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The Indonesian Dispute in the Security Council

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THE INDONESIAN DISPUTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

By

Robert L. Munkres

A THESIS
Presented to the Faculty of
The Graduate College in the University of Nebraska
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Arts
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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

The group of islands formerly known as Netherlands India forms a part of the Malayan Archipelago and, geographically speaking, links Australia with Asia and the Pacific with the Indian Ocean. While this territory consists primarily of five large islands, the entire archipelago is dotted with numerous islands of varying sizes. Under Dutch administration Netherlands India was divided into the following geographical divisions: Java and Madura, Sumatra Region, Dutch Borneo, Celebes Region, and Moluccas, New Guinea, and Sunda Islands; the total area of this territory is over 700,000 square miles.¹

When the Portuguese reached India in 1498, they found that the chief market for spices was Malacca, located in the Malayan peninsula. Consequently, in the interests of increasing their trade, the Portuguese took over the city after attacking it twice with a small army.²


² H. M. Vlekke, The Story of the Dutch East Indies, p. 56. Chapter IV of Mr. Vlekke's book is devoted to a discussion of the part which religion played in the fighting between the Catholic Portuguese and the Mohammedan natives.
Shortly after this conquest, the Portuguese traders discovered that spices in Malacca cost five to seven times as much as the spices bought in the islands where they grew. On the basis of this knowledge they quite naturally desired to establish direct relations with the Spice Islands (Moluccas) in order to by-pass the middlemen. This did not prove to be difficult as the local rulers were quite willing to give the Portuguese such a foothold in return for aid in carrying on the almost constant warfare of the islands.3

In 1522 the Portuguese were granted the right to build a fort in the Spice Islands and were also granted a monopoly of cloves. Wherever Portuguese traders went, missionaries followed; consequently, when the Portuguese moved into the Spice Islands, Christianity began to spread through the territory; Islam, however, spread much faster. During the earlier part of the 17th century this was an increasingly important cause of friction. The trouble came to a head when, in 1570, the Sultan of Ternate was assassinated and the evidence strongly indicated that the Portuguese Governor had instigated the act. In a matter of days the Moluccas were virtually in unanimous revolt against the Portuguese.4

By 1580 the Portuguese were in desperate straits as a result of the alliance of native princes against them when the Portuguese received help from an unexpected source; in

3Furnivall, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
4Vlekke, op. cit., p. 62.
that year Philip II of Spain had made good his claim to the throne of Portugal. With the aid of the Spanish and new bases in the Philippines (which were closer than Malacca), the combined Portuguese-Spanish forces maintained a precarious hold in the Moluccas. However, the power of Portugal was broken and, toward the end of the century, it seemed that the entire tropical Far East would fall to the Mohammedans.\(^5\)

The Dutch arrived in the Indies in 1596. Though they had never wanted to come East, the Netherlanders were forced to do so by the same event that had enabled the Portuguese to maintain their weak hold in the Indies—the succession of Philip II of Spain to the throne of Portugal. Prior to 1580 the Dutch spice trade had been primarily with Portugal. King Philip, a bitter enemy of Dutch independence, closed the harbors of Portugal to his rebellious Dutch subjects. This forced Dutch traders to go to the source of the spice trade or else give up a lucrative trade which had become a necessary means of livelihood for the Holland merchants.

The Dutch ventures into the Eastern trade were not backed by private organizations, but rather by the State and civic corporations. Experience soon demonstrated the necessity of a common policy of trade and selling if trade was to remain profitable.\(^6\)

The deadly and unrestricted competition between the Dutch traders quickly forced prices up in the East and drove

\(^5\)Furnivall, *op. cit.*, pp.16-17.

\(^6\)Ibid., pp. 20-24.
them down on the home market. This situation, combined with the fact that the Dutch Republic was not able to protect trade in distant waters, led the States General to incorporate the East Indian traders into the United East Indian Company in 1602. The new corporation was given divers rights of monopoly and sovereignty. This monopoly operated to the exclusion of all other Netherlanders in the areas east of the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Straits of Magellan; the powers of sovereignty included the power to make alliances and contracts with the various princes and potentates in the delimited area. The Dutch Republic retained "only a right of control." 7

The Company did not want to acquire territory at the outset of the venture to the East. Its aim was to preserve the Spice Islands as a private trading ground. However, such a policy, though allegedly only commercial, inevitably led to a policy of territorial expansion. This change grew out of the discovery by the Company that it was impossible to trade successfully unless the area was also governed. 8

As a result of this change in policy, the Company, through agreements and alliances with native rulers, acquired an indirect control or dominance over large areas in the Malay Archipelago. By 1750 the Company had largely, but not completely, shifted from a commercial to a territorial and political basis. Steadily declining profits, poor financial


8 Furnivall, op. cit., p. 25.
administration at home, penurious treatment of its personnel in the East, and the breakdown of the commercial monopoly combined, however, to cause the collapse of the Company toward the end of the 18th century. In 1798 the charter of the Company was nullified, to take effect on 1 January 1800. On the latter date the Dutch Government took over both the Company's assets and its liabilities.9

During the Napoleonic Wars the British took over the Dutch Colonial possessions in the Far East. The English maintained that they did not come as enemies, but rather to prevent the power of France from becoming dominant in that area. By the Treaty of Amiens of 1802 all of these possessions except Ceylon were restored to the Netherlands. Renewal of hostilities placed the Dutch colonies at the disposal of the English once again. In 1810 France annexed the Netherlands; consequently, when the English arrived in Java in August, 1811, they took the island from the French rather than from the Dutch.10

Java was placed under Raffles as Lieutenant Governor. Raffles instituted a system of taxation based upon the Eastern concept that all property belonged to the ruler and that the tenants had to pay land rent. This rent was fixed at two-fifths of the harvest and the ruler's share could be paid in either money or products. Raffles instituted other reforms dealing with administrative structure, the police force, and

10Furnivall, op. cit., pp. 54-67.
the judicial organization. While some of these reforms were only of temporary importance, others were of permanent value and marked Raffles' administration as a turning point in colonial administration in the Netherlands Indies.11

Under the provisions of the Treaty of London of 13 August 1814, the East Indies were given back to the Netherlands. However, because of Napoleon's return from Elba, the actual transfer did not take place until 1816. By 1819 the Dutch had effectively occupied only a few small areas in the Outer Territories--Padang and Palembang in Sumatra, Pontianak, Sambas, and Bandjermesin in Borneo, Madassar in south and the Minahasa in north Celebes, and the Moluccas, which had made up the old center of Company activity. In general it may be said that the formation of the Dutch colonial empire has been very largely the work of the last century, with particular emphasis upon the period from 1900 to 1940.12

Following the Napoleonic Wars the Dutch initiated a new system of taxation in their East Indies possessions. Prior to this time, the natives had been required to turn over to the government a portion of their crops as land rent or taxes. Under the new system, which came to be known as the Culture System, the natives were required to place at the disposal of the government a portion of their land and a certain number of working days. The land and working time

11Vandenbosch, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
12Ibid., pp. 56-57.
thus put at government disposal was used for the cultivation of crops for export out of the islands; the whole process was under the supervision of government officials. While the plan was financially successful for the Dutch, serious abuses in the administration of the program began to create conditions of distress among the Javanese peasants; the human tendency to profiteer became evident in the Netherlands Ministry for the Colonies. Advocating, as it did, government supervision of land, this program operated to the disadvantage of the Netherlands Indies in that Western private enterprise was kept out of the country and the economic development of the area was thus retarded.13

While the Culture System did result in the introduction of many new export crops which ultimately benefited the islands economically, by 1850 the economic deficiencies of the System had become apparent; in addition, liberals opposed the System on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the economic principles of the liberal trend of thought which was then prevalent in the Netherlands. "In the long run...there was no escape from the conclusion that the principles of Liberalism were irreconcilable with a system of government enterprises based on compulsory labor and trade monopolies."14

Conditions in Netherlands India were brought to the attention of the Dutch public in 1860 when Edward Douwer Dekker, a former East Indies official, published his novel, Max Havelaar.

14Vlekke, op. cit., pp. 156-160.
In 1901 a coalition ministry composed of the representatives of three Christian parties came to power in the Netherlands. In the same year the Netherlands Government issued an important statement embodying the change in policy: "As a Christian power, the Netherlands is obligated in the East Indian Archipelago to imbue the whole conduct of the Government with the consciousness that the Netherlands has a moral duty to fulfill with respect to the people of those regions." In 1905 this policy was implemented by a forty million guilder loan which was paid by the Netherlands treasury to that of the Indies Government so that funds might be made available in the Indies for the improvement of economic conditions on Java and Madura.

As stated above, prior to the 1890's the Dutch had not attempted to penetrate the vast territories of the islands, outside of Java, with their administration. By the turn of the century, however, several factors combined to force an abandonment of this policy of "non-penetration." The planters who inhabited the east coast of Sumatra, which had become the center of a thriving European agricultural industry, were demanding more effective administration. Another factor of major importance was fear of foreign intervention and a growing uneasiness over the fierce out-break of economic imperialism in the Far East. The task of

18Vlekke, op. cit., p. 175.
establishing Dutch control over these areas was entrusted to Governor-General van Heutz; a few years earlier General van Heutz had successfully prosecuted a war against the Achehnese, a fanatical tribe of aborigines who inhabit the northern tip of Sumatra. Between 1900 and 1912, and particularly during the period between 1904-1909, effective Dutch control was established over most of the Outer Territories. In addition, van Heutz's administration marked the first serious attempt to lay the basis for a popular educational system; van Heutz also introduced measures designed to promote the economic development of the Indonesians.19

Prior to Dutch rule the archipelago was divided into innumerable small states and this condition made possible the conquests of the Portuguese and later those of the Dutch. Before 1596 there had been a great deal of similarity between the situation in the islands and that of feudalistic Europe of the Middle Ages. However, the long period of Dutch rule resulted in integration in many spheres; this integration finally resulted in the development of a feeling of unity among the Indonesian peoples and eventually gave rise to a nationalist movement.20

In 1908 Indonesian nationalism was first expressed in an organized and institutionalized manner when Dr. Waidin Soedira Cesada, a retired medical subordinate, founded the first Indonesian nationalist society, Boedi Oetomo (the

19Vandenbosch, op. cit., p. 65.

20Vandenbosch, op. cit., in L. A. Mills, op. cit., p. 82.
Glorious Endeavor. This organization, which was originally composed of Javanese intellectuals, had at first only a social, economic, and cultural program, but later it also entered the political field. This society, however, has never been a popular movement, working chiefly among those who have obtained a Western education. By virtue of these facts it has, on the whole, exercised a moderating influence on nationalist activities.21

Shortly after the formation of Boedi Oetomo another political society was formed, Sarekat Islam. The primary cause for the formation of this society was the depressed conditions in the batik industry in central Java. For the most part the depression had been caused by competition from foreign countries. While the principal element in the formation of Sarekat Islam was economic, a religious element was introduced in order to secure popular support for the movement. Had Sarekat Islam confined its activities to the economic field, it probably would have remained primarily a middle-class party. The founders of the movement recognized this fact and appealed to the only common element in Javanese life--Islamism--in order to secure the interest of the masses and thus create a wide popular base for the movement.22

In general, the program of Sarekat Islam embodied a twofold purpose—the promotion of economic welfare and the advancement of the interests of Islam. In connection with

21Turnivall, op. cit., p. 243.
22Vandenbosch, op. cit., p. 317.
the latter purpose, the movement not only wished to keep the people true to Mohammedanism, but also to oppose all wrong conceptions of the religion of the Prophet. At the first congress of Sarekat Islam, held in 1913, expressions of loyalty to the Netherlands were made, but the congress also passed a resolution calling for the evolutionary establishment of a self-governing Indonesia within the Dutch empire. By 1917, when the second congress of the party was held, a much more radical spirit had become apparent; by this time independence had become the primary goal of the movement. While they professed the desire to obtain this independence by parliamentary means, if peaceful activities failed, the leaders implied that the party would then know what course of action to follow. Within a short time this new spirit began to express itself in action; in 1918 the personnel of the government pawnshops went on strike out of sympathy for a discharged pawnshop official.

The third party congress, held in October, 1918, embodied a new and still more radical trend as the leadership of Sarekat Islam began to take on the character of doctrinaire socialism. This was evidenced by the facts that the party propaganda had now singled out capitalism as the major enemy and the class struggle was given increasing emphasis.23

A third facet of the nationalist movement was reflected in the Indian party. This party, which was organized in 1912, was composed of both Eurasians and Indonesians; the party's

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23 Ibid., p. 318.
platform was based on an appeal for a brotherhood of these two groups for an independent East Indies. However, the early leadership of this movement was very radical and, as a result, in 1914 three of its leaders were exiled. This action quelled the radical element in the party and it continued a more peaceful existence under the name of Insulinde. 24

In December, 1916, the Volksraad, the central legislative body, was created as a concession to the nationalists. Its functions were only advisory and its powers extremely limited, a fact which continually led to fresh demands for constitutional reform. It is not at all surprising that promises and preparations for reform failed to check the nationalist movement. Partially because of the failure of the Netherlands Government to take more positive action on the issue of constitutional reform, the nationalist movement, during the period from 1920 to 1927, began to acquire new and radical tendencies. During this period the nationalist movement fell under the influence of communism; the islands were ripe for communist propaganda at this time as the village, which had been a social and economic unit in itself, was being broken up by the introduction of large-scale

24 Ibid. See Rupert Emerson, "An Analysis of Nationalism in Southeast Asia," Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 5, February, 1946, pp. 208-215. Mr. Emerson discusses some of the characteristics of nationalism and the implication of increasing nationalism in regard to the hope for a peaceful and cooperating world. This entire issue of the Far Eastern Quarterly is devoted to the Netherlands Indies and includes articles on such subjects as natural resources, population problems, cross currents of culture, the problem of minority groups, objectives of the Japanese occupation, as well as an analysis of nationalism.
European cultures. With the breaking up of the village system, governmental functions became more and more centralized; whereas formerly civil servants had kept themselves constantly informed on local problems and grievances and had promptly sought their solution, under the new centralized system, local grievances went unnoticed and uncorrected. The communists utilized and exploited all of these local grievances as much as possible.

Following World War I a number of labor unions were established and from 1920 to 1927 fostered a series of strikes in Java and Sumatra. During this period Dutch and native communists attempted to take over the labor unions and political societies. Within the span of a few years they were able to secure the positions of leadership in local chapters of Sarekat Islam; however, they were defeated in their attempt to take over control of the central leadership of the party. In 1925 the party ejected the communists and prohibited any of its members from joining the Communist Party. However, this victory for the moderates was a hollow one; the power of the leaders of Sarekat Islam had been completely undermined and the party never regained its former prestige or membership.25

25 For a history of Indonesian politics, see G. McT. Kahin, "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism," pp. 73-196, in Asian Nationalism and the West, edited by W. L. Holland. Mr. Kahin deals with a study of major Indonesian political organizations and their programs up to the transfer of sovereignty in part one of his article. In part two he covers the political developments since the transfer of sovereignty to May, 1952.
After their expulsion from the party, the doctrinaire radicals and communists went into the labor union movement and organized a rival society to Sarekat Islam. In addition to the rival society, which was called Sarekat Rayat Merah (Red Proletariat League), the communist leaders organized a Red Trade Union Secretariat for Indonesia and this organization was apparently affiliated with the headquarters of the Red Trade Union International at Moscow. Communist activity caused a series of bitter strikes and culminated in a number of simultaneous armed and violent disturbances in Java and Sumatra in November, 1926, and again in January, 1927. The Dutch, now convinced that the radical trend in the nationalist movement was communist inspired, took steps to repress such movements by establishing an internment camp in the heart of New Guinea and by deporting to this camp over a thousand communists and their families. It seems to be quite probable that the suppression of the communist outbreaks definitely ended that trend in the nationalist movement which sought after and hoped for aid from foreign sources. Since 1927 the nationalist movement has thrown off outside influences and has assumed a more purely nationalist character.26

Another phase of the nationalist movement manifested itself in the establishment of so-called "wild schools"; these schools were maintained by nationalist groups rather than by the government. The sponsors quite understandably

26 Ibid., pp. 319-323.
refused government aid in order to remain free from official regulation. The object of the nationalists in establishing these schools was to provide a strongly Indonesian, nationalist training for the people of the islands and to raise the level of development of the masses. Quite obviously, students played leading roles in the development and maintenance of this movement.

Closely allied to this movement, in spirit at least, was the establishment of study groups by Indonesian intellectuals during the mid-1920's for the purpose of discussing social and political questions. Some of these clubs developed into new political parties and acquired large memberships. Probably the most prominent of these was the Bandung Study Club which, in 1927, became the Partai Nasional Indonesia; the first leader of this party was Sukarno, who became the President of the Republic of Indonesia two decades later. The basic principle of the party was embodied in a policy of non-cooperation with the Dutch; the party's method of achieving its ends was largely built around nationalist mass action.

In the latter months of 1929 the nationalist movement again threatened to go over to violence, and the Governor-General was forced to take action against the nationalists. As a result, the Netherlands Government dissolved the Partai Nasional Indonesia in that year and arrested Sukarno, who was then interned on the island of Flores and later at Benkoeuen on Sumatra. In addition to Sukarno, the Netherlands Government arrested and prosecuted several more leaders
of the party. This prosecution resulted in the ejection of the Partai Nasional Indonesia from the realm of political activity, at least for the time being.27

In December, 1928, the major political parties, largely through the efforts of the leaders of the Partai Nasional Indonesia, were organized into a federation of nationalist societies. However, by the summer of 1930 a major breach had developed between the Partai Sarekat Islam and the other member societies of the federation which were religiously neutral. The dispute became so bitter that toward the end of 1930 the Islamic society decided to withdraw from the federation.28

The rapid rise of the nationalist movement in the East Indies produced a very definite reaction in European circles. In 1929 this reaction manifested itself in the organization of the Vaderlandsche Club which championed the interests of the European population in the East Indies and also maintained the belief in the inviolability of the empire. In 1932 the nationalist leader in the Volksraad announced that the nationalist coalition had changed its objective from the creation of an autonomous Indonesia to the creation of an independent Indonesia.29

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29Ibid., pp. 333-334.
As a generalization, it may be said that the nationalist movement experienced a definite slowing down after 1930. This was caused, for the most part, by two conditions. The first was the depression which gravely affected the economy of the islands as it did the rest of the world. The depression made nationalist activity extremely difficult to carry on because of the lack of funds. The second condition was the vigorous repressive measures which the East Indies Government invoked against the revolutionary tendencies of nationalist activities. This action, of course, operated to keep many natives from joining nationalist societies for fear of reprisals. However, by the mid-1930's the movement had been revived, but on a cooperative rather than a revolutionary basis. The rise of fascism and national socialism abroad, and particularly the ever-growing threat of Japan, had not gone unnoticed by the nationalist leaders; consequently, they began to see the advantages of cooperating with the Dutch.

In mid-1936, however, the hopes of the moderate nationalists for evolutionary self-government received a set-back. In 1936 a majority of the Volksraad had passed a resolution calling for a conference to be convened to discuss plans for the evolutionary development toward self-government for the Indies over a ten-year period within the limits of the existing Dutch Constitution. The Netherlands Government rejected this proposal and in doing so disillusioned a number

of Indonesians who had previously maintained that a policy
of moderation and cooperation with the Dutch provided a sure,
if slow, road toward self-government. Had not the threat of
Fascism been so imminent, a strongly militant nationalism
might have developed. Faced with the existing situation,
the Gerindo, a new party which had been formed in 1937 and
had gained power rapidly to become the powerful left-wing
of the nationalist movement, generally cooperated with the
Dutch, but made clear that if cooperation between Holland
and Indonesia against Fascism was to be effective, it must
be on the basis of equality.31

In February, 1940, the Volksraad passed the Wiwoho
Resolution calling once again for self-government within
the framework of the Netherlands Constitution. This
resolution proposed expanding the membership of the Volksraad,
making department heads of the Netherlands Indies Government
responsible to this body, and a revising of the powers of
the Governor-General. The reply of the Netherlands Govern-
ment, which was not received until three months after the
German occupation of the Netherlands had taken place, stated
that its general attitude was that no political reforms could
be considered until post-war restoration of the mother
country's government had taken place. Shortly after the
rejection of the Wiwoho Resolution the Netherlands Government
notified the Volksraad, in answer to a question from that

31 C. T. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,
body, that the acceptance by the Netherlands of the Atlantic Charter, which contained a pledge of the right of self-determination for all people, in no way affected the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia.

These two actions on the part of the Netherlands Government resulted in a rapid break-down of the Indonesian-Dutch solidarity which had been created by the threat of Fascism. While a small number of influential leaders of the nationalist movement remained convinced of the evils of Fascism, they were not able to check the growing conviction of the masses that a Japanese invasion would actually mean the liberation of the islands. Consequently, when the Japanese did invade in February and March of 1942, they were generally received with enthusiasm.32

During the first few months of occupation, the Japanese operated under the illusion that they would encounter no real difficulty with the nationalist leaders and that they, therefore, could exploit the country to the benefit of Japan's war effort without making any concessions to Indonesian nationalism. However, economic exploitation and the frequent brutality of the Japanese in their dealings with the Indonesians began to break down the original enthusiasm and to replace it with a strong antagonism. By the end of 1942 a few small-scale insurrections had broken out so that the Japanese began to realize that Indonesian nationalism was a real and powerful force with which some sort

32Ibid., pp. 98-102.
of modus vivendi would have to be reached if they expected to achieve even the minimum aims of their occupation. Consequently, the Japanese got in contact with the nationalist leaders in an attempt to secure popular support for Japan's war efforts. The Japanese promised that self-government would be granted in the near future and, on 9 March 1943, sanctioned the creation of an all-inclusive nationalist organization, known as the Poetera. While the Japanese considered the Poetera primarily as a means of securing popular support for their war effort, the nationalist leaders used it chiefly as an instrument for spreading and intensifying nationalist feelings among the masses and for securing concessions toward self-government from the Japanese. The nationalist leaders used the Poetera primarily to work toward their own long-term nationalist aims, and only secondarily to achieve the Japanese war aims. There seems to be little doubt that the activities of this organization resulted in an increased political consciousness among the Indonesian masses, particularly in regard to their desire for independence.33

33See Australian Paper No. 1, Dependencies and Trusteeship in the Pacific Area; this paper was prepared by a study group of the Australian Institute of International Affairs in 1947. This group noted that "the Indonesian nationalists who collaborated with the Japanese in putting up the false facade used the opportunity to strengthen the foundations of a stronger policy directed ultimately against both Japanese and Dutch." This paper deals with colonial policy and economic development, problems of assimilation, Asiatic nationalism, and the effect of the Japanese occupation upon the various independence movements of Southeast Asia.
In September, 1943, a Japanese trained, Indonesian-officered military organization, known as the Peta, was established to help the Japanese defend Indonesia against Allied invasion. At the peak of its strength, which was reached in the middle of 1945, the Peta numbered about 120,000 armed men. It was the Peta which formed the backbone of the army of the Republic of Indonesia.

By the end of 1943 the Japanese realized that the Poetera was serving the purposes of the Indonesian nationalists to a far greater extent than it was the Japanese war effort. Consequently, they dissolved the Poetera and in its place, on 1 March 1944, set up a new organization, Diawa Hokokai, which was maintained compulsorily. This organization did not win popular support, nor did an all-inclusive Islamic organization which was created subsequently.

In mid-1944 the Japanese established an organization for educated young men from about twenty to thirty years of age which was closely controlled. Indonesians suspected of underground activities were forced to assume positions of leadership in this organization; in this way the Japanese hoped to curtail the activities of the major Indonesian leaders. However, in October, 1944, after Premier Koise's announcement that Indonesia would be granted its independence in the very near future, Japanese policy underwent a change. The Japanese army relaxed its controls over the Hokokai and nationalist leaders were allowed to talk of independence to
a far greater extent, and were required to infuse less pro-Japanese sentiments in their speeches. In late 1944 three Indonesians were appointed as residents in Java and Madura and in the remaining residencies of these two islands Indonesian sub-residents were appointed. In actuality these residencies were administered by the Indonesian sub-residents rather than by the Japanese residents.

On 1 March 1945 the Japanese sanctioned the establishment of the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence for Java and Madura. On 25 July 1945 a similar committee was set up on Sumatra. On 17 August 1945, two days after the Japanese had accepted the Potsdam Agreement as a basis for surrender, Sukarno and Hatta met with the members of the Preparatory Committee to draw up a declaration of independence. After some discussion, the text was decided upon and the contents of the declaration were broadcast over the entire Indonesian radio and telegraph network. The Indonesian nationalist movement was once more in the open and moving towards its goal of independence.34

34Ibid., pp. 103-136.
CHAPTER II

THE REVOLUTION
UP TO
THE LINGGAUDIOTI AGREEMENT

On 29 September 1945 British troops landed in Batavia to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces in accordance with the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement and to release Allied prisoners and personnel interned on the islands. Several weeks prior to this, however, on 3 September, Lord Louis Mountbatten, Allied Commander for the Southeast Pacific Area, had charged the Japanese with the duty of maintaining law and order as well as the duty of maintaining the status quo pending the arrival of British troops. In implementation of this order, Mountbatten also ordered the Japanese forces to disband the Republic of Indonesia which had been proclaimed on 17 August 1945. By the time that this order was issued, however, the Republic was a functioning, if untested, organization; in addition, Japanese arms had been quite widely distributed among the population and, as a consequence, extremists and lawless elements had secured arms along with the rest of the natives.¹

In general, the rapid establishment of the Republican Government may be attributed to the fact that the Japanese were convinced (and the eloquent arguments of newly-elected President Sukarno materially aided in strengthening this conviction) that any attempt to halt or suppress the nationalistic independence movement and the rise of the new government would inevitably lead to a bloody struggle. While the Japanese might have won the fight, such a victory would have been achieved only at the cost of heavy casualties. Consequently, the Japanese attempted to avoid a direct clash with the Indonesian revolutionists; as a result, their policy prior to the arrival of Allied troops was one characterized by uncertainty and compromise. While the Japanese did take vigorous steps toward stopping the growth of Indonesian military power they were unable to halt the mass movement of civilian functionaries to the services of the Republic. The latter situation was, of course, due to the fact, noted in the previous chapter, that Indonesians had been installed as residents and sub-residents on the islands of Java and Madura prior to the Japanese surrender at Potsdam.\(^2\)

While the British forces came to the Indies for only two major purposes, both primarily military in nature (1) accepting the surrender of, disarming, and repatriating some 283,000 Japanese troops and (2) liberating over 200,000 Dutch and Allied prisoners of war and internees) it rapidly became apparent that these aims could not be achieved without

\(^2\)Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-139.
dealing with the political situation in the islands. Britain was faced on the one hand by a nationalistic feeling among the Indonesians which could easily become a militant movement and on the other by the danger that British support of the as yet unrecognized Republic would almost certainly alienate Holland and perhaps provoke her opposition to Britain in the United Nations Security Council. 3

As it turned out, the attempts of the British to maintain a neutral policy, in respect of the political relations of these two groups, had the temporary effect of antagonizing both sides. The Dutch found the British policy toward the Indonesian leaders to be highly objectionable. Immediately upon his arrival in Batavia, Lieutenant General Sir P. A. Christison, Commander of the Allied Forces in the Netherlands East Indies (A.F.N.E.I.), issued a proclamation stating that he intended, first, to ask the present party leaders for their support and, second, in view of the extremely limited number of British troops in the Netherlands East Indies, to allow the present Indonesian leaders and authorities to retain responsibility for the government in areas under their control. This proclamation was galling to the Dutch because of the implied recognition of Indonesian authorities and party members which it carried. The Dutch, of course, did not want any type of recognition to be extended, either officially or unofficially. 4

3Charles Wolfe, Jr., The Indonesian Story, pp. 18-19.
4Ibid., p. 19.
The Indonesians, at first, did not oppose the landing of British troops and, following the landings, cooperated with the British by running the civil administration, public utilities, and by maintaining law and order. When Dutch and Ambonese troops, which had been interned on the islands during the war were released and attached to the Dutch contingent of A.F.N.E.I., the nationalist leaders immediately demanded that no new Dutch troops should be permitted to land until the Republic had been recognized. However, in the early part of October, 1945, two small companies of Dutch volunteer combat troops landed and they were followed by personnel of the hated Netherlands Indies Civil Administration. This action immediately touched off a heated condemnation of British policy by the Indonesian leaders because the arrival of Dutch troops had been authorized by the British.5

To add to the gravity of the situation, the British, prior to the landing of Dutch troops, had stated that Netherlands law would be applied and enforced by Netherlands administrative officers. Further, General Christison declared that Japanese troops would be used on a temporary basis to maintain law and order. The Republican leaders continually warned the British that the situation, particularly after the landing of new Dutch troops, was becoming critical.6 In addition to the mere presence of Dutch troops, the activities of these troops further incensed the population. Following

5Ibid., p. 20.
6Kahin, op. cit., p. 142.
the arrival of the Dutch General van Oyen, a number of "incidents" occurred which were caused by "trigger-happy" patrols of Dutch and Ambonese troops. Then too, the nationalists were informed that any outbreak on their part would be dealt with immediately by the occupying authorities.7

These elements of dissension operated to convince the Indonesians that their independence was being threatened. This apprehension on the part of the nationalists culminated in armed attacks upon Dutch and British patrols and an intensified effort to secure more arms from the Japanese.8

On 4 November 1945, Brigadier Mallaby, the British commander who had been negotiating with local Indonesian authorities, was killed in Surabaya. The British did not have sufficient troop strength to undertake immediate retaliatory action. On 9 November however, General Mansergh, who had succeeded Mallaby, ordered the Indonesians to surrender their arms or the British would take offensive action against them for the purpose of establishing law and order. This action was initiated the following day as it was evident that the ultimatum would not be complied with by the irregular armed bands which were responsible for the terror. The resulting Battle of Surabaya cost the British several hundred casualties (which included casualties among Indian troops); however, several thousand of the irregular nationalist

8Kahin, op. cit., p. 144.
troops were killed. In Bandung British losses were smaller because of the larger concentration of British troops there.9

As a part of the plan of battle against the Indonesian extremists, the Allied Command ordered Japanese troops, under Japanese commanders, to attack and recapture Indonesian-held cities. This action not only increased the ill-feeling which the Indonesians held against the British and Dutch, but also brought a storm of protest from the rest of the world.10

The Battle of Surabaya served notice on the British that unless they were willing to undertake a major military campaign in Indonesia, they would have to establish some sort of a modus vivendi with the leaders of the Republic. Consequently, the British began to assume an unfavorable attitude toward the Dutch refusal to deal with the Republic and they applied pressure on the Dutch to negotiate some sort of a peaceful compromise.11

With the beginning of the new year the situation began to improve. On 10 February 1946 the Lieutenant Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies, after a trip to Holland, began a new series of discussions with the Indonesian delegation, which was headed by the Republican Prime Minister, Sjahrir. The Dutch had agreed to negotiate

10 Kahin, op. cit., pp. 144-145.
11 Ibid.
even though they still refused to accept Sukarno and Hatta because of their "collaboration" with the Japanese during the war.12

United Nations Action

The situation in Indonesia was first brought to the attention of the Security Council at the second meeting of that body on 25 January 1946. At this meeting the President of the Security Council brought to the notice of the Council a communication from the head of the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic dealing with the situation in Indonesia; the item was then included on the agenda.13

The above-mentioned communication was brought up for discussion at the 12th meeting of the Council on 7 February 1946. At that time the Ukrainian representative, after citing various newspaper reports as support for his contention


13Security Council, Official Records, First Year: First Series, Number 1, From the First Meeting (17 January 1946) to the Twenty-Third Meeting (16 February 1946), pp. 15-19. This letter, which was dated 21 January 1946, stated that military operations had been directed against the Indonesian population for a number of months and, that in addition to regular British troops, "Japanese enemy forces" were also being used in the operation. The Ukrainian Government was of the opinion that this situation constituted a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security as described in Article 34 of the Charter, that the Security Council should carry out necessary investigations, and that appropriate measures should be taken to put an end to the situation. (Security Council, Official Records, First Year: First Series, Supplement Number 1, Annex 4, p. 76.)
that a dangerous situation existed, leveled the charge at
the United Kingdom that British troops, along with Japanese
contingents, were being used to suppress Indonesian nationalists.
The Ukrainian delegate did not question the right of British
troops to be in Indonesia, but he maintained that their use
"for the suppression of the national movement of the
Indonesian people is inadmissible." Mr. Manuilsky then
stated that the appropriate thing for the Security Council
to do, with the Indonesian question at its present stage,
would be to create a special commission for the purpose of
conducting an on-the-spot investigation and re-establishing
the peace.14

In answer to this charge the British representative,
Mr. Bevin, pointed out that, because of an inadequate
intelligence service, the British had sent only a limited
force to Indonesia. He further stated that the British,
when they arrived in Java and Surabaya, never fired a shot,
but were fired upon and some British soldiers were killed.
Mr. Bevin then pointed out that General Mallaby had been
assassinated while he was signing a truce with the leaders
of the nationalist movement; such action (referring to the
truce) could hardly be construed in such a manner as to support
the contention that British military authorities were attack­
ing the Indonesian movement. He closed by observing that,
in his opinion, if the United Nations wished to help settle
the problem in Indonesia, the proper approach would not be

14Security Council, Official Records, op. cit., pp. 174-
to send another commission there, but rather to urge the parties already in negotiation "to bend their energies to effect a settlement."\textsuperscript{15}

Mr. van Kleffens of the Netherlands, after noting the commission of a number of atrocities in the islands, declared that the action of British troops could not fairly be termed to be a "military action", but was rather in the nature of police protection. The Netherlands delegate maintained that no situation existed in Indonesia which endangered international peace, that no dispute existed, and consequently, that no case existed with which the Security Council was competent to deal because the matter was a domestic issue.\textsuperscript{16}

At the following meeting on 9 February 1946 the Ukrainian representative reiterated his charges concerning the use of British and Japanese troops as instruments for suppressing Indonesian nationalism. He insisted, on behalf of his delegation, that the principle of self-determination which is embodied in the Charter be applied to the people of Indonesia and he requested once again that a special commission be created.\textsuperscript{17}

The British representative maintained that Holland was the recognized sovereign power in Indonesia and consequently the Indonesian situation constituted an internal matter with which the Security Council was not competent to concern itself.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 178-182.

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 182-187.

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 188-193.
He declared that any other treatment of the problem would set a precedent which would have repercussions over a very wide field. During the course of his speech he pointed out that at the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs he had "suggested an enquiry into the troubles in Bulgaria and Roumania" but that the Soviet Government had stated "that they were sovereign Powers and it was declines." Mr. Devin believed that the same principle was applicable in this case.18

The Netherlands delegate closed the session with a speech in which he questioned the Ukrainian delegate's reference to a "one-sided" war. He stated that, to the best of his knowledge, the native forces included approximately 80,000 men who were well-armed and equipped. Mr. van Kleffens also reaffirmed his stand that the British troops were not engaged in a struggle with the Indonesian people but, rather, were concerned with subduing armed bands which were attempting to prevent Allied forces from carrying out their orders.19

The next day at the 14th meeting of the Council, Mr. Vyshinsky, head of the USSR delegation, supported the Ukrainian oral proposal for the creation of a special investigating committee. He maintained that the rebuttals of the British and Netherlands delegations were not supported by fact. The Soviet delegate suggested that British, and to a lesser extent Dutch, opposition to the investigating commission was based upon the fact that both of these countries

18 Ibid., pp. 193-196.
19 Ibid., pp. 196-198.
have special business interests in Indonesia. In conclusion Mr. Vyshinsky stated that the use of Japanese troops was a direct breach of the agreement which had been reached by the Allies, under which General MacArthur issued the order for Japanese troops to surrender unconditionally and be disarmed.20

The 15th meeting of the Security Council, also held on 10 February, brought nothing new in so far as the various attitudes of the members were concerned. Mr. Bevin merely re-stated the fact that British commanders had been in contact with Sukarno in an attempted conciliation before trouble broke out between the Indonesians and British troops, while Mr. Van Kleffens again acknowledged that military action was being carried on in Indonesia, but denied that it was being directed against the Indonesian nationalist movement as such; it was, according to Mr. Van Kleffens, being directed against extremists over whom the nationalists, by their own admission, had little control.21

On 11 February 1946, the delegate representing the Ukrainian SSR, after some debate upon his authority to do so, submitted a resolution calling for the establishment of a commission composed of representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. This commission would carry out an on-the-spot investigation in order to get a factual picture of the

20 Ibid., pp. 199-209.
21 Ibid., pp. 216-219.
situation in Indonesia and it would then report to the Security Council on the result of its work.22

Following the introduction of the Ukrainian resolution, the delegate representing the United States, Mr. Stettinius, stated that, in view of the fact that negotiations were already being carried on between the Netherlands Government and the Indonesian leaders, the best hope for settlement would lie in the prompt and successful completion of such negotiations. Consequently, the Council should take no action which would introduce new complications which, in turn, might prejudice or retard the completion of the negotiations. In the opinion of the United States delegation the appointment of a commission such as the one proposed by the Ukrainian delegate would have the aforementioned effect. Mr. Stettinius added, somewhat parenthetically, that the general view of the United States in regard to any fact-finding or investigating commissions which might be created by the Council was that such bodies should be composed of impartial persons chosen on the basis of their competence and who would represent the Security Council as an international body rather than their individual countries. The United States representative closed by saying that he believed it would be appropriate for the Council to express the hope that the disarmament and repatriation of Japanese troops might be promptly carried out.23

22 Ibid., pp. 223, 232.
23 Ibid., pp. 235-237.
In general, the USSR, Mexico, and Poland were in favor of sending the commission to Indonesia. The representative of the United Kingdom flatly declared that "he would refuse to be a party to the commission." The Netherlands representative maintained his view that he would not oppose creating a commission which would deal only with the question of the conduct of British troops in Indonesia, but that he would refuse to accept a commission "which would busy itself with matters within domestic jurisdiction." 24

On 12 February the Egyptian delegate submitted a proposal, at the 17th meeting of the Council, stating, in effect, that under no circumstances should British troops be used against the Indonesian nationalist movement. It urged that the British troops be withdrawn from Indonesia as soon as their strictly limited objectives were accomplished. The resolution also declared that the Council wished to be informed of the results of the negotiations being carried on between the Indonesians and the Netherlands Government. The Council, of course, reserved the right to take such further action as it might deem necessary and proper. 25

The Indonesian question was considered for the last time in 1946 on 13 February at the 18th meeting of the Council. At that meeting the Ukrainian proposal was put to a vote and it was rejected as there were only two votes in favor of the measure. The representative of the USSR then submitted an

amendment to the Egyptian proposal calling for the creation and dispatch of a commission which would be composed of representatives of China, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR. This amendment was defeated with only Mexico, Poland, and the USSR voting in favor of it. The Egyptian proposal itself was then put to a vote and it was also rejected as only two representatives voted.26

As stated above, in February, 1946, discussions were opened between the Indonesian delegation and the Dutch Lieutenant Governor General. However, in addition to this peaceful attempt to reach a solution, the Dutch also employed the services of the now notorious Captain Westerling and ordered him to "pacify" the areas in rebellion against the Dutch. Republican reports and those of the Dutch differ a great deal as to the number of casualties inflicted by Westerling. Republican authorities asserted that nearly 30,000 Indonesians, civilians as well as guerrillas, were executed by his firing squads, or otherwise killed. On the other hand, official Dutch sources reported that only 4,000 were killed. While the Netherlands Government did appoint a commission to look into the alleged brutalities of Dutch troops, no report was ever published.27

Although, according to the Civil Administration Agreement of 28 August 1945, the Supreme Allied Commander of the re-occupying forces was authorized to exercise final

26Ibid., pp. 257-263.
27Kahin, op. cit., p. 145.
local authority over all branches of the Netherlands Indies Government in matters of a military nature, the Dutch Lieutenant Governor General retained his position as the top authority in purely civil matters. His actions, however, were required to conform to military orders. The British Commander-in-Chief was empowered to inform the Dutch Lieutenant Governor General when and the extent to which the military situation would allow responsibility for the civil administration to be resumed by the Netherlands Indies Government. Consequently, as the military situation became relatively quiet in 1946, the Dutch Civil Administration was authorized to assume an increased scope of responsibility, although remaining ultimately responsible to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of A.F.N.E.I.\(^{28}\)

As a result of the situation noted above, by July, 1946, the Dutch had almost completely re-established their control and authority in Borneo, the Celebes, and the islands east of Java. With the return of the Dutch to these areas, economic rehabilitation was undertaken and, in general, progressed quite rapidly.\(^{29}\)

The Malino Conference

In July 1946 a conference between the Dutch and representatives of the islands east of Java—an area known to the Dutch as the Outer Islands—was convened in Malino in the


Celebes. The purpose of this conference, which had been summoned by Dr. van Mook, who at that time was Lieutenant Governor General of Netherlands India, was the inauguration of some form of representative government in the Outer Islands. Prior to this time this area had been under direct or indirect Dutch administration.

The results of this conference were embodied in three principal decisions which were unanimously adopted. The first of these called for the organization of a United Indonesia, to be known as Sarekat Indonesia, on a federal basis. This federation was later to be expanded to include both Java and Sumatra. The second decision called for the maintenance of lasting cooperation between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The final decision stated that self-government was to be established within all of the component units of the federation. The first and third decisions constitute at least partial evidence of the fear felt by the Outer Territories that they and their interests would be subordinated to those of Java and Sumatra in a United Indonesia established on any basis other than that of federalism. It was for these reasons that Dr. van Mook, in his opening speech at Malino completely and deliberately rejected the idea held by the Republic of a

30 Barbara Whittingham-Jones, "The Malino Conference and After," The Asiatic Review, Vol. XLII, October, 1946, p. 371. Miss Whittingham-Jones, in discussing the Outer Islands, states that the feeling of nationalism in that area is as deep and sturdy as that found in Java. However, the nationalism of the Outer Islands is less doctrinaire than its counter-part in Java and hence is more realistic. The leaders from the Outer Islands specifically acknowledged the necessity of cooperating with the Dutch, at least during the interim period prior to the transfer of sovereignty.
unitary State which would be ruled from Java. It was also at least partially because of the Republican ideal of a unitary state that the Netherlands considered the Republic to be composed of radicals with whom negotiation was very difficult.

In regard to the nature of the relationship which would exist between Indonesia Sarekat and the Netherlands, the conference drew up a formal resolution which declared that this relationship should be described and defined in a statute; this statute would also include provisions for the establishment of separate constitutions for the Netherlands and for Indonesia. Another resolution was concerned with the problem as to whether Indonesia would remain under Dutch hegemony or declare herself to be completely sovereign and independent. This problem was not solved, but a resolution was adopted under which a final decision on the matter was postponed until after a ten-year trial period or period of transition. According to the resolution, during this time United Indonesia would be able to create the necessary political, economic, social and cultural, and governmental structures and institutions which would be necessary in order to make a "free and independent decision." 31

While the great majority of the delegates at the Malino Conference expressed a desire to remain within the Dutch Empire as an equal partner with the Netherlands, a minority maintained that the relationship should be established

31 Ibid., p. 372.
by treaty rather than by statute. This point of view was, of course, almost identical with the one which was held by the leaders of the Republic.32

The British Withdrawal

On 15 October 1946 a truce was negotiated between the British and the Dutch on the one hand and the Indonesians on the other. Under the terms of this truce, which was designed to allow the British to withdraw their troops from the islands, lines of demarcation were established around the bridgeheads, which now became Dutch fortifications as they had been British. Neither side was to conduct offensive operations beyond these lines; however, in practice, both sides violated this part of the agreement. In addition, the Indonesians agreed to the landing of additional Dutch troops. The maximum number was set as that of the total number of Dutch and British troops which had been in the archipelago on 15 October when the truce had been concluded. In accordance with this provision, British-trained Dutch troops arrived until the 92,000 joint total was reached; in addition, the British turned over their surplus war materiel to the Dutch replacements. On 30 November 1946, the last of the British troops were withdrawn from Batavia. Consequently, A.F.N.E.I.

32Ibid. Miss Whittingham-Jones stressed the importance of the Malino Conference as a step in the right direction, an importance which does not seem to have been borne out by later events. She gives most of the credit for the success of the Malino Conference to Dr. van Mook, who was the guiding force behind the Conference.
was officially disbanded and military control passed over to the Dutch.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{Events Leading to the Linggadjati Agreement}

The negotiations between the Dutch and the Republicans, though they were protracted, finally led to positive results. There were several factors which led to the agreement between the Republic and the Netherlands to resume negotiation early in 1946. Among the more prominent was the fact that Republican leaders realized that their leadership in trained administrative and professional personnel was very weak; in addition, they knew that there was not sufficient capital in the country to provide for its economic development. Both sides realized that they stood to gain from a settlement which would ensure the maintenance of good relations as well as the continuation of Dutch technical and financial assistance.\textsuperscript{34} The British, anxious to withdraw from Indonesia had informed the Dutch that the withdrawal of British troops would be commenced by the end of November, 1946. In this and other ways the British exerted great pressure on the Netherlands to come to an agreement with the Republic. This pressure, combined with the attitude of progressive Dutch elements toward making realistic concessions to the Indonesians, led to the initialing of the Linggadjati Agreement on 15 November,\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{33}Wolf, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 24-25.

\textsuperscript{34}Brookings Institution, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 360.
1946, by the Dutch Commission-General in Indonesia and the Republic.35

The negotiations, which had been primarily carried on between Sjahrlr and van Mook, were begun in early 1946. However, the discussions were suspended when the Schermerhorn cabinet resigned on 21 May. Van Mook, of course, felt it necessary to abstain from further formal negotiations either until he received a new mandate or until the new political line-up and policy in Holland had been clarified. In June, 1946, an attempted coup d'etat against the Sukarno-Sjahrlr Government delayed negotiations still further. On 2 July a new cabinet was formed in the Netherlands Government; van Mook then proceeded to convene the Malino Conference referred to above.36 On 13 August Sukarno's dictatorship, which he had established in order to combat effectively the attempted coup d'etat after Sjahrlr had been kidnapped, was ended and Sjahrlr was returned to the post of Prime Minister as the head of a new cabinet which included three more members of a strongly rightist Islamic Party than its predecessor had. The Islamic Party tended to favor an antagonistic policy toward Dutch proposals. On 17 August the States-General of the Netherlands Government set up a Commission General to represent it in the negotiations. This commission

35 Kahin, op. cit., p. 196.

36 The resolutions reached at this conference were endorsed at the Pangkal Pinang Conference, which was held in October, by European, Eurasian, Chinese, and Arab racial minorities. Wolf, op. cit., p. 41
was given far reaching powers to negotiate and reach an agreement without having to refer back to the Hague, as van Mook had been required to do. One of the most important events which preceded the initialing of the Linggadjati Agreement was a trip into the interior of Java by a semi-official Dutch mission. This trip, which lasted from 15 September to 20 September, was made at the invitation of the Republic. The report on conditions in the interior which was made by Dr. P. J. Koets, the chief of van Mook's cabinet and head of the mission, was very favorable to the Republic. Coming as it did on the eve of the resumption of negotiations, this report was a major factor in creating the improved atmosphere which prevailed at that time.37

Though the draft Agreement was initialied at Linggadjati, it was not formally signed by the Governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia until 25 March 1947.38 Before it was adopted, however, the Agreement encountered stiff opposition from both the Dutch Government and the Government of the Republic.39

The Linggadjati Agreement (also known as the Cheribon Agreement) provided:

1. That the Netherlands Government recognize the Republic as the de facto authority in Java and Sumatra;40

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38 Kahin, op. cit., p. 206.
2. That the Netherlands and Republican Governments cooperate toward the setting up of a sovereign democratic federal state, the United States of Indonesia, to consist of three states, the Republic of Indonesia, embracing Java and Sumatra, the state of Borneo, and the Great Eastern State;

3. That the Netherlands and Republican Government cooperate toward the formation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, to consist of the Kingdom of the Netherlands--including the Netherlands, Surinam, and Curacao--and the U.S.I., which Union would have as its head the Queen of the Netherlands;

4. That the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and the U.S.I. be formed not later than January 1, 1949, and that the Union set up its own agencies for the regulation of matters of common interest to the member states, specifically foreign affairs, defense, and certain financial and economic policies;

5. Finally, the Agreement provided for a mutual reduction in troop strength and a gradual evacuation of Dutch troops from Republican areas as quickly as possible consistent with the maintenance of law and order, and for the recognition by the Republic of all claims by foreign nationals for the restitution and maintenance of their rights and properties within areas controlled by the republic.41

The Agreement embodied two major defects which were the cause of the rapid break-down of Dutch-Indonesian relations during the period between the conclusion of negotiations in November, 1946, and the final ratification of the Agreement on 25 March 1947. The first of these lay in the fact that the Agreement referred continually to cooperation between the two parties. Unfortunately, there were strong factions on both sides that were not ready for such cooperation. Readiness for cooperation was lacking because of a mutual distrust in the sincerity and trustworthiness of the other.

41Wolf, op. cit., pp. 43-44. The complete English text of the Linggadjati Agreement may be found on page 175 of this book.
In the second place, the Agreement called for a federal United States of Indonesia which was to be composed of three semi-autonomous states. This carried the implication of an equality of areas which has not been, is not, and never will be a fact.42

Even at the time of the signing of the Agreement, both of the parties openly placed different interpretations upon the terms "cooperation" and "federal". For the Dutch, cooperation meant continued leadership and sole responsibility for the formation of the United States of Indonesia, while the Indonesians took it to mean joint responsibility and consultation in the formation of the proposed federation. A similar difference existed in the interpretation of the term "federal". The Netherlands held that it meant equal states cooperating with the Netherlands, while the Republic maintained that a federal United States of Indonesia would not deny the Republic its position of superiority among the islands, based upon its superior political and economic wealth and its maturity.43 In view of the existence of such a situation, it is not difficult to see why the relations of the Republic and the Netherlands suffered a rapid deterioration in the months immediately following the formal signing of the Linggadjati Agreement.

42 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
43 Ibid., p. 46.
CHAPTER III
LINGGADJATI TO RENVILLE

With the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement on 25 March 1947, optimism pervaded the atmosphere in Batavia. This outlook was, however, doomed to a short-lived existence. During the two months which followed the signing of the Agreement alleged violations and breaches of the "spirit of Linggadjati" increased in number, although both the Netherlands Government and the Republic continued to pay lip service to the Agreement.¹

Failure of Negotiations Following Linggadjati

As noted in the preceding chapter, the Linggadjati Agreement left many problems unsolved. Among the more important of these were (1) the question of the power to be exercised by the Crown as head of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, and (2) the controversy between the Republican and non-Republican Indonesians. New disputes arose concerning the trade and commerce restrictions imposed on Indonesia by the Dutch and the presence of Dutch troops on Republican territory.² The situation was further aggravated by Dutch

¹Wolf, op. cit., p. 106.
²Brookings Institution, op. cit., p. 361.
support of the movement toward autonomy in East Indonesia and Borneo, and by the increased program of foreign relations on the part of the Republic. The Indonesians, of course, considered any step toward the establishment of an autonomous East Indonesia or Borneo as a direct violation of the Linggadjati Agreement; the Dutch considered the increased foreign relations of the Republic as evidence that the Republic did not intend to live up to its commitments under the Linggadjati Agreement. In addition to these issues, numerous violations of the cease-fire truce agreement of 14 October 1946 took place and, following Linggadjati, a number of "plots" were discovered which, according to Dutch allegations, involved Republican leaders. These "plots" were supposed to have been designed for the purpose of creating disorder and instigating sabotage in East Indonesia.

Failure to reconcile these differences resulted in a complete impasse. After the Republican cabinet had rejected an agreement, which had been initiated by both parties, calling for the establishment of a joint police force, tension increased and was marked by the burning of bridges and other structures by the Republicans.

In the course of negotiations following the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement, Mr. Sjahrrir, realizing that the Dutch were quite prepared to go to war if their demands were not accepted, agreed to a number of major concessions.

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The more important of these concessions included (1) acceptance of a Dutch-dominated interim government, (2) recognition of the de jure position of the Crown's representatives in such a government, and (3) acquiescence in the control of Indonesian foreign relations by the Netherlands Government during the interim period. The immensity of these concessions operated to weaken Sjahrir's political support in the Republic. The internal situation grew steadily worse until, on 27 June, Sjahrir notified Sukarno of his resignation as Prime Minister. On 3 July a new cabinet was formed with Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin as Prime Minister. This new cabinet went even further in its concessions to Dutch demands than had Sjahrir, but the Dutch were not placated. They continued to demand the establishment of an Indonesian police force which would be jointly manned and controlled and which would operate inside of the Republic. This demand was rejected by Sjarifuddin and the rest of the Republican leaders.

On 18 July discussions were broken off and the already heated atmosphere approached the point of combustion. On 21 July, at the recommendation of van Mook, Dutch troops moved to launch an all-out attack designed to destroy the Republic. The Dutch "police action" was also aimed at securing possession of the commercially most profitable regions of Indonesia, whose possession and control the

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7 *Wolf, op. cit.*, p. 126.
Netherlands had not been able to obtain through the negotiations which had produced the Linggadjati Agreement. The fact that Dutch economic resources were very low while their military strength was at a peak was an important consideration in the Dutch decision to resort to a "police action."8

In instituting military action the Dutch originally maintained that, by their action, they were not abandoning the Linggadjati Agreement. The so-called "police action" was, according to the Netherlands Government, of a temporary nature rendered necessary by the inability of the Republic to maintain law and order. Further, the Dutch maintained that Republican activity, "especially the holding of Dutch hostages, had not been regulated under the Linggadjati Agreement and that the arbitration provision of that agreement therefore did not apply."9 From the beginning, however, a divergence of opinion was apparent. On 21 July, in a memorandum to the Republican Government, Dr. van Mook stated that the Netherlands Government had resumed its freedom of action and no longer considered itself bound by the Linggadjati Agreement. On 26 August van Mook recognized East Borneo as a new "autonomous" state and prospective


member of the United States of Indonesia. Dr. van Mook also expressed the "hope" that action of a similar nature might take place in West and East Java, the Palembang area in South Sumatra, and the Medan area of the northeast coast of Sumatra. The implications of such a statement were quite clear in light of the fact that these territories were recognized as being under the de facto jurisdiction of the Republican Government under the Linggadjati Agreement. ¹⁰

In general the Dutch advance was very rapid and this progress enabled them to capture large stocks of export goods. Most of these goods had been stockpiled in the Republic because of the Dutch blockade which had been imposed upon the islands shortly after the Japanese surrender. By capturing the export goods the Dutch were able to attain one of their more important secondary objectives, which was to secure export goods in order to help relieve the economic situation in the Netherlands. ¹¹

Submission to the Security Council

By letters dated 30 July 1947 the acting representative of Australia and the permanent liaison officer of the Government of India brought to the attention of the Security Council the renewal of hostilities in Indonesia. ¹²

¹⁰ Wolf, op. cit., p. 130.
¹¹ Kahin, op. cit., p. 214.
The Australian communication stated, first, that hostilities were in progress in Java and Sumatra between the armed forces of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, and, second, that his Government considered these hostilities to be a breach of the peace under Article 39 of the Charter; he urged the Council to take immediate action to restore international peace and security. The communication further proposed that the Council order both parties to cease hostilities immediately and to institute arbitration under Article 17 of the Linggadjati Agreement. The letter concluded with a request that a meeting of the Security Council be called immediately to consider this communication.\(^\text{13}\)

The communication from the Indian Government also drew the Council's attention to the Indonesian situation, under Article 35 of the Charter; the Indian Government was of the opinion that the situation constituted a danger to the maintenance of international peace and security as defined in Article 34 of the Charter, and it therefore requested the Council to take the measures necessary to bring the crisis to an end. In drawing the Council's attention to the Indonesian situation, the Indian Government noted that the Dutch forces had attacked the Indonesian people without warning "at a time when a delegation of the Indonesian Republican Government was actually at Batavia for negotiations with the Dutch authorities on the implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{13}\text{Ibid.},\text{ Annex 40, pp. 149-150.}\)

\(^{14}\text{Ibid.},\text{ Annex 41, p. 150.}\)
Following the submission of the Indonesian question to the Security Council, that body considered the question at length for several meetings. In general, there were three problems which received the greatest amount of attention: (1) the question of the legal status of the Republic of Indonesia, (2) the question of the method and machinery to be used to bring about a cessation of hostilities, and (3) the question of the competence of the Security Council to deal with the Indonesian question.

171st Meeting, 31 July 1947

The Indonesian question was brought up for debate at the 171st meeting of the Security Council which was held on 31 July 1947. Upon the invitation of the President the representatives of the Netherlands and India were invited to take part in the discussions. Upon these two representatives taking their places at the Council table, Mr. Gromyko of the U.S.S.R. raised the question of extending an invitation to participate to the Government of the Republic. Mr. van Kleffens objected on the grounds that the admission of Republican representatives would, in effect, prejudge the whole question before the Council—the question of the legal status of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia.15

Colonel Hodgson, the Australian representative, stated that, in view of the fact that de facto recognition

had been extended to the Republic and since the Linggadjati Agreement called for the President of the International Court of Justice (a judicial body before which only states may be a party to a case) to nominate the chairman of an arbitration body, Indonesia was a state in international law. Mr. Hodgson then submitted a draft resolution which called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and for settlement of the dispute by arbitration under the provisions of the Linggadjati Agreement. The Chinese representative proposed an amendment to the Australian resolution adding "other peaceful means" to arbitration as a means of settlement. The Australian delegation accepted the amendment.

With the discussion centering around the legal status of Indonesia and whether an invitation to participate in the discussions should be extended to that body, the Netherlands representative reiterated his Government's position that a legal state of war did not exist in Indonesia. The Dutch delegate maintained that the disturbance was caused by lawless bands of natives who were not controlled by the Republican Government because that Government was corrupt and consequently unable to secure obedience from those under its de facto authority. Mr. van Kleffens concluded by pointing out that consideration of the matter by the Security Council might upset negotiations between the

16 Ibid., pp. 1623-1626.
17 Ibid., pp. 1639-1648.
Netherlands and the Republic.  

At the close of the meeting, Mr. Johnson of the United States delegation informed the Council that his Government, being very much concerned with the existing situation in Indonesia, had offered the parties the use of its good offices. In general, Syria, Colombia, and China supported the Australian resolution. The French delegation felt it would be dangerous to adopt a resolution without further information and debate on the substance of the question. The Soviet and Indian delegations favored an immediate decision in regard to cessation of hostilities, but they felt that the matter of arbitration needed further study.

172nd and 173rd Meetings, 1 August 1947

At the 172nd meeting on 1 August the representative of the United States, after pointing out that the legal questions relating to the status of the Republic could be settled later, submitted an amendment to the Australian resolution; this amendment called for a cessation of hostilities and the settlement of the dispute by arbitration or other peaceful means. Mr. Johnson stated that, since the amendment made no mention of any article of the Charter and contained

18 Ibid., pp. 1639-1648.
19 Ibid., p. 1648.
no commitment regarding Netherlands' sovereignty over the region, the amendment would leave the question of sovereignty to be settled at a later date and hence would allow the parties to make use of the United States' offer of good offices which, earlier in the day's discussion, the Netherlands' delegate had accepted on behalf of his Government.21

Following submission of the United States amendment, Mr. Gromyko, after discussing the de facto recognition extended to the Republic by the Linggadjati Agreement and the dangers inherent in negotiations conducted between occupying and occupied countries, submitted an addition to the Australian resolution providing for the immediate withdrawal of the troops of both sides to the positions which they had held prior to the beginning of military operations.22

On the afternoon of 1 August, at the 173rd meeting of the Council, Mr. Parodi of the French delegation, after stating that he did not feel the Security Council to be competent to deal with the Indonesian question, introduced a resolution which (1) reserved entirely the question of the Council's competence, and (2) called upon the parties concerned to bring hostilities to an end.23 Mr. Lange of Poland suggested that to the United States amendment there should be added the phrase "and keep the Security Council

21 Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, Number 68 (172nd and 173rd Meetings), 1 August 1947, pp. 1655-1659.

22 Ibid., pp. 1659-1665.

23 Ibid., pp. 1676-1678.
informed of the progress of settlement." The United States representative informed the Council that he was willing to incorporate the French amendment concerning the competence of the Council into his own proposal.

The Council voted upon the proposal, paragraph by paragraph. The preamble ("Noting with concern the hostilities in progress between the armed forces of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia...") was adopted by a vote of 7 to 0 with 4 abstentions. The second part of the preamble, which embodied the French suggestion concerning the competence of the Council, was rejected by a vote of 5 to 0 with 6 abstentions. The remaining three paragraphs, which called for (1) cessation of hostilities, (2) keeping the Security Council informed of progress, and (3) settlement of the dispute by arbitration or other peaceful means, were all adopted by identical votes of 8 in favor, none opposed, and 3 abstentions (Belgium, France, United Kingdom).

The Council next acted upon the Soviet resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of troops. Mr. van Kleffens of the Netherlands cautioned the Council that, should this resolution be adopted, "terrible acts of retaliation" against "a great number of people belonging to various races" would follow the proposed withdrawal of Dutch troops from the areas which they had occupied since 21 July.

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24 Ibid., p. 1686.
25 Ibid., p. 1687.
26 Ibid., pp. 1699-1703.
Mr. Johnson of the United States was of a similar opinion; he maintained that chaos and disorder would follow the withdrawal of the Dutch civil administration. Following the very brief debate, the U.S.S.R. resolution was rejected by a vote of 2 to none, with 9 abstentions.

Reaction of the Disputants to the Cease-Fire Order

By a letter dated 3 August 1947, the Netherlands Government informed the President of the Security Council that, while it, the Netherlands, maintained its attitude in regard to the jurisdiction of the Council, the Lieutenant-Governor-General had been instructed to get in contact the authorities of the Republic for the purpose of reaching an agreement concerning a cessation of hostilities. A cable from the Deputy Prime Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Gani, did not indicate what attitude or action would be taken by the Republic; the Prime Minister had just been released from a concentration camp and, in addition, difficulties in transmission had delayed his receipt of the telegram concerning United Nations action in regard to cessation of hostilities.

The attitude of the Republican Government was transmitted to the President of the Security Council by means of a cablegram dated 6 August 1947. This communication contained

27 Ibid., pp. 1704-1705.
28 Ibid., p. 1710.
the following provisions: (1) in compliance with the Council's resolution of 1 August, Indonesian armed forces would cease hostilities at 2400 hours, Indonesian standard time, on Monday 4 August; (2) the Netherlands' delay in the transmission of the Security Council resolution to the Republic was noted and the Council was asked to consider the fact that serious technical difficulties, caused by Dutch "acts of aggression", had to be overcome in executing the cease-fire; (3) the Republic pointed out that, in contrast to the first cease-fire issued in connection with the truce of 14 October 1946, no definite line of demarcation could be traced; (4) the Government of the Republic expressed grave concern over the fact that unless the cease-fire were to be supervised by a third party, there would be no guarantee that such an order would not be unilaterally violated by the Dutch forces; (5) the cessation of hostilities should apply to all kinds of action directed by the Dutch military and civil authorities against the civilian population; and (6) a cessation of hostilities should be followed by a withdrawal of Dutch armed forces to the demarcation lines fixed by both sides on 14 October 1946.\footnote{Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, Number 72 (178th Meeting), 7 August 1947, footnote on pages 1841-1842.}

The Government of the Republic, by a cablegram dated 7 August 1947, notified the United States Government that it was fully prepared to submit to the decision of the Security Council, which decision recommended arbitration as the primary
means of settling the dispute. The Republic also accepted the United States offer of good offices and requested that Government to use its influence to secure the immediate dispatch of an international arbitration commission to Indonesia. Mr. Sen of India put the Indonesian suggestion regarding an international arbitration commission before the Security Council at its 178th meeting on 7 August 1947.31

178th Meeting, 7 August 1947

Following Mr. Sen's speech in which he presented the Indonesian request, Mr. van Kleffens once again presented to the Council the reasons for the Dutch "police action". In general these reasons were (1) that the Republic was still holding hostages contrary to the Linggadjati Agreement; (2) that the territories held by the Dutch had had their supply of foodstuffs cut off, also contrary to the Agreement; and (3) that hostilities had not ceased in accordance with the provisions of Linggadjati.32

180th and 181st Meetings, 12 August 1947

The Indonesian question was not brought up for discussion again until 12 August, when Colonel Hodgson of the Australian delegation, noting the United States offer of good offices, stated that his Government had offered to join

31Ibid., p. 1847 and footnote.
32Ibid., p. 1848.
the United States as mediators and arbitrators in the dispute, and, further, that this offer had been accepted by the Government of the Republic. The Australian representative then submitted a draft resolution for consideration by the Council. This resolution called for the establishment of a commission whose duty it would be to report to the Security Council "on the situation in Indonesia following the resolution which the Council had adopted on 1 August 1947." In proposing such a commission, Colonel Hodgson said that his resolution deliberately refrained from naming the representatives who would compose the membership of the commission because he felt it would be better if the members were appointed by the Council once the parties had begun negotiations. In regard to the status of the commission members, the Australian delegation felt that such members as would be appointed by the Council should be considered as agents of the Council who would act as observers and help stabilize the general situation until negotiations were under way. As agents of the Council, the representatives would report directly to that body and thus enable it to have access to the true facts. The remainder of the 181st meeting was taken up by discussion of the Polish representative's proposal that the representatives of the Republic of

33 Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, Number 74 (180th and 181st Meetings), 12 August 1947, pp. 1917-1918. The text of the Australian resolution may be found in the footnotes of these pages.

34 Ibid.
Indonesia be invited to participate in the discussions. The President of the Council read a letter from Mr. Sjahrir, the Indonesian representative, in which the Security Council was advised that if an invitation to participate were extended to the Republic, that Government accepted in advance, for purposes of the dispute, the obligations of a member of the United Nations. Mr. van Kleffens opposed this suggestion on the grounds that, since the letter from Mr. Sjahrir clearly indicated that the Republic based its request on Article 32 of the Charter, the Republic had no legal grounds for making such a request in view of the fact that it was not a sovereign and independent nation. After several representatives expressed points of view, pro and con, on the matter of Indonesian sovereignty, Mr. Johnson of the United States, while stating that his Government "expressly takes no position" on the legal status of the Republic, asserted that the representatives of Indonesia should be invited. He then pointed out that such an invitation could be extended through rule 39 of the rules of procedure if that rule were given a liberal interpretation. Since, under Article 40, all decisions are without prejudice to the legal rights of the parties concerned, extending an invitation to Indonesia would be a matter of simple justice and would in no way confer upon the Republic any international status to which it was not already entitled. The President of the Council closed debate on the proposed invitation to Indonesia by

stating that such an invitation "would not bind any State to recognize the independence or sovereignty of the Indonesian Republic" but, rather, "would be extended simply in connection with the work of the Security Council." The proposal was adopted by a vote of 8 to 3. Although both France and Great Britain voted against the proposal, the President stated that this matter was a procedural point and, therefore, declared the measure adopted.36 Mr. van Kleffens then raised the question of inviting representatives of East Indonesia and Borneo. Several of the Council members questioned whether the positions of East Indonesia and Borneo were the same as that of the Republic in view of the fact that no fighting was taking place in these areas. As the application of the Philippines to participate in the discussions was already before the Council, no action could be taken on the Belgian suggestion that the question be put to a vote.37

184th Meeting, 14 August 1947

The Philippine request was acted upon at the 184th meeting which was held on 14 August 1947. The question of Philippine participation was put to a vote early in the meeting as there was very little discussion on the subject. The proposal was adopted by a vote of 9 to none with Poland and the U.S.S.R. abstaining. Following the vote, General Romulo,

36 Ibid., p. 1940.
37 Ibid., pp. 1942-1943.
representative of the Philippines, was invited to take a seat at the conference table.38

The next item upon which the Council acted was the Belgian proposal to invite East Indonesia and Borneo to participate in the work of the Council. This proposal had originated with Mr. van Kleffens of the Netherlands but was supported by Belgium in view of the fact that the Netherlands was not, at that time, a member of the Council. In general, those in favor of the proposal based their attitude upon the assumption that extending an invitation to these territories would be the only equitable thing to do. Colonel Hodgson of Australia stated that his Government wanted to admit the representatives of East Indonesia and Borneo, but under rule 39 of the rules of procedure and not under Article 32 of the Charter. The reason for this attitude was the fact that the Republic had been granted de facto recognition by seven countries, including the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States, whereas East Indonesia and Borneo were recognized as possessing de facto status only by the Netherlands. The rest of the debate on this topic centered around the views concerning the applicability of Article 32 or rule 39. Mr. Gromyko produced a telegram, dated 6 August, from the Prime Minister of the East Indonesian Government to Mr. van Kleffens in which Mr. Nadjamoeddin, the Prime Minister, informed Mr. van Kleffens that the East Indonesian Government "expressed its agreement with the decision

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of the Netherlands Government to initiate police action against those elements of the Republic which obstruct the execution of the Linggadjati Agreement." Mr. Gromyko stated that he brought this telegram to the attention of the Council "in order that we may be clear as to whom the Netherlands Government recommends us to invite to the Security Council." The Belgian proposal was rejected by a vote of 4 in favor, none against, and 7 abstentions. The remainder of the meeting was devoted to a speech by Mr. Sjahrrir of Indonesia in which he briefly traced the history of the development of the nationalist movement in Indonesia, concentrating particularly on the happenings since the landing of Allied troops following the end of World War II.

185th Meeting, 15 August 1947

The following day, at the 185th meeting, Mr. van Kleffens answered Mr. Sjahrrir's version of the history of Indonesia. In the course of his speech, the Dutch representative stated that the Republic's acceptance of the offer of good offices made by the United States was so weighted with conditions and reservations that it actually did not amount to an acceptance at all.

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39 Ibid., pp. 1901-1992. The text of the telegram from the East Indonesian Prime Minister may be found in the footnote on page 1991.


Following Mr. van Kleffens' speech, Mr. Katz-Suchy of Poland submitted an amendment to the Australian resolution which had been introduced at the 181st meeting. Whereas the Australian resolution had called for the creation of a commission whose only duty would be to report to the Security Council on the situation in Indonesia, the Polish amendment provided that this commission should act as a mediator and an arbitrator in the Indonesian dispute. Mr. Katz-Suchy noted that, had the Security Council taken action on the Indonesian question in January, 1946, the problem would not have developed into the serious situation with which the Council was faced in August, 1947. 43

187th Meeting, 19 August 1947

At the 187th meeting Mr. Gromyko, in discussing the proposed commission, stated that the United States was attempting to force its good offices upon the Indonesian Republic; in view of the fact that the Republic had requested the Security Council to set up its own commission for arbitration and mediation, the Soviet delegate maintained that insistence by the United States upon use of its good offices indicated a lack of respect not only for the Indonesian Government and the Indonesian people, but also for the Security Council. Mr. Gromyko suggested that the

43 Ibid., pp. 2014-2017. The text of the Polish amendment may be found in Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, Number 79 (187th and 188th Meetings), 19 August 1947 in a footnote on page 2058.
insistence of the United States was based, at least partially, upon her large economic interest in Indonesia. The Russian representative concluded by expressing the hope that the Council would comply with the Republic's request for the creation of an arbitral commission.44

Following Mr. Gromyko's speech, Mr. Tsiang of China offered another amendment to the Australian draft resolution. This amendment noted that the Netherlands intended to request the career consuls stationed in Batavia to submit joint reports on the situation in the Republic and to propose to the Republic the appointment of an impartial state to enquire into the situation and to supervise the cease-fire; each of the two disputants were to designate a state and these two states would then select the state whose duties were defined by the amendment. The amendment resolved that the consular body at Batavia and the impartial state should be requested to forward copies of their reports to the Security Council.45 Colonel Hodgson of Australia maintained that the effect of the Chinese amendment would be to take the matter outside of the Security Council since it referred only to reports by the consular body at Batavia and did not even say to whom that body was to report; in addition, the amendment said nothing about whether the consular body was to be appointed by the Security Council or was to be subject


45 Ibid., p. 2067. The text of the Chinese amendment may be found in the footnote of page 2067.
to that body's jurisdiction in any way.\textsuperscript{46} In adjourning the meeting, the President of the Council suggested that the representatives of Australia, China, and Poland meet together and try to formulate a compromise proposal.\textsuperscript{47}

**192nd and 193rd Meetings, 22 August 1947**

On 22 August 1947 Mr. van Kleffens, in the first speech of the day, declared that anyone who voted in favor of the Australian resolution, even were it to be modified by the Polish and Chinese amendments, would be implicitly stating that the Council had jurisdiction in the dispute. In view of this fact, according to the Netherlands representative, if the Council were to adopt the Australian resolution, an important precedent would be set in regard to Security Council intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign States. Mr. van Kleffens, of course, regarded the Indonesian question as a matter of domestic concern and he maintained that it was "pure illusion to think that the Government of the Republic represents anything but itself."\textsuperscript{48}

Mr. Pillai of the Indian delegation spoke in support of the Australian draft resolution, subject to the Polish amendment. The Indian delegate (1) opposed the Chinese

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., p. 2072.
\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., p. 2075.
\textsuperscript{48}Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, Number 82 (192nd and 193rd Meetings), 22 August 1947, pp. 2144-2147.
amendment on the grounds that it virtually took the matter out of the Council's hands, (2) insisted that the troops of both sides must return to their original positions, and (3) considered undesirable the involvement of consular officials in questions of this kind, particularly in view of the circumstances of the Indonesian situation. The Colombian delegate, Mr. Lopez, was of the opinion that the Security Council should accept the responsibilities which logically followed from its cease-fire order; the Council should first decide whether to ask the parties to revert to their original military positions and, next, whether to appoint a commission or to follow the Netherlands proposal regarding the selection of an impartial state to supervise the cease-fire.

On the afternoon of 22 August 1947 the first matter to be considered was a draft resolution presented by the representative of Belgium. This resolution called for extending an invitation to participate in the work of the Council to the representatives of East Indonesia and Borneo. Though a similar proposal had been rejected at the 184th meeting, the President decided to put the new resolution to a vote because the rules of procedure contained no specific provision prohibiting rejected resolutions being put to a vote a second time. The Belgian proposal was rejected by a vote of 4 in favor, none against, and 7 abstentions--the same.

49 Ibid., p. 2156.
50 Ibid., p. 2160.
vote as was registered against the earlier proposal.51

The Australian representative briefly reviewed the resolutions before the Council. Colonel Hodgson stated that, in compliance with the request of the President, he had met with the representatives from the Chinese and Polish delegations in an attempt to reach a compromise on the resolution submitted by Australia and the amendments submitted thereto by China and Poland. The Chinese and Australian representatives came to an agreement while the Polish representative maintained one reservation in regard to the composition of the commission. The Australian-Chinese joint resolution requested the Governments which were members of the Security Council and which had career consuls in Batavia to instruct their consuls to prepare joint reports on the situation in Indonesia following the Security Council resolution of 1 August. These reports were to cover the observance of the cease-fire order and the conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation and in areas from which armed forces might be withdrawn by agreement between the parties. The resolution further requested the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic to grant to these consular representatives all facilities necessary for the effective fulfillment of their duty.52

51Ibid., pp. 2170-2172.

52Ibid., pp. 2172-2174. The text of the joint Australian-Chinese resolution may be found in the footnotes on pages 2173-2174.
Colonel Hodgson then referred to the second Australian resolution which dealt with a proposal for arbitration. While this resolution was very similar to the Polish amendment to the original Australian resolution, the difference lay in the fact that the Polish amendment called for the appointment of three arbitrators by the Security Council, while the Australian resolution envisioned the appointment of one arbitrator each by the Governments of the Netherlands and the Republic and by the Security Council. In conclusion, the Australian delegate noted the advancement by the United States of a resolution by which the Council would resolve to tender its good offices to the parties in dispute. The American resolution also provided that, if the parties so requested, the Council would assist in the settlement through a committee composed of three members of the Council; each of the parties to the dispute would select one of the committee members and these two would then select the third.

Mr. Gromyko opposed the various proposals for the creation of an arbitration commission and the creation of a consular commission on the grounds that (1) the consular commission would be biased in favor of the Netherlands because, of the five eligible career consuls in Batavia, three, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, were

53Ibid., p. 2174. The text of the Australian resolution may be found in the footnotes of this page.

54Ibid., The text of the United States resolution may be found in the footnotes on page. 2179.
favorable to the colonial point of view, and (2) the proposed commissions of arbitration would put the solution of the Indonesian problem into the hands of one, two, or three nations rather than into the hands of the Security Council as a whole.55

194th Meeting, 25 August 1947

Mr. Sjahrir of the Republic of Indonesia, speaking at the 194th meeting on 25 August 1947, noted that (1) the military situation in the Republic was daily growing worse despite the 1 August cease-fire order, (2) the Council should condemn aggression and should require the withdrawal of Netherlands troops to the positions which they occupied under the terms of the 14 October 1946 truce, and (3) the Republic was willing to accept any resolution of impartial arbitration, provided that the Security Council would not be by-passed.56

The Belgian representative, Mr. van Langenhove, brought to the attention of the Council a draft resolution requesting the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the question of the competence of the Security Council to deal with the Indonesian question.57

Mr. Gromyko then submitted an amendment to the joint Australian-Chinese resolution. This amendment proposed the omission of

55 Ibid., pp. 2179-2183.
57 Ibid., p. 2193. The text of the Belgian resolution may be found in the footnote on this page.
the paragraphs dealing with the establishment of the consular commission and in its place proposed the creation of a commission which would be composed of the states which were Members of the Security Council; the duty of this commission would be to supervise the implementation of the Council's 1 August resolution. The amendment was rejected by a French veto, the vote being 7 in favor, 2 against (Belgium, France), and 2 abstentions (China, United Kingdom).58

Following the vote on the Soviet amendment, Mr. Katz-Suchy of Poland submitted an amendment to the United States resolution and the Australian resolution which called for the establishment of a commission consisting of eleven members of the Security Council whose duty it would be to act as mediators and arbitrators in the Indonesian dispute.59

The Polish amendment to the Australian resolution was rejected by a vote of 4 in favor, 3 against, with 4 abstentions.

Immediately after the vote on the Polish amendment, the Australian resolution was put to a vote. It failed of adoption, the vote being 3 in favor, none against, and 8 abstentions. The final vote of the day was taken on the United States draft resolution calling for the creation of a Committee of Good Offices. This proposal was adopted by a vote of 8 in favor, none against, with 3 abstentions.60

58 Ibid., p. 2200.
59 Ibid., pp. 2203-2204.
60 Ibid., p. 2209.
The discussion now turned to consideration of the Belgian proposal to ask the International Court for an advisory opinion on the question of the Council's competence. Mr. Gromyko attacked the proposal as being designed to divert the attention of the Security Council and the United Nations from the substance of the question and "to draw attention to legal considerations of secondary importance which properly should never even have arisen."61

195th Meeting, 26 August 1947

Consideration of the Belgian proposal was continued at the 195th meeting which was held on 26 August 1947. In general, the opponents of the proposal spoke of the time which would probably be necessary to obtain an advisory opinion from the Court; this delay would offset any value which might be derived from such an opinion. When put to a vote, the Belgian resolution was not adopted; the vote on the measure was 4 in favor, 1 against, and 6 abstaining.62

The Polish resolution, dated 25 August, reminding the Netherlands and Indonesian Governments of the Council's cease-fire order of 1 August and calling upon those Governments to adhere strictly to that resolution was considered next. The discussion of this proposal centered around cease-fire violation and whether the Republican Government was

61Ibid., pp. 2210-2211.

actually capable of maintaining law and order in the area under its jurisdiction. At the close of this debate the Polish resolution was adopted by a vote of 10 to 0 with 1 abstention.63

Interim Report of the Consular Commission

An interim report from the consular representatives at Batavia, dated 22 September 1947, was included on the agenda of the 205th meeting which was held on 29 September. The Commission's interim report was based upon visits by its members to eleven different Netherlands and Indonesian-controlled areas in Java and Sumatra. The report noted that the advances of Netherlands troops between 20 July and 4 August had been in the nature of spearheads and some fighting had occurred. While the main bodies of Republican troops retreated before the Dutch advance, considerable numbers "remained between the spearheads in some areas and guerrillas remained in all areas." During and after the Dutch advances, the Indonesians pursued a scorched-earth policy; looting and other disturbances also took place along with heavy loss of life, particularly among the Chinese, during this period. On 29 August the Netherlands East Indies Government announced its intention to accomplish "complete restoration of law and order and the complete disarmament and winding up of all armed organizations" which opposed the authority of the East

63Ibid., pp. 2224-2232. The text of the Polish resolution may be found in the footnotes on pages 2224-2225.
Indies Government. The Dutch set the demarcation line for
the area in which they proposed to re-establish law and order
at the point of their most advanced positions. The Republic
did not accept this line of demarcation and consequently
considered Dutch patrol action along this line to be hostile
action. The result of this situation was, quite naturally,
a continuance of patrol clashes and sniping in spite of the
Council's cease-fire order of 1 August. The Commission
further noted that the situation described above was not
only the cause of the continued conflict, but also the major
obstacle in the path of effective implementation of the
cease-fire order. The Commission reported that no practical
interim measures had been discovered which would more
effectively implement the 1 August resolution or reduce
casualties. The report concluded by stating that the
Commission hoped to complete a written report on or about
30 September.64

By a letter dated 30 August the Netherlands representa-
tive notified the Secretary-General that his Government's
attitude concerning the competence of the Security Council
was unchanged, but that the tendency of the Council's
resolutions of 25 and 26 August was acceptable and the
Netherlands Government would provide the career consuls at
Batavia with the necessary facilities.65

64 Security Council, Official Records, Second Year,
Number 91

65 Security Council, Official Records, Second Year,
Number 92 (206th Meeting), 1 October 1947, p. 2481.
Five days later the Netherlands delegate notified the Secretary-General that his Government had invited the Belgian Government to serve on the Committee of Good Offices and the invitation had been accepted.66

The President of the Council was notified of the selection of the other members of the Committee by letters dated 18 September. The Republic of Indonesia selected the Government of Australia to serve as its representative; the representatives of Australia and Belgium jointly selected the United States to serve as the third member of the Committee.67

The Australian Government appointed Mr. Justice Kirby, a judge of the Australian Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, as its representative on the Committee and the Government of Belgium selected former Prime Minister Paul van Zeeland.68

207th Meeting, 3 October 1947

Mr. Evatt of Australia opened discussion at the 3 October meeting of the Security Council on the interim report of the Consular Commission by noting the fact that the cease-fire was not being observed; in view of the gravity of the situation, the Australian delegate submitted a resolution

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66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
requesting the Secretary-General "to act as convenor of the Committee of Three and arrange for the organization of its work" and, further, that the Committee be requested to proceed with its work "with the utmost dispatch." 69

Immediately following Mr. Evatt's speech, Mr. Gromyko declared that the interim report clearly indicated that the Security Council's decision was being ignored. The Soviet delegation considered it to be the Security Council's duty to rectify this situation and, accordingly, submitted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of both Netherlands and Indonesian troops to the positions which they had occupied before the beginning of military operations. Mr. Gromyko submitted this resolution because he felt the Australian resolution to be insufficient and useless in view of the existing situation. 70

Mr. van Kleffens concluded the day's speeches by presenting the Netherlands' reasons for opposing the withdrawal of troops. The primary reasons were (1) the inadequacy and corruptness of the Republican administration in areas between the Dutch troops, and (2) the danger to hostages and the fear of reprisals in areas from which Dutch troops would be withdrawn. In the course of his speech Mr. van Kleffens alluded to a cablegram, dated 29 September, from Mr. A. G. Gani, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic to the President

69 Ibid., p. 2488. The text of this resolution may be found on page 2503.

70 Ibid., pp. 2488-2491. The text of the Soviet resolution may be found on page 2491.
of the Security Council. Mr. Gani stated that the Dutch advances amounted to penetration, not occupation, and that such penetration did not confer upon the penetrators the right to regard areas between their converging lines as occupied territory. The Indonesian official also declared that the Netherlands was attempting to "divide and conquer" by "making preparations for the establishment of a puppet state with other quislings,...which in fact means a continued effort by the Netherlands to strangle the Republic politically..." Mr. van Kleffens maintained that this telegram presented a distorted picture and then proceeded with a description of the inadequacy of Republican administration and evidences of lack of good faith on the part of the Indonesian leaders. 71 Before the meeting was adjourned a vote was taken on the Australian resolutions; this proposal was adopted by a vote of 9 in favor, none against, with 2 abstaining. 72

208th Meeting, 7 October 1947

Discussion of the interim report of the Consular Commission was continued at the 208th meeting. Mr. Pillai of India, the initial speaker of the day, supported the Republican point of view that the establishment of spearheads did not constitute effective occupation. The Indian delegate pointed out that the Netherlands Government had set its own

71 Ibid., pp. 2492-2502. The text of Mr. Gani's cablegram may be found in the footnote on page 2494.

72 Ibid., p. 2503.
demarcation line and had evidently expected the Republic to accept this as a *fait accompli*. In regard to the alleged atrocities, Mr. Pillai suggested that very probably such accusations could be justifiably made against both sides. In view of the circumstances it was natural that the Republic should regard the Dutch attempt to restore law and order behind the so-called "van Mook line" as a continuation of hostilities. Consequently, the Indian representative was of the opinion that the fighting probably could not be stopped until the armed forces of both sides were withdrawn to their ante-bellum positions. 73

Mr. Palar of Indonesia spoke strongly in favor of the withdrawal of Dutch troops to the positions which they had held under the truce of 14 October 1946. The Indonesian delegate maintained that the difficulties noted by the Consular Commission in its report were all caused by the presence of Dutch troops in Republican territory. The Republic, while grateful to the Council for the offer of its good offices, wanted a guarantee that any solution reached would be binding upon both parties. In conclusion, Mr. Palar noted, at length and with numerous examples, inaccuracies in the speech given at the previous meeting by the Netherlands representative. 74


74 Ibid., pp. 2517-2523.
209th Meeting, 9 October 1947

Speaking at the 209th meeting on 9 October, Mr. Austin of the United States expressed the opinion that the interim report of the Consular Commission did not supply the Council with adequate information concerning the proposed withdrawal of troops and the consequences of such an action. Consequently, the United States delegation felt that the parties to the dispute should seek to conclude an agreement, with the aid of the Committee of Good Offices which was about to commence work. 75

210th Meeting, 11 October 1947

Colonel Hodgson took issue with the United States' point of view at the next meeting. The representative of Australia disagreed with the opinion that no facts existed which warranted withdrawal of armed forces by stating that the existence of continued hostilities and the fact that the Security Council order was not being obeyed constituted sufficient evidence upon which to base the withdrawal of troops. Colonel Hodgson also opposed the Soviet resolution because he felt that it was impractical since it did not provide for a loss of contact between the armed forces of the two parties. He then submitted a proposal calling upon the Netherlands and the Republic to withdraw their armed

75 Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, Number 95 (209th Meeting), 9 October 1947, pp. 2526-2528.
forces to a point at least five kilometres behind the positions which they had held prior to the cease-fire order of 1 August. 76

Sir Alexander Cadogan of the United Kingdom noted that it would be extremely difficult for the Council to ascertain the position of the troops of both sides as of 1 August; consequently, it would be extremely difficult to implement the Australian resolution. With the purpose of remedying this situation in mind, the British delegate submitted a draft resolution stating that the first step toward ensuring observance of the cease-fire order should be the establishment of a provisional demarcation line. The resolution also requested the Committee of Good Offices to make this its first objective and to instruct the Consular Commission to make proposals for establishing such a line. 77

Mr. de La Tournelle of France went on record as being definitely opposed to the Soviet resolution on the grounds that the withdrawal of troops might even extend the area of conflict. The French delegate felt that the Australian proposal was not suitable because the troops in question did not occupy clearly defined and stable positions; France did, however, support the proposal of the United Kingdom. 78

76 Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, Number 96 (210th Meeting), 11 October 1947, pp. 2552-2555. The text of the Australian resolution may be found on page 2555.

77 Ibid., pp. 2556-2558. The text of the British resolution may be found on page 2558.

78 Ibid., pp. 2559-2560.
The Australian delegation felt that the United Kingdom resolution would be ineffective in getting the troops to break contact whereas their own resolution was a positive attempt to secure this objective. The Netherlands representative maintained that the Australian resolution was too simple to provide for a practical solution to the problem of preventing future violations of the cease-fire order, but he supported the British proposal as being based upon "pure common sense." 79

211th Meeting, 14 October 1947

On 14 October at the opening of the 211th meeting, the President of the Council, Sir Alexander Cadogan, drew the attention of that body to a cablegram dated 11 October 1947 from the Consular Commission. This communication contained a summary of the main points of the complete consular report. It pointed out, first, that cease-fire orders had been given but there was no confidence on the part of either party that the other side would obey them; no attempt had been made by either side to reach an agreement for the purpose of implementing them. Second, the Republican Government had ordered its troops "to remain in their positions and cease hostilities;" the Netherlands East Indies Government had considered it necessary to continue with the restoration of law and order within the limits of the "van Mook" line. Third, the Dutch troops continued

79 Ibid., pp. 2564-2567.
mopping-up operations in areas occupied by Republican troops which had been by-passed during rapid Dutch advance; Indonesian troops were ordered to defend themselves and "to oppose movements within Netherlands-held territory." Fourth, a considerable amount of banditry, murder, and arson was still being carried on by irregular bands. Fifth, the population suffered considerably before the police action and scorched-earth policy; this suffering had been intensified during and after the police action. Sixth, administration and cultivation was being carried on under emergency conditions in both areas; in the Netherlands area fears of banditry and of future Republican reprisals existed, while in the Republican area wide-spread shortages caused by the cessation of normal export and import trade had become apparent; the food situation in the Republic was good, but might deteriorate in a few months' time. Seventh, the influential class of Indonesians, which numbered not more than 5% of the total population, all sought independence, while not necessarily supporting the Republic; "there is little hatred of the Netherlands, whose assistance in running the country is recognized as essential."80

The representatives of Poland and the U.S.S.R. both stressed the need for immediate Security Council action in view of the fact that the Dutch were continuing with their

80 Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, Number 97 (211th Meeting), 14 October 1947, pp. 2569-2570. The text of the Commission's cablegram may be found in the footnotes of pages 2570-2571.
"mopping-up" operations while the Republic had ordered its troops to remain in their positions and cease hostilities.\textsuperscript{81} Mr. El-Khourī of the Syrian delegation, in discussing the proposals before the Council, stated that he did not believe that the Consular Commission would be able to draw the line of demarcation proposed by the British resolution as it would be a very difficult job and would require the services of experts. The Syrian delegate did not believe the Australian proposal to be practical or likely to achieve good results because he did not think it correct to ask troops which had not advanced at all to withdraw still farther. Mr. El-Khourī considered the Soviet proposal to be a practical resolution, since it was based on the line of demarcation accepted by both sides two or more years previously. In order to offset the Dutch contention that withdrawal of troops would lead to reprisals and retaliations, he submitted an amendment to the Russian resolution calling for the release of hostages and the declaration of a general amnesty in favor of persons guilty of political crimes.\textsuperscript{82}

213th Meeting, 22 October 1947

At the opening of the 213th meeting on 22 October 1947 the President stated that the complete report of the Consular Commission had been received.\textsuperscript{83} This report went into great

\textsuperscript{81}Ibid., pp. 2572-2580.

\textsuperscript{82}Ibid., pp. 2583-2585.

\textsuperscript{83}Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, Number 99 (213th Meeting), 22 October 1947, pp. 2597-2598.
detail on such matters as the differing interpretations of
the cease-fire order, the van Mook line, allegations of
breaches of the cease-fire order, and the general condition
of the areas occupied by the respective forces of the
Republic and the Netherlands. The complete report merely
emphasized the fact that the differing interpretations
placed upon the cease-fire order precluded the effective
operation of the Council’s 1 August resolution. Economic
rehabilitation had been started on the east coast of
Sumatra, but in the absence of agreement between the Nether-
lands and the Republic, great difficulties would continue.
The report also noted that trade in general, and particularly
exports, had been "hamstrung" by the blockade and the
general instability of the country.84

Mr. Austin was of the opinion that the major problem
facing the Council had to do with the long-range settlement
of the dispute. In an effort to solve this problem, the
United States representative submitted a draft resolution
calling upon both parties to consult with each other for the
purpose of implementing the cease-fire order and, pending
the conclusion of such agreement, to cease any activities
"which directly or indirectly contravene that resolution;"
the resolution further called upon the Committee of Good
Offices to assist the parties in reaching the agreement
mentioned above and also requested the Consular Commission

84Security Council, Official Records, Second Year,
Special Supplement Number 4, "Report by the Consular
and its military assistants to make its services available to the Committee.85

Mr. van Kleffens stated that neither the amnesty proposed by Syria nor the Indonesian guarantee of maintaining peace and order would be effective as the Republican Government was not capable of enforcing such a guarantee.86 General Romulo of the Philippine delegation expressed the opinion that the second interim report of the Commission was unduly favorable to the Netherlands, citing examples in support of this argument.87

214th Meeting, 27 October 1947

After studying the complete report of the Consular Commission, Mr. Pillai of India, speaking at the 214th meeting of the Council, declared that this report gave added support to his statement made in connection with the Commission’s first interim report; namely, that the responsibility for the continuance of hostilities in Indonesia should be placed on the Netherlands Government.88 The United States representative held that the full report of the Commission indicated that it would not be wise for the Security Council to attempt to solve the complicated military problem; this matter should be given to the Committee of Good Offices. In light of the report’s disclosure that differing interpreta-

85Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, Number 99 (213th Meeting), 22 October 1947, pp. 2502-2504. The text of the United States resolution may be found on page 2504.
86Ibid., pp. 2606-2607.
87Ibid., p. 2598.
88Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, Number 100 (214th Meeting), 27 October 1947, p. 2624.
tions of the cease-fire order were the cause of the trouble, Mr. Austin submitted a revision to the resolution which he had submitted at the 213th meeting. The revised resolution contained an additional paragraph advising the parties to the dispute that the Council’s cease-fire order “should be interpreted as not permitting the use of the armed forces of either party by military action to alter substantially the territory under its control on 4 August 1947.”

At the next meeting Sir Alexander Cadogan withdrew the draft resolution concerning the establishment of a line of demarcation which he had submitted at the 210th meeting because that resolution was covered by the broader United States resolution. Mr. Katz-Suchy of Poland, in a lengthy speech directed against the Netherlands, objected to the United States resolution on the grounds that (1) it recognized territorial gains acquired by force, and (2) it was conducive to further misinterpretation, particularly the meaning of the term “substantial.” In consequence of his indictment of the Netherlands, the Polish delegate submitted a resolution (1) stating that the Netherlands had been guilty of failure to comply with the Security Council resolution of 1 August and 27 August, (2) calling upon the Dutch Government to withdraw all troops and civil administration from Republican territory and for the Consular Commission to supervise the

89 Ibid., pp. 2640-2644. The text of the revised United States resolution may be found in the footnote on page 2644.

compliance of both parties with the above provisions,
(3) requesting the Committee of Good Offices to take into
consideration the fact that the Netherlands Government had
not complied with the Council’s resolutions, and (4) calling
to the attention of the Netherlands Government the fact that
failure to comply with the provisional measures would create
a situation which might lead to the necessity of applying
enforcement measures.91

216th and 217th Meetings, 31 October 1947

On 31 October 1947, the representative of China,
Mr. Tsiang, proposed an amendment to the United States draft
resolution. This amendment, in regard to the resolution’s
provision concerning consultation between the parties, added
a phrase calling for such consultation to take place either
directly or through the Committee of Good Offices. The
amendment also added a phrase calling for cessation of incite-
ment to activities which would contravene the resolution and
for appropriate measures to be taken for safe-guarding life
and property.92 Colonel Hodgson of Australia noted the
Belgian amendment to the revised text of the United States
draft resolution which stated that any substantial alteration
of the territory occupied by the parties on 4 August would
be inconsistent with the Council’s resolution of 1 August.

91 Ibid., pp. 2660-2662. The text of the Polish
resolution may be found on pages 2661-2662.

92 Security Council, Official Records, Second Year,
Number 102 (216th and 217th Meetings), 31 October 1947,
p. 2663.
In effect, this amendment merely changed the wording of the last paragraph of the United States resolution from a negative to a positive statement.93

Mr. Gromyko of the U.S.S.R. drew the Council's attention to a letter, dated 28 October 1947, from Mr. Thamboe, representative of the Republic of Indonesia, addressed to the President of the Security Council. In this letter the Indonesian delegate stated that the only situation under which an understanding could be reached would be complete withdrawal of Netherlands forces from territory which they had occupied after 21 July. The Republican Government again called upon the Security Council to appoint an international commission composed of representatives of the Security Council; the duties of this commission would include observing and investigating conditions in and supervision of the territories evacuated by Netherlands forces.94

On the afternoon of 31 October, at the 217th meeting, Mr. Muniz of Brazil declared that the report of the Consular Commission clearly indicated the impracticality of attempting to supervise a cease-fire without direct contact with the situation. The Brazilian delegate opposed the resolutions submitted by the U.S.S.R., Australia, and Poland on the grounds that they adopted too theoretical an approach to the problem. He supported the United States resolution and

93Ibid., p. 2684. The text of the Belgian amendment may be found in the footnote of this page.

94Ibid., pp. 2689-2690. The text of this communication may be found in the footnotes on pages 2689-2690.
was of the opinion that the proposed functions were within the competence of the Committee of Good Offices.\textsuperscript{95}

Sir Alexander Cadogan of the United Kingdom also opposed the Russian and Polish resolutions because of the serious disorders which might result from the withdrawal of troops; he felt that the Australian resolution was impractical since there were pockets of Republican troops which were situated well behind any line which could be drawn in the territory held by Dutch troops. The British representative supported the United States resolution generally, but thought that it could be improved by the Belgian and Chinese amendments.\textsuperscript{96}

Since the list of speakers in general discussion was exhausted, the President put the Soviet resolution, calling for withdrawal of troops, to a vote. The resolution was rejected since it failed to receive the affirmative votes of seven members; the vote on the measure was 4 in favor, 4 against, and 3 abstentions. The Australian draft resolution was next in order of priority. Before the resolution was put to a vote, Colonel Hodgson accepted an amendment submitted by Mr. Gromyko changing the distance of withdrawal of troops from five to twenty-five kilometres. The Australian resolution was not adopted, the vote being 5 in favor, 1 against, and 5 abstentions.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{95}Ibid., pp. 2691-2693.

\textsuperscript{96}Ibid., pp. 2693-2696.

\textsuperscript{97}Ibid., pp. 2698-2699.
Australian resolution, Colonel Hodgson submitted an amendment to the United States proposal which would change the wording of the last paragraph of that resolution to "a positive statement of the clear intention of the Council." 98

Mr. Austin, United States representative, proposed the establishment of a small sub-committee to study the United States draft resolution and the Chinese, Belgian, and Australian amendments with the purpose of reconciling the different texts. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 7 in favor, none against, with 4 abstentions. Following the vote, the President suggested that this sub-committee be composed of the representatives of the United States, Australia, Belgium, and China; the Council approved this suggestion by a vote of 7 in favor, none against, and 4 abstentions. The Council, however, rejected a Presidential proposal that the terms of reference of the sub-committee be broad enough to include the United States and Polish draft resolutions on an equal footing for purposes of examination. 99

218th and 219th Meetings, 1 November 1947

The sub-committee submitted a draft resolution at the 218th meeting on 1 November 1947. This resolution called upon the parties to consult with each other, either directly

98 Ibid., pp. 2702-2703. The text of the Australian resolution may be found on page 2703.
99 Ibid., pp. 2706-2717.
or through the Committee of Good Offices, for the purpose of giving effect to the cease-fire order, to cease any activities or incitement to activities which would violate that order, and to take measures to provide for safeguarding life and property. The resolution further advised the parties that the cease-fire order should be interpreted as prohibiting "the use of the armed forces of either party by hostile action to extend its control over territory not occupied by it on 4 August 1947;" the parties were also invited to conclude agreements as to the withdrawal of troops in the event that such action should appear to be necessary and the Committee of Good Offices was requested to aid the parties in reaching an agreement while the Consular Commission was requested to make its services, and its military assistants, available to the Committee of Good Offices. The President announced that all proposals before the Council which had been submitted by the delegations of China, Belgium, Australia, and the United States had been withdrawn in favor of the resolution submitted by the sub-committee.

Mr. Pillai of India felt that the new resolution was too weak in that it did not express regret or disapproval in regard to the fact that the Council's cease-fire order had not been implemented, while Mr. Gromyko was of the opinion that the resolution could not produce satisfactory results.

100 Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, Number 103 (218th and 219th Meetings), 1 November 1947, pp. 2723-2724.

101 Ibid., p. 2724.
since it did not provide for the withdrawal of troops. Mr. Gromyko also noted that the resolution would have the effect of legalizing the control of the Netherlands over territory occupied by Dutch troops on 4 August. At the 219th meeting, Mr. Lopez of Colombia, maintaining that it would be a very serious matter for the Council merely to note that the 1 August resolution had been disregarded, proposed an amendment to the sub-committee's resolution stating that the Security Council expected to see the 1 August resolution fully and faithfully complied with by the two governments. This amendment was not adopted as it failed to receive the affirmative vote of seven members of the Council.

The sub-committee resolution was adopted by a vote of 7 to 1 with 3 abstentions. The Polish resolution was rejected, 2 votes in favor, 4 votes against, and 5 abstentions.

At the 222nd meeting of the Council on 9 December, the President noted receipt of a communication from the Committee of Good Offices. This cablegram, dated 1 December, stated that the Netherlands and the Republic had agreed to hold discussions on board a ship of the United States Government, if such were available. The United States Government

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102 Ibid., pp. 2725-2730.
103 Ibid., pp. 2746-2747. The text of the Colombian amendment may be found on page 2747.
104 Ibid., p. 2749.
105 Ibid., pp. 2750-2751.
had notified the Committee that it would put at its disposal the U.S.S. Renville, a duty transport. 106

229th Meeting, 17 January 1947

On 17 January 1948, at the 229th meeting, the President, Mr. van Langenhove, read to the Council a cablegram, dated 17 January, from the Committee of Good Offices. This communication stated that the governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia would sign a truce agreement at 1430 hours on that day on board the U.S.S. Renville. Two hours after the signing of the agreement identical cease-fire orders and regulations were to be sent out to the armed forces of both parties. 107

The truce agreement provided for the issuance of a stand-fast and cease-fire order to the troops of both parties. These orders were to apply along the "van Mook line" which had been described in the Proclamation of the Netherlands Indies Government on 29 August 1947, and demilitarized zones were to be established in general conformity with this line, without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties. 108

The Renville Agreement set forth a list of twelve political principles which were to govern the relationship


between the two parties, plus six principles upon which further negotiations were to be based. The latter group of principles was not accepted by both parties until 19 January. The twelve political principles provided for "continuation of the Committee's assistance, civil and political liberties, changes in the administration of territory to be made only with the full and free consent of the population, gradual reduction of armed forces, resumption of trade, transport, and communications, the holding of free elections after a period of from six to twelve months, self-determination by the people of their political relationship to the United States of Indonesia, the convening of a constitutional convention, the possible observation by a United Nations agency of conditions between the signing of the agreement and the transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia, the independence of the Indonesian people and cooperation between the people of the Netherlands and Indonesia, a sovereign federal state under a constitution to be arrived at by democratic processes, and union of the United States of Indonesia and other parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the King of the Netherlands."109

The six additional principles contained the following provisions: (1) "Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies should remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands until, after a stated interval, the Kingdom transferred its sovereignty to

the United States of Indonesia;" (2) "the Republic of Indonesia should be a state within the United States of Indonesia;" (3) "all states would be offered fair representation in any provisional federal government;" (4) "either party might request continuance of the Committee's services during the interim period;" (5) plebiscites were to be held "under international observation to determine whether the peoples of the various territories of Java, Madura, and Sumatra wish their respective territories to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or another state" and that "there be a constitutional convention in which the various states would be represented in proportion to their populations;" (6) "any state could, instead of ratifying the constitution, negotiate a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands."110

110 Ibid., p. 377.
CHAPTER IV
RENVILLE TO THE SECOND POLICE ACTION

The signing of the Renville Agreement, at least partially in response to pressure from the United States Government, caused a break-down in the internal politics of the Republic. On 16 January 1948 the largest of the political parties, the Masjumi, withdrew from the cabinet; on 23 January Sjarifuddin resigned as Prime Minister. President Sukarno appointed Mohammed Hatta, who was then Vice-President, to form a new cabinet. The reason for this choice was that Hatta, as Vice-President, stood above party. A new cabinet was finally formed on 29 January with Hatta as Prime Minister and the Masjumi and Indonesian Nationalist Parties as the dominant factions.¹

The new cabinet took immediate steps to implement the Renville Agreement, including recognition of the van Mook line. By 26 February approximately 35,000 men of regular Republican army units had withdrawn from their pockets beyond the van Mook line into Republican-held territory. Within a week after signing the Renville Agreement, the Dutch unilaterally conducted a plebiscite on the island of Madura; the purpose of the plebiscite was to determine the

¹Kahin, op. cit., pp. 230-234.
status of that area as between the Republic and the newly-created Interim Federal Government. This action was violative of the Renville Agreement in that (1) it was not conducted under the observation of the Committee of Good Offices, (2) the Renville Agreement had provided that no such plebiscite should be carried out until at least six months after the signing of the Agreement, and (3) the conditions stipulated by the Renville Agreement under which such plebiscites were to be carried out (freedom of speech, assembly, and publication) were not observed. On 21 January van Mook recognized the "State of Madura".2

In West Java, Dutch activity followed a very similar pattern. On 12 October to 19 October 1947, the Dutch had convened two conferences designed to establish an independent state. The second of these conferences had provided for the calling of a third, to meet on 24 February 1948. Despite Renville provisions to the contrary, this conference was convened in Bandung on 23 February. The result of this conference was the birth of the new State of West Java. On 9 March the creation of an interim federal government was announced by van Mook; this government was to function until a United States of Indonesia was established; while the Republic was invited to join in this government, the Dutch established as a condition of acceptance the negotiation of a final political settlement between the Netherlands and the Republic. On 27 May a federal conference was convened

2 Ibid., pp. 235-238.
at Bandung by the Dutch and this action seemed to constitute additional proof, in the eyes of Republican leaders, of unilateral Netherlands activity in violation of the principles of Renville.3

1st Interim Report of the Committee of Good Offices

On 10 February 1948 the Committee of Good Offices submitted its first interim report to the Security Council. In general, this report, which covered the activities of the Committee through January, 1948, dealt with a review of the Committee's work, the work of special committees which had been established to implement the Council's resolution of 1 November 1947, and a description of the negotiations which lead to the signing of the truce agreement and acceptance of the political principles as a basis for further political negotiations.4

247th Meeting, 17 February 1948

The Security Council resumed consideration of the Indonesian question on 17 February 1948 at its 247th meeting. After the Council approved a request by the Australian representative that his Government be invited to participate

3Ibid., pp. 238-247.

in the discussions, Mr. Frank Graham of the United States, Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices, presented the Committee's report to the Council. This report was primarily concerned with a description of the historical background of the Indonesian problem and of the course of negotiations which had culminated in the Renville Agreement. Mr. Justice Kirby, Australian representative on the Committee of Good Offices, suggested that in the future the Committee should make its suggestions to the parties without necessarily waiting for an invitation from both parties to do so. He also advocated an informal rather than a formal approach on the part of the Committee and a greater display of initiative than the situation in the past had allowed. The Netherlands representative, while welcoming the agreements which had been reached, noted that continued political discussions would involve such difficult problems as the relationship between the Government of the Republic and the interim federal government, the constitution of the United States of Indonesia, and a definition of the relationship between that body and the Government of the Netherlands.


6Ibid., p. 377.
248th Meeting, 17 February 1948

Later in the day, at the 248th meeting, the Indonesian delegate expressed the opinion that the Committee of Good Offices should be granted powers beyond the mere rendering of good offices; he emphasized this point particularly in regard to the problem of conflicting interpretations of provisions of the agreements. Mr. van Zeeland of Belgium, while urging the parties to implement concretely the eighteen principles of the Renville Agreement, laid stress upon the need for replacing the provisional arrangements of the truce with a lasting agreement. The Australian representative felt that a basis had been established for a "just and enduring settlement," but believed that the Committee should have more positive functions in order to bring about more effectively fulfillment of the Renville Agreement. The delegate from Belgium disagreed with this point of view, maintaining that the Committee should not go beyond the restricted powers which it possessed at that time.7

249th Meeting, 18 February 1948

The following day, at the 249th meeting, the Soviet delegate noted that Netherlands troops continued to take over more and more Indonesian territory. He also stated that the Committee had forced the Republic to accept what he termed a Netherlands ultimatum embodied in the Renville Agreement.

7Ibid., pp. 377-378.
and that this agreement was designed, not in the interest of the Indonesian people, but for the purpose of continuing colonial dominance. In view of this situation, the representative of the U.S.S.R. held that the only solution was adoption of the Soviet proposal for the withdrawal of the troops of both sides. Following this speech, the Canadian delegate submitted a draft resolution which (1) noted with satisfaction that the Truce Agreement had been signed, (2) commended the Committee for its assistance, and (3) requested both the parties to the dispute and the Committee to keep the Council informed as to the progress of the political settlement.8

251st Meeting, 20 February 1948

The United States representative, at the 251st meeting, noted the great achievement which the parties had made in that they had reached an agreement and brought about an end to hostilities. The Indian and Chinese delegates, however, both expressed the opinion that the cessation of hostilities, while a significant success, had been achieved largely through the concessions of the Republic and its faith in the Security Council. The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. repeated the charges of the Soviet delegate as to the partiality of the Committee towards the Netherlands and its adherence to the colonial point of view.9

8 Ibid., p. 378.
9 Ibid., pp. 378-379.
At the next meeting, held on 21 February, the Indonesian representative accused the Netherlands of intending to establish new states in West Java, Madura, and East Sumatra without the plebiscites called for in the Renville Agreement. He reiterated his request that the Committee of Good Offices be given the power of arbitration. The Colombian delegate submitted amendments to the Canadian resolution which (1) added an invitation to both parties to attempt to reach an early and full implementation of the political principles, (2) suggested that the parties use the Committee's services to adjust differences in the interpretation and application of these principles, and (3) requested the Committee to continue to assist the parties to attain the above goals.

The delegate from Australia also submitted an amendment to the Canadian resolution. This amendment stated that the matter of offering suggestions to the parties in an attempt to help them reach a political settlement without necessarily waiting for the parties to request such action should be left to the discretion of the Committee itself. The Netherlands representative opposed this point of view; he maintained that publication of proposals without the previous consent of both parties would constitute a means of applying pressure to the parties and such a situation would not be compatible with the functions of a good offices committee.10

10Ibid., pp. 379-380.
The Indonesian question was not discussed again until 26 February at the 256th meeting. At that time the representative from the Republic of Indonesia charged the Netherlands with interpreting unilaterally the Renville Agreement by their promotion of the "popular movements" in West Java and Sumatra. While supporting the Colombian and Australian amendments, the Indonesian delegate felt that unilateral action on the part of the Dutch threatened to break down the Renville Agreement in the same way similar action had ruined the Linggadjati Agreement. The Soviet delegate opposed the Canadian resolution on the grounds that it approved of the Renville Agreement and the U.S.S.R. felt that that Agreement was not solicitous of the rights of the Republic.\(^1\)

The Philippine representative agreed with this point of view, speaking at the 259th meeting, by maintaining that the Republic had been forced to abide by a demarcation line which had been established by force, contrary to the Council's resolution of 1 August 1947. The Chinese delegate, noting the great importance of the events in Western Java and Madura, submitted a draft resolution requesting the

\(^1\text{Ibid., p. 380.}\)
Committee of Good Offices to pay particular attention to the political events in Western Java and Madura and to report to the Council on such events at frequent intervals. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 8 in favor, none against, with 3 abstaining. In view of the debate in the Council and the statement by the Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices, the Australian representative did not feel it necessary to urge adoption of his amendment to the Canadian resolution. The Security Council then rejected the Colombian amendment to the Canadian resolution; the Canadian resolution itself was adopted by a vote of 7 in favor, none against, with Colombia, Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R., and the U.S.S.R. abstaining.  

2nd Interim Report and Special Reports from the Committee of Good Offices

By a letter dated 19 March 1948, Mr. Palar, representative of the Republic of Indonesia, informed the Security Council that his Government considered the establishment of the State of East Sumatra, which had been promoted by the Netherlands, to be a violation of the Renville Agreement. On 1 May the Council received the report of the Committee of Good Offices on political developments in Western Java. For the most part, this report dealt with a resume of the three

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12Ibid.  
conferences held in Western Java and a presentation of the opinions of each of the parties, the Netherlands and the Republic.\textsuperscript{14} On 26 May the Committee submitted a report on the political developments in Madura and also its second interim report. The report on the political development in Madura dealt primarily with a description of the plebiscite which had been held on 23 January for the purpose of determining the status of Madura. Like the previous report on Western Java, this report presented the conflicting opinions of the two parties as advanced by the respective parties.\textsuperscript{15} The second interim report described the work of the various sub-committees. The report noted that political discussions had begun on 16 March; submission and discussion of working papers by both parties indicated that there was substantial agreement on a good many points. The report also stated, however, that no understanding had been reached on the following points: (1) "Measures for cooperation during the interim period..." this point included the transfer of governmental functions from the Netherlands to the Republic; (2) the date of the plebiscite; (3) territories to be involved in the plebiscite; and (4) the status of New Guinea.\textsuperscript{16}


\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, Document S/786, pp. 25-41.

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, Document S/787, pp. 41-72.
The Security Council resumed discussion of the Indonesian question on 10 June. Mr. Palar, the first speaker, accused the Dutch of attempting to eliminate the Republic by circumventing the actual negotiations. While criticizing the Dutch for their lack of sincerity in negotiating and for their continued military action, Mr. Palar strongly objected to the delay by the Security Council and cited the possibility of the Council becoming no more than a registering agency for events which have happened in the past. The Indonesian delegate mentioned six specific events as the cause of "tremendous distrust on the part of the Indonesian Republic." These events were: (1) the establishment of the "Provisional Federal Government for Indonesia" by the Netherlands on 9 March 1948; (2) the holding of the Dutch-sponsored Bandung Conference; (3) the banning by the Netherlands of a counter-conference which was to have been held in Jakarta, Batavia; (4) the amendment to the Dutch Constitution regarding Indonesia; (5) the events in Madura; and (6) the events in West Java.17 Mr. van Kleffens of the Netherlands countered by declaring that a negative Republican attitude in regard to previous agreements for a federal Indonesian State and for a Union of the Netherlands and United States of Indonesia was the underlying

17 Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, Number 02 (316th and 317th Meetings), 10 June 1948, pp. 2-24.
reason for the inability of the Parties to come to a full agreement. The Dutch representative also noted that the opposition of non-Republican Indonesians to a unitary state which would be headed by the Republic was a major stumbling block. Mr. van Keffens maintained that the Council should not devote its time to discussing "incidental questions of secondary importance;" he further suggested that the Council let the Committee of Good Offices work with the problem rather than carry on periodical debates itself since such debates seem to "estrange the parties rather than conciliate them." The Netherlands delegate also expressed the hope that the Council would not support any suggestions aimed at modifying "the nature, competence, or procedure of the Committee of Good Offices... ."18

Report on the Federal Conference at Bandung

The report of the Committee of Good Offices on the Federal Conference which opened in Bandung on 27 May was included on the agenda of the 322nd meeting which was held on 17 June.19 In general, this report contained only the formal documents relating to the conference and a presentation of the conflicting interpretations of the two parties in regard to the motive behind the Conference rather than any concrete observations on the part of the Committee itself.20

18 Ibid., pp. 25-34.


Mr. Tsiang of China disagreed with Mr. van Kleffens' contention that the Republic of Indonesia wanted a unitary state and had displayed a negative attitude in regard to a union with the Netherlands. The Chinese delegate maintained that the real question in Indonesia was not a choice between federalism and unitarianism, but rather, whether such a federation would be "an Indonesian federation created through democratic methods or through Dutch control and manipulation." Mr. Tsiang then suggested that, in view of the Republic's opposition to the new states of Madura and Western Java, fair and impartial plebiscites should be held in those areas unless the parties should voluntarily agree to some other form of settlement. The Chinese representative closed by expressing the hope that the Renville Agreement would not be followed by a "police action" as the Linggadjati Agreement had been.21

On the basis of the reports before the Council, Mr. Pillai of India charged the Dutch with numerous and flagrant violations of the Renville Agreement by their activities, which he described as inciting dissidence and engineering separatist movements, in West Java and Madura.22

Mr. Malik once again charged that the Committee of

21 Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, Number 86 (322nd and 323rd Meetings), 17 June 1948, pp. 2-4.
22 Ibid., pp. 4-13.
Good Offices, through its reports, had supported Dutch colonial interests and were not objective. In referring to the reports on political developments in Madura and West Java, Mr. Malik stated that the former could be more accurately described as "a report on the arbitrary organization by the Netherlands authorities of a plebiscite in Madura," while the latter should be entitled "a report on the establishment by the Netherlands authorities of a puppet State in Western Java." The Soviet delegate concluded by declaring that the policy of the Netherlands Government in Indonesia stood in contradiction to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter.23

Mr. van Kleffens read a press release of the Committee of Good Offices, dated 16 June, which stated that the Netherlands delegation had notified the Committee that, in view of the publication of a strictly confidential document, it would discontinue negotiations, except for discussions regarding implementation of the truce agreement, pending receipt of new instructions.24

At the 323rd meeting, Mr. Tarasenko of the Ukrainian S.S.R. charged the Committee of Good Offices with a lack of objectivity; he noted particularly the fact that American oil companies were holding conversations with the Netherlands Government concerning oil concessions in Indonesia. The Ukrainian delegate also reiterated the charge that the

Netherlands was attempting to force Indonesia back into the status of complete colonial dependence upon Holland.25

326th Meeting, 23 June 1948

On 23 June the Council initiated discussion on the Federal Conference which was being held in Bandung. Mr. Palar of Indonesia examined the report which the Committee of Good Offices had submitted on this Conference against a background of the reports on Western Java and Madura, and arrived at the conclusion that the Netherlands had intentionally misinformed the Council in regard to the report on West Java. He also stated that the Republic had completely accepted the idea of a federation, but not one created through the use of methods such as had been employed in West Java and Madura, since a federation created in such a manner would benefit the Dutch and not the Indonesian people. The Indonesian representative concluded that the Federal Conference was a unilateral attempt on the part of the Dutch to set up a federation which could be dominated by them. 26 Mr. van Kleffens, of course, objected to Mr. Palar's version of the Bandung Conference. He stated that "the Republic has neither the monopoly nor priority to discuss the problem of federation with us or with the other States who are going to form the United States of Indonesia;"

25bid., pp. 40-46.

26Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, Number 89 (326th Meeting), 23 June 1948, pp. 2-14.
since the Bandung Conference in no way threatened international peace and security, the Dutch representative felt that it should not take up any more of the Council's time. 27 General Romulo of the Philippine delegation decried the attitude of some Council members who were afraid that any action on the part of the Council would disrupt negotiations. He emphasized that the Council had interfered to the extent of requesting reports on the situation in West Java and Madura and that those reports clearly indicated that Holland was responsible for the separatist movement in Indonesia. 28 Mr. Malik, after again accusing the Netherlands of attempting to set up puppet states while economically destroying the Republic by a blockade, noted that the Council had received a cablegram from the Committee of Good Offices in which the United States and Australian delegations expressed concern that no substantial progress had been made towards settling the dispute. Consequently, these two delegations had jointly submitted a working paper for consideration by the parties. The Netherlands delegation, however, refused to accept this paper as an agenda item. This cablegram also stated that the Committee had been notified on 22 June that the Netherlands Government was prepared to resume discussions. 29

27 Ibid., pp. 14-16.
28 Ibid., pp. 16-21.
By a cablegram dated 29 June, the Committee of Good Offices notified the Security Council that no agreement had been reached under which the Australian-United States working paper could be considered; in addition, the Netherlands Government stated that its decision not to consider this working paper was final.30

3rd Interim Report of the Committee of Good Offices

The Committee of Good Offices transmitted its third interim report to the President of the Security Council by a letter dated 23 June. This report noted the "evacuation of 35,000 Republican combatants to Republican-controlled territory from behind forward positions of Netherlands troops" and the release of a "considerable proportion of prisoners held as prisoners of war." In regard to the Dutch blockade on the islands, the Committee reported that a number of important agreements had been reached in principle; but it was unlikely that such agreements would be effectively implemented until a political settlement had been reached; in consequence of this situation, no substantial increase in the Republic's import and export trade had taken place. According to reports of the Committee's military assistants, the shortage of medical supplies and, in some instances, of food constituted a major problem for the Republic. The report also noted that differing interpretations of the Renville

Agreement and of the principles which it contained was the cause of much misunderstanding and dispute. In regard to this gap in the positions of the parties, the Committee stated that failure to make significant progress in bringing the parties to an understanding operated to create an "unwholesome effect upon the atmosphere." 31

328th Meeting, 1 July 1948

On 1 July Mr. Pillai of India suggested that the Dutch refusal to consider the Australian-United States working paper seemed to destroy the hope that the Netherlands had not really intended to break off negotiations when they had announced "suspension" of negotiations upon the alleged publication of this document. 32

The delegate of the Ukrainian S.S.R., Mr. Manuilsky, attacked the work of the Committee of Good Offices, stating that it had not acted in the interests of the Indonesian people, but rather had favored the interests of Governments which were "carrying out a policy of colonial expansion." Mr. Manuilsky also accused the United States of supporting the division of Indonesia in order "to penetrate more deeply into Indonesia and to wrest economic advantages from the Dutch." 33 Following this speech, Mr. Tsien, the representative

32 Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, Number 91 (328th Meeting), 1 July 1948, pp. 5-7.
33 Ibid., pp. 10-14.
of China, renewed his request that the President ask the Committee of Good Offices to transmit to the Council the Australian-United States working paper. The Chinese proposal was put to a vote, but failed of adoption; the vote on the measure was 6 in favor, none against, with 5 abstaining.34

329th Meeting, 6 July 1948

Speaking at the 329th meeting, Mr. Palar stated that the Dutch were continuing their economic and political warfare against the Republic in an attempt to destroy that Government. The Indonesian representative described the Dutch blockade and questioned whether this action could be legally carried on by the Dutch in view of the fact that the Renville Agreement was in force.35 The representatives of Australia, China, U.S.S.R., and Syria all indicated support for a proposal requesting the Committee of Good Offices to make a report on the Netherlands blockade imposed upon Indonesia.36 Mr. Tsang of China submitted a formal resolution calling upon the Committee of Good Offices to transmit to the Security Council "an early report on the existence of restrictions on the domestic and international trade of Indonesia and the reasons for the delay in the

34 Ibid., pp. 14-15, 34.
36 Ibid., pp. 16-18.
implementation of article 6 of the truce agreement."37 The Council adopted this resolution by a vote of 9 to none, with 2 abstentions.38

Breakdown in Negotiations

On 23 July the Committee of Good Offices notified the Council that, in view of the stalemate in political negotiations, the Republican delegation had decided that their presence in Batavia would serve no useful purpose and, hence, they decided not to return to that city after 23 July; only those delegates required for work connected with implementation of the truce agreement would return to Batavia. The Netherlands representative had stated that the formation of a new cabinet in Holland had made it impossible to obtain any new instructions. The Committee concluded that discussions, which had been suspended since the end of May, directed toward a political settlement could not be resumed "until one party or (the) other comes forward with (a) complete and concrete programme for (the) establishment of (a) United States of Indonesia based upon substantial concessions to (the) point of view of (the) other party."39

37Ibid., p. 28. The text of the Chinese resolution may be found on this page.

38Ibid., p. 30.

Reports on the Dutch Blockade

In accordance with the Council's resolution of 6 July, the Committee of Good Offices submitted a report on the Dutch blockade on 24 July. The report cited the arguments advanced by the Dutch for imposing the blockade—such as to limit illegal trade, to control movement of military supplies, and "to protect Indonesian producers and consumers against exploitation by middlemen and foreign traders"—and the contentions of the Republican delegation that the blockade was illegal. This report reached substantially the same conclusion as that contained in the Committee's third interim report; the Committee felt that, in the absence of an agreement restoring the political and economic unity of Indonesia, "the economic plight of Republican-controlled territories cannot be substantially ameliorated until a way is found to relax existing regulations." The report noted that such relaxation "would require basic improvement in the attitude of the parties."  

On 28 July the Netherlands Government submitted to the Acting Secretary-General its comments on the report of the Committee of Good Offices on trade regulations. This communication stated that any shortage of materials in Republican-controlled territories was caused by faulty Republican organization which had not prevented Chinese merchants from draining off large quantities of produce.

through private channels. The Netherlands Government stated that the Republic itself had destroyed many foreign plantations and Chinese rice mills through their "scorched-earth" policy during the police action. This destruction was, of course, very detrimental to the foundations of the economic system. The next day the Netherlands Government submitted an addition to the above comment on the report of the Committee. This addition pointed out that (1) the Committee's report might cause misunderstanding since it seemed to indicate that the shortages of goods and lack of economic development in the Republic was caused by the Dutch trade regulations; the Netherlands Government felt that this was not the case; (2) no blockade existed in Indonesia; the Dutch maintained that the Republic used the "blockade" to cover up deficiencies in their Government's organization and, consequently, that the "blockade" existed only in Republican propaganda.

341st and 342nd Meetings, 29 July 1948

The Security Council resumed discussion of the Indonesian question on 29 July. Mr. Palar of Indonesia, noting that political negotiations had been at a complete standstill since the middle of June, maintained that the Dutch had rejected every attempt to secure a settlement.


42Ibid., Document S/926/Add. 1, pp. 119-123.
The Indonesian representative supported the report of the Committee of Good Offices which had labeled the Dutch activity in Indonesia a blockade. Mr. van Kleffens answered the Republican charges that the Netherlands was deliberately attempting to keep negotiations at a standstill by pointing out that the delay was caused, first, by the fact that a new government was being formed in the Netherlands as a result of a general election, and, second, by the resignation of the United States representative on the Committee of Good Offices because of ill-health. The Dutch delegate then dealt with the problem of the Dutch trade regulations by quoting several references on international law which defined the term "blockade", and he concluded that the trade regulations did not fit into any of the categories described.

Following this exchange, the Chinese delegate submitted a draft resolution which called upon the parties "with the assistance of the Council's Committee of Good Offices, to maintain strict observance of both the military and economic articles of the 'Renville' Truce Agreement, and to implement early and fully the twelve 'Renville' political principles and the six additional principles."


44 Ibid., pp. 9-22.

45 Ibid., p. 22. The text of the Chinese resolution may be found on this page.
At the 342nd meeting Mr. Malik questioned the Netherlands' contention that their activity did not constitute a blockade. He also went on record as opposing the Chinese resolution on the grounds that it "would not only lead to no improvement and ensure no solution furthering the legitimate interests of the Indonesian Republic and people, but would again be exploited by the Netherlands Government and authorities to further their colonial interests..."46 The Chinese resolution was then put to a vote and was adopted, the vote being 9 in favor, none against, with 2 abstentions.47

The Communist Revolt

Following the breakdown of political negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic, the internal situation in Indonesia became very precarious. The Indonesian people were frustrated by the Dutch violation of the Renville Agreement and by the failure of the United States Government "to honor what Indonesians considered to be its promise to oversee the implementation of the Renville principles..."48 Two factors in particular played major roles in instigating the communist revolt in September, 1948. The first of these was the economic blockade.

46Ibid., pp. 29-34.
47Ibid., p. 38.
48Kahin, op. cit., p. 254.
imposed by the Netherlands; the privations caused by shortages of many different goods, including foodstuffs and medical supplies, made communist propaganda and promises seem enticing. The second factor was the increased interest which the Soviet Union evidenced in Indonesia and all of Southeast Asia; this factor, of course, operated to push the Indonesian problem still further "into the arena of big-power conflicts."\(^{49}\)

The Communist Party of Indonesia initiated its revolt against the Government of the Republic on 18 September 1948. While the aim of the attempted coup was originally the overthrow of the Republic, by 20 September the communists had shifted their position by maintaining that their action was only an attempt to eliminate "colonial and feudal elements" from the Republican Government. By 30 September government troops had driven the communists from all of the major cities which they had previously held; the communists were, however, able to withdraw from the towns before being surrounded by government troops. Such withdrawals were in keeping with the general policy of the communists to avoid battle and retreat to mountainous terrain more suited to guerilla warfare.\(^{50}\) During the month of October guerilla warfare took place at frequent intervals until, on 28 October, the last major communist military force was captured and the


rebellion was, for all practical purposes, ended. On 15 December, the emergency grant to Sukarno of "full powers," which had been granted on 15 September, terminated and it was not renewed.51

There were several reasons for the failure of the communist revolt, the major one being the fact that the coup was attempted before the communists were actually prepared for such an action. Other reasons were: (1) attacking the Republican leaders, particularly Sukarno, was tantamount to an attack on the Republic itself, for these leaders symbolized nationalism for the mass of the Indonesian people; (2) the peasantry was comparatively well off for inflationary conditions had enabled them to wipe out a large part of their indebtedness; (3) the communists overestimated the support which they had from labor and from within the armed forces of the Republic. Dissatisfaction existed in both of these groups because of economic conditions; neither group was, however, willing to support a movement to overthrow a government which was the symbol of Indonesian nationalism.52

4th Interim Report of the Committee of Good Offices

On 15 November 1948 the Committee of Good Offices submitted to the Security Council its fourth interim report.

51Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 289-300. Chapter IX of this book, pages 256-303, presents a clear picture of the events leading to the communist revolt.

52Ibid., pp. 300-303.
In this report the Committee noted that no political negotiations had been held under its auspices since the end of May; in addition, the Netherlands delegation had been "reluctant" to consider the Australian-United States working paper and prior to 10 September, on which date the United States delegation had submitted a draft proposal, neither had offered a proposal for an over-all settlement of the dispute. This stalemate in political negotiations had four consequences of major importance: "(a) A deterioration in the economic situation within the Republic, and a delay in the economic rehabilitation of Indonesia as a whole; (b) An increase in political difficulties within the Republic; (c) An increase in political tension between the parties; (d) An increasing strain on the truce, with the ever-present possibility of its general breakdown."53

The Committee's estimate of the situation concluded with the observation that direct talks which were commencing at that time might "represent a serious and possibly final attempt of the parties to reach an over-all settlement." These direct talks were the result of an official Netherlands communique dated 22 November which had announced that the Netherlands Government felt that it might be possible to reach a final solution.54


54 Ibid., p. 4.
Special Report on the Direct Talks Between the Netherlands and the Republic

The Committee of Good Offices, on 12 December, submitted a special report to the Security Council regarding the direct talks being carried on between the Netherlands and the Republic. The report presented the official view of both parties, each of which placed the blame for failure to reach an agreement on the other. The Committee stated that the collapse of direct talks intensified an already aggravated situation which threatened to lead to complete abandonment of the truce and a resumption of hostilities. The report described the proposed establishment of an interim federal government by the Netherlands, which action "is apparently to occur before 1 January 1949," as an action which would strengthen the Republic's opinion that the Netherlands intended to establish unilaterally a United States of Indonesia without the Republic. The Committee also concluded that, since the Dutch had openly stated that further negotiations would be futile, almost no chance existed for a resumption of bona fide negotiations.55

By a letter dated 14 December Mr. Palmar urged the Security Council to meet immediately for the purpose of considering measures to prevent a worsening of the situation and to bring about a resumption of negotiations. The

Republican Government believed the situation constituted a threat to the peace in view of the special report of the Committee of Good Offices in which that body reported "that it has no confidence that even the present unsatisfactory level of truce enforcement can be maintained..."

On 18 December, the Committee of Good Offices submitted to the Council a report supplementary to the one of 12 December. This report merely contained communications which had passed between the representatives of the Netherlands and the Republic as the parties futilely attempted to create a basis upon which negotiations could be resumed.

Renewal of Hostilities

The next day, 19 December, the Committee of Good Offices cabled a report to the President of the Security Council stating that the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation had informed the United States representative "that Netherlands forces had already commenced military operations against the Republic and had crossed the status quo line into Republican territory." The Committee urgently requested the Security Council to consider the out-break of hostilities in Indonesia; the Committee also noted that this resumption of hostilities was in violation of the Renville Agreement in that no notice of repudiation of the

56 Ibid., Document S/1120, pp. 210-211.
truce agreement by the Netherlands had been received by the Committee of Good Offices as a whole. 58

Because of the resumption of military operations in Indonesia, Mr. Jessup of the United States, by a letter dated 19 December, requested that the President call an emergency meeting of the Security Council. 59 By a letter bearing the same date, the Netherlands representative submitted a memorandum to the President setting forth the reasons which motivated the Dutch to resume hostilities. In general, the Dutch laid the blame upon an "increasing number of infiltrations of Republican armed groups and of acts of violence perpetrated by them against the Indonesian population in Netherlands-controlled territory..." The Netherlands Government maintained that it had notified the Committee of Good Offices of its intention to terminate the Truce Agreement, thus abiding by article 10 of that agreement. 60

The next day the Netherlands representative transmitted to the President of the Security Council the comments of the Netherlands delegation on the special report of the Committee of Good Offices. This report objected to the statements in the Committee's report pertaining to the probable results of the establishment of an Interim Federal

58 Ibid., Document S/1129/Add. 1 & Corr. 1, pp. 224-228. This document also contains a list of Republican truce violations submitted by the Netherlands delegation.


60 Ibid., Document S/1130, pp. 228-231.
Government by the Netherlands; the Netherlands, of course, felt that the report should have pointed out "that the Republican point of view is opposed to the letter and the spirit of the Renville principles and that the Republican violations of the truce continue at an ever-increasing rate."61

The League of Arab States appealed to the Security Council, by a cablegram to the President of the Council dated 21 December, to order the Netherlands to halt their military operations in Indonesia.62 On the same day the Netherlands representative transmitted to the President a report containing additional information concerning the situation in Indonesia. This report contained the text of a speech made by the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs on 19 December in which he stated that the Netherlands Government had demonstrated that it was willing to co-operate in finding a way to give freedom and sovereignty to Indonesia, but that the Republic refused to accept the other Indonesian States as equal partners. The rest of the report dealt with the failure of the Republic to adhere to the Renville Agreement and to the number of violations of the truce agreement by Republican troops from 1 January to 14 December 1948.63

Reports from the Committee of Good Offices

In response to a request from the Security Council, the Committee of Good Offices submitted another report, dated 21 December, on the Indonesian situation. This report contained the following conclusions: (a) the Netherlands Government had failed to notify the Committee that Holland had repudiated the Truce Agreement and thus had failed to comply with article 10 of that Agreement; (b) there was no action on the part of Republican troops which might have legitimately precipitated the Netherlands action; (c) negotiations under the auspices of the Committee were not adequately utilized; the direct talks preceding the Dutch military action could not be considered to be negotiations since they consisted only of Netherlands demands for acceptance of their point of view on all important issues; (d) in commencing military operations, the Dutch Government violated "its obligations under the Renville Truce Agreement." The following day the Committee submitted another report to the Council; for the most part, this communication dealt with a description of the Netherlands attack on Jogjakarta on 19 December and on Kaliurang on 20 December. The report noted that communications had been broken between Kaliurang and Batavia for a four-day period. On 23 December the Security Council received another report

from the Committee of Good Offices. The Committee informed
the Council that most of the Committee's military observers
were returning to Batavia in compliance with orders received
from Netherlands military commanders. The Acting Chairman
of the Netherlands delegation had informed the Committee
that, since the truce agreement was no longer binding, the
military observers' task had come to an end.66

388th and 389th Meetings, 22 December 1948

In response to the request of the United States
representative the Security Council resumed consideration
of the Indonesian question at its 388th meeting. Mr. van
Rojen, Netherlands representative, stated that the policy
of his Government, though it had been hampered by a lack of
cooperation on the part of extremist groups in the Republic,
"is and remains the promotion of the freedom of Indonesia
in order to create a sovereign federation of Indonesia
linked in voluntary and equal partnership with the Kingdom
of the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian union."
The purpose of Dutch military action was to eliminate
irresponsible and extremist elements in portions of Central
Java and Sumatra. The rest of Mr. van Rojen's speech,
which consumed the entire meeting, was concerned with a
history of the happenings in Indonesia since the signing
of the Renville Agreement, with emphasis upon what the Dutch

considered to be the failure of the Republic to cooperate in implementing this agreement. At the afternoon meeting Mr. Palar of Indonesia presented the views of his Government concerning the Dutch military action. He maintained that, in actuality, the Dutch policy was a "deliberate continuation of its economic and political warfare--after the signing of the truce agreement with the Republic--carried out in outright violation of that agreement."

The Indonesian representative referred to the Dutch economic restrictions, the establishment of new states in West Java, Madura, East Sumatra, Pasundan, and South Sumatra, and to Dutch demands that their terms be accepted as evidence of the intention of the Netherlands Government to eliminate the Republic. Following this speech, Mr. Jessup of the United States, after noting the seriousness of the situation, stated that his Government failed to find any justification for the renewal of military operations in Indonesia. He further stated that his Government felt that the cease-fire order of 1 August 1947 was still binding and that the Netherlands had violated this order by taking armed action. In view of the fact that the situation in Indonesia could easily threaten international peace, the United States joined with Colombia and Syria in submitting a draft resolution to the Council. This resolution, after noting

68Ibid., pp. 31-42.
69Ibid., pp. 42-49.
that the outbreak of hostilities was in conflict with the cease-fire order of 1 August, ordered the parties to cease hostilities immediately and to withdraw their armed forces to their respective sides of the demilitarized zones which had been established under the Truce Agreement of 17 January 1948. The resolution also instructed the Committee of Good Offices (1) to report to the Security Council on the events which had taken place in Indonesia since 12 December, and (2) to assess responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities.

390th and 391st Meetings, 23 December 1948

Mr. Hsia of China was of the opinion that the Security Council, in view of its past actions, was competent to deal with the renewed outbreak of hostilities; he also pointed out that a real partnership and cooperation between the Netherlands and Indonesia was not likely to be established by the employment of force. Colonel Hodgson of Australia presented a history of the events in Indonesia, emphasizing the fact that the Netherlands had conducted negotiations which had not been held under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices and had demanded acceptance of Netherlands terms. The Australian representative proposed an amendment to the joint draft resolution submitted by the United States,


71 Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, Number 133 (390th and 391st Meetings), 23 December 1948, pp. 1-5.
Colombia, and Syria. This amendment would delete the last paragraph which instructed the Committee to report on events that had taken place since 12 December. The Australian delegation felt that the Council already possessed sufficient information and that responsibility should be assessed by the Council on the basis of this information. The amendment further called for (1) the immediate release of the President of the Republic and other political prisoners who had been arrested since 18 December, and (2) the Committee of Good Offices to observe and report on compliance with the Council's instructions and to see that no reprisals or punitive action be taken against individuals.72

At the 391st meeting the Representatives of Syria and India both condemned the Dutch for resorting to the use of military force and urged the Security Council to take immediate action to stop the hostilities in progress.73

Mr. Malik of the U.S.S.R. declared that in all the time that the Indonesian question had been before the Council, that body had not yet dealt with the problem firmly and effectively; the Soviet delegate again charged that the Committee of Good Offices merely operated to protect the colonial interests of the Netherlands. Mr. Malik placed the responsibility for all of the trouble in Indonesia upon the Netherlands policy "of colonial oppression, terror

72 Ibid., pp. 5-17. The text of the Australian amendment may be found on pages 15-16.
73 Ibid., pp. 18-29.
and brute force applied to Indonesian patriots, of shameless exploitation and inhuman oppression of the local population..." He then stated that the U.S.S.R. delegation could not support the joint draft resolution since (1) they felt that the order to withdraw armed forces "should be addressed only to the Netherlands as the aggressor," and (2) the last clause calling for the Committee of Good Offices to assess responsibility created "the false impression that the Council does not know which is the attacking party, who began operations against whom and which agreements were broken."74

392nd Meeting, 24 December 1948

At the opening of the 392nd meeting, Mr. Malik submitted a resolution which would (1) condemn Netherlands aggression; (2) require the immediate cessation of military operations and the withdrawal of Dutch troops to the positions which they had occupied prior to the renewal of military operations; (3) require the immediate freeing of the President of the Republic and other Republican political leaders arrested by the Dutch; and (4) provide for the creation of a commission of the Security Council which would be composed of all the States members of the Council and require this commission to supervise the fulfillment

74 Ibid., pp. 29-41.
of cessation of military operations and the withdrawal of troops.\textsuperscript{75} The French delegate, Mr. Parodi, expressed the opinion that, in spite of the fact that the action taken by the Netherlands Government was "brutal and shocking," the Security Council was without competence in regard to the situation.\textsuperscript{76}

Mr. van Roijen spoke in opposition to the joint resolution on the grounds that (1) a cessation of hostilities would restore the chaos which had existed previously, (2) the Committee of Good Offices had no jurisdiction over an internal conflict and was not competent to assess responsibility for the course of events, and (3) the withdrawal of Dutch troops would allow terrible acts of reprisal against the population of the evacuated areas by undisciplined forces. The Netherlands Government also maintained its position that the Security Council did not have jurisdiction in this matter.\textsuperscript{77} The Belgian representative was also of the opinion that the question of competence was not yet settled and that the Security Council actually did not have legal jurisdiction over the

\textsuperscript{75}Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, Number 134 (392nd Meeting), 24 December 1948, pp. 2-3. The text of the Soviet resolution may be found on page 3.

\textsuperscript{76}Ibid., pp. 7-12.

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., pp. 13-24. Mr. van Roijen also referred to a document which presented the Dutch view of the economic restrictions imposed upon Indonesia. This document may be found in Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, Supplement for December 1948, Document S/1157, pp. 315-319.
Indonesian question. 78

The joint resolution was then put to a vote, paragraph by paragraph. After being voted on in this manner, the amended text was voted on as a whole and was adopted by a vote of 7 to none with 4 abstaining. The adopted resolution called for a cessation of hostilities, the immediate release of the President of the Republic and other political prisoners arrested since 18 December, and instructions to the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Council on the events which had taken place since 12 December and to report to the Council on the compliance of the parties with the above provisions. 79 The Soviet resolution was also put to a vote, paragraph by paragraph, but was rejected in its entirety. 80

Mr. Ritchie, representative of Canada, presented a draft resolution instructing the Committee of Good Offices to submit a report recommending practicable steps which the Security Council might take in order to establish peaceful conditions in Indonesia. 81 As the proposal seemed ambiguous to a number of the Members of the Council, the representatives of Australia, Syria, and the United States all

78 Ibid., pp. 24-27.
79 Ibid., pp. 30-38. The text of the amended resolution may be found on pages 37-38.
80 Ibid., pp. 39-42.
introduced amendments for the purpose of clarifying it.82 Neither the amendments nor the draft resolution itself was adopted; the vote on the resolution was 6 in favor, none against, and 5 abstentions.83

Reports from the Committee of Good Offices

The Security Council received reports from the Committee of Good Offices dated 25 and 26 December. The first of these reports merely contained the letters which the Committee had sent to the delegations of the Netherlands and the Republic, respectively, requesting the parties to cooperate with the Committee and its military assistants. The letter to the Netherlands Government also requested that Government to provide the President of the Republic and his Government with all facilities necessary to issue directions from Jogjakarta or any other city that they might choose.84 The report submitted on 26 December outlined the major events which had taken place in Indonesia since 12 December. The Committee concluded that (1) negotiations presupposed that neither party would attempt to coerce the other by use of armed forces and that each was willing to compromise with the reasonable viewpoint of the

82Ibid., pp. 49-52.
83 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
other, (2) the Indonesians would be reluctant "to accept as bona fide any negotiations in which again they start with an area under their control diminished as a result of the resort to armed force...," and (3) since the demarcation line no longer existed, it would not be possible for the Committee's military observers to distinguish between internal security measures and hostilities between the parties.85

393rd Meeting, 27 December 1948

The representative of the Netherlands opened the 393rd meeting with a brief statement to the effect that the action in Java had practically ended except for clashes with "irregular armed bands," that the goal of Netherlands' policy was still the establishment of an all-Indonesian federal interim Government, and that fourteen prominent Republicans in Batavia had been released.86 The policy of the Netherlands toward Indonesia and the handling of the Indonesian question by the Security Council was assailed by the Ukrainian delegate, Mr. Tarasenko; he then submitted a draft resolution which called for the immediate withdrawal of Netherlands troops to the positions which they had occupied prior to the renewal of military operations.87


87Ibid., pp. 3-7. The text of the Ukrainian resolution may be found on page 6.
Mr. Malik questioned the desire of the Netherlands to cease hostilities; according to the Soviet delegate, the statements of Mr. van Roijen constituted "a direct refusal on the part of the Netherlands Government to cease hostilities against the Republic of Indonesia." In view of this situation, Mr. Malik submitted a resolution which noted that the Netherlands Government had not ended military operations against the Republic and ordered "military operations to cease within twenty-four hours of the adoption of the present resolution." 88

Mr. El-Khoury of Syria and Mr. Desai of India both noted that the President of the Republic had not yet been released and the latter delegate felt that armed forces should be withdrawn to the lines occupied prior to the renewal of military operations. 89 These opinions were followed by a lengthy speech by Mr. Malik, who accused the United States of being opposed to the withdrawal of troops. 90 Following this speech, both the Ukrainian resolution and the Soviet proposal were put to a vote; both were defeated, the former by a vote of 5 in favor and 6 abstentions, the latter by a vote of 4 in favor and 7 abstentions. Mr. Palar, in the concluding speech of the day, charged that the Netherlands was using delaying tactics in order that their military

88 Ibid., pp. 7-8. The text of the Soviet proposal may be found on page 8.

89 Ibid., pp. 9-13.

90 Ibid., pp. 24-35.
objectives might be achieved in defiance of the Security Council.  

395th Meeting, 28 December 1948

In the interim between discussions of the Indonesian question at the 393rd meeting and at the 395th meeting, the Chinese delegate submitted a draft resolution for consideration by the Council. This proposal noted that the Netherlands Government had not released the President of the Republic and other political prisoners in accordance with the Council's resolution of 24 December and called for the release of those persons within twenty-four hours after the adoption of the resolution.  

The early part of the debate at the 395th meeting dealt with the failure of the Netherlands to release political prisoners; the delegations of Syria, Indonesia, and China wanted an immediate decision taken on this subject while the Netherlands representative requested a delay until the following morning pending receipt of authoritative information from his Government. The Soviet delegate supported the Chinese resolution, but felt that it did not go far enough; Mr. Malik maintained that the Security

91 Ibid., pp. 35-39.

92 Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, Number 136 (394th and 395th Meetings), 28 December 1948, p. 48. The text of the Chinese resolution may be found on page 51.

93 Ibid., pp. 48-54.
Council should not only demand the release of political prisoners, but should also demand that the Netherlands Government cease hostilities and withdraw its troops from Republican territory. Mr. El-Khouri of Syria proposed changing the wording in the first paragraph of the Chinese resolution in order to take cognizance of the fact that fourteen political prisoners had been released, but not the President and his Cabinet. The amended Chinese resolution was adopted by a vote of 8 in favor, with 3 abstentions.

The Council then considered the Colombian draft resolution which called for the consular representatives in Batavia to submit to the Council a complete report covering the observance of the cease-fire and conditions in areas under military occupation or from which troops might be withdrawn. This resolution had been submitted as a working paper at the 393rd meeting; it was advanced as a draft resolution when the Ukrainian proposal failed of adoption. The Colombian representative emphasized that this resolution was not intended to circumvent the Committee of Good Offices, but merely to overcome the objections of those who felt that the Committee's terms of reference did

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94 Ibid., pp. 55-58.
95 Ibid., p. 65.
96 Ibid., p. 67.
not include such an operation. The representatives of the Soviet Union and of the Ukrainian S.S.R. opposed the Colombian resolution since it did not demand withdrawal of troops and since they felt that it would be prejudicial to the Indonesian people. Mr. Jessup of the United States offered an amendment slightly altering the wording of the resolution which was accepted by the Colombian delegate. The proposal was adopted by a vote of 9 in favor with 2 abstentions.

Report of the Committee of Good Offices

In accordance with the Security Council's resolution of 24 December, the Committee of Good Offices submitted a report, dated 29 December, dealing with the extent of compliance with the cease-fire order and the release of political prisoners. This report contained letters of enquiry on compliance with the Council's resolutions which had been sent to the parties by the Committee and the replies from the parties. The Indonesian delegate had replied, in a letter dated 28 December, that he was unable to make contact with either the Republican Government or the

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97 Ibid., pp. 67-68. The text of the Colombian resolution may be found in Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, Number 135 (393rd Meeting), 27 December 1948, p. 21.

98 Ibid., pp. 69-73, 76-78.

99 Ibid., p. 79. The amended text of the Colombian resolution may be found on page 80.

100 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
Republican delegation as they had been interned and he had received no information about them. By a letter of the same date the Netherlands delegation informed the Committee that fifteen Republicans had been released on 24 December; as to the letter of enquiry, the Netherlands delegate stated that he would not be able to give a final reply as there was not time to consult the Netherlands Government. In the remainder of the report the Committee noted that, as of 26 December, they were in contact with only one party, the Netherlands; in addition, the Netherlands Government had not authorized the return of military observers to the field and had withheld permission which would allow the Committee to operate aircraft, with the consequence that the Committee was unable to obtain first-hand information on the military situation from its own representatives.101

396th Meeting, 29 December 1948

At the opening of discussion of the Indonesian question on 29 December, Mr. van Roijen presented to the Council a declaration of the Netherlands Government. This declaration included the following points: (1) Netherlands forces in Java would cease hostilities on 31 December 1948 at the latest; cessation of hostilities in Sumatra would require two or three more days because of a "special emergency situation." It would still be necessary to

continue action against disturbing elements. (2) The Netherlands Government would lift the restrictions on freedom of movement from "a number of prominent personalities" if such persons agreed to refrain from "activities endangering public security." (3) The Netherlands Prime Minister was to leave for Indonesia within a few days. (4) The Netherlands Government had granted "all possible facilities" to the military observers and their staffs and was prepared to grant similar facilities to members of the Consular Commission. In connection with the third point, Mr. van Roijen added that with the arrival of the Netherlands Prime Minister in Indonesia, consultations for the establishment of an all-Indonesian federal interim government could begin. 102

Mr. Palar expressed extreme disappointment in the development of the discussions and the decisions taken on the violations of the truce agreement by the Netherlands. He also stated that he had received a telegram from the Indonesian representative in Singapore reporting that the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Education and the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Information had been murdered by the Dutch. In addition to this, the Netherlands Government, according to Mr. Palar, had issued a statement which was in complete defiance of the Security Council resolution. In view of these facts, the Indonesian

representative reserved his position until the Council would take the necessary steps to deal with the situation.  

Mr. Falla of the United Kingdom, in view of the statement made by the Netherlands representative, felt that the Council should refrain from further action until its first meeting in 1949.  

The Indian representative, however, was very critical of the Netherlands statement, holding it to constitute an attitude of defiance in regard to the resolution of the Security Council. Mr. Desai felt that the problem before the Security Council had changed from the dispute between the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to a problem involving the Netherlands Government on the one hand and the Security Council on the other.  

Mr. El-Khoury pointed out that the Dutch statement meant that "the Netherlands will order a cease-fire when the operations are completed and when the Indonesian Republic has been completely wiped out." As to the second portion of the Netherlands statement, the Syrian delegate maintained that the Dutch intended to deprive the Indonesian leaders of the right "to engage in politics or to work for the interests of their country."  

Mr. Malik supported this position with a great deal of vehemence, declaring that the Netherlands was an aggressor.
who refused to pay any heed to the Security Council and the United Nations.\footnote{107}

Mr. Jessup, after noting that no further resolution was needed to point out that the Netherlands had failed to comply with the Security Council resolutions, advocated postponement of further action on the part of the Council until the first meeting in January, 1949, when additional reports from the Committee of Good Offices would be available.\footnote{108} The meeting closed with both the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Soviet delegates condemning the Security Council, allegedly led by the United Kingdom and the United States, for sanctioning Netherlands aggression by failing to adopt the resolutions proposed by the representatives of the U.S.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R.\footnote{109}
CHAPTER V
INDEPENDENCE

Reaction to Dutch "Police Action"

In the interim between 29 December 1948 and 7 January 1949, the date of its first meeting in the new year, the Security Council received communications from several of its members as well as reports from both the Consular Commission and the Committee of Good Offices. On 31 December 1948 the Indian delegation notified the Secretary-General that the United Kingdom Prime Minister had requested the Indian Government to "grant facilities and safe conduct" to Dutch aircraft carrying the Netherlands Prime Minister and his party to Indonesia. Since the Indonesian question was under the active consideration of the Council, the Indian Government felt it necessary to ask for the Council's approval before taking such action. After consulting General McNaughton, President of the Security Council for January, the Secretary-General advised the Indian Government to grant safe conduct.¹

On 3 January 1949 the Government of Pakistan, in a letter to the President of the Council, expressed disapproval

of the failure of the Security Council to halt Dutch activity in Indonesia. As a minimum action the Security Council should require (1) the withdrawal of Dutch troops to the positions which they had occupied before the resumption of military activity, (2) release of Republican leaders and restoration of their freedom and authority, and (3) resumption of negotiations under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices.\(^2\)

By a letter of the same date the Netherlands Government, through its permanent representative to the United Nations, suggested to the Security Council that, in order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding, problems which were being directly discussed by the Security Council should not be handled simultaneously by "executive organs in Indonesia of the Netherlands Government and by the Committee of Good Offices." This letter also pointed out that visits by the Committee's military observers to certain areas might involve a great deal of personal danger for which the Netherlands Government felt obliged to disclaim responsibility.\(^3\)

The Consular Commission submitted a report to the Security Council on 6 January; the purpose of this report was to point out the need for further clarification of the relationship of the Commission and the Committee of Good

\(^2\)Ibid., Document S/1179, pp. 3-4.

\(^3\)Ibid., Document S/1180, pp. 4-5.
Offices, particularly in regard to the disposal of military observers. By a letter of the same date the Belgian Government, in view of the fact that its term as a Member of the Security Council had expired, requested that it be allowed to participate in the discussions of the Council on the Indonesian question.

Report of the Committee of Good Offices

On 7 January the Committee of Good Offices submitted a report to the Security Council in accordance with that body's resolution of 24 December 1948. The Committee, after reviewing the course of events since its last report on 29 December 1948, reached the following conclusions:

1. the cease-fire order had not been complied with;
2. the order issued to the Royal Netherlands-Indonesian Army in pursuance of the cease-fire order could not be considered as an order to "cease hostilities forthwith;"
3. the Committee had no first-hand information since its military observers were still immobilized;
4. the Committee requested that the Security Council define the functions of that body as opposed to those vested in the Consular Commission;
5. the disappearance of the truce destroyed the functions exercised by the Committee as an instrument of negotiation; consequently, the Committee brought to the

5 Ibid., Document S/1192, p. 18.
attention of the Council "the problem of its present and future status."6

397th Meeting, 7 January 1949

The Security Council continued discussion of the Indonesian question on 7 January at its first meeting of the new year. Before opening debate, the President, General McNaughton of Canada, in the absence of any objection from the Members, invited the representative of Belgium to participate in the discussions of the Council. Mr. van Roijen then briefly summarized the events which had taken place since the last meeting of the Council, including the issuance of what the Netherlands termed to be a cease-fire order and the freeing of a number of Republican political leaders. The Netherlands delegate stated that, since their release might "endanger public security," Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, and Salim were released from enforced residence, but were limited to the island of Bangka. Mr. van Roijen also noted the arrival of the Netherlands Prime Minister, Mr. Drees, in Indonesia for the purpose of instituting consultations leading to the establishment of an all-Indonesian federal interim government.7 Mr. Palar of Indonesia drew the Council's attention to the (1) reports

6 Ibid., Document S/1189, pp. 6-17.

7 Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Number 1 (397th Meeting), 7 January 1949, pp. 3-10.
of the Committee of Good Offices which stated that the
Netherlands had violated the Renville Agreement, (2) Nether-
lands cease-fire orders which countenanced continued
military operations against guerillas, in other words the
bulk of the Indonesian army, and (3) fact that the President
of the Republic as well as several other members of that
Government had not been released. The Indonesian representa-
tive advocated the withdrawal of Dutch troops to the previous
truce lines.8

General Romulo supported the latter contention of
Mr. Palar. The Philippine representative maintained that
the cease-fire order could not be implemented as it existed;
he held that withdrawal of troops was the only measure which
would ensure observance of that order.9 Sir Benegal Rau of
India brought to the attention of the Council the fact
that the Prime Minister of India had invited fifteen countries
of the Southeast Asia area to meet in New Delhi to discuss
the Indonesian problem; in calling this conference, Mr. Nehru
had described the Dutch action as "the most naked and
unabashed aggression and the use of armed might to suppress
a people and a Government." Sir Benegal Rau also questioned
whether continued Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands
could be justified in view of their activities in Indonesia.10

8Ibid., pp. 10-17.
9Ibid., pp. 17-25.
10Ibid., pp. 28-31.
The Security Council was informed by the Committee of Good Offices, through a report dated 8 January, that arrangement had been made for "the dispatch of the military observers to various areas in Java and Sumatra beginning on the morning of 9 January." Three days later the Committee submitted to the Council copies of correspondence between itself and the Netherlands delegation regarding a visit by the Committee to the President and other leaders of the Republic. The Netherlands delegation stated that "competent authorities are now investigating the possibility of acceding to this request;" the report noted that final arrangements had not been completed. The Government of Burma submitted an application to participate in the discussions of the Security Council on the Indonesian question on 11 January and this request was granted at the 398th meeting.

398th Meeting, 11 January 1949

The United States representative, Mr. Philip Jessup, stated that his Government considered the Dutch military
activity to be completely unjustified and in conflict with the Renville Agreement; he felt that the Security Council should place more reliance upon the reports of its own agency, the Committee of Good Offices, than upon those transmitted by the Netherlands Government, one of the parties to the dispute. The United States delegate, after charging the Netherlands with failure to enter into bona fide negotiations, declared that the first steps toward an ultimate settlement of the Indonesian problem should include (1) fixing of a definite date for the holding of elections throughout all Indonesia for the purpose of establishing foundations for a United States of Indonesia, and (2) fixing of a definite date for the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands Government to the Government of the United States of Indonesia. In conclusion, Mr. Jessup maintained that the U.S.S.R. was actually opposed to an independent Indonesia, preferring instead a government controlled by the communist party.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 2-10.}

After Mr. Moe of Norway had made his initial speech on the Indonesian question—in which he expressed the opinion that the arguments of both sides were at least partially correct but that the Dutch military action was not justified and that the maintenance of law and order by the troops of either party should be supervised by the Committee of Good Offices with the Security Council as trustee—Mr. Malik
once again criticized the resolution adopted by the Council and accused the United States and the United Kingdom of backing the "colonial interests." He also maintained that the Dutch military action was supported by Marshall Plan aid, concluding that the only solution to the problem was to (1) condemn the Netherlands aggression, (2) demand immediate cessation of hostilities and release of Republican political leaders, and (3) withdrawal of Dutch troops from Republican territory.15

Reports of the Committee Concerning Republican Leaders and Its Military Observers

The Committee of Good Offices submitted two reports to the Security Council on 14 January. The first of these communications informed the Council that arrangements had been made for the Committee to visit the Vice-President, the Chairman of the Republican delegation, and the Minister of Education on the Island of Bangka on 15 January.16 The second of these reports concerned reports from the Committee's military observers in the field. These observers reported that (1) roads, bridges, and property had been and were being destroyed on a much larger scale than Netherlands military authorities had anticipated, (2) almost all of the


bridges in the former Dutch demilitarized zone had been destroyed, and (3) the number of Dutch troops available was insufficient to prevent guerrillas from performing acts of sabotage and to maintain law and order in the towns.17

400th Meeting, 14 January 1949

On 14 January Mr. van Roijen undertook the task of answering the various charges leveled against his Government; these charges were, for the most part, in regard to the termination of hostilities, the release of political leaders, and the granting of facilities to the Committee of Good Offices and the Consular Commission. He denounced accusations concerning these subjects as very biased and lacking in objectivity. The Netherlands delegate "would not be able to acquiesce" in any proposal calling for withdrawal of Netherlands troops to the former status quo line; the arguments followed the same general pattern as earlier speeches on this subject, asserting fear of extremist elements and of reprisals against the population of areas formerly occupied by the Dutch. On behalf of his Government, Mr. van Roijen stated that (1) the Netherlands Government "trusts that a federal interim government will be instituted within one month from the present date," (2) free general elections would be held as soon as possible, and (3) a round-table conference would be held

17 Ibid., Document S/1212, p. 49.
between the representatives of the Netherlands and of Indonesia for the purpose of creating a draft statute for the Netherlands-Indonesian union. The Netherlands Government also declared that it would take every possible measure to bring about the transfer of sovereignty during the year 1950. Following this rather lengthy statement, Sir Alexander Cadogan of the United Kingdom maintained that political prisoners should be released, but that Dutch troops should not be withdrawn.\footnote{\textit{Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Number 4 (400th Meeting), 14 January 1949, pp. 2-18.}}

In his initial speech on the Indonesian question, Mr. Alvarez of Cuba outlined the position of his Government as calling for: (1) withdrawal of Netherlands forces to their positions as defined by the truce agreement except in areas where the Committee of Good Offices may, under the supervision of its military observers, use them to maintain law and order; (2) release and reinstatement of the President of the Republic and other political prisoners; (3) the holding of free elections before 1 July 1949 to create a sovereign constituent assembly; (4) withdrawal of Dutch armed forces from the Republic "on the day that announcement of the forthcoming elections is made, and that withdrawal should be completed fifteen days before the elections take place;" and (5) withdrawal of troops from other territories of the United States of Indonesia before
24 December 1949. Mr. Hood of Australia pointed out that, in view of the guerrilla activity and the lack of co-operation with the Dutch on the part of the people of Jogjakarta, Mr. van Roijen's statement that "life is nearly back to normal in the former Republican areas" was misleading to say the least.

Report of the Committee Concerning Republican Leaders

The Committee of Good Offices transmitted a report concerning the visit of the Committee to the Republican leaders on the island of Bangka on 16 January. During this meeting the Vice-President and others informed the Committee that the High Representative of the Crown had indicated that he "no longer recognized either the legal existence of the Republic nor the official status of its servants." The Republican leaders on Bangka also requested that they be visited by the three members of the Republican delegation in Batavia.

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19 Ibid., pp. 18-21.

20 Ibid., pp. 26-29.

At the 401st meeting of the Council, Mr. Palar expressed the opinion that none of the arguments advanced by the Netherlands delegate could refute the evidence contained in the reports of the Committee of Good Offices. He also pointed out that Mr. van Roijen's statements concerning the existence of "tranquillity and peace" in Indonesia were quite erroneous. In regard to the Netherlands pledge of a transfer of sovereignty during 1950, the Indonesian representative declared that, in actuality, the Netherlands wishes to establish an Indonesian union in which the basic essentials of sovereignty would be secured by the Netherlands. 22

The position of the Indian Government was outlined by Sir Benegal Rau under five major points: (1) the political leaders of the Republic should be released and their authority to conduct negotiations re-established; (2) the Security Council should take a more active part in implementing its resolutions, possibly through the reconstitution of the Committee of Good Offices in a Commission of the Security Council; (3) armed forces should be withdrawn and the authority of the Republic re-established as soon as possible; (4) "definite dates should be fixed for the plebiscite and for the transfer of complete sovereignty to the United States of

Indonesia;" and (5) the economic blockade on Indonesia should be lifted so that the Republican Government might have the necessary financial resources for operating a government during the interim period.23

402nd Meeting, 21 January 1949

In view of Mr. van Roijen's statement that the Netherlands Government still maintained its position that the Security Council was not competent to consider the Indonesian question, Mr. Nisot of Belgium noted that the Council had rejected the Belgian proposal that the question of competence be put before the International Court. He expressed the opinion that, since the competence of the Council had not been verified, that body should contemplate no measure without first making certain, by reference to the Court, that it is competent to take such action.24 Following this speech, Mr. Alvarez of Cuba submitted, on behalf of the Governments of China, Norway, the United States, and Cuba, a joint resolution designed to facilitate a "just and lasting solution" to the Indonesian problem while "observing due respect for the fundamental rights of both parties."25 This resolution embodied the following major provisions: (1) the Government of the Netherlands

23 Ibid., pp. 9-13.
24 Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Number 6 (402nd Meeting), 21 January 1949, pp. 2-5.
25 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
was to discontinue military operations immediately, while
the Government of the Republic was to order a halt to guerrilla
warfare; both parties were to co-operate in restoring peace
and maintaining law and order; (2) the Netherlands Govern-
ment was called upon "to release immediately and unconditionally"
all Republican political prisoners arrested since 17 December
1948, to provide for their return to Jogjakarta, and to
provide the facilities necessary for the functioning of the
Republican Government; (3) negotiations between the parties
were to be entered into immediately on the basis that an
interim federal government should be established not later
than 15 March 1949, elections of representatives to an
Indonesian constituent assembly should be completed by
1 October 1949, and the transfer of sovereignty should take
place as soon as possible and not later than 1 July 1950;
(4) the Committee of Good Offices was to become the United
Nations Commission for Indonesia; this Commission was to
assist the parties in implementing this resolution and would
have authority to "consult with representatives of areas
in Indonesia other than the Republic" and to observe the
elections to be held throughout Indonesia; the Commission
was to assist in restoring the civil administration of the
Republic and to submit regular reports to the Security
Council while the Consular Commission was requested to
facilitate the work of the United Nations Commission through
the use of military observers and other staff facilities;
and (5) the Secretary-General was requested to provide the
Commission with the necessary staff, funds and other facilities and the Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic were called upon to "co-operate fully in giving effect to the provisions of this resolution."26

After this resolution had been introduced, Mr. Jessup presented the reasons which had motivated his Government to share in its sponsorship. In general, these reasons consisted of the facts that (1) the United States believed that the Security Council should continue to concern itself with the Indonesian question, (2) despite their legal inequality, there were still two parties to the dispute and both must be put in a position from which bona fide negotiations could be carried on, (3) the Security Council could not approve of the results of the second Dutch "police action," (4) negotiations should be assisted by an agency of the Security Council, and (5) any workable settlement of the Indonesian problem must be the result of an agreement between the parties to the dispute.27

The Soviet Government took a very critical view of the joint draft resolution. Mr. Malik maintained that this resolution "fully satisfies the aggressor, is acceptable to his protectors and abettors and ignores entirely the legitimate interests of the Indonesian Republic and its people." By not ordering an immediate withdrawal of Dutch troops and by


27Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Number 6 (402nd Meeting), 21 January 1949, pp. 6-10.
demanding a cessation of guerrilla warfare on the part of
the Republic, this resolution would allow the Netherlands
"to annex the Republican territory" which they had occupied
as a result of their military activity. The only difference
between the Committee of Good Offices and the United Nations
Commission for Indonesia was the change in name; the new
body would still serve to shield the attempts of the Nether-
lands to press Indonesia back into colonial status.28

The New Delhi Conference

Between 20 January and 25 January a conference of
the representatives of Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon,
Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen, met in New
Delhi, India, to discuss the Indonesian situation. In
addition to these representatives, the Governments of China,
Nepal, New Zealand, and Siam sent observers to the Conference.
A resolution adopted on 22 January by this Conference was
transmitted to the Security Council along with a letter
from the Prime Minister of India. Mr. Nehru pointed out
that the sympathy of the above-named nations was with the
Republic, the Governments of Burma, Ceylon, India, Pakistan,
and Saudi Arabia having already denied the Netherlands
Government facilities of transit by land, sea, or air. The
resolution adopted by the Conference on Indonesia stated

28Ibid., pp. 15-19.
that the second Dutch "police action" constituted "a flagrant breach of the Charter of the United Nations and defiance of the efforts of the Security Council" and made the following recommendations to the Security Council: (1) all political prisoners should be immediately freed and the Republican Government should be allowed to function freely; (2) the residency of Jogjakarta should be returned to the Republic and the parts of Java, Madura, and Sumatra which had been held by the Republic on 18 December 1948 should be restored to that Government by 15 March 1949; (3) Netherlands forces should be withdrawn immediately from the residency of Jogjakarta and gradually from the rest of the territory held by the Republic on 18 December 1948, such withdrawal to be completed under United Nations supervision by 15 March 1949; (4) all economic restrictions imposed upon Indonesia by the Netherlands should be rescinded immediately and the Republican Government should be provided immediately with all necessary facilities for communication with the outside world.\(^29\)

Report of the Committee on the Military Situation

By a report dated 24 January, the Committee of Good Offices submitted an analysis of the military situation in Indonesia to the Security Council. According to this report,

the Republican forces had adopted a "scorched earth" policy and guerrilla tactics, with such effectiveness that the establishment of law and order in territories formerly controlled by the Republicans was not yet possible; in general, the situation in such territories was very unstable. Because of the guerrilla tactics of the Republic, the Netherlands troops could not cease hostilities despite the fact that orders had been given to that effect; since the Republican Government had been prevented from functioning, no authority existed to implement the "cease hostilities" order in regard to the guerrilla forces. The report also pointed out that "occupation of large towns and important installations" had been the objective of the Dutch army, and, when the Dutch commander-in-chief issued the order to "cease hostilities," "practically all the objectives had been taken." 30

30 Ibid., Document S/1223, pp. 60-62. See G. M. Kahin, "Resistance in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, February 23, 1949, Vol. XVIII, pp. 45-47. In a report from Batavia, dated 22 January 1949, Mr. Kahin stated that the purpose of the Dutch military action of 19 December 1948 was the imposition of a "speedy settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute along lines dictated by the Dutch." The Netherlands felt that the capture of the principal Republican leaders and cities would cause native resistance to collapse; the ferocity of guerrilla warfare and even the attitude of the population in Dutch-occupied Jogjakarta illustrated the fallacy of this belief. The reports of lack of collaboration was corroborated by Mr. B. J. Muller, head of the Dutch Economic Administration in the Jogjakarta district; Mr. Muller reported that a maximum of only 150 of approximately 10,000 civil servants formerly working in his district had agreed to work for the Dutch. The Dutch had also been counting on the collaboration of "a large number" of Republican leaders once Jogjakarta had been occupied; not one of the leaders in the city agreed to work for the Dutch and the activity of the Dutch army—the shooting of an adviser to Prime Minister Hatta, a former cabinet member, and a high official of the Ministry of the Interior as well as numerous civilians—did nothing to promote collaboration.
The next day the Committee of Good Offices submitted a report to the Council dealing with "arrangements for the transportation of members of the Republican Mission to Lake Success and the present status of the Republican leaders." In regard to the possibility of receiving authorization for the Republican representatives to go to Lake Success, the Committee reported that the Netherlands Government had reached no decision concerning clearance and facilities and, consequently, the Committee could not make any arrangement for the trip. On the question of the status of the Republican leaders, the Committee transmitted a letter, dated 24 January, from the Secretary-General of the Republican delegation. This letter stated that Sukarno and Salim, interned on Sumatra, were "confined under armed guard to a relatively small military area," while the leaders on the island of Bangka had freedom of movement on the island but had been instructed not to engage in any political activity other than that "in line with the policy of the Netherlands." The Secretary-General also emphasized the fact that numerous obstacles stood in the way of communications between Republican leaders and the Republican delegation and the Committee of Good Offices.\(^{31}\)

The 403rd meeting was devoted to discussion of the joint draft resolution submitted by China, Cuba, Norway, and the United States. Sir Benegal Rau indicated several modifications which he thought necessary to make the resolution workable and to bring it into conformity with the New Delhi resolution. He first suggested that the withdrawal of troops be accomplished before a specified date, 15 March 1949; in the second place the Indian representative emphasized the necessity of "at least four or five months of settled government" in order to make certain that the plebiscites would be held under proper conditions; thirdly, Sir Benegal Rau pointed out that, since the Republican Government would have virtually no economic resources "as a result of the Netherlands aggression," the United Nations Commission should make recommendations as to what economic resources should be provided in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Republican Government; all restrictions on inter-island trade and on trade between the islands and foreign countries should be abolished, with the exception of those agreed upon by the Netherlands Government and the Republican Government.32

The primary motive of the Norwegian Government in sponsoring the joint resolution was, according to its

representative, Mr. Moe, to find a solution for the Indonesian problem. The solution embodied in the resolution was based upon compromise, and necessarily so as there were two parties to the dispute in Indonesia. Since a great deal of mutual mistrust existed, it would be necessary to establish the United Nations as a trustee of the actions of both parties. Finally, Mr. Moe stated that his Government could not accept the contention that the Republic of Indonesia no longer existed, since its state of disorganization had been caused by the Dutch military action.

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R., Mr. Tarasenko, stated that the joint resolution and the plan outlined by the Netherlands representative were both designed "to stifle the Indonesian Republic and to restore the old colonial order in Indonesia." He maintained that the United States and the United Kingdom and, under their leadership, the majority of the Council "opposed the defence of the legitimate rights of the Republic and made themselves parties to the encouragement of the aggressor."

404th and 405th Meetings, 27 January 1949

At the next meeting of the Council Mr. Falar, after referring to an article in the New York Times which carried a statement of an official Dutch spokesman to the

33 Ibid., pp. 8-12.
34 Ibid., pp. 17-20.
effect that the expenditures in Indonesia would be mainly "carried by heirs of the former Netherlands Indies Government," maintained that the heart of the Indonesian problem was that of economic domination; the Indonesian delegate interpreted this news item as evidence that the Indonesian people were to be forced to pay for the Netherlands military action. In view of this feeling, Mr. Palar felt that the joint resolution was not strong enough to relieve the doubts in Indonesian minds as to the intentions of the Netherlands. Because of this, the representative of the Republic urged the Council to embody the principles of the New Delhi resolution in the joint draft resolution by means of amendments. Mr. Hood of Australia also advised the Council to give careful consideration to the proposals of the New Delhi Conference and to revise the joint draft resolution accordingly.

At the 405th meeting, Mr. U So Nyun of Burma supported the position taken by the Australian delegate and likewise advocated the incorporation of the principles of the New Delhi Conference into the joint draft resolution. Mr. van Langenhove of Belgium cautioned against the adoption of amendments to the joint resolution which would give that document a threatening character; the Council should, rather,


36Ibid., pp. 13-20.

37Ibid., pp. 21-29.
avoid extremist positions, such as those consistently advocated by the U.S.S.R., and attempt to formulate a truly constructive solution.\textsuperscript{38}

In view of the debate carried on before the Council and the receipt of the New Delhi resolution, Mr. Tsang of China placed before the Council several amendments to the joint resolution; these amendments were sponsored jointly by the Governments of China, Cuba, Norway, and the United States. The wording in paragraph 2 was revised so as to state that the officials of the Government of the Republic should take over the administration of "the Jogjakarta area" rather than merely "the city of Jogjakarta." He also referred to several amendments which were designed to clarify the meaning of the resolution, but embodied no substantive change.\textsuperscript{39}

The Canadian delegation also submitted an amendment which was designed to improve and clarify the wording of the joint resolution, but contemplated no substantive change in the resolution.\textsuperscript{40} In response to an inquiry by the representative of Indonesia, Mr. van Roijen stated that

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., pp. 29-31.


\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., pp. 33-34. The text of the Canadian amendment may be found in Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Supplement for January 1949, Document S/1232, p. 66.
he had not received any further information regarding a trip to Lake Success by one or more members of the Republican delegation.41

406th Meeting, 28 January 1949

At the 406th meeting of the Council, Mr. Malik of the Soviet Union, after stating that the so-called "Anglo-American bloc" had consistently sided with the "aggressor," submitted a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Dutch troops to their positions as specified by the Renville Agreement.42 Before a vote was taken on the joint resolution, Mr. van Roijen, commenting on the New Delhi resolution, stated that the fundamental mistake made by those nations which condemned the Netherlands was that they identified Indonesia with the Republic; the Netherlands, of course, considered the Republic to be a minority entity.43

The joint draft resolution was then put to a vote, paragraph by paragraph. The Soviet amendment failed to secure the necessary affirmative vote of seven members and thus was not adopted. The rest of the joint resolution, as

41Ibid., pp. 38-40.


43Ibid., pp. 6-19.
amended by its sponsors and Canada, was adopted.44

410th Meeting, 16 February 1949

The only discussion of the Indonesian question during the month of February concerned a report from the United Nations Commission dated 15 February. This report, which was discussed on 16 February, embodied a recommendation that the date on which the Commission was to report under the Council's resolution of 28 January be postponed from 15 February to 1 March.45

Mr. Malik considered that approval of this recommendation would put the Council in the position of "faithfully pursuing the policy of encouraging those who were guilty of unprovoked aggression against the Indonesian Republic." Mahmoud Bey of Egypt agreed to the postponement, but expressed disappointment in the fact that the Commission did not make any report to the Council.46 The United Kingdom and Canadian representatives supported the President's proposal to grant the postponement. After another short comment by Mr. Malik, in which he accused the British delegate of always being ready to speak in defense of the Netherlands Government, discussion was closed and the


46Ibid., pp. 2-4.
President stated that the Commission would be notified that their recommendation had been accepted.47


The United Nations Commission submitted a report to the Security Council dated 1 March in compliance with the Council's resolution of 28 January. The Commission reported that, although the Netherlands had been given time "to adjust itself politically," not only had no agreement been reached on the establishment of a federal interim government, but also no negotiations had taken place as required by the resolution; in addition, the Commission reported that the Netherlands Government had not "complied with the basic prerequisites of further action under the resolution." The Netherlands had, however, declared that they would call a round table conference at the Hague on 12 March; this conference, to which all parties interested in the Indonesian dispute would be invited, would deal with the problem of "an accelerated transfer of sovereignty" as well as the creation of a federal interim government. The Commission stated that it had no authority to attend the conference at the Hague; since the Commission viewed this invitation as a substitute for the provisions of the 28 January resolution, it referred the matter to the Security Council and requested that that body instruct the Commission

47Ibid., pp. 4-7.
as to the position it should take in regard to the invitation. The report concluded by stating that it was conscious "of the progressive deterioration of the situation in Indonesia and of the augmented danger to world stability which must result." 48

Reports on the Proposed Round Table Conference

By a letter dated 2 March, the Netherlands Government informed the Security Council of its plans to call a round table conference which would be held at the Hague "at the earliest possible date, preferably on 12 March 1949." The purpose of this conference would be to (1) accelerate the transfer of sovereignty, (2) establish a Netherlands-Indonesian Union, (3) draft financial, economic, and military arrangements pertaining to such a Union, and (4) institute a federal interim government and other arrangements for the interim period. All interested parties had been invited to the conference, including the President of the Republic, the Chairman of the Federal Consultative Assembly, and the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. 49

The United Nations Commission submitted a supplementary report dated 7 March in accordance with the Council's 28 January resolution. This report contained a letter from

Sukarno to the Netherlands Government concerning the invitation to attend the round table conference. While stating that he agreed with the idea of an accelerated transfer of sovereignty and the purpose of the conference, Sukarno pointed out that the responsibility for such decisions as would be arrived at by the conference "can only be assumed by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia fully exercising its authority in its territory and seated in Jogjakarta." 50

On 10 March the Commission submitted a second supplementary report which also contained communications between the parties and the United Nations Commission. No further information was available concerning the Netherlands position regarding the round table conference; the Netherlands delegation assured the Commission that it would keep that body informed about any new developments. 51 The next day the Commission transmitted a third supplementary report to the Security Council. This report contained a letter from the Chairman of the Republican delegation which further clarified the Republican position in regard to the round table conference. This letter stated that the decision on the Netherlands invitation would have to be left to the Republican Government "when it is re-established and functioning freely at Jogjakarta;" there should, however, be no delay

in implementing the Security Council resolution in regard to the release of political prisoners, the restoration of the civil administration of the Republic, the re-establishment of the Republican Government at Jogjakarta, and the cessation of hostilities in Indonesia.52

416th Meeting 10 March 1949

The Security Council resumed consideration of the Indonesian question on 10 March. At the opening of the meeting, the President informed the Council that, upon a request from the Indonesian delegation, he had asked safe conduct for a member of the Indonesian delegation for a visit to the Republican leaders on the island of Bangka; the Netherlands Government had informed the President that they had no objection to the Indonesian request.53

Mr. van Roijen declared that the Netherlands Government could not, at that time, return the Republican Government to Jogjakarta for several reasons, the more important ones being: (1) such action would give rise to fear on the part of Indonesians outside of the Republic that the Republic would become the dominating power in Indonesia; (2) reprisals and other disturbances would be the result of the restoration of the Republican Government; and (3) the restoration of the


Republican Government "would entail the restoration of the influence of precisely the same militarist and extremist elements as have for three years been the main stumbling-block in negotiations with the Republic," in connection with this statement, Mr. van Roijen particularly emphasized the danger of communist elements taking over the Republican Government if it were immediately restored to Jogjakarta. The Netherlands delegate then discussed the proposed round table conference as a means of overcoming the dangers inherent in the immediate restoration of the Republican Government and requested the Council to allow the United Nations Commission for Indonesia to take part in the conference. 54

General Romulo maintained that the Dutch had failed to observe the Security Council resolution of 28 January and, further, that the proposed round table conference would be able to consider only those proposals which would be acceptable to the Netherlands. The Dutch, by amending their constitution and inserting provisions on the proposed Netherlands-Indonesian Union, had defined unilaterally what they wanted the Union to be, "regardless of the desires of the Indonesians." The representative of the Philippines stated that this Dutch counter-proposal was merely another attempt to circumvent the Security Council and to ignore its decisions. 55

54 Ibid., pp. 3-12.
Mr. Palar pointed out that the Netherlands proposal would be very attractive if the Indonesians could have confidence in the Netherlands. On the basis of past experience and the reports of the Security Council's Committee of Good Offices as well as the reports of the United Nations Commission, the Netherlands could hardly expect such confidence. The Indonesian delegate also accused the Dutch of using "nazi methods" in Indonesia and he cited as evidence several letters written by Dutch soldiers and printed in Dutch newspapers; these letters described torture methods which were used to obtain information. According to Mr. Palar, the objective of the Netherlands in calling the round table conference was four-fold in nature: (1) to disregard the Security Council resolution of 28 January, "demote the United Nations Commission for Indonesia and avoid the withdrawal of Netherlands troops and the restoration of the Republic;" (2) "to reduce the Indonesian problem from its international level to a domestic one where the Netherlands will have final discretion;" (3) "to avoid dealing with the Republic as the other party in the dispute;" and (4) "to degrade our gallant troops to the status of rebels."

In the last speech of the day, Mr. Austin of the United States, while supporting the idea of a round-table conference, maintained that his Government still considered the implementation of the 28 January resolution to be necessary for the solution of the Indonesian problem.

56 Ibid., pp. 19-30.
57 Ibid., pp. 30-35.
The President of the Council, Mr. Alvarez of Cuba, opened the 417th meeting by informing the Council that Pakistan had requested permission to participate in the discussion of the Indonesian problem. As there was no objection, the request was granted.58

Sir Benegal Rau was of the opinion that, in view of their past conduct, the Dutch would have to undertake some positive action toward the peaceable solution of the Indonesian problem; mere promises on the part of the Dutch could not be expected to restore confidence in the objectives of the Netherlands Government. Such positive action would have to include restoration of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta. Sir Benegal Rau also read a telegram received from Batavia which requested that he call the attention of the United Nations Commission to "atrocities of Dutch troops in Jogjakarta as a reprisal of recent attack of the Republican Army."59

The Belgian representative, Mr. van Langenhove, stated that, in regard to freeing the peoples of Indonesia, the Council could issue no injunction since the Charter did not confer such power upon that body; he asserted that, in regard "to the settlement of the substance of a question,

58 Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Number 20 (417th Meeting), 11 March 1949, p. 2. The text of the letter from the representative of Pakistan may be found on this page.

59 Ibid., pp. 2-7.
the Council can only make recommendations." In general, the Belgian delegate felt that the Netherlands proposal was a major step towards settling the dispute and that the Republic was being unreasonable in demanding the restoration of their Government in Jogjakarta.\textsuperscript{60} The representatives of both China and Canada suggested that a preliminary conference be called in Indonesia for the purpose of effectively implementing the cease-fire order and to decide on the time and conditions under which the conference could take place. Mr. Tsaiang also felt that, unless the fighting was halted and the Republican Government restored, the United Nations Commission should not participate in the round table conference.\textsuperscript{61}

\textbf{418th Meeting, 14 March 1949}

On 14 March, Abdur Rahim Khan of Pakistan outlined the position of his Government on the Indonesian problem. The Government of Pakistan felt that the Netherlands military action had been in defiance of the Council's orders; further, it felt that the action which the Council had taken was not only inadequate, but had also been taken in too hesitating a manner. The Pakistani delegate declared that the restoration of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta was absolutely necessary, as was the withdrawal of Dutch troops.

\textsuperscript{60}Ibid., pp. 7-13.
\textsuperscript{61}Ibid., pp. 16-22.
from Republican territory. Consequently, the Government of Pakistan felt that the proposed round table conference, particularly its composition, was unsatisfactory. 62

Mr. Palar of Indonesia maintained that the Dutch concept of a transfer of sovereignty "concerns the transfer of something which has nothing to do with sovereignty;" one of the major reasons for this contention was the fact that, under the newly amended Netherlands Constitution, one of the functions of the proposed Netherlands-Indonesian Union would be to "guarantee juridical warrants and a good government in Indonesia, both basic functions of sovereignty." 63

The representative of Egypt attacked that element in the Netherlands which still clung to the ideals of a colonial system. While agreeing with the Belgian contention that the Security Council has no power to ordain the existence of a new state, Mahmoud Bey declared that the Republic of Indonesia "has been and still is there, whether some reactionaries like it or not." 64

Mr. Malik once again accused the United States of giving encouragement to the aggressor, the Netherlands, by its actions in the Security Council; he condemned both the United States and the United Kingdom for allegedly using their influence to bring about the rejection of the Soviet

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63 Ibid., pp. 7-11.
64 Ibid., pp. 11-17.
proposal for the withdrawal of Netherlands troops. The representative of the U.S.S.R. charged that the proposed round-table conference was nothing more than an attempt on the part of the Netherlands Government to create "a cover for the aggressive action of that Government and an attempt to legalize the state of lawlessness resulting from Netherlands aggression in Indonesia."\(^65\)

The Government of the United Kingdom felt that the proposed round table conference should be studied in an unbiased manner, despite existing feelings caused by the non-compliance of the Netherlands with the Security Council resolution. It also felt, however, that the Council should do everything possible "toward establishing with the least possible delay the conditions which will make it possible for the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to agree to participate in the round table conference proposed by the Government of the Netherlands."\(^66\)

419th Meeting, 16 March 1949

The representative of Norway expressed agreement with the statements made by the Chinese and Canadian delegates; he felt that the "preliminary problems" concerning the cease-fire and the restoration of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta should be settled before considering the

\(^{65}\)Ibid., pp. 18-21.

\(^{66}\)Ibid., pp. 21-23.
major problem regarding the transfer of sovereignty in a round table conference. This point of view was also supported by Mr. Chauvel, the French delegate, who stated that the problems which concerned only the Netherlands and the Republic should be settled under the auspices of the United Nations Commission before holding a round table conference in which the Federalists would also participate.

Mr. Alvarez of Cuba was concerned about the failure of the Netherlands to implement the 28 January resolution; he declared that complete compliance with this resolution should be necessary before any additional methods would be utilized in attempting to solve the Indonesian problem. The Cuban delegate also felt that careful consideration ought to be given to the role which the United Nations Commission would play in any round-table conference in order to prevent any attempt to by-pass previous resolutions of the Security Council. Mr. Hood of Australia agreed with the conclusions of the Cuban representative, but was surprised that so many members of the Council were perfectly willing to consider a measure "which is tantamount to the invalidation of its own resolution."

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67 Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Number 22 (419th Meeting), 16 March 1949, pp. 2-4.
68 Ibid., pp. 4-6.
69 Ibid., pp. 6-8.
70 Ibid., pp. 8-12.
In answer to arguments put forth by Mr. Falar in an earlier meeting, Mr. van Roijen declared that the transfer of sovereignty was to be "real, complete, and unconditional;" in addition, he stated that the amendments to the Netherlands Constitution embodied only "the principles of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union which were agreed upon and laid down in the Linggadjati Agreement." Consequently, these amendments could not possibly be interpreted in such a way that they would prohibit the transfer of complete and unconditional sovereignty.71

Mr. Tarasenko, of the Ukrainian delegation, strongly opposed the proposed round table conference. He once again accused the "colonial powers" of using the Security Council to cloak Netherlands aggression in an aura of legality. Since he considered the round table conference to be only a deception, the Ukrainian representative opposed not only the suggestion that the United Nations Commission be allowed to participate in that conference, but also the Chinese proposal that it participate in a preliminary conference on the Indonesian question.72

420th Meeting, 21 March 1949

After reviewing the various points of view which had been expounded regarding the restoration of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta, Mr. Sen of India declared that the

71 Ibid., pp. 16-25.
72 Ibid., pp. 25-28.
responsibility for the continuation of hostilities, which was endangering the peace of South East Asia, rested upon the Netherlands Government. Mr. Palar then pointed out that the Dutch were attempting to destroy Jogjakarta and thus make it physically impossible to restore the Republican Government to that city. He summarized the position of his Government as follows: (1) immediate implementation of the 28 January resolution should be accomplished; (2) a preliminary conference could be held under the auspices of the United Nations Commission, but such a conference, and the restoration of the Republic which would follow, should last no more than fourteen days; (3) the United Nations Commission should report immediately on the situation in Jogjakarta; (4) after the restoration of the Republican Government, that Government "should be able to participate lawfully in whatever conferences or negotiations are provided for in the Council's resolution or are deemed necessary by both parties and the United Nations Commission for Indonesia;" (5) a report on the military situation in Indonesia, including those areas which were occupied by the Netherlands before 18 December 1948, should be made as soon as possible; and (6) an immediate investigation should be made, by any competent international organ, on the reports of atrocities.73

Mr. van Langenhove of Belgium, in answer to those who demanded a literal application of the Council's 23 January

73 Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Number 23 (420th Meeting), 21 March 1949, pp. 2-16.
resolution, stated that the Council's competence had never been verified or established since the matter had not been submitted to the International Court. He also alluded to the fact that it would be extremely difficult for the Republican Government to bring to an end the resistance movement since, in the past, that Government had advocated "war to the bitter end." The Egyptian delegate, Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, concluded the day's speeches by pointing out that the only logical procedure would be to allow the leaders of the Republic to contact their people before holding the round table conference.

421st Meeting, 23 March 1949

As no member of the Council objected, the President stated that he would send a telegram to the United Nations Commission requesting information on the general situation in Jogjakarta. Since a good deal of the Council's time had been taken up by varying interpretations of his suggestions, General McNaughton of Canada formally stated his proposal concerning a preliminary conference. This proposal directed the United Nations Commission to (1) assist the parties in implementing the Council's cease-fire order and in restoring the Republican Government to Jogjakarta, and (2) assist the parties in reaching an agreement on the time and conditions

74 Ibid., pp. 19-24.
75 Ibid., pp. 24-28.
for holding the proposed round table conference. In addition, the proposal stated that, if an agreement was reached, "the holding of a round table conference and the participation of the United Nations Commission in such a conference would be consistent with the 28 January resolution of the Council."76

Mr. Sen objected to including the matter of deciding the time and conditions of a round table conference in the agenda of a preliminary meeting. Mr. Hood of Australia agreed with this point of view, maintaining that the Republican Government would have to be restored to Jogjakarta before it could be expected to consider any such conference.77 The Soviet delegate attacked the whole idea of holding a conference, either the suggested preliminary conference or the proposed round table conference. Mr. Malik maintained that the Security Council should reaffirm its demand for the immediate and unconditional release of the Indonesian political leaders and, in response to the "growing demand of the peoples of Asia," order the immediate withdrawal of Netherlands forces from Republican territory.78 At the request of the Soviet delegate, the Canadian proposal was put to a vote; it was adopted by a vote of 8 to none, with France, Ukrainian S.S.R., and the U.S.S.R. abstaining.79

76 Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Number 24 (421st Meeting), 23 March 1949, pp. 2-6. The text of the Canadian proposal may be found on page 5.

77 Ibid., pp. 11-18.

78 Ibid., pp. 18-21.

79 Ibid., pp. 25-25.
Report of the Extent of Damage to Jogjakarta

On 26 March the United Nations Commission submitted a report on the alleged damage to the city of Jogjakarta. The Commission reported that the damage to the city was not serious enough to "interfere in any way with the re-establishment of the Republican Government in Jogjakarta;" the report stated, however, that it would be necessary for the Netherlands to furnish "necessary facilities" because of a lack of materials and equipment, part of which had been destroyed or removed as a result of the Dutch military action of 18 December 1948, which would "seriously hamper an effective functioning of the Republican administration."

When this communication was brought to the attention of the Security Council, Mr. Malik maintained that the report was contradictory since it had declared that no serious damage had occurred, yet there was a lack of materials and equipment necessary for administering a government.

1st Interim Report of the United Nations Commission

The first interim report of the United Nations Commission was submitted to the Security Council in a letter dated 4 August. This report covered the period from the

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establishment of the Commission on 28 January to 3 August.82

In accordance with the Security Council directive adopted on 23 March, the United Nations Commission made contact both with the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic for the purpose of setting a date for the beginning of discussions under the auspices of the Commission. Mr. van Roijen arrived in Batavia on 12 April and discussions were opened in that city on 14 April.83

The question of the restoration of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta was one of the most important issues considered during the newly-opened discussions. The Republican delegation submitted a plan which "envisaged four consecutive phases to bring about the return of the Special Territory of Jogjakarta to the administration of the Republic." On 21 April Mr. van Roijen stated that the Netherlands Government was willing to agree to the restoration of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta on two conditions: (1) the Republican Government should order "its armed adherents to cease guerilla warfare and co-operate in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order," and (2) a binding commitment must be made "concerning the time and conditions for the holding of the Round Table Conference at The Hague." On 7 May the Chairman of the Republican delegation, in a formal statement, accepted the Netherlands

83 Ibid., pp. 5-7.
conditions and Sukarno and Hatta agreed to urge the adoption of such a policy following the restoration of the Republican Government; the Chairman of the Netherlands delegation, in view of the Republican statement, agreed, on behalf of his Government, to the return of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta.84

A joint sub-committee was set up "to make the necessary investigations and preparations preliminary to the return of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta," this sub-committee went to Jogjakarta on 11 May. In compliance with Netherlands demands, anyone who wished to leave Jogjakarta before that city was turned over to Republican authorities was allowed to do so. This evacuation was completed on 9 June and Netherlands authorities estimated that approximately 30,000 people had left the Residency of Jogjakarta.85

In accordance with plans worked out between the parties and with the assistance of the Commission's military advisers, the evacuation of Netherlands troops from Jogjakarta started on 24 June and was completed on 30 June. The withdrawal was accomplished without any hindrance or serious incident. On 6 July, Sukarno, Hatta, and the other members of the Republican Government returned to Jogjakarta; the first meeting of the Republican Cabinet was held on 13 July.86

84 Ibid., pp. 8-12.
85 Ibid., p. 12.
86 Ibid., p. 13.
A second sub-committee was set up under the auspices of the Commission to study possible ways in which the cease-fire and the cession of guerilla warfare could be brought about. Informal discussions were held between the parties and on 22 June Mr. van Roijen announced that an agreement had been reached. Following the agreement of 22 June, further informal consultations were held; on 3 August cease-hostilities orders were issued simultaneously by the Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic. These orders were to be effective in Java as of midnight on 10/11 August, and in Sumatra as of midnight on 14/15 August. 87

Though discussions had been held on the subject, no final agreement had been reached on the release of political prisoners. On 1 August the parties agreed to consider "the establishment of a joint sub-committee under the auspices of the Commission to advise upon and to accelerate the release of political prisoners and prisoners of war." 88

Informal discussions between the parties on the question of holding a round table conference were initiated on 19 April and, on 7 May, resulted in an agreement on the time and conditions of holding such a conference. 89 This agreement called for the conference to be convened by

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87 Ibid., pp. 14-17.
88 Ibid., pp. 17-21.
89 Ibid., p. 23.
1 August, if possible, and for the conference to be completed within two months after the date of convening. The participants undertook to ratify the agreements reached by the conference within six weeks after its close and sovereignty was to be transferred to the United States of Indonesia "before the end of 1949." The participants in this conference were to consist of representatives of the Netherlands Government, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, the Federal Consultative Assembly, and the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. On 22 June the representatives of the Netherlands, the Republic, and the areas in Indonesia other than the Republic formalized the agreement discussed above. The Chairman of the Netherlands delegation stated that his Government approved the agreement and the Chairman of the Federal Consultative Assembly also endorsed the agreement. The Chairman of the Republican delegation declared that the agreement would be a part of the policy "to be urged upon the Government of the Republic of Indonesia after its restoration to Jogjakarta..." After its restoration, the Republican Government approved the agreement.

In conclusion, the Commission's 1st Interim Report stated that the following objectives of the Council's directive of 23 March had been achieved: (1) the Government of the Republic had been restored to Jogjakarta;

90 Ibid., Appendix X, pp. 74-76.
91 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
(2) an agreement had been reached on a cessation of hostilities and both parties had issued cease-hostilities orders to their troops; and (3) the time and conditions for the round table conference at The Hague had been agreed upon. 92

448th Meeting, 27 September 1949

At the 448th and the 449th meetings the Security Council dealt with (1) the problem of the payment of travelling expenses and subsistence allowances to alternate representatives on Security Council Commissions, and (2) a request from the Consular Commission at Batavia that the United Nations assume future costs of military observers in Indonesia. A French resolution which called for the retroactive payments of such expenses was adopted by a vote of 7 to 1, with 3 abstentions. The rest of the meeting was devoted to speeches on the question raised by the Consular Commission. In general, the United States supported the Consular Commission's proposal, while the U.S.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R. opposed it. 93 At the 449th meeting, a Cuban proposal to transmit the Consular Commission's request to the Secretary-General was adopted by a vote of 9 to 1, with 1 abstention, the U.S.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R. being opposed to the measure. 94

92 Ibid., p. 29.
93 Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Number 44 (448th Meeting), 27 September 1949, pp. 2-20. The text of the French proposal may be found on page 10.
94 Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Number 45 (449th Meeting), 5 October 1949, pp. 2-10. The text of the request from the Consular Commission may be found in Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Supplement for September, October, November, and December 1949, Document 3/1336, p.l.
The Round Table Conference at The Hague

The Round Table Conference was convened at The Hague on 23 August and continued in session until 2 November. According to the report of the United Nations Commission, the Conference was "eminently successful" and, as a result of the Conference, a new era in the relations of the peoples of Indonesia and the Netherlands was beginning. The achievements of this Conference may be summarized in four main categories.

Political and Constitutional Issues

As a result of the Round Table Conference, agreement was reached on (1) a provisional constitution for the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, (2) the Charter for the Transfer of Sovereignty, (3) the Statute of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, (4) an agreement in the matter of foreign relations, (5) an agreement on transitional measures, (6) an agreement on the right of self-determination, and (7) an agreement concerning nationality and citizenship.

The provisional constitution provided for the creation of a federal state in which the sovereign authority would be vested in a government composed of a President and Ministers, together with a House of Representatives and a Senate. The

95 Security Council, Official Records, Fourth Year, Special Supplement Number 6, pp. 1, 37.
96 Ibid., pp. 15-20.
Senate was to be composed of two representatives from each of the participating territories, while the House of Representatives was to consist of 150 members, with the number of members representing the Republic being equal to one-half the total number of members from the other territories of Indonesia. The Chinese, European, and Arabian minority groups were to be represented by a minimum of 9, 6, and 3 members respectively.97

The Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty provided that the Netherlands Government "unconditionally and irrevocably transfers complete sovereignty over Indonesia to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and thereby recognizes said Republic of the United States of Indonesia as an independent and sovereign State;" the transfer of sovereignty was to take place no later than 30 December 1949. In regard to the problem of the residency of New Guinea, article 2 of the Charter stated that the status quo would be maintained in that territory, with the provision that within a year after the transfer of sovereignty the political status of New Guinea would be determined by negotiations between the new Republic and the Netherlands.98

The Statute of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union was designed to promote the common interests of the two parties; co-operation was to take place primarily in the fields of

97Ibid., Appendix VI, pp. 53-71.
98Ibid., Appendix VII, pp. 91-92.
of foreign relations, defense, and finance, and also in matters of an economic and a cultural nature. All decisions in the Union were to be taken "in agreement between the two Partners;" a conference, composed of three ministers of each party, was to be held at least twice a year and more often if the partners deemed it necessary. The Union Statute also provided for a Union Court of Arbitration which was to be composed of six members, three to be appointed by each party; decisions were to be taken by a majority vote and, in the case of a tie, the Court was authorized to call upon the President of the International Court of Justice or another international authority to appoint a person of another nationality to sit as a special member of the Union Court with the right to vote.\footnote{Ibid., Appendix IX, pp. 95-101.}

An agreement was also concluded concerning foreign relations between the two parties. Under this agreement, the parties were to aim at co-ordinating their foreign policies and they agreed not to conclude any treaty or perform any "juridical act in international intercourse" which involved the interests of the other party without first consulting that party.\footnote{Ibid., Appendix X, pp. 101-102.}

The Agreement on Transitional Measures stated that the division of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia into component states should be accomplished by a Constituent
Assembly with the stipulation that a plebiscite be held among the population of the territories to determine whether they wished to form a separate component state. If a component state failed to ratify the final Constitution, that state would be free "to negotiate about a special relationship towards the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands." In addition, the Netherlands agreed to promote membership of the new Republic in the United Nations. This agreement settled the problem of self-determination of areas outside of the Republic which had been so important to the Netherlands.

A separate agreement was concluded concerning the problem of nationality and citizenship. In general, those persons who, because of the transfer of sovereignty, possessed dual citizenship were given the right to elect either Netherlands or Indonesian nationality.

Financial and Economic Problems

In this field, the parties were agreed that the Republic should assume liabilities as well as rights upon the transfer of sovereignty. A difference of opinion arose, naturally enough, over the extent to which the Republic should take over the debts of Indonesia. As the parties were

101 Ibid., Appendix XI, pp. 102-105.
102 Ibid., Appendix XII, pp. 105-109.
unable to reach agreement, though both made considerable concession, a "Debt Commission" was given the task of proposing the amount of the debt to be assumed by the Republic, giving due consideration to expenditures which it might attribute to military action.103

The proposal of the "Debt Commission" in regard to the domestic debt was accepted by the parties; upon the transfer of sovereignty, the Republic would assume "responsibility for both interest and amortization in the amount of 871 million guilders and for the debt to third countries in the amount of 420 million guilders." The Republic also assumed (1) responsibility for "certain items of the external floating debt," amounting to a maximum of 263.5 million guilders, and (2) obligations assumed, with regard to Indonesia, under the Bretton Woods Agreement. The Debt Agreement also reduced the "external debt due to the Netherlands by 2 thousand million Netherlands guilders."104

The parties agreed to promote voluntary cooperation in foreign commercial relations through consultation and continuous contact; a "most-favored nation" clause applying to "Netherlands nationals, corporate bodies, products, ships, and other objects" was included in the Debt Agreement. On the other hand, nationals of third countries were to enjoy "equal rights in participation in trade with Indonesia and

103Ibid., p. 21.
104Ibid.
in that country's economic activities and development. 105

Military Affairs

Separate agreements were concluded in regard to the withdrawal of Netherlands naval forces, land forces, and air forces. The Netherlands navy was to be withdrawn from Indonesia within one year; upon the request of the Republican Government, however, the Netherlands was, for a limited period of time, prepared "to lend aid in the defence of Indonesia at sea and in the building-up of the navy of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia." The Netherlands Government also agreed to turn over to the Republic a number of ships and naval aircraft. After the transfer of sovereignty, the naval base at Surabaya was to pass immediately into Republican hands and other naval establishments were to be gradually transferred to the navy of the Republic. All naval bases, however, were to continue to serve ships of both the navy of the Republic and the Royal Netherlands Navy. 106

The Royal Netherlands Army was to be withdrawn from Indonesia "within the shortest possible time;" until the time of such withdrawal, Netherlands troops were to be


assembled in areas designated by mutual agreement. Within these areas, the Dutch would be under the command of their own officers and have freedom of movement; in order to leave the designated areas, however, Dutch troops would have to obtain a pass which had been approved by a military authority of the Republic. The Royal Netherlands-Indonesian Army was to be reorganized into the army of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. 107

The agreement regarding Netherlands air forces stated that the "parties should aim at withdrawal, or reorganization, of Netherlands Air Forces in Indonesia within six months after the transfer of sovereignty." The Netherlands Government expressed its willingness to aid the Republic in building up, training, and equipping an Indonesian air force by supplying personnel, materiel, and technical advice. 108

An agreement was also reached concerning co-operation between the Netherlands and the Republic in the field of defense. Each partner was to be responsible for the defense of its own territory; any joint regulations adopted by a Union organ were to be implemented by each of the partners.

107 Ibid., pp. 23-29. Appendix XVI, pp. 135-145, contains the text of the agreement regulating Netherlands land forces in Indonesia after the transfer of sovereignty.

108 Ibid., pp. 29-30. The text of the agreement regarding the Netherlands air forces in Indonesia may be found in Appendix XVII, pp. 145-146.
within their own jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{Cultural and Social Affairs}

The partners agreed to set up a joint committee composed of fourteen members, seven to be appointed by each partner, to promote knowledge of each other's culture and to exchange information in the cultural field. The agreement envisioned an exchange of professors, teachers, and experts as well as of books and periodicals.

The Government of the Republic agreed to accept into its service all civil government officials who were employed by the Government of Indonesia at the transfer of sovereignty. The Republican Government also agreed that, for a period of two years, it would "refrain from taking any measures which would unfavourably affect the legal position of these government officials who have Netherlands nationality, and who will have been taken over from the service of the Government of Indonesia."\textsuperscript{110} In concluding its report, the United Nations Commission informed the Council that it would continue to carry out its functions and observe the implementation of the agreements reached at the Round Table Conference.\textsuperscript{111}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{109}Ibid., pp. 30-31.
\textsuperscript{110}Ibid., pp. 31-33.
\textsuperscript{111}Ibid., p. 37.
\end{flushright}
455th Meeting, 12 December 1949

On 12 and 13 December the Security Council considered the special report of the United Nations Commission on the Round Table Conference. In the initial speech of the day, General McNaughton of Canada brought to the Council’s attention a draft resolution which the Canadian delegation had submitted. This resolution noted the special report on the Round Table Conference which the United Nations Commission had submitted, welcomed the "forthcoming establishment of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia as an independent, sovereign state," commended the Commission for its part in settling the dispute, and requested the Commission "to observe and assist" in the implementation of the agreements reached at the Conference. General McNaughton stated that his Government noted particularly the "outstanding contribution made by the Council’s representatives in Indonesia."112

Mr. van Roijen echoed this opinion of the United Nations Commission, but declared that his Government still maintained their original attitude in regard to the competence of the Council to deal with the situation; he expressed regret that the question of competence had never been submitted to the International Court of Justice. After
informing the Council that the Second Chamber of the Netherlands Parliament had approved the results of the Round Table Conference, the Netherlands representative stated that he, personally, felt that the Netherlands and Indonesia were "about to enter upon a new period of friendship and co-operation." 113

Mr. Palar laid much importance on the fact that, as a result of the Round Table Conference, absolute and complete sovereignty would be transferred to the new Republic. He pointed out that none of the concessions which the Indonesian delegation had made at the Conference would in any way restrict the Republic's sovereignty. The Indonesian delegate supported the Canadian draft resolution, and urged that the United Nations Commission assist in the settlement of the status of New Guinea. 114

The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. took a much more pessimistic view of the results of the Round Table Conference. He maintained that the Dutch were still waging war upon the Indonesian people "who refuse to submit to the Dutch occupiers and to the Hatta clique, which has betrayed the interests of its people." Mr. Galagan then attacked the United States and the United Kingdom, accusing them of supporting the Dutch in "a course of armed aggression against the Indonesian people; he followed this attack with a history

113 Ibid., pp. 3-7.
114 Ibid., pp. 7-13.
of the Indonesian dispute in which he purported to show how the United States and the United Kingdom had supported Netherlands military operations. The Ukrainian delegate maintained that the United Nations Commission was only a tool of United States policy and that the composition of the Round Table Conference "determined in advance the character of the United States of Indonesia and of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union as a new political form of colonial slavery for the Indonesian people." In view of this situation, the Ukrainian delegation submitted a draft resolution calling for (1) withdrawal of Netherlands troops to the positions which they held prior to December 1948, (2) the release of Indonesian political prisoners and an investigation of the activities of Netherlands authorities "which have taken the form of brutal terrorism, murder, and persecution of the democratic leaders of the Indonesian people," (3) creation of a United Nations Commission which would be composed of states members of the Security Council, (4) instructions to this Commission to submit to the Council within three months proposals for the settlement of the Indonesian problem; (5) the United Nations Commission for Indonesia to be dissolved.\textsuperscript{115}

The representatives of Pakistan and China both praised the work of the United Nations Commission and supported the Canadian resolution.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{115}Ibid., pp. 14-27. The text of the Ukrainian resolution may be found on page 27.

\textsuperscript{116}Ibid., pp. 28-32.
Sir Benegal Rau of India and Mr. Blanco of Cuba supported the Canadian resolution and extended congratulations to the representatives of the Netherlands and of the Republic on the successful conclusion of the agreements at the Round Table Conference. Mr. Tsarapkin of the U.S.S.R. attacked the agreements which had been reached at the Conference on the grounds that, for the Indonesian people, "these agreements signify their return to their former colonial slavery under new and more subtle legal forms" and that, under these agreements, "Indonesia's freedom and independence are being sacrificed to the political and economic interests of a bloc of Colonial Powers, namely the United States of America, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and others." 

The representatives of Egypt and of Belgium expressed satisfaction in the outcome of the Round Table Conference and support for the Canadian draft resolution. Mr. Gross of the United States felt that the agreements reached at The Hague "should be regarded as a substantial contribution to the advancement of the purposes and principles of the Charter." In reply to the charges of the Soviet delegate, 

118 Ibid., pp. 5-12.
Mr. Gross stated that the delegates of the U.S.S.R. and of the Ukrainian S.S.R. were attempting to twist the meanings of the agreements reached at the Round Table Conference and that the Soviet Union had been attempting to thwart the efforts of the parties to reach agreement and to smear the Indonesian leaders.\textsuperscript{120}

Following several other speeches which, except for one by Mr. Galagan of the Ukrainian S.S.R., all expressed satisfaction with the results of the Round Table Conference, the resolutions before the Council were put to a vote. The Canadian resolution was defeated by a Soviet veto, the vote being 9 in favor and 2 against. The Ukrainian resolution was rejected by a vote of 2 in favor and 9 against. The President declared that the defeat of the Canadian resolution had no effect on previous Council resolutions concerning the activities of the Commission; consequently, that body would remain in Indonesia under its existing terms of reference to observe the implementation of the agreements concluded at The Hague.\textsuperscript{121}

The Transfer of Sovereignty

On 14 December the representatives of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and of the regions associated

\textsuperscript{120}Ibid., pp. 15-21.

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., pp. 33-35.
with the Federal Consultative Assembly met in Batavia and signed an agreement indicating that their governments accepted the Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia which had been formulated at the Round Table Conference. Mr. Sukarno was unanimously elected as the first President of the new Republic and, on 20 December, the first cabinet was appointed with Mr. Hatta as Prime Minister. At the same time a special delegation was appointed to receive the transfer of sovereignty from the Government of the Netherlands. On 27 December sovereignty was transferred to the Government of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia in a formal ceremony held at Amsterdam; at the same time the High Representative of the Crown in Batavia transferred administration to the Sultan of Jogjakarta, who had been appointed acting Prime Minister for the occasion. With the transfer of sovereignty, administrative and military responsibilities throughout Indonesia were, in accordance with The Hague agreements, taken over by authorities of the new Government. On 28 December President Sukarno arrived in Jakarta from Jogjakarta and assumed control of the day-old Republic.122

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

When the situation in Indonesia was brought to the attention of the Security Council in January, 1946, and again in July, 1947, a new step was taken in the field of international organization; for the first time an international organization, the United Nations, was dealing with the problem of a colony seeking to become independent of its mother country. While one may be critical of the procedure and the methods which were used by the Security Council, such an attitude must be tempered with the realization of the enormous difficulties which exist when a new type of problem is considered for the first time. In addition to the fact that the problem was a new one, the United Nations itself was an organization of only recent creation, and this undoubtedly accounts for even more obstacles in the path leading to a final solution to the Indonesian problem. The very fact that the Indonesian dispute did pose a new type of problem would seem to add to the importance of a study of the dispute and of the measures used in searching for a solution to the problem.

During the treatment of the Indonesian dispute by the Security Council, a number of problems arose; some of
these were resolved to the satisfaction of all parties concerned while others continually recurred to plague the Council. One of the most basic of the latter problems involved the legal question of the competence of the Security Council to deal with the Indonesian question. This question was actually a manifestation of one of the basic problems of all international organization, the problem of distinguishing between the respective jurisdictions of an international organization and of a state which is a member of that organization. A related problem arises in the determination of the Council's competence in such a situation, namely, who is to determine the competence of an international body in a given situation, the international organization by the simple expedient of taking action, the member state by unilateral declaration, or an international judicial authority. In the treatment of the Indonesian question, it would seem that the first alternative was utilized; it would be foolish to assert that the Security Council took the action that it did if that body did not believe itself competent to take such action. While there was no concrete declaration made by the Security Council on the matter of competence, obviously a majority of the members believed that that body was competent to deal with the situation.

It is, of course, true that the Council rejected a Belgian proposal to submit the question of competence to the International Court of Justice. For the most part, those who abstained from voting on the proposal (Australia, Brazil,
China, Colombia, Syria, and the U.S.S.R.) did so because they felt that submission of the issue to the International Court would merely delay and hinder the Security Council in considering a matter with which they felt the Council was competent to deal. Of the four nations which voted for the Belgian proposal (Belgium, France, United Kingdom, United States), only the United States had not, at some time, declared that the Indonesian dispute did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Security Council. If an answer had to be given as to the Security Council’s competence in the Indonesian dispute, it would seem that one must admit that the Council was competent in that it asserted jurisdiction, even though no concrete answer was given to the legal or theoretical question.

Another very basic question arose in connection with the problem of the competence of the Security Council, that of the legal status of the Republic of Indonesia prior to the transfer of sovereignty in December, 1949. The Netherlands, of course, consistently maintained that the Republic was not a state in international law and, hence, the Indonesian situation fell within the domestic jurisdiction of the Netherlands. Most of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council were worded so as to give no concrete answer to the problem; the Security Council took action under the provisions of the Charter regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, and several speeches given before the Council indicated that the action taken by that
body was aimed only at bringing about a cessation of hostilities and not at conferring upon the Republic a status to which it was not already entitled. At least partial refutation of the Dutch contention that the Republic was not a state in international law is embodied in the Linggadjati Agreement of 25 March 1947. Under this Agreement the Netherlands recognized "the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising de facto authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra."1 Following the signing of this Agreement, a number of other nations, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and India, extended de facto recognition to the Republic. This problem, as well as the problem of the competence of the Council, received no concrete answer; the whole field of the effect of recognition and the distinction between de facto and de jure recognition "is a somewhat elusive point of the law of recognition."2

In the handling of the Indonesian dispute a number of problems arose in connection with the methods and procedures to be used to bring about a cessation of hostilities. In the discussions carried on in the Security Council, this problem embodied another procedural problem, that of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the disputants.

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2Ibid.
For the most part, the U.S.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R. supported proposals calling for the withdrawal of the troops of the Netherlands and, in some instances, of both of the parties. The Netherlands and its supporters, Belgium, France, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the United Kingdom, opposed troop withdrawals on the grounds that such action would lead to reprisals and retaliatory action against the population of areas from which Netherlands troops would be evacuated. As with most of the other disputes which the Security Council handled and the attendant cease-fire orders which were issued, the problem of bringing about a cessation of hostilities did not produce a clear-cut example as to how cease-hostilities orders may be implemented.

The obvious deficiency in an undertaking of this kind is, of course, the lack of an international police force or military unit which could supervise a cease-fire effectively. In the absence of such a body, sanctions other than the use of armed force may be applied through the states which are members of the United Nations. Several countries of the Southeast Asia area did apply sanctions in connection with the Indonesian dispute by denying to the Netherlands the right of transit across their respective territories. This action, however, was not taken at the request of the Security Council and, consequently, it cannot serve as an example of the application of sanctions through the United Nations.
Another procedural problem which was solved with a great deal less trouble involved extending an invitation to participate in the discussions of the Council when it was considering the Indonesian question to the representatives of Burma, Belgium, the Philippines, and Pakistan. An invitation was, of course, extended to the Republic of Indonesia, and later to the Netherlands when that country's term on the Security Council expired. Australia was also invited to participate in the Council's discussions and to continue to serve as a member of the Committee of Good Offices even though her term on the Security Council had expired. The Netherlands opposed extending an invitation to the Republic because they felt that such an invitation would carry the implication that the Security Council was recognizing the Republic; the invitation was extended, but the question of the legal status of the Republic was not answered until the transfer of sovereignty took place in December, 1949.

The treatment of the Indonesian dispute by the Security Council supports the contention that disputes between nations are not to be solved merely through the creation of elaborate machinery; the parties to the dispute must possess a genuine desire to find a solution to their problem as well as a willingness to accept a compromise solution which involves concessions from both parties. For this reason, it would be extremely difficult to make a comparative evaluation of the services of the Consular
Commission, the Committee of Good Offices, and United Nations Commission for Indonesia. The Consular Commission was set up primarily for the purpose of reporting to the Security Council on the situation in Indonesia and was, by its very nature, quite limited as to the amount of assistance it could offer the parties in the settlement of the dispute. An additional weakness of the Consular Commission was exposed in the Security Council discussions; namely, while collectively it represented the United Nations, individually the members of the Consular Commission represented different nations whose policies might differ from those of the United Nations. The composition of the Consular Commission also caused controversy over the reports which it rendered. As Mr. Kahin pointed out, the Consular Commission had a more pro-Dutch composition than the Security Council since Belgium, France, and Great Britain were represented on the Commission whereas Russia, Syria, Colombia, and Poland were not.

The Committee of Good Offices and the United Nations Commission for Indonesia represented the United Nations in Indonesia for all except the very early part of the dispute. The membership of the two bodies was the same, the difference lying in their respective powers. The Committee of Good Offices was, quite obviously, limited in the role which it could assume in aiding the negotiations between the parties. The United Nations Commission was granted additional powers, including the power to make

3Kahin, op. cit., p. 217.
recommendations to the parties as well as to the Security Council. While the reconstitution of the Committee of Good Offices as the United Nations Commission for Indonesia undoubtedly aided in the final settlement, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate with any degree of exactness the specific contributions which the Commission made toward the final settlement. It would seem that such forces as increased pressure by the United States on the Netherlands and continued Republican resistance played at least as great a part in the ultimate settlement of the dispute.

While the value of the work of the Security Council in regard to the Indonesian dispute cannot be assessed with any degree of exactness, it seems quite apparent that the Council did contribute substantially to the settlement of the problem. Through the work of its Consular Commission, Committee of Good Offices, and United Nations Commission for Indonesia, the Security Council made the facts of the situation available to the members of the Council and to the peoples of the world. Through the debates carried on in the Security Council, the Indonesian question was given publicity; following submission of the Indonesian dispute to the Security Council, the activities of the two disputants were carried on in the spotlight of world opinion, and it seems that this factor exercised a moderating influence upon the parties. In the course of the debates in the Security Council, the two parties to the dispute in particular,
and the other members of the Council in general, were forced to discuss their points of view and to listen to criticisms of their respective points of view. It would seem fair to consider these factors as having served a valuable and substantial part in the final solution of the Indonesian problem.

In regard to the attitudes of the major powers toward the Indonesian dispute, the Dutch "police action" of December, 1948, seems to have played a rather important role. Prior to that time a number of nations had been favorable to the point of view of the Netherlands; following receipt of the reports of the Committee of Good Offices, the attitude of the Security Council as a whole clearly indicated disapproval of the action taken by the Netherlands Government. The New Delhi Conference, which was called by Prime Minister Nehru of India for the purpose of considering Netherlands activity in Indonesia, and the resolution adopted by the conference was indisputable evidence that the countries of the Southeast Asia area were strongly sympathetic to the cause of the Republic of Indonesia; as noted above, several of the countries which participated in the Conference had denied the right of transit to the Netherlands.

In general, Belgium and France sided with the Netherlands, particularly on the question of the competence of the Council to deal with the Indonesian question; consequently, when Belgium's term on the Security Council
expired, the Netherlands lost one of its strongest supporters, though Belgium continued to serve on the Committee of Good Offices and on the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. The United Kingdom was directly concerned with the situation in Indonesia for a longer period of time than any of the other members of the Security Council with the exception of the Netherlands. The British, quite naturally, leaned toward the Dutch point of view, though not to as great an extent as did Belgium and France; in 1946 they had exerted pressure upon the Netherlands to reach an agreement with the Republic, but this was for the purpose of facilitating the withdrawal of British troops from Indonesia. At least in the initial stages of the Council's deliberations, Great Britain seemed to regard the Indonesian dispute as a matter which fell within the domestic jurisdiction of Holland, but she did not maintain this position in the later stages with clear-cut statements as did Belgium and France.

The U.S.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R. followed a strongly anti-Dutch and allegedly pro-Indonesian policy from January, 1946, when the Ukrainian delegate brought to the attention of the Council the presence of British troops in Indonesia, until the transfer of sovereignty in December, 1949. The representatives of these two countries also maintained a consistent policy in regard to the actions and stands taken by the United Kingdom and the United States; the Communist delegates periodically attacked the two western nations as the supporters and abettors of "Netherlands
aggression. At one point in particular, however, the Communist bloc seems to have been inconsistent. During almost all of the debates in the Security Council the U.S.S.R. took the part of the Indonesians and, more particularly, of the Republic. With the successful conclusion of the Round Table Conference at The Hague, the Canadian delegation introduced a resolution expressing satisfaction with the results of that Conference; the Ukrainian delegation opposed this resolution and, in the course of the discussion, referred to the "Hatta clique" as having "sold out" the people of Indonesia to the Dutch; yet it was Hatta who, along with Sukarno and Sjahrir, had furnished the leadership for the Republic when the U.S.S.R. so vehemently attacked Dutch policy in Indonesia and praised the Indonesian leaders for their stand against the Dutch.

The United States delegation, during the earlier consideration of the Indonesian question, seemed to be sympathetic toward the Republic's desire for independence, and yet seemed quite careful not to antagonize the Netherlands by taking too positive a stand. At least a partial explanation of this policy may be found in the fact that the United States was, at that time, actively pushing the development of a European Army and a plan for the unification of Europe. Quite obviously if the Netherlands, because of United States activity in the Security Council, actively opposed this program, the results could very well have been extremely detrimental to that portion of United
States policy. The United States, both through their representatives on the Security Council and through their representatives on the Consular Commission, the Committee of Good Offices, and the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, was very active in seeking for a peaceful solution to the Indonesian dispute. Following the second Dutch "police action," however, United States policy seemed to become firmer, more clearly demanding that the Dutch settle the dispute by negotiation rather than by resort to armed force.

At least two suggestions may be advanced for the improvement of the handling of disputes by the Security Council. The first of these would involve the creation of a permanent fact-finding body which would be prepared for dispatch to any part of the world upon the request of the Security Council. Such a body would serve the Security Council in much the same way that the Peace Observation Commission functions in relation to the General Assembly. With its present organization, the Security Council, upon taking cognizance of a dispute, must create some special body for the purpose of securing information concerning that dispute. Such a situation poses the second difficulty in Security Council procedure, that of the length of time generally required for the Council to take action on a problem. While it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to limit equitably the amount of time consumed by speeches, the process could conceivably be speeded up if accurate
information on a dispute could be made available to the Council with greater speed than it has been in the past.
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