A Three Part Analysis of the Antiwar Movement during the Vietnam War

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Apathy and Activism in the Heartland: The Antiwar Movement at the University of Nebraska, 1965-1970

On March 21st, 1968, Dr. Charles Marxer took center stage at the weekly Hyde Park Forum in front of the Nebraska Union. During his four minute allotment Marxer decried the complicity of Nebraskans in a war he saw as unjust and illegal. He rapped on the growing opposition to the Vietnam War but expressed his disappointment that, “Unfortunately the Movement has not taken hold everywhere. Nebraska, for example, remains a bastion of patriotic respectability, dutifully cranking out its monthly quota of expendable bodies for the Great War machine with barely a ripple of protest.” Professor Marxer’s remarks serve as emblematic of the particular antiwar movement at the University of Nebraska in the 1960s and 1970s. Students and faculty members involved in the antiwar movement saw themselves as fighting against local apathy as well as United States foreign policy, and their most lasting direct impacts came locally, rather than nationally. However, the majority of students and faculty at the University were largely uninvolved with the antiwar movement.

This study focuses on three snapshots of the antiwar movement at the University of Nebraska, an institution that has been almost completely absent in antiwar historiography until now. I chose each for its effects on campus, local media attention, and lasting impacts on both the local and national level. First, I examine the formation and initial activities of the local

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1 The name “Hyde Park Forum” came from the name of the London park that was known for its public and spontaneous speeches, and do not describe the actual location of the event. See: “Speakers to begin Forums,” The Daily Nebraskan, Lincoln, Nebraska, Oct. 13, 1965.
3 Steven Witte has an article on the student response to the “Cambodian Incursion,” but his article lacks context on both the campus, and the national movement. Stephen Witte, “UNL Reaction to the Cambodian Incursion and the Kent State Shootings, May1970,” Nebraska History 75 (1994): 261-271; Outside of an interview of Carl Davidson in Prairie Power and an overview in Prairie University, none of the books cited in this study mention the University of Nebraska.
chapter of the Students for a Democratic society in 1965. Then, I turn to Professor Marxer, and his organization the Nebraska Draft Resistance Union. Finally, I inspect student and faculty occupation of the Military & Naval Science building in May 1970. While there were other organizations on the University’s campus during this time that participated in the antiwar movement, these moments serve as the most publicized and had the broadest local and national waves.

**SDS**

The trajectory of SDS at the University of Nebraska reflected the crucible of the national organization five years earlier when Carl Davidson formed the local chapter in the fall of 1965. The Nebraskan SDS, which formed during a period of rapid growth, had four major similarities with the national SDS organization. First, both emphasized civil rights from conception. Second, each opposed the Vietnam War by 1965 and took issue with draft procedures. Finally, both placed a premium on free speech and local issues. After graduating from Penn State in the spring of 1965, Davidson enrolled in the University as a graduate student in philosophy. By the beginning of October, the Student Senate granted the University chapter of SDS a provisional status that allowed them to start activities, but the Student Senate did not officially recognize the group until later that month.

Once the Student Senate approved SDS, the members quickly immersed themselves in both local and global civil rights issues. They achieved this by targeting the minds of students on campus through their teach-in on South Africa as a response to the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre in South Africa. Davidson first announced the “week-long program on Africa,” which was part of

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4 *SDS*, 224.
5 *Prairie Power*, 33.
7 *Prairie Power*, 34.
a national SDS demonstration against the apartheid state, in an interview about the organization’s upcoming plans for the semester in February of 1966.⁸ The envisioned program included speeches at the Hyde Park forum, “literature on Africa, films, panel discussions and a teach-in as the culmination of the week.”⁹

The themed week started a month later when SDS organized demonstrations in front of four local companies that enjoyed substantial business with the South African government. Although SDS initially envisioned direct involvement from more South Africans at their teach-in, only Growdin Dubay of Rhodesia came from the region.¹⁰ After keeping the speakers secret, Davison announced the roster one week prior to the event in an interview with the Daily Nebraskan. On the docket was Karl Shapiro, an English professor and poet, Reverend Hudson Phillips of the United Campus Christian Fellowship, and Carl Davidson, who now served as the secretary-treasurer for SDS.

On the morning of March 20 about sixty students, not all of whom counted themselves members of SDS, picketed in front of four local insurance branches and International Harvester Corp.¹¹ SDS chose the insurance companies because they considered the companies “major stockholders in more than one of eleven consortium banks which floated a $40 million revolving credit loan to the government of South Africa.”¹² When prompted, Carl Davidson stated that SDS targeted International Harvester for, “In addition to being a major interest in the South

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⁸ SDS, 182.
¹² Ibid.
African economy, International Harvester is helping the government of South Africa in the development of nuclear reactors.”

About one hundred and twenty students attended the teach-in following the march in the Union auditorium. It featured Carl Davidson of SDS, Sur Orin, Godwin Dubay, Esron Maryogo and Reverend Hudson Phillips. As each speaker presented, members of SDS distributed pamphlets stating that “The official policy of the United States toward the government of South Africa is opposition, but the actual policy is cooperation.” The central focus of each speaker was the U.S. complicity with white supremacist apartheid South Africa; however, Orin, Maryogo, and Dubay all sought to educate Nebraskan students on the regime in South Africa. Maryogo, a University student from Tanzania, stated that “every condition for totalitarian government is present in South Africa today.” Dubay, a student from Rhodesia, explained that the South African racial hierarchy was not unique, but that the contemporary stratifications in Rhodesia was very similar to that in South Africa.

Local response to the march was overwhelmingly negative, while reactions to the teach-in were more mixed. An employee at Connecticut Mutual felt that protesting local businesses was an “awful waste of time” because “The Finance department pays no attention whatsoever” to employee input. A passerby called the protest a “disgrace to the country” and wanted the university to expel the students involved. News Editor of the Daily Nebraskan, Wayne Kruscher, in his recurring column, “If I Were King,” criticized the march as “a threat to every University student who likes or at least wants to think.” Kruscher also stated that the teach-in was “excellent,” and that “the school can’t have enough of them.” However, in the “Campus

Opinion” letter “Resisting is the Only Choice,” one student criticized the rhetoric of the teach-in stating “South Africa is content to live at peace with its neighbors; it does not claim that it plans to destroy and dominate all who oppose it as the communists do.”

By 1965 the antiwar movement reached college campuses. Inspired by the peaceful tactics of the sit-ins in the South and soon after the SCLC’s march to Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma, SDS members helped over two hundred professors at the University of Michigan to hold the first teach-in. Through August, the movement “slowly expanded.” Activists and faculty from UC Berkeley’s Vietnam Day Committee protested at Oakland Army Terminal, “an embarkation point for Vietnam.” By October, VDC organized the International Days of Protest. SDS at the University of Nebraska participated in the Protest along with nearly one hundred thousand others in eighty cities and campuses.

On October 1, SDS announced its intentions to participate in the International Days of Protest, a condemnation of the war organized by the VDC at University of California, Berkeley. The centerpiece of the Nebraskan Protest was to be a teach-in at the Love Memorial Library auditorium. “About a dozen” members of SDS at Nebraska succeeded in bringing together “Doves and hawks, pacifism and power politics, the domino theory and spheres of influence.” Unlike their teach-in on South Africa, SDS wanted students to see a range of viewpoints and

18 Movement and the Sixties, 125.
19 Ibid, 140.
20 Ibid, 140.
opinions on the war so they created three panels, each organized by topic with opposing speakers.

The first panel at the standing-room-only event centered on the very presence of the United States’ military in Vietnam. Dr. Stephen Ross felt that if the war benefited the nation’s interests, then “we should stay; if they aren’t, we should leave.” In the opposing panel, Dr. Victor Lane of Wesleyan University, a pacifist, condemned the Vietnam War as he did all wars and argued that “violence was evil for man and that nations are not above the standards of men.” The next panel focused on the motives of the United States in Southeast Asia. Dr. Albert Winter, a self-described “chicken-hawk,” denied that the United States had imperialistic motives in the region, whereas Jack Kittredge, Midwestern Coordinator for SDS, focused on the domino theory used to justify US presence in Vietnam “Nations don’t change because of their neighbors, but because of their internal affairs,” he posited.  

From the beginning, SDS had a decentralized structure and agenda which encouraged chapters to focus on local issues that chapters chose with autonomy. However, this increased with the rise of the Prairie Power contingency, in which Carl Davidson would figure significantly. Seemingly, the Hyde Park forum created by the University of Nebraska SDS in October of 1965 accomplished and embodied those ends. Inspired by the history of public debate in the London park of the same name, the forum allowed all students and faculty to speak on any topic of their choosing. Members of SDS, embracing the ethos of participatory democracy on which SDS was founded, contributed most to the early sessions and tended to

26 Prairie Power, 3-6; Movement and the Sixties, 149; SDS, 280.
27 Prairie Power, 36.
focus on both national and international issues, as the first sessions largely covered Vietnam War. While the intention of the forum was to discuss local topics and problems, SDS members preferred widen that scope from inception.

However, as the forum allowed any student or faculty member to speak, it also reflected the contemporary conservative politics and the interests of students in 1960s Nebraska. The first forum featured students speaking on the “University Code.” Later in the fall, a student proposed a “new system of Women’s Hours,” curfews for women in the spirit of *in loco parentis*, that were often more restrictive than those set for men. By the spring semester, SDS loosened its grip on the forum and the number of issues covered diversified as well as the people speaking. In February, the *Daily Nebraskan* reported that “The subject matter of the speakers’ talks was not of Viet Nam, nor of ideology, nor of metaphysics, but of the situations, problems and nature of the University campus.” The next week’s forum “revolved around religion, a previously untouched issue.”

Ironically, as SDS members lowered their microphones, and the topics became more locally-focused, the organization’s forum embodied the ideals of the national SDS more fully than when they were the most numerous contributors.

During the spring semester, Carl Davison resigned from his post as temporary president, and without him the press coverage slowly left. Davidson was an articulate, charismatic leader that the press converged on whenever they needed a quote. Even after the members elected him

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secretary-treasurer, he remained the most oft-cited member of SDS. By being the only SDS member to speak at the teach-in on South Africa, he was the public face of the organization in another way. At the national SDS convention the summer of 1966, members of SDS recognized Davidson’s skill and elected him national vice president, a significant step in the solidification of Prairie Power’s legitimacy. Davidson continued his life of activism beyond his work with SDS as he later wrote a criticism of student activism itself as he posited that students often fell into the trap of working to much within the confines of university systems, which were themselves oppressive. Davidson’s national post was the most significant contribution the University of Nebraska SDS made to the national antiwar movement.

Excepting Davidson’s national position, SDS at Nebraska made no national waves. However, the organization’s first year on campus was a success. Students wrote letters to the *Daily Nebraskan* about the first teach-in for weeks. The Hyde Park forum was inclusive and welcomed a broad range of topics from a diverse set of people and lasted for years. The African-themed week allowed students to learn about international topics in a manner that the University did not provide in the curriculum. While this year does speak to the acumen of activists on campus, the inability of SDS to recover after Davidson’s departure for the national office, and a *Daily Nebraskan* poll that concluded that 46% of students “did not know what SDS [stood] for,” exposed the pervasive apathy of students even as the antiwar movement was gaining traction on campuses nationwide. Finally, the year was more peaceful than other state universities with an active SDS like Kent State, which suspended the local chapter after seven hundred conservative

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students “attacked two hundred SDS members and antiwar faculty” with baseball bats and chains.\textsuperscript{36}

**NDRU**

In August 1967, twenty-seven-year-old Dr. Charles Marxer came to the University of Nebraska as a temporary professor in the philosophy department. When Marxer arrived at the University, the antiwar movement was expanding at the most rapid pace yet. In October, the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam organized students to protest military conscription in Stop the Draft Week.\textsuperscript{37} The Week “climaxd with the March on the Pentagon,” where about 50,000 protestors, including “middle-class liberals, student radicals, hippies, civil rights workers, black power advocates, and Vietnam Veterans,” organized on the lawn of the Lincoln Memorial.\textsuperscript{38} However, the absence of the Week in Lincoln again signaled the relative apathy of University of Nebraska students, compared to more radical campuses like UC Berkeley where “some 10,000 marched on the draft induction center in Oakland.”\textsuperscript{39} Marxer took issue with this apathy and sought to change both the minds and opinions of the students at the University while also attempting to dismantle the conscription of young Nebraskan men to fight in what he saw as an unjust and illegal war.

Marxer first announced the formation of the Nebraska Draft Resistance Union at a Hyde Park forum on March 21, 1968.\textsuperscript{40} Draft resistance unions existed at other similar universities, like SUNY-Buffalo which the FBI surveilled between 1965 and 1970.\textsuperscript{41} NDRU, which the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{36} *Campus Wars*, 37.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} *The Movement and the Sixties*, 178.
  \item \textsuperscript{39} Terry Anderson, *The Sixties* (New York: Longman Press, 1999), 98.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} “NU Instructor says state barely ripples with Protest.” *Omaha World Herald*, March 22, 1968.
  \item \textsuperscript{41} *Campus Wars*, 35; *Movement and the Sixties*, 158-159.
\end{itemize}
University had not yet formally recognized, had two central purposes. First, to stop the war through draft resistance and, second, to educate “young people about the unjust and illegal nature of the war, the misdirection of our country’s foreign policy, and the coercive, and anti-democratic character of the draft.” To accomplish these ends, Marxer announced the four activities of NDRU. First, Marxer planned on educating the students by printing “special purpose leaflets.” Second, the organization wanted to promote a “We Won’t Go” pledge of draft-eligible men on campus who refused military induction. The pledge read, “We believe the war in Vietnam to be illegal and immoral. As long as our country is involved in that war, we shall refuse to serve in the Armed Forces.” Third, he wanted to council men classified as I-A, or available for military service, by draft boards and educate them on their options to avoid military service. Finally, Marxer advocated peaceful draft resistance. He supported men “returning draft cards, draft card burning, non-registration, non-cooperation, and induction refusal.” No students signed that day.

Dr. Royce Knapp, a professor of education at the University, spoke in opposition to Marxer at the Hyde Park forum. Knapp took issue with several of Marxer’s stances. He saw draft resistance as illegal and encouraged students to follow the law because “without the law we have anarchy.” Instead of participating in protests, which he saw as disrupting the democratic process, he advised students to voice their protests with their ballots and elect representatives

43“Nebraska Draft Resistance Union ‘Press Conference,’” March 21, 1968, Nebraska Draft Resistance Union (NDRU), Demonstration, Student (May 1970) draft, Archives and Special Collections, University of Nebraska.
that held similar views. Ironically, Knapp closed his speech by stating that students should follow their conscience. That is, Knapp wished students follow his conscience, not theirs.

Response to NDRU and Marxer’s speech varied but almost entirely negative. Even at the forum itself, which over two hundred students attended, the audience was overwhelmingly in favor of Knapp. The only exceptions were a few students wearing black armbands in protest of the war. In fact, the loudest applause of the forum came when a student yelled “Let’s hear it for Dr. Knapp,” after the professor stated that he felt he represented much more of the faculty than Marxer did.

The community and local politicians answered Marxer and NDRU with vitriol. A. Eileen Seares, in a letter to chancellor Clifford Harden, called Marxer’s promotion of draft card burning “treason” and expected his contract with the University to expire in light of his comments on the war. State Senator Clifton Batcheldor of Omaha took the most offense to Marxer and NDRU. Batcheldor wanted the University to terminate Marxer because of his statements, creation and heading of NDRU, and support of burning draft cards. He asked the county attorney, Paul Douglas, to file charges but Douglas refused as he did not think that the actions were “criminally connected.” Batcheldor used his position as an elected official and representative as a justification for exerting power over the University. He believed that, because the state, that is, the taxpayers, gave $60 million to the University annually, the state senate, who represented the people, should have enjoyed some control over the University. The University Board of Regents disagreed.

49 Letter by A. Eileen Sheares, Nebraska Draft Resistance Union (NDRU), Demonstration, Student (May 1970) draft, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska.
51 Ibid.
The University of Nebraska Board of Regents also criticized Marxer’s remarks, but defended his right to speak. A statement from Dr. B. N. Greenberg, President of the Board, clearly expressed their thoughts on Marxer’s comments. “The Board of Regents is in complete and unanimous disagreement with Mr. Marxer and his remarks,” but continued, stating that “In a democratic society Mr. Marxer as any citizen, has a right to express his personal views, disagreeable as they may be,” Greenberg wrote. In the release Greenberg also stated that the University investigated Marxer both in the legality of his actions and teaching and found that he was not in violation of any laws. He did write, however, that the University would terminate Marxer in June.

The Buffalo Chip, an Omaha-based underground newspaper named for the excrement of the eponymous animal, released the only in-depth articles on NDRU. This was not unique to Nebraska, as the “treatment of antiwar demonstrations was often more detailed, accurate, and objective, if more breezy,” in underground publications during the Vietnam War. NDRU operated out of one of the many churches on campus, presumably the United Ministries in Higher Education. The organization’s office was Spartan, containing only “a desk, a phone, a couple of filing cabinets and piles of information on draft regulations and how to beat them.” Wanting to avoid service, over forty students, including graduate students, sought out NDRU in

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52 Press Release, University of Nebraska News Service, Nebraska Draft Resistance Union (NDRU), Demonstration, Student (May 1970) draft, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
56 The Buffalo Chip provides the only in-depth article on the organization itself and simply refers to NDRU using a “University of Nebraska campus church.” However, in a report on the events of May, 1970 the Daily Nebraskan refers to the United Ministries in Higher Education as a “center of campus anti-war and anti-draft activity.” “NDRU,” Buffalo Chip, May 1968; Sylvia Lee, “How It Was,” Campus in Crisis: Two Weeks in May, School of Journalism, July 1970 Demonstration, Student (May 1970) draft, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska.
its first month. Marxer emphasized the localization of conscription to those who sought the coveted Conscientious Objector status, since “much of the draft decisions are made by the local boards.”

After Marxer’s termination, NDRU suffered but expanded, if only for a short time. By the fall of 1968 NDRU existed on both the University of Nebraska and the University of Omaha campuses. The Union’s philosophy remained the same in Marxer’s absence, “We want to build resistance to the draft and the war in Vietnam” John Dietz told Buffalo Chip. Speaking for the organization now, he continued to advocate Marxer’s initial preferred form of resistance of non-cooperation. He also shared Marxer’s strategy of appealing to the emotions of students as he believed they were “reaching the conscience of our peers.”

May, 1970

Whereas the national antiwar movement hit its zenith in 1968, the height of student dissent on the University of Nebraska campus came during the spring semester of 1970, a delay that other state universities did not see. By 1970 neither NDRU nor SDS existed in Lincoln. So when President Richard Nixon announced a bombing campaign in Cambodia on April 30, no dedicated antiwar organizations existed on campus. One might expect continued apathy in Lincoln, even though for “hundreds of thousands, even millions, of students, faculty, and staff at more than half of the nation’s colleges, ‘business-as-usual’ became unthinkable,” due to the activist vacuum on campus. But this was not the case, as ASUN, led by its newly elected

60 Campus Wars, 3.
61 For more on the demise and fallout of SDS see: SDS, 557-616; The War Within, 304-306.
president Steve Tiwald, picked up the banner of the movement and waved it more vigorously than ever before seen on campus.63

The president’s speech created an immediate reaction from the National Student Association and the University of Nebraska administration. Tiwald received a telephone call that night about an emergency meeting of the NSA the next day in Washington, D.C. At the meeting Tiwald voted in affirmation, along with fifty-four other campus leaders, in “calling for the impeachment of President Nixon.”64 Dr. G. Robert Ross, executive dean of student affairs, sensed that problems might arise on campus and requested a special meeting with other administrators on Monday, May 4. The three-day delay proved costly as students moved more quickly than administrators predicted, and the deaths of four Kent State students at the hands of the Ohio National Guard brought an anger to the University that had not yet existed.

Immediate student response to the announcement of the bombing campaign in Cambodia was mild. On May 2, the Innocents Society, a student organization founded in 1903 that was unique to Nebraska, and modeled itself after “senior societies on eastern campuses,” wore black armbands at their convocation to protest Nixon’s new plan in Cambodia.65 The crowd met the armbands with gasps and applause. Students also made plans to canvas local residents to voice their protest of the president’s Cambodia campaign and made plans for an antiwar rally on the north side of the Union building.66

On Monday, May 4, the rally started as planned. Hundreds of students attended. Soon after it began, Philip Medcalf, a student, grabbed an outdoor microphone and began what he

63 Dana Parsons, “Student Leadership ‘Vital,’” Campus in Crisis: Two Weeks in May, School of Journalism, July 1970, Curtis-Demonstration, Student Policies, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska.
64 Lee, “How It Was – A Chronological Account,” Campus in Crisis: Two Weeks in May.
65 Prairie University, 44.
would later call a “rabble-rousing” speech. He implored students to leave campus and bring the demonstration to the Lancaster County Draft Board Offices. About half of those present at the rally, including twenty-seven-year-old English professor Dr. Steven Rozman, followed him and marched to the draft office. Soon after they arrived, an unnamed protestors broke the door to get into the office and, using the damaged property as justification, the police officers present declared the assembly illegal and evacuated the office. Some of the students allowed themselves to be arrested in protest of the draft. Professor Rozman followed them to the police station and spent the afternoon “trying to obtain their release.” Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs, G. Robert Ross, after notification of the arrests, met with city attorneys and police at the County-City building to discuss the options of the students and administration following the arrests.

Meanwhile at the rally, Tiwald presided and read the NSA’s statement on the bombing in Cambodia and the proposed nation-wide strike of classes. The students decided to “write letters of protest to Nebraska’s congressional delegation.” However, the mood of the rally changed from peaceful to mournful as word of deaths of the four students at Kent State reached Lincoln. The news made about one hundred and fifty students leave the antiwar rally outside the Union and head towards the “terminal building to hold a silent vigil outside.” By 7:30 p.m. about two hundred students met at the United Ministries for Higher Education, which had “been the primary meeting place for anti-draft and anti-war groups on the university campus.” Again, disagreements on their plan of action quickly divided students, and by 8:00 p.m. about one hundred students, including Alan Siporin and Dan Ladely, whom the University administration would later identify as leaders in the occupation, left the UMHE with the intention of occupying

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the Military & Naval Science building, also known on campus as the “ROTC building,” in protest. The meeting at the UMHE continued without the separated faction, symbolizing a break between radicals who no longer believed in working within organized structures and liberals who still held the faith. With Tiwald presiding, the students discussed their options moving forward including “canvassing, letter-writing, [and] petitions.”

The march on the Military & Naval Science building was not entirely unexpected and Colonel Gist, professor of military science, requested the janitorial staff to lock all entrances to the building earlier that evening. Soon after, Vice Chancellor Ross, who also had concerns about the building, arrived to meet with Col. Gist and campus police captain Gail Gade. Within thirty minutes of Ross’ arrival, the protestors met the locked entrance. This proved to be of little importance as the students broke the lock and forced their way in, even as campus police officers attempted to barricade the door. The students again refused to let police restrain them. Ladely proclaimed that they had taken the building and invited those still outside in. The occupation of the Military and Naval Science Building, the height of the student antiwar movement at the University of Nebraska, had begun.

Throughout the night of May 4 the population of the Military & Naval Science building swelled, with estimates reaching two thousand occupants. As “only 13 percent of students identified with the New Left in 1969,” and the University had 18,000 students in 1970, further

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proving that the activism at the University reflected the larger national movement.\(^1\) Several faculty members also participated including Professor Rozman, Dr. Philip Schribner, assistant professor of philosophy Dr. June Levine, and Dr. David Levine the chairman of the Psychology department. Inside, activity centered on the “pit,” a depressed area in the center of the building the ROTC used to practice hand-to-hand combat. Two rock bands, Bald Eagle and Frigate, played music while a caterer sold tacos and sandwiches. Discussion in the “pit” started on the war and the focus turned to cultural reform through the night. This change in attention came from the demands students made of University administration.\(^2\)

President of the Lincoln campus, Dr. Joseph Soshnik, planned to leave the city the night of the fourth to attend an alumni meeting in South Sioux City. However, after hearing about the events on campus, he chose to stay, and in doing so may have prevented a violent end to the occupation. President Soshnik reached the ROTC building at about nine that night and immediately went to the campus police headquarters with “Vice Chancellor Ross, Police Captain Gade, Dean of Faculties Magrath, ASUN President Steve Tiwald and others.” They returned to the ROTC building at about ten. By that time “under the very loose – and periodically denied – leadership of Alan Siporin, Dan Ladely and Maggie Young, a student who had been one of the organizers of the short-lived NU chapter of Students for a Democratic Society,” the demonstrators had arrived at six demands to present to the University administration.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) David Farber, *The Sixties: From Memory to History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1994), 185; Lee, “How It Was – A Chronological Account,” *Campus in Crisis: Two Weeks in May*.


First, they requested amnesty for those arrested at the draft board office and any “who might be arrested at the ROTC building.” Then, they called for administration backing of the NSA strike on classes and suspension of University ROTC until the U.S. withdrew from Southeast Asia. Fourth, they sought to remove all guns from campus, including campus police. They concluded their demands with insistence on public meetings of the Board of Trustees and for “all Free University classes to receive one hour of credit toward degrees.” None of the demands came to fruition in the coming years. However, Soshnik and the rest of the administrators with him retreated back to the campus police office to discuss the demands and returned at about 1 a.m., when Soshnik explained that he did not have dictatorial powers and had no power to meet any of the demands. Soshnik, recognizing the need to reduce the “unbelievable tension” between the administration and occupants, again left for campus police office to prepare an official statement.74

Meanwhile, during the “negotiations [that] were beginning at the ROTC Building, an even larger crowd was gathering at the Nebraska Union ballroom for an emergency meeting of the Student Senate” of the ASUN. Not only did the senate reach a quorum, but thirty-three of thirty-five senators attended the meeting, further proving that this was the height of the antiwar movement and the nadir of apathy on campus. The senate passed four resolutions at the meeting. They requested a meeting “between students and local law enforcement officials in an effort to prevent a repeat of the Kent State tragedy.” Then, recognizing the importance of the moment and the desire to be inclusive, they called for an “all-University town hall meeting” for the following afternoon in the Coliseum to vote on the proposed NSA strike. The third and fourth resolutions

focused on the senate’s rhetoric, which emphasized a condemnation of violence and that the
strike was “not against the University but against the foreign policy of the United States.” At the
conclusion of the meeting, most in attendance left for the Military and Naval Science building.75

By about three in the morning on May 5, Soshnik returned to the occupied building
where he read the statement he prepared. Students held mixed feelings, but responded positively
to Soshnik’s speech, which recognized the need for open discussion. Many students and faculty
members, believing that there was nothing more to accomplish through occupation, left. Others
took Soshnik’s speech as tacit permission to stay in the building and by 6 a.m., about two
hundred students remained. While the students stayed in the building, Vice Chancellor Ross
contacted Flavel A. Wright of the law firm Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson and Oldfather,
which represented the University. Ross inquired about obtaining an injunction to remove the
occupying students. Ross then went to the ROTC building and alerted the students that they
could remain in the building if they stayed in the “pit.” Soon after, Soshnik told some of the
occupiers he saw as leaders that they had to leave the building by 6:30 a.m., but they responded
by reasserting the autonomy of individuals in the building. The occupiers persisted and stated
that they would not leave until the special faculty meeting scheduled for noon that day. Again
fearing violence, Soshnik moved the meeting to 10:00 a.m. and the building emptied in time for
the meeting.76

The faculty senate meeting caused the emptying of the ROTC building, but did little
more to alleviate the feelings of demonstrating students. The senate voted preemptively to not
impose sanctions on students who wished to strike. However, it did not concede to any of the

76 Lee, “How It Was – A Chronological Account,” Campus in Crisis: Two Weeks in May; “Report of the
Commission of Inquiry On Disruptive Actions on the University of Nebraska Campus, Lincoln, April 30-June 10,
1970, Released August 10, 1970.”
demands made by Siporin, Ladely, and Young the previous night. In spite of that, the meeting was open to students in an effort to avoid increasing the already high tension between the demonstrators and administration. That afternoon, the all-campus town hall meeting started as scheduled. Estimates on attendance ranged from four to nine thousand. However, with a student population of eighteen thousand, this meeting was not entirely representative of the student body. The meeting’s central issue was participation in the NSA’s nation-wide student strike. Ultimately about five thousand students voted to join about one quarter of public universities in the strike, more than the sum of votes submitted in the 1970 ASUN elections. While the strike began the next day, the apogee of activism had passed.\textsuperscript{77}

While thousands of students voted to strike, only a small percentage participated. As \textit{University News} later broadcasted on KRNU, the University’s radio station, the term “strike” was a misnomer. They cited the pejorative and violent connotations of the term and suggested that “boycott” was more accurate.\textsuperscript{78} Participation in the strike varied between colleges. The College of Agriculture and Home Economics, the College of Engineering and Architecture, the Teachers College all reported normal class attendance. The College of Arts and Sciences and College of Business both reported a fifteen percent drop in attendance. The English department in the College of Arts and Sciences saw the highest participation in the strike, with only about half the students attending class, which was a common theme for English departments at other campuses like Penn State where the English department “obtained some measure of national recognition and became a locus of faculty and student antiwar dissent.”\textsuperscript{79} Some faculty members


\textsuperscript{78} \textit{University News}, Transcription from KRNU, Broadcasted May 15, 1970, May 1-18, Demonstration, Student (May 1970) Draft, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska.

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Campus Wars}, 27; Antiwar faculty tended to also concentrate in social sciences at MSU, \textit{Campus Wars}, 53.
also suspended classes; however, this was a minority as over 95% of classes met as scheduled.

Again, the English department was the most active department as one fifth of the classes did not meet.80

However, the small dip in official classes did not result in an abatement of education. Both faculty members and students led strike classes. Many of these occurred in the English department and were “mainly concerned the situation on the Nebraska campus, including strike activities and ideas for educational reform.” The Union also hosted strike classes that focused on military and foreign policy as “faculty, including ROTC faculty, participated in the meetings as did Administration officials.” President Soshnik spoke at one two-hour class and students gave him a standing ovation after he concluded.81

Dissent by University of Nebraska students was not limited to campus, or even the state of Nebraska. On May 8, Ken Wald, Randy Reeves, Chuck Faulkner, and Dennis Berkheim, financed by donations that they raised themselves, boarded a plane for Washington D.C. The largest donation the students received came from Chancellor D.B. Varner who gave the students one hundred dollars. He later said that he had received criticism for the donation, but he reaffirmed his stance that direct petitioning of elected officials, not public protests and building occupations, were the “the proper way to protest.”82 The students had mixed feelings about their trip to Washington. When they met with Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa, the staff was friendly and he helped the students organize their plans for protesting. Senator Frank Church of Idaho, a dove who “introduced an amendment to a military sales bill cutting the appropriations for troops

in Cambodia” in the wake of Nixon’s April 30 announcement, was receptive to the students’ concerns. However, when they met with Nebraskan senators Carl Curtis and Roman Hruska, they found that both were “quite uniformed about student activity and opinion in Nebraska” and were critical of the strike because they believed it deprived students the opportunity to learn.

The weekend following the occupation of the ROTC building signaled the end of widespread antiwar activism on campus. On Saturday, May 9 the ASUN was the largest funder of a peace rally held outside Memorial Stadium concurrent with the annual spring football game. In spite of the efforts of speakers like Omaha Black Panther David Rice, author John Swomley, Reverend Tom Rehorn, president of the U.S. Farmers’ Association, Fred Stover, and Reverend James Armstrong, the passersby met the rally with apathy as few attended the rally after the football game. The next day the ASUN organized another all-university town hall meeting. The most pressing item on the agenda was the continuation of the strike. Prior to the meeting “Radicals gathered at the United Ministries in Higher Education, and Conservatives at the Zeta Tau Alpha Sorority House.”

Fueled by “The violence of the war in Southeast Asia and the crisis of violence in education, [and] the increasing division between students and other citizens,” the students at the UMHE created a proposal for the upcoming town hall meeting. They suggested the creation of a “new university” that aimed to reform the university’s current pedagogical approach and student involvement in politics. The radicals at the UMHE drafted a five-point proposal for the hypothetical institution. First, they expected each class at the University to devote some time to educating students in a manner more relevant to the “concerns and needs of the students.” Then,
they called for the continuation of classes that would reflect and expand on the teachings at the strike classes. Third, the creation of student groups “concerned with educational reform at the University.” These groups would work with both the ASUN in order to create a more “meaningful education,” because they believed that there were “aspects of the ‘normal functioning’ of the University that [were] seriously repressive and inimical to the growth of students.” Fourth, they requested that the “new university” allow students to take incompletes when they found it “unproductive to continue in normal classes.” Finally, in order to increase in student participation in elections, they asked the administration to move Thanksgiving break to before November elections so that students could aid the campaigns of the candidate of their choosing. The drafters of the final proposal intended it to be a response to critics that saw the strike as destructive as well as a means to increase student political activism.86

That night, about three thousand students attended the town hall meeting. The only item on the agenda was a vote on continuing the strike. After the collection of the secret ballots, the students planned another town hall meeting for the next day. The meeting, which had attendance estimates range from 1,500 to 6,000, was “ostensibly to announce the results of the Sunday vote,” in which students voted 1357 to 1030 to end the three-day strike. However, after the declaration of the previous night’s referendum results, another vote occurred. This time, the result was overwhelmingly in favor of continuing the strike. Conservative students on campus, especially the Young Americans for Freedom and the Committee for Undisrupted Education, an unofficial ad-hoc organization that condemned the strike, criticized the results of the second strike vote as several hundred students left after the announcement of the previous meeting’s

vote, including most of the members of YAF and CUE and did not participate in the second, spontaneous vote.\textsuperscript{87}

Nonetheless, the strike ended. By May 12 class attendance returned to normal and strike classes ceased. On the same day the University Senate reviewed each of the proposals made to create a “new university,” but the recommendations ultimately fell on deaf ears.\textsuperscript{88} At the conclusion of the meeting, which the Senate opened to students, Dr. Peter McGrath, Dean of Faculties, read a statement that reflected positively on the previous two weeks, emphasizing that the “educational process has continued to take place at [the] University,” which remained “peaceful, but not unconcerned,” and that “regular curriculum has also been intensified and supplemented by constructive additional educational effort.”\textsuperscript{89}

The peace that McGrath praised, and the rest of the University administration was so careful to preserve, broke the following night when two students, Robert Buchsbaum and Jeffery C. Gunkel, who acted in isolation, threw “firebombs” through an open window in the Student Union building. Both students had participated in the strike and actively protested against the war. The fire did not catch and the attempt to burn down the Student Union succeeded only in burning the rug the “firebomb” landed on.\textsuperscript{90} A second arson attempt occurred a month later on June 10 when “fires causing $15,000 in damage were set at the ROTC building.” However, despite the implicit connection due to the occupation of the same building a month prior, the

\textsuperscript{87} The Committee for Undisrupted Education, May 1-18, Demonstration Student (May 1970) Draft, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska.

\textsuperscript{88} “Report of the Commission of Inquiry On Disruptive Actions on the University of Nebraska Campus, Lincoln, April 30-June 10, 1970, Released August 10, 1970.”

\textsuperscript{89} Statement by Dr. Peter Magrath, Dean of Faculties, University of Nebraska, at conclusion of Faculty Senate Meeting, May 12\textsuperscript{th}, 1970, May 1-18, Demonstration Student (May 1970) Draft, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska.

Commission of Inquiry on Disruptive Actions called for by University chancellor D. B. Varner found no connection between the fire and the building occupation.91

By the beginning of June, with the semester over, campus returned to its ways before Nixon’s April 30 announcement. Two events broke the return to normalcy on campus. First, the self-titled “college of life,” an unofficial organization, erected a tent on the lawn outside the Student Union building with president Soshnik’s permission. The “college of life” was a group of students looking to continue the communal spirit that emerged from the antiwar protests over the previous weeks. The “college” never had many participants, and did not disturb regular classes.92 The final event that sparked students was the shooting of two students at Jackson State College by city and highway police on May 14. However, unlike the Kent State shootings that helped fuel the occupation of the Military & Naval Science building and the height of the antiwar movement at the University, students remained apathetic in the face of the further student deaths at the hands of their government. The next day, a poster announced a silent vigil sponsored by the Afro-American Collegiate Society for that night at the “college of life” and asked attendees to “Bring a Candle! Bring a Friend!”93 About forty students, most of them black, attended.94

Although the ASUN served as the central leader and organizer during the height of the antiwar movement at the University, especially through President Steven Tiwald, leadership was often decentralized, unofficial, or non-existent. Moreover, students labeled as leaders, especially when the title came from outside the movement, rejected it for a variety of reasons. Tiwald, who “felt a tremendous dual responsibility,” as the ASUN president and as a sympathizer with the

92 Ibid.
antiwar movement, wanted to provide a democratic avenue for students to determine the
direction of the antiwar movement on campus.\footnote{95} Dan Ladely and Allen Siporin had a tenuous
relationship with leadership. Both helped draft the occupants’ demands, but when administrators
requested that the two help evacuate the building, they claimed that they could not control the
crowd and that no student ever officially led any part of the occupation or the march to the draft
office. Neither planned on becoming a leader in the occupation, while both embraced the
opportunity to be a spokesperson.\footnote{96} Ken Wald was also labeled as a leader in the campus antiwar
movement, but did not “Conceive [himself] as having a tremendous amount of influence on
people.”\footnote{97} The “college of life” claimed no leaders.

Student activists cited different catalysts for their involvement in the events on campus in
May of 1970. Ken Wald “got involved to express [his] abhorrence and disgust with the United
States’ foreign policy.”\footnote{98} Siporin did not participate in the movement at all until he “heard on
May 4 about the killings at Kent State and learned that some of his friends had been arrested” at
the State Selective Service headquarters.\footnote{99} Ladely later stated he hoped that educational reform
would result from the strike. While the University Senate ultimately rejected each of the
demands students made when occupying the ROTC building, a different form of change took
place on campus.

Although the University never accepted any of the official demands or resolutions made
by the student radicals, the events of May did have lasting effects, albeit less tangible ones.
Later, both Siporin and Ladely felt that the occupation of the ROTC building resulted in breaking

\footnote{95} Parsons, “Student Leadership ‘Vital,’” \textit{Campus in Crisis: Two Weeks in May,} School of Journalism, July 1970,
Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska.
\footnote{96} Ibid.
\footnote{97} Ibid.
\footnote{98} Ibid.
down the “caste system” that existed on campus. Both believed that there had been a significant rift between students and administration which the month’s events helped ameliorate.\textsuperscript{100} Bruce Wimmer pointed out that even though students were deeply divided in their ideals, “the University community was drawn a little closer together” because of the constant debates between the two sides. English Professor Paul Olson expressed that students now knew how to express their complaints with the University. Chancellor D. B. Varner made an effort to connect with students and appointed a student to his staff to ensure he kept “in tough with student ideas an feelings.” While the University strayed away from punishing students, the University regents dismissed Professor Rozman after the 1971 academic year ended. However, an investigation the same year submitted a 1,704 page report and concluded that Rozman “was not guilty of inappropriate actions” which led some professors to later believe the administration used him as a scapegoat which was part of a larger, national culling of antiwar faculty.\textsuperscript{101} The University faculty and administration, in spite of its conservative slant, tended to tolerate student and faculty dissent more than most, as a 1969-1970 survey concluded that 79% of faculty approved of the “expulsion of student activists.”\textsuperscript{102} Finally, although the University administration, which had been “more available than any other…in recent memory,” was already reevaluating curricula to make the education students received pertinent to problems students face after graduation, admitted the strike “spurred along many of the programs already under consideration.”\textsuperscript{103} While the impetus for activism was United States’ foreign policy and the shootings at Kent State, and

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} “ROTC takeover Remembered,” \textit{Lincoln Journal-Star}, May 6, 1990; For details on Rozman dismissal see: “Officials Gave Most of Rozman Criticism,” \textit{Omaha World-Herald}, February 24, 1971; For more on the dismissal of antiwar faculty at other universities see: \textit{Campus Wars}, 53-57.
\textsuperscript{102} For conservatism in University of Nebraska faculty see: \textit{Prairie University}, 150. For statistics on faculty opinion see: \textit{Campus Wars}, 44.
\textsuperscript{103} For availability of administration see: \textit{Prairie University}, 152. For quote on changes in curricula see: Bruce Wimmer, “Effects of Strike May Stay,” \textit{Campus in Crisis: Two Weeks in May}.
the original ambitions of students were to change the nation’s involvement in Southeast Asia, the most lasting results were on the University’s campus.

Like the response to NDRU and the initial activities of SDS, community reaction to the events of May 1970 was largely negative and failed to respond to the arguments and motivations nested in the antiwar movement and instead criticized superficial phenomena like the appearance of protestors and their methods of protesting. W.R. Redding viewed the “demonstrations on the Lincoln campus with alarm and disappointment.”104 The general public also misunderstood the student strike, and thought that it disrupted the educational process and prevented students not participating from attending regularly scheduled classes.105 Central to every criticism was the perceived lack of order on campus, the contempt for dissent, and advocating for the expulsion of any student or faculty member who participated in the antiwar movement.106 W.R. Redding stated that neither he, Chancellor Varner, the recipient of his letter, nor the state, had “anything to gain by coddling or negotiating with this segment of society” and called for the dismissal of any students involved.107 State Senators also joined the criticism. State Senator Terry Carpenter, who was “sick and tired of these long haired professors,” stated that any participant, including faculty members, should be “busted.”108 Further, Lincoln print media maintained an openly conservative slant that was atypical of media nationwide during the second half of the Vietnam

104 Letter from W. R. Redding to Chancellor D. B. Varner, May 1-18, Demonstration, Student (May 1970) draft, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska.
106 Letter from Charles Fairley to Chancellor D.B. Varner, May 1-18, Demonstration, Student (May 1970) draft, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska.
107 Letter from W.B. Redding to Chancellor D.B. Varner, May 1-18, Demonstration, Student (May 1970) draft, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska.
War. Not only with the events of May, but with all three snapshots examined here, Lincoln newspapers never gave the same amount of attention to antiwar activists as those criticizing the movement, which was a “misapplication of the ‘fairness doctrine’” that some newspapers used to present the views of those critical of the movement “in order to balance those of the doves.” Administration response to the criticism was dismissive. President Soshnik summed it up well when he stated that “These people have constitutional rights that they don’t lose when they walk on campus.”

As evidenced by the vote to end the strike, students at the University did not universally support the strike or the occupation of the ROTC building and reflected the larger anti-antiwar movement. The two most vocal organizations were YAF and CUE. YAF distributed three leaflets throughout the month of May, each criticizing the antiwar movement. However, none of the leaflets took issue with the motives behind the actions, but instead focused the methods of the activists. One such artifact cited several passages from philosopher Ayn Rand condemning civil disobedience when “encroaches on the rights/property of others.” CUE’s sole concern was criticizing the student strike, specifically the process through which the strike started. CUE likened the process to the post-WWII trials at Nuremberg, and referred to those calling for the strike “a small group of self-appointed foreign policy experts who are more interested into turning it into a political circus than the pursuit of education.”

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112 “Outside the Tower,” May 6, 1970, May 1-18, Demonstration, student (May 1970) draft, Archives and Special Collections, Love Library, University of Nebraska.
113 Flyer for the Committee for Undisrupted Education, May 1-18, Demonstration, Student (May 1970) draft, Archives and Special Collections, University of Nebraska.
Different events served as catalysts for the antiwar movement at the University of Nebraska. Dr. Marxer took issue with the conscription practices, the teach-ins at other campuses and the national antiwar movement inspired SDS to educate students, and the Cambodian incursion and subsequent shootings at Kent State spurred the events of May 1970. But, within these different events and inspirations, each compartment of the antiwar movement in Lincoln fought to challenge local opinions and reduce apathy as a means of changing national policy.

This essay contributes to the historiography of the antiwar movement generally, and specifically to the niche of examinations of individual universities as the University of Nebraska was a non-elite, Midwestern university with no reputation for political activism. Its accomplishments are two-fold. It complicates the perception of apathy at the University of Nebraska, while contributing a history that has not yet existed, until now.
Bibliography
Using MALLET and Voyant to interpret The Veteran revealed an organization that perpetually focused on the present, while keeping an attentive eye on the past. Throughout The Veteran’s tenure, the newspaper analyzed and criticized various contemporary aspects of the world, constantly updating the list of issues with which it grappled. However, Vietnam Veterans Against the War never lost sight of the Vietnam War, the conflict that birthed the organization. Using digital tools to parse through the more than 120 editions of the newspaper revealed that it kept its finger on the zeitgeist’s pulse while simultaneously remembering the war that it rallied against. Further, this exposes the current historiography on VVAW as narrow as none emphasize the eternal modernity of the organization.

Using digital tools to interpret historical documents is relatively new to the study of history, but those in digital history already espouse its value. Even more novel are tools for textual analysis. MALLET, a command-line program that utilizes latent dirichlet allocation, is one of those tools. Simply put, LDA is a mathematical equation that parses through a corpus and returns “topics” of words that co-occur throughout a document. Because of MALLET’s ability to analyze a corpus large enough to contain thousands of books relatively quickly, “topic modeling is one of the hottest trends in digital humanities research today.”114 Even more than its speed, topic modeling can reveal aspects of a corpus that conventional “close-reading” cannot. By showing the user words that tend to relate to each other across the corpus, “distance-reading,” that is using computers to “read” documents, with MALLET shows the user how “documents

relate to one another, how they relate to topics, how topics are related to each other, and how all of those are related to words.” Exposing these trends between topics and words is the true value MALLET lends this project.

In its early days VVAW focused on recruitment and spreading the message that there were servicemen in and out of the military that opposed the war. The founders of VVAW first coalesced in the spring of 1967 after Jan Berry and five other vets painted a banner at an antiwar march through New York in April of that year. Berry oversaw the infant organization’s first meeting where those in attendance elected him president. That fall, two thousand vets and a “small group” of VVAW members joined tens of thousands of other protestors at the National Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam’s march on the Pentagon. However, another three years passed before the organization held its first major event.

Operation Rapid Action Withdrawal, more commonly referred to as Operation RAW, was VVAW’s first public demonstration. Occurring in May of 1970, and taking advantage of a thirty percent growth in membership following the Cambodian incursion and the death four students at Kent State, VVAW wanted to increase their own publicity in order to increase membership while protesting the war. The Operation was a march from Morristown, New Jersey to Philadelphia, where the GIs performed “guerilla theater” to simulate war zones for civilians. It was also the first time future vice president and presidential candidate John Kerry spoke for the organization. Ultimately, Operation RAW was crucial to the organization as it facilitated growth, attracted future leaders of VVAW, and “served as a prototype for future VVAW protests.”

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118 Hunt, 53.
Inspired by the Citizens Commission of Inquiry on U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam that investigated the massacre at My Lai, VVAW wanted to further publicize American war crimes in Vietnam. What resulted was the Winter Soldier Investigation in early 1971. The investigation’s title took its name from Thomas Paine’s *American Crisis* which posited that “The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from service of his country.” VVAWers wanted to prove that they were in fact patriots, and exposing war crimes was a patriotic act.\textsuperscript{119} At the Winter Soldier Investigation VVAW hoped to “show that My Lai and other atrocities were not isolated incidents, but logical results of U.S. policies.”\textsuperscript{120} The event took place in Detroit, Michigan in an effort to gain support from the general public and distance themselves from Washington politics. In spite of funding and public endorsements from Hollywood star Jane Fonda, the Winter Soldier Investigation failed to achieve its main objective of publicizing the experience of GIs in Vietnam, and it would not be until the next year that the media would fully acknowledge the organization’s rhetoric.\textsuperscript{121}

Named as the third episode in a trilogy of military actions, Operation Dewey Canyon III again hoped to bring media attention to the veteran’s opposition to the war and the manner in which the military used them as individuals.\textsuperscript{122} Like the Winter Soldier Investigation earlier that year, the vets hoped that their personal testimonies would increase public opposition. This time, they specifically sought out D.C. landmarks and politicians, which ultimately lead to a massive increase in media attention. Dewey Canyon III consisted of “Five days of marching, lobbying Congress, performing guerrilla theater, and speaking against the war. At the close of the week’s

\textsuperscript{119} Hunt, 59; Tom Wells, *The War Within: America’s Battle over Vietnam*, (Berkeley, University of California, 1994), 463.
\textsuperscript{120} Wells, 463.
\textsuperscript{121} Wells, 473; Hunt 70-72.
activities, VVAWers planned to return their combat medals to the government.”123 Although millions viewed Kerry’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was the open-air testimony and return of medals by vets that resulted in increasing VVAW’s credence in the eyes of the media and antiwar movement at large and served as the event’s climax.124

Aptly, the Last Patrol was the final major, public demonstration by VVAW. Sensing the war could not last much longer, the vets targeted the 1972 Republican National Convention for their “final offensive.”125 About 1,200 VVAW members participated.126 On Tuesday of the convention the vets formed four neat rows and, with military discipline, marched silently to the convention. “There is nothing left to say” one member told a reporter.127 The silent march had a “profound” impact on Hunter S. Thompson who was in Miami to cover the convention as a part of his Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail ’72. In spite of his gonzo style that blurred reality and fiction, Thompson’s writing reflected the wider, generally sympathetic media coverage on the Last Patrol.128 Following the march to the convention, they requested permission to enter and security acquiesced, letting in three wheelchair-bound vets. Once inside, they began chanting in an attempt to delay Nixon’s acceptance speech and security guards summarily removed them from the hall.129 Keeping a theme, the vets again saw themselves as rejected by their president.

Following the signing of Paris Peace Accords in 1973 and the fall of Saigon in 1975 VVAW evolved with America’s foreign policy, but could not forget the war that consumed their lives. The lasting effects of Agent Orange and the group therapy rap sessions dominated the

123 Hunt, 77.
124 Kerry, 15.
125 Hunt, 143.
126 Nicosia, 232.
127 Hunt, 158.
128 Ibid.
years immediately following the war. For VVAW the use Agent Orange in Southeast Asia, a chemical used to destroy vegetation, was a legal matter and lead the lawsuit battles against the creators of Agent Orange.\textsuperscript{130} In addition to the legal conflicts, which ultimately resulted in a settlement to VVAW’s chagrin, VVAW relied on public actions like the Winter Soldier Investigation of Agent Orange in December 1979 and sit-ins at Veterans Administration hospitals in the 1980s to expose the treatment of vets after the war.\textsuperscript{131} None came close to reaching the scope or impact of previous events. Although the informal rap groups began before the war’s end, VVAW blazed a new trail for recovering from the traumas of war. VVAW developed a strategy in which the vets retained primary control of the group therapy sessions, a departure from previous methods that relied on professionals to direct recovery.\textsuperscript{132} It is this vet-focused style that the VA would copy years later.\textsuperscript{133} Although the war was over, VVAW retained a tight focus on it, for a time.

For the last forty-four years, \textit{The Veteran} has served as the major news publication by VVAW.\textsuperscript{134} \textit{The Veteran} was an underground newspaper, albeit an unconventional one amidst a sea of eccentricity. When defined as any publication that openly opposed the “American ‘system’ politically, culturally, socially, and economically,” underground newspapers “as a group exerted influence on American popular culture,” \textit{The Veteran} certainly fit into this

\textsuperscript{130}Nicosia, 442, 490.\textsuperscript{131}Nicosia, 490-492.\textsuperscript{132}Christian Appy, \textit{Working-class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam} (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press 1993), 309; Hunt, 86-87.\textsuperscript{133}Hunt, 180.\textsuperscript{134}Starting in August 1971, the first three editions of the publication were under the name \textit{The 1st Causality}. Then, in 1973 the name changed to \textit{The Winter Soldier}. Finally, in the fifth year of its publication VVAW, settled on \textit{The Veteran}. For simplicity’s sake, this article refers to the entire corpus as \textit{The Veteran}, regardless of publication year or official title of that specific edition. Furthermore, a previous publication under the title \textit{Vietnam GI} by VVAW enjoyed a wide circulation among active-duty soldiers and even made its way to Vietnam. Started by Jeff Sharlet the publication “soon became the most influential GI newspaper in the country.” Unfortunately, publication of \textit{Vietnam GI} stopped after Sharlet’s death in 1969 and VVAW does not maintain an archive of the paper on its website as it does for the entire run of \textit{The Veteran}. Wells, 281; Hunt, 23; Hunt, 31.
framework. However, unlike most underground publishers, VVAW was not solely comprised of college students. In spite of this, the casual tone, open criticisms of the government, hand-drawn pictures, openly biased articles, and articles with an anonymous author all fell in line with the schemata other underground newspapers. This classification is important as it freed contributors to *The Veteran* from the strictures of conventional print media, specifically the open bias, drive to increase profits, and appeal to a broad reader base. *The Veteran* also fell into the category of underground GI newspapers which proliferated after 1968.

Although MALLET served as the main tool for creating topics, getting a final product from MALLET takes time. The user must go through a series of steps in order to “train” the program to produce usable results. This project required ten iterations to see quality results. The first two were simply experiments with the program. For the third I added stopwords and an optimize interval of 10. Although MALLET comes with an automatic list of English stopwords, words that the program does not factor into its topics because they occur too frequently thus muddling the topics, the user must add their own customized list of stopwords. The optimize interval in MALLET “turns on hyperparameter optimization, which allows the model to better fit the data by allowing some topics to be more prominent than others.” This is an especially useful command for this project as it shows the supremacy of certain topics over time, accentuating the modernity of VVAW. Iterations four, five, and six all adjusted stopwords and the optimization interval. Iterations seven, eight, and nine were experiments with the number of topics. If the user requests too many topics, they become vague. Too few and important topics or

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136 Anderson, 376, Wells, 281-282.
137 Examples of stopwords: “I,” “me,” “you,” “the,” and “and.”
words may not appear. Fifteen topics is optimal for this project as it shows the diversity of topics without having too many vague ones.\textsuperscript{139} So, by iteration ten, I had perfected the stopwords list, input an optimization interval of 10, and adjusted the number of topics to fifteen.

The final topics reveal a newspaper that always kept an eye on modern events but remembers the Vietnam War vividly and stands as a contrast to prevailing histories on the organization. Of the fifteen topics, eleven focus on the experience of VVAW members after discharge.\textsuperscript{140} The rest tangentially or directly relate to their experience in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{141} Further, seven topics have no direct relationship to the VVAWers’ experience in the war.\textsuperscript{142} The disparate nature of these topics show the varied interests of VVAWers which current histories tend to ignore. Further, as the majority of these topics focus on their experience after the war, rather than their time in it, exposes faults in the narratives on VVAW. The two main histories of VVAW, \textit{The Turning} and \textit{Home to War}, both focus on public events put on by VVAW, namely the four outlined here. Those four events are here for their importance in the long history of VVAW, but they also serve the purpose of emphasizing that they are decidedly absent in \textit{The Veteran}.

Surprisingly, the most significant moments in the history of VVAW, Operation RAW, the Winter Soldier Investigation, Dewey Canyon III, and The Last Patrol, are of little import in the organization’s main publication, in spite of historians’ insistence on focusing on them. However, as only Operation RAW occurred during the newspaper’s tenure, the publication could not cover the prelude and aftermath of first three. In spite of the lack of overlap, the short-term

\textsuperscript{139} See appendix A for the final topics.
\textsuperscript{140} Topics: 0, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14.
\textsuperscript{141} Topics: 1 and 9.
\textsuperscript{142} Topics: 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, 13, 14.
memory of *The Veteran* further exposes the varied interests of its authors as they do not frequently mention them enough to create their own topics.

Topics 8, 9, 6, and 12 dominated the paper and are present in almost every issue. Topic 8, titled “Post-War Life,” was a near-monolith in *The Veteran*. It was present in every issue, and was the most prevalent topic in all but twenty seven issues. The topic’s nadir came from 1973 to 1975 when Legal Troubles/WSO, Topic 13, reigned supreme. Topic 8 saw another drop in prominence from Volume 5 Number 7 to Volume 7 Number 5 when issues with employment came to the forefront. Topic 8 showed that VVAW’s prime topic was focusing on how their life was after the war, and everything is through its lens. Topic 9, Military, was the second most common. Like Topic 8, Topic 9 showed up in every issue in the full run of *The Veteran*. However, unlike Remembering the War, which was often the most prevalent topic in an issue, Military was rarely the highest topic, and was never amongst the lowest categories in any issue.¹⁴³

Much like Topic 8, Topic 9 showed that authors saw every event through a militaristic lens and frequently relied on their experiences in the military to explain modern phenomena. Further it showed that, as veterans, VVAWers concerned themselves more with America’s international affairs and armed services more than they do with various domestic issues. Topic 6, Remembering the War, was the third most popular. Remembering the War was the first topic to not appear in every iteration. In fact, it became most popular in the 1980s, once the memories of the war became easier to bear and veterans had been able to ease their burdens through the group therapy that encouraged vets to express their emotions about the war. The last major topic is Topic 12, Vietnam in School. Topic 12 arose in 39 of the charted issues. Like Remembering the

¹⁴³ In this study I define High occurrence as frequency over .2, Medium as between .1 and .19, and Low as .5 to .99. All topics below Low in any publication are ignored.
War, Vietnam in School saw a rise in the eighties and is prominent in every issue after Volume 11 Number 3 and is the most prominent narrow topic, as Topics 8, 9, and 6 are all fairly generic and do not fit into any specific time period, explaining their longevity. Further, Vietnam in School, Topic 12, rose in prominence throughout The Veteran’s run. This rise suggested that how schools taught the Vietnam War increased in status to VVAWers as they became parents. Embedded into Topic 12 is VVAW’s response to the proliferation of literature on the Vietnam War over the last two decades, which VVAWers frequently reviewed, discussed, and criticized. Following the top four topics, there is a relatively large drop-off in prevalence.

The next most prominent topics all had short, but marked tenures in The Veteran. First, Topic 7, Employment, did not appear until Volume 5 Number 1, and did not have a single manifestation after Volume 10 Number 3. This delayed onset showed that employment issues for veterans did not come into the purview of vets until after United States’ withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Further, the short tenure of Topic 7 suggests that VVAWers saw employment as a relatively unimportant issue once the eighties began. This is unsurprising as by 1987 Vietnam-era veterans had an unemployment rate only .03% higher than the general population. However, veterans with disabilities had a more difficult time finding work with a disability rate 1.9% higher than other veterans. Topic 13 is the first muddled topic as MALLET conflated references to the Winter Soldier Investigation and the Winter Soldier Organization, a sister organization to VVAW that allowed civilians to join. However, what is not muddled is that Topic 13 figured most prominently in The Veteran in the period during and immediately

144 For examples of VVAW literature reviews see: Kurt Hilgendorf, “This History’s Bunk,” The Veteran, Spring 2004; Jerry Lembcke, “Still a Force for Peace,” The Veteran, Fall 2003.
146 Hunt, 170; Nicosia, 226-228.
following the debates on the inclusion of civilians in VVAW. Topic 5, Agent Orange, was also a fleeting issue. With only appearances on five charts, Agent Orange does not appear to be nearly as a pervasive issue as Nicosia surmised, positing that Agent Orange helped refocus VVAW in the late 70s.\footnote{Nicosia, 490.} However, as the words “agent” and “orange” both appeared in three topics next to each other, this shows that adding codes to group phrases in MALLET is necessary in future iterations.\footnote{“Using Phrases in Mallet Topic Models,” David Mimno, 2015, \url{http://www.mimno.org/articles/phrases/}.} Topic 14, Reagan Presidency, proved the modern nature of \textit{The Veteran} as Topic 14 appears in all but one issue from the fall of 1979 to the winter of 1987, with the highest rating of any topic in any issue in Volume 14 Number 3. VVAWers frequently discussed Reagan, often deriding him for his foreign policy issues, for example Evan Douthit’s rebuke of the president’s role in the Iran-Contra affair.\footnote{Evan Douthit, “Iran scam - Contragate: From The Men Who Brought You Beirut & Sky Wars,” \textit{The Veteran}, Winter 1987, 1, \url{http://www.vvaw.org/veteran/article/?id=2777}.} This group of issues shows the varied interests of VVAW.

The final grouping of topics again showed the array of VVAWers’ concerns and their perpetual modernity, while simultaneously exposing the narrowness of the current historiography on VVAW as none appear in published works on the organization. Topic 10, The War on Terror, unsurprisingly shows up after the September 11th attacks and subsequent US involvement in the Middle East. Further, it appears in every issue after Volume 39 Number 1 and received a Medium rating in every issue after Volume 41 Number 1, meaning that VVAWers began criticizing the US military’s involvement in the Middle East early and often.\footnote{Dave Curry, Joe Miller and Barry Romo, “George W. Bush Reaches a New Low in Support of the Nation’s Veterans,” \textit{The Veteran}, Fall 2003, 2, \url{http://www.vvaw.org/veteran/article/?id=367}.} This shows that, even decades later, VVAWers showed no reticence or reluctance to condemn US militarism, especially in a conflict in an undeveloped state as Vietnam was during the war. Further, the inclusion of “IVAW,” the Iraq Veterans Against the War, in the topic is telling as it exposed the
solidarity between the two organizations, especially after the Winter Soldier Investigation: Iraq
and Afghanistan that criticized the war in the same manner as the eponymous event VVAW
organized.\textsuperscript{151} Legal Matters, Topic 2, was the next in line in terms of prominence. Topic 2 was
most prevalent in the early years of the newspaper as many members found themselves
embroiled in lawsuits and trials. The high water mark for Legal Matters came in Volume 4
Number 5 which featured articles on the Bob Hood trial, VVAWers advocating the right to
strike, and demands for universal amnesty for draft-dodgers and a single discharge that would
eliminate dishonorable discharges. Topic 0 received attention in only four issues, but its narrow
focus shows that VVAWers fixated on Central America, the title of Topic 0, when United States
foreign policy focused on the region, another example of VVAW’s focus on foreign policy.
Topic 0’s only High rating came in 1990 when members expressed solidarity with El
Salvadorians who resisted US intervention and criticized US involvement in Panama and
Colombia.\textsuperscript{152} Topic 3 shows the shortcomings of MALLET as well as it also focused on the War
on Terror. Like Topic 10 of the same name, Topic 3 shows up after the spring of 2003, however,
it does not appear after 2010. The final topic, Articles by Barry Romo, is interesting as it shows
up in Volume 4 Number 3, but never appears again until Volume 21 Number 1. However, upon
closer inspection, this is also the issue when the transcriptions of all articles began including the
author, whereas before many articles had no author in the byline. As Barry Romo was the most
prolific author of VVAW it is unsurprising that he generated his own topic once his name
appeared with all his articles.

\textsuperscript{151} Ward Reilly, “Winter Soldier: Iraq and Afghanistan…The Bravest of the Brave,” \textit{The Veteran}, Spring 2008, 16,
http://www.vvaw.org/veteran/article/?id=848.
\textsuperscript{152} \textit{The Veteran}, Spring 1990.
There are alarming absences in the topics MALLET produced that go beyond the four major events mentioned previously. First, Gainesville and Eight never appeared in any iteration. In spite of the trial that accused eight members of VVAW of conspiracy to disrupt the 1972 Republican National Convention, the words never appeared and neither did any of the names of the accused. Also intriguing is the lack John Kerry’s presence. Kerry was a prominent member of VVAW and spoke in some of the most publicized events for VVAW including giving testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a part of Dewey Canyon III which millions watched on TV. Further, his long career as a senator, secretary of state, and cabinet member also complicated his absence. One would expect the most famous and politically powerful alumnus of such a political organization to be the focal point of numerous articles, especially in light of the prominence his service during his presidential run in 2008 during which his service and participation in VVAW came under intense scrutiny. Perhaps the best example of this is *Unfit For Command*, a book criticizing Kerry’s actions both during and immediately after his service in Vietnam. However, many VVAWers had a low opinion of Kerry even when he was an active member in VVAW because they believed that he was using the organization to start a political career and thought himself superior to other, less elite VVAWers. This distrust and dislike of Kerry explains his absence in the face of his eminence. In spite of these absences, the topics presented by MALLET give a great overview of *The Veteran*’s run.

The second digital tool used in this project is Voyant, a “web-based text analysis environment that helps you visualize the distribution of words within a single text or compare

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154 Hunt, 89; Nicosia, 495.
their usage across a number of texts.”¹⁵⁵ So, in contrast to MALLET, which analyzes how words relate to each other, Voyant measures the popularity of a single word across a corpus. Also unlike MALLET, which requires some comfortability with command-line inputs in place of the more popular graphic user interfaces, Voyant has a stand-alone website that is much more user-friendly. Voyant is not perfect for all “distance reading” projects, however as it not “well adapted for managing a very large collection of texts.”¹⁵⁶ At just over one hundred editions, *The Veteran*, seems to be the perfect size for Voyant as it is large enough that digital methods greatly ease the reading burden, and small enough that the user can easily interpret Voyant’s results.

Voyant provides several tools for the user, the most basic of which is a measurement of the most popular words in the corpus presented in a customizable word cloud, once the user inputs the stock and customized stop-words.¹⁵⁷ The most popular words in the full run of *The Veteran*, presented in Voyant’s word cloud, do not yield dazzling results as the largest words are “war,” “veterans,” “Vietnam,” “people,” “VVAW,” and “vets.” The most useful tool Voyant provides for this project is its measurement and charting of relative frequency of individual words.¹⁵⁸ Further inspection into Voyant by measuring the frequency of single words across the full corpus, however does hold merit.

The most common words across the corpus, listed above, like the most common topics, appear in every issue, and with generally high frequency. The most common word, “war,” never dipped below 19 mentions, and peaked at just over 120, corroborating MALLET’s output on the prevalence of the military, Topic 9, throughout *The Veteran*. Further, the word’s use rose in

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¹⁵⁷ For consistency’s sake, I used the same stop-words for MALLET and Voyant.
¹⁵⁸ Voyant shows the occurrence of a word or phrase per 10,000 words. “Type Frequency’s Chart,” Voyant Tools Documentation, 2015, http://docs.voyant-tools.org/tools/typefrequencieschart/.
recent years, showing that VVAWers became interested in not just the Vietnam War, but also the multiple military engagements of the US military in the Middle East. The next most popular words, “Vietnam,” “veteran,” and “veterans,” each saw a general upward trend in frequency with “Vietnam,” peaking in Volumes 12 and 13. Although VVAWers never lost sight of the war in which they fought, the rise of “veteran” and “veterans” reflected VVAW’s solidarity with IVAW and their support of the plight of all veterans, not just those who served in Vietnam. Unlike “veteran” and “veterans,” “vets” and “vet” balance out their longer forms as they declined in popularity as “veteran” and “veterans” rose. In an effort to gain legitimacy and an air of decorum and professionalism, authors stopped abbreviating words. After these individual words there was a massive drop-off in appearances.

Issues regarding expanding VVAW’s potential membership base had fleeting presence. In 1973 VVAW officially expanded its possible pool of members by permitting civilians to join. The debate on this expansion shows in Voyant as words like “women,” “sexism,” “WSO,” and “VVAW–WSO,” only saw spikes in popularity in the years surrounding the decision. “WSO,” had no mentions through Volume 3 Number 3, then saw a rise in Volume 5 Number 5, but received no mentions since. Similarly, “VVAW–WSO” was only mentioned in five issues, none of which were after Volume 5 Number 4. “Women” had a relatively low frequency throughout The Veteran’s tenure, only rising above ten uses per 10,000 words five times, three of which were within two years of the inclusion of civilians, and thus a rise in the relative population of women in VVAW. However, the number of women in VVAW were always “sparse,” and “VVAW remained thoroughly dominated by white males, possibly more than any other mass movement at the time.”

159 “Sexism” had a similar trajectory as it had minor popularity, never

159 Hunt, 136.
rising above ten mentions per 10,000 words, through the first five years of *The Veteran* and almost no mentions after. Gender, like many other issues, were fleeting in VVAW.

The next grouping of words all revolved around post-war issues and perceptions of the war and corroborated MALLET’s findings on corollary topics. First, “Patriot” was the most infrequent word examined here. Never rising above three mentions per 10,000 words, and only seeing use in two or more consecutive issues four times, the dearth of the word showed VVAW’s reluctance to see any service member in high regard. “Agent Orange” also matched MALLET’s output on the eponymous topic. The phrase did not appear until eight years after printing began and held sustained prevalence until Volume 15 which observed a massive drop followed by murmurs until Volume 40 Number 1 when *The Veteran* featured an article on a bill to increase aid to Americans and Vietnamese affected by the toxin.¹⁶⁰ “Employment” also matched its namesake in MALLET. “Employment” had its high-point in the early years of the newspaper and a drop after Volume 6 with relatively infrequent mentions following. “Jobs” complicated this however as it had a both a higher prevalence and a higher volatility than “Employment.”

The final grouping of phrases revolved around the four major events put on by VVAW and show the short-term memory of VVAWers. Neither “Operation RAW” nor “Operation Rapid” broke the two instance mark and received almost no attention after Volume 4.¹⁶¹ “Winter Soldier” was in vogue in the earlier issues of *The Veteran*, but saw a stark fall through the eighties and nineties until the formation of IVAW which held its own Winter Soldier-inspired event, mentioned above. Additionally, “Dewey Canyon” and “Dewey Canyon III” both have low horizons, with few exceptions caused by shorter editions of *The Veteran* more than high

¹⁶¹ Voyant’s word chart feature has a character limit lower than the full phrase “Operation Rapid Action Withdrawal.”
frequency. Finally, writers discussed “The Last Patrol” even less than any other events and ignored it entirely until *The Veteran’s* sixteenth year. In spite of their importance to historians, VVAW’s major events seem to be of little import to VVAWers after the fact. This is because of the members of VVAW focused on the present, and wanted to grapple with current issues rather than continually rehash old events and faded memories. While VVAWers put great value on the events during the time in which they occurred, it was the issues those events responded to, more so than the event itself, that the VVAWers continued to write about.

In conclusion, textual analysis tools like MALLET and Voyant lend themselves well to interpreting a corpus the size of *The Veteran’s* full run and exposed the simultaneous modernity and long-term memory of VVAW. Through *The Veteran’s* entire run VVAWers focused on contemporary, generally international issues, extending their historical relevance by decades in comparison to the exiting historiography on the organization that ends their story prematurely. However, VVAW never lost sight of the Vietnam War and the high prevalence of topics directly related to it from MALLET and the frequency of “Vietnam” over time in Voyant show this.
Appendix A

0 – Central America/US Military  0.10511  u.s nicaragua america central government contras bases page panama reagan aid south economic guard policy invasion honduras contra box peace

1 – Vague  0.13258  npa school ceremony recruitment hollywood sports hostages art the recruiters wayne gao balweg letter ceremonies oppressed jews mia tapes dis

2 – Legal Matters  0.12587  vvaw nixon trial u.s american defense prison government soldier box brothers indochina winter states united political military crimes discharge vvaw/wso

3 – War on Terror  0.08428  iraq vvaw ivaw bush soldier winter members ptsd don’t it’s march iraqi afghanistan troops contact barry chapter event families bob

4 – Articles by Barry Romo  0.07932  u.s colombia gulf states barry united romo vieques anniversary coordinator clinton insignia memorial gls clarence w's persian bush antiwar thirty

5 – Agent Orange Fight  0.15807  vets agent u.s orange government south v.a problems fact africa effects situation draft hell carter postal vfw there's pac chemical

6 – Remembering the War  1.15511  vietnam vietnamese back years remember knew thought good children man base time guys kill vet nam died lot viet experience

7 – Employment  0.28232  vets workers fight rich vvaw people bill country struggle class jobs working system union veteran fighting vet day page benefits

8 – Post-war Life  3.11358  war people veterans vietnam national time vets years day back members support work year part make state end office chicago

9 – Military  2.18846  military american country world government service president troops local group rights political city women good real states struggle army united
10 – War on Terror 0.14502  iraq orange agent afghanistan ivaw ptsd service wars care members victims organizing campaign obama trauma mental hood health iraqi work

11 – Vague/North Vietnam 0.07467  hanoi chi minh north show french laos giap housing van heal meese guide p.o center bac platoon ortega willson baker

12 – Vietnam in School 1.10657  war veterans vvaw vietnam peace soldiers veteran years school book combat health home life day students lives anti-war history community

13 – Legal Troubles/Events 0.18184  people wso struggle government trial police vvaw/wso soldier repression working charges winter system amnesty imperialism u.s riverside vva thieu support

14 – Reagan Presidency 0.15536  vets vietnam agent orange vvaw reagan u.s vet government veteran problems veterans groups nam national america salvador memorial draft children
Appendix B

V1 N1

V1 N2
V12 N1

V12 N3
V34 N1

V35 N1
Appendix C
A Historiography of the Antiwar Movement in the American West

For most authors, to write on the antiwar movement during the Vietnam War in the West is write about the University of California, Berkeley. To put it in Kirkpatrick Sale’s prophetic and succinct words for rationale on this narrow emphasis, “Berkeley had it all. And had it, moreover, in extremes.”¹⁶² For this historiography, the West is defined as all land between the Mississippi river and Pacific Ocean. Although this definition provides a large swath of land, especially in the second half of 20th century in which the West had a more modern and diverse society than any previous time in history, it is large enough to allow for comparisons within the region. Specifically this facilitates comparisons between the prairie states and the coast. The historiography is not complete however, as the experiences of women, minorities, and organizations outside of Berkeley like the Vietnam Veterans Against the War are underrepresented.

This historiography starts with an aberration, albeit a necessary one that refuted a popular contemporary notion of the antiwar movement as exclusively consisting of economic elites. “The Changing Social Base of the American Student Movement” responded to previous research asserting that activist students of the 1960s were products of “humanistic, liberal, middle-class families.”¹⁶³ The sociological study argued for a shift in the demographics of the antiwar movement compared to earlier in the decade. Based on surveys from students at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, the authors found that “there is unquestionably a widespread feeling among students across the country concerning the basic issues which have been foci of protest, representing a dramatic shift of student opinion to the Left over the past five years.” That

“dramatic shift” was one of economic status. The survey compared “veterans” of student activism, that is, students who had expressed discontent for three years prior to May 1968 when Mankoff and Flacks distributed questionnaires, to newcomers. They found multiple differences between the two cadres. The two authors most emphasized the rise in prevalence of rural roots of newcomers, their Christianity, less educated parents and siblings, and relatively less political awareness, thus bringing complications to a young field.\footnote{164}

It is the detailing of this change on the origins of activists that makes “The Changing Social Base of the American Student Movement” relevant to this historiography. Further, Mankoff and Flacks approached the article from a Marxist standpoint. The two argued that “the combination of deepening cultural crisis (rooted in the impact of advanced technology on traditional capitalist values) with a rapidly expanded incorporation of young people into segregated enclaves created the ground for the emergence of widespread generational consciousness – a consciousness in considerable tension with established authority.”\footnote{165} Further, the two hypothesized that there was a growing class consciousness among students and that the longevity of the movement depended on newcomers becoming more politically well-versed. Todd Gitlin was the only other academic to analyze the antiwar movement from a Marxist perspective, further adding to the importance of this article.

Kirkpatrick Sale’s SDS chronicled the origins, rise, and breakup of the Students for a Democratic Society, which he argued was the most important organization in the antiwar movement in the 1960s. Like subsequent historians, although he himself was not a professional

\footnote{164}{The “veterans” were largely Jewish or non-religious, came from well-educated urban families, and read multiple political publications. Ibid, 58.}
\footnote{165}{Ibid., 63.}
scholar, Sale argued for the preeminence of the Port Huron statement as it “provided [an] intellectual framework for the New Left.”

He further argued that SDS “was initially responsible for opening up the left spectrum of politics in this country, successfully introducing the concepts of participatory democracy, corporate liberalism, local organizing, student power, the new working class, revolutionary consciousness, and imperialism, with the eventual effect of not only pushing the liberal canon to the left but establishing socialism as at least a possible political alternative for a considerable segment of the population.”

In the West, Sale presented myriad dimensions of the student organization. Sale, like subsequent authors with a national scope, placed an emphasis on UC Berkeley. Sale integrated the Free Speech Movement at the university into his narrative and posited that academics and the media alike misunderstood the movement because they saw it as a reaction to the impersonality of the multiversity. Sale pushed against this interpretation as many of the most prominent members of FSM, including its leader Mario Savio, sought out UC Berkeley as transfer students. Further, Sale argued that FSM inspired SDS, especially its embodiment of participatory democracy.

Sale does not exclusively focus on UC Berkeley, in fact the author dedicated an entire chapter to Prairie Power. He suggested that Prairie Power represented a change from the “Old Guard,” or previous members of SDS. Prairie members of SDS were more anarchical, and pushed for a decentralization of the power in SDS and ultimately had “pervasive” power in SDS.

Sale contributed to this historiography by detailing the truly national history of SDS, a major intellectual and organizational player in antiwar movement.

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166 SDS, 6.
167 Ibid., 8.
168 Outside of brief mentions, Sale gave little attention to Savio, a character many authors vet. Ibid., 165-168.
169 Ibid., 280-281.
In 1989, frustrated by the lack of local studies and the over-emphasis on national media and Washington D.C., W.J. Rorabaugh released *Berkeley at War: The 1960s*. Rorabaugh’s monograph exclusively focused on the Bay Area city and saw the decade as a struggle for local power. Rorabaugh saw Berkeley as representative of a nation-wide rise of liberals on the local level and posited that those on the “bottom saw less a disintegration of society than a rebirth of community spirit and individual liberty in opposition to a corrupt, bureaucratic social order,” which he argued was the most “profound legacy of the sixties.” Each of the chapters in his book focused on a different issue in the city. Chapters one and three were of most use here.

Chapter one looked at the university from WWII to the mid-1960s. Of particular interest was his focus on FSM, which he used to show popular support of the organization from students and faculty in FSM’s fight for more political freedoms for students. Chapter three vetted anticommunism in the city, in which the antiwar movement deeply intertwined itself. He gave an in-depth analysis of the Vietnam Day Committee, the underground newspaper *The Berkeley Barb*, teach-ins, the marches and riot at the Oakland Induction Center, Stop the Draft Week, the city’s news, the local SDS chapter, and the Vietnam Commencement. Cumulatively, he used these events to expose the pervasive and varied antiwar movement in the city as it evolved through the decade, inched towards radicalism, and increased its own power. Rorabaugh’s contribution to this historiography is a deep and thorough local study on what is the most oft referenced western city in the antiwar movement.

The 1990s saw an explosion in this historiography as professional historians began publishing full-length monographs on the national antiwar movement. Started by Charles DeBenedetti and finished by Charles Chatfield after DeBendetti’s death, *An American Ordeal*,

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which sought to chronicle the entire antiwar movement, was the first. In it the two emphasized the discursive nature of antiwar movement, a duality marked by liberals and radicals. In the afterword with sole authorship by Chatfield, he marked the difference stating “antiwar liberals saw the war as a policy issue, antiwar radicals as a means toward revolutionary social change. The former tried to de-escalate and then end U.S. military involvement, while the latter challenged intervention in an attempt to transform the distribution of power and privilege in America.” However, in spite of its national scope, An American Ordeal saw the entire West in the San Francisco bay. He used the 1964 UC Berkeley teach-in to argue that it really was about speech rights on campus and the disconnected bureaucracy in America and not the Vietnam War, connecting it to the ethos of FSM. Further, FSM provided the impetus for the Vietnam Day Committee, a “strange concoction of radical pacifism, student protest, civil rights activism, leftist politics, and cultural bohemianism peculiar to the Bay Area.” The only Western events to get any specific attention were the disturbances at the Oakland Induction Center in October, 1967. The two authors used the event to mark the radicalization of, and subsequent debates within, the movement, as radicals had “achieved a new level of unreality.”

The 1960s: From Memory to History was an excellent compilation of articles on the long sixties. Of most use to this historiography was Kenneth Cmiel’s chapter “The Politics of Civility” that examined the antiwar movement from its comprehension of decorum. Cmiel took special interest in UC Berkeley through his examination of FSM and subsequent Filthy Speech Movement as representative of the counterculture that he characterized “not an attack on politeness, but rather an ‘alternative,’ that was not based on restraint, but rather an expression of

172 Ibid., 115.
173 Ibid., 136.
individualism from ‘liberated human beings.’” He further expounded that, in spite of hope for a change in American culture, a revolution, the dream went unrealized. He then turned to the political left which viewed the Vietnam War and racist as the true obscenities in America, not the word “fuck” or long hair. It was this accusation of incivility, Cmiel posited, that had lasting consequences in American culture. Further, is this article’s focus on civility and rhetoric, with tangential connections to Berkeley that made this article important here.

Also from 1994, Covering Dissent: The Media and the Antiwar Movement investigated the relationship between the media and the antiwar movement. In it Melvin Small argued that the media affected the public’s opinion on the Vietnam War. However, Small goes as far as to say that the media misrepresented the antiwar movement in both scale and convictions which lead to a reinforcement of public perception that viewed the movement with skepticism. Small leaned on prominent national news sources for his book, specifically The New York Times, The Washington Post, Time, Newsweek, and the three nationally televised nightly news programs of NBC, ABC, and CBS. He choose these because he was concerned with the connections between public perception, the media and national policy. Further, as the presidents monitored these seven sources closely, they best served his ends. Although Small did not have grant significant attention to the West, he used publications that enjoyed national circulation and therefore his arguments applied to the West as much as the rest of the nation.

Terry Anderson’s The Movement and the Sixties, argued that the antiwar movement was part of a larger shift in America, which he collectively referred to as “the movement,” was more porous to...
than previous portrayals.\(^{177}\) Anderson’s national overview, the second of its kind in this historiography, went beyond any specific focus on leaders, ideology, or organizations because of the permeable and fluid nature of the movement, allowed him to chronicle the spread of the sea change.\(^{178}\) He asserted that the movement came to the West after its crucibles in the South in the fifties and early sixties.\(^{179}\) Once in the West, Anderson retained his wide scope. He tackled myriad topics across the region and mentioned more disparate universities and cities than any other author mentioned here. For example, he cited two pro-war rallies at Brigham Young University, antiwar housewives in Denver, and a resolution the Californian Federation of Teachers passed condemning the war.\(^{180}\) However, in spite of his attempts at a national scope, Anderson could not escape UC Berkeley. Most notably, Anderson used the VDC to mark a split between radicals, who were willing to use violence to achieve their ends, and liberals, who exalted education and nonviolence.\(^{181}\) Anderson’s most significant contribution to this historiography fits into the ethos he set out with. For example, He exposed the intersectionality between the civil rights and antiwar movements through the Black Panthers’ occupation of the capitol building in Sacramento.\(^{182}\) Further, he noted interweaving of the counterculture and the antiwar movement. The best instance of this was the San Francisco Human Be-in. Although the most prominent outcome of this event may have been the coining of Timothy Leary’s now-famous ethos of “Tune in, turn on, drop out,” the Be-in was notable to Anderson because of Jerry Rubin’s call to end the war.\(^{183}\) Anderson’s tome on the shifting culture of America exposed how interconnected the changes really were.

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\(^{178}\) Ibid.

\(^{179}\) Ibid., xvii.

\(^{180}\) Ibid., For BYU demonstrations see 145, 351; for housewives and teachers see 166.

\(^{181}\) Ibid., 150.

\(^{182}\) Ibid., 176-177.

\(^{183}\) Ibid., 67.
Jerry Lembcke’s *The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam* vetted the story of civilians spitting on GIs. As Lembcke outlined, it was usually a woman antiwar activist who would spit on the GIs as they arrived home from war in Oakland. Through his research, Lembcke could not find a single concrete piece of evidence that corroborated the myth. In fact, Lembcke posited that antiwar groups tended to be sympathetic towards GIs because of their opposition to the draft and disproportionate numbers of working-class men pulled into the war.184 Further, Lembcke saw the intersections of the myth, GIs, antiwar activists, and VVAW, and therein lies the value of *The Spitting Image*. As Lembcke focused largely on the role of movies in their portrayals of warriors and antiwarriors, much of his book located itself in America. The most recurring setting in the West is the Oakland Induction Center. Lembcke used this setting best in his refutation of *Coming Home*’s portrayal of antiwar activists where he demonstrated the “inversion” of “historical reality” by the film that showed animosity between protestors and GIs in spite of the demonstrations only ever occurring before GIs left for Vietnam, not when they returned.185 By examining the cultural power of the media, Lembcke finds sources for the myth of animosity between antiwarriors and veterans.

*The Turning*, an examination of Vietnam Veterans Against the War, was intriguing for this geographically-based study as its only mentions west of the Mississippi were brief sentences on the actions of individual chapters. In spite of VVAW being a national organization with members and chapters in all fifty states, there was a dearth of activity in the West.186 Most notably, none of the major events put on by VVAW, Operation RAW, a march from Morristown

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185 Ibid., 145
to Valley Forge, the Winter Soldier Investigation, which sought to expose US war crimes in Southeast Asia, Dewey Canyon III, a “limited incursion into the nation of congress,” and The Last Patrol, a silent march protesting Nixon’s presidential nomination at the 1972 Republican National Convention, took place in the East. For Hunt, the West was a place to briefly mention single incidents or the actions of an individual chapter. The Los Angeles chapter continued operations when lack of funding forced the national offices had to close. During Operation Peace on Earth, VVAWers occupied a “hospital ward at Travis Air Force Base.” Four hundred protested at Fort Ord, “fifteen turned themselves in as ‘war criminals’” in San Diego, and VVAWers in Seattle occupied the local Republican offices in response to Nixon’s renewed bombing campaigns in 1971. Examinations of VVAW in the West would fill in a gap in this historiography.

*A Generation Divided*, the only other sociology text investigated here, attempted to reshape the perceptions of the 1960s by arguing that it was a decade where the New Right flourished alongside the New Left and examining commonalities and divergences between the two disparate groups. Klatch relied on two different sources for her book. First, she conducted “life histories” with seventy-four former activists to study how the participants in the two organizations remembered their roles in their respective organizations. These made up the bulk of her text, a departure from the other histories used here that relied more heavily on archival material than interviews. Although she did examine archival materials of both organizations. As for the West, Klatch made a significant contribution by complicating both Sale’s and Gitlin’s narratives on Prairie Power. Citing both author’s works used here, she outlined the prevailing

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187 Hunt, 116
188 Ibid., 35.
189 Ibid., 141.
190 Ibid., 145.
notion of Prairie Power representing a distinct break from the “Old Guard” of SDS that embraced the counterculture more. However, Klatch posited that the distance between the Old Guard and Prairie Power was more fluid and ill-defined by proffering her interviews with Jane Adams who had joined SDS in 1964, before the Midwest’s rise in power, but held “ambivalent views of the counterculture,” and saw benefits to working with the counterculture.\textsuperscript{191} Although she examined both the Young Americans for Freedom and SDS, her work on the latter formed her contributions to this historiography.

\textit{The Long March} was the most openly political and unabashedly conservative tome on the antiwar movement cited here. An art critic for \textit{The New Criterion}, Kimball saw the cultural revolution of the 1960s, of which the antiwar movement was part and parcel, as responsible for leaving American culture “rudderless: physically in-tact, its ‘moral center’ in shambles.”\textsuperscript{192} For the antiwar movement Kimball focused mostly on students and criticized them as “bourgeois” whose only accomplishment was “blighting a good many lives.”\textsuperscript{193} Further, he posited that the antiwar movement was not about the war at all, an assertion that puts him alone in this historiography. Instead “Vietnam was merely the occasion for disruptions and demands that went far beyond any specific government policy…The real issue was our way of life: what used to be called the ‘American way of life,’ with its social and political institutions, its moral assumptions, its unspoken confidences about what mattered.”\textsuperscript{194} Kimball did fit in with other authors as he saw the entire West as existing in the San Francisco Bay. His only explicit exploration of the West is on the Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley which he argued wanted “the university to

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Kimball, 9.
\item Ibid., 129.
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transform itself from an academic community into an operating base for political radicalism.”

As the only author who openly criticized the antiwar movement, Kimball brought balance to this historiography.

_The Vietnam War on Campus_ was another compendium of essays, specifically focusing on student response to the war. Although the entire volume was excellent, three essays, “The Refiner’s Fire: Anti-war Activism and Emerging Feminism in the Late 1960s” by Barbara L. Tischler, “Healing from the War: Building the Berkeley Vietnam Veterans Memorial” by Joe McDonald, and “Lock and Load: The Antiwar Movement comes to a Los Angeles Secondary School” by Marc Jason Gilbert, are of most interest here. In the introduction Gilbert compared contemporary perceptions of the antiwar movement, that is response during the war, to prevailing notions at the time of publication. He posited that during the war society saw antiwarriors as left-wing elites at prestigious institutions who did not understand the nature of war or the war itself. Gilbert contrasted that with modern response by both historians and politicians, namely former president Bill Clinton and then-senator John Kerry. Politicians tended to “dismiss much of the criticism directed at them as the sour grapes of self-deluded defenders of a dysfunctional social order too eager to hide its interests in Africa, Latin America, and Asia beneath the mantle of moral anticommunism.”

He also argued that the antiwar movement was right. “The United states had stumbled into war in a country that it knew little about in defense of geopolitical assumptions that its own intelligence agencies labeled illusory.” The other essays also contributed to this historiography and their tight geographic focus filled in spaces in the West and the historiography.

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195 Ibid., 107.
197 Ibid., xii.
Tichler’s chapter on the intersections of feminism and antiwar activism argued that studies focusing on the antiwar movement as inspiring feminist movements, miss women’s contributions to the antiwar movement itself. Tichler asserted that “During the anti-war movement, particularly on college campuses all over the United States but also in the public realm of entertainment and in the man’s world of the U.S. military, women honed their skills and came to understand their rage at the objective conditions of their lives.”\(^{198}\) Though her article had little mention of geography, she did examine how women staged female-centric antiwar protests. For example women held a rally and protest at the Oakland Induction Center in February 1966 after the death of two nurses in Vietnam.\(^{199}\) By placing women in the antiwar movement at the center of her study, she created both a new history and a contribution to this historiography.

The next article, “Healing from the War: Building the Berkeley Vietnam Veterans Memorial,” by Joe McDonald examined the construction and ironies of a war memorial in Berkeley, epicenter of the western antiwar movement. McDonald, most known for his music with Country Joe and the Fish and the antiwar anthem “I Feel Like I’m Fixing to Die Rag,” argued that the memorial facilitated reconciliation because it allowed vets to metaphorically “touch the corpse” of fallen brothers-in-arms. McDonald also emphasized that, in spite of antiwar sentiment from both he and other contributors to the monument’s construction, there was unanimous support of troops.\(^{200}\) Even decades after the last battle in Southeast Asia, McDonald pushed for support for the veterans and their emotional recovery.


\(^{199}\) Ibid., 62.

The final chapter featured from *The Vietnam War on Campus* is the editor’s “Lock and Load: The Antiwar Movement Comes to a Los Angeles Secondary School” in which he asserted even high school students came to think critically about “the Establishment.” Leaning mostly on the school’s newspaper for evidence and argument, he contended that it was generally pro-war and critical of the antiwar movement as the paper “defended traditional political processes and values while attacking not the opponents’ positions, but their character.”\(^{201}\) Like other historians who examined the Vietnam War on school campuses, Gilbert found that newspapers themselves became places of contention over free speech and free press that ultimately resulted in increasing the rights, and thus agency, of student journalists.\(^{202}\) Further, by examining the response of high school students in Los Angeles, Gilbert played a second role in this historiography.

*The Whole World is Watching* focused on the media in America, specifically its coverage of the 1968 Democratic National Convention which Gitlin posited was part of the changing “texture” of mass media in the 1960s that influenced the New Left.\(^{203}\) A Marxist sociologist and former antiwar activist himself, Gitlin used CBS news broadcasts and their archives for his primary source base. Although his focus was on Chicago, he also looked west on occasion. Gitlin split his Western focus between UC Berkeley and the Prairie Power members of SDS. In Berkeley he looked at the interactions between students, most notably for members of FSM, the Vietnam Day Committee, and the media. For example, he noted that “Throughout the sub-society of news reporters, arrests certify protest events. According to a reporter who covered the Berkeley beat for the *San Francisco Chronicle* in 1965-1966, stories about student activities at the University

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\(^{202}\) Ibid., 189-190.

of California were routinely disqualified as news unless there had been arrests.”

Gitlin also examined Prairie Power. However, he emphasized the culture from which Prairie Power members came and asserted that, due to the conservative cultural mores of the plain states, any sort of rebellion was sure to “provoke repression,” thus mitigating and explaining the radical nature of Prairie Power. This conclusion on the new leaders in SDS diverged from previous explanations that ignored relative Midwestern culture and did not see rebellion as a natural response to conservatism. As it covered the media as an entity, *The Whole World is Watching* provides a valuable framework for this project which also examines the media, albeit a different one.

“The Vietnam Era Antiwar Movement” by Mitchell Hall was the most succinct and non-academic exploration of the antiwar movement included here. He concluded that the antiwar movement earned a “partial victory” as “The public largely accepted the movement's message even as it often rejected the activists themselves,” and although they were “Unable to end the war directly, the movement was strong enough to alarm the government, creating social conditions that limited policy options and made stopping the war possible.” Hall also provided accessible definitions on the difference between liberals and radicals within the antiwar movement that held more clarity than those given by Debendetti, Chatfield, and Anderson. Liberals, the largest contingency throughout the antiwar movement, believed that they could affect change through direct action with the political system. Radicals however, saw American bureaucracy as flawed and therefore sought to change society outside of the government’s reach.

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205 Ibid., 30.
In the West, Hall briefly emphasized the importance of the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam as it brought together the sometimes disparate liberals, radicals and pacifists. Later, Hall glanced toward Oakland where “police fought 3,500 radicals attempting to close down the city’s induction center.” Hall’s brevity and clarity on the accomplishments of the antiwar movement addressed a general reader that other works here missed.

Also published in 2004, Lieberman’s *Prairie Power* attempted to complicate the prevailing narrative on the contingency that rose to power in the middle years of the 1960s. By focusing his entire monograph on the group, he hoped to humanize the Midwestern students and delved into their personal politics as “Prairie Power was not just a contingent of SDS; it was a set of values and a style of protest that to some extent distinguished student activism at large Midwestern state universities from that at more elite and urban institutions.” Further, contrary to previous historians like Terry Anderson and in line with Klatch’s findings, prairie students did not have a unified ideology, although he admitted most “were affected by the counterculture, and virtually all have maintained the values to which they came in that turbulent era.” Lieberman’s contributions to this historiography are twofold. First, he provided a working thesis and definition on Prairie Power. He described them as “a group of southern and Midwestern activists who emphasized organizing students around local issues, decentralizing SDS leadership, and focusing on the war in Vietnam” that “shaped the New Left in the late sixties and early seventies” Further, he called for historians to perform more local and regional studies as previous monographs on the movement had too broad of a scope and were therefore

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207 Ibid., 16.
209 Ibid., xi.
210 Ibid., 1-3.
premature. As the current historiography on the antiwar movement in the West focused almost exclusively on the Bay Area, this call for more studies with a tight focus is apt.

Another national overview of the antiwar movement, *The War Within*, by Tom Wells looked at the interplay between the antiwar movement and the federal government. Wells argued that, for all its miscalculations and deep divisions, while simultaneously underestimating its own strength, the movement prevented Nixon from escalating the war at “critical junctures.” Like Anderson, Wells looked at various aspects of the movement beyond Berkeley, but never broke out of California. For example, he examined a demonstration of sixty thousand in San Francisco in April of 1967, concluding that “the Santa Clara county labor council’s endorsement of the protest and the participation of thousands of trade union members were marked signs of the peace movement’s continuing growth.” Further, he gave little attention to the violence at the Oakland Induction Center during the International Days of Protest that other authors used to show the radicalization of the movement. Wells contributed to this historiography by looking beyond Berkeley, but could not manage to escape the state.

Melvin Small’s second contribution to this historiography, *Antiwarriors*, also gave a national overview of the antiwar movement. However he was also interested in the movement’s effect on the president and federal policy. Small concluded that those in it believed that they did in fact shorten the war. However, his historical conclusion is much more tempered as “reasonable evaluation of the antiwar movement falls somewhere between that of activists who proudly claim credit for stopping the war and that of former U.S. officials who report that the

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211 Ibid., 11.
213 Ibid., 134.
214 Ibid., 57.
only ones influenced by the doves were the Communists who held out longer than they would have because they misunderstood American politics.”

Small also differed from other historians like Lieberman and Klatch, stating that the New Left disproportionately consisted of “children of the establishment at leading colleges and universities.” Further, as his book examined the relationship between the federal government and the movement, the Small grants the West little attention in his book. Even UC Berkeley received only passing mentions for the underground newspaper, *The Berkeley Barb*, the Free Speech Movement, teach-ins and SLATE. Although Small called for participants in the movement to write about their experiences and argued that it is their duty, few in the West answered.

Unlike most of the texts cited here, *Rethinking the American Anti-War Movement* did not make significant headway into new scholarship, instead it attempted to give a more broad but clear overview of the movement than previous authors, finding a balance point between large monographs like *The Movement and the Sixties* and Mitchel Hall’s brief article. However, Simon Hall did present the movement as being simultaneously successful, because of its longevity and “innovative tactics,” but flawed due to factionalism and being less popular than the war itself.

Unlike other authors like Debendetti, Hall shied away from making an assessment on the efficacy of the movement and stated that it is ambiguous as to whether or not the antiwar movement helped end the war itself. A professor of history at the University of Leeds, Hall is the only author cited here not holding degrees, advanced or undergraduate, from a university in the United States. However, his research interests have been inside America his entire intellectual

216 Ibid., 163.
career. As an outsider looking in, but with acumen and credentials, Hall provided a much needed international perspective on the antiwar movement.

Another sociologist, Penny Lewis, vetted the collective American perception, or memory, of the Vietnam War in an attempt to correct it. She opened her book with the prevailing narratives on the New Left as supplanters of the Old Left, upper-middle class, intellectuals. However, her research on the socioeconomic status of hawks and doves showed that “by and large, the greatest support for the war came from the privileged elite, despite the visible dissention of a minority of its leaders and youth [emphasis hers].” Lewis broke her book into two parts. The first examined the accuracy and origins of the “elite antiwarrior” architype. She concluded that the “middle class culture of the main antiwar organizations” in the early years of the movement explain why those who opposed the war in the working class never joined in representative numbers. Her second half explained the longevity of antiwar myths and leaned heavily on the media and politicians who had the cultural capital to shape myths to their benefit which “elite antiwarriors” architype does as it ensured continued loyalty of the working class.

Lewis’ monograph also did well in the West as she frequently referred to coalitions in California, mostly centered on San Francisco bay.

Subversives took an in-depth look at the interplay between the FBI and the antiwar movement and how Reagan used them to gain political clout in California, most notably in the 1968 gubernatorial election. Leaning on declassified FBI documents through a Freedom of Information Act request, Seth Rosefeld found that the FBI held files on “hundreds of students, professors, and on members of the board of regents; established informers within student groups,

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219 Ibid., 15-18.
the faculty, and the highest levels of the university’s administration; and gathered intelligence from wiretaps, mail openings, and searches of Berkeley homes and offices in the dead of night.\textsuperscript{220} Although Rosefeld largely focused on groups outside the antiwar movement, like FSM, he also gave significant attention to the Berkeley Draft Information Committee, Stop the Draft Week, and the Vietnam Day Committee. Most notably, Rosefeld portrayed the protestors at the Oakland Induction Center during Stop the Draft week in a significantly brighter, less anarchical light than other authors in spite of his claim that the week contained the “most militant antiwar demonstrations.”\textsuperscript{221} Like \textit{Berkeley at War}, Rosefeld contributed a tightly focused tome on Berkeley to the antiwar historiography.

The historiography is not complete, however as there is still a dearth minorities, women, veterans, and local studies. Although minorities were largely against the war due to the unfair nature of selective service, they were proportionately uninvolved in the movement. Lewis’ study got at the sociological exclusion of minorities, but did not examine those outside the organized movement. Although, some authors like Anderson in \textit{The Movement and the Sixties}, did note intersections in the West, most notably the Black Panthers and the Chicano movement. Women also remain a point of exclusion in the historiography. Klatch attempted to provide insight into the role of women. But due to women being disproportionately underrepresented, she did not want to give an unrealistic view of SDS by interviewing them in numbers equal to men. Also notable, is Sale’s emphasis that SDS was a “seedbed for women’s liberation,” while other later authors like Lieberman and Tischler emphasized sexism in the movement. Although VVAW’s most public actions all took place on the east coast, the most prominent antiwar group after the


\textsuperscript{221} Ibid., 384-385.
breakup of SDS in 1970 remains completely absent here, in spite of having chapters in every state. Finally, historians have produced few in-depth local studies on the movement, especially outside of Berkeley. Once these notable demographically, organizationally, and geographically-based gaps are filled, the historiography will be much more complete.

Further, once historians finally break out of the Bay Area, they open up a whole new realm of analytical possibilities. The most obvious may be to compare the radicals of Berkeley and those on the prairie. But further comparative possibilities exist. For example, a historian might aim to replicate the work of Kenneth Heinemann who used the antiwar movements at non-elite state universities in the upper Midwest and northeast to balance out the overemphasis on elite campuses. Finally, historians need further direct comparisons between the YAF and SDS beyond *A Generation Divided*. Although useful as a sociology, it focuses too much on the memory and identity of individual subjects, thus the larger narratives of the two organizations becomes lost.

In conclusion, the current historiography of the antiwar movement in the West disproportionately focuses on the Bay Area, specifically UC Berkeley. Although the university was a major site of creating antiwar sentiment, students at other universities and in other organizations campaigned against the war at this time. Defined as all land west of the Mississippi river, the current historiographic shortcomings go beyond geographic want. Only Tichler’s article, “The Refiner’s Fire,” focused on the role of women. Anderson explored the intersections between various movements like the Black Panthers and the antiwar movement during the 60s, but did not examine the experiences of minority students within the antiwar movement. Although

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they were always a disproportionately low number of members within the organized movement, there is still value to that examination as it will fill in a gap in the historiography.
Bibliography


