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TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
# TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Section I. GENERAL

1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual sets forth doctrine and establishes procedures for the management, planning, collection, production, reporting, and dissemination of Army technical intelligence. The manual is applicable to both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare. It covers procedures and establishes broad principles regarding the role of military intelligence personnel and units in technical intelligence, and provides guidance for commanders, staffs, and combat support personnel in technical intelligence matters.

b. Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Whenever possible, comments should be prepared on DA Form 1598 and forwarded direct to the Commanding Officer, US Army Combat Developments Command Intelligence Agency, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219.

2. Definitions

a. For definition of terms used see AR 320–5.

b. The relationship of intelligence and technical intelligence is set forth below.

(1) Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all information concerning one or more aspects of foreign countries or areas which are immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of military plans, policies, and operations. Intelligence consists of evaluated information and conclusions which the tactical commander, staff officers, and strategic planners require on a continual basis to determine enemy probable courses of action. Intelligence production is a completely integrated effort and no one phase of intelligence must ever be considered to be the sole intelligence system. Each aspect and level of military intelligence, to include technical intelligence, plays a vital role in the final tactical, theater, and strategic intelligence picture and therefore must be considered as part of an overall integrated intelligence effort. All tactical commanders and staff officers employ intelligence in planning and maintaining the security of commands.

(2) Technical intelligence is defined as intelligence concerning foreign technological developments, performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel, which now or may eventually have a practical application for military purposes. It is the end product resulting from the processing and collation of technical information. However, the scope of technical intelligence is broad; and it includes all technical aspects of foreign equipment, supplies, installations, facilities, communications, captured and abandoned items, conventional or special, which now have or may have a practical application in furthering military operations. The scope also includes, particularly during internal defense
operations, captured friendly and allied equipment and materiel which may have been used against US forces. Technical intelligence contributes primarily to the extension of the combat intelligence effort.

c. Other terms used in this manual are—

(1) Scientific and technical intelligence—includes that foreign intelligence relating to basic and applied research in natural and applied sciences and engineering; scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of foreign weapons, weapon systems, and other materiel; production methods employed in their manufacture, and related technology pertaining to materiel supply, operation, and maintenance.

(2) Factory marking—the numbers, letters, symbols placed on manufactured products (or in accompanying documents) during manufacture or inspection for purposes of identification and control.

(3) Significant equipment—captured enemy equipment likely to produce more technical intelligence of value than others.

Section II. MISSIONS AND OBJECTIVES

3. General
The United States must maintain a superior position to all enemies and potential enemies in any given area of technology and be alert to the current and future technological developments of all nations. The contributions of U.S. science and technology have already provided a technological superiority and an extensive research and development effort has been created in order to maintain this superiority in the future.

4. General Mission of Technical Intelligence Units

a. The mission of Army technical intelligence units is to provide assistance to tactical commanders in the selective examination, evaluation, and classification of technical information derived from technical examination of foreign equipment and materiel.

b. Technical intelligence units/personnel at all levels perform a twofold function—

(1) They assist the tactical commander and staff in meeting tactical planning needs in technical areas.

(2) They assist the strategic scientific/technical intelligence effort by supporting theater, DA and DOD agencies in the overall integrated technical intelligence collection and analysis effort.

5. Major Objectives
The major objectives of technical intelligence are to—

a. Determine enemy technical materiel threats as they affect strategic and tactical planners and commanders.

b. Determine foreign technological capabilities and limitations.

c. Provide information from which military countermeasures are developed.

d. Permit use of foreign materiel and facilities by US forces.

e. Exploit new developments for US military needs.

f. Fulfill national and/or military technical “items-wanted list.”

g. Provide input on a continuous basis to the overall national integrated technical and scientific intelligence program in consonance with theater policies.

h. Provide tactical and strategic studies on characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of foreign facilities, equipment, installations, materiel, and resources.

6. General Concepts

a. In order to fulfill the above missions, U.S. Army technical intelligence units are provided primarily to support the field army commander's tactical technical intelligence requirements.

b. In fulfilling the above missions, military technical intelligence units provide on-the-spot field analysis, detailed analysis, and limited
operational data from field testing. Detailed analysis and evaluation is performed by the technical intelligence company of the field army and/or higher echelons. Final and detailed technical analysis beyond field army and/or theater resources is performed in the appropriate CONUS-producing unit.

c. Technical intelligence requires prompt exploitation at the tactical echelon to be of maximum benefit to tactical commanders. Therefore, technical intelligence elements at all echelons operate as functionally integrated teams to insure maximum coordination, collation, and exploitation of foreign arms, equipment, and materiel.

d. Prompt exploitation provides usable tactical intelligence, assists in the production of strategic technical intelligence, facilitates military training, and assists the overall national research and development effort.

7. Expanded Mission

a. At times, the U.S. Army technical intelligence effort supports related scientific and technical intelligence production of the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and joint/national intelligence requirements of Department of Defense research agencies in consonance with theater approved technical intelligence programs.

b. In unified or specified commands, the factors of distance and processing time from the zone of interior may make it desirable for the commander's intelligence organizations to perform certain functions normally associated with CONUS units. In such cases the unified or specified commander advises the higher echelon concerned of the functions being performed. He also insures that his action does not interrupt the flow of information to the higher echelon. Included among these functions may be—

1. Publication of technical intelligence bulletins.

2. Publication of intelligence of a general orientation nature.

3. Preparation and dissemination of other intelligence studies and documents which would lose utility if delayed by preparation in the zone of interior.
CHAPTER 2
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY

Section I. MISSION AND CAPABILITIES

8. General

The technical intelligence company provides for the selective examination, evaluation, and classification of technical information and the dissemination of intelligence derived therefrom, through the technical examination of enemy materiel.

9. Mission

a. The technical intelligence company is organized under TOE 30–34 (fig. 1) and provides for the functionalized execution of the technical intelligence within the field army. This grouping, in one company, of various technical skills provides a capability for a coordinated technical intelligence effort; provides an interchange of skills, knowledge and experience, and a consolidation of specialized technical skills necessary to provide a widely varied functional technical intelligence support to the field army. Normally, the unit is located in the Field Army Support Command (FASCOM) area and operates under the direct control of the Military Intelligence Battalion TOE 30–25 (fig 2). This unit is completely airtransportable; however, it is only fifty percent ground mobile.

b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, (ACofS, G2) Field Army, is responsible for the direction and staff supervision of the entire technical intelligence effort for the field army commander. Therefore, close coordination and liaison with the technical intelligence company and the G2 staff (e.g., Order of Battle and Strategic Intelligence) through the military intelligence battalion are necessary to insure smooth integration of the overall technical intelligence effort.

c. The technical intelligence company is capable of providing necessary technical intelligence support to corps and divisions assigned to the field army. In addition, it is a flexible organization readily adaptable to the integration of technical intelligence activities of other services and can be integrated into a joint or unified command intelligence effort in all types of warfare.

d. The technical intelligence company is organic to the military intelligence battalion, field army. Cellular functional technical intelligence teams from TOE 30–600 can provide augmentation to the unit as required. Also, the unit is compatible with the support systems employed within a theater of operations and the commodity-oriented CONUS base.

10. Capabilities

a. At full strength, the technical intelligence company has the capabilities to—

(1) Examine, evaluate, and classify captured enemy materiel.

(2) Prepare and disseminate technical intelligence reports, summaries, and analyses.

(3) Prepare and maintain technical intelligence files and records.

(4) Prepare and assist in the preparation of captured enemy materiel for evacuation to CONUS bases as required.

(5) Participate in the interrogation of prisoners of war and to process the information derived therefrom.

(6) Operate as a control center for a coordinated technical intelligence program within the field army.

b. The unit is dependent upon theater resources for chemical and medical laboratory support.
Figure 1. TOE 30-31, Technical Intelligence Company.
Figure 2. TOE 30-25, Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army.
c. At reduced strength, the unit is adaptable to lesser capabilities during prolonged combat periods for a limited period of time. In addition, the unit is capable of supporting an independent corps for a limited period of time.

Section II. FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION

11. Functions

This company performs all technical intelligence functions utilizing combat service support personnel operating as functional elements. For example, the company—

a. Assists in the technical intelligence planning being conducted concurrently by the military intelligence battalion headquarters and the field army G2 staff.

b. Coordinates directives for the collection of technical intelligence source materiel. This materiel normally will be evacuated through the tactical unit support channels to the technical intelligence company, field army.

c. Provides centralized control of all technical intelligence activities in the field army area. (Engineer topographic, terrain intelligence, and signal communications intelligence are not included within the scope of technical intelligence.)

d. Is organized to function as the command and control center for the receipt, evaluation, reporting, and shipment of all technical intelligence materiel received in the field army.

12. Unit Operations

a. Company Headquarters. Personnel and equipment are provided in the company headquarters for the supervision, coordination, and control of the activities of organic platoons. Also, unit supply, mess, maintenance, communication, and general administration are provided.

b. Support Platoon. This platoon provides technical support to the evaluation and analysis sections of the company such as drafting; illustrating; packing, crating, and shipping material; translating; and photographic services. This allows full utilization of critical skills within the various sections and improves support to all elements of the program. The functions of elements of the support platoon are as follows:

(1) Platoon headquarters. The headquarters is responsible for supervising and directing the activities of the platoon and providing drafting and illustrating support to the unit.

(2) Photography section. This section provides both still and motion picture photographic services for the company. Developing, printing, enlarging, and other processing support is required from the Army Signal Battalion (TOE 11–95), although frequently the military intelligence battalion can directly provide limited support.

(3) Receiving and shipping section. This section receives and unpacks equipment and materiel. It also packs and crates small items of materiel for evacuation as required. The section has within it the necessary expertise in the handling of explosive, chemical, biological, and radiological materiel.

(4) Translating section. This section translates foreign language documents concerning foreign technical intelligence materiel into English or other languages as required. It also translates identification plates, nomenclature markings, and instructions accompanying foreign materiel.

c. Evaluation and Analysis Platoon.

(1) This platoon performs the detailed analysis of documents and materiel for information pertinent to technical intelligence. It evaluates this information in conjunction with reports and information from other intelligence sources, and prepares reports for distribution as prescribed.

(2) Each of the sections in this platoon has certain common functions and
responsibilities. In the production of technical intelligence, each section, under the supervision of the platoon leader—

(a) Assists in planning the collection effort.

(b) Provides guidance to the corps collection teams in the collection of technical information and materiel.

(c) Evaluates and processes the collected materiel for technical intelligence information.

(d) Disseminates the resulting technical intelligence.

(e) Assists in interrogation of prisoners of war, refugees, evacuees, displaced persons, and escapees for information of interest to technical intelligence.

(3) The functions of elements of the evaluation and analysis platoon are as follows:

(a) Platoon headquarters. This headquarters is responsible for initial analysis of materiel, coordination of evaluation between the various sections of the platoon, and participation in the preparation, development, and dissemination of reports through prescribed command and intelligence channels. The platoon headquarters provides the control, assignment for evaluation, and recording of disposition of technical intelligence items. When an item of materiel is received, the platoon headquarters assigns the item to the section which has primary interest, and informs other sections having secondary interest.

(b) Communications-electronics section. This section performs technical intelligence analysis and evaluation of fixed plant communications, signal equipment, and signal information. It supervises storage, issue, and processing of collected foreign communications materiel. It analyzes electronic warfare, automatic data processing, combat surveillance, radar, radic, and meteorological materiel.

(c) Weapons and munitions section. This section performs the technical intelligence evaluation and analysis of free rockets, guided missiles, and associated equipment including internal guidance and launching equipment; weapons and combat vehicles to include tanks, towed and self-propelled guns, howitzers and armored personnel carriers; nuclear and nonnuclear ammunition; rocket and missile warhead sections (nuclear and nonnuclear); chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, munitions and ammunitions, and propellants; explosives and pyrotechnics; meteorological and propellant-activated devices; and mines.

(d) General supply and equipment section. This section performs technical intelligence analysis and evaluation of general supplies; petroleum; clothing and textiles; subsistence; chemical, biological, and radiological equipment; and photographic equipment.

(e) Mobility section. This section performs technical intelligence analysis and evaluation of aeronautical, aerial delivery, surface transportation (marine and land), power generation, construction, barrier, and bridging equipment; general purpose vehicles such as amphibian vehicles to include cargo and utility vehicles and self-propelled, tracked, and bridging vehicles; and general support equipment and supplies.

(f) Medical section. This section analyzes and evaluates foreign health problems and the organization, training, techniques, facilities, and materiel used by foreign medical services. In conjunction with chemical personnel in the weapons and munitions section and the miscellaneous supply and equipment section, it assists in evaluating CBR
weapons effects information and advises on how they may affect operations. It also arranges for evacuation of captured foreign medical materiel for further analysis or exploitation. (See paragraphs 24–27 for the scope of medical technical intelligence.)
CHAPTER 3
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONALIZATION

Section I. GENERAL

13. Overall Concept
   a. The technical intelligence company contains quartermaster, signal, transportation, chemical, medical, engineer, and ordnance combat service support personnel. These specialists provide the overall technical intelligence analysis and evaluation capabilities of the unit through their extensive training, background, and experience. When employed as functional teams, technical analysis and evaluation is accomplished more effectively. This chapter discusses the functionalization concept as it applies to technical intelligence, covers the scope of the broad areas of technical intelligence, and discusses additional capabilities.

   b. The proper organization and employment of the combat service support specialists is critical to mission accomplishment. The company must operate within clearly defined objectives, goals, and priorities prescribed by the field army commander. Personnel must not be given analysis tasks which can be more efficiently performed by other field army or theater assets.

c. Each functionally organized technical intelligence team must be tailored to perform its required mission. Teams must be flexible in their operations since personnel of the unit will be required to perform extensive coordination and liaison internally for mission success. Teams should be "tailored" to perform a specific technical intelligence function with consideration given to the training and capabilities of the combat service support specialists. Sections must assist other sections in keeping abreast of trends and developments which have an impact on mutually related areas of interest.

d. The functionalyzed areas of interest of technical specialists will frequently overlap. For example, transportation, engineer, communication-electronics, and ordnance specialists may need to work together when a new tank is being analyzed. Also, medical and chemical specialists may overlap in CBR analysis missions. When possible, functional teams should be composed of personnel having related functional qualifications. They can be "tailored" to form a working team in order to perform a specific technical examination and/or analysis mission.

Section II. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE

14. Scope
   a. The scope and/or primary objectives of communication-electronics equipment are to--

      (1) Provide communication-electronics equipment intelligence concerning the capabilities and limitations of foreign communication systems, both civilian and military.

      (2) Provide the field army with intelligence on captured communications equipment and systems.

      (3) Provide data for possible application in developing new US electronic equipment and devices.

      (4) Provide communications-electronic equipment intelligence for strategic and tactical planning.

      (5) Assist in providing tactical and strategic estimates on enemy communication capabilities.
b. In meeting the above objectives, there is a continuous need to examine, analyze, and test communications-electronic equipment and devices and to analyze enemy communication diagrams and schematics. Recent communication trends and developments necessitate that the scope of communications-electronic equipment intelligence be broadened to include wire, radio, television, satellites, telemetering devices, electronic instruments, photography, computers, radar, facsimile, crypto, and laser communication equipment or devices.

c. Communications-electronics specialists must maintain extensive liaison with other intelligence elements to include the U.S. Army Security Agency. They evaluate and interpret information concerning enemy electronic-communications research and must keep abreast of civilian and industrial communication developments. In addition, they must exploit any technical data derived from other intelligence activities such as the U.S. Army Security Agency. Therefore, the technical library must have communications and electronics information concerning details and performance data on a wide variety of items.

b. Specifically, communications-electronics specialists can perform the following:

(1) Exploit intelligence from captured communication materiel.
(2) Assist in the exploitation of foreign scientific communications-electronics information.
(3) Prepare enemy communications-electronics intelligence studies.
(4) Evaluate enemy communications-electronics equipment information as received on a day-to-day basis.
(5) Supervise the collection and evacuation of enemy communications-electronics equipment.
(6) Provide limited assistance as may be required to other intelligence activities such as U.S. Army Security Agency and strategic intelligence elements.
(7) Maintain, evaluate, and interpret information concerning military and civilian research and development.
(8) Assist in the exploitation of foreign communication complexes and facilities by United States forces.

e. Communications-electronics personnel may need to accompany combat elements whose missions include the capture of special communication bases or targets for prompt analysis and exploitation. They assist in photographing significant items of captured materiel; however, the section is dependent on signal units for photographic processing support.

f. Other general areas of interest to communications-electronics equipment intelligence are—

(1) Acoustic equipment.
(2) Missile guidance devices.
(3) Power equipment.
(4) Meteorological equipment.
(5) Electronic countermeasures equipment.
(6) Guided missile control systems.

g. Data in the following areas are of primary interest to communications-electronics equipment intelligence production:

(1) Output power.
(2) Frequency range.
(3) Bandwidth.
(4) Modes of operation.
(5) Circuitry design.
(6) Antenna design.
(7) Anti-jamming features.
(8) Tube structure.
(9) Transistors.
(10) Equipment ruggedness.
(11) Major modifications.

15. Additional Capabilities

Signal personnel, in addition to their normal technical intelligence functions can—

a. Provide recommendations on the disposition of fixed and special communication installations and/or equipment.

b. Provide limited analyses concerning radiac equipment and meters as well as electronic, chemical and/or biological warning devices, and instruments.
Section III. WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS INTELLIGENCE

16. Scope

a. Ballistics deals with the motion of projectiles and the forces governing that motion. In practice, this subject is of interest to the weapons and munitions analyst in analysis of small-arms ammunitions, artillery shells, bombs, missiles, and projectiles. Of particular importance to the tactical commander are their penetrating and fragmentation effects. The following items of intelligence interest can be analyzed by the weapons/munitions analysts:

1. Type of driving/rotating band (type of metal encircling projectile at the base).
2. Direction of weapon rifling.
3. Combustion rate of the powder or propellant.
5. Layering structure of grains in charge.
7. Size and shape of projectile.
8. Firing tables (if present).
10. The use made of substitute materials.

b. The weapons and munitions technical analysts contribute to the knowledge of interior and exterior ballistics through their use of continually revised handbooks, their knowledge of equations and formulas, energy motion and burning rules, and firing tables. The integration of this data establishes the relations between powder pressure, projectile travel, and velocity. All of these factors can contribute to meeting the overall needs of the tactical commander; namely, analysis of enemy technical capabilities and how the tactical commander can best counter the enemy threat.

c. Trajectories can be computed from a particular muzzle velocity, angle of departure, and ballistic coefficient using standard temperature, density, and no wind. Any variations from these conditions would be nonstandard. In ground fire, one of the most important elements is the determination of variations in range and displacement of the point of fall from all possible causes. Changes in muzzle velocity, angle of departure, and powder granules will cause such variations. Firing tables can assist in producing a wide variety of technical intelligence. Such tables are valuable since they include range elevations or tables for a particular gun. Also, they provide a series of tables of differential effects each of which gives the effect on range of some particular departure from standard conditions. Therefore, firing tables, when available, should always accompany the weapon to which applicable and be handled in accordance with normal technical intelligence evacuation procedures.

17. Functions

Weapons and munitions specialists contribute to the following:

a. Locating, identifying, examining, and submitting reports on tactical capabilities of foreign materiel and equipment.

b. Providing technical guidance to corps technical collection teams.

c. Evaluating technical information that flows in from the corps collection teams.

d. Assisting in the breakdown and assembly of equipment.

e. Assisting in testing of vehicles, equipment, and accessories.

f. Inspecting vehicles to determine major modifications and changes.

g. Assisting in analysis of parts, assemblies, engines, power trains, and chassis for collation, updating, or incorporation of data for technical intelligence manuals or handbooks.

h. Performing analysis on missiles and associated equipment.

i. Assisting in the production of technical intelligence from factory markings.

18. Additional Capabilities

The weapons and munitions section includes chemical equipment analyst for the identification and evaluation of flamethrowers, smoke generators, and other chemical weapons and munitions.
Section IV. GENERAL SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE

19. Scope

a. Supply and equipment technical intelligence personnel play a primary role in supply and maintenance technical intelligence and contribute to the tactical mission through analysis and evaluation of enemy supplies and/or resources. Specific areas of interest are subsistence, individual equipment, clothing, general supplies, petroleum, maintenance, and such services such as graves registration, laundry, and bath.

b. In the preparation of a technical intelligence analysis of enemy combat service support, supply and equipment technical specialists must take into account enemy economic factors (e.g., food, agriculture, and industrial production), the enemy labor force, and enemy technological capabilities. In this regard, close coordination with strategic intelligence elements at field army level is imperative.

c. Exploitation of enemy materiel begins as soon as its existence is discovered in order to determine the immediate tactical usefulness and significance of the materiel. Exploitation of materiel in the field is performed to the extent that field conditions and facilities permit. Exploitation in the field does not replace the need for exploitation in CONUS. Materiel that cannot be used or exploited in the field or theater of operations must be evacuated to the United States for complete detailed analysis and exploitation.

20. Functions

a. An increase, decrease, or other change in the enemy’s supplies gives an indication of change in enemy combat service support capabilities. The examination of captured items must, of necessity, involve a continuous study of the items themselves in conjunction with the applied sciences which made the development of these items possible. All analyses need to be evaluated in terms of the social and cultural environment of the enemy.

b. In assembling supply and equipment intelligence information, supply and maintenance specialists analyze and evaluate foreign activities to include the following:

(1) Determining the design, performance, source and methods of manufacture, and methods of storing items.

(2) Examining supply and maintenance organizations, installations, and storage depots.

(3) Determining characteristics, limitations, vulnerabilities, and military potential of military and civilian facilities.

(4) Processing and abstracting information from foreign commodities and equipment acquired in a field army area of responsibility.

(5) Preparing technical intelligence reports and studies concerning such items as petroleum, food, clothing, and equipment.

(6) Assisting in the training of field army personnel in supply and equipment intelligence.

(7) Producing and maintaining information and intelligence concerning foreign materiel and commodities.

(8) Assisting in the analyses of enemy storage, packing, and preparation of food and equipment.

21. Additional Capabilities

a. In conjunction with other technical intelligence specialists, supply and equipment specialists provide a capability to the field army for supervising battlefield collection of a wide variety of items. For example, through the use of mobile laboratories available at theater level, the analysis, evaluation, and identification of captured foreign petroleum products and facilities for U.S. tactical uses are facilitated.

b. Other areas of technical intelligence to which supply and maintenance specialists can contribute through analysis are—

(1) Troop subsistence supplies.

(2) Commodity items.

(3) Food spoilage and contamination.

(4) Packaging and marking.

(5) Acquisition of data concerning draft animals and protective clothing.
c. Supply and maintenance technical intelligence personnel can perform the following for order of battle intelligence:

(1) Identifications based upon enemy uniforms, insignia, and decorations.

(2) Maintain supply and equipment intelligence files as they pertain to logistics.

d. The section also includes highly trained chemical personnel for the operation of the CBR agent sampling and analyzing kit. The operation of this kit is under the supervision of a chemical officer who is an organic chemist. Chemical personnel assigned to the general supply and equipment section evaluate chemical defense equipment, including individual and collective protection equipment, and decontamination equipment and supplies.

Section V. MOBILITY INTELLIGENCE

22. Scope

a. The scope of mobility intelligence is comprehensive. It covers most aspects of engineer and transportation activity at all echelons of the enemy's military organization. Engineer and transportation support is of a greater variety today and has become increasingly more important in all types of military operations. Also, there has been an increasing use of all types of engineer and transportation equipment by supply and transport agencies of all armies.

b. The mobility technical intelligence specialists will usually be involved in both strategic and tactical technical intelligence. The field army technical intelligence company will have to meet the needs of the theater and lower levels. Frequently, the same items of mobility intelligence may be needed by numerous levels within the field army and the theater. For example, the condition and capacity of highway and railroad facilities in a contiguous geographical area may influence the decision to launch a certain military operation. Therefore, mobility intelligence will play an important part in the overall strategic and tactical planning for field army and theater forces.

c. Mobility specialists can contribute to CBR intelligence in a variety of ways. Because of their training, the engineers can assist in studies to evaluate the destructive effects of nuclear weapons on the terrain, aboveground and underground structures, installations, equipment, and stored supplies. Mobility specialists contribute intelligence reports and studies on such items as soils, structures, facilities, and man-made objects such as roads, railroads, bridges, airfields, ports, utilities, urban areas, and military installations.

23. Functions

a. Engineer mobility specialists contribute to limited analyses and evaluation of technical intelligence concerning the following:

(1) Foreign engineer equipment to include its capabilities.

(2) Enemy construction operations, techniques, and resources.

(3) Lines of communication (roads, bridges, waterways, etc.).

(4) Public utilities.

(5) Materiel quality and shortages.

(6) Enemy depots, dumps, and supply points.

(7) Defenses and fortifications.

(8) Town plan analysis and urban area studies.

(9) Water-crossing equipment and techniques.

(10) Maintenance of a bibliography of foreign military and civilian engineer specialists and engineer order of battle.

(11) Airborne drop zones.

(12) Underground facilities and tunnels.

b. Transportation mobility specialists in the mobility section can contribute primarily to the production of mobility intelligence concerning all foreign air, land, and water transportation systems of immediate or potential military importance. This intelligence concerns characteristics, conditions, development, organization, materiel, operation, maintenance, construction, performance, capabilities, and limiting factors of enemy and/or selected foreign transportation systems and facilities (e.g., highways, railways, waterways, ports, harbors, industrial, and scientific installations and transportation
supplies). Mobility intelligence is necessary for contingency planning and emergency operations. Therefore, transportation specialists will need to produce intelligence on adjacent friendly countries for use by technical and strategic planners and combat service support elements. Frequently, the United States may use another nation's transportation system.

c. Mobility specialists can contribute to the following:
   (1) Integration and coordination of the transportation collection effort.
   (2) Evaluation, interpretation, processing, and dissemination of transportation information and data.
   (3) Assistance in the preparation of transportation estimates.

24. Scope of Medical Intelligence

a. Medical intelligence is a functional entity and should not be fragmented. Medical technical intelligence is not primarily materiel oriented. Examination, evaluation, and classification of medical materiel are only segments of the total medical technical intelligence effort. If possible, medical intelligence must retain integrity so that the end product will include all available information affecting the health and welfare of men and animals in actual or possible areas of military operation which is immediately or potentially significant. Such information is vital in both strategic and tactical planning and may influence military operations.

b. The field army surgeon can assist in providing requirements for medical information/intelligence to the command G2. The intelligence produced should be coordinated and evaluated by the field army surgeon and staff prior to dissemination.

c. The theater command can provide valuable assistance and guidance to the field army medical technical intelligence effort. The theater surgeon can coordinate the employment of medical units in support of medical intelligence activities and arrange for support of field army medical intelligence activities by theater level units as appropriate. The theater surgeon and staff can assist the field army G2 in determining potential tactical and strategic applications of fully evaluated medical intelligence produced by field army technical intelligence elements.

25. Medical Intelligence Functions

The following specific technical intelligence functions are performed by medical specialists:

a. Collect, examine, classify, and evaluate raw information concerning non-US health problems, training, and materiel used by foreign medical services.

b. Provide medical intelligence information to the field army surgeon through G2 for professional evaluation prior to dissemination.

c. Assist in the interrogation of prisoners of war, refugees, defectors, and escapees to obtain medical information.

d. Assist in the investigation of medical aspects of incidents involving diseases or enemy CBR operations.

e. Accomplish initial examination and evacuation of captured foreign medical materiel to include escort of live cultures to CONUS.

f. Assist in the compilation of environmental data pertinent to health aspects of military operations.
g. Provide technical staff advice on medical intelligence to include the scope of medical subjects to be incorporated into medical unit training programs.

h. Provide limited analysis on drugs, serums, and antibiotics.

26. Sources

The principal sources of medical information of potential intelligence value include—

a. Direct observation of patients and medical service operations, both military and civilian.

b. Discussions with personnel involved directly or indirectly with medical service operations (enemy, allied, or civilian).

c. Study of military and civilian reports and publications of a medical or technical nature.

d. Prisoners of war, refugees, evacuees, displaced persons, and friendly escapees.

e. Examination of enemy medical materiel, facilities, and personnel protective devices.

f. Civil affairs public health teams who obtain information on the public health services and facilities in an area of operation.

27. Additional Capabilities

In addition to their normal technical responsibilities, medical technical intelligence personnel can perform the following:

a. Assist in the identification of CBR agents.

b. Assist in the evaluation of CBR weapons.

c. Provide information and data on medical aspects of enemy combat operations.

d. Assist as required in the preparation of medical studies and reports of tactical significance.

e. Collect data regarding enemy military and civilian medical facilities.

f. Provide advice on communicable diseases.

g. Provide limited analysis of drugs and serums.

28. Scope

For purposes of this manual, chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) technical intelligence includes the following tasks and functions:

a. The collection, examination, evaluation, identification, and dissemination of information on equipment, materiel, and documents pertaining to chemical, biological, and radiological operations under conditions of nuclear or nonnuclear warfare.

b. The collection of samples of chemical, biological, and radiological agents employed against friendly forces; the identification of chemical agents and/or transmittal of samples to a supporting general chemical laboratory for analysis; the transmittal of biological samples to a supporting medical laboratory for analysis; and the collection and forwarding of radiological samples to a supporting general chemical laboratory for determination of radio isotopic composition.

c. The determination and dissemination of information pertaining to enemy techniques and procedures of decontamination; individual and collective protection; CBR agent detection and identification procedures, fallout predictions and procedures for CBR attack warning; radiological monitoring and survey operations; impregnation and reimpregnation of clothing; field laboratory services; and assistance in determination of enemy organization and operational effectiveness in chemical, biological, and radiological operations under conditions of nuclear and nonnuclear warfare.

d. The collection and dissemination of information about foreign chemical and biological production and storage installations, facilities, capabilities, and stockpiles.

e. Assistance, within the technical intelligence company capabilities, in developing field countermeasures against chemical, biological, and radiological operations under conditions of nuclear and nonnuclear warfare. The use of
chemical and biological munitions introduces new factors into technical intelligence operations. In this area, the most critical function of the technical analyst lies in determining the effectiveness of such munitions, technical characteristics, detection, unique modifications, and the need to develop rapidly effective countermeasures. Close coordination with the theater general chemical laboratory, with army medical service laboratories, and with staff chemical officers is essential because of the constantly developing and changing state of the art.

29. Nature of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Technical Intelligence

a. Chemical, biological, and radiological technical intelligence is an integral part of the total military intelligence effort and is essential to military operations. The possibility or probability of use by the enemy of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, the enemy level of training, the effectiveness of enemy offensive and defensive equipment, the potential for waging CBR operations, and the capability to defend against these weapons are important considerations at every level of military planning. The impact that employment of CBR operations will have on friendly forces makes timely technical intelligence information essential. The initiation of CBR operations can change the entire course of a war. The CBR technical intelligence organizational requirements generally fall into two functional categories—

(1) An organization for the collection effort.

(2) An organization for the evaluation and analysis effort.

b. The collecting of CBR technical intelligence is, for the most part, dependent on the effectiveness of the overall intelligence collection plan using all available sources of information. On-the-spot preliminary evaluation and dissemination of significant information may be done in connection with the collection effort when the situation warrants, but final detailed analysis will not always be accomplished by technical intelligence collecting personnel. Prior to use of CBR weapons, enemy capabilities to employ these weapons must be considered as well as the magnitude and location of the probable employment and the enemy capability to defend against surprise employment of these weapons by friendly forces. Once these weapons have been employed, priority in the collection effort shifts to identification of agents employed; tactics, techniques, and procedures used; information on new weapons and agents; size and location of stockpiles; and targets for engagement.

30. Functions

Chemical personnel in technical intelligence units assist field army commanders in the following areas:

a. Examining captured CBR materiel.

b. Examining, evaluating, and identifying, when possible, equipment related to CBR operations.

c. Assisting personnel, as may be required, in the identification of biological agents.

d. Providing technical assistance to army and corps staff on CBR matters.

e. Maintaining liaison with chemical mobile laboratory teams.

f. Preparing intelligence reports and estimates.

g. Assisting, as required, in the location and evaluation of CBR targets.

31. Additional Capabilities

Chemical personnel have the following additional capabilities:

a. Assisting in laboratory analysis of POL products and, in conjunction with medical laboratory personnel, determining the effects of chemical and biological agents on POL products.

b. Collecting CBR samples following enemy attack for analysis and delivery to supporting laboratories for identification.
CHAPTER 4
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLANNING AND COLLECTION

Section I. PLANNING

32. General

a. Effective technical intelligence production requires broad planning in a variety of technical areas. Extensive planning outside the technical intelligence company will frequently be required to fulfill all production responsibilities especially in some highly technical areas such as electronics, missiles, and sensors (app II).

b. A continuous requirement exists for detailed technical intelligence planning in preparing estimates of enemy tactical capabilities that have been or will be fielded in the near future.

33. Command Responsibilities

a. The collection and production of technical information are a function of command. The complex nature and importance of technical intelligence requires that a commander use all the means available to insure its success. Tactical commanders and units are the key to successful execution of technical intelligence plans. Prior technical planning is required for combat missions; otherwise the technical intelligence production cycle may be disrupted.

b. Intelligence staffs at all echelons are responsible for detailed planning concerning the exploitation of captured enemy equipment, materiel, installations, facilities, and commodity items within their area of responsibility. They must insure that—

(1) Members of the command are properly trained in the recognition, proper handling, and reporting of captured enemy equipment, materiel, and documents.

(2) New or unusual equipment/materiel or equipment modifications remain in place, if possible, for exploitation by appropriate intelligence personnel.

(3) Proper safeguards are provided for captured equipment/materiel to prevent looting or retention as souvenir items.

(4) Appropriate reports on captured enemy equipment and materiel are furnished to higher headquarters.

(5) Technical intelligence collection personnel supervise and direct the evacuation of captured or abandoned enemy materiel from collection points throughout the field army area.

34. Operational Planning

The technical intelligence company is responsible for internal planning as it affects analysis, evaluation, integration, and production of technical intelligence necessary to satisfy overall field army needs.

35. Additional Planning Factors

a. It is imperative that technical intelligence management, planning, and production be standardized to minimize duplication of effort and dissipation of resources. For example, report standardization facilitates planning, production, assignment of responsibility for specific items, collation of resources, programming, meeting time schedules, and dissemination of the end product.

b. Effective technical intelligence planning is characterized by the following (app III):

(1) Mission analysis.

(2) Requirements and priorities are balanced with collection and production capabilities.
(3) Proper intelligence collection agencies are assigned.
(4) Proper functional teams are formed for maximum equipment and materiel exploitation.
(5) Vital support areas are considered, such as equipment tags, evacuation procedures, and establishment of specific collection points for foreign materiel.

c. Planning consideration must continually be given to the quality of technical intelligence production, its responsiveness to needs, and costs of the overall production effort. Technical intelligence is a time-consuming process which requires imagination and insight into its operation.

36. Requests for Technical Intelligence

a. Requests for tactical technical intelligence are submitted through intelligence channels and must be as specific as possible for planning purposes. Further, requests based on previous technical and/or combat intelligence reports should fully identify such reports. Requests must be carefully screened to prevent overstatement of requirements.

b. Requests for technical intelligence should follow theater policies and include, as a minimum, the following:
   (1) Requesting organization.
   (2) Specific requirement.
   (3) Scope of requirement.
   (4) Reason for requirement.
   (5) Pertinent data of assistance to technical intelligence personnel.
   (6) Date desired.
   (7) References (if applicable).

Section II. COLLECTION

37. General

a. In the direction of the overall intelligence collection effort, the technical intelligence company and corps field collection teams must continually coordinate their collection efforts with unit intelligence personnel at the small unit level through periodic visits, dissemination of guidance, and emphasis on the importance and timeliness of technical intelligence and captured equipment from all possible sources. Most materiel, equipment, and documents captured will be collected by frontline tactical units. Other items of equipment and materiel may be captured in raids, found abandoned in overrun areas, seized, requisitioned, purchased, or confiscated by civil affairs units. Only through a continual indoctrination effort at all echelons can maximum effectiveness of the technical collection effort be achieved.

b. There are many information collection and production elements that are capable of providing support to technical intelligence units in the discharge of their responsibilities. Some sources of assistance are—
   (1) Order of battle.
   (2) Strategic intelligence.
   (3) Special operations.
   (4) Counterintelligence.
   (5) G2 air.
   (6) Interrogation of prisoners of war.
   (7) Long range patrols.
   (8) Civil affairs units and teams.

38. The Collection Effort

a. The overall intelligence collection plan or schedule will select those intelligence collection assets which can best fulfill the collection needs of the technical intelligence company for the production of technical intelligence, (e.g., long range patrols and corps technical intelligence collection teams). The technical intelligence unit should make frequent recommendations for inclusion in the overall intelligence collection plan to insure that its specific equipment and materiel needs, including technical documents, manuals, and photographs, are met. Critical components of bulky equipment and materiel must be completely identified to aid the collector in his collection efforts. In addition, when component elements of a piece of equipment are required, identification must be
complete and specific to preclude collection of a complete item when only a portion is required. Also, provisions must be made to insure collection of items of opportunity.

b. Frequently, many priority collection requirements will revolve around the Items-Wanted List (IWL). This is an alphabetical listing containing information, artist sketches, and/or photographs of equipment and materiel which are required by higher echelons and agencies for intelligence purposes, testing, evaluation, planning, or study. The equipment contained in the listing must be evacuated immediately. Technical intelligence collection personnel at corps must be frequently briefed on this list, and tactical units must receive instructions on what to do should the items be acquired.

c. Technical intelligence collection requires a system of priorities since some types of information and/or equipment will always be more critical than others. The intelligence staff must use a collection schedule with established priorities prepared as far in advance as possible. If it is known, for example, that transportation equipment studies will be prepared each year, technical equipment and materiel needed for this requirement must be incorporated on a continuous basis into the overall collection plan. Collection requirements for technical information will need to be programmed in advance by the technical intelligence unit to insure inclusion of its own requirements as well as those of other headquarters.

d. The theater prepares technical intelligence directives and levies collection tasks, usually in accordance with DOD requirements, on appropriate technical intelligence and/or intelligence units to meet specific needs. The field army G2 staff element specifically controls technical intelligence by collating collection requirements with those tasks which have already been developed or which are in the process of being developed.

Section III. COLLECTION AGENCIES AND LIAISON

39. Agencies

A technical intelligence collection agency refers to a person, unit, organization, or instrumentality which collects or acquires technical data. This varies from routine troop collection to collection by research, observation, analysis and evaluation, or interrogation. Some intelligence collection agencies that contribute to the overall technical intelligence program are combat troops, military intelligence battalion collection elements, corps technical intelligence collection teams, and civil affairs units. Also, psychological operations units and special forces operational detachments can contribute to the collection as long as they are not detracted from their primary missions.

a. Combat Troops. Troops in combat are usually the first to encounter enemy materiel or new or modified foreign materiel, sometimes with documents intact. The intelligence officer at each appropriate level must insure that captured equipment and/or documents are recovered for technical intelligence exploitation. It is imperative that vital technical intelligence materiel and equipment and new discoveries be exempt from destruction. Every effort must be made to insure that enemy equipment, materiel, documents, and logistical complexes are promptly safeguarded and reported to an element of the technical intelligence company so that the maximum technical information can be obtained. These principles must be thoroughly considered and implemented in all operational plans and briefings at each level of command. They should be emphasized in unit training programs.

b. Intelligence Personnel. Personnel of intelligence sections and field army intelligence units will come in contact with numerous technical documents, data, information dealing with foreign materiel, and military and civilian personnel who are excellent sources of technical information. Therefore, frequent coordination and liaison between the technical intelligence company personnel and intelligence elements at all echelons is mandatory.

c. Corps Technical Intelligence Collection Teams. These teams are trained to collect and search for tactical information on foreign materiel, facilities, methods, techniques, and tech-
Technical activities. These units work with various corps elements and contact front-line tactical elements for collection of materiel. The teams are organic to the corps and assist primarily in carrying out the technical intelligence collection responsibility.

d. Civil Affairs Units. The civil affairs organization consists of staffs, units, and functional teams. Civil affairs units provide command support or area support to tactical or administrative units and are designed to support civil affairs operations at specific echelons of command or level of government. The size and capabilities of civil affairs units and cellular functional teams may vary; however, the personnel assigned to them are trained specialists who are technically qualified to provide assistance in various specialized functional areas which are considered to be in the normal range of technical intelligence units. These areas include—

(1) Food and agriculture.
(2) Public communications.
(3) Public health.
(4) Public transportation.
(5) Civilian supply.
(6) Public works and utilities.
(6) Commerce and industry.

e. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Units. These units perform psychological operations functions in support of theater and field army, corps, and division. Personnel of PSYOP units possess and can lend assistance in special skills, technical knowledge, and the use of such items as radio, loudspeaker, and printing equipment.

40. Collection Liaison

Frequent coordination and liaison are required between the technical intelligence company and field army intelligence elements at all subordinate tactical echelons. Army intelligence units can provide many items of captured enemy materiel. Frequent visits must be programmed by technical intelligence elements to key tactical units with actual or potential access to enemy or foreign materiel. In addition, liaison is required among key combat, combat support, and combat service support elements. Effective liaison aids in insuring that the following are accomplished for the collection effort:

a. Enemy equipment is promptly secured, safeguarded and evacuated.

b. Locally procured indigenous items are quickly identified together with their sources.

c. Coordination with allied collection agencies achieves maximum value and enemy equipment obtained by allied intelligence counterparts reaches US technical intelligence channels.

d. Technical intelligence personnel are kept current on technical trends and developments.

e. Intelligence collection plans are fulfilled and kept current.

f. Combat and combat support units are thoroughly indoctrinated on their technical intelligence roles.
CHAPTER 5
CAPTURED MATERIEL EVACUATION

Section I. GENERAL

41. Concept
   a. Captured materiel with explanatory technical documents is one of the most important sources of technical intelligence. Combined with technical interrogation reports and other intelligence data, this source can lead to valuable combat intelligence on enemy capabilities, limitations, and probable courses of action. Every effort must be made to insure that captured materiel and documents of intelligence value are immediately placed into technical intelligence channels for prompt exploitation.

   b. Exploitation of captured materiel takes place both in the theater of operations and in the CONUS base. Final, complete, and detailed analysis is performed in CONUS. Captured materiel of technical intelligence interest can be exploited at predesignated collection points at division, corps, field army, and/or theater. Technical intelligence collection teams can be sent forward to echelons below division collection points to examine materiel when needed. If necessary, captured materiel can be evacuated directly from the division collection point to the technical intelligence company at field army for exploitation. Collection points at theater army support command (TASCOM) can be utilized to augment those resources located in the field army service support area. All items for CONUS exploitation are forwarded to the Foreign Technical Intelligence Officer (FTIO), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (para 95b).

42. Report Credibility
   All technical reports produced by the technical intelligence company should bear the following statement on the cover to give official credence to the report:
   "This is a United States Army Technical Intelligence Report. The data contained herein was derived through limited testing, analysis, and examination utilizing U.S. Army Laboratory and test facilities."

Section II. RECOVERY PROCEDURES

43. Collecting Points
   Maintenance collecting points are designated facilities to which captured or abandoned foreign materiel is evacuated for temporary storage and proper disposition in accordance with technical intelligence requirements. Collecting points operate, where needed, throughout the theater of operations. In the field army area, one or more collecting points can be provided for each corps area and for the field army service area. In the division areas, maintenance collecting points are operated by the division maintenance battalion. Evacuation flow through collecting points is as shown in figure 3. The unit specifically designed to operate collecting points in the field army service area is the collection and classification company (TOE 29–139) assigned to the army support brigade. Collecting points operate for the classification, segregation, disassembly, and disposition of serviceable and unserviceable foreign materiel in accordance with guidance and instructions provided by the field army commander.

44. Equipment Recovery Guidelines
   Responsibilities for recovery and evacuation
Figure 8. Captured equipment evacuation flow.

1--Capturing Units
2--Main Supply & Evacuation Route
3--Collecting Points

Use depends upon the nature of the item, the availability of transportation, the current situation, etc.)
of foreign materiel at various levels are similar to those for U.S. materiel. The discovery of items of foreign materiel, however, will be reported by the capturing unit through intelligence channels. Items for which there are no disposition instructions should not be evacuated until coordinated with technical intelligence elements. The capturing unit must submit a preliminary technical report to the intelligence officer of its higher headquarters. (See annex B of app IV.) The capturing unit may be directed to evacuate the item to the collection and classification company or guard it and leave it in place for on-the-spot preliminary screening by technical intelligence personnel. When materiel does not have to remain in place for intelligence evaluation and the discovering unit is incapable of evacuating it, the unit may request evacuation assistance directly from the command responsible for direct support maintenance. Evacuation may be directed from a maintenance collecting point to the technical intelligence company at field army in accordance with the following guidelines:

a. Foreign materiel may be of value for technical intelligence purposes, or it may be utilized by friendly forces. Foreign materiel should be cleared from the battlefield or destroyed to prevent recapture or reclamation by the enemy or by guerrilla forces.

Section III. COLLECTION TEAMS, EXAMINATION, TAGGING, AND EVACUATION

45. Functions of Corps Technical Intelligence Collection Teams

a. The corps technical intelligence coordinator on the corps G2 staff must work closely with the technical intelligence collection teams that operate within the corps areas of responsibility. Close liaison will be necessary since the corps technical intelligence coordinator must depend upon the collection teams for preliminary examination, analyses, evaluation, and assistance in evacuation of equipment acquired by the corps tactical elements.

b. The primary functions of the technical intelligence collection teams are to establish liaison and coordination with the collection and classification companies that operate collecting points for foreign materiel; to render support to corps tactical field elements in collection; perform on-the-spot technical examination; provide technical advice and supervise the evacuation of equipment, as required. The teams assist in equipment identification; provide instructions and insight on the use of enemy equipment; provide countermeasure advice; and recommend on-the-spot destruction of captured enemy materiel, if necessary. In addition, they assist corps subordinate unit intelligence officers in the accomplishment of their individual technical intelligence responsibilities, and provide limited technical intelligence data through the use of technical handbooks and/or reference books. They collect, examine, select, and expedite evacuation of foreign equipment and materiel throughout the corps area as directed. In addition, they are responsible for—

b. Technical intelligence elements of the military intelligence battalion and the intelligence officers of all commands are interested in captured or abandoned items of foreign materiel. Procedures must be established for the screening and evacuation of all materiel. Implementing instructions are published by subordinate commands in the form of directives and SOP's.

c. Items of foreign materiel being evacuated directly to the field army support area are reported through higher headquarters to the technical intelligence company and held until disposition instructions are provided or responsibility is assumed by another activity such as the technical intelligence company.

d. Items which are of no use either for technical intelligence or for equipping friendly forces are demilitarized and disposed of as directed by higher headquarters.

e. General support maintenance units of the field army support command direct support units in recovery and evacuation operations by providing backup recovery and evacuation support. Such support is limited and is of an emergency nature. Detailed information on recovery and evacuation procedures is contained in FM 29-22.
(1) Preparing special reports on significant enemy equipment.
(2) Providing limited technical advice and user instructions on the use of captured equipment by US forces.

c. In a fast-moving, fluid tactical situation, it is imperative that technical intelligence collection teams located at corps come forward to tactical units to analyze captured equipment or materiel. This is necessary to prevent loss of potentially vital technical intelligence. Photographs, sketches, diagrams, and general observation of equipment must be made to prevent total loss of technical intelligence should the equipment be recaptured or the area overrun, or should the equipment have to be destroyed in place to prevent recapture.

46. Examination Objectives

a. The first objective of technical intelligence analysis (after enemy materiel is captured) is to obtain information of tactical value to combat forces. Information obtained includes the following:

(1) Determination of equipment operational characteristics, performance, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.
(2) Recognition of new significant weapons.
(3) Identification.
(4) Analysis for modifications.
(5) Countermeasures.
(6) Identifying and properly handling radioactive materiel.

b. Effective technical intelligence is derived from data acquired by actual examination, field testing (when possible), limited laboratory analysis, and integration with other known intelligence data. Examination and analysis should be performed using any accompanying foreign language documents captured with the materiel.

47. Marking and Tagging

To facilitate segregation, collection, further detailed analysis, and shipment of materiel for intelligence purposes, weather-resistant equipment tags produced locally within the theater are securely attached to the item itself and to the shipping container (figs. 4 and 5).

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Figure 4. Equipment marking tag.

a. Equipment tags accompany the materiel to its final destination. Article 103, Uniform Code of Military Justice, is printed on the reverse side of the tag to forestall tampering (fig. 5).

b. In addition to the establishment of proper safeguards, all military personnel should receive training in equipment tagging responsibility in conjunction with other intelligence training and in the consequences of failure to
ARTICLE 103, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

a. All persons subject to this code shall secure all public property taken from the enemy for the service of the United States, and shall give notice and turn over to the proper authority, without delay, all captured or abandoned property in their possession, custody or control.

b. Any person subject to this code who: (1) fails to carry out the duties prescribed in subdivision (a) of this article; (2) buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of captured or abandoned property, whereby he shall receive or expect any profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or another directly or indirectly connected with him; or (3) engages in looting or pillaging; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

 execute this responsibility. Also, troops must be indoctrinated not to deface original markings on materiel at the time of its capture.

c. Tagging, marking, crating, and preparation for shipment to CONUS is the major responsibility of the recovery and shipping section of the technical intelligence company in accordance with field army and theater policies. However, the section must depend upon field army support command elements for the preparation and shipment of bulky items.

Figure 5. Reverse side of equipment marking tag—Article 103.
48. Evacuation Guidance

The general plans, policies, and procedures for evacuation of all foreign equipment and materiel are prescribed by the joint/unified/theater and field army headquarters. These general plans normally are based upon DA and DIA policies and guidance. Each command echelon within the field army must insure that its plans are in accordance with field army directives and the overall field army technical intelligence plan.
CHAPTER 6
PROCESSING OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

Section I. PROCESSING

49. Technical Information Processing

a. At times, the wide range of technical expertise necessary for mission accomplishment will not be found within the technical intelligence company. Normally, the broad range of technical equipment/materiel will necessitate the highest degree of functional coordination within the technical intelligence company in the utilization of varied experience, technical training, and background.

b. Processing is the first step in the intelligence cycle whereby technical information becomes intelligence. The three phases of technical intelligence processing are—

1. Recording.
2. Evaluation.
3. Interpretation.

c. In urgent situations, technical information can be processed as received without waiting to collect additional supporting information if background files and an adequate data base have been accumulated and kept current. The intelligence produced in such a situation may be crucial, if, for example, the intelligence derived contains data on missiles capable of carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads.

50. Recording

Recording is the first step in processing. Technical information and data are recorded in journals and workbooks and in intelligence files to aid technical analyst in grouping related items of information and to facilitate evaluation and interpretation. Recording involves reducing information and data to written or graphic form and grouping together related data to facilitate evaluation and interpretation. Recording facilitates the preparation and dissemination of technical intelligence reports and makes subsequent interpretation and evaluation easier. Commonly used combat intelligence aids, such as the intelligence worksheet and intelligence journals, can be adapted for technical intelligence needs. When the need is urgent, the recording step can be omitted to permit more rapid evaluation, interpretation, and immediate dissemination to tactical units.

51. Evaluation

Evaluation determines the pertinence of information. It consists of the critical appraisal of data for its subsequent interpretation. It includes determining the reliability of the source and agency and the accuracy or credibility of the information. The system applicable to evaluation is described in FM 30-5 and has been standardized for use by NATO Forces and other allies.

a. Evaluation involves systematically arranging all pieces of information and comparing known data with the current state of the art. This process must be carried on continually at all appropriate echelons. As technical information flows to the technical intelligence company, it must be associated with all related data including previous technical reports.

b. Evaluation requires a comprehensive technical knowledge which rarely is possessed by one individual. Evaluation, therefore, will require close coordination within the technical intelligence company.

c. Technical evaluation must take into consideration the industrial and scientific base and capability of the enemy. Evaluation estimates based solely on United States standards must be avoided. Foreign equipment and materiel
may appear wholly inferior when judged by American standards; however, when judged by the standards of the specific army and area in which they were developed, the items of equipment may be superior and considered to be highly effective.

d. Evaluation ratings should be made at the technical intelligence company. The evaluation step of processing is never omitted.

52. Interpretation

This step is the result of critical judgment evolving from evaluation and subsequent analysis, integration, and deduction. It is the mental process of determining the importance of information, integration of this with other technical data, and deduction. The analysis function is centralized in the evaluation and analysis platoon of the technical intelligence company, since frequent coordination within the company is necessary to fully exploit the wide variety of equipment and materiel. The field army G2 staff element integrates the analyzed technical information with intelligence produced by all other intelligence elements to arrive at an estimate of the capabilities and limitations of foreign military armed forces.

a. Analysis. Analysis requires a thorough knowledge of enemy equipment and materiel to include past technological trends, developments, and tactical doctrine on equipment use. Analysis involves detailed research when the volume of technical data increases.

b. Integration.

(1) This step is lengthy and consists of combining numerous isolated elements of technical information with other technical data to form a logical conclusion. More than one technical conclusion may be formulated based upon other existing and finished intelligence. Technical intelligence conclusions are made with primary emphasis upon the tactical mission. This phase requires good judgment, experience, a varied background knowledge, and a knowledge of scientific methods. When formulated, all technical hypotheses, if possible, should be tested for validity and reliability.

(2) The technical intelligence company must integrate the technical information provided by all intelligence collection agencies in order to construct an objective assessment of enemy capabilities. Technical intelligence is by nature a complex task requiring extensive coordination and collation by highly competent specialists capable of using their technical background, training, and expert opinions of technical reports in relation to available combat and strategic intelligence. Extensive integration must be performed by the field army intelligence staff in collating finished technical intelligence from other military intelligence battalion elements prior to the final dissemination of technical intelligence.

c. Deduction. Deduction is the last step in interpretation. This step consists of deriving meaning from the hypotheses that have been developed and tested. Deduction provides answers as to the meaning of technical intelligence and data in relation to the tactical situation and area of operation.

Section II. ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

53. Considerations

a. The producers of technical intelligence must constantly keep in mind that actual and potential enemy capabilities, limitations, and probable courses of action are being developed at the field army, theater, and national levels. Based upon the technical intelligence produced, new requirements for U.S. equipment are developed. Any pertinent intelligence that will assist in the preparation of new U.S. military equipment and/or countermeasures must be considered by the technical intelligence producer during the entire technical intelligence production cycle. For this reason, technical intelligence should be coordinated with all intelligence elements.

b. Factors which must be regularly considered by technical intelligence producers include,
but are not limited to, the following:

1. Effects of terrain and weather.
2. Characteristics, performance, and effectiveness of enemy equipment and materiel.
3. Countermeasures that are effective against enemy equipment.
4. New design features and modifications of old and/or new equipment.
5. Overall combat intelligence requirements.

54. Technical-Military Reference Library

a. Technical intelligence production, research, analysis, and evaluation cannot be conducted without a current data base. The need for specific data requirements, performance characteristics, equipment descriptions, operational limitations of materiel, and the extensive need for integration and collation of technical information covering wide areas necessitate the provision of a technical intelligence reference library. This library will prove to be one of the most useful working tools for the technical intelligence company. As a minimum the technical library should include—

1. Technical Bulletins.
2. Foreign Equipment Handbooks (by country).
4. DIA Scientific and Technical Intelligence Registers.
5. Organizational and Logistical Data Handbooks.
6. Enemy tactics and operational concept studies.
7. Technical equipment documents and studies.
8. Order of battle handbooks.
10. Appraisals of enemy equipment.
11. Equipment vulnerability studies.
12. Threat studies and assessments.

b. Library technical publications not only provide accurate and timely technical information and intelligence references, but in the interest of field army consumers they provide limited and selective technical intelligence support, thereby reducing the need for direct unit support. Library technical publications must be oriented toward the needs of combat, combat support, and combat service support users and field army requirements.

55. Use of Experts and/or Organizations

a. The technical intelligence company will sometimes require assistance from military and/or civilian personnel or organizations to assist in the technical analysis of materials to fulfill a special tactical or strategic mission. This may occur when the expertise needed to solve a highly technical and complex problem is not available within the technical intelligence company. Therefore, maintaining an up-to-date “Technical Expert File” (of names) will prove invaluable. When utilized, these “experts” should work directly with the technical intelligence company, and must possess the proper security clearance; they should be used as consultants/advisors for a short period of time. The most important criterion governing the use of these individuals is that such service should normally be voluntary.

b. Military and/or civilian personnel whose training could be of special interest to technical intelligence units for analysis and production services include—

1. Ammunition maintenance technicians.
2. Guided missile maintenance personnel.
3. Nuclear weapons specialists.
4. Guided missile and special weapons personnel.
5. Ammunition supply specialists.
6. Data processing personnel.
7. Electronic countermeasures personnel.
8. Cryptographic personnel.
10. Optical specialists.
11. Explosive ordnance specialists.
13. Guided missile propellant and explosive specialists.
14. Geographers, geologists, and/or construction specialists.
15. Photograph experts.
17. Weapons systems analysts.
18. Chemists, physicists, and biologists.
20. Indigenous surgeons and medical specialists.
56. Photography

a. Photographs are a valuable source of permanent information for technical analysis and evaluation. Frequently, technical intelligence analysts supplement their finished reports with photographs, diagrams, and charts. Equipment and materiel will often be captured or confiscated by fast-moving tactical units; photographs of this materiel can be sent to the rear by technical intelligence collection teams prior to the receipt of the actual equipment. In a fast moving tactical situation, the photograph will be the only item available to the analyst if the equipment becomes lost, damaged, destroyed, or recaptured. For this reason, technical intelligence collection teams at corps must be cognizant that one of their first specific acts should be to photograph in place all items of intelligence value from as many different angles as required.

b. Photographs must be analyzed, evaluated, and compared, and must be accompanied by appropriate written descriptions prior to further detailed evaluation and dissemination. The data available from a photograph may be highly advantageous to the analyst; however, skill and training of the analyst are very important in exploitation of photographs. Photographs permit a vast quantity of data base information to be rapidly analyzed, collated, and filed. Once photographs of equipment are taken, equipment should be rapidly evacuated. All photographs must contain a ruler, scale, or other measuring comparison to assist the analyst and other users of the information.

c. Long range patrols, special forces operational detachments, and other intelligence collection elements can provide photographs of special items of intelligence interest when operating behind enemy lines. However, their use must be coordinated at the appropriate echelon and they must be thoroughly briefed on technical intelligence requirements prior to dispatch on these missions.

Section III. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

57. Classification

Technical intelligence reports from the technical intelligence company are produced in accordance with appropriate army regulations in the 380-series. When equipment is acquired through a friendly foreign government, the specific security classification assigned by that government must be adhered to and given equivalent protection by being assigned to Group I in accordance with AR 380–6. Otherwise, classified technical intelligence reports will be assigned to Group 3 as stated in AR 380–6. (Paragraph 59 discusses the various types of reports.)

58. Security Policies

a. At times, technical intelligence involves sensitive security equipment/materiel and therefore will require stringent security controls by the technical intelligence unit. A unit technical intelligence SOP covering security is mandatory in order to provide an adequate security framework to support operational requirements. The technical intelligence SOP must be precise, yet flexible, and should follow the following minimum guidelines:

1. Requirements for sensitive technical intelligence materiel in support of assigned missions must be carefully planned and should be revised periodically.

2. Information and materiel should be disseminated on a need-to-know basis in accordance with specific security regulations.

3. Care must be taken not to overclassify.

b. At times, indigenous personnel may be required for a specific mission. Because of the sensitive nature of many areas of technical intelligence, information should be released only after:

1. An explicit need-to-know has been established.

2. Care has been taken to furnish only those portions for which need-to-know has definitely been established.

3. The security requirements imposed by security regulations have been complied with.
(4) It has been determined that released information is in the best interests of the United States.

c. Special provisions must be prescribed by technical intelligence units for handling critical captured enemy equipment such as communication security equipment. This equipment must be classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher and designated "crypto," and tagged and evacuated to the nearest U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA) elements as soon as practicable. Some components of intelligence interest are as follows:

1. Speech security devices.
2. Teletype security devices.
3. Data security devices.
5. Key lists.
7. Documents, manuals, circuitry diagrams, and all ancillary equipment.

Section IV. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

59. Reports (see STANAG 2084 app IV)

Six types of technical intelligence reports are generally used in the exploitation of captured materiel. These are—

a. Spot Report. This or written report is prepared by the capturing units and/or intermediate command echelons to rapidly report by electrical or other means the acquisition of captured or abandoned foreign materiel through their next higher headquarters to the technical intelligence company. The basic items of this report should normally include as a minimum:

1. Who is reporting (unit)?
2. What is being reported?
3. Where and when (coordinates)?
4. How much materiel?
5. Whom to contact.
6. Condition of materiel.

b. Preliminary Technical Report. This report is prepared and disseminated through intelligence channels on all captured foreign materiel. It is prepared by corps technical intelligence collection teams or the capturing unit. The preliminary report places emphasis on alerting other tactical units to significant new tactical capabilities. It is prepared in the format as shown in Annex B of STANAG 2084.

c. Complementary Technical Report. This report is prepared by technical intelligence collection teams operating throughout a corps area in support of corps elements. It is a limited report for the use of the technical intelligence company and such other intelligence elements as the military intelligence battalion or field army G2 staff elements. It supplements information in the PRETECHREP.

d. Detailed Technical Report. This report is the responsibility of the field army technical intelligence company and is prepared by various combat service support specialists in a coordinated effort. No format is specified because of the wide variety of materiel usually contained therein.

e. Technical Document Report. This report is written on all captured enemy technical documents such as maintenance handbooks, operation manuals, drawings, and sketches.

f. Special Technical Report. Special technical reports are prepared as required by field army G2 staff elements and higher echelons primarily as input to studies, plans, and contingency planning requirements. These reports contain special information on items of significant intelligence interest. No format is prescribed for these reports, and content is governed by the nature of the technical intelligence desired.

60. Combined Operations Reports

Appendix V outlines current NATO-standardized nomenclature as prescribed by STANAG 2097. When possible, all technical intelligence report nomenclature should be NATO-standardized and should be in consonance with overall unified/joint/theater policies and guidance. The reports that can be used by technical intelligence elements in all combined operations are:


c. Complementary Technical Report (COM­
TECHREP).
d. Detailed Technical Report (DETECH­
REP).

61. Using Instructions
Captured materiel which is later put into
service and used by United States or Allied
forces requires using instructions. Technical
intelligence company personnel involved in de­
tailed analysis at FASCOM are responsible for
preparing and distributing using instructions.
Such instructions, when published, should
always be a part of the final detailed report
(DETECHREP) prepared by the company.
Reports should always be annotated to indicate
they are official field army technical intelligence
reports.

Section V. DISSEMINATION

62. General
The timely dissemination of technical intel­
ligence reports is of maximum importance to
tactical, combat support, and combat service
support commanders. The field army intel­
ligence staff uses technical intelligence reports
as a basis for estimates, recommendations, and
interpretation of information received.

63. Methods Used
a. The methods used to disseminate technical
intelligence depends upon the detail and
urgency of the intelligence and upon who the
intended users are. Primary consideration
must be given to the needs of the tactical users.
The most common means of dissemination are:
(1) Detailed technical reports (app IV,
STANAG 2084).
(2) Technical intelligence bulletins.
(3) Technical reviews and summaries.
(4) Special technical reports.

b. Before technical intelligence is transmitted
to intelligence staffs for the normal processing
and conversion into intelligence, the data must be—
(1) Screened for elimination of non­
essential information.
(2) Translated into a nontechnical lan­
guage to permit general understand­
ing.
(3) Interpreted, analyzed, and coordinated
among all other combat service sup­
port specialists serving on functional
technical intelligence teams.
(4) Collated with other related intel­
ligence and data as appropriate.
CHAPTER 7
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Section I. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) SUPPORT

64. General

a. Combat service support for technical intelligence encompasses EOD, military police, and civil affairs support.

b. Experience shows that about five to ten percent of ammunition employed will fail to function as originally intended. Compounding this problem are the use of missiles and delayed-action and influence-type fuzes on many types of ammunition and the introduction of "home made" explosive devices. The term "explosive ordnance" includes conventional ammunition as well as chemical, biological and nuclear ammunition.

c. Recovery and evacuation operations are often complicated by the presence of ammunition items in or on equipment. In addition, the possibility that abandoned items have been boobytrapped must always be considered. It is necessary, therefore, that personnel engaged in recovery and evacuation operations be constantly on the alert for such items. Extreme care must be taken to prevent explosions, fires, radiation burns, and accidental functioning. Accordingly, assistance of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel should be requested to provide explosive disposal support. The potential represented by modern chemical, biological, and nuclear ammunition has placed increased emphasis upon this requirement.

65. Technical Intelligence Value

a. Foreign ammunition encountered in the field may be of considerable intelligence value. There are many intelligence, research, and development agencies in the Army and in other departments of the government that may benefit from prompt information concerning new items of foreign ammunition or the modification of old.

b. Information on foreign ammunition assists in determining order of battle intelligence; evaluating probable enemy courses of action, capabilities, and vulnerabilities; and developing countermeasures. The markings on a bomb, missile, or shell; the materials used or substituted; or the mere fact that the item exists may be of great strategic value. Identification of the filler may establish requirements for special protective or retaliatory measures against conventional, nuclear, chemical, or biological attack.

c. Knowledge of employment, effectiveness, and possible countermeasures are of immediate concern tactically. The type and caliber of enemy supporting weapons can be determined from captured enemy ammunition, duds, components, and fragments. Sabotage devices being introduced by clandestine means can provide valuable indicators of probable enemy courses of action.

d. Manufacturing methods and details of design may be of value to research and development agencies of the Army. The development of effective EOD render-safe procedures and tools for first-seen enemy ammunition is of particular importance to the safety of EOD personnel and to the accomplishment of their mission.

66. Information Desired

Technical intelligence information desired on ammunition includes:

a. New items of enemy ammunition, together with complete technical data on construction, markings, and functioning.
b. Design or change in design of known ammunition.

c. Changes in manufacturing techniques.

d. Quality and type of material and/or explosive content.

e. Packing, storing, and maintenance techniques.

f. Data concerning place and date of manufacture.

g. Documents pertaining to the above, including sources of information.

67. EOD Team Operations

The EOD unit commander is solely responsible for determining the proper procedure to use in accomplishing the disposal operation for each project assigned to his team. Technical intelligence specialists provide technical advice to the team as required. Selection of the best method of disposal depends on a number of factors including the location, amount, and nature of the explosive involved, proximity to structures and facilities; accessibility; condition; and personnel safety. Tasks to be performed include—

a. Identification. All ammunition is first identified to determine the disposal procedure to be used. First-encountered foreign ammunition and markings must be photographed for technical intelligence and EOD purposes. Special procedures required by technical intelligence for photographing various types of markings are followed by EOD personnel. A written memorandum is prepared on the spot to include a concise description of the item, sketches, and details of location.

b. Destruction in Place. Nondestructive render-safe procedures should be used on first-seen foreign ordnance. If it cannot be rendered safe or removed, the item should be destroyed in place in such a manner as to minimize damage. Samples of chemical or biological agent fillers are extracted from chemical or biological ammunition and preserved for laboratory analysis by technical intelligence personnel.

c. Recovery. Unrecognized items and those for which search has been directed by higher authority should be recovered whenever possible, even at the expense of considerable risk. Recovery of components and fragments of such items may be equally important. Such recovery is of value to technical intelligence and CONUS-based DA research elements in the development of disposal methods and tools. The following minimum guidelines apply:

1. New or unknown types of foreign ammunition recovered by EOD personnel must be turned over to technical intelligence units for disposition. Security classification of the items and their components will not be lower than SECRET.

2. Foreign nuclear weapons or components, to include sabotage devices, are evacuated through technical intelligence channels. Security classification of such items will not be lower than SECRET RESTRICTED DATA.

3. In addition to security escorts, technical escorts are required to provide safety control for shipments of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other hazardous items of ammunition. Within the field army, technical intelligence personnel will coordinate with appropriate staff officers to determine the need and arrange for technical escorts. For shipment of such ammunition to CONUS, the theater intelligence officer determines the need and arranges for technical escorts.

4. Collection of technical intelligence data will, in many instances, entail dismantling the ammunition and stripping fuzes and other dangerous components for analysis and evaluation. These operations should be conducted only by experienced EOD personnel. In many cases, complete dismantling and stripping may be beyond the capability of small units in the field. Unless the urgency requires the acceptance of a high degree of risk, the item is evacuated. Dismantling and stripping is conducted only in response to a valid requirement placed through technical intelligence or EOD staffs.
Captured mines and boobytraps should be analyzed and/or tested only by trained weapons/munitions specialists who are thoroughly familiar with their construction, techniques, and use. Extreme caution must be exercised when such things as taut wires and pull releases are encountered, since any explosive item can be used as a boobytrap. Unusual mechanisms used as boobytraps should be immediately reported to the technical intelligence company through use of the spot report. Any countermeasures must be coordinated with explosive ordnance demolition personnel. Final disposal of explosive components or hazardous materials associated with such devices and with recovered ammunition is the responsibility of EOD personnel.

68. Reports

All information gathered by EOD personnel on first-seen foreign ammunition must be reported immediately through EOD control centers to EOD staff officers. At staff level, such reports will be placed in intelligence channels in accordance with intelligence regulations. Two types of EOD reports are required in the field: preliminary technical reports and complementary technical reports.

a. Preliminary Technical Reports (PRE-TECHREP). These reports are prepared by EOD personnel upon recognition of the ammunition as an item of technical intelligence value. The reports are used to alert technical intelligence teams so that they may be dispatched to the site. In addition to the information prescribed in Annex B, STANAG 2084, a recommended tentative render-safe procedure should be indicated by the EOD unit commander.

b. Complementary Technical Reports (COM-TECHREP). These reports are prepared by technical intelligence teams as prescribed in Annex D, STANAG No. 2084. In the absence of technical intelligence personnel, the report will be prepared by the EOD unit. This report contains complete and detailed information not found in the PRETECHREP. It will be submitted by the fastest available means to the technical intelligence company.

69. Dissemination

Technical intelligence on ammunition and missile warheads may be disseminated from any level. Information in reports being transmitted to higher echelons, or received from other sources, which may be of value to disposal personnel of a lower command should be extracted and published at once. The Foreign Science and Technology Center, U. S. Army Materiel Command, makes available foreign ammunition items, reports, and evaluations required for study and use in the development of EOD tools and render-safe procedures. The need for the strictest secrecy in explosive ordnance render-safe procedures is extremely important in order that the enemy does not learn when effective measures for disarming his ammunition have been developed.

Section II. MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT

70. General

Military police can often contribute significantly to the command’s technical intelligence effort. Military police characteristically perform duties on an area-wide basis; they are trained observers; and their close association with numerous law enforcement and other civilian agencies during the course of normal duties can be effectively utilized in certain aspects of the development of technical intelligence. This effort should not, however, be exploited to the detriment of their primary duties of providing police or investigative services to the command.

71. Collection

As collection agencies, military police units and personnel, particularly criminal investigators, are well suited to assist in such functions as:

a. Collecting and reporting items of foreign material on the “Items Wanted List.”
b. Locating specific technical items of equipment.

c. Locating personalities and activities within a specialized technical field.

d. Reporting items of potential technical intelligence value determined from prisoner of war (PW) and civilian internee sources.

e. Reporting items of potential value confiscated or captured in raids.

72. Security and Escort

Items of materiel captured or received by U. S. military forces and determined to be of technical intelligence value will often require safeguarding not only during storage but also during evacuation. Military police normally provide physical security at storage depots and during movement to the rear when the materiel is determined to be “sensitive.” Military police escorts are provided for safeguarding classified information.

73. Using Agency

a. Military police have a continuing interest in technological changes and developments of foreign nations in the following general categories for possible adaptations to U. S. military police use:

   (1) Physical security devices, including protective alarms and all types of intrusion-detection devices.

   (2) Traffic control devices, including electronic speed and surveillance devices.

   (3) Police and investigative equipment, such as identification systems and photography.

   (4) Automation of police records on offenders, criminals, and prisoners; and on traffic, and law enforcement files and systems.

   (5) Riot control munitions, devices, and techniques.

   (6) Industrial defense equipment and techniques.

   (7) Boobytraps.

b. The senior military police representative at each command closely coordinates with the technical intelligence staff officers of the appropriate headquarters to ensure that items in the above-listed categories are included on the “Items Wanted List” and that potentially usable technical information is mutually exchanged.

74. Materiel Obtained by Military Police

The different items of foreign materiel subject to confiscation from prisoners of war include arms; ammunition; military equipment (except mess equipment, metal helmets, and protective masks); military documents, such as military codes and ciphers; pictures and maps or sketches of military installations or implements of war; and signal devices. All other property taken from prisoners is grouped in the category of retained or impounded property and must be accounted for or ultimately returned to the prisoner if the capturing forces assume custody.

75. Marking of PW Materiel

a. Procedures for marking foreign materiel of potential technical intelligence value that is taken from PW should include means of positively identifying the materiel with the PW. This is necessary because prisoners and materiel will often be evacuated through separate channels, and accurate identification of the PW will facilitate future location. This would also facilitate the identification of certain property which must eventually be returned to the PW by regulations. (STANAG 2084, app IV.)

b. Capturing troops are authorized to obtain nothing more than the name, rank, and service number of the prisoner. Military police detachments assigned to the lowest level of command should, therefore, provide as much as possible for a positive means of identification such as a photograph or fingerprints of the PW to be affixed to the materiel tag.

Section III. CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT

76. General

The nature of civil affairs operations requires its personnel to develop and maintain close relationship with the civilian population.
As previously stated, this puts civil affairs personnel in a favorable position to collect intelligence information as well as to obtain foreign materiel/equipment and technical information which may be of significant value to the technical intelligence effort of the command.

77. Collection Potential

Civil affairs personnel, in the conduct of their day-to-day operations, may encounter persons with potentially valuable technical knowledge, materiel/equipment, and technical documents. These persons may be sources of technical intelligence and may include—

a. Civilian technicians among refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons.

b. Military personnel with technical backgrounds impersonating civilians.

c. Civilian technicians and scientists associated with the hostile government or forces.

d. Governmental technical documents, specialized libraries, and archives.

e. Industrial and scientific records.

f. Technical blueprints, plans, manuals, or other information pertaining to technical intelligence in the mobility, communications-electronics, weapons and munitions, chemical, and medical fields.

78. Procurement and Identification

a. Direct support to technical intelligence units may be provided by civil affairs units in the possible procurement of technical materiel/equipment, identification of technical personnel, and recruitment or hiring of civilian technicians or scientists.

b. Aside from the normal procurement of civilian real property, civil affairs personnel may procure—

(1) Civilian equipment such as recording devices, radios, weapons, or other items which may be found as personal possessions.

(2) Medical instruments, drugs, and other medical supplies.

(3) Civilian motor vehicles, construction equipment, and materials.

(4) Fuels, lubricants, greases, and propellants.

c. Through contacts with civil organizations, leaders, political enemies of the hostile regime, and various other segments of the population, civil affairs personnel can provide valuable assistance in the identification of individuals having technical knowledge such as—

(1) Civilian technicians—engineers, architects, chemists, and physicists.

(2) Professional personnel—doctors, surgeons, dentists, nurses, lawyers, and university professors.

(3) Skilled craftsmen/laborers—mechanics, gunsmiths, electricians, draftsmen, and allied personnel engaged in the production of weapons, vehicles, missiles, tracked vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment.
CHAPTER 8
INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

79. Characteristics

a. Technical intelligence emphasis, goals, and priorities in internal defense development assistance operations will differ from those in limited and general conflict. While some procedures may vary, the principles of technical intelligence remain unchanged. However, additional considerations will be necessary in applying these principles. Military units, for example, may be dispersed for independent/decentralized operations. Movement of technical intelligence personnel must be by the fastest means available. Likewise, evacuation of enemy equipment and materiel must be performed by the most secure means available, usually by air, to prevent recapture or loss. The technical sophistication of the insurgent’s equipment and materiel normally is not as extensive as that of a conventional enemy. Enemy materiel consists primarily of small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars obtained from friendly, neutral, and hostile nations. Such equipment is often augmented by primitive but nevertheless effective weapons such as crossbows, mantraps, sharpened stakes, and the like.

b. Technical intelligence specialists must be thoroughly familiar with the characteristics, capabilities, and performance of the small arms and weapons from a variety of friendly and non-friendly nations. The insurgent usually has a limited capability to perform modifications to weapons and materiel. If these modifications are not carefully analyzed and evaluated, their significance and the conclusions drawn can be misleading. Often, technical intelligence derived during internal defense operations has serious national and political consequences; it must therefore be accurate.

c. Arms caches and weapons-smuggling are frequently resorted to by the insurgent. Arms caches can be of major significance politically and tactically. Arms caches and logistical stores should be carefully analyzed and evaluated for technical intelligence usually in a combined effort with the host country. The discovery of arms caches, when carefully exploited by functionally integrated technical teams, can lead to valuable intelligence about the overall insurgent tactical situation. Normally, all captured equipment and materiel becomes the property of the host country, and for this reason combined operations, liaison, and coordination are important to insure full exploitation. The disposition of foreign materiel may be governed by status of forces or other agreements, thus complicating the collection and analysis problems. Close coordination by technical intelligence personnel with tactical units, civil affairs units, and all U.S. government departments and agencies engaged in collection is important. Combined (U.S.-Host Country) technical intelligence operations are a particularly effective means of improving collection capability by using the language and area knowledge of native military personnel.

d. The scope of insurgent warfare can encompass the elite and professionally trained military forces as well as local guerrillas or part-time fighters and noncombatants. However, substantial differences exist in armament, organization, training, equipment, and overall effectiveness. Technical intelligence collectors and analysts must be cognizant of these differences in all analyses. Familiarity will insurgent tactics, doctrine, and organization will greatly enhance the technical analysis and evaluation capabilities of the technical intelligence unit.
80. Cold War Operations

a. In cold war operations, prior to initial deployment of combat forces, the early detection and identification of equipment and materiel used by hostile forces assume paramount importance. The establishment of identities of outside logistical sources of supply is imperative and assists in the determination of diplomatic action, overall strategy, force structure, and military equipment which should be deployed for successful mission accomplishment.

b. Should Military Attaches, Military Assistance Advisory Groups, or Military Missions be present in a foreign country experiencing insurgency, their capabilities and background information data can be used to supplement the initial technical intelligence data base in order to begin technical intelligence collection and analysis.

Section II. RESPONSIBILITIES

81. Technical Intelligence Emphasis

During internal defense operations, technical intelligence personnel perform normal duties as described for conventional operations; however, particular emphasis must be placed on the following:

a. Training host country combat personnel, as necessary, in technical intelligence collection and evacuation procedures.

b. Coordinating technical intelligence matters with other services having a technical intelligence interest and with the host country.

c. Assisting in the organization and development of a host country technical intelligence capability if required.

d. Performing more on-the-spot technical intelligence analysis and evaluation of enemy equipment and materiel.

e. Providing technical advice and assistance to host country military technical intelligence personnel as required.

f. Assisting in adapting ideas and techniques of insurgents for use by US forces as feasible.

82. Role of the Unit Intelligence Advisor

a. The intelligence advisor plays a basic role in technical intelligence collection by coordinating host country requests for technical intelligence support, providing technical intelligence advice, and informing US intelligence staffs when significant discoveries of insurgent equipment, materiel, or arms caches are acquired. Technical intelligence collection/analyst personnel must keep the unit intelligence advisor informed of important guerrilla weaponry developments in addition to helping him maintain a technical intelligence “Item-Wanted List.”

b. Since the unit intelligence advisor is responsible for advising and training host country forces in all aspects of intelligence, to include technical intelligence, a mutual flow of technical information between the advisor and advisee is mandatory. Mutually defined goals and objectives between an advisor and advisee are essential.

83. Combat Service Support Role

If an insurgency progresses into a war of movement, technical intelligence becomes important to the success of combat intelligence. Combat service support staffs expand their participation in the technical intelligence production effort through advice at all command echelons. All technical intelligence must be processed through intelligence G2/S2 staff elements; however, close coordination with technical service staffs during the interpretation and evaluation phase is mandatory. The establishment of a combined US and host country technical intelligence center may become advisable.

Section III. PROCEDURES

84. Analysis

a. Technical intelligence collection and analysis becomes more complicated in internal defense operations since the combined political or military objective often is more than merely seizing and holding terrain. Information of the
technical characteristics of insurgent weapons must be continuously updated and expanded as the weapons appear. Otherwise, the tactics and efforts needed to isolate the insurgent cannot be adequately determined. When a blockade is used to stop the flow of arms and ammunition to the insurgent, technical intelligence analysts must be particularly thorough in collection, analysis, and evaluation. For example, supply shortages and small changes in the chemical composition of propellants and demolitions or shortages might be indicators of the potential effectiveness of a blockade.

b. It is imperative for political/military purposes that technical intelligence personnel keep abreast of outside military assistance furnished such as modern anti-aircraft missiles, guns, propellants, and petroleum products. For example, analysis of new missile propellants can give vital indications of enemy tactical capabilities.

85. Investigative Data

a. The technical intelligence collection teams have a responsibility to conduct weapon and ammunition cache investigations and make reports thereon. Thousands of caches, depots, salvage points, and small factories may be discovered over a period of time and need to be fully exploited. Most of the weapons and ammunition will be a mixture of those from other nations to include our own. Statistical data must be maintained on weapons, ammunition, and supplies that have been captured by our forces. Technical intelligence plays an important role in the maintenance of such data and in determining its overall significance.

b. The discovery of arms caches may occur frequently and may completely tie up technical intelligence specialists. At times, on-the-spot analyses may have to be performed by functional teams. One of the most important problems facing technical intelligence specialists will be the planning for exploitation of these arms caches. Priorities must be established with primary consideration given to tactical needs. The entire analysis effort can be materially assisted by proper troop orientation in all aspects of technical intelligence, close coordination with major tactical headquarters, and placement of proper emphasis on the “Items-Wanted List.”

c. Technical characteristics of a newly encountered enemy weapon or item of equipment, in addition to providing valuable combat intelligence, can, when scientifically analyzed, be used in strategic intelligence and as an aid in determining enemy technical, industrial, and manufacturing capabilities. In addition, it is possible by analysis of the marking of cartridge cases to determine the plant and country where the cartridge was manufactured.

d. In the event of capture of a large number of like items of equipment or materiel, the technical intelligence collection teams must examine the materiel and obtain all available information relative to lot numbers, date of manufacture, and factory markings that may assist in providing information on the item. A sufficient number of items must be transmitted through technical intelligence channels to properly evaluate the item. The remaining items are then processed through normal evacuation and/or salvage supply channels for use as needed by friendly forces.

e. Information on the use of “primitive weapons” such as poisonous spikes, crossbows, and deadfalls must be widely disseminated together with appropriate instructions on countermeasures.

f. The technical intelligence personnel of the field collection teams coordinate operations with explosive ordnance disposal teams if dud rounds of any type are suspected.

86. Logistical System

Although the logistical system of the insurgent may be rudimentary and primitive, the technical intelligence analysts may be required to deal with a variety of commodity items for intelligence purposes (e.g., salt rations, agricultural products, primitive drugs, and serums). The capability of the insurgent’s logistical system to support sustained military operations may well be determined through technical analysis of commodity items.

87. Combined Operations

a. A major problem of technical intelligence is the acquisition of the necessary language skills and experiences to perform technical analysis and evaluation of technical equipment
in a foreign country. Therefore, combined operations with the host country forces are usually imperative. Host country military personnel who possess some limited technical training are utilized to assist in analyses. Close supervision is necessary. With additional training, such personnel can assist in overcoming language and operational problems. Also, civil affairs units, if available, may assist in the acquisition of necessary linguistic personnel.

b. Indigenous technical intelligence personnel who are thoroughly familiar with the culture and environment of the insurgent are an asset to the analysis, evaluation, and collation of certain types of technical data and information. For example, the living habits of guerrillas living in underground tunnels can be useful in evaluating and updating important technical data. Classrooms, billets, hospitals, and stored materiel may be indicators which lead to valuable intelligence.

88. Search and Destroy Operation

a. An important characteristic of internal defense operations is the extensive use of “search and destroy” tactical operations which do not emphasize holding terrain. In addition to the potential loss of valuable intelligence, these operations present a formidable problem for the technical intelligence collection teams and analysts. Technical intelligence collection teams coordinating with tactical units must emphasize that such operations should attempt to avoid the destruction of potentially valuable technical equipment/materiel and facilities. Therefore, technical intelligence personnel must brief tactical elements on current “Items-Wanted Lists” and other items of significant intelligence interest. In this manner, sound decisions can be made by tactical commanders and staff officers in avoiding the destruction of potentially valuable intelligence. Proper planning, implementation, and dissemination of the operations order can minimize the loss of potential intelligence.

b. Tunnels and excavations are frequently used by the insurgent in order to provide protection to personnel and supplies. When these are discovered, they must be destroyed. However, tunnels and excavations may contain a wide variety of potential intelligence information that should be collected prior to their destruction. Time permitting, the following checklist should be used by tactical units in submitting information reports on the destruction of all such facilities—

(1) Location (coordinates).
(2) Evaluation of construction.
(3) Specialized underground areas (classroom, training).
(4) Installation of internal communication facilities.
   (a) Internal to internal.
   (b) Internal to external.
   (c) Use of special antennas.
(5) Power available.
(6) Alternate/emergency power system.
(7) Storage facilities (effect of weather on).
(8) Assessment of construction of internal operational facilities (shops, tool-making, repairs).
(9) General assessment of health facilities.
   (a) Waste disposal.
   (b) Water facilities.
   (c) Contamination.
   (d) Care of sick and wounded.
   (e) Assessment medical standards.
(10) Assessment of training facilities (if applicable).
(11) Measures taken against severe weather.
(12) Assessment of political propaganda indoctrination (documents, newspapers, magazines, printing presses).
(13) Evaluation of use of environmental resources.
(14) Evaluation of local/commercial resources (lumber, cotton).
(15) Special items of interest.
(16) Recreation facilities.
(17) Assessment of defensive areas.
(18) Internal security or warning devices.
(19) Assessment of intelligence or intelligence related activities.
(20) New field expedients (of major and constant interest).

89. Boobytraps and Mines

a. Explosive mines and boobytraps are used widely by the insurgent. Frequently mines, boobytraps, and emplaced munitions are used
for harassment of military operations; therefore, it is imperative that technical intelligence specialists keep abreast of these munition developments. The employment of explosive ordnance materiel must be analyzed on a continual basis. For example, duds can easily be modified and used as boobytraps.

b. The weapons and munitions specialists, in coordination with EOD personnel, can provide the following principal information when such weapons and tactics are used.

1. Fragmentation radii.
2. Modifications made to boobytraps and mines.
3. Construction of locally manufactured mines.
4. Principal fuzing systems (pressure, pull, chemical).
5. Types of explosives (bomb, grenade, artillery, mortar).
6. Fuze ingredients and structures.
7. Modifications to mortar and artillery fuzes.
8. The use of “commercial devices” or materiel.
9. Foreign manufactured items used in mines and boobytraps.
10. Use of triggering devices (battery or blasting machines).
11. Use of chemical devices.
12. Use of large bombs.

c. Dissemination of technical intelligence concerning boobytraps and mines should be made together with countermeasure training data.

90. Civilian Technicians

During internal defense operations, it is possible that civilians having technical knowledge will come under civil affairs control upon liberation of an area from insurgent control. Their evacuation for interrogation purposes may not be desirable because of the attitude of the civil population at the time. However, the civil population will in all probability be screened by U.S. or host country civil affairs units or police elements. When civilians having technical skills are identified and they can contribute potential technical intelligence information, they should be referred to technical intelligence elements.

91. Propaganda Equipment

a. Psychological operations are widely used in an insurgency and in a limited and general war environment. The discovery of insurgent propaganda equipment requires analysis by a functional team consisting of supply, chemical, and equipment personnel to analyze the printing presses, chemicals, inks, and paper being used. Such analysis is necessary to assess guerrilla methods and determine sources of supply. Communications-electronics specialists can assist psychological operations personnel in the analysis of loudspeakers and radio broadcasting equipment.

b. The technical intelligence aspects of operable foreign radio and television stations and printing facilities are important in furthering the field army psychological operations capability. Such installations and facilities should be turned over to civil affairs and psychological operations units for maximum exploitation.

c. Radio broadcasting and printing facilities can be used to further enhance the overall technical intelligence effort. Specific items of equipment desired can be advertised, offering a monetary reward to potential defectees. However, such a program must be strictly controlled and be approved at the highest echelon.

92. Long Range Patrols

a. The long range patrol (LRP) company has a limited capability to acquire and exfiltrate small portable items of enemy equipment or materiel, and can be used under exceptional circumstances. However, it must be emphasized that such missions should not interfere with primary patrol missions. The requirements for the long range patrol requires coordination and approval at higher headquarters.

b. The long range patrol (LRP) companies of the corps or their equivalent command structure will have an extensive need for technical intelligence. Frequently, special technical reports and data will have to be furnished for special missions. The nature of LRP mission may necessitate observation, identification, and reporting of enemy equipment and materiel over periods of 3 to 5 days. Such special missions require the most current technical infor-
mation and data. Prior to dispatch of the LRP on certain special missions, technical intelligence personnel may be requested to provide a general technical briefing on equipment and materiel to the patrol to contribute to mission success by accurately identifying enemy equipment and materiel which may be observed or used by the enemy to detect such patrols.
CHAPTER 9
THE STRATEGIC EFFORT

93. General

a. The overall military technical intelligence effort plays a vital role in the U.S. strategic/national, scientific, and technical intelligence effort. Equipment, materiel, data, and information are provided on a continual basis to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which acts as the central military technical intelligence coordinating office, and eventually to CONUS-producing units where long-range technical/scientific intelligence and equipment are developed. Army technical intelligence support is provided as close to the area of collection as possible in order to accomplish this mission (fig. 6).

b. The objectives of the strategic technical intelligence effort are to—

1. Determine capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of foreign technology, materiel, facilities, and installations.
2. Exploit foreign technologies for the benefit of the US forces.
3. Assist in the development of effective countermeasures by providing intelligence to the overall military research and development effort.
4. Provide materiel and information upon which to base the training of all armed forces personnel.

c. The principal producers of foreign intelligence within the Department of Defense are—

1. Assistant Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence of DIA (DIAST).
2. Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC).
3. Missile Intelligence Directorate (MID).
4. Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center (STIC) of the Department of the Navy.
5. Foreign Technology Division (FTD) of the Air Force.

94. Role of DA Agencies

The Army Materiel Command, through its subordinate agency known as the Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC), is responsible for providing U.S. strategic planners, the military research and development effort, and the military technical/scientific effort with timely and appropriate technical intelligence. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), Department of the Army, has general staff responsibility for all scientific and technical intelligence activities in the Army. Specifically, ACSI, DA, performs the following:

a. Formulates policies and procedures which insure that scientific and technical intelligence activities are carried out in the most efficient and productive manner.

b. Supervises the preparation and execution of the Army scientific and technical intelligence program, in coordination with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and provides for its integration into the Department of Defense (DOD) Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP).

c. Coordinates requirements for technical intelligence originated by the Department of the Army staff and major subordinate commands to insure that they are fulfilled.

95. Strategic Procedures

a. A requirement for technical intelligence can be levied by any agency within DOD. Frequently, however, a research and development (R&D) activity or major CONUS command
Note
A modified version is included in Change 1, which is included at the end of this document.

Figure 6. Organization for strategic technical intelligence.
levies this requirement upon military intelligence resources.

b. Requirements are prepared by the Army consumer using appropriate DA Forms for Intelligence Production Requirements (IPR) which are forwarded to ACSI, DA, for review. The requirements are then forwarded to DIA for final validation and are levied upon the appropriate oversea theater command. As requirements are satisfied, the information and/or materiel are forwarded direct, or through major oversea command channels, to CONUS. Unless specific instructions to the contrary are given by a Department of the Army agency, all items for CONUS exploitation must be forwarded to the Foreign Technical Intelligence Office (FTIO), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, in accordance with provisions of the theater command. This office makes the decision as to the CONUS site of full exploitation to include the detailed plan concerning security and disposition.

96. Strategic Dissemination

When the final technical intelligence reports are produced, they are disseminated to various consumers in accordance with previously requested statements of intelligence interest (SII). A continual feedback of information from oversea producers to DIA and from DIA and CONUS-producing units to the oversea major commands is necessary if the entire technical intelligence cycle is to be effective. The distribution of technical information from CONUS-producing units is made by DIA to the oversea command to insure that military intelligence units are kept abreast of important enemy technical and scientific trends and developments.
## APPENDIX I

### REFERENCES

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<th>Reference</th>
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<th>FM</th>
<th>Description</th>
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APPENDIX II
MAJOR CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

Major categories of technical intelligence interest used for planning purposes—

(1) Science and Technology.
   (a) Medical sciences.
   (b) Physical sciences.
   (c) Chemical sciences.
   (d) Research and development.
   (e) Materials.
   (f) Military equipment production.
   (g) Missiles and rockets.

(2) Nuclear.
   (a) Nuclear materials.
   (b) Weapons and munitions.
   (c) Nuclear reactors.
   (d) Nuclear power systems.
   (e) Nuclear propulsion.

(3) Electronics.
   (a) Radar.
   (b) Computers.
   (c) Communications.
   (d) Reconnaissance and surveillance equipment.
   (e) Electronic countermeasures.
   (f) Laser.
   (g) Telemetry.
   (h) Other.

(4) CB.
   (a) CB agents.
   (b) Weapons and munitions.
   (c) CB defensive equipment.

(5) Ground Systems.
   (a) Combat vehicles (wheeled and track).
   (b) Support/logistical vehicles.
   (c) Artillery.
   (d) Air defense equipment.
   (e) Infantry weapons.
   (f) Ammunition, munitions, fuzes.
   (g) Antitank equipment.
   (h) Individual equipment and/or supplies.
   (i) Special warfare weapons.
   (j) Maintenance equipment.
   (k) Amphibious equipment.
   (l) Camouflage equipment.
   (m) Wire support equipment.
   (n) Airborne equipment.
   (o) Target acquisition equipment.

(6) Aerodynamic Systems.
   (a) Bombers.
   (b) Fighters.
   (c) Drones.
   (d) Helicopters.
   (e) Reconnaissance aircraft.
   (f) Other.

(7) Missiles.
   (a) Aircraft-launched missiles.
   (b) Ground-to-ground missiles.
      1. Short-range missiles.
      2. Intermediate range missiles.
      3. Long-range missiles.
   (c) Air defense missiles.
   (d) Anti-tank missiles.
   (e) Anti-missile missiles.
   (f) Space systems.
   (g) Submarine/ship-launched missiles.

(8) Sensor Equipment
   (a) Optical.
   (b) Acoustic.
   (c) Radint.
   (d) Photographic.
   (e) Elint.
   (f) Telemetry (measuring devices) laser.
   (g) Other.

(9) Information Storage and Retrieval.
   (a) Electronic data processing equipment.
   (b) Document processing equipment.
   (c) Manual equipment.
   (d) Machine translation equipment.
   (e) Real-time ADP equipment.
   (f) Telemetry support equipment.
   (g) Graphic display equipment.
APPENDIX III

EXAMPLE OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLAN

Appendix ______ to Annex ______ (Intelligence) to Operation Order.

1. General
   a. References.
   b. Purpose and scope.
   c. Period covered.
   d. Subordinate elements required to support similar plans.
   e. Priorities.

2. Organization
   a. Intelligence Agencies (at each echelon).
      (1) Organization.
      (2) Functions.
      (3) Subordinate agencies functions.
      (4) Supporting agencies.
      (5) Liaison and coordination.
   b. A subparagraph for each combat service support technical intelligence section as it relates to paragraph 2c.
      (1) Weapons-munitions.
      (2) Communication-electronics.
      (3) Supply and equipment.
      (4) Chemical.
      (5) Mobility.
      (6) Medical.
   c. Each combat service support element should know the following:
      (1) Mission.
      (2) General organization.
      (3) Functional team structure.
      (4) Allotment of technical intelligence personnel.
      (5) Specific functions and responsibilities.
      (6) Location of collection points at each echelon.
CLASSIFICATION

(7) Availability of chemical and medical laboratories in the theater.

3. Personnel
   a. Military policies concerning:
      (1) Responsibilities of capturing unit.
      (2) Handling captured enemy materiel.
      (3) Handling abandoned equipment.
      (4) Handling technical facilities and installations.
      (5) Authority for destruction of captured materiel when necessary.
      (6) Taking custody of enemy materiel from capturing units.
      (7) Technical intelligence collection team operations in forward areas.
      (8) Preliminary examinations and analysis.
      (9) Reports to be rendered.
         (a) To tactical units.
         (b) To technical intelligence company.
      (10) Coordination and liaison with combat intelligence personnel.
      (11) Equipment evacuation.
      (12) Markings and tags.
   b. Civilian
      (1) Policies concerning civilians in an area of military operations having a technical knowledge.
      (2) Limitations on activities of individuals and groups.
      (3) Policies concerning evacuation of civilian personnel.
      (4) Interrogation of civilians having a technical knowledge.

4. Direction
   a. Important policies governing overall technical intelligence collection and analysis (trophies, souvenirs, theater policies).
   b. Amplification of Items Wanted Lists.
   c. Special technical intelligence targets.
   d. Policies governing publishing requirements.
   e. Support to be provided by the field army and its subordinate support elements (i.e. FASCOM, General and Direct Support Elements).
   f. Additional support requirements necessary and by whom rendered.
   g. Preparing EEI and other intelligence requirements.
   h. Host-country agreement (if applicable).

5. Collections
   a. Documents
      (1) Procedures for collecting technical documents.
      (2) Forwarding and handling of technical documents (see appendix IV, STANAG 2084, FM 30–16).
      (3) Responsibilities for translation of technical documents.

CLASSIFICATION
(4) Responsibilities for analysis, evaluation, and dissemination of technical data.
(5) Handling of timely technical data.
(6) Channels for forwarding.

b. Prisoners
(1) Procedures for selecting personnel with technical knowledge.
(2) Responsibilities of IPW personnel.
(3) Technical intelligence cooperation with IPW and combat intelligence personnel.
(4) Handling of military personnel with technical knowledge.
(5) Handling of civilian personnel with technical knowledge.
(6) Channels for evacuation.
(7) Ultimate disposition (civilians, defectees).
(8) Reports to be rendered.

c. Materiel
(1) Specific unit responsibilities.
(2) Examination policies.
(3) Evacuation channels.
   (a) Primary.
   (b) Alternate.
(4) Destruction policies (authority to determine whether a target should be destroyed).
(5) Policies in regard to significant new equipment.
(6) Sensitive or classified equipment.
(7) Safeguarding.
(8) Marking.
(9) Ultimate disposition.

d. Facilities and Installations.
(1) Procedures for collecting, analyzing, and reporting information.
(2) Areas of primary overall intelligence and technical intelligence interest.
(3) Channels for forwarding facilities data.
(4) Disposition and dissemination of facilities data.

6. Processing
a. Records and/or files required to be maintained.
b. General policies governing preparation of technical reports.
   (1) Preliminary reports (PRETECHREPS).
   (2) Detailed technical reports (DETECHREPS).
c. Liaison and coordination between personnel of the technical intelligence company and other intelligence elements concerning evaluation and interpretation of technical information.

7. Dissemination
a. Scope.
b. Content.
c. Editorial assistance.
d. Types of reports.
e. Special reports.
f. Policies governing dissemination.

a. Theater and/or theater army policies.
b. Scope and priorities.
c. Effort that may be expended on missions.
d. Additional support sources if needed.
e. Procedures for collecting and reporting data.
f. Responsibilities for direction of operations.
g. Limitations on units and individuals.
h. Security.
i. Safeguarding components of intelligence value.
j. Host-country agreement.

JONES

General

Distribution: C
OFFICIAL
/s/ S.S.SMITH
Smith
G2
(Editorial note: STANAG 2084-HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT, dated 22 June 1962, also adopted as SOLOG 94, is a primary concern in this field manual. Normally, the Details of Agreement (DofA) which appear in this STANAG would have been reproduced in this appendix, and remain valid until such time as the STANAG is officially withdrawn or revised. However, this procedure has not been followed in this instance because the U. S. Armed Forces (and other NATO members) have developed and concurred in a revision of STANAG 2084 which has been recommended to the Army Board, Military Agency for Standardization, NATO, for promulgation as STANAG 2084 (Edition No. 2)—HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS. It is anticipated that the revised STANAG will be promulgated approximately in April 1966; therefore, the DofA of the revised STANAG (subject to minor editorial changes which may appear in the published text of Edition No. 2) have been selected for the appendix of this field manual in lieu of the DofA which they will soon replace. It is also to be noted that the descriptive title of STANAG 2084 (Edition No. 2) has been changed to agree with the sequence followed in the DofA).

STANAG 2084 (Edition No. 2) HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS

(Adopted as SOLOG 94)

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT (DofA)

HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS

Enclosures: Annex A (DofA)—Types of Captured Enemy Equipment
Annex B (DofA)—PRETECHREP
Annex C (DofA)—COMTECHREP—TYPE A
Annex D (DofA)—COMTECHREP—TYPE B
Annex E (DofA)—COMTECHREP—TYPE C
Annex F (DofA)—Technical Intelligence Teams

AGREEMENT
1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces will use the procedure detailed in Part I for the handling of captured enemy equipment and associated technical documents and in Part II for handling captured enemy documents. It is further agreed to use the item list of equipment and the description and procedure for these reports in Annexes A-F (DofA). Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice any national right on the equipment proper.

DEFINITIONS
1. Document
Any recorded information regardless of its physical form of characteristics includes, but is not limited to, the following: All written mate-
rial, whether handwritten or printed or typed; all painted, drawn or engraved material; all sound or voice recordings; all printed photographs and exposed or printed film, still or motion picture; and all reproductions of the foregoing, by whatever process produced.

PART I

HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS

GENERAL

2. Captured enemy equipment (CEE) and associated technical documents will be handled for exploitation with the minimum delay through the following processing channels:

   a. Preliminary screening and reporting for information of immediate tactical value by national units assigned to NATO.
   b. Secondary screening and complementary reporting by special intelligence support teams (Technical Intelligence Teams).
   c. Detailed exploitation by specialists in the rear areas.

   Note. A detailed list of the types of CEE to be processed is given in Annex A (DofA).

3. The technical intelligence reports and documents considered are:

   c. Detailed Technical Reports (DETECHREP) (submitted by specialists as appropriate).
   d. Captured Enemy Technical Documents (TECHDOC) (Maintenance Handbooks, Operation Manuals, Drawings, etc.).

4. National Army, Navy and Air Technical Intelligence Teams should be provided to carry out the examination of captured enemy equipment for the information of immediate tactical value (where no requirement exists for a permanent Naval Technical Intelligence Team, such groups may be set up on an ad hoc basis). They should be in a position to:

   a. Receive at the earliest possible moment any Preliminary Technical Reports.
   b. Prepare and transmit the results of Complementary Technical Reports.
   c. Dispatch items of equipment for specialist examination at base or to the captured equipments depot (which are to be established at a minimum of one per Army Group).
   d. Liaison with prisoner of war (PW) interrogation units.
   e. Insure that new equipment in possession of a PW is examined as soon as interrogation units have finished with the items concerned. Full use should be made of voluntary information which the PW may give. (See STANAG 2033 (Edition No. 2).)

   Note. Items of equipment taken from the PW to be examined, which, according to Article 18 of the 3rd Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, must be left with the PW,
rial, whether handwritten or printed or typed; all painted, drawn or engraved material; all sound or voice recordings; all printed photographs and exposed or printed film, still or motion picture; and all reproductions of the foregoing, by whatever process produced.

PART I

HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS

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3. The technical intelligence reports and documents considered are:
   c. Detailed Technical Reports (DETECHREP) (submitted by specialists as appropriate).
   d. Captured Enemy Technical Documents (TECHDOC) (Maintenance Handbooks, Operation Manuals, Drawings, etc.).

4. National Army, Navy and Air Technical Intelligence Teams should be provided to carry out the examination of captured enemy equipment for the information of immediate tactical value (where no requirement exists for a permanent Naval Technical Intelligence Team, such groups may be set up on an ad hoc basis). They should be in a position to:
   a. Receive at the earliest possible moment any Preliminary Technical Reports.
   b. Prepare and transmit the results of Complementary Technical Reports.
   c. Dispatch items of equipment for specialist examination at base or to the captured equipments depot (which are to be established at a minimum of one per Army Group).
   d. Liaison with prisoner of war (PW) interrogation units.
   e. Insure that new equipment in possession of a PW is examined as soon as interrogation units have finished with the items concerned. Full use should be made of voluntary information which the PW may give. (See STANAG 2033 (Edition No. 2).)

   Note. Items of equipment taken from the PW to be examined, which, according to Article 18 of the 3rd Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, must be left with the PW,
must be replaced by equivalent items serving the same purpose (See STANAG 2044 (Edition No. 2.).)

f. Receive from intelligence channels all copies of technical documents which may assist them in their examination.

5. Technical Intelligence Teams should as far as possible be independent, or organic to the units earmarked or assigned to NATO and be sufficiently flexible to cater for a variety and number of equipments. They will need to be equipped with suitable tools, transport and facilities for compiling and sending their reports from the field. Suggested allocation for these teams is given at Annex F(DofA).

6. Specialist Teams are required to carry out the more detailed examination of captured enemy equipments to supplement the more superficial data which can be obtained in the field. Such teams should be in a position after their examination to render the Detailed Technical Report. No suggested allocation is given for these teams as they will depend on national resources available.

HANDLING OF CEE BY CAPTURING UNIT

7. Units locating enemy equipment of intelligence value will submit the Preliminary Technical Report given at Annex B(DofA). This report will be transmitted by the accelerated intelligence reporting procedures when it contains intelligence information which could have an immediate effect upon the current situation. Reports not containing such information will be transmitted by the quickest possible means with the precedence as determined by the commander initiating the report. These reports will contain a general description of the equipment and any technical information of immediate tactical importance.

8. Unit Commanders will be responsible for placing the captured enemy equipment under guard in order to prevent looting, misuse or destruction before the arrival of the Technical Intelligence Field Teams.

9. All technical documents will be clearly tagged or otherwise identified so as to avoid defacing and marked “TECHDOC” by the capturing unit or appropriate agency. In the normal exploitation of captured documents the Command concerned can provide duplicate copies for the guidance of all Technical Intelligence and Specialist Teams in their examinations. All such copies should accompany captured equipment until technical exploitation is finalized.

10. The command concerned will notify the appropriate Technical Intelligence Team, which will arrange to examine the CEE, either on the spot or nearby where better field facilities may exist. (See Annex F(DofA).)

11. Having completed the field examination, the relevant parts of the Complementary Report will be completed and sent through normal staff channels. The description of such equipment and any additional information of tactical value as can be extracted will be sent directly to such headquarters as specified by NATO Authorities. The formats of these reports are given in Annexes C, D and E(DofA).
12. Arrangements should then be made for the speedy evacuation of the equipment to the rear areas where suitable facilities exist for a detailed examination of the equipment by specialists.

13. This will enable the completion of a Detailed Technical Report. No illustration is given of this type of report in view of the great variety of equipments involved. It should, however, follow the pattern already used by national technical exploitation agencies. Such reports will be submitted as soon as possible by specialists through the same channels as those laid down for Complementary Reports. If directed, national intelligence agencies should also be informed after either the Complementary or the Detailed Technical Reports have been forwarded.

14. In the case where the capturing nation is not in a position to conduct an exhaustive field or rear area exploitation of the equipment, the appropriate NATO authority will advise the capturing nation as to further action. In these cases, the exploitation agency should inform the capturing nation of the results of that exploitation.

PART II

HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS

GENERAL

15. Captured enemy documents (CED), except those belonging to CEE (TECHDOC) or reproductions thereof, will be forwarded for exploitation to the appropriate “Captured Document Center.” These centers will be, as a rule, organic to Major NATO Commands. Captured documents will be sent with the minimum delay through the following processing channels:

a. National units assigned to NATO for preliminary screening for information of immediate tactical value.

b. Special Intelligence Support Teams for CED for secondary screening, reproductions and dissemination to all concerned.

c. USACDC for detailed exploitation and indexing.

16. Captured documents will be divided as follows:

a. Category “A.” Category “A” documents are those which contain information concerning significant intelligence subjects, such as enemy order of battle, the employment of new weapons and equipment by the enemy, his logistic situation, (Stock levels, shortage, supply systems, especially supply systems for missiles) his morale, his losses, etc. Such documents require immediate operational exploitation, and the originals or microfilm copies must reach appropriate operational intelligence staffs at the earliest possible moment.

b. Category “B.” Category “B” documents are cryptographic documents, all encrypted items and all documents relating to enemy radio systems. These documents must reach the appropriate intelligence staffs at the earliest possible moment.
c. Category "C." Category "C" documents are those of lesser intelligence value.

d. Category "D." Category "D" documents are those which contain no information of intelligence value.

HANDLING OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS BY THE CAPTURING UNIT

17. Captured documents will be forwarded without delay by the capturing unit to the staff under which the unit is operating, with details of the date, time and place of capture (with map coordinates), together with the name of the capturing unit and the circumstances under which the documents were found.

18. Documents will be clearly tagged, or otherwise identified so as to avoid defacing, by the capturing unit in the following way:

   a. Identification Letters. Documents will be tagged showing the nationality of the capturing force by the national identifying letters prescribed in STANAG 1059.

   b. Designation of Capturing Units. This will include the service to which the unit belongs.

   c. Serial Number. Units will give each document a serial number and should record the dispatch of the document in a war diary.

   d. Date/Time of capture.

   e. Place of capture (with map coordinates).

   f. Summary of circumstances under which the document was found.

19. In cases, where documents are discovered by personnel of NATO staffs and units, and not by national forces assigned to or earmarked for NATO, then the identification letters to be used will be "NA." Other instructions in paragraph 18, however, will apply.

20. Whenever intelligence derived from a captured document is included in a unit or information intelligence report, the identification letters and number of the document concerned will be quoted to avoid subsequent false confirmation.

HANDLING OF CED BY INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAMS

21. All captured documents will be categorized and forwarded. The detailed procedures for handling captured documents will include the following main tasks:

   a. Screening.

   b. Recording

   c. Translation.

   d. Reproduction.

   e. Dissemination.

22. Intelligence staffs will insure that there is no delay in the exploitation of captured documents. If for any reason, qualified personnel or microfilming facilities are temporarily not available or are insufficient to handle the volume or type of documents concerned, the documents
will be forwarded immediately to the next higher echelon and will not be retained by the staff in question.

23. The staff concerned will handle the documents in one of the following ways:

a. Category “A.”
   (1) Where microfilming facilities exist, they will photograph documents with attached comments, and forward original documents direct to either the national agency or the appropriate NATO Intelligence Support Unit for exploitation, by-passing intermediate headquarters. Where suitable linguists are available, microfilms will be examined for information of tactical value to local commanders.
   (2) Where microfilming facilities do not exist, but suitable linguists are available, they will examine documents for information of tactical value to local commanders, attach appropriate comments, and forward without delay to the appropriate higher headquarters.
   (3) Where linguists are not available within the formation headquarters, the documents should go to the PW interrogators for evaluation.

b. Category “B.” These will be forwarded without delay to the Naval, Army, or Air Force headquarters which are primarily interested. The NATO international headquarters under which the capturing unit operates should be informed of the capture and disposition of important documents in this category as soon as possible.

c. Category “C.” The staff concerned will forward Category “C” documents direct to the appropriate NATO Intelligence Support Unit for exploitation. Exceptions to this procedure include:
   (1) Unmarked maps and charts of previously unknown types which will be forwarded to the nearest engineer unit or topographical section.
   (2) Personal mail and paybooks taken from a PW, which will be returned to the PW after exploitation by interrogation personnel or intelligence staffs.
   (3) Other documents acquired from a PW which, after they have served their purpose in interrogation, will be forwarded to the appropriate intelligence staff for further exploitation.
   (4) Documents specifically related to equipment which will, if of intelligence value, accompany the equipment to the intelligence agency responsible for exploitation and then will be sent without delay to the captured document center.

d. Category “D.” Captured documents will not become final as Category “D” until they have been thoroughly analyzed by document translation specialists at the highest command echelon interested, preferably at least two levels above division. Category “D” documents will be disposed of as directed by appropriate authority.

24. Documents of the Categories “A,” “B,” “C,” and “D” captured from crashed enemy aircraft or, in particular, related to enemy anti-aircraft defense or enemy control and reporting systems, will be transmitted to the nearest Air Force headquarters without delay. The same procedure applies to all captured maps and charts of enemy air forces. After evaluation by the responsible Air Force intelligence staff they will be transmitted to the topographical or other appropriate unit. Documents
taken from a ship, including Category "B" code books, call signs, frequency tables, identification symbols, etc., should be forwarded without delay to the nearest naval force headquarters.

25. As a general rule, Maintenance Handbooks, Operation Manuals and drawings should accompany the captured equipment until the intelligence exploitation is completed.

HANDLING OF CED BY THE CAPTURED DOCUMENT CENTER (CDC)

26. Lists of documents which have been exploited will be distributed to all intelligence staffs by the CDC to avoid duplication in translating and processing identical documents by different units. A master list of all captured documents which have been exploited in NATO commands will be maintained.

27. When action on captured documents at CDC has been completed, the original documents will be sent to the national staff whose forces captured them.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

28. This STANAG will be considered to have been implemented when the necessary orders/instructions putting the procedures detailed in this Agreement into effect have been issued to the forces concerned.
TYPES OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT

Types of enemy equipment to be collected and examined by Technical Intelligence Teams. (New equipment or equipment in the process of development ("significant equipment") will be the main concern of these teams.)

1. Army Equipment.
   a. Guided missiles.
   b. Ammunition, all types including mines, demolitions, pyrotechnics and chemical.
   c. Infantry weapons.
   d. Sabotage equipment.
   e. Armored fighting vehicles (AFV’s)
   f. Military vehicles excluding AFV’s.
   g. Artillery, including anti-tank, anti-aircraft and field rocket weapons.
   h. Guided missile launching systems.
   i. Engineering, amphibious and river crossing equipment.
   j. Electronics, infra-red detection and communication equipment.
   k. Airborne equipment.
   l. Special weapons, including nuclear, biological and chemical warfare equipment, flame and incendiary weapons, equipment for dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents, together with protective devices.
   m. Miscellaneous equipments:
      (1) Camouflage equipment.
      (2) Clothing and personal equipment.
      (3) Medical equipment.
      (4) Rations.

   a. Aircraft, airframe and power plant.
   b. Airborne, armament and ammunition, bomb sights, gun sights and photographic equipment.
   c. Airborne radio and electrical equipment.
   d. Miscellaneous airborne equipment, including instruments and controls, dinghies, parachute and other safety equipment.
   e. Ground equipment and installations.
   f. Fuels, lubricants, greases and propellants.
   g. Guided missiles and associated equipment.
   h. Equipment for dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents.
   i. Miscellaneous equipments:
      (1) Flying clothing equipment, including G-suits, pressure breathing equipment, etc.
      (2) Medical equipments and flying rations.
   a. Ships.
   b. Missiles and launching systems.
   c. Shipboard ordnance, including guns, fire control equipment, i.e., radars, range finders, stable elements, range keepers, spotters' telescopes, gun mounts and turrets, ammunition hoists, rammers, fuzes, fuze setters, recoil mechanisms, weapons of all types including Hedgehogs, Mousetraps, Weapon “A” equivalents, Limbo types, depth charge racks and “Y” and “K” gun launchers; torpedoes and torpedo tubes; including ASW launchers; rockets and rocket launchers.
   d. Sea mines of all types, including moored, bottom and floating; contact and influence.
   e. Harbour defense equipment including nets, booms, alerting devices, net tenders.
   f. Navy electronics, infra-red, detection and communication equipment, sonars, fathometers and sonobuoys.
   g. Fuels, lubricants, greases and propellants.
   h. Special weapons, including chemical warfare equipment, flame and incendiary equipment for dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents, together with protective devices such as clothing, gas masks and canisters; salt water spray deck washing equipment for protection.
   i. Medical supplies and medical instruments.
   j. Demolition and sabotage equipment, underwater demolition team (UDT) equipment (sleds, masks, etc.).
   k. Naval engineering systems, including: main propulsion machinery, steam or gas turbines, boilers, diesel engines, auxiliary equipment including motor generators, heat exchangers, pumps, evaporators, fuel oil systems for boilers and diesel engines, including fuel pumps and fuel oil heaters; pressure gauges, boiler accessories including safety valves, steam control valves, gauge glasses, feed water check valves, propellers, hull zinscs, refrigerating machinery, submarine storage batteries and their ventilating equipment, ammeters, voltmeters, amp/hr meters; steering engines, engine room telegraph systems, submerged atmospheric gas analyzers, CO$_2$ scrubbers, compressors, and ships underwater logs; samples of metals used in shipbuilding and any information (description) of welding technique used in shipbuilding.
   l. Hydrofoil and hovercraft, small boats and boat handling equipment, life rafts and signal apparatus or any of their components such as hydrofoil foils.
   m. Anchors, chains, windlasses, winches, fueling and transfer at sea rigs, and cargo handling gear.
   n. Hydrographic survey ships equipment including high altitude research rockets and their launching equipment, sonars and fathometers, sea bottoms ampling gear such as drags and coring equipment, deep sea anchors, sea current measuring devices, biological sampling equipment,
Nansen bottles, possible helicopters and other equipment such as laboratory instruments.

Notes.

(1) Although cryptographic material is not specifically mentioned in the above lists, technical intelligence teams will also be responsible for the collection of such material. Special instructions for the handling of this equipment will be issued by the appropriate NATO command.

(2) Where no requirement exists for permanent Naval Technical Intelligence Teams, such groups may be set upon an ad hoc basis.
PRETECHREP

To be submitted by accelerated intelligence reporting procedures immediately following the acquisition of significant enemy equipment (see paragraph 7 (DofA).)

A. Date found, location (map reference).  
B. Type of equipment and quantity.  
C. Origin.  
D. Brief description with distinguishing marks.  
E. Technical characteristics with an immediate value.  
F. Signature of the commander of capturing unit.  
G. Time and origin of the message.
COMTECHREP—TYPE A

To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately following initial examination of enemy aircraft.

A. Date and location of crash and map of reference.
B. Type of aircraft and:
   (1) Overall length.
   (2) Overall wing-span.
C. Identification and distinguishing marks.
D. Type of engine(s) and condition.
E. Cause of Crash; number, location and caliber of projectile strikes; condition of aircraft.
F. Armament:
   (1) Guns of all types, installation positions, quantity.
   (2) Ammunition and number of magazines.
   (3) Bombs and bomb installations.
   (4) Mines and mine carriers.
   (5) Rocket projectiles and carriers.
   (6) Pyrotechnics, number and type.
G. Armour plate; quantity, positions, thickness, strikes, penetrations.
H. Number of crew and fate.
I. Wings and control surfaces, leading edge, of protected against balloon cables by cutters, strengthening or other special devices; de-icing.
J. State if samples are obtainable of:
   (1) Gasoline.
   (2) Oil.
   (3) Coolant.
   (4) Hydraulic fluids.
   (5) De-icing fluids.
K. Internal equipment; state condition and whether bombsights, radio, photographic equipment and electronics equipment and instruments are standard. If not, specify modifications, alterations or omissions. Obtain radio frequency setting, if possible.
L. Landing gear; type and condition.
M. General remarks and special points or unusual features not mentioned.
N. Name plates photographed:
   (1) Airframe.
   (2) Engine.
   (3) Others.
O. Other information.
P. Name of officer in Command of Technical Intelligence Team making examination.
Q. Time and origin of message.
COMTECHREP—TYPE B

1. COMTECHREP TYPE B is used for reporting information about ammunition, missiles, bombs, shells, rockets, projectiles, mines, torpedoes, etc.

2. To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately following initial examination.

3. Only use those letters for which information is available.

   A. Nationality, designation and mark number.
   B. Description.
   C. Overall length of missile, including fuze, tail, vanes and fittings.
   D. Maximum diameter of missiles.
   E. Shape and design of missiles (streamlining shells).
   F. Length and width of tail.
   G. Span of vanes.
   H. Thickness of casing at nose.
   I. Thickness of casing at sides.
   J. Thickness of casing at base.
   K. Material of body.
   L. Material of tail or vanes.
   M. Colour and marking of nose.
   N. Colour and marking of body.
   O. Colour and marking of tail or vanes.
   P. Weight and nature of main filling.
   Q. Total weight of missile.
   R. Method of suspension.
   S. Detonation system.
   T. Fusing systems and markings.
   U. Anti-handling or boobytrap devices.
   V. Method of propulsion.
   W. Date and location of missile.
   X. Other information.
   Y. Name of officer in command of the Technical Intelligence Team making examination.
   X. Time and origin of message.
COMTECHREP—TYPE C

To be submitted within 72 hours following the acquisition of an item of captured equipment not covered under Types A and B.

A. Date found, location (map reference).
B. Type of equipment and quantity.
C. Origin.
D. Description with distinguishing marks (additional details).
E. Conditions of equipment.
F. Technical characteristics of immediate tactical value (additional details).
G. Recommended disposal.
H. Name plates photographed.
I. Photographs taken.
J. Other information.
K. Name of chief of team.
L. Time and origin of message.
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TEAMS

1. Army and air teams should be provided by national forces assigned to NATO on the following minimum bases:
   
a. Where forces concerned are operating on one front or on a peninsula (Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece): two army and two air teams.

   b. Where forces concerned are operating on two fronts on a peninsula (Turkey): two army and two air teams per front.

2. See paragraph 4(DofA), regarding naval teams.

3. It is recognized that as these teams will be furnished on a national basis, their composition will be partly determined by national characteristics. However, the following composition of army and air teams is suggested as a standard in order to give adequate technical intelligence support to the fighting forces:
   
a. Air Team.
      (1) Airframe-engine equipment.
      (2) Armament.
      (3) Radio-electronics.
      (4) Administrative-photos, reports, transport and equipment.
      (5) Guided missile ordnance.

   b. Army Team.
      (1) Vehicles, tanks.
      (2) Engineering equipment.
      (3) Armament.
      (4) Radio-electronics.
      (5) Guided-missile ordnance.
      (6) Administrative.
      (7) Nuclear-biological-chemical specialist.
APPENDIX V

STANAG 2097—NOMENCLATURE FOR SOVIET BLOC ARMY
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT (DofA)
NOMENCLATURE FOR SOVIET ARMY WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT


GENERAL

1. The NATO Armed Forces agree to use the nomenclature of the country of origin for Soviet Bloc Army weapons, equipment and vehicles whenever this nomenclature is known.

2. When the nomenclature of the country of origin is NOT known a short descriptive title will be devised and used as an interim measure only.

3. These short interim title will be issued by SHAPE as soon as possible after the sighting details have been received from national/NATO sources. When reporting new items to SHAPE national/NATO sources should suggest a possible interim title, formulated as detailed in the subsequent paragraphs. Interim titles should:
   a. Include the country of design and manufacture (where this is different from the country of design) or the best intelligence estimate thereof.
   b. Include a question mark after the country name when appropriate.
   c. Become progressively more specific, e.g.
      (1) E. German (?) Hand Grenade M 1960.
      (2) E. German copy of Sov Hand Grenade M 1960.
      (3) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand Grenade M 1960.
      (4) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand Grenade A.KG-3.

When the manner in which information was obtained clearly warrants protection of a confidential source or method, the NATO country providing the information will assign a security classification which will remain binding on all recipients until the classification is removed by the originating authority.

DESCRIPTION

5. The nomenclature for any given piece of equipment will include an adequate description to show:
   a. the role of the equipment, e.g., medium tank, howitzer, antitank gun;
   b. type of chassis where applicable (assumed to be wheeled unless otherwise stated), e.g., halftracked, tracked.
WEAPON CALIBERS

6. The caliber of all weapons will be referred to in millimeters and will always be placed immediately preceding the description of the weapon.

7. The abbreviation "mm" for millimeters will always be used.

DATE OF FIRST SIGHTING OR EVIDENCE OF EXISTENCE

8. The year when the equipment was first seen or known to exist will be indicated by the use of the letter M and the four figures of the year. These figures will become part of the title, e.g., 100 mm Field Gun M 1964.

9. It is possible that more than one new equipment of a similar type may be sighted in any one year. To distinguish between the various types a numerical suffix will be applied to the sighting date, e.g., M 1962/1, M 1962/2, M 1962/3.

EXAMPLES OF TITLES

10. The items to be included in the title of each group of weapons and equipment, and examples of these titles, are shown at Annex "A" (DofA).
**TITLES OF GROUPS OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT**

**COUNTRY OF ORIGIN—**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Equipment</th>
<th>Items in Title</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>Caliber</td>
<td>7.62mm Pistol M 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry anti-aircraft (AA) Weapons</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>12.7mm AA Machinegun M 1963</td>
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<td>Infantry anti-tank (AT) Weapons</td>
<td>Sighting year</td>
<td>82mm AT Launcher M 1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hand Grenades</td>
<td>If anti-tank (AT)</td>
<td>Hand Grenades M 1964</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sighting year</td>
<td>AT Hand Grenades M 1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>Caliber</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>152mm SP Gun M 1965</td>
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<td>Rocket Launchers</td>
<td>Caliber</td>
<td>240mm Rocket Launcher (16-round) M 1964</td>
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<td>Description</td>
<td>One Round Rocket Launcher M 1964</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sighting year</td>
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<td>Armored Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>If amphibious</td>
<td>APC M 1964</td>
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<td></td>
<td>If tracked or half-tracked.</td>
<td>Amphibious Tracked APC M 1964</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sighting year</td>
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<td>Assault Guns (SU's)</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>Truck, 4x2 M 1964</td>
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<td></td>
<td>If tracked</td>
<td>Amphibious Truck, 4x4 M 1965</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Tracked Amphibian M 1964</td>
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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

OFFICIAL:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

Distribution:

To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12–11 requirements for Technical Intelligence.

HAROLD K. JOHNSON,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12–11 requirements for Technical Intelligence.

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

FM 30-16, 19 September 1966, is changed as follows:

Page 3, paragraph 1a. Line 6 is changed to read “nonnuclear warfare and in chemical, biological, radiological, and internal defense environments. It covers procedures and.”

Page 3, paragraph 2b(2). In line 19 “internal defense” is changed to read “stability.”

Page 4, paragraph 5a is superseded as follows:

d. Provide information which enables U.S. forces to use foreign material and facilities.

Page 4, paragraph 5h. Line 1 is changed to read “Provide the technical intelligence aspects for tactical and strategic studies on.”

Page 6, paragraph 9a. In line 4, “intelligence within” is changed to read “intelligence mission within.” The last sentence is deleted.

Page 6, paragraph 9b. In line 5, “with” is changed to read “between.”

Page 6. Paragraph 9c is rescinded.

Pages 6 and 9, paragraph 10. Subparagraphs a, b, and c are redesignated as b, c, and d and subparagraph a is added as follows:

a. The technical intelligence company is capable of providing necessary technical intelligence support to corps and divisions assigned to the field army. In addition, it is a flexible organization readily adaptable to the integration of technical intelligence activities of other services and can be integrated into a joint or unified command intelligence effort in all types of warfare. The technical intelligence company is completely airtransportable; however, it is only 50 percent ground mobile using organic vehicles.

Page 9, paragraph 12b(3). Line 8 is changed to read “biological, and radiological defense materiel.”

Page 10, paragraph 12c(3)(f). In lines 8 and 9, “miscellaneous” is changed to read “general.”

Page 12, paragraph 14a. In line 2, “equipment” is changed to read “intelligence.”

Page 13. Paragraph 14g(12) is added as follows:

(12) Communications equipment modules.

Page 16. Paragraph 22a is superseded as follows:

a. The scope of mobility intelligence is comprehensive. It covers most aspects of engineer and transportation activity at all echelons of the enemy’s military organization. Engineer and transportation support has become increasingly important in all types of military operations due to the increasing use of engineer and transportation equipment by supply and transport agencies of all armies.

Page 16, paragraph 22b. In line 3, after “tactical technical intelligence.” the following is added “See FM 30-5 for a discussion of the interrelationship of tactical and strategic intelligence.”

Page 16, paragraph 22c. In lines 9 and 10, the words “structures, facilities, and manmade objects such as,” are deleted.

Page 17. Paragraph 24a is superseded as follows:

a. Medical intelligence is that category of intelligence which concerns itself with man as a living organism and those factors which affect his efficiency, capability, and well-being. Although medical intelligence is a functional entity and should not be fragmented, strategic requirements indicate the need for intelligence concerning foreign medical technical developments, performance, and operational capabilities.

Page 17. Paragraph 24a.1 is added as follows:

a.1. Medical technical intelligence is not primarily materiel-oriented. Examination, evaluation, and classification of medical materiel are only segments of the total medical technical intelligence effort. If possible, medical intelligence must retain integrity so that the end product will include all available information affecting the health and welfare of men and animals in actual or possible areas of military operation which is immediately or potentially significant. Such information is
vital in both strategic and tactical planning and may influence military operations.

Page 17, paragraph 25c. In line 2, "defectors" is changed to read "defectors."

Page 18. Paragraph 27q is rescinded.

Page 19, paragraph 29a. In lines 15 and 16, the sentence "The initiation of CBR operations can change the entire course of a war." is deleted.

Page 19, paragraph 30. Subparagraphs c and e are superseded and b is added as follows:

b. Preparing and forwarding samples of biological agents to medical laboratory personnel for identification.

c. Maintaining liaison with the general chemical laboratory.

Page 20. Paragraph 31 is superseded as follows:

31. Additional Capability

Chemical personnel have the additional capability of collecting CBR samples following enemy attack for delivery to the supporting general chemical laboratory (for analysis and identification of chemical and radiological agents), and to the supporting medical service laboratory (for identification of biological agents).

Page 21. Paragraph 37b(9) is added as follows:

(9) Engineer topographic units and terrain teams.

Page 22, paragraph 38b. In lines 1 through 3, first sentence is superseded as follows:

b. Frequently, many priority technical intelligence collection requirements will be generated by intelligence collection programs established at national and Department of Defense levels. These programs include priority requirements for certain items of enemy equipment and materiel. Such requirements normally will be distributed to U.S. Army collection agencies in the form of Items Wanted Lists (IWL).

Page 22, paragraph 39a. In line 16, after "obtained," the following is added "This is especially important concerning documents relating to enemy communications-electronics systems, for example: code books, call signs, frequency tables, signal operating instructions (SOI), standing signal instructions (SSI), cryptography and encrypted items."

Page 22. Paragraph 30c is superseded as follows:

c. Corps Technical Intelligence Collection Teams. These teams are trained to collect and search for tactical information on foreign materiel, facilities, methods, techniques, and technical activities. Technical intelligence augmentation teams (TOE 30-600), assigned to the technical intelligence company, will be placed in direct support of the various corps elements, and will contact frontline tactical elements for collection of materiel. Technical intelligence teams assist primarily in carrying out the technical intelligence collection responsibilities of the corps.

Page 24. Paragraph 43 is superseded as follows:

43. Collecting Points

Collecting points are facilities to which captured or abandoned foreign materiel is evacuated for temporary storage and proper disposition in accordance with technical intelligence requirements. Collecting points operate, where needed, throughout the theater of operations for the classification, segregation, disassembly, and disposition of serviceable and unserviceable foreign materiel in accordance with guidance and instructions provided by the field army commander. In the division areas, maintenance or salvage collecting points operated by division support command units, normally are designated to receive captured or abandoned foreign materiel (FM 29-22). In the field army area and COMMZ, the collecting points are normally those operated by the Collection and Classification Company (TOE 29-139). Evacuation flow through collecting points is as shown in figure 3.

Page 26. Paragraph 44e is rescinded.

Page 30, paragraph 49a. In the first sentence "expertise" is changed to read "proficiency."

Page 32, paragraph 55a. In line 6 "expertise" is changed to read "proficiency."

Page 34. Paragraph 60 is superseded as follows:

60. Combined Operation Reports

Appendix V outlines current NATO-standardized nomenclature as prescribed by STANAG 2097. When possible, all technical intelligence report nomenclature should be NATO-standardized and should be in consonance with overall unified/joint/theater policies and guidance.
Page 37, paragraph 67b. In line 9, “personnel” is changed to read “chemical laboratory, or medical laboratory personnel.”

Page 40. Paragraph 78c(1) is superseded as follows:

(1) Civilian technicians—engineers, architects, chemists, physicists, and communications-electronics specialists.

Page 41. Chapter 8, the title is changed to read “STABILITY OPERATIONS.”

Page 41, paragraph 79a. In lines 2 and 3 “internal defense development assistance operations” is changed to read “stability operations.”

Page 41, paragraph 79b. In line 11 “internal defense” is changed to read “stability.”

Page 41, paragraph 79d. In line 9 “will” is changed to read “with.”

Page 42, paragraph 81. In line 1 “internal defense” is changed to read “stability.”

Page 42, paragraph 84a. In lines 2 and 3 “internal defense” is changed to read “stability.”

Page 43, paragraph 84b. In line 5 “propellants, and petroleum products.” is changed to read “propellants, communications-electronics equipment, and petroleum products.”

Page 44, paragraph 88. The title is changed to read “Strike Operations.”

Paragraph 88a. The first sentence is changed to read “An important characteristic of stability operations is the extensive use of strike operations. These operations are offensive in nature and include reconnaissance in force, raids, coordinated attacks, and search and destroy and search and clear operations. Strike operations are terminated by withdrawal from the operational area upon mission accomplishment; the holding of terrain is not emphasized.”

Page 44. Paragraph 88b(9) (e) is superseded as follows:

(e) Assessment of medical standards.

Page 45. Paragraph 90. In line 1 “internal defense” is changed to read “stability.”

Page 47. Paragraph 93c(3.1) is added as follows:

(3.1) Medical Intelligence Officer.

Page 47, paragraph 94. After line 7, the following sentence is added:

The functions of the Army Medical Intelligence Officer are to direct the AMEDS intelligence program, and to develop and administer those medical intelligence activities, to include collecting and producing medical scientific and technical intelligence, for which the Surgeon General is responsible.

Page 48. Figure 6 is superseded as follows:
Figure 6. Organization for strategic technical intelligence.
Page 50, appendix I. The following are added to the list of references in proper numerical order:

FM 19–2, Military Support in the Field Army.


The following changes are made to indicate classification:

(S) FM 3–10A, Employment of Biological Agents (U).

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

(C) FM 3–10B, Employment of Chemical Agents (U).

FM 11–30 is deleted.

Page 52, appendix II. After category (5) (o) the following are added:

(p) Construction equipment.

(q) Mine warfare equipment.

(r) Bridging.

(s) Psychological warfare equipment.

HAROLD K. JOHNSON,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
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Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.