealing to the competing interests of order. By the 1860s, these two diverging approaches, national interests versus multilateral diplomacy, created political friction for Palmerston.\textsuperscript{85} Almost a century later, a similar

\textsuperscript{84} John Ikenberry, \textit{After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 81-82; and Edward V. Gulick, \textit{Europe’s Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft} (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1955), pp. 67-68. As historian Tim Chapman explains it, the five great powers of Europe participating in the Congress of Vienna accepted the concept of “just equilibrium” to varying degrees. While the terms of the agreement may have favored some powers over others, the European balance of power remained independent “of any one individual who had a clear-cut aim for each area of Europe.” See Tim Chapman, \textit{The Congress of Vienna: Origins, Processes and Results} (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 19.
\textsuperscript{85} In addition to the Suez Canal, Palmerston experienced similar difficulties during the American Civil War. On the one hand, the prime minister maintained British neutrality which “implicitly recognized the Confederacy as belligerents, and not mere rebels.” On the other hand, Palmerston respected the Federal blockade of Southern states, depriving the Confederacy of legitimate sovereignty. Bell, \textit{Lord Palmerston}, p. 360.
quandary applied to the Suez Crisis of 1956 as the international community, represented by the United Nations, came to terms with its constituent members without sacrificing its objectivity as an internationalist arbiter.

During the 1860s, both Palmerston and Gladstone labored to improve Britain’s relations with Egypt once canal construction began. Not until Benjamin Disraeli became Prime Minister in 1874, however, did the British government chart a more unilateral course in policy-making. International affairs of the early 1870s exhibited swift, converging economic currents that played to Disraeli’s political strengths. For much of the nineteenth century, Egypt had prospered in the cotton-growing industry. During the American Civil War, the northern embargo of southern cotton exports increased Egypt’s annual export profits from one million pounds sterling in 1860 to nearly eleven million pounds sterling by 1865. Careless monetary policies and expensive modernization efforts, however, left Egypt financially over-extended and suffering from inflation. With the resumption of America’s cotton trade by 1866, prices plummeted leaving the viceroy and his successor, Ismail Pasha, few resources for paying the nation’s suffocating debt. By the mid-1870s, Egyptian debt approached 100 million pounds with millions more being added for overdue interest payments. Among its few worthwhile assets were the nearly 177,000 shares of Suez stock the Egyptian government purchased to help fund the canal’s construction.
Opened on the eve of the new decade, the canal quickly became an investor’s nightmare. Shares lost over half their value by 1871. The shares rebounded by 1875, but Ismail needed cash desperately to avoid defaulting on immense loan interest payments. Having already mortgaged his shares to raise cash, Ismail had no choice but to announce the sale of these securities which would yield no dividends and possess no voting rights on the company’s board until 1895. In the summer of 1875, he set his price at four million pounds.

As England’s newly elected prime minister, Disraeli jumped at the opportunity to fulfill his imperial ambitions and acquire almost half of the canal’s shares in a single stroke. Disraeli pounced for several reasons. First, eighty percent of the canal’s traffic flew the Union Jack. While still only accounting for about ten percent of England’s world trade total, the waterway’s economic value benefited Britain’s interests undeniably. Second, by 1873, British creditors controlled more than half of the debts extended to prop up Egypt’s economy. Defaulting on these debts threatened England’s creditors as much as Egypt’s debtors. Third, a recent mutiny in India and Russia’s continued interest in the Middle East and Central Asia made the canal more valuable as a strategic asset for British policy-makers. Lastly, as Robert Blake mentions, “it seemed all too likely that if [Egypt’s] Khedive, whose financial profligacy was only surpassed by that of his nominal suzerain, the Sultan, finally went bankrupt, the French Government would seize the

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chance [to intervene].” The possibility of French unilateral action was an event Britain’s Conservatives and Liberals hoped to avoid.

To meet Ismail’s asking price, Disraeli operated outside official government circles. By-passing his Chancellor of the Exchequer, the prime minister established a line of credit with Baron Lionel de Rothschild, one of the wealthiest bankers in Europe. Using the British government as collateral, Disraeli received four million pounds at five percent interest with an additional two-and-a-half percent commission to compensate Rothschild personally. On 26 November 1875, the British government transferred funds via Rothschild’s bank—an astounding three days after Ismail agreed to Britain’s offer.

The hasty and clandestine nature of this transaction polarized British public opinion. For the most part, the masses cheered Disraeli’s actions. “Suez captured the public imagination,” says Disraeli biographer Stanley Weintraub, “and helped move the Palmerstonian Daily Telegraph, which had supported Gladstone, over to Disraeli.” The Queen also expressed her approval. Support came from the Jewish community too. A spring 1876 article in the Jewish Chronicle hailed Disraeli’s move as proof of Britain’s interest in bringing Palestine under British control. Pronouncements such as these, however, left some questioning the prime minister’s motives.

87 Blake, Disraeli, pp. 581-582.
90 Bernard Glassman, Benjamin Disraeli: The Fabricated Jew in Myth and Memory (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003), p. 83. Geographically, the canal lay approximately one hundred miles west of Palestine’s southern border.
Critics attacked nearly every aspect of Disraeli’s dealings. Anti-Semites spread fears of a Jewish conspiracy. Himself of Jewish decent, Disraeli was shunned as a “Shylock” obsessed with “personal gain at the expense of the national interest.”

Rothschild’s Jewish heritage only fueled these conspiracy theories. In the more reasoned realm of politics, William Gladstone and others took the opportunity to critique their adversary’s policies. During a 21 February 1876 debate in the House of Commons, opponents questioned the wisdom of purchasing shares that would be financially impotent until near the end of the century. In response, Disraeli argued that by simply owning such a large portion of a company, it was impossible not to wield some degree of influence regardless of the stocks’ condition. Gladstone worried that England was committing itself beyond its capabilities. Regarding the Rothschild loan, Gladstone and others took umbrage at the two-and-a-half percent commission because it made it seem “as if [the Rothschilds] were a nonprofit concern and Britain a charity case.” In many respects, these developments shared similar characteristics with de Lesseps’s strategy.

Both men blended public and private interests to achieve their respective objectives. De Lesseps enlisted the help of government leaders to provide moral and financial support for his proposal. Disraeli reversed the relationship, using Rothschild’s bank to provide the capital for purchasing Egypt’s shares and aid in securing British national interests. In doing so, both men consolidated control over the canal. De Lesseps expressed an initial interest in limiting the disbursement of Suez Company stock to fewer

91 Glassman, Benjamin Disraeli, p. 83.
94 Weintraub, Disraeli: A Biography, p. 544.
than ten countries. After the initial public offering, de Lesseps’s wish appeared to be granted when only two countries held an overwhelming majority of the securities. In 1875, the British government perpetuated the trend by replacing Egypt as the largest single shareholder.

Another characteristic de Lesseps and Disraeli shared was the ability to project their respective perceptions of reality as innate fact. During de Lesseps’s induction into the French Academy on 23 April 1885, the institution’s director Ernest Renan hailed de Lesseps’s qualifications. “No one, assuredly, in our age,” Renan proclaimed, “has been more persuasive than [de Lesseps], and in consequence no one has been more eloquent.” Disraeli’s brilliant maneuvering in 1875 rivaled that of the French entrepreneur, de Lesseps. Yet, like many of his fellow citizens, Disraeli misunderstood the division between public investment and physical ownership. Contrary to Britain’s popular perception, the Suez Company did not own the canal, only the rights to fees collected from it. In addition to mimicking de Lesseps’s techniques, Disraeli’s approach also reflected some trends practiced by his own political rivals. Similar to Palmerston, Disraeli projected Britain’s hegemony. Like Palmerston, Disraeli allowed the British people to believe in this identity without correcting or restraining it. Unlike Palmerston, however, Disraeli believed his own illusions. The symbiotic relationship between Disraeli’s policies and public fervor became intoxicating.

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96 Blake, *Disraeli*, pp. 585 and 587.
97 Eldridge, *Disraeli and the Rise of a New Imperialism*, p. 46. As the prime minister’s chief opponent, Gladstone questioned the perceived acquisition and attempted to make the distinction. See Weintraub, *Disraeli: A Biography*, pp. 543-544. Yet, with his return to 10 Downing Street in the 1880s, Gladstone upheld Disraeli’s policies when England’s interests in Egypt were challenged rather than taking the opportunity to reverse course again. See Jenkins, *Gladstone: A Biography*, p. 502.
mentality persisted for the next eighty years, directly contributing to the Suez Crisis of 1956.

Meanwhile, the British government’s monopolization of commercial and strategic influence proved detrimental to cultivating a broader sense of international harmony. Although these methods established a greater sense of unity among state and non-state interests, they undermined connections between individual states and the rest of the international community. Agreements continued to be drafted and implemented, but the basis on which these understandings rested was increasingly unstable. In essence, greater compatibility between governments and private organizations helped contribute to international tension and crisis diplomacy. Neither de Lesseps nor Disraeli heeded these concerns as they worked to insulate their respective interests from international interference. Indeed, their perspective reflected the prevailing sentiments of the era.

IV

From this period on, England and much of the world applied and reacted to increasingly jingoist ideology expressed first and foremost in various competing foreign policies. Gertrude Himmelfarb’s analysis of Victorian social history establishes, implicitly, how the English transformed national values into universal ones. In her book *The De-moralization of Society*, she contends that integrating imperialist national interests with international common interests emerged as the standard in British policy-making. Although Himmelfarb remains suspicious of interpreting the application of values as virtuous behavior, she concludes that “it was no small feat for England, in a
period of massive social and economic changes, to attain a degree of civility and humaneness that was the envy of the rest of the world.” In other words, Himmelfarb pardons the imposition of British values on others because of their enlightening effects on other societies. The period following England’s acquisition of canal stock reveals a more complex relationship.

By 1876, European colonial appetites gorged on further Egyptian misfortune. Within a year of selling its interests in the Suez Canal Company, the Egyptian government returned to the brink of defaulting on its crippling debt. French and English financiers intervened on a massive scale. Known as “Dual Control,” European bureaucrats began crafting Egyptian fiscal policy. Under this policy, Egyptian viceroys lost political credibility. As public services in Egypt either declined or were usurped


100 According to some historians, one of most poignant examples of British philanthropy was in improving labor conditions within Egypt in the late nineteenth century. Typically, Egyptian rulers called the Corvee into service to meet the needs of providing cheap labor for extensive infrastructural projects—including the Suez Canal. The Corvee represented mass armies of laborers forced to work on these projects. Daily life was equivalent to that of slavery. Insubordination led to violent reprimand. See Karabell, *Parting the Desert*, p. 170. Credit for the abolition of the practice during the 1880s has many claimants. As Nathan Brown notes, some historians praise the arrival of England’s enlightened liberal ideology. Others contend that Egypt’s working class led labor reforms. Still others, including Brown, point to Egypt’s land-owning elite and their legislative reforms. Nathan Brown, “Who Abolished Corvee Labour in Egypt and Why?,” *Past and Present*, No. 144, (August 1994), pp. 116-118.

101 The spring and summer of 1879 proved especially turbulent for the Egyptian government. Faced with mounting domestic pressure the Khedive organized a new Egyptian ministry on 7 April 1879. Reorganization provided a sense of reform through which the Khedive attempted to propose his own fiscal strategy independent of European advisors. Within weeks of the April 7 announcement, German officials called for the Khedive’s removal. French and English counterparts agreed. On 26 June 1879, Egypt’s head-of-state abdicated, passing authority to his son, Muhammad Tawfiq Pasha. See Robert Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy* (Pittsburgh, PA:
by British officials, some Egyptians clamored for reform. Ahmed Urabi, a colonel in the Egyptian army, began fighting for prompt payment of money owed to soldiers. By 1881, Urabi criticized the Egyptian government and the amount of foreign influence throughout the bureaucracy. He wished to implement a nationalist agenda. In September, he and his allies brought down the government and created a new one in December. While emphasizing Egyptian sovereignty, Urabi maintained loyalty to the Khedive, the Sultan, and the paying of Egypt’s debts.

For the British government, Egyptian sovereignty threatened British colonial interests. On 8 January 1882, British and French officials issued a Joint Note threatening direct intervention. Urabi’s defeat at the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir on 13 September 1883 left British officials in complete control. Disbanding of the Egyptian army meant that British military personnel assumed responsibility for Egypt’s protection. As one historian put it, “Britain had put a lid on Egyptian Nationalism, which was to be kept down for more or less seventy years, . . . and assumed responsibility for the most populous and sophisticated country in Africa.” Additionally, the British government had also muzzled domestic opposition to its imperialist policies. By the time this latest crisis ended in 1883, Gladstone’s ruling Liberal Party had endorsed the imperialist

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102 It should be noted that Urabi’s sense of nationalism was due in part to the intellectual developments occurring in the Arab world during the early part of the nineteenth century. During and after the Napoleonic era, Egypt began attracting Muslims who wished to adapt science, technology, and nationalist philosophy to revitalize and reform Arab civilization. This impulse was known as the Arab renaissance. Mahmoud Ayoub offers a succinct overview of early Arab intellectuals responsible in part for the rise of Arab nationalist sentiment. See Mahmoud Ayoub, Islam: Faith and History (Oxford, England: Oneworld Publications, 2004), pp. 202-204.

103 Jenkins, Gladstone: A Biography, p. 506.
ideology that Disraeli’s Conservatives had long championed. The narrow spectrum of Britain’s ideological debate was set.

Indirectly, these circumstances also influenced the scope of ideological debate within Egypt. Empathy for Egyptian nationalism had not been extinguished, but the lessons of these late-nineteenth century experiences altered the relationship between Egyptians and their nationalist aspirations. Numerous issues, including the canal, sparked repeated protests during the first half of the twentieth century. Rather than challenge the British government’s usurpation of multilateral principles to fulfill Britain’s national interests, Egypt’s iconic nationalist leader of the 1950s, Gamal Abdel Nasser, adopted these tactics to advance his own pan-Arab vision. The precedent set was to make a particular cause appear more inclusive than any other cause and to exploit divisions within rival perspectives. Instead, these Machiavellian machinations undermined the fundamental characteristics of multilateral diplomacy.

With much of British society firmly believing in the benevolent principles of universal liberal doctrine, the country’s diplomats set about reconciling England’s North African gains with the rest of Europe. While not the first conference assembled to discuss Suez Canal matters, the Constantinople Convention of 1888 was perhaps the most important. Unlike the Conference of 1873, which standardized the canal’s fees and the measurement of tonnage, the 1888 convention addressed the issue of security. Immediately after ousting Urabi, British officials wanted a multilateral agreement “to

104 Hopkins, “The Victorians and Africa,” p. 387. See also Robinson-Dunn, The Harem, Slavery and British Imperial Culture, p. 7.
105 Throughout the twentieth century, nationalist opinions and ideology grew. When, in 1908, British officials attempted to extend the Suez Canal Company’s concession to 31 December 2008, Egyptian nationalists and the popular press organized opposition and defeated the measure. See Schonfield, The Suez Canal in Peace and War, p. 65.
preserve the freedom of the canal for the passage of all ships in any circumstances” while reserving “the right to defend the canal from an act of aggression against Egypt so long as [Britain’s] occupation . . . continued.” Negotiations teetered for the next six years culminating in the 1888 meeting. Attendees included British, French, Russian, Spanish, Italian, Dutch, Austrian, German, and Ottoman officials.

Signatories of the Constantinople Treaty represented a broader collection of interests and opinions than the French and British rivalries decades earlier, but certain conditions provided ample opportunities for unilateral activity. Throughout his quest to build the canal, de Lesseps believed that the great powers should maintain the waterway as a neutral site benefiting world trade. Unfortunately, the politics of Europe’s balance of power were not so idealistic. France and Russia wanted Britain out of Egypt as soon as possible. The 1888 agreement not only failed to do so, it also did little to clarify transit rights and canal control. In the words of historian Hugh Schonfield, “the Canal was not to be neutralized but rather extraterritorialized while remaining part of Egypt.” The canal may have remained a part of Egypt, but matters concerning its operation belonged to the Commission of Consular Agents, comprised of the states attending the 1888 convention. Article 12 guaranteed international safeguards by proclaiming “that none of [the participants] shall endeavor to obtain with respect to the Canal territorial or commercial advantages or privileges in any international arrangements which may be concluded.”

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of the treaty, but Egypt and the Ottoman Empire were responsible for resolving canal-related disputes. The combination of these stipulations robbed the Constantinople Treaty of any multilateral value. Interested parties were left to police themselves and settlement of any infractions rested in the hands of the two governments least able to impose authority on others. Egypt’s de facto status as a protectorate of the British Empire meant that the British government sacrificed very little when it agreed to these conditions. With Egypt and the canal under British control, attention shifted to securing British interests in Palestine. “The urge,” historian Isaiah Friedman writes, “to widen the cordon sanitaire off the Suez Canal zone became almost irresistible” and led the British government to dominate much of the Middle East. The mirage of a multilateral framework not only disguised the aims of unilateral control, but also, in Britain’s case, demonstrated a perpetual desire for expansive influence.

V

Special interest groups, such as the burgeoning Zionist movement of the late nineteenth century, adopted similar political tactics. Zionist ambitions of creating a Jewish homeland reflected trends tracing back to the early 1800s. Roughly a decade after Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt, Jews began returning to the Negev region in “large,


organized parties.” Turkish and Egyptian rulers respected Jews, providing them with legal rights and representation in local government. As the century progressed, orthodox Jews saw Erez-Israel as a pristine, uncorrupted land far removed from the modern European culture that eroded the foundations of Judaism by satisfying immediate gratification with “material needs.” Over time, Europe’s Jewish community split between those espousing separation from and those favoring assimilation with mainstream European society. As the century drew to a close, Zionist leadership established an illusion of unity to mask stark divisions within the Jewish community and all across Europe regarding the formation of a Jewish state.

As a young journalist in Vienna, Theodor Herzl became an ardent Zionist. Just as de Lesseps had done nearly forty years earlier, Herzl moved almost constantly across Europe to spread his ideas and rally support. From 1890 to 1895, the journalist organized Jewish nationalist sentiment to combat what he considered to be a rising tide of anti-Semitism. He corresponded with religious figures, fellow journalists, authors, and both active and retired politicians. During these years, Herzl remained adamant in his perspective. After submitting his ideas to the Rothschild Family Council, the young journalist recorded in his dairy: “I [Herzl] bring to the Rothschilds and the big Jews their historical mission. I shall welcome all men of goodwill—we must be united—and crush all those of bad.”

Herzl realized that he faced stubborn opposition. In Paris, Baron Maurice von Hirsch described Herzl’s views as “fantastic” and utterly unattainable without help from wealthy Jews who opposed the Zionist movement.\textsuperscript{116} Where Herzl wished to transplant Jewish culture, Hirsch sought its complete reconstruction from an urban, professional culture to a rural, agrarian one. Herzl wanted to accentuate Jewish innovation and ambition. Hirsch wanted a more humble approach to Zionism. By 1896, many Jews, including formal publications such as \textit{The Jewish Chronicle}, preferred Hirsch’s arguments over Herzl’s.\textsuperscript{117} Other Europeans such as the wealthy Jewish banking family of the Rothschilds as well as former German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck also deemed Herzl’s proposals to be somewhat radical and dangerous.\textsuperscript{118} After these early negative critiques, Herzl traveled to England and found a more favorable audience.

English support for a Jewish homeland in the Middle East was well-established by the time Herzl visited London and Wales. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Lord Palmerston advocated Jewish emigration to Palestine, in effect, reinforcing Britain’s consolidation of power in the region. To demonstrate the level of commitment to the region, the British government pursued, not only formal diplomatic ties with Ottoman officials, but also cultivated informal relations with a private, ethnic community within the Ottoman’s domain. Disraeli’s handling of Suez Canal securities and the outright seizing of control in Egypt in 1882 only intensified England’s interests in the Negev region. Jewish settlement of the area would secure the only viable route through which England’s chief rival, Russia, could threaten the Suez Canal. In November 1895, Herzl

\textsuperscript{117} Vital, \textit{The Origins Of Zionism}, pp. 267-268.
\textsuperscript{118} Elon, \textit{Herzl}, p. 154.
toured England spreading his Zionist message. England’s Zionist allies, including Israel Zangwill, helped Herzl refine his nationalist aspirations. Inspired, Herzl returned to Vienna in 1896 to record his thoughts in what has become a centerpiece in Zionist literature.

Similar to de Lesseps’s approach to constructing the Suez Canal, Herzl applied business-oriented means to fulfill romantic Zionist ends in his 1896 landmark book, *Der Judenstaadt*. Like the Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal, Herzl called for creating a “Jewish Company” to act as “a joint-stock company” to assist in the emigration of Jews interested in establishing a Jewish homeland. Understanding the need for popular consensus within the Jewish community, Herzl organized “the Society of Jews” to ensure, as Herzl put it, “that the enterprise becomes a Suez rather than a Panama.” As two de Lesseps-inspired projects, the Suez and Panama Canal ventures became the measure for the Jewish Company’s success and failure. Herzl could not have been any clearer in how influential the Suez Canal Company, and de Lesseps himself,

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120 *Der Judenstaadt* translates as *The Jewish State*.

121 World Zionist Organization, Hagshama Department, *The Jewish State-III. The Jewish Company*, [updated unknown; cited 20 September 2007], Available from http://www.hagshama.org.il/en/resources/view.asp?id=285. Working with the Society, the Jewish Company would be responsible for managing and selling European properties and purchasing properties in Palestine. By the early twentieth century, the Jewish Colonial Association (JCA), the Jewish National Fund (JNF), and the Palestine Land Development Company encouraged Jewish settlement of Palestine by purchasing land and teaching Jewish immigrants how to acclimate themselves and thrive in their new, arid surroundings. See Best, et. al., *International History of the Twentieth Century*, p. 120. Speaking in broader generalities, the Israeli historian, Avi Shlaim describes “modern Zionism” as “a secular movement with a political orientation toward Palestine.” According to Shlaim, Herzl thought of Jews not only in terms of a religious community, but also as members of a national heritage. See Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, pp. 2-3.
was to his envisioning the Jewish settlement of Palestine. However, one of the earliest challenges facing Herzl’s scheme was the faulty presupposition upon which his “Society of Jews” rested.

As Herzl ascended to the forefront of the late nineteenth century Zionist movement, he underestimated the persistent divisions within the Jewish community and opposition he had experienced in sharing his views. Just as European heads-of-state and British public opinion had splintered during the Suez Canal’s construction, Jewish opinions regarding Zionism were by no means unified. Hirsch remained committed to his agrarian experiment in Argentina. In another instance, Jewish publishers refused to print Herzl’s book. One such publisher believed that the Jews’ conditions were improving socially and politically and that European anti-Semitism was receding. Others, including the wealthy banker Lord Nathaniel Rothschild, tended to agree. Herzl recorded in his diary that “[Nathaniel Rothschild] did not believe in Zionism. . . . [Rothschild] was an Englishman and wanted to remain one.” As the wealthy European family who had helped England secure commercial rights to the Suez Canal, the

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122 As a boy, Theodor Herzl idolized Ferdinand de Lesseps’s engineering accomplishments and his determination. One of Herzl’s biographers describes how Herzl entered the Realschule in 1869 with an intense interest in science and technology inspired by the Suez Canal’s completion that same year. See Elon, Herzl, p. 21.
123 Vital, The Origins Of Zionism, pp. 256, 266. Herzl, himself, had to be convinced that Palestine was more popular than South America.
124 Elon, Herzl, p. 175.
125 Nathaniel Rothschild was Lionel’s son.
Rothschilds did not want Herzl to spread news of the hardships experienced by Eastern European Jews.

Russian and Eastern European Jews became political and social scapegoats for rising nationalist and anti-Semitic feelings. Legal discrimination stripped Jews of voting and property rights as well as equal education opportunities. Pogroms targeting Jewish communities and businesses led to mobs looting, publicly beating, and murdering Jews. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed over two million Jews fleeing from the East to Western Europe and to the United States. A few Eastern European Jews made their way to Palestine and wished to continue doing so without attracting the international attention that Herzl was fomenting. Critics of Herzl’s methods, including the Rothschilds, believed that agitation would result in restrictive immigration policies preventing Jews from relocating in the West.\footnote{Elon, *Herzl*, pp. 339, 353. Herzl worried about Jews in Rumania in Galicia where he estimated that 700,000 Jews lived in destitute conditions. See Patai, *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, Vol. IV, p. 1292.}

The Dreyfus Affair of 1894-1895 amplified these fears as anti-Semitic activities increased in Western Europe after Alfred Dreyfus was wrongfully found guilty of treason. Dreyfus was a French military officer who was also Jewish. Herzl argued that such abuses made a Jewish homeland an indispensable necessity.\footnote{According to Morris, “Herzl regarded Zionism’s triumph as inevitable” and used European anti-Semitism to strengthen his call for the creation of a Jewish State. Morris, *Righteous Victims*, pp. 20-21. See also Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, pp. 2-3.}

Outside the Jewish community Herzl encountered mixed reactions to his proposal. In some cases, he found tacit support but always in an unofficial capacity. The Grand Duke Friedrich I of Baden worried that by supporting Zionism, “people would misinterpret this as anti-Semitism on his part.” When pressed to allow his views to be
shared with “a few trustworthy men in England,” however, the Duke agreed.\textsuperscript{129} In other cases, Herzl ran into stubborn resistance. Ottoman obstruction to relinquishing control of any part of Palestine thwarted any immediate plans for a Jewish state. Despite this setback, Herzl wove together a network to move his ideas forward, much the same way as de Lesseps had done.

As Europe’s leading figures in the Jewish community convened the First Zionist Congress in August of 1897, Herzl and others realized that dissension could prove fatal to the movement’s agenda. As the World Zionist Organization proclaims on its web-site, “the Congress was created to organize all the Zionist ideologies under one movement, a political movement.”\textsuperscript{130} To his credit, Herzl handled the proceedings with the utmost diplomacy. He eased tensions, allowed delegates to speak their mind, and yielded to the assembly’s decisions regarding the Zionist platform’s content. Yet, his frustrations seethed beneath this placid veneer. Confiding in his diary, Herzl referred to some attendees as “‘enemies’” and even went so far as to describe one adversary as “a real Judas.”\textsuperscript{131} The Jewish physician and literary icon, Max Nordau, voiced an equal degree of vehemence when he took the podium at the Zionist Congress. After describing the tormented existence of Western European Jews and the resiliency of the Jewish community, Nordau concluded, “The opinion of the outside world had no influence,

\textsuperscript{129} Patai, \textit{The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl}, Vol. I, pp. 334 and 338. Friedrich I was son-in-law of German Kaiser Wilhelm I.
because it was the opinion of ignorant enemies.”¹³² What is supremely ironic about the approach Herzl and Nordau took is that they sought to add their voices to the world community by creating a new Jewish state—but they did so by shunning much of the very community they wished to join.

In some respects, interesting comparisons exist between the Zionist strategy and those strategies used by de Lesseps and Britain’s political leadership. While not as concerned with camouflaging nationalist ambitions beneath multilateral rhetoric, Zionist leaders continued recognizing the importance of projecting uniform solidarity as a prerequisite for influencing the international community. By 1907, members attending the Eighth Zionist Congress called for pressing ahead with establishing Jewish colonies in Palestine. “After that,” writes one scholar, “the necessary international guarantees to protect Zionist colonization could be obtained.”¹³³ Projecting a presence of broader, universal support remained in the service of fulfilling self-interested ends just as it had been by Europe’s entrepreneurs and politicians. Yet, some Zionists took the extraordinary measure of denouncing the international community and its insensitivity to Jewish concerns. During and after the Suez Crisis of 1956, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s foreign policy operated from the same uniquely hypocritical set of assumptions. In addition to escalating the likelihood of crisis between states, this perspective dictated the agenda of transnational groups such as the Jews dating back to its

¹³² Speech of Max Nordau at the First Zionist Congress, 29 August 1897, http://www.mideastweb.org/nordau1897.htm. According to historian Melanie Murphy, Nordau described European society as “sick” and culturally “diseased.” See Melanie Murphy, Max Nordau’s Fin-de-Siecle Romance of Race (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), pp. 6-7. With specific regard to Palestinian Arabs, Herzl publicly proclaimed equality and camaraderie between Jews and Arabs in creating a new Jewish state. Privately, however, Herzl favored an economic form of ethnic cleansing by denying Arabs employment opportunities and thus precipitating their relocation to neighboring countries. See Morris, Righteous Victims, pp. 21-22.

earliest foundations. The use of “a variety of myths,” as historian Michael Berkowitz put it, allowed “[succeeding Zionist Congresses to act as] the single most powerful force in transmitting Zionist goals and ideals to the party faithful and the broader Jewish audience.”\textsuperscript{134} The manipulation of an internationalist perspective reigned uncontested.

VI

French and British Middle East policies enacted during the First World War only reinforced the status quo. Beginning in November 1916, Britain’s Sir Mark Sykes and France’sFrançois Georges Picot discussed postwar plans for the region. According to historian David Fromkin, despite the treaty’s division of regional influence between Britain and France, British officials portrayed French rule as “annexation” of Arab land while depicting British authority as synonymous with Arab “independence.”\textsuperscript{135} The desire to secure their own interests in the Middle East jeopardized the multilateral niche British diplomats had attempted to create for themselves. Practicing these types of mutually exclusive tactics did little to achieve the objective of negotiating a postwar peace agreement.

British officials adopted an almost identical approach when addressing Zionist concerns. Mindful of their interests in the region, British officials respected the “international problem” that Palestine and the Jewish Question posed. Failure to recognize Jewish claims might have made the Jewish community allies of the German

\textsuperscript{134} Berkowitz, \textit{Zionist Culture and West European Jewry before the First World War}, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{135} Fromkin, \textit{A Peace to End All Peace}, pp. 193-194.
Empire. In addition to depriving Germany of Jewish support in the Great War, the British government sought to preserve Britain’s wartime gains in the Levant. Britain’s outright “military conquest” of Palestine “would have violated the principle of non-acquisition of territories by war enunciated by President Wilson and the Provisional Russian government, and alienated world opinion.” Left with no other viable option, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George authorized the Balfour Declaration, recognizing Zionist claims in Palestine. Once again, unilateral objectives sought fulfillment through multilateral means. By proclaiming Britain’s endearing ties to Arab and Jewish populations as stipulated by British interpretation of the Sykes-Picot Treaty and the Balfour Declaration, Lloyd George hoped to safe-guard his country’s interests in the region.

Fortunately for the British government, much of the rest of Europe as well as the United States was receptive to Zionist ambitions. Like Great Britain, however, the basis for this support remained beholden to the respective countries’ national interests. The French Foreign Ministry’s support for Zionist goals remained based on the condition of Allied success in the Great War. In historian Alan Sharp’s estimation, French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau traded greater British control in Palestine and the Middle East for Britain’s future support of French interests in the Rhineland and other

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136 According to Isaiah Friedman, this competition between rival Great Powers in Europe expedited “the decision-making process” resulting in the Balfour Declaration. See Friedman, The Palestine Question, p. 283.


138 Fromkin argues that French opinion disparaged the Zionist movement, considering it as a pro-German policy. See Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, p. 292.
Eurocentric issues. Lloyd George’s part in fulfilling this *quid pro quo* was not forthcoming, however. Sharp attributes the reversal to changes in British and Russian fortunes of war. British conquests in the Middle East late in the war bolstered British confidence. Meanwhile, the collapse of Tzarist Russia in 1917 removed the threat of Russian expansion into the region. Where French occupation of Lebanon and Syria once served as a buffer, protecting British spheres of influence from a possible Russian incursion, French possessions now rivaled British interests in the Middle East.  

“...the bitterness resulting from this Anglo-French misunderstanding [regarding the *quid pro quo*],” Sharp continues, “was unfortunate and persistent.”

Indeed, the British government’s effort to incorporate as many allies as possible without sacrificing any of their national interests seems naïve. Like a diplomatic game of musical chairs, once the music stopped, parties would participate in a free-for-all. This analogy representing the pursuit of self-interest is neither surprising nor unique. What is particularly disturbing, however, was the way in which British officials continued misrepresenting notions of multilateral diplomacy. The implication that everyone’s interests could be met rested on policies that contradicted one another. After the chorus of the Great War ended in November 1918, Jews and Arabs occupied the same seat.

At the Paris Peace Conference, Jews and Arabs stated their case for self-determination before the conference’s Council of Ten in February and early March 1919. Jewish leaders agreed to British trusteeship provided that Britain encourage local self-

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government, respect Jewish religious traditions, enforce equal rights, and allow those in Palestine to freely choose to become Palestinian citizens if they so desired. Prince Feisal spoke on behalf of Arab interests. Recounting the Arabs’ loyal service to the Allies in defeating the Ottoman Turks, Feisal requested fulfillment of promises made regarding Arab independence, contrary to the settlement reached in the secret Sykes-Picot proceedings. During one exchange at the Council of Ten meeting, American President Woodrow Wilson asked for Feisal’s “personal opinion” if the Middle East were to be mandated to one of the Great Powers. Would he [Feisal] prefer one mandatory or several? Initially, the Prince deferred to wishes of Arab public opinion. When pressed for his own views though, Feisal opposed “partition.” As he put it, “Arab unity” was his primary concern. “The Arabs,” he said, “asked for freedom only and would take nothing less.” The council largely ignored Feisal’s opinions. Britain and France partitioned the Middle East and governed the territories they controlled.

Britain’s obsession with preserving order during the interwar period disregarded the need for establishing an internationalist network to bridge the influx of ethnic and cultural diversity. As early as 1921—even prior to the League of Nations officially recognizing the Sykes-Picot Agreement—tensions boiled over during the Nebi Musa riots, in Palestine. In an effort to impose order, British officials investigated the causes.

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142 Indeed, the prevailing insensitivities to the plight of those who obstructed national interests pervaded the entire Paris Peace Conference. For example, John Foster Dulles, a young American diplomat at Versailles, called for moderate reparations that the German government was to pay. Dulles went so far as to include language in reparation drafts that demanded Germany’s paying exorbitant fees, while simultaneously acknowledging that payments should be scaled to meet the Germans’ ability to pay. Dismayed by the punitive peace that ensued regardless of young American in Paris arguments, Dulles remarked decades later that, “Prohibitions thus incite the very acts that are prohibited.” See Richard Immerman, *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1999), pp. 8-10. According to historian Hugh Thomas, Dulles harbored his jilted feelings during the Suez Crisis of 1956, when he served as U.S. Secretary of State. See Hugh Thomas, *Suez*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 60-61.
for the riots and limited Jewish immigration to Palestine. Historian Anthony Best and others agree that “the unrest, as well as the British response laid down the pattern for the rest of the mandatory period.” Throughout the remainder of the 1920s, relations between British authorities, Jews, and Arabs were particularly opportunistic. The Arab majority, represented by the Husseini faction, were highly critical of British policies, yet received ample funds from British sources. The minority Nashashibis faction, espousing reconciliation with the Jews, won Jewish financial support. During the Wailing Wall riots of 1929 where Arabs and Jews clashed over rights to religious prayer in Jerusalem, Arab protesters also “accused the Jews of . . . coveting all the Arab lands lying between the Nile and Euphrates [Rivers].”

Caught in a deteriorating situation, where instability in Palestine was the norm, British policies began to break down as a result of internal discontent as well as external disillusionment. The British government sought to salvage reconciliation by redefining its explicit support for Jewish autonomy in Palestine. In the wake of the Wailing Wall Riots, the 1930 Passfield White Paper called for Zionist concessions regarding the establishment of a national home. Historian Peggy Mann contends that one reason for British reservations was due to the growing importance Arab oil played in determining Britain’s economic and national security policies. The Suez Canal’s role as a conduit through which vital supplies of oil moved also impacted British policies in the region. This imperial asset could have become the target of Arab reprisals if British officials

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persisted with supporting Zionist claims. Agreement on these findings, however, was by no means unanimous. By 1931, Zionist supporters in Britain had mobilized public opinion enough for British Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald to voice his opposition to the Passfield report and its call for restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine. This bout of policy whiplash left many Arabs questioning Britain’s status as an honest broker in the Middle East.

The Arab Revolt, lasting from 1936 to 1939, testified to Arab frustrations. General strikes and acts of civil disobedience turned to outright violence by 1937. During that year, British advisers, convening the Peel Commission, recommended partition of Jews and Arabs. The British government shied away from this drastic proposal and reverted to its policy of abandoning the creation of a Jewish state. Jewish immigration was curtailed again and support shifted to “guaranteeing the achievement of an Arab Palestinian state within ten years.” These experiences during the interwar years demonstrate the debilitating effects British interests had in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition to failing to address the concerns of the two most contentious ethnic communities in Palestine, erratic British policies also sabotaged British efforts to

\footnote{Peggy Mann, *Ralph Bunche: UN Peacemaker* (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1975), p. 164.}

\footnote{Morris, *Righteous Victims*, p. 117. “By 1935,” writes Peggy Mann, “only 60,000 Jews were allowed legal certificates of entry into Palestine. A year later the British had halved that figure to 30,000.” See Mann, *Ralph Bunche*, p. 164.}

\footnote{Anthony Best, et. al., *International History of the Twentieth Century*, pp. 114-115. Loyalties toward Arab nationalism split between Prince Feisal and his father, King Hussein on the one hand and Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud on the other. Ibn Saud hailed from the family ruling over the Hejaz region of the Middle East. This area forms a part of what is today Saudi Arabia and includes the holiest places in the Muslim world: Mecca and Medina. Where Feisal and Hussein preferred secular governance, Ibn Saud championed the combined secular and spiritual leadership of the caliphate and the movement known as Wahhabism. In 1956 and afterwards, Egypt’s Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser encountered similar divisions within Arab nationalism and worked to patch the two back together. See Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace* pp. 101, 326.}
stabilize the region. The Suez Crisis of 1956 arose and intensified as a result of similar circumstances.

VII

After the Second World War, prospects for an enlightened era of multilateral diplomacy seemed possible. The Iranian crisis of 1946 provided the newly formed United Nations with an opportunity to capitalize from this popular attitude. Several weeks after the formal surrender of the Axis Powers, Soviet forces lingered in the northern provinces of Iran. When rebellion erupted in these provinces, the Soviets denied access to Iranian troops deployed to quell the revolt. On 19 January 1946, the matter was referred to the United Nations Security Council. While American officials did expend a significant amount of diplomatic pressure through the UN, they respected the organization’s jurisdiction. The United States government favored immediate UN action to convey a sense of strength and authority to the international community. When Soviets and Iranians presented their own individual proposals to end the crisis, some American advisors opted for broader debate. “An agreement involving withdrawal of the Soviet and Ukrainian notes following withdrawal of the Iranian note, without full discussion in the Security council,” one undated draft telegram stressed, “would indicate that the Security Council was an arena for unabashed political bargaining instead of a forum for free international discussion.”148 As the Cold War consumed the attention of policy-makers in Washington over the course of next decade, calls for open debate

remained constant but the basis for such debate changed from preserving the viability of
the United Nations to protecting America’s global security interests.

Other initiatives to facilitate multilateral debate after the Second World War were
better at remaining beholden to their original sense of purpose. The re-aligning of
economic and political power after 1945 allowed colonized populations to demand and
act on behalf of their independence, which helped encourage collective discourse. As
early as the spring of 1947, organizational efforts began with the Asian Relations
Conference (ARC).¹⁴⁹ Over 200 delegates and observers represented thirty-one countries
ranging from Egypt to Australia and beyond.¹⁵⁰ Defined as a “cultural” conference, the
ARC “decided on as inclusive a list of invitees as possible” to counter ingrained trends of
conferring within exclusive groups so as to present a unified front and thus diminish
differences. Diverse and openly opposed groups such as the Jews and Arabs as well as
the Nationalist and Communist Chinese factions were invited to contribute to the “growth
in understanding” and “maturity” necessary for postwar problem-solving. Attendees
included specialists “from cultural organizations . . . [as well as] individual scholars.”¹⁵¹

Many conflicting assessments obscure the conference’s significance. In a general
sense, the meeting met expectations, but some critics felt more could have been achieved.
Historian A.W. Stargardt makes two key observations that accentuate success. First,
“many individual delegates tended to voice their own views, rather than repeat a ‘line’

¹⁴⁹ This conference is also known as the Inter-Asian Relations Conference.
296-297. The 31 countries were Afghanistan, Bhutan*, Burma, Ceylon, China, Egypt, India, Indo-China,
Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Malaya, Mongolia, Nepal, Palestine, Philippines, Siam, Tibet, Turkey*, Australia*,
the United Kingdom*, the United States*, the USSR*, and the Soviet Republics (Armenia, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan). Those countries with asterisks sent observers only. The
Arab League also sent an observer.
and, at times, the discussions were enhanced by the diversity of views expressed by members of the same delegation. For the most part, delegates agreed upon raising standards of living via planned economies that were “free . . . from the influence of foreign capital.” According to analysts at the American Institute of Pacific Relations present during the conference, Jewish representatives, comprising the entire Palestinian delegation, dissented, advocating instead, “heavily capitalized” partnerships with industrialized nations.\textsuperscript{152} Yet, when some delegates proposed a continental trading bloc, others feared the threat of Indian and Chinese dominance.\textsuperscript{153} Second, Stargardt noticed that “looking beyond the detail, this conference was seen as a great demonstration for the freedom and independence of the countries of Asia which some were in the process of achieving and which could not long be denied to others.”\textsuperscript{154} General consensus declared that imperial elements should be removed and that countries reserved the right to set “its own immigration policy.” However, opinions splintered over the amount of support powerful Asian states should commit to weaker neighbors in their struggle for independence. Those in favor of more “active assistance” were off-set by those attempting isolate, not expand, pockets of conflict.\textsuperscript{155} More than anything else, the ARC served as a forum of opinion that became more institutionalized—but rather than promote uniformity, it accepted and reflected diversity as an alternative to rigid perceptions of order.

After World War II, the world’s political environment was such that individuals and newly independent countries such as India sought to embrace this diversity and

\textsuperscript{153} Mansergh, “The Asian Conference,” pp. 299-300.
\textsuperscript{155} Mansergh, “The Asian Conference,” pp. 300-301.
include those that European imperialists ostracized. This idea grew in popularity up through the 1950s and had a definitive effect on multilateralism within the United Nations. Historian Akira Iriye would label ARC objectives as “globalization” and “multiculturalism” that “was . . . giving rise to [an] awareness of diversity.”

Extending beyond awareness, however, the ARC, and the numerous examples succeeding it, helped propel diversity into a broader sense of internationalist purpose. As Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the ARC’s chairperson, stated at the opening session:

We seek no narrow nationalism. Nationalism has a place in each country and should be fostered, but it must not be allowed to become aggressive and come in the way of international development. . . . The freedom we envisage is not to be confined to this nation or that or to a particular people, but must be spread out over the while world.

Rather than interpret multilateralism as an extension of national interests, Nehru and indeed much of the developing world separated the two spheres. By 1947, Nehru and others wanted their new nationalist regimes to affect international debate and did so by accentuating diversity rather than suppressing it. Nehru’s approach formed the basis of his evolving non-aligned philosophy. This idea of improving the socio-economic standing for a majority of the world’s population took off during the 1950s and became the basis for the Non-Aligned Movement.

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156 Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*, p. 149.
Although the impact of the ARC’s independent internationalist outlook affected some participants profoundly, others saw no place for such a perspective to their own autonomous pursuits. For example, the curtailing of nationalist sentiments in favor of multilateral diversity failed to influence matters regarding the increasingly volatile Jewish-Arab dispute in Palestine. As Britain’s imperial domain crumbled rapidly after World War II, both Arabs and Jews perpetrated terrorist attacks. Generally speaking, Arabs targeted Jews; Jews targeted British authorities.\(^\text{158}\) Jewish militants obliterated British military headquarters at the King David Hotel on 22 July 1946. On 14 February 1947, London officials announced their intent to return Palestine to the League of Nations successor, the United Nations. Meeting in its first emergency session in May 1947, the UN General Assembly agreed to form a special committee to investigate. Like the countless commissions preceding it, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) gathered information and testimony to decide on a course of action.

The Special Committee faced truly daunting challenges as it inherited the problems pervading the fate of Palestine. One of the most crippling issues was the questionable quality of the committee delegates. Ralph Bunche, representing the UN secretariat office during the UNSCOP mission, provided less-than flattering assessments of his colleagues. In his opinion, of all the delegates from Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Holland, Iran, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and

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Yugoslavia, no one possessed the necessary appreciation of the situation, nor the objectivity required for constructive leadership. 159 None of the committee members, including Bunche, were specialists in Middle Eastern affairs. What Bunche possessed that the others lacked was an ability to balance sensitivity to the intricacies of the situation with the resolve necessary for maintaining perspective. 160 The committee members’ lack of this critical equilibrium was not the only challenge that confronted them in Palestine.

External efforts to influence UNSCOP added to the complexities facing the UN delegation and its mission. Raids, arrests, and killings continued in spite of the committee’s presence in Palestine. These activities distracted the delegates as they questioned whether the committee, as a whole, should comment publicly on these matters or keep their attention focused on the task at hand. Debate within UNSCOP devolved into futile pro-Zionist, pro-Arab arguments regarding the volatile course of events involving British authorities, Jews, and Arabs. In some instances, Jews and British authorities used “spies and bugging devises” to monitor UNSCOP members. 161 As the UN group set their itinerary for conducting interviews of various factions within each of the interested parties, British officials declared that UNSCOP would have to provide a list of the prospective interviewees, some of which included people wanted by the British

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159 Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, pp. 140-142. See also Morris, 1948, p. 41. Often times the historical analysis of these assessments is somewhat conflicted. For example, Morris describes Paul Mohn, UNSCOP’s Swedish deputy chairman; Ivan Rand, the chief Canadian delegate; and Garcia Granados, Guatemala’s delegate as pro-Zionist. Ralph Bunche saw them as anti-Semites interested in “dumping world Jewry on the Arabs.” See Morris, 1948, p. 41; and Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, p. 147.

160 According to historian Jim Haskins, “Before this assignment, [Bunche] had never even read a book on Palestine.” Unlike his counterparts on the committee, however, Bunche maintained “calmness, tactfulness, patience, a sense of humor, and a tremendous intelligence and ability to see situations from new angles.” See Haskins, Ralph Bunche, pp. 62-63. David Horowitz, Jewish Agency liaison officer to UNSCOP, commended Bunche’s grasp of “the ramifications of the complex issue, . . .his depth of understanding, his wide knowledge, and his dedication.” Horowitz quoted in Mann, Ralph Bunche, p. 163.

161 Morris, 1948, p. 42. See also Mann, Ralph Bunche, pp. 160 and 162.
authorities.\textsuperscript{162} British attempts to manipulate UNSCOP to serve their own purposes threatened to derail the UN’s efforts to engage in pluralistic diplomacy.

Arabs and Jews devised their own strategies when interacting with the UN delegation. Protesting UNSCOP’s simple notion of acknowledging and negotiating with Zionist interests, Arab officials boycotted the delegation’s fact-finding mission. The Jewish population, on the other hand, carried out a well-scripted drama. Moderate and hard-line Zionists, such as Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, often employed “good cop, bad cop” tactics to make Weizmann’s appeals appear more amiable and persuasive to committee delegates.\textsuperscript{163} Seeing Ralph Bunche as the most capable member of the delegation, Zionists from the Jewish Agency wanted private access to him in order to make their case.\textsuperscript{164}

The attempts to influence and interfere with the UN delegation combined with the rigors of their travels and security burdened the committee members. Like all mediators in the Arab-Jewish dispute, Bunche and other members of UNSCOP grew frustrated and became mired in confusion and pessimism.\textsuperscript{165} One of the main frustrations was the fact that, as Bunche put it, “there was a vacuum in [Palestine] so far as authority was concerned, and this was particularly true with regard to the Arabs.” Where Jews were allowed to construct a “semi-governmental apparatus” consisting of hospitals, schools, and “local authorities,” Arabs remained dependent on British authorities and were thus poorly prepared for the termination of Britain’s mandate in Palestine.\textsuperscript{166} Given these

\textsuperscript{162} Urquhart, \textit{Ralph Bunche}, p. 143.
\textsuperscript{163} Morris, \textit{1948}, pp. 42-43.
\textsuperscript{164} Urquhart, \textit{Ralph Bunche}, pp. 143-144; and Mann, \textit{Ralph Bunche}, p. 163.
\textsuperscript{165} Urquhart, \textit{Ralph Bunche}, p. 146.
circumstances, the UN officials moved towards making their final recommendations. UNSCOP agreed upon some form of territorial partition between Jews and Arabs but differed as to its degree. Bunche drafted both the majority and minority reports that would eventually frame the scope of debate in the UN General Assembly.

The Indian, Iranian, and Yugoslavian delegates represented the minority viewpoint which supported the idea of a federal, bi-national state. Instead of two separate entities, land would be divided into Arab and Jewish sectors, but political power would rest in a unified central government representing the interests of both parties. Defense, foreign policy, finance, and immigration would be the responsibility of the federal government, while the two “states” comprising it would dictate education, housing, public health, and taxation policies.  

The pluralist aspects of this proposal seem clear. Arabs and Jews would be able to enjoy nominal self-determination of primarily domestic concerns while federal control set the international agenda.

In a lengthy explanation of his opposition to the majority, Abdur Rahman, India’s UNSCOP representative, noted that support for a federated state was considerable. Rahman expressed how the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry, assessing the plight post-World War II Palestine, had rejected complete partition because of fears that it “would result in civil strife which might threaten the peace of the world.” Rahman and Vladimir Simic, Yugoslavia’s delegate, acknowledged that Britain’s maintenance of the status-quo led to deficiencies in education, public health, law, land reform, and taxation policy which resulted in a weak political infrastructure. In spite of these shortcomings, Rahman argued that self-determination was indivisible and therefore must be granted to

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the people of Palestine as a whole. UNSCOP’s majority, however, adopted a more literal interpretation of the term “self-determination.”

Minus the three delegates favoring federalism and Australia’s abstention, the remaining committee members called for two separate states. Like a Salvador Dali-inspired checkerboard, the boundaries of these two states paradoxically integrated the two communities together while simultaneously alternating patches of territory between Jewish and Arab rule. Jerusalem and lands immediately surrounding it became an international enclave. In an effort to emphasize greater cooperation, and perhaps appeal to the advocates favoring federation, UNSCOP would authorize official recognition of either state’s independence after the signing of a treaty creating “a formal economic union.” Nearly six months after Nehru’s proclamations at the ARC, where he espoused nationalist sentiments that respected the international community and its efforts to guarantee universal freedoms, UNSCOP delivered its findings to the United Nations General Assembly. By October 1947, the Assembly deliberated both proposals.

Support for United Nations Resolution 181, endorsing partition, was at best reluctant. In the United States, President Harry S. Truman agonized over the Arab-Jewish predicament. As early as 1946, the president supported partition plans. Yet, according to historian Michael Cohen, “Truman still clung to the plan for a unitary Palestine as advocated first by the Anglo-American Committee”—the same committee

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169 Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, p. 259. Slightly more than half of all Palestinian land fell under Jewish control.

170 Douglas Little, *American Orientalism*, p. 82.
Rahman praised in his opposition of UNSCOP’s majority ruling. Lobbyists for Zionism and political reverses during America’s 1946 mid-term elections helped Truman change his mind. The Chairman of the Democratic National Committee told Truman that even toning down previous pro-Zionist statements could cost the president re-election in 1948. Likewise, high-ranking bureaucrats opposed to partition came to understand the political interests at work. As the UNSCOP plan made its way before the UN General Assembly, Loy Henderson, a State Department official and member of the U.S. delegation to the UN “realized [years later] that Congress, the press, the Democratic party, and aroused public opinion would all turn against [Truman] should he withdraw his support for the Zionists.”

According to historian Peter Hahn’s investigation of the close relations between Zionist organizations and the American Federation of Labor (AFL), Truman heard from yet another bloc of his constituency that was in favor of creating an independent Jewish state. Truman, himself, recalled years later, “I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this

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172 Peter Hahn, “The Influence of Organized Labor on US Policy toward Israel, 1945-1967,” in *Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World Since 1945*, eds. Peter Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2001), p. 161. Other organizations involved included the Jewish Labor Committee (JLC), the Trade Union Division of the National Committee for Labor Israel (TUD/NCLI), and the American Trade Union Council for Histadrut (ATUCFH).
instance." Much like the Arabs and Jews of Palestine, U.S. officials operated from a position of national self-interest that infringed upon multilateral approaches to arbitration.

From roughly this point forward, the United States began a slow process of replacing Britain as the power responsible for constructing consensus in the Middle East. Historian Melani McAlister notes that, in spite of domestic political opposition, the threat of continued Soviet expansion accentuated "the necessity not only for U.S. leadership but also for U.S. supremacy." One key focus for such "supremacy" applied directly to the Arab-Jewish dispute. Using the United Nations as a basis for consensus, American officials applied their own "special pressure" on Haiti, Liberia, the Philippines, Nationalist China, Ethiopia, and Greece to get UNSCOP's partition plan through the General Assembly. Economic and military aid as well as collective security agreements, such as the Rio Treaty of 1947, helped ensure all but Greece's compliance. Without this effort, the two-vote cushion by which UN Resolution 181 passed the General Assembly would not have been achieved in all likelihood.

In many respects, these events emulate the course taken by British officials with regard to the Suez Canal. Two examples, the complete reversal of British and American policy regarding the Zionist agenda and the fulfilling of national interests through the manipulation of multilateral consensus, stand out as the most significant parallels.

174 McAlister, Epic Encounters, p. 50.
175 Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 261. Heavy lobbying by non-government organizations such as the Jewish Agency, sympathy for Holocaust victims, Arab non-cooperation, and considerable political pressure from the United States all helped pass the resolution by a slim margin. See also Best, et. al., International History of the Twentieth Century, p. 120.
176 Historians Melvyn Leffler and Douglas Little describe how American policy towards creating a Jewish state reversed itself twice. By the spring of 1948, senior officials at the State Department thought they had persuaded Truman to support a federated state. When Warren Austin, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, expressed this change in policy openly, Truman bristled at the news. The President's only recourse.
Truman as well as much of the American public understood the Arab-Jewish dispute mainly from the viewpoint of domestic national politics rather than Middle Eastern stability. As a result, the motivation for passage of UN Resolution 181 conflicted with efforts to establish a greater degree of interdependency between Arabs and Jews that a federated state may have cultivated. National self-interest remained the dominant motive not only for the United States, but also for the several states that were corralled into voting for partition.

While national interests are rightfully considered to be a fundamental aspect of international affairs, it seems equally justifiable to conclude that obsessive attention paid to national interests creates new and increasingly volatile problems that unfettered multilateral diplomacy may be better able to resolve. Throughout the history of the Suez Canal and the myriad interests it stimulated, one subtle irony that contributed substantially to international crisis was the inability of interested parties to identify and allow for multilateral diplomacy in matters where national interests conflicted. Officials, such Ralph Bunche and others, who comprehended the perilous diplomatic trends being established, formed a nascent minority. As a result of the prevailing insensitivity to using multilateral means to achieve unilateral ends, the actions taken during 1947-1948 and the subsequent decade contributed directly to the intensity of the Suez Crisis of 1956.

demonstrating his unequivocal support for a Jewish state was to recognize Israel’s independence once it was declared on 15 May 1948. See Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 240; and Little, *American Orientalism*, p. 85. See also Urquhart, *Ralph Bunche*, p. 156.
The escalation of regional tensions that factored directly into the Suez crisis began with abandoning the procedures established in UN Resolution 181. According to the resolution, two criteria were to be met prior to official recognition of partition. First, a two-month grace period between Britain’s evacuation and Palestinian and Jewish independence was to be observed. Second, recognition of independence rested on the economic treaty both Jews and Arabs were to ratify. If the treaty failed to take effect before 1 April 1948, the UN commission was authorized to implement it. Only after the partitioned states achieved independence under these conditions would either state be eligible for membership to the United Nations. Rather than instill a sense of orderly transition across Palestine, however, the UN resolution’s promise of recognition moved Jews and Arabs to intensify their efforts to attain independence.

For British authorities eager to leave Palestine, these sentiments uncorked a new conundrum. On the one hand, the British were relieved of their responsibilities in the Levant. On the other hand, those officials among the last to leave feared that the introduction of UN Palestine Commission officials would precipitate unrest and the targeting of British authorities. As a result, the British kept the UN commission out of Palestine “until just [before] the British were terminating the mandate.” UN officials were unable to build meaningful relationships, necessary for implementing Resolution

181, and therefore act as an effective intermediary between Jews and Arabs.178 British forces scheduled to leave no later than August 1948 relinquished control three months earlier. The day after Britain announced the end of its mandate, Israel declared its independence on 15 May. The same day, Israel’s Arab neighbors declared war on the new Jewish state.

The war continued for much of the remainder of 1948. As the United Nations’ chief negotiator, Count Folke Bernadotte secured a temporary cease-fire, during which time Arabs and Israelis reinforced their positions. While it is worth noting that the Truman administration remained committed to supporting the UN mediation between Arabs and Jews, it is equally important to understand the context and limits of that support. Historian Melvyn Leffler points out that Truman and his subordinates embraced the spirit of the negotiations conducted by Bernadotte, but American participation in enforcing a UN cease-fire remained out of the question. Yet, when American and British officials did discuss the possibility of restoring order, the strategies proposed remained independent of the UN’s jurisdiction.179 Without adequate enforcement, the UN-sponsored arms embargo was violated repeatedly. In one particularly ironical case, Czechoslovakia delivered four Nazi-built Messerschmitt Me-109 fighter aircraft to Israel to aid in their war for independence.180 The combatants rejected a 15 July United Nations

Security Council order to “desist from further military action.” Towards the end of 1948, the fortunes of war turned in Israel’s favor. In addition to holding their ground, Israelis conquered another twenty-one percent of territory formerly known as Palestine.

Typical of twentieth century warfare, non-combatants bore the brunt of the war. And just as typical, both sides set about defining the context of the ensuing debate. Fear of reprisals and outright evictions of Arab ethnicities drove Palestinians from their homes. According to Arab-Israeli dispute specialist, Benny Morris, departure of Palestinian civic leaders, intellectuals, and business-owners contributed to the mass flight of the poor. Reports of Israelis carrying out massacres and looting cars, homes, businesses, and warehouses as well as destroying property added to exodus. As early as 1 August, Bernadotte reported the “acute” degree “of human suffering;” refugee estimates reached 550,000. Bernadotte wanted to allow Palestinian refugees to return of munitions from various sources in the Western hemisphere. See Amitzur Ilan, *The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Arms Race: Arms, Embargo, Military Power and decision in the 1948 Palestine War* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 74, 82, 93-94.

182 Best, et. al., *International History of the Twentieth Century*, p. 126.
183 Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited* (New York; Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 591. Interestingly, Morris argues that Zionist ideology, from its earliest conception, focused on the eviction of Arab populations from Palestine. However, he goes on say that the Palestinian refugee problem beginning in 1948 was more the result of war itself than any conscious policy on the part of Arabs or Israelis. In some cases, the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), added to the confusion by encouraging some Palestinians to stay while helping others to leave. See Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, pp. 588-589 and 593.
184 ORSC, “Letter dated 6 August 1948 from the Vice-Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine and President of the Palestine Arab Delegation to the United Nations addressed to the Acting Secretary-General concerning refugees and displaced persons,” 9 August 1948, Doc. S/957, p. 3. Benny Morris adds that many Palestinians wished to escape the prospect of Jewish rule and believed that their displacement would be temporary once Arab powers began their invasion of the new Jewish state. See Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, p. 589. With regard to the murdering of Palestinian civilians, Morris contends that “apart from the 20-odd cases of massacre, Jewish troops often randomly killed individual prisoners of war, farmhands in the fields and the occasional villager who stayed behind.” These activities were perpetrated by individual Israeli Defense Force (IDF) units and their commanders. See Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, pp. 588-589, and 592.
home for those wishing to do so once peace was re-established.\textsuperscript{185} The Foreign Minister of Israel’s provisional government, Moshe Shertok, reckoned that neighboring nations who had invaded Israel were responsible for mass dislocation; therefore Israel felt no responsibility for accommodating the refugees’ return. Israel remained willing to negotiate terms of return as a part of a peace settlement acknowledging Israel’s right to exist.\textsuperscript{186}

Israeli leadership also stirred debate by equating the plight of Palestinians to those of Jews stuck in Europe’s post-World War II relocation camps. An estimated 250,000 Jews resided in camps across Europe in 1948. In a letter addressed to the UN Secretary General Trygve Lie, Shertok described the “demoralizing life of camp inmates” despite the approximately two million U.S. dollars per month the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee spent to maintain the camps and their occupants.\textsuperscript{187} Jamal Husseini, President of the Palestine Arab Delegation to the United Nations, took issue with Shertok’s assessment.

\textsuperscript{185} ORSC, “Cablegram Dated 1 August 1948 from the United Nations Mediator to the Secretary-General concerning Arab refugees,” 5 August 1948, Doc. S/948, p. 1. See also Morris, \textit{The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited}, p. 595.

\textsuperscript{186} ORSC, “Letter dated 4 August 1948 from the Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel to the Acting Secretary-General, transmitting a letter dated 30 July 1948 from the Foreign Minister of Israel to the Mediator, concerning Palestinian Arab refugees,” 5 August 1948, Doc. S/949, pp. 2 and 4. Benny Morris refutes the idea that Israelis would extend the right of return to Palestinian refugees. While Jews did not make explicit calls for expelling Arabs, they did move to prevent the return of refugees “at all costs.” By the summer of 1949, Israeli public opinion was united in this cause. See Morris, \textit{The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited}, pp. 589 and 600.

\textsuperscript{187} ORSC, “Letter dated 10 August 1948 from Moshe Shertok, Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of Israel to the Secretary-General concerning four questions on refugees raised at the 343rd meeting of the Security Council,” 10 Aug. 1948, Doc. S/965, pp. 2-5. On British-occupied Cyprus, food rations were “utterly inadequate” for the 12,000 Jews who sought illegal entry into Palestine before being partitioned. Resettling Jews outside Palestine was too slow, Shertok argued, and Israel needed a labor force desperately. Word of these conditions had been circulating for some time. The previous year, former US vice-president, Henry Wallace, brought the issue to the attention of an already sympathetic American public in an article he wrote for \textit{The New Republic}. See Mart, \textit{Eye on Israel}, p. 23.
Where Israel made broad generalizations, Arabs, such as Husseini, considered the plight of the two groups as utterly incomparable. Jewish refugees in Cyprus, Husseini said, were not so much refugees as illegal aliens who had violated British immigration law. Additionally, Arab refugees numbered nearly twice as many as Jewish refugees in Europe; therefore stressing the limited resources available to them. Since 1945, Husseini contended, Jewish organizations caring for Holocaust survivors, along with American funds, and the UN’s own International Refugee Organization had provided hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars in relief making Jewish refugees recipients of “more attention and contributions then any other refugees in Europe.” Arab authorities were not as well prepared to deal with the rush of humanity that swamped the region which worsened the prospects for peaceful co-existence.

188 Abdul Rahman Azzam, the Secretary General of the Arab League, reported to the UN Security Council that independent organizations such as the International Red Cross agreed that Arab refugees were “in dire straits” and that the overall situation could turn disastrous and spread if help was withheld. Syria’s estimated 80,000 Arab refugees cost the Syrian government 1.2 million pounds in local currency every month. Lebanon had absorbed 70,000 displaced Palestinians, 75 percent of whom lived “in extreme poverty” costing 900,000 Lebanese pounds per month. Edward Ghorra, Lebanon’s alternate delegate to the UN, informed the Security Council that these refugees included thousands that were “sick, orphans, and aged” with which the government could not cope. Iraq held 23,000 refugees “most of them women and children in a distressing condition . . . without any means of subsistence.” Trans-Jordan cared for over 72,000 Palestinians aided by the Red Crescent and the Women’s Union. Egypt tended to over 276,000 “sick and hungry” refugees; and Palestine held another 138,000. Before year’s end, Arab refugee estimates approached a total of one million. See ORSC, “Letter dated September 1948 from the League of Arab States to the Secretary-General regarding the condition of Arab refugees from Palestine,” 7 Oct. 1948, Doc. S/997/Add. 1, p. 2. See also ORSC, “letter from the Secretary General of the Arab League to the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the Position of Arab refugees from Palestine, dated 25 August 1948,” 11 Sept. 1948, Doc. S/997, pp. 1-3.

Regardless of location, this mass displacement swelled the ranks of an impoverished, landless class known as the fellaheen. Possessing a history pre-dating the Suez Canal, the fellaheen has often been marginalized and oppressed by the ruling hierarchy. In the nineteenth century, the fellaheen comprised the draft labor force responsible for building the Suez Canal. After 1948, they became a powerful and unstable force for change across the Middle East. One reason for the group’s volatility stemmed from the fact that the bulk of refugees in Egypt, for example, were young males. Predictions foreshadowing the spread of discord throughout the region came to fruition in the 1950s as all of Israel’s neighbors coped with domestic instability. Where revolutions were successful, as was the case in Egypt, the new regimes allied with the fellaheen. As a result, this social class formed yet another viable interest group during the Suez Crisis of 1956. See Doc. S/997/Add. 1, p. 2. See also ORSC, “Letter dated 11 Oct. 1948 from the League of Arab States to the Secretary-General regarding the condition of Arab refugees from Palestine,” 16 Oct. 1948, Doc. 997/Add. 2, p. 2.

Those individuals who persevered with fashioning peace agreements that jeopardized the unilateralist wartime actions, perpetrated by both sides, became targets of violence. The most infamous of examples occurred when the UN’s chief negotiator in the region, Count Bernadotte, called for a new partition plan requiring Jews to yield land won during the war to Arabs. Bernadotte’s amendments proposed transferring the Negev and West Bank jurisdictions to Transjordan authorities. The Jews were compensated for these losses by gaining control over the “western Galilee” region.

Neither Jews nor Arabs endorsed Bernadotte’s plan. The Negev region was essential to Jewish plans for future population growth. Arabs were suspicious of Transjordan’s consolidation of territory and its impact on the regional balance of power. When Ralph Bunche was chosen to deliver Bernadotte’s report to the General Assembly, both Israelis and Arabs favored postponement. According to Bunche, Arab delegates wanted to await the outcome of the presidential elections in the United States. The Republican nominee, Thomas Dewey, was believed to harbor pro-Arab sentiments stemming from his close ties to Wall Street investors concerned with protecting their oil interests in the Middle East. As Election Day approached, however, Arabs were crest-fallen at the news of Dewey’s pro-Israel declaration.

With the status quo unlikely to change, belligerent interests in the Levant took matters into their own hands. At 2:05 p.m. GMT on the Friday afternoon of 17

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September 1948, Count Bernadotte was assassinated by Israeli terrorists. En route to a local YMCA, the UN convoy carrying Bernadotte stopped at an Israeli army roadblock. Two men wearing Jewish army uniforms approached Bernadotte’s vehicle “and fired at point blank range.” During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Bernadotte had negotiated cease-fires in an effort to initiate a more stable peace, had proposed reversing the ethnic-cleansing that had taken place, and had supported territorial concessions that might have provided a greater sense of security. These efforts interfered with the installation of unilateral order from which the Arab-Jewish War of 1948 emerged.

What was particularly disturbing about the impact Bernadotte’s assassination had on collective diplomacy was the general apathy that the international community exhibited thereafter. Bernadotte and the United States government pushed Israelis for “substantial repatriation as part of a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem and the conflict.” Yet, American pressure lacked the “conviction” necessary to impel the Provisional Government of Israel (PGI) to yield. Speaking before an audience at the National Defense University in the early 1950s, Ralph Bunche made a similar observation and concluded that “if the [British, French, and American] governments take

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195 With specific regard to territorial concessions by both Jews and Arabs, UN Commander E.L.M. Burns offers a succinct summary. See E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (Toronto, Canada: Clarke, Irwin & Co., Ltd., 1962), p. 126. Bunche offers a positive assessment of the UN’s effort in Palestine coordinated by Bernadotte. Israelis and Arabs “bowed to the authority of the United Nations, not to the authority of military events.” See Henry, ed., Ralph Bunche, p. 181-182. Hurewitz credits Bunche directly. “Between 13 January and 21 July 1949,” he writes, “Bunche led Israel and its immediate neighbors to the conclusion of four separate agreements that interlocked into a relatively durable armistice system. Indeed, it proved to be the only comprehensive arrangement—built, it should be noted, of bilateral blocks—that the hostile neighbors have so far been able to agree upon.” See Hurewitz, “Ralph Bunche as UN Acting Mediator: The Opening Phase,” p. 175.
196 Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, pp. 599-600. The PGI did offer to allow for the return of a fraction of the roughly one million Palestinian refugees. Arabs rejected this token gesture. Accordig to Morris, the United States government also deemed the proposal “insufficient.”
an apathetic position, if they are diffident or indifferent, if they are content with drift, then dangerous situations [may] well develop simply by default.” Bunche’s somber prognostication proved highly accurate as multilateral diplomacy became the indentured servant of competing national security interests. Over the course of the decade following the Second World War, the dominant mentality governing international relations was one where dialogue and interaction between various interests threatened the application of national security prerogatives.

X

While radical factions within countries, such as the one responsible for Bernadotte’s death, took the most extreme of measures to repudiate multilateral diplomacy, governments took a more subtle approach to turn this diplomatic liability into an asset of national interests. For American officials, the intensification of the Cold War justified this principle which determined the operational parameters for virtually all of the county’s international relations. As authors of the provocative NSC-68 report put it, “In a shrinking world, . . . it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable.” In addition to implying that a hegemonic sense of uniform order was desirable when faced with the alternative of Soviet domination, policy doctrines such as NSC-68 also assumed

197 Henry, ed., Ralph Bunche, p. 186.
that any debating of alternatives was detrimental to America’s national security. The “absence of order” was the peril over which American interests obsessed.

The aim of imposing American notions of order in contested areas of the world had two unintended consequences that contributed to fundamental issues surrounding the Suez crisis. First, the implementation of American security interests alienated nationalist sentiments of self-determination popular after the Second World War. More than simply combating breakdowns in international order, officials in Washington associated any independent ideology or deviation from American expectations as a threat to American interests. When the rising tide of nationalism in Egypt and much of the rest of the Arab world coalesced in the 1950s and challenged American efforts to reconstruct the West’s hegemonic order in the region, the president’s senior officials adopted a nearly irrevocable position that sought to isolate and undermine those leaders considered to be uncooperative. These one-dimensional, punitive policies inspired nationalist leaders, such as Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, to commit greater acts of defiance, which assured more stringent Western condemnation and direct intervention.

In addition to undermining self-determination within states, American policies of the 1950s also sought to redefine notions of multilateral diplomacy. The prevalent climate of intolerance in international affairs, aided by the imposition of a particular brand of ideological world order, made competing notions of order construct their own sense of international legitimacy. Venues where the international community gathered

199 David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007), pp. 93-94. Historians, such as David Schmitz, trace this American diplomatic tradition back to the aftermath of World War I when the United States government “came to favor and actively support ‘stable’ right-wing regimes over what they perceived to be unstable democratic or radically nationalist governments.” See Schmitz, *Thank God They’re on Our Side*, p. 10. As a U.S. State Department official in the 1950s, George Kennan made a similar observation when he remarked that American allies may include repressive regimes “whose origins and methods would not stand the test of American concepts of democratic procedure.” See Best, et. al., *International History of the Twentieth Century*, p. 366.
became susceptible to subterfuge. During the Korean War, American policy-makers used the United Nations to provide a veneer of legitimacy underneath which American policy-makers installed their own sense of order. To circumvent the Security Council, where a Soviet veto could nullify attempts to win world support for military intervention in a future conflict, the U.S. delegation oversaw passage of what came to be known as the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution. According to this measure, when a “lack of unanimity” existed among the Security Council’s permanent members regarding “international peace and security, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately [and make] appropriate recommendations . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

In addition to circumventing the possibility of Soviet veto, the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution also “side-stepped the [UN] Charter” by allocating authority to the General Assembly “where the United States controlled an unquestioned automatic majority.” Much like the British had done after consolidating control over the Suez Canal, American officials sought to portray their national interests as universal interests. Nowhere was this more visible than with the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution designed to provide international support for America’s imposition of order.

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In the roughly one hundred years marking the canal’s construction, Zionism’s ascendance, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and the Cold War, the world witnessed the subjugation of multilateral diplomacy to the whim of individual national self-interest. Private interests, such as de Lesseps and his Suez Canal Company, misrepresented multilateralism by placating the desires of European and Middle Eastern leaders rather than foment genuine, multilateral discourse. The masquerade continued with de Lesseps’s creation of a “multi-national” Suez Canal Company in which two countries held over ninety percent of the company’s shares. Under Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, the British government misunderstood and misrepresented its control over the canal after acquiring Egypt’s stake in the company. The Constantinople Convention of 1888 reinforced these misperceptions by allowing signers of the treaty to police themselves. Meanwhile, actual enforcement of the treaty’s terms rested with the feeble Ottoman Empire and Egypt, a British protectorate. In following de Lesseps’s model, Theodor Herzl organized Zionist strategies for re-settlement of Palestine mainly through the highly effective actions of numerous private organizations. Many of these organizations put significant pressure on President Truman as tensions in Palestine grew increasingly volatile.

The course of Palestine’s partition, Israel’s independence, and America’s Cold War concerns perpetuated the subordination of multilateral consensus to national interest. Although United Nations Resolution 181 sanctioned partition, the measure passed as a result of concessions the U.S. delegation made to reluctant member states. In effect,
national self-interest determined the fate of the resolution rather than any serious commitment to the resolution itself. Once passed, interest in seeing Resolution 181 put into effect disappeared, allowing Zionists to pursue their own path to independence. The United Nations served a similar purpose during the Korean War as American policy-makers enlisted the institution to endorse a particular worldview.

Exceptions to these developments did exist; but as tensions in the Middle East escalated in the early- to mid-1950s, the status quo remained dominant. Attitudes emerging from the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 contrast the prevailing mentality of misrepresenting national interest as the basis for internationalist appeal. The ARC’s attempt to bridge differences existing among competing notions of world order inspired additional efforts by the mid-1950s. Coincidentally, these diplomatic anomalies coincided with a new, internationalist sense of purpose within the United Nations. By 1956, these diplomatic trends would challenge the prevailing diplomatic discourse. However, events in the Middle East during the early 1950s continued disguising unilateral ambitions as multilateralism, which contributed directly to the intensity of the Suez Crisis of 1956. Successful crisis management occurred only when multilateral diplomacy gained the initiative.
Chapter II

Unilateralism and the United Nations: International Affairs and the Rise of Dag Hammarskjöld as UN Secretary General, April 1951 to July 1956

The conditions emerging from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continued to plague international relations during the 1950s. De Lesseps and Disraeli became the unlikely paragons of national leaders insistent on social and political uniformity to ensure fulfillment of national interests. In Iran, the populist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh wrestled with reforming his country’s domestic and foreign policies while relying on traditional methods of political corruption to retain political power. The impasse resulted in disaster for Mossadegh. From Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser observed Mossadegh’s missteps and established his own strategy for creating a populist autocracy. By 1954, Nasser was governing Egypt directly, implementing a nationalist agenda that catered to a broader ethno-religious populace.

The United States also suffered from an increasingly dogmatic sense of conformity. The Red Scare of the early 1950s cast suspicion on American citizens including those who worked for the United Nations. While accusations of political
subversion subsided by 1954, many American officials pursued foreign policies that remained highly conditional. The result left the United States government in an undesirable position of pursing collective security agreements that were largely beholden to America’s national security interests.

In the case of the Middle East, President Eisenhower’s plans to create a defense network failed to address the concerns of America’s potential and actual allies. Attention to Cold War security matters eclipsed the Arabs’ more immediate concerns of Israeli aggression. Realizing this disconnect, Nasser interpreted America’s collective security proposals as another form of imperialist exploitation. British officials, meanwhile, objected to the Eisenhower administration’s assumption of Middle Eastern initiatives. Desperate to maintain some influence in the region, British policy-makers entered into the American-inspired Northern Tier alliance. Involvement of a Western, imperialist power undermined the independent intent of the agreement. As a result, America’s attempts to incorporate the Middle East into a military alliance were torpedoed by its own ideological inflexibility and by the ulterior motives of its principal European ally.

The following analysis investigates not only these developments and the resulting development of non-aligned ideology, the Czechoslovakian arms deal, the Aswan Dam proposal as well as the heightened tensions surrounding the Arab-Israeli dispute, but also the concomitant developments taking place within the UN Secretariat’s office. Contrary to the escalation of international tensions in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world, Dag Hammarskjöld’s election as the new Secretary General of the United Nations and his astute diplomatic skills offered an alternative to the ingrained status quo. Recognizing the self-destructive tendencies of competing national interests, Hammarskjöld moved the
organization away from endorsing a particular ordered worldview, as his predecessor had done, and more towards a perspective encouraging exchanges of world opinion that would facilitate broader, multilateral dialogue. In the case of American pilots captured by the Communist Chinese and accused of violating Chinese airspace, Hammarskjöld’s ideas were put to the test. In this instance, as well as in future international crises, the Secretary General served as the ideal diplomat for crisis resolution due to his role as an honest broker. The UN’s renewed sense of purpose, with Hammarskjöld at the helm, proved indispensable during the Suez crisis and its negotiations.

I

When Mohammad Mossadegh became Prime Minister of Iran in 1951, it appeared as if he supported a greater degree of political pluralism. As head of the nationalist party controlling a majority of seats in the Iranian parliament, Mossadegh called for broad reforms guaranteeing greater freedom and equality for all Iranians.  

Soon after Mossadegh took power, senior Truman administration officials, including Secretary of State Dean Acheson, recognized that Mossadegh “had enthusiastic support from newly emerging groups in [Iranian] cities, including workers, shopkeepers, teachers, students, government employees, and some religious zealots.” These groups that Acheson had identified as well as labor unions, women groups, and artists, organized themselves into


vibrant “social, political, or cultural associations.” Support from these segments of Iranian society provided Mossadegh with a great deal of political legitimacy. During this period, Iran also benefited from a diverse, multi-party political system.

With regard to foreign policy, Mossadegh took a hard-line approach. He advocated “‘negative equilibrium,’” intent on removing all foreign influences from “Iran’s social, economic, and political affairs.” Indeed, there were stifling foreign influences with which to contend. At the time, Western oil companies held substantial concessions to Iran’s abundant oil fields. According to some scholars, “Iran produced more oil than all the Arab states combined,” thanks largely to Britain’s imperial oversight. However, such prestige came with sacrifice. Through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), leaders of Britain’s oil industry dictated production quotas, prices, and revenue shares for its members, including the Iranian government. Mossadegh and his people demanded complete control of their nation’s natural resources and pursued this course of action by nationalizing all oil operations in Iran. For some Iranian specialists such as Shireen Hunter, Mossadegh’s short-sighted policy-making contributed to an antagonized worldview where “deep suspicion of great power intentions” resulted in a

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hierarchical and “polarized” sense of the international community divided between the haves and the have-nots.209

Many Western policy-makers expressed concern over the precedent Mossadegh’s policies set for Western concessions throughout the rest of the world. During a cabinet meeting, Britain’s Defense Minister Emanuel Shinwell wondered if the Suez Canal would be next as other developing countries aspired to achieve “financial freedom.”210 While initially acting as a mediator between Iranian and British interests, Truman administration officials acted in a biased manner by drafting an Anglo-American proposal for Mossadegh’s consideration.211 The proposal stipulated that if the Iranian government refused to relinquish control of the AIOC, then British interests were to be compensated for company property as well as “the profits that would be forfeited over the life-time of the concession.”212 Any remaining chance of establishing a constructive multilateral dialogue between Anglo-American and Iranian interests suffered from the boycotting of Iranian crude oil by American and British oil interests. Desperate for a compromise agreement by 1953, Mossadegh hoped that “hints” of Iran’s moving into the Soviet sphere of influence would garner sympathy in an America reeling from unsympathetic McCarthyism.213 To skittish Washington officials, nationalization

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smacked of socialism and Mossadegh’s round-about rapprochement with the West only confirmed his weakness.

Western officials grew impatient with the prime minister’s unwillingness to yield to Anglo-American standards. As historian Mary Ann Heiss put it, the West “joined to formulate a gender-based view of Mossadegh that denigrated him for departing from what they considered to be acceptable Western norms—and that worked against their stated goal of seeking a resolution [to the oil crisis].” Thinking that Mossadegh’s “fragile,” “emotional,” “impractical,” “hysterical,” and “neurotic” temperament made negotiations impossible and that Mossadegh’s pro-communist leanings threatened U.S. interests, the newly-elected Eisenhower administration began preparing for a U.S.-supported coup in Iran. 214 Fazlollah Zahedi, the man the CIA chose to replace Mossadegh, was considered to be much more amenable. In his biography of CIA director Allen Dulles, Peter Grose describes Zahedi as a Nazi collaborator during World War II and “a man who would follow orders.” 215 The search for a docile candidate for prime minister served as part of America’s plan to reinstate Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the shah of Iran, as the new head of the Iranian government.

In the case of both Iranian and Anglo-American policy-making, initiatives operated from an exclusive pretext. On the one hand, Mossadegh’s ousting of foreign business interests, while perhaps justified, remained provocative nevertheless. Over the

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215 Grose, Gentleman Spy, p. 364.
course of his term as prime minister, Mossadegh also coped with satisfying an increasingly restless polity. By 1952, he had resorted to rigging Parliamentary elections, as his predecessors had done, in order to retain a governing majority. As a result, those groups that had cheered Mossadegh’s rise to power began questioning the sincerity of his commitment to reform. Support disappeared completely when the prime minister pressured Parliament to grant him greater control over the military in 1953. As historian Richard Cottam concluded, Mossadegh’s actions made erudite Iranians ambivalent enough to watch his government collapse during the August 1953 coup d’etat. On the other hand, the West’s most viable diplomatic effort represented British interests at the expense of all other considerations. Given Iranian suspicion of Western motives, this proposal could only have been construed as an ultimatum. Rather than deviate from this unaccommodating course of action, the Eisenhower administration simply forged ahead. When Mossadegh’s actions impeded American interests, he was removed from power, thus setting an early precedent for the Eisenhower administration and its stand on independent nationalist movements. Political power shifted from elected officials in Iran’s parliament to the more autocratic office of the shah.

Having consolidated his political control over Iran with American assistance, the shah dismantled the country’s professional associations. Rather than earn the trust of the middle-class only to lose it later as Mossadegh had done, the shah governed autocratically. After 1953, the new regime “either outlawed or rendered functionally

\footnotesize{216 Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, pp. 101 and 280.}
\footnotesize{217 Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, pp. 281-284.}
impotent” virtually all secular associations, including the Iranian Parliament. The Eisenhower administration indicated tacit approval of these measures by allocating over one billion dollars in economic and military aid to Iran from 1953 to 1961 despite CIA operatives having incited mass demonstrations during the 1953 coup. For a brief period, Mossadegh had benefited from an eager and engaged citizenry. After the 1953 coup, the shah, along with the American government, subordinated civic discourse and agendas to state interests.

In foreign policy, the shah pursued a course similar to that of his domestic agenda. He introduced his policy of “‘positive nationalism’” which replaced “‘negative equilibrium’” in name only. Nearly identical to Mossadegh’s efforts, the shah’s new policy “meant that we [Iranians] make any agreements which are in our own interests, regardless of the wishes of others.” From the start, the shah attempted to reconcile two conflicting tendencies: engaging with the West and representing the wishes of his people who demanded the charting of an independent course in Iran’s foreign affairs. With regard to Iran’s oil policy, the shah agreed to re-configure the AIOC into a “multinational [oil] consortium” consisting of only four members: Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. According to historian Mary Ann Heiss, negotiations favored American interests, specifically U.S. business and national security. During a National Security Council meeting in 1954, Herbert Hoover, Jr., the Appointed Consultant to the

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219 By the 1970s, many groups had fled Iran and continued their activities abroad. See Mirsepassi, *Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization*, pp. 67-68, 70-72.
Secretary of State, commented that the consortium was “perhaps the largest commercial deal ever put together, with assets which might be over a billion dollars.”223 Much like the consolidation of Suez Canal Company shares, the sense of “multilateral” consensus was illusory at best, shielding hegemonic ambitions behind an image of broader cooperation. Like French and Egyptian concentrations of Suez stock, the United States and Britain dominated Iran’s new oil consortium by controlling over eighty percent of Iran’s oil production.224

II

Between Mossadegh’s rise and fall in Iran, Egypt had experienced a political revolution of its own in 1952. Griped by a growing sense of nationalist sentiment, members of the Free Officers Movement, a small organization within the Egyptian military, seized control of the government. As early as the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the Egyptian government gained greater control over the country’s Military Academy including its admission policy. That same year, an impressionable Gamal Abdel Nasser entered the Military Academy as one of fewer than a dozen Egyptians hailing from various social and economic backgrounds. For the most part, officer corps careers were reserved for those individuals of Turkish heritage and possessing an elite social status.225 As a founding member of “the Free Officers,” Nasser was one of a

224 Little, *American Orientalism*, pp. 57-58. Iran and France rounded out the four-nation consortium and divided the remaining twenty percent of production between them.
handful of military officers who “adopted policies that tapped into the mainstream of
Egyptian culture and society” and coinciding nationalist sentiments.\textsuperscript{226} In her book
\textit{Mobilizing Islam}, Carrie Wickham describes the Free Officers as an organization
dedicated to “egalitarianism.”\textsuperscript{227} After Egypt’s military debacle in the 1948 war with
Israel, the Free Officers became more politically active as Egyptians blamed King Farouk
for sending a poorly prepared Egyptian army off to war against the Jews.\textsuperscript{228} Fighting in
Palestine introduced Nasser to like-minded individuals and “the ideas which illuminated
the path ahead of [him].”\textsuperscript{229} By 1952, Nasser and other members of the Free Officers
Movement led their country in revolution.

Afterwards, the extent of Egyptian social discontent alarmed Nasser. After
consulting with “leaders of opinion,” the army officers realized that only the army could
ameliorate dangerous levels of factional tension.\textsuperscript{230} Roughly a week after the Free
Officers’ military coup, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), acting as a
provisional government, became permanent and called for the voluntary purging of
“undesirable elements” from “parties and associations.” With regard to the nation’s
institutions of higher learning, the government outlawed non-sanctioned student
organizations, fired non-compliant faculty and administration officials, and stationed
security personnel on campuses nationwide.\textsuperscript{231} As one scholar put it, Nasser dominated

\textsuperscript{226} Michael Doren, \textit{Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question} (New
\textsuperscript{227} Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, \textit{Mobilizing Islam}, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{228} Vatikiotis, \textit{The Egyptian Army in Politics}, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{230} Nasser, \textit{Egypt’s Liberation}, pp. 33-34, 34, and 42. Nasser equated the amount of social unrest as
bordering on “chaos.”
\textsuperscript{231} Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, \textit{Mobilizing Islam}, p. 24.
political thought by establishing an “ideological consensus” in Egypt.\footnote{Raymond Hinnebusch, “Political Parties in the Arab State: Libya, Syria, Egypt,” in Nation, State and Integration in the Arab World, Vol. 3: Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State, Adeed Dawisha, and I. William Zartman, eds. (New York: Croom Helm, 1988), p. 50.} When political organizations resisted voluntary assimilation, the RCC abolished political parties, including popular independent affiliations such as the Wafdist party and the Society of Muslim Brothers.\footnote{Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics, pp. 76-77. See also Viviane, Nadia Ref ‘at, and Samir Murcos, “From Inertia to Movement: A Study of the Conflict over the NGO Law in Egypt,” in NGOs and Governance in the Arab World, Sarah Ben Nefissa, Nabil Abd al-Fattah, Sari Hanafi, and Carlos Milani, eds. (New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2005), p. 103; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, p. 24; and Hinnebusch, “Political Parties in the Arab State: Libya, Syria, Egypt,” p. 50. The Society of Muslim Brothers is also known as the Muslim Brotherhood. The name of the political party Nasser created was the Arab Socialist Union (ASU).} The Society of Muslim Brothers, also known as the Muslim Brotherhood, retaliated by attempting to assassinate Nasser on 26 October 1954.\footnote{According to one Egyptian informant, the Brotherhood was in considerable disarray by January 1955. The same Egyptian informant also “seriously doubted that the entire secret organization [the Brotherhood] was behind the [assassination] attempt.” See Telegram from Jefferson Caffery to State Dept., Cairo, 6 January 1955, Department of State, RG 59, State Dept. Central Files, #774.00/1-655, Box #3681, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Nevertheless, assassination plots against Nasser continued into the next year. Six members of the Muslim Brotherhood convicted of conspiring to kill Nasser had their sentences commuted from the death penalty to “penal servitude for life.” Dozens more were arrested and convicted. See Jefferson Caffery to State Dept., Cairo, 4 Jan. 1955, Dept. of State, RG 59, State Dept. Central Files, #774.00/1-455, Box #3681, National Archives, Washington, D.C; and Howard Elting, Jr. to State Dept., 11 Jan. 1955, Dept. of State, RG 59, State Dept. Central Files, #774.00/1-1155, Box #3681, National Archives, Washington, D.C.} Similar to the shah in Iran, Nasser and his RCC sought to forge greater uniformity across all aspects of Egyptian civil society.

Nasser’s headlong pursuit of a monolithic order generated considerable dissent not only between his regime and other competing factions, but also within the RCC. By 1954, Nasser’s authoritarian sense of order upset leading RCC officials. Where some RCC leaders including the president of the new government, General Muhammad Neguib, supported reconciliation with elements once opposed to the revolution, Nasser, the man wielding “real power,” took a more absolute stand.\footnote{Richard Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 128-129, 150-151. According to Middle East specialist Barry Rubin, General Naguib was regarded as}
Nasser assumed complete political control after placing Neguib under house arrest. RCC purges continued for some time.\textsuperscript{236} Complete control over every political, economic, social, and cultural dimension extinguished any opportunities for establishing connections between diverging points of view. Without access, alienated interests were either absorbed by the state, perished quietly, went into self-imposed exile, or resorted to violence. Refusing to acknowledge—let alone acquiesce—to alternative perspectives elevated despondency and insecurity not only among domestic organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, but also among regional and international organizations.

What is particularly fascinating about Nasser and his ideological assumptions is the degree to which he fused his ideas of order with a broader sense of international populism. In his book \textit{Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution}, Nasser outlined his movement’s basic principles. First, Nasser explained that Egypt’s revolution possessed the unique characteristic of experiencing both a political and a social revolution simultaneously during and after 1952. Second, Nasser addressed Egypt’s acting as an intersection for three overlapping “circles” encompassing pan-Arab, pan-African, and pan-Islamic associations and their impact on economic development and political cohesion. In the Arab circle, Nasser accentuated the roots of Arab civilization, the Arabs’ geo-strategic importance, and their access to cheap oil as the key strengths of pan-Arab identity. Oil made the entire region indispensable to the rest of the world; therefore, according to Nasser, this natural resource should be used to advance the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}

\bibitem{} being more “‘pro-Western’” and was favorable to Egypt’s participation in a mutual security agreement with the United States. See Barry Rubin, “America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957,” \textit{Political Science Quarterly}, Vol. 97, No. 1, (Spring 1982), p. 78.

\bibitem{} Many high-ranking Egyptian officers fled the country. See Telegram from Jefferson Caffery to State Dept., Cairo, 5 January 1955, Department of State, RG 59, State Dept. Central Files, #774.00/1-555, Box #3681, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
\end{thebibliography}
interests of all Arab nations as a single bloc. In the African circle, Nasser proclaimed solidarity with black populations experiencing similar strife in winning independence from colonial rule. Nasser condemned imperial intrusions throughout the continent and expressed a desire to create “an enlightened African consciousness” through a Cairo-based “African institute.” In the Islamic circle, Nasser wished to reach out to the global community of Muslims by establishing a “Parliament of Islam.” Under this umbrella institution, Muslims from all professions and backgrounds would dedicate themselves to “mutual cooperation.” Together, these spheres form the crux of the ideology bearing Nasser’s name.

Scholarly analysis of Nasserism has revealed a great deal about what inspired Nasser and the lasting significance of his political philosophy. For some, Nasser’s realistic assessment of the Egyptian Revolution and its challenges makes his commitment commendable. Few if any revolutionary figures were inclined to address their own shortcomings, but Nasser tackled these issues candidly. For others, Nasserist ideology served as the latest manifestation of an emerging Arab identity. Notions of pan-Arabism dated back to the 1920s and 1930s when the term “Arab,” once used to describe the Bedouin, began applying to all those who spoke Arabic. Early twentieth century Arab intellectuals and writers, such as Muhammad Husain Haikal, had championed pan-Arab unity. Prior to the ending of World War II, Arabs were already beginning to organize. From 25 September to 8 October 1944, officials from Syria, Egypt, Transjordan,

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238 Dorothy Thompson in *Egypt’s Liberation*, pp. 5-6.
Lebanon, and Iraq convened the Preliminary Conference on Arab Unity. These five states along with Saudi Arabia drafted the Arab League Charter on 22 March 1945. The new organization was to coordinate policies relating to “financial and economic matters, communications, cultural matters, questions of nationality, social questions, [and] problems of public health.”

Ethnic solidarity proved popular with Egypt’s bureaucratic elites working within King Farouk’s old regime just prior to the 1952 revolution.

Nasser continued the trend by including pan-Arab visionaries such as Haikal in an inner-circle of advisers.

Perhaps more than any other revolutionary, Nasser had succeeded in fusing his autocratic mindset together with the popular socio-political notions of liberty and mass-empowerment. Political analyst Raymond Hinnebusch recognizes that although Nasser oversaw a one-party state, his “modernization polices” enhanced “the social base of potential political participation.” Compared to the developments in 1950s Iran, Nasser succeeded in cultivating popular authoritarianism where Mossadegh and the shah had failed. Nasser claimed to represent a diversified society both within Egypt and across entire regions because he had incorporated them into his unitary national interests and identity by dominating domestic professional associations and proposing the creation of various international institutes designed to synthesize regional policy-making.


242 Hinnebusch, “Political Parties in the Arab State: Libya, Syria, Egypt,” p. 50.

243 As a scholar of Arab nationalism, Salim Yaqub makes a similar argument. “[Nasser],” he contends, “called for a common Arab policy to meet the common threats of Zionism and Western imperialism. The unstated assumption was that Egypt itself should determine the content of that policy.” See Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, p. 31.
doing so, Nasser emulated Western leaders of the nineteenth century and the Eisenhower administration of the twentieth century by creating the illusion that monolithic state interests represented the broadest collection of values shared by the international community.

Several International Relations specialists have advanced the understanding of this phenomenon as it applies to the formation of nationalist identity. Benedict Anderson believes that states used cultural instruments to perpetuate a homogenous sense of nationalism. Language, especially vernacular language; newspapers; and museums provide a sense of belonging by bestowing communal values to all members of a particular group.244 Theorist Ernest Gellner abides by this constructionist view of nationalism, adding that “nations are not given, but are created by states and by nationalists.”245 Other scholars, such as Partha Chatterjee, contend that embracing Anderson’s “models” helped distinguish “Third-world nationalisms” such as Nasserism.246 Indeed, Nasser’s actions reflected these tendencies precisely. As a leading specialist in Arab political philosophy, Adeed Dawisha understood that “the application of Egypt’s values to the Arab world gave rise to Egypt’s aspirational goal . . . of ‘Arab

unity.’” This sense of solidarity would satisfy the need for political and ideological legitimacy as well as “the psychological needs of prestige” in the Arab world.\footnote{Dawisha, \textit{Egypt in the Arab World}, pp. 140-141.} What was best for one’s own state was best for the world as a whole, and both revolutionaries and reactionaries alike set about promoting a brand of world order that required conforming to certain cultural standards.

III

During America’s Red Scare of the early 1950s, socio-political paranoia affected perceptions on an international level in ways that paralleled those events in Egypt and Iran. As Cold War scholar Elaine Tyler May contends, Senator Joseph McCarthy’s anti-communist rampage across national politics blamed the burgeoning “cosmopolitan urban culture” for the supposed demise of the country’s “self-reliant entrepreneurial spirit.” Tyler and others often associate McCarthyism with domestic purges.\footnote{Elaine Tyler May, \textit{Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era} (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1988), pp. 10-11. See also Gaddis, \textit{We Now Know}, p. 225.} According to David Reynolds, McCarthyism “helped stabilize the country in a new conformity.”\footnote{David Reynolds, “American Globalism: Mass, Motion, and the Multiplier Effect,” in \textit{Globalization in World History}, ed. A.G. Hopkins (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002), p. 254.} Yet, McCarthy’s actions simultaneously bred contempt and “disunity” between the United States and Western Europe.\footnote{James Rorty and Moshe Decter, \textit{McCarthy and the Communists} (Boston, MA: The Beacon Press, 1954), p. 100. Ironically, Rotry and Decter use press clippings from Hammarskjöld’s native Sweden to demonstrate the degree of disharmony. According to “Sweden’s largest and most influential newspaper:” The unanimous opinion of Europe is that Joseph McCarthy symbolizes exactly the reverse of what America stands for and what we have learned to appreciate. His name is the arch enemy of liberty, and a disgrace to the name of America.} As in Egypt and other regions of the world, quests for conformity within American society negatively affected the international arena.
Unlike other individual civil servants who had their loyalty questioned by the government they served, United Nations’ employees who happened to be American citizens lay outside this domestic jurisdiction. According to historian Peter Heller, UN Secretary General Trygve Lie accommodated McCarthyism by dismissing twenty-one American employees who invoked their Fifth Amendment rights. By mid-1953, Dag Hammarskjöld’s election to succeed Lie made it so that he now had “to reconcile a member states’ demand for a certain standard of national loyalty” with the international organization’s demand for non-partisan objectivity. Gingerly, Hammarskjöld faced off against America’s policies challenging not only UN integrity, but also the institution’s identity.

Hammarskjöld’s record during this event is mixed. On the one hand, he won concessions from the U.S. government whereby the Secretary General acted as “the final arbiter” regarding “the validity of evidence” as to an employee’s loyalty. In his first two and half months as Secretary General, Hammarskjöld stated explicitly how “a truly international civil service, free from all national pressures and influences, should be recognized, not only in words, but in deeds.” Sadly, he remarked, this “principle” so fundamental to UN effectiveness was over-shadowed by the organization’s member states. Of the points contested, Hammarskjöld’s winning the right to evaluate

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employee loyalty under UN standards and not U.S. standards remained the most significant.\textsuperscript{253} On the other hand, some critics say that Hammarskjöld differed little from his predecessor. “Hammarskjöld bowed,” self-proclaimed socialist and former UN employee Conor Cruise O’Brien writes, “more gracefully and inconspicuously than Trygve Lie, but bowed none the less, to prevailing American opinion.”\textsuperscript{254} Hammarskjöld may have yielded to the whim of America’s political climate, but he also recognized the corresponding decline of multilateral diplomacy and prepared the UN for filling this role.

As cultural expressions of UN member states became the standard in conceptualizing international order, Hammarskjöld focused on defining the relationship between rigid connotations of world order and the dynamics of multilateralism. During the same speech in which he called for an independent international civil service, the Secretary General proclaimed that “the constructive will of the Member nations to put the common international interest before national demands” determined the extent of the UN’s influence. In addition to developing an independent cohort of international civil servants, Hammarskjöld called on UN Member States to re-engage in the organization’s “open debates” where perspectives of national interests could be scrutinized and evaluated. Hammarskjöld argued that “the debates generally tend in the long run to reduce the differences between [diverging] positions.”\textsuperscript{255} Contrary to the self-serving trends dominating world affairs, Hammarskjöld’s philosophical approach quietly reminded the international community of the fundamental need for governments to

\textsuperscript{253} Heller, \textit{The United Nations Under Dag Hammarskjöld}, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{255} ORGA, Eighth Session, Doc. A/2404, p. xiii.
understand world order in terms of interests that extend beyond the fulfillment of national interests.

IV

Unfortunately, key diplomatic figures ignored Hammarskjöld’s unique approach. Beginning in August 1954, tensions escalated between Communist and Nationalist Chinese regimes regarding the sovereign status of Quemoy and Matsu, two islands located in the Formosa Strait between the communist-controlled mainland and the nationalist holdout of Formosa Island. United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sought to use the UN Security Council to distort international perceptions of Soviet and Chinese activities. Bringing the matter before the Security Council, Dulles hoped, would put the Soviet delegates in an untenable situation. If they vetoed a proposal to have UN officials act as lead negotiators, then the Soviets would be seen as obstructing international peace. If the Soviets supported the proposal, then the Chinese Communists would be seen as the “international outcasts.” Instead of interpreting the UN’s potential as an independent organization that could add a new dimension to international discourse, Dulles disregarded it by using the UN Security Council as an instrument for endorsing an anti-communist agenda.

Roughly a year after Hammarskjöld’s remarks calling for a more robust UN role, another international problem concurrent to the Formosa crisis permitted the Secretary  

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General to put his ideas into practice. Before stalemate yielded to armistice in the Korean conflict, Chinese forces had captured eleven American airmen who had allegedly violated Chinese airspace. On 14 November 1954—twenty months after their capture—a Chinese military tribunal sentenced the airmen to prison. Resolution of this crisis made its way quickly to the United Nations for a number of reasons.\footnote{According to Pauline Frederick, President of the United Nations Correspondents Association, President Eisenhower requested that the United Nations handle the matter, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary General to conduct the negotiations, and Hammarskjöld made the initial effort by traveling to China in-person. See “UN Interview Pauline Frederick,” 20 June 1986, Interviewer: Norman Ho, p. 4, [updated 17 April 2001; cited 4 December 2009], Available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/dag/docs/history/frederick1.pdf} First, the United States did not officially recognize Communist China as a legitimate state. Therefore, American officials could not negotiate without losing face by tacitly recognizing Communist China’s existence. Second, since armed forces involved in the Korean War operated under United Nations auspices, American officials felt comfortable supporting UN-sponsored negotiations. As a result, Hammarskjöld negotiated not on behalf of the United States, not on behalf of the General Assembly that had mandated his participation, but rather on behalf of the constitutional merits afforded him under the United Nations Charter to maintain international peace.\footnote{Brian Urquhart, \textit{Hammarskjöld} (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 105-106. See also Heller, \textit{The United Nations Under Dag Hammarskjöld}, pp. 40-41.} Lastly, by characterizing his mission in a constitutional context, Hammarskjöld served as the only viable mediator acceptable to both Eastern and Western powers.\footnote{Richard Miller, \textit{Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy} (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1961), p. 35.} In early January 1955, Hammarskjöld spearheaded the international effort to reach a compromise.

From the start, the Secretary General displayed a tremendous amount of deference and inclusiveness to build consensus. From New York, the Secretary General and his entourage flew to London, Paris, and Delhi before heading on to Canton, Hankow, and,
finally, Beijing. All along the way, Hammarskjöld conferred with British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden; French Premier, Pierre Mendes-France; and Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Hammarskjöld said of these meetings that “they represented . . . a more complete picture of how matters looked from other angles—something which is essential if this job is to be done properly.”\textsuperscript{260} One journalist said of Hammarskjöld’s approach, the resourcefulness of personal diplomacy mirrored “the old fashioned skill that averted many world crises.”\textsuperscript{261} Yet, important characteristics differentiated the secretary general’s approach from the diplomatic methods of Ferdinand de Lesseps. Rather than fabricate consensus to fit a particular agenda, as de Lesseps had done in his quest to construct the Suez Canal, Hammarskjöld met with national leaders to gather advice and procure a more holistic view of the problem at hand.

Hammarskjöld’s methods also hoped to foster greater harmony between multilateral diplomacy and the fulfillment of individual national interests without sacrificing one for the other. In a paradoxical sense, the Sino-American standoff provided Hammarskjöld with the diplomatic leverage he needed to gain credibility as an impartial party. According to Richard Miller, both China and the United States detested the idea of backing-down. “In this somewhat frozen state of affairs,” Miller continues, Hammarskjöld “served as an honest broker,” communicating Chinese and American perspectives, while earning “the confidence of both sides in the process.”\textsuperscript{262} During a press conference on 14 January 1955, the Secretary General declared, “There was need to

\textsuperscript{262} Miller, \textit{Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy}, p. 44.
exchange information . . . so that the facts might be brought out clearly and possible misunderstandings might be straightened out.” Hammarskjöld believed that by engaging in what he called “open diplomacy,” he had succeeded in providing both parties room for diplomatic maneuvering. Any “final decisions,” he continued, “will emerge as unilateral decisions and as part of a general development, more than as the result of any kind of, so to say, settlement.” Indeed, Hammarskjöld’s analysis proved correct. In May 1955, Chinese officials released the first of the American flyers. Rather than having conflicting national interests heighten the sense of crisis, Hammarskjöld hoped to enlist their support in resolving it by giving them an opportunity to appear as protagonists, advancing the cause of world peace. Regrettably, no government proved very willing to continue this trend of easing tensions either in the pacific or elsewhere in the world.

V

To the contrary, relations were strained not only among Cold War adversaries, but also among allies. In matters pertaining to the Middle East, the earliest signs of discontent between friendly nations emerged during the negotiations regarding the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954. Under the terms of this arrangement, all British military personnel were to evacuate Egypt by 1956. This included the gargantuan military base that defended the Suez Canal Zone. After the evacuation, the Egyptian military would assume responsibility for canal security. Daily operation of the canal, however, remained

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264 The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954 allowed for the return of British forces to the Suez base during the seven-year period following evacuation. Grounds for such an intervention were only permissible in the event of a regional security threat.
in the hands of the Suez Canal Company, whose largest share-holder was Great Britain. According to modern Middle East scholar Douglas Little, U.S. officials encouraged these concessions in order to prepare for American installation of security agreements with the Egyptian government. Winning Nasser’s support was necessary for preventing communist infiltration into the Middle East. Yet, at one point during the negotiations of 1954, Prime Minister Churchill argued, “The situation must be avoided in which people would think that the United States had driven the United Kingdom out of Egypt.”

Attempts to forge a regional security agreement also suffered from fundamental discrepancies regarding basic regional boundaries. In the negotiations that culminated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) creation in 1949, American officials refused to include Greece and Turkey as founding members of the organization. According to political scientist, Douglas Stuart, “extension of the alliance into the Eastern Mediterranean would blur the regional identity of NATO.” Instead, U.S. State Department officials looked to involve Greece, Turkey, the United States, and Great Britain in a larger Middle East Command (MEC) that would be associated with NATO. The implied sense of autonomy that the MEC was supposed to enjoy

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265 Little, American Orientalism, p. 128. In the words of Contemporary British Historian, L.J. Butler, “Although Britain sought to involve the United States in defending the Middle East, the Americans appeared to be more concerned about consolidating their own relations with [Nasser’s] new regime, and pointedly (and in vain) waited for an invitation from the Egyptian government to discuss regional security.” See L. J. Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002), pp. 111-112. John Lewis Gaddis concurs with Butler’s analysis of initial British and American cooperation during the Truman administration regarding Middle East collective security. However, Gaddis concedes, “Similar methods do not always succeed . . . in dissimilar situations.” See Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 168.


267 Douglas Stuart, “The United States and NATO Out-of-Area Disputes: Does the Cold War Provide Precedents, or Merely Prologue?,” in A History of NATO—The First Fifty Years, Vol. I, ed. Gustav Schmidt, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 126. The MEC was also referred to as Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). Cairo was to serve as the headquarters for this new Middle East alliance.
disappeared as the Cold war intensified. From 1951 onward, British and, to some extent, American officials campaigned to have NATO assume the lead in crafting the West’s Middle Eastern defense policy.\textsuperscript{268}

To complicate the context of Middle East security arrangements, shifts in political power in both the United States and Egypt altered policy priorities. Guaranteeing the terms necessary for creating a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) that involved Egypt meant including provisions for the selling of weapons to the Egyptian government. As early as November 1952, prior to Nasser’s assuming complete control over Egypt, General Naguib had agreed to America’s terms.\textsuperscript{269} That same month, however, Eisenhower won the presidency and, soon afterwards, began enacting his “New Look” diplomacy. Instead of funding conventional weapons development and manufacturing, the Eisenhower administration diverted funds to pay for nuclear weapons systems.\textsuperscript{270} Therefore, the ideal opportunity for including Egypt in a collective security arrangement occurred at a time when senior U.S. officials were least likely to take interest.

Efforts made to initiate some degree of collective security suffered from additional hurdles. During U.S. Secretary of State Dulles’s meetings with Egyptian officials in May 1953, the divide between American interests of containment and Arab interests of improving Arab armed forces came into sharp focus. According to Adeed Dawisha, Egyptian officials supported “strengthening the already existing Arab Collective Security Pact” to defeat potential communist threats. Contrary to the


\textsuperscript{270} Secretary of State Dulles took charge of balancing leaner military procurements with more effective diplomacy. See Immerman, \textit{John Foster Dulles}, pp. 50-51.
Americans, Egyptians believed that communist infiltration of the Middle East would originate from domestic sources instead of coming from an overt act of aggression in the Caucasus region located some five thousand miles away.\textsuperscript{271} In his analysis of U.S.-Arab relations, Salim Yaqub identifies how “the United States and the Nasserist movement applied their shared values inversely.” Where American officials wanted unquestioned support for their Cold War objectives and reconciliation of matters relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict and Western imperialism, Arabs sought diplomatic independence in Cold War relations and stronger pledges of American support for the Arab struggle against Zionism and Western imperialism.\textsuperscript{272} These perspectives are important in understanding not only the scope of the divisions surrounding discussions of collective security, but also in understanding the respective fixation on national interests that remained sacrosanct in the eyes of those responsible for creating defensive alliances. Given this context, the likelihood of success for constructive multilateral diplomacy was minimal.

Once Nasser consolidated political power in 1954, he began distancing himself from any alliance with the West. Egypt’s new nationalist leader considered any “arms-for-alliance” deal as American neo-imperialism. Eisenhower’s insistence on American leadership in any collective security organizations only reinforced Nasser’s apprehensions.\textsuperscript{273} The same could be said for plans to have NATO assume a more direct

\textsuperscript{271} Dawisha, \textit{Egypt and the Arab World}, pp. 10-11.
\textsuperscript{272} Yaqub, \textit{Containing Arab Nationalism}, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{273} For analysis of Eisenhower’s perspective regarding collective security arrangements see Richard Saunders, “Military Force in the Foreign Policy of the Eisenhower Presidency,” \textit{Political Science Quarterly}, Vol. 100, No. 1, (Spring 1985), p. 100. In a 21 November 1951 memorandum, U.S. officials summarized and responded to Soviet arguments criticizing any Arab-American military alliance. Soviet officials equated the stationing of western troops in Middle Eastern states with an imperialist occupation. Additionally, they expressed concern over the proliferation of weapons and the overall deterioration of regional peace and security. American policy-makers stressed the defensive objectives of any military alliance and its mission to protect national independence. Nearly three years later, as debate over a collective security agreement intensified, some American officials noted that the US was “preparing to
role in Middle East security issues. Yet, even after Nasser’s coming to power and his successful Anglo-Egyptian negotiations in 1954, rank and file State Department officials believed that Nasser would participate in America’s collective security efforts in exchange for U.S. weapons. These assumptions were erroneous. As historian Peter Hahn put it, “having just arranged the departure of British troops, [Nasser] would not consider signing any agreement requiring the presence of American officers [in Egypt] under any conditions.” Additionally, the French sale of jet fighter aircraft to Israel in late 1954 only reinforced Nasser’s anti-imperialist suspicions of Europe’s persistent interference in the region. The following year relations among all parties deteriorated further.

Stymied by Nasser’s intransigence, U.S. diplomats succeeded in having Iraq sign a mutual defense agreement with Turkey on 24 February 1955. Doing so deprived the Soviet Union of gaining access to the Middle East by force without risking an expansive war. Nasser was concerned that Iraq’s participation in a regional defense pact might challenge Egypt’s control of pan-Arab loyalties. Determined not to be excluded,

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277 Henry Byroade to State Dept., Cairo, 11 March 1955, RG 59 State Department Central Files, #774.00/3-1155, Box #3681, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
British officials joined what came to be called the Northern Tier alliance on 5 April. British participation dashed American hopes of incorporating anti-imperialist countries such as Egypt into any Cold War-oriented collective security arrangement. Many, including officials in Washington, equated British participation with British command and control of American-supplied armaments. Arab nationalists would not tolerate this type of command structure. As a result, the alliance became, in the words of one scholar, “quite toothless.” This game of one-upmanship among Arab leaders as well as Anglo-American allies accentuated international instability that remained characteristic of the entire period of the mid-1950s.

Speaking at the Fifth Annual All-Jesuit Alumni Dinner, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expounded on American perceptions of world peace and security. As if to refute Hammarskjöld’s efforts to negotiate among differing views of world order, Dulles stressed the adversarial relationship pitting “peace versus liberty.” He proclaimed “that the craven purchase of peace at the expense of principle can result in destroying much of the human spirit.” Should this happen, he continued, “peace, under certain conditions, could [cripple] the capacity for moral and intellectual judgment.” While Dulles acknowledged the difficulty in attaining consensus in an increasingly interconnected world, he concluded that the United States contributed to “human freedom” through active participation in the United Nations and by entering into “mutual security arrangements . . . with more than forty nations [worldwide].” By advertising

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278 Little, *American Orientalism*, pp. 129-130. The Northern Tier grew to include Iran and Pakistan by the end of 1955. British officials often refer to the alliance as the Baghdad Pact.
American principles as universal norms, Dulles perpetuated the misrepresentation of multilateralism. Contrary to Hammarskjöld’s view where the UN acted as a forum for the exchange of principled perspectives to attain world peace, Dulles argued that peace processes that sacrificed a nation’s principles set a dangerous precedent. Indeed, Dulles’s generation feared the repercussions of unchecked appeasement, and perhaps rightfully so. However, Dulles’s Orwellian logic of representing “human freedom” based on the American model suggested that liberty was attainable if only the world conformed to American perceptions of it.281

The differences with regard to world order began to encroach on one another—so much so that they fostered international instability. The fact that Eisenhower based his mutual security program on the desire to demonstrate American solidarity with “the independence and self-determination of all peoples” only agitated British officials and their efforts to maintain an image of imperial omnipotence.282 Yet, the Eisenhower administration’s empathy for Nasser’s anti-colonial sentiments also had limits. Dulles proved reluctant to encourage nationalist pursuits beyond fulfilling Cold War objectives.283 Reacting to the diametrically opposed views of British imperial policies and Egypt’s nationalist agenda, the Eisenhower administration decided to forge ahead

281 Melanie McAlister reaches a similar conclusion in her examination of biblical blockbuster movie epics of the 1950s and official national security documents such as NSC-68. Combined, these efforts “mobilized, and then transformed, the logic of liberation from racial slavery to support a political construct of US-dominated liberty. In so doing, they used a complex and pernicious language of gender to suggest that American world power would produce a well-ordered international family.” McAlister, Epic Encounters, pp. 46-47. Nineteenth century concepts played a central role in forming these visions of world order. As David Reynolds notes in his essay on “American Globalism,” “National Security Council paper NSC-68, one if the defining documents of U.S. Cold War policy, applied the 1850s language of slavery versus freedom to the ‘shrinking world’ of 1950 that lived under the shadow of the atomic bomb.” See Reynolds, in Globalization in World History, p. 254.


283 Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 168. Gaddis describes Dulles’s deficiency as diplomatic “tone-deafness.”
with securing its own (myopic) interests. As a result, America’s alliances were not as stable as Dulles had assumed when he attempted to portray American principles as the basis for interdependency.

Dulles’s remarks were part of a coordinated media campaign by the Executive branch to garner Congressional support and appropriations for the mutual security program. Like his Secretary of State, President Eisenhower equated peace with achieving America’s national interests. “We [Americans],” Eisenhower surmised, “are convinced that our own continued economic, cultural, and spiritual progress [is] furthered by similar progress everywhere.”

During a 20 April speech to Congress, the president called on legislators to reallocate money earmarked for Europe’s continued post-World War II reconstruction and move it to fund economic, technological, and military development in Asia. The president proposed transferring over $3.5 billion dollars—roughly two-thirds of which went to military support—to friendly countries stretching from Japan to Turkey. The injection of funds would, Eisenhower hoped, spur “private overseas investment and private enterprises abroad” and, thus, encourage “loans rather than grants whenever possible.”

Officials at the Bureau of Economic Affairs endorsed the president’s foreign aid policy. “While recognizing and respecting the diversity of values and institutions in other countries,” one report proclaimed, “[the U.S.] must foster the adoption of policies conducive to local investment and initiative . . . . [without] the

appearance of ‘intervention.’”286 Though sensitive to the self-determination of states, Eisenhower’s efforts to extend America’s influence in Asia upset the supposedly harmonious relations existing between the United States and its established allies in Europe. Additionally, the recommendation that the U.S. government engage in foreign investment without “intervention” demonstrates the indirect efforts made to extend influence that began more commonplace after the Suez Crisis of 1956.

VI

America’s deteriorating relations with Israel also suffered during this period. After taking office in 1952, President Eisenhower distanced himself from the once cozy relationship with the Jewish State and the “Israel lobby” within the United States. As one historian put it, “Dulles admired the Israelis for their pioneering spunk and their anticommunist zeal but resented their uncompromising approach toward the Arabs and their unabashed involvement in interest group politics on Capitol Hill.”287 Leading Jewish advocates created the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations to streamline their message so as not to antagonize the president further. Conference participants grew frustrated, however, over the loss of influence within the Eisenhower administration. As historian Peter Hahn put it, Jewish leaders “discovered their ineffectiveness limited by the need to arrive at a consensus before each visit” with

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287 Little, American Orientalism, p. 89.
The Zionist Movement intensified efforts to mobilize other means of support. According to the analysis of U.S. State Department officials, Zionist organizations affiliated with the World Zionist Congress strengthened ties with “non-Zionist supporters of Israel.” Cooperation included large-scale bond campaigns where interested Americans could help offset gaps resulting from U.S. government cuts in aid. Previous Israeli bond drives had generated approximately $150 million in revenue.289

The Eisenhower administration’s handling of relations with Israel demonstrates the various complexities facing the increasingly diversified field of foreign policy-making. To their credit, administration officials moderated what had been America’s decisively pro-Israeli stance. The influence of powerful Jewish lobbies had been checked in order to curry favor with Arabs. Yet, the means by which it was accomplished in some ways perpetuated the rising tide of intolerance that was being expressed elsewhere.

Similar to the situations in Iran and Egypt, where national leaders were taking a hard-line against outspoken interest groups, senior American officials began withdrawing from outspoken groups which held dissenting opinions. While not as totalitarian as either the shah’s eradication of special interest groups or Nasser’s infiltration of them, the Eisenhower administration disengaged nonetheless. As a result, Israeli officials responded with a heightened sense of foreboding.

News of London’s eventual military evacuation from Suez and Washington’s extension of Cold War-oriented military aid to Iraq in 1954 delivered concussive blows to Israel’s foreign policy agenda and fueled support for the nation’s political hardliners

288 Peter Hahn, “The United States and Israel in the Eisenhower Era: The ‘Special Relationship’ Revisited,” in The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, p. 228.
such as David Ben-Gurion. These events threatened the security of Israel so severely that Israeli officials disregarded Egypt’s refusal to join America’s mutual security program. As Michael Handel argues in his essay on Israeli security strategy, Israel’s attention to “short-range survival” and “military solutions,” based on “preemptive strategy,” disregarded “longer-range planning and diplomatic options.” Douglas Little offers a more nuanced argument by acknowledging that Israel’s moderate Prime Minister Moshe Sharett attempted to establish secret negotiations with Nasser but that Israeli hard-liners succeeded in derailing Sharett’s plan.

Similar to the terrorist activities used in 1947 and 1948, Israeli hard-liners initiated plans to achieve their interests by escalating international tensions in the region. In July 1954, an Israeli unit attached to the psychological warfare branch of Israeli Defense Force (IDF) intelligence, activated an “Egyptian-Jewish network . . . in Cairo and Alexandria” to bomb “American and British cultural centers and other sensitive sites [in Egypt].” The objective was to weaken American-Egyptian relations and thus sabotage international support for Sharett’s peace initiative. In the wake of the foiled plot, Israeli public opinion was “infuriated by the torture of their agents” as well as the sentencing and execution of some of the conspirators. Instead of criticizing the

292 Little, American Orientalism, p. 90. Benny Morris uses Sharett’s term “‘activist’” to describe Zionist hard-liners. According to Sharett, “Israeli activists adopted a Judeo-centric view that was unsympathetic to and uncooperative with Arab negotiators.” See Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 280.
294 Little, American Orientalism, p. 90.
295 Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 282.
surreptitious nature of the operation and its intent to thwart peaceful negotiations, Israelis expressed their solidarity with perpetrators acting in the name of national security.

The Israeli press was complicit in manufacturing this sense of public unity. Press censorship and state-operated radio gave Ben-Gurion and other ideologues ample opportunities to edit events to the point where they became “wholly fictitious.”

Recording his memoirs years later, the Chief of Staff for the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), Canadian General E.L.M. Burns described how the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) instigated border disputes to galvanize Israeli opinion and thus stimulate Israel’s militarist mentality to enact strong defense policies. Jacob Blaustein, President of the American Jewish Committee, warned Secretary of State Dulles of Israel’s domestic political condition and implored the secretary to support Sharett. Unfortunately, Blaustein’s plea proved ineffective. The prime minister’s conciliatory approach to international affairs seemed increasingly untenable as Israelis gravitated towards more reactionary policies.

Israel’s antagonistic outlook helped fuel persistent border clashes that occurred all along Israel’s frontier. Guerrilla activity from both Arabs and Israelis had occurred periodically since the 1948 armistice. For the most part, the belligerents remained content with targeting civilians in the countless raids which occurred between 1948 and

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296 Morris, Righteous Victims, pp. 278-279.
297 See Eedson Louis Millard Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (Toronto, OH: George G. Harrap & Co., 1962), p. 38. The UNTSO was responsible for maintaining the 1948 Arab-Israeli armistice.
299 Gabriel Sheffer, Innovative Leaders in International Politics (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), p. 88. See also Tal, “Israel’s Road to the 1956 War,” p. 64.
Wanting to appear resolute in the face of mounting security concerns, however, Sharett yielded to Israeli hard-liners when he appointed David Ben-Gurion as the new Defense Minister. Within two weeks of taking office, Ben-Gurion amended the IDF’s rules of engagement to retaliate directly against Arab military personnel. The night of 28 February 1955, two Israeli paratrooper platoons infiltrated the Gaza Strip inflicting nearly seventy casualties, most of which were Egyptian soldiers. Despite what some historians might label “historical determinism,” this new Israeli policy made Nasser realize that he could no longer guarantee his troops’ security against raids and therefore could not enforce strict orders preventing Egyptian retaliation. Egypt’s president also associated Israel’s action with a larger, Anglo-American conspiracy designed to overthrow his government. To keep his grip on political power, Nasser grew increasingly determined to up-grade the nation’s arsenal.

Sharett also looked to bolster his own sense of security by forming an alliance with the United States. During Truman’s presidency, the Tripartite Declaration created an Anglo-French-American alliance designed to maintain the status quo in the Middle East following the 1948 armistice. Under the declaration’s terms, these three Western powers vowed to help defend either Arabs or Israelis against the aggressor in the event of another Arab-Israeli war. To help prevent hostilities, the Western powers agreed to

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300 Tal, “Israel’s Road to the 1956 War,” pp. 63, 65. The forty-seven border clashes in 1953 grew to one hundred and forty-five by 1954. Morris notes that “[Sharett] was able to stop particular retaliatory actions or reduce their scope. But, paradoxically, while he was prime minister, the reprisals increased in magnitude and in the number of casualties inflicted on the Arabs.” See Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 281.

301 As further evidence of the Israeli government’s control of public information, Israeli citizens had no knowledge of the political rift between Sharett and Ben-Gurion until the fall of 1956. Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 280.

302 Tal, “Israel’s Road to the 1956 War,” p. 59; Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, p. 18. See also Morris, Righteous Victims, pp. 279-281.

303 Laron, “Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal,” p. 27.
enforce an arms embargo on any Middle Eastern state planning aggressive military action. Unable to procure weapons directly in 1954, Sharett requested the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 be broadened to include an American pledge to protect Israel’s borders. If Sharett could not import weapons from the West, then he would attempt to gain their allegiance in a collective security agreement. Amidst a period of intense Cold War tensions, however, the United States was disinclined to become pre-occupied with Arab-Israeli border disputes. Sharett’s lack of diplomatic success combined with his citizens’ hard-line sympathies not only contributed to Sharett’s political defeat in the fall of 1955, but also served as key examples of the extent to which unilateralist policies dictated international affairs. Under Ben-Gurion’s leadership, the Israeli government took to securing its own interests regardless of the consternation caused to the international community.

VII

Newly independent countries struggled with similar inclinations as they asserted themselves into world politics more effectively. The Asian Relations Conference of 1947 had laid some of the groundwork, but later meetings in the mid-1950s solidified an independent sense of world order known as non-alignment. The Bandung Conference, or Asian-African Conference, of 1955 marks the definitive origins of the non-aligned movement and its foray into international politics. Located approximately one hundred and twenty miles southwest of Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta, Bandung hosted

representatives from twenty-nine African and Asian nations. Agenda items focused on strengthening relations among the participants, discussing strategies for solving “social economic and cultural problems” facing these new nations, examining ways of promoting “world peace,” and exchanging views regarding the challenges of surmounting the biases and stigma great powers attached to post-colonial powers. Disinterested in the bipolar, Cold War paradigm, non-aligned countries such as India, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Egypt, and many others sought to reverse the manipulative behavior that imperial world powers exploited.

In coming together as they did, many conference delegates shared a suspicion of an imposed sense of world order, especially one emanating from the West. Historian Peniel Joseph describes the Bandung conference as “part of an emerging Third World solidarity that challenged white supremacy at the global level,” free from “the Cold War’s ideological restrictions.” Conference observers such as Australian journalist, C.P. Fitzgerald, and expatriated African-American activist, Richard Wright, also realized to varying degrees that the conference minimized the role “doctrine and ideology played” favoring instead a greater “breadth of mind.” Both men agreed that the West should be sensitive to the perspectives expressed at Bandung. Yet, where Fitzgerald expressed

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305 The nations included India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Yemen. The Central African Federation was invited but did not send a delegation. The first five countries of this list (India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia) were called the Colombo Powers, which sponsored the Conference.


some skepticism over non-alignment’s idealistic rhetoric, Wright advocated the “transnational humanism that [exceeded] narrow nationalisms of any kind.” Fitzgerald worried that the divide was growing between Asian democracies, such as India, Ceylon, and, at the time, Burma, on the one hand, and Western democracies, on the other. Asia’s free and independent electorate, he said, contested the ideological and economic allure of Western democracies. Although these Asian democracies remained critical of Western policies in many respects, Fitzgerald warned against Westerners categorizing non-aligned ideology as communist infiltration.Official reaction among American policy-makers justified Fitzgerald’s fears.

American reactions to the Bandung Conference confirmed the backhanded attention paid to post-colonial nations. For the most part, U.S. officials viewed the event only so far as it directly impacted Cold War interests. Particular attention dissected Communist China’s participation and statements made relating to Taiwan. With regard to other agenda items such as decolonization, the Eisenhower administration’s opposition to immediate liberation placed, as one historian put it, the “First World . . . on a collision course with the goals of Third World nationalists.”

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310 Chester Pach, Jr., “Thinking Globally and Acting Locally,” in The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, p. xvii. Political Scientist Steven Metz offers an excellent critique of American foreign policy regarding African decolonization. Metz relegates U.S. interests in Africa to the economic, ideological, and security fields. Examination of key policy-makers of the 1950s reveals a variety of opinions as to how best to interact with African nations. According to Metz, senior foreign relations specialist such as Chester Bowles and Hans J. Morgenthau called for the U.S. to engage
administration refused to send official observers to Bandung and failed to send official
greetings to the conference members as was customary for such occasions. 311
Furthermore, Eisenhower’s Mutual Security Program was unveiled in an attempt to up-
stage the conference, by portraying the Northern Tier countries as allies in the fight to
contain communism.  It was precisely this type of mentality that irritated non-aligned
leaders and provoked non-aligned fears of Cold War exploitation.

Although the participants at Bandung wished to advance their national interests,
these influences failed to dominate the proceedings. United States Representative Adam
Clayton Powell (Democrat-New York), another of America’s unofficial observers,
testified to the rhetoric that both the Indian and Chinese delegations sometimes used in
unsuccessful attempts to control the proceedings. 312  According to scholar David Kimche,
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru convened the Bandung Conference in part to
check China’s emergence as a regional power.  Earlier in 1954, these two Asian giants
agreed bi-laterally to Panch Sheel, or “five principles” emphasizing non-aggression,
equality, respect for territorial sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, and
peaceful co-existence.  At Bandung, Nehru hoped to extend Panch Sheel to others.
However, not everyone agreed with these principles.  Krishna Menon, leader of India’s
delegation to the United Nations and Nehru’s trusted emissary, described the “five

African nations directly instead of maintaining a “Eurocentric” view of imperial exploitation. Morgenthau
supported greater United Nations participation in decolonization movements. Fellow policy-maker, Paul
Nitze, warned of American advocacy for decolonization and the destabilizing consequences it would have
on America’s pressing Cold War security concerns. Secretary of State Dulles shared Nitze’s sentiments.
See Steven Metz, “American Attitudes Toward Decolonization in Africa,” Political Science Quarterly,
Line, pp. 95-96; and Brands, The Specer of Neutralism, pp. 3-4.
311 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, 101, pt. 3:
   4144.
312 U.S. Congress.  House of Representatives.  Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, 101, pt. 4:
   5121.
principles” as poorly written. Nasser remained uninterested in them, too; other delegates from Iraq and Turkey said they went against the United Nations Charter. In other cases, Indian and Indonesian attempts to spread “positive neutralism” met with anti-communist rhetoric from other delegates. While en route to Indonesia, Richard Wright noticed that the Egyptian delegation boarding the plane to the archipelago nation was obsessed with winning support for the Arab cause. Nasser even threatened to boycott the conference if Nehru invited Israel. As the conference opened, Wright described the scene as “brooding, bitter, [and] apprehensive . . . . Everybody read into it his own fears; the conference loomed like a long-buried ghost rising from a muddy grave.” Wright’s vivid metaphor seemed not only ominous, but also unjustified.

The remarkable characteristic of the Bandung Conference was that, despite several attempts, the interests of no single delegation dominated the proceedings. Participants agreed upon the representation of diverse interests and demanded respect of that diversity. In a gesture of multilateral solidarity, the delegates issued an eleven-page document listing recommendations for fulfilling non-aligned objectives. Known as the Bandung Communiqué, the document called for strengthening mutually beneficial trade agreements and facilitating cultural exchanges in areas such as education. Support for human rights and “the principle of self-determination of peoples” also commanded considerable attention. With regard to world peace and cooperation, attendees called upon the United Nations to expand its membership. According to the Bandung

Communiqué, nearly a quarter of the nations represented at Bandung were ready for immediate induction into the world organization. Additionally, the conference supported UN-sanctioned self-defense, “universal disarmament,” and “abstention from . . . collective defense [designed] to serve any particular interests of the big powers.”

Contrary to Iranian, Egyptian, American, British, or Israeli policy-making of the early 1950s, the conference’s recommendations provided a more genuine and multilateral consensus to which the participants were committed. Whether intentional or not, these general recommendations symbolized a more constructive alternative in world politics by contesting unilateralist perspectives attempting to represent a more multilateral agenda.

VIII

Multilateral diplomacy receded once again after the conference had concluded. Returning to Egypt, Nasser focused on the country’s security matters. In his biography of Dag Hammarskjöld, Brian Urquhart argues that Nasser remained conciliatory towards Israel in the wake of the February 1955 attack. By April, however, Nasser had opened arms deal negotiations with the Soviet Union’s Ambassador to Egypt. Keen on not seeming beholden to the West’s benevolence, Nasser decided to open a dialogue with the Soviets and members of the Eastern bloc. The new Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, was also eager to improve relations with Third World nationalists to broaden the scope of

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the Cold War. In doing so, Khrushchev reversed his predecessor’s guarded attitudes towards Egypt.³¹⁹

The United States and its staunchest allies, Britain and France, realized the destabilizing effect Nasser’s request could have on the region, but the members of the Tripartite Declaration differed on how to handle the escalating tensions. In June 1955, American Ambassador to Israel, Edward Lawson, met with Israeli Prime Minister, Moshe Sharett. The prime minister confirmed “that unless the United States, United Kingdom, and the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) were able to prevail upon the Egyptians to stop shooting at Israelis inside Israeli territory” Israel would take matters into its own hands. British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, and Britain’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Harold Macmillan, wanted to pressure Nasser by having the Tripartite allies make a show of force communicating the West’s determination.³²⁰ President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles disagreed, opting instead to act through the United Nations’ Security Council. At a June 16 meeting in New York City of the American, British, and French officials, both Dulles and American Ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., stressed the need for Security Council recommendations to legitimize economic pressure.³²¹ American officials deserve some credit for their willingness to recruit UN help in the event of an Arab-Israeli war. However, the motives

³¹⁹ Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 136. Using newly declassified Russian, Czech, and Egyptian documents, Guy Laron’s research offers a highly-detailed account of Egypt’s 1955 arms deal with Czechoslovakia. See Guy Laron, “Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal,” pp. 6, 16, and 18.
for doing so remained centered around the imposition of a Western sense of world order instead of facilitating a greater sense of multilateral diplomacy.

To a degree, the very nature of the West’s Middle East foreign policy was fundamentally flawed. On the one hand, the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 wished to perpetuate the status quo. On the other hand, however, the Eisenhower administration’s desire to create a collective security organization in 1954 bred contempt among Arabs and Israelis alike, which upset the status quo. Egyptians feared American intrusion. Israelis feared American abandonment. And, as if to bring the conundrum full circle, the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Henry Byroade, reported to his superiors that should the U.S. deny weapons to Egypt, the Arabs would “interpret [America’s actions] as being totally partial to Israel.” Rather than admit the pitfalls of their own policies, senior officials in Washington responded to Byroade’s warning by reiterating the collective security agreement necessary for any arms accord with Nasser.322

Denied help from the West, Nasser turned to the Soviets for assistance. Unlike the diplomatic quagmire American and Egyptian officials encountered in their arms deal negotiations, relations between the Egyptians and the Soviets began improving as early as 1954. Egyptian negotiations with the communist bloc proceeded throughout the spring and summer of 1955. Commensurate with these talks, border clashes between Egyptians and Israelis became more aggressive. By September 1955, the Egyptian government had resorted to training and equipping the fedayeen, a militant group emerging from within

322 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Dept. of State, 17 June 1955, *FRUS: Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Vol. XIV*, pp. 255-256. For the official response from Washington, see the footnote at the bottom of page 256. In January 1955, the, then, US ambassador to Egypt relayed Nasser’s concerns that Egypt’s external strength correlated with the country’s internal strength. As a result, Nasser believed that his country was not “strong enough internally to align itself openly in a military way with the West.” Caffery to State Dept., Cairo, 8 January 1955, Dept. of State, RG 59, State Dept. Central Files, #774.00/1-855, Box #3681, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
populations of disenfranchised Palestinian refugees. Israeli forces retaliated by seizing “the Demilitarized Zone of El Auja, the strategic key to both the Negev and Sinai.” On 12 September 1955, Egyptian and Czechoslovakian officials concluded an arms deal agreement.

For Nasser, the arms deal tackled several of Egypt’s chronic strategic and economic problems simultaneously. First, Egypt succeeded in modernizing its military forces. Nasser arranged to take delivery of 200 Soviet-built MIGs half of which were to arrive by December 1955. Of these initial aircraft, thirty-seven were “‘medium’ bombers (presumably IL-28s)” with the remaining sixty-three being MIG-15 fighter planes. Also included in the cache of weapons were “one hundred heavy tanks [including Joseph Stalin Mark IIIIs and Czech T-34s], six torpedo patrol boats, and two submarines.” Russian technicians were to provide a ninety-day training course to Egyptian personnel.

Second, the Czech arms deal helped revive Egypt’s flagging economy. Instead of having to pay cash as it would have done with any purchase of weapons from the United States, cash-strapped Egypt agreed to pay for Soviet weapons with one of its few natural resources dating back to the nineteenth century—cotton. The economic boost the arms deal delivered to Egypt came none too soon for Nasser. In her assessment of Middle Eastern economies, Robin Barlow notes that, after Egypt’s 1952 revolution, “general stagnation” hit the country where agricultural output floundered as a result of abrupt land

323 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 136.
reforms and Egypt’s fiscal obsession with maintaining balanced budgets to avoid accruing additional debt.\textsuperscript{326} Early in 1955, American officials were also learning through their embassy in Cairo that Nasser had trouble selling his country’s current cotton crop, which was necessary prior to planting for next year’s harvest.\textsuperscript{327}

After years of haggling with various world powers, Nasser finally concluded an arms deal. The event was significant for several reasons. Nasser had achieved a diplomatic coup that reverberated throughout the international community. The Egyptian leader gained access to weapons systems that outclassed any others in the region without sacrificing Egyptian autonomy. During a United States Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) meeting on 12 October 1955, various department heads agreed that Egypt’s purchases from Czechoslovakia tipped “qualitative and quantitative superiority” in Egypt’s favor in both tanks and planes. They also agreed that Egypt required a year or so to integrate these weapons into his armed forces and use them effectively.\textsuperscript{328}

While by no means an example of multilateral diplomacy, the Czech arms deal showed that the Soviets had proven themselves to be more effective at mastering the appearance of multilateralism. Quickly after consolidating political control in Russia, Khrushchev began improving relations with nationalist leaders in the developing world.\textsuperscript{329} Unlike American proposals, the Soviets’ terms for an arms agreement benefited Egypt in several ways, not only in the more obvious strategic, political, and economic

\textsuperscript{327} G. Lewis Jones to State Dept., Cairo, 12 January 1955, RG 59, Dept. of State Central Files, #774.00/1-1255, Box #3681, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
\textsuperscript{329} John Lewis Gaddis credits Khrushchev’s sensitivity to his improved relations with Josef Broz Tito, the communist Yugoslavian autocrat who charted a non-aligned foreign policy. See Gaddis, \textit{We Now Know}, p. 171.
areas, but also, and more importantly, in catering to Nasser’s sense of Arab empowerment and pan-Arab solidarity. In Guy Laron’s words, “Nasser was able to regain what the Baghdad pact was supposed to take away: his dominant position in the Arab world.”

By 1 October 1955, the Arab League, Egyptian Bar Association, Egyptian Army and police commands, Chamber of Commerce, Cairo’s Greek and Cypriot communities, the rector of Cairo’s Al Azhar University, and Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to Egypt all expressed their support. Khrushchev could appreciate Nasser’s perspective to a greater degree than Western diplomats dared. For Nasser, the Soviet’s appreciation and accommodation of pan-Arabism paid high dividends.

IX

Securing a supply of modern armaments allowed Nasser to deliver on promises made in support of anti-colonial liberation movements. Since 1 November 1954, the Front de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Front, or FLN) had launched raids nationwide against French colonial forces in Algeria. Within weeks, Nasser was shipping rifles and heavy weapons to FLN-friendly intermediaries in Tripoli. Introducing additional weapons to the region, French officials feared, would help transform the Algerian War into a war of attrition. If that happened, the war could attract greater international attention, requiring the French government to expend additional resources to justify its intervention.

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331 “Arab League Takes Stand,” NYT, 2 October 1955, p. 7.
332 Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, p. 78.
Egypt’s involvement, as well as the various diplomatic strategies that each side pursued, convey a substantial amount of international interest. Almost immediately, French and pro-FLN factions began lobbying segments of the international community for help. The French government had the paradoxical task of portraying the insurrection as an internal matter that did not warrant the international community’s attention, while simultaneously soliciting military and diplomatic support from its Western allies. \(^{333}\)

Meanwhile, anti-colonial FLN sympathizers sought to bring international attention to the inhumanity Algerian Muslims were experiencing. Proposals to debate the Algerian Question in the General Assembly had had been circulated since 1954, but the UN Steering Committee had voted against it. \(^{334}\)

On 30 September 1955, three days after news of the Czech arms deal with Egypt went public, the General Assembly of the United Nations agreed to put the Algerian Question on the agenda.

French officials were appalled. Editorials in France’s *Le Monde* newspaper decried the hypocrisy of nations voting in favor of airing debate whose “own conduct [over what was considered to be domestic matters of state] was primitive.” \(^{335}\)

As historian Matthew Connelly put it, the French thought U.S. diplomats “could . . . command a majority in the [UN’s] General Assembly.” \(^{336}\)

Perhaps thinking back to UN Resolution

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181, where the United States corralled UN member states, French officials thought that American influence was irresistible. When the opposite proved true and the UN voted to debate the Algerian Question, French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay blamed his American allies. Pinay also thought that “the U.S. had not fully recognized the dangers inherent in the fusion of the Bandung and Soviet blocs, which he considered the greatest threat to the stability of the world.”

French officials looked to monopolize institutions representing diverse perspectives in order to legitimize unilateral action. According to New York Times reporter, Harold Callender, French officials tried desperately to project a unified front in maintaining order in Algeria; but it was political divisions within France that led the UN to act. Unable to exercise its influence effectively in the General Assembly, the French delegation withdrew rather than admit its own limitations.

Similar to American involvement in UN Resolution 181, the Iranian government’s coercion of professional associations, Nasser’s plans for pan-Arab unity, and British efforts to remain relevant in the Middle East through the Baghdad Pact, French policymakers required a high degree of conformity in order to manipulate international perception. During the height of the Suez crisis in October and November 1956, officials from virtually every country suffered a similar lack of influential conformity.

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338 See Harold Callender, “UN Act Stressess France’s Division,” NYT, 2 October 1955, pp. 1 and 4. Indian delegate to the UN, V.K. Krishna Menon, pointed out that discussion of the Algerian question did not imply condemnation. “No resolutions are before us,” Menon continued, “no suggestion of censure or reproach is made . . . . We are condemning no one in the French government or in its delegation here [at the UN]. The search is for a solution in bringing up a new element, the interest of the United Nations.” David Anderson, “Algerian Debate Voted by the UN; French Quit Hall,” NYT, 1 October 1955, p. 2.
President Eisenhower adopted a parallel strategy to that of his French allies when he attempted to fuse Western-led collective security arrangements with UN efforts to maintain international security in the Middle East. While convalescing from a heart attack in Denver, Colorado, Eisenhower delivered a 320-word statement on 9 November 1955 that affirmed his support for the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 as an instrument of security. Later in the same statement, however, Eisenhower backed UN efforts to institute a peaceful settlement serving as the basis for “true security.” The President’s dual endorsement proved counter-productive. Where the Tripartite Declaration enforced the status quo of armistice, efforts—both UN-inspired and not—to achieve a Middle East settlement depended upon hefty concessions. Dulles presented one such proposal whereby Israel relinquished a sizable portion of southern territory to Arab control. Additionally, any context involving execution of the Tripartite Declaration would involve re-deployment of European forces to a region ardently anti-imperialist in its outlook. As a result, Western-inspired coalitions would destabilize the region rather than bring a sense of calm and order that UN officials were attempting to facilitate. Unfortunately, Eisenhower continued to insist that these two initiatives remain interchangeable.

Fallout emerging from the Egyptian government’s arms deal with the Soviets also complicated an already intricate diplomatic scene in the Middle East. In addition to perpetuating anti-colonial independence movements and elevating international attention,

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339 PPDE, pp. 839-840.
Nasser’s actions armed him with additional diplomatic leverage to which American and British negotiators responded.\(^341\) With help from the World Bank, British and the American policy-makers agreed to finance the Aswan Dam project designed to modernize Egypt’s economy and utilities. Putting the dam’s significance in historical terms, U.S. Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. said that the project would be in comparable economic terms “larger than the total of all U.S. public works of this type produced since 1900.”\(^342\) The dam would tame Nile flooding, add nearly 1.3 million acres of arable land—“equivalent to about 1/3 of the total acreage [cultivated in all of Egypt in 1955,]” generate 10 million kilowatt hours of electricity per year, and stimulate industry.\(^343\) In particular, Egypt’s cotton industry stood to benefit mightily from the enormous public works project.

The prospect of a cotton glut on the world market upset an already unstable cotton industry. During a meeting with the interested parties involved in the Aswan Dam proposal, Hoover admitted that the increased cotton production which would result from the dam’s completion gravely concerned U.S. cotton growers.\(^344\) America’s cotton surpluses throughout the 1950s undercut prices to the point where farmers could no longer make a decent living. By 1955, eighty percent of North Carolina’s acreage allotment for cotton was measured in increments of six acres or less. On Capitol Hill, politicians proposed a two-price system raising domestic prices to offset lower prices.

necessary for competing on in international market. Hoover “hoped” that the world’s cotton glut would dissipate by the time of the dam’s completion. Eisenhower believed that U.S. population growth would compensate the world’s cotton producing capacity. In addition to potentially upsetting America’s domestic cotton growers, who lobbied for federal subsidies, U.S. involvement in the Aswan Dam project also challenged the administration’s basic principles of foreign aid policy.

Since 1954, the Eisenhower administration had grappled with the Cold War dimensions of the socio-economic strategies of developing nations. Ideally, Eisenhower wished to reserve foreign aid for private enterprises in what has been described as traditional “liberal international political economy.” As a result, the president’s economic philosophy scuttled initiatives doling Western aid out to the governments of developing countries. The administration even opposed “multilateral development grant funds” that the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld supported. Eisenhower feared that developing countries would become dependent upon UN grants. During a 1 December 1955 National Security Council meeting at Camp David, Maryland, Eisenhower’s advisers debated the details of an Aswan Dam proposal. U.S. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson proposed recruiting Egypt’s private investors to help fund

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construction.\textsuperscript{349} Although palpable to Western capitalists, supporters of Wilson’s recommendation ignored long-held Egyptian resentments toward capitalist exploitation.

Failure to consider the Egyptians’ economic philosophy made capitalist-oriented motives moot. Nasser’s contempt for private enterprise harkened back to his helping lead Egypt’s revolution. Along with foreign exploitation, high concentrations of wealth and land ownership prior to the 1952 revolution resulted in government corruption, unfair taxation, and exploitation of Egypt’s lower social classes.\textsuperscript{350} Wilson and others in the Eisenhower administration also over-estimated the strength of Egypt’s private sector and under-estimated their loyalties to the state. As a Fulbright scholar living in Egypt during the 1950s, Richard Mitchell observed that “the capitalist, placing his own interests before those of the nation, fails to use wisely the natural and human resources of the state.”\textsuperscript{351} The governments of developing countries were often the only institutions capable of handling massive infrastructural projects. In some cases, social elites in developing countries “preferred” state-sponsored modernization.\textsuperscript{352} Presumably, Egyptian entrepreneurs could profit from new national infrastructure without taking any initial investment risk.

Other administration officials questioned the ideological wisdom of any deal. Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey raised concerns over providing funds for enhancing Nasser’s socialist-based economy. Making an unintended pun, Humphrey understood the Aswan Dam as “a case of ‘damned if you do and damned if you


\textsuperscript{350} Mitchell, \textit{The Society of the Muslim Brothers}, p. 221. In a January 1955 interview, Nasser believed that Egypt’s trade unions were no match against the interests of capitalists. See R.H.S. Grossman, “Nasser’s Plan for Peace,” \textit{The New Statesman}, 22 January 1955, p. 95, RG 59, State Dept. Central Files, #774.00/1-2655, Box #3681, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

\textsuperscript{351} Mitchell, \textit{The Society of the Muslim Brothers}, p. 221.

\textsuperscript{352} Adamson “‘The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy?,”” p. 66.
don’t.”

On the one hand, the project stood to strengthen Egypt’s economy tremendously, reduce the nation’s poverty, and thus reduce the chances of its shift to the Soviet sphere. On the other hand, raising Egypt’s cotton production only increased its ability to procure additional Soviet weapons if necessary, while simultaneously competing with U.S. cotton growers. Hoover also expressed reservations about the extent of the dam’s actual impact upon Egypt’s socio-economic standing. He worried that any arable land development would simply off-set Egypt’s population growth and, in the end, offer no improvement in the nation’s standard of living. Smiling, Eisenhower responded by quoting a memorable World War I cartoon: “If you knows a better ’ole, go to it.”

The exchange at Camp David demonstrates both the potential success and inherent failure of Eisenhower’s foreign aid strategy. Remarkably, Eisenhower’s decision to go ahead with the loan proposal demonstrated a willingness to work with national-socialist regimes while simultaneously fulfilling Cold War objectives of containing communism’s spread. Regrettably, however, the aid package proved incompatible with Nasser’s economic philosophy. The administration understood how to strengthen relations with the Egyptian government through socio-economic development, but it lacked the philosophical flexibility necessary for sustaining successful negotiations.

U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, announcement on 19 December 1955 that American loans would be extended to Egypt to help finance the Aswan Dam project. The United States and Great Britain proposal included an initial offer of a combined $200

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million in loans while the World Bank pledged another $200 million.\(355\) As early as 1953, the World Bank had re-defined itself as a “conservative institution,” extending loans on a highly conditional basis.\(356\) Terms for the Aswan Dam project proved to be no exception. The World Bank, working through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), presented Nasser with terms, forming a partnership between the bank and Egypt to ensure stability of the country’s “inflation” and “creditworthiness” and to monitor Egypt’s foreign debt.\(357\) Conscious of Ismail’s sale of Suez shares in 1875 which resulted in the sacrificing of Egypt’s sovereignty to British officials, Nasser interpreted the West’s Aswan proposal as an infringement upon Egypt’s self-determination. In a New Year’s Day telegram to the State Department, Ambassador Byroade explained the prime minister’s hesitation:

> Documents would become published and they would simply say on their face to public opinion here that Egypt had surrendered its sovereignty and independence in economic and financial fields to [the] World Bank. [Nasser] talked at length as to why Egyptians are unusually sensitive, in view [of] their history, to matters involving large foreign debt.\(358\)

Tapping the Western-established World Bank resources meant agreeing to Western-oriented terms. The stipulations were perfectly logical and moderate. According to Byroade, even Nasser “realized [that the] bank must have safeguards upon its investment.” Not wanting to have Aswan Dam funding slip away, Nasser offered several

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355 Senior US officials such as Treasury Secretary George Humphrey estimated costs at $1.3 billion to complete the project in 15 years. See FRUS, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Vol. XIV, p. 814.


counter-proposals from changing World Bank procedures to using the bank’s money during the latter stages of the project. Both sides understood the impact the project would have upon Egypt’s modernization, but neither side was willing to make the necessary concessions.

XI

This inability to interact with diverging opinions became symptomatic for international affairs in general throughout 1956. By January, an earlier agreement among U.S., French, and British officials regulating weapons shipments to the Middle East was collapsing. Pressure from Israel for arms to counter those Egypt received from the Soviet bloc continued to affect adversely U.S.-Israeli relations. Israeli Prime Minister Sharett’s inability to negotiate an arms agreement isolated him politically. Like an Israeli Disraeli, Israeli Defense Minister Ben-Gurion manipulated deteriorating relations with Arab neighbors and used “officials and party functionaries, who played highly dubious roles involving questions of dual loyalty” to weaken Sharett’s position further. Where Sharett clung to the hope of allying with and receiving arms from the United States, Ben-Gurion implemented a more unilateral approach. Despite some difference of opinion, historian David Tal agrees that Israel’s growing belligerency, evident since Ben-Gurion’s return to government, alienated the Arabs. As American ambassador to Israel, Edward Lawson, reported from Tel Aviv, Ben-Gurion grew “extremely nervous” over Egypt’s

360 Sheffer, Innovative Leaders in International Politics, p. 98.
access to modern armaments while the West deprived Israel equal access. The growing sense of anxiety felt throughout much of Israeli society led to Ben-Gurion’s becoming Prime Minister on 2 November 1955. Only after Ben-Gurion’s victory did the U.S. allow France and others to supply weapons to Israel. Once this happened, status quo agreements such as the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 lost all meaning.

Nasser also pursued an increasingly unilateral agenda once both Mid-East peace and Aswan Dam negotiations stalled. As a personal friend of the president and a former deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Anderson became Eisenhower’s special representative to the Middle East. Two trips to the region in early 1956 convinced Anderson, Eisenhower, and Dulles of Nasser’s uncooperativeness. Much like the controversy surrounding the Aswan Dam, Nasser could not agree to the open, formal Arab-Israeli negotiations Anderson intended. Direct meetings would cost Nasser politically at home—a price, Nasser suspected, he could not afford. In an October 1955 State Department communiqué, one Foreign Service Officer reported that Nasser’s hard-line with Israel was popular with the working class and labor leaders. Nasser used this political momentum, but he did not trust it. Even as late as 1956, Nasser continued to fear “overthrow and assassination.” However, if properly enticed and supported by the West, Egypt and Nasser would make unilateral and clandestine progress toward settling Israeli-Egyptian disputes. Dulles interpreted the prime minister’s view as a subtle form of diplomatic blackmail to give Egypt time to stockpile weapons without having to

363 C.C. Finch to State Department, Cairo, 26 October 1955, Dept. of State, RG 59, State Department Central Files, #774.00/10-2655, Box #3681, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
formally recognize or participate in negotiations with Israel.\textsuperscript{365} Nasser would control the form and pace of Middle East peace and would be the sole pan-Arab representative.

As a result of Nasser’s position, the West tried to isolate him while simultaneously providing arms to Israel. Known as the Omega initiative, the United States began covertly undermining Nasser’s pan-Arab aspirations. Among other things the plan denied Egypt the sale of Western-manufactured weapons, delayed Aswan Dam negotiations as well as food shipments and other aid to Egypt, interfered with Egyptian interests in Yemen and elsewhere in the Middle East, and generated support for Saudi Arabia’s leadership as an Arab alternative to Nasser.\textsuperscript{366} Meanwhile, the same day Dulles expressed these views, he met with Israeli Ambassador to the United States Abba Eban. Dulles told him of America’s unhappiness with Nasser and supported Israel’s acquiring arms from France and other Western suppliers.\textsuperscript{367} All of this, however, happened in secret. During an April Fools Day meeting with the British Ambassador to the United States, Dulles unveiled his plans. He remained committed to pledging American cooperation with Britain “on a secret basis,” avoiding an “open break with Nasser,” and allowed French and Canadian arms shipments to Israel to proceed.\textsuperscript{368} The Secretary’s strategy represented the country’s private actions regarding Middle East policy. Publicly, the Eisenhower administration supported Hammarskjöld’s efforts to ease Arab-Israeli tensions.


\textsuperscript{366} Dulles to Eisenhower, Memo on Near Eastern Policy, 28 March 1956, D.D.E. Library, Ann Whitman Files Dulles-Herter Series, Box #6, Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.


Shortly after the New Year, the Secretary General made his first of two trips to the Middle East. His maiden trip was part of a larger world tour designed to better understand the international issues facing the United Nations. Three days after Hammarskjöld’s 24 February return to New York, he shared his initial impressions at a press conference focusing predominately on conditions in the Middle East. With the calculated candor that accompanied all his public statements, the Secretary General believed that the Arab-Israeli dispute was “dramatized” to the point of obstructing compromise. When asked of the Cold War’s impact upon the region, Hammarskjöld replied:

I think the basic fact in the understanding of that area is that irrespective of the side—Israel or Arab—there is a very strong wish to be independent and to mould one’s own fate according to one’s own ideas. By implication, you can see that pressures or imprudent discussion, from whatever side it comes, is unhelpful.

Instead of “imposing [its] will,” the organization could help foster “reasonable progress toward” all-purpose objectives “to keep people from rushing into a conflict because they cannot get everything at once or cannot get it in just the form that they would like.”

Rather bluntly, he identified national self-interest as a leading culprit in escalating Arab-Israeli tensions not only regionally, but globally as well. Hammarskjöld’s second trip in April suffered as a result of these myopic international conditions.

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By the end of March 1956, Security Council members convened to address rising Arab-Israeli tensions. According to one of Nasser’s closest confidents, Mohamed Heikal, Israel’s protest of an alleged 180 border incidents near Gaza during the previous four months demonstrated the region’s volatile instability. On 4 April, the Security Council unanimously authorized Hammarskjöld to negotiate directly with the concerned parties to re-establish “the [1949] armistice demarcation lines,” and allow UN policing of those borders. As if to emphasize the point even more, the day before Hammarskjöld’s departure to the Middle East, Israeli artillery shelled Gaza killing 59 people and wounding 93 others. Egyptian-endorsed fedayeen raids followed. Similar to UN involvement following the 1947 partition, Hammarskjöld’s mission functioned as a tool for imposing order. Yet, as witnessed in 1947, the most ardent UN member states calling for order also served as the ones most involved in pursuing their own interests in the region.

As Hammarskjöld hop-scotched around the Middle East, various interests continued implementing contradictory policies. American activities serve as an excellent example. In a 9 April telegram to Nasser and Ben-Gurion, President Eisenhower expressed his full support for the Hammarskjöld mission calling upon both leaders to practice “high statesmanship.” Ambassador Byroade even encouraged Nasser’s full disclosure to Hammarskjöld and Chief of Staff for the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), General E.L.M. Burns regarding Egypt’s involvement in the

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372 Telegram from Eisenhower to Nasser and Ben-Gurion, 9 April 1956, p. 1, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman Files, International Series, Box #9, Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.
fedayeen raids so as not to upset any possible cease-fire agreement.\textsuperscript{373} Between these two communiqués, however, the White House received a message from Saudi Arabia’s King Saud pledging his cooperation with the United States, thus setting in motion America’s plan to shift support away from Nasser.\textsuperscript{374} While the United States backed UN efforts to instill order on the one hand, the American Superpower cultivated instability by challenging Nasser’s authority in the Arab world. American officials undermined the legitimacy of the Arab world’s chief representative at the exact moment that he engaged in legitimate negotiations working toward a Middle East peace.

Sadly, the United States was not alone in these foreign policy follies. On 18 April, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden opened meetings with Soviet leaders Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev. In Heikal’s words, “Eden was anxious to get Russia to become a signatory to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 to ration the supply of arms to Middle Eastern countries.” Nasser feared Russia’s compliance with the declaration and, with it, the potential threat to Egypt’s steady supply of munitions. These fears played a pivotal role in Nasser’s search for alternative weapons suppliers and Egypt’s official recognition of China’s Communist government on 16 May.\textsuperscript{375} In turn, Egypt’s move alarmed U.S. officials who considered it further evidence of Nasser’s shift to the communist sphere.

Realizing the need for reconciliation with the West, Nasser acquiesced to the terms accompanying the Aswan Dam offer. “By the end of June,” writes historian Steven

\textsuperscript{373} Colonel Goodpaster to Mrs. Whitman, Presidential Communique, 11 April 1956, p. 3, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman Files, International Series, Box #9, Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

\textsuperscript{374} “Transcript of Oral Message from King Saud to President Eisenhower,” 10 April 1956, pp. 1-2, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Ann Whitman Files, International Series, Box #46, Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

\textsuperscript{375} Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, p. 102.
Freiberger, “Dulles knew that Nasser had dropped the objections he had raised to the loan in February.” Dulles also knew that Nasser had solicited the Soviets for a loan proposal. Despite reassurances to the contrary, the Secretary’s patience with Nasser expired. He wanted to make an example of Nasser to others who considered practicing international opportunism.\(^{376}\) On 19 July, Dulles withdrew U.S. funding for the dam. Britain followed suit shortly thereafter. Dulles legitimized his action by citing the lack of Congressional support for allocating the funds.\(^{377}\) While true, Dulles’s explanation was not presented as the official reason for the loan cancellation. The official announcement blamed Nasser for killing the loan proposal. “Agreement by the riparian states,” the announcement declared, “has not been achieved, and the ability of Egypt to devote adequate resources to assure the project’s success has become more uncertain than at the time the offer was made.”\(^{378}\) Why the Eisenhower administration let a chance to publicly chastise the Democratically-controlled Congress slip away in an election year remains a nagging question and reinforces the prevailing trend towards minimizing internal dissent by focusing attention on international differences.

Nasser received word of Dulles’s announcement as the Egyptian President left the Brioni Conference. Unlike the more inclusive Bandung Conference, the Brioni summit included Nasser, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito. In H.W. Brands study of the non-aligned movement, this triumvirate constituted “the big three of the neutralist world.”\(^{379}\) Continuing the work of the


\(^{377}\) Rubin, “America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957,” p. 87


Bandung Conference, the Brioni gathering sought greater coordination of policies among these distinguished leaders. According to Nasser’s adviser, Mohamed Heikal, Tito also wished to inform his colleagues of changes within the Soviet Union and its international outlook resulting from what Tito had heard at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party earlier that year.\textsuperscript{380} Nasser and Nehru were en route to Cairo when they learned of the Eisenhower administration’s decision to withdraw funding for the dam.\textsuperscript{381} Heikal argues, however, that Nasser was already aware of the Americans’ plan nearly two weeks prior to the official announcement.\textsuperscript{382} A week after Dulles’s reversal, Nasser proclaimed Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal to generate the extra revenue necessary for constructing the Aswan Dam.

During this time of rising tensions in the international arena, Secretary General Hammarskjöld made a second trip to the Middle East. This second journey had two enlightening effects. First, it proved substantially more inclusive in its diplomatic approach. As Richard Miller makes clear, the mission gave Hammarskjöld a first-hand perspective and personal contact with the region’s leaders.\textsuperscript{383} The Secretary-General’s testy but durable relationship with David Ben-Gurion and Hammarskjöld’s more amicable relationship with Egypt’s Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi allowed for “the utmost frankness.”\textsuperscript{384} An honest exchange of views and concerns accompanied these

\textsuperscript{380} Heikal, \textit{Cutting the Lion’s Tail}, p. 112.  
\textsuperscript{381} Brands, \textit{Specter of Neutrality}, p. 273.  
\textsuperscript{382} Heikal, \textit{Cutting the Lion’s Tail}, p. 110.  
\textsuperscript{383} Miller, \textit{Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy}, p. 61.  
\textsuperscript{384} Urquhart, \textit{Hammarskjöld}, p. 151. In historian Michael Oren’s assessment of the relationship between David Ben-Gurion and Dag Hammarskjöld, Oren describes how Israelis generally resented the United Nations for not condemning Arab hostility towards Israel. As a result, these two men endured a turbulent series of meetings. See Michael Oren, \textit{Ambivalent Adversaries: David Ben-Gurion and Israel vs. the United Nations and Dag Hammarskjöld, 1956-57}, \textit{Journal of Contemporary History}, Vol. 99, No. 1, (January 1992), pp. 89, 94, and 101. Given Israel’s domestic political divisions between “hawks” and “doves,” it is easy to understand why Ben-Gurion’s dealings with Hammarskjöld were so uneasy. See
friendly meetings which approached the heart of genuine constructive dialogue rather than add to the entrenched exchange of rhetorical noise.

Second, Hammarskjöld’s trip demonstrated the highly complex forces at work within the international community as a whole. Hammarskjöld remained reasonably optimistic when reporting his findings to the Security Council in early May. His observations revealed that the general intransigence came not from stubborn governance but from the impracticality of the peace itself. According to a summary of the report, “the demarcation lines [between Arab and Israeli lands] had . . . no basis in history or in the distribution of population or private property and had to be observed in a situation of great political tension.” Later, he requested that governments, people, and world opinion at-large refrain from inciting unjustified animosity that would erode the confidence and goodwill of the negotiations. Instead of participating in unilateral behavior that escalated tensions, Hammarskjöld called for the concerned parties to engage in “coordinated unilateral moves” for the sake of compromise. As a master of his craft, Hammarskjöld showcased the diplomacy necessary for an international environment that could sustain negotiation. He understood that national interests dictated foreign policy, but he also realized that these interests could be as destructive as they were constructive. Without a multilateral objective intent on establishing regional peace in the Middle East, little chance lay in achieving any negotiated settlement.


385 “Summary of the Reports by the UN Secretary-General a Compliance with the Near East Armistice Agreement,” 2 and 9 May 1956, American Foreign Policy, 1956, pp. 595, 597-598.
By the summer of 1956, government officials worldwide began applying Hammarskjöld’s internationalist perspective to serve their own purposes. Nationalist leaders in the Middle East took an early lead in instilling greater domestic conformity to convey steadfast solidarity on the world stage. The strong bonds between Iranian nationalist Mohammad Mossadegh and Iran’s professional associations deteriorated rapidly as Mossadegh’s regime resorted to corrupt political practices. After the 1953 coup, Iran’s new leader, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, relegated civic associations to serving the interests of the state. Monopolization of similar groups also occurred following the Egyptian revolution of 1952. Once in power, the Revolutionary Command Council pursued social uniformity by infiltrating or disbanding organizations. Additionally, Egypt’s revolution embodied the independent desires of Egyptians, Muslims, Arabs, and Africans. This dimension of Nasser’s nationalist philosophy spread conformity not only within a given society, but also across societies, thus internationalizing efforts to synthesize anti-imperialist rhetoric and dominate the agenda of the broader movement.

American society experienced purges of its own during the McCarthy Era of the early 1950s. Prior to McCarthyism’s demise in 1954, American citizens serving as international civil servants in the United Nations endured increasing amounts of scrutiny. As the new UN Secretary General, Hammarskjöld exhibited a good deal of diplomatic finesse between preserving the organization’s non-partisan practices and catering to the desires of its members. The experience altered the organization’s sense of purpose from reflecting a particular sense of world order to representing a genuine multilateral
perspective in international matters. With Hammarskjöld at the helm, the United Nations was going to re-dedicate itself to practicing multilateral diplomacy. He challenged UN delegations to place the international interest above any particular national interest.

Attendees at the Bandung Conference grappled with the difficulties of putting Hammarskjöld’s ideas into effect. Leading delegates wished to influence the proceedings to endorse specific interests that would enhance the international clout of a select few. As a result, several observers noted that many delegates were initially suspicious about the motives and agendas of their fellow participants. In spite of the agendas individual delegations had set for the conference, the plenary session succeeded in establishing a clear set of multilateral, non-aligned interests. Much like Hammarskjöld’s philosophical approach, the recommendations proposed in the Bandung Communiqué offered a more genuine consensus that served as a constructive alternative to the imposition of order by a single source.

Instead of realizing the significance of accomplishments such as these, governments continued to portray national interests as emblematic of broader international interests. Senior U.S. officials, such as Secretary of State Dulles, clung to a principled version of world order that required a high degree of conformity. Unfortunately, Dulles’s efforts succeeded in fostering international instability. Nasser grew frustrated over America’s obstructionist policies regarding arms deals, collective security arrangements, and socio-economic development. Israel’s government plotted an increasingly unilateral course in foreign policy due in part to the Eisenhower administration’s tepid relations with the Jewish state. A lack of good faith also permeated Israeli foreign policy. In the words of Israeli historian Shimon Shamir, “It
must be borne in mind that the contacts in search for [an Arab-Israeli] settlement were always by-products and side-shows of greater dramas.” Frustration and alienation upset Arab and Israeli relations not only with the United States, but also exacerbated the already volatile tensions existing between Arabs and Israelis. Bloody border clashes in the eastern Sinai and Egypt’s arms deal with Czechoslovakia added to the sense of foreboding. Meanwhile, Cold War allies such as Great Britain and France questioned America’s commitment to maintaining the status quo in the Middle East and North Africa.

Imitations of multilateralism persisted as American and British policy-makers appealed to Nasser’s infrastructural needs through the Aswan Dam loan proposal. The combination of Nasser’s initial unwillingness to agree to the loan’s terms and the Eisenhower administration’s insensitivity to Egypt’s nationalist perceptions led to the proposal’s cancellation. Equally important, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ignored Nasser’s pleas to re-structure the loan proposal for the sake of preserving Egypt’s sense of fiscal autonomy. In response, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. As a result, the universe of unilateral activity proved to be expanding not only within the world’s societies, but also between them.

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Chapter III

The Mismanagement of Multilateral Diplomacy: National Leadership and Its Short-Sighted Policies, February to October 1956

The familiar diplomatic trends displayed in the long lead-up to Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 continued to feed the likelihood of crisis as summer turned to autumn. The lack of a more multilateral perspective on nearly everyone’s part triggered two crises that defined the year in the international arena. As Egyptian officials squared off against Western interests, the Soviets imposed their ruthless brand of autocratic order in Poland and Hungary. Behind the Iron Curtain, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev experienced political unrest after his attempt to coat Communist party principles with a more palatable sense of pluralism. Mass protests in Poland during the summer of 1956 spread to other countries behind the Iron Curtain and turned into outright revolution in Hungary by November of that year. During this same period, the international community responded with varying degrees of indignation and
indifference to Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. Those countries most concerned with canal control met in London to discuss alternatives. Although the London Conferences of August and September 1956 represented a broader array of international interests, the pretext for peaceful resolution to the crisis reflected the interests and agendas of only eighteen nations. Failure to address the Egyptian government’s sovereignty meant that Nasser boycotted the proceedings. As a result, the London Conferences lost nearly all legitimacy as a diplomatic gathering that brought opposing sides together. In many respects, presentation of conference recommendations to Nasser in Cairo generated considerable resentment that only amplified the severity of the crisis. Deadlock led British and French officials to enlist the United Nations’ help to reduce the tension, but these initiatives masked their preparations for war. Additionally, though many scholars credit the Eisenhower administration with instigating UN participation in resolving the conflict, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and other senior officials hoped to steer clear of the organization. Investigating the circuitous diplomacy occurring between February and October 1956 helps in recognizing when negotiations should not only involve UN officials but should also be orchestrated by them as well.

I

Much like the numerous British, Egyptian, and American examples of portraying respective national interests as universal interests during the early to mid-1950s, the Soviets also devised their own strategies for representing a broad array of perspectives.
Building on its success resulting from the Czech arms deal of 1955 and with it the Soviets’ improved international image as a world power genuinely interested in the socio-economic development of poor countries, the Presidium unveiled a new approach to promote communist ideology worldwide. At the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev declared a return to a more pluralistic pursuit of a communist utopia. Early in his 25 February closed-door plenary session speech, Khrushchev called for restoring Leninist principles by renouncing Stalin’s “cult of the individual” and Stalin’s brutal abuse of power. Khrushchev embraced the level of opinionated debate Lenin had encouraged. Party Congresses under Lenin convened regularly and debated “at length all the basic questions” pertaining to domestic, foreign, party, and state policies. “Stalin,” Khrushchev continued, “ignored the norms of party life and trampled on the Leninist principle of collective Party leadership.”

Taking this through to its logical conclusion, Khrushchev allowed for the possibility of pursuing socialism by way of a variety of paths. Like Eisenhower’s attempt to associate the West’s Tripartite Declaration with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Khrushchev made it the Soviet Union’s responsibility to try to represent broader interests


389 Interestingly, in his autobiography, Khrushchev recalls a conversation he had with Yugoslav Prime Minister Josip Broz Tito in 1955 regarding Stalin’s legacy. Partly as a result of this exchange, Khrushchev began coming to terms with “the falsity of [the Soviet’s] position” towards the Stalinist era and the need to investigate the purges more objectively. See Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. by Strobe Talbott (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 1970), pp. 343-344. This admission is significant for two reasons. First, it implies that Khrushchev’s motive for his secret speech at the 20th Congress was due at least in part to his interactions with the non-aligned interests of the world. Second, it provides some insight into the influence outside opinions had on Khrushchev initially and his willingness to allow for multiple routes to socialism.
by permitting greater input from rank-and-file Communist Party members. Interestingly, as historian William Taubman points out, Khrushchev consulted only a few Soviet officials prior to his delivering the speech. Among those kept out of the loop were leaders in Eastern European countries such as Poland and Hungary.\textsuperscript{390}

Simultaneously, Khrushchev needed to expand his own political base of support by converting opponents to his cause. To accomplish this, Khrushchev yielded increasingly to the pressures of maintaining the status quo. According to historian Richard Immerman, “Khrushchev had actually developed second thoughts about [his speech to the 20\textsuperscript{th} Congress] shortly after delivering it.”\textsuperscript{391} Part of this regret originated from the fact that Khrushchev saw a need to appease his elder comrades within the Party. The First Secretary’s rise to power benefited from the support of younger party members, but, outside this cadre, Khrushchev remained politically isolated.\textsuperscript{392} To gain the confidence of his peers, Khrushchev wrestled with the faulty paradoxes of his doctrine. The Soviet leader, writes historian John Lewis Gaddis, wanted “to civilize Soviet society by eliminating Stalin’s worst abuses” on the one hand, while on the other hand attempting “to disassociate himself and his colleagues . . . from the discredited tyrant.”\textsuperscript{393}

Much like the chagrin American officials expressed following Great Britain’s entrance into the Baghdad Pact, Khrushchev discovered that gestures of unity could become political liabilities when calls for coalition-building took on a life of their own.

\textsuperscript{391}Immerman, \textit{John Foster Dulles}, p. 153.
\textsuperscript{392}Sergi Khrushchev, \textit{Khrushchev on Khrushchev: An Inside Account of the Man and his Era}, ed. and trans. by William Taubman (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 1990), p. 14. In describing his father’s actions, Sergi Khrushchev describes how older party members who had survived Stalin’s purges “carefully weeded out any timid little shoots of the new and progressive. Attempts to look at the past objectively were ruthlessly cut short.” Nikita Khrushchev had to negotiate between these devout hardliners and the young enthusiasts Khrushchev had mobilized.
\textsuperscript{393}Gaddis, \textit{We Now Know}, p. 206.
Khrushchev’s recognition of more than one route to socialism created ample international acrimony. The new doctrine of “hybrid socialism” contributed not only to the growing Sino-Soviet split, but also inspired protests in Eastern Europe. After researching newly-opened Soviet archives, Mark Kramer reexamines the repressive policies Soviet leaders exacted on Polish and Hungarian protesters in 1956. Soviet-led Polish troops crushed Polish workers on strike for higher pay and better working conditions. By late June, Poland’s Pozan riots left over fifty dead and hundreds wounded. Soviet leadership was particularly concerned about the spread of unrest “unless strict ideological controls were re-imposed.” Incidents such as these show the conditions Khrushchev attached to multilateral perspectives. Though more totalitarian in their response to dissent, Soviet actions share similar characteristics with both Western and Middle Eastern leaders and their desire to convey a greater sense of pluralism while maintaining a firm grip on its manifestations.

II

Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal sought a similar objective. The night before his 26 July speech, Nasser shared his intentions with his cabinet ministers and RCC members. As Mohamed Heikal recalled years later:

Nasser told assembled ministers that he could have followed a different course and asked [his advisers] for their opinions, but he had rejected this idea, partly because he was absolutely convinced in his own mind that the

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decision he had come to was the right one, and partly because what he was proposing to do involved calculations outside the scope of their departments.

Some subordinates applauded the news; most, however, sat stunned and offered alternative proclamations to help allay their own fears. The prime minister would not hear of it. The next day, speaking for the most part extemporaneously, Nasser’s announcement filled thirty-three pages of translated text.396

Justification for seizing control of the canal lay in Nasser’s reaction to the West’s biased policies and Egypt’s pursuit of equality among nations based upon Bandung principles. Specifically, Nasser accused the United States of extending far greater technical, commercial, and financial aid to Israel than to the Arab world, creating an imbalance of power. He also accused the U.S. of supporting French imperialist efforts in Algeria at the expense of Arab lives. Given these circumstances, Nasser proclaimed, Egypt must marshal the few resources at its disposal for the betterment of the country and its citizens. He argued that if the West reneged on deals such as the Aswan Dam loan proposal, then Egypt reserved the right to seize alternative revenue sources such as the Suez Canal to fulfill the nation’s socio-economic development.397

Recounting the canal’s imperial legacy, Nasser aimed to transform the structure’s image from one of exploitation to one of opportunity for Egypt. He told of Ferdinand de Lesseps’s promise that the canal would serve to benefit the country and its people, but Nasser argued that the Frenchman had propagated a lie to fulfill an imperialist agenda. The prime minister equated de Lesseps’s actions with those of the World Bank’s

396 Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, pp. 124, 126.
397 Schnes to Dulles, Cairo, “Nasser’s July 26 Speech,” 31 July 1956, pp. 4-5, 12, 21-22, 31-32, Dept. of State, RG 59, State Department Central Files, #774.00/7-3156, Box #3682, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
chairperson, Eugene Black. Both men desired to meddle in Egypt’s internal affairs to the
detriment of the country’s sovereignty. In Nasser’s view, this opportunistic exploitation
was at an end. The uttering of de Lesseps’s name in the speech served as the
codeword for Egypt’s military commanders to move into the canal-zone and seize
control. Like nearly every other aspect of the Suez controversy, history, too, was
drafted into service in the battle between inclusive and exclusive notions of diplomacy.
The man who helped demonstrate the effectiveness of monopolizing multilateral
perspectives in the nineteenth century served as the codeword for Nasser’s own
harnessing of the multilateral pan-Arab, anti-imperial initiative in the twentieth century.

Indeed, the impulse to enlist history in this way was nearly ubiquitous. In her
book *Eye on Israel*, Michelle Mart describes how Americans throughout the 1950s
identified with Israeli settlement in a hostile land and its historical parallels to the
Puritans’ hardships in the New World. During a private 31 July conversation with
American diplomat Robert Murphy, Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold
Macmillan expressed his country’s determination not to experience “another Munich”
even if it meant ending up as “perhaps another Netherlands.” Rather than appeasing
another megalomaniacal dictator as Britain had done with Hitler in Munich in 1938, the
British government and its people were willing to sacrifice their empire as the Dutch
Hapsburgs had done in the sixteenth century in an attempt to retain their relevance as a
world power. The truly fascinating aspect of these developments shows how the leaders

398 Schnes to Dulles, Cairo, “Nasser’s July 26 Speech,” 31 July 1956, pp. 12, 14, 21-22, and 29, Dept. of
State, RG 59, State Department Central Files, #774.00/7-3156, Box #3682, National Archives, Washington,
D.C.
399 Heikal, *Cutting the Lion’s Tail*, p. 126.
of various countries took history and interpreted it to fit a particular national context. British policy-makers adapted history’s lessons to provide a particularly bleak outlook. Rank-and-file Americans identified with and took solace in the rugged durability of the Israelis—a kindred spirit in an unkind world. For Nasser, historical experiences of exploitation united Arabs, from which Nasser hoped to capitalize politically. In the case of all three countries, governments and citizens alike incorporated the experiences of others to fit their own historical perspective and encouraged others to think similarly.

In addition to empowering Egypt’s citizens, Nasser used his nationalization of the canal to unite the cause of all Arabs as well as those populations yearning for liberation from colonialism. “My own destiny,” he exalted, “is tied to that of my brother in Jordan, Syria, the Sudan . . . . That is how we are born in this part of the world with inter-related destinies.” By proclaiming solidarity with his fellow Arabs and Africans, Nasser used the nationalization of the canal not simply as an opportunity for Egypt to unilaterally thumb its nose at the declining empires of Europe, but more importantly as an opportunity to serve as universal inspiration for all people struggling with freeing themselves from their colonial past. A paradox emerged where Nasser hoped to galvanize regional support and embody the nationalist zeal of the non-aligned world without consulting those whose support he wished to enlist.

These efforts extended to Western powers too. According to Mohamed Heikal, Nasser’s efforts to win “wider world opinion” included attempts to drive a political

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402 As Michelle Mart put it, “the idea that Israel was an innocent nation beset by hostile neighbors reflected Americans’ perceptions of their own country’s situation in the Cold War threatened by expansionist Communism.” Mart, Eye on Israel, p. 83.
403 Schnes to Dulles, Cairo, “Nasser’s July 26 Speech,” 31 July 1956, pp. 12-13, Dept. of State, RG 59, State Department Central Files, #774.00/7-3156, Box #3682, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
404 Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, p. 133.
wedge between British and American leadership. In the weeks following Nasser’s nationalization of the canal, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden pressured U.S. Secretary of State Dulles and other American officials into adopting a more aggressive stance against Nasser. Careful not to lend any additional legitimacy to Eden’s argument, the Egyptian leader refrained from associating his seizure of the Suez Canal with Dulles’s abandonment of Aswan Dam funding. Instead, Nasser stated that his actions were a part of a more long-term agenda. Nasser’s motives, however, were purely political, focusing on generating as much international support for his actions as possible.

To a degree, Nasser succeeded in influencing many of his Arab allies. Initial responses by other leaders in the Arab world idolized his political genius. In Syria, the U.S. embassy reported that newspapers called the move “‘historic’” and that the government “proposed that all Arab states resign from [the] IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and International Monetary Fund and set up purely Arab institutions to finance development [in] Arab countries.” Populations in Lebanon and Libya also cheered the event. Nasser won new admirers in Kuwait and Morocco where prior support had been non-existent. Supporters in Sri Lanka also expressed their solidarity. Nasser even garnered support from within Iraq—Egypt’s chief rival for Arab loyalties. According to U.S. State Department officials, influential opinion-

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405 Heikal, *Cutting the Lion’s Tail*, pp. 132-133.
406 Moose to Dulles, Damascus, 30 July 1956, Dept. of State RG 59, General Records of the State Dept., #974.7301/7-3056, Box #5338, National Archives, Washington, D.C. See also, Heikal, *Cutting the Lion’s Tail*, pp. 133-134.
407 Emmerson to Dulles, Beirut, 30 July 1956, Dept. of State RG 59, General Records of the State Dept., #974.7301/7-3056, Box #5338, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; and Davies to Dulles, Tripoli, 31 July 1956, Dept. of State RG 59, General Records of the State Dept., #974.7301/7-3156, Box #5338, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
408 Dillon to Dulles, Paris, and Brewer to Dulles, Kuwait, 30 July 1956, Dept. of State RG 59, General Records of the State Dept., #974.7301/7-3056, Box #5338, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
409 Smith to Dulles, Colombo, 30 July 1956, Dept. of State RG 59, General Records of the State Dept., #974.7301/7-3056, Box #5338, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
makers, such as the “Iraqi press and political leaders,” approved of the canal’s nationalization. Nasser’s political move was, for the most part, a public relations triumph. However, dissenting voices were heard in Arab, non-aligned, and Western camps.

Heads of state in Iraq, India, and elsewhere expressed their concerns over the event. The same day Nasser delivered his speech; British Prime Minister Anthony Eden honored visiting Iraqi dignitaries with a dinner party in London that evening. Hearing of the Suez canal’s fate, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-Said, advised Eden to strike back with abrupt force against Nasser. Because he was Nasser’s rival for Arab loyalties, Said’s response is understandable. He stood to gain significantly from any weakening of Nasser’s position—but at what cost? Said’s quest for solidarity clashed with a sizable segment of his fellow Iraqi citizens. By 1958, these festering resentments boiled over during Iraq’s revolution, but in 1956 they proved that unity within supposedly homogeneous groups was by no means a certainty in spite of efforts to demonstrate the contrary.

Indian officials also balked at Nasser’s unilateral maneuver. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru conveyed his concerns to Nasser in a delicately worded personal letter on 3 August. Later, communicating through his ambassador in Cairo, Nehru cautioned Nasser “that he had acted hastily and that public opinion in India was likely to be unfriendly.” Nasser’s good friend and advisor, Muhamad Heikal, remembered his boss’s keen sensitivity toward gaining Indian support. India’s position

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410 Unsigned message to Dulles, Baghdad, 29 July 1956, Dept. of State RG 59, General Records of the State Dept., #974.7301/7-2956, Box #5338, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
as “the most important member of the Commonwealth, as well as of the Afro-Asian community,” made it extremely valuable. The fact that Nasser’s announcement followed soon after meetings between Nehru, Nasser, and Yugoslav Prime Minister Josip Broz Tito had concluded in Broni, Yugoslavia hinted at India’s possible collusion in Egypt’s nationalizing the canal. As a result, Nehru was placed in a situation where he was required to deny any prior knowledge of Nasser’s plans in order to save face in the international community. While understanding Nasser’s intent and respecting Egypt’s sovereign rights, Nehru also realized the international ramifications and urged Egypt’s lead in smoothing relations with the world’s canal users.

Nasser took these comments seriously and quickly sought to ease his friend’s fears and those of the international community. He believed that without India’s support, the rest of the non-aligned world would turn their backs on Egypt. In certain cases, this seemed to be a plausible threat. Officials from developing countries expressed consternation equal to if not greater than that of Nehru. In one instance, a Nigerian Emir, passing through Cairo, shredded a message he was asked to sign endorsing the nationalization of the canal. In another instance, the Sheikh of Kuwait offered his strong rebuke of Nasser’s act. Consensus in the West, opposing the canal’s nationalization, seemed equally unstable.

414 Heikal, *Cutting the Lion’s Tail*, pp. 134-139.
Beginning 27 July, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden insisted on resolute opposition to Nasser’s action. At an emergency cabinet meeting, Eden shifted his attention away from legal technicalities to favoring direct economic and political pressure. Cabinet members agreed that from the perspective of jurisprudence, Nasser had not violated any prior agreements.\textsuperscript{416} To allay their trepidation, the advisers began redefining the canal as “an international asset” that was too important to be controlled by a single country. Subsequent discussions during the meeting, however, led to severe lapses in logic. On the one hand, British officials supported the idea of transforming the issue into an international dilemma. On other hand, Eden chided efforts calling for the UN Security Council’s involvement. Instead, Cabinet officials sought to confer with French and American officials exclusively. Also noteworthy was the fact that once British officials reached a consensus that Nasser’s nationalization was a breach of international trust, discussion focused more intently on the use of force. In essence, Eden and his staff concluded that the British, French, and American governments would determine the international interest, negotiate on its behalf, and decide on the appropriate circumstances and application of military force.\textsuperscript{417}

Convincing members of his own government was not enough for Eden. Later the same day, he drafted a letter to Eisenhower to coordinate policy responses. Eden took the


\textsuperscript{417} Gorst and Johnman, \textit{The Suez Crisis}, pp. 58-61.
liberty of presenting his interpretation of Nasser’s move as a “defiance of international agreements” which, if dealt with quickly, would “have the support of all the maritime powers.” Seizure of the canal threatened “the free world,” Eden argued, and its most vital commodities such as oil. 418 According to British estimates, sixty million tons of oil representing two-thirds of Western Europe’s annual supply made its way through the Suez Canal. 419 Using this argument of Western interdependence as a basis for action, the prime minister alluded to the possibility of military intervention in his message to Eisenhower, but left it as an option of “last resort.” 420 Of interest here is the fact that British officials passed off military force as a last resort when, according to historians Anthony Gorst and Lewis Johnman, they had already taken steps to create an “overwhelmingly hawkish” sub-committee to handle the crisis. 421 Besides perpetuating the double-dealing that occurred among Western allies, Eden’s actions exhibited classic characteristics of mistaking unilateralist policy-making for multilateralism. The day after his talk with Macmillan, American diplomat Robert Murphy recollected in his memoirs, “Eden was laboring under the impression that a common identity of interest existed among the allies. That was not the American view, and I [Murphy] gave no encouragement to that idea.” 422 As with Eisenhower’s experience negotiating collective security agreements in the Middle East, Khrushchev’s experience in handling mounting dissent following his “secret” speech, and Nasser’s experience following his

418 Eden to Eisenhower, London, 27 July 1956, Dept. of State, RG 59, General Records of the State Department, #974.7301/7-2756, Box 5338, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
419 Gorst and Johnman, The Suez Crisis, p. 57.
420 Eden to Eisenhower, London, 27 July 1956, Dept. of State, RG 59, General Records of the State Department, #974.7301/7-2756, Box 5338, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
421 Gorst and Johnman, The Suez Crisis, pp. 58-59, and 61. The sub-committee became known as the Egypt Committee.
nationalization of the canal, Eden’s policy-making was built on political quicksand. In every instance, each individual failed to represent accurately the multilateral perspective, which only succeeded in escalating international tensions.

Britain’s European neighbors as well as members from within the British Commonwealth took a more accommodating view of the Suez crisis. As the “seventh largest user [of the] canal, Dutch officials were optimistic that Nasser would make some effort to honor “international commitments.” Indeed, Nasser had promised to compensate shareholders owning stock in the Suez Canal Company at fair market prices. Like the Dutch, Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson believed that Egypt’s control of the canal did not warrant alarm as long as maritime transit remained undisturbed. Officials in Washington also expressed their reservations regarding military invasion during a 31 July meeting at the White House. Among Eisenhower’s circle of advisors, Secretary Dulles noted England’s favoring “ultimatum” over “conference.” The Secretary’s brother and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, reported the British people’s feverish support for some sort of military response and numerous references equating Nasser’s act with that of Hitler and his re-militarization of the Rhineland twenty years earlier.

Allen Dulles’s assessment of the British citizenry was a bit premature. Several scholars have investigated British public opinion and its enthusiasm for Eden’s policies.

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423 Matthews to Dulles, The Hague, 30 July 1956, Dept. of State RG 59, General Records of the State Dept., #974.7301/7-3056, Box #5338, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
“For most of a public life spent largely in the resolution of diplomatic conundrums,” writes Eden biographer David Dutton, “it was Eden’s particular skill to move those around him towards consensus forming the basis of action. But in the case of Suez Eden began with a near consensus—at least in the domestic context—and had the misfortune to see it fade away in the weeks which followed.”

Other historians differ with Dutton only in a matter of degree. Within a week of Nasser’s announcement, high-profile British politicians such as Opposition leader Hugh Gaitskell argued in the House of Commons that force could only be justified after its endorsement by “the public opinion of the world” embodied within the United Nations. Britain’s popular press echoed parallel points of view. According to historian Ralph Negrine, by 5 August British newspapers such as *The Observer*, *The Guardian*, and *The Daily Mirror* advocated UN involvement. Despite Eden’s efforts to spread his particular perspective, he seemed aware enough of the fact that the successful return to an acceptable sense of world order relied entirely upon U.S. endorsement. When it came to assuming a lead role, however, the Eisenhower administration demurred.

By early August 1956, Eisenhower had begun imposing his own limits on multilateral diplomacy. The same day Gaitskell advocated UN involvement in the Suez crisis, British, French, and American allies condemned Egypt’s “unilateral seizure” of the canal and its effect on “the freedom and security” of all nations. The statement went on

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to call for convening an international conference to reinstate the canal’s status as an international asset.\textsuperscript{430} Egypt and the international community were to negotiate independently of the United Nations. During an 8 August press conference, President Eisenhower continued to distance himself from any efforts made to involve the world organization. When asked if he supported Egypt’s referral of the Suez issue to the United Nations, the president expressed skepticism. Eisenhower raised the possibility of a Security Council deadlock resulting from British and French veto powers and then questioned the organization’s overall ability to handle the matter with due haste.\textsuperscript{431}

Given this lack of confidence, it is easy to identify the misunderstandings and misrepresentations that occurred between Eden and Eisenhower. Where Eden interpreted UN involvement as an impediment to his sense of British national security, Eisenhower dismissed UN involvement because of the impediments resulting from his allies’ national security interests. Both men reached the same conclusion as a result of diametrically opposed perspectives. For the next several weeks, however, Eden and Eisenhower misconstrued each others motives.\textsuperscript{432} For Eden, American endorsement of an international conference meant that U.S. officials remained receptive to military options. American policy-makers, on the other hand, took British participation in the conference as a sign of good faith. The faulty basis on which these presuppositions were based contributed to a false sense of multilateral diplomacy. Furthermore, the West’s refusal to

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\textsuperscript{430} U.S. Department of State, \textit{American Foreign Policy, 1956}, (1959), pp. 607-608.
\textsuperscript{431} \textit{PPDDE}, p. 668.
\textsuperscript{432} According to historian Hugh Thomas, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles “distrusted Eden’s independence” when it came to exhibiting free world solidarity. Throughout the crisis there was to be misunderstanding,” Thomas contends, “Dulles seemed to agree with British hatred of Nasser when he was with the British; in the U.S.A. he would publicly talk against old-fashioned colonialism.” Hugh Thomas, \textit{Suez} (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 60.
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engage in negotiations through the United Nations thwarted a more genuine internationalist alternative that would have included Egypt’s support.

For Dag Hammarskjöld, the lack of confidence hurt. Throughout the late summer of 1956, the secretary general continued grappling with problems facing enforcement of the General Armistice Agreement in the Middle East; but new frustrations emerged after Western leaders decided to exclude UN officials from mediation over Suez. When reporters asked Hammarskjöld to comment on the canal’s nationalization and the West’s response, he pointed out that apparently his advice was unimportant. Signs of aggravation appeared as early as 24 and 25 July, when border clashes between Israelis and Jordanians erupted once again. Hammarskjöld threatened to dump the entire Arab-Israeli dispute on members of the Security Council as stipulated by Article 99 of the UN Charter, if the violence persisted. These half-nelson tactics had limited success, each time resulting in diminishing effectiveness. As the head of UN operations in the region, General E.L.M. Burns notes in his memoirs, from roughly the end of July to the end of September, Israeli officials reported fifty-nine complaints of incursions along its borders, leaving nineteen Israelis killed and dozens wounded. Jordan registered sixty-three complaints against Israeli actions leading to seventy-two Jordanian deaths. Finally, in a letter to Hammarskjöld, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion charged “that the UN observation posts in Gaza had been useless and that Israel would be unlikely to accept them after 31 October. Besides foreshowing the ominous events that played out in the

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433 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 156.
434 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 156. Under Article 99, “the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.”
435 Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, p. 165.
436 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 156.
fall of 1956, Ben-Gurion’s unilateral motives were indicative of world leaders for much of August.

The general malaise expressed towards the United Nations by leaders of countries both great and small also limited the scope of policy debate. As early as 9 August, Eisenhower and his senior advisors expressed their fundamental opposition to Nasser’s nationalization of the canal. During a lengthy National Security Council meeting, the president concluded that “Egypt had gone too far.” Contrary to his own deliberative approach to race relations, where he considered himself to be the representative of moderates of all races, Eisenhower feared that “chaos” would dominate the region if Nasser got his way. According to historian Michael Hunt, “[Eisenhower] thought ‘dependent peoples’ should submit to several additional decades of Western tutelage.” As the National Security Council’s discussion addressed the history of the Suez Canal, analysis yielded to increasingly orientalist thinking. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson’s observation that the Egyptian government once held substantial shares of canal stock but sold them led Eisenhower to respond, “harems were expensive.”

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437 See Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, pp. 92-93. For Eisenhower’s views on Nasser and his success in the Middle East, see “292nd Meeting of the National Security Council,” 9 August 1956, D.D.E. Papers as President of the United States, Ann Whitman Files, NSC Series, Box #8, D.D.E. Library, Abilene, KS. See also Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 164 Additional evidence of Eisenhower’s masking racial biases with portrayals of him as a prudent centrist in race relations can be seen in Andrew Rotter’s investigation of the president’s relations with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. According to Rotter, Eisenhower and Nehru got along well together despite the president’s view that Nehru was somewhat effeminate and “‘emotional.’” See Andrew Rotter, “Gender Relations, Foreign Relations: The United States and South Asia, 1947-1964,” in Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World Since 1945, eds. Peter Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2001), p. 205-207. For additional analysis of Eisenhower and his senior staff and their perceptions of Nehru and other Third World leaders, see Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, p. 112.
438 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 164.
By the end of the meeting, the president instructed the State and Defense departments to lead the formulation of U.S. policy responses. Specifically, Eisenhower stated that both departments “should be jointly studying all possible contingencies which might develop out of the [Suez crisis].” Seven contingency papers were drafted by mid-September, but much diplomatic jockeying took place over the course of the intervening weeks.

A 12 August meeting between America’s bi-partisan Congressional leaders, the president, and his senior staff included a lop-sided discussion that obstructed the nation’s objective involvement in any international diplomatic discourse. In a scene reminiscent of Nasser’s informing his advisers of his intention to nationalize the Suez Canal, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles reported to the legislators assembled that France and Britain had agreed to America’s setting a diplomatic course to resolve the crisis. Beginning 16 August, an international conference was scheduled to convene in London which would negotiate acceptable terms for international control of the canal.

Yet, in the discussions that followed this announcement, Eisenhower and Dulles scarcely veiled their contempt for Nasser and their sympathetic support for America’s two NATO allies. Contrary to their quest for a diplomatic solution, the president, secretary of state, and at least one member of Congress equated Nasser’s usurpation of the canal to Hitler’s aggressive acquisition of territory during the 1930s. Less-than-diplomatic French and British officials had expressed identical arguments as early as the spring of 1956. Operating from this pretext, opportunities for open debate suffered significantly.

Eisenhower and Dulles stonewalled legislators who viewed the crisis through a broader, more unbiased perspective. Representative Charles Hallack (Republican—Indiana) and Senator Leverett Saltonstall (Republican—Massachusetts) inquired about possible United Nations participation. Like the president’s 8 August response to the press, Dulles replied that a Security Council veto could halt progress and the General Assembly held no authority to act on its own recommendations. As a result, the best the world body could achieve was “inconclusive debate and [general acquiescence] amounting to de facto recognition of what Nasser has done.”\footnote{441} The fact that the Eisenhower administration refused to recognize Nasser’s basis for action casts further doubt on America’s diplomatic intentions. Additionally, Dulles conveyed Hammarskjöld’s own concern over British and French disregard for UN intervention. Hammarskjöld, according to Dulles, was agreeable to partnership between the UN and “any international board” established as a result of the London Conference. Yet, Dulles conceded, Hammarskjöld’s gravest concern lay with “answers [that] were lacking with respect to possible developments should no peaceful solution be obtained.”

Hammarskjöld’s reservations exemplify the crux of conflict on which the Suez Crisis teetered.

Dulles’s inability to recognize the relationship between the administration’s continued disregard for Nasser’s perspective and Hammarskjöld’s reservations regarding viable arbitration served as another example of the discrepancies occurring between national interests and multilateral diplomacy. Some Congressional members attempted to show the folly of Dulles’s perspective. For example, Senator Theodore Green (D-RI) raised the prospect of internationalizing all the world’s waterways. Dulles parried this

\footnote{441 From here on, party and state affiliations will be abbreviated.}
thrust saying that it would conflict with America’s national interests in the Panama Canal. Green retorted, “if everybody took that position no progress would ever be made.” Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX) asked about Nasser’s intentions and the likelihood of his closing the canal. Both Eisenhower and Dulles said that canal closure was not inevitable, but Dulles continued by saying that the Europeans’ argued that Nasser was not trustworthy.\footnote{Memo of Conversation, “Notes on Presidential –Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meeting,” 12 August 1956, \textit{FRUS: Suez Crisis, Vol. XVI}, pp. 192, 194.} Rayburn’s question was the closest this eclectic group of policy-makers came to addressing the practicality of Nasser’s closing the canal. Denying access would hurt Egypt’s economic prospects as much as Europe’s. Nasser’s preoccupation with socio-economic development might have offset the West’s paranoia. Yet, few if any government officials on either side of the Atlantic cared to consider these (interdependent) connections.

These biased views doomed negotiations before they had begun. Evoking the well-established practice of concealing national interests beneath the cloak of international legitimacy, the London Conference lost credibility as a forum for mediation. The same day that U.S. officials met in the White House, Nasser declined his invitation to the London Conference. “The proposed conference has no right whatsoever,” Nasser proclaimed, “to discuss any matter falling within the jurisdiction of Egypt or relating to its sovereignty over any part of its territory.”\footnote{Memo of Conversation, “Notes on Presidential –Bipartisan Congressional Leadership Meeting,” 12 August 1956, \textit{FRUS: Suez Crisis, Vol. XVI}, p. 188.} Instead, the conference became the latest manifestation of mutually-exclusive tendencies that dominated diplomacy.
Delegates from twenty-two nations attended the London Conference. For one week in mid-August 1956, the conference set about drafting a multilateral agreement designed to re-establish international authority over the Suez Canal. In his opening remarks, Dulles repeated claims that “the [canal], by reason of its internationalized character, both in law and in fact, is the last place wherein to seek the means of gaining national triumph and promoting national ambition.” The basis of Dulles’s argument simultaneously encapsulated and ignored the history of the canal.

Prior to its construction, de Lesseps had operated from a quid pro quo context, guaranteeing economic and political empowerment to any and all governments that supported his ambitious project. The resurrection of the Ottoman Empire, a revival of French pride, English economic dominance, Egyptian independence, all of these inducements were unstable enough without de Lesseps’s attaching a sense of multilateral recognition of these promises by the international community. For Egypt, the allure of independence served as the main reason for Ismail Pasha’s concession. Nasser was simply following through on that promise. Disraeli’s purchase of Suez Company shares satisfied Britain’s national security concerns by providing economic peace of mind.

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444 The countries represented were Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States. Both Egypt and Greece declined their invitation to attend.

445 *American Foreign Policy, 1956*, p. 611.
Eden wanted to maintain that commercial insulation. During the summer of 1956, these conflicted chickens were coming home to roost.

Analogous to the UNSCOP decision on Palestine in 1947, two views emerged at the London Conference in 1956. The majority endorsed America’s plan for outright “international control and operation of the canal” and raised the prospect of using military force if Nasser remained defiant. Presenting his proposal as the most inclusive of opinions, reflective of “actual conditions,” and projecting “confidence for the future,” Dulles dismissed more accommodating alternatives and thus undermined the chances for successful negotiation. “Although [the secretary] certainly would have been happy to have his plan implemented,” writes historian H.W. Brands, “he knew that Nasser could not accept it.”

Eugene McCarthy concurs, “Dulles generally proceeded without consulting, or even caring about, the opinions of other nations.” Given Dulles’s disposition and these interpretations of it, the chances for a negotiated settlement plummeted. Dulles’s lack of faith may have been forgiven had others not felt similarly.

Contrasting the eighteen-nation majority, delegations from the remaining four countries supported an alternative proposal. Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and the Soviet Union would have allowed Egypt to retain ownership of the canal while simultaneously forming an international board of canal users capable of exercising “‘advisory functions.’”

India’s delegate, Krishna Menon, devised the plan, which paralleled Nehru’s earlier idea for drafting a new convention to replace the Treaty of 1888. Though somewhat more attuned to Nasser’s view, discord resonated regardless of Egypt’s desire

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to appease India. Like the majority proposal, the minority’s plan still imposed stipulations upon Egypt. Nasser was willing to negotiate with the international community, but he refused to yield to any agreement that imposed concessions as a prerequisite. Consequently, neither the majority nor the minority views were particularly inclusive despite their efforts to appear so.

To complicate matters, personality conflicts detracted from the London Conference proceedings. Historian Hugh Thomas laments how “India who could have exercised an influence for compromise was unfortunately represented by Menon, who always maddened British Conservative politicians and who acted as Egypt’s advocate.”

Some Egyptian officials themselves, however, took umbrage with Menon’s proposals and considered him “a prima donna” at high-profile conferences such as the one in London. Poor personal relations also plagued the diplomatic mission sent to Cairo to negotiate directly the terms of the London Conference with Nasser.

The Menzies Mission, named for Australia’s Prime Minister Robert Menzies who headed the delegation, arrived in the Egyptian capital to explain the conference’s majority proposal and prepare for its implementation. A specter of foreboding overshadowed the initial proceedings of 3 September and for good reason. Menzies seemed, at best, a dubious choice to head the mission. Prior to leaving for Cairo, Menizes had gone on public record opposing Nasser’s nationalization of the canal on legal as well as moral grounds. Picking up on this, Nasser, “noting that Menzies sounded even more like a nineteenth-century imperialist than British Prime Minister

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449 Thomas, Suez, p. 71.
450 Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, p. 147.
451 In his memoirs, Lester Pearson agrees that “Mr. Menzies was not exactly the kind of man likely to create the best impression on Nasser.” The Australian leader remained “violent in his opposition” to Nasser’s course of action. See Pearson, Mike, p. 233.
Anthony Eden, complained that the Western powers were trying to back [Nasser] into a corner. An antagonistic tone overwhelmed the negotiations. Tensions infiltrated discussions establishing the schedule of meetings. Menzies wanted a morning and afternoon meeting each day; Nasser rejected this idea saying “Mr. Menzies it looks as if I may have a war on my hands and in the morning[s] I must be preparing for it.”

Scarcely hiding his contempt for Menzies, Nasser proceeded the next day to explain his views. He began by questioning the validity of Dulles’s view “that the canal must be insulated from the politics of any one nation.” The crux of Nasser’s argument rested on two key claims. First, he stuck by his view that the canal was within Egyptian sovereignty and therefore outside the jurisdiction of international input. Second, Nasser noted the hypocritical parallel between the political motives for Nasser’s seizing the canal and political dimensions of the London Conference proposal which threatened economic and military retaliation if Egypt failed to comply. In Nasser’s opinion, the proposal’s ultimatum-like demeanor further justified his taking control of the canal. He refused to yield to what he labeled “‘international colonialism’” and its Western sponsors.

Nasser’s reference to colonial exploitation exposed the sensitivity Western diplomats had to this infamous legacy. On one occasion, Nasser and Menzies sparred verbally over the issue. Nasser alluded to “trouble” should the international community “impose” its will on Egypt. Menzies saw trouble as inevitable if Nasser failed to relinquish the canal to international authority. As if to make his point more emphatic,

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454 Heikal, *Cutting the Lion’s Tail*, p. 150.
Menzies packed his papers and prepared to walk out of the proceedings. H. W. Brands credits Loy Hendreson, the American delegate to the Menzies Mission, with single-handedly salvaging the situation by interjecting his own sense of the mission’s significance as an avenue through which progress could be made to mediate between Egyptian sovereignty and international commitments. As a first-hand eyewitness, Nasser’s adviser, Mohamed Heikal, remembers the scene differently. Henderson took this conciliatory tone after the delegates from Iran and Ethiopia objected to the use of threatening rhetoric. Moments later, the Swedish delegate voiced his commitment to negotiating with Nasser. Contrary to Brands’s analysis, Heikal cites this consensual vote of confidence as the reason for the mission’s continuance.

The efforts of Loy Henderson and his fellow delegates were not the only examples of the West’s attempt to ease Nasser’s suspicion. On 5 September 1956, as the talks in Cairo continued, President Eisenhower also reacted to Nasser’s sense of colonial encroachment. Isolating Menzies even further, Eisenhower proclaimed that the United States would not support the use of force in resolving the Suez crisis. Menzies’s hard-line tactic lost its meaning after news of Eisenhower’s statement spread. On his return trip to Australia after talks with Nasser had ended in failure, Menzies met with President Eisenhower in Washington. According to Hugh Thomas, Menzies told Eisenhower that America’s refusal to use force “pulled the rug clean out from under [Menzies’s]

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458 Heikal, *Cutting the Lion’s Tail*, pp. 151-152. The three other delegates comprising the Menzies Mission included Swedish Foreign Minister, Osten Unden, Iranian Foreign Minister, Dr. Ardalan, and Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Ato Aklolou Hapte-Wold.


feet.”\textsuperscript{461} The mission’s official final report, however, blamed Nasser for his irrational intransigence.\textsuperscript{462} The more likely culprit seems to have been Menzies’s unwillingness to negotiate.\textsuperscript{463} In many respects, the Menzies Mission accentuated the ruptures that not only further debilitated relations between jaded adversaries, but also marked the deterioration of trust between allies. This breakdown in diplomacy outside the United Nations served as further evidence of the international organization’s indispensability as an alternative for multilateral diplomacy.

V

In spite of the unraveling of solidarity that was taking place, Western leaders continued to act as if they enjoyed the full support of their allies. By early September 1956, the leaders of the various countries interested in resolving the Suez crisis attempted to do so by their own means. For example, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles rallied support for a second London Conference. Dulles hoped to create a Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA) to provide qualified canal pilots, collect tolls from SCUA members to be divided between Egypt and the association, and, if possible, determine the canal’s traffic patterns.\textsuperscript{464} British Prime Minister Anthony Eden planned to have this second conference serve his own purposes. Indeed, although Eden announced the convening of a second conference of canal users, Dulles masterminded the concept. Eden understood his country’s participation as nothing more than a show of unity. Where Dulles hoped to

\textsuperscript{461} Thomas, \textit{Suez}, p. 78. See also Hoopes, \textit{The Devil and John Foster Dulles}, p. 356.
\textsuperscript{462} Brands, \textit{Inside the Cold War}, p. 305.
\textsuperscript{463} Thomas, \textit{Suez}, p. 78.
\textsuperscript{464} \textit{American Foreign Policy, 1956}, pp. 625-626.
allow time for reasoned negotiation to re-assert itself, Eden believed that his support of Dulles would be reciprocated should force be necessary to resolve the crisis. Not only did the first London Conference fail to bridge the gap between Egyptian and international concerns relating to the canal, it did not even change the mindset Western allies held towards one another. As historian John Campbell put it, “The discipline of both [Eastern and Western] blocs seemed to be breaking down.” Yet, each leader remained convinced that the disparate course they pursued enjoyed the support of their allies. Multilateral diplomacy had reached its lowest ebb.

Although some U.S. government officials began favoring UN participation, Eisenhower’s senior advisers continued to limit the organization’s role to one of rubber-stamping Washington-based policy. Anonymous bureaucrats began understanding the dispute as more than a simple matter of bloc politics. According to a New York Times article, “Western diplomats” had recoiled from the prospect of UN deliberations for fear of an Asian-African-Latin American coalition that could dominate the proceedings in the UN General Assembly. Witnessing the diversity of opinion within the Afro-Asian bloc, however, eased America’s fears to the point where they could accept referral of the matter to the world body. Discipline among Asian nations had been particularly elusive during the first London conference. Where Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan had aligned with the 18-nation proposal during the first London Conference, India, Indonesia, and others had dissented.

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Dulles hoped to capitalize from the re-alignments that were taking place to direct the UN’s course of action. During a 6 September meeting with Congressional leaders, Dulles expressed his intention of using the Security Council to legitimize his plans for international operation of the canal. International administration of the canal remained “the fundamental issue” for Dulles, which automatically precluded him from considering alternative perspectives regardless of their source. With little equivocation, Dulles envisioned the role of the United Nations much as the Truman Administration had—an instrument designed to endorse a particular brand of world order. Yet, the next day, he accused his European allies of conspiring to use the UN in precisely the same manner. After listening to British and French proposals to bring the Suez question before the Security Council themselves, Dulles communicated his concern that the Security Council would simply “impose on Egypt a new treaty in the form of the 18-power proposal.”

Dulles deserves equal amounts of credit and criticism for his analysis. His suspicion of British and French motives was credible; but Dulles failed to recognize similar pitfalls within his own policy-making. Dulles’s subordinates within the State Department were more observant.

Rather than remain anonymous, Loy Henderson, the American member of the Menzies Mission, voiced his opposition to Dulles’s “user’s association.” Amidst efforts to revive negotiations with Nasser over the original London Conference proposal, Henderson reported to the State Department the “difficulties and friction” caused by any new proposals coming from Washington. Hearing of Dulles’s Suez Canal Users

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Association (SCUA), Henderson said that it “would be even more unpalatable . . . than the 18-nation proposal.” Dulles’s views proved incompatible among allies, congressional legislators, State Department subordinates, and even contested the multilateral identity Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld wished to construct for the United Nations.

To complicate matters, NATO allies also began to re-consider referring the Suez crisis to the United Nations. Prior to the diplomatic fireworks occurring during the Menzies Mission, a 2 September 1956 *New York Times* article described the multiple majorities present at the London Conference. “A majority of the twenty-two nations favored international operation of the [Suez] canal,” writes Harold Callender, “but [another] majority opposed the use of force to impose this or anything else on Egypt.” The most vocal advocate for both majorities was the United States. Rather than affirm overlapping majorities that the United States could influence and lead as Callender implies, these fluid perspectives proved how delicate and complex the entire crisis had become. Countless fissures such as these led Canada’s Foreign Minister Lester Pearson and Belgium’s Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak to endorse UN action in the Security Council. Speaking before the NATO Council, Pearson believed “that a majority opinion at the Security Council, even if it was vetoed there as it would be, might be an important and valuable support for subsequent negotiations or action.” For the first time in the Suez crisis, senior-level governmental officials understood the pivotal role the United

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470 Harold Callender, “Western Rift Over Suez,” *New York Times*, 2 September 1956, p. A2. Later in the article, Callender relayed how the Suez Company wished to escalate the crisis beyond the already belligerent tone France and Britain had taken. Specifically, the company began bribing French newspaper owners to cast Nasser as antagonist and provocateur. See also Thomas, *Suez*, p. 78.

Nations could play in resolving the dispute. These opinions formed the foundation upon which eventual compromise would be reached.

Soon afterward, other journalists picked up on variations of these multilateral themes. Tracing the relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain, the iconic Walter Lippmann identified numerous occasions where each ally had served to restrain the other to benefit broader alliance interests. For example, Britain filled this restraining role when the United States considered expanding the Korean War and the Indo-Chinese War after the Dien Bien Phu debacle. “In . . . these instances,” Lippmann writes, “American opinion was divided. And official Washington was sharply divided. The British stand did much, it may have been decisive, to ensure the victory of the moderates.”

Lippmann’s analysis implies the often overshadowed value multilateral diplomacy possesses in times of tremendous crisis. Unlike the course of events contributing immediately to the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the even longer history surrounding the canal’s nineteenth century controversies, contested opinions were not abhorrent. Indeed, in Lippmann’s opinion, they proved vital to international mediation. “The old conventional weapons are ineffective against guerillas fighting with the support of the native population. . . ., Lippmann concludes. “Some day and somehow the Atlantic nations and the liberated nations will have to come to a new understanding and into a new relationship.” Lippmann, Hammarskjöld, and even Loy Henderson comprehended the new multilateral effort and sensitivity that crisis resolution required. Policy-makers obsessed with advancing national interests, however, were not to covet

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multilateralism as an independent alternative unto itself, but rather as a means to a more myopic end.

VI

Indeed, the intractable habits of key leaders remained unyielding. Like many American, British, and French officials, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser also turned to the United Nations for affirmation of his interests. After the Menzies Mission failed, Nasser welcomed UN arbitration of canal disputes between Egypt and the canal’s users. According to historian Hugh Thomas, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and French Prime Minister Guy Mollet rejected Nasser’s proposal. Similar to Dulles’s strategy, Nasser sought to embellish his image as a facilitator of multilateral interests while simultaneously accentuating British and French imperialist belligerency.

As Nasser joined in the various efforts attempting to usurp multilateral initiatives, so too did he have to mollify growing discontent from within the Arab world. Nasser was eager to remain at the forefront of his pan-Arab cause, but his unilateral actions regarding the nationalization of the canal threatened the political stability of key Arab states. In Syria, the Cabinet resigned as a result of internal disagreements between its Socialist and Nasser-inspired Nationalist elements. King Hussein of Jordan expressed his resentment regarding Nasser’s cavalier interference throughout the Middle East. Hussein grew “increasingly perturbed” by Nasser’s self-appointed role as Arab spokesperson; Nasser’s unilateral actions, such as nationalizing the Suez Canal; and

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474 Thomas, Suez, p. 78.
Nasser’s subversive propaganda campaigns to undermine Arab rulers who opposed him. By September, the Jordanian King shared his views with President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon and President Shukry al-Kuwatly of Syria in an effort to subvert Nasser’s influence. President Chamoun also had to contend with mounting tensions between Lebanese Christian and Muslim communities. Christian Arabs grew “uneasy” about Islam’s dominance in Arab nationalism. In some cases, Arab Muslims looked to turn these suspicions to their advantage. On one occasion, Muslims accused Arab Christians of burning the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian flags at a Lebanese festival in an effort to isolate the Arab Christian community. Ethiopia’s Ambassador to Egypt conveyed his frustration “that small nations in the Red Sea area were completely at Egypt’s mercy and felt uncomfortable.”

One country’s support that Nasser could not afford to lose was that of Saudi Arabia. On 23 September, Nasser traveled to meet with King Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman Al Saud. Oil was the main concern of the Saudi sovereign. With so much of Western Europe’s oil supply transported by naval tankers, the Suez Canal occupied a vital “part of the broader Middle East oil complex.” King Saud requested that Nasser remain mindful of Egypt’s commercial responsibilities and of the dire consequences any stoppage in oil shipments or oil payments would have on Saudi Arabia. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru expressed his “concern that the Saudi Arabian government is

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477 Brewer, “French on Cyprus Embitter Arabs,” NYT, 1 September 1956, p. A3. Because the Saudi Arabian flag contains writings from the Qur ‘an, the Christians’ act was considered particularly heinous.
479 As if to accentuate the role of petro-politics, King Saud and Nasser met in Saudi Arabia’s “oil capital,” Dahran, before relocating to the royal family’s seat of power in Riyadh. See Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, pp. 157-158.
in grave danger of a Communist coup if its oil revenues should be denied or substantially reduced.\textsuperscript{480}

By mid-September a growing chorus calling for UN involvement resonated across the Atlantic; but it did little to affect the diplomatic initiatives of major world powers. United Nations officials continued to carry out their duties as stipulated in the Armistice Agreement. These efforts provided UN officials with valuable, first-hand experience from which they made astute observations. For example, Chief UN mediator, General Burns, expressed concern over the escalating Suez crisis and its detrimental effect on the already tense Arab-Israeli dispute. Should Europeans and Egyptians go to war, Burns cautioned that Israel may join the fight in a series of “arbitrary retaliations” against its neighbor without fear of rebuke from the Security Council. Hammarskjöld agreed, but the circumstances as they existed left the United Nations powerless.\textsuperscript{481} To a limited degree, Britain’s Defense Minister Walter Monckton felt similarly. During an 11 September British Cabinet meeting, Monckton believed that “any premature recourse to force” would “alienate” domestic and international public opinion. Monckton’s primary interest was gaining American endorsement of any military actions Britain made against Egypt.\textsuperscript{482} Admittedly, American approval narrowed “international public opinion” severely, but at the very least Monckton’s assessment demonstrated some sensitivity to the international community and its impact on domestic support.


\textsuperscript{481} Burns, \textit{Between Arab and Israeli}, p. 169; and “U.N. Termed Paralyzed,” \textit{New York Times}, 3 September 1956, p. A2. According to Mohamed Heikal, King Saud also worried about the outbreak of an expansive war. The king warned Nasser of this possibility during their September meeting. See Heikal, \textit{Cutting the Lion’s Tail}, p. 158.

\textsuperscript{482} Gorst and Johnman, \textit{The Suez Crisis}, p. 81.
The same cannot be said for the Eisenhower administration. President Eisenhower and his senior staff remained steadfast in their handling of Suez Canal negotiations. Although Eisenhower realized in a letter to Eden that “the most significant [American] public opinion . . . seems to think that the United Nations was formed to prevent [the Suez crisis from flaring into war,]” the president and his Secretary of State continued to follow a diplomatic course outside the UN’s jurisdiction. Dulles unveiled his Suez Canal Users Association during the Second London Conference, which began on 19 September. Contrary to calls for UN involvement, Dulles questioned the organization’s “authority” over drafting and implementing a new agreement. Dulles also disagreed with General Burns over the notion that a potential war in Suez could expand into a wider Arab-Israeli conflict.

Rather than continue to assign credit to Dulles for his ability to identify occasions when the United Nations was being manipulated to serve a particular set of interests as was the case with British and French initiatives, Dulles took to undermining the integrity of the organization directly. This included not only questioning the UN’s capacity to mediate crises, but also refuting the analysis of its officials in the field. Refusing to consider referral of the Suez crisis to the UN simply because it conflicted with the U.S. government’s own proposals tarnishes the sincerity of the administration’s commitment to productive negotiations. As if to amplify the point, King Saud wrote President Eisenhower criticizing Dulles’s “‘Users’ Association’” for its imposition of terms without

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addressing Egyptian needs. The Prime Minister of Ceylon, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike described Dulles’s idea as a “‘giant step towards war.’” Given this sense of foreboding, the Eisenhower administration’s consideration of alternative perspective remained mixed at best.

On 17 September, the same day Eisenhower received King Saud’s letter, the president’s National Security Council unveiled its seven contingency plans in preparing for any eventualities in the Suez crisis. One plan titled “‘The Suez Canal Situation is Referred to the UN in the Absence of Military Action,’” called for “side-stepping the UN Security Council in favor of either forming a UN subcommittee to resolve the crisis or

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486 “Letter from King Saud to President Eisenhower,” 17 September 1956, D. D. E. Papers as Pres. of the U.S., 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box #46, D.D.E. Library, Abilene, KS. Remember that this was the same logic Dulles applied to Anglo-French efforts to have the UN Security Council endorse the recommendations of the First London Conference.

487 A.M. Rosenthal, “Nehru Says West is Risking a War,” NYT, 14 September 1956, p. 1. Like Saudi Arabia’s King Saud, India’s Minister of Trade, D.P. Karmakar, was anxious about the economic ramifications if the canal shut down for any reason. According to Kamakar’s 1955 figures, “[seventy-one] percent of India’s total imports” and “[sixty] percent” of the country’s imports traversed the canal. See Rosenthal, “Nehru Says West is Risking a War,” NYT, 14 September 1956, p. 6.

Careful not to alienate the Americans completely, Indian officials reached out to the Americans with a proposal of their own. As reported in the New York Times, Nehru’s special envoy throughout the crisis, V.K. Krishna Menon, hoped that India and the United States could collaborate and act as “representatives of moderate elements on each side of [the Suez] controversy and find an acceptable compromise.” Menon began a round of shuttle diplomacy in late September to demonstrate India’s commitment to finding a peaceful resolution. Beginning on 21 September, Menon conferred with Nasser as well as the Soviet and Communist ChineseAmbassadors to Egypt in an effort to fill the role of “honest broker.” See Sam Pope Brewer, “Indian Taking Nasser View to London,” NYT, 22 September 1956, pp. 1 and 2.

In many respects, India’s efforts to take a lead role in mediation appeared just as dubious as previous initiatives offered by Western powers. While Nehru and Menon deserve some commendation for their willingness to serve as a moderating influence, the rejection of Dulles’s SCUA plan only to then turn around and ask for American help in implementing a new proposal seems counter-productive. Like the inherent weakness of other proposals, the Indian government’s initiative introduced yet another approach to mediation without considering the alternatives that already existed. In an interview occurring well after the Suez crisis, Menon remained confident of the potential success of India’s plan. To support his argument, Menon pointed to the fact that American officials eventually assumed the role suggested by India’s plan when the UN General Assembly convened in emergency session during the height of the Suez crisis. During the same interview, Menon blamed Dulles for the London Conference’s failure to reach an acceptable agreement. See Brecher, India and World Politics, p. 64.

relying on the “intervention of the Secretary-General.” Another contingency, forecasting British and French military intervention in Egypt, recommended reversing the president’s opposition to invasion and providing “political and logistical support” for its two NATO allies.\footnote{489}

Given the scope of these strategies, it is clear how disjointed the U.S. approach to the Suez crisis had become. On the one hand, the Eisenhower administration remained open to a broad spectrum of responses. This provided the U.S. with a good deal of flexibility in policy-making. On the other hand, these recommendations contradicted earlier proclamations, including objections to military intervention, which Eisenhower had already endorsed publicly. Dulles’s reservations regarding the extent of independent UN involvement in negotiations serves as another contradictory example. By September 1956, Dulles was more inclined to use the organization to endorse his own brand of compromise.

As the calendar turned to October, solidarity surrounding the SCUA proposal remained highly conditional. France remained adamant about the association’s non-interference in internationalizing the canal. In fact, French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau refused to sign the final report of the Second London Conference that officially “proposed an association of canal users.” Pineau was of the opinion that French policymakers “should retain freedom of action to refuse measures deemed contrary to [their] interests.”\footnote{490} Japan and Pakistan sent observers only; and Ethiopia flirted with the idea of

\footnote{489 See “292nd Meeting of the National Security Council,” 9 August 1956, D.D.E. Papers as President of the United States, Ann Whitman Files, NSC Series, Box #8, D.D.E. Library, Abilene, KS; and Editorial Note, \textit{FRUS: Suez Crisis, Vol. XVI}, p. 509. Interestingly, of the seven proposals, none addressed a possibility where war would ensue and matters would be brought before the UN.  
joining them. Iran agreed to participate with the condition that the SCUA refrain from “any use of force against Egypt.” According to a 6 October New York Times article, objections to force included “economic . . . or any other kind of warfare [used] to break Egypt’s control [over] the canal.” British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd admitted in a private meeting that “the Scandinavians would not come into SCUA without the UN having been involved.” Nevertheless, the users’ association was agreed to. When Nasser heard the news, he declared that any attempt made to implement the SCUA through force of arms would be interpreted by Egypt as an act of war. This tepid response from America’s allies and Nasser’s unequivocal reaction to the SCUA allowed others to follow through with their own strategies for crisis management.

Beginning on 5 October, British and French officials began presenting their case to the UN Security Council. In their opening statements, Selwyn Lloyd and French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau repeated the position taken by those eighteen nations at the London Conferences by emphasizing the international rights of unfettered access to the canal and demanding a degree of international authority over its administration. Lloyd conceded that nations retained the right to nationalize “undertakings,” but argued that the canal’s status as an international artery made any discussion of nationalization “irrelevant to the matter before the Security Council.” Framing debate in such a way automatically disqualified Egypt’s claims. In doing so, Lloyd attempted to steer the Security Council to support the course of action set by the 18-nation proposal.

495 “Excerpts from the Text of Debate on the Suez Canal in the UN Security Council,” NYT, 6 October 1956, p. 3.
Additionally, Lloyd explained that “if one government is to have the power to control the canal, the confidence of those countries that the present patterns of their trade and economies can be maintained will be sadly shaken.” Here, Lloyd isolated Egyptian interests while insisting that Britain’s commercial interests were synonymous with those of the international community.

The French Foreign Minister’s remarks were blunt and bleak compared to his British counterpart. According to Pineau, the Suez crisis represented “the limits” placed on national sovereignty. These restrictions, Pineau continued, stemmed “from treaties freely concluded.” Therefore, “international treaties must be respected.” In other words, the Egyptian government had an obligation to abide by the terms of the 1888 Convention. That obligation superseded unilateral actions taken on behalf of national interests. As a result, Pineau concluded, no negotiation was necessary because the Egyptian government had breached international law, which the United Nations was required to uphold.

Pineau’s argument is intriguing for a couple of reasons. First, he interprets international treaties as a restraining influence on countries engaged in pursuing unilateral objectives. Yet, French and British policy-makers, including Pineau, had plotted their own interventionist course to take back the canal and were planning to use the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954 as the basis for the intervention. Ironically, this international agreement was originally designed to maintain the status quo, as American officials had tried to do in 1954-1955. Pineau sets a dangerous double-standard where one treaty restrains Egypt’s intervention in Suez while another treaty authorizes British

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496 “Excerpts from the Text of Debate on the Suez Canal in the UN Security Council,” *NYT*, 6 October 1956, p. 3.
and French intervention. Second, by presenting his case as an ultimatum, Pineau set the stakes for peace at all or nothing. If the Security Council approved the British and French proposal and Nasser refused the terms, then Britain and France would be within their rights to invade Egypt in an effort to enforce the international community’s will as expressed through the Security Council. As Anthony Nutting put it in his own recollection of the Suez crisis

> If in a world which had undertaken to respect the Charter of the United Nations, [the British and the French] were going to revert to nineteenth-century methods to settle a dispute, they must find a twentieth-century pretext for doing so. If they were going to commit an assault, they must appear to be wearing a policeman’s uniform.\(^{498}\)

This forecast satisfied the key prerequisite of attaining the moral authority that British Prime Minister Anthony Eden had requested prior to any use of force.\(^{499}\) It also demonstrates exactly how British and French officials used the United Nations to serve their own national interests, thus undermining any hopes of genuine multilateral diplomacy.

\(^{498}\) Nutting, *No End of a Lesson*, p. 12.

The full extent of this deception emerged during a series of private meetings between, Lloyd, Pineau, Hammarskjöld and Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi. From 9 to 13 October this quartet met in the secretary general’s office and signified the first direct talks between the “main protagonists” since the nationalization of the canal. Hammarskjöld mediated which was “beneficial to the individual nations and . . . consonant with the opinion of the larger world community of the United Nations.” The secretary general set an objective tempo by asserting himself when the ministers encountered deadlock. For example, when Lloyd introduced five principles as a basis for negotiation, Fawzi objected to their being a simple re-statement of the principles agreed to at the London Conferences. Hammarskjöld declared that their origin should not preclude them from mere discussion. Fawzi concurred that, presented “in a new context,” the principles may be acceptable. By the time these private talks concluded, a total of six principles served as the skeletal framework for compromise. The principles were as follows:

(1) there should be free and open transit through the canal without discrimination, overt or covert—this covers both political and technical aspects;

(2) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;

(3) the operation of the canal should be insulated from the politics of any country;

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(4) the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users;

(5) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development;

(6) in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due.\(^{503}\)

Although the United Nations served as the “new context” through which the principles could be agreed to, Lloyd and Pineau reverted back to the unacceptable context of the London Conferences.

On Sunday, 14 October, Lloyd and Pineau introduced a draft resolution re-stating the six principles to which Lloyd, Pineau, and Fawzi had agreed. However, credit for these principles went to the eighteen-nation proposals coming from the First London Conference. Furthermore, the draft resolution legitimized the rights of the SCUA to collect canal tolls and function as stipulated by the Second London Conference. These latter portions of the draft resolution betrayed the spirit of the UN proceedings by sabotaged compromise for the fulfillment of national interests. The British and French governments saved face by portraying the Egyptian government as having acquiesced to the London Conference recommendations. The Soviet Union’s Foreign Minister, Dmirti Shepilov, and Yugoslavia’s non-permanent representative on the UN Security Council, Kosa Popovic, protested these efforts as an affront to world public opinion. Popovic argued that “this part of the draft . . . based on the 18-power proposals . . . [has] already proved unable to make agreement possible.” Instead, Popovic offered an alternative draft

\(^{503}\) The Suez Canal Problem, 1954-1958, p. 133, U.S. State Dept., RG 59, General Records of the State Dept., #974.7301/6-158, Box #5354, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
resolution that omitted references to the London Conferences. Ten minutes before midnight on 14 October, the Security Council “unanimously approved” the six principles while the Soviets, backed by the Yugoslavs, vetoed proposed resolutions that would have established international control over the canal.

Throughout the entire proceedings, progress was always kept in check. In his memoirs, Selwyn Lloyd recalls “[the French] thought that the exercise at the United Nations would be futile but they agreed to act in concert with [England].” Once in New York, Pineau shared his pessimism with U.S. Secretary of State Dulles and took the opportunity to lobby for Nasser’s removal from power. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden had expressed the same sentiments as early as 3 October during a Cabinet meeting. Lloyd remained somewhat out of the loop with regard to his superior’s perspective. The British Foreign Minister had left for New York to attend the opening session of the Security Council the day before Eden shared his thoughts. On the other hand, Pineau remained fully informed of the British and French plans for armed intervention in Egypt.

Indeed, events at the United Nations were to deflect international attention while military plans were finalized for implementation if negotiations in New York collapsed. Pineau, and later Lloyd, carried out that responsibility. As late as 11 October, Reuters news service reported Pineau as saying there was “no basis for negotiation.” By the final day their private meetings with Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi, Pineau and, now,

507 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 165.
508 Gorst and Johnman, The Suez Crisis, p. 86.
509 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 167.
Lloyd, under instructions from Eden, thwarted compromise by equating the six principles to the London Conference proposals. Any diplomatic breakthrough, short of Egypt’s complete agreement to international control of the canal, would have scuttled their true intentions of using the UN to justify military action.

Since September 1956, French, Israeli, and British heads of state and senior officials met in secret outside Paris. Details surrounding military intervention called for an Israeli attack on the Sinai region in response to persistent cross-border fedayeen raids. Once initiated, these hostilities would provide a context for Anglo-French forces to seize the Suez Canal and guarantee its continued operation as stipulated by the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954. Thirty-six to forty-eight hours after the war began, Britain and France would issue their appeal to have Egyptian and Israeli forces withdraw ten miles from either side of the canal to allow for Anglo-French units to take control of the waterway. Though straightforward in theory, British, French, and Israeli officials disagreed over the political conditions necessary for war in addition to the wartime strategic priorities.

Israel’s Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and its Military Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan grew increasingly frustrated by their allies’ pettiness. As late as 22 October, Eden set exacting terms to which his co-conspirators were to comply. The first condition required a “legal, political, and moral justification for the invasion of Egypt by Britain and France.” Achieving this mandate became the motive for taking the Suez controversy

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to the United Nations Security Council. As Anthony Nutting so eloquently phrased it, “aggression was less likely to be interpreted as such if those committing the act were considered enforcers of international consensus.”\textsuperscript{511} The other condition said that, although, England would not join Egypt in an attack against Israel, the British government retained the right to come to Jordan’s aid if Israel attacked it. Ben-Gurion took issue with the notion that Israel should act as the “aggressor, while the British and French appeared as angels of peace to bring tranquility to the area.”\textsuperscript{512} Israel would not play the stooge to enhance the image of others.

Differences of overall strategy also plagued the final round of discussions. As Selwyn Lloyd’s secretary remembered decades later, where the Europeans wanted Israel’s invasion to pose sufficient threat to the canal thus warranting Anglo-French intervention, the Israelis “main objective” was conquering Shram al-Sheikh. Securing this post at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula would open Israeli access to the Gulf of Aqaba and transform the Israeli port of Eilat into a major center of commerce.\textsuperscript{513} Contrasting the Western Europeans’ focus on limited war aims, namely taking back the canal, Ben-Gurion and Dayan took this opportunity to sell the idea of re-defining the balance of power throughout the entire Middle East. Their plan’s most ambitious act had Israel and Iraq splitting Jordan in two, each absorbing a portion for itself. As the Israeli leadership saw it, Iraq’s new authority would serve Britain’s interests through the

\textsuperscript{511} Nutting, \textit{No End of a Lesson}, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{512} Dayan, \textit{Moshe Dayan}, pp. 211-212. Historian David Tal concurs by stressing the fact that “the decision to go to war was not an Israeli initiative; it was in fact the result of a proposal by France to punish Nasser in kind for nationalizing the canal.” See Tal, “Israel’s Road to the 1956 War,” p. 75. Historian Terence Robertson refutes Tal’s argument saying that “the origins of the Suez crisis lie in Israel, where the decision to fight a preventive war was deliberately timed to take advantage of what Israeli leaders thought to be widespread disenchantment with Colonel Nasser and his politics.” See Terence Robertson, \textit{Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy} (New York: Atheneum, 1965), p. xvi.
\textsuperscript{513} Gorst and Johnman, \textit{The Suez Crisis}, p. 98.
Baghdad Pact; and France could possibly re-impose itself in Lebanon and Syria.

According to Dayan, war in Suez would initiate a series of steps in fulfilling Israel’s vision of a new order. However, French and British concerns over the canal shelved the scheme.\textsuperscript{514}

As a result, relations remained far from chummy. Dayan observed that “it [was] possible that [the allies’] very inability to tune into each other’s wavelengths made [the Israelis on the one hand and the British and French on the other] feel it was useless to engage in further clarifications or mutual attempts at persuasion.”\textsuperscript{515} Later, Dayan confesses, “Britain’s behavior toward [the Israelis], hardly ‘gentlemanly,’ also aroused suspicion and mistrust.” As if to reinforce the point, Dayan changed Israel’s battle plan to secure the southern portion of the peninsula before seizing the northern and most direct route to the canal along the Mediterranean shoreline.\textsuperscript{516} Altering this detail undermined the validity of the proclamation British and French officials had scheduled after hostilities had commenced. How could the Anglo-French concern for canal security be accurate when Israel’s main thrust was to take such a circuitous route across the peninsula?

Britain, France, and Israel coordinated plans only on the shallowest of levels. The alliance remained one of convenience rather than conviction.\textsuperscript{517}

Still, in spite of these considerable differences, the three parties patched together a superficial agreement. Known as the Sevres Protocol, Britain, France, and Israel scripted courses of action. After Israel’s initial invasion operations began on 29 October, the British and French governments planned to submit an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt

\textsuperscript{514} Dayan, Moshe Dayan, pp. 215-217. See also Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 179.
\textsuperscript{515} Dayan, Moshe Dayan, p. 218.
\textsuperscript{516} Dayan, Moshe Dayan, pp. 226-227; and Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 32-36.
\textsuperscript{517} Historian Lindsay Braun describes the alliance as “one of the truly unconvincing contrivances of the twentieth century.” See Braun, “Suez Reconsidered,” p. 558.
calling for a cease-fire and access to the canal-zone. Israel was to secure routes to the Gulf of Akaba and refrain from attacking Jordan. Lastly, these “arrangements” were to “remain strictly secret.”

Although these invasion plans remained secret, U.S. officials had authorized its NATO allies to supply Israel with weapons. U.S. Secretary of State Dulles encouraged French and Italian officials to supply weapons to the Israelis as early as May 1956. By June, French officials promised delivery of six-dozen Mystere-class warplanes and forty Super Sherman tanks to the Israeli government. During a 15 October meeting of senior State Department officials, American intelligence-gathering revealed that Israel “[possessed] sixty of the seventy-two French jets, far in excess of the twenty-four that had been reported officially.” While discussing the rising tensions between Israel and Jordan and prospect of war, U.S. officials noted how, as a fighter jet, the Mystere would be virtually useless in any Israeli-Jordanian conflict since “Jordan has no aviation.”

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518 Gorst and Johnman, The Suez Crisis, pp. 100-101. See also Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Full Circle, p. 584. While U.S. officials may have been unaware of the Serves Protocol, records prove that America’s top diplomatic officials were aware of potential hostilities as early as July 1956. French Prime Minister Guy Mollet and his foreign ministry advisers warned the U.S. Ambassador in Paris of France’s hard-line stance against Nasser and of the possible recruitment of Israel to attack Egypt if the Suez crisis was left unresolved. See Geoffrey Pearson, Seize the Day: Lester Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy (Ottawa, Canada: Carleton University Press, 1993), p. 141. By 8 October, some senior U.S. intelligence officers within the CIA and other officials expressed increasing alarm. Kermit Roosevelt, one such CIA operative, forecast British military operations in the Suez region before November 1956. See Grose, Gentleman Spy, p. 433.

519 By September, the U.S. government also allowed the Canadian government to sell twenty-four F-86 Sabre jets to Israel. This sale never occurred because Israel had already begun to receive the French aircraft and no desire to maintain a hybrid air force. Additionally, Israel could not afford the F-86 jets. See Levey, “Israel’s Quest for a Security Guarantee from the United States, 1954-1956,” p. 61. According to scholar Geoffrey Pearson, “Dulles told [Lester] Pearson that the United States was reluctant to be seen as choosing sides by engaging in an arms race with the Soviet Union. This factor [Dulles said] did not apply as much to American allies.” See Geoffrey Pearson, Seize the Day, p. 140.


By mid-October 1956, American officials wrestled not with the conspiratorial actions of their allies but rather with their own self-inflicted bewilderment. The Eisenhower administration longed for the best of both worlds where it sanctioned the shipment of arms to aid Israel on the one hand while remaining adamantly opposed to any justification for war on the other hand. Additionally, while officials in Washington refused to participate directly in the arms race between Egypt’s Soviet armaments and Israel’s Western-manufactured weapons, Eisenhower and Dulles reserved the right to control the flow of munitions through America’s NATO allies. This might have succeeded had the United States required NATO’s compliance with the arms embargo. Instead, U.S. officials enlisted its allies for provisioning the Israeli military. The schizophrenic nature of these policies was the greatest challenge the U.S. government had to surmount.

VIII

Many other governments faced similar circumstances where independent courses of action plotted for the sake of multilateral benefit provoked crisis rather than preventing it. Soon after the Soviet Union’s 20th Congress, Khrushchev realized that in his haste to seize the political initiative by appealing to a broader spectrum of socialist ideology, he had to devote greater amounts of time and energy to containing the forces he had helped unleash. Poland’s Pozan riots tested the limits of Khrushchev’s tolerance, but more vocal dissent followed in the fall of 1956. Next to front page headlines of the Soviet’s UN veto of the British and French proposals regarding operation of the Suez Canal lay news of
Hungary’s and Poland’s continued experimentation with broadening communism’s party line. Local party newspapers in Hungary forecast the return of “rehabilitated comrades” such as Imre Nagy and the pursuit of independent ideas. In Poland, the government acknowledged the injustice of past purges and began reconciliation by honoring the memories of those political outcasts who had paid with their lives. Before the end of October, Imre Nagy returned to power in Hungary.

British and French officials also experienced political turbulence as they attempted to manipulate multilateral forums to justify the use of force. After Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, British, French, and American policy-makers coordinated their response. Reminiscent of de Lesseps’s dependence on quid pro quo agreements that satisfied European, Ottoman, and Egyptian interests, British policy-makers used similar means to influence the Eisenhower administration in 1956. By agreeing to participate in the London Conferences, British and French officials thought they had earned American support for military operations if diplomacy failed. When it seemed as if negotiations might succeed with UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld acting as the lead mediator, the British and French Foreign Ministers sabotaged the proceedings. Like the Americans and the Soviets, the British and French suffered from the catch-22 brought about by their own policy-making. The British and French became entangled in their own efforts to have international organizations, convened for the purpose of keeping the peace, authorize the use of military force.

Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser suffered from the same self-deluding policies. Nationalization of the canal was a unilateral act Nasser could use to

win the favor and represent the plight of anti-imperialist, non-aligned interests worldwide. In many respects, however, Nasser’s action upset some of Egypt’s staunchest allies. Having acted without consulting even his closest advisors, Nasser was quick to rehabilitate relations. For example, Nasser traveled to Saudi Arabia to speak directly with King Saud and address his concerns regarding oil shipments through the canal.

Nasser also showed greater receptivity to the international community as a whole when the United Nations began debating the Suez issue. Nasser’s government stifled “press attacks on the U.S. in the hopes [that the American government] would work out [a] solution which Egypt could accept.” Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi reflected his superior’s amiable nature at the UN. Although meetings with the British and French Foreign Ministers were brusque, Fawzi had a better rapport with Terry Duce, chairman of the massive Arab-American Oil Company (ARAMCO). Duce represented Western oil interests “as well as some of the large banks” who wished to negotiate with the Egyptian government. According to Mohamad Heikal, Duce considered tankers “more reliable” and less vulnerable than pipelines. As a result, access to Suez remained vital. Unfortunately, these constructive exchanges, made possible in part by the United Nations, yielded to less compromising alternatives.

The subjugation of the United Nations to the national interests of particular member states not only demoralized the most stoic of international civil servants such as Hammarskjöld, but also ignored the value of the institution as an objective analyzer of international affairs. Contrary to the foresight exhibited by UN officials, the Eisenhower

523 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 165.
524 Cairo to U.S. Dept. of State, 11 October 1956, U.S. State Dept., RG 59, General Records of the State Dept., 1955-1959 Central Decimal Files, #774.00/10-1156, Box #3682, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
525 Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, pp. 167-168.
administration’s unwillingness to acknowledge connections between Arab-Israeli disputes and the Suez situation resulted in a debilitating lapse in awareness of diplomatic deterioration. When the Suez War began on 29 October and the full scope of British and French involvement was revealed, Eisenhower was incensed. Yet, as early as 4 September *New York Times* reporter Dana Adams Schmidt described “Washington’s misgivings about the continued British-French military build-up [in the Eastern Mediterranean].” Eisenhower may not have known the extent of military planning that had been set in motion, but he was aware of the preparations and the threat it posed to maintaining peace. Additionally, in the weeks preceding the conflict, America’s attempt to achieve national interests through multilateral means at the London Conferences undermined the basis for negotiations and contributed to the Eisenhower administration’s inaccurate assessment of the entire crisis. In spite of these developments, many scholars credit the U.S. government with leading world opinion in condemning the Suez War. Yet, rather than craft the pivotal UN resolutions responsible for resolving the conflict, the Eisenhower administration merely endorsed the measures set forth by other delegates.

British and French policy-makers also severely miscalculated the crisis and opportunities for multilateral diplomacy. By late October 1956, senior advisers ignored the fact that the United Nations provided Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi with a diplomatic environment where he could accept negotiated terms that Hammarskjöld

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presented. British and French posturing had become so fixated on their own national interests that any role the United Nations assumed other than the one stipulated by the British and French governments was intolerable. Such preoccupation dictated not only the terms of compromise, but also the diplomatic venues that were to receive credit for compromise. Examples such as these confirm the detrimental effects national interests had on multilateral diplomacy—especially when government officials attempted to impose prescribed principles on the international community. As experienced in the past, these efforts helped precipitate crisis rather than avert it. By the end of October 1956, the mismanagement of multilateral diplomacy resulted in war.
Chapter IV

The Midnight Hour: The Suez War and Diplomatic Efforts to Halt Its Expansion, October to November 1956

With the birth of the Atomic Age a group of American scientists created the Doomsday Clock to represent humanity’s flirtation with self-destruction. Since the end of the Korean War, the hands remained at an ominous two minutes to midnight. Four years after the Suez crisis scientists reset the clock to read 11:53 p.m. As their web site contends to this day, one reason for stepping away from the brink lay in quarantining the Suez War and keeping it from mutating into a larger conflict. The scientists’ summary timeline credits the superpowers for their willingness to compromise, but nothing is said of the UN’s role in facilitating successful crisis management. Yet, as witnessed in both the Hungarian crisis and the Suez crisis, superpower influence played a central role in escalating each crisis. Detailed examination of the transcripts of late-night General Assembly speeches, meticulous negotiations, as well as the international reactions to the

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UN’s flurry of activity reveals a veritable multitude that should share in the laudatory praise traditionally heaped upon so few. By December 1956, these combined efforts, represented by nearly all-night debates on the floor of the United Nations’ General Assembly, kept the one clock that should never reach midnight from doing so.

Contrary to the UN’s facilitation of inclusive, multilateral negotiations that ultimately led to resolution of the Suez crisis, diplomatic initiatives of the countries directly affected by the crisis had placed national interests before the collective interests of the international community. In many respects, leaders of the various countries involved had little recourse. Escalating tensions triggered policy-making that was more reactionary in nature. Call it realpolitik or simple human nature, these actions and reactions were justifiable. When national leaders attempted to enlist the support of the international community to suit their own purposes, anxiety continued to fester.

Throughout the 1950s and during the height of the Suez crisis, national leaders had improved upon well-established practices of presenting national interests as being emblematic of a broader set of international interests. Following in the footsteps of Ferdinand de Lesseps, Eisenhower, Eden, Nasser, and others seemed unlikely to separate unilateral and multilateral agendas. Eisenhower administration officials had attempted to use Cold War bi-polarity to justify creation of a defensive military alliance in the Middle East. British officials seized on collective security as a means of continuing some measure of their own presence in the region despite the growing nationalist backlash against the West’s imperial powers. In the non-aligned camp, Nasser and others tried to harness the movement’s universal agenda to serve their own purposes.
By the mid-twentieth century government officials worldwide had developed a precarious paradox where policies put into effect for the supposed purpose of representing multilateral interests resulted from increasingly unilateral decision-making. By October 1956, these officials had miscalculated severely the negative impact these methods had on international diplomacy and crisis management. American, British, Soviet, and Egyptian officials in particular clung to shaky assumptions that they commanded a sense of solidarity within their respective blocs of influence at the exact moment when solidarity was declining. The result led to the climax not only of the Suez crisis, but also the Hungarian crisis, and revealed the UN’s indispensable value as an institution of multilateral diplomacy.

I

As British, French, and Israeli officials conferred just outside Paris in October 1956, Hungarians tested their political independence. About the same time that the British, French, Israelis squabbled over war aims and strategic timetables, Hungarian students and workers united behind a 16-point resolution calling for immediate political change. Among its most adamant proposals, the document demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, the return of former Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy to political power, new elections, economic re-organization, Hungary’s implementation of a more independent foreign policy, and the “complete freedom of opinion.”530 In many ways, these ideological shifts from behind the Iron Curtain paralleled Bandung principles

530 Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, pp. 126-127.
of non-alignment as Hungarians plotted a distinctly independent course for themselves.
Imre Nagy championed this cause by favoring “democratic coalition [over] one-party
dictatorship . . . [and] ideological warfare by neutralism and peaceful co-existence.”
According to one unidentified eyewitness observing the country’s revolutionary events, a
sense of equality and unity replaced the Hungarian peoples’ mutual suspicion.”
Inspiring as these sentiments were in contributing to a prominent sense of Hungarian
identity, they also helped dispel the misrepresentations of multilateralism that had helped
precipitate the Hungarian crisis. Hungarians were not simply rebelling against Soviet
oppression; they were exposing the Soviets’ double standard of claiming to represent
multilateral interests while cracking down to ensure greater conformity.
Khrushchev had hoped to balance Soviet policy-making on this premise, but as
much as it reoriented political loyalties in Eastern European countries, such as Poland and
Hungary, it also disoriented officials within the Soviet government. Local populations in
Poland expressed open support for Władysław Gomułka, a former victim of Stalin’s
purges. Gomułka’s political career was resurrected in October 1956 when he was
reinstated to the Polish United Workers’ Party and became party leader soon afterwards.
Kremlin officials feared that Gomułka’s return to power could result in Poland’s exit
from the Warsaw Pact. According to Soviet scholars Mark Kramer and William
Taubman, Khrushchev used considerable political and military pressure in his
negotiations with Poland’s new government. In Taubman’s words, “Khrushchev
exercised prudent restraint.” However, Taubman goes on to say that the most
challenging obstacles to negotiations were Khrushchev’s insensitivity to Polish interests

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Nagy also advocated the expansion of private enterprise.
532 Miller, *Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy*, p. 129.
and his vacillation between political enticements and military intervention. Fortunately for Khrushchev, Gomulka appeased the Soviets after hearing that Soviet tanks were heading towards Warsaw.\textsuperscript{533} Having successfully brought Gomulka’s independently-inclined Polish government under control by mid-October 1956, Khrushchev thought that he could manage Nagy, too.

Originally, Imre Nagy was appointed as Hungary’s Prime Minister in 1955 as a conciliatory move designed to create parity between Stalinist-era communist hard-liners and new reformers. This initial experiment failed. Nagy was removed from power after a few months and expelled from the Communist party for his dissenting opinions.\textsuperscript{534} By the autumn of 1956, however, Khrushchev was willing to deal with Nagy once again despite new efforts to keep the reformer out of power.\textsuperscript{535} Nagy’s political rival was Erno Gero, the First Secretary of the Communist Party in Hungary. After Nagy was removed from power in 1955, Soviet officials supported party hard-liners such as Gero. As Nagy’s popularity grew, Gero had reason for concern. His interest in preserving the status quo would be upset by Nagy’s return to office. Of particular interest, however, is the role Moscow played in heightening tensions between these factions in Hungary, rather than mediating between Gero and Nagy.

Always worried about maintaining order, Soviet policy became exceedingly opportunistic. Within roughly eighteen months, Soviet leadership had reversed its position between stalwart conservatives and progressive reformers for a third time.

\textsuperscript{534} Taubman, \textit{Khrushchev}, p. 289.
\textsuperscript{535} As journalist William Jordan recorded in an article, “Leaders in the Kremlin [seem] ready to accept . . . developments that once would have been branded ‘heresy’ and dealt with summarily.” See William J. Jordan, “Communist World in Throes of Major Change,” \textit{NYT}, 28 October 1956, p. 4B.
According to one scholar, the Soviets’ impulsive policy-making led officials in Moscow to chastise Gero for exaggerating the potential threat Nagy’s resurgence might have had on maintaining party order and “[stamping[ed] Moscow into an ill-advised commitment of Soviet troops [in Hungary].”\textsuperscript{536} In many respects, Khrushchev’s indecisiveness only worsened matters. Yet, Soviet opportunism and indecision reflected the Kremlin’s understanding of the relationship between multilateral legitimacy and fulfillment of unilateral national interests. In Poland, Gomulka served as the country’s leader as long as he conformed to the Soviets’ agenda. Khrushchev hoped to recreate this situation in Hungary with Imre Nagy. Unfortunately, this relationship between multilateral and unilateral interests was incredibly unstable. As Kramer points out, during the height of the Soviet-Polish standoff, tensions bordered on civil war. Polish soldiers in the Red Army remained loyal to the Soviet Union. Poland’s internal security forces, however, “were fully willing to fight on behalf of the new Polish regime.”\textsuperscript{537} In Hungary, the lines of loyalty were more clearly drawn.

Following through with their 16-point plan, Hungarians chose Imre Nagy to lead the country once again. Political police, known as the \textit{Allamvedelmi Hatosag} (AVH), tried to repress Nagy’s reformist movement. On 25 October, these police officials fired into a massive crowd gathered to hear Nagy’s inaugural speech as Hungary’s newly elected leader.\textsuperscript{538} Forty-eight hours later, the Red Army engaged the rebellious Hungarians.

\textsuperscript{536} Miller, \textit{Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy}, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{538} Miller, \textit{Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy}, pp. 130-131.
That same day, 27 October, the Soviets mobilized their diplomatic resources in the United Nations Security Council to face-off against the international community. The Soviet Ambassador to the UN, Arkady Sobolev, disavowed Hungary’s sovereignty, arguing instead that the issue remained a domestic dispute between Hungary’s rival political factions and therefore lay outside the UN’s jurisdiction. Sobolev then took the diplomatic offensive by accusing the United States of inciting rebellion within several sovereign countries in violation of UN principles. For example, Sobolev noted how in 1952, the United States Congress appropriated $100 million for funding political dissent across Eastern Europe.539

Although President Eisenhower was reluctant to disturb the Cold War status quo, the administration’s “rollback” rhetoric made it impossible to simply ignore the Hungarian cause. The result led to a paradoxical impasse during the Hungarian crisis. On the one hand, “[Eisenhower] instructed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to maintain caution and avoid giving Moscow any reason to suppose that the United States had either instigated or would support the Hungarian rebels.”540 On the other hand, “to maintain their political prestige, . . . it was most important for the United States to conceal their inadequacy as best as they could from international public opinion.”541

540 Grose, Gentleman Spy, p. 437.
541 Csaba Bekes, “Cold War, Détente, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution,” in The Cold War after Stalin’s Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace?, eds. Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc., 2006), p. 218. Other historians made similar observations. Douglas Little describes how Eisenhower had hoped to contrast the Soviets’ brutal handling of the Hungarian crisis with the West’s sense of moral purpose. Little as well as historians Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley agree that the Eisenhower’s desire to “liberate” Eastern Europe from communist rule was nothing more than ineffective rhetoric. Any moral leverage the West had over the Soviet Union, Little argues, was nullified by the Suez War. H.W. Brands opposes these perspectives. Brands credits Eisenhower for criticizing America’s allies and their involvement in the Suez War. Instead of losing the moral initiative, Eisenhower’s consistency
as American policy-makers suffered from their own shortcomings in handling the Suez crisis, the same officials were attempting to deal with Soviet intervention only to confront nearly identical obstacles. Where the Eisenhower administration sought to enlist arms suppliers for Israel while sustaining the status quo in the Middle East, Eisenhower also wished to encourage independence for Soviet satellites without having to enforce it. In doing so, the Eisenhower administration created another paradox for itself with regard to the Hungarian situation where the U.S. government sought to advance Cold War interests without escalating Cold War tensions. Fortunately for Eisenhower, Khrushchev was suffering from similar bouts of indecision and proceeded to withdrawal. By 30 October, both Nagy and the Soviets agreed to a cease-fire.

II

As events in Hungary quieted, the events in Suez exploded. On the evening of 29 October 1956, Israeli forces launched their invasion of the Sinai in dramatic fashion. A squadron of C-47 transport aircraft dropped an Israeli airborne company east of the Mitla Pass, approximately twenty to thirty miles from the southern section of the Suez Canal. To confuse the enemy further, four WW II-vintage P-51 Mustangs flew over the peninsula cutting overhead telephone lines with their propellers and wings skirting bolstered America’s image in the international community. Eric Hobsbawm contends that the situation in Hungary combined with war in the Sinai allowed the Superpowers to recognize and accept the limits of their respective spheres of influence. See Little, American Orientalism, p. 177; Ambrose and Brinkley, Rise to Globalism, p. 156; Brands, The Devil We Knew, p. 106; and Hobsbawn, Age of Extremes, p. 397. The strategic objective was not to threaten the canal so much as to seize a key route that prevented Egyptian reinforcement of forward positions located along the border with Israel.
just four yards from the ground.\textsuperscript{543} Thirty minutes after these missions commenced, the commander of the UN observer station at El Auja, along the Egyptian-Israeli border, reported being expelled from his post at the hands of the Israelis.\textsuperscript{544} UN observation posts such as the one at El Auja were a part of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). According to its mandate, UNTSO was responsible for supervising the General Armistice Agreement, including the policing of the border, following the Arab-Jewish War of 1948.\textsuperscript{545} Elsewhere along the border, Israeli formations punched through Egyptian defenses. The Israelis’ advance displaced innocent UN observers and enemy Egyptian forces alike. On 30 October at 2:17 a.m., roughly seven hours after Israeli forces began their attack, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, General E.L.M. Burns, issued a cease-fire.\textsuperscript{546}

Throughout that late October day, the full measure of diplomatic double-dealing unraveled in the hours and days following Israel’s invasion. A meeting between the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Abba Eban, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, William Roundtree, began with Eban ―categorically rejecting [any notion] that Israel would attack‖ and ended promptly when both parties learned of news to the contrary.\textsuperscript{547} As the clock struck midnight in the Sinai, officials in Washington met with British and French embassy liaisons to discuss evoking

\textsuperscript{543} Dayan, \textit{Moshe Dayan}, p. 236.
\textsuperscript{544} Burns, \textit{Between Arab and Israeli}, pp. 179-180.
\textsuperscript{545} UNTSO remains in place to this day.
\textsuperscript{546} “Excerpts from Debate in UN Security Council on the Israeli-Egyptian Situation,” \textit{NYT}, 31 October 1956, p. 8. See also Burns, \textit{Between Arab and Israeli}, p. 180. Israeli officials agreed promptly; but Egyptian diplomats had not responded by the time the matter was deliberated before the UN Security Council.
the Tripartite Declaration. Representing Great Britain, J.E. Coulson argued that the declaration “would be inoperative.” Egypt detested the document’s premise and refused to allow the return of Western troops to Egypt. Without this concession, Coulson concluded, Britain could not engage in any military campaign against Israel. What seems to be the supreme irony here is that America’s own allies quashed any idea of tripartite action even before the declaration was brought before the United Nations for consideration. In all likelihood, the proposal would have been vetoed by the Soviet Union, but British officials did not care to let it get even that far.

Coulson was correct to question the chances of Egypt’s acquiescing to tripartite intervention, but the British government’s assessment was insightful only so far as supporting a pre-determined military option independent of the United Nations. These entrenched perspectives remained incapable of quelling the rapid series of events unfolding in the Middle East. The Sevres Protocol required ample amounts of instability generated by the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. Without it, the British and French basis for intervention was lost. In other words, these European governments had staked the securing of their national interests on encouraging conflict. The task ahead of British and French officials was to get the international community to condone their strategy. They were not alone. The Security Council deliberations of 30 October foretold the difficulty policy-makers experienced in restoring order.

549 The Sevres Protocol was the result of secret meetings between British, French, and Israeli senior officials to choreograph events following Israel’s invasion of Egypt. Under the terms of this agreement, British and French officials would issue an ultimatum to both the Egyptian and Israeli forces: vacate a ten-mile corridor on either side of the Suez Canal to allow for the insertion of Anglo-French forces.
Members of the UN Security Council agreed that a cease-fire was imperative but many of the proposals continued to place national interests ahead of international peace. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., called for immediate action through the UN Security Council beginning with a cease-fire and a return to the status quo antebellum. Later that day, Lodge’s draft cease-fire resolution called for Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai, implored other UN members not to interfere in the conflict, and authorized the Secretary General to take charge of the conflict resolution process and provide status reports to the Security Council. Although Lodge’s resolution reflected the sentiments of the council as a whole, some delegates felt it did not go far enough. Yugoslavian Representative to the UN, Dr. Joza Brilej, endorsed Lodge’s cease-fire proposal but noted that Israel’s concerns over cross-border fedayeen raids should have been handled through the General Armistice Agreement “for which Israel has displayed a growing contempt.” Arkady Sobolev, the Soviet representative, supported the resolution noting, however, the absence of any condemnation of Israeli aggression. Sobolev also expressed his concerns over the ultimatums issued by Britain and France.550

Concurrent with Lodge’s cease-fire proposal, British and French officials issued their own conditions for a cease-fire as set by the Sevres Protocol. Along with the cessation of hostilities, Egyptian and Israeli forces were to withdraw ten miles from either side of the Suez Canal, and allow for Anglo-French occupation of the canal-zone to ensure its unfettered operation. If either of the Egyptian or Israeli governments failed to comply with these terms within twelve hours, “Anglo-French forces would intervene with

the means necessary to ensure that their demands [were] accepted.‖ 551 In his address to the UN Security Council, British Ambassador to the UN, Sir Pierson Dixon, argued that because British and French forces were being deployed to Egypt to re-establish peace, the operation had the best interests of the world community and UN principles at heart. 552 Many representatives in the Security Council rejected the ultimatum and Dixon’s attempt to sell it to the world body. Sobolev favored Security Council measures being taken “for the maintenance of peace and security” instead of leaving countries to pursue their own course of action. Brilej concurred, saying that the West Europeans’ proclamation had the uniquely paradoxical nature of threatening to use force “at a time when such earnest efforts are being made to achieve a peaceful and mutually acceptable settlement to the Suez problem.” 553

The conundrum Brilej identified was one of the often overlooked yet enduring legacies spanning the canal’s existence. Since de Lesseps’s personal campaign to build the waterway in the nineteenth century, the imposition of a single perspective that misrepresented a broader set of competing interests not only disregard those interests, but also simultaneously undermining the project’s original vision of fostering global economic and cultural exchanges. In addition to contributing to increasingly popular notions of nationalist identity, de Lesseps’s methods also inspired foreign policy-making that operated from a similarly exclusive pretext. The combination of greater self-

551 Gorst and Johnman, The Suez Crisis, p. 100.
553 Official Records of the Security Council (ORSC), Eleventh Year, 30 October 1956, 749th meeting, Document S/PV.751, p. 6. Townsend Hoopes adds that the ultimatum did not explicitly mention bombing, and, once they commenced, British and French sorties targeted only Egyptian defenses, not Israeli formations. Also, the timing and terms of the ultimatum did not coincide with the actual deployments on the ground. When the decree took effect, the Egyptians would have had to withdrawal 110 miles in order to comply while the Israelis could have advanced an additional 90 miles before encountering the Canal Zone corridor. See Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, p. 376.
awareness and persistent efforts to subordinate multilateral diplomacy to support unilateral purposes created diplomatic gridlock. The West’s unsuccessful negotiation of a collective security agreement in the Middle East stands as an excellent example. A similar fundamental flaw plagued Western European efforts to act as the guardians of international peace in the autumn of 1956.

III

Not even the initial outbreak of war could curtail entrenched habits where national interests sought to dominate decision-making inside the international community. Few, if any, officials realized that the Suez War occurred in part because of the pervasive inability of diplomats to distinguish between their own interests and any broader multilateral agenda. The best that anyone could do was to point out the hypocrisy embedded within the various policy proposals as Brilej had done after hearing the British and French offer their ultimatum. The longevity of these habits as traced from Ferdinand de Lesseps to the West’s Middle East security plans of the early 1950s to the London Conferences helps epitomize an old adage: “‘Insanity’ is best defined as applying the same methods and expecting different results.” By the end of October 1956, the pace of events in the Sinai and in Eastern Europe eclipsed completely the various strategies designed to contain them.

One reason for these shortcomings was each proposal’s inability to address the immediate concerns of the combatants as well as breed a good deal of suspicion and resentment. Following Sobolev’s speech, Egypt’s UN Representative Omar Loutfi
deflected calls for cease-fire by insisting upon Egypt’s right to self-defense as allowed under the UN Charter. Israel’s Abba Eban, only slightly more informed than during his previous day’s meeting with Roundtree, justified the attack by arguing that the fedayeen’s cross-border infiltrations threatened Israeli security. Eban also expressed Israeli “contempt” for Sobolev’s “accusation” that Britain and France “had prompted Israel to [attack] Egypt.” Rejecting this notion further, Britain’s Sir Pierson Dixon declared that “both [Egypt and Israel] . . . have shown such repeated disregard for the resolutions of the Security Council that [the British and French ultimatum] should have the general support of the Council.” 554 The Israeli and British perspectives convey the general lack of good faith that afflicted virtually all members of the Security Council. In Dixon’s case, the British Ambassador sought to capitalize on this situation to expand support for British and French intervention. The British government failed to realize that this justification for taking unilateral measures made the crisis more acute.

Eban and the Israeli government were guilty of the same ignorance. Eban transformed Israeli interests into international interests. Incredibly, he made these connections with an amazing degree of nonchalance, rivaling that of the British delegation. From Eban’s perspective,

World opinion is naturally asking itself what these fedayeen units are, what their activities imply for Israel’s security, whether their plans for the future are really full of peril for Israel, and whether this peril is so acute that Israel may reasonably regard its elimination as a primary condition of its security and indeed of its existence. 555

Issuing his own ultimatum, the ambassador declared, “World opinion must choose between two candidates for its confidence: . . . the men, women, and children of Israel [or] these fanatic warriors of the fedayeen groups.” “World opinion,” Eban concluded, “must decide whom to trust.”

Advertising national interests as multilateral interests irked influential segments of the international community. Convinced of their own course of action, the British and French Ambassadors to the UN vetoed Ambassador Lodge’s draft resolution calling for a cease-fire in the Sinai. Sabotaging their staunchest allies’ efforts to achieve peace exposed the duplicitous degree to which the British and French were willing to go not only to secure their interests, but also to protect their ability to do so as they saw fit. With the cease-fire dead in the Security Council and the deadline for evacuation of the Canal Zone having expired, British and French bombers began attacking Egyptian positions along the canal.

United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld could not tolerate this kind of Machiavellian belligerence. Speaking before the Security Council on 31 October, Hammarskjöld excoriated the two delegations. He noted how, in addition to compromising the authenticity of any negotiations that had occurred previously, British and French motives had threatened the basic principles of the UN Charter. “The principles of the Charter are,” Hammarskjöld argued, “by far, greater than the Organization in which they are embodied, and the aims which they are to safeguard are holier that the policies of any single nation or people.” “A Secretary General,” he

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557 Mohamed Heikal offers a vivid account of events taking place in Egypt. When bombing commenced at 6 p.m. Cairo time on 31 October, Nasser heard it and looked on from the roof of his private residence several miles away. See Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, p. 179.
proclaimed, “cannot serve on any other assumption than that—within the necessary limits of human frailty and honest differences of opinion—all member nations honor their pledge to observe all Articles of the Charter.” Much like his 1953 assessment of the UN’s purpose as an organization where the international interest superseded the interests of any one member state, Hammarskjöld remained beholden to that premise amidst the Suez crisis. By 1956, he, as well as others, began to comprehend the volatility that followed when UN member states attempted to fuse international interests with national security concerns.

Regarding the Atlantic alliance, the British and French ultimatum to Egypt and Israel destroyed any vestiges of good faith President Eisenhower held for his European allies. Writing to his friend Al Gruenther, President Eisenhower confided, “I don’t see the point in getting into a fight to which there can be no satisfactory end, and in which the whole world believes you are playing the part of the bully and you do not even have the firm backing of your entire people.” Like Nasser had done during his nationalization speech, Eisenhower drew parallels between contemporary events and the past. In particular, he equated British Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s action to “the Victorian period.” Historian Richard Immerman and others interpret the president’s metaphor as a reference to traditional “gun-boat diplomacy.”

Even members within the British Commonwealth expressed their dismay. According to historian Thomas Millar, Eden’s government kept Commonwealth

558 Uruquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 174.
countries abreast of developments in the lead up to the Suez War. British officials had also collected input from the Commonwealth governments. Information regarding military intervention, however, was not shared. Eden’s ultimatum and subsequent invasion of Egypt stunned members of the Commonwealth. Like Yugoslavia’s UN Representative, R.S.S. Gunewardene of Ceylon deplored the use of aggressive force to preserve peace. Indeed, Gunewardene remarked, “the events of the last few days have demonstrated the tremendous weight of world opinion that has been brought to bear against the reckless use of force.” In Canada, Foreign Minister Lester Pearson called for tempered discontent in responding to the British government’s actions. With such a lack of consensus, even from within the British Commonwealth, international attention turned to the United Nations for mediating the crisis.

IV

With any type of Security Council action at an impasse, as a result of the veto, attention turned quickly to the General Assembly. Dr. Joza Brilej authored a Security Council resolution to move the Suez issue to an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly as allowed by the “Uniting for Peace” resolution of 1950. Immune


from the Security Council’s permanent member veto, the resolution passed and
deliberation began late in the day on 1 November. The President of the United Nations,
Rudencindo Ortega, of Chile, presided over the plenary session and ended his opening
remarks by noting the pervasive international support for the emergency meeting. No
sooner had Ortega finished his speech then the French representative rose to record his
objection to the proceedings. The Egyptian UN Ambassador, Omar Loutfi, registered his
complaint regarding the launch of British and French bombing raids on Egyptian targets.
Referring to the Treaty of 1888, Loutfi argued that Egypt reserved the legal right to
defend the canal. He also questioned the “‘temporary measure’” Britain and France were
planning to take in occupying the Canal Zone. Loutfi warned that in 1882, the last time a
“temporary measure” had occurred, occupation of the Canal Zone lasted almost three-
quarters of a century. For Egypt, reassurance rested with multilateral diplomacy and its
“condemnation” of aggression championed foremost by the two Superpowers.564

Pierson Dixon addressed the assembly a short time later. Like the French
delegate before him, Dixon questioned the validity of the emergency session and its
ability to resolve the Suez crisis. From the British perspective, the United Nations had
not arbitrated the Arab-Israeli conflict successfully on previous occasions. Now,
according to Dixon, Arabs and Israelis were exploiting the Security Council’s
ineffectiveness and internal discord to gain a territorial advantage in the Middle East.
These developments and the speed at which they progressed justified immediate British
intervention. Dixon equated the Suez crisis to the Korean War. “On that occasion,”
Dixon argued, “the Member of the United Nations which had forces on hand and was in a

564 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.561, pp. 2-4. Before yielding the podium,
Loutfi also noted the turning of British public opinion against its own government to cement further the
illegitimacy of aggression.
position to intervene at once courageously did so." The pivotal difference between 1950 and 1956 was the role and function of the United Nations. Under Trygve Lie, the UN in 1950 subordinated itself to the interests of its member states. Hammarskjöld envisioned a more independent—or more appropriately a more interdependent role—for the United Nations. Additionally, discussion within the Security Council in 1956 had not authorized, nor entertained the idea of discussing, armed intervention and appeared unlikely to do so.

As Dixon continued his statement, the differences between Britain’s unilateral basis for action and the UN’s call for a multilateral approach to conflict resolution grew considerably. Dixon assigned blame to the Egyptians’ and Israelis’ unilateral policies. In Egypt’s case, Dixon noted how Nasser ignored UN recommendations calling for Israel’s maritime access to the Suez Canal. The Israeli government’s decision to invade the Sinai Peninsula, on the other hand, threatened canal security and the transmission of international commerce. Where much of the international community began identifying the pursuit of unilateral policies as the source of international crisis, British officials interpreted the same conditions as justification for their own unilateral activity. British policy-makers had scripted their country’s sacrifice to be portrayed as a service to the international community.

John Foster Dulles appeared equally susceptible to the same misperceptions.

During his often quoted “heavy-hearted” speech at the first emergency session, the U.S.

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565 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.561, pp. 5-6. Dixon even goes so far as to describe British and French involvement as a “temporary police action.” See ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.561, pp. 6-7.

566 The Egyptian government’s refusal to recognize the state of Israel meant that the two countries remained in a state of war following the 1948 conflict. As a result, Israeli ships were denied access to the canal.

567 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.561, pp. 6-7.
Secretary of State believed that the UN General Assembly held “the moral judgment of the world community.” Consequently, Dulles decreed “the united will of this Organization to have an impact upon the situation and perhaps to make it apparent to the world . . . that there is here the beginning of a world order.” Dulles even referred to this “united will” as “the constituted authority.”

Yet, like Dixon, Dulles could not escape the temptation to depict a pluralistic forum such as the UN General Assembly in such monolithic terms. As historian Townsend Hoopes put it, the Secretary’s speech was “a sermon, an appeal to the ideals of Western Man and an implied demand that these ideals must be met at least by the leading nations of the Western world.”

Although the General Assembly may have contributed to a sense of international solidarity, this awareness emanated not so much from a “united will” as much as from an environment where various perspectives could be presented and discussed.

When Dr. Tingfu Tsiang, the Nationalist Chinese permanent representative to the United Nations, addressed the assembly, he alluded to the distinctions between moral conformity and multilateralism. Tsiang believed that the “restoration of peace [in the Middle East]” depended on the “co-operation of all parties.” While not perfect, Tsiang continued, the six principles presented to the Security Council in October served as the best prospect for resolving the Suez crisis. “If the Assembly adopted a resolution which primarily and instantly could restore peace, and at the same time would go far to remove the causes of war,” Tsiang suggested that, then, international opinion would appeal to

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568 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.561, p. 11.
569 More specifically, Hoopes describes the speech as a balance “between [Dulles’s] own theme and the President’s in a defense of the resonant Wilsonian principle that international justice must be looked for within the structures and processes of the established world organization, that these were mankind’s highest expression of decency, mutual accommodation, and law, that nothing justified breaking them for selfish ends.” Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, p. 379.
“the opinion of the moderate people” in Israel, Britain, and France. To achieve this, Tsiang endorsed General Burns’ original cease-fire proclamations requiring an immediate end to armed aggression and Israel’s withdrawal.\textsuperscript{570} Compared to Dulles and Dixon, Tsiang’s tone conveys a more inclusive approach to resolving the crisis. Rather than mandating a moral consensus as Dulles implied, Tsiang’s emphasis lay with forging practical support to which each side could attach their own moral justification.

Many UN representatives contributing to the debate aligned themselves between Dulles’s moral focus and Tsiang’s more practical approach. After a recess, the General Assembly reconvened at 9:50 p.m. on 1 November. The Philippines’ permanent representative to the UN, Felixberto Serrano, respected the spectrum of discussion, but concluded his remarks by supporting the U.S.’s cease-fire proposal which re-instated the \textit{status quo ante bellum}. Representatives from Colombia and Ecuador also favored the U.S.’s draft resolution. As debate continued late into the night, Ecuadorian representative, Jose Trujillo, commended President Eisenhower for “applying . . . the same [international] law to friends and enemies” alike. However, not all supporters of the resolution upheld this sense of moral duty. Jordanian and Syrian representatives contended that the resolution failed to condemn the British, French, and Israeli breach of the UN Charter’s principles. None the less, these representatives acknowledged the need to act promptly to prevent the entire Arab world from coming to Egypt’s aid and thus expanding the scope of the conflict.\textsuperscript{571} Practicality motivated Jordanian and Syrian support. Though imperfect, the resolution being debated would stave off the prospect of expansive war.

After a second recess, the assembly agreed to limit debate due to the unstable nature of the crisis and the immediate need for multilateral action. Reconvening at ten minutes to midnight, the General Assembly heard from Israel’s Abba Eban. Picking up where he left off in the Security Council, Eban persisted with rallying world opinion to Israel’s aid. “We [Israelis] know,” he confessed, “that Israel is most popular when it does not hit back, and world opinion is profoundly important to us,” but the lack of “peaceful coexistence” between Arabs and Israelis left the Jews no choice but to ensure “self-preservation.” Eban claimed a special relationship between Israel and international opinion. This “uniqueness” and “eccentricity” was slowly transforming the “consciousness of mankind.”

These exhaustive efforts to sway the multilateral mind were stale and uninspiring. Although Disraeli’s political legacy of portraying national interests as universal interests remained irresistible, it also proved to be highly ineffective during the most intense period of the Suez crisis.

As if to amplify the point, Eban criticized the U.S.-sponsored cease-fire proposal. “It will not do,” he argued, “to go back to an outdated and crumbling armistice regime designed by its authors to last for a few months and now lingering for eight years in growing paralysis of function.” Clearly, the U.S.’s sense of order based on the status quo ante bellum was unacceptable. The result afforded representatives from other UN

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573 Indeed, in defending British and French militarist impulses, Dr. Ronald Walker of Australia’s UN delegation used language similar to that which Eban had employed. Louis de Guiringand, France’s chief UN delegate, also argued along the same lines as Eban. The Frenchman categorized UN efforts as “powerless,” which in turn cultivated “free reign to inordinate ambitions.” To accentuate his point, Guiringand referred to Nasser’s manipulation of Arab nationalism “to serve Egyptian national interests exclusively.” (Naturally, British and French “ambitions” remained the exception.) Like America’s actions on the Korean peninsula years earlier, Guiringand continued, the Suez situation demanded immediate action on the part of individual member states. Again, note parallels between Guiringand’s reference to the Korean War and British representative Pierson Dixon’s earlier use of the same example. See ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-1, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.562, pp. 28-30.

member states an opportunity to exert their own broader influence in resolving the Suez crisis.

India and its delegation played a substantial role in this new faction. In noting the Security Council’s support for the emergency session, Indian representative Arthur Lall also counted forty-nine of the UN’s seventy-six members among the majority who supported a more multilateral decision-making process. This simple acknowledgement conveyed as sense of independence from the elite Security Council while promoting a sense of interdependence within the General Assembly. After conveying Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s concern that twentieth-century practices were reverting back to the “predatory practices” of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Lall questioned the validity of “vital interests” as a legitimate argument for unilateral intervention. “This violent approach to the safeguarding of vital interests,” Lall concluded, “is . . . plunging the world into chaos.” To illustrate his point, Lall referred to the fact that British and French intervention on behalf of keeping the Suez Canal open had actually succeeded in shutting-down the canal. With Israeli ground forces pushing deep into the Sinai desert and British and French warplanes attacking from the air following the twelve-hour deadline, Nasser ordered the scuttling of ships in the canal to prevent any other country from seizing the waterway in tact.

The Suez crisis pivoted on the wide differences existing between unilateral action and the rapid mobilization of multilateral initiatives. At the moment when the

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575 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-1, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.562, pp. 30-31. The Saudi Arabian representative, Jamil Baroody, shared the perspective Lall and others had expressed prior to the General Assembly’s adoption of America’s draft cease-fire resolution. The proposal was not ideal, but for Baroody, the inclusion of the Secretary General in the enforcement of the cease-fire offered enough evidence of impartiality. See ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-1, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.562, pp. 33-34.

576 To make matters worse, the Syrian government destroyed pipelines and pumping stations that moved Iraqi oil to Mediterranean ports for shipment to Europe. See Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, p. 376.
governments of a select few countries embroiled themselves in war, much of the remaining international community was constructing a practical alternative to conflict. Rather than weaken and delay progressive crisis management, debates occurring in the General Assembly helped institute a stronger foundation for re-instituting peace. Input came from various portions of the globe with fluctuating degrees of enthusiasm. In fact, considerable disagreement surrounded the draft cease-fire resolution and implementation of the peace process. At the very least, however, numerous UN representatives recognized the severity of the crisis and the policies responsible for it—specifically the determined attempts to fuse national interests and multilateral agendas into a unitary policy.

The crisis and the prospect of an expansive war may deserve some credit for this epiphany, but international civil servants such as Dag Hammarskjöld had forecast this role for the UN for some time. In his first address to the General Assembly as the Secretary General in 1953, Hammarskjöld called for the international organization to expand its role in global affairs. He was a proponent of having the UN act as independent arbiter. Hammarskjöld and the UN enjoyed early success in negotiating a dispute involving Communist Chinese and American interests regarding American pilots captured during the Korean War. As a result, the secretary general and his fellow international civil servants were well-prepared for and receptive to managing the Suez crisis. By November 1956, UN representatives were also broadening their sense of understanding.
After the pre-vote debate concluded and the General Assembly passed the cease-fire resolution by a more than 6 to 1 ratio, Canada’s Foreign Minister Lester Pearson took the rostrum. In the early hours of 2 November, Pearson explained his nation’s abstention during the vote moments earlier. To Canada’s disappointment, fellow delegations ignored the disconnection between resolutions ending the fighting and resolutions making the peace. Pearson’s main objection was the absence of a “provision . . . supervising or enforcing the cease-fire.” Repeating the concerns of previous speakers, Pearson agreed that simply returning to the status quo solved nothing. “Such a return,” Pearson argued, “would not be to a position of security, or even a tolerable position, but would be a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion.” To remedy this bleak forecast, Pearson suggested organizing “a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out.” Instead of an observer status like that of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the new UN force would represent “a truly international peace and police force.”

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577 Thordarson, Lester Pearson, p. 87.
578 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-1, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.562, pp. 35-36. See also Pearson, Mike, Vol. II, p. 247. According to historian Bruce Thordarson, Pearson had raised the idea of an “international police force” during a 1 November Cabinet meeting. The idea, Thordarson goes on to say, had existed for some time. See Thordarson, Lester Pearson, p. 87. According to Brian Urquhart, the idea dated back to November 1955 when General Burns suggested inserting UN troops along the Egyptian-Israeli border. See Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 176. See the footnote at the bottom of the page. Adlai Stevenson, the 1952 and 1956 Democratic nominee for President was another early advocate for stationing UN troops along the border. Speaking in Charlottesville, Virginia on 11 November 1955, Stevenson criticized the Eisenhower administration for demonstrating “little initiative within or outside the United Nation in devising measures to prevent . . . border clashes.” Stevenson speculated as to whether the UN should act more independently in this particular situation. Eisenhower rejected Stevenson’s idea. Surprisingly, during the 1956 Presidential campaign, Stevenson decided not to use the UNEF proposal as an occasion to advertise his
from the moral condemnation of force to the more mechanical matters of peacekeeping. His call for a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) marked a paradoxical twist in the diplomatic discourse.

In one sense, Pearson’s move served as a calculated response to his country’s predicament. Canada depended heavily upon strong ties between the United States, Britain, and France. Destruction of this trans-Atlantic alliance threatened to place Canada in a position of choosing between cold war and imperial allegiances. Additionally, Pearson and his colleagues shuddered at the prospect of having Canada’s “two mother [Britain and France] countries reprimanded for their aggression.” He saw UN intervention as imperative to relieving Canada’s allies.

While admitting his desires to rescue his allies’ image, Pearson also recognized and respected the ascendance of multilateral diplomacy. “This was 1956, not 1876,” Pearson recollects in his memoirs, “and [the British and French] course was doomed to failure and ultimate disaster” when pitted against the international community. Unobtrusively, the Canadian Foreign Minister rallied support for his UNEF proposal prior to announcing it at the plenary session. Pearson courted votes from UN representatives of non-aligned countries, especially India. One scholar contends that Pearson abstained during the vote pertaining to the U.S. cease-fire resolution so as not to

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580 Pearson, Mike, Vol. II, p. 244.

581 Thordarson, Lester Pearson, pp. 87 and 89.

jeopardize non-aligned support for his international police force resolution. Pearson was especially qualified for this role of rallying multilateral consensus. He understood the complexities of international negotiation. Entering Canada’s Department of External Affairs in 1928, Pearson went on to represent his country at “various international conferences in Geneva, including sessions of the League of Nations.” Similar to Hammarskjöld’s career path, Pearson’s exposure to these international settings provided him with the knowledge and foresight necessary for navigating sensitive diplomatic situations.

Scholarly consensus is by no means united with regard to assigning credit for these initiatives. In stark contrast to the pro-Pearson perspective, historians analyzing the Suez crisis from various other viewpoints praise the Eisenhower administration for its inspiration. Russell Braddon argues that Dulles led, personally, the General Assembly in demanding a cease-fire. Cole Kingseed contends that Eisenhower not only called for referring the Suez crisis to the UN Security Council, but also convinced Lester Pearson to introduce his pivotal UN police force resolution. Diane Kunz agrees, saying that Pearson represented U.S. views while serving as an “honest-broker.” Kunz argues that Pearson remained untainted by the British and French deception, yet, compared to Hammarskjöld, Pearson still commanded the respect of those European powers.

583 Thordarson, Lester Pearson, p. 87. This reasoning seems a bit odd considering that so many non-aligned countries voted in favor of the cease-fire resolution. Had Pearson joined the majority, he probably would have risked very little political capital in doing so. Still, Canada’s abstention added to its aura of impartiality.
What is truly fascinating about these interpretations is not only how Pearson’s role satisfied the immediate concerns of those interests involved in the Suez crisis, but also how his efforts are portrayed to satisfy historical analysis of the event. Assigning credit seems more important than analyzing the mechanics Pearson employed to achieve compromise. These analyses assume that because the American-sponsored cease-fire enjoyed such overwhelming support that those who supported it also supported the U.S.’s perspective of the crisis. Many key delegations did not. Conversely, Pearson made a whole-hearted effort to earn the endorsement of a broad segment of the General Assembly for his UN emergency force proposal. If the Eisenhower administration was genuinely concerned about establishing such a coalition, why could it not master-mind such imaginative initiatives during the two London Conferences?

Instead of possessing the embittering overtones of unilateral imperialism or the insufficient return to the *status quo ante bellum*, creation of a UN military police force satisfied the needs of a skeptical audience by appealing to a broad set of interests. Support for Pearson’s plan included UN member states that held diametrically opposing perspectives. Britain’s Pierson Dixon seemed relieved at the prospect of introducing an international force and thus diffusing Britain’s concerns. John Foster Dulles expressed both his and Eisenhower’s “complete agreement” with Pearson’s idea. Leonardo Vitetti, the Italian Ambassador to the UN, favored Canada’s appraisal of the situation and identification of the need for international intervention. Libya’s representative to the UN throughout the Suez crisis by exerting “[American] diplomatic and economic pressure on its allies.” See Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, pp. 64-65. Historian Herman Finer, on the other hand, blames Dulles for “stringing along” America’s allies and flinching in the face of Soviet aggression. Together, these actions, according to Finer, undermined the UN’s effectiveness. See Finer, *Dulles Over Suez*, pp. 322-323.

echoed Pearson’s concerns over how the UN, as an institution of world opinion, would implement the Charter’s principles. Likewise, U Win of Burma considered Pearson’s proposal the organization’s most important work and essential to repudiating “gunboat diplomacy” for all time.589

VI

Though initially skeptical of the idea, Hammarskjöld also endorsed Pearson’s proposal within hours of first hearing of it. Hammarskjöld worried that organizing and deploying the UNEF could not respond quickly enough to contain the crisis.590 Rarely one to let his vanity consume him, however, the Secretary General held “an imaginative, constructive, and forward-looking approach” that accommodated the commitment to multilateral crisis resolution.591 Hammarskjöld dispatched his executive assistant, Andrew Cordier, and Undersecretary Ralph Bunche to meet with Pearson and hash out the numerous details surrounding Canada’s proposal. Having played such an integral part in the General Armistice Agreement of 1948, Bunche’s return to Middle Eastern matters marked his first and overdue involvement in the Suez crisis.592 That evening as Pearson, Bunche, and Cordier conferred, Hammarskjöld met privately with Iran’s UN

590 See Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, pp. 265-267. See also Pearson, Mike, Vol. II, p. 251; and Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 176. Urquhart and Person contend that the secretary general faced a sobering reality check of his own. Hammarskjöld recognized his own limitations in crafting strategies for crisis management. His individual efforts had not succeeded. As a result, he delegated authority to his subordinates, Ralph Bunche and Andrew Cordier. Hammarskjöld also had to reconcile his utter disbelief regarding British duplicity and anger over Israel’s belligerence. See Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, p. 264; and Pearson, Mike, Vol. II, pp. 247-248, and 251.
591 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 176.
592 Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, p. 263.
representative, Djalal Abdoh. Speaking on behalf of the entire Afro-Asian bloc, Abdoh requested that Hammarskjöld “intervene personally to negotiate a cease-fire.” Rather than handle matters himself as he was prone to do earlier that spring and summer, Hammarskjöld yielded to the collective spirit that proved instrumental to resolving the crisis.

Other attempts at accommodating multilateral interests were unsuccessful. Minutes taken during a 3 November White House conference involving President Eisenhower, Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., and other senior officials reveals just how feeble and out-of-touch administration officials were when it came to representing a broader set of viewpoints. For example, when Undersecretary for Near Eastern Affairs William Roundtree reported that Washington’s message to Nasser met with a favorable reply, Roundtree described how these telegrams had helped clarify America’s foreign policy agenda. “For the first time,” the meeting minutes declare, “[Nasser] realized that the U.S. was not simply playing the British game in the [Middle East].” Identifying this early November communiqué, as the “first time” that Nasser understood America’s motives in this crisis conveys the persistent narrow-mindedness not only of Nasser but also of U.S. officials. So eager were the Egyptian and American governments to pursue their own interests, they paid little attention to the perceptions those policies conveyed. Once again, insensitivity to how others perceived of certain policies contributed to the intensification of the crisis.

In another example, Hoover and Rountree met with the Ambassadors of Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia later in the day on 3 November. Lebanon’s

593 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, pp. 176-177.
Ambassador Dr. Victor Khouri began by expressing the Arabs’ heartfelt wishes for Dulles’s recovery from surgery and Arab thanks for America’s encouraging role taken regarding Suez. Speaking for the administration, Roundtree called for re-establishing the status quo before any new proposals could be suggested. Having achieved this through the UN cease-fire resolution (which the belligerents had yet to accept), Roundtree unveiled two new draft resolutions that Lodge was scheduled to introduce to the UN General Assembly that evening. This scenario, linking postwar changes to an initial return to the status quo, was the fundamental flaw of the U.S. government’s approach to crisis management. In the case of the Suez crisis, successful crisis resolution required changes to the status quo in order to facilitate peace. These two actions needed to be addressed simultaneously. American officials failed to consider this prerequisite. The Arab ambassadors sensed this when they asked how the U.S. government would respond if the cease-fire failed. The administration, Hoover and Roundtree replied, would formulate strategies in response to events as they unfolded. The Arab ambassadors expressed their fervent desire for an infusion of American leadership. Unfortunately, U.S. officials had done so by plotting policies that were unresponsive to the situation at hand. In many respects, the policies put forth represented U.S. interests more than those of the international community.

595 According to the minutes of the meeting, Dulles suffered from “acute appendicitis.” Later, news leaked that the Secretary of State was suffering form ileitis. See Memo of Conversation, “Visit of Group of Arab Ambassadors to Under Secretary,” 3 November 1956, FRUS: Suez Crisis, Vol. XVI, p. 949.
596 The first draft resolution focused on easing Arab-Israeli tensions; the second addressed the Suez crisis. 597 Memo of Conversation, “Visit of Group of Arab Ambassadors to Under Secretary,” 3 November 1956, FRUS: Suez Crisis, Vol. XVI, pp. 949-951.
At first, as the First Emergency Special Session reconvened on 3 November at 8 p.m., the prospect for American leadership seemed promising. Omar Loutfi, Egyptian Ambassador to the UN, announced that the Egyptian government would observe the U.S.-sponsored cease-fire resolution. During his opening remarks, however, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., reminded the assembly that despite overwhelming international support for the cease-fire, hostilities continued. Lodge proceeded to unveil the Eisenhower administration’s plan for creating long-term stability in the Middle East. To start, the U.S. Ambassador criticized the UN organization for failing to neutralize threats to regional peace. “While the temptation is strong to place the whole blame on the States directly concerned, the fact is, as Secretary Dulles reminded us, that the United Nations must also share responsibility for what has happened.”

To rectify the situation, Lodge proposed two draft resolutions designed to restructure the postwar order. The first draft resolution called for replacing the inadequate Palestine Conciliation Commission with another committee consisting of five member states answering to the conflicting parties and the UN General Assembly. The second proposed resolution called for creating a three-nation panel responsible for clearing and securing the Suez Canal as an “international waterway” and negotiating a peace between the belligerents. The Convention of 1888 and the six principles adopted by the Security Council were to serve as the foundation for negotiation. Even amidst...

598 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 3 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.563, pp. 45-47.
war, American officials pressed for international control of the canal as established
during the unsuccessful London Conferences. Like so many other senior bureaucrats in
the Eisenhower administration, Lodge persisted in linking peace to earlier efforts that had
already proved fruitless. As historian Michael Guhin put it, “The American post-attack
public policy followed from its pre-attack stances.” In this regard, U.S. policy differed
little from those of its British and French allies. All attempted to use the war as
justification for their own prefabricated policies. As a result, little consensus lay in
endorsing these draft resolutions.

The best and most ironic example of the opposition facing Lodge’s resolutions
occurred when Iraq’s UN delegate Muhammad Jawad expressed his government’s
criticism. Where the Iraqi ambassador to the United States had supported American
leadership, Jawad lampooned the Superpower’s plans. Jawad argued that Lodge’s first
proposal did more harm than good to Palestinian interests because “instead of
recognizing [their] rights, [the proposal] suggests, and then only en passant, that they
should be treated in a humane way.” Had Lodge and other members of the U.S.’s UN
delegation been more sensitive to the genuine interests of others rather than incorporating
them into America’s own interests, such disillusionment might have been avoided.
Jawad considered Lodge’s proposals as tantamount to “appeasement” in the face of
British, French, and Israeli aggression. At one point, the Iraqi delegate despaired

When one cannot make an aggressor abide by the rule of law, then one
accepts his interpretation of the law and his method of implementation. What

more can an aggressor ask than to commit aggression and persist in carrying it out despite the decisions of a world assembly?

Failure to hold the aggressors accountable would compromise the UN’s principle purpose, Jawad concluded.\(^{601}\) He was not alone. Distancing himself from his American loyalties, Felixberto Serraro of the Philippine delegation expressed similar reservations as did the Soviet and Saudi Arabian delegates.\(^{602}\) Lodge’s admonishment of the international community not only alienated the audience that had requested American leadership, but his actions also sacrificed an opportunity for engaging in multilateral diplomacy so that the U.S. government could advance its own interests.

Fortunately, other UN ambassadors proposed more objective alternatives for reestablishing peace. Later, during the 3 November plenary session, India’s Arthur Lall introduced a more popular draft resolution. Instead of addressing long-term issues facing the Middle East, Lall’s proposal, representing “the opinion of the delegations of almost all the Asian and African countries,” addressed the immediate concerns stemming from the Suez crisis. Because the British, French, and Israelis continued flouting the UN cease-fire, India and a bloc of nineteen other nations called for the Secretary General to take direct control of the situation to oversee enforcement of the cease-fire process and provide a status report within twelve hours.\(^{603}\) Such broad support provided a more legitimate strategy for quelling the conflict rather than use the opportunity to advance already unpopular agendas. Considerable support lay in endowing Hammarskjöld with the authority necessary for dealing with the crisis. All that remained was to create instruments through which to carry out his responsibilities.

\(^{601}\) ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 3 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.563, p. 49.
\(^{602}\) ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 3 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.563, pp. 51, 63, 76.
\(^{603}\) ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 3 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.563, p. 54.
Again, as with Hammarskjöld and Pearson, experience in multilateral diplomacy helped Lall not only comprehend the need or compromise, but also marshal the support necessary for mediating the Suez crisis. Lall was a central figure in the international activism exhibited during this time in Indian diplomacy. Lall’s intelligence won the confidence of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who chose him to represent India in international affairs. Since India’s independence in 1947, Lall had served as Consul General for India in New York, the first Trade Commissioner in London, the country’s ambassador to Austria as well as the ambassador to the UN. These experiences meant that Lall adopted a more moderate outlook when compared to India’s other delegates to the UN. Born in 1911, Lall was considerably younger than either Pearson or Hammarskjöld, but his commitment to multilateral diplomacy shared a similar professional trajectory.

Canada’s Lester Pearson followed Lall’s speech with his own announcement for creating the UNEF. Pearson’s private discussions the previous day had enlisted the Secretary General’s support and that of his staff. Careful not to upstage Lall’s idea, Pearson introduced his peace-keeping force as a “supplementary responsibility” for the Secretary General. Unlike the American proposals that favored creating international boards staffed by the member states, decision-making under the Canadian and Indian model rested outside the direct hands of member states. Greater multilateral diplomacy endowed Hammarskjöld with the authority and trust to act appropriately in the interest of

international peace and security. As the scholar Mark Zacher put it, Hammarskjöld had
groomed himself and the organization for an occasion such as this one “by providing the
Member States with a resourceful instrument for direct action in the Secretary General
and his staff.”

What some members of the international community realized was that peace and
security could be more easily achieved independent of nationally-interested doctrine. As
Reiz Malile, Albania’s UN delegate, put it, “In our time, those who try to tamper with the
destinies of other peoples merit universal censure. Times have changed. It is madness to
think that a people can be crushed by force.” Skeptics may argue that the Suez crisis
simply reflected a brief period in history where multilateral and national interests
converged. However, given the U.S.’s efforts and those of other major world powers to
influence the course of debate, early November 1956 marked the brief ascendance of
multilateralism over that of more unilateral national interests. The most representative
body of world opinion had outflanked those individual nations intent on imposing their
own sense of order. According to Brian Urquhart, “creation of a UN force thus became
the key to the resolution of the [Suez] crisis.” With the UNEF now sanctioned by the
General Assembly, Hammarskjöld charged Bunche with issuing yet another cease fire,
which was promptly sent to British, French, and Israeli officials at seven a.m. on 4
November.

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605 Zacher, *Dag Hammarskjöld’s United Nations*, p. 3.
606 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 3 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.563, p. 73.
607 Urquhart, *Ralph Bunche*, p. 266.
Seven o’clock in the morning in New York City was one o’clock in the afternoon in London. Eden’s Egypt Committee met for the second of two meetings that day at 3:30 p.m. The only consensus able to be reached was to have the full Cabinet debate the issue of going ahead with an invasion in light of the UN’s call for a cease-fire and insertion of the UNEF. Eden argued, unpersuasively, that the lack of a UNEF actually legitimized Britain’s reasons for invading. At 6:30 p.m., the full Cabinet debated their course of action, serenaded by the muffled catcalls from protesters congregating outside.  

Eden laid out three options: proceed with invasion plans as a vanguard for the later UNEF, suspend military operations for twenty-four hours, or hold off invasion indefinitely. After a lengthy debate, Eden polled his advisers. As historians Anthony Gorst and Lewis Johnman describe it, “for the first time [in the crisis] a [Cabinet vote] revealed that some six Cabinet ministers had serious reservations about continuing with the military action.” Six of the eighteen ministers were for postponing or abandoning invasion plans—including both the Navy and Air Force ministers. In spite of these objections, the majority of the British Cabinet sided with Eden. Within twelve hours Britain and French airborne forces landed near Port Said, the northern mouth of the Suez Canal.

Meanwhile, domestic support evaporated. Britain’s opposition party leader Hugh Gaitskell lampooned Eden’s justification for invasion as a spearhead to precede the arrival of United Nations troops. “Nothing,” Gaitskell noted, “was said about this in the

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608 An estimated 20,000 people chanted “Eden must go!” and other slogans as the movement’s leaders denounced Eden as a “knave and a fool.” See Drew Middleton, “Throng in London Denounces Eden,” NYT, 5 Nov. 1956, pp. 1 and 2.
609 Rhodes James, Anthony Eden, pp. 565-566.
610 Gorst and Johnman, The Suez Crisis, p. 118. See also Rhodes James, Anthony Eden, p. 566.
[British and French] ultimatum to Egypt.” Furthermore, no mention of it made its way into Dixon’s speeches either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. Editors at the British daily, The Observer, apologized to readers for thinking that the British government would respect its “international obligations.” 611 Even the Archbishop of Canterbury considered the invasion unjustified and antithetical both to United Nations principles and the majority of world public opinion. 612 Legal arguments supporting intervention also wavered.

Despite official pronouncements favoring Eden’s policies, defections plagued the prime minister’s office of legal council. According to a 29 October memorandum titled “The Right of Intervention,” Britain’s Lord Chancellor Viscount Kilmuir believed that intervention was legitimate if the Suez situation threatened British shipping, British nationals living in Egypt, or international commerce. As debate preceding the invasion intensified, other legal specialists argued against intervention and its authorization under international law. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office, argued that intervention would create a situation that endangered British nationals in Egypt, when one had not existed previously. Britain’s Attorney-General, Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller suggested shifting debate from international law to acting promptly “in the interests of the nations of the world and in conformity with the intentions underlying the [UN] Charter.” 613

Such a strategy raised two major concerns, which eroded political support for Eden’s government. First, Fitzmaurice and his like-minded colleagues questioned the

611 Gorst and Johnman, The Suez Crisis, pp. 120-121.
612 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 3 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.563, p. 46.
constitutionality of the proceedings that formulated these policies. Increasingly, Eden depended on counselors that devised justification for military intervention. Restricting input combined with “the practice of bypassing the regular channels of legal advice,” Fitzmaurice warned, “always leads to trouble.” Second, to justify invasion, the legal minds Eden trusted sought to manipulate UN principles by having them serve British national interests. These tactics not only served as another example of the pervasive tendency to confuse national interests with a multilateral agenda, but the tactics also sabotaged the British government’s domestic and international credibility. Eden’s opponents wasted no time in maximizing the loss in confidence. During a 4 November television and radio broadcast, Gaitskell criticized Britain’s use of its UN Security Council veto saying that “[Britain] should have been acting on behalf of the United Nations and . . . should have had world opinion behind us.” At the same time, Gaitskell echoed earlier calls for the prime minister’s resignation.

IX

Across the Atlantic, Democrats and Republicans in the United States prepared for the Presidential election of 1956. President Eisenhower faced off against his own political rival: Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic Party nominee. Behind in the polls, Stevenson went on the political offensive attacking Eisenhower’s policies including the president’s stand on the Suez crisis. During an 18 October speech in Youngstown, Ohio,

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615 Gorst and Johnman, The Suez Crisis, pp. 119-120; and “Gaitskell’s Address,” NYT, 5 Nov. 1956, p. 2. By 5 November, British Ambassador to the UN, Pierson Dixon, no longer supported the justifications for British military intervention in the Canal Zone. See Gorst and Johnman, The Suez Crisis, p. 122.
Stevenson described Eisenhower’s “diplomatic strokes” in the Suez as “erratic, naïve, and clumsy . . . through which Russia gained welcome to the Near and Middle East.” Appraising the situation further, Stevenson alleged, “the administration [lacks] any real capacity to adjust its policies to new conditions.” Yet, Stevenson offered few substantial changes to America’s foreign policy. Although he made a valid point concerning Eisenhower’s unresponsive foreign policy, Stevenson limited his argument to the Cold War context Eisenhower had maintained throughout the crisis.

The president felt little need to change his stance. Overall, the administration basked in the glow of economic growth and relative peace and security. In an 11 September telephone conversation between Dulles and Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, Stevenson’s foreign policy speeches were discussed. Nixon called the Democratic nominee’s proposals “irresponsible.” The like-minded Dulles thought the country could not “afford [a] trial-and-error president at this time.” As Election Day neared, Eisenhower hoped to coast to the finish smoothly. In historian Cole Kingseed’s words, “the president sought to have his administration present a calm and united front to the American public.” Realistically, Eisenhower had little to worry about. The Democrats’ virulent attacks on the president’s policies represented a losing campaign in the midst of death-throes rather than an actual threat to its opponents. In the words of a Stevenson biographer, Eisenhower’s credentials in foreign policy made any political attacks

617 Stevenson’s concerns involved reforming the country’s military establishment, addressing the needs of the developing world, and reviving NATO’s sense of mission. See Bert Cochran, Adlai Stevenson: Patrician among the Politicians (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1967), pp. 279-280.
618 Dulles phone call to Nixon, Tuesday, 11 September 1956, 8:28 a.m., Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone Conversation Series, Box 5, Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.
Stevenson launched seem feeble and petulant. As Kingseed himself mentions, by the end of October 1956, “Eisenhower decided to cancel the remainder of his campaign appearances to prevent [international] events from getting out of hand.” Even with the Suez war raging in early November, its effects were not felt at the polls. The November 7th front-page headlines called Eisenhower’s re-election “a landslide.” Winning almost ten million more popular votes than Stevenson out of almost sixty-two million votes cast and an Electoral College count of 457 to 73, there was little that could have kept Eisenhower from a second term.

For British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Election Day in the United States combined with the rapid formation of the UNEF had upended European efforts to take the canal by force. Eden had hoped to deploy forces so as to catch the United States and the United Nations off-guard, making the invasion a fait accompli. Amidst mounting pressure from his own constituents and the international community alike, Eden agreed to a cease-fire effective midnight 6 November. Within roughly thirty-six hours after putting troops into Egypt, the British and French operation had become a political quagmire. British and French forces had not secured the entire Canal Zone. Eden could not afford to press the attack and continue to suffer from the repercussions of international reprimands. Dwindling oil reserves, a plummeting British pound, and loss of face in the world community could not be surmounted, despite Secretary of State Dulles’s second-

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619 Cochran, Adlai Stevenson, p. 274. In Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.’s political memoir, he recalls how popular Eisenhower was with key members of the international community. During a reception in the summer of 1956, Indian Ambassador to the UN, Arthur Lall, reported to Lodge that most of “the foreign ministers from the great powers” wanted Eisenhower to remain in office. See Henry Cabot Lodge, As it Was: An Inside View of Politics and Power in the 1950s and 1960s (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1976), p. 89.

620 Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956, pp. 97-98. See also Guhin, John Foster Dulles, pp. 376-377.

guessing Eden’s decision to halt operations. According to historian Michael Guhin, Dulles contended that had the British and French fulfilled their objectives, the United States government could have taken a more conciliatory stance by recognizing their de facto control of the canal.622  French Prime Minister Guy Mollet also urged Eden to delay his cease-fire announcement a few days until Anglo-French forces had secured the canal.623

As it turned out, Eden’s announcement coincided with news that the Soviets were planning to intervene directly in the Suez crisis. Senior Soviet official Nikolai Bulganin’s 5 November letter to British and French officials denounced the “predatory war” being waged against Egypt. Hoping to advance Soviet interests by representing the sentiments of the international community, Bulganin alluded to nuclear brinkmanship if British and French military operations refused to desist. To bring peace to the Middle East, Bulganin reiterated earlier proposals calling for depositing “volunteers” in the region to help facilitate the peace process. Contrary to the UNEF, the use of “volunteer” forces would include Soviet and American personnel. The parallels between the Soviets’ suggestion and the British and French argument for direct intervention in Egypt demonstrate the continued insensitivity shown toward genuine multilateral diplomacy that minimized the role national interests played. Although Soviet threats had little if any effect on British decision-making, certain parts of the world equated Eden’s cease-fire with his receipt of Bulganin’s note.624

622 Guhin, John Foster Dulles, p. 293.
624 See Gorst and Johnman, The Suez Crisis, pp. 122-123; and Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, pp. 88-89. Reinforcing the conclusion that Soviet leaders wished to speak for the peaceful interests of the world, historian William Taubman notes that “when the Americans rejected [the Soviet
With pressure to end hostilities coming from the international community in the form of monetary chaos, from domestic dissent in British public opinion, and from Cold War adversaries, the influential role played by the United Nations was overshadowed. Yet, for all the proposals and rhetoric offered by government officials preoccupied with securing peace on their terms, the United Nations was the only institution with adequate credibility to act. Danish Ambassador to the United Nations Karl Eskelund remarked that salvation “from the edge of catastrophe” came “not by threats or bluster but by the action of the United Nations.” Eskelund continued, “We [UN members] are breaking new ground, but I feel sure that we can reap a rich harvest from that ground in terms of peace and security.” The UN representatives from Ecuador, India, Iraq, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and even America’s own Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. shared in their colleague’s confidence.

Eskelund’s analysis distinguishes between individual nations’ efforts to create stability and the United Nations’ own initiatives. Of these two perspectives, the forum of world opinion proved more adept at resolving crisis and conflict. The organization capitalized on its somewhat oxymoronic status. On the one hand, most of its influential members had challenged the institution’s central premise by instigating instability. Yet doing so allowed the United Nations to endorse alternatives to which even the most reluctant of nations yielded. Although countries, such as Britain, France, Israel, Egypt, and the United States, never abandoned their attempts to manipulate multilateral

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diplomacy to suit their own interests, they could not escape from acknowledging the UN’s pivotal role in abating the Suez crisis.

By the first week of November 1956, President Eisenhower was pressuring Ben-Gurion to abide by the UN’s resolution calling for a cease-fire and deployment of an international peacekeeping force. The president threatened to end all U.S. public and private aid to Israel and abstain from procedures in the United Nations aimed at expelling the Israeli delegation from the international organization. According to historian Richard Miller, Eisenhower’s “effort was part of [the administration’s] plan to regain the initiative it had achieved with its initial stand and the first resolution.” Israeli historian Avi Shlaim describes Ben-Gurion’s reaction as “bitterly disappointed. [Ben-Gurion] had grossly misread the international situation and now had to pay the price.” Momentum would revert back to nationally-interested parties soon enough, but not before multilateral diplomacy left its historic mark upon the international community.

X

Capitalizing upon its momentum, the UN General Assembly convened the next day, 7 November, to approve the UNEF’s structure and mission. The collective body formed an Advisory Committee to handle UNEF’s operational parameters. In addition to the Secretary General, the committee included representatives from seven nations: Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway, and Pakistan. While some committee

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627 Miller, *Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy*, p. 89.
participants may have had their own interests in quelling the violence, such as the
Canadian government’s desire to repair strained relations between the U.S. and Great
Britain, all of the UN committee participants understood these motives to be secondary to
the immediate concern for resilient stability and peace. Committee members and UN
officials moved ahead as quickly as possible. Hammarskjöld and his subordinates
wanted to assemble and deploy UNEF troops in order to keep hostilities from flaring up
again between Egyptians, Israelis, and Europeans while simultaneously preventing any
opportunity for the Soviet Union to send their own military contingent to the region.629

Given the intensity of ill-will existing between the combatants and the degree to
which various governments had contributed to amplifying the Suez crisis, officials at the
United Nations faced considerable challenges in making the UNEF a reality. Shortly
after the General Assembly authorized creation of the UNEF, Hammarskjöld contacted
General Burns asking his advice as to the size and composition of the proposed UN
Emergency Force. Ideally, Burns favored a division-sized force complete with
reconnaissance units, a tank brigade, and fighter-aircraft units. Such a deployment would
be capable of withstanding aggression or challenges to UNEF authority and legitimacy.
Burns requested unit contributions no smaller than a battalion from those member states
interested in offering personnel. Burns also requested that the soldiers be expected to
serve for at least one year.630 In typical fashion, however, Burns quickly adjusted his
requirements to the realities established by a demanding pace of events. By mid-
November, the first UN troops would be arriving in Egypt.

630 Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, pp. 187-188.
Hammarskjöld entrusted UN Undersecretary Ralph Bunche with vetting member states willing to offer UNEF military unit contributions. According to Brian Urquhart, Bunche became quite popular as UN ambassadors lobbied for inclusion in the emergency peacekeeping force. From early- to mid-November Romania, New Zealand, the United States, Burma, Iran, and the Philippines volunteered but were rejected. Criteria for UNEF participation eliminated many prospects which posed challenges for assembling the UNEF in a timely manner.

For example, nations with ample reserves to devote to the UNEF were ineligible mainly due to politics. As belligerents in the Suez War, French and British forces would make a mockery of any peacekeeping force they included them. China’s UN delegation remained ambivalent to the crisis. Although communist China had opened official relations with Egypt in the spring of 1956 when Nasser recognized the communist regime as China’s legitimate government, China’s representation in the United Nations remained under Nationalist control. In a show of support for Egypt, China’s communist government had recruited 280,000 Chinese “‘volunteers’” to help Egypt repel its invaders. According to historian Richard Miller, Nasser gave serious consideration to the Chinese as well as the Soviet offers of assistance. Superpower involvement, however, risked further escalation of tensions as well as the fueling of Cold War anxieties. As General Burns notes, mutual suspicion also disqualified Eastern European countries and

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631 Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, p. 267.
632 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 7-15 November 1956, Doc. A/3302/Add. 7-10, 14, and 22/Rev. 1/7-15 Nov. 1956. The United States did provide logistical support for the UNEF. Interestingly, historian Stephen Ambrose credits President Eisenhower with preventing U.S. forces from participating in the UNEF. During a 6 November phone conversation with Eden, “Eisenhower said he wanted none of the great nations in the [UNEF].” The next day, however, American officials submitted a request to contribute military personnel to the UNEF. Though appreciative, Ralph Bunche and the UNEF advisory committee rejected the offer. See Ambrose, Eisenhower: Vol. II, The President, p. 369.
633 See Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, p. 99.
the “‘Mediterranean powers’” who happened to be NATO allies. Burns argues that these satellite states of Superpower spheres of influence would have been susceptible to puppeteering. However, with Hungary’s revolt, Soviet officials may have been more worried about extending any higher profile to rambunctious elements within their spheres of influence.

Once these hurdles were cleared, Hammarskjöld and the UNEF faced the challenge of deploying the force while simultaneously addressing the skepticism of those most directly affected by it. As Urquhart put it, “the stationing of a UN force on the sovereign territory of a member state had never occurred before and would have aroused the sensibilities of any sovereign government”—particularly the Egyptians who endured colonial rule and invasion. To remove any misperceptions, General Burns flew into Cairo on 8 November to inform Egypt’s senior officials directly. Two issues blocked the immediate deployment of UN troops. First, Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Egypt’s Foreign Minister, expressed concern over Canada’s inclusion in the UNEF. Fawzi and other Egyptian officials questioned Canada’s motives and impartial integrity because of its ties to the British Commonwealth. Second, the Egyptian government voiced concern over UNEF’s simply replacing Western troops with an international force to operate the Suez Canal.

To ease these anxieties, both Hammarskjöld and Burns relied upon UNEF’s mandate as authorized by the UN General Assembly. No single country determined the force’s course of action or its operational guidelines. Additionally, the United Nations

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634 Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, pp. 189-190. Superpowers and their satellites would not even enjoy indirect influence over UNEF. In deliberations pertaining to the Advisory Committee’s composition, the General Assembly defeated Poland’s nomination of fellow Soviet satellite Czechoslovakia. See ORGA, Doc. A/PV. 567, 7 Nov. 1956, pp. 108 and 125.
635 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, pp. 184-185.
had no jurisdiction over canal operations. Although peacekeepers would occupy the

canal-zone initially, the force’s objective was to separate the belligerents, not to seize
territory. In one unpublished communiqué, Hammarskjöld warned Nasser that “any
wavering from Egypt’s side now would undoubtedly isolate Egypt in world opinion
which so far had been its best protection.” At this point, the UN Secretary General was
more concerned about organizing the UNEF and having it establish a buffer between the
warring parties.

In spite of these early challenges, progress was made. By 12 November, Nasser
agreed to Colombian, Swedish, Finnish, Indonesian, and Yugoslav participation in the
UNEF. Burns held his second face-to-face meeting with Nasser, who had designated
Brigadier General Amin Hilmy as his chief liaison officer to the UNEF. Preparations for
quartering UNEF troops and all the accompanying needs went rather smoothly. In
Burns’s own words, “of course, from time to time there were arguments and difficulties,
but one felt in dealing with [Hilmy] there was always goodwill, and a sincere intention to
treat UNEF as one would treat an ally in wartime, at the least.”

The good relations established early on proved infectious. Hammarskjöld arrived
in Egypt on 16 November, the day after the first contingent of UNEF troops had arrived.
During a series of meetings lasting three days, Hammarskjöld and Nasser settled upon the

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636 As quoted in Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 185.
637 Canadian, Norwegian, and Danish participation was also expected. Preparations for the deployment of
these forces were made in Ralph Bunche’s office and depended heavily on the United States Air Force and
other logistical services. As Richard Miller notes, “the air lift was a two and one-quarter million dollar
initial contribution by the United States to the Emergency Force.” See Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and
Crisis Diplomacy, pp. 100-101.
638 Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, pp. 203-205. Not everyone was so enamored with General Burns.
Mohamad Heikal recalls how Nasser “complained” about the general’s inflated sense of self-importance.
See Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, p. 205. Nasser’s assessment of the UNEF commander soured mainly
as a result of the differing opinions regarding the redeployment of Egyptian military forces as Israeli forces
withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in 1957.
“good faith” agreements. The Secretary General vowed to respect Egyptian sovereignty while the UNEF retained its autonomy with regard to enforcing the cease-fire. Additionally, Nasser and Hammarskjöld agreed that the Egyptian government reserved the right to request UNEF’s removal but to base that request on “the completion of the force’s task.”

This kind of agreement epitomized multilateral diplomacy. Hammarskjöld was receptive to Nasser’s heightened sense for national sovereignty and accommodated Nasser’s concerns. For example, the Egyptian government would work with the UN to determine UNEF assembly areas and deployment both during and after all invading forces had withdrawn. Also, the role UNEF personnel played in the Suez Canal Zone was temporary and solely dependent on the presence of Anglo-French forces. Hammarskjöld would have to consult Egyptian officials if the national composition of UNEF changed or expanded. In return, Nasser not only respected Hammarskjöld’s representation of multilateral interests, but Nasser also catered to those interests by promising not to evict UNEF personnel without referring the matter to the UN General Assembly. Each party respected the interests of the other on a fundamental level.

XI

As the situation in Suez moved from acrimonious to accommodating, the situation in Hungary became more volatile. The cease-fire and withdrawal of Soviet forces from

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640 Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, pp. 191-192. The last point, allowing the General Assembly to have some say in the removal of UNEF from Egypt, answered pressing questions concerning UNEF’s role in the region. Was it to function as a buffer between the Suez War adversaries, or was the force to have a broader mandate in helping faciliate another Arab-Israeli agreement?
Hungary, that began being implemented by 29-30 October, broke down over the course of a few hours. The short-lived cease-fire allowed Soviet forces to reorganize and re-deploy within Hungary. By 2 November, Soviet military strength inside Hungary, measuring between 75,000 and 200,000 soldiers and 1,600 to 4,000 tanks, began a bloody and methodical march back towards Budapest.\footnote{Miller, \textit{Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy}, p. 135.}

With the resumption of hostilities, a second round of diplomatic activity at the United Nations ensued. Beginning on 1 November, Imre Nagy, Hungary’s Prime Minister, cabled Hammarskjöld proclaiming Hungary’s neutrality and negation of its Warsaw Pact alliance with the Soviet Union. Nagy requested that the United Nations and “the four great Powers” help defend Hungary’s neutral position.\footnote{ORGA, “Cablegram dated 1 November 1956 from Mr. Imre Nagy, President of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People’s Republic, Addressed to the Secretary–General,” Doc. A/3251, Second Emergency Special Session (ES-II), p. 1.} Meanwhile the Soviet Union’s Ambassador to the UN, Arkady Sobolev, continued to insist that Soviet force was necessary for isolating subversive activities in Hungary sponsored by the Western powers. On 3 November, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. took new action in the United Nations Security Council. Lodge presented a draft resolution calling for the Soviet’s immediate end to “intervention” in Hungary, the Soviets’ ending “the introduction of additional forces into Hungary,” international recognition of Hungarian sovereignty, and UN help in the distribution of humanitarian aid.\footnote{“Text of U.S. Resolution and Excerpts From Assembly Debate on the Hungarian Issue,” \textit{NYT}, 4 November 1956, p. 16.} Not surprisingly, the Soviet delegation vetoed Lodge’s proposal. Paralleling the script followed during the UN debates relating to the Suez crisis, a later Security Council vote succeeded in moving debate of the Hungarian crisis to the General Assembly.
Unlike Suez, events in Hungary moved at such a pace that no proportionate multilateral or unilateral response could be mounted. “Caught by surprise and embroiled in the crisis over Egypt,” writes historian John Thompson, “the Western powers reacted slowly to the thwarted Hungarian uprising. They judged direct support to the revolutionaries too risky and instead settled for aiding Hungarian refugees.” Keeping Hungary within the Soviet sphere of influence was imperative to the communists’ security interests. Once the leadership in Moscow reversed course and intervened with impunity, the fate of Nagy’s government was nearly sealed. Any Western efforts to exploit Hungary’s defection from behind the Iron Curtain would have risked a wider confrontation directly involving the two superpowers. The Suez crisis did not pose such an immediate threat to either superpower, thus allowing the UN to exert a greater degree of influence.

Time also factored into determining the viability of UN intervention in the two crises. Where the Suez crisis dragged on for months, the Hungarian crisis was suppressed in a few weeks. Seventy-two hours after appealing to the world organization, Nagy’s government struggled to survive. The same day that Ambassador Lodge presented his draft resolution, Janos Kadar, one of Nagy’s own Cabinet officials, split-off to form his own rival government—one friendlier to Soviet influence. Early in the Sunday morning hours of 4 November, Soviet troops and tanks entered Budapest intent on extinguishing Nagy’s government. By two-o’clock that afternoon, the last Hungarian radio transmissions, pleading for help against Soviet aggression, died out. Soviet control re-imposed itself within Hungary over the next several days.

644 Thompson, A Vision Unfulfilled, p. 388.
Only after these events transpired did the General Assembly convene. Lodge continued pressing for UN action on behalf of Nagy’s government. He recalled how the Soviet Union itself had initially supported Nagy and acquiesced to his new “‘liberal socialist government.’” Lodge pointed out the peculiar creation of a rival government at the exact moment that the Soviets began their invasion. Lodge concluded that Nagy remained the legitimate leader of Hungary and that, therefore, the United Nations should act upon his calls for assistance.

UN delegates from America’s NATO allies supported Lodge’s conclusions. Sir Pierson Dixon of Great Britain called for an “immediate cease-fire” as a “first step” in assisting Hungary. Canada’s Lester Pearson, the architect of the UNEF, proposed that a similar UN force be deployed to Hungary. These proposals came too late to be of any help to Nagy. Sobolev responded by saying that the Nagy government actually represented counter-revolutionary elements responsible for repressing the peoples’ will. Elaborating upon his point, Sobolev said, “The government of Nagy fell apart, and the Revolutionary Peasants and Workers Government has been set up. [This new government] includes some members of the Nagy Cabinet who remain true to the Hungarian people.”

Compared to the French and British attempt in the UN to present their actions in Suez as a fait accompli, the Soviets had succeeded in presenting the Hungarian situation in precisely such a context.

Sobolev also attempted to seize the diplomatic initiative only to be outflanked by the General Assembly’s recommendations. Further discussion of the Hungarian

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situation, Sobolev argued, favored “Fascist elements” opposing the interests of the Hungarian people. Because Britain, France, and the United States sponsored the continuation of debate, the Soviet Ambassador declared that the whole matter was a ploy to distract the United Nations from the abuses occurring in Egypt.  

By the end of the second emergency session, the General Assembly agreed upon a resolution insisting that the Soviet Union end its intervention in Hungary, empowering the secretary general to investigate matters surrounding the Hungarian issue, and requesting that the Hungarian government permit UN observers into Hungary.

Opportunities to capitalize on these terms disappeared when British and French forces invaded Egypt on 5 November. World public opinion fixated on Egypt throughout the most crucial period of the Hungarian crisis. In the eyes of many specialists, the escalating Suez War was a greater threat to world peace. As historian Richard Miller put it, “Hungary was strictly a big-power struggle and [Hammarskjöld’s] influence could not have materially changed it.” The confusion and rapidly changing circumstances, such as Nagy’s initial triumph followed by his government’s precipitous demise, made UN participation difficult to define. After nationalization of the Suez Canal, the Suez crisis remained in a fluctuating state where governments sought to shape world opinion. Nagy and the Hungarian crisis enjoyed no such honeymoon. During the General Assembly debates on the Hungarian crisis, UN delegates from Asian and African countries remained silent. Several nations, including Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Saudi

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648 Miller, *Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy*, p. 139.
Arabia, and Yugoslavia abstained from voting on the 4 November resolution. Had they objected to the Soviet’s repressive measures more vehemently there is little basis that it would have altered the outcome. Soviet military dominance was so swift and complete that more organized protest could have continued to have been ignored.

XII

The blistering pace of events occurring at the height of the Suez crisis and the Hungarian crisis revealed the extent to which national interests had marginalized the broader diversity not only between generalized spheres of influence, but also within them. Khrushchev grappled with the consequences of his earlier policies sooner and for a more prolonged period than his Western counterparts. Khrushchev’s attempt to usurp reform agendas proved to be more successful in Poland than in Hungary. Wladyslaw Gomulka’s return to power in Warsaw and Imre Nagy’s return in Budapest gave the Kremlin leadership pause, but only to varying degrees. Where Gomulka yielded quickly to renewed Soviet imposition, Nagy’s government defiantly called the Soviets’ bluff. By doing so, the progressives in Hungary at least exposed the Soviets’ utter disrespect for representing a more inclusive array of interests.

The Suez crisis and the subsequent Suez War served the same purpose for the leading Western powers. After the full extent of British, French, and Israeli complicity began to unfold, attention turned to monopolizing international opinion to condone or condemn military intervention. In addition to alienating the United States from its

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stauncest NATO allies, the efforts to occupy the UN’s attention also fractured the British, French, and Israeli alliance. British Ambassador to the UN, Pierson Dixon, sought to soften British policies by portraying British intervention as necessary for securing global trade or acting as a vanguard for future UN action. Meanwhile, Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban delivered a blunt ultimatum to the world body—to either support Israel’s cause or the cause of Israel’s enemies.

For the UN Secretary General, the deliberation with which respected Western powers associated their own interests with multilateral interests was intolerable. In his 31 October speech to the Security Council, Hammarskjöld admonished any effort to circumvent the principles of the UN Charter. The head of the United Nations had no alternative other than to assume that all member states agreed to and abided by the principles. Governments that abused that assumption or used the means of UN principles to secure nationally-interested ends threatened the UN’s purpose as well as its legitimacy.

Fortunately, Hammarskjöld’s warning was heeded. The Yugoslavian delegation’s recommendation to move debate to the UN General Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution helped the organization to retain the initiative. Though limited in scope, Henry Cabot Lodge’s draft resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire was popular but unattainable without significant changes to the status quo ante bellum. Lester Pearson’s draft resolution calling for insertion of a UN Emergency Force addressed the dire need for greater border security between Egypt and Israel. Arthur Lall’s proposed resolution for Hammarskjöld to organize the UNEF helped ease skepticism regarding the force’s objectivity.
Peacekeeping strategies developed and implemented over the next several days in early November 1956 bridged several divides simultaneously. First, it tempered the reluctance of those UN members who questioned the limits of the American proposal. Creating new structures to guarantee peace encouraged more genuine support for the cease-fire. The war signified a changing status quo and a new approach addressed those changes. Second, the influx of more multilateral input responded indirectly to British, French, and Israeli skepticism of, if not down-right loathing for, international action. While still difficult for these aggressors to digest, UN-led peacekeeping remained a benign instrument that helped diffuse tensions.

Interestingly, numerous sources credit various national leaders with these innovations. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden commends himself. Others praise the Eisenhower administration. Indeed, in at least one particular meeting with Arab ambassadors, U.S. leadership in resolving the Suez crisis was considered to be imperative. Yet, lingering questions undermine the extent of the Eisenhower administration’s involvement. For example, if U.S. officials had proposed creation of the UNEF in private consultations, why would America’s Ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., propose superfluous UN resolutions that could potentially compete with the UNEF for legitimacy and funding? If this idea was central to American policy-making, why would Lodge jeopardize the UNEF’s popularity by following up with two highly-unpopular draft resolutions of his own? Also noteworthy are the differences in postwar structure between the UNEF and Lodge’s second of two proposals. Where administration of the UNEF rested with UN officials directly, Lodge’s securing of the Suez Canal involved the creation of a three-nation panel reminiscent of recommendations
harkening back to the London Conferences. Lodge’s ideas lacked the broad consensus that Pearson’s and Lall’s proposals enjoyed. The Arab world, as well as more dependable allies such as the Philippine delegation, frowned on Lodge’s agenda.

The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt on 4 November led the European powers to a similar, albeit more severe, repudiation. Within Eden’s own government, consensus disintegrated. Opposition came from those most responsible for spear-heading the invasion, including Cabinet-level Naval and Air Force ministers, Eden’s political opposition also mobilized. Hugh Gaitskell torpedoed any and every attempt Eden made to justify armed intervention. Doubts also surrounded the legal authority Eden had in upholding international law in the Canal Zone.

Contrary to these developments, various international officials recognized the need for prompt UN action and endorsed Hammarskjöld’s philosophical approach. UN Ambassadors including Karl Eskelund, Arthur Lall, Joza Brilej, and Tingfu Tsiang adhered to the sacrosanctity of the UN Charter and helped provide UN officials with the authority necessary for reestablishing peace. Dag Hammarskjöld, Ralph Bunche, and General E.L.M. Burns moved rapidly to facilitate the UNEF’s success. In doing so, Hammarskjöld negotiated with Nasser directly and enacted the “good faith” agreements. Perhaps more than any other single event throughout the Suez crisis, these agreements represent the unassailable value of multilateralist diplomacy. Hammarskjöld honored Egyptian sovereignty. Nasser respected UNEF’s peace-keeping mission and the General Assembly’s jurisdiction over determining when that mission had been accomplished.

Sadly, multilateral consensus began dissolving shortly after the deployment of UN peacekeepers to the Canal Zone and the Sinai Peninsula. The Soviet Union crushed
Hungarian opposition within roughly forty-eight hours after renewing attacks on Nagy’s government. Despite a new round of debate and activity in the UN General Assembly, the speed with which the Red Army accomplished its mission left no doubt as to the fate of Hungarian sovereignty or Soviet dominance. On the contrary, Soviet leaders had learned valuable lessons from the Suez crisis and their own experiences following Khrushchev’s “secret speech.” Rather than fight to define their unilateral legitimacy, the Soviet leaders created a rival Hungarian government challenging Nagy’s claim of representing the will of the Hungarian people. In doing so, the Kremlin devised more effective strategies for fusing multilateral diplomacy seamlessly with national interests. After the Suez crisis abated, Arab and Western leaders enacted similar strategies of their own.
Chapter V

The Image of Inclusiveness: Responses to Multilateral Diplomacy and its Effects on International Relations, 1956 to the 1960s

In 1958, Hannah Arendt, one of the world’s leading political theorists, published a book that examined the precarious status of humanity. The sum of all human “experience,” she declared, can be understood so long as it can be shared.650 During the perilous days when the Suez crisis reached its crescendo, the international community had shared in successfully resolving the immediate conflict. The multilateral measures taken through the UN General Assembly established a more viable sense of international security. Unfortunately, this sentiment began dissipating almost as soon as Dag Hammarskjöld and his staff began acting on General Assembly recommendations. Many delegates interpreted the resolution of the Suez crisis as justification for the continued pursuit of national interests that had done so much to escalate the crisis. Paralleling the developments of the nineteenth century, the national leaders of 1956 and beyond sought

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new avenues through which unilateral interests could become synonymous with a greater sense of multilateral legitimacy. As experienced during the Suez crisis, attempts to use national interests as a basis for multilateralism intensified international crises that the United Nations was charged with resolving. Investigation of the immediate aftermath of the Suez crisis, the policies implemented, and the long-term consequences demonstrate how UN influence and prestige declined as governments began pursuing their interests through other international organizations.

Analyzing these new patterns not only adds to the historical significance of the Suez crisis, but it also helps broaden understanding of the increased reliance on various institutions in international affairs. As International Relations specialist John Ikenberry put it, “international institutions [act as] constraining and connecting mechanisms between states.” Charles Maier, a specialist in European Studies, shares the contention that those state officials who contribute to and instill faith in “transnational values and morals” develop a more reserved set of foreign policies. Indeed, there is a degree of validity in these assessments. During the Suez crisis, the United Nations served as the ideal example of the prudent restraint international organizations contributed to resolving crisis. Reasons for constraint revolved around the UN’s impartiality as international civil servants attempted to address multiple interests without allowing any single national interest to dominate.

Instead of recognizing this new, highly effective role for which the United Nations was ideally qualified for resolving international crises, some scholars have

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explained how individual states began addressing this new dimension in international affairs. Ikenberry articulates how ceaseless quests for world power detract from the true value of international organizations. “Because power is the ultimate determinant of outcomes in international relations,” Ikenberry insists, “institutions do not matter.”

Developments occurring within the international system following the Suez crisis reveal a more complex relationship between institutions and governments.

Rather than abandon organizations such as the UN, policy-makers worldwide sought to create institutions to rival the UN’s multilateral legitimacy. Government officials devised strategies that used private organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and quasi-governmental organizations not to restrain states but to more convincingly camouflage national interests in order to gain greater international clout. For U.S. officials, this effort represented an entirely new objective in the country’s “grand strategy.” Historian Paul Kennedy notes

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654 The extensive list of acronyms that describe organizations more specifically is truly staggering. In many cases NGOs can be subdivided into more specific categories. Examples include international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), self-help organizations (SHOs), grassroots organizations (GROs), donor-organized NGOs (DONGOs), quasi-nongovernmental organizations (QUANGOs), and the Orwellian-inspired government-organized nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs). See Thomas Weiss and Leon Gordenker, eds., NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 223-226.
how the Eisenhower administration, in particular, developed this “very American”
concept to balance domestic demands with international security concerns. While
taking the lead on creating the United Nations following the Second World War,
American policy-makers also established a more homogenous global economic order.
According to economic historian Diane Kunz, “the capitalist economic system [the
Bretton Woods system] depended on the United States—as provider of gold, lender of
last resort, and, crucially, military protector.” In return, Kunz continues, “Bretton Woods
furnished the United States multilateral cover under which to run the Western economic
order.” Over the course of the intervening decades, the scope of institutional collusion
has become the accepted practice.

International institution experts Thomas Weiss and Leon Gordenker make a more
explicit connection between state and non-state actors. While not originally created to
work with governments, NGOs and the like “have become exponentially more visible
precisely in connection with governments.” Several scholars of NGO activities concur.
According to John Clark, “Many liberal governments are co-opting NGO leaders on to
various official bodies or commissions.” P.J. Simmons argues that “the growing

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655 Paul Kennedy, “American Grand Strategy, Today and Tomorrow: Learning from the European
Experience,” in Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1991), pp. 168-170. Specifically, Kennedy focuses his research on the polity’s role in maintaining a
vigilant balance particularly between military and non-military matters. Commonly described as the “guns
and butter” debate, the objective was to create a domestic environment with the highest standard of living
while maintaining an optimal state of military readiness. See also Maier, “International Associationalism:
The Social and Political Premises of Peacemaking After 1917 and 1945,” p. 50.
656 Diane Kunz, “The International Financial System and the Nation-State,” in From War to Peace: Altered
Strategic Landscapes in the Twentieth Century, eds. Paul Kennedy and William Hitchcock (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 220. According to economist, Joan Spero, countries of the developing
world grew “increasingly dissatisfied with the [Bretton Woods] system that affected their economies but
excluded them from its management and from what they felt was an equitable share of its wealth.” See
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influence of NGOs are not in the field but in the arena of public opinion and the corridors of power.\textsuperscript{657} The United Nations was not one of these beneficiaries.

In the wake of the Suez crisis and the extended emergency session debates, the UN’s corps of international civil servants competed more aggressively with the governments of the world for distinction as curators of multilateral legitimacy. Officials of virtually all nationalities launched various campaigns to mobilize broader international opinion in order to suit their own purposes. Some Arab governments continued operating through the UN General Assembly, turning it into their own soapbox. During the Lebanon Crisis of 1958, the United States encouraged this type of activity to warrant direct U.S. intervention. As Britain aligned itself more closely with the United States, French officials moved to expand a supranationalist agenda and thus minimize the need for appealing to the United Nations. Nasser’s creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) paralleled those actions taken by the French government. By the time of the Congo Crisis, beginning in 1960, the UN’s ability to impose itself as an international arbiter was extremely limited. The member states’ various attempts to manipulate public opinion and power hurt more authentic opportunities for advancing multilateral diplomacy. The process was a slow one whose origins emerged as the Suez crisis began to abate.

Delegates of particular UN member states interjected exclusive interests throughout many of the emergency-session UN General Assembly debates pertaining to the Suez crisis. As delegates from Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, and Sweden set forth a draft resolution to grant Hammarskjöld the authority to create the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), other members embarked on their own self-aggrandizing campaigns.\footnote{658} Lebanese and Libyan delegates credited Arab unity with the political victory that the United Nations—as a whole—had formulated. Speaking for Lebanon, Edward Rizk applauded pan-Arab resiliency in the face of imperialist aggression and equated Egypt’s domestic solidarity of spirit with that of American revolutionary Patrick Henry. Not content with proclaiming Arab resolve, Rizk dismissed the General Assembly’s contribution to ending the crisis. “The success the Assembly has had so far,” Rizk declared, “is very limited indeed and does not go beyond putting an end temporarily to the senseless fighting.”\footnote{659} Libya’s Fathi Abidia agreed with Rizk’s assessment of Arab courage and righteousness, portraying Arabs as the agents of peace while casting “colonialism and Zionism” as the culprits of conflict.\footnote{660}

Meanwhile, British and French delegates as well as their supporters associated UNEF’s deployment with their own operational success. Members of the British
Commonwealth, including British Ambassador to the UN, Pierson Dixon, praised Eden’s
decision for creating conditions that allowed the UNEF to “establish itself in the area.”
Once UN forces were in place, British and French contingents could be relieved.
Australia’s Ambassador to the UN, Sir Ronald Walker, deflected attention away from
Western European intervention by blaming the Soviets and their Czechoslovakian arms
deal for triggering the Suez crisis. French Ambassador to the UN, Louis de Guiringaud,
pointed out that the French government had originally proposed the idea of creating an
“international army” as early as 1919 at the Paris Peace conference.\footnote{661}

These efforts to be counted among the multilaterally-minded had their limits,
however. French, British, and British Commonwealth responses to an Asian-African
draft resolution calling for the immediate extraction of French and British forces from
Egypt were less enthusiastic.\footnote{662} Dixon, Walker, and de Guiringaud argued that the
proposal was redundant. Hammarskjöld’s creation of the UNEF implied removal of all
other combatants. Dixon and de Guiringaud went on to question the General Assembly’s
jurisdiction over peacekeeping operations. As representatives of two of the world’s great
powers, these two ambassadors said that such matters should be debated in the Security
Council.\footnote{663} The trend towards restricting debate over the peacekeeping process mirrored
that of the diplomatic maneuverings that occurred in late October 1956 as the same
delegates labored to keep debate from spilling into the General Assembly in the first
place. Dixon and his French colleague were also loath to acknowledge any gap between
their countries’ unilateral intervention and the installation of the UNEF.

\footnote{661}{ORGA, Eleventh Session, ES-1, 7 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.567, pp. 111-114.}
\footnote{662}{This draft resolution is commonly referred to as the “nineteen-power resolution.”}
\footnote{663}{ORGA, Eleventh Session, ES-1, 7 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.567, pp. 113-115.}
The same day that these exchanges took place in the General Assembly, Israeli Prime Minster David Ben-Gurion began his own public relations campaign. During a speech before the Knesset, Ben-Gurion described Israel’s military dominance as beneficial not only for the country’s “security and internal tranquility,” but also for “our external relations on the world scene.” “Israel,” he continued, “has confined itself to safeguarding its rights in the international waterway and world public opinion has supported this demand.” Moments before associating Israel’s national interests with world opinion, however, Ben-Gurion criticized Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union for appeasing Egypt’s “Fascist” regime.\(^{664}\) Outbursts such as this one weakened the already feeble influence Israel held with the United States, Soviet Union, and United Nations.\(^{665}\) Ben-Gurion continued the perplexing practice of chastising members of the international community for their timidity while simultaneously fusing Israel’s national aspirations together with the interests of the international community.

Interestingly, both Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser and President Eisenhower developed similar attitudes in the aftermath of the Suez crisis. Nasser interpreted Arab “victory” in the crisis as justification of his authority over Egypt and throughout the Arab world. As political scientists Adeed Dawisha and William Zartman put it, “Through skillful and effective use of his propaganda machine, Nasser created in the minds of his people an image of himself as the first genuinely local hero who not only had dared to defy the might of the West, but had actually won.” “From then on,” Dawisha and Zartman argue, “Nasser’s legitimacy as Egypt’s president, and the

\(^{665}\) Since 24 October 1956, the United States withheld monetary aid from Israel in response to its military mobilization and invasion of Egypt. Combined with its loss of broad support worldwide, Israel remained defiant nevertheless. See Kunz, \textit{The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis}, pp. 165-166.
legitimacy of the political order which he had created were not to be questioned.”⁶⁶⁶ As discussed earlier, Nasser’s control of universities by the mid-1950s silenced “the country’s leading source of opposition activism.” By 1958, board members of Egypt’s professional associations were required to become members of Nasser’s ruling political party.⁶⁶⁷ Nasser hoped that such unanimity of opinion would spread to encompass regional ethnic loyalties, too.

Almost precisely when Nasser presumed to speak for his fellow Arabs, his appeal was beginning to erode. Nasser’s claim to represent pan-Arab interests encountered turbulence as the Arab League convened in Beirut on 13 November 1956. The League’s agenda at this meeting covered the Suez crisis, Arab concerns regarding increased Soviet influence in the Middle East, and the need for increased Arab unity. As historian Richard Miller argues, some attendees understood the last point of discussion as a “backhanded slap” at Nasser’s snubbing of the pan-Arab community when he nationalized the Suez Canal.⁶⁶⁸ The Arab community was caught in a frustrating conundrum between not wanting to endorse Nasser’s unilateral means to achieve pan-Arab ends and not wanting to miss an opportunity to humiliate Western imperial powers.

⁶⁶⁸ Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, p. 104.
The Eisenhower administration faced a similar situation. On the international stage, Eisenhower advocated an expanded role for the United Nations. During a 14 November press conference, he seemed receptive to the prospect of using the United Nations as an independent institution not only in preserving Arab autonomy from threats of Soviet subversion, but also in assuming a larger role in world affairs. Later, however, a White House official amended the president’s remarks saying that the United States should remain at the forefront of containing communism. By implication, this single exception nullified any potential opportunity for expanding the UN’s role.669

With regard to the Middle East, the Eisenhower administration had little need for the United Nations. In a 27 November letter to England’s (iconic) former Prime Minister Winston Churchill, President Eisenhower revealed the depth to which national interests pervaded his thinking. First, Eisenhower focused attention on communist infiltration as “the real enemy” upon which all other factors in the Middle East were measured. Second, he hoped to rehabilitate “British prestige” in the region to assist in curtailing communism’s appeal in Arab countries. Lastly, he wanted to cushion Britain’s energy and economic upheavals resulting from the Suez Canal’s closure.670 Aided by fears of oil shortages in Western Europe, the Suez crisis debased the value of the British pound as investors sought safety in the more stable U.S. dollar.671 Motivated by his own agenda

669 Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, pp. 104-105.
671 Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis, p. 136. For some historians, this fiscal conundrum reflected years of neglect. Michael Hogan argues that ever since 1945, Britain found itself in a paradox where it relied upon American funds for reconstruction projects and preserving the empire, “but the terms
and encouraged by his British allies, Eisenhower disregarded Arab sentiments and risked re-igniting the conflict that UN peacekeepers were in the process of mediating. The president’s obsession with communism led him to endorse an ill-fated policy of siding with a one-time imperialist power in a region that despised not only the Western imperialist legacy, but also any unwelcome intervention from foreign countries.

The multilateral factors that had helped resolve the Suez crisis yielded to the prevailing mindset through which crisis and conflict had intensified. As UNEF troops began arriving in Egypt to physically diffuse the situation, the key participants responsible for escalating the crisis had already begun ignoring the UN’s efforts that had led to the deployment of the peacekeeping force. The insensitivity Israeli, Egyptian, and American officials exhibited towards international diversity both between and within blocs, as well as towards the accomplishments of pluralistic peace-making, meant that one of the most valuable lessons emerging from the crisis went unheeded.

Fear of threats to America’s national interests in the Middle East following the Suez crisis led Eisenhower to pursue an increasingly interventionist policy. According to historians Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, Eisenhower and Dulles were determined to thwart any Soviet infiltration into the Middle East “‘vacuum’” following the exit of British and French forces by 27 December 1956. Ambrose and Brinkley note how the term used to describe the situation in the region “infuriated Arabs.”

Depicting the Middle East as a political void served as another example of the West’s disregard for Arab nationalist sentiments. To prevent communist exploitation, White House officials

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672 Ambrose and Brinkley, Rise to Globalism, p. 158.
drafted and edited what came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine in December 1956. Two days before its public unveiling on 5 January 1957 before a joint session of Congress, Eisenhower shared his doctrine with Saudi Arabia’s King Saud signifying his elevated status as the West’s newest ally in the Middle East. The doctrine declared that communist subversion in the Middle East “would undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.” To bolster the region’s sovereign countries and protect them against communism’s spread, Eisenhower asked Congress to extend economic and military aid to states looking to stimulate development and strengthen self-defense. Though more subtle in its approach, the Eisenhower doctrine followed a similar course to that of early American policies attempting to incorporate Middle Eastern countries into a defensive pact arrayed against communism and receptive to Western influence.

Nasser remained skeptical. Within days of hearing the president’s speech, Nasser derided the Eisenhower doctrine as a veiled attack on Arab nationalism because international communism was nearly non-existent in the Arab world. Adding to Nasser’s concerns, Harold Macmillan succeeded Anthony Eden as Britain’s Prime Minister on 9 January 1957. Under Macmillan’s leadership, Britain supported American foreign

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674 In addition to nursing his political pride, Eden secluded himself from the public to recover from a stomach ailment that stress had exacerbated. Eden’s sequestration only added to his opponents’ calls for the prime minister’s resignation. During his convalescence, Eden visited Bermuda, where he stayed at his friend’s estate: *Golden Eye*. Eden’s friend was none other than Ian Fleming. See Braddon, *Suez: Splitting of a Nation*, p. 131. Six months later on 10 June 1957, Canada’s government fell. Lester Pearson, one of the main architects of the UN peacekeeping mission in Suez was dismissed from office as the Progressive Conservative Party took control. One of their criticisms of the previouse government was the fact that it failed to support French and British policy during the Suez crisis. See Thordarson, *Lester Pearson*, p. 87. See also John Robinson Beal, *Pearson of Canada* (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1964), p. 118. Kevin Spooner argues that, although Canada’s new Prime Minster, John Diefenbaker, replaced the more liberal St. Laurent government, Diefenbaker did not change “the course of Canadian foreign policy” in any
policy objectives more readily. Some historians argue that American officials “indirectly” influenced British politics making Macmillan prime minister and thus making Britain a “junior partner” in fulfilling U.S. interests in the Middle East.675 By early February 1957, U.S. officials including Secretary of State Dulles fed Nasser’s suspicions by broadening President Eisenhower’s initial proclamation to guard against any “type of nationalism which would lead to a loss of independence [in the Middle East].”676

For close to the next decade and a half, writes historian Douglas Little, U.S. foreign policy “hoped to exorcise the demon of Nasserism and shield pro-Western regimes from revolutionary change.”677 Instead of ameliorating these tensions, Nasser and Eisenhower used the conditions in the region to justify their own mutually exclusive and antagonistic courses of action. Eisenhower’s policy of intervention provoked Nasser into reiterating calls for Arab solidarity against non-Arab incursions, which amplified America’s need more for direct regional involvement.

Some politicians and scholars picked up on the disconcerting effects the Eisenhower doctrine could have on the international system. As Congress debated Eisenhower’s new Middle East policy, Representative Stewart Udall (D-AZ) read a

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published critique of the doctrine into the congressional record. Authored by esteemed scholar and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, the article criticized the president’s policy for its “moralism” and “vagueness” and for the corrosive influence these factors had upon global realities. Niebuhr argued that Eisenhower’s “grand solution” favored the “power and comfort of [the United States]” at the expense of “the troubles and turmoils of the world at large.” Throughout its long history, the Suez Canal symbolized the mistaking of national interests for global interests. As the world emerged from the Suez crisis, according to Niebuhr, the United States seemed poised to repeat the error. Niebuhr also took his assessment a step farther by implying that this misrepresentation became the basis for constructing, in this particular case, American foreign policy.

Eisenhower’s policy ignored more pressing matters facing the international community. Socio-economic development, national self-determination, and non-alignment provided the context through which many leaders, such as Nasser, understood the international arena. Yet, America’s Cold War context and attempts to associate the needs of the developing world to it undermined the very nature of the challenges facing countries attempting to plot an independent course in world affairs. With regard to the Middle East, the Eisenhower administration created its own context for foreign policy-making rather than basing its actions on the immediate concerns that faced the region and its population.

A similar mindset beset the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). During the NATO Council meetings of 1956 and 1957, members agreed to consult with their allies within the organization to coordinate responses pertaining to “out-of-area

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issues."⁷⁷⁹ NATO scholar, John Milloy contends that “When a dispute arose between two or more members that could not be settled directly, they were obligated to involve NATO before submission to any other international agency.”⁷⁸⁰ Developments such as these did not bode well for the United Nations’ ability to maintain multilateral diplomacy.

III

Independent of NATO, European leaders also began defining in greater detail the context by which they would interact with the rest of the international community. In comparing British and French foreign policies, historian William Hitchcock contends that France favored plans for supranational integration. Prior examples include the Marshall Plan’s creation of regional institutions to organize Europe’s economic recovery efforts in 1948 and the European Coal and Steel Community’s (ECSC) synchronization of economic interests for France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries in 1951.⁷⁸¹ Throughout the 1950s, French officials came to understand that their national security and economic recovery lay in reconciliation with Germany more than associating with the United States.

Soon after the Suez crisis, French and other European officials rededicated themselves to European integration. The 1957 Treaty of Rome expanded commercial, social, and cultural collaboration among ECSC members by establishing the European

Economic Community (EEC). The central focus of the EEC, or “Common Market,” promoted the free flow of goods among its members at the expense of those states outside the community. The treaty created “Trans-European Networks” that integrated the EEC’s “transportation, telecommunications, and energy infrastructures.” Additionally, the six European states sought closer social and cultural ties. Socially, the community sought improved labor and educational opportunities. Members looked to raise living standards and improve employment opportunities through contributions made to “a European Social Fund.” In education, exchanges of information and experience combined with greater student mobility were designed to enhance the “European dimension in education.” Greater social cooperation meant the “cultural heritage of European significance” would be preserved.  

Matters involving “international organizations” were referred to the EEC Commission which served as an intermediary on behalf of its member states. Where self-interest prevailed, a paradox soon followed.

While EEC members banded together for mutual benefit based on exclusion, on the one hand, they professed continued support for the international community as a whole. For example, members encouraged the economic and social “integration of the developing countries into the world community.” Yet, EEC members remained determined to dictate the terms by which this was to happen.

Like the British involvement in the Baghdad Pact of 1955, where London officials looked to retain some degree of influence in Middle Eastern affairs and do so at the expense of the U.S. and its interests in facilitating a collective security agreement to contain communism, French officials sought to use the EEC in a similar way. According

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682 Treaty of Rome, 25 March 1957, Part III, Chapter 2, Title VIII, Articles 118 and 123; Part III, Chapter 3, Article 126, paragraph 2; Part III, Title IX, Article 128, paragraph 2; Part III, Title XII, Article 129b.
683 Treaty of Rome, Part III, Title XVII, Article 130u.
to John Hargreaves, author of *Decolonization in Africa*, “[although] the expenses of aid and commercial preference were diffused among France’s partners in the EEC, the franc zone was preserved and substantial credits distributed through the [EEC’s] Ministry of Co-operation [were manipulated by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the French President.]” Specifically, the French government benefited from EEC funds devoted to the development of non-self-governing territories. While responsible for contributing nearly thirty-five percent of the total sum, French dependencies received over eighty-five percent of the outlays. Other members of the EEC accepted these conditions in exchange for French concessions on other matters.

The anti-colonial faction of the international community was less compliant. Beginning in October 1957, the UN General Assembly debated the potential effects the Treaty of Rome could have on the process of decolonization. The Afro-Asian bloc within the UN worried that the Common Market would hamper efforts encouraging African industrialization in both dependent territories and independent states. These delegates also expressed concern over the potential eclipsing of African economic interests by those of the European-dominated Common Market. Much like Nasser’s fear of “collective colonialism” regarding international control of the Suez Canal, similar concerns arose over African integration into a European economic order.

Delegates from EEC countries and the United States attempted to allay these apprehensions. As they did so, however, they undermined the integrity of the United

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685 The African Studies specialist, Veronon McKay, details the contributions EEC members made to the development fund for dependent states and territories. Out of a total sum of over five hundred and eighty million dollars amassed over five years, the French government was to contribute two hundred million dollars. Yet, “French territories were to receive the lion’s share, a total of $511,250,000.” See Vernon McKay, *Africa in World Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 147.
Nations as a forum for multilateral diplomacy. Western delegates argued that the Common Market would promote “economic development of the African territories” and thus promote “mutual interest.” Betraying their own concerns about the setting of these debates, Western delegates questioned the UN’s authority as a forum for such discussions. The U.S. delegation stated that debates pertaining to “the operation of the Common Market [should be left to] the GATT organization.”

This mentality reflected the West’s growing discontent with the United Nations and initiatives taken to circumnavigate its jurisdiction. For example, while the Treaty of Rome promised to comply with UN principles, the treaty reserved the right “to promote [the Community’s] overall harmonious development . . . leading to the strengthening of [the Community’s] economic and social cohesion.” As NATO members established guidelines that orchestrated decision-making and policy-making in matters of Western security concerns, members of the EEC took parallel steps in matters of commerce, education, labor, and culture. Such structures parallel those that already existed within the United Nations. With such redundancy, nations could challenge more inclusive organizations such as the UN while continuing to represent a broader, international interest.

Put another way, individual heads of state may have been committed to UN principles, but they reserved the right to construct their own policies to enforce these

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687 McKay, *Africa in World Politics*, pp. 147-148. Known as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, GATT served as the West’s international economic model for the post-World War II world.

688 Treaty of Rome, Part III, Title XIV, Article 130a. Other observers, such as the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, argued that the EEC and institutions like it were improvised “on an ad hoc basis to meet specific needs.” Instead, a more methodical approach was necessary. Countries comprising “the free world should,” Fund members contended, “make a deliberate effort to determine their common objectives and to create institutions that give effect to them.” See Rockefeller Brothers Fund, *Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1961), p. 187. While appearing more inclusive than the impromptu proliferation of international institutions, the Fund’s proposal remained fixated on excluding nations that refused to embrace a certain ideological and economic perspective.
principles. Leaders often justified an unpopular course of action by presenting it as a defensive measure. The prime ministers of Britain and France invaded Egypt to protect international trade. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion justified the invasion of Egypt in part by calling it a preemptive defensive measure taken against the *fedayeen*. The Eisenhower Doctrine was the latest manifestation of this trend of rationalizing unilateral national decisions as necessary defensive measures to protect peace.

When President Eisenhower deferred to UN principles, he did so only in so far as the principles remained beholden to an American context. One example of this involved Israeli policies put into effect in early 1957. As the UNEF established a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces, a majority of Israelis resented withdrawing back across the Sinai Peninsula and returning to their original borders. Reluctant to give up their gains, Israeli policy-makers sought to exchange territory for unobstructed maritime passage through the Strait of Tiran and security concessions that protected Israel’s administrative interests in the Gaza Strip to thwart future *fedayeen* attacks.\(^{689}\) Negotiations between the United Nations and Israel stalled in early February 1957 when Israeli forces refused to evacuate from these two areas considered so vital to their security concerns. As General Burns, commander of UNEF put it, “Israel thus defied the opinion of the world, as expressed by the General Assembly.”\(^{690}\)

Although substantial numbers of Americans and their elected representatives sympathized with Israel’s security concerns, the Eisenhower administration kept its dispassionate distance. During a 20 February speech, Eisenhower made his perspective clear. “Britain and France have withdrawn their forces from Egypt. Thereby they

\(^{689}\) Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli*, p. 240.
\(^{690}\) Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli*, p. 248.
showed respect for the opinions of mankind.” Later in a televised address, the president declared the following:

If we [Americans] agree that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of international order. . . . If the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by using force, then we will have destroyed the very foundation of the organization, and our best hope for establishing a real world order.\textsuperscript{691}

While Eisenhower’s expression of support for UN principles was valuable, it was compromised by the Chief Executive’s new Middle East policy. The Eisenhower Doctrine’s heavy emphasis on military aid helped facilitate the use of force to maintain international peace acceptable to U.S. security concerns. This kind of logic paralleled the thinking of British and French officials who had made similar proclamations in an effort to legitimize their intervention in Suez.

The double standard developing between multilateral ends and the unilateral means used to achieve those ends ignored the conditions that make “armed attack” more likely. Similar to the Soviets’ Czech arms deal of 1955, the introduction of U.S. weapons under the Eisenhower Doctrine stood poised to re-ignite a regional arms race. Dulles’s expansion of the doctrine to include not only communist threats, but also Arab nationalist actions meant that the chances for greater volatility grew exponentially. Future instability in the Middle East would no longer be relegated to an Arab-Israeli dispute. In essence, Eisenhower and several other world leaders cloaked their own national security interests in UN principles, which undermined the legitimacy of the United Nations. John Ikenberry’s concept of international organizations acting as institutions of restraint was waning in the months and years following the Suez crisis. While Eisenhower deserves

\textsuperscript{691} Quoted in Burns, \textit{Between Arab and Israeli}, p. 251.
some credit for recognizing the importance multilateral diplomacy played in the Suez crisis and weighing the alternatives stemming from it, the conclusions he drew remained self-serving. Eighteen months later the usurpation of multilateralism to reflect self-interest contributed to a new crisis in Lebanon.

IV

Much like the Suez crisis, political tensions in Lebanon escalated as a result of the excesses of competing national interests. By February 1958, Nasser’s pan-Arab philosophy spread to Syria culminating in an Egyptian-Syrian alliance known as the United Arab Republic (UAR).\textsuperscript{692} News of this unified, supernationalist front split opinion all across the Arab world. The Iraqis and Jordanians, grew apprehensive and formed their own Arab Federation. Other Arabs, from all across the Middle East including many Lebanese Muslims, rallied to Nasser’s ideology. Within months, regional political tensions accentuated Lebanon’s domestic political problems which pitted the country’s Christian President and his supporters against the majority Muslim populace. President Camille Chamoun rejected allegiance to either of these new pan-Arab unions and, instead, re-affirmed his country’s commitment to principles found in

\textsuperscript{692} Interestingly, according to historian Roby Barrett, Nasser justified his action “to prevent a Communist takeover [in Syria].” Nasser’s reasoning not only outlawed the Communist Party, but also all other political parties throughout the UAR. As late as 7 February 1958, this disassociation with communism led to a new round of American opportunism as the Eisenhower administration extended aid to Nasser in the form of “trade, cultural exchanges, economic assistance, military training, CARE programs, and grain under Public Law 480.” Roby Barrett, \textit{The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: U.S. Foreign Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy} (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 48.
both the United Nations and Arab League Charters.\textsuperscript{693} These perspectives and Chamoun’s efforts to extend his term as president upset the country’s pro-Nasser supporters.\textsuperscript{694} Civil war erupted in May 1958.

Instability in Lebanon cascaded throughout the international community. Despite its preference for a diplomatic solution to the Lebanese crisis, the Eisenhower administration voiced its willingness to intervene militarily if the crisis escalated. Eisenhower’s senior staff reached this consensus as early as 13 May 1958.\textsuperscript{695} Historian Erika Alin argues that the Eisenhower administration was reluctant to use the Eisenhower Doctrine as the basis for intervention in Lebanon and attached certain “conditions” President Chamoun was to meet before American military deployment. Among these criteria, the Lebanese government was “to file an official complaint of its grievances regarding [UAR] interference in its affairs with the United Nations Security Council.”\textsuperscript{696} While seemingly altruistic, Eisenhower’s deference towards the UN during the Lebanon crisis actually undermined the integrity of the international organization by having the world organization serve to legitimize America’s unilateral intervention. After the Suez crisis, American policymakers were becoming particularly adept at creating these conditions. In essence, officials in Washington wanted the best of all possible worlds.

\textsuperscript{693} Sam Pope Brewer, “Lebanon To Shun Both Arab Unions,” \textit{NYT}, 26 March 1958. According to a 1932 census, Christians enjoyed a slight demographic majority, which determined representation in Lebanon’s parliament. After twenty-six years, Lebanese Muslims argued that they were the social majority and called for political adjustments accordingly.

\textsuperscript{694} To a certain extent, Chamoun’s re-election bid also upset his western allies too. According to historian Erika Alin, President Eisenhower grappled with supporting Chamoun’s re-election at the risk of alienating the Lebanese population, or backing away from Chamoun to support a more moderate candidate who may not represent America’s interests as staunchly as Chamoun had in previous years. See Erika Alin, “U.S. Policy and Military Intervention in the 1958 Lebanon Crisis,” in \textit{The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment}, 3rd ed., ed. David Lesch (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), pp. 154-155.

\textsuperscript{695} Miller, \textit{Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy}, p. 166. See also Alin, “U.S. Policy and Military Intervention in the 1958 Lebanon Crisis,” p. 156.

Proceedings in the UN did not follow the Eisenhower administration’s script. By early June, both Lebanese and UAR officials turned to the United Nations to raise awareness and garner support for their respective positions. Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanon’s Foreign Minister, appealed to the UN Security Council for help in neutralizing rebel support from the UAR. Reports of cross-border infiltrations and gun smuggling from neighboring Syria turned the civil war into a regional conflict undermining Lebanon’s national sovereignty. In presenting the UAR’s argument, Egyptian Foreign Minister Omar Loutfi accused the Lebanese government of attempting to distract domestic and world public opinion from Chamoun’s political power-grab. At the conclusion of these UN Security Council hearings, members agreed to a Swedish proposal calling for the secretary general to send an observation team to Lebanon to investigate reports of outside interference and deliver its findings to the Security Council.

Tensions increased dramatically when pro-Nasserist forces in Iraq seized control of the country in mid-July 1958. According to historian L.J. Butler, this revolution posed an even greater threat to British and, more broadly, Western interests in the region than did the Suez crisis. Strategically, the Baghdad Pact was subject to dissolution. Economically, the generous oil concessions that Western interests had established with the Iraq Petroleum Company could be subject to nationalization. British and American officials feared that Iraq’s revolution was the start of a pan-Arab domino theory.

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697 Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, pp. 165-166.
699 Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, p. 163. See also Butler, Britain and Empire, p. 143; and Erika Alin, “U.S. Policy and Military Intervention in the 1958 Lebanon Crisis,” pp. 149 and 159. As Political Scientist, Naseer Aruri, put it, “the defeat of the UAR would remove the potential threat to the stability of the conservative system and thus would assure the continued exploitation of the region’s
The next day, 15 July, American Marines landed in Lebanon. President Eisenhower began his address to the American people by clarifying that American military forces were deployed at President Chamoun’s request. In notifying Congress, Eisenhower said that American motives showed “concern” for Lebanese independence “which [the U.S.] deems vital to the national interest and world peace.” In addition to perpetuating the tendency to unite national interests with international harmony, the president’s unilateral action rested upon the general premise of the Eisenhower Doctrine. According to one anonymous U.S. government official, legal justification for intervention in Lebanon lay in the Mansfield Amendment inserted into the doctrine’s preamble. The amendment credited to Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT) stated that “the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East.” In many respects, this amendment reflected the sentiments expressed in Dulles’s corollary to the Eisenhower Doctrine, which authorized implementation of the policy if either communist or Arab nationalist threats interfered with American interests in the region. Yet, as historian Richard Miller points out, “the intervention could not be justified under the provisions spelled out in the operative sections of the Doctrine.” Only proof of armed interference from states compliant with international communism could justify the deployment of American forces.

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700 “Texts of the President’s Statement and Message to Congress,” *NYT*, 16 July 1958, p. 2.


Unconcerned with these discrepancies, the Executive Branch moved ahead with building consensus for military intervention in Lebanon. President Eisenhower and his senior staff sought endorsement, not dialogue. Although the president met with Congressional leaders the day before the landings took place, Eisenhower and his advisors did so to garner support for their decision rather than engage in debate. Where Senators Mike Mansfield, William Fulbright (D-AR), and Speaker of the House Samuel Rayburn (D-TX) distinguished between pro-Nasser and communist influence, the president and Secretary of State Dulles considered the two linked. By the meeting’s conclusion all agreed that Eisenhower’s actions were “generally approved . . . as the best.”

Leaders of the House and Senate demonstrated their compliance soon thereafter. During an exchange in the House of Representatives, one Congressman asked to address his fellow members, to which Rayburn replied, “Not if it is controversial. The Chair is not going to recognize Members to talk about foreign affairs in this critical situation.” Contrast this mentality with the extensive debate that occurred during the Suez crisis and one begins to appreciate the role that the United Nations played in resolving conflict. Where participants at the United Nations achieved consensus through the exchange of viewpoints, leaders interested in protecting national interests demanded consensus through conformity.

As the Lebanon crisis escalated, enlisting the United Nations to endorse a particular perspective proved hazardous to multilateral diplomacy. When Eisenhower explained America’s intervention to an American audience, U.S. Ambassador to the

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704 Quoted in Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, p. 183.
United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., presented the country’s case to the Security Council. Lodge looked to transfer the matter from the U.S. to the UN as quickly as possible by expanding the UN’s presence in Lebanon to include a police force. Lodge, along with British and Jordanian officials, described threats to Lebanon and other sovereign Arab states if the United Arab Republic consolidated its gains.705

Reports from the UN’s own observers were less dire. In presenting the observer’s findings to the Security Council, as required, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld stole momentum from Lodge’s call for urgent action.706 Swedish delegate Gunnar Jarring criticized America’s intervention so much so that he proposed suspending UN operations in Lebanon. Koto Matsudaira, Japan’s UN representative, shared similar regret and believed that any compromise was the sole responsibility of the United Nations. Soviet, Asian, and African officials also denounced America’s move.707

Within two weeks, the Security Council became mired in deadlock. Draft resolutions such as America’s bolstering the UN’s mandate in Lebanon and the Soviet’s call for America’s immediate withdrawal reflected the unimaginative efforts of attempting to divert multilateral diplomacy to suit national interests. The Swedish and

707 Miller, *Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy*, p. 191; “Excerpts From Statements Before UN Security Council on Mideastern Issues,” *NYT*, 18 July 1958, p. 4. In a 31 July letter to President Eisenhower, the King of Morocco thanked the president for his commitment to preserving international security but expressed “hope that the United Nations will be able to defend and protect the small nations against any attack on their independence and sovereignty thereby ensuring, by [the UN’s] action, justice and peace among peoples.” See “Letter from the King of Morocco to Dwight D. Eisenhower President of the United States,” 31 July 1958, translation, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box #39, D.D.E. Library, Abilene, KS. The Emperor of Ethiopia offered “to assume the lead [in] rallying resistance against [the UAR and its efforts to] subvert all of East Africa,” if the United States contributed the necessary financial, military, and political aid. Such acts of seemingly benevolent self-interest demonstrate the attempt by virtually all parties to turn international crises to their own benefit. See “Telegram from his Imperial Majesty for President Eisenhower,” 29 July 1958, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box #39, D.D.E. Library, Abilene, KS.
Japanese proposals fell victim to the permanent members’ veto. Motivated by public relations maneuvering, world leaders tried to plan an international summit on their own, but it too failed.

A greater and more genuine appeal to multilateral diplomacy combined with political transformation within Lebanon itself helped end the crisis. The untenable political climate in Lebanon meant that new elections were held almost immediately. General Fuad Chehab replaced Camille Chamoun as Lebanon’s elected president on 31 July 1958. In early August, debate within the United Nations shifted from the Security Council to the General Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution. Similar to the Suez crisis of 1956, the Lebanon question of 1958 found an eager audience focused on compromise. Hammarskjöld took the initiative by agreeing to have the UN observers play a more flexible role in Lebanon, requesting mutual re-assurance of non-aggression within the Arab world, and expressing support for the UN’s involvement in Arab economic development. On 21 August amidst a flurry of draft resolutions, delegates from the ten Arab members of the UN issued their “Good Neighbor Resolution.” In exchange for the removal of foreign troops, Arab leaders agreed to respect Lebanese and Jordanian sovereignty as well as UN principles. The General Assembly passed the resolution unanimously. While critiquing these events in a news conference, New Zealand’s Sir Leslie Munro proclaimed that Arab consensus emanated from “the

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708 Historian Erika Alin credits President Eisenhower’s special envoy to Lebanon, Robert Murphy, with facilitating negotiations that allowed for Chehab’s election. Alin, “U.S. Policy and Military Intervention in the 1958 Lebanon Crisis,” pp. 160-161. Caroline Attie, in her book Struggle in the Levant, explains how some senior U.S. officials remained opposed to UN involvement in the Lebanon crisis. According to American Ambassador to Egypt, Raymond Hare, his negotiations with Nasser were preferable having the matter go before the United Nations, where the crisis would “‘degenerate into a [Cold War] propaganda battle.’” Meanwhile, the British, still weary of Nasser, endorsed UN mediation. See Caroline Attie, Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 211. As an aside, “Chehab” may also be spelled “Shihab.”
harmonizing influence of the Assembly itself.\textsuperscript{709} By October 1958, the 14,000 U.S. troops deployed to Lebanon were removed. While it is true that negotiations took place privately, the appeal to and expression of the General Assembly contributed to a more resilient agreement based on a more authentic attempt to engage in multilateral dialogue rather than imposing a prefabricated solution grounded in an ideological mindset.

V

The dichotomy existing between multilateral diplomacy and unilateral interests clashed again during the Congo crisis of the early 1960s. Like much of the rest of the African continent, the Congo and its population were wrestling with attempts to transition from colonial rule to independence. The Congo’s Belgian colonial government made tentative gestures towards Congolese autonomy by studying possible constitutional reforms and allowing for “limited municipal elections” by 1958. Headway was slow and cumbersome at best and counter-productive at worst. Throughout the 1950s, Congolese social and cultural groups served as centers for directing nationalist ideology. As African specialist Edgar O’Ballance explains, these associations served a dual purpose because “all political activity was banned in the Congo and the only Congolese groups that were permitted were those with social, cultural, or study objectives, plus low-level advising

\textsuperscript{709} Miller, \textit{Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy}, p. 204. Arthur Lall challenges Hammarskjöld’s involvement in the Lebanon crisis. Lall cites his negotiations with Dulles as the reason for successful resolution of the crisis. According to Lall, Hammarskjöld was left out and “went into a big sulk” as a result. See Lall, \textit{The Emergence of Modern India}, p. 142.
committees.” The restrictions conveyed the sense that Belgians in the Congo were sympathetic to independence so long as they directed its course.

As seen so often throughout world affairs during the 1950s, governments sought to co-opt domestic organizations to create the illusion of a diversified society while maintaining a high degree of hegemony. Similar to the shah’s consolidation of political power during 1953 in Iran, and Nasser’s Egyptian revolution of 1954, the restriction of civic associations in the Congo was the latest attempt to contain socio-political pressures. Because of the colonial government’s repressive legacy in the Congo, however, the double standard by which it pursued decolonization undermined the Belgians’ legitimacy as stewards of Congolese sovereignty. Organizations such as the Alliance des Ba-Kongo (ABAKO), led by Joseph Kasavubu; the Confederation des Association Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) led by Moise Tshombe; and the Mouvement National Congolias (MNC), led by Patrice Lumumba, challenged Belgian rule. In 1958, Lumumba’s MNC represented Congolese interests at the All-African Peoples’ Conference in Ghana. Early the following year, rioting erupted in the Congo capital of Leopoldville as a result of a volatile mix of fervent nationalist ideology and a two-year old economic recession that left as much as twenty-five percent of Leopoldville’s workforce unemployed. The combination of a discredited government

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711 Scholars such as Political Scientist David Gibbs, interpret these actions as evidence of the persistent “dictatorial” trends that the Belgian colonial government wished to disguise. See David Gibbs, _The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis_ (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1991) p. 55. In a broader context, other European imperialist powers also sought to re-invent themselves as partners in decolonization. French ambitions “to offer the French colonies autonomy within a new French community” combined with the Belgian government’s decision to relinquish the Congo forced Macmillan’s government in London to take similar steps with regard to England’s colonial possessions in Africa. See Butler, _Britain and Empire_, p. 152.  
712 Gibbs, _The Political Economy of Third World Intervention_, p. 73.
and social unrest reduced the Belgian plan for a transition of power from several years to a matter of months.

The Congo gained its independence on 30 June 1960. The MNC won majorities in the newly created Senate and central assembly, guaranteeing Lumumba’s becoming Prime Minister. Joseph Kasavubu became the chief executive and head of state.\textsuperscript{713} Tragically, Congolese leaders and the polity were ill-prepared for independence, leaving a tremendous vacuum of power. According to Political Scientist David Gibbs, although nearly three-quarters of Congolese society benefited from some measure of primary education, only thirty people graduated from universities in the Congo in 1960. Gibbs also mentions that by 1960 one person in the whole of the Congolese population had a law degree.\textsuperscript{714} These statistics did not bode well for a society that was now placed in charge of its own bureaucracy.

The rush towards independence in addition to an over-burdened central government created severe political rifts between Lumumba’s MNC and its rivals. Moise Tshombe’s organization, based in the Congo’s Katanga province, was established to consolidate interest groups within Katanga in order to represent a more unified whole. As a result, Tshombe’s “federation of tribal and professional groups” felt no loyalty towards Lumumba’s government. Kasavubu also wrestled with Lumumba for greater control. Distrust between these two leading governmental figures led to fissures that


pervaded all levels of the bureaucracy. By 5 July, various factions in the Congo sensed the weakness gripping the central government and began acting on their own impulses.

More than simply devolving into a civil war, the conflict between Tshombe, Lumumba, and Kasavubu bordered on anarchy. As one historian described it, Belgian colonial officials returned to their homeland, “leaving a crossfire among various groups struggling for the succession.” Mutineers in the Congolese National Army targeted Belgian nationals and army officers who had remained in the Congo. The legacy of colonial exploitation as well as economic frustrations and political factionalism contributed to Congolese recriminations. The sense of ill-will spread despite the efforts of both Lumumba and Kasavubu to address the overwhelming sense of injustice that many Congolese felt. The government’s inability to restore order held severe consequences for both the Congo and the international community.

Lumumba’s government was also hampered by the sheer logistics of governing. The Congo was colossal in size. It measured over nine hundred thousand square miles, making it larger than Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Norway combined. The nearly non-existent infrastructure meant that urban centers and provinces were isolated. As a result, efforts to establish a cohesive sense of national unity were particularly daunting.

Eager to assert his own autonomy at his rivals’ expense, Moise Tshombe issued “a unilateral declaration of independence” for Katanga province on 11 July 1960. Katanga possessed a wealth of natural resources. The province held significant amounts

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716 Brands, The Devil We Knew, p. 63.
of copper, uranium, cobalt, radium, germanium, zinc, and industrial-grade diamonds.

The mining giant, Union Miniere du Haut Katanga (U.M.K.), sold $200 million worth of Katanga’s minerals per year and supplied ten percent of the world’s copper, sixty percent of its cobalt, and most of the world’s radium. The company’s annual revenues profited Belgian bankers, who owned approximately forty-two percent of U.M.K.’s shares. The breakdown of law and order in the Congo threatened U.M.K. operations. Tshombe understood these economic factors and asked Belgian officials for political recognition and military support.

Although Western powers were hesitant to recognize Katanga’s secession officially, Belgian, Western European, and American policy-makers reacted positively to Tshombe’s unilateral declaration. The reintroduction of Belgian troops to the Congo eased the concerns of panicked U.M.K. investors, Western European consumers of Katanga’s resources, and America’s Cold War security interests in sub-Saharan Africa. According to a 9 April National Security Council report, continued exertion of Western European influence in West Africa remained vital to America’s security interests throughout the Congo crisis and much of the process of decolonization in the early

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718 Peter Bart, “Congo Disorder Cutoff Minerals,” 12 July 1960, NYT, p. 13. Gibbs also notes that several senior Eisenhower administration officials also had ties to Katanga. The American ambassador to Belgium and Allen Dulles the CIA Director had interests in an American mining company that supported Katanga’s independence. The son of Secretary of State Christian Herter was climbing the executive ranks of Mobil Oil, which “had direct investments in the Congo, especially in Katanga.” See Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention*, p. 100. See also Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, p. 128.

1960s. Yet, the return of Belgian forces on 12 July transformed the scope and severity of the Congo crisis.

Lumumba countered Belgian intervention with his own calls for international support. As with many events surrounding the Congo crisis, this appeal was not as straightforward as may have seemed. Anxious for immediate support, some members of Lumumba’s government requested direct American military intervention. At the moment when Lumumba needed to present himself as the executor of Congolese sovereignty, he was distracted by the rampant lack of political discipline originating from within the ranks of his government’s bureaucracy. Undaunted, Lumumba’s messages to UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld addressed the destabilizing effect Belgian troops were having in the Congo. Lumumba blamed the Belgian government for masterminding Katanga’s secession. In a second message, Lumumba stipulated that UN forces would be deployed “not to restore [the] internal situation in [the] Congo but rather to protect national territory” from Belgian encroachment. An additional clarification stated that only neutral countries were to contribute to the creation of a UN force, thus eliminating direct American participation.

The Eisenhower administration helped Lumumba save face by denying direct intervention and deferring to the United Nations. Christian Herter, the new United States

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721 Actual Belgian intervention had already begun by 12 July. Two days earlier, Belgian naval forces had landed at Matadi to liberate 400 Europeans held by CNA mutineers. After storming ashore and killing twenty Congolese, the Belgian unit discovered that the captives had been released prior to their arrival. News of this event coincided with other reports of Belgian atrocities that affected world opinion and heightened calls for UN involvement. See Eric Packham, Success or Failure: The Intervention in the Congo after Independence (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1998) p. 23. See also “Belgium’s Forces Fight Congolese to Quell Risings,” 11 July 1960, NYT, pp.1 and 3.

Secretary of State, explained to Hammarskjöld that “‘the United States believes that any assistance to the government of the Congo should be through the United Nations and not by any unilateral action by any one country, the United States included.’” 723 Like Congolese policy-makers, American officials also had to address their own self-conflicted policies. On the one hand, officials in Washington supported exercising influence through trusted Western European allies, such as the Belgian government, which saw a need for unilateral intervention the Congo. On the other hand, President Eisenhower endorsed UN resolutions calling for the insertion of UN peacekeepers into the Congo, thereby disposing of the need for unilateral action. Much like America’s strategic interests in the Middle East during the early to mid-1950s, policy-makers along the Potomac River cloaked the execution of their own unilateral interests in Africa in multilateral terms. Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon expressed these quirky sentiments during an 18 August National Security Council meeting. While responding to a series of policy questions regarding American interests in Africa, Dillon supported “the decision to provide aid to the Congo through the UN.” Moments later, however, as he assessed America’s continued reliance on Western European nations to serve as proxy powers in Africa, Dillon admitted that “it was still [America’s] objective to get the Belgians back into the Congo, but whether this was practical we do not know.” 724

VI

Seizing the opportunity to capitalize from the turbulence created by contradictory policies such as these, the Soviet delegation to the United Nations took immediate action during the UN Security Council debate on 13 July. After the Tunisian delegate proposed a draft resolution calling for the removal of Belgian forces from the Congo and insertion of UN peacekeepers, the Soviet representative accused the United States of interfering in the Congo’s domestic affairs and employing the services of United Nations’ personnel including Undersecretary of the United Nations Ralph Bunche to advance Western interests in the region.725

Several historians specializing in the Congo crisis make similar arguments. According to David Gibbs, Hammarskjöld became a puppet of Western interests. Additionally, Hammarskjöld’s subordinate Andrew Cordier maintained strong ties with the U.S. State Department.726 Other scholars criticize Hammarskjöld for sacrificing his status as an impartial international civil servant. Once the UN peacekeepers began arriving in the Congo, Hammarskjöld argued for a weak Congolese government that would remain dependent on the UN forces. Edgar O’Ballance describes the deployment of UN forces as “Hammarskjöld’s empire-building project.”727 Given the international community’s convincing mandate authorizing UN intervention and the chaotic conditions enveloping the Congo, these assessments seem excessive.

Reminiscent of the organizational agility Hammarskjöld displayed during the Suez crisis, the Secretary General maneuvered UN policy between ideological loyalties that infiltrated the Congo crisis. As witnessed during the Security Council deliberations of 13 July, the Soviet delegation linked UN activities to Western interests. Yet, when voting on the resolution to create a UN peacekeeping force, also referred to as the Organisations des Nations Unities au Congo (ONUC), the U.S.S.R. approved the resolution along with the United States. Regardless, the Cold War divide widened as both Katanga’s leader, Moise Tshombe, and Belgian government officials warned of communist plans to exploit the anarchy engulfing the Congo. Tshombe portrayed Lumumba as a puppet of Soviet and Communist Chinese regimes. Indeed, Lumumba had appealed to the Soviet leadership for military aid, shortly after making a similar request to the United States government. Intending to represent himself as a non-aligned nationalist and play the Superpowers off against one another, Lumumba’s actions backfired. His opportunist gamble weakened rather than strengthened his position.

Congolese relations with the United Nations were somewhat better, although not without misgivings. Regarding the issue of Katanga’s independence, UN officials refused to recognize the province’s sovereignty. As King Gordon of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace put it, “The mandate of the United Nations Force . . . would apply to the entire Congo. Belgian troops would have to withdraw from the Congo, including Katanga, and the [ONUC] would have the right of deployment in all six countries.”

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729 According to David Gibbs, the amount of Soviet influence is often exaggerated. The number of Soviet and Czechoslovakian advisers in the Congo never surpassed 380 individuals. This was insignificant compared to the thousands of UN and Belgian civilians and military personnel that served in the Congo. See Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention, p. 99. It should be noted that although Lumumba refused direct American intervention in the Congo, he did request American military aid.
provinces, including Katanga.”730 The UN’s selective recognition buoyed Lumumba’s political fortunes as a Congolese leader, but he began squandering his advantage soon thereafter. By August 1960, Lumumba demanded that non-African ONUC troops, who were believed to be motivated by ulterior, imperialist motives, be withdrawn from the Congo. The next month, as Lumumba’s political legitimacy declined, the Congo’s President, Joseph Kasavubu, and the newly-appointed commander of the Congolese Army, Colonel Joseph-Desire Mobutu, wanted Ghana and Guinea troops expelled from the ONUC. Smelling the political “blood in the water,” Kasavubu and Mobutu protested the pro-Lumumba sympathies of these ONUC contingents.731 While Hammarskjöld respected Kasavubu’s right to contest Lumumba’s legitimacy, Hammarskjöld ignored proposed changes to the ONUC’s composition.

VII

Additional efforts to compensate for any perceived complicity with Western interests included Hammarskjöld’s charting a more independent course for the ONUC in early September. The secretary general began by appointing Rejashwar Dayal as the UN’s Special Representative in the Congo. Dayal was an ardent anti-colonialist and supporter of Lumumba’s nationalist agenda.732 Although Lumumba’s grip on power was slipping, UN officials continued to recognize him as the legitimate ruler even as other

Western powers sought to replace Lumumba. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) drafted plans to assassinate the Congolese leader and supported Mobutu’s 14 September military coup. Lumumba was removed from office and retreated to his residence, where ONUC forces surrounded Lumumba’s compound and prevented Mobutu’s forces from arresting the former Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{733} Thus, the UN’s intervention upset Mobutu’s efforts to consolidate political power and frustrated American efforts to establish a Western-friendly regime in the Congo. Vindication of Hammarskjöld’s handling of these events came on 17 September, when the UN General Assembly rewarded him with a vote of confidence.

During the General Assembly’s emergency session, the scope of the crisis became nearly incomprehensible. Deadlock beset the Security Council over a draft resolution commending the UN’s efforts in the Congo and imploring UN member states to appropriate the funds necessary for continued UN activities while requesting that members “refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order [in the Congo].”\textsuperscript{734} Sensing an opportunity to outmaneuver the Soviet delegation and its Security Council veto of the proposed draft resolution, the U.S. delegation evoked the “Uniting for Peace” resolution to take the matter before the General Assembly. The United States representative, James Wadsworth, reiterated the proposed Ceylon-Tunisian

\textsuperscript{733} Lumumba requested the protection of ONUC troops. See Henry, ed., \textit{Ralph Bunche}, p. 197.
\textsuperscript{734} “Text of Ceylon-Tunisia Resolution in UN on Congo,” 17 September 1960, \textit{NYT}, p. 2. With specific regard to supplying the funds necessary for the ONUC, unofficial estimates projected a cost of between forty and forty-five million U.S. dollars for expenses incurred in 1960 alone for the 17,000 peacekeepers in the Congo. Expenses forecast for 1961 would increase the amount to between seventy to seventy-five million dollars. According to one source, Nations contributing personnel to the ONUC were expected to compensate their own troops. The UN was responsible for any “extraordinary expenses.” The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) stationed along the Egyptian-Israeli border also suffered from budgetary shortfalls. UN member states owed twenty-one million U.S. dollars for the cost of maintaining the 5,300-man force. See “UN Facing Debate on Costs of Military Forces in Congo,” 17 September 1960, \textit{NYT}, p. 2. Geographically speaking, the Congo covered an area roughly equal to that of all Western European countries combined and was home to about fourteen million Congolese. See Mann, \textit{Ralph Bunche}, pp. 287-288.
resolution. As he did so, Wadsworth spoke out against any “unilateral action” that would “obstruct the United Nations effort in the Congo.” The introduction of “personnel or equipment . . . [by] any power,” Wadsworth continued, “would be particularly dangerous.”\(^\text{735}\) Wadsworth was referring to the deployment of Soviet aid to the Congolese government, but his statement rejected any unilateral intervention. The CIA’s plot against Lumumba and support for Mobutu as well as the Belgians’ support for Tshombe were equal if not greater transgressions.

Wadsworth’s approach was the latest in a long series of diplomatic maneuvering during international crises. Rather than objectively pursue multilateral diplomacy, American officials simply relied on the traditional practice of seeking the “multilateral” label to condone the application of a particular agenda. “Unilateralism,” writes historian Melvyn Leffler, “is quintessentially American.”\(^\text{736}\) However, the masquerading of these selfish ambitions also characterized American diplomacy. The Soviet delegation played into its adversary’s scheme by openly criticizing Hammarskjöld and the UN organization for supplanting Belgian colonialism with other forms of Western imperialism.\(^\text{737}\) Sensitive to their own national interests and equally eager to disguise them, the Soviet

\(^{735}\) “Excerpts From Address in General Assembly During Debate on the Congo Situation,” 18 September 1960, NYT, p. 38.


\(^{737}\) “Excerpts From Address in General Assembly During Debate on the Congo Situation,” 18 September 1960, NYT, p. 38.
delegates decided to make the United Nations the scapegoat for the Congo’s political
disintegration. Yet, lampooning Hammarskjöld deflected international attention in a way
that hurt Soviet prestige. By doing so, Wadsworth and many of his fellow UN
representatives sympathized with the secretary general and commended him on his
efforts and his impartiality. Thus, the Americans successfully shifted international focus
away from criticism of the West, and they looked good doing so.

Wadsworth and his contemporaries in the Eisenhower administration did not stop
with blaming the Soviets for obstructing world peace. Privately, American officials in
Washington criticized the Belgian government for supporting “anti-Lumumbist” factions
in the Congo that conflicted with the UN’s agenda. These abrasive policies helped
legitimize Soviet and Afro-Asian claims of imperialist interference. During the same
closed-door meeting, the American advisers credited the UN with maintaining its
impartiality in the Congo as well as “preventing unilateral interventions” while
simultaneously providing an adequate degree of “law and order.”

As witnessed in previous international crises, American policy-makers were quick
to identify the self-interests of other countries and the detrimental effects these policies
had on crisis resolution, but the same officials remained oblivious to their own
government’s role in the crisis. Scholars such as David Gibbs argue that American and
other Western support for Katnaga’s succession in July 1960 was “highly
destabilizing.” The CIA’s plans to assassinate Lumumbia, whom the UN peacekeepers
protected, also prove America’s penchant for acting unilaterally. Blind-spots such as

738 Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Main Elements in the Congo Situation,” 10 January 1961,
1961, the Kennedy administration relied on the Agency for International Development (AID) and the CIA
these convey the hypocritical nature of American foreign policy-making. The fact that
these unilateralist activities were ubiquitous among all the major powers involved in the
Congo crisis made the United Nations’ own intervention imperative.

Once again, however, self-interest prevailed. By mid-February 1961, Lumumba
was caught, imprisoned, and killed after attempting to rally his remaining pockets of
support. On 21 February, the UN Security Council allowed the ONUC “to use military
force, if necessary, to prevent civil war.”\(^{740}\) Safeguards against the UN interfering in
domestic matters were removed, which upset some members of the international
community. After Lumumba’s death, Guinea, Morocco, Egypt (UAR), Ceylon,
Indonesia, and Yugoslavia made preparations to withdrawal from the ONUC. Reasons
included the loss of the legitimate Congolese ruler and a lack of legitimacy in having the
UN participate in the domestic affairs of any state.

Hammarskjöld, Ralph Bunche, and other UN officials persevered. For the next
three years, they continued to stitch together the fabric of Congolese sovereignty. The
world organization paid high price for its efforts. Hammarskjöld’s death in a plane crash
en route to cease-fire negotiations between Congolese and Katangan representatives
threatened to leave the UN leaderless and adrift at a time when it needed Hammarskjöld’s
sense of visionary purpose. UN officials remained vigilant, however. By 1963, Bunche
and 20,000 peacekeepers negotiated Katanga’s return as a province of the Republic of the
Congo and aided in returning stability and prosperity to the country.\(^{741}\) The following
year, UN peacekeepers ended their mission and withdrew.

\(^{741}\) Haskins, *Ralph Bunche*, p. 111.
Spanning roughly the same period of time in which the United Nations was engaged in rehabilitating the Congo, the blending of non-governmental and quasi-governmental organizations continued unabated. One of the newest incarnations emerged in 1960 with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As salvage crews labored to clear the Suez Canal of debris in the spring of 1957, Nasser hosted a conference intent on enhancing Arab influence in the oil industry. One of several recommendations called for establishing an international organization to oversee Middle Eastern oil production. Little came of this idea until 1960 when massive oil reserves flooded the market triggering a price crisis. Plummeting revenues drove Western-owned oil companies British Petroleum and Standard Oil of New Jersey to cut fixed rates upon which they had agreed to divide profits with their Arab partners. Without changes to this “posted price,” oil companies would have to bear the brunt of all profit losses resulting from falling crude oil prices. A month after Standard Oil’s announcement in August 1960, Arab oil producers retaliated by forming OPEC.

The move symbolized a broader, post-Suez crisis trend towards creating exclusive organizations representing national interests. Overnight, OPEC acted on behalf of countries controlling eighty percent of the world’s crude oil exports while consisting of only five founding member states: Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran. Similar to the Western-dominated oil consortium established in Iran after the 1953 revolution, OPEC differed only in scale. Where British, French, American and Iranian

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interests had divided Iran’s oil revenues among themselves to maintain the status quo of international exploitation, OPEC coordinated oil policies among its members to exert their own leverage within the international community. More generally, the founding of OPEC paralleled Europe’s Treaty of Rome in that they both created more exclusive subdivisions within the international community. While perhaps constructive in providing a greater degree of international networking and institutionalism, the potential for creating new and more complex threats to the international system remained.

For example, although Venezuela’s participation provided a modicum of international legitimacy, OPEC cleaved the Arab world in two. In 1957, Nasser’s strategy aimed to assert Egyptian interests in Arab oil politics while overlooking the fact that Egypt itself was not an oil producing country. As energy expert Daniel Yergin phrased it, “It was a case of a ‘have not’ seeking to . . . arouse and shape public opinion . . . of the ‘haves.’” By 1960, segregating Arab interests doomed Nasser’s pan-Arab ambitions. The United Arab Republic became a radical threat to Saudi Arabia’s conservative shift. Indeed, the feud boiled over during the 1962 Yemeni Civil War to the point where Egyptians and Saudis engaged in a proxy war against each other. Some scholars argue that OPEC replaced the Arab League as the “most important consultative forum” in the Middle East. Yet OPEC remained a consultative arena for the haves at the expense of the have-nots.

Like the Treaty of Rome, OPEC’s statute shared a paradox by espousing international integration on the one hand while maintaining an exclusive membership on the other hand. Under Article 31 of OPEC’s guidelines, those who serve the organization

743 Yergin, The Prize, p. 509.
are “international employees with an exclusively international character.” As such, staff must act independently of any government. In his assessment of the organization, Issam Azzam describes OPEC employees as “international civil servants” making them professional equivalent of UN employees despite their representing a much smaller constituent group. Yet, according to the statute’s preamble, the organization is defined as a “permanent intergovernmental organization” committed to “coordination and unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively.”

Contradictions such as these plagued governments and the institutions they created to suit all sorts of interests. Europe sought greater economic and social association. Petroleum producers wanted to synthesize distribution of a single commodity. By the mid-1960s, the United States moved to institutionalize its ideology and cultural identity.

IX

With an appropriate measure of irony, American policy-makers opened a new effort to spread their interests via private institutions when President Lyndon Johnson proclaimed 1965 the “International Cooperation Year” in celebration of the United Nations’ twentieth anniversary. Beginning in January, Representative Dante Fascell (D-FL) framed debate by quoting excerpts from Richard Gardner’s book *In Pursuit of World Order*. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization

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746 OPEC Statute, January 1961, Caracas, Venezuela, Resolution II.6, Preamble and Article 31.
Affairs, advocated the proliferation of “international institutions” where national interests intersected with pragmatic foreign policy-making.\textsuperscript{747} Fascell’s own participation on the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs placed him at the forefront of the trend towards greater institutional networking. By June, Facell and his subcommittee colleagues, Frances Bolton (R-OH), Donald Fraser (D-MN), and Peter Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) introduced a resolution rededicating Congressional support for UN principles while simultaneously promising further “growth of institutions of international cooperation.”\textsuperscript{748}

Controversy followed weeks later when some Representatives questioned the value of the UN’s place in world affairs. Harold Gross (R-IA) labeled the organization a “wind palace that has no principles” and credited the United States with forcing British, French, and Israeli compliance during the Suez crisis. Representative Claude Pepper (D-FL) expressed how “high hopes [for the United Nations] have turned into disillusionment.”\textsuperscript{749} One of the major criticisms was the escalating cost UN members bore for prolonged peacekeeping efforts.\textsuperscript{750}

Speaking on behalf of the subcommittee, Representative Frelinghuysen offered a thoughtful and eloquent rebuttal. He used his opponents’ objections as examples for strengthening the UN rather than weakening it.\textsuperscript{751} In some ways reminiscent of Hammarskjöld’s 1953 Annual Report to the General Assembly, Frelinghuysen commended the organization’s inclusiveness:

\textsuperscript{747} U.S. Congress, House, \textit{Congressional Record}, 89\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 1965, Vol. 111, parts 1-2: 970.
\textsuperscript{748} U.S. Congress, House, \textit{Congressional Record}, 89\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 1965, Vol. 111, part 9: 12850.
\textsuperscript{749} U.S. Congress, House, \textit{Congressional Record}, 89\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 1965, Vol. 111, parts 11-12: 14402-14403.
\textsuperscript{750} For a description of UN peacekeeping overruns regarding both the ONUC and the UNEF, see footnote #77.
\textsuperscript{751} U.S. Congress, House, \textit{Congressional Record}, 89\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 1965, Vol. 111, parts 11-12: 14404.
The UN is a genuine international organization which does not separate the “have” countries from the “have nots” or the big from the small, strong from the weak, or the developed from the underdeveloped, or the capitalist from the Socialist or even Communist. The United Nations has refused to become a handmaiden of any particular alinement [sic] or ideology. This is its strength.\textsuperscript{752}

Built upon the exchange of interests, the UN occupies a unique and essential position in the international system. Although Frelinghuysen and others on the subcommittee tried to transplant this sentiment, their efforts had unintended consequences.

Rather than cultivate a more multilateral perspective to temper the nation’s interests, the subcommittee’s initiative slowly manifested itself into a partnership between the national interest and the agendas of private organizations. On 22 October 1965, Fascell presented a provocative report to Congress laying the foundation for future foreign policy decision-making. The report’s conclusions proved somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, surveys of the country’s private international organizations revealed that they wanted to remain independent of ideological or political influence. On the other hand, these institutions supported government involvement in coordinating programs among various private institutions and “enhancing their effectiveness.” The report went so far as to suggest establishing a federal umbrella agency to direct private organizations.\textsuperscript{753}

While Fascell’s dream of creating such an agency failed, the desire for increased institutionalization of American foreign policy making persisted. In 1967, Representative Gilbert Gude (R-MD) advocated a similar viewpoint when he addressed the Capitol Hill Kiwanis Club. With regard to foreign aid specifically, Gude argued that “the growth of

\textsuperscript{752} U.S. Congress, House, \textit{Congressional Record}, 89\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 1965, Vol. 111, parts 11-12: 14405.

\textsuperscript{753} U.S. Congress, House, \textit{Congressional Record}, 89\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 1965, Vol. 111, part 21: 28610.
intermediate institutions [expanded] the decision making process” while contributing to a
sense of “national consensus” and more responsive governance. While enticing,
Gude’s conclusions, as well as those of many of his colleagues, failed to address a
growing dissatisfaction with a single, unitary consensus.

Political conservatives and liberals expressed their concern over a monolithic perspective. The notion of there being an attainable “national consensus” proved illusive at best, and highly-improbable at worst. Quoting from the venerable Walter Lippmann, a young Representative named Donald Rumsfeld (R-IL) exploited what Lippmann described as “the great consensus” and its being mistaken for “the false consensus[,] which is achieved by manipulating opinion in order to erase opposition to the will of the leader.”

Rumsfeld used Lippmann’s article as cheap political capital for criticizing the Johnson Administration; but the accomplished journalist had tapped into America’s underlying domestic tension of the age.

Leading scholars also observed similar disquieting trends. In her book The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt believed that the most serious problem facing society was an individual’s political isolation from effective governance. Experts, political operators, and insiders held such an advantage in information and resources that individuals could

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754 U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 90th Congress, 1st sess., 1967, Vol. 113, parts 7-8: 10052. Representative Frank Morse (R-MA) read Gude’s speech into the Congressional Record.
not voice or spread their own opinions successfully. Instead, as historian Daniel Boorstin argues in his book *The Image*, first published in 1961, American society manufactured “extravagant expectations . . . of [the American people’s] power to shape the world” which generated a false sense of the real world and the problems affecting it. Like Lippmann’s ominous proclamation of a “great consensus,” Boorstin described how Americans had mastered the ability “to fabricate national purposes when [Americans] lack them, to pursue these purposes after [Americans] have fabricated them.” The Charter statements of the nation’s youth movements during the early 1960s reinforce this general sense of misguided malaise. The Students for a Democratic Society Port Huron Statement of 1962 warns of the resulting demoralization:

The American political system is not the democratic model of which its glorifiers speak. In actuality it frustrates democracy by confusing the individual citizen, paralyzing policy discussion, and consolidating the irresponsible power of military and business interests. . . .

Even students of the ideologically opposed Young Americans for Freedom believed that democracy had somehow gone astray. As a result, these young conservatives believed that greater individual freedom required less government. By the 1960s, politicians worldwide endorsed the expansion of non-governmental and quasi-governmental organizations to spread their interests abroad.

Both Fascell and Gude argued that this very threat justified the need for a more inclusive foreign-policy debate, but the participation of private institutions faced daunting challenges. According to one 1969 study of State Department sub-culture, government

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officials considered “independent outsiders” as a threat to the Department’s monopoly on foreign policy making.\footnote{Andrew Scott, “The Department of State: Formal Organization and Informal Culture,” \textit{International Studies Quarterly}, Vol. 13, No. 1, (March 1969), p. 6.} Fascell’s proposal for government coordination of private, non-government organizations was one way of easing these tensions, but this did not occur until the 1980s. Once it did,\footnote{Iriye, \textit{Global Community}, p. 110.} scholar Akira Iriye argues, a “kind of symbiosis existed between governmental and non-governmental activities, the former focusing on state-to-state aid and the latter on marginalized segments of recipient populations.”\footnote{Iriye, \textit{Global Community}, p. 134. See also Callahan, \textit{Unwinnable Wars}, pp. 215-216.} Yet, even with the input of private organizations, foreign policy activities retained a high degree of conformity. Simply incorporating private organizations into the decision-making process did not necessarily mean adopting a more universal approach. Many scholars such as Iriye and others applaud the new role international organizations created for themselves.\footnote{Iriye, \textit{Global Community}, p. 134. See also Callahan, \textit{Unwinnable Wars}, pp. 215-216.} Unfortunately, the United Nations was not one of these beneficiaries.

XI

Throughout the 1960s, the United States and other Western governments marginalized the role of the United Nations in international affairs as decolonization expanded the number of UN member states. According to one-time UN civil servant, Brian Urquhart, U.S. officials grappled with a paradox where the superpower’s majority in the General Assembly was to oversee decolonization, which in turn destroyed the majority that the U.S. once enjoyed. The efforts of the U.S. and other Western powers to control the pace of decolonization via the UN soon gave way to a more independent
inertia. From 1947 to 1967, ninety-four independent countries joined the United Nations.\footnote{Urquhart, *Decolonization and World Peace*, p. 15.}

Instead of leading these efforts, the West either observed passively or pursued their own controversial strategies for managing these dramatic changes. Having helped establish the European Economic Community, the French government attempted to reign in its colonial possessions by organizing a new federation that was to replace the dilapidated imperial model. Under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, the French Community called for independent home-rule for French colonies, while France retained control over the colonies’ defense, fiscal, economic, and foreign policy as well as the judicial system.\footnote{Bernard Lugan, *African Legacy: Solutions for a Community in Crisis* (New York: Carnot USA Books, 2003), p. 110. See also Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa: France’s Successful Decolonization?* (New York: Berg, 2002), pp. 173-174.} This type of independence without sovereignty was met with mixed reactions. A referendum among French African colonies in the late 1950s endorsed the proposal.\footnote{Lugan, *African Legacy*, p. 110. One possible explanation for this may be due to the favorable ties African economies had with the wider world in the mid-1950s. Profits from exports resulted in hefty reserves of hard currency. See Richard Bissel, “An Introduction to the New Africa,” in *Africa in the Post-Decolonization Era*, eds. Richard Bissel and Michael Radu (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984), p. 6.} Yet, as historian Tony Chafer describes it, French efforts to ease the transition from colonization to independence proved inadequate for “African aspirations.”\footnote{Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa*, pp. 13 and 186. While not a member of the EEC, the British bureaucrats shared similar sentiments as their French counterparts. In L.J. Butler’s words, “well into the 1950s, and even on the eve of the withdrawal from Africa, British officials did display an almost astonishing confidence in their own ability to shape the long-term development of the colonial territories.” See Butler, *Britain and Empire*, p. 193.} French disingenuousness contributed to fourteen African states proclaiming their independence in 1960. Meanwhile, French military forces continued to
protect vital areas of economic and political importance in countries including Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Madagascar.  

Divisions between independent African countries and the West continued into the 1960s and beyond. In addition to fostering intractable political instability in places such as the Congo, African and Western interests encountered deadlock in economic matters concerning the implementation of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). African nations enlisted in this new framework as a result of economic hardships that often accompanied independence. Richard Bissel’s assessment of the NIEO and its “institutionalization . . . in UN [and other] organs” demonstrates how negotiations broke down. This methodical approach to economic revitalization, Bissel writes, “was far more useful for casting blame than for funding solutions, since most of the proposed solutions involved the commitment of massive resources or compromising basic principles by the West to such a degree that the NIEO solutions would not be implemented.” Interestingly, Bissel identifies the OPEC oil shocks of the 1960s and 1970s and the resulting economic stress Western countries felt as one reason for the repudiation of NIEO proposals.

Another, and perhaps the culminating, event that heightened Western disillusionment with the UN General Assembly involved the seating of the People’s Republic of China. In Brian Urquhart’s estimation, the UN vote in 1971 to recognize Communist China’s delegation, after twenty-one years of U.S. stone-wallling, signified “the end of the automatic U.S. majority.” Chinese officials proceeded to use their new position in the world to represent the interests of the developing world. Within roughly a decade of Communist China’s participation at the UN, the country’s membership in other

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768 Urquhart, Decolonization and World Peace, p. 4.
international organizations jumped from around ninety in 1976 to over three hundred by the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{769}

\textbf{XII}

In the wake of the Suez crisis, members of the international community appeared to be insulating themselves in increasingly myopic foreign policies. Once the UNEF arrived in the Sinai and the war ended, delegates in the General Assembly began claiming credit. Arab and Israeli attempts to do so resulted in glaring paradoxes. Enthusiasm shown for pan-Arab solidarity actually fractured the region between Nasser’s United Arab Republic (UAR) and the Iraqi-Jordanian Arab Federation. Israeli Prime Minster David Ben-Gurion tethered Zionist interests to international interests while simultaneously disparaging the international community for appeasing Nasser and his ideology. British and French officials sought to rescue their international prestige by yielding graciously to UNEF forces as they arrived while proclaiming, as the French did, that an international peacekeeping force had been their brain-child.

Americans, meanwhile, prepared to fill a political void in the Middle East that only they perceived. The unveiling of the Eisenhower Doctrine, originally designed to prevent communist infiltration into the region, actually succeeded in upsetting Arab nationalists who showed no communist affinities. Despite misgivings from international relations theorists, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, the Eisenhower Doctrine enjoyed broad

support in the United States. Yet, one of Niebuhr’s main criticisms was how far removed the doctrine was from the pressing realities that threatened the region more directly.

Interaction among policies of mutual exclusion contributed to a series of self-fulfilling prophecies. For example, in its purest form, Eisenhower’s Doctrine was designed to quash any alternative ideologies that might threaten American interests in the Middle East and authorized intervention should any threat emerge. Fed up with the long history of Western policies that presupposed intervention, Arab nationalists united to form associations like the UAR. These types of activities antagonized American policymakers and thus provoked a need for implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine. Roughly two months after the Suez crisis was resolved, the same tensions that had instigated it resurfaced to dictate national policy once again. Such activity served the paradoxical purposes of reinforcing Nasser’s calls for pan-Arab unity while simultaneously justifying America’s direct and indirect intervention in the region.

Within three months of Eisenhower’s declaration, leading states of Western Europe created the European Economic Community (EEC) to elicit greater integration across Europe, thus creating a more formidable bloc in the international arena. Following pan-Arab trends in the Middle East, the EEC created pockets of interdependency that individual states could affect more easily. Although these alliances succeeded in providing a greater sense of cohesion in a globalized world, the relations between the United Nations and its members suffered.

By 1958, a new round of international crises was emerging in the Middle East and other areas in various stages of political flux. The cleaving of Arab nationalism into two rival camps, along with Christian-Muslim tensions, helped trigger the Lebanese crisis as
Lebanese Prime Minister Camille Chamoun attempted to maneuver politically between Nasser’s UAR and the Arab Federation. Civil War forced Chamoun to request outside intervention. Interest in quarantining Nasser’s ambitions led Dulles and others to expand the Eisenhower Doctrine to include threats from pan-Arab fanatics. During Congressional deliberations over the application of the president’s new Middle East policy, some reservations were expressed in smaller private gatherings, but debate in larger chambers was curtailed on the eve of American Marine landings in Lebanon. The absence of genuine debate was a common characteristic of American foreign policy during this period of time. In the case of the Lebanon crisis, defenders of American intervention may argue that Iraq’s revolution made action imperative. Yet, resolving the crisis occurred when the UN General Assembly convened and endorsed the Arab-inspired “Good Neighbor Resolution.” Foreign forces would exit Lebanon in exchange for Arab assurances respecting the sovereignty of other Arab nations.

Two years later, the circumstances that led to the Lebanese crisis reappeared in the Congo during its traumatized transition to independence. Belgian insistence on directing the process left the Congolese isolated without any measurable visceral or intellectual investment. The few Congolese social organizations, permitted by the Belgians, served as the stewards of Congolese political identity. Independence in 1960 left the leaders of these organizations to govern from an almost untenable situation. Internal instability in the Congo fed the competing national interests of not only Belgium, but also the Soviet Union and the United States. As a result, the Congo crisis erupted into yet another international situation demanding UN involvement.
Hammarskjöld’s abilities as an impartial international civil served admirably once again. The ONUC peacekeeping forces sought to achieve three objectives. First, keep individual countries from acting unilaterally in the Congo. Second, keep the Congo united. Third, respect Congolese sovereignty by refusing to intervene in domestic matters. UN officials did well in maintaining these standards of conduct by refusing to endorse any particular agenda that favored one set of interests over another and expanded ONUC objectives only when instructed to do so by the General Assembly.

Specific national interests included Belgian interests in reasserting colonial control in the Congo, as well as Cold War interests of the Superpowers. Mining interests in the Katanga province left many Belgians supporting Katanga’s independence. Unofficial though it was, such support hampered UN efforts to maintain the Congo as a whole. American interests supported UN intervention in addition to devising strategies intent on having the Belgians return to the Congo. Like earlier instances during implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1958 or the numerous examples in the escalation of tension precipitating the Suez crisis, American policy-makers operated from a monolithic mindset. “Overall,” writes David Gibbs, “the relative absence of bureaucratic rivalries during the Eisenhower administration was notable. Officials in the Eisenhower administration with rare exceptions assented to the dominant pro-Belgian, pro-Katanga policy.”\footnote{See Gibbs, \textit{The Political Economy of Third World Intervention}, pp. 86-87, and 91. Italics in the original text. Interestingly, Robert Murphy, Eisenhower’s trusted confidante and one-time U.S. envoy during the Suez crisis, supported Katanga’s independence. For reference to Robert Murphy, see Gibbs’ footnote #95. Gibbs, \textit{The Political Economy of Third World Intervention}, p. 242. See also, O’Ballance, \textit{The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998}, pp. 18-19.} As the Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba associated with the Soviet Union, American officials drafted assassination plans and supported a military coup in the Congo. All of these unilateral activities worked against the United Nations
and its peacekeepers. The General Assembly’s vote of confidence along with the perseverence of UN officials, such as Ralph Bunche, played a pivotal role in salvaging Congolese sovereignty.

The camouflaging of unilateral practices in multilateral contexts as witnessed in the many dealings following the Suez crisis continued into the 1960s and beyond. Employees at OPEC rivaled the international civil servant status of United Nations personnel. In the United States, various Congressional representatives wished to create a closer relationship between government and non-government organizations. In the case of national security interests specifically, consensus and conformity characterized these relations. These developments marginalized the role multilateral diplomacy could play in conflict resolution.

In addition to stifling opportunities for broader multilateral dialogue, these trends also contributed to rising consternation between and within societies. OPEC, for example, crippled pan-Arabism by dividing the Arab world between those countries that possess petroleum reserves and those that do not. American society was also divided between those who monopolized power and those who felt increasingly alienated from the decision-making process.

The combination of these outcomes following the Suez crisis and subsequent crises meant that multilateral diplomacy was becoming the exception rather than the norm. Hannah Arendt’s desire for societies to participate in shared experiences was being misconstrued. While the international community paid lip-service to the UN’s accomplishments in constructively facilitating conflict resolution, many of the same officials undercut these successes by attempting to use multilateral means to achieve
unilateral ends. Over the decades, the United Nations’ identity suffered as these means and ends, which had a long history of subtlety, became increasingly imperceptible.
Conclusion

Understanding the Suez crisis from an internationalist perspective allows for a more comprehensive analysis of the crisis and the central role the United Nations played in its resolution. The proceedings that took place within the UN General Assembly in early November 1956 offered a diplomatic alternative that provided the greatest chance for successful mediation. The temporary ascendance of pluralistic diplomacy was due in part to two key factors. The first factor was the relationship between national interests and the international community as defined by the UN General Assembly. The second factor was the influence exerted by key figures including UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, Indian Ambassador to the UN Arthur Lall, Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson, and others.

For all its success in the fall of 1956, UN and its multilateral negotiations cannot be segregated from the realist world of international relations entirely. Appeals to national interests remained too seductive for commercial entrepreneurs, special interest groups, and political leaders to ignore. From de Lesseps’s dealings in the mid-nineteenth century as he campaigned to construct the canal to the rise of Zionism to the national security interests of the Cold War, various interests competed to represent a broader set of international interests. De Lesseps’s strategy inspired British policy makers and their attempts to portray imperial interests as universally benevolent. The Zionist Theodore Herzl modeled his “Jewish State” on de Lesseps’s Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal. These events played a fundamental role in the escalation of international tensions throughout the Suez Crisis of 1956.
Since its inception, the United Nations wrestled with these two developments and responses to them as characterized by the Arab-Jewish dispute and the decolonization movement. UN negotiator Ralph Bunche gained a first-hand understanding of the brewing Arab-Jewish conflict resulting from Israel’s independence in 1948. Like Hammarskjöld, Bunche’s experience as an international civil servant provided him with a diplomatic awareness that would prove indispensable during the Suez crisis. Both men maintained a sense of objectivity and impartiality at a time when national interests were at their most myopic. Bunche’s role in UNSCOP and Hammarskjöld’s handling of Senator McCarthy’s investigation of U.S. employees in the UN as well as the issue of U.S. prisoners of war in China testify to the new role to which UN staff laid claim. This role was based on using the United Nations as an independent alternative in the pursuit of multilateral diplomacy as expressed in Hammarskjöld’s UN address in 1953.

The emphasis on independence was emblematic of the burgeoning non-aligned movement too. Meetings such as the Asian Relations Conference (ARC) and the Bandung Conference defined the principles of non-alignment which endorsed greater UN involvement as an honest broker in resolving international disputes rather than act as an instrument in the service of the great powers. Although this sense of deference to the UN could be interpreted as simply the most efficient way for newly independent nations to maximize their leverage in international affairs, influential voices from within the non-aligned camp held conflicting views on the matter. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Sir John Kotelawala, supported a more genuine internationalist perspective. Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai were among those that wished not only to manipulate the UN, but
also to monopolize non-aligned gatherings and portray themselves as the movement’s leader.

While the proceedings at Bandung were not eclipsed by Nasser’s and Zhou’s agenda, their efforts were indicative of international relations of the 1950s. Examples preceding Bandung include Iran’s Western-supported coup d’etat in 1953 and the subsequent creation of a “multilateral” oil consortium whose membership included Britain, the United States, France, and Iran. For many non-aligned nationalists, these brazen acts by Western powers justified their suspicions of engaging with Europe and the United States. Additional evidence came in 1955 when British officials began divesting themselves of their imperial holdings in Egypt and Iraq only to reverse course and participate in the Baghdad Pact. France’s imperialist war in Algeria had a similar affect. U.S.-Arab collective security negotiations and the highly-conditional terms American officials attached to them also disregarded Arab concerns regarding anti-imperialist and Zionist ambitions.

Between the autumn of 1955 and the autumn of 1956, the inability of individual states to engage in multilateral diplomacy grew more acute. The collapse of collective security negotiations, and promise of Western munitions that the agreement would have included, left Nasser to negotiate an arms deal with the Soviets. To combat their fears of communist influence in Egypt, Western powers appealed to Nasser’s socio-economic needs in an attempt to win Nasser’s loyalty. The U.S. and British Aswan Dam loan proposal, however, with its stipulations regarding World Bank management of Egyptian finances, remained insensitive to Nasser’s commitment to national self-determination.
Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal and the impasse resulting from the two London conferences led to the further deterioration of multilateral discourse.

Amidst this vacuum of legitimate multilateral diplomacy, the United Nations played a pivotal role in crisis and conflict resolution. Hammarskjöld rebuffed efforts intended to manipulate the UN into condoning military intervention. Moving debate to the General Assembly provided a greater degree of pluralism that remained focused and effective. Pearson’s call for deployment of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to separate the belligerents and re-establish peace combined with Lall’s proposal that Hammarskjöld take charge of the UNEF’s creation and administration helped implement a cease-fire that created a new, peaceful status quo.

Hammarskjöld’s “good faith” agreement with Nasser also aided in UNEF’s success. The deployment of an international peacekeeping force on Egyptian soil threatened to draw Egyptian sovereignty into question. Where foreign intervention had elicited an immediate and negative response by Nasser in earlier situations, Hammarskjöld the UNEF would be responsible in part for protecting Egyptian sovereignty once the force took up its final positions along the Egyptian-Israeli border. In return, Nasser was responsible for the nearly uninterrupted flow of international commercial goods through the Suez Canal. This “good faith” agreement made each party responsible for protecting the interests of the other. As a result, UN sponsorship of multilateral diplomacy helped secure the national interests of individual nations by acting independently of any one set of interests. Egypt got the sovereignty it desired. Western European commercial traffic could navigate the Suez Canal without fear of being seized.
Israel had a protected border with one of its strongest regional adversaries. The United States got at least a temporary reprieve in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

In the weeks and years following the Suez crisis, much of the international community took extraordinary steps to insulate national interests from international interference. Strategies adopted included more traditional methods of making national interests representative of a broader international agenda. The formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the meetings occurring within NATO stressed the need for greater uniformity. The Eisenhower Doctrine targeted communist expansion in the Middle East and was even expanded to include any threats against U.S. interests in the region, including Nasser’s pan-Arab sense of ethno-nationalism. Nasserism, as it came to be known, was another example of usurping an inclusive agenda to serve a single purpose. In doing so, the escalation of international crisis intensified once again.

For example, competition between supporters of Nasser’s United Arab Republic (UAR) and the Iraqi-led Arab Federation precipitated the Lebanon Crisis of 1958. Lebanese Prime Minister Camille Chamoun’s efforts to remain independent of these rival factions were futile. His only recourse was to call on the United States for assistance. Eager to gain international legitimacy for military intervention in Lebanon, U.S. officials deferred to the United Nations not to lead the international community in another round of multilateral diplomacy, but instead to endorse the U.S. course of action as established by the Eisenhower Doctrine. International tensions subsided, however, after the UN General Assembly supported the “Good Neighbor Resolution,” which removed U.S.
forces from Lebanon in exchange for Arab promises to respect the sovereignty of Arab states.

Similar circumstances affected Congolese independence in 1960 and the civil war that ensued shortly thereafter. The UN’s recognition of Patrice Lumumba’s government set the organization on a political collision course with U.S. and European leaders who supported Lumumba’s opposition. Belgian bankers supported Moise Tshombe and the creation of an independent Katanga province, which held precious natural resources. U.S. policy makers also supported for Katanga’s secession and, later, Colonel Joseph-Désire Mobutu’s coup against Lumumba. Despite these unilateral courses of action, UN negotiator Ralph Bunche and the UN General Assembly carried on after Hammarskjöld’s death to enact a cease-fire that respected the Congo’s sovereignty as a single state.

Multilateral diplomacy may not replace traditional diplomatic methods, yet, during the course of events comprising the Suez crisis, UN-led multilateral initiatives proved their value. Pluralistic diplomacy helped alleviate the escalation of tensions in the international community. In doing so, the United Nations served the interests of various nations without subjecting itself to the interests of any one nation. National leaders respected the UN’s legitimacy, but they recoiled from endorsing a more independent role for the organization. Instead, much of the international community resorted to using international organizations to advance a uniform sense of world order. Returning to more genuine expressions multilateral diplomacy has a distinct place in international affairs and may be necessary now more than ever.
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