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Responding to the call that anthropological inquiry should be directed at the formation, enactment, and effects of policy (Shore and Wright, 1997), this chapter examines a Georgia school district’s official and de facto policies for responding to Latino newcomers and the understandings that compelled their making of Latino educational policy. More specifically, it describes how a broad but vague consensus regarding the goals of a novel binational partnership hid the differences in various partners’ interests and understandings. Looking at both a Georgia superintendent’s initial letter to his prospective partners at a Mexican university and then at the experiences of a Mexican university-affiliated bilingual education coordinator, the chapter highlights the interface between culture, policy, and power, illuminating how and why only certain portions of the formal binational accord were enacted and then only in certain ways. The chapter describes the political posturing, advocacy, and maneuvering that shaped the curriculum that Latino newcomer students encountered at school.

INTRODUCTION

Whether students in U.S. schools who are not native speakers of English should go to school to be assimilated, or whether schooling for such students should acknowledge and celebrate their differences, is a central and unresolved debate in contemporary U.S. society (Wong Fillmore and Meyer, 1992) and elsewhere (Hornberger, 2000). This debate revolves around core issues of who we are, how and by what criteria we group ourselves (Barth, 1969), and who we propose to be. Because schools are a proposed vehicle for the realization of either of
these contrasting ends, they are, in this regard, instruments of cultural policy. Yet because of the historic role of schools in relation to the society that has created them, schools are not equally well suited to the two prospective courses outlined earlier. As Hornberger (2000, 173) explains, there is an ideological “paradox wherein a traditionally standardizing education is increasingly called on to make room for and promote diversity.”

In looking at a case of how a Georgia school district—Conasauga Public Schools (CPS)—and a Mexican university partner responded recently to dramatic demographic changes in Conasauga, this ethnography of education policy considers how contrasting cultural goals were articulated and enacted as policies and, as a further component of the policy process, how they were resisted and/or appropriated. To illuminate the interwoven nature of power, of culturally defined roles and statuses, of the comprehension of need and circumstance, of policymaking, and of policy enactment as all of these pertain to schooling in the New Latino Diaspora, this study focuses on the evolving understanding of several Mexico and Georgia–based leaders of a binational, K–12/university partnership. Two of the leaders noted here—the superintendent and the curriculum coordinator—were from CPS; another was from the Mexican university; a fourth individual had ties to the Mexican university, but mainly led a trilingual private school in the same city where the Mexican university was located. Finally, two private sector Conasauga community leaders—an eminent, community-oriented attorney, who lacked formal ties to either the university or the school district, and an equally eminent business executive—were also key instigators of the partnership.

In accordance with the other contributors to this volume, with this case study I seek to describe and analyze an example of educational policymaking in the New Latino Diaspora. In so doing, my focus is not directly on the Latino newcomers who were, as Foucault (1977, 200) would note, the “objects of information, but [almost] never the subjects of communication.” That Conasauga leaders sought help from more than 1,000 miles away to find out who now lived down the street and what should be done for/with/about them epitomizes this pattern of objectification.

Taking advantage of my position as a partial insider in the Georgia/Mexico partnership’s initial creation and implementation, I look at the contested and emerging ways that the needs of the newcomers were understood and responded to by host community leaders and the Mexican scholars they invited to assist them. Consistent with the framework of Shore and Wright (1997), such an analysis seeks to peel back the typical pseudo–objective veneer of policymaking to reveal the micropolitics of how policies responding to demographic change became linked to various leaders’ attempts to gain or protect their power and decision-making prerogatives. Their efforts at both prerogative protection and vision articulation had consequences for the other leaders and the Latino newcomers.
Because my initial entrée to Conasauga was as the contracted grant writer for a *Title VII: Systemwide Bilingual Education* proposal, my first and best contacts there were the leaders of the school district. Because chronicling local need was a starting point for our relationship, the generally optimistic leaders not only shared rosy scenarios with me but also acknowledged at least some of the struggles they confronted. Thus my conversations with Conasauga partnership planners effectively highlighted their evolving understanding of the challenges brought forward by the new presence of Latinos. A related starting point for our relationship was my need to understand the still sketchy structure and purported intent of the binational partnership they were creating so that I could write convincingly about how that partnership responded to local challenges and merited funding. My relationships with these educational leaders have persisted up to the time of this writing in the summer of 2000.

Levinson and Sutton (2001, 17) write, “In the processes of policy formation, problems are constructed for solution and thus the needs of individuals and society become subject to authoritative definition.” In Conasauga I was privy to the tentative problem constructions engaged in by leaders. In my capacity as grant writer, I helped them articulate an authoritative, “official” policy in response. The Georgia/Mexico partnership that I wrote about in the Title VII proposal was their primary educational policy response to demographic change and to its related challenges to identity and community, though an alternative response—the broad introduction of a fully scripted, monolingual, phonetics-oriented Direct Instruction program—later became a rival policy response as the coalition that created the binational partnership began to fracture.

I first met the Mexican partners before the $500,000 Title VII grant was approved and before a local attorney prevailed on the Conasauga City Council to contribute $750,000 to the new partnership. My ability to speak Spanish (albeit as a second language), my background of having worked and studied in rural Mexico and with Mexican transmigrants in the United States (which meant I was more versed in their area of scholarly expertise than anyone else they encountered in Conasauga), my residence in Georgia (and relevant awareness of statewide currents of educational politics), and my shared status as an outsider to Conasauga (though one familiar with all the insiders) made me a useful sounding board for the Mexican partners. When I visited their university in Mexico for four days in 1998, my visit became an occasion for them to highlight their Georgia work within their university community—as I was asked to make a formal presentation. In turn, I was invited to stay at the home of one of the Mexican partnership leaders, and I was given open access to all of the files the Mexican leaders kept regarding the partnership (except for individual evaluations of teacher candidates sent to Georgia). I had an arranged interview with their university’s president, and I had a chance to spend a day with the woman who later became the bilingual coordinator.
in Conasauga, at the private trilingual primary school she directed in Mexico. I also met with the Mexican leaders during most of their visits to Georgia.

In keeping with Shore and Wright’s recommendation that the ethnography of policy should do more than study up, my research methodology was also consistent with Reinhold’s notion of “studying through” (cited in Shore and Wright [1997, 14])—i.e., tracing the ways in which power creates webs and relations between actors, institutions, and discourses across time and space. Studying through entails multisite ethnography, as the actors in the “policy community” frequently operate in and are informed by different geographic spaces. In conducting this research, I visited administrative offices and classrooms in Georgia and Mexico. I sat in on the majority of the face-to-face encounters between Georgia and Mexico partners, and I collected documentation (e.g., faxes, letters) of much of their communication that was not face-to-face. To better understand the Conasauga context, I visited the workplaces of Latino newcomers and the corporate offices of their employers. I drew from previous experience living and working in Mexican sending communities and teaching in bilingual adult immigrant education programs in U.S. receiving communities (in Kansas and Georgia). I also spent a lot of time in Conasauga classrooms interviewing educators and observing instruction.

Because of what I found through this range of inquiry, in this chapter I also seek to broaden or counter any assumptions that locate policymaking, implementation, and appropriation as occurring at different hierarchical tiers (i.e., made at only one level and resisted/appropriated only at another). Although hierarchy and status are pertinent to this case study, they are not reliable means for predicting who was an enactor and who was a resister. This may be because, at least initially, the differently situated leaders came to the binational partnership as equals. However, it also reflects the perhaps not-so-surprising revelation that, in the jockeying to influence policy formation and the equally important interpretive tasks that guide policy implementation, the same individual could simultaneously be a policy enactor and a resister.

CULTURE, POLICY, AND THEORIES OF ACTION

Levinson and Sutton define policy “as a complex social practice, an ongoing process of normative cultural production constituted by diverse actors across diverse social and institutional contexts” (2001, 1). Among the norms produced and reproduced are those related to status, role, and decision-making prerogative. As an example of the inescapable embeddedness of culture in formal policymaking, consider that cultural guidelines about roles underlie the decisions regarding who is to make policy, who can formally adapt it, and who should implement it. In the case here, a 72-year-old attorney who had spent his entire professional life in public affairs presumed that it was his prerogative to monitor whether the
schools in his community were being suitably responsive to their growing numbers of Latino newcomer students. Because he found no suitable plan, he presumed that it was appropriate that he be a key developer of such a plan. Because of his stature in Conasauga, others there agreed with his presumptions. His initial bid for a formal role in policymaking was broadly accepted. Moreover, his original problem diagnosis or “problem construction” (Levinson and Sutton, in press, 17)—that a “communication gap” was the reason for struggles of English monolingual teachers to teach Spanish monolingual students—became the most broadly accepted understanding of the challenge at hand. Redress meant bridging the gap, which was broadly assumed to be a language education task.

The excitement and the challenge for an ethnography of educational policy is to make sure that the detailed, on-the-ground ethnographic lens reveals underlying cultural beliefs as they favor certain policies and types of policymaking over others, and/or as they compel the resistance to an articulated policy. Argyris and Schön (1978), as understood by Hatch (1998), offer a useful heuristic—their model of theories of action—that helps reveal the cultural roots and cultural processes that are tacitly but powerfully a part of educational policymaking and enactment. Argyris and Schön (1978) differentiate between espoused theory and theory in-use. Both describe theories of action—that is, problem diagnoses, rationales and strategies of response, and posited outcomes. According to Hatch’s (1998, 28) synthesis, “[O]fficial pronouncements and presentations reflect espoused theories . . . and the actions of program staff or individuals within an organization reflect theories in-use.”

Describing one highly accessible source of espoused theory data, Shore and Wright (1997, 15) emphasize that an anthropology of policy needs systematically to collect new types of data, particularly “policy documents,” and to interpret them as “cultural texts.” “They can be treated as classificatory devices, as narratives that serve to justify or condemn the present, or as rhetorical devices and discursive formations that function to empower some and silence others.” This chapter later focuses on one such document—a letter of introduction sent by the CPS superintendent to his soon-to-be collaborators at the Mexican university in September 1996, which proposed several possible arenas for collaboration and that, in retrospect, generated confusion at the Mexican end about what CPS leaders wanted and were willing to do. (See Figure 4.1 in the next section.)

In relation to a particular proposed action, both espoused and in-use theories of action can be in significant congruence, but they can also differ substantially. For example, a school district administrator might espouse that the rationale for a program such as the Georgia/Mexico partnership was to improve the way newcomer students were served at school, while the more salient theory in-use could be that, to maintain middle-class (non-Latino) support of the schools, the district needs to look like it has a strategy for responding to the newcomers. In this
example, according to the espoused theory, newcomer students are the policy target, but according to the theory in-use, middle-class, Anglo families are the actual priority. Evidence of this theory in-use might be inferred by examining communication networks—Whom does the administrator call? Whose input do they seek for problem diagnosis and proposed remedies? Evidence of the theory in-use might also emerge from listening to the administrator’s frequently stated hopes and fears, such as consistently decrying the steady trickle of white students leaving the public school system. In this instance, understanding the administrator’s theory in-use would be much more useful for describing the administrator’s view of the tasks at hand and his/her sensibility regarding appropriate responses.

Referring back to the concepts of espoused theory and theories in-use, the remainder of the chapter explores why conflicts arose in the enactment of the partnership, why the partnership in practice looked different than it did on paper, and why one of the four components of the project—the bilingual curriculum component—was resisted and then unilaterally terminated. The next section looks at the initial problem diagnosis and mobilization that created the Georgia/Mexico partnership. The subsequent section focuses on the resistance by some CPS partners to the proposed bilingual education component, which ultimately led to that component’s uncomfortable termination and to a formal change in the complexion of the partnership. The final part describes how in trying to establish the educational policies that were to be operative in Conasauga, the various leaders described here were simultaneously engaged both in making those policies and resisting at least some of their collaborators’ interpretations of that policy.

It should be acknowledged that this chapter describes at greatest length the most contentious and least successful element of the partnership—the bilingual curriculum component—and, in so doing, risks painting the partnership as a failure when, in other lights, the partnership can be held up as a more favorable model of responsiveness to the presence of Latino newcomers (e.g., Zúñiga et al., this volume). Focusing on the unsuccessful component makes sense because it clearly demonstrates the consequences of unacknowledged differences in theories of action, but it risks giving an unjustly negative assessment tone. In other reports that look cumulatively at all four components of the partnership (e.g., Hamann, 1999a), I offer a more balanced assessment.

AN ANATOMY OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT: REACTING TO NEWCOMERS

In the spring of 1996, in Conasauga, a small city north of Atlanta, a senior attorney began an informal inquiry into the quality of education available at local schools for the growing number of Mexican newcomer students. For this inquiry and for the subsequent pursuit of the Georgia/Mexico partnership, the
attorney's strategy was in keeping with the type of political decision making that Hunter (1963) found characterized the de facto governing process by the elite in southern cities—the highlighting of interpersonal ties, meeting often behind closed doors, and exchanging personalized correspondence.

When the attorney began to look at how the local schools were responding to demographic change, CPS enrolled 1,243 Hispanic students, about 28 percent of the district's total enrollment. This represented a dramatic change from the 151 Hispanic students (less than 4 percent of the total enrollment) who were enrolled in September 1989, and it also differed from the September 1999 tally of 2,280 Hispanic students (slightly more than 45 percent of enrollment). The ongoing and dramatic changes in student enrollment were the main factors leading to the creation of the binational, four component, K-12/university partnership. The demographic changes were a consequence of changes in the employment patterns of the carpet and poultry industries in the late 1980s and 1990s, and of the related maturation of the migration streams that linked Conasauga to several Mexican sending communities.

The septuagenarian attorney who initiated the Georgia/Mexico partnership was no ordinary individual—having represented Conasauga decades earlier in both the U.S. Congress and the state senate—and his interest in the schools' problems was both civic and personal. According to his frequent public explanations, he was compelled to act by his daughter's complaints. She, working as a monolingual paraprofessional in a suddenly majority-Hispanic elementary school, had complained about her and her colleagues' lack of knowledge regarding how to communicate with most of the students at her school. She added that those students and their parents appeared similarly frustrated in their attempts to communicate with her and her colleagues. Given this language gap, productive teaching was becoming difficult.

Visiting his daughter's school, the attorney was surprised by the frustration and confusion he encountered among instructors. He was further disconcerted when he asked school district leaders how they were responding to the presence of so many Spanish-speaking students with little or no English language skills. The retiring superintendent admitted that they had no real plan. The attorney became convinced that the CPS status quo was inadequate and that he needed to make sure that the district did something quickly to respond to its changing demography. This decision to take action personally was consistent with a long-standing local pattern. Flamming (1992) notes that, in and near Conasauga, industrial leaders and other elite private citizens had personally intervened in schools and other civic institutions since the area's industrialization began in the late 1800s.

The attorney found that the district he was critiquing agreed with his call to action. Although they had no comprehensive plan of their own, district leaders were
not opposed to accommodating the growing numbers of Hispanic newcomer students. Akin to the teachers that Heath (1983) worked with in the 1970s, who had broad latitude to shape curriculum because their districts were unsure how to negotiate the sudden changes of desegregation, the attorney initially had broad latitude to help shape Conasauga schools' first response to its new demographic reality. As with the teachers in Heath's study, the attorney's window of opportunity to innovate and improvise was eventually challenged by the district as it tried to reassert a more traditional protocol for policymaking, but that challenge did not emerge until later. At first the attorney did not always act with the district personnel's explicit awareness, but he always acted with their blessing.

Knowing that he was not an educational expert, the attorney wrote dozens of letters and initiated dozens of conversations with Georgia university personnel, political contacts, and bureaucrats at the state department of education, in all cases seeking advice and support for an initiative that would help the district. Early on he determined that attracting bilingual educators to the schools was crucial. Only bilingual personnel could bridge between groups that were monolingual in different languages.

As an indicator of the attorney's eminence and the regional appropriateness of his "campaign" style, the chancellor of the Georgia Board of Regents felt compelled to write back to the attorney, conceding apologetically that the Georgia public universities had no bilingual teacher training programs, endorsement protocols, or even strategies to attract bi/multilingual persons into teaching. The chancellor further acknowledged that the Board of Regents was slowly waking up to the need for such programs, but that they would be some time in coming.

Also among the people the attorney communicated with in 1996 was his client, longtime family friend, and neighbor—the wealthy CEO of one of Conasauga's large manufacturers. The attorney explained the schools' dilemma as he understood it—as a communication gap. The CEO responded by mentioning that he knew someone whom he thought could help, a Mexican business partner who had ties to a private Mexican university.

According to sources I interviewed at that private Mexican university, the Georgia CEO three times called his powerful business partner, asking that partner how Conasauga could be assisted in its efforts to accommodate its influx of Mexicans. After the third call, the Mexican business leader was convinced of the Conasauga CEO's seriousness, and he agreed to contact the university's rector to discuss creating a partnership between CPS and the Mexican university.

The chain of communication had quickly become quite extended—an attorney, acting somewhat on behalf of a school district, talking to a local industrialist, who contacted a Mexican industrialist, who contacted a Mexican university leader—and in September 1996, only four months after his original school visits, the attorney received the name of a sociology professor at the Mexican univer-
The Politics of Bilingual Education

That professor had been approached by his university's rector to lead that university's still nebulously defined participation in a possible binational partnership. Ever impatient and feeling stymied by the insufficient response from Georgia institutions to his inquiries, the attorney called the Mexican professor to explain Conasauga's challenges and to ascertain how the professor's university could help. The first conversation was choppy. It was humorously recalled by both as hampered by a low-quality international connection, the attorney's complete lack of Spanish proficiency, and the professor's limited English proficiency, complicated by the attorney's unfamiliar southern accent. Nonetheless, the nascent partnership now had a leader in Georgia and a leader in Mexico.

Shortly thereafter, with a quick orientation from the attorney and a few others, CPS's new superintendent agreed to participate in the partnership. Although his initial understanding of what was being arranged was vague, the new superintendent had a well-honed political instinct reflecting his previous experience winning two elections for the superintendent role in a different Georgia jurisdiction. Moreover he was familiar and comfortable with the personalized politicking (Hunter, 1963) in which the attorney, the CEO, and other local supporters of the nascent partnership engaged. As CPS's first superintendent with no previous experience in CPS, he knew that appearing responsive to local leaders was important. Thus he said "yes" when the Georgia attorney asked him to send a letter (Figure 4.1) to the Mexican professor that clarified how the Mexican university could help Conasauga schools. The "clarity" the letter generated, however, was both minimal and ephemeral. The Mexican partners were enthused by the letter, but also misled. The letter marked the first substantive communication between CPS and the Mexican university. Thus it was disproportionately important to the Mexican partners' conceptualizations of CPS's wishes, understandings, and expectations. The analysis that follows considers how the letter led the Mexican partners to misunderstand both the modus operandi of CPS and the desired outcomes of its leaders. Notably, the letter suggested a greater familiarity with and support for bilingual education than was actually the case and it suggested a less hierarchic, more inclusive decision-making structure than actually prevailed in CPS.

Several facets of this letter merit specific attention. Levinson and Sutton (2001) emphasize policy's role in the production and reproduction of norms, and there were a number of norms embedded in the superintendent's text. For example, the superintendent explicitly refers to his Georgia experience with K–12/university partnerships to suggest that the Georgia template can be a model for the binational partnership they were creating. Within that template the superintendent initially envisioned Conasauga as a hosting site for preservice teachers (and administrators) engaging in their student teaching.

On the other side, because systematic consultation between instructors and administrators was a normal practice in the regular professional lives of the Mex-
Dear [Mexican partner],

As the Superintendent of the Conasauga Public Schools, I send you greetings on behalf of our students, faculty and Board of Education. I truly look forward to this excellent opportunity to work with you to provide the needed educational opportunity our students deserve.

You have already received information regarding our eight schools. I am extremely proud of these schools and the work being done to provide an outstanding education for our students.

I have now met with our eight school principals on two occasions to discuss the possibilities of assistance from [your university]. They are very excited about the assistance you may offer.

We have discussed many strategies which could assist us. We have a high percent of Spanish speaking students at three of our schools and this number increases each year. All of us agree that adult bilingual assistance in the classes would be of great benefit to all concerned.

By providing instruction in the native language, these students could increase their skill levels in academic subjects. Also, we could provide intensive English instruction with the ultimate goal being that of a literate bilingual student.

I am unclear of the training your teachers receive. In the University System of Georgia, a student in training to be a teacher must spend three months in a school in an experience called “student teaching.” This person is under the supervision of the University and the classroom teacher. If you have such an experience for those in training to be a teacher, we could provide this experience in our schools. If your teacher training does not contain this requirement, perhaps the “Georgia Experience” with Conasauga Schools could serve in the place of some of your courses in education training.

Additionally, if there is training for school administrators, we would welcome these students. I am certain there are many positive experiences anyone would receive by working in our schools.

Also, if nurses or school counselors are available or in training, we would certainly welcome them.

Perhaps this program could lead to an exchange of educators. We could possibly send some of our teachers for training in Mexico. Other ideas include: instructing our teachers in the Spanish language, creating Saturday classes for children and adults (families), summer school, obtaining textbooks in Spanish and many others.

It is my desire and I have the approval of our Board of Education to hire someone to coordinate all these activities. I am certain this person should be extremely organized and willing to work hard to implement this program.

I have listed the schools below and the number of your teachers/students they have requested. I asked the principals to state their needs, perhaps these numbers are too high, but I believe they confirm our needs.

Signal Hill—13, Oakwood—2, Town Park—2, Hamilton—20, Guthrie—10,
West Glen—4, Conasauga Jr. High School—5, Conasauga High School—12.

This is a total of sixty-eight (68) people! Perhaps an unrealistic number at the beginning of this project. But please remember, I did ask for the needs. One-half of the number would be wonderful. As you analyze our needs it will be obvious that we will appreciate any assistance you provide.

We would do all we could to provide housing and substance [sic] for these individuals. I am certain our community would welcome your students/faculty with open arms.

Please consider this proposal and contact [the attorney] with your thoughts regarding this request.

Again, I truly look forward to working with you as we develop this program.

Sincerely,

CONASAUGA PUBLIC SCHOOLS SUPERINTENDENT

cc: [the attorney]
The Politics of Bilingual Education

ican partners, they inferred from the superintendent's reference to consultation with building principals that such consultation was the norm in Conasauga instead of an anomalous example. This "misread" meant that later suggestions by the Mexican bilingual curriculum coordinator for CPS officials to consult with school site practitioners were heard differently than had been intended.

The letter misled the Mexican partners in another way. As I confirmed in several conversations with the Mexican partners, they presumed from the letter's overt expression of need for bilingual teachers, from its mention of the importance of native language instruction, and its support of the goal of bilingualism that there was enthusiasm in Conasauga for bilingual education and the assistance of Mexican instructors. (My Title VII grant application which the Mexican partners read six months later also made Conasauga educational leaders seem conversant with the main principles, strategies, and options of bilingual education.) The Mexican leaders inferred that the concept of bilingual education was broadly familiar in CPS and that bilingual education was to be an ongoing mechanism for developing all students' bilingualism rather than just a transitional vehicle for Latino newcomer students who had not yet sufficiently mastered English.

Because of the superintendent's seeming familiarity with bilingual education, it was easy to overlook the fact that though he promised to hire an "extremely organized and willing to work hard" partnership coordinator he did not promise to hire a coordinator with pertinent content knowledge. As it happened, after no external searching, the superintendent's executive secretary was designated to be the CPS coordinator, but none of her other duties were reduced. Clearly committed to the Project's success, the executive secretary supported the partnership's development by working extra hours and during weekends. This laudable dedication, however, permitted CPS to avoid any administrative reconfiguration to support the Georgia/Mexico partnership. As of the spring of 2000, CPS's execution of partnership-related administrative tasks still depended on the extra energy and goodwill of a monolingual employee who had many other responsibilities and no formal expertise in bilingual/multicultural education or with immigration issues.

Before writing the letter, the superintendent consulted with principals in each CPS school to discover their wishes and needs. However, after these meetings the principals (and other school-based personnel) were not systematically included in the Georgia/Mexico partnership planning process that led to and guided the partnership's formal enactment. During the 1997-1998 school year, the principals were consulted regarding the performance of the visiting instructors from Mexico, and there appeared to be open channels of communication between the schools and the superintendent, but the point remains that from this letter Mexican partners could surmise more site-based input than subsequently occurred and could presume more site-based knowledge of and support for the partnership than actually existed. This presumption of a collaborative relation-
ship between CPS school sites and central administration later complicated the efforts of the Mexican university's designated bilingual curriculum coordinator.

Although the superintendent never subsequently lobbied for the number of Mexican instructors that he noted in the letter, and the principals initially claimed they needed, it is easy to see how the Mexican partners (and the attorney) inferred from his letter that he enthusiastically supported the visiting instructor component. Given the figure in his letter and the success of the initial 14 visiting instructors who came in October 1997, it is striking that the CPS superintendent successfully reduced the proposed number of visiting instructors for 1998–1999 from 25, the figure suggested by the attorney to the Mexican university officials, to the 16 that were ultimately agreed upon. When the Georgia/Mexico partnership seemed like an abstract wish list, the superintendent was willing both to echo the attorney's emphasis on the recruitment of bilingual instructors and to repeat the CPS principals' declarations of need. However, two years later the superintendent's sense of the cost and logistical complications of managing the visiting instructors from Mexico led him to request a much smaller number. He was not willing to argue for the substantial reallocation of resources and logistical adjustments that the principals' original request would have required. He was willing to ask for help from an unorthodox source, but only in a supplemental rather than transformative way.

In his letter the superintendent asked the Mexican partners to direct further questions and communication to the Georgia/Mexico partnership's instigating attorney. In hindsight this contributed to the Mexican partners' uncertainty regarding who at the Conasauga end was actually in charge of the Georgia/Mexico partnership. Was it the school district's chief executive or the private attorney? Referring to the partnership's ambiguous leadership in Conasauga, the Mexican professors subsequently recounted, "We were never sure who to send the faxes to."

Moreover, beyond this ambiguity, the superintendent's letter gave no indication of the important role the CPS curriculum coordinator would play in shaping CPS's actual participation in the partnership. Although it would have been awkward in a letter such as this to note that the curriculum coordinator, with 25 years of work for CPS to her credit, had been a finalist for the CPS superintendency (and would have been the first woman to ever occupy that position), failure to mention her while mentioning the principals could, by reasonable interpretation on the part of Mexican readers, suggest that the principals' input would be substantial and that no substantive (let alone discordant) role on the part of central administrators needed to be anticipated.

Toward the end of the letter, the superintendent asserted that he was "certain" the community would welcome the Mexican university's assistance with open arms. It is unclear how this welcome was to be made manifest and who
was supposed to be included in the term "community." I assume the superintendent was not referring to the relatively small but obviously vocal group whose anti-immigrant letters-to-the-editor had compelled Conasauga's local newspaper to temporarily suspend printing such texts in 1995. Presumably many of the citizens who had successfully petitioned for the opening of a local Immigration and Naturalization Service office were also not included. It is true that, as a newcomer to town, the superintendent may well not have been aware of this recent local political history.

As it turned out, however, CPS educational administrators ended up heeding community voices that narrowly defined an acceptable welcome for newcomers. In promising the welcome of the host community, the letter left unacknowledged that the welcome available might not match the welcome that Mexican project leaders anticipated. In fact, as I have written elsewhere (Hamann, 1999b), Suárez-Orozco's (1998) "pro-immigration script" adeptly describes the allegedly pro-newcomer orientation of many Conasauga citizens, particularly those in professional positions. According to that script, newcomers are welcome because they are religious, familial, devoted, hardworking, and willing to take jobs no one else will. In Conasauga, the newcomers' presence was constructed as supporting the up-by-the-bootstraps model of social advancement and thereby proving Conasauga was an essentially fair place for all. This script, however, idealizes and bounds newcomers, simultaneously claiming that newcomers must want to be assimilated and that they are virtuous in part because of their willingness to tolerate hazardous, low-paying jobs. The script both rationalizes assimilative schooling and the presence and perpetuation of newcomer Latinos' marginal economic status. To quote David Spener (1988, 146), what the host society offers is "assimilation at the bottom." Ultimately it was only supplemental and assimilative portions of the Georgia/Mexico partnership that CPS leaders were willing to implement with any vigor.

As the Georgia/Mexico partnership was getting started, CPS officials were unsure of all that was potentially being offered—hence the superintendent's questions about bilingual nurses, administrators, and so forth and his reference to familiar models (e.g., the offerings of the University System of Georgia). Although officials acknowledged this uncertainty, they nonetheless remained certain about their responsibility and prerogative to be at the table as decision makers. Conasauga leaders were willing to ask for help, but because of their lack of expertise they were not well positioned to scrutinize whether what was being offered was really what they wanted. Thus they set up a scenario where, regarding some educational policy for Conasauga's Latino newcomer students, Mexican partners could say "you said this was what you wanted" and Conasauga leaders could say "yes, but we did not mean it." Of course, neither at that time nor since has such a frank interchange occurred.
Mexican participants in the first face-to-face meeting between Conasauga and Mexican leaders in December 1996 distinctly remember that, on the first day of the meeting, those on the Conasauga side only presented the attorney's wish for help finding bilingual instructors. Although their notes from that meeting indicate that they also received a one-page "curriculum goals" sheet from the CPS curriculum coordinator, none of the Mexican meeting participants remembered the sheet or any discussion of its contents. Although she was technically "at the table" and "on record" in favor of bilingual education, in many ways the curriculum coordinator's input and prerogative regarding the partnership was downplayed at this early meeting. Direct Instruction, a tightly scripted, monolingual, phonetics curriculum that was later strongly championed by the curriculum coordinator (at the expense of some partnership initiatives), was not mentioned at the December 1996 meeting.

According to Mexican university-based partnership leaders, three-fourths of the four-component structure of the partnership initially agreed upon reflected items added to the partnership agenda by the Mexican collaborators and agreed to by the Conasauga contingent. In March 1997, the four-component structure of the Georgia/Mexico partnership was formally signed into being at a ceremony at Conasauga High School. Following the original vision of the Conasauga attorney, the agreement specifically promised the recruitment, specialized orientation, and placement of bilingual graduates of the Mexican university into Conasauga classrooms. It also promised the organization of a summer training institute for Georgia teachers at the university in Mexico. It outlined a multifaceted research, needs assessment, and community leadership development initiative that would have the Mexican researchers work with Conasauga's Latino newcomer community. And it promised that the Mexican university would help CPS to adapt the Georgia-mandated Quality Core Curriculum (QCC) into a bilingual, more culturally responsive format. In turn, this adapted curriculum was to be implemented, at least in part, by the Mexico-trained visiting instructors.

AN ANATOMY OF POLICY RESISTANCE

Space constraints do not permit a review of all the components of the Georgia/Mexico partnership's implementation through 1999. But highlighting the demise of the bilingual component illustrates how, beneath a superficial consensus favoring the partnership, there were competing ideas about what the partnership should accomplish and how it should be governed.

In June 1997 Mexican university personnel assured the attorney that the bilingual curriculum revisions were essentially complete. But in October 1997, when the first group of Mexican visiting instructors finally arrived, the revised curriculum had not yet been accepted by the district. This made the immediate tasks of
the visiting instructors unsure and ambiguous. In fact, the revised curriculum was never accepted by CPS. Even in April 2000, the CPS curriculum coordinator maintained that it was never received, while Mexican university partners claimed that such an explanation was misleading. CPS seemed to have unilaterally changed its expectations regarding what the curriculum was to be, and then they avoided several Mexican efforts to clarify what was being sought.

In the summer of 1998, with neither the Mexican university's nor the attorney's assent, CPS indicated that it no longer had any interest in the bilingual component (though it would push ahead with a nonpartnership-related initiative to add Spanish as a foreign language classes four days a week at all elementary and middle schools). Rejecting the partnership's bilingual component did not indicate, however, that bilingual education per se was being abandoned. A CPS principal interviewed on National Public Radio's All Things Considered insisted as recently as March 1999 that her school embraced bilingual education. What seems then to have been in dispute was who would get to define bilingual education in Conasauga and what that definition would encompass. One hundred sixty minutes per week of Spanish as a foreign language classes and the acceptance of the use of Spanish by paraprofessionals tutoring Spanish speakers were de facto what CPS was characterizing as bilingual education.

In contrast, the Mexican sociologists who had first suggested the bilingual component had done so as part of a more complex maneuver related to whether and under what terms they were willing to join the partnership. Although the prospect of even limited links to CPS would have had some attraction to the Mexican university, leaders there remembered that they had rejected the initially proposed stand-alone package of sending Mexican teachers to be bilingual paraprofessionals in Georgia classrooms. They had agreed to provide such support only if they were also allowed to engage in a community study, to examine adult education opportunities for Latino newcomers, to identify potential Conasauga-based Latino leaders, and so on. To the Mexican partners, the bilingual component was an element in a multifaceted initiative that recognized, affirmed, and built on the cultural knowledge and frameworks that Latino newcomers brought with them to Conasauga.

Thus there were unreconciled differences in theories of action regarding both who was to make decisions and what was in the best interest of Hispanic newcomer students and the district at large. One administrative change in Mexico obscured the immediate recognition of difference in theories. Because the Mexican university's main Georgia/Mexico partnership leaders were applied sociologists (and supporters of but not experts in bilingual education), the Mexican team initially relied on one of its graduates to serve as a bilingual education consultant. When that consultant indicated he could no longer continue with the partnership in the fall of 1997, Mexican leaders turned to another alumna as
their new bilingual education consultant. She made her first visit to Conasauga in January 1998, and returned for a second visit at the end of April.

When the new Mexican bilingual component coordinator visited Conasauga and CPS for the first time in January 1998, she brought several operating assumptions with her. First, she thought her main task was curriculum development and therefore that she needed to clarify what kind of curriculum CPS would want. She did not anticipate this would be problematic, because it was in line with the superintendent's original September 1996 letter and with the partnership agreement brokered in December 1996 and signed in March 1997. Second, she thought the curriculum would be implemented by the visiting instructors and perhaps others. According to the orientation she had received from the Mexican partnership leaders, the bilingual component and the visiting instructor component were linked. It followed that primary activities of her visit were observing how the visiting instructors were being used and listening to what CPS administrators thought of the instructors' performances to that point. Her final assumption reflected both her upbringing and her job. Because of her experience growing up in both the United States and Mexico and because of her job leading a combined, private, trilingual primaria and secundaria (elementary and secondary school) in a Mexican city, she thought of bilingualism and bilingual education as sensible and straightforward and as a permanent rather than a transitional strategy.

During her three-day January 1998 visit, she met the attorney, the superintendent, and the curriculum coordinator, each of whom had been part of the Conasauga delegation that visited Mexico in December 1996. The new bilingual coordinator saw all 13 visiting Mexican instructors, watched many of them teach, and stopped at all eight schools in the system, even the two that since Christmas break were no longer hosting a visiting instructor. She talked to principals, assistant principals, educational instructional specialists (EISs), and others who oversaw the visiting instructor's duties at the schools. In conversations with administrators, she recommended the bilingual education research of Jim Cummins, and she promoted the total quality management approach (TQM) to administration. She saw Direct Instruction for the first time and commented to several people that she was intrigued by it. She did not say and perhaps did not see that Direct Instruction was inconsistent with the decentralization of decision making that is a core tenet of TQM and that it challenged several of the Georgia/Mexico partnership's four components.

Direct Instruction is a strictly scripted phonetics-oriented curriculum that CPS leaders, listening to consultants not involved with the Georgia/Mexico partnership, were implementing at the same time as the Georgia/Mexico partnership. Championed by the CPS curriculum coordinator in particular (who was one of the few people in the district authorized to approve the substantial in-
The Politics of Bilingual Education

vestment required for the importation of Direct Instruction), Direct Instruction became the new curriculum adopted by CPS partially in lieu of the bilingual component that the partnership agreement had specified. Direct Instruction was adopted without consulting the Mexican university. Nonetheless, the visiting instructors from Mexico were centrally involved in the classroom delivery of Direct Instruction, which created the irony of Mexican nationals who spoke deeply accented English teaching English phonetics to Latino newcomers.

On February 19, 1998, the Mexican bilingual coordinator and the university’s partnership leader faxed a report they had cowritten about the bilingual coordinator’s visit to the CPS superintendent. The bilingual coordinator was the report’s lead author, though the name of the partnership leader at the Mexican university was also attached, implying his review and endorsement of its contents. Reflecting both courtesy and the ongoing lack of clarity as to who in Conasauga was in charge of the Georgia/Mexico partnership, additional copies of the report were directed to the attorney and to the CPS curriculum coordinator. The presumption at the Mexican end was that the report would remain a private working document. In fact, because of political considerations in Conasauga, it did not.

In early February 1998, after the bilingual coordinator’s visit but before the preparation of her report, there was a public meeting of the ad hoc Georgia/Mexico partnership committee, the loosely structured body headed by the attorney that was composed mainly of prominent local business leaders. For this occasion, there was a long list of invitees, including all the Mexican visiting instructors, a representative from a local junior college, the chair of the Conasauga City Council’s Finance Committee, a bilingual priest, a social worker with the Migrant Education program, and four representatives from a neighboring school district that had participated modestly in the Georgia/Mexico partnership, as well as various business leaders, the attorney and his assistant, and four representatives from the CPS Central Office (including the superintendent and the curriculum coordinator). In all, there were 29 present, including me.

The meeting’s official agenda was surprisingly brief. There were five items listed, including the fifth entitled, “Other matters for consideration.” The CPS curriculum coordinator was supposed to speak second, giving an update on the Georgia/Mexico partnership’s “curriculum design.” I knew an hour ahead of time, however, that the printed agenda was to be changed. I was to present a “deliverables report” that I had prepared for the superintendent and dropped off just that morning. The deliverables report was not on the official agenda. It was a five-page summary of what the Georgia/Mexico partnership had accomplished to date that I had prepared as a favor to the superintendent. A local business leader had promised that his company would support the Georgia/Mexico partnership if only he could see proof of its “deliverables.” I
had made the report relatively short, but it was not organized to support an oral presentation.

The attorney presided over the meeting. He decided to insert me into the agenda second, ahead of the curriculum coordinator's curriculum report. In the packet assembled under the attorney's supervision and distributed to all attendees, the outline that the curriculum coordinator had prepared to support her presentation was enclosed last, after the new Mexican bilingual curriculum coordinator's résumé, after articles from *Time*, the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, and *The Kiplinger Washington Letter* regarding Hispanic education and national demographic trends, after sheets of statistics breaking down enrollment at CPS's two secondary schools and three Title 1 elementary schools by race and ethnicity, after a one-page Georgia/Mexico partnership budget, after several letters about the partnership written by an immigration lawyer who had assisted with the visiting instructors' visas, and after a recent local newspaper story that labeled the Georgia/Mexico partnership as a "bilingual education program." I do not know whether the agenda-bumping and placing the outline last in the packet were intentional slights, but the curriculum coordinator's role and report were deemphasized by these actions.

When the curriculum coordinator finally did speak, she introduced the "Bilingual Transitional Plan." The plan was described as not having been "formally presented or adopted," but it was based on the input of "many [unspecified] people, much reading, and some experience." The Mexican university was not mentioned, and no Mexican partners remembered having reviewed the document. The stated goal of the plan was to have "all students achieving at grade level in English while developing skill in a second language."

The first four points all related to non-native speakers of English and varied in their specificity. The plans for instruction in English were all much clearer than for instruction in Spanish, but there was acknowledged intent to include the latter. According to the second item of the two-page plan, "All research indicates the stronger one is in his/her first language the easier the transition to a second language." Based on this research, the plan recommended beginning Spanish instruction in kindergarten, offering Spanish for Spanish-speakers, and having bilingual staff and language learning related technology. This portion of the plan and all others notably excluded the idea of any academic content instruction in Spanish, apart from language arts. One line in the plan did promise that "primary instruction would be in English with the students' native language (Spanish) utilized to facilitate language and academic growth." Her report generated no public questions.

As the meeting ended, eight people lingered for an unannounced executive planning session. All were business leaders except the attorney, the CPS superintendent, and me (who, sensing a research opportunity, asked if I could stay). The CPS curriculum coordinator's presentation of the Bilingual Transition Plan was
The Politics of Bilingual Education

lost in the shuffle. No one asked about the recent visit of the bilingual curriculum coordinator from Mexico, nor whether any of the Mexican partners had endorsed the CPS curriculum coordinator’s proposal. Despite the lack of attention that the curriculum plan received at the end of the meeting, it resurfaced in two separate and significant ways during the following month.

The February 19 report faxed by the Mexican partners clearly, if unwittingly, reasserted their assumption that they were still leading the bilingual curriculum development initiative. It made no reference to the CPS curriculum coordinator’s outline or presentation at the early February meeting. Although all of the visiting Mexican instructors had attended that meeting (excluding the executive session), they had not reported back to partnership leaders in Mexico that the CPS curriculum coordinator had presented an alternative curriculum action plan.

The Mexican partners’ report did make several pointed comments and a few subtle ones. For example, the report criticized the frequent casting of the visiting instructors as assistants or paraprofessionals, saying in the recommendations section: “The [name of the university] teachers are not U.S. certified, but they have been certified in Mexico. They are not at the level of paraprofessionals and they are not student teachers. In fact, most of them have had important experience as teachers in Mexican private, bilingual schools. [Name of the university] teachers could and should take a more pro-active role.”

Although acknowledging that the visiting instructors were happy and had been treated well by the superintendent and his assistants and by the principals and teachers at the schools, the report complained about the Conasauga teachers’ regular failure to pass along lesson plans and other preparatory materials to visiting Mexican instructors ahead of time. The Mexican teachers frequently first viewed a lesson plan at the moment they were supposed to be enacting it. The report also complained about the marginal spaces—hallways, cafeterias, supply closets, etc.—where the Mexican instructors (and newcomer students) were frequently expected to work. Additionally, it criticized the lack of clarity regarding what the instructors’ task was to be. (At the Mexican end, the assumption had been that they would implement the bilingual curriculum created as part of the partnership, but in the absence of that curriculum, Conasauga educators initially were quite uncertain about how to collaborate with the visitors.)

That so much of the report was devoted to detailing the experience of the visiting instructors reiterates that those on the Mexican end viewed the visiting instructor component and the bilingual curriculum component as closely intertwined. There was also much in the report about the still promised bilingual curriculum itself, but mostly questions. In a section entitled “The Conasauga Model for Bilingual Education,” the Mexican authors proposed an April 1998 summit (which was never held) to hasten the development of the curriculum CPS was seeking. At the proposed conference, four questions were to be answered:
• “What do Conasauga teachers, principals, superintendent want?” [sic]  
(Note how they propose to consult with several groups. Note too that the CPS curriculum coordinator was not included in the list, though that did not necessarily mean she was to be excluded from the process.)

• “What do Conasauga students need?”  
(Note that the possible answers to this question could include much that was not part of Georgia’s Quality Core curriculum or the Direct Instruction curriculum.)

• “How will all Conasauga students, Anglos and Hispanics, reach the goal of graduating at 12th-grade reading level?”

• “Will the ‘Transitional Bilingual’ model be used?”  
(Note that the reference to transitional bilingual models was a question. Though they had their own ideas regarding what was most appropriate, Mexican partners were still unsure as to what bilingual curriculum format CPS was seeking.)

This segment of the report ended with a final tie-in between curriculum development and the role of the visiting instructors: “These [answers to the questions] are issues which must be carefully defined by all. Once the model is clarified, the role for the [visiting Mexican] teachers should also be easier to clarify with respect to the difference between their roles and that of the U.S. teachers, the ESOL teachers, the paraprofessionals, etc.”

Although blunt and perhaps critical of CPS’s failure to recognize the visiting instructors’ status as credentialed educators, the report was neither dismissive nor inappropriate. Assuming that it would be read only by those leading the Georgia/Mexico partnership and/or CPS, the authors’ straightforwardness was intended constructively. These were questions that needed to be answered so that the Georgia/Mexico partnership could move forward and achieve the objectives that Mexican leaders thought were desired at the Conasauga end. Embedded in the report were assumptions and questions about policy—assumptions that the Mexican university was still supposed to contribute to curriculum policy development and questions about the hows and whats of detailing that policy.

What was desired at the Conasauga end varied, however. On February 27, in a maneuver that reasserted his own power, the attorney mailed copies of the Mexican partners’ February 19 report to everyone on his Georgia/Mexico partnership mailing list (i.e., to more than 100 people). By mailing the bilingual curriculum coordinator’s report, the attorney was inviting thought, feedback, and participation from many beyond the CPS Central Office regarding how the identified obstacles could be addressed. But he had also converted constructive private criticism between partners into public criticism of CPS.

On March 5, at a luncheon meeting with partnership leaders from both countries that included the superintendent, several other CPS Central Office figures, the attorney, his assistant, and four administrators from Mexico, the CPS curriculum coordinator again shared her Bilingual Transitional Plan. There were no
adjustments in response to the February 19 report from Mexican partners, nor even an acknowledgment of it in the barely revised document, though she did refer to this report orally.

Early in the meeting, through the intervention of the superintendent’s executive secretary (who had a large administrative role coordinating CPS’s portion of the partnership), the curriculum coordinator was invited to present her comments regarding the bilingual curriculum component. The secretary had intervened because she knew the curriculum coordinator was trying to keep another appointment. The curriculum coordinator distributed the Bilingual Transitional Plan she had presented in early February and said that the model recommended in the Mexican bilingual coordinator’s February report was not the one that CPS was seeking. This misrepresented the Mexican partners’ February report, as it had not recommended a particular model—but rather had asked if transitional bilingual education (TBE) was what CPS was seeking. Although a departure from the spirit of what the Mexican university had initially suggested, TBE seemed like the closest match to what the Mexican bilingual coordinator thought was being asked for. Still, though the Mexican partnership coordinator had been named as coauthor of the February report, neither he nor anyone else present at this March meeting was enough of a curriculum expert to question the CPS curriculum coordinator’s interpretation of the February report. Nor did anyone challenge her own plan as vague and contradictory.

The curriculum coordinator’s presentation was not long, nor did it draw many questions. She did say that she had not yet had the chance to share her own plan with the bilingual component coordinator in Mexico (who was not present). She also said that the School Board had not yet seen it, and she asked the present Mexican partners to convey the message to their bilingual component coordinator that during the coordinator’s next visit she was not to meet with CPS principals; rather her role was to act more as a private consultant to the superintendent and the curriculum coordinator. Honoring that request, when the Mexican bilingual coordinator did return in early May, she did not meet with CPS principals.

Later in the March 5 meeting, after the curriculum coordinator had left, when the Mexican university’s budget for the partnership was reviewed, no one noticed the contradiction between the budget’s inclusion of the bilingual component and the unilateral curriculum decision made by the curriculum coordinator. The budget text claimed that the curriculum design needed to be accepted by the principals and assumed that the curriculum would be put together by the Mexican bilingual coordinator.

After the meeting, on March 18, perhaps displaying frustration at the CPS curriculum coordinator’s exclusion of the Mexican partners in her preparation of the Bilingual Transitional Plan, the attorney again tried to outflank the CPS coordinator (though again not overtly). In a letter to the partnership’s amorphously
defined "committee and friends" announcing a substantial gathering being planned for March 27, the attorney enclosed a copy of a letter written by a former Georgia State Department of Education administrator that praised the insight of the Mexican partners' February 19 report. The former state administrator wrote, "From an instructional point of view, I was most interested in Professor [bilingual coordinator]'s report. Her comments indicate that she has a solid foundation in how students learn within the context of multilingual, multicultural environments." The attorney was not enough of an education expert to convincingly intervene directly in a curriculum methodology debate, but, as he had before, he tried to be convincing by quoting someone whose expertise was clearer.

The Mexican bilingual coordinator made a return visit to CPS in early May 1998. According to a Mexican colleague who accompanied her, during that visit the CPS curriculum coordinator directly asked the bilingual component coordinator to send all future correspondence regarding the Georgia/Mexico partnership exclusively and directly to her. It was unclear whether the superintendent was also supposed to be excluded from the direct chain of communication.

In the summer of 1998, CPS moved to freeze the bilingual curriculum component (while continuing with other facets of the Georgia/Mexico partnership). Because the attorney did not concur with this decision, he disregarded it in his communication with the Mexican university. As late as the fall of 1998, the university was including a category for bilingual curriculum consulting in its budget submissions to CPS. As recently as the spring of 1999 (and perhaps since then), the Mexican leaders of the Georgia/Mexico partnership were still centrally involving the bilingual coordinator in their portion of the partnership's administration, as they still sought to clarify the curricular tasks of the visiting instructors. In April 2000, a Mexican partner still characterized the bilingual component as inactive rather than terminated.

In one light then, the conflict stemmed from the CPS curriculum coordinator acting out her belief that curriculum decision making for the district was centrally her prerogative, not a shared task of the partnership, whereas the Mexican collaborators continued to follow the March 1997 partnership accord (which stated that they would develop a bilingual curriculum). The partnership-founding attorney sided with the Mexican collaborators. In the months and years that followed the establishment of the partnership, the CPS curriculum coordinator became an increasingly outspoken champion and promoter of Direct Instruction—a curriculum that was completely scripted and monolingual and, as importantly, that was centrally managed and independent from the partnership agreement. No doubt, part of the CPS curriculum coordinator's theory of action for embracing Direct Instruction reflected her understanding of what would work best for Latino newcomer children. But she was also relying on theories in-use about her own power, responsibility, prerogative, and position. The curricular policy she proposed sup-
ported the cultural reproduction of a hierarchical management structure, a structure that formally offered her much authority.

Meanwhile, though initially intrigued by Direct Instruction, the Mexican partners quickly began to doubt the value of that curricular strategy, at least to the extent that it meant a major responsibility of the visiting instructors was to deliver a fully scripted, fully phonics-based curriculum in English. Whatever its virtues, Direct Instruction forfeited taking advantage of the visiting instructors' familiarity with Mexican schooling, cultural mores, and language. Direct Instruction was inconsistent with the cultural affirmation orientation that the Mexican partners thought had been built into the design of the partnership.

PARTNERSHIP POLITICS AND SCHOOLING THE NEW LATINO DIASPORA

The Georgia/Mexico partnership's existence increased Conasauga's capacity to accommodate Latino newcomers. However, remembering the partnership's origin outside the school system, as a program initiated by a savvy attorney and substantially developed by a Mexican university, the partnership's existence did not indicate CPS's unqualified embrace. Various CPS instructors consistently questioned the district's receptiveness to change, suggesting their own frustration with the administrators above them. Many times I heard predictions by CPS administrators that the influx of Hispanics to the district was finally topping off, as the availability of low-cost housing within the city limits was allegedly tapped out. These predictions may have reflected wishful thinking, but they did not indicate a district ready to consider what would happen if the demography continued to change. At the administrative tier, during the full course of my inquiry, there were few indicators of dissatisfaction with the existing educational program. Title VII funding was sought as a means to obtain extra resources. Later, Direct Instruction was portrayed as the solution to problems that otherwise might have emerged. Sarason (1990) has identified dissatisfaction as requisite for a willingness to change. Those leading CPS showed little overt dissatisfaction.

From the CPS leaders' point of view, the problem with the bilingual education component was not just that the idea was politically unpopular in many circles, but also that it depended on someone else's expertise. Accepting the Mexican bilingual coordinator's suggestion for a roundtable in April 1998 to discuss CPS future curriculum needs and desires would have helped the district anticipate and thoughtfully respond to ongoing change. That this invitation from the Mexican partners was declined is telling. In 1996 CPS had admitted that it was not sure how to move forward, but it was disinclined to make the same admission in 1998.

One reading of the curriculum coordinator's ultimate resistance to the bilingual curriculum component (resistance that was not challenged by the superintendent
or CPS School Board) was that she was defending the status quo decision-making hierarchy, resisting an alternative form of governance and a concomitant loss of power for her role. Although initially unsure of how to respond to the dramatic change in student and parent demographics, and thus initially receptive to the involvement of the attorney and the Mexican university, CPS leaders became increasingly doubtful about the partnership, and particularly the politically controversial bilingual curriculum component, as they realized how vulnerable they had made themselves not only to broadsides by the attorney but also to the more vague challenges of the community. Without a good grasp of the hows and whys of bilingual education and the broader topic of culturally responsive pedagogy, CPS leaders were uncomfortable facing any doubts raised by the Anglo public about the new educational course promised by the partnership. As noted earlier, I have written elsewhere (Hamann 1999b) about how the Conasauga public was largely willing to welcome or at least accept the presence of newcomers, as long as the newcomers seemed willing to take work no one else wanted and seemed receptive to assimilation. Though the bilingual curriculum and other partnership efforts initiated by the Mexican university promised Conasauga assistance with the newcomers, they did not promise assimilation.

One assumption of formal policymaking is that policy should be made by experts, and for leaders to admit their lack of expertise would suggest that they should not be making the policies. One could say that the Georgia/Mexico partnership was enacted as a “political technology” (Foucault, 1977) that converted the political problem of how to accommodate the presence of Latino newcomers at school into a “neutral” social science question regarding best pedagogical and curricular practice. As Shore and Wright note (1997, 9) central to political technology is the deployment of “expert knowledge,” and the partnership’s struggle regarding bilingual education was sometimes contested around issues of expertise.

The curriculum coordinator was the one educator in this study for whom the binational partnership was not readily a means for displaying her educational expertise or advancing her theories of action regarding how CPS should operate and what it should seek to accomplish. Through its new curriculum and the (re)deployment of expert visiting instructors and Summer Institute–trained CPS educators, the Georgia/Mexico partnership promised a reconfiguration of power away from the Central Office and to site-based personnel. It seemed to confirm the bypassing of her that had been routine in the enactment of the partnership, be it at the December 1996 meeting in Mexico, the February 1998 meeting of the ad hoc oversight committee, and at other times. Within the partnership, the curriculum coordinator found her attempted contributions to be overlooked or ignored.

Reacting in part to the superintendent’s original consultation with the CPS principals in September 1996, the Mexican partners assumed that site-based personnel had decision-making input within CPS and, unwittingly, further chal-
lenged the curriculum coordinator's role when they made claims and requests to that effect. These dynamics all jeopardized the status that the curriculum coordinator had obtained by diligently climbing the traditional hierarchy that had prevailed in CPS. Sarason (1990, 55) notes that "Those who wield power do not look kindly on any possible dilution of that power. I do not say this critically but rather as a statement of empirical fact. To gloss over that fact is to reduce mightily the chances that any significant proposal to alter power relationships will be successful, even in part."

The curriculum coordinator's traditional authority came from her control over curriculum decision making and her authority over a substantial curriculum and staff training budget. The Georgia/Mexico partnership sought to intervene in these two arenas, extending more curriculum authority directly to instructors and site-based administrators and designating portions of the staff-training budget to underwrite the substantial expenses of Summer Institute participation.

Nonetheless, despite being implicated by the attorney's original critique of the status quo in CPS, the curriculum coordinator initially sought Title VII funding and otherwise supported the nascent Georgia/Mexico partnership. However, as the new partnership's implications for her own status became clearer, she stopped supporting it. Instead she substituted the heavily scripted, expensive Direct Instruction model.

Contrary to the espoused theories of the superintendent (as expressed in the September 1996 letter), but perhaps not contrary to his theories in-use (as he apparently did not try to limit her maneuvers), in 1998 the curriculum coordinator moved to limit the communication channels available to the Mexican bilingual coordinator and failed to coordinate her own curricular ideas with that partner. In fact, she tried to recharacterize the Mexican coordinator's role as more akin to a consultant than a partner. Ultimately, she advocated the abandonment of the bilingual curriculum component. Each of these steps reasserted her authority. Although rejecting the inputs of the attorney and the Mexican partners, none of these actions presumed authority beyond that which had been traditionally associated with her position. As I finished my research, the partnership faced a crucial challenge of trying to win back the favor of the curriculum coordinator. Doing so would be difficult and would require attention to her professional status and to her theories regarding her role and the larger interests of CPS.

Yet reviewing the political maneuverings of partnership leaders hardly finishes this story. It was still the case that the diagnosis of the attorney was accurate regarding the need to reform practice and policy in CPS, if Latino newcomers were to be sufficiently accommodated. Dentler and Hafner (1997) found that site-level autonomy, practitioner accountability, and expert professional support seemed important for districts struggling with the arrival of large numbers of immigrant students. However personally sensible, the machinations that restricted
communication between Mexican partners and school site personnel, that tied up large quantities of instructional time delivering a scripted (and monolingual) curriculum, and that resisted reallocation of resources (i.e., moving existing funds and changing existing structures rather than just adding on programs with new external resources) all kept CPS from adopting the practices noted by Dentler and Hafner.

The machinations also restricted the input of the local Latino community and left intact local Latinos' status as "objects of policy" rather than contributors to it. This was accomplished through the obvious mechanism of challenging the input of the Mexican university and the less obvious mechanism of reasserting the traditional arrangements regarding which community members should have input on educational and community policymaking decisions. Traditionally there were no local Latinos, so traditional local decision making did not incorporate them.

The Mexican partners' efforts did challenge the local Latinos' status as only objects of policy. They engaged in a substantive community case study and generated several reports with pointed suggestions about how CPS and the larger Conasauga community could be more responsive to the newcomers. CPS leaders' failure to engage with those reports (by circulating them to site-based educators, for example) limited their consequence. Similarly, restricting the direct contact between the Mexican partners and CPS educators restricted the exchange of the Mexican experts' expertise. CPS did not restrict contact between local educators and the visiting instructors, but the visiting instructors' local status as paraprofessionals (which reflected Georgia educational law rather than local maneuvering) and the failure to exploit the instructors' expertise (by asking them to spend much of their time teaching a fully scripted curriculum in marginal spaces) diminished their input on CPS Latino education policy.

Thus it seems accurate to say that, at least during the duration of my study, attempts to be more responsive to local Latinos still largely excluded local Latinos from shaping what that response would look like. Maneuvers of informed proxies (i.e., those from the Mexican university) and vigorous advocates (e.g., the attorney) were parried, reducing the indirect voice of local Latinos, as well as the contribution of external experts. To say, however, that Latino education in Conasauga was inappropriate or unimproved seems like a question of perspective. The local capacity to teach newcomers English clearly improved. If, as Wong Fillmore and Meyer (1992) asked, the task of schooling is an assimilative one, then the CPS schools improved. If, however, the goal of schooling should be democratic self-determination, with greater student, parent, and teacher input, and with the promotion of multiple and diverse views, then the picture is more mixed. Often one step forward seems to have been countered with a forced step back. The extant Latino educational policy in CPS seems to have been the product of a host community orientation for assimilation mixed with accommodation
of Latinos when forced to by agents outside of CPS, like the attorney and the Mexican university, or when educators at levels below the district leadership who had attended Summer Institutes or who had gained professional respect for the visiting instructors appropriated the official policies. The accommodations to difference that did happen seemed often to be begrudging compromises rather than part of an inclusive, multicultural vision. As Shore and Wright note (1997, 7), "Not only do policies codify social norms and values, and articulate fundamental organizing principles of society, they also contain implicit (and sometimes explicit) models of society." The norms in Conasauga were a traditional hierarchical organization for the school district and a skepticism of multiculturalism framed in the not-as-welcoming-as-it-first-appears "proimmigration" script (Suárez-Orozco, 1998; Hamann, 1999b).

NOTES

1. Concerned perhaps that in writing a critical educational ethnography I risk angering the administrators who permit access to school district research (Levinson and Holland, 1996, 19), readers might wonder about the ethical standards that I am following. Readers might also worry that I am betraying confidences gained through my grant writer role. These concerns are fair, but I justify this writing in several ways. First, from the moment I initially came to Conasauga as a grant writer I was explicit about my research intentions, and informants spoke with me knowing I was documenting what they were saying and doing. Second, like Deyhle (Deyhle, Hess, and LeCompte, 1992), who felt that successful grant writing for Anglo education administrators on a Navajo reservation gave her license to scrutinize and critique the implementation of the program she helped fund, I too feel a right and responsibility to see how my work has been followed up. Like her, I agreed to be a grant writer because I believed I could help bring needed resources that would benefit newcomers who otherwise would continue to confront problematic educational circumstances. Third, though I never made or implied any promises of anonymity (except in specific instances when I was asked to keep, for example, a specific comment "off the record"), I have consciously used pseudonyms here because I think the specific identities of place and people matter less than the larger lessons that can be derived from this case study. Although I believe that public figures are fair foci of public scrutiny, in this instance I feel that "naming names" is gratuitous and would offer little assistance to readers' comprehension of my thesis. Fourth, though I have not shared this particular manuscript with all the individuals who centrally figure in this account, I have shared with all of them copies of my dissertation from which this is derived. In what amounts to a verification of the interpretive validity of this qualitative research (Maxwell, 1992), informants in Conasauga and at the Mexican university have told me that they found my dissertation fair, insightful, and on target. Finally, I do not believe that anyone described here acted with deliberate malice and I have similarly sought to avoid any malice in my account.

2. The use of the term Hispanic reflects both local practice by Anglos and many Latinos in Conasauga. The terms Latino and Mexican are also used locally, but somewhat less frequently. I use the term when reflecting local usage and/or, as here, trying to portray an emic perspective.
3. All these statistics come from Conasauga Public Schools (CPS) records.

4. For a good discussion of employment changes in Georgia's poultry industry and their social contexts and consequences, see Griffith (1995). For general discussions of how Hispanic immigrants are transforming many rural towns and small cities, see Stull, Broadway, and Griffith (1995) and the introductions and sections on the Changing Relations Project in Garden City, Kansas, in Lamphere (1992) and Lamphere, Stepick, and Grenier (1994). Massey, Alarcon, Durand, and Gonzalez (1987) and Tienda (1989) describe how migration streams mature. Put briefly, the longer a community hosts immigrant newcomer workers, the more likely some workers will establish roots in their new community and be able to support the reunification of their families. Economic factors become less important over time for the sustenance of migration streams, and single workers or workers apart from their families make up a declining portion of the newcomer population. This means, among other things, that the indirect costs of corporations employing newcomer workers grow over time as, for example, the number of immigrant children in the schools increases.

5. Although the attorney's initial construction of the challenge faced by the schools was simplistic—identifying the challenge faced by newcomer families as strictly linguistic—it was accurate as far as it went. At the time that the attorney visited the school where his daughter worked, two-thirds of its enrollment was Hispanic, 41% of the Hispanic students there had been born outside of the United States, and nearly all lived in Spanish-speaking households with parents who had been born in Latin America. Across the district, the majority of Hispanic students in CPS were foreign-born—59 percent in 1996–1997 (Conasauga Public Schools, 1997; Hamann, 1999a). Moreover, almost half were identified as limited English proficient, and nearly all came from Spanish-speaking households (Conasauga Public Schools, 1997).

6. In Conasauga the superintendent is appointed by the School Board.

7. That sheet described a mix of quite specific English language—phonetics instruction strategies with very vague notions of including Spanish across the curriculum.

8. In the Mexican city where the partnering university is located, bilingual education (with rare exception) means dual instruction in Spanish and English. Although at the university level in Mexico the association of English with the imperiousness of the United States sometimes means that English is viewed ambivalently (Francis and Ryan, 1998), both languages are taught because both are deemed useful. This contrasts much bilingual education in the United States, where cultivation of the first language is often supported only as a bridging step for the process of teaching English (i.e., transitional bilingual education). Foreign language instruction in U.S. schools is not usually thought of as bilingual education. See Rippberger (1993) for more about the different assumptions about bilingual education in the United States and Mexico.

9. One of the original 14 visiting instructors did not return to Conasauga after going home to Mexico for Christmas 1997. Because of the way catchment zones were divided in Conasauga, the two elementary schools that dropped their visiting instructor support each had about 12 percent Latino enrollment, whereas the Latino enrollment at the elementary schools on the poorer side of town averaged about 70 percent.

10. She apparently was unaware that Cummins (1996, 201–203) opposed the use of Direct Instruction with LEP (limited English proficient) students because empirical data showed that the method helped such students only minimally with sustained academic gains and that it was significantly less effective than a properly implemented bilingual program. See Adams and Engelmann (1997) for a description of the Direct Instruction program.
model and Heshusius (1991) and Allington and Woodside-Jiron (1999) for a useful critique of it.

11. During the 1990s, largely because of the influx of Latino students, the CPS student population grew by 25 percent, making most school buildings overcrowded and necessitating the use within them of some marginal spaces. Perhaps because they arrived after the start of the school year, the Mexican instructors were disproportionately overrepresented as users of such spaces, though Grey (1991) notes that frequently language minority students and their educators are forced to work in the most marginal spaces. Wortham (this volume) describes a similar pattern.

REFERENCES


