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Wyclif and Lollardy

Stephen Lahey

John Wyclif’s place in the history of Christian ideas varies according to the historian’s interest. As scholastic theology, Wyclif’s thought appears an heretical epilogue to the glories of the systematic innovations of the thirteenth century. Historians of the Protestantism, on the other hand, characterize him as a pioneer, the “Morning Star of the Reformation,” acknowledging his theology and the Lollard and Hussite movements associated with it as forerunners of sixteenth-century change. It has been difficult to understand Wyclif as a man of his age because the late fourteenth century itself is easily viewed as a period of transition from “Late Medieval” to “Early Modern.” Recent scholarship has helped to change this by showing how the decline of systematic Thomism and Scotism, the developing Ockhamist Moderni movement, and a vibrant Augustinianism contributed to form an atmosphere in which Wyclif’s theological innovations were a recognizable, albeit unorthodox, expression of the period. The beginning of the fourteenth century saw a shift in the practice of theology, from the magisterial Summa to an interest in terminist analysis of specific theological problems. Theology had become “mathematized,” reduced to a set of problems soluble through examination of the concepts involved. Ockham’s Moderni movement is most associated with this methodological shift, and most theologians of the period, whether philosophical Ockhamists or not, embraced it. Robert Holcot and Adam Wodeham are among the best-known analysts of terms, concepts, and propositions associated with understanding the divine nature and attributes, and the psychological elements of human willing, loving, and enjoyment relevant to merit and grace, among other problems.

Ockham’s approach to the thorny problem of divine foreknowledge and future contingents is particularly significant for understanding later fourteenth-century theological controversy. Ockham believed his account of divinely known future contingent truths preserved the contingency of the future action without detracting from God’s perfect knowledge; further, he argued that the human will was capable of actively eliciting its enjoyment of God above all things. If our will achieves this through its own agency, independently of God’s foregoing causal knowledge, critics responded, the Pe-
lagian heresy in which one can merit grace through one’s works is resurrected. The most notable of these critics was the Mertonian Thomas Bradwardine, whose *De Causa Dei* argues that God predestines all created action, including all human willing; no one can will without God having eternally willed that they will as they do.

Bradwardine’s determinist position is important not only because of its effect on academic treatments of merit, grace, and the future contingents problem into the sixteenth century; it also highlighted a revival of Augustinianism at Oxford that achieved its fullest expression in Wyclif’s thought. The Paris condemnations of 1277 had set the stage for an increase of interest in orthodox Augustinian theology, and theologians of the following years like Gregory of Rimini emphasized the need for faithfulness to Augustine’s writings over *Moderni* innovation. In Oxford, Uthred of Bolton had formulated a position redolent of the controversial Pelagianism, and Rimini’s disciple John Klenkok imported the new Augustinianism into England to combat Uthred. The influence of the Augustinian, or “Austin,” friars in Oxford was instrumental in helping to transport Augustinianism across the channel, particularly in the form of arguments specifying the need for grace for any just exercise of authority. Giles of Rome’s papalist *De Ecclesiastica Potestate* was the first to formulate this thesis, and effectively denna the new Augustinianism. Giles’s arguments were particularly appealing to the Irish scholar Richard Fitzralph, whose *De Pauperie Salvatoris* responded to Franciscan Minorites using Giles’s contention that grace alone justifies authority, in this case, over temporal goods. Fitzralph’s innovation was to introduce the term *dominium* to the discussion, making grace-founded *dominium* an important concept in mid-fourteenth-century Oxford. By mid-century, despite the depredations of Black Death, theological discourse at Oxford was lively, enriched by Bradwardine’s determinism and Fitzralph’s Augustinianism; scholars like Richard Brinkley, Thomas Buckingham, and Peter of Candia enjoyed an atmosphere in which philosophically innovative Augustinian theology could flourish.

Wyclif arrived at Oxford from Yorkshire in the 1350s, and following an education in the systematic theology of Thomism, Scotism, and the new learning of the *Moderni*, he rose to become Master of Balliol College and his generation’s foremost logician and realist metaphysician. He began theological studies in 1363, and was ordained six years later. As was then common for ordained scholars, he held benefices in Lincolnshire, Buckinghamshire, and Gloucestershire while at Oxford, until 1381, when he retired to Ludgershall, Leicestershire, where he died in 1384. While these facts suggest a placid life as scholar and rector, events in Wyclif’s life and his own inability to accept compromise on the priest’s ecclesiastical responsibilities led to a tumultuous career. He entered the service of John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, in 1372, representing the Crown at negotiations with papal nuncios in Bruges in 1374, and supported Gaunt in parliamentary disputes in 1376 and in the Hauley-Shakyll incident in 1378. Shortly after he began his royal service, Wyclif decided that he was obliged to turn from metaphysics to more practical matters. “It is time for me to give the rest of my life to matters as much speculative as practical, according to the capacity that God has given.” So his writings shifted from the academic pursuits of pure
logic and metaphysics to the need for ecclesiastical reform, the right relation of secular to sacred authority, to issues of fraternal and papal responsibilities, Scriptural interpretation, and the Eucharist.

Wyclif’s earlier writings on the need for royal divestment and control of the English Church earned him lasting ecclesiastical antipathy. In 1377 Bishop William Courtenay attempted formally to confront Wyclif but was foiled by popular unrest. Shortly thereafter Gregory XI demanded Wyclif’s arrest and examination, and Courtenay attempted again in 1382 to force Wyclif into submission at Blackfriars, where 24 propositions characterizing Wyclif’s ecclesiology were condemned as heresy. In each instance, the Duke of Lancaster’s protection ensured Wyclif safety in what would otherwise have been life-threatening confrontations. The Council of Constance declared Wyclif an heresiarch in 1415, unjustly condemned and burned the Bohemian Jan Hus for having espoused Wyclifism, and ordered Wyclif’s remains to be exhumed, burned, and thrown into the river Swift. Connections between Wyclif’s realist metaphysics and his ecclesiological ideas were sufficiently evident to scholars in Prague to prompt them to embrace his ecclesiology after having accepted his ontology, which played an important role in the tumultuous Hussite rebellion of the fifteenth century. Following Constance and the defeat of the Hussites, there were no significant instances of this realism again in the scholastic tradition.

Most twentieth-century scholarship of Wyclif’s theology has been predicated on the influence of his earlier philosophical writings on his later, more practical theology. Indeed, throughout his logical and metaphysical treatises one occasionally catches glimpses of Wyclif’s mounting frustration with the state of the Church, while his formal philosophy undergirds many of the arguments of the later treatises, occasionally resurfacing in his arguments for the need of logical training in interpreting Scripture and understanding the Eucharist. While Wyclif did not disagree with Ockhamism on many points, including sensitivity to the relation of language to thought and to extralinguistic reality, he adamantly rejected Ockham’s denial of the existence of universals outside the mind. In fact, he felt that advocacy of such a spare ontology contributed to society’s downfall. “Thus, beyond doubt, intellectual and emotional error about universals is the cause of all the sin that reigns in the world.” Wyclif contended that God knows creation primarily through universals and only secondarily as individual creatures. This need not entail the existence of some realm of universals apart from divine and created being; universals exist primarily in God as second intentional concepts and secondarily in created essences as first intentional concepts.

While Wyclif accepted the reality of traditional universals like genus and species and so on that had been introduced to scholasticism by Boethius and disputed in the schools for centuries beforehand, he departed from contemporary realists like Walter Burley and Gregory of Rimini by arguing that universals are the foundation for relations as well. Thus, any relation holding between creatures has a reality beyond the creatures themselves; its being is founded in God’s conception of the paradigm of that relation. Hence, Adam’s paternity relation to the rest of humanity is real
through God’s conception of paternity as such and its connection to Adam’s being as the first instantiation of the species Man. In this sense, Wyclif explains, all mankind existed potentially in Adam by virtue of his causal priority as the first father. This is a radical departure from the Aristotelian understanding of relations, and was to have important consequences for Wyclif’s conception of the Church and of human dominion in creation. Certainly the most obvious consequence has to do with salvation; if some will be saved and others damned at judgment, some will have a relation of “justification through grace” to their Creator that others will lack. And while the “justification” relation is a consequence of how the saved act, it has reality by virtue of God’s understanding of justification and who will enjoy it. “The entire species of man is complete through God’s mediation, and … the multitude of the predestined are one genus, whose principle is the celestial Adam [Christ], while all the damned are a lesser generation, whose father and prince is the devil.”14 As a result, Wyclif’s relational realism involves a deterministic theology evocative of and reliant upon Bradwardine’s anti-Pelagianism.

Bradwardine held that God’s perfect foreknowledge and omnipotence meant that every created action is directly caused by God’s participation in the activity. Indeed, Bradwardine held that this coeffiency of activity extends to cases of human sin; here. God’s moving causal primacy is as much a cause of the mechanics of the physical act of the sin as is the sinning agent. Only the sinner’s will acts alone, although in any case in which the created agent wills the good. God’s causal power moves along with the agent’s willing, and is the reason why it is good.15 Wyclif felt that Bradwardine’s position could too easily be taken to eliminate the possibility of merit and demerit in human activity, suggesting that clarity about the necessity with which God foreknows future events dispels theological error.16 The means by which Wyclif addresses this determinism is distinguishing between the kind of necessity by which God knows who will be saved and the kind of necessity of truths not dependent upon created action, like mathematical or definitional truth. That God necessarily knows who will be among the saved is undeniable, but a consequence of the activity of created wills.

This could suggest that God’s knowledge is caused by created events, compromising the divine essence’s perfection. Wyclif hastens to distinguish between the way in which our knowledge is causally reliant upon and temporally consequent to created action, and the way in which divine knowledge is eternal, and so neither temporally consequent to, nor causally reliant upon, temporal events. That we will freely, God eternally wills with absolute necessity, but how we will is only hypothetically necessary. Although God eternally knows, and wills, that I will X at a given time, I might have willed otherwise then, in which case it would have been absolutely necessary that God know and will that I will otherwise. Our action only has causal power over eternal knowledge after the fact; there is no reduction in God’s power, because as eternal knower God is prior ontologically to creation. So while there is a sense in which our action “causes” divine knowledge, that sense does not entail contingency in the divine nature.17
Wyclif’s metaphysical realism about relations is important not only because it illustrates how Wyclif’s thought diverges from Bradwardine’s, but also because it provides the theoretical framework on which his ecclesiology rests. Two conclusions follow from it. First, God knows who are the Elect, predestined for salvation, and so the real members of Christ’s earthly body. This means that the true Church is the congregation of the Elect, free of sin and favored by grace through Christ’s redemption to live the ideal life. Anyone tainted by sin claiming membership in the church must be an imposter, and anyone so stained claiming ecclesiastical authority must forcibly be stopped. Second, every just action for which we are responsible is an instantiation of God’s justice, and every law-grounded relation we enjoy is only a real relation through divine law. These two concepts lead directly to Wyclif’s indictment of the existing Church’s hunger for secular authority, to his insistence on the need for clerical reform and for royal divestment of Church property, and to his contention that Scripture must be available in the vernacular for the proper instruction of the Elect on earth.

Wyclif’s conception of the Church’s identity is the foundation of his ecclesiological program. “The holy doctors are in agreement stating that all the elect are, from the beginning of the world to the day of judgement, one person which is the mother Church.” This definition of the true Church as the congregation of the Elect causes some problems, notably in determining exactly who are saved, and who are damned. That it is impossible to know who is predestined, Wyclif explains, should help us recognize that Church membership is no basis for claims of earthly authority. “Without a special revelation, no one should assert that he is predestined, and similarly, he should not assert that he is a member of the Church, or for that matter, its head.”

It follows that, if the Church is the congregation of the elect, whose identity remains unknown in this life, the need for clerical authority is likely to be decreased, if not eliminated altogether. It is tempting to interpret Wyclif as having endorsed the abolition of the priesthood altogether, given his claim that “all the predestined are at once kings and priests.” While this could follow from his definition of the Church, Wyclif explains that the Church has need of a class of “evangelical lords” who instruct Christians by teaching and exemplifying lex Christi. There is need for a clerical hierarchy of authority, however; bishops are useful primarily to prevent clerical abuse of authority, while the pope can serve as spiritual exemplar for the entire Church. The existing papal machinery of ecclesiastical control is an abomination, existing to attain and maintain the mundane power inimical to the priestly office. The arguments papalists present to justify this authority are without Scriptural foundation. Where in the Petrine commission is anything said of special powers of the absolution of sin or excommunication granted to some of Christ’s servants but not to others? “How dare anyone say that he alone has the singular power of absolving any sinner from punishment and blame?” Surely such authority is God’s alone to assign to as many as He will, without restriction. Nor is excommunication a tool for anyone to trifle with for their own ends, “for it is certain that anyone sinning mortally excommunicates himself, that is, places himself outside the community of the faith-
ful, and accordingly a minister of the church publishes that fact by denouncing the 
excommunicant and forbidding him from any communication with others in God’s 
name … [T]he Church today is without any foundation in pretending to excommuni-
cate to obtain temporal goods; neither the apostles nor any of Christ’s disciples knew 
that sort of power; rather than scandalize the church by demanding even the neces-
sities of life, … they would endure hunger, thirst, and scant clothing, and would set 
themselves to manual labor.”22 Throughout Wyclif’s works, he stresses that excommu-
nication is a matter between God and sinner, without need for clerical interference, 
that anyone claiming the authority to excommunicate pretends to divine authority, 
thereby indicating his or her own sinful state.23

Priestly authority may be necessary for guidance, but when priests assume that the 
office allows its holders secular power, they confuse two kinds of law. The Church is 
defined by Christ’s law, which is exemplified by Christ’s life and illustrated by the 
piety of the early Church. Secular power is different from spiritual authority, and 
the law that serves as its foundation is grounded not in Christ’s life, but in original sin 
and the institution of private ownership, from which Christ’s law liberates us. Those 
who accept the responsibility of instructing others in Christ’s law are bound, Wyclif 
holds, to obey it scrupulously, to turn away from the world’s temptations not only to 
strengthen their own spiritual resolution but also to embody the Christian life. Of pri-
mary interest for Wyclif is the clergy’s tendency to use their authority to wield sec-
ular power, from papal claims of superiority over emperors and kings down to the 
lowliest priest’s claiming ownership of property. While anyone can rationalize a hun-
ger for temporal goods by pretending to be concerned for the Church, they should 
not fool themselves. “Because they have cold intentions towards temporal goods for 
which they strive, they are hypocrites, as abominable to God as the tepid water which 
causes vomiting.”24

Property ownership is part of a concept that lies at the heart of Wyclif’s theology, 
*dominium*, which also includes jurisdiction and enforcing what is right. *Dominium* is 
the chief relation holding between Creator and creation, consequent upon God’s cre-
ative act, entailing His governance and sustenance of all things as well as His ulti-
mate authority in any action associated with ownership of creation, including giving, 
receiving, and lending any created thing. In fact, God’s *dominium* lies at the founda-
tion of anything in creation having the capacity to exercise any kind of power what-
ever. Recall that Wyclif held that all relations in creation are prefigured and ontologi-
ically reliant upon God’s being; the justice of any created being’s exercise of power is 
grounded in divine justice, and the actual exercise of that power is causally reliant on 
God’s willing that action. Hence, a creature’s having any capacity to give, receive, or 
lend, and to exercise jurisdiction or authority, is causally reliant upon, and prefigured 
by, God’s own *dominium*. In Aristotelian terms, any creature’s having, which Wyclif 
explains is the tenth category in Aristotle’s list of predicables, is reliant upon God’s antecedent having: “And the dominion of God … his lordship over every creature, is 
the principle of the final category.”25 So God’s *dominium* serves as a universal rela-
tion in which all created instances of *dominium* participate.
Wyclif describes God’s *dominium* in *De Dominio Divino*, the first major treatise he produced after having decided to turn his attentions to “more practical” matters. Here he explains that God’s *dominium* is the “standard and presupposition” for all relations involving jurisdiction or ownership in creation, including the natural lordship mankind enjoyed before the Fall, the evangelical lordship exercised by priests, and the coercive, civil lordship that characterizes secular power. “The lordship of God is the measure, as prior and presuppositum, of every other [lordship] assigned; if one creature has lordship over another. God has prior lordship over it, so any created lordship follows upon God’s lordship, and not otherwise.”

In keeping with his realist metaphysics, Wyclif explains that God’s *dominium* over creation is secondary to His *dominium* over the universals that provide its order and structure. This means that God knows and has authority over humanity as such before having it over individual people. And since God’s *dominium* is the paradigm for all created instances of lordship, it follows that *dominium* as such is ideally over whole classes of things, rather than over individual objects.

That the concept has come to mean the exercise of authority and ownership over particular things in the world illustrates how man’s understanding has been weakened by sin. As created, Wyclif explains, man enjoyed true *dominium* over creation, and the lordship Adam exercised was a true instantiation of, and participation in, God’s *dominium*. Characterizing this natural *dominium* was the absence of distinction between lord and subject as we have come to understand it; natural lords were as much servants as lords, because “all men have a dual nature, both elements of which, namely body and soul, serve the other in serving themselves, and they serve the just if the man is in a state of grace. Accordingly any man is corporally subservient to his spirit, and spiritually subservient to that of his brother, so he is at once lord and servant.” Any human being was a lord as much as subject in prelapsarian natural *dominium*, because nobody had a will bent on serving itself to the exclusion of God; thus, distinctions of “mine” and “thine” were foreign before the Fall. “Natural *dominium* extends across the entire world: heaven, earth, and the universe in which the heav-ens are contained … [it] requires no solicitude or looking after by any secular lord, janitor, or lesser minister, . . . [it] is not eradicable from human nature, despite the ob-stacles of sin.” The stamp of natural lordship remains with us even if the innocence in which we exercise it is lost, by virtue of the ideal exemplar humanity by which we have our being and are known primarily by God.

Sin destroyed man’s capacity for natural *dominium* by introducing the illusion of exclusive ownership, in which one selfishly assumes exclusive control of property. Since creation alone is the foundation for such exclusive ownership, and only God creates, this supposition is grounded in illusion. To claim unrestricted authority over what someone else has brought into being is to suppose that the other agent is capable of giving over absolute control of the object. But, Wyclif explains, it is impossible to abdicate *dominium* in this sense; bringing something into being entails remaining responsible for it throughout its being. The requirement of creation as necessary condition for ownership is based securely in Wyclif’s philosophical theology, in which
“God produces all works most principally, most immediately, and most exclusively … creatures do nothing unless previously motivated through and helped by God’s movement.” When God gives to us, He never loses control over the gift; God keeps all of creation in being, so what God gives remains to a real extent God’s. “Because God is omnipotent and His multiple creation is required by any creature, it follows that He cannot alienate through giving any of His gifts because of the plenitude of His dominion.”

Private property ownership is a fiction founded on the belief that God can abdicate His dominium over the owned sufficiently to allow the owner real control over it. Wyclif was certainly not the first to have suggested this; his theory of ownership is heavily reliant on the literature of the Franciscan Poverty Controversy, and distinctions between ownership, possession, and various kinds of use were fully developed in William Ockham’s Opus Nonaginta Dierum and in Richard Fitzralph’s De Pauperie Salvatoris. Wyclif’s understanding of the ultimate impossibility of exclusive property ownership among men and of the consequential artificiality of postlapsarian civil dominium is reliant on Fitzralph’s treatise, in places so much so that critics have accused him of having cribbed from Fitzralph. While there is no question that Wyclif made use of Fitzralph, the results of his incorporation of Fitzralph’s conception of dominium into his own philosophical theology are sufficiently original to rule out this accusation.

Until Christ’s coming, the specter of property ownership eliminated any possibility of man’s serving God as a natural lord. God would never deprive the just of any gift without recompense, and Wyclif argues that those made righteous through Christ’s redemption and His institution of lex Christi regain the lost natural dominium by living in the apostolic purity of evangelical dominium. “Man in a state of innocence had lordship over every part of the sensible world, and the virtue of the passion of Christ is [the basis] for righteous remission of all sins and for restitution of lordship, so the temporal recipients of grace have justly complete universal lordship.” Christ lived a communal life with the apostles, sharing everything in the caritas of His sinless nature, and those who follow His example, realizing through grace the restored caritas of apostolic purity, regain the natural lordship now called evangelical dominium. “For all men coexisting in caritas on this side of Christ communicate in the things over which they exercise lordship … since all members of the church hold unmediately their lordship from Christ their chief lord, which I call natural, evangelical, original, or grace-endowed lordship … restored by the gospel, beyond which any super-added lordship would be superfluous.”

It is difficult at this point to see why Wyclif would later attack the friars so vehemently, given the obvious similarities uniting his ideal of evangelical surrender of civil lordship and the mendicant ideal defended by Michael of Cesena, Ockham, and others. The theoretical seeds for his later indictment of the friars lie in Wyclif’s distinction between St. Francis’s ideal and Christ’s: followers of Francis are called Franciscans, while followers of Jesus Christ are not “Jesuans,” reliant upon the rule of a man, but Christians. In an order instituted by man, obedience of the rule may or may not be a nec-
necessary condition for grace, while a life faithful in Christ, a divinely-instituted ideal, is needed to receive grace. Franciscans follow a rule constructed by a man, while Christians live by Christ’s divinely appointed law. So long as the friars argue that Christians ought to surrender civil ownership to enjoy apostolic purity, they are correct, but when they suppose that their Order is the foundation for the righteousness of this purity, they err grievously. Wyclif’s later writings became increasingly directed against the Friars, whom he nicknamed “Caim,” an acronym referring to Carmelites, Augustinians, Dominicans (Jacobites), and Franciscans (Minorites). In the Trialogus Wyclif outlines the six chief evils perpetrated by the mendicant orders. They oppress Christians with the burden of their physical needs and the greedy prices they charge for their services as confessors, they avoid labor, they sully Christ’s law with impertinent additions that benefit themselves, they ignore the rebukes of non-friars, they hunger for wealth and worldly honor, and “what is worst of all, they seduce to their ruin in spiritual things those of the people who rashly put their faith in them.” Many of the shorter Latin pieces of Wyclif’s later life are directed against the friars, as are a considerable number of the vernacular tracts attributed to him.

We must not suppose that lacking private ownership is all that is needed to regain our lost birthright. There have always been poor people, but their suffering does not mean they live in the righteous state of prelapsarian man. The poverty characterizing evangelical dominium is a state of one’s spirit, and not only a matter of having or not having things. “Evangelical poverty has nothing to do with the possession of temporal goods, but [is a] mode of caring having, which augments wealth neither by increasing nor by taking away from it, just as on the other hand it neither augments nor decreases a privation of goods.” Evangelical dominium is so different from the civil dominium resulting from sin that defining it must not take civil elements into consideration.

The doctrine of natural dominium restored through Christ’s redemption of original sin provides the basis for Wyclif’s demand that all priests live in apostolic poverty and humility, removed from the taint of private property and secular authority, and for his contention that the king ought to bring this about through divestment of ecclesiastical authority and property. It would appear that the justification for royal control of the Church is precluded by Wyclif’s rejection of the justice of civil dominium, how can someone be sufficiently righteous to cleanse the Church when he embodies the institution caused by original sin? Had Wyclif desired, he might have argued as Marsilius had, for a complete separation of the two realms of Church and State, with secular authority having total control over all temporal goods. This was certainly how Gregory XI interpreted Wyclif, for the bulls condemning De Civili Dominio accuse it of Marsilianism.

Wyclif differs importantly from Marsilius, though, because his political theory is nested in his theology. The justice of civil rule is only real through participation in divine justice; De Civili Dominio begins with the motto “Divine justice is presupposed by civil justice; Natural lordship is presupposed by civil lordship.” Wyclif’s idea is that a just civil lord is just through grace, since, as he had argued in his philosophical theology. God’s will is the primary cause of a given individual’s acting justly. Thus it
is possible for someone to exercise proprietative and jurisdictive authority with God’s justice, but only if he is eternally foreknown to be among the Elect favored by grace. A just king, then, is first and foremost a member of the Church, but one who is not free to abandon the cares of civil ownership. His place is to serve as God’s minister in the postlapsarian world, a steward of temporal goods acting as a human lord on behalf of the interests of the divine lord.

Since the king is the minister of God, according to the correspondent eminence of virtue, it is clear that he should rule following the divine law by which the people are ordered. Since it is the part of justice to decline from evil and to do good, the king should coerce rebels against divine law and other authorities, and advance the factors of justice according to the laws of caritas. The king should have the power of ministratively ruling his subjects from God, and not by human law lacking divine sanction.39

Wyclif’s just king is the central aspect of a political theory that emerges from his ecclesiology, and is better understood as a follower of lex Christi shouldering the responsibilities of postlapsarian life on behalf of the other evangelical lords than as a secular officeholder.40 That priests have come to embrace the secular encumbrances from which Christ freed His flock is the greatest threat now facing the Church, and should be the king’s chief concern. This is because the king is as much Christ’s vicar as any bishop is, realizing Christ’s divinity to exercise dominium over physical goods just as prelates realize Christ’s humanity to exercise a different kind of dominium over spiritual affairs.

It is right for God to have two vicars in His church; namely a king in temporal affairs, and a priest in spiritual. The king should strongly check rebellion as did God in the Old Testament. Priests ought minister the precepts mildly, in a humble manner, just as Christ did. Who was at once priest and king.41

The cancer of private property ownership and its attendant hunger for secular authority was introduced into the Church by the Donation of Constantine, Wyclif explains, and can be purged only by a grace-endowed civil lord using his office as God intends to protect the Church from its own sin. Ideally, the Church would be nothing more than an apostolic community enjoying the purity of evangelical poverty, but circumstances require the intercession of secular authority. “It would be best for the Church to be ruled wholly by non-avaricious successors of the apostles following the rule of Christ; less good would be a regime mixed through with co-active secular civil powers and lords, but worst of all is when prelates rule who are immersed in the worries and cares of civil lords.”42

The place of the evangelical lord is to serve as God’s steward in spiritual concerns, just as the civil lord serves God in temporal matters. Evangelical dominium is the fullest realization of the natural dominium mankind lost with the Fall, and the evangelical lord is entrusted with the care for that which is most valuable in creation, the spiritual reality that undergirds earthly life. The Church as Christ’s living presence in the world is the vehicle by which this responsibility is carried out, and
those entrusted with it must focus their whole lives upon it. Priests are most precisely the stewards of Christ’s body, and “must give themselves in their service by promulgating, working, and manifesting such that they glorify God through their continued actions, taking this service upon themselves in humility.” These spiritual shepherds must lead their flock by embodying the caritas made possible by an apostolic life devoted to Christ’s law. “The pastor must instruct his charges through virtuous works so that they might live their faith as he does.” Accordingly, an evangelical lord living a vicious life fails to instruct his charges, ignoring his duties as God’s spiritual steward. And because of the exalted nature of spiritual authority, this kind of failure is far more onerous than secular tyranny or some more mundane transgression; the dignity of the office, and of the giver of the office, is defiled by an evangelical lord’s turning from his spiritual responsibilities, warranting readdress far more than does material iniquity.

The history of the Church embodies this failure. Initially the Church lived the ideal life of apostolic purity and poverty that had been revealed through Christ’s teachings and exemplary life, but the Donation of Constantine destroyed any possibility that this would continue on an institutional level. The Church had become yet another secular organ, “perverted by temporal affairs from the honor of caritas, as prodigal in rich ornament as civil and secular lordship, prone to more richness in food, families, and clothing … than the secular laity.” This wealth of material possessions makes evangelical lords incapable of the spiritual purity required by their office. “As one overburdened with a multiplicity of clothing is thereby oftentimes rendered un-fit for travel, so the man who is burdened with things temporal is often made less capable of serving the Church.” Wyclif frequently refers to material possessions as the vilest elements in the church, “the dung of the mystical body of Christ,” contending that nullification of the Donation and the divestment of ecclesiastical office of all material authority are the only means by which evangelical lords will be cleansed of this filth. If the well-being of the Church requires using material things, he suggests, then let it be sustained by alms provided by the grace-favored civil lords. The ecclesiastical industry presently thriving on this dungheap, the selling of benefices and indulgences, and the proliferation of canon law, a perverse monster created by grafting secular juridical practices onto the living body of lex Christi, all must be obliterated for the Church to realize its true identity. Then, Wyclif contends, the church will be able to instruct mankind through its exemplary caritas, and the war and confusion that now troubles the world will die away.

If, according to the Old Testament, it is licit and obligatory to remove a yoke that weights down a neighbor’s mule, much more so in the New Law should a brother’s soul not be burdened by the weight of so-called alms by which Christ’s religion is lost and dragged to the lower depths by the devil’s snare; and in these matters, we ought not to trust the appetites of sick men who have embraced in their need dungheaps in the Pauline sense. If, therefore, temporal possessions are necessary for us, let them be given to us according to the manner and measure the Gospel has determined; for then temporal possessions will be dispersed in the world as fruitfully as
the rains, and dissensions and wars and sects and other fruits of the flesh that the Apostle mentions will be laid to rest, and the word of God will enter ....

Our source for understanding Christ’s law is Holy Scripture, which is the source not only of all order in the Church, but the special link between the eternal logic of the Ideas understood by God and any understanding possible in the human mind. If Wyclif’s name is remembered at all in common parlance, it is as the first to have translated the Bible into the English language; however, contemporary scholars suggest that the Wyclif Bibles that have survived are likely not to have been the products of Wyclif’s own translating efforts, but the work of his disciples. This does not diminish Wyclif’s importance in the history of the place of Scripture in Christian theology, though; his theory of Scriptural interpretation was one of the key elements of the Lollard and Hussite movements, and remains a landmark of late medieval philosophical theology.

Augustine had long ago urged the primacy of Scriptural authority above all other sources of knowledge, and had argued that cases in which Scripture appeared to fly in the face of reason demanded greater perspicacity in Scriptural interpretation. What had changed by the late fourteenth century was the depth of logical analysis to which Scripture might be subjected; throughout Wyclif’s works on understanding the Bible, he rails against those who would use new-fangled logical tools to demonstrate the incompatibility of cold, clear Aristotelian reason with revealed truth. Every truth, however it might appear to conflict with Scripture, must be, if it is indeed true, found primarily in Holy Scripture. This, Wyclif contended, is because Scripture is the embodiment of the eternal logic of divine understanding, the source of all truth. Since God’s knowing a thing to be true is that by which the thing is true, and since Scripture is the primary source of every truth in creation, “all law, all philosophy, all logic and all ethics is in Holy Scripture”; if our reason judges something to be so, the foundation for that judgment must rest in Scripture primarily, and only secondarily in the operation of created reason.

Wyclif had early on argued that Augustine’s call for a careful interpretation of Scripture required a sensitivity to the fundamental truths of logic, suggesting that too many logicians had confused means with ends, making logic appear incommensurate with studying Scripture. A careful student of the relation of terms to objects will recognize the primacy of the ontological nature of the object to the truth of the term, and correspondingly, the primacy of the universal to the particular nature. The Ockhamist logicians erred in supposing that universals play no part in the signification of terms, which led to a misunderstanding of the nature of truth. Following Grosseteste, Wyclif argues that a term or word’s signifying force is dependent upon its conformity to that which it signifies, and since the first and most primary universal signification is the Word’s embodiment of the eternal ideas known by God through which creation occurs. Thus, the duty of the student of Scripture is to begin with a recognition that the Word of God is the perfect expression of, and universal in which, all created truths have their being.
In fact, the nature of Holy Scripture realizes a universal-particular relation. Scripture has five levels of being, of which four have an ideal, universal status instantiated in the physical book.

It has been my custom to list five degrees of sacred Scripture. The first is the Book of Life mentioned in Apocalypse 20 and 21. The second is the truths written in the Book of Life in their ideal being .... In the third sense Scripture means the truths which are to be believed in general, which, in their existence or effect, are written in the Book of Life. In the fourth sense Scripture means a truth to be believed as it is written in the natural book which is a man's soul .... In the fifth sense, Scripture means the books or sounds or other artificial signs of truth.\textsuperscript{52}

The physical book is not the end of the relation; the active participation of the individual, believing reader engaging with the text is the final instantiation of the chain that begins with the ideal truths understood by God. What I truly understand when I read Scripture is my mind's realization of an instantiation of the eternal Truth that makes use of the written medium of the Bible as a means. In fact, Wyclif holds that, as the source of all truth in creation, Scripture serves as the paradigm for any linguistic expression of the truth, and is the means by which God teaches man how to express all truth. "Scripture should be the exemplar of all types of human speaking, [since] it includes in itself every type of possible speech."\textsuperscript{53} As with any other true relation. God’s willing the reality of the relation is necessary for the understanding that blossoms in my mind instantiating the universal eternal Word, which means that grace is necessary for successful Scriptural understanding.\textsuperscript{54} Thus Wyclif identifies two elements necessary for understanding the truth of Scripture: the most basic element, the movement of the Holy Ghost in the reader’s mind illuminating the eternal truth that Scripture embodies, and secondly, schooling in logic and grammar sufficient to aid the reader in understanding how the words in the Bible refer to eternal truths. With these two elements, a Christian reading Scripture has no need of “authoritative” intermediaries explaining how to understand the truth it contains. “The whole of Holy Scripture ... is an infinitely greater authority than any other writings regarding its authenticating the propriety of human authors ....”\textsuperscript{55}

Since Scripture is the first and final authority, it must be available to all seekers of truth. Certainly without ready access to Scripture justice will be impossible in society, as is salvation for anyone deprived of the living Word of God.

It has been said that there should be a mirror of secular lords in the vulgar tongue by which they can rule in total conformity with the law of Christ... for Holy Scripture is the faith of the church and as much as it is plainly understood in the orthodox sense, so much for the better ... Similarly because the truths of the faith are clearer and plainer in Scripture than the priests know how to express, since many priests ... are ignorant of it while others conceal the points of Scripture which speak of humility and clerical poverty, it seems useful for the church that the faithful reveal this true sense .... In each language by which the Holy Ghost gives knowledge is the faith in Christ disclosed for the people.\textsuperscript{56}
Wyclif’s belief that Scripture ought to be available in the vernacular, and the movement to translate it that followed, are not all for which Wyclif is commonly remembered. While it is easy to report Wyclif’s denial of transubstantiation occurring during celebration of the Eucharist, it is not so easy to understand the complexity underlying his motivation for doing so. From one standpoint, Wyclif’s eventual rejection of transubstantiation, an explanation of Christ’s real presence at the Sacrament approved by Innocent III in 1215, can be explained as a rejection of the scholastic Aristotelian accounts propounded by Aquinas and Scotus based on his philosophical rejection of their synthetic Aristotelianism. In this account, Wyclif the philosopher denies the possibility that the substance of the elements are annihilated at consecration because it demands that one act entail two simultaneous yet independent movements: the bread ceases to be at the same instant and place that Christ’s body begins to be. Yet the schoolmen insist on calling this an act of conversion, which requires a subject in which the conversion occurs. What, Wyclif asks, is converted, if the bread’s substance is annihilated when Christ’s body begins? If one responds that the accidents remain constant while the underlying substance shifts, then it appears that our sense perception, the foundation of our understanding of the material world, might never perceive things as they are. The certainty of natural knowledge would vanish; how would we know that the perceived object X is not some other object Y with the perceptible accidents of an X? If the answer is that some accident-like quantity causes the other accidents to remain constant in the absence of underlying substance, the problem still exists: in what do these accidents inhere? If something, it must be substantial according to Aristotelian ontology, but if not, then nothing is the subject of conversion. The explanation that Wyclif’s rejection of transubstantiation grows out of his metaphysics has been widely accepted, but frequently followed by a dissatisfaction with the apparent vagueness of Wyclif’s alternative account of Christ’s real presence in the elements.

A different view is possible if one concentrates on Wyclif’s interest in redefining Christian authority through a reassessment of Scriptural hermeneutics. Throughout De Eucharistia Wyclif blasts “modern doctors” for having run roughshod over the distinction between the literal and figurative interpretations of Christ’s words. In too many cases theologians have twisted the ideas of the Evangelists and the Church Fathers to benefit themselves, thereby creating a tendency amongst prelates to value the words, the signifiers, rather than the truths signified. Did not Paul, Augustine, Rhabanus, and John the Damascene indicate that the sacrament remained bread and wine while signifying Christ’s body and blood? This fixation with appearances rather than true underlying meanings is symptomatic of a priestly disease that manifests itself in other forms, including a hunger for material goods, for political power, and an aversion to spiritual discipline. What is sorely needed, Wyclif believes, is an approach to Scripture guided not by earthly concerns but by a prayerful seeking of eternal truths. Attention to the fundamentals of proper logical analysis of Scripture is fundamental here; its absence leads to undue emphasis placed on pilgrimage, the cult of relics, and transubstantiation, all merely signs of eternal truth, not true in themselves. Here Wyclif the Scriptural commentator and ecclesiastical reformer proves the abuse
of clerical authority through examination of the biblical foundation for transubstantiation, making his redefinition of the Eucharist a vehicle through which his vision of a Church reborn can be realized.

While this interpretation improves on the view that Wyclif’s eucharistic doctrine is primarily philosophically motivated, by incorporating other elements of his theological vision, it requires a fuller understanding of his logic and philosophy of language than one might suppose. Underlying his arguments for correct interpretation of Scriptural language and of the relation of sign to signifier is an assumption that his audience is familiar with formal scholastic linguistic analysis, including supposition theory, the nature of denomination, and similar concerns of the late fourteenth-century Oxford schoolman. Nor is Wyclif’s logic the only concern. Recently Heather Phillips has argued convincingly that Wyclif’s “remanence” theory, in which Christ’s being has spiritual reality in the physical essence of the host, is best understood through an awareness of his interest in optics. Phillips explains that Wyclif’s alternative to transubstantiation incorporates the imagery of light and its refraction pioneered by Alhazen, Witelo, and Roger Bacon to explain how Christ’s being is wholly and really present in the host, just as an image is present in a mirror. While the object reflected is not itself substantially “in” the mirror, the mirror certainly undergoes a change such that the reflected object is really present in the mirror in a way that it is not when no reflection occurs. So it is with the Eucharist; while Christ is not substantially “in” the elements, they serve as mirror by which Christ’s being is really present in them when consecrated.60

Wyclif’s thought serves as the foundation for many Lollard doctrines, although attempts to trace secure ties from surviving Lollard writings to particular elements of Wyclif’s thought are bound to be affected by the movement’s shift from formal academic circles to popular vernacular preaching and debate. Nevertheless, in each of the three general areas of Lollard ideology—teology, ecclesiology, and politics—Wyclif’s theological influence is unmistakable. Lollardy, the popular English movement rooted in Wyclif’s theology, is divisible into three distinct periods. In the first, the “Oxford period,” from 1378 to 1413, the fates of Wyclif, his writings, and the careers of important figures in Lollardy are closely associated. The movement was recognized as sufficiently threatening to warrant parliamentary authorization of the death penalty for its members in 1401, with the enactment of De Heretico Comburendo. In 1409, Archbishop Thomas Arundel issued the Constitutions, which in its attempt to stamp out Wyclifism restricted all public preaching to licensed representatives of the episcopal authority. In 1413, Sir John Oldcastle and other rebellious knights, all of whom identified themselves with general tenets of Lollardy, rose unsuccessfully against Henry V. 1415 proved a significant year for Lollardy, for Wyclif’s writings were formally condemned as heresy at the Council of Constance just as the doomed Oldcastle revolt marked Wyclif’s disciples as guilty of treason. From 1415 into the 1560s, Lollardy was an underground movement associated with a host of anticlerical reformative preachers, firebrands, and common citizens situated largely in England’s northern counties. Thus, Lollardy was three things: at its inception, it was a movement among scholars and students at Oxford, at which point it was heretical; it be-
came a cause used by anti-Lancastrian knights, making it treasonous as well as heretical; finally, it waned but remained as glowing embers among the people in the north country, at which point it was mainly heretical again.\footnote{61}

Theologically, Lollardy embodies a reaction against much of the practice of late fourteenth-century Christianity. The cult of saints, the proliferation of clerical profit from administration of the sacraments, and a fondness for pilgrimage and image-worship, drew the ire of preachers and believers inspired by the spirit of Wyclif’s reforming zeal. Underlying all Lollard theology was the conviction that Scripture alone provides the basis for legitimate Christian practice. “It is said often that we desire not that men believe us, unless we base ourselves in the faith or in the reason of God’s law. And then men believe us not because we say a thing, but because God says it—and woe to him who then believes not!”\footnote{62} One of later Lollardy’s greatest foes, Bishop Reginald Pecock, described the movement’s theology as poisoned by three connected misconceptions.

> No ordinance is to bind Christian men to the service of God save that it is grounded in the Holy Scripture of the New Testament … . That whatever Christian man or woman humble in spirit desiring true understanding of Holy Scripture shall without fail find [it] … wherever he or she shall read or study … and the more meek he or she shall be, the sooner he or she shall come into the true understanding of it... Whenever a person has found the understanding of Holy Scripture … he or she ought turn away their hearing, reading, and understanding from all reasoning and arguing or proof which any cleric might make by any kind of evidence of reason or Scripture, and especially of reason, to the contrary.\footnote{63}

Bound up in the \textit{sola scriptura} theological orientation are virtually all of the elements of Lollard theology.\footnote{64} While most Lollards did not deny the need for sacraments to attain salvation, their extant writings describe a vehement reaction against ecclesiastical sacramental practices. Most easily recognizably Wyclifite among these is the Lollard denial of transubstantiation. Just as a man seeing a statue does not think first about its being of some kind of wood but thinks what the statue is meant to represent, suggests an early vernacular sermon, so someone considering the Eucharist should think of Christ, and not bread or wine, nor any metaphysical subtleties. Many Lollard texts rely heavily on the substance of \textit{De Eucharistia}: “The bread of the sacred host is true bread in its nature, and is eaten physically, but it is God’s body figuratively …. This host is eaten physically and spiritually by some men, but Christ’s body in His nature is not physically eaten.”\footnote{65} Some later Lollards even rejected the real presence of Christ, holding that the Eucharist was but a memorial of Christ’s passion, while other, more extreme individuals actively denigrated the sacrament; one Lollard knight is said to have taken the host from his mouth and consumed it later with a dish of oysters.

The other sacraments came under similar scrutiny, although the basis for criticism tended more towards Scriptural interpretation than metaphysical arguments. Various texts discuss the need for infant baptism, the possibility of marriage for clergy, and
the legitimacy of laymen hearing confession and absolving sins, in each case starting with the possibility that Scripture allows for more freedom than contemporary Church practice admits. Typifying Lollard rejection of clerical profit from sacramental authority, many texts decry the contemporary traffic in indulgences with arguments that would prefigure Luther’s: how can the pope be truly charitable if he does not relieve all suffering souls from the torments of purgatory? How can the pope justly release from purgation living supplicants who might well be eternally damned? To clerical arguments that money is asked to cover the physical costs incurred by the Church, “certainly a little lead costs many thousand pounds each year to our poor land … truly they deceive people and mock them, for they sell a fat goose for little or nought, but the garlic costs many shillings!”

Much that embodies late medieval Christian practice drew Wyclifite fire. Wyclif had rejected prayers to individual saints as based in the confused belief that the saints have powers based in their own sanctity, apart somehow from divine giving. Enthusiastic followers pursued this line of reasoning, resulting in iconoclastic occurrences like using the image of St. Katherine as fuel to cook supper and similar destruction of pictures, statues, and relics. Prayer as a whole underwent a serious revision: Latin prayers spoken by non-Latin-speaking people were worthless, and the activity of a faithful life serves as a more effective prayer than any mere collection of words. Likewise, the practice of pilgrimage was criticized as but an opportunity for revelry and entertainment. True pilgrimage, these preachers suggested, involves giving alms to the poor and serving God faithfully in daily life; few Lollards would countenance the hijinks of Chaucer’s merry band.

Lollard ecclesiology is recognizably a vernacular adumbration of Wyclif’s dominium writings, based on the premise that the true Church is the congregation of the Elect. While Wyclif was clear that its true members were unknowable save by God, his Lollard disciples tended towards a variety of interpretations of this idea. Some followed Wyclif, holding the Church’s membership to be unknowable. The author of the Lanterne of Liyt, a well-known early Lollard text, expands on Wyclif’s definition, saying “The Church is not in men by power or spiritual or temporal dignity, for many princes and high bishops and others of lower degree … are found to be apostate …. The Church stands in those persons in whom is acknowledgement and true confession of faith and truth.” Others interpreted the membership to be the “holy saints of God,” “the congregation of just men for whom Jesus Christ shed his blood,” or “true Christian men and women.” The obvious conclusion to be drawn from these later definitions—that “true Christians” are recognizable as just, godly men and women—is contrary to Wyclif’s idea, but dovetails neatly with the issue of whether priests who sin can minister to their flock. Here, Wyclif’s belief that clerics pursuing worldly goods or acting sinfully are not fit to serve as spiritual lords provided sufficient foundation for his followers to embrace a Donatism that he had struggled to avoid. Earlier Lollards followed Wyclif’s approach, arguing that “Antichrist’s sophisters should know well that a cursed man fully doth the sacraments, though it be to his damnation, for they are not the authors of these sacraments, but God keepeth that dignity to
Himself.” Nevertheless, Donatism loomed over the development of Lollard conceptions of the priesthood, so that the Carmelite Thomas Netter was to identify Wyclifism with the heresy in his later *Doctrinale Fidei Catholicae.*

Wyclif’s sentiments towards the Church and its present state are echoed throughout Lollard writings. Regarding the physical being of the Church, Wyclif’s opinions suggest later, Tudor innovations; in *De Officio Regis* he advises the king to dismantle the churches in times of national emergency and use the stones to build fortresses. Similar attitudes surface in Lollard texts; one suggests that worship is “commonly better done in the air under heaven, but often in rainy weather, churches are good.”

His antipathy towards papal striving for political power surfaces repeatedly in Lollard indictments of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. If there is any need for a chief spiritual lord, should he not embody Christ’s law in his person and actions? “God gave power to Peter being a good and holy man to bind and to loose, and to his successors who are as good as he was—and otherwise not.” Likewise, the Church’s crying need for reform must be addressed by the just civil lord as his chief duty, although some later Lollards surpassed their teacher in their zeal for reform by arguing that if the king be incapable of divesting the church of its wealth, then the duty falls to the common people.

While the impact Wyclif’s thought had on the theological landscape of the fifteenth century was significant, it is difficult to describe direct influence it might have had on the Lutheran movement of the early sixteenth century. Elements of Wyclif’s reformative vision certainly suggest Luther’s, notably the appeal for a “top-down” reform model in which the aristocracy takes responsibility for the Church’s reform, as well as the deterministic theology, the emphasis on the place of Scripture in the Christian’s daily life, the savage attacks on clerical abuse of power, and the rejection of transubstantiation. Yet Luther was in many senses a product of his schooling, and the Council’s condemnation of Wyclif in 1415 discouraged further formal academic pursuit of the philosophical theology that had germinated into Wyclifism.

Bohemia proved a more fertile ground for Wyclifism. Jan Hus, a professor and preacher at the university of Prague, began a theological movement based in Wyclif’s thought that would grow into a nationalist crusade that would influence eastern Europe’s Christianity into the seventeenth century. In the early fifteenth century, Prague intellectuals discovered Wyclif’s realism, which flew in the face of the nominalist thought universally accepted by German academics, and Czech intellectuals eagerly embraced it as definitive of their Bohemian identity. While Hus was by no means foremost among Prague’s Wycliffites, he became familiar with Wyclif’s reformative ecclesiology and theology in pursuing his doctorate, and incorporated some of the English reformer’s revolutionary sentiment into his sermons. Hus’s *De Ecclesia* incorporates none of Wyclif’s *dominium*-centered philosophy and little of his antiproprietary theology into its argument, retaining primarily the argument that the Christian church is nothing more than the universal body of the predestinate. While many of Hus’s arguments for clerical reform find their origin in Wyclif’s *De Ecclesia* and *De Potestate Pape,* the philosophical complexity that characterizes
Wyclif’s theology is absent. Arguments that Hus embodied a Bohemian incarnation of Wyclifism are overstated; at best, Hus used Wyclif’s thought as an inspiration. Hus supported Utraquism, the belief that the communicant must take both bread and wine, but did not deny transubstantiation, as did Wyclif, and later reformers. While Luther’s exclamation on reading Hus’s *De Ecclesia*, “We are all Hussites without knowing it,” is celebrated as evidence of Hus’s proto-reformation status, it is more accurate to view the treatise as the chief document of the Hussite revolution in fifteenth-century Bohemia.

Notes

4. Gwynn, 1940; Trapp, 1956, pp. 146-274.
8. For a bibliographical and chronological account of Wyclif’s writings, see Thomson, 1983.
15. *De Causa Dei contra Pelagium*, I.9, p. 190D.
19. Ibid., pp. 5.24-8.
20. *De Officio Regis*, ch. 6, p. 133.20.
23. See also *De Ecclesia*, ch. 7, pp. 153–6; *De Potestate Pape*, ch. 7, p. 141; *De Officio Regis*, ch. 7, pp. 226-38; *Trialogus Supplementum*, ch. 4.
27. Ibid., ch. 8.
28. *De Civili Dominio*, I, ch. 11, pp. 77.32-78.6.
29. Ibid., III, ch. 13, pp. 228.8-229.4.
33. Ibid., III, ch. 13, pp. 230.5-15.
34. Ibid., III, ch. 2, pp. 15.5-23.
37. *De Civili Dominio*, III, ch. 8, pp. 119.34-120.2.
38. Ibid., I, ch. 1, pp. 1.1-2.
39. Ibid., I, ch. 26, pp. 188.14-24.
40. For Wyclif’s political thought, see Daly, 1962; Lahey, “Wyclif and Rights,” 1997; McGrade, 1991; Wilks, 1965.
References


