THE FRENCH COLONIAL MIND

VOLUME I
FRANCE OVERSEAS
Studies in Empire and Decolonization

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and Tyler Stovall

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# Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments ix

Introduction: Mapping the French Colonial Mind xi

*Martin Thomas*

**PART 1**

*Colonial Encounters and Imaginings of Empire*

1 Reflections on the French Colonial Mind 3

*Patricia M. E. Lorcin*

2 Intellectuals for Empire? The Imperial Training of Félicien Challaye, 1899–1914 26

*Emmanuelle Sibeud*

3 Colonial Minds and African Witchcraft: Interpretations of Murder as Seen in Cases from French West Africa in the Interwar Era 49

*Ruth Ginio*

4 The Colonial Cosmology of Fernand Braudel 72

*John Strachan*

5 Mental Maps of Modernity in Colonial Indochina during World War II: Mobilizing Sport to Combat Threats to French Rule 96

*Anne Raffin*

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PART 2
Language, Culture, and Communities of the Colonial Mind

6 Anticlericalism, French Language Policy, and the Conflicted Colonial Mind in Cameroon, 1923–1939
KENNETH J. OROSZ

7 Information and Intelligence Collection among Imperial Subjects Abroad: The Case of Syrians and Lebanese in Latin America, 1915–1930
MARÍA DEL MAR LOGROÑO NARBONA

8 Religious Rivalry and Cultural Policymaking in Lebanon under the French Mandate
JENNIFER M. DUECK

9 France’s Arabic Educational Reforms in Algeria during the Colonial Era: Language Instruction in Colonial and Anticolonial Minds before and after Algerian Independence
JAMES D. LE SUEUR

PART 3
Administrators and the Colonial Mind after World War II

10 Thinking Like an Empire: Governor Henri Laurentie and Postwar Plans for the Late Colonial French “Empire-State”
MARTIN SHIPWAY

11 Recycling Empire: French Colonial Administrators at the Heart of European Development Policy
VÉRONIQUE DIMIER
12 Friend or Foe? Competing Visions of Empire in French West Africa in the Run-up to Independence

TONY CHAFER


TODD SHEPARD

14 Rigged Elections? Democracy and Manipulation in the Late Colonial State in French West Africa and Togo, 1944–1958

ALEXANDER KEESE

List of Contributors

Index
Preface and Acknowledgments

Historical inquiry is often predicated on deceptively simple questions, one of which is “Why did people do that?” Answers are typically formulated around a combination of internal motivations and external factors: prevailing socioeconomic conditions, calculations of personal or political advantage, national security requirements, ethnic loyalties, or other cultural norms. The question of the objective sought becomes more urgent when the action taken appears, at least to the contemporary observer, hard to justify. Thus we tend to be more engaged by the actions of history’s wrongdoers than by those of the well intentioned, who remain, for many, historically dull. Does the work of European colonialists fall into that category of historical wrongdoing? Superficially at least, the answer must surely be “yes.” Imperial conquest and a colonial domination founded on racial differentiation and exclusion is indefensible on numerous grounds. Yet to scratch the surface of colonial history is to reveal countless ardent imperialists for whom colonialism was self-evidently virtuous, morally unimpeachable, even ethically imperative. Thus we return to our opening question: “Why?”

The external factors mentioned above provide answers, but not a comprehensive explanation of imperialists’ motivations. To reach that, we need to think about the components of their cultural outlook, the sources of their attitudes toward such issues as nation, race, ethnicity, gender, and religion. In short, we have to look deeper into the colonizers’ minds. It is the purpose of this book and its companion volume, *The French Colonial Mind, Volume 2: Violence, Military Encounters, and Colonialism*, to explore these questions.

The two linked volumes of *The French Colonial Mind* originated in
a conference held at the University of Exeter’s Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies over a sunny spring weekend in April 2007. Hosted by the Centre for the Study of War, State, and Society, the conference was generously supported by the Leverhulme Trust and the University of Exeter’s Department of History. It is a pleasure to acknowledge their support here. The two anonymous readers who each read the manuscripts for each volume did a wonderful job in pointing us to additional lines of enquiry. Robert Aldrich helped clarify the conference’s organizing theme, and his outstanding work over many years was a key inspiration for it. Ruth Ginio also kindly read my introductions to both volumes and, as usual, made incisive suggestions about how to improve them. As editor, I would also like to thank Claire Keyte and Andrew Thorpe at Exeter and Heather Lundine, Bridget Barry, Joeth Zucco, and Jim Le Sueur at the University of Nebraska Press for their invaluable help in bringing the project to fruition. Editing is sometimes regarded as a rather thankless task. That has certainly not been the case for me, for which I thank all of the contributors to *The French Colonial Mind*, as well as our outstanding copyeditor, Jane Curran. Producing the volumes has been a real pleasure and a rich source of insight into the many facets of French colonialism. I’ve learned a lot and enjoyed myself doing so. I hope that readers will derive something similar from the chapters that follow.
Introduction

Mapping the French Colonial Mind

MARTIN THOMAS

What is the French colonial mind? The proposition that there existed a collective conscious, or unconscious, thought process—a universal mind of French colonialism—that influenced, determined, or otherwise affected key decisions in the colonial encounter may appear ambitious to the credulous, ludicrous to the skeptic. There were, of course, countless supporters of imperialism, thousands of empire administrators, seemingly endless colonial minds. Yet, whether treated in the singular or the plural, investigating the mind—or minds—of colonialism promises valuable results. Why?

Historians typically search for links between extraneous factors and personal motivations in seeking to explain why individuals, groups, institutions, or governments acted in particular ways. Central to this is the mental universe—the outlook or worldview—of those involved in the events or decisions analyzed. The challenge facing scholars of empire is to study the commonalities among colonial minds while acknowledging the dangers of oversimplification. Attitudinal formation and the derivation of shared ideas are critical, often revealing more subtleties than stereotypes. As Susan Bayly has argued in relation to Paul Mus, one of France’s most reflective and influential thinkers on the cultures of the Indochinese peninsula, careful interrogation of the idea of “colonial minds” challenges the generic applicability of the stock terminology familiar to scholars of colonial history, from “civilizing mission” to...
“Orientalism” and notions of the Other. Even in the case of the other turn-of-the-century Francophone empire, King Leopold’s Congo Free State, the once widely accepted notion that the early paths of Belgian imperialism were reducible to the beliefs and desires of a single royal mind has now been exploded. Confronted with diverse peoples and practices, Belgium’s imperialists, like their French cousins, “had multiple ‘others’ against which to define [their] identity.” Their responses were as multifaceted as the cultures they encountered. As in the Belgian case, so in the French, the suggestion that the connections between mental processes and identity formation could be precisely mapped or, more ambitious still, reduced to singular generic characteristics, might also raise scholarly eyebrows. Yet, strip these ideas down to their essentials, to their individual components, and the colonial mind quickly becomes an essential and familiar analytical tool. For colonial mind-sets, individual or collective, were products of their cultural environment and their historical moment. Seen in this light, study of the colonial mind—or minds—builds on the body of work regarding cultures of empire, which ranks among the fastest growing and the most dynamic in the field of colonial history.

It has, for instance, become almost inconceivable that a general history of empire and its rulers could be written without consideration of social mores and cultural practices, of habit, tradition, and custom, as well as politics and economics. Colonial minds made possible what Ann Stoler has termed the “imperial formations” on which the legal, institutional, and cultural bases of colonial discrimination were built. The legitimization of discrimination and coercive extraction derived from commonplace ideas among imperialists of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries who, as Stoler puts it, justified “imperial guardianship, trusteeships, delayed autonomy, temporary intervention, conditional tutelage, military takeover in the name of humanitarian works, violent intervention in the name of human rights, and security measures in the name of peace.” Imperial formations, the product of shared presumptions and cultural norms, determined the forms of knowledge production regarding colonial societies within European imperial states. As a result these formations provided the building blocks with which to construct what Roland Barthes termed “the myth of French imperialism.”
This rhetoric of order from chaos, of cultural elevation within the fabric of “greater France,” achieved widespread currency among politicians, intellectuals, and the wider public in twentieth-century France. The underlying anxieties and unspoken fears of colonial officials only too aware of the actual fragility of their colonial presence, were rarely articulated in bureaucratic reports and government correspondence. And yet, as Stoler has again shown, such insecurity was deeply embedded in the very processes of reportage, surveillance, and segregation that helped make colonial rule inherently exclusionary and repressive. Investigating colonial attitudes helps us decode the bombast so common in official colonial documentation. They reveal the gaps between the self-assurance with which empire was represented as a force for good on paper and the persistent doubts and fears among officials daily confronted with a majority population unremittingly hostile or, at best, indifferent to their claims of imperial improvement.

The few individuals, largely at the extreme left of the political spectrum or among the literary and artistic avant-garde, who opposed such representations of empire resorted to shock tactics in their efforts to persuade French opinion that colonialism was anything but benevolent. Initially, at least, few took notice. Far more influential were the changing patterns of academic engagement with empire, which lent intellectual weight to the belief that France pursued a higher imperial purpose than mere strategic, economic, or political advantage. The role of such empire-oriented disciplines as social anthropology, psychology, and ethnography is now placed squarely alongside the perhaps better-known academic specialties—classical history, geography, and Darwinian biology—as determinants of European imperialist credos. Understandings of the physical challenges of living and working in arid, tropical, or otherwise forbidding colonial climates were shaped by the belief, increasingly prevalent in France and Britain from the mid-nineteenth century, that successful colonization demanded mastery of the science of acclimatization. Focused primarily on the exploitation of unfamiliar flora and fauna and on conquering the physiological problems, diseases, and other maladies encountered by Europeans in the colonial world, an underlying assumption behind acclimatization’s scientific precepts was that Western science could tame the colonial environment, harnessing it to European ends.
Introduction

Yet, while such scientific colonialism emboldened French colonizers to persist in the face of physical adversity, it was widely accepted that the unfamiliarity and daily hardships of life in the colonies could destabilize the European mind. Empire was dangerous, not just physically but also psychologically. Fears were stoked in the realms of the imagination, fueled by both penny-press scaremongering and academic treatises produced on both sides of the English Channel in which a strong tendency developed, particularly evident in the medical context, to “sensationalize” the pathological threats inherent to Africa especially. Prolonged exposure to life in the colonies could wreck the mind as much as the body, producing that quintessentially colonial malady, “tropical neurasthenia.” Aside from the menace of disease and mental breakdown, as one of our contributors, Emmanuelle Sibeud, has argued elsewhere, the social dangers that colonies and empire service presented were very much constructed by the colonizers. The colonial officials, doctors, missionaries, and other quasi-professional ethnographers who tried to codify the cultures with which they came into contact are now rightly seen not merely as the observers of colonial society but also as its creators. Yet colonialism was a complex process, often dependent as much on collaboration as on conquest. The legal codes, customary practices, and economic transactions it generated rested on cultural borrowing. Only through the co-option of traditional elites and the compliance of thousands of local clerks, translators, and other adjuncts did colonial “administration” become possible at all. A sustained colonial presence rested more on hybridity—cultural and administrative—than ruling officials cared to admit. Little wonder then that nineteenth-century racial theorists, Gustave Le Bon and Arthur Gobineau prominent among them, depicted colonial expansion and the resultant intercultural contacts not just as transformative but also as corruptive of the innate superiority of the French.

If Le Bon and Gobineau represented one, particularly ugly, extreme of French reflections on colonialism, the administrators, soldiers, artists, and academics who viewed empire in more positive terms were no less prone to misconception. Whether anthropological, sociological, or ethnographic, their observations were necessarily artificial. Their attempts to make sense of the unfamiliar drew on preexisting ideas,
often on comparisons with other, foreign examples of phenomena that appeared in some way similar to what now confronted them. All were exterior points of reference, a reminder that colonial minds, like any others, came laden with presumptions. Moreover, those being observed were not just abstract “subjects” of enquiry but living subjects of colonial rule.¹⁷ How, then, could they be considered dispassionately on their own terms? All this is to suggest that concepts of modernity and cultural authenticity, of state formation and capitalist economic organization in dependent territories, each of them central to our understanding of what colonialism involved, require prior consideration of the intellectual and attitudinal basis of European imperialism. As historian Frederick Cooper has recently observed in the context of French imperialist opinion after World War II, to comprehend colonialism, one must address how European imperial nations began “thinking like an empire.”¹⁸ Colonial minds, French or otherwise, are now integral to the study of empires, nations, and “natives.”¹⁹

Identifiable commonalities of outlook—the product of education, career background, or lived experience—help us to grasp why those in positions of colonial power acted as they did, whether as governors, as economic overseers, as missionaries, or, conversely, as critics of empire. Certain aspects of imperialist thinking will always be integral to such analysis. Examples include attitudes toward an imperial “mission civilisatrice” or a “white man’s burden,” the changing philosophical and ideological justifications advanced for colonial rule, the borrowing of administrative practice and juridical form from other colonial environs or from other imperial rivals, and the intellectualization of race theory.²⁰ As Robert Nye has pointed out, racist ideas, anxiety about ethnic mixing, and dire eugenicist predictions of societal degeneration were not confined to the extremist margins of European intellectual thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Quite the reverse: such ideas featured in a whole raft of scientific, medical, and political writing, gradually transferring into the mainstream current of ideas in France and elsewhere.²¹

Nowhere was this more apparent than in the minutiae of colonial codes of practice, whether administrative or commercial, military or legal. As Emmanuelle Saada has argued, just as colonial law made French
prestige an inviolable concept, so it provided new legal frameworks to help police racial boundaries. Such restrictions cut both ways: on the one hand, sleights on the honor of colonial officials were a serious criminal offense; on the other, French officials were increasingly expected to exercise sexual self-restraint to conserve their “dignity” as members of the ruling elite.22 Parallels might be drawn here with their brethren in the business community, although European traders and managers rarely faced the same level of sanction for “misconduct” toward their contacts and employees.23 If the sexual preoccupations of certain fonctionnaires are now well known, other recesses of the colonial mind remain less explored. Beneath the horizon of landmark decisions of policy and principle the professional, social, and familial milieus inhabited by colonial officials, soldiers, educators, religious orders, or settlers also molded responses to the workaday challenges of colonial life, whether at the level of high policy or at that of personal interaction with indigenous peoples.24 Understood as the study of attitudes, presumptions, and expectations, investigating the colonial mind thus becomes something achievable and useful: an attempt to unpick the constituent parts of imperialist (and to a degree anti-imperialist) thought and daily practice.

So is this really a collection of essays about colonial mentalities? Building on the Annales School’s approach to histories of the everyday, historians of mentalities have tried to codify the formative influences of social customs, religious observance, education, the use of language, and other behavioral norms in configuring habits of mind. Theirs is a view of history that considers cultural practice one of the key determinants of social action. What people do reflects how they have been conditioned to think, whether at an intellectual or an emotive level, and this process is in turn driven by identifiable influences such as those referred to above. Cultural outlooks, or mentalities, imperceptibly formed over the long term, are thus judged to have a greater bearing on human action than the more episodic and transient political events that have typically predominated in historical enquiry.25

Does it follow that a study of colonial minds must take mentalities and the antipolitical history leanings of the Annales as its starting point? Not necessarily. Several of the chapters in both this volume and its partner, Violence, Military Encounters, and Colonialism, combine ap-
preciation for socioeconomic change and formative cultural influences with abiding concern for the political “event history” disparaged by the Annales School. If anything, the essays in both volumes demonstrate the interactions between the two, between patterns of behavior and individual agency within the events described. Taking a cue from international history’s obsession with the mutually reinforcing presumptions of bureaucratic elites, several contributors here look beyond the politicians and colonial governors supposedly at the apex of French imperial rule to consider the derivation of their ideas and policy choices. The “unspoken assumptions” of colonial actors are every bit as important as those of the high political actors that James Joll examined so carefully in tracing the attitudes of mind—the “worldview”—that drove them into taking fateful decisions for war in 1914.

Mary Lewis called recently for historians of empire to look beyond the binary oppositions of metropole and colony, colonizer and colonized, to recognize the connections between internal societal dynamics and wider international rivalries. It is a welcome rallying cry that several of the chapters in this and its partner volume take up, acknowledging that French colonial attitudes and practices were neither entirely forged in French-ruled territory nor solely with French geopolitical interests in mind. Put differently, as Lewis herself has demonstrated, the local and the international were always linked. French colonial bureaucrats, wherever they were posted, usually acted in ways that were recognizably French, but that often displayed other inflections—perhaps born of their earlier career paths in different countries, perhaps derived from rulings, treaties, or other limitations imposed by international organizations such as the League of Nations. Equally, colonial subjects were just as likely to respond to the colonial presence in ways that mirrored their own experiences of the foreign. These experiences were as many as they were varied but include such dislocating factors as intermarriage, slaving, itinerant trading, seasonal movements to different pasturage, and economic migration. The colonial world, in other words, was in some ways more cosmopolitan than some depictions of predominantly sedentary peasant societies allow. Rulers and ruled were, moreover, aware of the disruptive potential of rival imperial powers, whose presence across a nearby frontier or, closer to home, within the consulates, missions, and com-
mercial premises of the colony posed discrete challenges to untrammeled French domination. Whether at the international level of competition between states or at the transnational level of economic, cultural, and political ties between communities across imperial boundaries, colonial rule could never shut out extraneous influences. Indeed, as Frederick Cooper and Jane Burbank have convincingly demonstrated, one of the things that made empires such durable political units was their capacity to accommodate diverse peoples, traditions, and practices. Foreign experiences, foreign presences: both affected colonial minds.

If not uniquely French in its derivation, colonialist thinking was, first and foremost, elitist in its most fundamental presumption that hierarchy and the uneven distribution of power were both politically essential and ethically defensible. While French colonial minds provide our focus here, the contributors accept that these elite figures and the decisions they reached were subject to multiple influences, domestic, colonial, and foreign. The goal then is to connect cultural assumptions with political outcomes, the origins of prevalent colonialist ideas with the practical consequences of such thinking.

Another consideration comes into play here. Perhaps, as with international systems, so with colonial empires; political actors, whether backroom officials or leading politicians, do not begin from the proposition that they can bend the system/empire to their will but start from a recognition that the system/empire sets narrow limits to what could realistically be achieved. And constraints on action could be financial, economic, or technological rather than narrowly political or military. As this implies, ruling empire was not simply a matter of bilateral relations between metropolitan center and colonial periphery. Several contributors in both of the Colonial Mind volumes have more to say about the transnational, about substate interactions across political (or colonial) frontiers than the high politics of French colonial policy. Theirs is a view of empire in which rigid divides between mother country and colony, between individual colonies, or between governors and governed cannot be sustained. The model of a honeycomb recently proposed by Patricia Clavin to help define transnational relationships is useful here. Bounded and interlinked, but with discrete spaces in which particular activities were performed, the honeycomb view of transnational imperial relations
has much to commend it. Yet at the risk of stretching a point, just as in a beehive, so within an empire, the colony is ultimately bound together by service to a single authority. As other contributors in this volume make plain, studying the queen bees can be rewarding. High-policy initiatives sometimes provided the clearest—and most significant—evidence of the material impact of attitudes and presumptions. Whether investigating those in high office or those working on the peripheries of empire, colonial minds, it seems, are not easily confined within any of history’s subdisciplinary boundaries.

Set in the context of the French colonial empire, this analysis of intellectual formation inevitably engages with debates about the nature and purpose of empire, about the real and the imaginary in French colonialism. Some of these arguments—regarding the relationship between republicanism and imperialism, about the place of Christian religion in colonial settings, about the social consequences of economic development—are of long standing. All were central to colonial policies and actions from at least the early nineteenth century onward. Their centrality to the study of colonial history, rightly, persists. Other debates—about the social construction of ethnic difference, about the exploitative aspects of colonial gender relations, about the forms of violence (physical, psychological, cultural) inherent to colonial domination, about memories of empire and the commemoration or memorialization of decisive colonial events—are more contemporary, demarcating and sometimes dividing scholars of the “new imperial history.”

To be sure, thinking about what put the “colonial” into French minds cannot alone provide a comprehensive understanding of empire. The very term “colonial minds” suggests an analytical preoccupation with the derivations of attitude and the connections between underlying assumptions and colonial actions among the insiders within various imperial projects, whether official, military, corporate, or cultural. Such a precise focus has potential pitfalls. Perhaps the most obvious is, almost by definition, less engagement with the minds of colonial subjects than with the rulers of empire. But maybe such rigid distinctions are misleading anyway. Consider, for a moment, an example from another empire—the British. In 1960, three years before Uganda’s independence from Britain, Murray Carlin, an instructor at Makerere College, wrote the following:
Introduction

What we are practising at Makerere, day in and day out, . . . is the subversion . . . of the African mind; the breaking down of mental tissues; their reconstruction in the Western mode; the reordering of thoughts, feelings, habits, responses, of every aspect of the mind and personality. This is what we are doing, and cannot avoid doing—that is the core of our activity.35

At the time, Makerere College was the sole establishment of higher education in British-ruled East Africa. The implication in Carlin’s words that the capacity of Makerere staff to reorder African minds was a one-way process was hardly remarkable. Yet here as elsewhere, it was not just the colonized whose outlook was transformed by colonial encounters. Those theoretically charged with molding or monitoring African opinion were profoundly influenced by the subjects of their gaze.36

As in the British Empire, so in the French, colonizers’ ways of thinking were fluid, subject to change in response to colonial experience. But what of those with little direct exposure to life in the colonies? Numerous French ministers, senior officials, influential business figures, soldiers, or intellectuals had important things to say about empire even if their personal encounters with it were limited. Theirs could still be “colonial minds,” colonialist in outlook because of the apparent ease with which they dismissed the opinions of dependent peoples. Except for those moments of crisis when insurrection threatened the colonial state, there was, for example, little appreciation among leading metropolitan policymakers of the “everyday forms of resistance”—the go-slows, non-compliance, verbal opposition, and tax avoidance, among numerous other things—by which peasant agriculturalists or industrial workers registered their hostility to colonial rule in a middle ground between outright rebellion and functional acquiescence.37

Awareness that numerous colonial minds condemned the overwhelming majority of unrepresented Africans, Asians, and others to silence, to bear mute witness as mere pawns in a grand imperial design, is therefore critical to any reading of colonialist attitudes, presumptions, or prejudice. And as Greg Mann has warned us, to forget this one-sidedness is to risk reproducing the very colonialist presumptions about African practices that the analysis of colonial minds should expose.38 Another
potential limitation of any work centered on the study of individuals and the roots of their ideas is that the impersonal, the structural forces driving processes of colonial change may also be overlooked. Attaching greater weight to plans, projects, and the origins of imperialist thinking risks leaving in the shadows long-term social change, economic transformation, international pressures, and other “macro” factors that perhaps played as great a role in making empire what it was. Perhaps—but as many of the essays collected here indicate, it need not be this way. Studying the ideas of French imperialists does not suggest that cultural diffusion—the spread of ideas and normative standards—was purely a one-way process. Looking at the French side of the colonial equation and taking individual agency seriously in doing so does not imply disregard for dependent peoples. Nor does it indicate a rejection of structural approaches to social change, political economy, or the impact of the prevailing international system of the day. To take but one example, it is surely impossible to understand French concerns about the productivity, the cost, and the insurrectionary potential of workers on the rubber plantations of southern Vietnam without appreciating the underlying economic processes that led to their proletarianization.39 In this case, the cultural meets the political at a fundamental level.

Investigations of the cultures that produced colonial minds may complement structural approaches, not supplant them. Moreover, as Joachim Görlich has noted in the context of recent ethnographic analyses of colonial Oceania:

These studies concentrate mainly on the cultural practices of colonized groups. The colonial authorities are frequently represented as undifferentiated, as a homogeneous, hegemonic power block, and characterized only as instigators of transformations. However, this perception is too one-sided and does not do justice to the complexity and dynamism of the colonial encounter.40

Görlich is surely right. Just as the colonized defy simple categorization, so colonial minds were never entirely monolithic, nor did they come to colonial situations or economic relationships with ideas fully formed. To borrow Andrew Zimmerman’s telling Bourdieu-like phrase

xxi
in relation to colonial anthropologists, “the field constructs the anthropologist” as much as the anthropologist constructs his or her field.41 Put differently, ethnographic knowledge, much like other forms of knowledge about colonial societies, combined presumption and experience, subjective expectations and real encounters.42 Broadly speaking, such is the finding of George Trumball, whose incisive analysis of French ethnographers at work in Algeria after 1871 pinpoints the limitations of such encounters:

Defined through relations of participant-observation enmeshed in unequal power relations, colonial ethnographies trace the histories, above all, of interactions. The behaviors and beliefs of many Algerians remained occluded, outside of the purview of ethnographers. Hence, colonial ethnographies, like all administrative archives, perhaps overemphasize zones of contact and interaction.43

Nor were such interactions confined to academic fieldworkers observing colonial societies. Officials and settlers were also marked by their colonial surroundings, by the political situations they confronted. They were subject to conflicting ideas and emotions about what they saw or what they did.

Moreover, imperial decision makers, like any other individuals, were also affected by social relations within the particular professional milieu in which they operated. Elites have their own internal hierarchies, whether within government, within the armed forces, or within religious orders and educational organizations. Pause for a moment to think about the apex of French colonial hierarchy: the Ministry of Colonies. How did the permanent staff of that ministry relate to other, more senior departments of government with far larger budgets and more influential personnel, and how did this change over time? Without a formal ranking of ministries or a binding system of British-style “collective responsibility” by which it was expected that all ministers should support government decisions, how was consensus reached—and by whom—about the direction of colonial policy? If there was no common agreement at all, then which individuals or groups became the final arbiters of state—and colonial-state decision making? Sometimes these decisions did not stem
from elected representatives, but from within state bureaucracy or from elite lobby groups collectively described as the “Parti Colonial.” Sometimes colonial governments habitually defied central authority in Paris. What clearer evidence of dissentient colonial minds could there be than the notorious, disastrous insubordination of the so-called Saigon clique of senior officials and military officers grouped around High Commissioner Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu that sped headlong into war with the Vietminh in 1946 in open defiance of their nominal political masters in Paris.44

Another question we have to ask is thus how politicians related to permanent officials whose specialist expertise could be both intimidating and excluding? And beyond the walls of government, how did business elites interact with bankers and major overseas investors? How significant was the common ground between these commercial figures in shaping ideas about empire, particularly within the highly sectarian and yet oddly cohesive interest groups of the Parti Colonial?45 Finally, beyond the boundaries of elite interest, was there room for the general public either in France or in the colonies to make their collective presence felt in the mental worlds of the powerful? If so, are we talking, at least before 1945, about the mobilization of predominantly male, predominantly bourgeois opinion, or about something more intangible: French society and what it would, or would not, tolerate being done overseas in its name, but without its express consent?

Most colonial encounters between Europeans and local populations were, of course, ostensibly remote from state action. These, too, could reverberate beyond those immediately involved, influencing wider attitudes to empire and the purposes it served. For increasing numbers of well-to-do French families of the early twentieth century, the empire was not only a source of national pride but also an exotic tourist playground, a tapestry of colorful places to visit and different cultures to “sample.” For the less affluent, the heroic, the exotic, and the titillating were recurrent features of the empire-themed films that pervaded French cinema from the early 1920s to the last days of decolonization. In these recreational realms, too, colonial minds were at work. To take one telling example, the colonial authorities employed leading illusionist Jean-Eugène Robert-Houdin in the 1850s to tour Algeria. Beguiling
local notables with mesmerizing tricks, Robert-Houdin was also em-
ployed to demonstrate the chicanery of sufi marabouts whose claims to
mystical powers were thrown into question by the magician’s sleight of
hand. Here were colonial minds at work. The presumption that Algeri-
ans were peculiarly susceptible to supposedly supernatural, miraculous
sights meshed with the official determination to prove the superiority of
French rationality and the hollowness of Muslim alternatives by playing
with the magician’s art.  

Deeply rooted—and deeply flawed—cultural presumptions rendered such bizarre methods normal. The use of Robert-
Houdin pointed to what would become a common pattern. Whether in
the production of official guidebooks that depicted colonial subjects and
imperialist achievements in particular ways, in the exploitation of com-
mercial opportunities to generate new sources of revenue from tourist
encounters between French visitors and colonial populations, or in the
distinct racial and economic taxonomies that differentiated the French
from their fictionalized colonial subjects on the cinema screen, colonial
subjects were rendered explicable to imperialist minds through two-
dimensional stereotypes.

And these stereotypes were crudest of all in the sphere of popular leisure. These changing forms of recreation and
popular “consumption” of imperialist ideas also influenced—and were
influenced by—the promotion of empire in mainland France, something
that required the engagement of French metropolitan minds with the
colonial project.

A final element to consider here is the national aspect of colonial
minds. That changing forms of popular imperialism were connected
with the development of imperialist attitudes may seem self-evident,
but were the forms or the processes involved uniquely French? As Mat-
thew Stanard has recently observed, such were the commonalities in
attitude toward colonial peoples, dreams of colonial riches, and imper-
ial obligation to “civilize” colonized groups across nineteenth- and
eyearly twentieth-century Europe that it is perhaps impossible to discern
uniquely national imperialisms. These were viral ideas, fast spreading
and seemingly irresistible; their original source was difficult to trace.
In this sense the French colonial minds studied in this volume may of-
fer scholars some means to hold a mirror to their equivalents in other
European imperial states.
These multifarious and unquantifiable composite elements of attitude formation make our task complicated enough, but there is another level of analysis entirely. Perhaps the minds of political leaders were largely made up before they faced the countervailing pressures of ministerial responsibility, party interest, financial market pressure, or voter verdicts. Should we see the agglomeration of competing external demands on decision makers as secondary to the preexistent attitudes of mind with which they approached colonial issues? A lofty politician or colonial governor, even a lowly police officer or missionary educator, might be subject to local political pressure to act in certain ways, but more influential still might be their underlying outlook in regard to the actions they were expected to take. To use the most obvious example, few questioned the notion that in colonial societies white Europeans and nonwhite indigenous populations would—and should—be treated differently. Such attitudes were often the product of ingrained prejudices and racial assumptions that owed more to family background, cultural milieus, educational experience, religious dogma, contemporary writings, and—conversely—to ignorance of any alternative way of thinking, than to specific instructions from higher authorities that could be located in time and place. Long years of reinforcement of such assumptions through social, familial, and professional contact with like-minded individuals carried greater weight than the more sporadic, unorthodox suggestions of a minority that such attitudes might, perhaps, be misguided.

Thus we return to the importance of studying colonial minds to help us unravel the ways in which material alternatives were understood and approached. Actions, choices, and decisions rooted in culturally derived attitudes and practices had lasting political consequences.

These consequences, moreover, lasted beyond the formal end of colonial rule and in some ways endure still. Consider for a moment the recent struggles between politicians, media commentators, and academics over the ways in which the French colonial past should or should not be represented in French schools. Or witness the contretemps between former French president Jacques Chirac and his Senegalese counterpart Abdoulaye Wade over the past contributions and present-day pension rights of West African former servicemen of the French colonial army. Or simply look no further than the paternalist language
still commonplace in French official pronouncements about former dependencies, of which French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s otherwise conciliatory speech to Senegalese students at the University of Dakar on 27 July 2007 was but one among many. All of these examples remind us that studying colonial minds is not just history, but a matter of current affairs.

This collection of essays and its partner volume on colonial violence take as their starting point the proposition that thought precedes action, its multiple forms notwithstanding. In certain circumstances—for instance, prior to the launch of a crucial policy initiative or the establishment of a trading company, a mission school, or a hospital—this reflective process could run to months and years, its twists and turns traceable in the archival record. In other cases—from decisions about where to settle, with whom to socialize, and how to behave in the company of different ethnic groups or in different communal settings—the “thought” involved requires more delicate unpicking. These were decisions more likely to be recorded in personal correspondence, in diaries, or in intimate conversation; often they were not recorded at all. Yet the importance of such decision making is hard to dispute. Collectively, these patterns of social behavior among the French communities of empire—the settlers, officials, and others who asserted their pride of place within colonial society—molded the ways in which empire developed politically, economically, and culturally.

Aside from this concern with the connections between thoughts and patterns of behavior, the chapters that follow suggest that thought is, to varying degrees, conditioned by habits of mind. Such habits were—and are—strongly affected by familial upbringing, educational background, or the social or professional networks in the context of which the actions discussed took place. What unites them is their concentration on what lay behind the decisions or the actions investigated, what made them possible, indeed probable, and, in some cases, even inevitable. Some of the events discussed are well known, others far less so. But in their focus on the derivation of ideas and the often unspoken assumptions of colonial elites, the essays cast new light on themes familiar to scholars of colonialism in general, and French colonialism in particular.
In the opening chapter of volume 1 Patricia Lorcin reflects on the interpretive slants that might be applied to the term “colonial mind” or its collective equivalent, “colonial minds.” She reviews the themes that emerge strongly across the two volumes, picking out points of convergence and divergence, as well as other aspects of imperialist attitude formation that might be further explored. Her chapter is also the prelude to the four essays in the first section of volume 1, all of which examine various facets of “Colonial Encounters and Imaginings of Empire.”

Picking up from Patricia Lorcin, in her contribution Emmanuelle Sibeud revisits the issue central to the entire volume: was there ever a definitive French colonial mind? Her questioning goes further. If, indeed, there was an identifiable, collective “colonial mind,” how far were intellectuals a part of it? How far, indeed, did they shape it? She answers these questions by focusing on an individual career, that of Félicien Challaye. Born in 1875, Challaye came to public attention after returning from Savorgnan de Brazza’s mission to the French Congo. His ferocious criticism of colonial abuses in Central Africa and the sensational impact of his writings give the lie to a kind of “absent-minded” imperialism in the early Third Republic, suggesting that there was no lack of enthusiasm for empire, no lack of contested debate over its human costs, among the country’s political and intellectual elite. Challaye was certainly no thoughtless imperialist inured to the cruelties of colonial rule. Yet he accepted the principle, even the inevitability, of colonial expansion, seeing it as a process that could not be resisted, only controlled. His attitude to empire was conditioned by the need, as he saw it, to regulate relations between exploiters and exploited. This led him to place empires and individual colonies in a hierarchy covering the spectrum from good to bad colonial governance. These ideas would become central to liberal and eventually Socialist thinking about the possibilities of “humanist” imperialism, marking him out as an intellectual architect of the French imperial mind.53

Ruth Ginio explores the imagination of colonial minds run wild in her examination of French colonial perceptions of African witchcraft.54 She does so by focusing on allegations of ritual murder and consequent
criminal trials in French West African criminal courts during the 1920s and 1930s. As she points out, colonial obsession with African witchcraft revealed far more about French fears and stereotypes than about the African societies being observed. Witchcraft, and especially what were defined as “witchcraft-related crimes,” elicited a stream of inquiries, some official, others quasi-scholastic, which brought administrators and academics together as amateur ethnographers.

Ginio’s chapter considers two instances of this process at work. It focuses first on Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1938), a French philosopher who wrote extensively on what he defined as the “primitive mind,” and second on Marcel Prouteaux, a future governor whose interwar career began as a serving commandant de cercle in Côte d’Ivoire. Prouteaux mounted the largest official investigation hitherto attempted of witches’ secret societies within his territory. It emerges that these two men thought very differently about African religion, African social organization, and African minds. Examining their writings comparatively, Ginio reduces their opposing viewpoints to two core differences: the capacity of Africans to think and act according to French precepts of logic, and the utility of prosecuting witchcraft cases in enhancing colonial state control. Where Lévy-Bruhl accepted the former and dismissed the latter, Prouteaux did the reverse. His more apocalyptic vision of West African witchcraft as a twentieth-century echo of Europe’s premodern witch crazes proved the more influential—and damaging—as more alleged cases of ritual murder went through the colonial legal system.55

John Strachan’s essay revisits the place of empire, in this case, Algeria, in the intellectual formation—the colonial minds—of two of France’s most preeminent historians of the twentieth century: Fernand Braudel and Charles-André Julien.56 Braudel spent most of the 1920s and early 1930s in the colony, taking teaching posts at lycées in Algiers and Constantine to help fund the completion of his doctoral research.57 Julien’s family had moved to Algeria from Caen in 1906, and their liberal, Dreyfusard leanings helped define his critical outlook toward the iniquities of colonialism that he saw around him. If Julien was always the academic heretic, drawing the hostile attention of the security services for his persistent attacks on colonial government, Braudel was slower to appreciate the social injustices of colonial rule. He did, however, take issue with the
Mapping the French Colonial Mind

study of history at the University of Algiers, which during the interwar years was dominated by an ethnocentric, Latin perspective on the history of North Africa and the Mediterranean. In his adoption of the *longue durée* perspective on the history of Mediterranean cultures, Braudel marginalized—and thus implicitly criticized—the French colonial presence, which he identified as but a fleeting moment in historical time.

Focusing on wartime Indochina under Vichy rule, Anne Raffin demonstrates another side to the colonial encounter and its effects on official minds. She discusses the place of administrative inspection visits as intelligence-gathering exercises in which the potential for a transfer of knowledge between governors and governed was all too often missed. The papers of Governor-General Admiral Jean Decoux reveal remarkably little interaction with Vietnamese, whether members of the indigenous elites or not. Indeed, his accounts of inspection tours recount his impatience with the subtleties of indigenous cultures and traditions. Raffin takes this as her starting point for a broader consideration of Vichy’s “official mind” in Indochina. She posits that there was a classic administrator “type,” an official class prone to misperception about the peoples of Indochina. The recurrence of stereotype and the enduring reluctance to accord value to indigenous forms of social organization suggest that at certain times and in certain locales such “types” often came to prominence. Raffin proves the point by focusing on the relationship between Governor Decoux and his fellow naval officer, Maurice Ducoroy, appointed head of the Vichy-style youth organization in Indochina. By mobilizing Vietnamese youth into Vichyite organizations and attempting to foster a new style colonial patriotism through sport and other “character-building” activities, Ducoroy’s policies rapidly backfired.58 Far from providing a safe, apolitical outlet for youthful energies and so retarding the development of political consciousness among the young, mobilization sharpened the very sense of national belonging that the colonial authorities were anxious to prevent.

The second section of Volume 1, “Language, Culture, and Communities of the Colonial Mind,” contains four essays that address the parts played by education, media of instruction, and bonds of community in forging colonial minds.59 Kenneth J. Orosz’s assessment of conflict and
Introduction

competition between state and missionary educators in the Cameroon mandate exposes the bitter disagreements over suitable educational practice for colonized minds. He begins from the proposition that however one chooses to define such a constituency, the language of instruction was uniquely influential in transforming those to be educated. He proves the point by focusing on the Mandate’s early years, during which an intense, sectarian war was fought over language policy between the dominant missionary groups in the territory: the Catholic Spiritains and their Protestant missionary group rivals. Many of the latter established their schools during the preceding German colonial era, although they were largely staffed by British and Americans.

The central argument that divided these groups concerned the medium of instruction in primary school teaching. Determined to recast the minds of young Camerounais in a French Catholic image, the Spiritains’ espousal of French instruction clashed with Protestant mission groups, which insisted that progress could be achieved only by teaching in the African vernacular languages of Cameroon. In spite of French state backing for French language instruction, the Spiritains underwent a fundamental change of mind in the mid-1920s, accepting that their spiritual and political message was more effectively delivered in vernacular form. As Orosz shows, these language wars and their effects, both on missionary minds and on those of the children to pass through mission schools, compel us to think about the very basis of colonial implantation, specifically about how colonial ideas were composed and transmitted.

María del Mar Logroño Narbona’s contribution analyzes neglected, but substantial, communities of colonial minds: the thousands of Syrians and Lebanese settlers, mainly commercial traders, living across Latin America in the interwar years. French acquisition of the Syria and Lebanon Mandates in 1920 engaged these communities directly. Furthermore, the fact that some 20 percent of all Syrians and Lebanese lived outside the Levant aroused deep concern in the French security services, stirring fears that these emigrants would become focal points for anticolonial sedition, nationalist ideas, and hostile propaganda. Concentrating on Latin America, Logroño charts the efforts of French diplomatic and police agencies to monitor these overseas Levantine communities and their links with families and acquaintances “back home.” The French
thereby sought to control the movement of knowledge between the mandates and their emigrant communities as well as the movement of people, money, and goods between the two. Logroño’s examination of this French preoccupation with emigrant opinion suggests that we should conceptualize the Levant mandates in demographic terms—as peoples—rather than in merely geographical terms as distinct territorial locations.

The Levant mandates are also the focal point for Jennifer Dueck’s chapter, which highlights differential state treatment of confessional groups in Lebanon, something that helped determine patterns of social and political change in the mandate. She analyzes the connections, professional and personal, between leading French and Lebanese educators and political actors, the cumulative result of which was to reinforce the power of the Maronite Patriarchy. Importantly, however, Dueck points to growing friction between Jesuit, Catholic, and Maronite religious and educational institutions as their minds became fixated on the prospect of Lebanese independence in the years immediately preceding World War II. Catholic, especially Jesuit, institutions were, above all, anxious to conserve the status and privileges of their religious and educational institutions whereas the Maronite Patriarchy was more broadly animated by the consolidation of Maronite dominance within the political elite of an independent Lebanese nation state. In her discussion of these mounting rivalries and differing political and cultural priorities, Dueck argues that French efforts to build consensus—a shared colonial mind—between Lebanon’s French Catholic and Maronite hierarchies was doomed to failure.61

Algeria is the site for the last essay in this second section. James D. Le Sueur echoes the preceding essays in arguing that issues of language and identity were both inseparable and paramount in Algeria’s colonial and postcolonial politics. Propagating the use of French, imposing strict language requirements, and denigrating local languages as inferior or obsolete were all weapons used by officials in the centralization of colonial power and the marginalization of precolonial cultures. Favoring certain languages over others was also integral to the practices of divide and rule, not least between Berber and Arabic-speaking populations in North Africa.62 Conversely, as Le Sueur points out, for nationalists in numer-
ous colonial and postcolonial locations an urgent political priority was to supplant the inauthentic language of the colonizer—English, French, Portuguese, Afrikaans—with the authentic, local indigenous languages that had for years been marginalized, even prohibited. Algeria’s Front de Libération Nationale considered this task pivotal to the rediscovery of the country’s Arabic and Arabo-Islamic civilization. Arabization began under Ahmed Ben Bella in 1964 but was pursued with greater intensity under Houari Boumediene when a process of what Le Sueur dubs “de-frenchification” gathered pace.

Matters did not run smoothly. Le Sueur detects a disjuncture between the Arabophones who had been trained and educated according to the tenets of the Arabization program, but who nonetheless could not secure the same level of administrative posts or other employments next to those who were fluent French speakers. Le Sueur then turns his attention to the colonial authorities in the last days of French Algeria. Ironically, they too turned to Arabization from 1959 onward, hoping that by doing so they might reconcile Algerians to a continuing French presence. It was also hoped that widespread adoption of a distinct Maghreb Arabic, as opposed to standard Arabic, would render Algerians immune to the attractions of pan-Arabism and Egyptian-style radicalism. These goals proved unrealistic. Thwarted by the practical obstacles and political barriers to such a program, French-controlled Arabization did not get far. It nonetheless tells us much about colonial minds in the final years of French Algeria as the pursuit of linguistic and cultural integration acquired greater urgency in the face of the apparent radicalization of the Arab world.

The five essays in the third and final section of volume 1 discuss what might be termed “official minds.” Each examines changing forms of imperialist thinking among French colonial administrators after 1945. Martin Shipway investigates one of the most influential actors in the reconfiguration of the French Empire as French Union between 1944 and 1947. His subject, Henri Laurentie, director of political affairs in the Ministry for Overseas France, was a key figure in the postwar reconstruction of empire and the immediate origins of the Franco-Vietnam War. Yet, as Shipway indicates, while Laurentie was a central actor in these
events, he remained strangely detached from them. Apparently an administrative insider, Laurentie was more the outsider intellectually—too liberal, too radical, and, in some ways, not enough of a “colonial” mind to secure acceptance of his ideas. His position was, in this sense, analogous to that of the minister who would build on many of Laurentie’s ideas, the veteran Socialist Marius Moutet, who would, in turn, find himself marginalized once the scope for radical reform in the Indochina Federation diminished as the territory edged closer to war with France in 1946. As Shipway makes clear, Laurentie’s brief ascendancy during the late war years came to an abrupt halt even earlier, in September 1945. It was then that Laurentie dared to suggest that government reform plans, such as the March 1945 colonial declaration that he had helped draw up, were unfit for their purpose.

What lay behind this spectacular change of colonial mind? Shipway demonstrates that the answer lies in Laurentie’s distinctive administrative background. He was neither a career colonial official with years of field service nor a graduate of the administrators’ training college, the École Coloniale. As a result, Laurentie’s view of empire was always more cosmopolitan and comparative than specialist and local. Laurentie’s case was more typical in other ways, however. For one, he exemplified the dichotomy between administrative insider and political outsider that so often marked out colonial officials. Close to the center—even at the center—of power in their own locale, the empire’s senior administrators found it harder to influence elite political opinion in metropolitan France. Sometimes, as in Indochina, this impelled them to backstairs intrigue. In other instances it left officials feeling overlooked and ignored. In this sense, Laurentie offers a model of a certain sort of official: high-minded and farsighted certainly, but frustrated by the mundane realities of French coalition politics, inter-agency wrangling, and the scheming of lesser officials in Saigon. His was a frustrated colonial mind, its insights squandered by the political actors and governing officials to whom Laurentie reported.

Véronique Dimier’s contribution puts a different perspective on the “official mind” of French imperialism by investigating the part played by former colonial administrators in the overseas aid agencies of the European Community. She points out that, while such officials had
Introduction

rarely applied indirect rule in practice while serving in the empire, some of them eventually did so while administering European Economic Community (EEC) development aid. As Louis Sicking, another student of colonial influences on the EEC, has recently pointed out, “France thus joined two different communities in 1958: the EEC and the Community with its overseas territories. There was no question of a divorce yet. In the perception of some, this was more a case of bigamy.”68 That France was able to sustain this bigamous relationship with the EEC and its fast decolonizing black African territories was largely thanks to the former colonial officials that populated key offices of the EEC. As Dimier makes plain, it is thus possible to read the work of colonial minds even in the founding constitutional documents of European integration and European development aid to Africa. Her analysis ranges from the provisions of the Treaty of Rome to those of the Yaoundé Convention and, later still, the Lomé Convention of 1975. This date marks the endpoint of her analysis, as it was at Lomé that British officials wrested control of development aid from their French counterparts.

The picture was much different beforehand, as Dimier demonstrates. Initial European economic development provisions were entirely modeled on the French postwar colonial development scheme. Hence the recourse to colonial terminology and associationist precepts, styles, and practices that continued into the 1960s and even into the 1970s. Aid policy was therefore couched in a paternalist language of European support for emergent former dependencies. This was not, of course, a purely African phenomenon; witness, for example, the continuities in “developmentalist” thinking across the European colonial territories of Southeast Asia from the 1920s to the 1960s.69 But it was certainly in black Africa that the EEC presence was strongest. Echoing the work of Christophe Bonneauil, Dimier illustrates that European aid to several newly independent African countries repackaged a string of state-driven development schemes informed by colonial era presumptions about the supremacy of western scientific rationalism and the continuing African requirement for European guidance.70

In another replication of erstwhile colonial practice, development aid administrators toured former colonial territories in order to cement relationships with client rulers and politicians. In Dimier’s words, not
only was the European Community’s early aid policy colonial in origin, but it also was implemented by “colonial administrators at a distance.” The result of this domination of administrative offices by colonial minds was what Dimier terms a new “sedimentation of empire.”

Where Dimier traces French colonial thinking forward from the immediate postwar period, Tony Chafer’s essay begins by looking backward from the perspective of the early Fourth Republic to colonial policymaking in Francophone West Africa immediately before World War II. He notes the extent to which pre-1939 precedents remained central to the delineation and implementation of post-1945 colonial reform. That said, the postwar period brought to the fore a host of factors that reconfigured colonial administrative practice. Among the most important were the new bureaucratic agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental, created to administer economic development, to monitor labor conditions, and to supervise political reform. Like Dimier, Chafer highlights the significance of the 1946 French colonial development program, the Fides. Its implementation led to the emergence of a whole new raft of colonial bureaucracy. So, too, did the establishment of the colonial Labor Inspectorate (Inspection du travail), studied by Frederick Cooper.

These new bureaucracies remolded official attitudes toward long-term structural change across French West Africa. For example, whereas before 1939 the African worker was typically depicted as a transient phenomenon to be tolerated but not encouraged, after 1945 state agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) presupposed that increasing industrialization and proletarianization were inevitable. But if colonial minds were changing, Chafer also argues that colonial policy became less coherent as the proliferation of groups with a stake in governmental decisions, not to mention the emergence of stronger, more cohesive nationalist groups, introduced greater complexity to the policymaking process. There was, for instance, intense rivalry between the Inspection du travail’s universalist ethos, which posited that French and African workers should eventually be treated comparably, and the majority of colonial government officials who adhered to associationist thinking, preferring traditional solutions to local problems. Implicit in this argument is that the new institutional mechanisms devised after 1945,
which were meant to achieve policy coordination, were inadequate to the task—that the official mind of French imperialism had broken down into fragmentary elements.

Todd Shepard’s essay also connects past precedents to changing conceptualizations of empire. He does so by analyzing political debate in Paris and Algiers over the scope and purpose of “integrationism” in postwar Algeria. As Shepard notes, although formal French adoption of the term “integration” is usually traced back to Interior Minister François Mitterrand’s January 1955 announcement of French policy in North Africa, both the idea and the terminology had longer antecedents. In a fascinating discussion, he links integrationist thinking, most famously and most doggedly espoused by anthropologist-turned-Algerian governor Jacques Soustelle, to earlier variants of the policy in mainland France, in the United States, and, most notably in Soustelle’s case, in Latin America. Central to the integrationists’ argument was the contention that France did not possess an empire. Rather, it was an empire: hence their preference for the term France mondiale, “global France.” Shepard’s forensic exploration of the intellectual roots of integrationism, and the increasingly tortuous thinking of its proponents as the Algerian revolution proceeded, reveals how certain of the brightest colonial minds within France’s governing elite struggled to devise viable institutional practices and citizenship reforms, the avowed, if unfulfilled, purpose of which was a “deracialized imperialism.”

Alexander Keese’s contribution, the final essay of volume 1, moves us south of the Sahara once more. He investigates the French colonial mind through the prism of elections and electoral procedures in the post-war years preceding decolonization’s perhaps artificial 1960 endpoint in French West Africa. Elections took place with remarkable regularity in the final years of colonial rule throughout this vast region, widening the circle of African populations able to participate in differing levels of territorial representation. The process culminated in 1956–58 as votes took place, first over the French enabling law (Loi Cadre), and then in referenda on membership of the French “Community” of Francophone African states. Superficially at least, this might be construed as a triumph of gradualism and democratic inclusion—a vindication of reformist colonial minds. Not so. Keese makes plain that the reality
of electoral practice was altogether different. As fears of organized nationalist opposition intensified, so the rigging of elections assumed new forms. Keese reflects upon what this indicates, taking issue with British imperial historian Kenneth Robinson’s identification of a “French style” of dealing with “natives” wishing to vote. In analyzing the methods by which colonial authorities sought to control the outcome of elections, Keese’s judgment is subtler. While he highlights the prevalence of state coercion, financial corruption, and manipulation of opinion, he also concedes that in certain instances officials were prepared to countenance a free vote. His essay demonstrates that detailed study of these colonial elections is an excellent vehicle for analysis of the gradual alteration of official minds as resistance to decolonization diminished over time. With the curtain fast descending on France’s empire in Africa, it is also a fitting point to close this first volume of essays on facets of French colonial minds at work.

Notes


3. As examples, see Nicholas Thomas, Colonialism’s Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government (Cambridge UK: Polity, 1994); Frances Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands Indies, 1900–1942 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1995); Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Catherine Hall, ed., Cultures of Empire: Colonizers in Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830–1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2001); Andrew S. Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back? The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Harlow UK: Longman, 2005); Pascal Blanchard and Sandrine Lemaire, eds., Culture coloniale: La France conquise par son empire, 1871–1931 (Paris: Editions
Introduction


4. Indeed, David Cannadine’s Ornamentalism, one of the most innovative and popular such histories, discusses traditions and imaginings of empire to the virtual exclusion of “high politics.” Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose also privilege cultural understandings in assessing empire’s impact on British society and identity in their recent edited collection, At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2–3, 18–25.


Mapping the French Colonial Mind


18. These comments draw on Frederick Cooper’s indispensable Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), especially chap. 5, “Modernity,” which contains by far the most comprehensive survey of social science, subaltern studies, and colonial history writing on the interrelationship between colonialism and modernity. For the “thinking like an empire” discussion, see Cooper Colonialism in Question, 153–54.


20. See, for example, Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930 (Stanford:
Introduction


26. Regarding this tension between long-term social processes and individual agency in key political events, see Zara Steiner, “On Writing International
27. The study of “unspoken assumptions” was pioneered by James Joll, who coined the term at his inaugural lecture as professor of international history at the London School of Economics; see Joll, *1914: The Unspoken Assumptions* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968).


29. The ways in which Tunisians exploited these foreign presences to mitigate the effects of French rule are expertly dissected in Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming).


Introduction


43. George Trumball IV, An Empire of Facts: Colonial Power, Cultural Knowledge and Islam in Algeria, 1870–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4. I am grateful to the author for the opportunity to see an advance manuscript copy of this book.


53. Sibeud goes much further here than Eric Savarese’s influential *L’Ordre colonial et sa légitimation en France métropolitaine* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998), which does not focus squarely on these connections.


Mapping the French Colonial Mind


60. French fears were sharpened by the fact that Muslim emigrant returnees might undermine official efforts to rig census results in Lebanon in order to contrive a Christian majority in the territory; see Rania Maktabi, “The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited: Who Are the Lebanese?” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 26:2 (1999), 219–41.


More common in the terminology of international history, the idea of an “official mind,” of an identifiable bureaucratic consensus derived from shared cultural background and educational training, has also been a staple of French colonial history since the publication of William B. Cohen’s landmark book, *Rulers of Empire: The French Colonial Service in Africa* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971).


Todd Shepard here expands on arguments he put forward in *The In-