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EMERGING FROM THE SHADOWS: CIVIL WAR, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND PEACEBUILDING AMONG PEASANTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN COLOMBIA AND PERU IN THE LATE 20TH AND EARLY 21ST CENTURIES

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EMERGING FROM THE SHADOWS:
CIVIL WAR, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND PEACEBUILDING
AMONG PEASANTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN COLOMBIA AND PERU
IN THE LATE 20TH AND EARLY 21ST CENTURIES

by
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CIVIL WAR, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND PEACEBUILDING
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Peacebuilding in Colombia and Peru following their late-20th and early 21st century civil wars is a challenging proposition. In this study, it becomes necessary as indigenous peoples and peasants resist domination by extractive industries and governments in their thrall. Whether they protest nonviolently or rebel in arms, they are targeted for human-rights violations, especially murder, disappearance and displacement. The armed actors, state, insurgency, paramilitaries or drug traffickers, destroy civic institutions (local or regional government) and the civil (nonprofit) sector and replace them with their own authoritarian versions. Therefore, peacebuilding has emphasized rebuilding civic institutions, civil society and local initiatives, also personal relationships across scales and sectors. What has been called “the third side” has become an important resource for the parties materially affected by the conflict, a role well suited to civil society.

I examine peacebuilding across levels of authority, complexity and interaction, as well as across scales such as international, national and local. I also look at peacebuilding
across a hierarchy of human needs and the full complement of human rights. In the centerpiece of the thesis, I focus on case studies from two postmodern ethnographies.

One looks at highland villagers in Peru undergoing Western-style evaluations and treatment for their trauma in the wake of the civil violence and rituals of reconciliation allowing former rebels who abused human rights back into the community. The professionalization of human rights, along with a Western bias in official discourse, has blunted the full affect (emotions) and hidden the full effect of the mass violence from the broader audience. With human-rights professionals in Colombia, this professionalization also came at a price. The costs there were the fissures in the human-rights community across the local-to-national and reconciliation-to-liberation perspectives. Both groups required spiritual and psychological resources to anchor them in the midst of horrific violence. A new ethic and cultural paradigm of “interculturality” could greatly assist conflict resolution and peacebuilding in these situations.

Peacebuilding for the long term depends on sustainable-equitable development; respect for rule of law and transitional justice; retraining state and rogue armed actors; effective land reform; and resettling the displaced.
I want to thank Martha McCollough for her invaluable efforts. I also want to offer my gratitude in particular to the other members of my committee, Stephen Glazier and Robert Hitchcock. I am grateful as well to the Department of Anthropology and the University of Nebraska–Lincoln.

I also owe a debt to Union Theological Seminary in New York, where I received a master’s in theological education and where I first studied liberation theology. In addition, I want to thank my father, Dr. A. D. Flowerday, formerly professor of agronomy at the University of Nebraska, who took his family to Colombia from June 1967 to June 1969, where he was a U.S. Agency for International Development agricultural adviser to Colombia, where my eyes were opened to poverty and racism.
When they resisted Shining Path directives, the peasants were warned that the communal ranch would be burned down just like the [agrarian society] cooperative. The threat obliged the *comuneros* [the members of the collective] to divide all of the animals among themselves and divide the remaining equipment among the neighborhoods of the community. It was a painful decision, executed only out of fear of the reprisals that would result from disobedience. The objective was not only to liquidate all productive projects that might divert the peasants from the path of the people’s war, but also, in the words of *senderista* cadres, “that every type of organization disappear.”


This impact [of FARC] can be assessed not only in terms of its role as *a state with an almost undisputed territorial control and its monopoly expansion of commerce*, providing means of transportation (such as speed boats [mostly for the drug trade]), constructing landing strips, and *adjudicating and arbitrating social and personal conflicts*. This is in addition to providing health and education services. In many municipalities [similar to counties] of these areas, *the only authority, beyond the symbolic state police station in the capital centers of the municipalities, is that of the FARC, and it is the sole provider of essential public services.*


What is at stake in postwar contexts is the reconstruction of social relationships, moral communities, cultural forms, and economic networks, and *the reinvention of ritual life that allows people to make sense of suffering endured and suffering inflicted.*


For the NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] that focused on state-sponsored and paramilitary violence against community activists, simply ending the guerilla violence was not enough. *They argued that without ameliorating the root causes of the conflict – poverty, inequality, and political corruption – the dissolution of the guerillas’ military machine would not lead to a reduction in violence.* Many human rights defenders viewed the peace activists’ slogans, such as blanket rejections of violence and generic statements in support of peace, as a competing discourse that undermined efforts to ensure justice and accountability. In fact, many of the early peace initiatives, such as mass demonstrations against guerilla violence and the symbolic votes [non-binding referendums] for peace, did not address the issues of social reform that NGO activists viewed as the foundation for a lasting peace.

Winifred Tate, *Counting the Dead: The Culture and Politics of Human Rights Activism in Colombia*, 2007
CONTENTS

Chapter I. The Terms of the Discussion and the Difficulties We Face / 1

Chapter II. The History of the Conflict, the Depth of the Violence and the Nature of the Armed Actors / 47

Chapter III. In Search of Peace: Religion, Ritual and Reconciliation in Postmodern Face-to-Face Communities amid Mass Violence in the Andes / 79

Chapter IV. Church and State, Peasants and Indigenous Peoples: Conflict Mitigation, Mediation and Transformation / 144

Chapter V. Lessons Partially Learned: Local, National and International Connections / 183

References Cited / 232

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1: Summary of The Third Side / 245

Appendix 2. Models of Genocide and Mass Violence / 252

Chapter I

The Terms of the Discussion

and the Difficulties We Face
INTRODUCTION

The social and moral chaos that engulfs any community during times of civil war is the result of an exceedingly complex phenomenon, a zone of multi-lateral contention that can become exponentially unstable. Taming this beast with various programs designed to foster peace is an equally complex process. Therefore, isolating a single thesis in this study to explore in any deterministic way, among a multitude of conflicts and interests, is difficult and probably misleading. Still, we cannot explore every facet of a society either, so we have to pare our concerns down to a small handful at most. We will be doing that here by focusing on fundamental issues of social justice, aggression, ritualized and therapeutic healing, social and individual, and the social construction of human rights.

More specifically, as there have been a number of calls lately within peace, equity and development circles to better support civil society, we will be examining those issues closely in our case studies. This is in keeping with a recent call from the UN for the world’s nations to better protect members of civil society. The UN News Centre highlights this issue in a March 3, 2014, article that is headlined: “UN Human Rights Council opens with calls to protect, support civil society activism.” This emphasis marked the 25th meeting of the council. Produced by the UN News Service, the article leads with:

Noting that more and more people around the world are taking to the streets to lay claim to their rights, United Nations officials opened the latest session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva today with calls for the protection of members of civil society who pursue justice in their countries.
Streets, airwaves, entire countries are buzzing with demands for economic, social and political justice,” UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay said, as she opened the high-level segment of the 25th session of the Council, the Organization’s major human rights organ.

[UN News Centre 2014; emphasis added]

In the spirit of this emphasis, we will be taking a close look at civil-society workers in need of better protection and support. In two case studies, we will examine how the professionalization of human rights changes the professionals who do the work, the nature of the work they do and the way the moral knowledge of a given population is socially constructed and interpreted.

Among human-rights professionals in Colombia, we will look at how always being in close contact with death and constantly risking one’s life affects these people. We will do this in Colombia by examining the physical security and mental health of human-rights (advocacy) professionals. In the highlands of Peru, among the people who suffered the most, we will explore the professionalization of state human-rights (trauma-treatment) workers dealing with the severe emotional and spiritual crises afflicting the survivors of the violence as an initiative of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC). There, the civil-sector workers needing protection, that is, validation and support so that they do not become extinct as a social role, are the Native healers called curanderos. They needed to be better integrated into the trauma-treatment process through an intercultural hermeneutical approach. While the trauma counseling was less than wholly successful, another PTRC-supported project was. The National Repentance
Law was effective in encouraging and enabling a public repentance process—an intercultural mix of Native and Christian belief systems—with which to integrate former human-rights abusers back into village life.

Regarding methodology, on the macro-scale, emphasizing etics, we will try to make good use of human ecology, political economy and social anthropology, and on the micro-scale, exploring emics, we will be working mostly in cultural, psychological and belief-systems anthropology, particularly in two case studies. (Etics, how a population actually lives, and emics, ideas about how they wish to live, are ways of looking at behavior and ideas about behavior, respectively. They have been derived from linguistic terminology, for the spoken language, phonetics, and the idealized language, phonemics).

We will restrain such an extensive investigation by looking at victims of human-rights violations and their advocates in various social locations within the broader social organization. We will then explore a few of what might be called moral epistemologies, ways of understanding the relationship of human rights to peacebuilding during and after the violence. We will do this in close quarters through two ethnographies but also ground it in other social-science data. Aside from our two moral analytics, critical theory and a Ricoeur-like “hermeneutics of consciousness,” our main social analytic will be examining peacebuilding at various levels, or scales, from the international level, or macro-scale, to the national level, the meso-scale, and finally, to the historically less explored but increasingly discussed local level, or micro-scale.

Regarding political economy and asymmetries of scale, we should note that each country has been in many ways, and still is in some, a frontier economy in most of the countryside. Frontier justice and semi-feudal (patron-client) relations have long held
sway there. A weak state presence has meant a weak local government and civic structure as well. Civil society and traditional judicial and cooperative institutions have filled this gap in the countryside, but they can be easily overwhelmed, as occurs during mass, pluralistic or civil violence. The introductions of cheap, reliable small arms, training in dirty war, international collusion in the art and science of terror, along with a rush for figurative, and sometimes literal, gold in the form of extractive industries such as mining, oil and gas, timber and plantation agriculture (palm oil, bananas, coffee, cacao and cattle raising, and of course, coca for cocaine), have produced extreme levels of violence and a variety of armed actors, all of whom vie for control and are of dubious legitimacy.

It is a cultural geography and political ecology that is still being “tamed,” that is, bureaucratized, routinized and thereby flattened out socially, ethically and emotionally. This process brings rationality and manageability but it also can diminish the individual or the small group and their suffering.

In particular, we will take a close look at:

- Restoring nonviolent and cooperative relationships among civic leaders and citizens at the village level in the wake of the civil war and its atrocities in the highlands of Peru. These were some of the most abused of the highland peasantry in the poorest parts the country. This face-to-face interaction of the abused and their abusers represents some of the most socially torturous, morally complex and spiritual redemptive aspects of peace building, and among the least-investigated.
• The professionalization of human-rights workers in Colombia, which, besides the NGOs, includes increasing numbers of human-rights staff in government and the military. This development provides increasing credibility for human-rights work but causes tension within and among groups and across levels (scales). Regardless, because of this emphasis on professionalism, in both countries, there is now a much better-educated public and a better-trained human-rights workforce.

Precisely because peacebuilding is so extensive and multi-laterall, we will also explore a number of its other aspects, meso- and macro-scale activities, social, political, economic and ecological. We will do that with more abstract, less narrative data. Those discussions will come later and be broader. Within this latter part of the study (part IV), one focus will be the work of faith-based and indigenous-rights organizations in human rights and peacebuilding. Of great importance in building sustainable peace in Latin America is a maturing Native-identity movement becoming increasingly well established and geopolitically savvy. It has found it can work around unresponsive national governments and gain a hearing with key international groups. From there they can sometimes create enough leverage to stop the violence and build a fledgling peace.

Also of great consequence, especially with a new pope championing the poor and powerless, is a theological movement of liberation, a discourse about rich and poor, powerful and powerless. It has gripped and divided the church, especially in Latin America. Liberation theology represents a deep and searching inventory of the tradition for its support of liberation, for the “least of these,” as Jesus once said of the poor. Its
demise has been celebrated a few times, but chances are good we will be a long time totaling up the number of serious discussions, about politics, religion, economics, even ecology, that liberation theology has transformed, especially in Latin America. So both the indigenous-rights and liberation movements have produced people and institutions that can function in what we are going to call a third-side capacity, actively as mediators, activists and peace communities, or reflectively, as writers, scholars and social critics or analysts. In addition, a number of national and international, NGO and intergovernmental groups have supplied third-side human capital (or capacity) at various times. Any of these might constitute this critical aspect of peacebuilding. It has theoretical and practical implications we will explore.

*Introducing the third side*

Third-side interests are a concept articulated by anthropologist William Ury to characterize an evolving approach to mitigating and ending conflict. Ury has helped popularize conflict resolution in the United States but he has done extensive work elsewhere as well. Particularly relevant for our purposes is that he has made a specific commitment to the resolution of civil wars. With former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, he even founded the International Negotiation Network, dedicated to stopping civil wars, the most common kind worldwide. These sorts of conflicts provide the social context for the analysis of peacebuilding we will pursue.

In *The Third Side*, Ury (2000) argues that a critical factor in resolving intractable conflicts is to bring in the “third side,” those physically, organizationally or systemically near the conflict, those with a critical stake in it. *When they get involved, the issues are no
longer bilateral. They become multi-lateral. This is generally to be distinguished from any independent third party chosen to facilitate negotiations appointed by the state or an NGO. At its best, the fully flexing third side becomes a kind of coalition, formal or informal, of the interests of the community – physical, political or economic. They are weighing in and saying they have every right to do so:

The third side is the surrounding community, which serves as a container for any escalating conflict. In the absence of that container, serious conflict between two parties all too easily turns into destructive strife….

The third side is not a transcendent individual or institution who dominates all, but rather the emergent will of the community. It is an impulse that arises from the vital relationships linking each member and every other member of the community.

[Ury 2000:7,14; emphasis added]

He calls it “a mobilized community acting systematically motivated by a new story” (Ury 2000). Ury offers a social explanation of how the third side works, below. There is also a psychological aspect we should touch upon. We will do that briefly below and in more depth in our case studies.

How does the third side work psychologically?

Another explanation is more psychological but augments Ury’s nicely. It has to do with a notion psychologists and psychological anthropologists refer to as “theory of mind.” It explains how we imagine what others are thinking as a way to anticipate their
behavior. The hypothesis is that we are able to construct parallel selves as tools and heuristics for modeling the behavior of others. These are probabilistic scenarios we run in a psychic virtuality, our imaginations. We use these scenarios to explain and anticipate behavior, and thereby, better meet our needs in various groups, each of which is different, each individual of which is different (Bownds 1999; Bor 2012; Whitehead 2008).

Theory of mind and a related concept, theater of mind – stemming from play rather than work – emerge early in childhood and early in our evolution as well, binding groups before language, in coordination of hunting and gathering, in ritualized song and dance, in trade and other areas (Whitehead 2008). The hypothesis is they paved the way for symbolic and linguistic communication.

Both theories depend on a recent discovery called “mirror neurons.” Initially believed to be activated by the observation of concrete activities such as tool use, they are now thought to also mirror more abstract or social behavior. When we observe an activity that commands our attention and strikes us as useful, our neurons fire in concert with those of the person performing the activity, in the same place in the brain and body, and in virtually the same way as that person, whether the behavior is interpersonal or solitary, social or technical (Whitehead 2008).

This has important implications for social-learning theory, the notion that we can’t learn everything by trial and error, as in classical behaviorism. Instead we internalize and try out various scenarios virtually, imaginatively, as we observe the behavior of others. It also places the birth of consciousness in a matrix of social interaction.

For our purposes, it helps explain how belligerents consumed almost entirely with their pursuit of conflict might be given pause to think about consequences outside their
bipolar world. A capacity to imagine what others are thinking and feeling, and so are likely to do, has helped us achieve our social goals as we mix with a complex variety of people. This may represent a Chomsky-like predisposition to understand the thought and behavior of others not unlike or related to our acquisition of language. The effects of any “theory/theater of mind” on conflict resolution and the efficacy of the third side should be investigated further, particularly as they relate to our understanding of empathy.

*How does the third side work socially?*

Socially, the third side succeeds by using the power of peers, the community of interested parties materially affected by the conflict, the more the merrier. Ury (2000) explains:

> The third side possesses the power of peer pressure and the force of public opinion. It is people power…. It influences the parties primarily through an appeal to their interests and to community norms. In *every conflict, there usually exists not just one possible third party but a multitude. Individually, we may not be able to intervene effectively, but collectively we are potentially more powerful than any two conflicting parties.* Organizing ourselves into a coalition, we can balance the power between the parties and *protect the weaker one.*

[2000:online; emphasis added]

The emphasis on protecting weaker parties as a key to peace is not always explored, but it should be considered integral to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. If weaker parties
and their interests are not protected in conflict resolution, it is largely coercion by other means.

It also succeeds by proceeding from a viewpoint focused on common ground, on shared interests, perhaps using some outgrowth of theory of mind. It operates on the assumption that most issues have more than two sides. They have many. The moral and pragmatic appeal is to the community as an extended family, perhaps engaging instincts for community encoded in our pre-settlement past.

Another pillar is its support for dialog and nonviolence. The focus is on process, on how we deal with our differences as well as what they are about and what the resolution is. It means looking for the limit concept of a “win-win-win” scenario, what Ury calls a “triple win,” satisfying the bi-polar interests and those of the surrounding community. The third side uses multiple roles in various ways, so it will be a good fit with our multi-dimensional, multi-sectoral approach to peacebuilding.

Regarding their contributions to conflict resolution, Ury lists these roles that third sides can play. The following detail various social and psychological services they can provide. (Emphasis added to examples in this study; see appendix 1 for a full explanation from The Third Side web site.)

(1) The provider. Conflict stems from the frustration of basic human needs. Providers share resources and knowledge. They help others feel secure, respected and empowered. This would include humanitarian and human-rights workers, any that provide physical security, food, water, development or land reform.
(2) **The teacher.** Teachers offer lessons in conflict transformation. These may involve an alternative worldview. They teach tolerance and problem-solving. *Various education-for-peace efforts in Colombia and Peru fit this category well.*

(3) **The bridge-builder.** Anyone can build bridges across social, economic or cultural divides by facilitating good relationships. Bridge-builders create cross-cutting ties, develop joint projects and foster dialog. *This category includes church and native leaders reaching out to rebels and the state in hopes of mediation, or state or rebel officials doing something similar.*

(4) **The mediator.** Mediators try to reconcile competing interests. They listen, ask people what they really want and suggest alternatives. They bring parties to negotiations, facilitate communication and help them find solutions. *This role in particular has been performed by various tribes and inter-tribal organizations and by progressives of the Catholic and Protestant churches.*

(5) **The arbiter.** An arbiter is usually appointed by the court and can determine a settlement. Arbiters replace destructive conflict with nonviolence, promote justice and encourage negotiation. *This role is appointed by the court and is generally outside the scope of this study.*

(6) **The equalizer.** Equalizers exercise their influence in particular on the more powerful. They help bring them to negotiations, build a more collaborative democracy and support nonviolence. *Human-rights workers especially provide this service.*

(7) **The healer.** A healer sees the conflict will not be resolved until people and relationships have healed. Healers create the right climate, listen, acknowledge
feelings and encourage an apology. The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s mental-health workers and curanderos fit here, but with different methods and results. The absence of such efforts at healing are evident among human-rights professionals in Colombia.

(8) The witness. These track conflict to keep it from escalating. They speak out and seek help. Witness for Peace (an NGO explored later) is an example of this role.

(9) The referee. Referees limit the size and terms of the conflict. They establish rules for fair fighting, remove offensive weapons and build nonviolent defenses. Peace communities, commissions and committees fit here. Roles stemming from customary law provided by the Nasa in Colombia, examined in part IV, are another good example of this activity. So are the citizen watch and law-enforcement services provided by the so-called rondas campesinas in highland Peru.

All or part of each are represented in this study. Of great significance in particular, Indian and church leaders have served in any number of these capacities in the pursuit of conflict resolution and transformation. (Conflict transformation is the process of managing social and environmental change to minimize conflict, but one that has no definite resolution.) They have also helped to create zones of peace and facilitated negotiations with the state behind the scenes, other third-side roles. For both the peasantry and the remote tribes, critical concerns have been battling transnational corporations for hundreds of years regarding access to natural resources. They most want to protect their lives and lands from exploitive development by petroleum, mining, timber or agricultural interests. For the rural and urban poor, their issues involve the most basic
aspects of development: health care; sanitary water; agricultural and credit cooperatives; literacy and educational projects; and a range of movements for civil and political rights, often focused on land rights and reform or greater autonomy in the local economy.

Land reform has been a contentious issue for centuries. For the indigenous peoples, fueled by a galloping cultural pride, self-determination regarding land and natural resources is an overriding concern. Facing the same kind of threats from extractive industries, but not in the same ways as the peasants, indigenous peoples in the mountains, jungle and savanna frequently fight transnational corporations and national governments for control of their most precious resource, their land, so precious it is not a resource to them. It is the source of all. Or the Source of All, depending. It is therefore not a commodity.

Having tried to escape Western-style “development” for decades, even centuries, many of these remote peoples, having nearly lost that fight, face extinction. They want development on their own terms, but failing that, they increasingly want to be left alone, and their land left alone. But oil and gas, mining and agricultural interests with large budgets, advanced technology and political influence have little intention of doing so.

_Ury and his critics_

Ury and other “popularizers” of conflict resolution have been criticized by a few scholars and practitioners as being simplistic, naïve or otherwise too optimistic. Ury’s breakthrough came with Roger Fisher and Bruce Paton in _Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In_ (Fisher, Ury and Paton 1991). It was of great value in
businesses and boardrooms, in labor negotiations, in family matters and even in environmental disputes. But it was primarily a popular treatment.

_The Third Side_ was published before one such critic, Alan Tidwell (1998), published _Conflict Resolved?_ – his examination of conflict-resolution theory – so he could not address it. But he did offer a relevant opinion on _Getting to Yes_. His most pointed comments are: “These popular texts tend to suffer from the same three criticisms: they trivialize conflict, routinize methods of handling conflict, and undervalue the role that situation and context play in handling conflict” (Tidwell 1998:25). Still, this surely must be true of almost any attempt to help large numbers of people process violent social conflict, then reconcile and at least partially heal after it. The sad fact is it probably has to be abstracted and routinized if we are to help hundreds of thousands, millions if you include the displaced. The question becomes how much flattening of affect and trivializing of effects there is, how much abstraction and routinization, trivialization by bureaucracy, we can afford, before it becomes inhumane itself. We will explore this in our case studies. These popular conflict-resolution books, Tidwell says, underestimate the power of emotions. Individual anger can fester. Social anger can develop over very long periods and can take a long time to resolve (1998; Gerlach 2010).

Yet, by the same token, he apparently is willing to trivialize Fisher, Ury and Paton (1991) when they advise acknowledging your opponent’s emotions. He knocks down a straw man when he proposes we imagine conflict-resolution facilitators telling Nazi perpetrators in a tribunal that a Holocaust survivor needs to ventilate her emotions. He is misunderstanding the more utilitarian reach of the publication and criticizing the content for being targeted at such an audience.
More to the point, however, he criticizes the use of language and in this particular case, he’s probably right. We will be looking at the language of conflict and trauma and its effects on victims a little later. However, there’s a hermeneutical issue as well – a broader issue of matching message to audience across popular, scholarly and practical levels. In general, he criticizes *Getting to Yes* for being a simplified application of a very complex art and science, points well taken in a more philosophical argument. That was its purpose, and it is probably better these ideas are in broader circulation because of it. In his defense, Tidwell is mostly criticizing any naiveté about imbalances of power in negotiations. Just changing language and perceptions may never be all that is required. This is his main concern, and it should be taken seriously.

*Catholic social witness as an emergent property*

The region’s most dominant religious force by far, is the Catholic Church. It applies its own leverage on human rights and peacebuilding, from within and without these two very Catholic countries. But for most of the last 500 years, the church has served as one of the overlords, an agent of colonialism, herding large numbers of Indians into missions and indoctrinating them while exploiting their labor under conditions of bondage or tenancy. There is no way to paint a prettier picture here.

Still, some of these missions saved indigenous peoples (or Native peoples, or Indians), from starvation and massacre. A few notable priests spoke out and began to articulate an ethic of human rights. This history of advocacy for the first peoples of this continent from within the church continues to be melted down and recast. It is a Euro-
American institution, but it is a source of cultural and subcultural pride for disadvantaged peoples facing a large, rights-abusive state.

Eventually, Catholic missionary strategy accepted an overlay of Christian iconography on Native spirituality. This approach to evangelization, and colonization, was eventually acceptable to the Catholic hierarchy and ultimately more appealing to the indigenous peoples. It was also easier, and more humane, than eradicating it. It focused on cultural parallels where possible. This Christianity-dominated mix is sometimes called the popular (or people’s) church. It is a classic example of religious syncretism but not without imbalances in power. Christianity is still the spiritual container and paradigm.

In the spirit of de las Casas, a prominent example of postmodern social action in Latin America comes from Chiapas in Mexico. After a long history of deprivation and violation of human rights, an indigenous rebellion riveted the world, briefly, in 1994. It had a romantic idealism, a moral edginess and a scathing critique of globalization upon the birth of the North American Free Trade Agreement. It also made use of the latest technology, the Internet, to tell a compelling story about poverty and pride.

Chiapas is interesting for our purposes because this eruption of indigenous ire took place where the bishop who showed the most concern for indigenous Meso-America during the earliest, most brutal stages of colonization, Bartolomé de las Casas, lived and worked during the mid-1500s. He is the prophet and paradigm for this kind of social witness. Long before anyone ever uttered liberation theology or international human rights, he was a pioneer in both. He challenged church and state over the abuse of the indigenous peoples and was moved around and marginalized because of it. In recent
memory, Samuel Ruiz, bishop of San Cristobál de las Casas (named for Bartolomé), functioned as a third sider in negotiations with the Zapatistas, as the rebels were called. He has served the Native community there and has often taken up the same kind of advocacy as de las Casas.

Closer to home, related to our case studies, that is, Gustavo Gutierrez (1973), a Peruvian from an indigenous background, is considered the father of liberation theology. He wrote the founding volume, *A Theology of Liberation*. It gave this theology a theoretical footing it has not really relinquished. Noteworthy as well is another exemplar and founder, Colombian theologian, activist and guerrilla Camilo Torres, a Jesuit sociologist from an aristocratic family in Bogotá who felt driven from the academy for his views. He then founded a major group of guerillas and was killed in his first battle. But he left behind an important legacy of action and reflection – the twin methodological poles of liberation theology. His *Revolutionary Priest* offers action to Gutierrez’s reflection (which itself was instigated by many social actions for and by the poor). Torres’ theory and practice was a precursor to some of the more philosophical approaches to liberation theology.

In addition, especially germane to our purposes, we should note that there have always been rebellions against this colonial-neocolonial form of social organization, and there have always been symbol systems adopted by the state, the wealthy and the military with which to put them down. However, within any insurgency also flows a well of symbolic resources, a tapping of the collective unconscious perhaps, and understanding the dialectic between them we might call a hermeneutics of consciousness. It explains how, as with liberation theology, the traditional symbol system can be adapted for the
rebels as well as for the elite, for the (relatively) innocent villagers, as well as for (relatively) guilty armed actors. We will examine this later in more detail.

These rebellions were almost always brutally suppressed and innocent people inevitably died. But in their wake, a clear mission was born regarding human rights. 

*Alongside the physical assault on the state’s monopoly on violence, which often failed, came an intellectual and moral assault on the state’s – and the elite’s – monopoly on mind and morality, which, at least in part, succeeded.*

Assisting this process, against the grain of the cultural and political dominance of a conservative church managed largely for the elite, in the second half of the 20th century, a theology of liberation began championing the poor and downtrodden, especially peasants, Indians and the urban poor. This movement, largely European early on, saw those descended from Native peoples as members of an oppressed class and assumed the goal was assimilation. Since the 1980s, however, strongly influenced by indigenous activism and idioms, it has become increasingly supportive of Native spirituality and lifeways, on their own terms and in dialog with Catholicism.

In general across Latin America, indigenous traditions and specialists are increasingly allowed and expected to flourish on their own. Emblematically, among other syncretistic events, religious specialists from different traditions have performed public rituals together. This is in addition to formal and informal education regarding other traditions. It represents the beginning of an intercultural approach within the Catholic Church.

One of the developments with potentially widespread consequences has been the emergence of a number of centers for research and practice in what is known as *indigenous theology*. These have flourished throughout Latin America but especially in
the Andes. They have less to do with public demonstrations of belief and more with a mix of deep research into the native traditions and the development of an appropriate hermeneutics, on one hand, and the theory and practice of social engagement, on the other. Where collaborations of these two primary third-side actors (progressive Catholics and Native activists) has probably had the most public impact has been in the sponsorship and coordination of a variety conferences, workshops and social action emphasizing interculturality and peasant and indigenous rights. In pursuit of this, an increasing number of theorists and practitioners are pioneering a still-Catholic project that seeks to become embedded in native cultures and use a given spiritual iconography in ways that do no violence to the culture it is seeking to bond with.

This is surely a challenge, but, if not performed as cultural imperialism, it should represent intercultural inroads. Some of the main movers behind this project are indigenous Catholics who have been trained as catechists, seminarians and novitiates. Indigenous religious specialists are also involved. Among its primary projects are to compile the written and oral traditions and organize the fables, myths and wisdom literature. They then look for ethical parallels between/among traditions and any expression of them in a corresponding set of symbols, stories, rituals or myths. Outreach from these centers has been a galvanizing experience for those of native descent in part because, as some have put it, Indians in Latin America have had 500 years to get used to some form of syncretism, often of their own making.

The implications here cannot be fully anticipated. They will play out over the long term (half to full centuries) and will produce excellent material for future research. However, they are outside the scope of this study. It is safe to say the mixing and
remixing of religious traditions are more thoroughgoing and far-reaching than most North Americans can easily grasp. The main lesson is that the native identity and liberation movements have put spirituality into intellectual, ritual and social practice and increasingly are learning to do it together. Klaiber 1998; Cleary 1997).

MODELS AND DEFINITIONS

Before we look at our cases in Colombia and Peru, we should examine some of the major models of peacebuilding and various ways to institutionalize conflict resolution¹. As for the significance of this kind of modeling, we also want to emphasize that peacebuilding has become especially critical following the world’s most widespread form of violent conflict, civil war. Such efforts become increasingly critical when considering that virtually half the countries that get help restoring their societies to nonviolence do not achieve that goal. Moreover, nearly three-quarters of peacebuilding initiatives take place with authoritarian governments still in power, with at best a sketchy plan for transition (both facts from Barnett et al. 2007).

Nevertheless, a major success has come from this effort. The concept and its activities have become institutionalized. This process of putting down bureaucratic and political roots can only grow with the realization that failed states represent a serious threat to global peace and stability.

As such, the notion of peacebuilding emerged distinctively in the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly as a Norwegian sociologist, Johan Galtung (1969), using social-conflict theory, began to talk about the need to deal with the factors behind violent
conflict. He advocated transforming social and political structures to create more equitable social, cultural and economic systems. Models, definitions, explanations and justifications have proliferated since. This has complicated the issue but has produced a theoretical richness as well. Some key models and their main factors follow.

The UN on peacebuilding

The concept of peacebuilding has become increasingly important over the last few decades, particularly in the wake of the Cold War – in which a tense but largely stable status quo maintained by two superpowers fractured into many small violent conflicts, most of them within national borders. In 2000, the UN’s Brahimi Report on Peacekeeping Reform reworked a definition from the Boutros-Ghali administration and said: “Activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war” (UN 2000). At the World Summit in 2005, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan supported this definition when he established the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

Governmental and intergovernmental models

Along the peacekeeping-to-peacebuilding continuum, UN agencies have lined up behind various but related core concepts, as have the developed nations. Barnett et al. (2007) note variations on a theme with key international and developed-world players. For example, the World Bank refers to postconflict reconstruction and recovery. The IMF uses the same phrase. The European Union uses crisis management, as well as
conflict prevention, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Is definition emphasizes prevention, based on a viable economy and functional social, political and judicial institutions.

Alongside these descriptions, the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has advised that peacebuilding emphasize “building relationships as well as institutions and structures; civil society participation and local ownership; and coordination and integration of multiple actors, sectors and disciplinary approaches” (Lambourne and Herro 2008:277; emphasis added). In 2001, the UN’s Security Council said both short- and long-term activities should focus on “fostering…institutions in areas such as sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence” (Lambourne and Herro 2008:277). Summing up this part of the discussion, we can use an inventory done by the UN in 2006. It classified the components of peacebuilding as: (1) security and public order; (2) justice and reconciliation; (3) governance and participation; and (4) socio-economic well-being (Lambourne and Herro 2008). Upon examination, virtually all have implications that are broader and longer term than one might think at first.

Scholarly models

Regarding the evolution in scholarly thinking about peacebuilding, Oliver Richmond (2010) outlines four generations of theory and practice:
• The first came from political science and emphasized conflict management and the rule of law by nation-states within their own territory, a largely Westphalian, sovereignty model.

• The second highlighted conflict resolution and was founded on the work of international-relations scholar John Burton (1990). Its pluralist approach to conflict resolution says that conflict is rooted in critical human needs and is generated by preventing their fulfillment.

• The third derives from sociologist Johann Galtung (1969). Its focus is on the transformation of a society through peacebuilding and statebuilding. As a fundamental cause of conflict, it seeks to redress social conflict between haves and have-nots, especially that leading to state failure and the collapse of rule of law.

• The fourth is conditioned by critical theory and poststructuralism. It is drawn from the critical thinkers of the Frankfurt School, from the postmodernists and from progressive literary and cultural studies. It looks at responses to conflict that emphasize liberation from domination and focuses on grassroots or hybrid efforts that avoid the cultural dominance of the “liberal peace” agenda and its top-down assumptions.

We will use some or all of these models as we investigate the prospects for peace in Colombia and Peru.
HOLISTIC MODELS, CRITICAL FACTORS AND DYNAMICS OF SCALE

Summarizing a number of studies, Lambourne and Herro (2008) offer an overview of the following critical factors in successful peacebuilding. They help us look at a range of constituencies, sectors and activities that need to be built into a lasting peace. We will select some of these for a closer look later, especially the meso- and micro-scale phenomena (emphasis added to those involving such activities).

A holistic model

- an effective system of communication, consultation and negotiation;
- peace-enhancing political, economic and security structures and institutions;
- *an integrative political–psychological climate, the software of peacebuilding*;
- a critical mass of peacebuilding leadership; and
- a supportive regional and international environment (Reychler 1999).

A multi-dimensional model

- absence of physical violence;
- *elimination of political, economic and cultural forms of discrimination*;
- self-sustainability;
- high level of internal legitimacy and external approval; and
- *propensity to transform conflicts constructively* (Reychler 2004).

A comprehensive plan

- national security;
• regional security;
• “quick wins” [negotiating “low-hanging fruit”];
• rule of law and constitutional consent;
• right to property;
• democracy or wider participation; and
• genuine moral and psychological reconciliation (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).

The keynote is that, as with the mass violence it follows, peacebuilding involves a complex and varied set of actors, sectors and interests. The relevant factors in each situation are specific to context. Because that statement opens up many questions, we have chosen the satisfaction of basic human needs as a key analytic with which to discover patterns and relationships basic to a multi-dimensional, contextual approach to peacebuilding. Another will be to organize these systems according to scale and complexity and explore relationships across levels of social and political organization.

An emphasis on local and interpersonal processes

In keeping with our emphasis on micro-scale analysis, Lambourne and Herro feature John Paul Lederach (1997, 2000). He has focused a great deal how war, especially civil war, destroys the social and cultural fabric and how this creates mistrust and division in formerly productive or supportive relationships. In addition to a focus on resolving the social and political issues driving violent conflict, he has emphasized that conflict can be transformed by the bridge-building involved in interpersonal relationships. This could involve face-to-face encounters of both leadership and rank-and-file, and something
similar with the public. They should be designed primarily as cultural-exchange experiences – with a given agenda and structure – but also have time for private, even confessional, moments. Something similar along vocational or disciplinary lines could be arranged.

Lederach notes that peacebuilding takes place within a time- and place-specific social context, a matrix of many variables. Peacebuilding should not be general and top down, in other words. As much as possible, it should be specific and bottom up. This means, for one, that sensitizing any program to the hopes, fears and needs of the local population has to be a basic part of preparing for any role or mission. In keeping with this local emphasis, it also needs to examine the role of another critical player: civil society (Lederach 1997). This sector may be especially effective as a conduit between levels and across scales.

This process of “devolving” the accountability for peacebuilding to the lower levels of the social structure mirrors a move within Latin American nations to do the same with judicial and political power. It has been called a democratization of peacebuilding and cannot be viewed as any linear throughput system. As with the mass violence it seeks to treat, it conforms as much to chaos theory as to any basic functionalism, simplified conflict theory or rudimentary systems approach.

In “The Political Economy of Peace Building: A Critical Theory Perspective,” Michael Pugh also says that “the ownership [control] of peacebuilding needs to be embedded in local communities.” In creating a “context of regeneration and peacebuilding,” he says “[reconstructing] civil society can be understood as building
trust, cooperation, compromise, inclusion and pluralism through non-state associations of all kinds” (2005:121; emphasis added).

Accordingly, the relationship between the international community, the intergovernmental community and the local and national users of peacebuilding resources has become an important area of concern. In light of this, the international donor and investment community, including the World Bank, has increasingly promoted ways for donor organizations and NGOs to get together to discuss local and civil-society objectives in peacebuilding, not always one with policy at the local or national levels, according to consultant Catherine Barnes (2006).

Barnes (2006:25) works with the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), civil-society organizations helping stakeholders develop conflict-prevention strategies. She too says that if peacebuilding is to be well accepted and lasting, “local ownership…is likely to result in more legitimate processes and sustainable outcomes [than national or international efforts].” GPPAC subsequently supplied critical background for an International Peace Academy initiative with civil-society organizations on the challenges of democratizing peacebuilding and ways to involve them as a more equal partner with states and intergovernmental agencies (Issaka and Bushoki 2005). They said that states generally cooperated with NGOs as long as their needs were met first. When civil society asked for practical and moral considerations in return, they were not always there. A classic example is President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia and his closed-door approach to its peace and justice law, in which paramilitaries were pardoned if they laid down arms and from which human-rights NGOs
were shut out. The report urged that central governments see civil-society
organizations as partners, not rivals (Eide et al. 2005).

In “Peacebuilding, the Local and the International: A Colonial or a Postcolonial
Rationality?” Vivienne Jabri (2013) looks into the complex issues of agency, scale and
social location in peace and justice work. She outlines a few important ways to
understand the gap between the local and the international levels and models for bridging
it. These are:

- A critical-inquiry approach that highlights local peacebuilding as a more
  authentic representation of the majority of the people. This is a reaction to the
  failure of the so-called “liberal peace project,” which Mac Ginty (2008) says has
  privileged the efforts of international organizations.
- A post-liberal approach that proposes a hybrid of international and local
  approaches (Richmond 2010);
- A capacity-building approach that reframes the local-international dichotomy and
  wants to reinvent the discussion with dialog and reciprocity on the ground. In this
  view, capacity building is a function of interactions and relationships, not entities,
  so it cannot be located in one sphere or the other (Chandler 2012); and
- Jabri (2013) proposes a transitional “postcolonial international” approach, in
  which she highlights the transition from a colonial to a postcolonial mentalit.
Pressure from the local and national levels has produced a new sensitivity at the
international level to local needs and prerogatives.
What most can agree on is that it revolves around creating institutions that are, in the terms of Barnett et al. (2007:49), “democratic, transparent, accountable, and responsive to local needs.”

In pursuit of a systematic approach to peacebuilding, having looked at spatial relations, Barnett et al. (2007) also offer a basic temporal analysis. They outline three phases of peacebuilding: stability creation, restoration of state institutions and the socioeconomic dimensions of conflict.

*Creation of stability*

These activities, the “first dimension” of Barnett et al., entail the need to “reinforce stability and discourage the combatants from returning to war” (2007:49). Here, peacebuilding picks up before peacekeeping leaves off. The first task is to maintain a peace accord, ensuring combatants do not re-engage in political violence. It then involves returning combatants to a viable civilian life, without which they may have any number of reasons to resume the violence. Underlying causes have to be addressed and powerful players abusing such power reined in or at least restricted. Our exploration of the dynamics and activities of human-rights workers in Colombia especially belongs in this phase, but so does the treatment of trauma and the reintegration of former combatants in Peru, without which, stability is much less assured.

The professionalization of human-rights work, then, is peacebuilding. But it entails many interpersonal or systemic complications within and across scales. The nature of the victims highlighted and the perception of human-rights violations as individual or collective can set the tone for the social construction of human rights and peacebuilding.
We will therefore be looking at the nature of these relationships and their implications for models of peacebuilding going forward.

With this in mind, in our first case, we will examine face-to-face reconciliation in the highlands of Peru, a process involving an expiation and public repentance by former genocidal insurgents before the community can take them back, a process supported by a national “repentance” law. As this involves a re-establishment of faith in local judicial norms and authorities, it belongs in the next phase as well, rebuilding faith in institutions.

In Colombia we will take a close look at how the extraordinary interpersonal, political and ethical tensions inescapable in human-rights work serve as a bonding, even spiritual, experience, but also how they can drive people apart into smaller, more contentious groups via splintering and fissioning. Because these events take place early in the process of peacebuilding, they have critical social, political and psychological implications for the subsequent rebuilding of social and political institutions that Barnett et al. (2007) outline. The basic premise for the long-term relevance of the two case studies is that peace needs to be built by whole (or healing) people working within holistically rebuilt (or healed) relationships and institutions.

In this long-term socioeconomic phase we will investigate sustainable-equitable development driven from the grassroots as a fundamental factor in lasting peacebuilding. This has been morally, emotionally and pragmatically supported of late by advocacy from both the Native-identity and progressive-Christianity movements and, increasingly, as an intercultural mix. In this part of the study, we will look at a number of cases and examples, but in the interests of space, mostly in overview.
Restoration of institutions

This phase is focused on re-establishing the legitimacy of public institutions (both state and, importantly, local). It entails building or rebuilding institutional capacity in public goods and services such as communication, transportation and utility networks, also health, legal and educational services (Barnett et al. 2007). It also often entails rebuilding the management skills, vision and ethics of the major economic players and institutions.

In our in-depth analysis, we will look at this in Peru among highland villagers as they reclaim traditional judicial and conciliation roles. In Colombia, we will examine human-rights professionals risking their lives and reputations as they confess their faith in their work, suffer, bicker and splinter on the local and national levels, building and rebuilding a human-rights infrastructure, then come together at the international level over the best way to engage the international community. In the study of human-rights workers, we will highlight the fact that the professionalization of human-rights work means that new institutions are being created within old ones as civil-society and governmental groups develop norms for mitigating and ending the violence. In both cases, intensely held differences stemmed from a reconciliation versus a liberation approach, complicated by the visceral tension and emotional drain of the political and cultural complexity of building peace amid civil chaos.

In both situations, many of the crucial decisions took place at the national and international levels using Euro-American ideas, ethics and symbols. In looking at the chances for first-class citizenship for indigenous peoples and their descendents, in one look at local needs, for example, within this discourse we still find, after participating in
talks in Geneva that produced an innovation in human-rights institutions, a very unhappy indigenous activist and an equally disgruntled union leader. Though hailed by the national and international NGOs as a consensus-building breakthrough, both activists felt the process was a waste. The lobbying was intended to bring a special rapporteur (reporter) and subsequent international attention to address human rights in Colombia. It failed but a partial solution, an in-country office of the human-rights commissioner, was found (see page 91).

*The socioeconomic phase*

This phase involves making peacebuilding as long-term as possible. Building and rebuilding institutions of conflict resolution, rule of law and sustainable development are the main issues here. Peacebuilding at this stage can involve anything from transitional justice to social or interpersonal reconciliation to various kinds of counseling (personal, job, work, group, etc.). It also includes inter- and intra-community negotiations, a rebuilding of civil society, respect for human rights, better ecological awareness and women’s empowerment (Barnett et al. 2007).

A crucial part of peacebuilding for our purposes is the empowerment of indigenous and peasant communities (Mac Ginty 2008, 2012). These efforts often rely on local or traditional spiritual leaders and highlight community and interpersonal relationships. Mac Ginty (2012) characterizes the prevailing international approach as privileging elites in exclusive, boardroom-style deals that ignore historical and social context and rely on values from the corporate sector. These tend to use people, ideas and resources from the outside.
PEACEBUILDING AS A COMPREHENSIVE, MULTI-LEVEL MODEL

A well-regarded scholar and practitioner of peacebuilding has laid out a conceptual framework for scalar analysis along the lines we just discussed. As noted above, John Paul Lederach, professor of international peacebuilding at Notre Dame, examines peacebuilding leadership at three levels. He calls these “top,” “middle-range” and “grassroots” leadership (Lederach 1997). The difference from those outlined above is the inclusion of international and national actors in both top and middle levels. He then separates each into official or highly visible leaders and those that are less official or dominant, more persuasive (media) or educational (higher education). He acknowledges the crucial role of international leadership, but his focus is the national level because he believes it holds the key to tapping the resources of the local level, which he views as the foundation of sustainable peace.

He says the top level consists of a few important political and military leaders. It may also include prominent religious leaders. The middle level is made up of a larger number of well-respected leaders in fields with more pedagogical, voluntary or private-sector roles, such as health, education, business or agriculture. These also may come from the academic, humanitarian or religious sectors.

The bottom, or grassroots, level consists of the masses and common folk, those most affected by the civil violence, in this case, peasants, Indians and the urban poor, the latter often former peasants. Lives at this level are often governed by a struggle for survival and a focus on primary needs such as good food, clean water, adequate shelter and physical safety. The key players here are frequently leaders of indigenous, peasant, worker or
neighborhood organizations. They may also be managers of relief or refugee agencies. Most important, leadership at this level is in close touch with most of the survivors. These kinds of connections should be of interest to anthropologists, as they cross many social scales, human needs and human ecologies – a cross-cultural sweep. These often are matters that can be understood in terms of community and face-to-face relationships.

The significant issue for our purposes is Lederach’s premise that the middle-range leadership is in a crucial position. Of the three groups, it can best coordinate with the other levels. In other words, it can prioritize information and activities across scales. On the other hand, it does not have the numbers and nominal moral authority of the grassroots, nor the administrative authority or political clout of the top. But in many ways, while squeezed by the demands of the other two, this level sees social problems in the most multi-dimensional detail (Lederach 1997). It also absorbs a great deal of the tensions associated with spanning these three levels of reality, power and access, as we will see among health workers in “the trauma industry” in Peru and among human-rights workers in Colombia.

In a critique of the top level, Lederach (1997) notes that actions at this level are generally top-down. National military and political leaders agree to stop the fighting, then disarmament begins. Given the relatively superficial nature of these deals, most of the details have to be determined. Lederach explains:

As we shall see, this scenario contrasts sharply with the kind of peace process envisioned under a more comprehensive framework, which assumes an interdependence of levels that involve multiple tiers of leadership and [multiple tiers
of] participation within the affected population and that integrate simultaneous...activities.

[1997:46; emphasis added]

The challenges facing leaders of the grassroots level are the large numbers of people needing help, the all-too limited budgets available to help them and the unrelenting pressures of everyday existence on these people keeping them from more effective mobilization.

Top-level processes are well documented by news media and history books. These have been effective in stopping the worst of the violence in selected cases (Lederach 1997). But the bulk of the work on the cultural, political and economic infrastructure remains. This is especially true for the peasants, indigenous peoples and urban poor, for any near the bottom of the social ladder.

A key activity at the middle range involves problem-solving workshops, one of the most consulted and evaluated of means. They often make use of third-party facilitators. Participants are generally considered “opinion leaders” but do not include top-level leadership. These discussions are generally informal and off the record. They facilitate direct interaction with adversaries and provide flexibility by offering alternatives out of the public eye. We will look again at their value in the summary.

These sorts of efforts led to the agreement between the PLO and Israel in 1993, a move toward peace in Northern Ireland in the mid-1990s and a peace accord in 1996 in a brutal conflict in Guatemala involving indigenous genocide. Mid-level actors are
especially appropriate for facilitating such workshops because they know the local situation in detail, yet have access to top-level decision makers.

Another defining characteristic of middle-range activity would be conflict-resolution training. It generally involves two main goals: raising awareness about multi-dimensional conflict and teaching concrete skills in analysis, communication, negotiation or mediation. In contrast to problem-solving, conflict-resolution can be taught across levels, classes, groups and sectors, Lederach (1997) says. He cites models from South Africa, the former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland and the Nairobi Peace Initiative of the Africa conference of churches in central Africa. These sorts of education for peace efforts have been strong and varied in both Colombia and Peru.

A third important activity at the mid-range is setting up peace commissions. Lederach (1997) cites examples of the value of these groups from Nicaragua of the mid-1980s, Central American of the late 1980s and South Africa of the late 1990s. The first two involved a settlement regarding government, autonomy and land use on the Nicaraguan coast and a ground-breaking Central American peace accord that marked the end of the region’s civil wars. In South Africa, following apartheid, an outgrowth of the national peace committee was the formation of several regional and local committees. These involved monitoring and communication systems that could detect mass violence in its early stages.

In Colombia, the Inter-Church Justice and Peace Commission (CLJP), composed of representatives from Catholic, Presbyterian and humanist organizations, has advocated for respect for human rights for more than 20 years. CIJP has worked for truth and reconciliation, transitional justice and reparations. It has concretely promoted a
negotiated solution and a truth and reconciliation commission (Peace Brigades International 2014). While these efforts may have, at long last, produced results in Colombia in the long term, Peru offers an exemplary version of such a commission from the stage of peacebuilding entailing a restoration of institutions.

Lederach (1997) then outlines key activities of the grassroots level. The bottom-up approach should hold the most potential for sustainable peace, he says, but it is much harder to organize. Still, he argues that the most effective peacebuilding efforts in civil conflicts of the past two decades have come from grassroots movements. This is especially true in Latin America. He also notes that these efforts often finally pay off once the conflict has exhausted the nation and its leadership, also largely true in both countries we examine. An especially interesting development from an anthropological perspective is the increasing use of traditional community leaders such as tribal elders to facilitate conflict resolution.

Lederach documents these in Somalia. While not leading right to a viable government, these and similar efforts brought a transitional national government by the early 2000s and a provisional constitution in 2012. He notes:

These conferences not only dealt with issues of immediate concern at local levels, but also served to place responsibility for interclan fighting on the shoulders of local leaders and helped to identify the persons who were considered…rightful representatives of those clans’ concerns. Having achieved this initial agreement, it was then possible to repeat the same process at a higher level with a broader set of clans. Characteristic of these processes were the reliance on elders; lengthy oral
deliberations (often lasting months); the creation of a forum or assembly of elders…careful negotiation over access to resources and payments for deaths [reparations] that would reestablish a balance among the clans. [1997:53; emphasis added]

Colombia provides a close approximation of these councils of elders in the exercise of community justice in many villages. Zapata (2006) believes it provides an important cultural resource for conflict transformation. She cites Edgar Ardila of the National University in Bogotá, who says that community justice involves customary (traditional) law and other judicial traditions rooted in Andean village culture. He classifies these as equity conciliation (conciliacion en equidad), peace from justice (justicia de paz) and indigenous jurisdiction (jurisdicción indígena). Decisions by these groups have legal standing, and their customs and judgments come from traditional norms and means of justice. Most are volunteers, they do not have to have legal training and their rulings are equivalent to those of a judge. Many Colombian scholars and activists believe community justice can bring cultural sensitivity to the judicial system, that it represents a democratization of justice, an empowerment of civil society and the building of a sustainable peace (Zapata 2006). Similar activities are longstanding in Peru, especially in conjunction with peasant organizations called rondas campesinas. We will explore these below.

As we are emphasizing in our case studies, grassroots activity can precede or follow a peace agreement, often representing clear resistance to the dominance of the armed actors and so placing its operatives in danger, as we will see with rights workers in Colombia. In
Mozambique, programs such as “Preparing People for Peace,” sponsored by the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM), and the “Circus of Peace,” run by UNICEF, took root before the formal peace. The CCM initiative started with a national conference of church leaders from all provinces. These then conducted seminars at the local level. Discussion focused on religious views of war and peace; church and family efforts for peace; helping the displaced (refugees) and securing their return; land access and reform; health and environment; human rights; and the effect of mass violence on children.

The Circus for Peace was a traveling show, followed by a forum, with an emphasis on youth. Using theater and art, it dramatized key features of violent conflict and modeled conflict-resolution skills. Among its benefits, likely owing to the emotional resources of both drama and art, was helping the audience to grieve. It documented the people’s concerns and prepared them mentally and emotionally for peace, including allowing those who had suffered terrible losses to process their grief into constructive activity rather than revenge.

A third model involved the Christian Health Association of Liberia. It addressed conflict resolution within the health-education efforts it had historically pursued regarding trauma. These focused on limiting prejudice and enhancing community decision making. Staff included health officials, conflict-resolution trainers and psychological professionals. We will look at a similar efforts in Peru. These programs make use of existing networks and associations in religion and health and focus on processing trauma, particularly among young people, to build a long-term peace. To be effective, they focus on the behaviors and attitudes of those who lived closest to the
violence and those who were their adversaries. About these dynamics and programs designed to treat them, Lederach believes:

War at this level is experienced with great immediacy, both in terms of violence and trauma endured and insofar as people live in close proximity and continued interdependency with those who were, and may still be, perceived as enemies. This is not a matter of political accommodation at the highest levels; rather it involves interdependent relationships in the everyday lives of considerable numbers of people... The process of advancing political negotiation at polished tables in elite hotels, while very difficult and complex in its own right, is both a more formal and more superficial process than the experience of reconciliation in which former enemies are brought together at the village level.

[1997:55; emphasis added]

Lederach’s last important lesson for this study involves moving from an understanding of issues to an analysis of systems. This involves moving outward concentrically from issues to relationships and to subsystems, then to whole systems. These often must be examined on a case-by-case basis, but the general pedagogical principle is the nested paradigm that includes all the levels and can relate one to another up and down the scale.
Human needs are a powerful source of explanation of human behavior and social interaction. All individuals have needs that they strive to satisfy, either by using the system…or acting as a reformist or revolutionary. Given this condition, social systems must be responsive to individual needs, or be subject to instability and forced change (possibly through violence or conflict).

– Roger Coate and Jerel Rosati, Preface to The Power of Human Needs in World Society, 1988

If one of the most critical issues regarding peacebuilding is its complexity and the holistic demands of that complexity, it makes sense to approach it in terms of fulfillment of human needs. A human-needs analysis allows us to be somewhat reductive – “fundamental” would probably be a better term – focusing on a manageable number of variables, and holistic at the same time, looking at issues across an array of needs, capacities, rights and scales.

A number of scholars have addressed human needs as a system, including one prominent in peace studies, John Burton. Another, perhaps best known for popularizing a hierarchy of needs, is psychologist Abraham Maslow. However, both owe a great deal to British anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, who pioneered the concept as the so-called father of functionalism, the notion that societies, or cultures, exist to allow humans to better meet their needs than they could as individuals.
The premise here is that real peacebuilding requires fulfilling each of these needs, not merely the physical and economic or just the social, psychological and spiritual. In this way, it dovetails well with the full range of human rights in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Helpful for our purposes, most of these needs not covered by the civil-political rights are covered by the social, economic and cultural rights, those not ratified in the United States. Sustainable peacebuilding, I will argue, entails honoring these rights along with the civil-political rights better supported in the West.

Malinowski (1944) believed that individuals first need to meet physiological needs, such as those for food, shelter and reproduction. For Malinowski, social institutions help people meet these needs, but also cultural and instrumental needs. The latter include a desire for systems of economics, social control, education and political life (Porth, Neutzling and Edwards 2009). In linking physiological needs to an organic, unified theory of behavior, he tied these closely to cultural needs, including spiritual needs, and focused on the functions such behaviors served in relation to the socio-cultural whole.

Malinowski (1944) summarizes this model of culture well here:

It [culture] obviously is the integral whole consisting of implements and consumers' goods, of constitutional charters for the various social groupings, of human ideas and crafts, beliefs and customs. Whether we consider a very simple or primitive culture or an extremely complex and developed one, we are confronted by a vast apparatus, partly material, partly human and partly spiritual by which man is able to cope with the concrete specific problems that face him.

[Porth, Neutzling and Edwards 2009:online]
Later, Maslow, a humanistic psychologist popular in the 1960s and 1970s, outlined a hierarchy of needs. These included physiological needs – air, food, water, sex, sleep, homeostasis and excretion; and needs for safety – security of body, employment [income], resources, morality, the family, health and property; for love and belonging – friendship, family and intimacy; for esteem – self-esteem, confidence, achievement, respect of others and respect by others; and for self-actualization – morality, creativity, spontaneity, problem solving and freedom from prejudice.

Maslow is also considered the father of transpersonal psychology. In general, this specialty seeks to integrate peak, mountaintop or other spiritual or anomalous experiences into the conceptual framework of humanistic psychology. In the studies of high-achieving people that led to his theory of psychic development, Maslow found the vast majority of such people had fundamental spiritual values that guided and motivated them. In other words, in this hierarchy, spiritual needs matter too (Abraham Maslow.com 2009? Danison 1998). However, given our analysis of community relations as integral to peacebuilding, we need to point out that Maslow is more psychological, and so more atomized and individualized than Malinowski. *Human needs, as Malinowski intended, lead to a better understanding of the community, not just the individual.*

Burton, the conflict-theory scholar, made good use of this system to lay out a critique of previous peacebuilding theory and his ideas for lasting peace. His set of needs is a little different than Maslow’s or Malinowski’s. He combines most of the physical needs under distributive justice and safety and security, then moves on to social and psychological needs. These are needs for belonging and love; self-esteem; personal
fulfillment; identity; cultural security; freedom; and participation. Helpful for our purposes, these needs could be grouped under a general need for dignity, an issue we will explore later as a framing tool for peasant and Indian social movements.

The alternative "Human Needs Theory" has evolved only in the last few decades, and largely as a reaction against these limited separate [disciplinary] explanations of social problems…. *If conflict resolution is to be taken seriously, if it is to be more than just introducing altered perceptions and good will into some specific situations, it has to be assumed that societies must adjust to the needs of people, and not the other way around.* Workers must be given recognition as persons if social and domestic violence is to be contained, young people must be given a role in society if street gangs are to vanish and teenage pregnancies are to decrease, ethnic minorities must be given an autonomous status if violence is to be avoided, [and] decision-making systems must be non-adversarial if leadership roles are to be collaborative.

[1998:online]

Burton, as we can see, was highly critical of any analysis that limited the social context of conflict and divided it into the nominally value-neutral paradigms of psychology, sociology, political science or economics. He believed that hidden ideologies and belief systems were involved in all such systems of knowledge. For any effective policy making regarding peace, he championed a holistic perspective (Burton 1998; Sandole 2001), but one rooted in an analysis of the difference in fulfillment of needs across levels of social, economic and political power.
We will examine these ideas in more detail when we get into our case studies. They come after the next section. But before we get to them, we need to review the history of the civil conflicts, their complicated interweaving of social, political and economic issues.
Chapter II

The History of the Conflict, the Depth of the Violence

and the Nature of the Armed Actors
THE HISTORY OF THE MASS VIOLENCE

In what follows, we will be exploring the challenges of peacebuilding in the wake of two of the most noteworthy but brutal revolutionary movements in South America of the last 50 years. They involve the major revolutionary group in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC) and the Communist Party of Peru—Shining Path (Partido Comunista del Peru—Sendero Luminoso, PCP-SL, known as Shining Path, Sendero or SL).

FARC is the longest and bloodiest rebellion in Latin American history. Peru also lays claim to one of the bloodiest revolutions in Latin American history. While Colombia’s is the longest-running and most lethal in absolute terms, Peru’s is the most intensive genocides in the continent’s history. Shining Path dominated the Peruvian left from 1980-1992 and dispensed its terror liberally during that period, killing about 35,000 people. It was largely contained by the early 1990s, but it contributed to a new period of oppression, fear and repression that lasted until 2000 and beyond. (Throughout, oppression will be defined as social and economic disadvantages that become institutionalized; repression will be defined as the ideological and physical destruction of dissent and dissenters.)

At one time, Shining Path nearly rivaled the state for control and was one of the most ruthless Latin American guerrilla groups of the 20th century, defined, for example, in terms of civilians killed out of total dead – about half, in contrast to most insurgencies, which kill civilians but many fewer than the security forces and generally the well to moderately well off. Perversely, though championing the peasants, poor and Indians,
while Shining Path killed liberally across all socio-economic categories, it had a pathological commitment to spilling a specific quota of peasant blood.

Regarding the political economy of each country and the connections between them, we should note they are similar enough socially, ecologically and economically to be compared usefully. They also contain key differences, which allows us to make some critical distinctions and fine discriminations.

In overview, a handful of industries are dominant in each, and they have most of these in common. They include coffee, chocolate, cotton, sugar and rubber, with timber increasing steadily, also gold, silver and copper. Peru also exports much fish and fish meal, Colombia emeralds, diamonds, bananas and ornamental flowers. Oil and gas pumping has become a major industry for both. Both have large populations of Indian-descended peasants in the highlands – though this was long denied in Colombia – and smaller populations of remote tribes in the lowlands, about 2 percent each. These are increasingly endangered by transnational development – private, governmental and intergovernmental. Protests regarding this abuse of their lifeways and lives is often met with government incompetence, corruption or indifference, if not murder, torture and displacement.

In the highlands, Peru has a acculturated peasantry considered fundamentally indigenous that is increasingly self-affirming. In Colombia, a similar population with a little more European makeup constitutes the majority of Colombia’s peasants, but its true ethnicity was explained away for years. It has only lately become more honest about its indigenous heritage. Colombia has a sizable Afro-Colombian population as well, near
both coasts. Peru has one too, also near the coast, but it is smaller and less heard from. Overall – highland and lowland, acculturated and isolated – Native groups make up about 45 percent of the Peruvian people. Interestingly, genetic testing recently revealed that Colombia’s indigenous demographic is much more statistically significant than had been assumed. It indicated that up to 85 percent of its people have some indigenous blood (Kearns 2006). According to the Library of Congress research division, at the end of Colombia’s colonial period, Native peoples likely numbered about half of the population (Bushnell and Hudson 2010).

In Colombia, in the late 1960s, after emerging from a 20-year period of social strife between liberals and conservatives called La Violencia (The Violence, 1946-1966), a few guerrilla groups began operations. FARC was formed in 1966 with 350 recruits, mostly in the south. It has had up to 20,000 soldiers at one time but probably hovers around 10,000 now. Overall, it has given up territory to the paramilitaries and the state in the last decade, but from 1999 to 2008, FARC and the National Liberation Army (*Exerjito Liberacion National*, ELN), the other major rebel group, were the de facto government in about 30 to 40 percent of the country, most of it dominated by FARC. For about 30 years, it has occupied a great deal of territory in the southern part of the country.

In Peru, after centuries of traditional values and rigid social hierarchies, following a short period of growth after World War II, which fostered some social and political liberalization, the rural economy either stagnated. During this period, however, the fortunes of the educated residents of the coast improved. This signaled a growing gap in well being between the darker skinned people of the mountains and high plains and the largely Euro-American or mestizo residents of the coastal plains, called the *Sierra* and
by the time Sendero arose, the quality of life in the Sierra had
diminished or had not improved for about 20 years.

At 482,122 square miles, about as big as Alaska, Peru has about 30 million people (as
of 2012, according to Buckman 2012b). Cusco, in the southern mountains, was the
capital of the extensive Inca empire, which ran up and down most of the Andes. At
439,405 square miles, Colombia is about as big as Texas and New Mexico combined and
has about 45 million people, second in Latin America (as of 2012, according to Buckman
2012a).

Including Colombia, the Chibcha Indians dominated almost everything south of
Guatemala and were spread across much of northern South America, just north and east
of the Inca. They were a politically and culturally sophisticated civilization of about half
a million. After the Incas, they were the most centralized society prior to Spanish
conquest. But by the 1700s, no one spoke the language and they had mostly become
acculturated Indians of the highlands, not unlike highland dwellers in Peru. Both
countries were colonized by those who modeled themselves on the European aristocracy.
Elites in both were very proud of their cultured and moneyed heritage and disdainful of
the original peoples. The latter were often threatened with beatings, torture or death if
they did not submit to slavery, debt bondage and virtual serfdom or tenancy.

Both countries have extremely varied geographies and ecologies. These include very
high mountain ecosystems, high valley and mountainside ecosystems and lower, hotter
valley ecosystems between the mountain ranges. Lowlands, plains and jungles dominate
the landscape east of the mountains, all the way to Brazil or Venezuela. Both countries sit
very near the equator and have very hot lowlands, generally savanna and rainforests. The
climate becomes more moderate the farther one goes up the mountains. The mountains, valleys and forests have a rainy season, late fall and winter, and a dry season, spring, summer and early fall. The eastern savanna (plains) is generally drier than the rest.

Last and probably most important, a dramatically inequitable distribution of land and income in rural areas characterizes both countries. In Colombia, where 38 percent is agricultural land, less than 1 percent of the population owns more than 50 percent of the most arable land. Land reform has been a chronic issue but has generally been stymied by corruption in the very institutions that are supposed to administer it. A lack of human and financial resources has also hampered these efforts.

In the early 2000s, under the Alvaro Uribe administration, Colombia moved away from land reform (or redistribution) and toward development by agribusiness (USAID 2010a). A disparity in land tenure has been accentuated by subsidies that included tax write-offs for large landowners and fostered inefficient or absence of land use. Drug traffickers also purchase agricultural land to launder money. These factors create higher land values than are justified by the land’s productivity. They limit the production of food and put additional stress on forested and indigenous lands. Once-indigenous lands are increasingly colonized and cleared by peasant and landless settlers (USAID 2010a). In addition, since the 1980s, the armed actors have purchased or commandeered about 4.5 million hectares, accounting for about half of the nation’s best land. Much of it is used to grow coca or launder drug money through cattle, timber or palm-oil operations.

In Peru, in response to longstanding social unrest, the Juan Velasco regime initiated an ambitious land-reform project in 1968. From 1969 to 1991, about 38 percent of the nation’s agricultural land was designated for the landless or disadvantaged small farmers
(USAID 2010b). However, the most effective part of this campaign ended in 1975, when a conservative military regime staged a coup and largely put a stop to it. Land was reassigned, but the allotments generally went to the larger landowners and mestizo middle class. Before this attempt to make land tenure more equitable, 1 percent of the people owned 80 percent of the private land, and 83 percent held about 5 hectares or less. This group owned only 6 percent of the country’s farmland (USAID 2010b).

Recent data compiled by the Peruvian Center for Social Studies (Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales, CEPES), a research group for rural development, shows that agribusiness has expanded rapidly since the early 1990s. It had been guided by the aggressively neo-liberal policies of then-President Alberto Fujimori (Burneo 2011). A report by CEPES and the International Land Coalition, “The Process of Land Concentration in Peru,” notes that as of 2010, 34 owners controlled 250,000 hectares of land, in a country where less than 3 percent of the land is arable, and this excludes land devoted to mining, petroleum or timber (Burneo 2011).

Colombia currently has the second highest unemployment rate in Latin America, a poverty rate of 48 percent and an extreme poverty rate, meaning a lack of basic necessities such as food, of 17 percent (Buckman 2012a). In another statistic on land concentration, an estimated 62 percent of the country’s best land is owned by 0.4 percent of the population (USAID 2010a). As of 2005, more than half of Peru’s population lived in poverty, and 18 percent lived in extreme poverty, and the rate in rural regions was twice that of urban areas. By 2006, poverty had risen to 44.5 percent. It then dropped to 35 percent by 2009 and 31.3 percent by 2011 (Buckman 2012b). Indigenous peoples in remote areas experience the most extreme poverty (USAID 2010b).
Other armed actors

Just as scrutinized here will be the extralegal means of social control used by the defense and law-enforcement organizations, mostly the army and national police. These are usually called the security forces or the forces of order. To subdue the guerrillas, state-sanctioned armed actors have been all too willing to illegally detain, disappear, torture, rape, kill or displace unarmed civilians. The conflict then spreads as the insurgencies redouble their efforts. The social chaos produces a cascade of armed actors.

In each situation, over the last 30-40 years, rampant civil strife has produced cracks in the political economy wide enough to open opportunities for the paramilitary sector, or paras, as well as for drug traffickers serving a large international market for marijuana, cocaine and heroin. Battling with the paras at first, the drug mafias have by now achieved an accommodation with them. Both the guerrillas and paras “taxed” or “regulated” the drug gangs early on but have mostly turned to running their own systems of production and distribution.

The paras emerged from the citizen militia and, properly speaking, in some cases, still are. But in Colombia, in contrast to the ronderos, they are largely vigilantes and mercenaries often called, accurately, death squads. By the early 2000s, the United States had finally put the largest Colombian paramilitary group, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC), on its terrorist list. Some of these vigilantes are agrarian working class or small-business people, but most have come from the military, the national police or the labor force on the large estates, usually looking for a way to move up. They also increasingly come from organized crime. They have often been managed by the military, and for centuries, leased or owned by large
landowners. They are sometimes also managed or paid, under the table or above it, by
the upper echelons of government. Along the way, they have started their own lucrative
drug operations, leaving them increasingly unaccountable to the state. After the dramatic
increase in violence in the 1990s, crucial developments in the 2000s began to limit
guerrilla and military violence. It then shifted to the paras and the criminal gangs.

Longstanding thornier issues have to do with how much the military will continue to
collaborate with the paras and let them do its lethal bidding. While many paras have
demobilized, nearly as many have formed criminal enterprises or security firms. These
are called _neo-paramilitaries_. Others have joined the military. Oddly enough, some have
joined the rebels, and guerrillas have joined the paras, isolated cases, but it has happened.

This complex of factors and players points to a new way of understanding genocide.
If civil wars are the most common kind worldwide, and they produce what is variously
called _mass violence, civil violence or violent pluralism (pluralistic violence), we should
understand them as a specific form of a generic concept, genocide_. I am going to call this
manifestation of it _civil genocide, civicide_ for short, or in its longest construction, _civil-
war genocide_. It means destroying a people by destroying their civil and civic
institutions, their physical, social and cultural capital (capacity), the hard-won benefits of
a centuries-long practice of reciprocal altruism. It involves a total assault on the civic
(public or governmental) and civil (voluntary or communitarian) sectors. In both regions,
but especially in the lowlands, civil and civic arrangements have always been more
communal, predate the state and stretch social resources in areas poorly served by
government. Once its civil and communal resources are destroyed, the population is
brought to its knees socially and psychologically.
Such an assault becomes the motive, means and opportunity for authoritarian social control. In other words, this form of genocide works by destroying the third side, especially civil society. It destroys the cultural immune system. It levels the institutions that create and enforce standards of individual and group behavior: law enforcement, public-works, school and court systems, local and regional assemblies and local and regional (civic or civil service) government. It also seeks in particular to eliminate voluntary or nongovernmental (civil) organizations. These would include husbandry and crop associations, co-ops for agricultural and industrial inputs and trade and religious groups, especially the religious schools, which generally have a better academic reputation than the public schools. We should also include cooperative lending and crime-prevention groups. Without these institutions, there are many fewer checks and balances, legally, politically or economically. There are few institutions left that traditionally mitigate predatory activity by overbearing political or economic forces.

This form of mass violence can involve direct mass killing or various sub-lethal persecutory actions by the state, the paras or the often-authoritarian rebels. It includes in particular the following sub-lethal processes, especially as they lead to lethal consequences: forced displacement (creating refugees), disappearance, beatings, famine, rape, overwork and disease.
Peru: The charismatic sociopath in history and the rise of Sendero

Regarding the depth and breadth of civil violence in Peru since independence, the worst occurred during a deadly reign of repression in the 1930s. Supporters of the major leftist political party were the main targets, as they were engaged in both armed rebellion and political activism. Many tens of thousands were killed or jailed (PBS 2002). The economy continued to be governed by a racial gradient, although modernization and urbanization created some opportunities for the mestizos, the mixed-race middle class, and acculturated Indians, for the former via higher education, for the latter through the lower pay of the informal sector, often in cities. While not always so accepted, mestizos have tended to identify with whites socially and demographically, and highland and lowland Indians were often excluded from the gains of a slowly industrializing economy. In the last census that used racial categories, mestizos were counted with whites, and together they comprised about 53 percent of the population. With a small Euro-American population, this meant mestizos outnumbered whites and Indians (Galindo 2010), though Indians comprised a strong minority at about 45 percent.

A quota of blood: Shining Path and the sanctification of violence

While deep divisions between rich and poor are long-standing in Peru and revolts have been common, Shining Path was largely the vision of one man. Born in 1934, Abimael Guzmán was the illegitimate son of an upper middle-class importer. He grew up in a two-room house in a different neighborhood than his half-siblings and resented it. He studied leftist philosophy at the National University of San Augustín in Arequipa and, by 1963 was teaching at the Universidad Nacional de (National University of) San Cristóbal.
of Huamanga, in the department of Ayacucho (similar to a state), the poorest in the country with a large concentration of the Indian-descended rural poor.

The south-central part of the country is largely mountains and high plains settled by a mostly illiterate and impoverished peasantry and presided over by a landed class that exercised semi-feudal domination over Native productive resources long after most of the continent had experienced some land reform (Stern 1998; Gorriti 1999). At the university, the disaffected sons and daughters of peasants got an education they thought a ticket to social mobility, only to find that jobs were few. In the late 1950s and 1960s, Ayacucho became an enclave of leftist thought for students and professors alike. By the 1960s, in the highlands, peasants were marching, protesting and taking over haciendas.

The highlands rise more than 9,000 feet above sea level in Ayacucho. There, three-quarters of a population of about a half million makes a subsistence living from potatoes, maize, barley, wheat and alfalfa. Where only grazing is feasible, the other quarter raise alpaca, llamas, sheep, goats and cattle. In Ayacucho and nearby departments, the eastern lowlands grade into the Amazon basin and produce coffee, fruit and in the last few decades, much coca, most of which is made into cocaine, often in Colombia, and exported to the United States, Europe and Brazil. National and multi-national companies also mine gold, silver and copper and cut timber, especially high-value mahogany. Where more roads are built, exploitation is more common (Gorriti 1999; Strong 1992).

Starting in Ayacucho, Guzmán began to reinvent the Communist Party. He branded his new organization with the legacy of Jose Carlos Mariátegui, founder of the Communist Party of Peru–Red Flag in the 1920s and champion of the indigenismo
movement. Mariátegui had called the Inca empire a prefiguration of communism, so the full name of Guzmán’s cadres became the Communist Party of Peru in the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariátegui. To propel the party into action, he tapped decades of Indian despair. In addition, Peru’s population had doubled between 1920 and 1960, putting great stress on limited arable land, about 3 percent of the country, and a school crisis meant that less than half its children were educated. Also, half the country, the Quechua-speaking Indians, had been newly disenfranchised by a Spanish literacy test (Strong 1992).

In addition, the coup of Gen. Juan Velasco in 1968 promised progressive reforms, but these goals were sinking by 1975, when, to stop social unrest, a conservative military government took over. While 9.75 million of 23 million hectares of land were reallocated, these were often top-down reorganizations that left the mestizos and larger landowners in control. In the highly Quechua Ayacucho, only about 11 percent benefited, compared to about half elsewhere, and per capita income in the region fell 20-30 percent during the 1970s (Goritti 1999; Strong 1992). As the goals of the Velasco regime were reversed, Guzmán prepared peasants, students, professors and many public-school teachers – most of whom were leftists – for a people’s war. In May 1980, Sendero inauspiciously launched its armed assault on Peru’s political sector by storming the polls in Chuschi, a small town in Ayacucho. It rifled files, burned ballots and urged a boycott of the elections. When most of the left was ready to focus on electoral politics, it barely made news.

In the next two years, however, SL would engage in about 1,100 violent actions. Maoist ideology determined that it raise armies in the countryside before surrounding the
cities, but in allegiance to the urban poor, Guzmán ensured that SL did not spare Lima, Arequipa or Cusco. Targeted for violence were banks, courthouses, government buildings, police stations, jails, political party headquarters, embassies, union offices, factories, hotels and shops. It also blew up infrastructure such as electrical towers, phone lines, water tanks, dams and railroads (Stern 1998; Gorriti 1999). Blackouts, transportation blockages and communication breakdowns were common. In addition, Sendero assassinated police and political officials, judges, wealthy landowners and church, peasant, NGO, human-rights and union leaders, as well as officials of political groups. Leftist leaders were even considered the enemy, reformists who would only delay the revolution. Shining Path also attacked the haciendas (estates) and, early on, shared the livestock, fodder and grain with the peasants. By 1982, according to state sources, only 180 people had died in SL-related violence, about half civilians (Strong 1992).

With the nation fresh from military rule, President Fernando Belaúnde was reluctant to use force, as few took Shining Path seriously. But soon enough he saw he had to mobilize the security forces. He declared a state of emergency in five provinces in Ayacucho and one in Aperumic (a province is part of a department). With this began the next phase of the human-rights disaster. Following the tradition of dirty war in Latin America, as promoted by U.S., British and Israeli trainers and applied by governments in Argentina and Brazil that Peru had consulted, wholesale arrest (including disappearance), torture and murder of anyone with leftist sympathies was believed the best way to quell the rebellion. By the mid-1980s, the dead numbered more than 7,000, of which about 200 were due to the security forces, 2,500 to civilians and 4,400 to guerrillas (Strong 1992).
Counting on indiscriminate state violence to catalyze the revolution, SL was not cowed. Instead, it was inspired by it (Strong 1992). By 1984, Shining Path’s attacks in Ayacucho were double those in 1982. By 1985-86, SL had backed off its core of operations and was working in the coca-growing Huallaga Valley and the six departments adjoining Ayacucho. In 1985, total SL attacks were twice those of 1984. By early 1986, its violence was relentless, and the response of officialdom just as brutal. A prison riot left 210 dead, 1,286 people had died in the civil war and four departments were in emergency status. As of May 1986, increasingly funded by coca money, SL had engaged in 98,365 actions since 1980 and nine departments were in states of emergency (Strong 1992; Stern 1998; Gorriti 1999).

The army’s initial reaction was essentially an uncontrolled racist repression. Degregori explains: “In 1983, the armed forces entered an unknown territory in which they dealt out indiscriminate repression; anything that moved was a potential enemy” (1992:78). Eventually, it realized it was harming its cause more than helping and began what he calls selective repression. It began assisting with infrastructure projects and shifted the composition of its troops from raw mestizo recruits from the coast, to whom the Indians were alien, to peasants from the region who had some experience as cultural intermediaries (Degregori 1992). In what he calls its “reconquest,” the army did not try to tightly control everything as it had done at first. The troops began weekly visits to peasant communities and ronderos (short for rondas campesinas, citizen watches and militia), took part in their parades and fiestas and helped meet the needs of the militias, distributing shotguns, for instance. However, from 1983-1988, the years before this turn, Peru led the world in disappearances.
Shining Path, then, increasingly decided to take no quarter. In the early 1980s, while controlling virtually all public activities in the regions they commanded, they had been more selective in their killings, executing mostly corrupt officials and thieves, enough to inspire peasant respect as the new patron, the one who favored the powerless. However, this began to change as the revolution expanded beyond Ayacucho, where it had some peasant-Indian sympathy, to regions where it had to maintain constant vigilance and totalitarian control.

Regarding Sendero’s commitment to violence, Degregori says,

Shining Path decided to compete with the army on an equal footing as regards the meting out of violence against the rural population, to defeat it on that ground too. Following this logic…Guzmán himself began to proclaim that “the triumph of the revolution will cost a million lives.

Thus…the region was devastated, from 1983 onwards, by two objectively external armies…. One of the main senderista slogans was, “the party has a thousand eyes and a thousand ears.” To put it more brutally, in those days, Shining Path generally knew who to kill…and if the peasantry submitted to its demands, it could survive. But while the party had a thousand eyes and a thousand ears, the armed forces were blind, or, rather, blind to everything but colour. Having recently arrived in the region, and trying to reproduce in the Andes strategies that had been effective in the countries of the southern cone, they had no means of distinguishing the enemy from anyone else in the area and wherever they saw dark skin, they fired.

[1992:76; emphasis added]
A little later, as SL could rely much less on volunteers, it began conscripting. To support this and other modes of authority, it decided to ramp up the repression as a means of symbolic and actual intimidation. Again, Degregori illuminates:

In this process Shining Path lost its peasant masses but won young cadres. Once again, it converted a social defeat [the defection of the highland peasantry] into political victory [in the other areas it controlled]. But nowhere else in Peru was the Ayacucho scenario of the early 1980s – Shining Path’s most social and consensual period – to be repeated. In later years, as the organization expanded into other zones, its tendency to resort to terror and its “anti-social” nature tended to increase.

[1992:77; emphasis added]

Out of these developments grew the establishment of the rondas as true militias, not just community watches. They finally drove off Sendero, leading it to parasitize the drug trade, as it had done with the peasantry. (Rondas campesinas means literally, peasant rounds, because they made rounds of the villages every night.)

SENDERO’S DEALS WITH DRUG LORDS AND OTHER DEVILS

Shining Path’s exact relationship to the cocaine trade is complex, but it was closely tied to it and like every other resource it dominated, it found a way to benefit from it. Early on, it tapped decades of anger over political, economic or physical abuse of peasants by agents of the state and by vigilante or criminal organizations. SL would take
over a village, town and eventually a region, proclaim itself the arbiter of the people’s rights and implement vigilante justice. Initially, offenders, often corrupt or abusive officials, were put through mock public trials, humiliated and beaten, even hanged, shot or hacked apart. These usually were much-hated thieves of livestock, corrupt officials, spouse abusers or cheating merchants. Later, the SL faithful would dispense with homilies, shout a few slogans and summarily execute. But in that time and place, any champion of those who were destined to be lifelong servants and beasts of burden was greeted with enthusiasm, even devotion. Where frontier justice and semi-feudal relations often applied, this meant that much of politics, civil rights and criminal justice was extrajudicial, corrupt or genocidal. Sendero promised a new national state in five years and asked peasant youth if they wouldn’t like to be a minister in the new government. With such bravado, it was received as a valorization of peasant vengeance and a dream of Indian justice.

In this social-political environment, on the eastern slopes of the Andes, where coca grows readily without much tending, any champion of the growers, otherwise at the mercy of amoral coca processors, was welcome (Strong 1992; Gorriti 1999). This situation was especially rewarding for the once-poor peasants who grew it because it could be harvested many times a year and conveniently brought middlemen to the bush to buy it instead of having to be hauled over mountains to market, as with coffee or cacao (cocoa).

According to Sendero operatives and peasants, SL regulated prices for the growers, established systems of justice where drug traffickers previously had ruled capriciously and asked for about 10 percent. Doing so, it established a fairly stable tax base, an
estimated $20-100 million a year (Gonzales 1992). The official line was they believed
the cocaine habit to be capitalist decadence, the growers driven to it by poverty and the
Indian reverence for the plant, their use of it for currency, ceremony and social events,
the beliefs of a primitive culture. They didn’t encourage it, they said. They merely
brought rationality and reasonable prices, as well as protection for the growers.

Into this unstable political ecology were added a government highly corrupted by
cocaine profits and a growing paramilitary sector, at times warring with rebels and drug
traders, at others, making agreements with them. Paras have a long tradition, not only in
Latin America but worldwide through history. An alternative to standing armies, private
militias are cheaper but are less well trained, less well equipped and more willing to
violate human rights. And in Peru and Colombia at this time, both groups were paid
better than most peasants.

As noted earlier, in Peru, the paras should be separated from the self-defense militias
(the rondas). Overseen by the military but mostly peasant-based, the latter were initially
organized to defend against rustlers and thieves, were tied to towns or villages and used
force fairly discriminately. They repelled Shining Path without excessive violence and
maintained an independence from the drug dealers and paras. The paras, on the other
hand, were regional killers, vigilantes riding on horseback or in SUVs. They were usually
paid by wealthy landowners and business people and had the hidden support of the
military. In addition, the situation with citizen militias was different in Colombia. With
one ethnic exception, there was no real counterpart to the ronderos. There citizen militia
largely refers to paramilitary groups. The largest there is known by its acronym, the
AUC. These have been mostly latifundia-based, or were first trained by the military and
evolved into paras. In contrast to Peru, they have been badly implicated in torture, disappearance and the killing of civilians, including women and children.

The social, political and human-rights meaning of cocaine profits many times greater than small countries and large businesses is that, failing a well-developed state, these extraordinary fortunes only attract more extra-legal players hoping to exploit not only a specific landscape for its cheap natural resources but its peasants and indigenous peoples as equally cheap human resources. This often occurs in economically challenged areas. In them, changes in consumption elsewhere, often in the developed world, make a previously undervalued landscape rich with high-value resources – such as gold, silver, emeralds, diamonds or petroleum, some of Colombia’s leading exports, and cocaine.

This undisciplined approach to development has been well documented in Violent Environments, a volume co-edited by Nancy Paluso and Michael Watts (2001). It examines the lucrative trade in diamonds in west Africa, oil in Nigeria and shrimp in south Asia and central America for the damage the resulting social chaos and mass violence inflicts on the vulnerable, human and non-human.

Regarding the drug trade, while the highlanders have suffered, the most vulnerable have been the lowland Indians and the generally poor Afro-Peruvians. In the coca-producing regions of Peru and areas benefiting from them, this competition for social and civil control has produced a reverberation of violence and multiplication of armed actors that destabilized natural, social and political landscapes and made life on the ground a waking nightmare at times.
The fall of Sendero

Though terrorizing Peruvian society for about 12 years, Shining Path’s dominance was relatively short-lived. Better use of intelligence, severe restrictions of civil rights under a new national-security regime and the success of peasant defense groups brought Sendero down. Its key leaders were rounded up in the early 1990s. Guzmán was arrested in 1992 in his safe house in Lima (Strong 1992; Stern 1998; Gorriti 1999). When it most needed peasant backing and a decentralized structure to survive, it had little or none.

Due to a ruthlessness regarding dissent, a leadership dismissive of peasant autonomy in theory and racist and elitist in practice, and a top-down absolutism borne of a mix of egomania and modernism and foreign to indigenous ways, SL finally had little support, even where it had the most early on. Its authoritarian ideology forbade religious festivals, separated children from parents for indoctrination, blocked commerce with expanding markets in the cities and destroyed peasant livelihoods. Children and adults lived in fear, were sick and hungry much of the time, starving at others, in SL enclaves cut off from the rest of the world. This destruction of those it was designed to help meant that once its leader was captured, it had little support from within and largely collapsed.

James Rochlin looks at rebel movements in Peru, Colombia and Mexico in terms of their pre-modern, modern and post-modern worldviews and their ability to build relationships and social capital (capacity) inside and outside of their boundaries.

While Sendero had much in its favor with respect to both ideology and support base, it also possessed crucial weaknesses. Perhaps chief among these was [its] attempt to smother... indigenous epistemology. Sendero’s prohibition of indigenous holidays; its
suppression of indigenous spirituality; its contradictions of indigenous conceptions of time, space, family, and the nature of truth and political change spawned considerable resentment.

[2003:48–49; emphasis added]

Amid a devastation of local institutions, this means that Shining Path was dedicated to eradicating not only institutions of political and economic control but the major modes of Native thought, experience and metaphysics, the stuff of truth itself.

Colombia: Rural poverty and the systems of coercion surrounding it

As of July 2013, according to a thoroughly researched report by the National Centre of Historical Memory, since it began in the early 1960s, this most recent war in Colombia has claimed the lives of about 220,000 Colombians, 80 percent of them civilians. Nearly 41,000 of the armed actors, security forces, paramilitaries and guerillas, have died as well.

Colombia features fragmented geographical, economic and political sectors, a poorly developed civil-political apparatus in rural areas and a two-tiered society historically based largely on landholdings, extractive wealth and semi-feudal relations. After independence, the nation suffered through nine civil wars between 1830 and 1895, capped by The War of a Thousand Days, from 1899-1902, which devastated the economy. These all involved Conservatives fighting Liberals. The former represented landed aristocracy in control of an encomienda system that was essentially feudal and their political proxies in government. Later, this system was replaced by latifundias as
virtual serfs became peasants. The Liberals favored a secular state, free trade and an economically liberal (free) merchant class (Rochlin 2003). They believed that Native peoples, tenants and small farmers should be integrated into a market economy at decent wages.

These polities were not well developed beyond their patronal bases and featured a tradition of private justice. Each department had its own army but was augmented or rivaled by militias from the encomiendas. In the aftermath of this war, the country formed its first national army. After about 1850, following a mining-based economy, agricultural production for export became more dominant, and, as in much of Latin America, one of the most vexing problems was finding a labor source for the large landowners who grew cotton, tobacco, quinine, small grains, cacao, indigo and later, dominating all exports, coffee and bananas (Buckman 2012a).

In the early days of the republic, with a large amount of public land apparently going begging (regardless of the land needs of the indigenous peoples), peasant settlers, called colonos, occupied these lands, legally or illegally. They often could not make it as freeholders and ended up as tenant farmers or laborers on the much larger holdings resembling plantations. Cash crops for export grew in the middle altitudes and lowlands, but the Indian population had occupied the highlands, so landowners had to recruit migrants to work on the large farms, which, as they were used to cheap labor, aggravated them. With unclaimed land nearby, laborers would strike out on their own, again causing labor shortages. In response, entrepreneurs would “enclose” peasant lands and assert rights to property and labor, driving the smallholders off or making them indentured. Judges in the thrall of the landowners accepted forged bills of sale, and the small farmers,
most of them illiterate, were not equipped to stop them. Not surprisingly, this enclosure movement produced armed resistance. Along with this resistance came a call for reform.

Still, from about 1900 to the early 1940s, it was relatively quiet. But when labor and land reforms halted under a Conservative president, *La Violencia* began (1946-1966). Liberal revolutionary groups controlled large areas of the coffee-growing central regions. Paras tied to the Conservatives fought the rebels to defeat secularism and communism, or so they believed. Its legacy was 200,000-300,000 dead – at least two-thirds rural folk – and a mass migration to the cities to escape poverty and violence.

This migration produced squalor in shanty towns thrown up by rural refugees on vacant land in the cities and a civil and political vacuum that fostered uprisings. While the recent violence has roots in these conflicts, it also has much in common with earlier civil wars, all of which have similar themes. Another paradox was that out of this period, Liberals and Conservatives agreed to share power by alternating presidents and dividing elective offices equally between the two parties. Called the National Front, it was approved by plebiscite but excluded all other political parties. It only lasted until 1974 but helped cause the violence that followed.

*The political economy of the mass violence*

FARC is rooted in the Liberal factions of *La Violencia*. The second era of this movement began when a military government banned the Communist Party in 1954. By the mid-1950s, frustrated with Liberal inaction on land reform, increasing numbers of peasants responded to the communist appeal of the guerrillas. In a longstanding conflict, they supplied a support base for the rebels or joined them.
One of FARC’s enduring issues, land reform, failed miserably between 1966 and 1980. In the late 1960s, President Carlos Lleras Restrepo gave land to sharecroppers and tenants, but landlords pushed them off with violence. By the 1970s and 1980s, drug barons and plantation bosses accelerated this consolidation. By then, estimates put the urban poverty rate at nearly 60 percent and the rural rate at nearly 90 percent (Sanchez 2001). By the late 1970s, FARC operated along eight fronts in the southern, eastern and central parts of the country. It was not powerful but happened to be well positioned to take advantage of the boom in cocaine traffic by controlling key growing regions. By 1985, it had 3,200 members on 32 fronts, by 1994, about 10,000 (Rochlin 2003). By the late 1990s, it may have comprised up to 30,000 members on about 100 fronts. It numbered about 20,000-25,000 in the 2000s but is probably half that now.

FARC is one of a half-dozen guerrilla groups. Chief in size and impact, having the largest peasant base, it is rooted in the peasant self-defense groups of the 1950s. It was initially formed to fend off military and landowner violence and has traditionally focused on agrarian reform. By the 1990s, it was the government from Arauca to Caquenta – most of the eastern plains, much of the southern bush and some of the Amazonian jungle. It also controlled parts of Antioquia (where Medellin is the capital), Santander and Tolima. After repressive regimes in the late 1970s and early 1980s, by the mid-1980s, a social consensus emerged that the guerrilla groups merited negotiation. The state brokered truces, and this détente contributed to the 1985 formation of the Patriotic Union (Union Patriotica, UP), the political wing of the left. FARC was first among equals in this coalition.
**FARC and the drug trade**

FARC’s history in drug trafficking is complicated, checkered and hard to appreciate without an understanding of all the systems of violence in Colombia. By the 1980s, as the drug trade began to expand into a multi-billion dollar industry, FARC, as with Shining Path and other insurgencies in the Andes, began to regulate the coca industry. Its original intent was to protect growers from abuses by processors and get 10 percent of the gross as a financial base, soon to become more important with the fall of the Soviet Union.

Including protection for the processors, this worked fairly well at first, but deep political differences made the alliance unstable. The drug traffickers, like many mafias, see themselves as entrepreneurs and want market freedom, legitimacy and an extremely laissez-faire political order. The rebels seek total control in their territory, one they believe adjudicates peasant welfare. With more local support than with Shining Path, FARC apparently achieved this control early on. It set up schools, health-care networks, agricultural coops and other aspects of civic order. This commitment predated the drug trade and eventually put them in conflict with the drug barons and their projects, which also included schools, clinics and community centers (not unlike the state, the rebels and eventually the paras). Both sought to emulate the patron-client relationships characteristic of the broader Iberian-American society.

Eventually a system of double or triple tribute would make life unbearable for the Native peoples and peasants. In it, rebels, military, paras and drug traffickers competed against or secured an accommodation with one another. In the 1990s, as FARC began to break away from the drug gangs, and as the military contracted with a burgeoning paramilitary sector to take over the dirty war, the situation was increasingly open to
violence. The drug traffickers also began to work with the paramilitaries but were taxed by them. To supplement its drug revenue, FARC turned increasingly to the extortion of transnational companies doing resource-extractive work, and to kidnapping, first of corporate heads, political leaders and the very rich, and then, of anyone who could pay. FARC and other guerrillas have historically generated revenue through such kidnappings (in which Colombia has led the world) and the extortion of oil, mining, agricultural and other transnational operations.

The period leading up to the late 1980s was a time of catastrophic violence that devastated the political wing of the rebellions, in which thousands of members of the UP were murdered. FARC’s lethality increased dramatically after that. Before it, from 1982-1985, it was believed responsible for about 500 of some 2,000 extrajudicial deaths, not a huge amount, though not morally inconsiderable. Soon after, through the 1990s, its contributions to mass violence increased exponentially, as did those by all other armed sectors except the army (Sanchez 2001; Tate 2007).

So if the UP stood to make electoral gains by the late 1980s and early 1990s, then why did FARC renew its assault on the civil and civic sectors during the 1990s? The most important explanation is that prior to and following the constitution of 1991, the military, the paras and some drug gangs summarily executed or blew up more than 3,000 of its leaders and rank and file. This massacre embittered a whole generation and re-committed it to violence.

Then, funded by drug traffickers and the state, the paras began an assault on the guerrillas, and as a result, FARC’s killings began to rise. Human Rights Watch (2001) noted: “For the year 2000, human rights groups reported that the FARC-EP killed 496
civilians nationwide, many accused of being paramilitary or government sympathizers.” But unlike Shining Path, while using political and corporate assassination at times, outside of the collateral damage of bombings, FARC generally has been more discriminating in its use of lethal force, at least among peasants on its own turf. Indiscriminate killings have been more the result of para and military violence, but since the early 2000s, all the armed groups combined have killed about a thousand a year in a civil war with a body count that now rivals *La Violencia* (HRW 2001, 2012).

These hostilities reached a chaotic peak in the 1990s, during which human-rights violations and extralegal deaths by all sectors rose rapidly. The military and paras were responsible for about two deaths for each of the guerillas. Ironically, between 1992 and 1996, as the government sought international respectability, rights violations by the state went from 54 percent of the total to 10.5 percent, while those of the paras, not coincidentally, rose from 18 to 63 percent. For the guerrillas, they were between 38 and 27 percent (Sanchez 2001).

Massacres attributed to paramilitary groups from October 1995 to September 1996 were 32; by guerrillas 13; and by unknowns, likely drug traffickers or the military, 10. By 1998, this was 103 by guerrillas and 91 by the paras (Sanchez 2001). Total deaths by FARC cannot be determined, but it clearly has its own extralegal code.

*Outside their own zones of control...the Colombian guerillas* [FARC first among them] *increasingly resort to practices that contradict their discourse.* This is most evident in their terrorist operations and in the massacres...against the social bases of their real or presumed adversaries....Once their initial penetration of peasant
communities is complete, the police are dislodged, and the population is subordinated to their designs; the next phase is that of political consolidation.

[Sanchez 2001:30; emphasis added]

Finally, another intractable variable is that, while the drug trade pumps untold billions of dollars into the economy and was responsible for steady economic growth during the 1980s and 1990s, it generates no taxable income. So it is that much harder for the resource-poor state to fund the training and equipping of the military, police and other response teams needed to supplant the criminal groups and ensure the survival of a civic apparatus and civil society.

Instead, the criminalization of the major military and political powers increases as they both tax and collude with the drug trade and become increasingly invested in trafficking. This alliance led to the assassination of three left-of-center presidential candidates in 1989-1990 and the many UP killings. The drug lords, paras and a corrupt state could ill afford a legitimate left and a state opposed to their activities. So it had to reignite guerilla violence after the truces.

When revolutions burn out: FARC’s epilogue

FARC’s violence has been winding down since the government, flush with U.S. military aid, abandoned its containment approach and shifted the dirty war to the paras. It then attacked the guerrillas head-on in a conventional war. In addition, FARC and ELN have both come under widespread domestic and international criticism for their kidnappings and sabotage of infrastructure. The rebellions also have waned as prospects
for peace develop. This has wavered but seems to have taken flight lately, as talks with FARC began again in mid-2013. These have featured President Santos agreeing to political participation for FARC and to land reform for small farmers. The latter, however, has been tried many times and generally gets blocked by the managerial and landowning classes. It seems very difficult to enact in a meaningful way. Tate explains that a recent study demonstrated:

During twenty-five years of state-sponsored agrarian reform, approximately 900,000 hectares were redistributed; [however] by 1988 Colombia had one of the worst ratios of land inequality in the world. As measured by the World Bank, the Gini Coefficient for land in Colombia was 0.86, with 0.0 being perfect and 1.0 representing complete inequality of land distribution. For comparison, selected others were: Brazil (0.85), Peru (0.91), Korea (0.35), Taiwan (0.45).

[2007:315–316, n. 22; emphasis added]

In addition, Santos, the leader of the campaign against them under Uribe, has continued to pursue an armed assault against the guerrillas, a point of contention for them regarding peace talks. It remains to be seen whether negotiations with FARC will yield peace or whether political participation will be done in by violence and land reform by political monkey-wrenching. Land-reform efforts may yet succumb to intimidation by enforcers for wealthy land owners and local politicians under their influence. It has happened before, here and across Latin America.

Other crucial issues related to mass violence and human rights in Colombia are:
The National Centre of Historical Memory said most of the more than 200,000 killings from the civil war occurred as large ranchers and latifundia owners began to fund and organize right-wing militias to combat FARC and other armed groups (Al Jazeera Americas 2013). This assault became especially acute during the 1990s and early 2000s.

A study by Amnesty International and the Fellowship of Reconciliation showed 47 percent of the murder cases reported in 2007 involved security forces bankrolled by the United States. The Ministry of Defense has since directed its troops to capture, not kill, guerrillas (Romero and González 2008).

According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), in the decade ending at 2011, more than 3,000 people were killed extra-legally by the state. The army committed most of these between 2004 and 2008. Since then, there has been a dramatic reduction in military cases, to around 15 percent, but a corresponding rise in paramilitary cases (HRW 2012). Total numbers have barely changed.

In a realm of multi-sector violence, where pressure on one factor can produce an increase in another, a sobering statistic involves assassination of Colombian human-rights professionals. They generally work for an NGO or the state and have been eliminated at a rate not seen since the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 2012, 42 percent more human-rights workers were killed than in 2011. In the first six months of 2013, 37 human-rights workers were murdered, one every 5 days, a 27 percent increase for the same period of the previous year (Isacson 2013).
Homicides of human-rights workers stabilized at about 30 per year for 2008 through 2011. However, in 2012 Colombia instituted restitution of land taken from the rural poor. It allowed the displaced to submit a claim for their lands, and the number of murders of human-rights workers jumped to 69 (Isacson 2013).

Next, we will look closely at the social construction of human rights and the human resources required at the highland-village and civil-society levels for effective peacebuilding, as well as the damage civil war does to the social capital necessary to that task. To do that, we turn to two incisive ethnographies of the postmodern Andes.
Chapter III

In Search of Peace:
Religion, Ritual and Reconciliation
in Postmodern Face-to-Face Communities

amid Mass Violence in the Andes
ETHNOGRAPHIES OF MASS VIOLENCE:
THE WINDING ROAD FROM HUMAN RIGHTS TO PEACEBUILDING

We have said that one of the most important aspects of peacebuilding is a holistic approach to human needs and an emphasis on local contexts, community initiatives and popular solidarity. This should be coupled with an emphasis on empowering civil society for similar aims. However, once one investigates these matters in detail, it becomes apparent that there are not only significant differences in the way human rights and peacebuilding are perceived across local, national and international levels, but also key differences in the way these matters are understood within a single level.

These are some of the most difficult issues bedeviling the human race, so it is likely that reasonable people would differ regarding the ways and means of relevant solutions, not to mention the likelihood of, not just the unreason of individuals, but the incomprehension of social systems in conflict – of villagers poorly educated in Western ways, especially as they are supposed to help them find peace, and, more significant, of Western-educated experts poorly versed in village ways, especially as those are supposed to accomplish something similar and, being local, may better hold the key. This poses vexing problems for social scientists, activists, NGO leaders and policy makers alike. Such dynamics across cultures among various postmodern communities are also the essence of anthropology.

Kimberly Theidon (2013) and Winifred Tate (2007) reflect on these matters of conflict within and between levels in riveting accounts of fieldwork with two different groups in Peru and Colombia. They do this in *Intimate Enemies: Violence and*
Reconciliation in Peru and in Counting the Dead: The Culture and Politics of Human Rights Activism in Colombia, respectively. To create the first, Theidon (2013), who researched the lethal swath Shining Path cut through Peruvian society in 1987, especially in the rural highlands, returned periodically to research the effects and aftershocks of the civil war on ordinary villagers. She looks in particular at Western and native interpretations of violence, trauma and healing as they struggled spiritually and psychologically to process their grief. In addition, she examines their social and political struggle to assimilate former rebels into civilian life to take their place among those they had once abused. There she focuses on how rituals of reconciliation helped the abused live with their former abusers, not without anxiety but in relative peace. In particular, she examines Ayachucho, the department that was birthplace of Shining Path and one of the areas of the worst violence. She takes a special look at how former enemies made peace or failed to – examining the effect the trauma of war had on those relationships, how this tore at the fabric of village life and, ultimately, how the villagers found a way to process their grief and accept former mass murderers back into the community.

For the second ethnography, Tate (2007) worked on human-rights issues in Colombia in different capacities at different times and levels, local, regional and national, from the late 1980s into the 1990s. She returned in 2001 to do an ethnography of human-rights workers during the worst of the 50-year civil violence. She had a particular interest in the relationships among these workers across the scales we have been discussing and across various moral and political epistemologies. We will use each to shed light on our two main objects of inquiry: meeting a hierarchy of human needs, particularly different
views of such across cultures and scales (the various moral epistemologies mentioned above), and the building or rebuilding civil society, also across cultures and scales.

In addition, in this study we will be looking at situations that may transcend conventional definitions of genocide and include what we earlier referred to mass or pluralistic violence. Related to these notions, as already noted, I want to introduce a novel paradigm called *civil genocide* or *civicide* (destroying a people by destroying their civic and civil institutions). It is closely related to models of multi-lateral, multi-vector civil conflict characterized as *mass violence* by Christian Gerlach (in *Extremely Violent Societies*, 2010), or *violent pluralism* in essays edited by Enrique Arias and Daniel Goldstein (*Violent Democracies in Latin America*, 2010).

All these models emphasize the participation of many parts of the society in this violence, in other words, a multi-class, multi-ethnic, multi-sector civil strife. It is a concatenation of armed conflict that transcends traditional definitions of genocide but kills just as many innocent people. It has traumatized the survivors via murder of friends and family, torture, rape, kidnap, starvation, displacement and manifold forms of post-traumatic psychological disorders. This manuscript follows a previous study that featured a close examination of models of genocide and mass killing, including the models above. It was intended to be part of a larger work for which this study is part II. Concerning this variety of models of genocide and/or mass killing, the critical issue is how these understandings of genocide form a rough gradient tending toward greater complexity of perpetrators and victims, from one-sided through binary to multi-lateral and multi-sector. The latter situation characterizes most civil wars and requires an approach to peacebuilding tailored to its complex, cross-cutting needs and variables. I have added a
matrix of these scholars and their models of genocide, along with key characteristics, in appendix 2. These constitute the social precursors to the conditions we will examine here.

Peacebuilding must be done in the midst of such trauma, in a social world in which most certainties are lost, even between people who have known each other for a long time. It must in one way or another deal with such trauma as a precondition to a lasting peace. As we will see, this is true not only for the villagers but for those who work closely with them to document their tragedy.

The very ways of thinking about the processing of that trauma, therefore, are culturally contested. We confront a conundrum when we even think about the metaphors we might use to characterize this event: Are we purging it, as with a Freudian catharsis, or banishing it with a Native cleansing? Are we involved in pleasing or appeasing the spirits? Or just one another? Is it a reconciliation, as with feuding neighbors or members of a clan? Are we clearing the forest so we can sow crops and build anew, a more “masculine,” putatively northern European, that is, white male, metaphor and model? Are we flushing the shadow from the collective unconscious so that it can be identified and reintegrating via higher consciousness, a Jungian model, or perhaps embracing the dissolution of subject-object relations as befits an Eastern mystic tradition?

And furthermore, how does an analysis of human-rights organizations relate to peacebuilding? We will pursue this as straightforwardly as possible by saying that peace must be built on both social and criminal justice, that stopping the violence comes first and preventing its immediate recurrence second, but examining its broader patterns must
come next. We will therefore also look into the longer term issues of land distribution, reconstruction of state capacity and sustainable, equitable modes of development.

More important, what are the metaphors, symbols, fables and myths the people most affected by this violence use to invoke healing and peace? Are they a fit with the metaphors, symbols, fables and myths used by the Western-educated professionals who try to facilitate, engineer or “build” a peace? And finally, in keeping with a previous genocide-studies component of this examination, in which we propose the search for an indigenous – as opposed to a northern European – model of genocide, is there an indigenous model of peacebuilding? It is to these matters we will turn.

PERU:

A SADNESS UNTO DEATH, THE TRAUMA INDUSTRY
AND A REPENTANCE BEFORE THE COMMUNITY

(The following epigraphic passages come from Theidon and Tate. They were selected for their emblematic qualities and are intended as first-person ethnography or thick description, in excerpt. Except for non-English words, emphasis is added.)

Too much memory

I hesitated for a moment. “Hernan, tell me a bit more about the psychological treatment you want in Hualla.”
He shifted in his chair and exhaled his frustration. “Life in Hualla is impossible! People argue all the time. Before we can even think about reconciliation, we need psychological treatment.”

“And what is it about psychological treatment in particular that would help?” I wondered.

“Well, everybody keeps remembering everything. They keep insulting each other, especially when they’re drunk. It’s one big fight. If we could have professional attention – therapy with a professional – we could forget everything that happened.”

“So therapy would be necessary so you could live together again?”

Hernan nodded. “That’s right. You know what the big problem in Hualla is? There’s too much memory – way too much memory,” repeating the line for emphasis.

“With psychological treatment, we could forget everything. That way we could live together again – peacefully,” he said.

[Theidon 2013:34; emphasis added]

Despite their omnipresent criticisms of the health posts, people are not rejecting medical care per se. Indeed, claiming trauma is in part a demand for services. Talking [about] trauma is one way of constructing the intervenable subject – individually and collectively. There will be no projects providing elixirs for daño [an affliction caused by angry mountain gods], no NGOs heading to the mountains with sacrifices for the apus. Interventions and their subjects must fit within a modernist paradigm... The modern subject of suffering is traumatized.

[Theidon 2013:35; emphasis added]
Indigenous peoples have for 500 years adapted to Europeans idioms, ways and modes of thought as a kind of protective coloring or ideological cloaking device, as these are among the weapons of the weak, as James Scott (1985) would have it. This is not more calculated than scavenging. The poor and homeless always have to do both. Still, it is not purely opportunistic. It is a way to get the system and its managers to notice, to take them seriously. As they do this, we might ask, speaking clinically, and ethnically, are there positive and negative aspects of memory? Apparently.

As part of her fieldwork, Theidon (2013) studied the work of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC) and investigated cultural tensions regarding concepts and terminology in mental and physical health. She also did health-needs assessments for an NGO and was struck by the bureaucracy overseeing reconciliation, by the cultural barriers to various modes of healing. Conventional models of psychotherapy hold to a virtual doctrine of retrieved memory. This is to allow one to experience the past deeply enough, but safely enough with the aid of a facilitator, that one gains some perspective and begins to move beyond it.

Hernan Periona, of the first quotation, was a former member of Shining Path, so his concerns with memory could be seen as convenient. But many other villagers complained of the oppression of memory. Women could not stop crying, asking for a pill that stops memories. Men could not control their drinking, or their fighting. The local term for the condition was llakis, which means both pain and sadness but transcends purely mental or emotional experience. It “fills the heart,” the indigenous seat of memory. It can overwhelm the individual and render him or her dysfunctional for short periods, less
functional than normal for long periods. Theidon (2013) describes it as a memory affliction. However, instead of the private associations developed during therapy, llakis is a social phenomenon that carries no stigma. It is a reaction to overwhelming social events and calls for, and expects, a social response.

*LLakis* surge from the heart, overflowing its capacity to contain so many hurtful memories. As they fill the body, “*you become pure pain or sadness.*” This is a “hydraulic model” of the emotions; emotions rise, fall, bear down upon, and travel through the body. There was another powerful expression several women used: *Yuyaynipas tapawan* (“*My memories suffocate me*”). Beneath the weight of reminiscence, the person cannot breathe and their heart aches. *Llakis* can rob the person of their use of reason, leaving them *sonso* (senseless or mad). And as *llakis* mature in the body, they can be fatal.

[Theidon 2013:41]

Other afflictions were a form of severe weakness (*iquyasqa*) she describes as a “profound, bone-penetrating exhaustion” (Theidon 2013:48). Western experts might call this severe depression. Health workers also documented birth defects and slow development among children born to women pregnant during the violence and a form of psychic (from the root, *soul*) death called *wanurqani*. Contrary to Western cultural idioms, this “death” might happen many times and result in loss of consciousness, fainting in Western terms.
Another common condition was a more self-evident “hardening of the heart,” both symptom and treatment, depending on social position and cultural set. Healers, or *curanderos*, would work with villagers to help them desensitize themselves to the effects of the violence, in other words, to harden their hearts. Then at town meetings community leaders would plead with villagers to “soften” their hearts, to reconcile and make village life more functional, more possible.

Regarding the second passage above, Theidon says that the human-rights professionals of the *Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission* were taught to routinely rework the testimony of the villagers, not out of deceit but in an attempt at cultural translation. As with Tate to follow, they represent the “professionalization” human rights work. This is essentially what Foucault would call *knowledge/power*. They would channel reports of these afflictions into categories of trauma, often post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), an official-sounding term that is really something of a catch-all. Most believed this was required to provide “universal” categories with which to document the events for historical and legal purposes. They had been trained not to respond to their first instincts, which was to produce a faithful transcript, but instead to adhere to a chronological sequence made of “Antecedents,” “Facts,” “Actions Taken,” “Sequelae” and “Expectations for the Future.” The afflictions Quechua speakers reported, such as those above, were generally listed under “Psychosocial Sequelae,” sequelae meaning “an aftereffect of disease, condition, or injury, or a secondary result” (Merriam-Webster.com 2014a) but in this context bearing the connotation of an afterthought, especially as it is psychological.
She makes it clear she is proud to have worked with the PTRC and lauds its “worthy goals” but notes that because they have had explicitly educational goals with national and international aims, truth commissions have had to develop means of conciliation for a much broader audience, especially considering the Western mentality of the national and international elite. So their cultural categories have to shift, and the emotional resonance of indigenous ways of knowing with them.

She notes that after a period in social science in which PTSD was over-diagnosed, during which trauma experts were deployed in a host of post-war situations, a critique of what she calls “the trauma industry” emerged. On the other hand, she explains she is not interested in cataloging “authentic” exotic-sounding indigenous ailments to throw up against psychiatry’s “artificial” universal categories. This too has been overdone. Instead, she calls attention to epistemological issues that have moral implications. Why are Western psychological concepts considered “theory” and Native categories “beliefs” or “customs”? While most such mental-health workers believe they are translating local terms into universal classifications, Theidon is most concerned with how this translation obscures a culturally sensitive record of peasant trauma as experienced, one which should have implications for healing, reconciliation and peace:

How can interventions help people rebuild their lives without understanding locally salient theories of illness, health agency, and social repair? *How do we respond to the needs of survivors of war without understanding the local forms and logics of social ties and their transformation?* Without understanding what makes a being human, and to whom that status is conferred or denied? [Theidon 2013:27; emphasis added]
Here we encounter a discourse about how to meet a complex of Maslow’s needs: needs for safety (security of body, employment, resources, morality, the family, health and property); love and belonging (friendship, family and sexual intimacy); and esteem (self-esteem, confidence, achievement, respect of others and respect by others), but in culturally appropriate ways. Without adopting a shrill tone, she argues that within the social context of long-term discrimination, this gap in what might be called reconciliation technologies needs to be rethought. The trauma industry specifically and the peacebuilding movement in general should come to grips with the full complement of human needs in culturally sensitive terms and propose ways to treat these deficits in a holistic way.

This form of discrimination is not just related to how international and national experts, working in nominal universals, make adjustments while scaling up the testimony of human-rights victims for an educated, international audience. It is mostly about how they individualize healing and reconciliation in a way that interferes with the collective mentality that is the prevailing ethos among villagers. Such a nuanced approach to pain, one with greater cultural resonance is necessary for more than just immediate reconciliation, but for functional psyches and relationships in village life over the long term as well. In addition, while it might seem as if the excerpts above concern only “higher” human needs, the psychological and the spiritual, these people are bereft beyond the adequacy of Western idioms in large part because they have lost most of the resources needed to put together even a meager living in the resource-poor highlands: their livestock, their homes, their fields and their men and boys and women and girls. In this
world, the psychological, the social, the economic and the spiritual may not be one, but they are closely related enough that they cannot be approached reductively. A simple coding for trauma cannot capture what they have lost.

Are there ways to satisfy both objectives, Western/international and local/indigenous? Do evolving models of bi-cultural education and a new emphasis on a non-bipolar interculturality, now gaining ground, represent avenues for constructive change? This is implied, though Theidon does not dwell on it. We will turn to these concerns periodically and in the conclusion. One of the main questions becomes: If we work within a system of basic needs, what does this mean interculturally? Are these needs universal? While little is wholly universal, most of them find expression across cultures. If so, how are they expressed in different cultures? How does this help interpersonal healing or social justice? And how does this serve reconciliation and peacebuilding?

Poverty and war widows

Marcos discussed how the political violence had severely affected Carhuaharrán, prompting him to solicit funding to open the Children of Jesus Soup Kitchen. I suggested we strengthen the request by incorporating statistics from the health post indicating that 80 percent of the children in Carhuaharrán and its eleven outlying annexes suffered from chronic malnutrition. Marcos nodded emphatically: “Yes. You know, here we need to think of the violence,” emphasizing that chronic hunger and poverty would require us to think about the violence in plural form. War and poverty had both assaulted his community with various consequences. [Theidon 2013:36–37]
“What do people want when you talk to them [about Shining Path and its atrocities]? Revenge? Fines?”

He shook his head. “They don’t talk about revenge. They ask for economic help: They say, ‘If I hadn’t lost my husband – before the violence, we had fifteen bulls, eighty cows, eighty sheep, and other animals too.’ And when we ask them how many they have now, they have two, three sheep” [an evangelical minister in the highlands].

[Theidon 2013:83]

If physiological needs precede social, psychological and spiritual needs, then, with adequate resources, we could pursue peacebuilding in a bureaucratized, step-wise fashion. But these needs occur simultaneously and all have to be met for the best hope of a fully functioning society. However, in the aftermath of wrenching civil conflict, it is likely that very few are met at all, certainly not at first. Theidon relates graphic testimony from villagers in Ayacucho regarding the deficits in their social, psychological and spiritual lives following the horrors of civil war. While she may exhibit an overemphasis among postmodernists on the ideological and the psychological, these needs must be taken seriously, and in general, they have historically been easier for the intervention and expert communities to gloss over. At the same time, physiological needs must be met, and concrete, economic security yields a sense of most abstract forms of social, psychological and spiritual security that foster the fulfillment of the “higher needs.”

Theidon’s focus is elsewhere, but here she documents some of the more eloquent testimony regarding poverty and the struggle to restore a livelihood, both for individuals and the community. Here we see an overwhelming, devastating grief that requires a
holistic response by response teams and health professionals, one operating, as the victims experience their tragedy, up and down the scale of human needs. But they received little or none of any such integrated response to personal and collective trauma. Those that we are told are human-rights professionals, and not just any but appointed by the PTRC, should apparently practice better intercultural awareness.

An area related to both poverty and politics to which Theidon devotes considerable space is a chapter called “Widows.” Not unlike the world of the Hebrew Bible, widows suffer disproportionately during good times and bad. In its 2001 Census for Peace, the Peruvian government estimated that the war created 20,000 widows (Theidon 2013). In Ayacucho, a third of the households were headed by women and were among the poorest people in the country. Among uncomfortable lessons they hold for the well-intentioned is that there is no dearth of discrimination among subordinate groups. After many spent the worst of the violence hiding in the hills, often in caves, they returned to half-empty villages to find their losses had just begun. As can happen under conditions of deprivation, the poor may conserve their resources by limiting their compassion for the most vulnerable among them. Theidon notes:

Izcarceta nodded. “Before people had caridad [charity, compassion]. They cared about the {single} women with many children – they worked for them. They would carry wood, on their animals they would bring wood. Now, the young people – they loathe old women with no strength.”

“Why did people change? What happened?”
Izcarceta shrugged. “They say they don’t have time. ‘We’re too busy,’ they say. We have to pay ten soles a day for someone to work our land. Where is a warmisapa {widow} going to get that sort of money? When all you have to drink are your tears, how can you pay that?”

[2013:166; braces, emphasis added]

Interviews with widows also documented that reconstruction assistance was often distributed differentially. Donors and their representatives would select those identified as “natural leaders” to participate in training and to establish the community’s priorities. These so-called leaders would use this standing to solidify their position on the social ladder, distributing aid according to patronage. If NGO leaders asked that women be included, their wives were designated. The widows were usually left out.

However, in one of the unintended consequences of war and reconstruction, for security purposes the widows, as others did, moved farther from their fields and closer to the towns. They were then able to more easily attend community meetings. While most of the married women chose not to, attendance by the widows was mandatory because they were heads of households. Because of this, the new discourse about human rights stemming from the civil war stimulated a consciousness and solidarity regarding women’s rights:

Participating in these workshops, you learn many things. The men should listen to women, between the two they need to talk… Me, now I go to the assemblies and I speak up. I complain about how the authorities are spending money! That’s the good
thing about us, the *warmisapas*. Even if you must sacrifice, they are always having us participate in the meetings. *We learn about what the men are doing and we have a chance to participate*… Ha, when we go to these trainings, the men say we’re just going to learn to complain… That’s why some of the women can’t talk to their husbands about their rights – they [the men] don’t believe in them. That’s why it would be good if they trained the men, too, about women’s rights so they can understand.

[Theidon 2013:176; emphasis added]

The widows began to experience a solidarity facing the twin evils of war and poverty. Responding to state-sponsored aid, embodying new roles and taking on new responsibilities, they began to interact more assertively with the government. They also set up their own voluntary associations, including soup kitchens, groups for sharing milk and a Mother’s Club for advocacy about state resources. Here, the widows became proactive about meeting their needs for *esteem* (self-esteem, confidence, achievement, respect of others, respect by others) and *self-actualization* (morality, creativity, spontaneity, problem solving, freedom from prejudice, acceptance of facts).

Theidon (2013:167) phrases it differently, but it amounts to the same thing. She says they began to politicize motherhood: “Purus explained, ‘We were so sad because we couldn’t feed our children well. Our children cried for food, and it’s the mother who must do something.’ And they did.”

With NGOs all over Ayacucho working to rebuild the region in the late 1990s, a new awareness of human rights was born, including the notion that women’s rights are always
human rights. This must surely make for a more satisfied, stable and peaceful society going forward, and it came from the grassroots.

*The evangelicals*

In many rural communities, the [evangelical] churches were the only social organization that did not dissolve, but rather resisted and stood their ground. Faced with the totalitarian, violent message of the subversive groups…the faith that animated these churches led them to elaborate diverse responses: from not complying with the call to arms, to the articulation of a theological reflection with which they lived daily life, to those who decided to fight against the terror of Shining Path by forming the *rondas campesinas*. In all cases, they were the response of native leadership, given that the majority of the foreign missionaries had to withdraw from these areas, *leaving the direction of their churches in the hands of local pastors and lay people*.


[Theidon 2013:67]

The emphasis on softening or hardening the heart, and on dramatic personal and social change, is striking. One must learn to live with the memories, many of which are personified in the faces of neighbors or relatives, without overwhelming the capacity of heart and mind (emotion and intellect) to contain the experience.
“Changing one’s life” is a central psychocultural theme {transcending traditions, as demonstrated here}. Campesinos visit curanderos to change their suerte (luck or destiny); congregations in the Evangelical churches pray to God so that He will change their hearts and their lives. Importantly, when the context changes, so does the person. Many people described the process of arrepentimiento (repentance): “After repenting, we go forth with a clean heart. We are no longer the people we were before. We are musaq runakuna – new people.

This was powerfully conveyed by El Piki {a curandero} in Carhuahuran…. “It was difficult, but we can accept the arrepentidos [ex-Senderistas, literally, “the repentant ones”]. As long as they act like runakuna [people] they can come back. We have to pardon them or we would hate them. Dios Tayta says we must pardon them so we can live with a tranquil heart.

[Theidon 2013:50; braces added]

When did the community kill {execute} the arrepentidos and when did they accept them?

Marcelina explained, “When they repented, then they accepted them. When they didn’t want to repent, they turned them over to the soldiers. When they begged, crying, crying, they {the soldiers} would whip them [instead]…and people here understood them. They couldn’t kill them. Comun runakuna [common people of the community] couldn’t kill them.”

[Theidon 2013:236; braces added]
While they have not always been well regarded by social scientists, evangelical churches in Latin America have been involved in many activities supportive of the peasantry. Their involvement with the remote tribes has been more thoroughly criticized, resulting in the expulsion of some groups, but their work with peasants and villagers has been given a new cast as they have combined evangelism with concrete community action (as above), as well as a traditional emphasis on sobriety, hard work and personal responsibility. Some say, on the other hand, that this reinventing of Native mores and mentalities, taking it from a collective to an individual ethic, is destructive of the cultural fabric, damaging to the emotional, intellectual and spiritual resources first peoples have traditionally depended on to meet basic human needs.

In the case of the civil violence in Peru, however, evangelicals helped supply a psychic framework for reintegrating former Senderistas into village life. An official policy was engineered by the National Repentance Law, an approach to truth and reconciliation that urged individuals to make a confession, largely in return for amnesty (save a whipping or two). The paradigm was basically Christian and had great resonance in many villages. And while Catholic confession is private, Protestants, especially evangelicals, often celebrate public confession as the first step toward grace. Most areas were served by Catholic priests who were spread very thin, but who, along with most of the evangelical missionaries, were withdrawn from the campo during the worst of the violence. The native leaders of the evangelical churches remained and were instrumental in marshaling peasant resistance to Shining Path. They did this with a crude, Manichean vision of earthly and heavenly justice, but it did allow them to survive, to inspire people
to stand up to the devils and – not incidently – to learn to read and write. These
churches also supplied fundamental support, material and ideological, for the rondas.

Besides becoming increasingly involved in community projects such as food relief,
sanitation and education, especially literacy, albeit with a strong ideology thrown in, they
also supplied a cosmology for enduring the war. Overlaid on centuries of Native
millenarian thought, evangelical apocalyptic motifs allowed them a safe psychocultural
space, during which food and physical insecurity, coupled with psychic stress akin to
madness, could be endured, this according to those who experienced it (Theidon 2012).

The other critical contribution was in the formation of the citizen-defense groups, the
ronderos. These managed to stay the hand of Sendero when the military could or would
not. The moral legacy of these groups is somewhat ambivalent, as they were at times
responsible for killing the relatively innocent – mostly civilians considered SL
sympathizers – but in general they protected people from terror without undue violence.
Their presence as an SL deterrent also meant the military was much less interested in
defining campesinos as rebel supporters and killing them.

They {Senderistas giving up} would arrive telling us they had been *engañados*
[tricked], forced to kill…. “Pardon me”…they would plead. “Pardon me,” they would
beg the community. …

They [villagers] asked, “Are you going to stop being like that?” If they were
going to stop, we accepted them… We would ask them over and over, “Are you
going to let the Senderistas in?” They would promise not to. *We asked them if they
could forget that they had learned to kill. They promised they could.* Questioning and
questioning, they [the villagers] accepted them. So runayarusanpunku [they would become people], they were peaceful and weren’t going back to that [Senderismo]. [But] they were watched night and day for where they might go. And if they didn’t go back [to SL], then they were like comun runa iguaina – like common people, like us.

[Theidon 2013:235; braces, emphasis added, except for non-English]

The repentance was not so public in every instance or village, nor did it mean there was little or no resentment, fear or disfavor shown former rebels, but repentance, and subsequent acceptance, if not forgiveness, was a critical feature of turning oneself in. It depends on what is surely a cross-cultural phenomenon. It is a relative of those forms of therapy used in certain extreme versions of treatment for addicts and the hard of heart such as criminal recidivists, one that depend on deconstructing and reconstructing the personality and character of the individual in question. The other salient intercultural feature is the mix of traditional and European moral and legal norms. Conversations with villagers (Theidon 2013:240) affirmed that that longstanding cross-cultural concepts of justice also featured confession and repentance. Whether informed by Catholic, evangelical or Native models of psychic and behavioral reform, the sentiment must be heartfelt, so Theidon (2013:241) observes. The performative speech involved in this judicial ritual must be convincing: “Confessing, atoning, sobbing, apologizing, begging, promising – sincerity would depend on both words and action.”

The searching questions and repentant answers mirror a ritualistic call-and-response format characteristic of Christianity but also of many cross-cultural liminal moments in which wrongdoing is expiated and people are reintegrated into the group. Theidon also
emphasizes that in nearly all religious traditions, retribution stands side-by-side with redemption. In this case, the retribution is inquisitional, a public grilling regarding culpability and sincerity that has the all-important effect of exorcising guilt if not demons and halting the physical violence, of predicating reconstruction and reconciliation on the prevention of revenge.

COLOMBIA:

HUMAN-RIGHTS ROOTS, WORKERS ON THE EDGE

AND THE ROUTINIZATION OF COMPASSION

Peace with justice or peace versus justice?

Human rights activists who traced their roots to the militancia [militancy] of the 1970s and 1980s drew on a repertoire of cultural meanings for their activism based on two major cultural influences on the Colombian left – the Catholic Church and the Communist parties…. These institutions provided cultural frameworks for appropriate activist emotional responses…. Colombian activists most often described this revolutionary consciousness in human rights practice as mistica, loosely translated as “mystique,” which captures the connotation of otherworldliness, romance, a commitment beyond rationality…. Activists used the mistica to describe the profoundly motivating emotional force that defined human rights activism for them, a commitment to this work as both a connection to the victims of political violence, a covenant with them, and a means of articulating the broad hope for justice
and social change. *In this vision, risk becomes part of the emotional appeal, as sacrifice, suffering, and even martyrdom were celebrated among radical Catholics and Communist Party activists as central signifiers of true vocation.*

[Tate 2007:148]

Some of the most emotional debates about human rights activism that occurred during the 1990s, however, focused on the transition from solidarity groups to professional human rights NGOs, *a transition that involved institutional mandates and practices, as well as the emotional identities of activists.* Did adapting to the codes of professional activism signify abandoning activists’ historic commitment to radical social transformation? This question was one of the most contentious issues over the next decade.

[Tate 2007:149]

As noted, civil society provides an important buffer against the abuse of disadvantaged groups and supplies critical resources for advocacy on their behalf. In addition, it not only aspires to lead; there are critical times when it does in fact advance the discussion and provides a fundamental and sustainable direction. Human rights and the environment provide convincing evidence for the latter, social justice less so.

In the midst of the horrific civil violence of the last half-century, one of the most important peacebuilding activities of this period, since the Universal Declaration, has become the human-rights activism of any number of nongovernmental organizations, many working with a commitment that is religious or nearly so. Regarding the stages of
peacebuilding, it is a fundamental activity of the earliest two phases. It has an important bearing on where peacebuilding trends and how it is socially constructed – by common people, opinion leaders and decision makers, by individuals, small groups and large organizations. In addition, we will also explore the longer term effect of a heightened awareness of the interconnectedness of all living things – inspired in transformational ways by indigenous and peasant worldviews holding the land sacred.

In part, because any number of human-rights workers in Colombia came from social-justice and development work, and this work was backed by a religious and intellectual movement reinventing Christianity to be more about the collective than at any time since Constantine, they felt a staunch allegiance not just to individual victims, but to a communitarian vision that could address the full range of human needs across scales and geographies. The victims become emblems, icons, of the collective ethos required to undergird lasting peace, so that the discussions about the professionalization of human rights advocacy were not just about its routinization, its bureaucratization, draining it of force, zeal and detail, but also critically about any atomization of compassion, any restriction of its depth and breadth.

Local human-rights workers live and work on the physical and emotional front lines of the civil violence. They know the local, national and, for the most part, the international landscape. They also have the best knowledge among rights workers of the varied conditions on the ground, where the torture, killings, rapes, disappearances and displacement take place. International professionals, on the other hand, have the best access to powerful people and critical resources on the geopolitical level, those who can influence, amend or transform public consciousness and policy. As Lederach explains,
mid-level workers provide crucial connections between these local and international players.

Human-rights became institutionalized in Colombia during the early 1980s as a response to nearly two decades of repression of social movements and insurgencies featuring a great deal of extralegal killing. As leftist activism created a new endangered species made mostly of indigenous, peasant and union leaders and leftist intellectuals, the left turned to human rights to build a conceptual framework with which to create an awareness about abuses by the state (and its allies, the elite) and to highlight the vulnerability of the left to the violence of the entrenched powers. This meant that many who moved from leftist to human-rights activism brought with them their profound political critique, even as they had to give up some of their most ideological tendencies and some treasured notions about the moral superiority of the rebels’ violence.

At this time as well, the vast majority of the population, 85-90 percent, was nominally or legitimately Catholic, and liberation theology, a theology of advocacy for the subordinate classes and peoples, was becoming increasingly popular among the young and progressive as a thinking, feeling person’s religion. A heady mix of Marxist analysis and leftist religious ideals were coursing through progressive parts of the society, especially liberal intellectuals, workers and peasants. Accordingly, the human-rights movement in Colombia was infused with a romantic, sometimes utopian, at times fatalistic, ideology that eventually saw that human rights were a logical extension of leftist politics. When the movement had to interact with and produce well-packaged narratives for the international human-rights leadership, such as the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS), and, especially, donors, this “encounter” of the
truth and those speaking it to power with the international human-rights community, as it was absorbed into the international value system, forced the discourse of human rights to become more individual, apolitical and structurally flexible. It was made palatable to the wealthy and powerful, albeit of a putatively liberal stripe. The international human-rights professionals were aware of this transformation of discourse, analysis and attitudes, of course, but it was easier for them to accept. They knew the touch-and-go world of international politics (Tate 2007). They knew that half-truths and half-measures often reigned and a lighter hand was often needed.

The legacy of liberation theology is mixed in Colombia because it was then, and remains, a very conservative country. The church was then led by one of the most conservative of bishops, Msgr. Alfonso Lopez Trujillo, now a cardinal. Trujillo was secretary general, then president, of the Latin American Council of Bishops and played a key part in the Vatican’s strategy under John Paul II to neutralize liberation theology.

At the same time, one of its most important exemplars has been former Jesuit Camilo Torres, an activist priest prominent in Colombia in the 1960s who felt chased from academic life and helped found the ELN. He basically served as a chaplain but probably carried a gun. We have referred to Torres and Gutierrez as leaders of liberation theology from Colombia and Peru, respectively, and we will be citing a few key passages from Gutierrez later. So here we ought to offer a characteristic glimpse at Torres’ thought. Torres led the way in action and reflection before the term “liberation theology” was popular. Chosen emblematically, we offer this passages: “The duty of every Catholic is to be a revolutionary. The duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution. The Catholic who is not a revolutionary is living in mortal sin” (Torres 1971). He also
somewhat famously said that if Jesus were alive in Latin America then, he would be a guerrilla. If this seems problematic morally, bear in mind that theories of just war were used liberally and convincingly by many left-of-center scholars, activists and popular-sector leaders.

In addition, Colombia’s progressive religious community was bolstered by the fact that Medellín hosted the 1968 Conference of Bishops. One of the most far-reaching statements on religion and social justice in church history came from this event. The conference set a challenge before the Latin American church, to relentlessly protest unjust social conditions and create “a preferential option for the poor,” an advocacy for the poor and powerless. Some would call it the charter of liberation theology. This began, as well, to have an ethnic cast to it, one that would take some time to fully develop into its own social movement.

In a chapter called “Solidarity with Our Class Brother,” Tate explains that:

For many of the un- and undereducated rural and urban poor, participation in these [solidarity and conscious-raising] groups was their first experience with political activism…. Participation expanded members’ social networks and created a new activist identity…. Marxist notions of solidarity and struggle with the oppressed replaced the traditional Catholic teachings of passive acceptance of poverty and the understanding of charity as giving to the poor. [Representing this kind of leader,] Doña Eugenia described this transformation as it affected her sense of herself as an activist working within the church: “With Father Vincente I learned the difference between solidarity and charity. If I give you the food that is left over, that I don’t
want because I am full, or the clothes that I don’t need anymore, that I no longer wear, that is charity. *Solidarity is when I share what I have with my class brother.* I began working in the jails as solidarity work [with political prisoners].

[Tate 2007:78–79; emphasis added]

Doña Eugenia was from a rural background had not had much formal education, but she had read and met Torres and was deeply moved by what he had said about fidelity to one’s class brothers and sisters. She also worked for the leftist United Front, distributed their clandestine newspaper and rounded up medicine for the guerillas. In this passage, she makes an eloquent statement about meeting her need for belonging by helping those who have been deprived of the means to meet even their most basic human needs. This, we are to understand, is the fundamental meaning of the *mistica.*

Later, moving up the ranks in human-rights work, she became more aware of and more critical of the better connected national and international workers. Tate notes that the early human-rights movement in Colombia was deeply split over the proper place of class solidarity and leftist thinking, torn by criticism that human rights were a bourgeois concern, individualistic, deflecting attention from poverty and collective rights due peasants, Indians and the urban poor. “For militants in Marxist parties, the universal aspirations in rights language was unconvincing. Many simply rejected the idea that rich people had rights, focusing on abuses experienced by peasants and workers during the course of their class-based organizing efforts” (Tate 2007:101).

Others found leftist organizing futile and its soul-searching misguided if not unconvincing. Tate recounts one lawyer’s odyssey into rights activism, a decision she
characterizes as a result of “feelings,” not a well-reasoned critique of the social violence. However, he seems to have his reasons, most having to do with choosing political effectiveness, however limited, over ideological or religious consistency:

I worked as a lawyer for three years and in leftist projects in [the poor neighborhoods of] southern Bogotá, as part of the civic movements that were related to the church. I had friends from the university that were very close to the people working with the Christian base communities {grassroots study groups for social action and reflection}, part of the Camilista movements {inspired by Torres}, which was an attempt to create a political party that was a complete failure. They were close to the ELN, and had a completely stupid discourse… We spent a long time discussing if we should support the armed movement or not – a complete waste of time. *People generally left; some people went into the ELN, some people into the human rights movement.*

[Tate 2007:99; braces, emphasis added]

Faced with a range of public criticism, often from the state or the right, but also from the left, the human-rights movement had to become more image conscious. But it was caught between the “devil” of sectarian differences and the “deep blue sea” of achieving nominal consensus by soft-pedaling class and its role in the repression. It would eventually be denounced by some it once counted as allies as being conciliatory with the worst elements in society. For the most part, however, at this stage, given that executive orders frequently declared states of siege that trampled on civil and human rights, supported by leftist scholars and their critique of Colombia as a virtual rights-abusing
dictatorship, with its roots mostly in the left, the human-rights movement targeted the state as the enemy.

One activist remarked: “We were organizations against the state, we were never nongovernmental organizations. Everything that had to do with the state was bad: repression, inequality, lies, corruption” (Tate 2007:104). Even so, the daily violations – the disappearances, the torture, the illegal searches and seizures – forced community, peasant and union organizers to work on human rights regularly, even if publicly criticizing them as the sole focus of advocacy (over social justice) and, more often, privately. Here a great deal of tension emerged in the struggle to remain faithful to a vision of meeting the most fundamental physical needs of others (as well as their needs for belonging and esteem) while struggling with their sense of the right kinds of local, national and international connections. At the national level, the government was considered corrupt and oppressive, but its players, especially in dialog with human-rights workers at that level, to whom local workers consistently wanted better access, could serve as brokers of approximate justice between those suffering at the local level and those who could apply leverage from the international level. Under great duress at times, with their very lives at stake, they could take advantage of a critical analysis of human-rights standards in national and international law that were woeful at protecting fellow advocates. Peacebuilding has little meaning until justice is served, they believed, but they would engage in human-rights work if it would serve the ends of social justice.

In contrast, the Peruvian human-rights community didn’t much distinguish between victims of the guerrillas and those of the state or paras, Tate (2007) reports. In her opinion, they misapplied humanitarian law to cover the abuse and murder of those
considered armed actors in isolated circumstances or in league with them, such as the ronderos or those who gave material support to the guerrillas.

They were careful not to champion the rights of the guerrilla collaborators, defining their mission as to “protect and support innocent victims,” in a policy adopted in 1987 at a national meeting of human rights groups. After the massive detentions following the antiterrorism legislation, they launched the “in the name of the innocent” campaign (estimated at approximately one-third of the nearly 22,000 people detained).... One unintended outcome of this policy was that human rights activists became de facto judge and jury, with their adoption of particular cases often influencing the outcomes (detainees not represented by human rights lawyers were assumed guilty). [However] rejection of guerrilla violence also made Peruvian activists more supportive of democracy and ending the war. While Colombian groups focused on “humanizing the war” through the [appropriate] use of international humanitarian law, Peruvians realized that negotiation with Shining Path was impossible, resulting in greater support for democracy and state-sponsored initiatives.

[Tate 2007: 330, n. 8]

While Tate’s focus is elsewhere, it would be fascinating to know if this approach had an effect on the cohesion of the human-rights movement and the mental health of these workers in Peru relative to those in Colombia (perhaps from a reduction of cognitive dissonance and resistance).
On the other hand, in Colombia, the leftist social critique took another direction, closely related to the political aspects of peacebuilding and its effects on peasants and indigenous peoples. This was to emphasize an alternative model of human rights that championed people’s justice and collective rights. In a landmark event in 1976, the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, signed by a number of NGOs and generally called the Algiers Declaration, developed articles declaring that every people has the right to exist, to self-determination and to free themselves from colonial – or neocolonial – domination. Sponsored by the International League for Liberation and the Rights of Peoples, it set up a chapter in Colombia by the late 1980s. Over the years, the Algiers Declaration has become an alternative human-rights paradigm in workshops across the country.

This declaration has also been used internationally to support popular tribunals that indict nations for their violations of the collective rights and autonomy of peoples. The most well-known example might be the (Bertrand) Russell Tribunal indicting the United States in 1967 for crimes against the people of Vietnam. Another Russell Tribunal convened in various sessions from 1974-76 to call military dictatorships in Latin America to account.

Along those lines, one convened in Bogotá in the fall of 1989. Human-rights experts from across the continent presented their findings. Colombian NGOs were well represented. As expected, some human-rights professionals criticized the tribunals for being tainted by partisanship. Others lauded them for creating a place for a crucial alternative discourse on human rights, for bringing structural violence into the discussion and, moreover, for highlighting it.
Another critical event in the history of international human rights and indigenous peoples has been the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf). In some sense, the Algiers Declaration prefigured and prompted it. In part urged on by that declaration, the General Assembly passed it on September 13, 2007. It has been signed by all the countries of the world, though not until recently by the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Colombia also lagged.

*The mystique, the madness and the social construction of the truth at the middle range*

In [his] history of the UP, journalist and former Peace Brigade volunteer Steve Dudley reflected on the impact of the sustained violence on party activists, many of whom became involved in human rights activism as the party was decimated [as the political front of leftist parties, the UP, gained standing, 3,000 of its key members were murdered in the late 1980s and early 1990s, stopping it in its tracks]. He…frames his narrative around the life and death of Josué [Giraldo, a noted UP member and human-rights lawyer who was murdered]. In one passage Dudley describes a conversation with Father Amar Garcia, a priest who knew Josué well and described his struggle as a “religious compromise.”

Garcia said the same was true for other UP members. They pretended to disregard the church, but their struggle closely paralleled their belief that their sacrifice would be rewarded. Within the party it was. Garcia said that the party functioned
using a strange honor code. “To be threatened was to get more prestige,” he explained. “That’s why they took risks. Risk is what gave them importance. The one who was the most threatened was the one who was the most important…. I don’t know what it was, sympathy for death; sympathy for martyrdom.”

[Tate 2007:156–157; emphasis added]

The violence confronting activists and communities where they worked was one of the factors that drove these vitriolic discussions [over the nature of integrity, obligations to the dead, alcohol abuse and infidelity as coping mechanisms or neglect of self for victims]. “This fight becomes focused on the cycle of death, that it is all right, if while defending life, you find death,” another activist concluded. “But death is becoming an end in itself.” The despair of constant violence, and the celebration of sacrifice, has led to the glorification of violence and the view that death is the only option. “The slogan has become, ‘they kill us or they kill us’…which gets activists and communities into the logic of death – death as inevitable and desirable,” he said. Organizations that do not experience the same persecution are viewed with suspicion…possibly harboring paramilitary informants or covertly supporting military programs. “If people aren’t threatened or killed, they are suspects; organizations whose members aren’t killed are suspect,” he went on to say.

[Tate 2007:160; emphasis added]

Before we turn to the next phase in the development of the Colombian human-rights movement, its increasing professionalism and those effects at various levels, we should
examine the emotional causes and consequences of the very difficult profession such workers pursue. The two excerpts above won’t likely do it justice, but they are a revealing part of the story. With key excerpts from Tate and some psychological and spiritual interpretation, we will try to represent the stresses, motivations and part-time madness (or alternately, religious transcendence) that these grassroots and mid-level human-rights workers experienced.

We should also note here that we are prompted by a number of scholars examining social movements who have increasingly called attention to the emotional lives of the participants as a neglected area of social science, seeing it as a critical reason for the resilience and staying power of certain movements (Tate 2007). In the face of public misunderstanding, meager funding, limited results and political persecution, even death threats, why do such people continue to do the work they do? They do so because of the emotional rewards, rewards that are spiritual or nearly so. These reasons are both deeply personal and very social. They are the main part of what binds these workers to one another and to the arduous, nerve-wracking work they do.

Making it more literal, less symbolic, than the excerpts above, Calhoun (1991:51) has said that such workers bear the risks “not because of the likelihood of success in manifest goals but because participation in a course of action has over time committed one to a [social and moral] identity that would be irretrievably violated by pulling back from risk” (Tate 2007:147) – we could say a need for self-esteem, confidence, achievement, respect of others and respect by others. In this case, higher-order needs at the national level drive a commitment to helping those at the bottom of the social ladder, to meeting basic needs at the local level, especially for food, shelter and safety.
One worker talks about a form of pleasure resulting from a passion for the group, for its cohesion and solidarity. It provides a motivation beyond actual outcomes. This might even be considered a neo-tribal effect that meets a need for belonging, in which human-rights workers and victims become a single group that must be defended. Yet another scholar looks at human-rights advocacy in the Southern Cone and explains that “dense but diverse interpersonal networks” embedded within broader, more impersonal networks make this life worth living in a way it would not be otherwise.

These observations should hold lessons that could be transferred to other aspects of peacebuilding, much of which has to be done under equally difficult conditions. On the other hand, a commitment to the victims that is this deep can produce conflicts between this and one’s other commitments – for example, to create palatable, consumable narratives for the international audience in order to get something done, not to mention one’s broader obligations to friends, family and self, to some degree of normalcy.

This passion for victims can be expressed in many ways, but two in particular stand out. Those at the grassroots jealously defend the legacies of individual victims (they often know them, or their reputations, individually), their desire to remember them and the overriding need not to compromise their lives, deaths or memories by sacrificing the fundamental political and economic aims of their activism. In other words, they would hate to sanitize the repression to make a case to donors and other agencies that might be uncomfortable with passion or partisan politics. The mystique of this work always hovers in the background. It breaks into the foreground in moments of conflict. A lawyer and UN consultant described his commitment this way:
I started human rights work because of wanting to work with the community…trying to achieve what I think is just…. I can feel the same thing working with NGOs or the state, the same dynamic, the same *mística.*” While defending his decision to work in different institutions, he noted that some former colleagues had changed when they took new jobs. “Some of the *campaneros* {compatriots} were very radical when they worked in NGOs, then they went to work with the government and they *burgesiaron* [became bourgeois].” But, he insisted… “I have the same *mística* of the work that I have always had, I haven’t cut the cord. This isn’t a political position, it’s the nature of the work {that motivates me}.

[Tate 2007:151; braces added]

Another also vowed his militancy had not changed, just his approach, moving from leftist activism to human rights. This ongoing passion allows him to deal with the fear that always shadows such work. Working for a higher goal than self-interest frees him to take risks, he said. However, he believes that the definition of his constituency has changed. He can no longer side with some victims and not others. “Human rights is a short-term vision if we only defend a certain kind of people and leaders. We [also] need to be on the side of the victims of the insurgency, and they do exist” (Tate 2007:150). He described it as a refined or distilled passion, one disciplined by the emerging professionalism of the field.

Dona Eugenia disagreed, and emphatically, confronting him at a human rights workshop when he urged the professionalization of human rights [a reporting
protocol] and the need to place the rebels’ violations on a par with those of the military and paras. She tore into him for abandoning his, and his movement’s, ideals: “You were a boy from the slums who was committed to defending the people…. Now you are otro cuento [something else].”

[Tate 2007:152]

She then related her own story and revealed the source of a good deal of her bitterness. After receiving death threats and barely avoiding capture, she escaped to Ecuador, where she felt abandoned by her former colleagues. She blamed this on the class barriers created by the appeal to donors. She castigated her former organization, the Committee on Solidarity with Political Prisoners (CSPP), the one that gave her a start, for selling out to international money.

How can it be that when you are in exile, people don’t look for you, [to] make sure you are all right? The CSPP, now that they are an NGO with money, don’t care. It is like we are friends if we are in the same position, but once you go up in the world, we can’t be friends any more because you have a new position, you are comfortable, and you have different interests.

[Tate 2007:152]

Dona Eugenia found her need for physical safety and sustenance overriding enough that it challenged to its core her sense of belonging, of solidarity with her fellow human-rights workers. These, she felt, had sold out to the national and international level and
were beginning to ignore the basic needs of those at the local level, of the people they vowed to serve when they took up the “cross” of human-rights work. Others commented in various ways about vexing issues regarding everything from spiritual to social and development needs going unmet as they struggle with the lack of communication and empathy across scales, becoming fed up with arrogance and organizational dysfunction at the national level.

Activism in Colombia also consists of complicated layers; these groups do not constitute a single “local” but [involve] multiple levels of access to resources [funding for office space or legal defense], education [how to report to an international organization], and travel [access to higher levels and the tourist destinations the upper-level actors routinely visited for their conferences, often criticized by lower-level workers].

These differences are greatest between “national” groups (generally understood as Bogotá-based groups), groups in larger cities (primarily Medellín), and [on the other hand] those in small towns and rural areas…. Activists in small towns and rural areas are often much more attuned to the particular dynamic of violence in their areas and less willing to adjust their analysis to include national dynamics or the concerns of international counterparts…. Such activists are often profoundly critical of their “national” (Bogotá-based) counterparts as being out of touch with local realities and failing to share resources and information…. Activists’ critiques included demands that the circulation of information, training and resources from national groups to local groups should be improved. Many voiced concerns that their position as holders
of privileged information desired by international counterparts was being usurped by national brokers.

[Tate 2007:186; emphasis added]

At another point, at a workshop on human rights, she records the transformation of a relatively straightforward narrative into a complex tale of justice not only delayed but tortured into a miscarriage, misshapen beyond simple right and wrong by local intrigue, multi-lateral rivalries and a coercion-based politics in which almost no one plays fair.

The group time almost up, the personero [representative/spokesperson] agreed to present our report [an exercise in documenting abuses]. Rodrigo [a national worker teaching incident-report writing] had started us off with the barest outlines of the context: a closed factory, a union, paramilitary groups, two assassinations. Now [after a local worker explained the situation in detail] the context appeared much more complicated, including not only those factors but also guerrilla groups, secret meetings, allegations of corruption, and the shifting political profile of the armed actors in the region. Conflict over land and resources, paramilitary politicization and increasing guerrilla abuses, as well as efforts by local officials with armed actors, had no place in the linear human rights narrative focused on individual assassinations, which the activists were being trained to produce.

[2007:141–142; emphasis added]

These last two excerpts stand in contrast to Lederach’s assertion that national brokers hold the key, or a key, to effective action. The explanation lies in the fact that Lederach is
describing optimal functioning and what Tate is describing is definitely suboptimal – blocked, not open, communication, what happens when good organizations, and the people in them, become, not bad, or even obtuse to the purpose of their work, but are surrounded by a situation already in flames, a fire in a crowded theater where the exit signs have all burned out. In the middle of this, they can’t shout Fire at the top of their lungs. They have to exhibit calm and help clear the theater systematically. This is where the stress on national workers is at its height. Still, it cannot compare to the social and moral chaos on the ground, the world the local activists and their victims live in all the time. However, the national workers are tasked with, and committed to, producing measurable results that can at least slow the violence. To appeal to the resources of the international level, they found they had to take the local stories and forge a consistent narrative and a working consensus. We turn to that next.

Creating consensus in the crunch

The central element of the public face of professionalism was the consensus of the human rights community. Because professional human rights activism is a dispassionate and objective analysis of the facts according to international legal standards, all activists must agree on the diagnosis of the problem and the proposed solution… Though many human rights activists in fact had profound differences, in their international lobbying they attempted to display a united front.

[Tate 2007:208]
We cannot look at all the possible nodes of interaction across all scales, or even most, so we will focus on one of critical consequence, the lobbying of the United Nations by Colombian human-rights groups. We will examine a crucial aspect of the local-national-international nexus: the need to create an coherent narrative for the UN Human Rights Commission. (The commission was abolished and replaced with a Human Rights Council in 2006, largely to regain impartiality in certain aspects of its work.) Such efforts by Colombian NGOs have been considered a model of how to work together to get results at the international level.

Tate (2007) notes that in preparing to lobby the commission, the Colombian NGOs found they had competing demands, for example, for an internationally significant special UN human-rights rapporteur (reporter), as opposed to an independent expert, a lower status option favored by the commission. To achieve a consensus, they had to spend much more time talking to one another than to the commission. In the end, however, this effort was ground-breaking. In a hard-won agreement on policy recommendations, they devised the first “Joint Declaration,” a formal request before the commission. Though it required intensive discussions prior to its presentation, it was considered the single most important tool in their lobbying. Among other lessons, workers had to realize that the commission was not a court taking testimony and making judicial decisions but a deliberative body governed by the political interests of its nation-states. The assignment of a special rapporteur – which the government opposed as a moral victory for the guerillas – was abandoned in favor of a new request, which was granted: establishing an office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia.
This is a good example of Lederach’s ideas. As a mid-level actor, the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ), human-rights professionals with legal training, performed the critical role of synthesizing and distilling a number of NGO narratives and objectives, or providing excellent resources to facilitate this. They set the Colombian NGO community up to execute a targeted lobbying campaign focused on a particular goal.

Various experienced leaders of NGOs headquartered in Geneva said they believed the consensus model to be a paradigm for NGO involvement with the commission (Tate 2007). This was largely a function of the resources the CCJ could command. For one thing, they were able to draw on an exceptional funding base, no doubt assisted by attorneys’ salaries and professional connections. It allowed them to put together a full-time staff that could stay in Geneva for extended periods, sponsoring meetings and soliciting input. They also took advantage of broad global contacts, including those who had done human-rights lobbying before. This professionalism (defined by the standards of the international level) facilitated the consensus position among NGOs. The approach involved a series of meetings with the delegates from the states making up the commission, as well as officials of the United Nations. It also entailed working closely with international NGOs, particularly in a campaign to enlist more NGOs in support of the Colombian proposal. The last and compelling angle involved the imagination required to propose a new institution, a commission office in country, along with a nuanced understanding of the commission’s rules and norms and how to use them creatively.
While many groups critiqued the U.N. lobbying strategy…some groups [in particular] developed radically different ideas about what [such] international work should look like. *They rejected the central focus on foreign governments, embassies and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, arguing that states will always seek their own interests* [and so may sabotage or stall the process]. Rather than attempt to convince government representatives to bring pressure on the Colombian government…*these activists believed they should develop alliances with social movements in other places, focusing on solidarity among oppressed peoples.* Examples frequently mentioned…included *unions, peasant groups and popular organizations.*

[Tate 2007:187;emphasis added]

None of this consensus-building means that the move was received equally well by all human-rights workers in Colombia, especially those nearest the violence. In addition, at the national level, civil-society groups had to come to grips with what the Colombian government wanted. First, even before the final agreement, the national NGOs took issue with the way the state expected to handle the reporting. They wanted instead a values-based analysis that looked critically into the social-political, and ultimately economic, sources of the violence and demanded action from the authorities. The state wanted them to merely document events and actions taken. A second conflict involved how the documentation was distributed. The state asked that only the UN professionals and
members of the commission receive copies. The agreement ultimately included an analysis of the social-political context but withheld publication for a year after the events. The report was first given to the High Commissioner and then to the states that were commission members, after which, it was released publicly.

Regarding another part of the agreement, on one level, the NGOs favoring it wanted a special rapporteur because the role entailed the authority to criticize the government publicly, via a censure, though this option is generally reserved for dictatorships, the state pointed out. Additional barriers the NGOs encountered were objections from the delegates of other Latin American states, who had their own reasons to obfuscate regarding human rights. Another obstacle to advocacy at the international level has been getting the international players to shift their focus from drug-trafficking abuses that portray the government as a victim to human-rights violations in which the government is at fault.

More far-reaching concerns, however, came from those with less patience dealing with international bureaucracies and more immediate concerns closer to home. One indigenous activist in particular, from southern Colombia, expressed his disgust and dismay. He thought it was a waste of time to come: “I don’t see how this makes any sense. No one speaking has any experience of human rights violations, just states and governments, and international NGOs [are represented]” (Tate 2007:111). Of his three visits to Geneva, he went on to say, “It is a detestable space. It is incredible the way people play with the tragedy of the people there” (Tate 2007:112).

His preferred option for human-rights activism was to create more permanent and lasting alliances with international social movements and rely much less on the influence
of European governments and donors. Another critic, a union activist who was a founding member of a national human-rights NGO, said the agreement represented a geopolitical winner’s view of justice. He also said that the international sanctions and boycotts used by the North Atlantic states to discipline other states, generally in the developing world, were a matter of wealthy nations using human rights to subvert the economies of poorer nations. This causes activists to hold back denunciations of abuses, he said.

In the view of this activists, the higher-order needs of the national and international workers again trump the lower-order needs of the people they set out to serve. His response was to urge the collaboration of unionists, peasants, women’s and indigenous groups across national borders. In the eyes of these disaffected activists, it is not that compromises must be made, not that national and international networking is not needed, but that a moral perspective based on a holistic approach to meeting human needs has been lost. They believe that the national and international workers have lost their way morally and their interests, and those they represent, of the people suffering on the ground, would be much better served if their networking built alliances with those more committed to meeting basic needs at the local and regional level, matters of decent wages, land reform, gender equity and protection of the lifeways of those whose existence, material, social, psychological and spiritual, has been sundered by an onslaught of developmental and political genocides.

However, all too often, these grassroots organizations are overburdened and understaffed and have all they can do to deal with concrete issues in their own countries. They lack systematic access to political and economic power. Developing these
relationships has proved time-consuming, costly and often ineffective (Tate 2007). Specific strategies have been fewer and more limited than those aimed at international organizations. The rejoinder from the local workers is that lobbying the UN is also time-consuming and expensive and often yields diffident results. NGOs have a very limited voice there and no voting privileges, they point out.

What we can hold to here is that this early stage of peacebuilding depends on a very complicated, even arduous process of working against political, economic and cultural odds to help people at the local level meet a variety of human needs, from basic to higher order, while coordinating a number of pressing issues across local, national and international scales with limited funds, people and access to policy makers. This spanning of gaps across levels of human needs and political leverage puts national-level workers under a great deal of stress. And sometimes, this causes the group to splinter, to fission in anthropological terms.

Independent of its problems and divisions, as noted, this advocacy is the leading edge of peacebuilding, even as the violence continues. Any holistic approach to peace must consider in depth and detail the many players, levels and dynamics of human-rights work. It must examine their personal relationships, their individual and social psychology and their spiritual needs. This is not to say no one ever considered this, but that it might be investigated more thoroughly and linked more directly to various aspects and models of peacebuilding.

In particular, many of the human-rights workers in Colombia felt they had an obligation to fight not just the professionalization, but the individualization, of human-rights work, to make sure the broader publics, local, national, international, understood it
as a collective or communitarian affair, that unless whole communities, nations and economies, even ecologies, are healed (or repaired), the human-rights struggle is heroic but piecemeal, a salve to conscience but not a social transformation. This is the subtext to the debate about the professionalization and individualization of human-rights work.

Conflict resolution: needs met and unmet

Conflict-resolution issues in these two populations have different complexions, but they offer closely related lessons in theory and practice, in individual and social dynamics and in restoration economics and ecology. Among the highland villagers, conflict resolution is embodied in a ritual of repentance supported by a national repentance law. However, buying into the trauma industry, the new, post-authoritarian face of the state exercises good intentions but has problems assisting conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the deepest sense because it leaves the villagers without familiar psychological categories with which to understand their grief and anger, their trauma.

With human-rights workers in Colombia, conflict-resolution techniques would have been valuable in preserving good will across a spectrum of views embodied by these professionals. This would have been helpful going forward in various ways, social, psychological and political, even if some eventually would need to split off to preserve their sense of integrity. Where they did exercise a crucial form of conflict resolution was in arriving at a working consensus regarding their request of the UN’s human rights commission. They did this primarily with much labor-intensive dialog.
Taussig and terror as culture, history as sorcery

A social and cultural anthropologist who has had a great deal to say about many of the issues in this study, especially in Colombia and Peru – from land tenure and use, to the colonization of agriculture, to crucial ideological and mythological dynamics of conquest – is Michael Taussig. On his web site with Columbia University, he explains that among his interests are:

1) the commercialization of peasant agriculture, 2) slavery, 3) hunger, 4) commodity fetishism [consumerism], 5) the impact of colonialism (historical and contemporary) on “shamanism” and folk healing… 7) the making, talking, and writing of terror… 10) a two-week diary detailing paramilitary violence [and] 11) a montage-ethnography of the Pacific Coast of Colombia.”

[Columbia University Department of Anthropology 2014:online]

Taussig offers any number of points of entry for our purposes. The task is to choose just a few. Among them, he has produced an analysis of the subsidy that peasant agriculture provides for what he calls "capitalist" (or industrial) agriculture. Then, in “Culture of Terror – Space of Death: Roger Casement’s Putumayo Report and the Explanation of Torture,” he does a penetrating confessional and literary treatment of a South American “heart of darkness,” using the novel by Joseph Conrad (Heart of Darkness) as the central conceit for exploiting indigenous peoples to death. He compares Conrad’s book on the rubber industry in King Leopold’s Congo, including the actual conditions, with the beginning of the Amazonian rubber trade in the early 1900s.
Alongside Conrad, he examines the writing of reformer and journalist Roger Casement, who also crusaded to stop the slavery and killings in the Congo. As it happens, Casement investigated a terror-filled company in the Putamayo region, the Peruvian Rubber Company. These sorts of European-funded rubber plantations also operated with similar bonded labor in Colombia, Ecuador and western Brazil. In the Putamayo, Casement documented the slavery of many tens of thousands of Huitoto Indians, enforced with torture, beatings, mutilations and massacres. It is estimated that 30,000 to 40,000 died (Brysk 2000).

In addition, while Taussig’s *History as Sorcery* is a winding road, it conveys in evocative detail, historical and symbolic, how the conquered mythologize and remythologize their conquerors and their conquerors' mythology, molding them in narrative and ritual, fitting them to key parts of their own version of the past, using them to better face the present and imagine the future. His is a very thick, thick description, and I cannot do it full justice here, but I will explore a few of these themes in a brief excursus.

**Peasant economies and capitalist agriculture in the Cauca.** In a study of an Afro-Colombian peasantry growing mostly sugarcane in the southwestern part of the country, Taussig examines a much-debated issue regarding the extent to which small holders who also work as wage labor on larger estates subsidize the success of large operations because they employ family labor paid in kind, not cash, and so are apparently more efficient. This, he maintains, is an efficiency largely captured by their disadvantage in the global market and the fact that the larger holdings have eaten up the minimum acreage needed for subsistence, thereby producing a captive, cheap labor pool. A counter
argument holds that unpaid family labor is actually a cost that makes these farms less efficient.

Taussig says the hybrid system, wages plus subsistence and some income from small holding, works by intensifying labor and by cutting the costs of reproducing labor (ordinarily of recruiting and training it, sometimes by conscripting or enslaving it). This labor shortage incidentally has not resulted from a shortage of indigenous peoples in the region, but from how few have been willing to do it so without coercion, a key ingredient sometimes. What he calls “non-capitalist” social organization, including a non-capitalist agriculture, supplies a subsidy critical to industrial agriculture and capitalism in general that makes those very large institutions seem more efficient than they are. Seen this way, he says, peasants and large landowners subsidize each other, the difference being the peasants’ subsidy allows the “capitalist farmers” to extract more surplus value from their operations while spending very little to reproduce their own labor, that is, on the cost of maintaining a cheap but stable supply of labor. Besides intensifying labor, getting more out of the workers for less, this system works because peasants supply public and social services the state does not, in education, water and health, for instance. Third, political tensions are reduced because there is a compliant labor force, trade unions are suppressed, seasonal and economic business fluctuations are dampened and there is a lower demand for public services. Peasant subsistence production is an indirect subsidy, but nevertheless quite real, Taussig (1978) concludes. Later he notes:

In any event, the development of large-scale capitalist farming in this area is dependent on the fact that a significant majority of its wage-labor force provides part
of its subsistence costs outside of the normal capitalist institutions. *Capitalist development of this sort does not so much displace peasant and other forms of non-capitalist production, but rather incorporates their very real economic efficiencies so as to balance the costs of capital investment which are otherwise [met] by international financing.*

[Taussig 1978:87-88; emphasis added]

This is capitalization as (neo)colonization, the economic paradigm haunting Latin America for centuries.

**The Putamayo rubber boom and a genocide of lowland Indians.** The crux of the Amazonian rubber boom was that, like much of industrial agriculture, it required a large and relatively cheap labor force. This became crucial as plantations, with no natural economic predators, grew extensively, consuming more land and requiring more workers. Most Indians were not interested in rubber tapping unless their other options, hunting, gathering and small farming, did not produce enough. Therefore plantation owners and their managers had to force Indians into service and keep them there with debt peonage. A plantation would start with many tens of thousands of indigenous peoples and once the operation was stopped, might have only a few thousand left. After an expose in a British magazine on Peruvian Rubber, a British company, Casement was asked to investigate further and report to Parliament on the depredations and atrocities wrought by this mercantilist-style enterprise. Parts of these reports also were published in popular and scholarly journals. Taussig (1984a) summarizes one as follows:
The article continues by declaring that the peaceful Indians work night and day collecting rubber without the slightest remuneration. They are given nothing to eat or wear. Their crops, together with the women and children, are taken for the pleasure of the whites. They are inhumanly flogged until their bones are visible. Given no medical treatment, they are left to die after torture, eaten by the company's dogs. They are castrated, and their ears, fingers, arms, and legs are cut off. They are also tortured by means of fire, water, and crucifixion tied head-down. The whites cut them to pieces with machetes and dash out the brains of small children by hurling them against trees and walls. The elderly are killed when they can no longer work. To amuse themselves company officials practice shooting, using Indians as targets, and on special occasions such as Easter Saturday…shoot them down in groups or, in preference, douse them in kerosene and set them on fire to enjoy.

[1984a:475]

In another place, Casement writes of enforcers sent by a rubber-station manager to wipe out a group of Indians who did not recruit enough other Indians as labor. The enforcers were recruited from non-Huitoto tribes and were called the muchachos (the boys). This is the tried and true means of the wholesale harvest of human resources and enslaving peoples: using one group to hunt humans (“I don’t have to outrun the bear [slaver]. I just have to outrun you.”).

In this case, Taussig transforms the argument above regarding labor shortages, the same Casement made when he tried to explain the barbarity of the rubber trade, that labor scarcity [of willing not potential labor] produced such intense pressure on the labor pool
that it had to be resolved by debt slavery, which had then to be enforced by hideous human-rights violations – torture, mutilation, disease and death. Taussig believes, however, that market forces, while powerful, do not fully explain this level of debasement. He (1984a) calls it a “cultural construction of evil.” He supports this with Casement’s reports documenting that the station managers and their leadership could not be persuaded that by killing Indians they were costing the company many thousands of dollars in scarce labor. They were somehow possessed by a fanaticism in which they “had lost all sight or sense of rubber-gathering – they were simply beasts of prey who lived upon the Indians and delighted in sharing their blood” (Taussig 1984a:479).

Taussig says that the terror had become an end in itself, a surrealism of paranoia and darkness, where everything spoke of death. Part of his conceit involves juxtaposing Conrad’s social realism with the surrealistic qualities of Casement’s, which he calls “mythic realism,” even though he was writing a government report.

It seems to me that stories like these were the groundwork indispensable to the formation and flowering of the colonial imagination during the Putumayo rubber boom. “Their imagination was diseased,” wrote the Peruvian judge Rómulo Paredes in 1911, referring to the rubber-station managers, “and they saw everywhere attacks by Indians, conspiracies, uprisings, treachery and in order to save themselves from these fancied perils...they killed, and killed without compassion.” Far from being trivial daydreams indulged in after work was over, these stories and the imagination they sustained were a potent political force without which the work of conquest and of supervising rubber gathering could not have been accomplished. What is essential to
understand is the way in which these stories functioned to create through magical realism, a culture of terror dominating both whites and Indians.

[Taussig 1984a:492; emphasis added]

As we have seen above with Theidon and Tate, this culture of terror produces its own epistemology, morality and mythology, its own forms of symbolic domination and exploitation along with the physical and political. Taussig later notes that Judge Paredes says that the rubber-station managers saw lethal danger everywhere. They were obsessed with the notion that they were stalked on all sides by poisonous snakes, big cats and cannibals.

**History as sorcery and implicit social knowledge.** Taussig (1984b) takes these themes further in “History as Sorcery.” There he explains that eventually, over decades and centuries, the acculturated Indians of the highlands began to mythologize the destruction of the lowlanders, perhaps as a way of distancing themselves, but also as a warning. They appropriated a demonology of Huitotos that framed them as cannibals, sorcerers and a variety of mythic beasts resembling devils. Then, over long stretches, highland shamans, as demonstrated by one Taussig worked with, incorporated this fetishism of terror into healing rituals and testing spirits. Taussig here, by extrapolation, demonstrates that peacebuilding not only means restoring public services and rule of law. It means dealing with the long-term effects of a culture of terror on the individual and the tribal unconscious, on how we make meaning out of, and learn from, however we can, the horror. He calls this *implicit social knowledge.*
“History as Sorcery” is a tale of mythic construction and reconstruction, of the sublimation of terror into demonology, and of that symbolic darkness into primordial myth. In the latter, it combines random violence – the evil wind – with evil manipulated for personal reasons – sorcery (1984b). In this hermeneutic, sorcery – individual, personalized – and the evil wind – impersonal and implacable – come together as a symbolic representation of the history of conquest. Taussig calls this history as sorcery.

To counter this horrific legacy, this spiritual inversion, using both Christian and highland spiritual resources to encode the memory and mystery of the Huitotos and their horror within a redemptive narrative, the collective unconscious produces another inversion, a paradox: The Huitotos are conflated with the original beings, the stronger, superior first people of the highland cosmology.

Taussig then describes the fieldwork he did with a well-known Andes shaman. In this account, the combined image of the Huitoto, the “lower people” (demons of the underworld) and the nearly superhuman first people, is appropriated in a healing ritual Taussig observes, a search for a lost husband, who has disappeared, interestingly, in the jungle, in the hot lowlands.

He summarizes the broader cultural and psychic developments that concern him as follows:

Bishop Pefia Montenegro in the seventeenth century urged with an intensity bordering on fanaticism that Indian rites had to be extirpated root and branch because these rites brought back into consciousness what he called “the memory of paganism.” But working with the same premise that ritual embodied and re-awakened
memory, the twentieth-century Capuchins…working with the Huitotos, developed…the opposite conclusion and strategy: *namely that to erase the pagan-stimulating function of memory, the rituals should be maintained so that with the memories they embodied could be intertwined with the images…of Christian suffering and redemption:* the death of the sinner, the Last Judgment and heaven and hell.

[Taussig 1984b:107; emphasis added]

The paradox of the Huitoto symbol in a late-modern shaman’s healing ritual presents an image of “tameable savagery,” Taussig says. Examining it, we see the lowland dwellers and their legacy have been dominated by the terror-filled “demonstration projects” of civilization performed by the rubber companies, then by the magic-saturated version of the invaders’ civilization established by the Church – sent in soon after the exposés to “save” the Indians, an effort that resulted in many thousands more dying, from smallpox, malnutrition and overwork.

So far, we have touched upon the overlay of Catholicism and native spirituality, in general terms in the introduction where it seemed mostly smooth and inevitable, and in more specific terms in the ethnographies of Theidon and Tate, where such mixing is more haphazard and conflictual, at best hit and miss. Taussig offers another such example, in which there is no easy resolution of one over the other, but in which the Huitoto myth becomes a part of a broader cultural quest for psychic wholeness and healing on both individual and social levels.
Is it possible that these opposed modes whereby history has put memory in the service of colonization are themselves registered in contemporary magic and are necessary to its power? That the evil winds buffeting the living with the memories of the preconquest pagans correspond to the bishop’s and the early colonial politics of memory, while the resurrection of the Huitotos corresponds to a modern mode of trying to use memory to change and dominate people? Is it possible that these winds and savages stand as…images of distinct historical modes of memory production and reproduction, whose political economy finds its most finely wrought expression in shamanic imagery where it is precisely the task to rework, and if possible undo, the history of sorcery?

[Taussig 1984b:107]

In treating the trauma of terror, to be truly intercultural we need to have a therapeutic hermeneutics of consciousness and cosmos, a spiritual and mythic world in which the rubber massacres in Putamayo, the re-imagining of conquest as a psychic countermeasure and a symbol of healing and the shaman’s song as a search for the lost, can all be integrated into a narrative of restoration and appropriated for personal or social power. This needs to happen not only within a single abstract cosmology but within a single village, highland or lowland, and within a single individual or group. As with llakis in Ayacucho, or the mistica of human-rights workers, it represents another profound spiritual response to trauma.

But is Taussig embellishing here? Or just projecting? Is this more than fancy travelogue? Here it helps to make use of philosopher Paul Ricoeur's two kinds of
hermeneutics (from his well-known essay on Freud): one of suspicion, reductive, analytical, borne of critical theory – familiar to liberation theorists, social critics and investigative journalists as they deconstruct the ways and means of power – and one of faith, or revelation, non-reductive, holistic, borne of interculturality, familiar to therapists, anthropologists, healers and peacebuilders, as they try to reconstruct it.

Both are required to come to grips with Taussig’s cultural construction of evil, to ensure that individuals and groups find the psychic and spiritual resources to deal with, exorcise and appropriate such a trauma-based symbolic universe for purposes of transformation within a given set of meanings and symbols. In Theidon and Tate, the epistemological and ethical hazard is about routinizing trauma and flattening its affect (and effects). With Taussig, it is another, ironically one he notes as a problem with Conrad’s writing but not in his own, that of aestheticizing horror, making it exotic and compelling but abstract, like a horror film or novel. What he does emphasize, and explores in detail, is the political meaning of magic, sorcery and healing, how for peasants and indigenous peoples, it is inseparable from the history of conquest.

*How violence flows toward money: How that is the order behind the chaos*

While we have portrayed these two nations as societies on the brink, we are not, of course, interested in demonizing the people of Colombia or Peru. These are, after all, just human beings trapped in intractable cycles of social, economic and political violence, a social chaos beyond the control of most people with average resources. While both nations are making strides toward peace with justice, what emerges is the picture of a society in the middle of an ongoing civil war, yes, but also a criminal war, a gangland
with armies whose resources are sometimes larger than the armed forces of many countries.

Integral to this normalization of multi-sector terror is a state corrupted by class privilege, by a legacy of social coercion that relies ultimately on murder and by drug money that has been fundamental to economic growth. Just living a decent life in this social environment is an incredible tribute to law-abiding, social capital-building citizens of all classes – that they keep going to work, raising children and supporting churches and civic groups, that they continue to vote and that they still base their gains on work and good will, not violence. Such observations are supported by some of Latin America’s best political minds:

*Given the scope of this collective experience of violence, it is not possible to expect that peace will be an immediate result of the negotiation process.* This situation is...so complex that even if we could negotiate institutional reconstruction with the guerrillas tomorrow, *the reconstruction of the State and the social fabric could take decades*.... It is a society that is beyond the prospect of formulating a project of unity or national order. [Instead it] is involved in a perpetual process of “negotiating disorder,” of making it, in lieu of eliminating it, at least bearable.

[Sanchez 2001:30; emphasis added]

The major organizing principle that comes close to explaining this much social chaos is not poverty itself – though that is its long-term engine – or the inevitable corruption created by the massive structural violence, but the speed of social and economic change
(Paluso and Watts 2001). Responding to an imbalance of wealth and power growing exponentially, an expression of potential social energy become kinetic, and redressing this imbalance violently, like a hurricane, dam failure or tsunami, it becomes a catastrophe.

Continuous with a long tradition of private militias in the campo, but made increasingly unstable by access to new wealth, in Colombia, for example, in the petroleum-rich regions of Arauca, Casanare and Putamayo, the banana zone of Urabá near Panama and various areas of mining, petroleum or coal riches, destabilized by a guerrilla movement that can support itself well with illicit profits, a state militia, a narco-militia and a citizen militia run amok, this influx of extreme wealth can wreak genocidal havoc.

An older but stable domination by large landowners and multinationals has been replaced by a free-for-all with little legitimacy, one that disadvantages corporations and unions, landowners and peasants, alike. Over the last 25 years, the banana zone in northern Colombia has become a base for moving drugs and trading arms. Social violence across sectors also characterizes the emerald industry in Boyaca, where the patrons treat the workers and guerillas as a mafia would, backing up their coercive relations with violence. This is also true of regions of gold mining in Antioquia in the north-central, coal in Cesar and La Guajira in the northeast and oil and gas pumping in Santander, Arauca and Casanare, near Venezuela (Sanchez 2001; IWGIA 2013).

Violence, then, spreads where rapid economic exploitation replaces agrarian subsistence, and more specifically, where the following conditions occur in a cybernetic relationship: poverty with increasing segregation of wealth, limited social mobility and
high rates of migration, all augmented by increasingly rogue forms of authority. The local and regional authorities can be legal or extralegal, but if extralegal, count on more violence. It ties peasants, workers and indigenous peoples to a railroad track with two trains bearing down on them. One is the ever-rising expectations borne of new wealth from resource-rich areas, especially where an established oligarchy used to mete out rewards discretely. The other is the multi-vector terror that plays on the rising expectations of the peasants, indigenous peoples and poor, but keeps them perpetually frightened and put down.

Outside the scope of this paper but deserving mention, urban violence, with its cycles of crime and vengeance, has also mushroomed in the last 30 years. This includes violence by gangs attached to the drug trade, 122 in Medellín alone between 1985 and 1990, a high point, and the sicarios, assassins who work for the drug dealers in vendettas, sometimes against upstart criminal organizations to keep unauthorized distribution down. Another involves the so-called “social cleansing” of the homeless, prostitutes, delinquents and small-time criminals (Sanchez 2001), often performed by paras hired by business or government.

This does not mean the situation is hopeless but complex and challenging. There are many interrelated dimensions to be coordinated across scales of human needs and social organization. We explore most of these important aspects of peacebuilding in various parts of this study. These supply the broader social and economic contexts within which the violence recounted in the case studies took place and within which any serious peacebuilding must perform a lasting transformation. None of these objectives will be
achieved quickly but they must be advanced and undertaken. In summary, they are
(from shorter to longer term):

- Zones of peace and national coalitions that can develop public opinion and
  political leverage for support of peacebuilding initiatives;
- Rituals of reconciliation in culturally sensitive forms;
- Education for peace, in a succession of ways we will outline and others we cannot
  – if there is hope for the future, it is with the youth;
- Job training, relocation assistance and counseling – moral, psychological,
  vocational – for everyone from demobilized combatants to displaced persons and
  victims of the violence;
- Protection for labor and peasant unions and their leaders, also for human-rights
  workers;
- Judicial protection and reform;
- Also, critically, a legal-judicial-social assault on:
  - Organized crime;
  - Impunity for rights violators; and
  - National leaders who allow extractive industries and agribusiness to run
    roughshod over peasant and Indian needs and community plans for
    development;
- Crop substitution – instead of drug suppression with toxic sprays – but of crops
  with a viable market; rice and cacao (cocoa bean) appear promising;
• Land reform, especially for tenants and small holders, including restitution for fraudulent titling and for the displaced;

• Socially responsible investment, including an emphasis on environmentally friendly and smaller enterprises – micro-lending is of great help here;

• Using leverage by the international business and lending community to get states to negotiate; and

• Retraining large corporations in sustainable, equitable development.

While we cannot explore all of these activities of peacebuilding in detail, we will explore some of the most important efforts in these areas.
Chapter IV

Church and State, Peasants and Indigenous Peoples:

Conflict Mitigation, Mediation and Transformation
OTHERS IN THIRD-SIDE ROLES:
AN EMPHASIS ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS

Parallel to the international NGO community runs the advocacy of the local, regional and national NGO communities. As we have said, they also generally represent those conflict-resolution specialist Ury (2000) would call “the third side,” often in classic ways. He argues that resolving difficult conflicts, from the interpersonal to the civil and geopolitical, often depends on involving the principals of the “third side,” the stakeholders in the community in which the conflict takes place. These people have much to lose if the conflict is not resolved peacefully. When the third side is engaged, the conflict broadens from social and political dichotomies to a consideration of many interlocking interests.

One remarkable example here is an indigenous rights movement emerging from three decades of repression (1960s-1980s) that has found it can sometimes circumvent unresponsive states and gain a hearing in the international community – for example, with the OAS, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations and the NGO community (Brysk 2000). Institutions such as the church, the national and international business communities and international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) can also perform third-side roles. They can often apply leverage by granting or withholding funding. Other third-side initiatives often involve a complex of local-to-national-to-international connections and leverages. We will explore these manifestations of the third side in what follows.
The Catholic Church in Latin America

A crucial part of the “third side” is the Catholic Church, the region’s most dominant religious force by far. It applies its own national and international leverage. Because of a shortage of priests, more than half have come from Europe, and many brought critical thinking with them. Still, for most of the last 500 years, the church served as one of the primary agents of colonialism, herding Indians into missions and indoctrinating them. Some of these saved Native peoples from starvation or massacre, and a few noteworthy priests spoke out about mistreatment. Catholic missionary strategy eventually overlaid Christian iconography on Native spirituality, which was less trouble and violent than eliminating it. The church instead found cultural parallels where possible (Cleary and Steigenga 2004).

Against the grain of this cultural and political hegemony, a serious but fledgling progressive movement in the church began in the late 1950s. By the 1960s and 1970s, it was in full flower as an increasingly well-articulated theology of liberation began to challenge the established ecclesiastical and political order. This movement was catalyzed by a gathering of cardinals and bishops assembled by Pope John XXIII in the early 1960s for Vatican Council II, usually called Vatican II. It pushed Catholicism to make many changes to become a more populist and popular church. In addition, a fundamental gathering of the leadership of the Latin American church was held in Medellín in 1968, during which its bishops affirmed a groundbreaking commitment to the poor.

This much-celebrated, much-debated movement, while distinctively Latin American, relied on a neo-Marxist analysis of class conflict, combined with the liberation motifs of the escape from slavery in Egypt and Jesus’ allegiance to “the least of these” (as he once
characterized the poor). It included Indians as members of an oppressed class but sought to assimilate them into the majority culture with full rights and benefits. Since the 1980s, however, it has become increasingly supportive of Native spirituality and lifeways, both in dialog with Catholicism and on their own terms. The debate about indigenous spirituality in the Catholic Church in Latin America is likely one of the most soul-searching and far-reaching in a long while (Calder 2004).

Identity versus class notwithstanding, this is a movement of profound solidarity with the subordinate classes and dispossessed races, one deeply involved with peasants and Indians that, at some cost in blood, torture and imprisonment, has produced countless spiritual and practical benefits. It has done so with grassroots consciousness-raising via small study groups called base ecclesiastical communities, which raise awareness and target initiatives among subordinate groups and classes, providing conceptual, financial and in-kind support, often small-scale projects focused on health care, clean water and production and credit cooperatives; literacy and other educational efforts; and building civil-society groups advocating for civil and political rights.

The base communities were originally led by catechists, lay pastors in effect, created to deal with the shortage of priests. As many were composed of peasants and Indians, soon their activities dovetailed with the aims of liberation. Many initially featured literacy campaigns. In them, peasants would teach one another and mutually discover the wider world and their place in it, and most of all, supported theologically by the transformative premise that “God champions the oppressed,” they began to realize their status is not willed by God but a social construction. They have been involved in land reform and, increasingly, in human rights as well. They also increasingly have been
influenced by indigenous understandings of the sacred nature of community and communion with the land.

Liberation theology has caused a deep rift in Catholicism between those caught up in its vision of peace with justice and those who believe it is heretical (preferring more traditional visions of same). Outside the church, it has been criticized, even demonized, by state and military officials, especially by those who believe it is communist-inspired and deserves no quarter. It also was beleaguered by censure under Pope John Paul II, an ardent anti-communist from the days when the Soviets dominated Poland. His tenure included the removal of sympathetic bishops and the silencing of progressive theologians.Remarkably though, under John Paul II, the Catholic Church has admitted to complicity in the abuse of indigenous peoples and has apologized. This is in contrast to the last pope, Benedict XVI, and his desire to reassert the total authority of the church, and with it, the old ethnocentrism. Pope Benedict also was resistant to liberation theology, had in fact served as its inquisitor under John Paul II.

To the surprise of many, the newest head of the Catholic Church, the first Latin American pope, has been quick to proclaim a new ethic from the Vatican. Pope Francis, a 76-year-old Argentine, has explicitly emphasized the church’s commitment to the poor. He has modeled this by living and dressing more simply than previous popes, by appointing new cardinals and bishops and by seeking to reform the church’s constitution and its governing body, the curia.

A compilation of his sayings regarding the church’s responsibility to the poor cannot be misconstrued. What remains to be seen is how far he may go before more conservative forces try to regain control. For the time being, he has re-energized a church worn down
by sex and financial scandals, by bickering over polity and by fights over modern versus ancient forms of liturgy. Selected statements by Pope Francis regarding poverty are:

A way has to be found to enable everyone to benefit from the fruits of the earth, and not simply to close the gap between the affluent and those who must be satisfied with the crumbs falling from the table, but above all to satisfy the demands of justice, fairness and respect for every human being.

[an address to the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, June 20, 2013]

Among our tasks as witnesses to the love of Christ is that of giving a voice to the cry of the poor.

[an address to the Archbishop of Canterbury, June 14, 2013]

What might need to change in your own heart in order to respond to the call to “give voice” to the cry of those in poverty?

Poverty calls us to sow hope…. Poverty is the flesh of the poor Jesus, in that child who is hungry, in the one who is sick, in those unjust social structures.

[a meeting with students of Jesuit schools, June 7, 2013]

[all from U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and Catholic Relief Services 2013:online]

Lately, adding to the cultural and theological complexity, in response to the burgeoning movement celebrating indigenous pride and culture, liberation theology increasingly has been altered by an emphasis on indigenous spiritual traditions and norms or, in some
places, on a syncretism that puts indigenous religious values on more equal terms (Cleary 1997; Klaiber 1998; Cleary and Steigenga 2004). There are a number of interesting questions that follow, including whether the church should become so good at empowering Native spirituality that it could put itself out of business. This is an exaggeration of course but not entirely idle musing since the church, after experiencing a renaissance from the 1960s through 1980s, has been losing members at an accelerating rate in the 2000s. Even so, what concerns us here is how these religious voices affirm intercultural understanding and socio-cultural justice and, most importantly, doing so, prevent mass violence and ecocide.

Also of interest is the influence of Protestantism, which, aside from the liberal but mostly limited influence of the mainstream denominations, represents the fastest-growing segment of the religious landscape, mostly by evangelicals. Less well explored is that many of these have historically been less concerned with Indian rights and development than with evangelizing the globe in order to bring about the religious utopia known as the millennium. They have been criticized for disrupting traditional cultures, privileging North American cultures and for being agents of the U.S. government or its corporations, many of which have funded these groups, including firms with natural-resource interests such as Weyenhauser and government actors with various security interests such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Central Intelligence Agency (Cleary 1997). Some evangelical organizations have been investigated, censured, sent home or restricted in scope. Most by now have made some accommodations with the cultures of the people they say they are there to help. How far this education goes and how much they can set aside their ethnocentrism remains to be seen. But we should note
in particular that they were one of very few civil society organizations that stood up to Sendero and slowed its path.

Another theoretical distinction is sometimes made between “negative” and “positive” peace. According to Galtung (1969:183), negative peace is the end of physical violence. Positive peace is the end of the deficits leading to the physical violence. The first involves stopping the violence. The second entails changing the social, economic and ecological conditions that make up the roots of the conflict. These objectives in particular need to include promoting social justice for and the political involvement of underrepresented peoples and groups (United Nations System Staff College and Catalan International Institute for Peace 2010). Perhaps another, more descriptive set of terms might be the “short-term” and “long-term” aspects of peacebuilding. The case studies above have involved both aspects but emphasize the more immediate needs. Next we will outline examples oriented to the long term. We will only be able to provide some commentary on each, but they deserve mention.

Another set of descriptors, perhaps more telling yet, might be (without prejudice) reactive and proactive peacebuilding. The former consists of immediate human-rights advocacy, action and alerts, including conflict mitigation efforts such as Witness for Peace, zones of peace, sanctuary movements and mediation with short-term aims. These have more to do with the civil-political rights in the UN’s Universal Declaration.

The major proactive approaches are conflict transformation, transitional justice, sustainable-equitable development and education for peace and justice. Conflict transformation, while a general term, can be typified as the prevention of violent conflict;
moving from long-term violence to sustainable outcomes; improving ways to analyze conflict and incorporating them into organizations dedicated to peace; reconstruction, reconciliation and healing; and social, political and economic programs. These longer term efforts are usually related to the UN’s social, economic and cultural rights.

PERU:
A NONVIOLENT CITIZEN DEFENSE, A CHURCH DIVIDED
AND AN INDIGENOUS AWAKENING

The rondas campesinas
Emerging in the northern Sierra out of traditional forms of justice in peasant communities, initially concerned mostly with corruption, petty theft and grand theft such as cattle rustling (where livestock are wealth), the rondas campesinas grew into citizen militias, not just community watches. But in dramatic contrast to the AUC in Colombia, they generally have reserved armed violence only for extreme cases, such as attacks by SL. Starn, Degregori and Kirk (1995:425) call the rondas “one of the largest and most sustained rural movements of the late 20th century” (Langdon and Rodriguez 2007:91). They were fundamental in stopping Sendero in the highlands and represent one of the most peaceful uses of a citizen militia in Latin America. They also represent a variant of a “zone of peace” (ZoP). These can be loosely defined as any declaration by a local or regional group that violence is not welcome, often within a city or region, and will not be tolerated (Langdon and Rodriguez 2007). They are similar in certain critical ways to that
established by the Nasa, profiled in the Colombian third-side examples, but the
ronderos are armed – for law-enforcement only – and have judicial standing.

Having established their value policing rustling in areas with a weak state presence
and a corruptible judiciary, they then became involved in the development of customary
norms for judicial decisions in cooperation with local and state government. They have
left a lasting legacy by resolving conflicts through general assemblies, developing mutual
state-local support for night patrols and community development and creating openings
for other cooperative approaches to community problems. Langdon and Rodriguez
(2007:179, n. 15) explain that this community ethic does not evolve solely out of
participation in communal land use, though this provides the basis for much of the
cooperation, but that such communities are governed by many interconnected networks
of kinship and reciprocity: “In these cases, the ronda campesina is the communal
organisation, having assumed the social functions of [other] community organisations in
formally recognized campesino communities.” Using their arms only for defense against
Sendero and other threats, the ronderos have rejected torture, disappearances and capital
punishment. They promote negotiations, settlements and community service instead of
corporal punishment. By the 1980s, they represented local justice in about 400,000
communities (Langdon and Rodriguez 2007).
The Catholic Church in Peru: A theology of liberation or reconciliation?

Since the 1960s, liberation theology has provided a theological, philosophical and political basis for a this-worldly emancipation of peasants and Indians from their decidedly marginal status in Latin American society. It has challenged the ecclesiastical and political status quo in the name of the ethic of social justice in the Hebrew scriptures (or Old Testament) and the ethic of universal love in the Second (or New) Testament. Based in critical theory, liberation theology expresses its overt ethical priorities by proposing that those poorly represented in the competition for resources have an “epistemological privilege.” Epistemology is about our ways of knowing, often explained as “how we know what we know.” The epistemological privilege of the poor and powerless (Gutierrez 1973; Segundo 1976) refers not to any greater knowledge base but to a special vantage point on systemic injustice, defined as gross inequity in distribution of resources and rewards in a given political ecology.

This school of theology and its educational counterpart, pedagogy of the oppressed, emerged in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s. In standing with the poor and powerless, it proposes that people experience their fullest humanity, including a deep sense of the transpersonal, as they become aware of a situation of injustice and attempt publicly, through a variety of nonviolent means, to redress it. It starts with what theologian Gustavo Gutierrez (1973) calls a pre-theological assumption: The world should not be the way it is. This realization is as important as any recognition of the divine or transpersonal that starts with a peak, oceanic or mountaintop experience or any other sense of union with the universe. It rests on the conviction that human beings
become critical and embrace freedom. It starts with Paulo Freire's (1970) twin assumptions in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*:

- The real calling of a human being is to be a *subject who acts upon and transforms his or her world and in doing so moves to new possibilities of being, of fuller and richer life, individually and collectively*.
- The world that this kind of person seeks to understand and ultimately transform is not a closed order, a static system to which people should adjust. It is instead a problem to be solved, the material such people must use to create history. *They do so as they overcome patterns of life that are dehumanizing and create what is qualitatively new.*

Both of these precepts have psychological and political dimensions. At the start of “In Search of Sociology,” Segundo (1976:39) notes that, “without a…determination to turn theology [or the transpersonal] into a serviceable tool…for a social praxis that is liberative, a false and quasi-magical concept of the divine will dissolve [it] in universal, ahistorical concepts.”

In the practice of social and ecological justice, then, Gutierrez says, “Sin is regarded as a historical fact, the absence of brotherhood and love in relationships among men, the breach of friendship with God and with other men, and therefore, an interior, personal fracture” (1973:175). It has an objective, and above all, a collective, manifestation: “Sin is evident in oppressive structures, in the exploitation of man by man, in the domination and slavery of peoples, races and social classes. *Sin appears, therefore, as the*
fundamental alienation, the root of a situation of injustice” (1973:175; emphasis added). For those uncomfortable with theological language, it might be helpful to put sin in quotation marks and think of it as a social metaphor. God is conceived of as the good, which is derived from God in Old English. It is then understood as a break with the good between or among individuals, within or among collectivities and between them and nature.

Peru is home to the man interestingly regarded as the founding father of liberation theology, Gutierrez, and many progressive parts of the Catholic Church bear his mark and influence. Peña (1994) notes that Gutierrez has explained that such a theology did not fall out of the sky. It came from priests and other religious workers working closely with the poor, especially peasants in the campo or those displaced to the cities by poverty, war or expansion by large landowners. In city or country, they often take over vacant land in squatter invasions. When these are put down violently, the stirrings of a civil war begin.

In other such instances of solidarity, the liberation church, sometimes more provocatively, sometimes less so, has helped peasants and Indians give voice to a politically and ethically well-articulated confrontation with the state and its longstanding partner, the elites. The question then becomes: Is this peacebuilding or aggravation of conflict? As above, the basic contention here is that social and economic justice is a non-negotiable condition for peace. A marginalized people do not remain that way forever or even for very long. In addition, as in other parts of Latin America, clergy have fulfilled third-side roles as mediators, or have enlisted others to do so.

In response, often supported by the Vatican, conservative clergy have organized significant opposition to this expression of Indian and peasant resurgence. Peña notes:
The more visible of the challenges against liberationists focused on their support of the popular sector. According to Levine (1986:6), popular groups constituted the masses in social sectors oppressed or exploited by an economic [and] social system.

Equally important was their emergence as a politically significant force in Peru. Since the early 1900s, this sector was the focus of successfully led protest movements (Tovar 1982:24). By the 1970s, they had organized 364 strikes in 1968, 788 in 1973, and 779 in 1975, before leveling to 440 in 1976. The 1980s experienced the proliferation of the revolutionary movements Shining Path and Tapac [sometimes Tupac] Amaru. There is no evidence that supporters of liberation theology in Peru support Shining Path and Tapac Amaru. This is because in part, as Berryman (1987:195) explains, “no liberation theologian has provided a theological rationale for killing.” Also, “to the extent death is theologized, it is in reflections on martyrdom, the willingness to give one's life to others, not to take others’ lives.” Therefore…the strategies of protest movements (strikers, land squatters, and worker groups) led Catholic officials to publicize their opposition to political activism…. The retrenchment policies of the Catholic Church in Peru and elsewhere, in the 1980s, against liberation theology and its proponents were linked to a general opposition to decentralized power in the Church and to popular political protests.

[1992:162]

Subsequently, one church official in particular who was vehemently opposed to liberation theology founded a movement celebrating traditional religious and cultural
values and began to organize against it. He framed this effort with a sonorous phrase, “the theology of reconciliation.”

In 1973, a group calling itself "God and Country" began appearing at the Catholic University of Lima. By 1974, the group included [a nationalist youth organization] and its religious sector – Sodalitium Vitae [meaning Fellowship of Christian Life in English]. Its founder, Luis Fernando Figari, was a secondary school teacher [who] later broadened his constituency when he became a…teacher at the Santo Toribio Seminary in Lima. Figari's ties at the seminary led to support from influential bishops…. In 1974, three years after Father Gustavo Gutierrez and others began publishing their work on liberation theology, Figari began publishing his ideas on reconciliation. Opposed to the liberalization of the Church, Figari organized Sodalitium Vitae and began his attack against liberationists.

[Peña 1992:163]

Their critique of social activism emphasized conservative values, asceticism by the clergy as an example for the poor, and traditional Catholic teachings. Sodalitium Vitae promoted these values by espousing an ideology of reconciliation. Peña believes it was successful enough, especially through the more conservative 1980s and 1990s, that it was able to rewrite the meaning of liberation theology. “Reconciliation meant diffusing political activism by encouraging opposition groups to find common ground on which to resolve their differences. In other words, reconciliation meant conflict resolution through nonviolence” (Peña 1992:163)
This raises some very complex issues, those we already visited in both Theidon (2012) and Tate (2007): Is peacebuilding better served by a strident advocacy for the oppressed, or by a posture of nonviolence emphasizing reconciliation? Is reconciliation a political and ethical Trojan Horse? Is there something beyond a zero-sum middle ground? Is there a “both-and”? There are no easy answers to these questions, and violence should never be more than the very last resort, but an enlightened approach to peacebuilding would surely hold that one must never gloss over the exacting, pervasive stranglehold on structural violence exercised by the status quo: Peace without social justice is not sustainable.

In the wake of dirty war: A major mobilization of indigenous peoples

Struggling against a wall of oppression, running through the soul-searing, multilateral violence, has been a decades-long struggle by indigenous peoples, peasants and the urban poor to reclaim their dignity, their livelihoods and their social-political standing (Brysk 2000). Many would say it has been 500 years in the making.

Across Latin America, in the wake of the dictatorships, repression and pseudo-democracies from the 1960s through most of the 1980s, a host of indigenous and peasant organizations were born. If, as Hitchcock and Twedt (1995) offer, indigenous peoples are killed simply because of “who they are,” they are now protecting that identity by projecting it onto the international stage so that it can never be denied again. They are calling attention to who they are holistically, across a range of needs and sensibilities, and across multiple scales, demonstrating the pride they feel in their whole culture and the essential dignity they experience within them. It is the international correlate of the
“Nunca mas” (never again) campaigns that lead to or accompany truth commissions on the national level. In addition, across multiple scales, a wealth of other NGOs concerned with peace and justice, sustainable development, fair trade and human rights have become active in indigenous rights.

Hemispheric awareness of indigenous peoples was catalyzed by the celebration of the 500th anniversary of Columbus’ stumbling onto the West Indies. This event inspired their own (anti-) quincentenary moment. Along with the advent of neo-liberal economic policies and nominal democracy has been the flourishing of a host of indigenous and peasant organizations, at a variety of scales, local, regional and national, that have fought its more damaging economic realities, sometimes in public protest, sometimes in lobbying and electoral movements and sometimes by creating alternative economic systems. In this process, the international NGO community has exercised its political leverage with Latin American governments, and the human-rights movement in particular represents a critical part of the road to peacebuilding.

Independent of insincere-seeming government efforts, this indigenous mobilization keeps growing and represents classic social-movement dynamics and, in its use of national and international leverage, third-side resources. Catalyzed by the long-standing violence, a continent-wide response to the 500th anniversary of Columbus’s landing and significant opposition to the free-trade agreements (now ratified in Colombia and Peru), it has articulated these demands: regional self-determination; full political and civil rights; a greater proportion of public funds and services; safeguards against theft or unauthorized use of protected lands by national and multinational corporations, among the most
important; and protection from territorial occupation, torture, killings and village
destruction by the armed actors (Brysk 2000; Cleary 2007).

*The indigenous awakening in Peru*

Though poverty is diminishing, the story of peasants and Native peoples in Peru has
no especially satisfying end at present. Still, an indigenous legacy has been reborn in the
last 30 years that has catalyzed a movement for inalienable collective rights, including
those related to development, and a movement for territorial autonomy that is gaining
momentum. While historically lagging behind its neighbors Ecuador and Bolivia,
Peruvian indigenous empowerment has embraced the all-important task of creating
peoples fully indigenous and fully citizens, including revamping education, government
and civil society at the local and regional levels.

An important example, programs touting not just multiculturalism but
“interculturality” emphasize literacy in both Quechua and Spanish, along with cultural-
awareness instruction in both. *Inter-* rather than *multi-*cultural activities speak of greater
equality between cultures, its proponents believe. This cultural paradigm includes a
peasantry with strong Indian roots and tends to emphasize cultural, not political (or class)
consciousness, in part because it emerged under Fujimori, when political activity could
get one killed. This produced some ironies, requiring careful attention and ensuring that
any movement for empowerment of peasants and Indians would not be purely revivalist
efforts. For example, experts from the state and NGOs want to teach children to read and
write in Quechua, but their parents say the schools should teach Spanish, the language
they must learn to ascend in the larger society. From this dialog emerged a greater
emphasis on both languages and cultures (Starn, Degregori and Kirk 1995).

Meanwhile, authentically indigenous organizations are emerging all over, gaining
momentum and developing an all-important indigenous leadership. Bilingual and
intercultural educational reform is seen as a key to indigenous self-determination and the
empowerment of future leaders (García 2005). Though they have much in common
generally, perhaps because each group has a different religious heritage, indigenous
spirituality has not thrown up an iconic public image of self-sacrifice, even unto death, as
with liberation Christianity, but it has been able to help change our ways of thinking
about the earth. Celebrating and promoting it as well as any spiritual tradition on the
planet, most of native spirituality represents a reverence for the source of all sustenance
and its irrevocable bond with the people who have tended it and made it their brother and
sister, their mother and father, as opposed to a resource base for extractive industries,
destined for private benefits at social costs. This movement too becomes a “third-side”
player, operating at various levels of human needs across scales. Far from being a
dreamy, counter-culture utopia, this is probably one of the most important social visions
of our time, as critical to our survival as any other.

*Education for peace*

Out of the civil violence of the 1980s and 1990s, Educa (shorthand, not an acronym),
an educational NGO that had been doing programming in schools in rural parts of Peru,
committed to a peace-education program as an integral part of curriculum and everyday
activity at school. It runs peace-education projects in the schools and communities in the
Andean region. It began to teach conflict transformation as a new approach to resolving a range of problems (Roush 2014). As a result, the political and educational leadership of the Huancavelica region, for example, has permanently incorporated peace education into its curriculum. In the manner of Lederach’s model, this is mostly aimed at principals, teachers, students, parents and local and regional leaders, who then can pass it on to the grassroots and rank-and-file.

Another organization, ODECA, has worked intensively for the national movement of civil society groups called *So It Doesn’t Happen Again* (a version of *Nunca Mas*). As a founding member, it has directed the educational efforts of the movement, working to enhance peace by making peace education a critical part of the curriculum and educational environment. In particular, it teaches using dialog, discussion and debate, while respecting others, to reach consensus (Roush 2014). In response to the findings of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC) in 2003, more than 170 organizations came together to form *So It Doesn’t Happen Again*. Its mission was to promote the understanding of difference at the micro-, meso- and macro-scales. It also tries to promote the case for reconciliation via reparations. This effort has been supported by the National Education Commission. Among its charges, the commission creates and approves educational efforts and advocacy about conflict resolution and positive change (Roush 2014).

*Other critical contributions*

**Truth and reconciliation.** After Alberto Fujimori resigned and fled the country, interim President Valentin Paniagua formed the PTRC in 2001. It was charged with
documenting extralegal deaths, torture, disappearances, displacement, means of terror
and other human-rights violations from 1980 to 2000, during the governments of Terry
Belaúnde, Alan García and Fujimori. It also offered ways to better support human rights.
It found those killed to be three times the number thought, 69,000, shocking the nation.
About half were committed by Shining Path, a third by government forces and the rest by
other guerrillas or paramilitaries. It determined that 75 percent of the victims were
peasants and indigenous peoples. The violence also displaced hundreds of thousands
(Gandhi 2011; Buckman 2012b).

The commission consisted of ten men and two women, all from Lima. Only one
could speak the language of the people who suffered the most, Quechua, none Aymara.
In its favor, the Peruvian military and other government officials were not given
immunity, and the hearings were broadcast on national television. The commission also
dug up mass graves and used forensic methods to establish cause of death. Campesinos
were allowed to watch and share their testimony. The media gave these more attention
than the hearings. Memorial services were held across the country. As the shock wore
off, people mourned in earnest. The commission urged reparations for the victims and
emphasized that most of them were poor and Indian, most of those peasants. It urged a
public acknowledgement by the state of the atrocities, prosecution of the guilty,
governmental reforms and greater acceptance of Peru’s multiethnic heritage.

Criticism of the commission included the following: (1) a focus on individual victims
drew attention away from the cry for justice by abused groups such as peasants and
indigenous peoples (and the urban poor); (2) merely investigating events and publishing
the findings does not address the enormous losses of people and land by the peasants and
Indians, whether to the government or to Shining Path; (3) the recommendations did not urge any greater public- or private-sector support for indigenous life and institutions, nor did they provide a critique of the legacy of social, political and cultural discrimination against those of Native ancestry.

In 2003, President Alejandro Toledo apologized on behalf of the government to the survivors of the violence and emphasized the severity of its effects on peasants and Indians. He outlined a five-part proposal for reconciliation: (1) improve health, nutrition and education for all Peruvians, especially the poor; (2) improve physical, telecommunications and electrical infrastructure; (3) increase productivity in agriculture and agribusiness; (4) enhance investment by the private sector; and (5) improve the resources of the state and civil society. Some of these objectives have been met by rapid and stable economic growth as Toledo sought to expand Fujimori’s neo-liberal economic policies, including privatizing state businesses and services. However, despite his Stanford credentials, his administration was beset with scandals and mismangement, and most of those outside the main currents of the economy remained so.

As with Fujimori, little improvement in the lives of working and low-income people yielded an increasing mistrust of free-trade economics. Also, despite a mandate to root out corruption and prosecute human-rights abuses, Toledo’s prosecutors moved very slowly. Finally, by 2006, a number of cases had been tried, resulting in several hundred convictions. However, with the uncovering of bribery and drug-trafficking charges against him and his administration, Toledo had an approval rating of 8 percent. Four years of economic growth above 5 percent had been distributed very selectively, said many tens of thousands in the streets (Forero 2006).
Constitutional reform. As in a number of other Latin American countries, one of the more concrete improvements for peasants and indigenous peoples in Peru has resulted from a constitutional reform giving them greater legal guarantees. These serve as an important foundation for peacebuilding going forward. The constitutional overhaul represents one of the most significant legal-judicial transformations in the service of justice, which includes service to peacebuilding. In 1994 a new constitution was approved that: (1) stated officially that the government “recognizes and protects the ethnic and cultural plurality of the nation”; (2) protected customary law with provisions for the fundamental rights of the individual; (3) recognized collective property rights; (4) made indigenous languages official in indigenous territories; but (5) did not produce legal recognition for Afro-Peruvians; (6) nor recognize the political autonomy of indigenous territories (though they have some within municipal authority).

COLOMBIA:

A STATE DIVIDED,

CHURCH, PEASANTS AND INDIANS INCREASINGLY UNITED

The Catholic Church: From mediation to social justice and human rights

The Catholic Church in Colombia has been involved in peacebuilding in a number of ways. One of the most significant was the intercession of the Colombia Conference of Bishops between the rebels and the Barco administration. This mediation resulted in the demobilization of about 4,000 fighters from 1990 to early 1991. From this time on, the church began to say emphatically and publicly that the issues causing the armed conflict
were largely neoliberal economic policies, state and judicial corruption and the divisions between rich and poor.

The bishops often issue *statements and proposals at the diocesan level that address the local context of violence* [as follows]: *groups of bishops*, sometimes accompanied by their priests and members of religious orders, *speak out collectively on common problems at the regional level; and the Conference of Bishops brings together all the bishops of the country in assemblies, where they speak with one voice*…. Practically all the Colombian bishops’ assemblies in recent years have addressed problems related to the conflict and prospects for peace.

[Gaviria 2009:174; italics added]

As part of this role, it set up a peace commission to work with the National Conciliation Commission and the National Social Ministry Secretariat to engage in discussions with grassroots groups committed to peacebuilding. While a civil-society institution and not a state initiative, this is not unlike the commissions extolled by Lederach above. It is a good example of mid-level civil-society coordination and leverage coming to fruition over the long term.

Because of the multi-dimensional, multi-sector nature of the violence, in classic third-side activity, the church often seeks to bring together a wide range of stakeholders, to discuss what its place in resolving the conflict might be, particularly in the areas of public safety, political discussions and support for democracy. These roles have most often involved facilitation of dialog and negotiations, in providing moral guidelines and in
mediation. Such activities are known as *pastoral dialogs*, and their very existence in the conflict has been criticized at times by political and judicial players. The state has actually tried to limit this form of witness and its peacebuilding orientation.

But the consensus within and without the church has been that this is one of its fundamental duties and that the goal has always been about resolving the conflict by championing the rights of the powerless (as opposed to any such activities that enhance it). These dialogs have also helped resolve other issues generated by the conflict such as kidnapping, massive displacement and the needs of single-headed households. Because the church has access to an international audience and resources, it has started a global campaign for the displaced through one of its international relief organizations, Caritas. From this push, one initiative has been to campaign for a law preventing forced displacement. Another has been to raise national awareness of the plight of the displaced, including sponsoring The Day of the Migrant. Yet another has involved setting up early warning systems regarding impending displacement, as well as accompanying the displaced, including whole communities, on their migrations. It has also argued for land recovery and land reform for such people. At 4 million displaced, Colombia is now third in the world (Refugees International 2013).

Noteworthy for this study has been its advocacy for the indigenous peoples of the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta. Comprising five tribes, they have suffered badly from the depredations of various armed actors, creating many displaced communities. Due to a very weak state presence, their lands have been dominated by both rebels and paras, both of whom “established systems of social and judicial control in the 1980s and 1990s
serving to damage and undermine traditional indigenous authorities and systems of
governance,” according to Minority Rights Group International (2005).

When the rebels moved out around 1999, the paras moved in. Because of the previous
rebel presence, the paras suspected an important tribe, the Kankuamos, of collaborating
with them. While the group insisted on its neutrality and victimization, the paras began to
apply standard methods of terror designed to move people off their lands. Acting in
concert with the army, they began to assassinate, massacre, disappear, threaten and
confine them and force their young into their service (Minority Rights Group 2005). By
the mid-2000s, paramilitaries who allegedly had been demobilized were committing half
the crimes in the area (Minority Rights Group 2005).

In response, the church published “The Situation of Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.” Endorsed by the National
Social Ministry Secretariat and Ombudsman’s Office (2003:96), the report called for “an
urgent need to implement a comprehensive emergency plan aimed at protecting
fundamental rights; guaranteeing respect for economic, social and cultural rights, and re-
establishing the real and effective presence of the state, taking into account the right of
indigenous communities to consultation and decision making by consensus” (Gaviria
2009:180). By calling attention to one of the least publicized but most severe
humanitarian crises among Native peoples and in the country in general, it pushed the
state to help these groups and created a model for dialog and action regarding indigenous
issues and the humanitarian crisis.

In addition, while establishing a social witness for peace and reconciliation, the
progressive church has not relented on its prophetic role as a critic of social inequality
and an advocate for the indigenous peoples, peasants and urban poor. In a 2002 conference, “Toward the Colombia We Want,” the bishops examined issues such as poverty and the economy, reforming the justice system and new ways of viewing national security. They stated clearly that peace must evolve out of social justice and that equitable development is a precondition. In another conference, it mapped out the main areas needing work in building a lasting peace: (1) a negotiated settlement in which all armed actors, other relevant institutions and trained facilitators are involved; (2) building and rebuilding of civil society; and (3) creating “structures at the community level that guarantee social justice and peaceful coexistence” (Gaviria 2009:176). In a particularly prophetic role, it criticized the Free Trade Agreement then being negotiated with the United States as asymmetrical and reaching well beyond development (into exploitation). The church has also called for a national peace policy as a guide to peacebuilding.

The indigenous awakening in Colombia

As in many Latin American countries, over the past few decades, indigenous peoples and peasants in Colombia have advocated for self-determination; human and civil rights; better public services, especially health care and education in rural and remote areas; a ban on appropriation of tribal lands by large corporations; and protection from rights violations by belligerents and drug traders.

To protect these rights, they have formed, among other such associations, the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC), founded in the Amazon in 1982 to speak for 34 groups in the national assembly; the National Peasant Association (ANUC), promoting land reform for small farmers and the rural poor; and various
regional groups, chief among them, the Indigenous Council of the Cauca Region (CRIC), the Organization of Antioquia (OIA), and the Regional Indigenous Organization of Putamayo, the department bordering Ecuador and Peru with a great deal of rainforest and coca cultivation. Another important group is the Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA) (Minorities at Risk 2004). Also hopeful, as mentioned in relation to Peru and elsewhere, is an emerging emphasis on “interculturality” in political groups and education reform (Rappaport 2005).

In addition, the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC), like the Catholic Church, a major third-side presence, has helped mobilize protests and, more proactively, development projects of benefit to the community and not multinational corporations. More than 30 civil-society and human-rights groups, national and international, have affirmed that the demonstrations are nonviolent attempts to end a physical and cultural genocide (Martínez 2008).

**The Nasa: An award-winning model**

A well-regarded example of third-side mobilization, southwest of the department of the Valle de Cauca, for which Cali is the capital, the Nasa, a settled indigenous people, have been badly brutalized by the violence of guerrillas, paras and drug gangs. Of the Pacific-bordering Cauca, a department south of the Valle, they are the second-largest group of the Native peoples in the country, are much studied, well organized and increasingly heard from. They number around 140,000 and have historically occupied a range of ecologies up and down the mountains. Armed only with their emblematic staffs – long sticks or poles – they set up their own guard in response to the cross-sector
violence, for which they received the National Peace Prize in 2000. In 2004, the guard rescued five Nasa leaders kidnapped by FARC without resorting to violence (Ballvé 2006).

In addition, on October 12, 2008, the Day of the Race – the indigenous answer to Columbus Day – promoted by the National Mobilization of Indigenous and Popular Resistance, large-scale protests began in La María, an indigenous territory in Cauca. Native organizations blocked the Pan-American Highway, the main road running north and south. In response, the army and police fired on unarmed demonstrators from helicopters and armored vehicles. This repression mobilized more protests, involving at least 200,000 Native people across the country. An estimated 60,000 indigenous people participated in an earlier march (Wirpsa 2009). Sixteen of 32 departments saw such demonstrations, most of which were supported by the International Affairs Commission, the Liberal Party and the Alternative Democratic Pole. Often the security forces simply declare the protesters are guerillas, or equally suspect, guerrilla supporters, even though they may only carry staffs and seek to negotiate demands with Uribe, as did the Nasa.

Other critical contributions

Zones of peace, sanctuary movements and Witness for Peace. In the absence of adequate protection by the security forces, a large number of communities in Colombia have declared themselves zones of peace. These were described above as community declarations that violence is banned in a given area and all nonviolent means will be used to stop it – “an attempt to establish norms which limit the destructive effects of violent conflict within a particular area or during a particular time period or with regard to a
particular category of people” (Langdon and Rodriguez 2007:91). While they are not always successful in ending the violence, one of their main effects has been to transform a mentality of victimization into one of resilience and assertiveness. They represent a classic “bottom-up” advocacy for peace.

As Alvaro Villaraga explained in an interview with Rojas (2007), the following efforts can be considered the three main areas of peacebuilding in Colombia. They are:

1. Women’s empowerment – this area is just as significant as the others we have examined, but it is too broad to do it justice here – Catalina Rojas (2009) explores these in Bouvier (2009);
2. Indigenous mobilization as a territorial and cultural movement;
3. Community-based humanitarian actions such as zones of peace.

The United Nations Development Programme has highlighted these projects as effective means of building peace. Among others, as of the late 2000s, this kind of resistance has been established in the departments of Tolima, Antioquia, Cauca, Barrancabermeja, Uraba, Narino, Calda and Arato. These represent the will of the community galvanized by a new story in terms Ury (2000) would surely endorse. They embody an emphatic challenge to the notion that important dialog can only take place at the national level between the rebels and the state.

Many of these efforts resulted from financial support by the European Union’s Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, working with the Colombian NGO, Redepaz (Network of Initiatives for Peace and Against the War, or just Network for Peace, a coalition of about 400 organizations). They created “One Hundred Municipalities of Peace in Colombia,” an initiative designed to foster gender equity, peaceful relationships and local democracy. More specifically, they outlined the
following objectives: (1) citizen participation; (2) educational intervention; (3) public action and involvement in peacebuilding; (4) information and communication projects; (5) building and strengthening local civil-society leadership (Rojas 2007).

While Redepaz took the lead, contributions of money, ideas and people also came from the Catholic Church and other religious organizations; a variety of indigenous communities; national NGOs for peace, human and women’s rights; peasant organizations; schools and universities; local political leaders and assemblies; and cities and communities. Challenges and shortcomings emerged of course, but they also held lessons. These included: (1) though EU funding intended as seed money was extended from 18 months to two years, it was too little for a number of long-term efforts; (2) the variety of projects and actors made it hard to evaluate success; (3) the degree of resources devoted to education versus the creation of peace networks and communities was not clearly stipulated; and (4) a overall strategy regarding the coordination of the various efforts and actors was lacking (Rojas 2007), no doubt a challenge in a concept so new.

Other critical issues involve the obvious disadvantage of nonviolent actors facing off against violent ones quite inclined to exert their will. In one case, in Mogotes, the ELN killed a mayor accused of corruption. The mayor’s relatives retaliated by accusing a leader in the municipal assembly of being corrupt as well. This opened up a process of mistrust that weakened the community’s resolve. A hunger strike by a local priest demanding peace re-energized the process. This demonstrated there is a counter balance in grassroots numbers, in citizens united and resolving not to be intimidated by violence, and in the galvanizing presence of a moral witness such a priest. The Mogotes ZoP even won the national peace prize for its efforts in conflict mitigation (Rojas 2007).
In the interests of space, only one more will be examined. In Samaniego, the Peace Table was established. A different kind of peace committee, a coalition of 25 private and public organizations, including youth groups and children, it developed a plan calling for the following: (1) building an information system for the most vulnerable parts of the community; (2) establishing policies for groups most in need of protection and support: children, women, the elderly and the disabled; (3) distributing public-service messages on the needs of the populations above; (4) networking with other institutions that serve at-risk people and (5) creating evaluation methods within a unified municipal plan. In the face of many obstacles, including being in a region of heavy insurgent and paramilitary activity, the program has endured. Its biggest challenge has been securing a commitment to the project across various municipal administrations. This has resulted in many of the programs being reduced or cut (Rojas 2007).

Still, one of the most innovative initiatives has come from the children. In 2003, the Movement of Children for Peace established the Foundation for Children and Youth in Peace. It promoted exchanges of war toys for nonviolent ones, ran peacebuilding workshops among youth and pursued media exposure for its aims. It also helped the displaced with food, housing and health care. In general, the problems in Sanamiego involved security challenges in a region dominated by paras, rebels and drug traffickers – the main issue with peace communities generally; inadequate funding; the challenge of dealing with thousands of the internally displaced, most of whom need public assistance; and issues related to the fumigation of drug plants, including problems in mental health, environment and food production (Rojas 2007). Another critical problem facing these communities is a lack of support from the national level, the leaders of which can feel
threatened by any attempt by another party or sector to exert its influence. President
Uribe spoke out against ZoPs as hampering the fight against the rebels.

Discussing Colombia’s peace communities, Rojas (2009) sums up the difficulties
they face as rooted in economic deprivation. The key to eliminating the reasons for the
rebellions and the repression they foster is sustainable development, she says. It is my
most well-considered opinion, well-supported by most of the expert, religious,
indigenous and humanitarian communities in this study, that this is all well and good, but
it is probably a half measure. Without development that is both sustainable and equitable,
peace is a happy but empty thought.

Also under this rubric are sanctuary movements, “underground railroads,” so to
speak, that move victims of dirty war to safer places. Along with ZoPs and Witness for
Peace (below), these have all been applied in Colombia. These represent conflict
mitigation, not resolution, but are noteworthy for the courage of their practitioners, the
righteousness of their aims and their immediate, if ad hoc, life-saving effectiveness. The
history of U.S. sanctuary movements has been most dramatically expressed in spiriting
African-Americans to freedom during slavery and moving victims of political persecution
in Central America, especially El Salvador and Guatemala, to the United States, Canada
and other countries during the civil wars there during the 1980s (Smith 1991).

Another conflict-mitigation program emerging from Central America in the 1980s
was Witness for Peace (WTP). Originally intended to help prevent an invasion of
Nicaragua by the United States, brandished by the Reagan administration as necessary to
thwart Communism, progressive religious activists from the United States went to the
border of Nicaragua and Honduras to stop U.S.-sponsored terrorists from entering
Nicaragua in defiance of national and international law. They positioned themselves as human shields and began to document human-rights abuses.

In response to the human, social, and environmental destruction wrought by Plan Colombia, the counter-narcotics, counter-insurgency program funded by the United States, Witness for Peace opened an office in Colombia in 2000. It has also documented forced displacement and has organized a coalition of worldwide human-rights and faith-based organizations in solidarity with Colombian communities under siege (Witness for Peace 2010).

In each of these cases, Christian, often liberal Protestant, church people have been instrumental to these approaches to peacebuilding. These are mostly means of mitigation, but they have an important place in peace and justice studies. There is, however, too little space for these except to note the relative effectiveness of each. They have both left important legacies. Two NGOs continue this work, a sanctuary system for Colombian refugees and a WTP office coordinating witness in the Colombian countryside. They provide striking, inspirational models for the collaboration of religion and human rights in the service of peacebuilding.

Education for peace. In a far-reaching social agreement, Colombian initiated a national educational plan for 2006-16 that sets out ground-breaking objectives for education for peace. The plan’s purpose is to outline all efforts available, public and private, for meeting the right to a quality education. In a grassroots process involving about 20,000 education professionals, arrived at in consultation with members of the public, the group came up with 10 important areas of concern. Peace education, coexistence (convivencia) and citizenship education and participation were the first
priorities. They helped guide a new initiative in the national educational plan for individuals, groups and communities (Roush 2014). (Copies are available at www.plandecenal.edu.co or from secretariatecnica@educacionparalapaz.org.co.)

One example, the Community-Based Institute on Peace Education (CIPE) demonstrates this new education plan. Their web site explains succinctly:

CIPEs are sustainable, community-based, non-formal peace education teacher training initiatives designed to address the lack of formal opportunities for the preparation of educators in the methods and practices of peace education. CIPEs are locally developed and taught in the local language [practicing interculturality] to more adequately address local manifestations of violence, local and national educational policies, and prepare educators in culturally and contextually relevant educational practices.

[IYPE 2009:online]

In partnership with the Peace Education Center of Teachers College at Columbia University, which founded and guides the global CIPE movement, the National Peace Academy supports and coordinates the effort in Colombia. In addition, Peru, India, the Philippines and the Ukraine have founded CIPE communities. (More resources are available at: http://www.i-i-p-e.org/cipe/.)

The CIPEs are a project of the International Institute on Peace Education (IIPE), founded in 1982 by Columbia’s Teachers College. The IIPE offers residential, cooperative hands-on education in peacebuilding. Organizers and attendees work toward
a multicultural learning environment using many interactive approaches. The IIPE also promotes networking and community in the host region. During July 12-18, 2010, the IIPE held its annual meeting in Colombia. It was co-sponsored by the National Peace Academy and the Foundation for Schools of Peace (Fundación Escuelas de Paz), which is administered by the Ministry of Education and a consortium supporting education for peace (IIPE 2009).

**Others educating for peace.** Colombia has a number of other NGOs involved in education for peace: the Permanent Assembly of Civil Society for Peace (Asamblea Permanente de la Sociedad Civil por la Paz), which, as its name suggests, works with civil society; the Life, Justice and Peace Corporation (Corporacion Vida, Justicia y Paz), a church-related program working directly with local communities; the Foundation for the Development of Ethnic and Cultural Education of the Pacific (Fundacion para el Desarolla Etnoeducativo y Cultural del Pacifico), which works on human rights and education of youth; the Foundation for Reconciliation (Fundacion para la Reconciliacion), dedicated to a just reconciliation; Just Peace (Justapaz), which works on peace and justice issues; Media for Peace (Medios para la Paz), a journalists’ group promoting responsible coverage of peace and human-rights issues; Redepaz, the well-known NGO of civil-society groups that gathers and disseminates peacebuilding information; and Vallenpaz, an NGO working in Valle del Cauca and Cauca for the transformation of rural conflict (Insight on Conflict 2011).

**A mobile school.** Lastly, worth mentioning in this section is the School for Peace and Coexistence (Escuelas de Paz y Convivencia, EPC). Sponsored by Caritas Colombia of the Catholic Social Pastoral Office and the Jesuit Program for Peace, it was founded in
Manizales in 2003, northwest of Bogotá in the country’s coffee-producing region. It represents a national program that looks at peace holistically, from the interpersonal to the geopolitical levels. Its significance for our study is that, similar to the Circus for Peace cited by Lederach, the EPC is a mobile school that operates in 49 dioceses in 21 of the nation’s 32 departments (states). It works with priests and pastoral agents, who then, through a multiplier effect, train youth and educators. It also works along the same lines with parishes and other religious communities; community leaders; civil-society organizations such as civil-defense or mothers’ groups; government and nongovernmental organizations at the local, departmental and regional levels; schools and universities; and the public. Due to its multiplier effect, it has by now trained tens of thousands in peacebuilding (Rogers, Bamat and Ideh 2008).

*Transitional justice*

Like Peru, Colombia passed a law authorizing a truth and reconciliation process, but in contrast, its impact was blunted by provisions granting amnesty to the paras, so much so that many peace and justice advocates would come to think it perverse. Colombia passed this so-called Peace and Justice Law in 2005, which allowed for the demobilization of thousands of paras. But many more remain, perhaps 70,000 or more, and many of those have reinvented themselves within security firms, perhaps as many as 30,000. Prior to its passage, up through 2004, talks with the paras were ongoing, but drug traffickers were believed to be guiding much of the agenda. Working without public input, the Uribe administration requested that Congress limit or eliminate legal penalties (provide impunity) for the paras to assist their demobilization. Investigations into human-
rights abuses linked to death squads and traced to prominent politicians in the Uribe administration proceeded haltingly as impunity slowed progress. During the civil war, indigenous, labor and environmental leaders, the latter two also often of Indian descent, were invariably targeted for assassination. They objected strenuously to impunity for the paras, particularly for the death-squad leaders, also condemned by human-rights organizations.

By 2006, it was estimated that about 30,000 of 100,000 paras had laid down their arms, and when some leaders refused, they were arrested. However, many have merely reformed as private enterprise. This is so prominent, it has been called the neo-paramilitary movement. Most of all, much national and international outrage remains over their immunity to prosecution. The law also contained provision for a truth and reconciliation process but not much came of it for many years.

Recently, however, the notion has been revived. Nearly a decade later, the government began working with the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) in New York to bring together international experts who have worked on truth commissions to discuss what such a commission does and how it might work in Colombia. Members of civil society and government officials participated in the ICTJ course offered in March 2013. The best news for survivors and victims was the recent passage in 2012 of the Legal Framework for Peace. It allows Congress to create a truth commission to provide legal accountability for those exempt from the earlier bill.

Eduardo Gonzalez, director of ICTJ’s Truth and Memory Program, led training in truth and memory projects that call attention to the underlying (structural) issues that cause the civil violence. In these workshops, Gonzalez explains that the effort must go
further than just basic documentation. It has to involve broader patterns and histories of violence and lay out complete reports leading to policy options. It should also secure gender equity and the participation of children. *It also needs to record in detail the indigenous perspective on seeking truth and a special focus on violations against such peoples* (ICTJ 2013).

*Constitutional reform*

In 1991, a new constitution created provisions for the autonomy of indigenous peoples and set up guarantees for their political participation within a corporatist model. Within this new charter, Indian communities were recognized as having collective, not just individual, rights. They were also given right of consultation and veto over development on their lands, especially regarding extractive industries (Ramirez de Jara 1997). (This exists in theory and is more challenging in practice.)

Spearheaded by the ONIC (National Indigenous Organization of Colombia), it secured more than 37 articles in the constitution. In its aftermath, for the first time, compañeros walked miles to the polls instead of being carried by trucks sponsored by political parties. Indigenous candidates won most of their elections handily. However, while the political rights have been observed, the development rights have mostly been ignored.
Chapter V

Lessons Partially Learned:

Local, National and International Connections
CONCLUSIONS

In human rights and peacebuilding, oddly enough, a key question for the expert community becomes, Do we really want to put ourselves out of business? (Or maybe not so oddly.) Well, yes and no. Then again, of course we do. But it is a limit concept, like social justice, racial harmony or unconditional positive regard. It is at least one way to understand the goal of peace and justice work, in this case, that is. We, like dentists, would like to be so good at what we do that we are no longer needed.

When universities fly. It is an odd form of hubris perhaps. Regardless, we won’t get there, so half-measures are necessary. International expertise in human rights and peacebuilding is one of those half measures. This is not so much criticism as inevitability. It is a partnership, after all, or should be. All the measures, techniques and ideas discussed here, in practice, require local people to execute them. At the same time, someone has to organize the data, interpret the text and read the landscape, social, political, economic, even ecological. That is what social science should do well, what I have tried to do here, guided by the daunting realization that peacebuilding following civil war is as complex as the social disaster that requires it. One should just about equal the other in diversity of causes, drivers or social debts demanding payment.

In attempting to rein in this complexity, I have tried to focus a great deal on relationships of and across scales, and in the midst of a persistent asymmetry of scale, look at the meaning of interpersonal and small-group relationships and their importance in making the bureaucratizing of peacebuilding more humane. This is defined as making it a more mutual cultural or subcultural exchange. It means making it as intercultural as possible, and so, making it more manageable socially and psychologically. We expect
that through various forms of dialog and interaction, differences among sectors and armed actors would become less mythological (demonized), and more familiar, more manageable. *This is as simple as saying that healed and reconciled people create healed and reconciled, and so more functional, institutions. These institutions are made of codified and ad-hoc relationships, so formal and informal relationships play a part.*

What we see convincingly is that in virtually every instance of local-to-national or national-to-international transactions, there is a significant amount of interaction between and among the levels. It is not strictly linear or top down. Of course, more than seeking to make the “upper levels” obsolete, more important is matching needs and resources across regions, scales and disciplines and making sure actors at each scale have been sensitized to the needs of the other. A classic case for our purposes is the well-meaning yet Western-dominated mental-health efforts in Ayacucho. Another might be any psychological and spiritual assistance, or conflict-resolution work, that would have been of use to human-rights professionals in Colombia. This should probably mean both precept-based education about cultural and subcultural differences and interaction on the interpersonal level. It involves a focus on relationships, but also on strategic matters such as funding plans, health and education strategies or how to get national governments, international NGOs and transnational corporations to listen to local concerns.

This would mean exchanging views not only from Putamayo to Geneva, and back, but Putamayo to Cauca, and Cusco to Lima and Lima to New York or Brussels and Washington to Oxford and both with Cajamarca. In keeping with Lederach’s guidance, perhaps more important is keeping Putamayo in close touch with Bogotá and Arequipa and Ayacucho in constant contact with Lima, using the grassroots-to-middle-level
connections to get the best targeting of resources, sharing of lessons and currency of
knowledge base.

\textit{Intercultural and international connections}

In these interactions of experts, values and knowledge bases, interculturality should
increasingly be a given, but it is not. Think of the indigenous activist from southern
Colombia and his visits to the UN offices in Geneva. As far as he is concerned, those at
the international level are just new colonial managers, added to the others. In his view,
they may have only become a little more sensitive to their charges and a lot more
sensitive to public relations.

On the other hand, there is probably greater hope in an information age than before it.
Relations across scales are more fluid, dynamic and far reaching. They enjoy more multi-
lateral interaction and have more potential to transcend social or national boundaries.
Assisted by this information revolution, more than 20 years after the inception of an
unprecedented mass mobilization, peasants, indigenous peoples and the urban poor have
continued to mobilize against neo-liberal economic policies, sometimes called
\textit{globalization} or \textit{free trade} (causing the left to insist on \textit{fair trade}). One dramatic result of
the turn to democracy across the continent in the last few decades has been a proliferation
of indigenous, peasant, faith-based and human-rights nongovernmental organizations.
They make up the bulk of civil society, from the grassroots to the national and
international levels. This movement has used the political openings of the economic
liberalism to speak out against the latter’s damage to workers, communities and ecologies
(Brysk 2000). The mobilization has produced some milestones that are easy to measure
and document, and some that are not. Among the first group, we should note the following accomplishments in conventions and declarations:

(1) In 1989, the UN International Labor Organization passed the Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, No. 169. It replaced the assimilation-oriented ILO Convention 107 and instead champions autonomy in development.

(2) The UN International Year of Indigenous Peoples, also the year of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, introduced in 1993, passed by the General Assembly in 2007.

(3) Two years later, the UN inaugurated the International Decade of Indigenous Peoples, 1995-2005. And because it was much needed,


As indicated by the need to declare a second such decade, we can reasonably assert that, so far, this international resolve has produced a few economic gains, some political gains but important cultural gains. The latter may serve as a foundation for achieving more of the first two.

Meanwhile, the deadly assault on peasants and indigenous peoples goes on. Beyond stopping the extralegal murder of the innocent, it is the thesis of this study that any consideration of mass violence, and any peacebuilding to follow, needs to consider the many economic, psychological, social and spiritual deficits (arrayed across a hierarchy of needs perhaps) inherent in neo-liberalism, which generally fosters inequity in development and pares social programs. Surely some social-welfare initiatives are due peasants and indigenous peoples in these two countries because of how brutally they have
been excluded from the benefits of Euro-American management of economy, polity and society over 500 years. Certain forms of state intervention in the economy and politics of an otherwise elite-dominated society would seem to be morally due and economically necessary. This is easy to affirm abstractly, but it pits those whose view of social ethics tends this way against the IMF’s traditional approach to structural-adjustment programs, which make major investment contingent on austerity measures. They tend to strip out social programs, neutralize peasant and trade unions and lower wages. Whether the new privately driven cultural and political progress made by indigenous peoples will yield greater social and economic justice in the long run remains to be seen. But it may offer greater autonomy and self-determination in civic and civil-society activities, and this should assist a more equitable development.

In many situations, particularly the lowlands, where the situation is dire in many places, where indigenous peoples are still learning to get the political and economic powers that impinge on their land and lives to listen to their demands, what likely has to happen is they have to make a well-integrated, well-timed use of international NGO and intergovernmental resources to counter the influence of huge multinationals, international actors with budgets greater than many countries, and the governments in their thrall. It is likely that local mobilization by itself may not be enough, in other words. It needs to be marshaled in concert with international backing.

In light of the critical importance of the international community to any hope of ending the assault on peasants and remote peoples, it is clear that national indigenous and peasant leaders have a crucial coordinating, teaching and advocacy role – and an equally critical symbolic and ideological role (ideology meaning a coherent body of ideas that
supports a set of symbols and behaviors). This advocacy should champion but not co-opt their communities’ needs, from basic to higher order, and present them to the international community with minimal distortion. This has produced recognizable, sometimes dramatic, results.

Since the neo-liberal opening, while always at risk for inaction or duplicity, Latin American governments have responded to international pressure for enforcement of human rights with key constitutional and political changes. This should surely help foster peace, but probably more in the long than the short run. They may have had utilitarian reasons for doing so, such as access to international lending and foreign investment, or reasons of conscience, or both. But they have begun to respond. Ultimately, these fledgling gains require more committed action from within and more sustained attention from without, including sanctions with teeth, to move from law to policy. Even so, the international NGO and intergovernmental communities provide a fulcrum for moral leverage with many governments in Latin America. This mobilization may prove to be a turning point continent-wide.

If the issues are seen this way, in terms of scalar asymmetry and human-needs hierarchies, indigenous and civil-society groups are learning in leaps and bounds about their ability to manage political leverage and use ideological and spiritual resources – what Bourdieu would call symbolic capital (or capacity) (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) – across scales. In this Native-identity moment and mobilization, fundamentally cultural but deeply economic and ecological as well, we see an example of a relatively successful “bottom up,” more intrinsically motivated movement. But it also requires instrumental yet important roles to be played by national and international organizations. If there is
good communication and relative good will across the social-political and cultural sectors, and across spatial and organizational scales, this should lead to peacebuilding.

Identity, dignity and social movements

Identity movements can be critical to affirming the dignity of the whole person within his or her whole culture and in supporting the fulfillment of the “higher” human needs (Galtung 1969; Burton, 1998). Regarding the subaltern, these needs apparently have to be met in order to generate sustained action on critical matters affecting the “lower” needs. As a way of unifying this array of needs, a deceptively simple but holistic approach to meeting needs for peacebuilding comes from Cheryl Lynn Duckworth (2011) in Land and Dignity in Paraguay. Examining the indigenous-rights movement in Paraguay, she uses what she calls the dignity frame to interpret how the indigenous communities have organized their demands for peace and justice into a coherent narrative.

Much discussed of late in social science, framing, she explains, is “a process by which a social group involved in a movement understands, presents and explains their worldview and the specific claims they are making” (Duckworth 2011:2). With this deceptively simple but far-reaching organizing principle, Paraguay’s indigenous communities were able to sum up their demands for respect in light of a universal value – autonomy, or self-determination, political, cultural and economic. They were then able to highlight a long list of dehumanizing conditions affecting indigenous peoples. Within this paradigm, issues of critical inquiry have included contested use of natural resources and rights to land – particularly its privatization under neoliberalism, which commodifies what indigenous societies hold as a sacred, common trust. Others key demands are
related to establishing intercultural education and universal health care. This assertion of dignity, this challenge to the state and the elite, began under the repression of the Stoessner regime (1954-1989) and continues to this day.

Burton and Galtung both assert that dignity is a basic human need. They say it involves autonomy, self-esteem, social standing and belonging. In contrast to the many years of negative stereotypes of indigenous peoples that Euro-American cultures have promoted, it means being known accurately, explains Duckworth (2011). It captures a range of peasant and indigenous demands in a single, simple concept, offering a way to address the full complement of human needs under one banner, in the manner of the U.S. civil rights movement (“I Am a Man.”) and a host of others (Duckworth 2011).

In addition, catalyzed by a pan-Indian mobilization, the constitutional changes in each country represent critical examples of local-to-national connections, of local effort and influence coming to fruition at the national level. This makes use of a newly “complementary” international role, an example of complementarity (Mitchell 2013), a coordination across scales, sectors and organizations. This included the comparative perspective on transitional justice offered by the EU, the United States and key Latin American governments. These written guarantees take their place among the important milestones toward building a lasting peace, but they have yet to reach their potential. In particular, consultation on development is frequently ignored, often via payoffs or closed-door negotiations at the state level.

Regarding other intercultural matters, the Catholic Church provides a social laboratory of function and dysfunction across cultures and scales. Historically, it has only practiced a limited form of intercultural exchange through a European-dominated
syncretism. In it, indigenous myths, symbols, rituals and celebrations were tolerated, but the Church basically enveloped key indigenous counterparts. More recently, though, it has opened up an intercultural dialog in earnest that looks to take peasant and indigenous spirituality seriously on its own terms. This could be a rich source of further research.

This represents the evolution of liberation theology from modernist to postmodernist idioms. While at the international level, the Catholic Church first supported, then repressed liberative theology and its pedagogy, the liberation movement has survived due to a strong grassroots-to-national connection. Because the church is a large, multinational organization, it can operate at the international level. At all three levels, local, national and international, it has produced a host of initiatives to meet needs at the “lower” end of the human-needs hierarchy, and increasingly, it has let Native peoples and the rural poor determine their own ways of meeting their needs at the higher levels.

We also find that, historically, the international level of the Catholic Church has been more likely to ignore lower-level needs for the higher, while the NGO community historically has been more likely to ignore higher-level needs in favor of the lower needs. Within the church, with the advent of liberation theology, this has begun to change the terms of theory and practice. The NGO human rights, and peace and justice communities are also beginning to address human needs holistically, not just piecemeal and legalistically.
Intimately counting the dead: Reconciliation and transformation across subcultures

Among other insights, Theidon and Tate offer a window on the crucial role of spirituality in sustaining groups and individuals during periods of tremendous social and interpersonal stress, in the midst of the civil violence we have chronicled. In two different Andean settings, they are both vitally concerned with personal, group and political relationships among the common people, among political and religious leaders and among the human-rights and peacebuilding communities. Of particular interest are the relationships between international experts and local people, and those as connected through the national level, which is a point of articulation, both meanings intended, a pivot point and switching yard flexible enough to have good access to international perspectives, secure enough to offer a voice for local needs.

As well as political dialog, each demonstrates why intercultural language and education, down-time encounters and exchanges fostering personal relationships are also important to peacebuilding. In addition, in each case, spirituality represents a fundamental form of psychological adaptation, a social and psychic technology providing a point of access to the transpersonal and/or greater psychic resources. Theidon and Tate focus on this as a psychic anchor as people struggle with intense stresses within and outside of the group. How it works, socially and psychologically, is not fully spelled out, but it should make fertile ground for future work. We will summarize some of those basic outlines here.

Regarding Theidon’s (2013) intimate enemies and the repentance of the Senderistas, Christianity provides the symbolic background, a metaphysical and political reference
point for the transformation of the hearts and minds of villagers and rebels. But the phenomenon of forgiveness is virtually universal, and all cultures have ways to process it, formally and informally. Using this mythic backdrop, the locals developed their own indigenous ritual for reintegration into the community, their own expiation of sin.

Forswearing past cultural and physical assaults, including the murder of fellow villagers, the authority for which was rooted in an international, universal worldview (Marxism), the former insurgents vowed to observe a wholly local perspective and ethic. This is another conceptually fascinating and peace-supporting aspect of interculturality and an implied critique of any alienated, international mentality.

Also in *Intimate Enemies*, regarding the documentation, processing and treatment of trauma, we see a dysfunctional local-to-national relationship, one that limits local expression to conform to international standards of data gathering and narrative construction. In light of the virtually sacred quality of certain soul-searing cultural narratives – well explored by Taussig, Theidon, Tate and others – regarding the mental-health workers in Ayacucho, we are confronted with a high level of dissonance in the cultural construction of local needs. It leaves local people without a familiar language with which to express their grief, without a common emotional stock, a psychic currency, across scales. As these are emotionally and spiritually charged issues, hard to conceptualize, verbalize and process under any circumstance, victims need the comfort and nuance of their own symbols and language with which to express their most complex emotions and values. Observing this need for culturally appropriate psychological care might be considered a cross-cultural, mental-health right, a variation on “First, do no harm.”
Interestingly, this is not only a scientific but a hermeneutical issue. By this we are saying that meanings, not just transliterations, are involved. In other words, it is profoundly local, it exists in a social, cultural and political context, and, if mishandled, it leads to inadequate local care and deeper needs for healing and empowerment. Some form of culturally appropriate trauma counseling should be available to these communities, and their own traditions and healing specialists need to be involved at a basic level. This needs to be investigated going forward.

It also seems likely that some form of the problem-solving workshops highlighted above by Lederach could be adapted for therapeutic purposes to assist reconciliation in situations like Ayacucho. They could balance the emotionalism of the ritual repentance and allow villagers to develop emotional and conceptual tools with which to confront how former mortal enemies might live together. Doing so, they could appropriate traditional (local to regional) judicial formats, as with the ronderos of Peru in one case or the traditional tribal conciliators of Colombian and the Nasa in another (Zapata 2006). By tailoring it to an existing cultural model, such a forum could provide a structure for exploring potentially explosive contents.

We also see that the near-asphyxiation of nuanced expressions of trauma performed by Western bureaucratic methods, the flattening of affect Theidon (2013) documents in the trauma industry resonates with what Tate observes regarding the bureaucratization of human-rights reporting. Both reflect an ethically removed and context-free routinization of care in the guise of professionalism. National human-rights workers report they were squeezed between local needs for the social construction of the truth and the requirements of the international NGO and intergovernmental community for a standardized discourse
in human rights. This, however, is less universal than Euro-American, less timeless than modernist. In all, it represents a very important, virtually Weberian, aspect of the local-national-international connection.

We could also confidently recommend some form, or varied forms, of counseling for the human-rights workers in Tate’s ethnography as well. These too would need to be intercultural, or inter-subcultural, as it were. They would need to integrate local and national worldviews, in particular the liberation and reconciliation paradigms. Tate doesn’t emphasize it, but they would also have to deal with a papered-over racism lasting a few hundred years.

Without getting too exotic with terminology, we could even say these issues of cultural and symbolic conflict, of dialectic and dialog, have to be resolved within a hermeneutics of consciousness. Hermeneutics is the art and science of interpretation. Consciousness has a succinct definition we have put in an endnote, but in this context, it is akin to a history of mentalities, of master narratives, the history of a people as received and their experience of that history. It largely determines a group’s goals and approved means of getting there. These may be similar or substantially different from one people to another, usually some of both. This is where interculturality lives. It is a symbolic interface culturally and an interpersonal interface psychologically, a cross-cultural exchange of both, that is.

Regarding peacebuilding and mental health, people need local help first, from experts they know and trust. In highland Peru, this needs to include curanderos who can interpret trauma, grief and bitterness in local terms. Interculturally trained curanderos (in some of Western medicine, that is) would be the best bet, as they need to educate their various
peoples about various Western approaches to healing, as well as explain things in a way that satisfies Western professionals and donors. Then, working with a small team of anthropologists, linguists and medical and psychological professionals, they would translate the villagers’ experience for the national and international communities in ways that lose little of the local meaning. Not too fine a point can be put on this. In the case of the highland villagers, little national or international help was available in ways that were a good fit with the local experience. The attentions of a few linguists and anthropologists might have remedied this situation a great deal. Regarding human-rights workers in Colombia, better training and face-to-face encounters with local peoples, including the remote tribes, would have helped national workers more accurately and responsibly, with greater cultural sensitivity, teach local workers about international standards for human-rights reporting.

Is there a cultural bias in this process, and how does it affect peacebuilding going forward? These and spin-off issues should point to good ideas for future research.

Tate does not say so, but regarding human-rights workers in Colombia, it seems they too suffer from too much memory. Ironically, there are now a few therapies, mostly pharmacological but also psychological, that treat post-traumatic stress disorder by blocking horrible memories, but they were not available in the early 2000s (Brain and Behavior Research Foundation 2013; Hale 2014). And are these desirable, medically, psychologically, spiritually?

Such a treatment entails ethical and psychological complications and would probably not have been a fit with the culturally critical hard edge (“they kill us or they kill us”) and
virtually religious discipline ("I have the same mistica…I haven’t cut the cord.")

these dedicated, highly educated, but romantic, workers valued. The subcultural
cloistering, combined with a working emotional illiteracy (denial) sufficient to get them
through the day, likely would have interfered with expressing any need for therapy, or
confession and expiation, or for that matter, rituals of reconciliation, though they
doubtless could have used such spiritual technologies.

Moreover, is it possible something like these activities may have occurred and we are
not told, perhaps out of discretion or due to other priorities? Is that a limitation on the
data (not of course on the intentions of the researcher)? Is it a limitation and affectation of
anthropologists that we will analyze in great detail such needs among non-European-
descended peoples but more rarely among Euro-Americans? Among the less educated at
the local level but not among the well educated at the national level? Among the less
exalted victims of civil violence but not among the more heroic champions of such
victims? This is not to criticize Tate, whose accounts are detailed, searching and incisive,
and who was surely constrained by time and money, but to articulate needs for future
research, to help secure the best information on these important subjects. Is it possible
that there may be, in some times and places, an implicit racism in the bureaucratization
and professionalization of human-rights work? These are interesting questions for further
work.

In light of the recent call from the UN to protect human-rights and civil-society
workers better than ever before, we see that better care for their physical safety and
mental health of would mean better care and concern from these workers, more resilience
and stamina, more cohesion, leading, we hope, to more sustainable efforts overall and
less pressure to seek an accommodation tilted toward those who have the most advantages already. We would expect it to produce greater solidarity facing an intractable enemy, one that can have virtually metaphysical implications for those near it, the ways and means of mass violence.

We see as well the importance of spirituality in making sense of extraordinary, soul-searing suffering, but with different cultural meanings. For the highland villagers of Peru, an indigenous belief system is stretched to its limits, so much so it leads to an appeal to Western psychiatry for its best-known and probably most superficial form of treatment, pills. Within their own spiritual traditions, the villagers have a variety of symbolic and emotional resources with which to communicate their experience of mass violence, and with the help of the community, to move past it. But they have too little assistance, traditional or modern, to make full and effective use of their own mental-health resources. The Western belief system of psychiatry offers some, but these ideas are poorly translated and poorly understood by those who need them.

For human-rights workers in Colombia, through the liberation paradigm, conflict theory embedded in Christian symbology offers intellectual and emotional resources with which to build solidarity and cope with the chronically high levels of stress and depression attending human-rights work. It does seem some form of psychological treatment – perhaps fit more comfortably within paradigms of conflict resolution and problem solving, but also individual or group work if needed – could have helped bolster the personal lives of these individuals and helped treat emotional and spiritual divisions within the group.
Ironically, the less educated villagers (in Western, middle-class terms) are saturated in suffering and want to make better of use of their own symbolic and conceptual resources, but they are also open (or susceptible) to Western ways of dealing with it. On the other hand, the better educated human-rights professionals seem to ignore such therapy in the interests of psychic and spiritual toughness. Seeing tremendous suffering all around them, knowing their lives are at risk when they try to do something about it, they try, mostly unsuccessfully, to wall it off or incubate it for motivation, different ways to keep it bottled up and under control.

The Peruvian villagers need good, common intercultural mental-health and spiritual tools. Their situation is almost clearer interculturally. They seem to be a population interested in and open to treatment. The human-rights workers needs are more complicated psychologically and culturally. They have volunteered for their role and are allegedly better educated, more ethically and politically literate and are better equipped to deliberate about what they should do or be in the world, what role they should play and its moral consequences. They need something like an interculturality made of the dialectic of meanings in the broader human rights community, its ethics and politics, one that can integrate competing paradigms of social (substantive) and criminal (procedural) justice.

Within village life, individuals are unique and have distinctive personalities, of course, as does their suffering, but the prevailing mentality is collective, so the suffering should be treated accordingly, on both levels, that is. This too, the dialectic of an individual versus a collective mentality, is a matter of interculturality. The repentance ritual does this fairly well.
The Colombian human-rights workers, on the other hand, are torn between their social-justice roots and their new identity within human rights. This tears at the group. Most understand the importance of a collective, or collectivist, vision, but, psychologically and politically, too often seem restricted by the individualistic ethos of the dominant social order.

Finally, the evangelical churches, some more committed to social issues, some less so, have performed a critical role in helping villagers deal with untold trauma and suffering. There is too little space here to go into the costs and benefits of evangelical witness among the rural poor in the Andes, but it has not been entirely about cultural imperialism, even as sensitive social scientists and human-service workers have some hard questions about the past.

Truth and trauma

The truth and reconciliation process represents a beginning, but it is only one part of transitional justice. In both countries, reparations are only discussed in the abstract, efforts at land reform have been largely thwarted, economic and ecological destruction continues in the name of development and communities and peoples continue to be torn asunder or disappear. Too often transnational corporations are barely held accountable to national governments. Working from the national level, they hold sway at the local level because of their leverage at the international level, their access to global capital. Using Lederach’s terms, especially regarding large extractive industries, we could say the grassroots level needs better help from the pivot point, the conceptually articulate and structurally flexible national level. Again, the notion of a translation across mentalities
and value systems, a hermeneutics of consciousness, suggests itself. This could be called the science and art of interpreting interculturality. It is how we construct an intercultural world that we can negotiate in common.

The truth commissions also offer an instructional moment, a contrast in local, national and international meanings, in action and inaction. In Peru, the process involved local people and reached into the most affected parts of the population. It pursued multiple media, explored many ways to reach the campo and used multiple resources to gather and bring them news of their testimony. It also included a national repentance law, which provided a ritualistic format for local truth and reconciliation, noted above.

This was nearly the opposite of Colombia. There, the Uribe administration brokered a closed-door, high-level deal that delivered impunity to death squads, kept their violations secret and had a very limited effect on their demobilization. It is a interesting inversion of Lederach’s ideal – but because the national level sealed itself off from the resources of the local and international levels. More recent stirrings of a real truth and reconciliation process have emerged since and are already making good use of international resources, this in the form of the well-regarded International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). In March of last year, it gathered international expertise from many truth commissions to advise Colombian professionals. At the national level, members of civil society and government have learned and will continue to learn from the ICTJ’s distillation of experience (ICTJ 2013).
**Between the grassroots and elite levels**

While scholars and practitioners have placed a great deal of emphasis on various grassroots approaches to peacebuilding, much less has been devoted to how these two levels – the local and elite – interact with one another, and how they might do so better. Christopher Mitchell looks into this in the introduction to *Local Peacebuilding and National Peace: Interaction Between Grassroots and Elite Processes* (Mitchell and Hancock 2013), a follow-up to an earlier book he edited with Landon Hancock on peace communities across cultures (Hancock and Mitchell 2007). The first volume was of significance at the time because the concept was new and some believed that, if secured by negotiations among local leaders, rebels and security forces, peace communities would spread and bring about peacebuilding on the national level. The evidence for this is mixed. At some times and places, peace communities have been respected by military, para and insurgent leadership. At others, chief executives have denounced them as undermining state authority in a way that is treasonous, paras kill whom they will and the insurgents resent self-determination by any other entity and undermine it with threats and violence. However, in some nations at some times, local peacebuilders have been allowed to participate as third-siders in top-level negotiations. In others places at other times, they have been shut out.

According to Layson (2003) and Mitchell (2013), a useful distinction can be made between *horizontal* and *vertical* peacebuilding. The vertical is the interaction between the state and the rebels. The horizontal relates to a number of interests at the same level, either the grassroots, or, alternately, running parallel above it, the elite level. It is well documented that national agreements can open up the possibility for peace, but the proof...
is on the ground and much work generally remains. With this in mind, Mitchell (2013) creates a simple diagram that conveys many relationships in a basic, four-line grid. Connected by an arrow pointing both ways, it puts elite and insurgent leaders at the top on opposite poles and grassroots leaders and “local influentials” at the bottom, connected by another arrow. Arrows also run up and down between the national and local levels. The functional and culturally appropriate coordination along these axes of peace, justice, humanitarian and development activities that make up effective peacebuilding is what he and others call complementarity.

He cites an example from the island of Mindanao in the Philippines. Local peacebuilding has become more effective there for having included representatives from the three main cultures, Moro, Catholic and Lumad. These efforts have involved training peace workers in setting up micro-credit facilities; examining media ethics surrounding the conflict; and setting up “spaces for peace,” “sanctuaries for peace” or “peace and development communities,” the latter through the UN Development Programme. They have also promoted as much engagement as possible by civil society in national peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

Civil-society groups used pressure and persuasion to get President Arroyo to convene a peace panel – similar to the peace commissions noted above. It was largely composed of religious, ethnic and regional representatives from the grassroots. In other words, national-level peacemaking – solutions negotiated at the upper levels – do not ensure there will be peace at the local levels. This uncertainty is greater if the top-level negotiations are removed, geographically and organizationally, from local people.
In the book’s conclusion, Mitchell and Hancock (2013) outline stages of conflict resolution and transformation that are similar to the phases of Barnett et al. (2007). Both represent a continuum more than discrete stages, but they allow us to organize the data in time and then develop expectations in space. With Barnett et al. in parentheses, these stages are: (1) during the violence (stability creation); (2) during late negotiations or very early in the peace (restoring institutions); and (3) during the broader post-conflict period (socio-economic dimensions). Beyond their documentary existence as social facts, more intensive study of peace communities would be helpful in better understanding early-stage indicators of peace. We should, in other words, investigate the extent to which they can serve as a set of these indicators.

During the violence. Elites, insurgents and paras will advocate and negotiate for their preferred futures, and local efforts are often ignored or denounced. Both the state and the rebels may see peace communities and neutrality as sympathy for the other side, even treasonous, as Uribe insinuated regarding zones of peace (ZoPs) in Colombia. They are equally vulnerable to government or insurgent violence, and, at best, their concerns might merely be ignored at the national level. Sometimes, this forces communities to switch from emphasizing peacebuilding to less controversial things like development and democracy (Hancock and Mitchell 2013).

During the peace process or soon after. Elites and rebels both want control over the significant parts of peacemaking, as they had with war making. Local initiatives may be able to prompt negotiations, but infrequently. Once they begin, unless concerted efforts are made to involve civil-society actors, local efforts and concerns can be dismissed. Sometimes local leaders can be incorporated into negotiation teams, if only as advisors.
This is a good way to anticipate local reactions to agreements, so they don’t collapse from a lack of local support, a point to be impressed upon decision makers. The situation calls for a unified civil-society approach. If divided, the concerns will probably be ignored. A classic example is the Colombian NGOs hammering out their agreement regarding demands before the UN Human Rights Commission (Hancock and Mitchell 2013).

During the post-conflict period, Elites still have most of the advantages and will try to dictate policy and programs. However, local NGO initiatives probably have more leeway at this stage than at the others. They can go around the national level to solicit training, resources and funds from the international level, as practiced lately by indigenous movements across the continent. Local-level NGOs often want to emphasize community development (economics), and regional and national organizations want to emphasize community relations (politics), the latter primarily agreements among departments and between them and the state or certain NGOs. The best time for complementarity, Hancock and Mitchell (2013) believe, is during peace negotiations or early in implementation.

Building for the long term: Sustainability and equity

The main focus of this study has been on activities ranging from the micro-scale to the meso-scale. They have dealt mostly with the early stages of peacebuilding, the chronological leading edge. And I have tried to outline a number of factors in the early stages cutting across scales and, ultimately, looked at these phases as formative periods that could determine the approach to constituencies and their needs going forward.
These other aspects of peacebuilding, the socio-economic dimension of Barnett et al. (2007), have to do with the long view of peacebuilding, the preventive aspects that constitute the conceptual leading edge. A complex of issues requiring long-term critical inquiry involves the interrelationship of sustainable development, social equity and land reform. As a guide to theory, practice and grassroots organizing, we will also look at food sovereignty and land-rights work pioneered by an international peasant network.

**Indicators of sustainability and social equity.** First, to make headway on a host of critical issues closely related to sustainability and social equity, the expert community has made a singular project of building a database of indicators of sustainability, development and social equity. We will refer to this herein as *sustainable-equitable development.*

Regarding such a perspective on sustainability and equity, it is increasingly apparent we are on the vanguard of an epistemological revolution. Many organizations are devising indicators of sustainable economics, social justice and healthy communities, highlighted here as infrastructural to peacebuilding. These should be of great value to monitoring and evaluation (M and E) programs, which matter a great deal to donors, international lenders and organizations such as the UN or OAS. But they also have value for any work in social or natural science aimed at the restoration of community, ecology or economy.

Regarding comprehensive indicators of sustainable equity, one of the most prominent developments is the data gathering done by the United Nations. In response to the 1992 Rio Summit and its Agenda (for Century) 21, the UN Commission on Sustainable Development produced *Indicators of Sustainable Development: Framework and*

The first edition documented more than 100 indicators in four categories: social, economic, environmental and institutional. Each was classified by driving force, state (condition) and response indicators. Each had documentation on its relevance, its definition and methodology and its limitations, as well as on data availability, agencies creating it and additional readings. A sampling of these indicators shows: combating poverty; promoting sustainable human settlement development; changing consumption patterns; transfer of environment ally sound technology, cooperation and capacity-building; integrated management of land resources; conservation of biological diversity; protection of the atmosphere; and integrating environment and development in decision-making (UN 1996: ix–xiii).

Before exploring these indicators of sustainability, however, we should explain that the UN has also developed a set of human-rights indicators, but they are not focused on the long-term, preventive aspects of peacebuilding we are exploring here. To save space, they are listed in an endnote. They are more closely related to the civil-political rights historically lauded in the United States, not to the social, economic and cultural rights it has ignored. These are sometimes referred to as procedural and substantive rights, respectively (UN OHCHR 2012).

The UN now categorizes these data-gathering pressure points, parameters and metadata in terms of structural indicators, process indicators and outcome indicators. Responding to feedback from governments and agencies making use of the indicators, the UN has also streamlined the subject matter. The list now consists of more basic
categories, called *indicator themes*. These are poverty, governance, health, education, demographics, natural hazards, atmosphere, land, oceans, seas and coasts, freshwater, biodiversity, economic development, global economic partnerships and consumption and production patterns. Note the increase in environmental categories. The most recent report explains the changes:

The division of indicators along the lines of four ‘pillars’ (social, economic, environmental and institutional) is no longer explicit in the newly revised set. This change emphasizes the multi-dimensional nature of sustainable development and reflects the importance of integrating its pillars. *Consequently, new cross-cutting themes such as poverty and natural hazards were introduced and existing cross-cutting themes such as consumption and production patterns are better represented.*

[UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2007:online; emphasis added]

Since poverty covers a broad range of issues, it was conceptually limiting to keep it as one sub-theme under equity. It is now a separate theme that includes sub-themes related to income, sanitation, drinking water, energy access and living conditions.

**Using the indicators.** Cooperating organizations have pledged to use these indicators in their capacity-building activities and offer feedback to enhance their usefulness. They are currently established by the Commission of Sustainable Development and, supported by two other datasets, the indicators of the Millennium Development Goals and the 2010 indicators on biodiversity, are considered the best indicators on sustainability and equity. Feedback from clients and the expert community goes into updates posted on the web site
of the UN Division of Sustainable Development. Other reputable organizations have joined the search for the best indicators. The UN’s Earthwatch program (UN System-Wide Earthwatch 2014) lists some of these on its web site.

Another initiative regarding indicators of peacebuilding, sustainable development and human rights comes from the move to integrate the best methods for monitoring the social, economic and cultural rights into the data gathering of the national human-rights institutions (NHRIs), of which there are about 70 worldwide. The Brooklyn-based Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) has been working on this for some time and has made important, integrative strides. CESR is committed to: (1) integrating the work of various social-justice advocates under one umbrella; (2) mobilizing communities in defense of their own rights as a constituency-based movement; (3) involving social scientists in applied research to document violations and propose remedies; (4) demanding legal, moral and political accountability from state and non-state decision makers; and (5) improving living conditions in keeping with basic human-rights principles (CESR 2013a). It generally presents an assessment of a country’s standing on social, economic and cultural rights to the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights prior to its visit to that nation.

In 2003, in conjunction with a number of human-rights and development organizations, CESR established the International Network for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR-Net), an information hub for people working on the full spectrum of human rights. It also sponsored a white paper on these issues that became an Oxfam publication on the rights-based approach to development. Offenheiser and Holcombe review this paper and discuss the challenges and opportunities of this approach. In sum,
they say that NGOs using such a model, which they support, will have to change their way of operating:

Pursuing a rights-based approach is an end to business as usual for international development nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs will need to move beyond supporting delivery of services to building the capacity of civil society to be an organized and effective balance to the power of governments and of the private sector. This transformation will have profound effects on the basic business plans, evaluation systems, and staff competencies of international development NGOs.

[2003:abstract]

In addition to their role in M and E programs and research, such indicators should be shared with as many national-level decision makers, change agents and opinion leaders as can be enlisted. This push for persuasion is based on the notion that national-level leaders often have the best command of the long view, as Lederach contends, but may lack the latest data on local conditions. This should include both humanistic information – narrative, interpretive meanings – and numerical information – geometric and proportional meanings. The CESR believes these two areas of human-rights discourse and policy, the procedural and substantive, have come from separate disciplinary lineages but are waiting for theorists and practitioners to help them mesh seamlessly and reinforce one another. CESR has published widely on bringing these two sets of rights together, morally, socially and conceptually. It advises using NHRIs more intensively in the development, application and revision of these monitoring tools (Corkery 2011).
With key indicators for sustainability, equity and human rights, we would then begin to explore the critical exchanges and relationships among manifold biospheric and human systems. We would use this to develop basic accounting (and accountability) systems with which to track and manage the development of all manner of very small to very large ecosystems. These should include human-made ecosystems.

For each of these, we would look for appropriate indicators of sustainability, equity and interdependence. We expect them to tell us reliably of socio-economic and socio-ecological health, especially where there is social, economic and geopolitical conflict and where human-rights abuses need to be better addressed (and peace better built). In particular we would want to look closely at urban-rural, North-South and global-local relationships to determine under what kinds of conditions human-rights violations, including those of the environment, are likely. We want to establish a warning system regarding human-rights and socio-ecological failure, in close connection. These often precede state failure, so this should be considered basic to the preventive aspects of peacebuilding. We propose that human-rights violations are more likely to occur during the breakdown of key capacity-building processes that support the fulfillment of a range of human needs, the interlinking of basic human needs and institutions required to meet them.

As a relative consensus is reached on key indicators for a given socio-ecological system, the focus shifts to promoting the implementation of policies that foster the building of the social and ecological capacity that can begin to meet a wide range of human needs. We also want to ask what roles and responsibilities the public sector should assume and which the private and NGO sectors should devote themselves to. This
objective is crucial. It opens the door to achieving cohesion and collaboration among the public and private communities that are the major players in environmental, economic or cultural policy. This means launching a dialog across scales that has yet to fully take place.

With these indicators as discussion points and with a data-driven, moderate tone, we would seek to throw open a multilateral public discussion about sustainability, social equity and human rights, about sustainable-equitable development. What have we, as a global society, learned about building social, economic and environmental capacity? What are the expectations across scales and the responsibilities of each to the other? What are the obligations of large-scale societies to smaller-scale societies and how do we meet them?

To try to answer these questions, we are looking for an empirical basis for support of the socio-economic, cultural and environmental human rights. By analyzing the data on support for various ecologies, human and natural, we would seek to interpret for the global public and its decision makers the rates and meaning of socio-environmental change. We want to use them to see where the bodies politic, economic and ecological are becoming unhealthy, and when and where environmental or human rights abuses are likely.

Land reform. Finally, central among issues needing urgent attention is land reform. It is a virtual “third rail” issue in public policy and this affects the social construction of civil strife and peacebuilding, but it must be addressed. It has been tried periodically in both countries over hundreds of years with limited results, though greater gains have been made in Peru. There, the Velasco regime began land redistribution in the late 1960s but it
was largely blunted by the late 1970s, when a right-wing military government
deposed a left-wing military government. Moreover, it has been seriously slowed since
the end of the 1990s and the return to civilian rule.

In Colombia, land reform has been always been part of the rebel discourse, but
beyond that has only been discussed abstractly during negotiations. Only lately has
President Santos agreed to land reform as part of peace negotiations with FARC. In
Colombia, with only partial results to show, the last serious attempt at land reform –
about 60,000 land titles given to small farmers and tenants in the 1970s and 1980s – was
turned back as drug mafias, paramilitaries, insurgents and wealthy landowners violently
uprooted small farmers and agrarian workers and recreated a more concentrated
ownership of land. A more recent move to redistribute land taken from drug gangs and
paras has not produced much actual transfer. In a paper for the FAO, World Bank experts
Gruschynski and Jaramillo discuss the conundrum regarding land reform in Colombian.
This serves for a number of countries with civil wars:

*On the one hand, it will be difficult to develop an inclusive and pro-poor rural
development strategy without facilitating land access to part of the landless
population. On the other, it is unlikely that the rural conflict can be resolved without
including a substantial land access programme…. [But] it is difficult to propose
decisive policy action for the short term while there is an ongoing complex war in
which two guerilla movements, paramilitaries and the military fight each other on
multiple fronts in the Colombian countryside. It is unfair to expect potential*
beneficiaries of land reform or productive projects to thrive while their basic security is under threat.

[2003:online; emphasis added]

In other words, it is very hard to build peace without land reform, and it is very hard to enact land reform in a war zone. They argue that the effort and expense of the land-reform process will only be supported if it is part of a holistic plan for peacebuilding, but, as we have noted, stopping the violence and making sure it does not recur has to happen first and consumes public resources, institutional energy and social engagement. Complicating things but in the proactive domain, entering the debate only recently, is a voice advocating that the land rights of the displaced be respected and in particular be better protected by modernizing survey, titling and administrative systems. It also could benefit from judicial reform. They advocate an end to incentives that favor large farms, including generous loans for machinery, easy credit for inputs and irrigation and production subsidies. These distort the market and disadvantage smaller family holdings. Because family workers are paid in kind, not in cash, small operations are generally more efficient economically. Large operations are apparently more efficient politically.

Food sovereignty. Land reform is critical because hunger and malnutrition are chronic problems in the rural parts of these countries and often lead to violent conflict. Over the past few decades, this has produced a movement for food sovereignty, not a new concept, but one with a new frame that links it to demands for human rights and helps it acquire its own status as a right: the right to productive land, enough to meet one’s needs. Food
sovereignty means not only self-sufficiency in food but title to and control over the land that can produce that food.

In this pursuit, the Transnational Institute, through the agrarian justice initiative of its Economic Justice Programme, has highlighted issues of food sovereignty on their website, at international conferences and symposia and in various white papers. (The Transnational Institute is part of the International Institute of Social Studies of The Hague, Netherlands.) It sponsored the second “Food Sovereignty Colloquium” on January 24, 2014. Their last such conference was “Food Sovereignty: a Critical Dialogue,” held September 14-15, 2013, at Yale University. Other organizers included Food First, Initiatives in Critical Agrarian Studies and the Journal of Peasant Studies.

Another organization is so basic to the food-sovereignty movement that it is considered a prime mover. Via Campesina is an international peasant and smallholders network. It has made its role and mission the staunch defense of their rights. On its website, it explains:

La Via Campesina is the international movement which brings together millions of peasants, small and medium-size farmers, landless people, women farmers, indigenous people, migrants and agricultural workers from around the world. It defends small-scale sustainable agriculture as a way to promote social justice and dignity. It strongly opposes corporate driven agriculture and transnational companies that are destroying people and nature.

[Via Campesina 2014:online]
It represents 150 local and national organizations in 70 countries and includes about 200 million farmers. An international NGO with a pluralist, intercultural base, it was born in 1993 and is by now considered a well-respected voice in global discussions of food and agriculture. It consults with organizations such as the FAO and the UN Human Rights Council, as well as with social movements at the local, national and international levels. Via Campesina has most recently called attention to assaults on the livelihoods of small farmers and peasants worldwide by celebrating 2014 with the FAO as the International Year of Family Farming (IYFF). The IYFF aims to raise the profile of family and smallholder farming by focusing on its pivotal role in combating hunger and poverty, in facilitating secure and adequate nutrition, in building local economies and incomes and in respecting the environment and pursuing sustainable development. It has not just engaged in cheerleading but has raised a critical voice as well – not as much to the FAO as to national governments that should take the declaration seriously and not bend to agribusiness internationally and large landowners nationally.

Via Campesina works to facilitate more sustainable and equitable agrarian policies. It says its goal to promote the central place of small and family farming in the agricultural, environmental and social agendas of nation-states and with nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations. The IYFF also wants to enhance the “relocalization” of agricultural production – more direct marketing and locally grown with less market manipulation – and highlight policies supporting food sovereignty as a way to enhance the social, economic and ecological sustainability of peasant agriculture.

Quantitative lessons about governments in transition. In *Pathways to Freedom: Political and Economic Lessons From Democratic Transitions* (Coleman and Lawson-
Remer 2013), in an essay on “Statistical Evidence,” Jan Teorell makes these observations about democratization based on quantitative analyses:

- A country’s level of economic development is not a driver of democratization, but it is a significant safeguard against backsliding into authoritarianism.
- In the short term, economic growth under autocracy impedes democratization. Conversely, economic crises tend to trigger democratic transitions.
- Nonviolent mass mobilization against autocratic regimes is a strong trigger of democratic regime change. Armed rebellion, by contrast, typically does not lead to democratization.
- Authoritarian regimes with partial political openness are the most likely to grow more democratic. It is worthwhile to promote elections in autocracies, even if flawed and fraudulent, as long as they permit some competition.
- The fate of new democracies does not appear to hinge on the choice of a presidential or parliamentary system.
- Overall, quantitative studies are fairly successful at predicting long-term changes in the level of democracy. Eruptive short-term change is less predictive.

[Teorell 2013:22]

Holistic lessons about governments in transition. Also in *Pathways to Freedom*, editors Coleman and Lawson-Remer (2013) distill some lessons from a number of case studies of civil violence over the last quarter century. They conclude that:
“New governments should move quickly to adopt policies aimed at materially improving the lives of the poor and the unemployed.” These need to be context-specific but address government spending and reduce across-the-board subsidies for necessities while offering targeted rebates on such items to the poorest in the population.

“Rule of law reforms that establish a fair and level playing field and prevent elites from bending the rules to serve their interests are crucial.” Two principles matter most here: working with local partners to bolster domestic pressure for reforms, and taking a bottom-up, capacity-building approach that secures rights for average citizens and protects judges, politicians and police so they can enforce the law.

“Transitioning countries should decentralize in ways that help deepen and sustain democratization efforts.” This should bring public services and state accountability closer to the grassroots.

“Conducting elections even under authoritarian governments is worthwhile.” These can raise expectations and lay the groundwork for greater democracy.

“Rather than arming insurgents or sponsoring coups d’etat, governments and international organizations interested in nurturing democracy should support civil society and independent media under authoritarian regimes through civic exchanges, capacity building and bottom-up technology transfer.”

“Given the importance of good neighbors, foreign governments and international and regional organizations must strive to compensate for bad ones.” This matters in particular with regard to the IMF, the World Bank and other bilateral assistance. They
should tie their aid to reforms that prevent elites from using the system to mostly serve their interests.

- “Outside states seeking to promote and reinfore democratization should pursue economic strategies – including trade, foreign aid, and investment policies – that spur the emergence of a middle class, rather than promote economic ties that increase overall growth and wealth but concentrate these gains in the hands of elites” (Coleman and Lawson-Remer 2013:227–232).

The UN System Staff College on indigenous peacebuilding. Lastly here, in the report from the UN workshop, “Indigenous Peoples and Peacebuilding: A Compilation of Best Practices,” sponsored by the UN System Staff College and the Office for the Promotion of Peace and Human Rights of the Catalan International Institute for Peace, the authors acknowledge that detailed, prescriptive answers for peacebuilding regarding indigenous peoples do not exist. They do, however, outline the following lessons learned (emphasis added to applications in this study):

- No magic formula nor unique model [exists];
- Choice of timing [of negotiations, initiatives and so on] is critical;
- [Cultivate] knowledge of different phases of the peace process: confidence building, dialog, negotiations, agreement, implementation;
- Address fundamental causes of conflict [such as land reform];
- Rely on domestic capacity [across levels];
- Improve communication [among disciplines, locales and levels];
For the international community [the lessons are]:

- Coherence of message;
- Avoiding paternalism [patron-client relations, including international ones];
- Analysis of situation [analytical fit to context: Burton’s human needs, Galtung’s social conflict, Frankfurt School’s critical theory];
- In-house capacity for political actions;
- Early action [as with a professionalization of human-rights work];
- Relying on regional organizations [for communication across scales].

[UN System Staff College and Catalan International Institute for Peace 2010:187]

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- The professionalization of human-rights work produces social and ethical tensions and brings with it social and ethical risks. Western norms for processing personal trauma as data, for interpreting narratives of mass violence, need to be examined. *They tend to individualize and thereby trivialize a collective experience. This then tends to atomize perceptions of resources and support, when the trauma needs to be understood collectively.* Such methods flatten the emotional-intellectual content, its nuance and detail, and substitute an incident-driven, non-contextual narrative. This does not adequately heal, reconcile or empower local people going forward. *A human-needs model can help determine how this bureaucratization of human rights limits the full analysis of human needs following mass violence and restricts treatment options.*
• Trauma counseling and conflict-resolution methods need to be administered with maximum sensitivity to the social, cultural and political environment. *Because they see value systems as products of cultures, psychological anthropologists can help build an ethic of interculturality here. In addition, belief systems are an integral part of this complex of behaviors.* They are continuous and contiguous with the mental-health issues. They should be interpreted interculturally and supported equally, without bias. As part of this, efforts in indigenous theology should be supported and coordinated across traditions.

• Various models of mass, pluralistic or civil violence are closely related. What the phenomenon consists of is critical. The terminology can be worked out later. They all tend to target the destruction of civic (legal-governmental) and civil (nonprofit-voluntary) institutions. Peacebuilding has to try to restore these. *Third-side efforts for peacebuilding, generally from civil society, are essential here.* National and international leaders need to understand this implicitly and develop resources accordingly. Leaders at the top level need to be lobbied effectively to ensure this new sector, this peacebuilding support system (the professionalization of human-rights, environment and development work), is itself supported. *Leaders at the middle level often are best positioned to do this.* Scholarship can assist this effort by focusing on both failure and success stories. *In addition, if there is an approach to peacebuilding that is characteristic of peasants, Indians and the urban poor, what is that and how can civil society assist it? (See parts IV and V.)*

• The third stage – the socio-economic phase – of peacebuilding contains virtually all of the matters of economic and ecological adaptation. It is just as critical as the first two (stability creation and restoration of institutions). We have confronted throughout
how human needs, like human rights, are political. To meet areas of basic human needs, as well as higher needs that involve autonomy, esteem and belonging (or dignity), and to honor the full set of human rights, development needs to be both socially and ecologically sustainable. Therefore, we should discuss “sustainable-equitable” development whenever the subject comes up. The good news is we have a burgeoning set of concepts, methods, models and metrics to help guide us. *These activities, from indicators and communities of peace to education for peace, to constitutional reform and bans on unauthorized development, to land reform and food sovereignty, represent a set of emergent properties in human rights.*

- Making development both sustainable and equitable is critical to a more peaceful future, but this is much easier said than done. It is a harder sell than sustainability alone. However, it can be justified in terms of systems theory, in terms of an imbalance of energy and resources, one which, not unlike natural disasters such as floods, tsunamis and earthquakes, bring about catastrophic forms of redress in the form of street or organized crime, disease, anarchy, rebellions or mass violence.

- Most critical of all is governmental, intergovernmental, NGO and corporate support for such development. Projects aimed at sustainable-equitable development will not only help stop the killings but displace many fewer people and do less damage to local and regional ecosystems. They also need to include education in a given indigenous culture, in particular its preferred way of managing land, wealth and technology. It should therefore include an enculturation in the values of the Other, as part of a general intercultural education. This has led to good results in education and development in the Andes, Central America, the American Southwest and elsewhere.
Groups that have bonded with violence, such as Shining Path and FARC, especially as they move deeply into drug trafficking, pose particular problems. Authentic citizen-defense groups, as with the rondas in Peru or the Nasa in Colombia, those who restrained their violence but still turned the tide of terror, may present a partial solution. They need to be well trained and well paid by a responsible military and not seduced into working for rogue elements for as much per month as most peasants see in a year (Tasini 2007). Lasting, deep social, cultural and economic development needs to occur to limit the guerillas’ appeal before they again gain broad support.

Truth and reconciliation commissions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for social healing and peacebuilding. They need to be part of a full complement of transitional justice, customary law and reconciliation and peacebuilding. Transitional justice has to provide options for the armed actors, or they will return to what they know. This is where sustainable-equitable development is indispensable. They not only need vocational training and options. They need to be monitored to ensure they do not regroup as security firms or join the drug traders. Law enforcement and the military have historically had a cozy relationship with the paras, so ways need to be devised to monitor their demobilization and ensure it is not a sham. Given the moral and practical complications of impunity, along with prosecution of key decision-makers and military leaders, reparations might be a way to broker some form of justice.

A clarion call for respect for human rights and rule of law would help as well, of course. An intensive campaign should be waged in major media. It should seek to demythologize both dirty war and armed rebellion. This is a virtually religious thing to do. If such campaigns were endorsed by the spiritual communities of Euro-American
Christendom and Native Latin America, they would probably carry more weight.

They should be aimed at the young.

- Once demilitarization has begun, state and citizen groups need to build support for robust small business, for civil society, for decision makers who won’t be bought and for stronger, corruption-resistant government in rural areas, especially the judiciary. This includes rebuilding the moral fabric of the courts and law enforcement, as well as school, health, agricultural and lending systems. Free-trade agreements need to include protection for small farmers, workers, small businesses, peasant unions, associations of indigenous peoples, the poor, the trades and the environment (Haugaard et al. 2005; Páez 2006; Tasini 2007). These would be well represented, or should be, in a comprehensive approach to support for all the human rights, for all.

- A number of civil-society voices have joined human rights, social justice, peace and development groups to challenge the historically legalistic (procedural) approach of the major human-rights organizations, and this has begun to change. In general, these voices have urged that support for procedural rights be tied to greater support for the social, economic and cultural (substantive) rights. The CESR approach we are highlighting here favors participatory development (Jochnick and Green 1998).

- In addition, in 2013, a manifesto of sorts was forged among 49 human-rights and social-justice groups worldwide. Organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam International and CARE joined CESR in one of the largest joint statements on all the human rights, for all, in perhaps half a century, “Human Rights for All Post-2015.” The statement places a great deal of emphasis on the social, economic and cultural rights as they provide support for observance of the civil and political rights,
those more obviously trampled on during massive social violence (CESR 2013b).

That statement appears in full in appendix 3.

- The Joint Statement on Human Rights for All Post-2015 and the CESR web site are good places to start when looking for reader-friendly statements on the urgent need to integrate the major UN human rights: civil, political, social, economic, cultural and environmental. If development can honor all these rights, there may be peace.

**Critical directions for future research**

- More detailed work on how indigenous people working in their traditions and progressive Christians have begun to promote and build peace, justice and development as equals, in ritual and reflection or action.

- More in-depth investigation of how “theory/theater of mind” relates to our understanding of empathy and its role in conflict resolution and third-side activity.

- More extensive work on how spirituality works, in various forms across cultures and subcultures, socially and psychologically, to keep individuals whole and communities together under the extreme stress of mass violence and its aftermath, especially during peacebuilding.

- More detailed examinations of the viability and effectiveness of some form of trauma counseling for victims of mass violence that is conducted in the victims’ own traditions with their own healing specialists. An equivalent look into what form of counseling and treatment would be most helpful, even critical, for human-rights workers in Latin America. Is there a cultural bias in this process – Western over
indigenous/peasant? Or subcultural – reconciliation over liberation? How does it affect peacebuilding going forward?

NOTES

1. UN agencies with a stake in various roles along the peacekeeping-to-peacebuilding continuum have lined up behind different but related core concepts. Many of the programs of the developed nations have also. Out of various roles and missions, they have developed different perspectives on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, but with a consistency that that should be noted. These agencies have the following models and definitions.

- *UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations* – peacekeeping: activities to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace, including activities to monitor and observe peace processes that emerge in postconflict situations and assist ex-combatants in implementing the peace agreements.

- *UN Development Programme* – conflict prevention and peacebuilding: activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundation of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations, something that is more than just the absence of war (along the lines of the Brahimi report).

- *U.S. Department of State* – postconflict reconstruction and stabilization: activities to help postconflict states lay a foundation for lasting peace, good governance and sustainable development.
• **UN Department of Political Affairs** – postconflict peacebuilding: all external efforts to assist countries and regions in their transitions from war to peace, including all activities and programs designed to support and strengthen these transitions.

• **U.S. Department of Defense** – reconstruction and stabilization: competencies identified for reconstruction include humanitarian assistance, public health, infrastructure, economic development, rule of law, civil administration, and media, whereas stability operations require sufficient security forces, communication skills, humanitarian capabilities and area expertise.

• **U.S. Agency for International Development** – postconflict recovery and transition assistance: immediate interventions to build momentum in support of the peace process, including supporting peace negotiations; building citizen security; promoting reconciliation; and expanding democratic political processes.

[Barnett et al.:38–40]

Regarding other peacebuilding models and definitions in developed nations, the relevant agencies in Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom use different terms with different emphases, but there is a great deal of common ground among them. For example, related to their role and mission, the UK defense department talks about *stabilization*, while NATO uses *peacebuilding*. In the UK, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department for International Development both emphasize *postconflict reconstruction*. The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs prefers *conflict prevention*, while the Canadian government generally calls its work for peace and

2. If the UN is incapable or unwilling to act when intervention is needed, then the human rights, social justice, peace and development communities need to mobilize to pressure governments, those implicated and those with diplomatic or financial relations with the offending states. Donor nations and intergovernmental organizations (beyond the UN) should have the most leverage here and should be targeted (World Bank, IMF, OAS, OHCHR and others). This points to another critical reason for an expanded, multi-lateral model of genocide: to prevent inaction based on any protracted debate over whether the situation constitutes genocide.

3. Consciousness: [1] the condition of being conscious; [2] the normal state of being awake and able to understand what is happening around you; a person's mind and thoughts; [3] *knowledge that is shared by a group of people* [the definition relevant here] (Merriam-Webster.com 2014b).

4. According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, three types of human-rights indicators and their characteristics are:

   (1) Structural indicators help in capturing the acceptance, intent and commitment of the State to undertake measures in keeping with its human rights obligations. Some common structural indicators are:
a) International human rights treaties…ratified by the State;
b) Time frame and coverage of national policy on vocational and technical education;
c) Date of entry into force and coverage of formal procedure governing the inspection of police cells, detention centres and prisons by independent inspection entities.

(2) Process indicators help in assessing a State’s efforts, through its implementation of policy measures and programmes of action, to transform its human rights commitments into the desired results. Some common process indicators are:

a) Indicators based on budget allocations;
b) Coverage of targeted population groups under public programmes;
c) Human rights complaints received and the proportion redressed;
d) Incentive and awareness measures extended by the duty bearer to address specific human rights issues; and
e) Indicators reflecting functioning of specific institutions (e.g., NHRI [national human rights institutions], legal system).

(3) Outcome indicators help in assessing the results of State efforts in furthering the enjoyment of human rights. Some common examples are:

a) Proportion of labour force participating in social security scheme(s);
b) Reported cases of miscarriage of justice and proportion of victims who received compensation within a reasonable time; and
c) Educational attainments (e.g., youth and adult literacy rates) by targeted population group.

[UN OHCHR 2012:34,36,38]
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APPENDIX 1

Summary of *The Third Side: Why We Fight and How We Can Stop*

[From: www.thirdside.org]

[William] Ury begins his introduction [to *The Third Side*] by saying, "No more important challenge faces us today than how to deal with our differences." He suggests that currently our differences are often resolved by fighting, which he defines as “attempts to resolve conflict through the use of coercive force.” He goes on to argue that this phenomenon is largely the result the widely held beliefs that “there is no other way” to resolve differences, or that conflict is human nature.

The first section responds to the assumption that “there is no other way” by providing an alternative to violence, which he calls “the third side.” According to Ury, the third side is "people from the community, using a certain kind of power – the power of peers, from a certain perspective – of common ground, supporting a certain process – of dialog and nonviolence, and aiming for a certain product – a “triple win.” He defines this “triple win” as “a resolution that satisfies the legitimate needs of the parties and at the same time meets the needs of the wider community.” For a more detailed description of the “third side,” see http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/Thirdsiders/ and www.thirdside.org.

Having provided an alternative to violence, in the second part of the book, Ury turns his attention to the assumed inevitability of violence. While many people believe that violence is in “human nature,” Ury argues that this assumption is an “origin myth” of contemporary Western society. He points to “simpler societies” such as the Bushmen and the Semai as examples of societies that do not assume the inevitability of violence and goes on to suggest that for 99 percent of human history violent coercion was probably not
the norm. Rather, he suggests that it is only in the most recent 1 percent of human history that war and violence have been accepted as “human nature.”

He attributes this shift to the economic shift from a resource base that is “expandable” in hunter-gatherer societies (wild foods) to one that is “fixed” in complex agriculturalist societies (land and power). As the resource base became “fixed,” the “basic logic of conflict” is thought to have shifted from “win-win” to “win-lose” [zero sum], where one person's gain is another person's loss. This shift in logic is thought to have encouraged violent coercion, but the resource base is again shifting to an expandable resource (information) and thus the “basic logic of conflict” can shift back to “win-win.” Thus, Ury views violent coercion not as inevitable, but as a socially constructed norm.

In the third part of this book, Ury addresses the question of “what can be done” to prevent violent conflict by identifying “three major opportunities to channel the conflict's vertical momentum, which leads to destructive struggle, into a horizontal impulse, which leads to constructive change.” The first of these opportunities is prevention. People can prevent conflicts from happening in the first place by addressing latent tensions. The second opportunity Ury identifies is resolution. When conflicts do arise, they can be resolved before they escalate. The final opportunity is containment. When escalating power struggles temporarily escape resolution, they can be contained to prevent violent expressions of frustration.

Within each of these “opportunities,” Ury identifies “practical roles” individuals can embody to help stop violent coercion. Within the prevention opportunity, one can be a provider, to help meet frustrated needs, a teacher, to address poor skills, and a bridge builder, to strengthen weak relationships. Within the resolution opportunity, one can be a
mediator to address conflicting interests, an arbitrator to address disputed rights, an
“equalizer” to address unequal power relationships, and/or a healer to nurture injured
relationships. Within the containment opportunity, one can be a witness to address a lack
of attention, a referee to address the lack of limitations or a peacekeeper to address a lack
of protections. For a more detailed account of these ten practical roles, see

In its three parts, The Third Side addresses common assumptions about violence and
concludes that there is an alternative to violence, violence is not inevitable and it can be
stopped. Ury's alternative to violent coercion is the “third side,” in which people with a
common perspective (of common ground) and unified process (of dialog and
nonviolence) seek a “triple win” (or a resolution which satisfies both the parties and the
society at large). In order to achieve this “triple win,” individuals can practice ten distinct
roles in their attempts to prevent, resolve or contain a conflict. Similar to other works
such as Diamond and McDonald's Multi-Track Diplomacy, Ury's Third Side
acknowledges that there are many roles to be played to prevent and/or resolve violent
conflicts. But Ury's book is especially important as it emphasizes the roles that everyone
– leaders and average people can play to help bring peace and stability to their lives and
their society.

[Reeder 2013:online]

***
Third Siders

Who are the third siders?

The third side is made up of both insiders, such as friends, family, and even the parties themselves, who are in turn actively supported by outsiders, such as neighbors, neutrals, and bystanders.

Prevention roles

The provider. Enabling people to meet their needs. Conflict usually arises in the first place from frustrated needs, like love and respect. Frustration leads people to bully others, to use violence, and to grab someone else's things. The most basic human needs include food (and other necessities for living), safety, identity, and freedom. If we as third siders can help people address one or more of these four needs we can avert destructive conflict. This is the role of the provider. Share resources, share knowledge; give others a sense of security; offer respect; and empower others.

Although a more thorough description of each of these activities is beyond the scope of this essay…more detail can be found

The teacher. Giving people skills to handle conflict. Sometimes people fight simply because they know no other way to react when a need is frustrated and a serious difference arises. By helping people learn new values, perspectives and skills, we as teachers can show them a better way to deal with differences. Delegitimize violence; teach tolerance; and teach joint problem-solving.
The bridge-builder. Forging relationships across lines of conflict. Good relationships are key to preventing conflict. Anyone can help build bridging relationships across natural divides. A relationship operates like savings in the bank; whenever an issue arises, the parties can dip into their account of goodwill to help deal with it. Often not a discrete activity, bridge-building takes place all around us, sometimes without us even perceiving it – at family meals, on school projects, in business transactions, and at neighborhood meetings. Create cross-cutting ties; develop joint projects; and foster genuine dialogue.

The mediator. Reconciling conflicting interests. At the core of conflict are often conflicting interests. As mediators, we can help reconcile the parties' interests. The mediator does not seek to determine who is right and who is wrong, but rather tries to get to the core of the dispute and help the parties resolve it. We may not think of it as mediation, but that is what we are doing whenever we listen attentively to people in dispute, when we ask them about what they really want, when we suggest possible approaches, and when we urge them to think hard about the costs of not reaching agreement. Everyone's a mediator; bring the parties to the table; facilitate communication; and help people search for a solution.

The arbiter. Determining disputed rights. Sometimes mediation is not enough to resolve a dispute or is not appropriate because basic rights are being violated. Whereas a mediator can only suggest a solution, an arbiter can decide what is right. The arbiter is a familiar role, embodied in the judge in the courtroom or the arbitrator in a work setting. More informally, the arbiter is the teacher deciding a dispute among two quarreling students, the parent ruling on a matter involving two children, or the manager
determining an issue among two employees. In this sense, we are all potential arbiters.

Replace destructive conflict; promote justice; and encourage negotiation.

**The equalizer.** Democratizing power. Every conflict takes place within the larger context of power. Imbalance of power often leads to abuse and injustice. The strong refuse to negotiate with the weak or to submit their dispute to mediation or arbitration – why should they, the strong think, when they can win? This is where the equalizer has a contribution to make. Each of us holds a packet of power, a measure of influence over the parties around us. Individually, our influence may be small, but collectively, it can be considerable. We are capable of empowering the weak and the unrepresented so that they can negotiate a fair and mutually satisfactory resolution. Help bring the powerful to the table; build collaborative democracy; and support nonviolent action.

**The healer.** Repairing injured relationships. At the core of many conflicts lie emotions – anger, fear, humiliation, hatred, insecurity, and grief. The wounds may run deep. Even if a conflict appears resolved after a process of mediation, adjudication, or voting, the wounds may remain and, with them, the danger that the conflict could recur. A conflict cannot be considered fully resolved until the injured relationships have begun to heal. The role of the healer is to assist in this process. Create the right climate; listen and acknowledge; encourage apology.

**The witness.** Paying attention to escalation. Destructive conflict does not just break out but escalates through different stages, from tension to overt conflict to violence. By watching carefully, the witness can detect warning signals, which, if acted on, can prevent escalation of conflict and even save lives. A witness can also speak up to persuade the parties to cease fighting and sound the alarm to call the attention of other
Third siders who can intervene as mediators, peacekeepers, or other witnesses. Watch out for early warning signals; go on patrol; speak out; and get help fast.

The referee. Setting limits to fighting. Some fighting can be salutary. Fighting can serve the function of clearing the air and bringing suppressed problems into sharp focus. If and when people do fight, it is important to reduce the harm. That is the role of the referee, who sets limits on fighting. Parents know this role well: "Pillows are OK, but fists are not." "No blows above the neck or below the belt." As referees, we can change the way people fight, replacing destructive weapons and methods with substantially less destructive ones. Establish rules for fair fighting; remove offensive arms; strengthen defenses – non-offensively.

The peacekeeper. Providing protection. When the rules are broken and the limits on fighting exceeded, the community needs to employ the minimally forceful measures necessary to stop harmful conflict in its tracks. The role of peacekeepers need not be limited to specialists like the police and U.N. peacekeepers, it is a community function that anyone may be called upon to play. When two children fight, adults can step in the middle and, if necessary, physically pull the two apart. The best peacekeepers never fight. They never fight because they don't need to. They accomplish their ends by intervening early and using persuasion. Interpose between parties; enforce the peace; and preempt violence before it starts.

[Ury 2003:online]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Narrow or traditional (With stated intent, government directly murders its own citizens, who are a racial, ethnic or religious group.)</th>
<th>Broader or expanded (Mediated – actions determine intent; perpetrators can be other than the state and victims other than the groups in the previous column.)</th>
<th>Mass, civil or pluralistic violence (Multi-sector, multi-lateral, involves the state and the rest of society.)</th>
<th>Types or other properties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drost (1959)</td>
<td>Physical annihilation only</td>
<td>Membership in any collectivity (not only religion, ethnicity or nation)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Types: substitution, devastation or elimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savon (1972)</td>
<td>Genocide of elimination</td>
<td>Traditional definition valid as policy, but not useful to social science</td>
<td>Genocides of substitution and devastation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dadrian (1975)</td>
<td>Successful attempt by dominant group with authority and/or access to resources of power to reduce by coercion or lethal violence minority group (emphasis on traditional definition)</td>
<td>Successful attempt by dominant group with authority and/or access to resources of power to reduce by coercion or lethal violence minority group</td>
<td>Cultural and latent genocides</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuper (1981)</td>
<td>Accepts UN definition because international consensus may make it the most viable for intervention (not borne out in history).</td>
<td>Still critiques UN Convention, including the lack of a political component he says brought it about (see below). Calls extermination of political groups related atrocities.</td>
<td>Since 1900, genocides usually occur in states that are multiethnic or pluralistic; these are especially vulnerable to mass violence during colonization or decolonization. Argues for genocidal process.</td>
<td>Types: Genocides are designed to settle racial, ethnic or religious differences; to terrorize a people conquered by a colonizing empire or nation; or to enforce a political ideology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 2. MODELS OF GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE

Author, model and properties (from Chalk and Jonnasohn, 1990, and others after 1990).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Narrow or traditional</th>
<th>Broader or expanded</th>
<th>Mass, civil or pluralistic violence</th>
<th>Types or other properties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuper revised (1985)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Victims can be political groups.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Types: against indigenous peoples; against hostage groups; after decolonizing a two-tier empire; in struggles by ethnic, racial or religious groups for power, secession, autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horowitz (1984)</td>
<td>Systematic destruction of a people by state bureaucratic apparatus</td>
<td>Admits model doesn’t explain genocide taking place across national boundaries. Victims are any innocent people.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Types: developmental – to intentionally or unintentionally destroy peoples in the way of economic exploitation; despotic – to eliminate real or potential opposition; retributive – to destroy a real or potential opponent; or ideological – against groups cast as enemies by dominant state myth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fein (1984)</td>
<td>Murder of a segment or all of a group defined outside the universe of obligation of the perpetrator by a government (emphasis on traditional definition)</td>
<td>Murder of a segment or all of a group defined outside the universe of obligation of the perpetrator by elite or crowd representing the perpetrator (emphasis on expanded definition)</td>
<td>Political groups subject to mass killings are called ideological slaughters. Does not explicitly exclude soldiers killing soldiers or civilians residing in enemy territory during wartime.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Narrow or traditional</td>
<td>Broader or expanded</td>
<td>Mass, civil or pluralistic violence</td>
<td>Types or other properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fein revised (1990)</td>
<td>Purposeful actions designed to destroy a collectivity through mass or selective murders of group members and suppressing the biological and social reproduction of the collectivity</td>
<td>Perpetrator may represent the state or another collectivity (can be states, groups or individuals). Eliminates one-sided killing to include victims rebelling against unjust govt. or situation; allows for bilateral genocidal killings as in civil war.</td>
<td>Re-crafted to include social and political groups and exclude victims of war.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauer (1984): genocide</td>
<td>Genocide consists of planned destruction of an ethnic, racial or national group. Includes biological decimation through kidnap of children or prevention of family life with the same objective as above. (Compare to holocaust below.)</td>
<td>Selective mass murder of elites or other parts of the population; the elimination of national culture and religious life (cultural genocide); enslavement with same intent; destruction of the national economic life with same intent</td>
<td>See previous column.</td>
<td>Includes policies of European settlers toward many native American tribes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legters (1984)</td>
<td>Restricted to direct attacks on identifiable populations such as religious, national or ethnic groups. Excludes political groups and non-lethal attempts to decimate the group, such as deportation or cultural genocide</td>
<td></td>
<td>Includes victims based on socioeconomic class (but not politics).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## MODELS OF GENOCIDE (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Narrow or traditional</th>
<th>Broader or expanded</th>
<th>Mass, civil or pluralistic violence</th>
<th>Types or other properties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Melson</td>
<td>First three types in last column (column 5) largely conform to the traditional definition or model</td>
<td>A process in which a settler regime confronts a less technologically advanced people</td>
<td>Types: against a communal minority tolerated but not at all equal; against a minority struggling for socio-economic progress, then resented by dominant culture; against a group identified with enemies of the state; or where majority culture undergoes economic or military disasters.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– cited in Chalk and Jonnasohn as 1986 but not listed in bibliography; see Melson, 1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith (1987)</td>
<td>No definition listed. One feature is that all his types are based largely on intent (however, they do include key mediated genocides).</td>
<td>Utilitarian and developmental (see column 5) are closely related mediated genocides. Institutional is also a mediated genocide.</td>
<td>Types: retributive – based on revenge; institutional – alongside conquest; utilitarian – based on material gain, common in the colonial period; developmental – has most affected indigenous peoples; or ideological – to impose an idea of salvation or purity on a society.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalk and Jonnasohn (1990)</td>
<td>One-sided mass killing in which a state or authority intends to destroy a group. “Other authority” was included to allow for occasions where a local authority becomes the perpetrator.</td>
<td>Group membership is defined by the perpetrator. Cases from broader models are instructive. These are called genocidal massacres and mostly combine genocide and ethnocide.</td>
<td>Types: eliminate a threat [politicide]; to spread terror among real or potential enemies [politicide]; to acquire wealth [developmental]; or to implement a theory, belief or ideology [ideological].</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## MODELS OF GENOCIDE (cont.)

### Author, model and properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scheper-Hughes (2002)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Argues for a continuum of genocide. Small wars and invisible genocides deserve consideration. Classic example of latter is street urchins and trash scavengers disappearing in “social cleansing.”</td>
<td>See previous column.</td>
<td>Includes in particular episodic massacres, disappearances, land grabs and displacement, disease or overwork that debilitates or kills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowen (2002)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Definition of genocide is a social and cultural construction. The most stable category is the relationship of powerful to powerless. It can involve the abuse of economic or political power, often both.</td>
<td>Genocide and political killings are in the same category. The more reductive the category, the more it reifies ethnicity and ignores its cultural construction, and the more it suffers from a deficient political explanation.</td>
<td>Definitions of genocide are tied to the past but do their work in relation to the future. They bring restrictions binding them to events that created them. New interpretations are required to meet the challenges of each generation. These can “stretch” the category.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totten, Parsons, Hitchcock (2002)</td>
<td>UN Convention is highlighted but authors refer to it as a “compromise definition” due to UN politics of the time.</td>
<td>They do explore broader models. Also note criticism of excluding political groups and lack of distinction of types in UN Convention. This model seeks common ground.</td>
<td>UN Convention’s mental harm category opens door to ethnocide. Noteworthy is that a dissenting member of the UN work group felt excluding cultural genocide would leave minorities unprotected.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Narrow or traditional</td>
<td>Broader or expanded</td>
<td>Mass, civil, pluralistic violence</td>
<td>Types or other properties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barkan (2003)</td>
<td>Non-deterministic. Diversity of models, not parameters that exclude possibilities; not measured against universal yardstick. Genocide is a family name for a range of crimes committed in the pursuit of social, political, economic or ideological dominance.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The terms ethnocide or ethnic cleansing diminish the dignity and suffering of the victims. UN Convention is broad enough to include these and not dodge its international duties (to intervene).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell (2009)</td>
<td>Genocide as social control based largely on social and cultural distance. Likelihood increases with increase in immobility (of target peoples); cultural distance; relational distance; functional independence (of dominant and minority groups); and inequality.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Types: A social deviance that can be both predatory (exploiting land or resources) and moralistic (retribution for alleged grievance or failing, often called retributive by others). Both affect peasants and indigenous peoples disproportionately.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Short (2010)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prevailing notions confining genocide to direct mass killing are not what Lemkin had in mind, don’t recognize social and cultural “death.” Especially relevant to lethal or debilitating persecution of peasants or Indians. Intent is a consistent pattern of action.</td>
<td>UN Convention is inadequate, excludes those killed for advocacy of social justice or self defense. Perpetrators can have multiple reasons for genocidal actions. Cites Shaw’s (2007) work to show Lemkin was at pains to include cultural genocide.</td>
<td>Model excludes single massacres and includes all collectivities. Doesn’t depend on perpetrator’s actions being authorized by the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerlach (2010)</td>
<td>A holistic complex that is multi-variable and multi-sector, one that works across ethnicity and class, as well as social position and political affiliation. Includes genocide, genocidal massacres and everything in last column (column 5).</td>
<td>Emphasizes process over products, relationships over entities and multiple or cybernetic causation over linear drivers and fixed boundaries. Includes public participation, the state and the rest of society.</td>
<td>Includes related social disasters such as forced displacement, disappearances, rape, famine, torture, bonded labor and unjust imprisonment.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ramirez (2010)</td>
<td>Multiple armed actors function as an alternative social order, in which militias sublet genocidal activities from the state. They both cooperate and compete with the state in a pluralistic violence.</td>
<td>Violent pluralism often takes place in an authoritarian oligarchy that can masquerade as a non-authoritarian state. It is a genocidal pseudo-democracy.</td>
<td>States of emergency seem to affirm state dominance but actually allow a greater role for (sublet) death squads. Implies that Rummel’s (1995) assertion that genocides don’t occur in democracies should be amended to include this kind of violence.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
A new joint statement, endorsed by 49 leading human rights and development organizations, calls for human rights to be placed at the core of the new development agenda.

10 May 2013: Human rights have surged to the forefront of the debate about what will succeed the Millennium Development Goals in 2015. As human rights and social justice organizations worldwide, we feel compelled to lay out some of the baseline implications of embedding human rights into the core of the sustainable development agenda this time around. [CESR, 2013b]

At its essence, a post-2015 framework anchored in human rights moves from a model of charity to one of justice, based on the inherent dignity of people as human rights-holders, domestic governments as primary duty-bearers, and all development actors sharing common but differentiated responsibilities. Accordingly, the post-2015 framework should be designed as a tool to empower and enable people—individually and collectively—to monitor and hold their governments, other governments, businesses, international institutions and other development actors to account for their conduct as it affects people’s lives within and beyond borders. A sustainable development framework founded in human rights can serve as an instrument for people and countries to help unseat the structural obstacles to sustainable, inclusive and just development, and
stimulate implementation and enforcement of all human rights—civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, the right to development and to environmental protection.

The post-2015 framework must then at the very least respect and reflect pre-existing human rights legal norms, standards and political commitments to which governments have already voluntarily agreed. International human rights, environmental and humanitarian law, the Millennium Declaration, as well as related international consensus documents agreed in Rio, Vienna, Cairo, Beijing, Monterrey and Copenhagen and their follow-up agreements must form its non-negotiable normative base.

If it is going to incentivize progress while also preventing backsliding and violations, human rights principles and standards must go beyond the rhetorical, and have real operational significance this time around. Amongst other things, anchoring the post-2015 agenda in human rights for current and future generations implies that the framework.

1. Upholds all human rights for all. The framework should stimulate improved human rights process and outcomes for all people, especially the most vulnerable, in all countries global North and global South. Along with economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, any successor framework must include commitments to protect freedom of association, expression, assembly and political participation if it is to ensure an enabling environment for an empowered civil society, and protect human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders, as central agents translating international political commitments into lived realities.
2. **Stimulates transparency and genuine participation in decision-making at all levels**, throughout all policies including budget, financial, and tax policies. Access to information and consequential participation is not only a fundamental human right, but will also be critical to developing, implementing, and monitoring an effective and responsive post-2015 framework.

3. **Integrates meaningful institutions and systems to ensure human rights accountability of all development actors.** Lofty aspirations for a post-2015 agenda will surely fail if proper *citizen-led systems of monitoring and human rights accountability* are not built into the very DNA of the framework, with clear and time-bound commitments of all relevant actors. While states must remain the primary duty-holder in development, all development actors, including third-party states, the private sector and international institutions should be made responsive and accountable for achieving and not undermining global goals. Integrating substantive human rights criteria into assessments of progress towards development goals and commitments means *monitoring both the policy and budgetary efforts of governments alongside development outcomes*. Any post-2015 monitoring mechanism would benefit from *constructive interaction with the existing human rights protection regime*, as well as other relevant accountability mechanisms. National mechanisms, such as judiciaries, parliaments, national human rights institutions, reinforced by regional and international human rights mechanisms such as the treaty bodies and the Universal Peer Review mechanism, can help ensure the implementation of the post-2015 commitments. Likewise, the post-2015 development agenda is well-placed to encourage governments to improve access to justice for people living currently in poverty by monitoring measures to eradicate existing barriers.
4. Ensures that the private sector, at the very least, does no harm. The post-2015 framework must reflect current international consensus that governments have a duty to protect human rights through the proper oversight and regulation of private actors, especially business and private financial actors to guarantee in practice that they respect human rights and the environment, including in their cross-border activities. At the very least, no governments should allow their territory to be used for illegal or criminal activities elsewhere, such as tax evasion, environmental crimes or involvement in human rights violations, no matter the perpetrator.

5. Eliminates all forms of discrimination and diminishes inequalities, including socioeconomic inequalities as a priority. To start, the timely collection and disaggregation of data on the basis of various grounds of compound discrimination is essential to identify, make visible and respond to inequalities and violations of human rights and to increase accountability. At a national level, data should be collected and disaggregated based on country-relevant factors as defined by rights-holders. Governments have a particular obligation under human rights law to protect the rights of the most marginalized and excluded and to take additional measures to ensure that they enjoy their rights on an equal basis with others. Protecting decent work, and diminishing wage disparities is also fundamental to reducing socio-economic inequality, as is reforming tax policy nationally and globally to unleash the resources necessary to finance human rights fulfillment.

6. Specifically and comprehensively supports women's rights. Addressing gender-based violence, guaranteeing sexual and reproductive rights, ensuring women’s rights to and control over land, property and productive resources and their economic
independence, recognizing the care economy and ensuring women’s rights to social protection and the equal distribution of paid and unpaid work, and their rights to participation in decision-making are critical, not only to realize women's human rights and achieve gender equality, but for enabling women’s full and active participation in economic, political and social life.

7. **Enable the currently disadvantaged and commonly discriminated against and excluded groups to be effective agents of their own development** by drawing on the provisions of human rights standards aimed at eliminating discrimination on grounds such as race, disability, migrant or indigenous status, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, etc.

8. Upholds the legal obligation to fulfill the minimum essential levels of economic, social, and cultural rights, without retrogression, which would imply a focus on “getting to zero” through the provision of social protection floors, universal health coverage, food security, and other floors below which no one anywhere will be allowed to live.

9. **Tackles structural drivers of inequality, poverty and ecological devastation at the global level.** A genuine and balanced global partnership then would enable people and institutions to monitor the common but differentiated responsibilities of all actors to prohibit rather than perpetuate these global obstacles. To be good-faith partners then, governments, business and international institutions must *assess the impact of their policies* (e.g. corporate accountability, environment, trade, aid, tax, migration, intellectual property, debt, monetary, financial regulation) *on human rights outside of their borders*. Existing human rights norms can provide a common set of standards and useful yardstick to assess policy coherence for sustainable development.
At a time of great uncertainty, multiple crises and increasing insecurity and conflict, let us not found the 21st century sustainable development framework on “bracketed rights” and broken promises, but instead on a bold reaffirmation of human rights for all.

[CESR, 2013b; original boldface converted to italics]

* * *

Signatories so far include:

1. Adventist Development and Relief Agency
2. Amnesty International
3. Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND)
4. Article 19 (Global Campaign for Free Expression)
5. Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID)
6. Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR)
7. Center for Women’s Global Leadership at Rutgers University (CWGL)
8. Center of Concern
9. Centre for Research and Advocacy, India
10. Centre For 21st Century Issues (C21st), Nigeria
11. Climate Change & Development NGO Alliance
12. Defensores PROCDN
13. Ecological Society of the Philippines
14. Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR)
15. Equilibres & Populations (EquiPop), France
16. European NGOs for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, Population and Development (EuroNGOs)
17. FemLINKPACIFIC
18. FIAN International
19. Finnish NGDO Platform to The EU Kehys
20. Forum for Women and Development (FOKU.S.), Norway
21. Gender at Work (G@W)
22. Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
23. Hope for the Needy
24. Human Rights Watch
25. International Centre of Comparative Environmental Law (CIDCE)
26. International Presentation Association of the Sisters of the Presentation
27. International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)
28. International Women's Health Coalition (IWHC)
29. Ipas
30. Kenya Debt Relief Network (KENDREN)
31. Kepa, Finland
32. KULU-Women and Development, Denmark
33. Latin-American Campaign for the Right to Education (CLADE)
34. National Fisheries Solidarity Movement, Nepal
35. National Indigenous Women Federation (NIWF), Nepal
36. Oxfam
37. Plataforma Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo (PIDHDD)
38. Population Matters
39. Realizing Sexual and Reproductive Justice (RESURJ)
40. Red Latinoamericana de Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir
41. Sedane Labour Resource Center (LIPS), Indonesia
42. Slow Food Tanganyika
43. Social Watch
44. Soroptimist International
45. Southern Africa Human Rights NGO Network (SAHRINGON), Tanzania Chapter
46. Terre des hommes Germany (tdh)
47. WASH United, Germany
48. WITNESS
49. Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF/FeDDAF-WASRO/BSRAO)

[CESR, 2013b; U.S. Human Rights Network, 2013]