March 2008

Using confirmatory factor analysis to understand executive control in preschool children: I. Latent Structure

Sandra A. Wiebe
University of Nebraska Lincoln, sandra.wiebe@ualberta.ca

Kimberly A. Espy
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, kespy2@unl.edu

David Charak
Southern Illinois University Carbondale

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/dcnlfacpub

Part of the Neurosciences Commons

https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/dcnlfacpub/38

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory - Faculty and Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Using confirmatory factor analysis to understand executive control in preschool children:

I. Latent structure

Sandra A. Wiebe & Kimberly Andrews Espy
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

David Charak
Southern Illinois University Carbondale

This research was supported by NIH grants R01 MH065668, R01 DA014661, R01 HD050309, and 5P01 HD038051. We thank Megan Banet, Mary Cwik, Heather Kaiser, Jessica Martin, and other members of the Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory for assistance with data collection, and the children and families who participated in this study. Portions of these data were presented at the meetings of the International Neuropsychological Society, St. Louis, 2005, and the Cognitive Development Society, San Diego, 2005.

Address correspondence to Sandra A. Wiebe, Department of Psychology, Room 102, 501 Building, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588-0206; fax 402-472-1707; electronic mail swiebe2@unl.edu.

(c) 2008 American Psychological Association

Manuscript published in Developmental Psychology, Vol. 44, 575-587

http://www.apa.org/journals/dev/

This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record.
Abstract

Although many tasks have been developed recently to study executive control in the preschool years, the constructs that underlie performance on these tasks are poorly understood. In particular, it is unclear whether executive control is comprised of multiple, separable cognitive abilities (e.g., inhibition and working memory) or whether it is unitary in nature. A sample of 243 normally developing children between 2.25 and 6 years of age completed a battery of age-appropriate executive control tasks. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to compare multiple models of executive control empirically. A single-factor, general model was sufficient to account for the data. Furthermore, the fit of the unitary model was invariant across subgroups of children divided by socioeconomic status or sex. Girls displayed a higher level of latent executive control than boys, and children of higher and lower SES did not differ in level. In typically-developing preschool children, tasks conceptualized as indices of working memory and inhibitory control in fact measured a single cognitive ability, despite surface differences between task characteristics.

Keywords: executive control, inhibition, working memory, preschool, confirmatory factor analysis
Using confirmatory factor analysis to understand executive control in preschool children:

I. Latent structure

Executive control is a term used to refer broadly to those cognitive abilities that are associated with, or subserved by, prefrontal cortex and interconnected subcortical system (Diamond, 2001; Stuss, 1992). Although research on executive control has been underway for several decades, remarkably there remains no well-agreed-upon definition as yet. One school of thought has conceptualized executive control as a group of relatively independent, or fractionated, cognitive abilities, typically including working memory, the ability to keep information in mind to guide ongoing or later behavior (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974); inhibitory control, the ability to keep irrelevant or misleading information from interfering with performance (Diamond, 1990; Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1993); and set-shifting, or adapting strategies to changing situational demands (Zelazo, Frye, & Rapus, 1996). In contrast, others have argued that executive control is a unitary, domain general construct that manifests in different ways depending on contextual demands (e.g., Duncan & Miller, 2002; Duncan & Owen, 2000).

Prefrontal systems undergo a protracted course of development (Benes, 2001). In comparison with posterior cortical areas, the phases of prefrontal cortical development, including neuronal generation, differentiation, and synaptic pruning, occur later and over a longer period of time (Giedd et al., 1999; Huttenlocher, 1990). Myelination of fibers within prefrontal cortex is not complete until early adulthood (Paus et al., 2001). Executive control undergoes a similarly delayed developmental trajectory where, for example, performance on “classic” executive tasks like the Tower of Hanoi or Stroop tasks improves through late childhood and adolescence (Welsh, Pennington, & Groisser, 1991). The preschool years are a particularly important phase in
the development of these skills (Espy, 2004). It is in this period that children make the transition from infancy to childhood, and are increasingly expected to exhibit greater control of their behavior in everyday life and to modulate behavior appropriately in contexts outside the home to achieve a goal, for example, to learn new information in school. Children’s developing ability to regulate their behavior depends not only on executive control, but also on the related processes of emotion regulation and effortful control (Kochanska, Murray, & Harlan, 2000). However, the focus of the present investigation is limited to executive control of cognition, which guided our review of the literature and the selection of tasks included in this study.

Until recently, few measures of executive control were available for use in preschool children. Adult measures have strong verbal demands either in testing format or in instructions, so that preschoolers typically are unable to complete the tasks or exhibit floor levels of performance. There now is an established literature and a broad repertoire of executive tasks appropriate for preschool children (e.g., Carlson, 2005; Diamond, Prevor, Callender, & Druin, 1997; Espy, Kaufmann, McDiarmid, & Glisky, 1999; Hughes, 1998). Nevertheless, disagreement remains regarding what exactly executive control entails. In the adult literature, a useful approach to addressing this problem has been to better characterize the interrelations among measures of executive control and thereby identify the organization of the underlying cognitive constructs of interest (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000).

Factor Analysis and the Structure of Executive Control

Factor analysis can be used to identify the latent structure underlying observed cognitive task performance (Gorsuch, 1983). Factor analysis capitalizes on true score variance and allows one to address the question of whether performance on different tasks can be summarized or represented by one, or several, latent common factors. Furthermore, by examining patterns of
factor loadings, the relations between the measured variables and the identified latent factors, it is possible to draw inferences regarding the interpretation of the identified factors and the shared cognitive abilities presumed to underlie relations among task performances. A table reviewing results from factor analytic studies on executive control is available as supplementary material.

To date, many studies have used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) or principal components analysis (PCA) to examine the structure of executive control. Generally, these studies have identified more than one factor or component explaining variability in executive control task performance in samples of adults (Lamar, Zonderman, & Reznick, 2002; Robbins et al., 1998) and of children (Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-Nuuttila, 2001; Welsh, Pennington, & Groisser, 1991). A fractionated executive structure also is supported by other findings. For example, the reported correlations between different measures of executive control tend to be low and often fail to reach significance (Robbins, 1998). Focal lesions to different parts of the frontal lobes result in differential, discrete performance deficits (e.g., Stuss & Levine, 2002).

However, because both PCA and EFA are exploratory techniques used to represent the observed data and do not include formal \textit{a priori} hypothesis testing, the conclusions that can be drawn from these methods are limited. The degree of independence of the factors identified in some of these studies also is questionable. Many early exploratory studies used Varimax rotation, which solves for the best-fitting orthogonal, or uncorrelated, solution. Gorsuch (1997) has argued that this approach is biased to identify factors that are sample-specific and difficult to replicate. He recommends the use of oblique rotations that allow for correlated factors but nevertheless yield independent factors if they better fit the data. In studies where correlated factors have been allowed, substantial inter-factor correlations ($r_s = 0.30 - 0.70$) have been observed (e.g., Boone et al., 1998; Brookshire et al., 2004; Lehto et al., 2003; but see Brocki &
Bohlin, 2004, for an exception.

Further, differences in the executive tasks administered influence the larger conclusions drawn from factor analytic studies. Because executive control entails the regulation of other cognitive skills to achieve a goal or end-state, executive control tasks also require non-executive cognitive skills (Kane & Engle, 2002). Not surprisingly then, executive control task performance can be influenced by non-executive task demands (Lamar, Zonderman, and Reznick, 2002), which may affect factor analysis results. In some studies, multiple dependent measures from a single task were included in the factor analysis (e.g., Boone et al., 1998; Espy et al., 1999; Pineda & Merchan, 2003). To the extent that these measures are correlated due to shared method variance, they will load together on the same factor. This potentially spurious common loading can skew relations from dependent measures from other tasks and make it difficult to interpret the best-fitting solution. To prevent this problem, the inclusion of only one indicator variable per task is preferred (Gorsuch, 1983). In sum, the outcome of any exploratory factor analysis will be influenced by any source of common variability, including non-executive demands, not just the cognitive construct of interest.

Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), a latent variable approach, addresses these limitations, and provides a method by which to compare the utility of various structures. Importantly, CFA includes multiple indices of fit, which can be used to evaluate different models, and thereby empirically test models previously developed through EFA conducted on data from other samples (e.g., Strauss, Thompson, Adams, Redline, & Burant, 2000). Furthermore, using CFA to model the cognitive constructs thought to underlie performance on different tasks allows one to extract a more “purified” latent variable (Miyake et al., 2000), because different sources of performance variability can be modeled on an a priori basis,
utilizing what is known about task demands. In CFA, the tasks that are expected to share
common executive demands, and thus to load on a common factor, are specified before the
model is run. CFA also can be used to assess whether the same latent structure fits equally well
to data for subsamples that differ on key characteristics, such as sex (Kim, Brody, & Murry,
2003). A series of studies by Miyake and colleagues demonstrate successful application of this
selected simple tasks to index inhibition, working memory updating, and set shifting. CFA
results supported a 3-factor model, although correlations between the three factors were
substantial ($r_s > .40$). Models with fewer factors fit the obtained data significantly more poorly.

Unfortunately, there is a paucity of factor analytic studies addressing the organization of
executive control in children in the preschool years. Several studies of executive control
development have included samples of preschoolers, but because many tasks could not be
administered to these young children, their data were used for cross-age comparison but
excluded from factor analyses (Klenberg et al., 2001; Welsh et al., 1991). To our knowledge,
only one study has explored the structure of executive control in preschool children (Espy et al.,
1999), although Murray and Kochanska (2000) included PCA in their study of early self-
regulation, a closely related construct that encompasses socio-emotional dimensions in addition
to executive control. Similar to reported findings in adults and older children, the best-fitting
model of executive control in the preschool period included multiple factors (Espy et al., 1999).
Confirmatory factor analysis has been applied even less frequently in child samples. Two notable
exceptions used CFA to compare models originally derived from EFA, with other models
including fewer factors (Brookshire et al., 2004; Lehto et al., 2003). Interestingly, the model
confirmed by Lehto et al. was structurally similar to the 3-factor model favored by Miyake et al.
Unfortunately, however, both the CFA and EFA models were conducted using the same dataset, which unfortunately compromises the obtained evidence of validation of the observed latent structure. No study to date has used CFA to assess the structure of executive control in children under the age of 6 years—the goal of the present investigation. Previous successes in using exploratory methods with this age group indicate that it should be possible to apply CFA to preschool data. To construct a series of testable models, the literature on current theories of executive control was examined and then used to select multiple age-appropriate tasks to index each hypothetical latent variable. Our approach was modeled after that of Miyake and his colleagues (Friedman & Miyake, 2001; Miyake et al., 2000, 2001).

Models of Executive Control

The primary task of an adequate model of preschool executive control is to define the processes that enable successful, goal-directed behavior in young children. Working memory and inhibition are central to executive control (Miyake et al., 2000, Zacks & Hasher, 1994). Diamond and her colleagues have argued that working memory and inhibition together play a critical role in the ability to overcome “attentional inertia,” that is, focusing on the same, previously-relevant aspects of a stimulus even when contextual demands change (Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003). The first model tested in the present study was a two-factor model including factors of Inhibition and Working Memory, with at least three tasks specified to load on each latent factor (see Figure 1). Another candidate executive control process is the ability to flexibly switch between modes of responding as environmental or task demands change (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). Unfortunately, it was not possible to consider a separate Shifting construct, because at the time of study design there were very few preschool tasks available in the literature. The foremost task, the Dimensional Change Card Sort (Zelazo, Frye, & Rapus, 1996), is not suitably
scaled psychometrically for the purposes of CFA. Thus, the present investigation focused on the putative distinction between inhibition and working memory.

Some investigators have parsed the inhibition construct into unique sub-processes. For example, Nigg (2000) distinguished inhibitory control over cognitive processes from inhibitory control over motor responses. In contrast, Friedman and Miyake (2004) found differences between tasks where interference resulted from conflicting information present in the environment within a given trial (i.e., distractor interference) and tasks where interference built up over successive trials (i.e., proactive interference). The second and third models tested, then, grouped the inhibition tasks on the basis of inhibition type (motor vs. cognitive inhibition), and source of interference (distractor interference vs. proactive interference).

There is an ongoing debate as to whether activation-only models can explain findings that others have argued require both inhibition and activation (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Munakata, Morton, & Yerys, 2003). These ideas are consistent with Duncan and Owen’s (2000) review of the neuroimaging literature, in which they identified a single network of frontal brain structures that were recruited consistently on tasks previously argued to differ in cognitive demands (working memory span, delay, response conflict, task novelty). Our fourth model included a single executive control factor, where all tasks in the battery loaded on a single factor.

Another, less interesting possibility is that variance in children’s performance on the executive control task battery is attributable to factors unrelated to executive control. The final three comparison models grouped the tasks on the basis of other non-executive task demands: specifically, tasks that required children to learn and remember a verbal rule were contrasted with nonverbal tasks requiring only reaching responses (e.g., delayed response); tasks that included visuospatial information were contrasted with tasks that did not; and tasks in which
children’s performance was timed were contrasted with tasks without such requirements.

After identifying the model of preschool executive control that best fit to the data, model fit across subgroups of the sample was evaluated through analysis of measurement invariance. Age differences in executive control are fundamental to the preschool period, and thus were of central interest. Furthermore, some studies with children and with non-human primates have revealed sex differences in some aspects of executive control (Overman, Bachevalier, Schuhmann, & McDonough-Ryan, 1996), and a recent study by Noble, Norman, and Farah (2005) identified robust relations between SES and executive control in children. Thus, possible organizational differences in executive control were examined as a function of background characteristics of the child, namely, age, sex, and socioeconomic status (SES).

Method

Participants

The sample included 243 preschool children (135 girls, 108 boys) who were recruited through birth announcements, local preschools, the local health department, and by word of mouth. Children ranged in age from 2 years 4 months to 6 years ($M = 3$ years 11 months, $SD = 12$ months). The sample was composed of 171 Caucasian, 43 African American, 9 Asian American, 1 Native American, 4 Hispanic, and 14 multi-racial children; one child’s race was not reported. The average maternal education of the sample was 14 years, 1 month ($SD = 2$ years, 3 months; range = 8 years to 20 years). A sub-sample of the children were recruited as full-term preschool controls in a longitudinal study of preterm infants ($n = 14$); these children were assessed longitudinally, although only data from the first assessment were included in the present analysis. Each child was tested individually in a laboratory setting by trained child clinical psychology graduate students. In total, 9 examiners conducted testing for this study, and
adherence to experimental protocols was maintained by regular team meetings with the second author. Children received a small toy and parents received a gift card as compensation for their time and travel expenses.

Executive Control Tasks

Participants completed a battery of preschool executive control measures that varied in format and demands, including 3 tasks considered \textit{a priori} to demand working memory and 7 tasks requiring inhibitory processes. The inhibition tasks were chosen so that they could be parsed further on the basis of types of interference (distractor vs. proactive interference) or of inhibition (motor vs. cognitive). A schematic depicting these comparative models is contained in Figure 1. Children’s task performance was scored online by the examiner, except for the Continuous Performance Task, which required a computer button press. Any scoring discrepancies were reviewed with the second author for resolution and consistent implementation across examiners. For each task, only one dependent measure was selected for inclusion in the analyses, listed in Table 1.

Working Memory. In the Delayed Alternation task, a treat was hidden out of the child’s sight in one of two locations. After a pre-trial, the correct location alternated whenever the child correctly retrieved the reward, so the child had to remember the previous location across a 10-second delay (Espy et al., 1999; Goldman, Rosvold, Vest, & Galkin, 1971). In the Six Boxes task (Diamond et al., 1997), 6 boxes differing in shape and color were initially baited, and the child was allowed to open one box on each trial. Box locations were scrambled between trials, so children had to remember which boxes had already been opened. Children also completed the digit span subtest of the Differential Abilities Scale (Elliott, 1990).

Inhibitory Control. In the Delayed Response task (Goldman, Rosvold, & Mishkin, 1970),
treats were hidden in a pseudo-random order in two locations in the child’s view. After a 10-second delay with active distraction, the child was allowed to search at one of the locations. Diamond has argued that this task requires inhibition, in that the child must inhibit a prepotent tendency to reach to the location that was rewarded on the previous trial (but may be incorrect on the present trial), but also must remember the treat’s present hiding location (e.g., Diamond & Doar, 1989). This task was included primarily as a measure of motor inhibition, as we reasoned that in preschool children difficulties emanate more from response conflict than memory of the treat’s current location (as it is hidden in plain sight of the child). It was included among the tasks requiring resistance to proactive interference, as interference with a current reach depends on reaches on previous trials. The Whisper task (Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, Koenig, & Vandegeest, 1996) required children to whisper the names of a series of pictures of familiar and unfamiliar characters. Children are presumed to have a prepotent tendency to speak or shout the names rather than whispering them, particularly for characters familiar to the child. This task was conceptualized as requiring motor inhibition and resistance to proactive interference. Two subtests of the NEPSY, a commercially available, norm-referenced developmental neuropsychological battery, were administered (Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 1998). In NEPSY Statue, children stood in a statue pose for 75 seconds while the examiner attempted to distract them by coughing, dropping her pencil, and so on. Each 5-second epoch was scored for eye and body movement, and talking. Statue was selected as index of motor inhibition, and resistance to interference from distractors. In NEPSY Visual Attention, children were asked to circle the target cats distributed on a page amidst a variety of distractors. This task was chosen because of its apparent cognitive inhibition demands and resistance to interference from distractors. In the Inhibit condition of the Shape School task (Espy, 1997; Espy, Bull, Martin, & Stroup, 2006),
children name the colors of different shape characters when cued with a happy face, but must suppress the naming response when characters have sad faces. Successful performance on the Shape School task was conceptualized as requiring cognitive inhibition, because of the internalized verbal response, and proactive interference, because children have to suppress a naming response that was established on previously named stimuli. In the Tower of Hanoi task (TOH; Simon, 1975, Welsh et al., 1991), children must move a set of rings into a goal configuration by moving one ring at a time and following rules about relative placement of the rings. The number of illegal moves divided by the total number of moves was used as an index of failure to inhibit tempting, but “illegal,” steps in problem solution (Bull, Espy, & Senn, 2004). Because interference from task performance was expected to result from the perceptual salience of the target configuration (present at all times), this task was categorized as requiring resistance to distractor interference and motor inhibition. Finally, in the Child Continuous Performance Test (CPT; Kerns & Rondeau, 1998) children pressed a button when pictures of infrequent target animals were displayed on a computer screen, but did not respond to frequent distractor pictures. All animal pictures were accompanied by animal sounds that conflicted with the picture identities and were thus an additional source of interference. This task was grouped with tasks requiring cognitive inhibition and resistance to distractor interference. 

**Statistical Methods**

Descriptive analyses were conducted using SAS version 8.02. Confirmatory factor analyses were conducted using Mplus version 4.21 (Muthén & Muthén, 2006). First, a set of models derived from previous research were compared empirically, and the best-fitting model was selected using the appropriate fit statistics. The $\chi^2$ test indexes overall fit of a model; non-significant values indicate acceptable fit. The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA;
Browne & Cudeck, 1993) is an adjusted fit index, with values less than 0.08 indicating acceptable fit to the data. The comparative fit index (CFI) is a relative fit index used to compare each model to a baseline independence model (a model where all the correlations or covariances are zero) with values between 0.95 and 1.00 indicating good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). All model comparisons were nested, and thus could be conducted using the difference in each model’s $\chi^2$ value. When two models did not differ significantly, the simpler model was favored because of greater parsimony (Bollen, 1989). The Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) also was examined, where a 10 point difference is evidence of a model difference in goodness of fit, favoring the model with the smaller BIC (Raftery, 1993).

To assess factorial invariance, the total sample was divided into subgroups on the basis of sex (boys vs. girls), SES (indexed by maternal education: children whose mothers had a high school diploma or less vs. children whose mothers with at least some college-level education) and age (divided approximately at the sample mean: younger vs. older than 4 years). For each characteristic of interest in turn, levels of factorial invariance were tested through a series of models. Models were nested, so they could be compared using $\chi^2$ difference tests. Non-significant $\chi^2$ differences between models represented acceptable fit of the more restrictive model, whereas a significant $\chi^2$ difference value favored the less restrictive model. For the first, least restrictive invariance model, no equality constraints were imposed; only the factor patterns were held constant across groups (i.e., the same factors are specified, reflecting the same tasks, but loadings, means, and residuals are allowed to vary freely; Meredith, 1993). The second model was a test of weak measurement invariance, so that the loadings of all tasks on their latent factors were held to be equal across groups. The third model tested strong measurement invariance, that is, the intercepts of the measured variables were held constant across group.
When strong invariance holds, group differences in means and variances of the latent variables are a function of group differences in means and variances of the measured variables, indicating that the same latent factors are identified in each group (Widaman & Reise, 1997). Fourth, as a test of strict measurement invariance, in the next model the residual variances of the measured variables were constrained to be equal across groups. Importantly, with strict invariance, group differences in means and variances of the measured variables reflect group differences in measurement that are solely attributable to their common factors. The fifth and sixth models constrained factor variances-covariances and factor means, respectively, to be equal across groups; as such they were not tests of metric invariance per se.

Results

Mean scores and standard deviations for performance on each executive control task are presented in Table 1, for the total sample and for boys and girls separately, in addition to statistical tests for sex-related performance differences. In general, girls outperformed boys, and on many tasks, this difference reached or approached conventional levels of statistical significance. Zero-order correlations between executive control tasks and relations with age are shown in Table 2. With few exceptions, there were significant low to moderate correlations between tasks expected to require similar cognitive abilities. Correlations between putative working memory and inhibition tasks also were significant and of similar magnitude. All tasks were correlated with age. As expected, older children exhibited better performance.

For all tasks, distributions of responses were examined to check for ceiling or floor effects and deviations from normality. For the Whisper task, there was a strong ceiling effect in that 52% of children achieved the maximum score. Consequently, this task was not included in factor analysis. Shape School latencies were log-transformed to normalize the distribution, and
outliers more than 3 standard deviations away from the mean were trimmed. Then, for all tasks, performance scores were converted to $z$-scores to minimize the impact of different variable scaling on fitting model invariance. For two tasks where higher scores indicated poorer performance, the scores were reflected to simplify factor loading interpretations.

The proportion of available data for each task ranged from 56% to 98%. The two tasks with the most missing data were Shape School (44%) and the Continuous Performance Test (39%), with the remaining tasks having less than 23% missingness. The Continuous Performance Test was computer-administered, and the primary reason for data loss was intermittent computer failure. Less frequently, data were missing because a child could not be engaged in one of the tasks, or because of examiner error in task administration. Logistic regression analyses were conducted to assess relations between missingness and age, sex, and maternal education for each task. For DAS Digit Span only, missingness was related to maternal education ($p < .05$); sex was related to missingness for NEPSY Visual Attention ($p < .05$). No other tasks showed relations between missingness and sex or maternal education ($p s > .10$). Missing data were thus considered to be consistent with a missing at random pattern (MAR) with respect to sex and maternal education (Little & Rubin, 2002). However, unsurprisingly, younger children were more likely to have missing data than were older children. Age was related to missingness for all tasks except Delayed Response, where a marginal trend was observed ($p < .06$). Because age-related differences in the structure of executive control were of central interest, invariance analyses grouping children by age were conducted nonetheless. However, these results must be interpreted with caution because the pattern of data missingness was related to age. Missing data were estimated using the EM algorithm in Mplus on the basis of all available data points (Muthén & Muthén, 2006).
Factor Solutions

Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) under maximum likelihood estimation (ML) was used to evaluate a model series illustrated in Figure 1. All multiple-factor models included correlations between factors, and error variances of the measured variables both within and across factors were uncorrelated. Table 3 lists the models and their fit statistics, and Table 4 summarizes the model fit comparisons. Although, in general, the 2-factor and 3-factor models displayed acceptable fit to the data, their fit was not significantly better than that of the simplest, 1-factor model (Model 4). The 3-factor model including working memory, proactive interference and interference from distractors (Model 2) approached a significant improvement in fit over the working memory/inhibition model (Model 1; \( p = .07 \)), but did not differ from the 1-factor model. Thus, for reasons of parsimony, the unitary Executive Control model was preferred. As illustrated in Figure 2, the standardized factor loadings for Model 4 were significant and exceeded a cutoff value of 0.40 (Stevens, 2001). The proportion of variance in individual task scores explained by latent executive control varied considerably across tasks. Over half of the variability in NEPSY Visual Attention and CPT performance was related to latent executive control, whereas \( R^2 \) values were closer to .20 for Six Boxes, Delayed Response, NEPSY Statue, and Delayed Alternation. This pattern is consistent with the definition of executive control as only one construct that contributes to performance on any individual task (Miyake et al., 2000).

Tests of Invariance

After the best-fitting model was established for the entire sample, relative model fit between groups of interest were evaluated. As detailed in the Statistical Methods, up to six increasingly restrictive models were tested, with each successive model retaining the equality constraints of the preceding model. Tests of invariance for children grouped by sex, maternal
education, and age are provided in Table 5. Strict measurement invariance was supported in analyses of sex, although boys and girls differed in latent variable means. Because girls were set as the referent group, their mean factor score was 0 ($SD = 0.89$), whereas boys’ mean factor score was -0.35 ($SD = 0.66$; Cohen’s $d = 0.64$, a medium effect size). When children were grouped by their mothers’ educational attainment, strict measurement invariance was again supported, even when latent means and variances-covariances could be constrained to equality. In these models, there was no difference in mean latent executive control, and the latent executive control factor accounted for the same proportion of variance in tasks across groups defined by the level of maternal educational attainment.

Models that grouped children by age demonstrated an overall poorer fit to the data, with CFI values below the preferred value of .95. There was not a statistically significant worsening of fit until residuals were constrained to be equal across younger and older preschool children (M4 comparison in Table 5, Panel 3). Of the models tested, a strong invariance model was preferred, where equal unstandardized factor loadings were specified across age groups (see Figure 2). Although tasks load similarly on the latent executive control factor, the factor explained different amounts of variance in individual tasks at the two ages. Executive control, then, likely drives task performance somewhat differently with development. Most notably, the latent factor explained 43% and 53% of for the variance in younger preschool children’s performance on CPT and NEPSY Statue respectively, but only 31% and 32% for older children.

Discussion

The goal of this investigation was to better understand the structure of executive control in preschool children. A diverse battery of executive control tasks was administered to a sample of 243 children between 2.25 and 6 years of age. A series of models was tested using
confirmatory factor analysis to assess the utility of differing conceptualizations of executive control organization in explaining variability in children’s task performance. The simplest model, a single Executive Control factor, was supported over other multi-factor models, where tasks were parsed in terms of working memory and inhibitory control demands as well as alternative explanations regarding differences in non-executive skills. Simply put, no explanatory power was gained by retaining multiple distinct factors in the model.

The findings of a unitary model of executive control contrast with extant findings. Studies of older children and adults utilizing both exploratory and confirmatory factor analytic methods typically have supported the existence of multiple dimensions of executive control, the fractionation view, although these dimensions are by no means independent (e.g., Brookshire et al. 2004, Miyake et al. 2000). Because of the more limited behavioral repertoire of preschool children, the tasks used are simpler by necessity, and therefore might be more homogeneous in executive demands than those used with adults. However, a cursory review of the tasks included in the present study contradicts this view. The responses required of children varied considerably, from simply standing still (NEPSY Statue), to searching for hidden rewards (Delayed Response), to pressing a button (CPT), to providing a verbal response (Shape School). Furthermore, the models in which tasks were grouped on the basis of non-executive task demands did not result in a significant improvement in fit to the data.

Given that different components of executive control seem to be identifiable in school-aged children, the single-factor executive control model may be specific to the preschool years. For example, for young children, inhibitory processes may be actively developing during this period, and may not be fully mature until later in development. The design of the present study and the observed relation between age and missingness limit the conclusions that can be drawn
regarding age invariance. However, the results of exploratory analyses indicated that the overall unitary executive control model could be fit for both younger and older preschoolers, with relatively subtle differences in model specification between the age groups, in that the portion of variability explained by the latent executive control factor differed for several tasks. If there were developmental differences in the underlying cognitive subprocesses that drive performance on executive control tasks early in life, substantial differences in model fit with advancing age would be expected. Test for replication is needed in other preschool samples to further confirm this intriguing preliminary finding.

Some have argued that even in mature adults, a single cognitive process underlies performance on executive or frontally-supported tasks (Duncan & Owen, 2000; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Duncan and Miller (2002) have proposed an adaptive coding model, in which prefrontal activation serves to bias neural processing in other regions of cortex, depending on the specific context. In this model, prefrontal neurons may boost the activation of subdominant information or responses, allowing them to “win out” over prepotent response tendencies and thereby be expressed in overt behavior. When behavior is dominated by prepotent responding, this response pattern may not necessarily be due to failure of inhibition, but rather may result from failure to enhance the activation of the correct stimulus-response relation (Munakata, 1998; Miller & Cohen, 2001). In the preschool years, the connections between the correct stimuli and responses likely are weaker than in older children. At this age then, the default prepotent response may be expressed across different contexts and degrees of conflict because the signal strength of the connection to the correct response is small in magnitude, and the immature nervous system of the preschool child may be less able to enhance the activation of the correct stimulus-response relation. In this framework, the common thread that characterizes executive control across tasks
is the enhancement of relevant stimulus-response relations to achieve goal-oriented executive control of thought and action, whether the information to be sustained is “stand still” in NEPSY Statue, “look under the left cup on this trial” in Delayed Response, or “name only the characters with happy faces” in Shape School. This model may hold particular appeal in its potential to explain dysexecutive behavior in preschool children, who, across a variety of circumstances and tasks, typically provide the most obvious response.

The single-factor Executive Control model showed strict measurement invariance for boys and girls, although girls displayed higher absolute levels of latent executive control than did boys. Strict measurement invariance also was observed between children whose mothers had only a high school education versus those with college-level educational attainment. In contrast to sex-related differences in latent executive control, children whose mothers differed in educational attainment did not differ in the latent level of executive control. These findings contrast with those of Noble, Norman, & Farah (2005), which might be related to sampling or to our use of maternal education as a proxy for SES. Importantly, the meaning of the executive control construct did not differ by this demographic characteristic.

Improved understanding of executive control will shed light on children’s ability to achieve well-regulated, goal-directed thought and action more broadly. Effortful control is an important regulatory aspect of child temperament that underlies behavior in the everyday context (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000). Beyond executive control of cognition, development of the ability to regulate both positive and negative emotions is important for socialization and functioning in the broader societal context (Kochanska, Murray, & Harlan, 2000). The approach to executive control development taken in the present study is informed primarily by neuropsychological models of prefrontal function, although clearly executive control is but one
aspect of the broader concept of self-regulation. Future efforts need to examine potential convergences with related self-regulatory behaviors in the socio-emotional domains, for example, by linking children’s executive control observed in the laboratory with self-regulatory abilities observed in the everyday context. Using the CFA approach applied here will help to reveal interrelations among self-regulatory processes across different contexts and methods.

Because executive control processes appear to be central in the etiology of externalizing behavior disorders (Nigg & Casey, 2005), the current findings have substantive clinical implications. For example, the observed sex difference in latent executive control, a more pure measure of the executive construct, may have clinical relevance given substantially higher risk for ADHD and disruptive behavior disorders in boys (Scahill & Schwab-Stone, 2000). The literature has been equivocal as to the nature of sex difference in executive control, with differences found for some types of tasks but not others (Overman, Bachevalier, Schuhmann, & McDonough-Ryan, 1996; Seidman et al., 2005), despite the fact that the neural substrates of executive control, prefrontal cortex, reach maturity more quickly in girls than boys (Giedd et al., 1999). The noted differences in executive control likely better reflect true sex differences in the executive process common across all tasks, as the latent variable approach parses executive control from non-executive task demands, such as language, that may show sex-related differences.

There also are methodological implications for future studies of executive control in preschool children. Subtle differences in relations between individual tasks and the latent executive control process imply that different tasks are better indexes of executive control at different ages in the preschool age range. Carlson (2005) drew similar conclusions analyzing equated task performances by age group. To adequately measure developmental change or to
detect performance impairments in clinical populations, selected tasks must be equally valid and comparably discriminative across groups. However, the age-related findings must be taken with caution because missing data was related to age, and the decision to split the sample at age 4 years was arbitrary, as children were recruited to cover the entire preschool age span. To address age effects with a cross-sectional design, groups of children should be explicitly selected in narrow age bands. More critically, the fundamental question at issue is how executive control dynamically unfolds across development, and how it supports key childhood competencies or marks problematic behaviors. To begin to address these questions, children who vary in pertinent background characteristics need to be evaluated repeatedly with age with concurrent assessment of everyday behavior and functioning.
References


Diamond, A. (1990). Developmental time course in human infants and infant monkeys, and the


executive control with the Shape School. *Psychological Assessment, 18*, 373-381.


NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.


Table 1

*Descriptive statistics for Executive Control Task performance and Age, for the complete sample and by sex.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>All Children</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Sex Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 135-239)</td>
<td>(N = 83-135)</td>
<td>(N = 52-109)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delayed Alternation: correct searches</td>
<td>1 - 16</td>
<td>9.06 2.39</td>
<td>9.17 2.42</td>
<td>8.93 2.36</td>
<td>0.74 .46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAS Digit Span: maximum span</td>
<td>1 – 6</td>
<td>3.38 1.31</td>
<td>3.53 1.29</td>
<td>3.18 1.33</td>
<td>1.86 .06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six Boxes: efficiency (correct searches / total searches)</td>
<td>0.33 – 1.00</td>
<td>0.68 0.18</td>
<td>0.71 0.19</td>
<td>0.65 0.17</td>
<td>2.54 &lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delayed Response: correct searches</td>
<td>2 – 17</td>
<td>13.43 2.84</td>
<td>13.69 3.12</td>
<td>13.12 2.70</td>
<td>1.52 .13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPSY Statue: 5-second epochs without movement</td>
<td>0 - 30</td>
<td>14.49 10.45</td>
<td>15.81 10.86</td>
<td>12.62 9.55</td>
<td>2.15 &lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whisper: correct trials</td>
<td>0 – 20</td>
<td>16.55 5.05</td>
<td>17.13 4.46</td>
<td>15.87 5.62</td>
<td>1.81 .07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous Performance Test: efficiency (hits / total responses)</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
<td>0.49 0.33</td>
<td>0.55 0.34</td>
<td>0.41 0.29</td>
<td>2.71 &lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shape School (Inhibit condition): latency (seconds)*</td>
<td>10 – 125</td>
<td>30.19 19.74</td>
<td>27.83 18.27</td>
<td>33.94 21.53</td>
<td>-1.76 .08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual Attention: efficiency (correct responses – errors / latency)</td>
<td>-0.35 - 0.62</td>
<td>0.13 0.16</td>
<td>0.16 0.17</td>
<td>0.10 0.14</td>
<td>3.17 &lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower of Hanoi: “inefficiency” (illegal moves / total moves)*</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
<td>0.31 0.24</td>
<td>0.30 0.22</td>
<td>0.33 0.25</td>
<td>-0.85 .40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>2.25 - 6.00</td>
<td>3.95 0.98</td>
<td>4.03 1.04</td>
<td>3.87 0.89</td>
<td>1.27 .21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* A higher score indicates poorer performance
Table 2

*Correlations Between Executive Control Task Performance Scores, Age, and Maternal Education*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Delayed Alternation</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. DAS Digit Span</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Six Boxes</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Delayed Response</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. NEPSY Statue</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Whisper</td>
<td>.14+</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Continuous Performance Test</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.16+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Shape School (Inhibit condition)</td>
<td>.15+</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. NEPSY Visual Attention</td>
<td>.38*</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Tower of Hanoi</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.14+</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.64**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.58**</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>.58**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal education (years)</td>
<td>0.11+</td>
<td>0.14+</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
<td>0.22**</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p < .01; + p < .10
Table 3

*Goodness of Fit Indices for Alternative CFA Models*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model (Number of Factors)</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>BIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Working Memory and Inhibition (2)*</td>
<td>31.07</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.987</td>
<td>4859.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Working Memory, Interference from Distractors, and Proactive Interference (3)*</td>
<td>25.87</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.995</td>
<td>4864.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Working Memory, Motor Inhibition, and Cognitive Inhibition (3)*</td>
<td>30.33</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>4869.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. General Executive Control (1)</td>
<td>31.14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.989</td>
<td>4853.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Verbal and Nonverbal Rule (2)</td>
<td>29.55</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.991</td>
<td>4857.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Spatial and Nonspatial Tasks (2)</td>
<td>30.69</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.988</td>
<td>4858.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Timed and Untimed Tasks (2)</td>
<td>28.58</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.993</td>
<td>4856.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not Positive Definite Residual Covariance Matrix*
### Table 4

**Comparative Fit of CFA Models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Comparison</th>
<th>$\chi^2$ difference</th>
<th>df difference</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>BIC difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1 vs. Model 2</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>5.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1 vs. Model 3</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>10.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1 vs. Model 4</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>5.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 4 vs. Model 5</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 4 vs. Model 6</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>5.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 4 vs. Model 7</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 4 vs. Model 2</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>11.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Favored model is underlined. When two models did not differ statistically, the more parsimonious model was chosen (Bollen, 1989).*
Table 5

Tests of Invariance for the Best-Fitting CFA Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>$\chi^2$ difference</th>
<th>$df$ difference</th>
<th>$p$ difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>31.14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.989</td>
<td>4767.99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tests of invariance by sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>66.62</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.965</td>
<td>4969.07</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>71.35</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.974</td>
<td>4929.85</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>75.13</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.986</td>
<td>4889.68</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4</td>
<td>83.09</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.989</td>
<td>4848.20</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>89.18</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.974</td>
<td>4848.81</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M6</td>
<td>99.45</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.948</td>
<td>4853.58</td>
<td>10.27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tests of invariance by maternal education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>67.44</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.965</td>
<td>4975.90</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>74.38</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.967</td>
<td>4938.89</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>81.82</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.969</td>
<td>4902.39</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4</td>
<td>89.46</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.972</td>
<td>4860.59</td>
<td>7.64</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5</td>
<td>90.28</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.973</td>
<td>4855.92</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M6</td>
<td>93.43</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.967</td>
<td>4853.58</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tests of invariance by age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>69.69</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.905</td>
<td>4802.52</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>82.07</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.879</td>
<td>4770.96</td>
<td>12.38</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>89.71</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.881</td>
<td>4734.65</td>
<td>7.64</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4</td>
<td>112.15</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.800</td>
<td>4707.65</td>
<td>22.44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Baseline = no invariance constraints; M1 = configural invariance; M2 = weak measurement invariance; M3 = strong measurement invariance; M4 = strict measurement invariance; M5 = equivalent latent variable variance-covariance matrices; M6 = equivalent latent variable means.
Figure Captions.

Figure 1.

*Path diagrams for Planned CFA models 1 through 7.* Single-headed arrows represent paths of factor loadings; double-headed arrows represent factor correlations. 6B = Six Boxes; CPT = Continuous Performance Test; DA = Delayed Alternation; DR = Delayed Response; DSP = DAS Digit Span; SSI = Shape School Inhibit condition; ST = NEPSY Statue; TOH = Tower of Hanoi; VA = NEPSY Visual Attention (cats only); WH = Whisper.

Figure 2.

*Best-fitting model for the full sample and for the sample split at age 4 years.* Standardized factor loadings ($\lambda$) are given within each indicator box along with observed variable $R^2$ values. Standardized residual variances ($\varepsilon$) are listed below each error term box. Note that for the figures depicting model differences across age, unstandardized factor loadings are constrained to equality but standardized loadings differ because of differences in standard errors between age groups. 6B = Six Boxes; CPT = Continuous Performance Test; DA = Delayed Alternation; DR = Delayed Response; DSP = DAS Digit Span; SSI = Shape School Inhibit condition; ST = NEPSY Statue; TOH = Tower of Hanoi; VA = NEPSY Visual Attention (cats only).