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Marivaux’s *Jeu de L’Amour et “De La Raison”*

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At a crucial point in the third act of *Le Jeu de l’amour et du hasard*, Silvia declares that she requires a battle in Dorante between love and reason: “je veux un combat entre l’amour et la raison,”¹ a struggle her brother Mario suggests will be to the death. In fact, the work’s entire action, not just the last act, can playfully be renamed *Le Jeu de l’amour et “de la raison,”* and while it is possible to read Dorante’s eventual proposal of marriage as the defeat of reason, in a very real sense such an evaluation must be nuanced, if not reversed.

Both as a moralist and a comic writer—two sides of Marivaux’s talent which converge in *Le Jeu*—reason serves as a foundation of his enterprise, and although critics of his theatre have touched on the role of reason in his comedies, their primary emphasis has usually been his treatment of love.² Approaching *Le Jeu* from the opposite direction by focusing attention on Marivaux’s complex notion of reason can serve to highlight his moral preoccupations underlying the play, while elucidating elements of its comic structure common to all his theatre. I will begin by examining how *raison* is treated in his journals and *La Vie de Marianne* and then go on to show how its ethical and social implications underpin *Le Jeu*.

As one element in the broad semantic field of Marivaux’s psychological vocabulary, *raison* in its most authentic form is an intellectual lucidity.³ His most useful description, found in *L’Indigent philosophe*, uses the traditional comparison of reason to sight:⁴ it is, he says, “une excellente lunette pour connaître la valeur des choses” (p. 307). As the intellect’s tool for arriving at an adequate appreciation of reality, its function is to see through veneers of sham and pretense, to penetrate from appearances to reality.

This is not to say that all who lay claim to reason attain what Marivaux would consider the most accurate assessment of reality. Two extreme examples of forms of reason he judges to be self-defeating illustrate the pitfalls involved. While he professes on occasion a respect for the seventeenth-century rationalist philosophers,⁵ he has little use for *raison* as
the speculative faculty which made possible their elaborate systems. He shared his own century’s distrust for “faiseurs de systèmes”:

laissez-leur entasser méthodiquement visions sur visions en raisonnant sur la nature des deux substances, ou sur choses pareilles (SF, p. 232).

Frédéric Deloffre has pointed out that the only characters in all of Marivaux’s theatre to be ridiculed without mercy are the three professional philosophers—the philosophe of L’Ile de la raison, Hortensius of La Seconde surprise, and Hermocrate of Le Triomphe de l’amour. Reason in its purest form is not so much ratiocination, mental agility, or a facility for argumentation, as it is insight, esprit de finesse, and intuitive critical vision; it is a quest for objectivity.

As raison concerns the will, acting reasonably need not involve extraordinary feats of self-control. Such tension is, in fact, often a sign that the precepts of true reason are being ignored. In L’Indigent philosophe there is a lament for the fate of a certain nobleman “qui passait pour un modèle de raison, pour un héros de fermeté d’amé, pour un sage” (p. 279). When the man’s son died and he lost half his wealth, the strain of keeping up the pretense of calm and serenity, which his reputation seemed to require, caused his death. Rather,

nous n’avons pas besoin d’un grand effort de l’esprit pour agir raisonnablement; la raison nous coule de source, quand nous voulons la suivre; je dis la véritable raison (p. 279).

The false reason of both the philosopher and the self-proclaimed stoic is the product of orgueil— the ultimate enemy of authentic reason (cf. IP, p. 279), and it is certainly to counteract pride, which distorts our vision, that the lunettes of reason are needed. This point emphasizes the moral content of Marivaux’s concept of reason. Any number of partial or defective judgments of reason can be found among his characters, but reason in its highest form is an ethical vision which evaluates a person’s worth as a human being, not just wealth, social position, or birth. The journals are tireless in exposing manifestations of orgueil, denouncing it in the name of the common humanity all share.

Grands de ce monde . . . Ces prestiges de vanité qui vous font oublier qui vous êtes, ces prestiges se dissiperait, et la nature soulevée, en dépit de toutes vos chimères, vous ferait sentir qu’un homme, quel qu’il soit, est votre semblable (SF, p. 116).

For Marivaux the moralist, to be most truly reasonable is to recognize one’s likeness in others; this reasonableness manifests itself in action in the form of an ethic of sympathy, a generous awareness that the needs of others are like one’s own:

Ce que je voudrais raisonnablement qu’un autre fit pour moi, ne le fit-il point, m’enseigne ce que je dois faire pour lui (SF, p. 233; cf. IP, p. 309).
Orgueil, which is the negation of reason, need not be confused with fierté, a legitimate and healthy result of the gaze of reason. Fierté involves a knowledge of one’s own intrinsic worth; it is more concerned with self-recognition than the recognition of this worth by others. Orgueil, on the other hand, cares only about the opinion of others and has no scruple about appearing to have qualities which in fact it lacks:

L’homme fier veut être intérieurement content de lui. Il suffit au glorieux d’avoir contenté les autres: c’est assez pour lui que ses actions paraissent louables. L’autre veut que les siennes le soient à ses yeux mêmes. En un mot, l’homme fier a du coeur, le glorieux n’a que l’orgueil de persuader qu’il en a. L’un a des vraies vertus dans l’âme; l’autre en joue qu’il n’a pas, et qu’il ne se soucie pas d’avoir (CP, p. 380).

In the two examples of defective reason examined above, the quest for fame, nurtured by orgueil, makes the philosopher imagine that by manipulating ideas and concepts he will create the science for human nature, just as the desire for public recognition leads the “martyr de l’orgueil” (IP, p. 279) to feign stoic self-control in the face of personal tragedy.

The ethical implications of Marivaux’s concept of reason also inform his view of society. Orgueil and its sibling vanité are at the root of evil in mankind:

Les hommes sont plus vains que méchants; mais je dis mal: ils sont tous méchants, parce qu’ils sont tous vains (IP, p. 323).

But if vanité, which is to a large extent the failure to appraise one’s worth reasonably, is the cause of evil among men, reason itself provides a remedy by showing the need for a social order to counteract the selfishness of the individual:

Il est vrai que nous naissons tous méchants, mais cette méchanceté, nous ne l’apportons que comme un monstre qu’il nous faut combattre; nous la connaissons pour monstre des que nous assemblons, nous ne faisons pas plus tôt société que nous sommes frappés de la nécessité qu’il y a d’observer un certain ordre qui nous mette à l’abri des effets de nos mauvaises dispositions; et la raison, qui nous montre cette nécessité, est le correctif de notre iniquité même (SF, p. 234).

Linking the reason of all humans, and providing the foundation of all social cohesion, there exists a “contrat de justice”:

il faut que mon prochain soit vertueux avec moi, parce qu’il sait qu’il ferait mal s’il ne l’était pas; il faut que je le sois avec lui, parce que je sais la même chose (ibid).

This law, which requires us to be just and virtuous, is understood everywhere and is everywhere the same, in contrast to “les usages particuliers des hommes,” the products of human invention, which vary from nation to nation (SF, p. 235).
These particular social arrangements of any given culture, unlike the fundamental moral code, are not necessarily completely in accord with reason; in fact, they well may be “défectueux” (ibid.). One striking example might be “cette inégale distribution de biens” (SF, p. 266), cause of the extremes of poverty and wealth in the France of his day. Happily for the body politic, social and economic inequality produces an “éblouissement de notre raison” (SF, p. 126) in the inferiors who are blinded to the failings of their betters by the trappings of power and prestige. While Marivaux recognizes that this indulgence of the weak in regard to the shortcomings of their superiors contributes to social harmony, he would prefer an arrangement in which true reason teaches inferiors to accept their position by being aware that what separates them from their masters is not of any consequence and which teaches the privileged that they are not intrinsically more worthy than their social inferiors whom they must treat with respect and compassion. He does not advocate leveling social ranks any more than economic equality. This is the lesson of plays like L’Ile de la raison and L’Ile des esclaves, where the moral reform of both masters and servants is presented as the solution to antagonism between classes.

The relation between reason and love is not specifically treated in the journals; however, it does appear in La Vie de Marianne where, because of differences in position between Marianne and her suitors, there are parallels with Le Jeu. For example, the lecherous old faux-dévot M. de Climal appeals to reason in his attempt to obtain Marianne as his mistress:

Ma fille, je vous parle raison; je ne fais ici auprès de vous que le personnage d’un homme de bon sens, qui voit que vous n’avez rien, et qu’il faut pourvoir aux besoins de la vie, à mains que vous ne vous déterminiez à servir (p. 113).

He argues that in her penniless state the only wise course open to her is to accept his offer to lodge with a woman of his acquaintance who is very “raisonnable” (p. 117). If reason for Marivaux is to see reality clearly, here reality is the hard facts of poverty and lack of protection; and if to act reasonable is to adapt one’s behavior to this perception of reality, reason here dictates a cynical prudence which is concerned with the calculation of self-interest rather than with ethical principle. M. de Climal’s version of reason is an ally of his love, but Marianne hesitates before both.

Later in the novel, when the young nobleman Valville falls in love with her, Marianne is called upon to exercise another form of reason. Mme de Dorsin, one of Marianne’s protectresses, who is herself characterized as “raisonnable” (p. 216), suggests that while it may be impossible to cure Valville of this passion, “il suffira de rendre cette passion raisonnable,” and only Marianne can accomplish this task: “il n’y a qu’elle qui puisse lui faire entendre raison” (p. 183). Here reason implies recognition of the differences of class which forbids a match between a girl of unknown birth and a gentleman of the quality of Valville. Marianne agrees to make him understand that she cannot return his love. This willingness, of course, only raises the esteem her protectresses have for her, and Valville’s mother is moved to express reason of the highest sort in Marivaux’s eyes. She realizes that only Marianne’s unknown parentage and lack of twenty thousand pounds of income stand between the girl and her son’s marriage: “La raison vous choisirait, la folie des usages vous
rejette” (p. 184). And shortly later, upon witnessing further proof of Marianne’s merit, Mme de Miran consents to the marriage.

Je songe que Valville ne blesse point le véritable honneur, qu’il ne s’écarte que des usages établis, qu’il ne fait tort qu’à sa fortune, qu’il peut se passer d’augmenter . . . il n’y aura, dans cette occasion-ci, que les hommes et leurs coutumes de choqués: Dieu ni la raison ne le seront pas (p. 205).

She invokes here much the same contrast between a fundamental moral code established on reason and “les usages particuliers des hommes,” which Marivaux had called into doubt as “défectueux” in Le Spectateur (p. 235). Of the two forms of reason in this episode only Mme de Dorsin’s presents an obstacle to love; Marivaux does not condemn it, given his acceptance of the contemporary social hierarchy, but he shows Mme de Miran’s as superior.

In the light of this interaction of love and reason in La Vie de Marianne, we should not expect to find an absolute opposition between the two in Le Jeu, as if the triumph of love depended on the utter defeat of reason. Reason, it will be seen, is a fundamental value for both Silvia and Dorante, and although both begin with the assumption that love and reason are mutually exclusive, both eventually are able to reconcile their love and their reason, although the concept holds a different content for each of them.

Silvia announces her allegiance to reason in the opening scene of the play during her discussion with Lisette of marriage. She declares that she is not searching for good looks in a husband, but reason, which she identifies with sound moral character:

on a plus souvent affaire a l’homme raisonnable qu’à l’aimable homme; en un mot, je ne lui demande qu’un bon caractère . . . (p. 800).

Like Marivaux the moralist, she is preoccupied with the difficulty of distinguishing essential truth about a person from outward appearances. Her first portrait is of a husband who appears reasonable to all the world, but who mistreats his entire household. Thus she proposes her disguise in order to assess better whether her proposed spouse is indeed a man of reason. In her distrust of men, especially handsome ones, she is sure that Dorante will prove as unworthy as the husbands whose portraits she drew in the first scene.

Yet, just four scenes later, this same girl who claimed to prize reason in a husband, declares that she hopes to vanquish the reason of her intended.

Je ne serai pas fâchée de subjuger sa raison, de l’étourdir un peu sur la distance qu’il y aura de lui à moi (p. 806).

Here reason is the awareness of social rank and obligations to caste which she hopes Dorante will sacrifice. The irony, of course, is that when Dorante finally arrives disguised as Bourguignon, not only is his reason subjected to assault, but her own as well. Both of them find themselves in a position where their “reasonable” perception of social order, where rank and personal merit should correspond, is disturbed. Dorante, struck by Silvia’s
obvious worth, finds it ridiculous that he wants to treat this servant girl with the respect due to the well-born:

Enfin j’ai un penchant à te traiter avec des respects qui te feraient rire (p. 808).

For her part, Silvia accuses Lisette of having lost her senses for not being able to recognize the conspicuous lack of breeding of Arlequin masquerading as his master.

Etes-vous folle avec votre examen. Est-il nécessaire de le voir deux fois pour juger du peu de convenance (p. 820)?

In both of these comments, the reference to folly points to the implicit norm-reason. Silvia’s distress is certainly the greater, so great in fact that her perception of what she owes herself as a member of the privileged order does not allow her to envisage the possibility of loving a servant, no matter what his personal worth. She asserts her indifference, justifying her coldness with a reference to her reason:

Voilà mes dispositions, ma raison ne m’en permet point d’autres, et je devrais me dispenser de te le dire (p. 822).

Only when the requirements of this notion of reason are satisfied by Dorante’s revelation of his identity is the way open for her to admit to herself her love.

When she insists in the third act on a battle in Dorante between love and reason, her father attributes this desire to an “insatiable vanité d’amour-propre” (p. 836). Yet she is not so much motivated by the desire to satisfy her feminine vanity, as her brother insists, as by the instinctive need she feels to expose Dorante’s reason to the same distress she had known. The weight of eighteenth-century social proprieties was lighter on a man than a woman; Dorante had been able to verbalize his love in the second act, while Silvia could not even acknowledge it to herself. Pushing him into a proposal of marriage will in a sense equalize their suffering, allowing them to enter marriage on more even terms and making a harmonious union more likely. Her strategy might seem self-defeating, for she refuses to give him the encouragement he seeks—an avowal of her tendresse for him. It is a strategy which hardly seems capable of nurturing a love strong enough to overcome his reason, but the clever nature of this tactic becomes clear at the close of her long speech stressing the precariousness of her position:

L’aveu de mes sentiments pourrait exposer votre raison, et vous voyez bien aussi que je vous les cache (p. 843).

This feigned generosity on her part is exactly what is needed to move Dorante. From the beginning he had been impressed by her fierté and her modesty—signs of a nobility of character which sharply contrasted with her servant’s costume. Her pretense of concern for his reason is the ultimate proof for him of her worth; it is proof that she is guided by the ethic of sympathy described in Le Spectateur, and he submits.
This is not to say, as Silvia would have it, that love wins out over reason. Rather, reason for Dorante is no longer only concerned with his obligation to social rank; he passes to the most authentic level of reason in Marivaux’s eyes—that which looks only at individual merit:

\[ \text{il n’est ni rang, ni naissance, ni fortune qui ne disparaîsse devant une âme comme la tienne. J’aurai honte que mon orgueil tint encore contre toi, et mon cœur et ma main t’appartiennent (pp. 843–844).} \]

Renouncing *orgueil*, the enemy of true reason, he accedes, like Mme de Miran, to a perception of reality shared by the finest, most chosen souls in Marivaux’s universe. Love does not vanquish reason but is fulfilled with its aid. If love had won out over Silvia’s notion of reason, i.e., if concern for social obligations had been vanquished by love, the implication might not have boded well for their future happiness. After all, if Dorante forgot his duty as a bachelor, what would keep him from doing so again once married? But because he overcomes, not duty, but pride, his decision is based on solid grounds.

Thus we see that love and reason are not necessarily opposed. Thanks to love, Dorante goes beyond reason conceived as self-control and motivated by concern for social rank to a clearer ethical vision. From the outset, Dorante had been more open to this appreciation of personal merit than Silvia. If there is a single point in the play at which it might be said that love vanquishes reason in Dorante, it is II.x. when Dorante comes to grips with his feelings for Silvia. After an indirect avowal of her affection for him, he responds, “si cela est, ma raison est perdue” (p. 824). Yet if we compare what it took to bring him to this realization, as against Silvia’s comparable “Je vois clair dans mon cœur” (p. 829), we find that even at this point he is closer to his final emphasis on reason as awareness of personal worth. He required only two motivating elements: the recognition of Silvia’s merit, followed by confirmation of her love for him; with her, a third element was necessary: the revelation of Dorante’s true status. Fortunately for both of them, Marivaux has contrived a reassuring theatrical universe in which personal merit and social rank correspond.9

Going beyond the rule of reason in this one play, we can note its importance in two fundamental components of his dramatic system—*marivaudage* and his comic norm. In terms of *raison*, *marivaudage* can be seen as the linguistic manifestation of the tension experienced by characters whose notion of what is reasonable is partial or defective. They refuse to see themselves and their situation objectively.10 In *Le Jeu* it is the refusal of Dorante and Silvia to recognize that they are in love with a person who appears to be out of place socially. Instead, they attempt to talk their way around their predicament without facing it directly. Eventually this circuitous approach does lead to greater insight, and once their vision had been corrected, the tension between the erroneously “reasonable” view they had been trying to maintain and reality disappears, and *marivaudage* ceases. It is no longer needed, for as we have seen “la raison coule de source” (*IP*, p. 279).

This view of *marivaudage* as the process by which characters pass from unreason to reason is further illustrated by *La Seconde Surprise de l’amour*, where the interaction between love and reason is uncomplicated by the social issues found in *Le Jeu*. Both the marquise and the chevalier have recently suffered the loss of a loved one. The marquise only survives
the death of her husband “par un effort de raison” (p. 676), and the chevalier, whose beloved Angelique has chosen the convent, finds in the marquise’s offer of mutual consolation a remedy against his despair: “Vous me sauvez la raison, mon désespoir se calme” (p. 686). The marquise even takes on as her personal reader a stoic “philosopher” Hortensius who preaches that reason is the supreme good to which all the passions, but especially love, must be sacrificed (p. 709). However, both protagonists instinctively reject such a sweeping condemnation of sentiment for a more moderate but no less defective version of what is reasonable. They falsely believe that in their grief they will never love again and that they can successfully substitute friendship for love. This belief is inspired less by the raison they invoke than by their fear of being rejected, the real cause of their inability to recognize their mutual love. The tension between this unacknowledged love and their outward protestations of friendship is gradually resolved over the course of the play in scenes II, 7, II, 9 and III, 8 where their haggling over terms such as dédain, injure, amour, and amitié exemplifies Deloffre’s description of marivaudage: “Chez Marivaux, c’est avant tout sur le mot qu’on réplique, et non plus sur la chose. Mais chaque reprise de mots signifie différence d’interprétation, chicane, discussion, rebondissement imprévu, progression dramatique enfin” (p. iv). Out of this apparent quibbling over words comes their realization that their amitié is in fact amour. With the chevalier’s avowal, “Mon amour pour vous durera autant que ma vie” (p. 725), the marivaudage ends. Authentic reason finally triumphs both at the personal level of their new-found insight into their feelings and on the more abstract level where it becomes clear that to attempt to renounce love forever, as the philosopher Hortensius recommends, is vanity.

Finally, just as reason serves as a standard in the ethical realm for Marivaux, it plays a role as his comic norm. In the seventeenth-century Lettre sur l’imposteur, which many critics take to be inspired by Molière himself, we find an interpretation of Molière’s notion of the comic in which the ridiculous is defined as the contrary of reason. What the spectator perceives as ridiculous is a sensible sign of unreason in the character on stage:

Le ridicule est donc la forme extérieure et sensible que la providence de la nature a attachée à tout ce qui est déraisonnable, pour nous en faire apercevoir, et nous obliger à le fuir.11

Marivaux likewise subscribes to reason as his comic norm, and in L’Ile de la raison he went so far as to render the ridiculous “hyper-sensible,” as it were, by making the characters shrink and grow before the audience’s eyes in proportion to their adherence to reason. Such a visualization of the characters’ ridiculousness, while an ingenious device, was perhaps too literal an illustration of Molière’s definition of the ridiculous as “la forme extérieure et sensible” of unreason, and the play failed. Just the same, it clearly establishes reason’s normative role in Marivaux’s comedy.

We have seen that for Marivaux, the true enemy of love is not so much raison as the aberrant forms of amour-propre such as orgueil and vanité which invent qualities that do not exist or seek to exalt unduly those that do. Raison is the norm of objectivity that allows the maneuvering of vanité and orgueil to appear comic:
Quelle misérable espèce d’orgueil... aussi n’est-il pas bon qu’à donner la comédie aux gens raisonnables qui le voient” (SF, p. 243).

Thus in Le Jeu Silvia’s somewhat vain confidence in the power of her charms is a chief source of the play’s comic vitality. Rather than judge her morally, Marivaux simply manages his plot in such a way that her vanity puts her into comic situations. In the first act she undergoes the same conflict between love and reason that she wanted Dorante to experience, and when she is at the point of seeing the victory of her charms in the last act, Dorante leaves her momentarily alone on stage ready to deny the love she had acknowledged with so much difficulty in the second act. Since Silvia is vaine rather than orgueilleuse, and since her charms are real, Marivaux treats her with indulgence. However, with a character like Arlequin, who displays a haughtiness that is not merely part of his disguise, more outright ridicule is in store. The gentleness with which Marivaux treats his protagonists hinges, of course, on his realization that neither he, nor his spectators, is without vanity or even orgueil. In fact, one critic sees this indulgence as the basis of a “strategy of identification” by which Marivaux’s plays “appear to manipulate on-stage characters in order better to change the perspective on real life of the spectators.”

The clear gaze of reason is thus for Marivaux the standard by which the various degrees of the comic are judged, much as it was for Molière. Still, there exists a great difference: while for Molière society’s vision of reality was the reasonable norm, Marivaux recognizes a more authentic form of reason which goes beyond society’s claims to a vision of human fraternity as the ultimate truth.

Notes

1. Marivaux, Théâtre complet, Paris, Garnier, 1968, I, 836. All quotations are from the various editions of Frédéric Deloffre, Journaux et œuvres diverses, Paris, Garnier, 1969; La Vie de Marianne, Paris, Garnier, 1963. I have italicized all references to reason in the citations for the convenience of the reader. The following abbreviations are used for the journals: SF, Spectateur français; IP, Indigent philosophe; CP, Cabinet du philosophe.

2. For example, Ruth Jamieson in Marivaux, A Study in Sensibility, New York, King’s Crown Press, 1941, provides a number of useful observations on the interaction of love and reason, although she is more careful to define the many varieties of sentiment than of reason. She points out that while the heart usually triumphs over the head when reason is identified with the “judgment of experience” (p. 99), with amour-tendresse reason refines and expands sentiment. Indeed, “Marivaux believes that the feelings and the reason are reconcilable and that experience in social and private life will result in the attainment of a working balance between the two functions” (p. 155). Marlyse M. Meyer in La Convention dans le théâtre d’amour de Marivaux, São Paulo, Cadeira de Lingua e Literatura Francesa, 1961, sees Marivaux’s protagonists as incarnating a “sensibilité raisonnable” which is not so much a fixed state as a rapid oscillation between two poles (p. 78). Valentini P. Brady in Love in the Theatre of Marivaux, Geneva, Droz, 1970, discusses reason as an instrument of self-control in the battle with love, “a weapon of lucidity representing order and stability, which man’s rational part uses against the chaos and confusion created by love” (p. 29).
3. Although many of the elements of Marivaux’s psychological vocabulary have received considerable study, little attention had been devoted to raison. A particularly fine treatment of his psychology in general is found in Henri Coulet’s “L’esprit et le coeur,” Marivaux romancier, Paris, Colin, 1975, pp. 129–154. In his article “Marivaux et Malebranche, CAIEF, XXV, 1973, Coulet proposes the most useful definition of raison in Marivaux I have found: “. . . la raison consiste à se conduire selon ce que l’entendement reconnaît comme vrai, et à redresser en fonction de cette vérité ses sentiments et ses habitudes” (pp. 155–156).


6. Théâtre complet, I, 886.


