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FALSIFICATION

of

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS.

THE AFFGHAN PAPERS.

REPORT AND PETITION

OF THE

NEWCASTLE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ASSOCIATION.

"Those collections of State papers which are supposed to furnish the best materials for history, are often in reality only one-sided compilations of garbled documents, counterfeits which the ministerial stamp forces into currency, defrauding a present generation, and handing down to posterity a chain of dangerous lies."—Kaye's Afghanistan.

LONDON:

EFFINGHAM WILSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE.

1860.

Price Sixpence.
PETITIONS PRESENTED UP TO THE 20TH JUNE.

(From the Reports of the Select Committee on Public Petitions.)

May 11th. Newcastle Foreign Affairs Committee. (Presented by Mr. Hadfield.)

,, 22nd. Manchester Foreign Affairs Committee. (Sir H. Wil
doughby.)
Keighley Foreign Affairs Committee. (No name
given.)
,, 24th. Park Foreign Affairs Committee of Sheffield. (Lord
J. Manners.)
,, 25th. Armley Foreign Affairs Committee. (Mr. Horsman.)
,, 31st. Winchester Foreign Affairs Committee. (Mr. Henry
Baillie.)
Leeds Constitutional Inquiry Association. (Mr. Bee-
croft.)
Bolton-le-Moors Foreign Affairs Committee. (Mr.
Crook.)
St. Pancras Foreign Affairs Committee. (Mr. James.)

June 4th. Marylebone Foreign Affairs Committee. (Mr. James.)
Cononley Foreign Affairs Committee. (Mr. Danby
Seymour.)
,, 5th. Members of a Public Meeting held in the Council
Hall, Sheffield. Signed, by order and on behalf of
the Meeting, G. Calvert Holland, Town Councillor,
Chairman. (Mr. Hadfield.)
Idle Foreign Affairs Committee. (Mr. Wickham.)
,, 6th. South Shields Foreign Affairs Committee. (Mr.
Ingham.)
,, 7th. Stockport Foreign Affairs Committee. (Mr. J. B.
Smith.)
,, 8th. Manchester Gaythorne Public Affairs Committee.
(Mr. Bazley.)
Rastrick Foreign Affairs Committee, in the West
Riding of Yorkshire. (Mr. Malins.)
June 14th. Morley Foreign Affairs Committee. (Sir John Ramsden.)

" 20th. Stalybridge Foreign Affairs Committee. (Colonel Sykes.)

Total number of Petitions, 19.

"The Petitioners pray the House to take into consideration the Volume of Documents entitled 'Copies of the Correspondence of Sir Alexander Burnes with the Governor-General of India, during his Mission to Cabul in the year 1837-1838, or such part of such Correspondence as has not been already published,' and to make known by its decision thereon whether it is fit and proper to mutilate the terms and alter the sense of the Despatches of Her Majesty's servants in laying them before Parliament, or the reverse."
THE AFFGHAN PAPERS.


The invasion of Afghanistan, in the year 1839, was undertaken by the cabinet of Lord Melbourne, Lord Palmerston being Foreign Secretary, on the pretext that it was necessary in order to counteract Russia.

The result of the expedition was to substitute the influence of Russia for that of England throughout Central Asia.

The evidence of its alleged necessity, was embodied in the "Correspondence relating to Afghanistan," which, in the same year (1839), was laid before Parliament, by command of Her Majesty, on the responsibility of the "India Board."

The most important part of this correspondence, being that which related to the mission of Sir Alexander Burnes to Cabul, in 1837 and 1838, was declared by Burnes himself, as soon as he saw it, to be "a fraud."

In 1842 the British forces in Cabul were exterminated by a general rising of the inhabitants, a circumstance which attracted the attention of Parliament to the origin of the invasion.

Sir Alexander Burnes having been killed at Cabul, his relations published his despatches with the object of proving that they had been garbled; and in 1842 Mr. Henry Baillie moved in the House of Commons for the publication of all papers relating to the Afghan war which had been withheld from Parliament, taking grounds for his motion on the charge that the papers of 1839 had been garbled. Mr. Disraeli seconded the motion, but it obtained only nine supporters.

In 1843, Mr. Roebuck made a motion to the same effect, which was rejected by 189 votes to 75.
In 1848 Mr. Anstey renewed the motion without success.
In 1857 this association published a report on the case; and in 1858 several petitions were presented to Parliament from Foreign Affairs Associations, praying for the publication of the papers moved for by Mr. Henry Baillie, in 1842. In the same year, Mr. George Hadfield, M.P. for Sheffield, renewed this motion, and it was agreed to by the House of Commons.

In 1859, an attempt was made to prevent the printing of the papers, after they had been laid before Parliament, on the pretext of economy, but Mr. Hadfield, seconded by Sir Henry Willoughby, carried a specific motion for the printing of the papers.

We have since examined the "Correspondence relating to Afghanistan," published in 1859, and have compared it with the "Correspondence relating to Afghanistan," published in 1839.

Our task has been rendered easy by the insertion of brackets in the correspondence of 1859, showing what parts of the despatches were omitted in 1839.

We find that the charge of forgery against the members of the "India Board" of 1839, is fully substantiated.

We find that the purpose with which this was done was twofold: to mislead Parliament as to the necessity of the invasion of Afghanistan and the deposition of Dost Mahomed, in order to counteract Russia; and further to oblige Russia by suppressing evidence, the publication of which would have been inconvenient to Russia.

And we find that, to effect these purposes, not only were whole documents suppressed and others mutilated, but, we find that, in some cases [indicated by side-notes in the Blue-book], certain words were erased from despatches and other words substituted.

That portion of the papers of 1839, presented by the "India Board," which related to the mission of Burnes, was divided into two distinct sections, No. 5 and No. 6, each of which was laid before Parliament on the 26th of March, 1839, and printed by order of Parliament on the 27th of March, 1839.

The date of the first despatch in No. 5, not including inclosures, is May 31, 1836; and of the last despatch, April 28, 1838. In No. 6, the first date is September 9, 1837; the last date, Decem-
ber 22, 1838. The contents of these two sets of papers referring to the same events, and the dates being intermixed, no reason appears for their separation, the effect of which is to confuse the reader.

By comparing these papers with those published last session, we have ascertained that out of 27 despatches in No. 5, 11 were garbled; whilst out of 38 in No. 6, 34 were garbled. The number of cases in which the words "Emperor of Russia," or their equivalents, were erased, or other expressions substituted, is altogether 54; of which 53 cases occur in No. 6, and only one case in No. 5. At page 227 of the Blue-book of last session, is a despatch from Sir Alexander Burnes to Mr. M'Naghten, dated April 30, 1838; at page 44, No. 5, the same despatch is given, reduced from three pages to two; and at page 18, No. 6, the same despatch again reduced to two short paragraphs. In the No. 5 version of this despatch, mention is made of a letter "from the Emperor" to Dost Mahommed; in the No. 6 version "a letter" is mentioned, but the words "from the Emperor" are struck out. At page 155 of the Blue-book of last session, is a despatch from Sir Alexander Burnes to Mr. M'Naghten, of February 23, 1838; at page 26, No. 5, the same despatch is given, reduced from three pages to two; and at page 14, No. 6, the same despatch again reduced to the following sentence:

"I had become, meanwhile, informed of the further communications of Captain Vicovitch, which went to inform the Ameer that the Emperor of Russia was supreme in his dominions, and could act of himself with promptitude, and without being delayed by consulting others, while the British Government transacted its business by a council (Punchayet), which gave rise to procrastination, and would show to him the advantages of allying himself to Russia, where no such inconveniences existed; and, further, that the Emperor's good will towards him would never, then, let Persia encroach in this quarter."

The effect of this sentence, taken by itself, is to excite alarm as to Russia, which the full despatch would have mitigated or removed. The words "Emperor of Russia" are here retained, the statement not being one by which that Sovereign was compromised. The 53 cases in No. 6, in which these words, or their equivalents, are erased, and sometimes others substituted, refer to the personal connexion of the Czar with the mission to Cabul of
Captain Vicovitch, whose proceedings were subsequently disavowed by Count Nesselrode.

It thus appears that in 1839 certain despatches out of those relating to the mission of Burnes to Cabul, being those, namely, which had special reference to Russian intrigue and the personal connexion therewith of the Emperor of Russia, were collected into a separate heap (No. 6), as objects of greater solicitude than the rest (No. 5) in the preparation they were to undergo previously to being submitted to Parliament.

The brackets and side-notes inserted by Mr. Kaye in the Blue-book of 1859, exhibit most of the perversions of 1839; but there is one case, and that of the greatest importance, which has not been indicated by either.

At page 198 of the Blue-book of 1859 occurs a despatch from Mr. Wade to Mr. M'Naghten, of the 21st of March, 1838, three pages in length. At page 14, No. 6, this despatch appears reduced to three lines, of which only a clause of nine words is authentic, the rest being a fabrication. The substance of this despatch is adverse criticism of the views of Sir Alexander Burnes in favour of an alliance with Dost Mahommed, and it refers to, and supports, a letter from Mr. M'Naghten to Sir Alexander Burnes, of January 20, 1838 (see page 111, Blue-book, 1859), in which the reprehension of the Governor-general is conveyed to Sir Alexander Burnes, for the steps which he had taken up to that period with the object of establishing such an alliance both at Cabul and Candahar. This letter, four pages in length, will be found at page 11 of No. 6, reduced to three short paragraphs, from which it would be impossible to infer that any disagreement whatever had existed between Lord Auckland and Sir Alexander Burnes.

At page 120, Blue-book (1859), will be found a despatch from Sir Alexander Burnes to Mr. M'Naghten, dated January 26, 1838, the first paragraph of which is garbled, with the object of making it appear that Sir Alexander Burnes, in speaking to Dost Mahommed, was expressing to him his own views, instead of which he was representing to him Lord Auckland's (see page 22, No. 5). Other omitted portions of this despatch show that Sir Alexander Burnes agreed with Dost Mahommed, and
not with Lord Auckland. An apprehension that Runjeet Singh would not give up Peshawur, is made in this despatch to appear as if entertained by Sir Alexander Burnes instead of Lord Auckland; Sir Alexander Burnes having expressed his belief to the contrary. (See Blue-book, page 16: Sir A. Burnes to Mr. M'Naghten, August 22, 1837; a despatch wholly suppressed in 1839.)

At Berlin, in the month of August last, the chairman of this association had an interview with the historian Ranke, and deposited with him a copy of the Afghan Blue-book of last session. Professor Ranke declared himself satisfied that a gross perversion of truth had been committed by the English Government, and placed in the hands of our chairman a work published at Berlin, in 1842, by Carl Zimmerman, under the title of "The Theatre of War in Inner Asia," and commended to public trust on the ground of the information being "drawn from English sources," directing his, Mr. Crawshay's attention to the chapter headed, "Alexander Burnes was the adviser of the expedition against Afghanistan."

The first despatch quoted by Zimmerman is Sir Alex. Burnes to Lord Auckland, Dec. 23, 1837. (See Blue-book, 1859, p. 89.) Zimmerman, of course, quotes the papers of 1839, in which, at p. 9, No. 6, this despatch is given, reduced from four pages to little more than one, and garbled to an extent inconceivable but by inspection of the original, with the aid of the brackets and side-notes. The words selected for quotation are as follows:

"It is a true maxim, that prevention is better than cure, and we have now both in our hands."

Nor could any one read this despatch in its garbled state without coming to the same conclusion as Zimmerman as to the views of Burnes. Nevertheless, it is this very despatch in which Burnes was most urgent in his recommendations to Lord Auckland to support Dost Mahommed. One suppressed passage is as follows:

"Should the conduct of Dost Mahommed, in his frank divulgement of all that has passed, meet with your Lordship's approbation, it seems a suitable preliminary step, if your Lordship resolves in making any change in our view, to set out by addressing a letter of thanks to this Chief for the proofs which he has rendered of his friendship and fidelity."
Zimmerman appends the following note to his remarks on this document:

"The Colonial Magazine of 1842, page 323, says of this letter, very justly, 'This letter shows fully how responsible Sir A. Burnes is for the Afghan expedition.'"

In the same despatch the words "Emperor," "His Majesty," are eight times omitted, the words "Russian Government" being substituted, and "it" put for "he."

Another despatch from Sir A. Burnes, quoted by Zimmerman, is that of April 30, 1838 (Blue-book, page 227), being one of those of which different versions appear in No. 5 and No. 6. Zimmerman quotes as follows, from No. 6, a paragraph which is omitted in the longer version of No. 5:

"I have only to repeat my most deliberate conviction, founded on much reflection regarding the passing events in Central Asia, that consequences of the most serious nature must, in the end, flow from them, unless the British Government applies a prompt, active, and decided counteraction. I do not offer these as opinions founded on the periodical publications of all Europe (though the coincidence of sentiment in all parties does not want its weight); but as formed on the scene of the Russian intrigues, and it is my duty, as a public servant, earnestly to state them to my superiors."

Now, between December, 1837, and April, 1838, Lord Auckland, as we have seen by Mr. McNaughten's despatch of Jan. 20, 1838, had rejected Sir A. Burnes's proposals for alliance with Dost Mahommed, and had disavowed some most important steps which he had taken in anticipation of a different decision. The Russian agent, Vicovitch, had already, in consequence, obtained the position with Dost Mahommed which Burnes had lost, and the despatch of the 30th April, taken by itself, would appear to bear out the view that at that date Burnes had ceased to urge upon Lord Auckland to make an alliance with Dost Mahommed the means of counteracting Russia. But at page 241 of Blue-book (1859), will be found a despatch of June 2, which, in 1839, was totally suppressed, an extract from which reveals the truth:

"I have before said we cannot, in justice to our own position in India, allow things to continue as at present in Cabul, and I have already, in my despatch of the 30th of April, suggested a prompt and active counteraction of Dost Mahommed Khan, since we cannot act with him. But it remains to be reconsidered why we cannot act with Dost Mahommed. He is a man of undoubted
ability, and has, at heart, high opinions of the British nation; and if half you
must do for others were done for him, and offers made which he could see
conduced to his interests, he would abandon Persia and Russia to-morrow. It
may be said that that opportunity has been given him, but I would rather
discuss that in person with you, for I think there is much to be said for him.
Government has admitted that at best he had but a choice of difficulties, and it
should not be forgotten that we promised nothing, and Persia and Russia held
out a great deal. I am not now viewing the question in the light of what is
to be said of his rejection of our good offices so far as they went, or as to his
doing so in the face of a threat held out to him, but these facts show that the
man has something in him, and if Afghans are proverbially not to be trusted,
I see no reason for having greater mistrust in him than others."

It thus appears that one of the objects with which the papers of
1839 were garbled was to conceal the circumstance that Sir A.
Burnes, during his mission to Cabul, recommended an alliance
with Dost Mahommed, and persisted in that recommendation up
to the period of his return from Cabul; and, further, to represent
Sir A. Burnes as the author of an expedition undertaken against
his advice and in spite of his remonstrances.

That he subsequently lent himself to carry out a project which
he had condemned, is a circumstance which has no bearing upon
the fraudulent misrepresentation by the India Board of the his-
tory and results of his mission to Cabul.

It is necessary to refer to other sets of papers laid before Parlia-
ment in 1839, besides those already mentioned, in order to under-
stand the case.

No. 3 of the sets of papers, presented by the India Board, relates
to the expedition of Shah Shooja against Dost Mahommed in 1833-
34, and shows that this attack was made in concert with Runjeet
Singh and with the connivance of the British authorities in India,
who paid in advance to Shah Shooja a portion of a stipend he
was in receipt of from them, with the knowledge that the money
was to be used to facilitate his invasion of Cabul. This was in
1832. See despatches Nos. 11 and 13, from which, moreover, it
appears that the same facilities had been already afforded to Shah
Shooja on the occasion of a former similar expedition.

In June, 1834, Dost Mahommed totally defeated Shah Shooja,
and took prisoner an Englishman named Campbell, who com-
manded two battalions of infantry, "to whom the brunt of the
action was confined."
These circumstances prepared the way for the mission of the Russian agent Vicovitch, who arrived at Cabul on the 19th December, 1837, whilst Sir A. Burnes was there.

At this period Dost Mahommed was engaged in a war with Runjeet Singh for the recovery of Peshawur; this being a cause he was bound to maintain, the inhabitants of the disputed territory to the west of the Indus being Mahommedans; on the other hand, the advance of the Persian army against Herat threatened the Afghaun chief upon the other side, so that he was forced to look around him to see in what manner he could strengthen his position. The siege of Herat, and the consequent alarm as to Russia, was the ground for the mission of Burnes.

On the 22nd December, 1837 (see page 85, Blue-book, 1859), Burnes wrote to the secretary of the Governor-General respecting the arrival of Vicovitch, stating that he was the bearer of letters from the Emperor of Russia, the Shah of Persia, and Count Simonitch, the Russian ambassador at Teheran. He gives a list of the documents, and copies follow of four letters, being those above mentioned, together with a letter from Dost Mahommed to the Emperor of Russia, written about the beginning of 1836. The documents are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4. In the papers laid before Parliament in 1839 (see No. 6, p. 8), in giving this letter the words "the Emperor of Russia a fac-simile of which in the Russian language I now forward. The agent also brings letters from," are omitted. The Emperor's letter is struck out of the list, and then the other three being given, the letter itself is not given, the numbers of the others being altered to leave no trace of the omission. The letter of the Emperor of Russia is described as being "three feet long, and emblazoned with all the honours of chivalry and war." (See p. 166, Blue-book, 1859.) At page 82, Blue-book (1859), is a letter from Candahar to Dost Mahommed, relating also to the arrival of Vicovitch, which was garbled in the same manner, but still more ingeniously.

On the 20th December Burnes had previously written to Lord Auckland (see page 80, Blue-book, 1859), as follows:
To W. H. Macnaghten, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Fort William.

SIR,—I have the honour to report, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, the very extraordinary piece of intelligence of the arrival at this city yesterday of an agent direct from [the Emperor of] Russia.

1. On the 11th instant I received a notification of his approach from my correspondent at Candahar in the terms reported in the annexed letter, No. 1, and on the 13th instant the Ameer received the information conveyed in the enclosure No. 2. A circumstance of so unusual a nature prevented my sending off an express to you till I could be better informed.

2. On the 19th, that is yesterday, the Ameer came over from the Bala Hisar early in the morning with a letter from his son, the Governor of Ghuzni, reporting that the Russian agent had arrived at that city on his way to Cabool. Dost Mahomed Khan said that he had come for my counsel on the occasion; that he wished to have nothing to do with any other power than the British; that he did not wish to receive any agent of any Power whatever, so long as he had a hope of sympathy from us; and that he would order the Russian agent to be turned out, detained on the road, or act in the way I desired him.

3. On the morning of the 19th, that is yesterday, the Ameer despatched a servant on the road to Ghuzni, to prevent the agent's entering Cabool without notice; but so rapid had been his journey, that he met him a few miles from the city, which he entered in the afternoon, attended by two of the Ameer's people. He has not yet seen the Ameer; he has sent a letter from Count Simonitch, which I have seen, and states that he is the bearer of letters from Mahomed Shah and the Emperor of Russia.

4. I asked the Ameer if he knew on what business the agent had come, and if he were really an agent from Russia; he replied that I had read all his letters from Candahar, and that he knew nothing more. I replied, that it was a sacred rule among civilised nations not to refuse to receive emissaries in time of peace, and that I could not take upon myself to advise him to refuse any one who declared himself duly accredited, but that the Ameer had it in his power to show his feelings on the occasion by making a full disclosure to the British Government of the errand on which the individual had come; to which he most readily assented.

5. After this the Ameer despatched a servant on the road to Ghuzni, to prevent the agent's entering Cabool without notice; but so rapid had been his journey, that he met him a few miles from the city, which he entered in the afternoon, attended by two of the Ameer's people. He has not yet seen the Ameer; he has sent a letter from Count Simonitch, which I have seen, and states that he is the bearer of letters from Mahomed Shah and the Emperor of Russia.

6. I shall take an early opportunity of reporting on the proceedings of this Russian agent, if he be so in reality; for if not an impostor, it is a most uncalled-for proceeding; after the disavowal of the Russian Government conveyed through Count Nesschoode, alluded to in Mr. M'Neil's letter of the 1st of June last. I have, &c.,

(signed) Alex. Burnes,

Cabool, 20 December, 1837. On a Mission to Cabool.
On comparing this despatch with its garbled edition (page 9 No. 6, Afghan Papers, 1839), consisting of the portions not between brackets, it will be seen that all Burnes's statements as to Dost Mahommed having sought his advice as to receiving Vicovitch, offering, if he wished, to refuse to see him, are struck out. It is true that in the extract given (at page 11 No. 6) of Lord Auckland's answer to this despatch, it is stated that—

"His Lordship is much gratified at the deference to our views shown by Dost Mahommed in requesting your advice as to the reception of this agent," but this is clearly no excuse for the suppression of Burnes's testimony to this effect, and its publication must be classed as a mistake similar to those already cited in the twice giving of two versions of the same despatches in No. 5 and No. 6.

So, in the recent correspondence relating to Savoy and Nice, the existence of a suppressed despatch was discovered by the neglect to erase a line in another despatch referring to it.

The extract from Lord Auckland's answer was one which it was necessary to give. It was the only portion published of a despatch already noticed (page 111, Blue-book, 1859), in which Lord Auckland conveyed to Burnes his disavowal of his proceedings. All reference to such a circumstance is carefully excluded, this being the special object with which the despatch was garbled, to the neglect of that with which Burnes's despatch had been previously garbled. The gist of the extract is that Burnes is to require Dost Mahommed to dismiss Vicovitch, and is to consider his refusal to do so "a breach of friendship with the British Government."

On the 18th of February, 1838 (see p. 151, Blue-book, 1859), Dost Mahommed replied to the Emperor of Russia and Count Simonitch, submitting the drafts of his letters to Burnes, and altering them according to his suggestions, every trace of which transaction was suppressed in 1839; but being unable to gain the smallest practical recognition of the value of his alliance from the British Government, and pressed by Persia on the one side, and the Sikhs on the other, Dost Mahommed appears to have hesitated to come to a final rupture with Vicovitch, who made him magnificent promises; and on this ground, together with his declining Lord Auckland's proffer of "good offices" with Runjeet Singh,
on terms most unacceptable, Burnes was recalled from Cabul in the spring of 1838, and having failed by personal remonstrance to bring Lord Auckland round to his view of counteracting Russia through Dost Mahommed, in the spring of 1839 the British forces crossed the Indus in conjunction with Shah Shooja and the Sikhs, the siege of Herat, which had been the sole cause of alarm, having been raised on September 9, 1838, Count Simonitch having been recalled from Teheran, and Vicovitch from Cabul, and their proceedings disavowed by the Russian Government in the autumn of the same year, and the British Government having in December 1838 expressed their entire satisfaction with the friendly declarations of the Russian Government.

These statements can be verified by reference to the correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan, laid before Parliament in 1839; a set of papers emanating, not from the India Board, but from the Foreign-office.

On January 16, 1837 (see p. 17 of this correspondence), Lord Palmerston writes to the Earl of Durham at St. Petersburg, complaining of the conduct of the Russian Ambassador at Teheran, Count Simonitch, in inciting the King of Persia to attack Herat. He says:

"It would be so contrary to all the professed principles, and declared system of the Russian Government, to have instructed Count Simonitch to have acted as he has done, that it must be assumed that the count had been acting without instructions."

On February 24, 1837, the Earl of Durham replies to Lord Palmerston, that Count Nesschrode informs him that, "if Count Simonitch had acted in the manner stated (which is denied), he had done that which was in direct opposition to his instructions."

On October 26, 1838, Lord Palmerston addressed a note to the Russian Government, again complaining of the conduct of their agents in Central Asia. The passage relating to Vicovitch is as follows:

"The Undersigned is further instructed to state that a Russian agent of the name of Vicovitch, but sometimes calling himself Omar Beg, and said to be attached to the staff of the General commanding at Orenberg, was bearer of letters from the Emperor and Count Simonitch to the Ruler of Cabul, copies of which are in the possession of the British Government; and that Count
Simonitch observed the most perfect silence towards the British Minister at Teheran, with respect to the mission of this agent; a reserve which might seem unnecessary, if this agent was merely to deliver the letters of which he was the bearer; and if his mission was to have no tendency prejudicial to British interests.

"But the British Government have learned that Count Simonitch announced to the Shah of Persia that the Russian agent would counsel the Ruler of Cabul to seek assistance of the Persian Government to support him in his hostilities with the Ruler of the Punjab; and the further reports which the British Government have received of the language held by this Russian agent at Kandahar and at Cabul, can lead to no other conclusion than that he strenuously exerted himself to detach the Rulers of those Affghan states from all connexion with England, and to induce them to place their reliance upon Persia in the first instance, and ultimately upon Russia."—(Page 179.)

To this note no reply was ever given, but it was crossed by a letter from Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo, dated St. Petersburg, October 20, 1838, dealing with the same topics, and which contains the following passage as to Vicovitch:

"In thus placing the facts in their full truth, our Cabinet can offer to that of London the positive assurance that in the mission of M. Witkewitch (Vicovitch) to Cabool, and that in the instructions with which he was furnished, there has not existed the smallest design hostile to the English Government, nor the smallest idea of injuring the tranquillity of the British possessions in India."—(Page 180.)

On December 20, 1838, Lord Palmerston replied to Count Pozzo di Borgo:

"Her Majesty's Government accept as entirely satisfactory the declarations of the Russian Government that it does not harbour any designs hostile to the interests of Great Britain in India."—(Page 193.)

The consent of the Czar was asked and obtained to the publication of this correspondence (see page 200), and it was laid before Parliament. Nevertheless, the invasion of Affghanistan proceeded, when every possible pretext for it had ceased, and Dost Mahommed was dethroned on a charge of being friendly to Russia. At the same time our Government accepted as sincere the friendly professions of the Russian Government towards England, and resorted to forgery, in order to oblige Russia.

We desire to direct especial attention to that series of perversions which we have characterised as made to suit the convenience
of Russia. The existence of these was not even suspected previously to the publication of the Afghan Papers, 1859, although those which related to Burnes and Dost Mahommed had been long notorious.

With this object we give three examples, the portions erased in the documents given in 1839 being printed in red.

(1.)

Translation of a Letter from Moolla Reshid, the Counsellor of Kohin Dil Khan Sirdar, to the Address of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, received at Cabool on the 19th of December, 1837.

A.C.

An ambassador on the part of the Russian Emperor came from Moscow to Tehran, and has been appointed to wait on the Sirdars at Candahar, and thence to proceed to the presence of the Ameer. He paid his respects to Mahomed Shah at Nishapoor, and passing through Kayanat, Lash and Jawer, Seistan and Gnoun Sail, arrived at Ahmed Shahee (Candahar). He is the bearer of confidential messages from the Emperor, and of the letters from the Russian ambassador at Tehran.

The Russian ambassador recommends this man to be a most trusty individual, and to possess full authority to make any negotiation on the part of the Emperor and himself. Captain Burnes will undoubtedly comprehend the real motives of this elchee.

The conduct and appearance of this man (elchee) seems to infer that he possesses no less dignity and honour than Captain Burnes, and whatever arrangements he may make will be agreeable to the Russian Emperor and the Russian ambassador. You have now both the English and Russian ambassadors at your Court; please to settle matters with any of them who you think may do some good office hereafter.

By the conversation of this man (elchee), it appears that Mahomed Shah is neither assisted nor induced by the Russians, and is come of himself to try his fortunes. You should receive him with consideration, as he is a man of consequence. He has got four horsemen with himself, and will remain but a few days in Cabool. Sher Mahomed has been sent by the Sirdars to conduct him to you. The Russians and the Persians are separately anxious to promote their respective designs in this quarter.

P.S.—When this Russian elchee reaches Cabool, show him respect, and it will rouse the mind of Alex. Burnes. His appearance will also
induce him (Mr. Burnes) to be sharp, and to put off delay in promoting your objects.

(True translation.)

(signed) Alex. Burnes,

On a Mission to Cabool.

(True copies.)

(signed) H. Torrens,

Deputy Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General.

(Papers. East India (Cabul and Afghanistan). Ordered, by the House of Commons, to be printed, 8 June, 1859, p. 82.)

(2.)

Translation of a Letter from Count Simonitch, the Russian Ambassador at Tehran, to the address of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan of Cabool, received on the 20th December, 1837.

A.C.

The respectable P. Vickovitch will wait upon you with this letter, and deliver to you an epistle from his imperial Majesty, in reply to the petition which you had addressed through your agent, Haji Husan Ali.

I have received some Russian rarities from the imperial store to forward to you; as the bearer (P. Vickovitch) is lightly equipped, it was beyond his power to take them along with him, but I will take the first opportunity to convey them safely to you, and now have the pleasure to send you the under-mentioned list of them.—(Papers. East India (Cabul and Afghanistan). Ordered, by the House of Commons, to be printed, 8 June, 1859, pp. 86-7.)

(3.)

Extract from Despatch to the Right Honourable Lord Auckland, G. C. B., Governor-General of India, &c. &c. &c.

Cabool, Dec. 28, 1837.

The communications which passed on this second occasion have been also made known to me, and are of a startling nature. Mr. Vickovitch informed Dost Mahomed Khan that the Emperor* had desired him to state his sincere sympathy with the difficulties under which he laboured, and that it would afford His Majesty great pleasure to assist him in repelling the attacks of Runjeet Sing on his dominions; that His Majesty was ready to furnish him with a sum of money for the purpose, and to continue the supply annually, expecting in return

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* Previously printed, "Russian Government;" "it" being afterwards substituted for "he."
the Ameer's good offices; that it was in the Emperor's power to forward the pecuniary assistance as far as Bokhara, with which State he had friendly and commercial relations, but that the Ameer must arrange for its being forwarded on to Cabool. — (Papers. East India (Cabul and Afghanistan). Ordered, by the House of Commons, to be printed, 8 June, 1859, p. 91.)

In the first of these examples we see not only the name of the Emperor struck out, but the words "from Moscow." At the same time the mention of the Russian ambassador at Teheran is retained. This ambassador was Count Simonitch, who was recalled and disavowed in 1838. The object in view here is to make it appear that Vicovitch had no higher authority than Count Simonitch for his proceedings. Care is even taken that he shall not be traced further back than Teheran.

The second example exhibits a refinement in the suppression of evidence which deserves notice. It is not to be known that the presents which Vicovitch took to Dost Mahommed were from "the Imperial stores."

The third example is given in proof of actual, and not merely constructive, forgery having been committed.

The British Government in this manner suppressed all traces of the acts of the Emperor of Russia and of the Government of St. Petersburg in connexion with their agents, and thus enabled the Russian Government to make the false assertions above quoted to the effect that their agents had acted "without instructions."

When Afghanistan was invaded it was alleged and believed that the Foreign Secretary of England dissembled enmity against Russia under the mask of reconciliation, and was seeking to thwart and humble the Czar in the person of Dost Mahommed; but the alteration of despatches in the interest of Russia is not compatible with this explanation of his conduct.

At the time of the invasion it was also alleged, but was not believed, that the object of its authors was to serve Russia, a charge which has now received the strongest possible confirmation in the discovery that the despatches laid before the Parliament of England at the time of the invasion were fraudulently tampered with, in order to serve Russia.
Having now given proof of every accusation which we have made in reference to the preparation of the Afghan papers of 1839, it is necessary that we should make some observations as to the military operations, in justification of which these papers were laid before Parliament.

Let the documentary evidence above given be reviewed, not solely in reference to the garbling of despatches, but also in reference to those operations, and it will be seen that in the same manner as the whole of the alterations of the despatches are reducible under one head, viz. to mislead with regard to Russia, so was Russia the pivot upon which everything turned in relation to the invasion of Afghanistan, its alleged object being to counteract Russia.

It is then of the utmost importance to ascertain what were the designs of Russia at that time.

These appear in her first sending and then recalling her agents before the outbreak of hostilities. Russia in 1839 did not contemplate any invasion of British India. She did design to lure the armies of England across the Indus into Central Asia. To this end the means she employed were adapted; they were not adapted to the project of an invasion. Russia did design then, as she designed before, and designs now, to acquire India; but in 1839 had no means at her disposal by which she could advance a single step towards the possession of India, except the crime and the folly of England. If a Russian invasion of India is not now the chimera it was twenty years ago, this is mainly because by our invasion of Cabul in 1839, an invasion which did not extend to Herat solely owing to the resistance of General Elphinstone, together with our conduct towards Persia, the inhabitants of the regions between her frontiers and the north-west frontier of India have been disposed in her favour and against us. General Jacob died a year ago, oppressed with anxiety at the progress Russia is making in this direction; and the most recent intelligence states that Dost Mahommed, whom, in self-protection we restored in 1843 (Sir Robert Peel being in office, and Lord Ellenborough Governor-General of India), and have since subsidised (the subsidy being now alleged to be withdrawn), was so hard pressed from the side of Bokhara, that he
will be forced to renounce our alliance and to make terms with Russia.

The results of the invasion of Afghanistan concur, with other circumstances, in pointing to the treason of the Foreign Secretary of England as the only hypothesis by which it can be explained. If Russia was believed to be sincere in her professions of friendship, why was Dost Mahommed dethroned on the charge of being friendly with Russia? If Russia was not believed to be sincere, why was she assisted, and by such means, in disavowing her agents and withdrawing from her attitude of aggression? These are questions that cannot be answered; but if it be assumed that the object of both Governments was throughout the same, viz. the invasion of Central Asia by England, it will be seen that what was done was what was required, viz. for Russia to furnish the pretext by a pretended quarrel, at the same time that any collision between the two Governments was avoided.

Afghanistan was invaded because Lord Palmerston's colleagues, in common with the rest of the nation, were under the impression, created by himself, that he alone understood Russia, and knew how to counteract her; whilst it was neither believed nor could be comprehended, that he was confederated with her.

Whatever difficulty may still remain as to this portion of the case, it is impossible that any pretext whatever can be alleged for refusing to deal with every public servant implicated in the charge of deceiving Parliament by falsified documents.

In the first sentence of this report we have mentioned the "Cabinet of Lord Melbourne" as the authors of the invasion of Afghanistan.

This was stated as an historical circumstance, not in reference to the proposal of judicial proceedings.

In entering upon this branch of our inquiry, it is necessary to premise that the "Cabinet" is a body not known to the law, and that no servant of the Crown is impeachable for his conduct in the so-called capacity of Cabinet Minister, except for usurpation of the Royal Prerogative, by assuming in that capacity to exercise an authority which belongs only to the Queen in Council. Every Privy Councillor is impeachable as such for advice given to the Sovereign, and all persons exercising lawful authority under the
Crown are punishable for any abuse of that authority. In cases of abuse of lawful authority which do not come under the cognisance of inferior tribunals, it is as much the duty of Parliament to impeach the offenders, as it is of a Court of Assize to deal with theft and murder. Parliament is our "High Court of Justice," and is intended to supplement lower courts of justice, so that all persons and all acts may be subject to the law.

The invasion of Afghanistan in 1839 was an act which, involving as it did Usurpation of the Prerogative, could not be dealt with by Parliament otherwise than as a case of high treason, irrespective of any intention to serve a Foreign Power. But the garbling of the despatches was a misdemeanour committed by a legally constituted authority, and presents the simplest possible case for the exercise by Parliament of its judicial functions. For this reason we select it to take action upon.

We have mentioned the "India Board" (commonly called the Board of Control) as responsible for the Afghan papers of 1839. But a Board consists of persons, and it is the liability of each of these to punishment by Parliament for misconduct which constitutes the responsibility of the "Board." On the 26th of March, 1839, the date of the Afghan papers, the President of the India Board was Sir John Hobhouse (now Lord Broughton), a name which is printed on the title-page as a guarantee of their sincerity. The other members of the Board, at the same date, were the Marquis of Lansdowne (Lord President of the Council); Viscount Duncannon (Lord Privy Seal), now Lord Besborough; Viscount Melbourne (First Lord of the Treasury); the Right Hon. T. Spring Rice, M.P. (Chancellor of the Exchequer), now Lord Monteagle; Lord John Russell, M.P. (Home Secretary); Viscount Palmerston, M.P. (Foreign Secretary); Marquis of Normanby (Colonial Secretary).

Our duty, and the duty of all acquainted with the circumstances, is to present the case to Parliament by petition; the duty of Parliament is first to inquire into the truth of the statements of the petition, and if it find them to be true, then to proceed, according to law, against the surviving members of the India Board, as constituted on the 26th of March, 1839.

The first of these procedures involves nothing more than we
have already done ourselves, viz. that a Parliamentary Committee should go over the Afghan papers of 1839 and of 1859, and pronounce whether or not the former were falsified.

The second procedure is one which Parliament alone can take: to call witnesses, and examine into the conduct of each individual involved by his official position in the charge of falsifying documents, and to award to each such punishment as he may prove to deserve.

This is what Parliament ought to do; the probability is, that Parliament will do nothing whatever, but will suffer the falsification of the Afghan papers to pass into a precedent for the future.

We have already laid the case before such Members of either House as we could approach with the best prospect of obtaining attention.

In every case, without exception, we have been met by the objection that the transaction occurred twenty years ago.

This objection is nothing in itself, but everything in what it indicates, the absence of moral sense in regard to public matters.

It could not be uttered in connexion with a case of theft or perjury; or if uttered would be immediately seen to imply connivance.

Pretexts are never wanting for the evasion of a disagreeable duty. Sir Robert Peel opposed inquiry into the Afghan war in 1843 on the ground that it had only occurred "four years ago."

Before such an objection could be offered, it would be necessary to pass an Act of Parliament fixing a period after which crime of every description should enjoy impunity.

The same Members of Parliament who have raised this objection have expressed their anxiety to prevent such practices in future, refusing to see that there are no means of preventing crimes of state in the future, any more than any other class of crimes, except by punishing them in the past.

The date of the transaction only aggravates the necessity for dealing with it. The author of the Afghan war twenty years ago has ever since directed what is called our "foreign policy," and is still directing it, with results which are at length commencing to excite alarm.
Our war with Russia has resulted in estrangement from France; our connivance with France has deprived us of every ally in Europe. We have prepared the way for Russia to succeed to Denmark; Denmark has become the ally of France and Russia against England. We have interfered with the Spanish succession; Spain, too, is added to the alliance against England. If not absolutely hostile, neither Austria nor Prussia can trust us. Turkey we have betrayed, as witness the Treaty of Paris, and the use now made of it. In Italy we have promoted an insurrectionary movement, patronised by Russia, because it affords the means of preventing Austria from covering Constantinople.

The two poles of our "Foreign Policy" in Europe have been believed to be the promotion of "liberal principles" and opposition to Russia. Our opposition to Russia has invariably resulted in advancing her ends; in every case which we select for the promotion of "liberal principles" she is interested in our success.

In Asia we have pursued a career of lawless aggression in the name, not of "liberal principles," but of "civilisation;" and when this pretext has not been sufficient, the necessity of countering Russia has been put forward. The result has been to turn India from a source of wealth into a drain upon our finances, from a secure possession into our greatest danger. As our attacks upon Persia and Affghanistan have made the inhabitants of those countries our enemies, so our annexations and our assaults upon the religion and customs of the inhabitants of Hindostan have made them our enemies. From the Caspian to the Indian Ocean we are without friends.

In China we have acted the part of pirates from the day when the direction of our relations with that country came into the hands of the Foreign-office in 1833, and we are now, invading China in conjunction with France, at the very time when we are called to arms to protect ourselves against a French invasion. It occurs to no one that a French force in China is available for India; and that France and Russia are united.

It is perfectly well known that the bombardment of Canton, followed by the mission of Lord Elgin, enabled Russia to acquire the territory of the Amoor, and yet our present invasion of China is justified to "public opinion" on the same pretext as the Aff-
ghan war, that it is necessary to counteract Russia. We have, it is true, made progress in twenty years, and it can now be avowed that Russia is to have China, and ought to have China, but still our interests have to be secured against Russia, and Lord Palmerston is the only statesman who understands how to do this. The Times of March 17th, 1860, has an article, the pith of which is contained in the statement that “it is the mission of Russia to absorb the rich northern provinces of China,” and that “this process is going on so quickly that we have no time to lose in securing treaty rights which the strong Government of Russia will hereafter recognise.” We are told in the same article that “Lord Palmerston is the only statesman who has any ripe and useful knowledge of the matter.”

Besides danger threatening on every side, not excluding our possessions in America and Newfoundland, we are already suffering from the inconvenience of an enormous expenditure, and this state of things is the direct result of that which goes by the name of “Foreign Policy,” which is, in fact, a series of crimes devised by one man, and accepted by the nation as the promotion of “liberal principles” in Europe, of “civilisation and Christianity” in Asia, and the counteraction of Russia everywhere. The short intervals of Conservative administrations do not affect this statement. Lord Palmerston was not impeached, therefore his acts were accepted. Sir Robert Peel finished the Afghan war and the first war with China. Lord Malmesbury signed the Succession Treaty with Denmark during his first tenure of office, and we have recently seen Lord Derby exact an indemnity from China as the result of hostilities which he had himself described as constituting on our part a violation of every law of God and man.

The history of England for the last twenty years is the history of the impunity of the authors of the Afghan war, the disasters of which did not even teach us the lesson not to attempt to counteract Russia through a dishonest Minister.

When, therefore, we are told that the forgery of official documents cannot be dealt with because it occurred twenty years ago, the principal criminals being still alive and managing our affairs, the meaning is, that it is desirable that this management of our
affairs should continue. As the utterance of this objection implies the absence of moral sense, so does it imply the absence of a sense of danger. The condition of the human being who can entertain it is one of "judicial blindness." Yet such is the condition of Parliament without exception.

Under these circumstances we have to warn our fellow-citizens that their exertions must be proportioned to the difficulty of the case. A Member of the House of Lords, whom we had depended upon with certainty to take it up, declined, and told us we should find the date of the transaction a great difficulty in our way, admitting, at the same time, that we were right.

But if we are right, all who do not assist us are wrong, and the difficulty consists not in the circumstances of the case but in the characters of men.

Members of Foreign Affairs Committees profess to be different from their fellow-countrymen in this respect. Let them prove that they are so by making a strenuous effort on this occasion to spread far and wide the knowledge they have received. Parliament may consent to be cheated, but we have it at least in our power to put on record a protest against such conduct that may be remembered in the evil days that are at hand.

Signed on behalf of the Association,

GEORGE CRAWSHAY, Chairman.

ROBERT BAINBRIDGE, Vice-Chairman.

GEORGE STOBART, Secretary.

Newcastle-on-Tyne, May 31, 1860.
PETITION

(PRESENTED BY MR. HADFIELD, MAY 11, 1860).

TO THE HONOURABLE THE COMMONS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED.

The Petition of the Newcastle Foreign Affairs Association.

SHEWETH:

That in 1839 an English army was, without a declaration of war, sent across the Indus.

That the professed object of this expedition was what was termed a policy—namely, to secure the North-Western frontier of our Indian possessions by "the substitution of a friendly for a hostile power" in Afghanistan.

That the friendliness of these authorities in Afghanistan had not hitherto been called in question, and that the "policy" of the substitution had been questioned by those connected with these subjects and countries, and that the means adopted for the securing of the North-Western frontier had been held by the Chief Authorities, servants of the Crown, both in England and in India, to be the very means of bringing danger to our Indian frontier and possessions.

That Papers were published to justify that expedition, and presented to your Honourable House on the 26th of March, 1839, entitled "Correspondence relating to Afghanistan."

That these documents, purporting to convey the statements and views of the agents of the Indian Government in Afghanistan, did represent the ruler of Cauful (Dost Mahommed) as in friendly intercourse with Russia; did represent the views of the
British Envoy as favourable to the substitution of Shah Soojah for Dost Mahommed, and did, further, exclude all mention of the Emperor of Russia and of the Government of St. Petersburg in alleging against Russia the steps taken in Central Asia to establish alliances and combinations hostile to the British interests in India.

That, through statements made and letters published by persons engaged in that expedition, doubts were entertained of the sincerity of the Papers above named; that for many years every effort to obtain the production of the despatches unmutilated failed; that, finally, on the 24th of March, 1859, a volume was laid before Parliament as a return to an order of your Honourable House, by which all doubts were removed and the insincerity of the former papers fully established.

That this volume shows that whole despatches were withheld from Parliament, while many others that were published were so mutilated as to pervert and alter their true sense; and that in several cases certain words were erased from despatches and other words substituted.

That it was by means of these alterations in the Papers presented to Parliament in 1839, that it was made to appear that Dost Mahommed, the ruler of Afghanistan, was unfriendly to Great Britain; while it is fully shown in the volume presented to your Honourable House in 1859, that Dost Mahommed was not unfriendly, but was anxiously desirous of an alliance with England.

That the Russian Government did, in the autumn of 1838, disavow and recall its agents in Central Asia. That the British Government did express its entire satisfaction with the declarations and conduct of the Russian Government. That the British Government did, nevertheless, pursue the measures adopted to counteract Russia in the invasion of Afghanistan, and in the substitution of one Prince for another, the result being the extermination of the British forces so employed, and the substitution
throughout Central Asia of the influence of Russia for that of England; as witness events occurring at the present moment. That the British Government did at the same time so alter the terms of the despatches laid before Parliament in 1839, as to obliterate all traces of the name and acts of the Emperor of Russia in connexion with the agents of the Russian Government, thus assisting the Russian Government to disavow its agents.

That the British Government either did believe the Russian Government to be sincere in its professions of friendship, or did not believe the Russian Government to be sincere. That in the former case there was no pretext for invading Afghanistan; in the latter case there was no pretext for assisting the Russian Government to disavow its agents. That reconciliation with Russia being followed by hostilities with Dost Mahommed, on the ground of his being friendly to Russia, either this reconciliation must have dissembled enmity, or there had never been any real quarrel. That as the alteration of these despatches to suit the convenience of the Russian Government shows that the reconciliation did not dissemble enmity, the original quarrel must have been only apparent, and the concert of the two Governments throughout these events never interrupted.

That the original documents being now obtained, your Honourable House is in a position, for the first time, to inquire into the conduct of those Ministers by whom these operations were carried into effect. That, further, the falsification of documents presented to Parliament now being brought to the knowledge of your Honourable House, a necessity is imposed of dealing with the said delinquency, and failing to do so, your Honourable House will suffer the same to stand as a precedent for the future.

Your Petitioners therefore pray your Honourable House to take into their consideration the volume of documents entitled "Copies of the Correspondence of Sir Alexander Burnes with the Governor-General of India during his Mission to Caubul in the years 1837 and 1838, or such part thereof as has not been
already published, and to make known by your decision thereon whether it was fit and proper to mutilate the terms and alter the sense of the despatches of Her Majesty’s servants in laying them before Parliament, or the reverse.

And your Petitioners will ever pray.

Signed on behalf of the Association, May 9th, 1860.

GEORGE CRAWSHAY, Chairman.
ROBERT BAINBRIDGE, Vice-Chairman.
GEORGE STOBART, Secretary.
ON THE ATTEMPTED IMPEACHMENT OF LORD PALMERSTON IN 1848, ONE OF THE GROUNDS Alleged WAS THE MUTILATION OF THE AFGHAN CORRESPONDENCE. SUBJOINED ARE EXTRACTS FROM THE CHARGE AND REPLY.

MR. ANSTEW (FEB. 23RD).

“So far as the form of the House do not prevent me, I say that forgeries—for it amounts to that—were committed for the purpose of misleading Parliament as to the intentions and dispositions of the princes and people of Afghanistan. I say, that from the papers which had been presented to Parliament, and upon which Parliament is called to judge, it appears that such suppressions have taken place, not only of whole paragraphs, but of parts of sentences, may, more, of words here and there selected with great care, so as to give to the documents thus dealt with an effect and purport, entirely different from that which was intended by the writers. This is particularly true with reference to the despatches of the late Sir Alexander Burnes, and I am in a condition to prove it by reference to the original drafts of his despatches. . . . It is not by accident that frauds like these can have been committed. Sir, I think it eminently disgraceful to the character of the British nation, and let me add, to this House, too, that the charge should have ever been made, and should have ever been suffered for so many years to remain without investigation. It has been pending ever since 1841, and yet no efforts have been made to vindicate the dignity of the law and the honour of the country.”

LORD PALMERSTON (MARCH 1ST).

That charge (viz, “of having suppressed many passages, and of having perverted the documents laid before Parliament”) has more than once been urged against us: it was brought forward frequently in the debates upon those important matters. We all took part in the discussion. My right hon. friend Sir John Hobhouse, who was then out of office, but at the same time felt himself bound to defend his own conduct and the acts of the Government of which he was a member, replied to the accusation; and I affirm, if any man will give himself the trouble of referring to those debates, as recorded in Hansard, respecting the despatches of Sir Alexander Burnes, he will see that it is not true to assert that the papers produced to the House did not contain a
faithful report of the opinions which that Gentleman gave to the Governor-General and the Board of Control. I do not mean to say that Sir A. Burnes did not himself subsequently alter those opinions; but the passages omitted contained opinions on subjects irrelevant to the question at issue; and when the House remembers how much Government is blamed for printing matters which do not bear upon the question, and how liable it is to the charge of endeavouring to obscure the understanding of Members, the House will be of opinion that we were not wrong in striking out such passages as were irrelevant and unimportant. And the House will be more inclined to be of this opinion when they recollect that Lord Fitzgerald, then President of the Board of Control, having access to these documents, felt himself bound to state that he could not find any trace on the part of the then Government of concealing or misrepresenting the facts. Sir, if any such thing had been done, what was to prevent the two adverse Governments who succeeded us in power—one of which endured for five years—from proclaiming the facts and producing the real documents?