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Active Shooter Security at the University of Nebraska:
The Case for Training and Door Locks

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The gunman entered the actuarial science class early on October 12, 1992 at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, raised his loaded AK-47 at his 20 classmates and pulled the trigger. The gun jammed. The students, realizing they had a short window of time to escape, bolted from the class while the gunman attempted to clear the jam. Unable to clear the jam, the gunman fled and a shooting massacre was averted.1 While the University of Nebraska dodged a metaphorical bullet on this occasion, it may be just a matter of time before it isn’t so lucky.

In the aftermath of this shooting attempt by Arthur McElroy at UNL and a host of more recent horrific massacres on campuses across the country, the University of Nebraska still remains vulnerable to an active shooter incident, ignoring protective measures that could save lives in the event of a campus shooting event. The University does not train its faculty, staff, and students on what to do during an active shooter incident, nor has it installed door locks that can be secured from the inside on classroom doors in its older buildings as a prophylactic measure against shooter entry and the captive shooting of students like “fish in a barrel.”2 Yet, in spite of being advised about these security deficiencies,3 University of Nebraska administrators have yet to take action.

Violence on campus has escalated since the 1990s and McElroy’s vain attempt at killing. The FBI noted in its 2014 Active Shooter Study that the average number of active shooting incidents rose from 6.4 incidents annually between 2000-2007, to 16.4 incidents between 2008-2014.4

According to the FBI, sixty percent of the incidents were over by the time police arrived. While warning systems and quick police response may help save lives, the best way to increase the odds of survival for students and faculty caught in the opening salvos of an incident is by empowering them with knowledge of what to do and providing them with resources to do it. Retrofitting older classroom doors with door locks that can be engaged from the inside and training faculty and students on how to implement the “run, hide, fight” protocol can provide them with the short-term survival measures needed until help arrives.

The purpose of this article is to inform University of Nebraska students, faculty and stakeholders of these two key security deficiencies that exist on campus and make them knowledgeable about actions that can be implemented to mitigate active shooter related deaths. Five classroom shooting incidents follow, along with
the lessons that were learned from each, and specific response recommendations for UNL students.

**Virginia Tech Shooting and Lessons Learned**

The worst campus shooting incident occurred at Virginia Tech, the deadliest shooting event in U.S. history, where 32 students and faculty were massacred on April 16, 2007. Seung Hui Cho used two semi-automatic pistols—a .22-caliber Walther and a 9 mm Glock 19—to kill two students in West Ambler Johnston Hall and 30 students in classrooms in Norris Hall.

After the event, a Virginia Tech Review Panel was convened by Virginia Governor Timothy M. Kaine to assess the events and handling of the incident, with the charter to make recommendations that would help colleges prevent or mitigate such incidents in the future. While the Review Board discovered a host of key findings in the areas of campus alerting, mental health evaluation, the role and training of police, two key findings that could save lives have largely been ignored until after shootings have occurred on campus.

The first finding involved inadequate training for students, faculty and staff on what to do during an active shooter incident. According to the Review Panel,

The training of staff and students for emergencies situations at Virginia Tech did not include shooting incidents. A messaging system works more effectively if resident advisors in dormitories, all faculty, and all other staff from janitors to the president have instruction and training for coping with emergencies of all types.

The Review Panel followed this finding with a recommendation:

Students, faculty, and staff should be trained annually about responding to various emergencies and about the notification systems that will be used.

A second, more controversial finding involved classroom door locks, with which the doors at Norris Hall, the site of 30 of the killings, were not equipped. According to the Review Panel:

Virginia Tech did not have classroom door locks operable from the inside of the room. Whether to add such locks is controversial. They can block entry of an intruder and compartmentalize an attack. Locks can be simple manually operated devices or part of more sophisticated systems that use electromechanical locks operated from a central security point in a building or even university-wide. The locks must be easily opened from the inside to allow escape from a fire or other emergency when that is the safer course of action. While adding locks to classrooms may seem an obvious safety feature, some voiced concern that locks could facilitate rapes or assaults in classrooms and increase university liability. (An attacker could drag someone inside a room at night and lock the door, blocking assistance.)
On the other hand, a locked room can be a place of refuge when one is pursued. On balance, the panel generally thought having locks on classroom doors was a good idea.

Yet, in spite of the Review Board’s general consensus that door locks were advised, it nonetheless stopped short of recommending them as a way of mitigating deaths in future incidents. This is curious in light of the descriptions of violence that occurred in the second floor classrooms that didn’t have locks.\(^8\)

After Seung Hui Cho entered room 206 and killed Professor Loganathan and several students, he then crossed the hall to room 207 and murdered Professor Christopher Bishop and several other students. One student in room 207 vainly attempted to rip a podium from its foundation in order to blockade the un-lockable door. In classroom 211, Professor Couture-Nowak’s students also attempted to barricade the door, but Cho was able to push his way in, kill the professor and shoot several students. By this time, students in room 205 had heard the shots and cries for help; they barricaded their door by using their feet as stoppers. Cho attempted to push his way in but was unsuccessful, so he fired through the door but didn’t hit any of the students, who were lying low. Cho returned to room 211 and went around the room shooting additional students, then attempted to enter room 204. Professor Liviu Librescu had braced his body against the door, while telling his students to escape out the window. Librescu was fatally shot by Cho through the door, but had delayed Cho’s entry long enough to allow 10 students to escape. While it is conjecture to conclude that door locks would have saved lives in this case, it nonetheless seems logical given Cho’s strategy to use classrooms as killing floors. The carnage ended when Cho shot and killed himself.

**Northern Illinois University Shooting and Lessons Learned**

Five lives were lost and 27 were injured in the Northern Illinois University shooting incident on February 14, 2008, after Steven Kazmierczak entered a geology class in the auditorium of Cole Hall and began his deadly shooting spree. Armed with a 12 gauge sawed-off shotgun and three handguns with eight loaded magazines, Kazmierczak first opened fire with his shotgun from the stage into the audience. When his shotgun ammunition was expended, he switched weapons to his Glock semi-automatic pistol and then walked up and down the aisles and shot students who were either frozen in fear or attempting to hide between seats.\(^9\) Kazmierczak then killed himself before police arrived. Five minutes later, the school posted a warning that a possible gunman was on campus.\(^10\)

Following the incident, the Governor of Illinois established the “State of Illinois Campus Security Task Force” to conduct a review of the incident, which published its own key findings and lessons learned from the tragedy. Amongst the findings was that not only police, but faculty, staff and students also required training about how to respond during an active shooter incident. According to the report, the Response Committee found that:
Comprehensive training and exercise of emergency response plans and systems are a necessary part of emergency preparedness. Training for staff, faculty and students in recognizing and understanding emergency alerts and the appropriate immediate response actions are essential to safeguarding lives.

The report went on to recommend that:

Colleges and universities should ensure that students, faculty and staff are informed regarding their roles and responsibilities in preparing for and responding to emergency situations.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Offers Course of Action

By this time, it was clear from the history of campus shootings that more than police and warnings were required if lives were to be saved in the crucial minutes prior to police arrival on the scene. Training was needed to turn students and faculty from helpless, panic-stricken victims to informed, quick-acting evaders and fighters.

In October of 2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security published its booklet, “Active Shooter: How to Respond,” which contained a simple survival protocol for what to do if in the vicinity of an active shooter. The protocol was developed in a cooperative effort by not only the Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement, but retailers and mall security agencies concerned about active shooters in highly vulnerable and target rich shopping malls.11

The protocol was designed to provide students and faculty with alternatives that were optimized for given situations, whether an escape path was available, a safe refuge was at hand, or the only option left was to fight for survival.

The protocol included the following measures:

1. Evacuate: If there is an accessible escape path, attempt to evacuate the premises. Be sure to:
   - Have an escape route and plan in mind
   - Evacuate regardless of whether others agree to follow
   - Leave your belongings behind
   - Help others escape, if possible
   - Prevent individuals from entering an area where the active shooter may be
   - Keep your hands visible
   - Follow the instructions of any police officers
   - Do not attempt to move wounded people
   - Call 911 when you are safe

2. Hide out: If evacuation is not possible, find a place to hide where the active shooter is less likely to find you. Your hiding place should:
• Be out of the active shooter’s view
• Provide protection if shots are fired in your direction (i.e., and office with a closed and locked door)
• Not trap you or restrict your options for movement
• To prevent an active shooter from entering your hiding place:
  o Lock the door
  o Blockade the door with heavy furniture
• If the active shooter is nearby:
  o Lock the door
  o Silence your cell phone and/or pager
  o Turn off any source of noise (i.e., radios, televisions)
  o Hide behind large items (i.e., cabinets, desks)
  o Remain quiet
• If evacuation and hiding out are not possible:
  o Remain calm
  o Dial 911, if possible, to alert police to the active shooter’s location
  o If you cannot speak, leave the line open and allow the dispatcher to listen

3. Take action against the active shooter: As a last resort, and only when your life is in imminent danger, attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter by:
• Acting as aggressively as possible against him/her
• Throwing items and improvising weapons
• Yelling
• Committing to your actions

In the case of the Virginia Tech massacre in Norris Hall, the evacuation option was not available. If doors had been equipped with door locks, the hide option might have saved lives. The fight option may not have been possible given the worldview of faculty and students at the time (fighting back wasn’t even considered), or it wasn’t determined to be a viable alternative for the situation.

**Oikos University Shooting and Lessons Learned**

A dozen nursing students at Oikos University were taking an exam on April 2, 2012 when One Goh entered through a back door with a .45 caliber pistol in one hand while holding the school’s receptionist hostage with the other. He ordered everyone to the front of the room before shooting the receptionist. Some of the students complied with Goh’s demand to come to the front of the room, but others ran. Goh then turned his weapon upon the compliant students, killing six more and wounding three others. Most of the students who ran survived. Goh left the building and was eventually captured by police at a local supermarket, which he had driven to in a car of one of his slain victims.

In the aftermath of the incident, Active Response Training, a private company that provides active shooter training for pay, published a list of nine lessons learned
from the Oikos University shooting. Included in the lessons was that “students need to be taught proper responses when a person begins shooting,” and that they must “recognize opportunities to act,” such as when a gunman reloads.14

**Purdue University Shooting and Lessons Learned**

At Purdue University, a lone gunman shot and killed a fellow teaching assistant in a classroom full of other students in the electrical engineering building. Cody Cousins, an undergraduate teaching assistant in computer engineering, entered a basement classroom on January 21, 2014 and murdered Andrew Bolt. The shooter then left the building, unarmed, and surrendered to police.15

The incident not only caught many by surprise, but also illuminated the poor state of training on how to respond during such an event, even after the Department of Homeland Security had published its recommended actions. By this time, most universities had posted the active shooter protocol on their web sites. However, at Purdue University, many faculty members were still unaware of what to do in an active shooter situation. Said one frustrated student, who was in the classroom directly above where the shooting took place, “I think Purdue needs to rethink how they train their faculty and instructors to respond to these situations.”16

After the initial shot, Purdue professors in surrounding classrooms continued to teach class as if nothing had happened, in spite of a text-message warning and pleas by students to lock the doors and turn off the lights in accordance with the “hide” recommended protocol. According to a student witness, Professor Rebecca Trax joked, “I’ll have the TA tackle him if he comes in.”17 Professor Trax left the door unlocked, the lights on, while she continued to lecture. Another faculty member, Miyoung Hong, an instructor in the College of Liberal Arts, insisted that there was no threat and opened the classroom door after another instructor had closed it.18 Students also expressed anger that many classroom doors were not equipped with door locks.

Three months after the incident, Purdue University released a report conducted by an 18-person security feedback panel made up of faculty, students, and a parent. Recommendations included the ability to lock doors from the inside without a key, expanding the text alert system, and providing additional training so everyone knows what to do during an emergency.19 In the transmittal letter from the panel to university President Mitchell Daniels, panel chair Patricia Hart highlighted:20

- One of the most frequently received responses concerned locks on doors. The panel takes this topic very seriously and recommends additional work be done to formally develop a strategy and understand all the pertinent details, including fire code requirements, ADA compliance and practical considerations for implementation of a final plan.
Training, education and preparedness are essential. ... There is training and education, there are detailed procedures, and we all need to take responsibility to attend training, to learn and know how to respond and to act accordingly in any emergency situation.

However, the report also highlighted one of the primary reasons universities have balked at installing door locks—high costs. According to the report, it would cost approximately $2 million to convert the over 41,000 doors with lockable hardware.21

While it is regrettable that it took a death on campus to spur administrators to do something, to its credit, Purdue University did take aggressive action on the panel’s recommendations, in spite of the costs. By the start of the fall semester, the university put out a press release stating the university was taking the following steps:22

- As part of a pilot program, emergency beacons, door locks and desktop pop-up alert windows are being installed across campus.

- Door locks are being installed in these same classrooms. These locks will be compliant with ADA requirements and fire codes.23

- Desktop pop-up alerts have been installed on a majority of classroom computers and on machines in a majority of university computer labs. A window will pop up on a machine with a message when a Purdue ALERT is issued.

- The Purdue Emergency Twitter account has been integrated with the Purdue ALERT text message system.

Additionally, the Purdue University Homeland Security Institute conducted detailed computer modeling to determine the best options to save lives. Given that a shooter averages three victims per minute and that the average time of response by police is 10 minutes, the modeling revealed that the two most effective means of slowing down a shooter are locks on schoolroom doors and armed school personnel. According to Institute director Eric Dietz, the two measures together could reduce the number of victims by up to 70 percent.24

**Umpqua Community College Lessons Learned**

Chris Harper Mercer fatally shot and killed an assistant professor and eight students at Umpqua Community College on October 1, 2015. Mercer entered the writing class held in classroom 15 of Snyder Hall, fired a warning shot, and ordered everyone in the classroom to lie down in the center of the room. He then put his backpack on the front desk, pulled out an envelope which he handed to a student, stating, "hey, kid with the glasses, you are the lucky one; I will not shoot you if give
this to the cops.” The papers and thumb drive in the envelope contained racial and social hatred writings.25

Mercer allowed the chosen student to move to the back of the classroom before he began picking off the professor and students in the center of the classroom. He told a wheelchair bound woman who had followed his order to get down on the floor to get back up, then shot her.26 He then asked two students their religions. After they replied Christian, he shot them. The shooter killed himself after exchanging fire with police, who arrived six minutes after multiple 911 calls.

Joe Olson, who had retired as President of Umpqua Community College several months prior to the incident, stated that the college had considered hiring an armed security guard to protect against such an event, but decided against it, believing the campus was safe and that having an armed guard might damage the culture of the school.27

Umpqua Community College has since requested $158,455 from the Oregon Legislature for door locks to rooms that don’t have them installed and $145,146 for three additional security guards in its 2015-2017 budget.28

Inaction Until After a Shooting

When one looks at the low probability of an active shooter incident on a college campus against the high costs and efforts associated with training, installing door locks, and other protective measures, many universities decide to accept the risk of a shooter and not spend the money for additional protective measures.

In the cases explored above, however, all of the schools victimized by active shooters incidents chose to spend more money on measures to mitigate deaths after an incident on campus. While actions after an incident may help to prevent future deaths, they are “a day late and a dollar short” for the previous victims. Additionally, one is left to question whether a university takes such action as a public relations measure or out of real concern. Either way, it doesn’t reflect well on the university’s leadership—taking action only to salve the school’s reputation or not having the foresight to take appropriate measures in the first place.

What Can University of Nebraska Students Do?

Given the University of Nebraska’s inaction on retrofitting door locks in its older classrooms and training personnel on what to do during an active shooter incident, the question arises as to what students and faculty can do to protect themselves. Obviously, becoming familiar with the recommended active shooter protocol is the first step. The most recent version of the university’s active shooter protocol discusses measures in terms of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s “run, hide, fight” measures (November 30, 2015) which are effectively the same as those put forth in the 2008 version.
The University of Nebraska has published the “run, hide, fight” protocol online in both video and print form. Finding it on the University’s web pages, however, can be daunting as it is buried deep in subdirectories (UNL/Emergency Planning and Preparedness/Emergency Procedures/ Shooting Incident/Active Shooter Response Training). It is easiest found by typing “active shooter” in the university web page search engine or through the following link: http://emergency.unl.edu/shotsfired.

As for specific action to be taken in response to an active shooter, running away from the scene is likely the best option, if an open avenue of escape presents itself, and the shooter isn’t “herding” students to a kill zone where an accomplice waits to ambush the fleeing students. Students that find themselves in a classroom with a shooter outside in the hallway or in an adjacent classroom, however, are faced with a more vexing survival dilemma, if the classroom door can’t be locked from the inside and rushing out into the hallway may put them in the sights of the shooter. Additionally, if the shooter subsequently breaches the door, it places students at risk of being shot like “fish in a barrel,” as has occurred in the deadliest of incidents, described above.

If students and faculty find themselves trapped in a classroom without a door lock, one option is to barricade the door with desks and other furniture as was done during the Virginia Tech incident. However, many doors without locks open to the hall, which means a shooter will only be slowed down, and will eventually obtain access given the will to do so.

At this point, if students and faculty cannot escape out of a window or alternate exit, they have no choice but to stand and fight, as recommended in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security protocol. One fight measure that has not been adequately explored is the use of mace/pepper spray against the assailant by students and faculty. While campuses prohibit firearms, many do not prohibit non-lethal incapacitating agents. The UNL weapons policy specifically prohibits “guns, knives, and explosives,” though it leaves open a prohibition on unnamed devices that are “capable of producing death, harm to person or property, or bodily injury.” However, former UNL Assistant Police Chief Mylo Bushing stated in 2001 that pepper spray was OK.

Many female students already carry mace/pepper spray as a defensive measure against rape or attack. There is nothing that prohibits male students from carrying it in their backpacks, either. While the use of incapacitating agents against a shooter, along with throwing desk items and personal objects at the shooter, may be a poor substitute to deadly force options, it will still allow trapped students to at least seize the initiative (a basic warfare principle), and provide a chance to either take down the assailant or escape the room. However, faculty and students need to trained in its use—that is, be aware of it as an active shooter measure and know how to use it, to include activating the sprayer under duress, the range of the spray, how far to stand away from the assailant, and the use of cover while deploying it.
With the University of Nebraska unwilling to provide formal training for faculty, staff, and students (posting a video on a web site does not constitute adequate training by the University), it is thus incumbent upon students to train themselves and their faculty. At the first meeting of a course during a new semester, students should ask their instructors about not only how the class will handle an active shooter, but other emergencies, like fire and tornado. Most instructors, realizing it is their responsibility to lead students in such an event, will find out, if they don’t already know. For those that don’t bother to find out, students should register a complaint against the instructor with the chair of the department.

Of course, nothing herein prevents students from placing pressure on the University of Nebraska administration to retrofit door locks in older classrooms and conduct training by writing to their parents and public officials about the active shooter deficiencies that exist on campus. At a university that markets itself as a place to “make waves where there is no ocean,” such activity should be encouraged. In fact, students and faculty may find it motivating to know that the University of Nebraska Police Department has adequate door locks in its building. Students deserve a safe learning environment also.

Training and door locks provide a way to empower potential victims into survivors. They provide them with forethought for action and temporary safe refuge against an active shooter, rather than treating students like helpless “sheep” to be protected by a police “shepherd.” It provides students and faculty with a fighting chance, rather than desperation and pleas for mercy, which have granted all too rarely in active shooting incidents.

The active shooter issue has come full circle at UNL. Arthur McElroy, the failed 1992 gunman at UNL, was released from the Lincoln Regional Center in 2015, judged to be too sick and feeble to present a danger to anyone. But that does not mean there isn’t someone out there willing to repeat such an incident.
Endnotes


2 The University of Nebraska-Lincoln has installed adequate door locks (lockable from the inside without a key) in its new buildings. The author teaches a class in Jorgenson Hall that is equipped with one.

3 The author attempted to have a door lock installed on the door to Burnett 119 as a protective measure against active shooter intrusion from January 11, 2016 until February 11, 2016, through normal channels, but the request was ultimately denied by University Police Chief, Owen Yardley. The author then sent e-mails (February 15, 2016) and letters (February 28, 2016) to University President Hank Bounds and Regent Tim Clare, requesting help on the matter, but has yet to receive a reply from either.


6 Ibid, p. 17.

7 Ibid, p. 19.

8 Ibid, see pp. 90-92 for an in depth description of the shootings on the second floor of Norris Hall.


11 The study was conducted at the behest of the National Retail Federation. See “Emergency Response Protocols to Active Shooters: Retail-specific supplement to DHS Active Shooter Materials,” National Retail Federation, 2011.


14 Ibid.


16 Ibid.


Letter from Patricia Hart to President Daniels transmitting final report of security feedback panel, April 29, 2016, Accessed March 25, 2015.


Door locks have now been installed on all Purdue University classroom doors.


See https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2016R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/86112

University of Nebraska Weapons Policy, Accessed March 27, 2016, http://police.unl.edu/weapons-policy


In an informal survey of my students in two Spring 2016 courses I was teaching, I was surprised to find out that over half of the female students already carried mace/pepper spray for protective purposes.