6-1951

History of Technical Intelligence

Army General School

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ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL
FORT RILEY, KANSAS

INSTRUCTOR'S FOLDER OF A UNIT OF INSTRUCTION
FOR INSTRUCTORS ONLY

HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE  I-2906

SUBJECT AND FILE NUMBER

SUPERVISORY SECTION: INTELLIGENCE  TRAINING  P & A

DATE PREPARED  June 1951
DATE REVISED

PROPERTY OF US ARMY
Organization and operations of technical intelligence during and immediately following World War II.

**LESSON ASSIGNMENT:** (List each item as study, read, or scan)

- **STUDY:** Student Summary I-2906

**ESTIMATE TIME REQUIRED OF STUDENT FOR PREPARATION OF LESSON ASSIGNMENT (SEE MEMO, 46, AGS, 3 FEB 1947):**

- **STUDENT INSTRUCTIONS:** (Example: Bring paper, blue and red pencils, FM 100-5, advance sheet OT 100, field glasses, carbine, fatigue.)

  - None

**B A L O P T I C O N (IS NOT) REQUIRED TO PROJECT (GLASS SLIDES) OR (OPAQUE OBJECTS):**

- Fill in time Balopticon will be used.

**STILLS, FILM BULLETINS, TRAINING FILMS, OR COMBAT BULLETINS:**

<table>
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<th>NUMBER</th>
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<th>APPROXIMATE TIME TO BE PROJECTED</th>
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SECTION I

SUBJECT: History of Technical Intelligence.

TIME ALLOTTED: 110 minutes. COURSE PRESENTED TO: G1/C. TYPE: C.

COORDINATION WITH OTHER COURSES, IF ANY: I-2901, Introduction to Technical Intelligence.

SUPERVISORY SECTION: Intelligence.

TO STUDENTS BEFORE CLASS: Student Summary I-2906.

NEEDED BY INSTRUCTOR TO CONDUCT INSTRUCTION:

INSTRUCTOR FOLDER:

1. DETAILED LESSON PLAN, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, COMPLETE.
   See Section IV, herein.

2. TRAINING AIDS:
   Chart I-2906-1, Organization of the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company.

3. MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR RETENTION IN SUBSEQUENT CLASSES: None.

ISSUED TO STUDENTS IN CLASS: Nothing.

SECTION II

ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS FOR CONDUCT OF THIS SUBJECT

TO INCLUDE SCHEDULE CARDS, FORM 41'S, ETC.

STUDENT'S STUDY ASSIGNMENT: Study Student Summary I-2906.

STUDENT UNIFORM: Uniform of the Day.

INSTRUCTOR ASSISTANT(S): None.

CLASSROOM OR FIELD AREA REQUIREMENTS: Classroom per platoon with sliding panels, and arm chairs.

REHEARSALS: Instructor assigned this subject should rehearse sufficiently to insure complete understanding of the subject material contained in the Student Summary, Detailed Lesson Plan (Section IV of this folder), and the accompanying training aid.
SECTION III
MATERIAL FOR INSTRUCTOR

SUMMARY: I-2903.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: "The Intelligence Series", GHQ Far East Command.

C&GSC, Technical Intelligence (Lecture Outline).

Intelligence Bulletin (March 1945), "What Do You Know About Foreign Weapons".

The Engineer School, Engineer Technical Intelligence
   Terms (1949).
SECTION IV

DETAILED LESSON PLAN

1. SCOPE. Organization and operations of technical intelligence during and immediately following World War II.

2. METHOD. This hundred and ten (110) minute period of instruction is held as a conference during which questions are put to the class and a guided discussion is conducted by the instructor.

3. TIME SCHEDULE. This is a hundred and ten (110) minute conference with time utilized approximately as follows:

   a. Introduction------------------------------------------ 6 minutes.
   b. Technical Intelligence at the beginning of World War II ------------------------------------------ 8 minutes.
   c. The Development of U.S. Technical Intelligence-- 16 minutes.
   d. Technical Intelligence in the ETO--- 20 minutes.
   e. Break----------------------------------------------- 10 minutes.
   f. Early Technical Intelligence Activities in the Pacific------------------------------------------ 10 minutes.
   g. The 5250th Technical Intelligence Company-- 12 minutes.
   h. Technical Intelligence Coordination---------- 5 minutes.
   i. Technical Intelligence Operations in the Philippines------------------------------------------ 10 minutes.
   j. Technical Intelligence in the Post War Period-- 8 minutes.
   k. Summary----------------------------------------------- 5 minutes.

   TOTAL 110 minutes.

4. INTRODUCTION (6 minutes). c. All through the history of war, victories have been credited to the introduction of a new weapon or a new tactical system built around weapon. In turn each new weapon has produced a counterweapon that temporarily altered the balance of power in favor of one nation.
b. The dominance of the cannon over the city and castle wall resulted in the first general exchange of resident ambassadors. Thus the need for accurate and timely information of the weapons of a foreign power was felt early in western history. The technical intelligence conducted by these ambassadors was furnished the craftsmen of the cannon foundries to produce a better gun and to the engineer who redesigned the city walls to minimize the effect of the neighboring kingdom's cannon.

Although technical and scientific intelligence have been conducted in some form throughout history, it was not until recent times that systems and organization were introduced. An organization for technical intelligence in the U.S. Army was first developed during World War II.

c. Technical intelligence is defined as intelligence pertaining to the principles of design and operation, manufacture, physical characteristics and performance of material used by foreign armed forces. In a broader sense, technical intelligence may also embrace the manufacture, storage, installation, operation, and maintenance of foreign material as well as the nature, organization, and activities of the agencies and installations in foreign ground forces having functions analogous to those of the technical services in the United States Army. Properly, technical intelligence is derived from material issued to the using troops while scientific intelligence is derived at any stage of development. We have discussed in a previous class the relationship of technical intelligence to combat intelligence and strategic intelligence.

d. In our discussion of the development of technical intelligence during World War II, you should keep in mind how well the organization met the needs of the four objectives of technical intelligence.

e. QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE FOUR OBJECTIVES OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE?

Answer: (1) Prompt development of countermemures and counter tactics.
(3) Prompt exploitation of new ideas for our own benefit.
(4) Early dedication to the state of enemy resources for war.
(5) Use by our own forces of enemy material.

5. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE AT THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II (8 min)

a. Instruc tor Comment: We entered World War II without an organization for technical intelligence; however in the years just prior to the war we had been conducting some technical and scientific intelligence.

b. Question: How had we collected information for technical intelligence for our preparation prior to the war?

Answer: The military attaché's, hampered by a lack of funds, had collected technical intelligence information in foreign countries.

c. Question: In contrast, the British and German had

Elaborate Organizations—How Was the German Report Organized?

Answer: The Germans organized a national scientific development system supported by a technical intelligence service in the armed forces. Further support was rendered by the industrialists who had established cartels in the early thirties. Through the cartel system they were able to obtain foreign developments, such as aircraft instruments, and at the same time deny foreign powers information through their patent control and their control of interchange of industrial information, particularly in the chemical industry.

d. Instruc tor Comment: Spain was used as a testing ground by the Germans for the fruits of the scientific development we have just discussed. While they learned much about such weapons as the Soviet 45mm AF gun, they managed to test their own 85mm dual purpose gun, concealing its antitank capabilities from the observers of other nations.

e. Question: In comparison with the German organization, what was the status of technical and scientific intelligence in the United States on 7 December 1941?
Answer: We had formed the National Defense Research Committee in 1940 which became the Office of Scientific Research and Development in 1941. Each of our six technical services in the Army had an intelligence organization capable of only limited support to a development program. There was no field organization to collect information other than the attaches.

f. QUESTION: FROM WHAT SOURCE DID WE DERIVE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE DURING THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY?

Answer: MI-10, the British technical intelligence agency.

6. THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE (16 minutes).

a. Instructor Comment: Although we have worked in close cooperation with the British since 1942, we soon realized that to meet certain needs of our own a technical intelligence organization was necessary. Accordingly the services' functions in technical intelligence were placed under G2 Army Service Forces and War Department technical intelligence was charged to the Military Intelligence Service of the General Staff. Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams (EEIS Teams) were formed. They varied in size but were composed initially of personnel from several services. These teams were first employed in North Africa.

b. QUESTION: WHAT WERE THE DUTIES OF THE EEIS TEAMS?

Answer: They had four duties:

(1) To gather enemy equipment for study.
(2) To examine enemy production facilities after capture.
(3) To question and examine enemy production experts when captured.
(4) To determine faults that appeared in our own equipment under combat conditions.

c. QUESTION: WHY WASN'T THE WORK OF THE EEIS TEAMS IN NORTH AFRICA CONSIDERED A SUCCESS?
RESTRICTED

Answer: The MDIS Teams provided practically no information on intelligence for combat units in North Africa. Since their interest was primarily in collection and evacuation, large amounts of ill-assorted material was sent to the United States. One result was that the British MI-10 who were providing intelligence to British and US combat troops were unable to collect material. Inexperience resulted in poor collection and processing despite the amount of material available.

d. QUESTION: WHAT CHANGES, AS A RESULT, WERE MADE IN THE ORGANIZATION FOR WAR DEPARTMENT TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN 1944?

Answer: In June 1944 MDIS concentrated its technical intelligence activities in a single section called the Military Research Section, Military French.

c. Instructor Comment: This section was charged with the preparation of complete, accurate, and timely intelligence on enemy technical subjects including: small arms and mortars; artillery and fire control; ammunition; rockets and guided missiles; engineer and individual equipment; uniforms and insignia; fortifications and defense; logistics.

With this change in organization at the War Department level, the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a directive stating that the most important use of enemy equipment was for intelligence purposes. The groundwork had now been laid for an efficient technical intelligence effort. As a result of this directive the War Department issued circular 160 which established priorities for the use of enemy material.

f. QUESTION: WHAT PRIORITIES WERE ESTABLISHED?

Answer: (1) Intelligence requirements of United States and Allied governments.
(2) Operational and training requirements within the theater where captured.
(3) Training requirements for troops in the United States and for overseas US commands.
(4) Requirements for displays for purposes such as industrial
ingcentive, war manpower recruiting, or war bond promotion.

C. QUESTION: AFTER JUNE 1944, HOW DID TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
   OPERATE?

   Answer: They operated under HIS' control out of theater levels.
   General coordination and priority targets were assigned from the War Department. Teams operated with Army, Corps, and Division where they collected
   every material for study.

D. QUESTION: HOW WAS THE FLOW OF CAPTURED PROCESSED FOR THE
   REMAINDER OF THE WAR?

   Answer: Captured material was evacuated through supply and
   service channels to theater where it was shipped to the appropriate test
   and analysis installation generally in the Zone of Interior.

E. QUESTION: HOW WAS REPORTING ACCOMPLISHED?

   Answer: Reports were forwarded through technical service
   channels to the Chief of the technical service on the War Department level.
   Vital information and intelligence was furnished the G2/G3 at the operating
   level of the top. This resulted in technical intelligence becoming available
   for combat intelligence purposes both as spot reports in combat and as
   finished studies disseminated to the troops.

7. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE ETO (20 minutes).
   c. Instructor
   COMMENT: While War Department technical intelligence was being organized
   as a result of the experience gained in North Africa changes were being made at the operating level partly because of changes at the War Department
   level and partly because of experience gained by the commanders,
   staffs and troops preparing for the Normandy invasion. Perhaps the clearest examples of the organizational trend are the steps that led to the
   formation of Engineer Technical Intelligence Teams.

b. QUESTION: WHAT CONDITION CONVINCED COMMANDERS AND ENGINEER
   STAFF OFFICERS THAT ENGINEER TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TEAMS WERE NECESSARY?
RESTRICTED

Answer: For more than six months of the African and Italian campaigns, units were reporting an enemy mine as a new mine when the mine had already been encountered by another unit. This lack of prompt dissemination resulted in needless loss of life, equipment, and time.

c. Instructor Comment: To correct the situation a study was made between August 1943 and January 1944 by the Office of Chief of Engineers. A complete file of existing information on enemy engineer equipment was set up in the Intelligence Division OOS in the United Kingdom. Another result of the study, was the formation of two (2) Research and nine (9) Combat Teams from volunteers in UK Reinforcement Depots and Engineer Units in the theater. The teams went into training in March 1944 with the Intelligence Division OOS in the United Kingdom and were available to accompany First Army in Normandy late in June. One research team and three combat teams, one for each of the corps, worked with First Army. Their early and spectacular success (an example of which we will discuss in a later class) led finally to the activation of five (5) research teams and eleven (11) combat teams.

d. QUESTION: HOW DID THESE TEAMS OPERATE?

Answer: The teams would collect enemy engineer equipment and information about such equipment, and disseminate the data and material as quickly as possible, when of immediate importance, to the combat troops. The information and material was sent to the zone of interior for research and analysis. The II/S organization at theater level provided the teams with target information and War Department collection information through the Theater Chief Engineer.

e. Instructor Comment: The other services organized similar teams with similar functions. But throughout the campaign there was little coordination among the teams other then informal arrangements made by team commanders. In many cases the assistance they received from the II/Ss was dependent upon the friendly relations established by the team commanders.
Friendly relations were established by demonstrating to the troops that technical intelligence provided immediate benefits to the combat troops. The operations of a single Ordnance Technical Intelligence Team in Normandy provides us with two excellent examples.

1. An armored division had the disheartening experience of seeing 75mm AP ammunition bounce off the front plate of the Mark VI Tiger Tanks. The Ordnance team demonstrated on a captured Mark VI that 75mm AP would penetrate the relatively thin side armor at normal combat ranges. Penetration cards, showing an a-silhouette, the point of aim, range, and ammunition, were made up and issued to tankers. The results of the tests were forwarded through G2 and Ordnance channels to the War Department and the tankers started knocking out Tigers.

2. The 30th Infantry Division found in Normandy that the supply of submachine guns nowhere met the demands of patrolling. They had seen and heard how the 82nd Airborne had lost men to "friendly" fire when an attempt to use captured 1940 "Bury" guns had failed because of the characteristic sound of the "Bury" gun. The Ordnance Technical Intelligence Team, experts in small arms, modified captured 1940s by drilling a hole in the bolt which was filled with lead, slowing the cyclic rate so that the "Bury" gun sounded like the US M1 Thompson. A French bicycle shop produced a thousand modifications in a week. Ordnance archives indicate the splendid support of technical intelligence activities from that division during the remainder of the war.

Q. QUESTION: AFTER TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED THE NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE, HOW WAS CAPTURED MATERIAL USED BY OUR TROOPS AGAINST THE GERMANS?
During the artillery ammunition shortage in late 1944, captured guns were turned on the Germans including the famous 88. In Italy, Ordnance, using Ammunition Interchangeability Data prepared by Technical Intelligence, were able to issue Italian and German 88mm mortar ammunition. Training literature produced by Signal Technical Intelligence enabled US forces to use quantities of captured field telephone equipment.

3. QUESTION: WHEN PLANNING THE NORMANDY INVASION IN MAY 1944, WHAT DECISION WAS MADE BY SHAEF ABOUT EVALUATION OF CAPTURED MATERIAL?

Answer: Captured material would be evacuated as rapidly as possible to the United Kingdom for test and analysis by the British technical intelligence agency.

5. QUESTION: WHY WAS THE DECISION TO CONDUCT TEST AND ANALYSIS IN THE UK MADE?

Answer: Facilities existed in the UK to conduct the necessary test and analysis and to forward the results through technical intelligence channels to the troops on the continent in a matter of days.

1. QUESTION: WHAT PROVISION WAS MADE FOR MATERIAL CAPTURED IN THE ETO TO BE TESTED AND ANALYZED IN THE UNITED STATES?

Answer: Samples were evacuated to the US for detailed test and analysis as well as reports of the tests made in the UK sent to the technical service concerned in the US.

Instructor Comment: By the close of the war in Europe we had a productive organization for technical intelligence. There were weaknesses in the organization which would be studied, but the objectives and general principles of a technical intelligence effort had been established.

6. BREAK (10 minutes).

3. EARLY TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE PACIFIC (10 minutes).
c. Instructor Comment: From the opening of the Pacific War until November 1942, there was little technical intelligence activity in the Southwest Pacific Area. Some small arms, ammunition, and a few items of Chemical Warfare equipment were turned over to Ordnance and Chemical Warfare officers for examination. No organized attempt was made to have technical intelligence carried into the field by a team of non-skilled in collecting and analyzing captured enemy equipment.

b. Question: As in Europe we relied upon our allies initially. Explain how Australian technical intelligence supported US operations in the Pacific.

Answer: Both American and Australian forces evacuated material to Land Headquarters, Australian Army in Australia where detailed test and analysis was made by Australian technical experts. The entire channel of evacuation was Australian. In addition the Australians helped train our technical intelligence personnel, with the aid of an extensive collection of captured equipment. For the remainder of the war we worked in close and profitable cooperation.

c. Question: In November 1942 a War Department Training Circular established a more closely unit control for processing captured equipment of intelligence value. Under this directive what system of evacuation was used?

Answer: The flow of material was from combat troops to service troops in the combat zone, through normal recovery channels, to the Theater Special Staff officer of the appropriate service, where a preliminary expert analysis was made before the material was forwarded to the chief of the service in the United States. Half of the material went to the United States and half to Australia for test and analysis by Australian Forces.

d. Instructor Comment: Theater special staff officers were responsible for preliminary expert analysis from which they made
preliminary deductions as to the state of enemy resources for war. They also were responsible for preliminary operation and maintenance instructions and instructions for local modifications to permit the use of captured material by our own troops. As early as November 1942 plans were being made to accomplish the objectives of technical intelligence.

**c.** QUESTION: HOW WAS REPORTING TO BE ACCOMPLISHED?

**Answer:** Informational reports on material passed through channels from combat troops to S2 or G2, then to S2 GCO, to the War Department, as well as being interchanged among the service troops handling the material.

**d.** QUESTION: WERE THERE ANY TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TEAMS OPERATING IN THE FIELD AT THIS TIME?

**Answer:** No.

**e. Instructor Comment:** The first technical intelligence unit in the theater, an ordnance group from the United States, began operation in December 1942. Since its organization and consequent operational techniques set the pattern later followed for other units in the Pacific, we should discuss its organization.

**f.** QUESTION: HOW WAS THIS TEAM ORGANIZED?

**Answer:** The team was divided into three sections:

1. **Administrative Section**, responsible for general supervision, reports, and liaison with other intelligence agencies.

2. **Field Teams**, operating with task forces, divisions, or corps, collected material and after making preliminary reports shipped the material to the analysis section.

3. **The Analysis Section**, analyzed the material received from field teams, made reports, and then shipped the material to the United States.
1. QUESTION: IN MAY 1943, US ARMY SERVICES OF SUPPLY (THE THEATER REAR DEPARTMENT) WAS DIRECTED TO ESTABLISH A CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT DEPOT IN AUSTRALIA. AT THE SAME TIME A JOINT ALLIED CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT BOARD WAS FORMED. HOW DID THIS BOARD OPERATE?

Answer: The board was composed of two Australian and two American officers and a Naval officer who determined on the basis of technical needs where material was to be processed for test and analysis.

10. THE 5250TH TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY (12 MINUTES). a. INSTRUCTOR COMMENT: Technical intelligence operations in the Southwest Pacific Area had, until 1943, been carried on by detachments of special staff sections operating under varying arrangements in regard to the assignment of personnel and the supervision of activities. Only Ordnance and Chemical Warfare had operated trained teams of specialists in the field. While a system of evacuation and reporting had been established by the War Department in November 1942, and a centralized captured enemy equipment depot and a board to control the flow of material between the allies by theater in May 1943, there was no coordinated effort to collect material in the field through the use of trained specialists.

b. QUESTION: IN DECEMBER 1943, ALL TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WERE DELEGATED TO UNITED STATES ARMY SERVICES OF SUPPLY (USASOS) WAS SUP W AS TAKEN TO ACHIEVE COORDINATED COLLECTING?

Answer: The 5250th Technical Intelligence Company, composed of six technical services and a controlling headquarters, was formed.

c. QUESTION: WHAT WERE THE ADVANTAGES, IN THE PACIFIC AREA, OF A COMPANY OF THIS TYPE?

Answer: For operations in the Pacific this organization permitted:

1. A grouping of specialists from six technical services with the possibility of coordinated effort among them.

2. A specific table of organization and equipment to facilitate field operations.
(3) Flexible operation and movement in the vast distances of the Pacific resulting in a more diversified and complete coverage.

(4) Rapid dissemination of technical intelligence and information through grouped analysis sections.

(5) Control and distribution of captured enemy equipment by a central agency to meet the training and technical needs of the Theater and the Zone of the Interior.

(6) Formation of well trained teams for field exploitation in amphibious war.

d. QUESTION: WHAT MISSIONS WERE ASSIGNED THE 5250TH TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY?

ANSWER: Assigned missions were:

(1) To evaluate all available enemy material, and from such evaluation to deduce the state of enemy resources for war, to affect the prompt development of counter weapons and counter tactics, and to exploit new ideas for our benefit.

(2) To provide promptly literate, experienced personnel, and other aids which would assist in the training of troops in the Theater and in the Zone of the Interior in the use and maintenance of enemy equipment.

(3) To supervise the retention or disposition of enemy material by military organizations or individuals, thereby assuring the supply of all available items which would assist Technical Intelligence personnel in the fulfillment of the assigned objective.

e. QUESTION: HOW WAS THE 5250TH TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY ORGANIZED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS MISSION?

ANSWER: The company was composed of a coordination and administration section, and a technical section for each of the six major services.
f. Note to Instructor: Display Chart I-6306-1 "Organization of 5530th Technical Intelligence Company"

g. QUESTION: MAKING USE OF THIS CHART EXPLAIN THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE TECHNICAL SECTIONS.

Answer: Each technical section, composed of laboratory and ready equipment intelligence service teams, operated under the technical supervision of its Chief of Service and under the general (direct) supervision of the AG of S, G3, United States Army Services of Supply. The laboratory functions of test and analysis and reports were handled by the Administrative unit of each section and collection and reports from the field by the Field Unit.

h. QUESTION: WHAT WERE THE DUTIES OF THE COMPANY COMMANDER?

Answer: The company commander was commanding officer of the company and rated as G2 Technical Intelligence Coordinator in the Office of AG of S, G3, USASCOS.

i. QUESTION: HOW WAS THE NECESSARY LIAISON WITH THE ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION (ATIS), SG1 AND THE NECESSARY COORDINATION WITH THE CHIEF OF SERVICE, DONE BY COMPANY HEADQUARTERS?

Answer: One officer was on duty with AG of S, G3 to conduct liaison with ATIS and one officer on duty in each Chief of Service's office to accomplish this duty.

j. QUESTION: WHAT PROVISION WAS MADE TO PROCESS ITEMS OF CAPTURED EQUIPMENT IN THE COMPANY?

Answer: A single captured enemy equipment depot operated under supervision of the Chief, Quartermaster Analysis Section. Here captured equipment was received, classified, recorded and delivered to the appropriate service as directed by the Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board.

k. QUESTION: CERTAIN ITEMS WERE SOMETIMES RETURNED TO UNITS AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE COMBAT FORCES BY THE CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT DEPOT. WHY?

RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

Answer: The return of certain items to the capturing unit
and/or individuals was one way of solving the souvenir problem that made
technical intelligence collection difficult.

1. Note to Instructor: Remove Chart I-2906-1.
2. Instructor Comment: The 5250th Technical Intelligence
company was evaluated by G2, GHQ Far East Command in 1947 as follows.
(from Vol VII Intelligence Series GHQ FGC 1947).

"The principle of having a coordinating unit for Technical Intelligence
proved highly satisfactory in the (remaining) months of the war.
Central control made it possible for teams containing representatives of
the six services to be fused into field function as composite field units.
This enabled the members to assist one another during the first days of
an operation when speed was all important. Information, documents, and
equipment were collected for all branches of services by all teams, and
the equipment was assembled in a central location where it was sorted and
evaluated by the individual service team concerned. Coordination also
made it possible to have adequately equipped teams formed and trained in
time for all operations and it assured complete Technical Intelligence
coverage. A comprehensive view of Japanese equipment and capabilities
was secured and positive results were obtained."

11. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION (5 minutes). a. Instructor
Comment: After the formation of 5250th Technical Intelligence Company,
the field teams operated under general orders from Army Headquarters.
They planned their own itineraries, secured transportation, took over
enemy equipment from combat troops to whom they were not necessarily
attached, and did all this by rather comprehensive authority from the
Army that they were "to proceed wherever necessary to secure captured
enemy equipment." They often had to win the cooperation of men who had
never heard of Technical Intelligence and had no conception of its mission.
They not only had to be combat non and technical analysts, but also first
class salesmen who could talk their way through
b. One occasion a team was refused permission to accompany
task force on an operation. Even after arrival with a task force,
corps, or division, problems arose regarding status and permission to
 accompany combat troops.

   c. QUESTION: What was the solution for this problem?
   
   Answer: The problem was solved by attaching after July 1944,
to the headquarters of a corps, a Technical Intelligence officer who was
responsible to coordinate the activities of teams furnished by USASOS to
the Army.

   d. QUESTION: What were the duties of the Technical Intelligence
Coordinator attached to Army?
   
   Answer: Working in the Office of G2 of 5, G2 of the Army,
the Technical Intelligence Coordinator:

   (1) Coordinated the activities of all Technical Intelligence
units placed on temporary duty with the Army.

   (2) Maintained liaison between G2 Army and G2 USASOS
(Theater Service Troops).

   (3) Advised G2, USASOS as to number and composition of
teams from 5250th Technical Intelligence Company
needed by Army.

   (4) Supervised the training program for troops on technical
intelligence matters.

   (5) Acted as liaison officer for the United States Technical
Intelligence Depot (the captured enemy equipment
depot in the 5250th T.I. Co.) to insure the flow of
captured material.

   e. QUESTION: What results were obtained by the system of having
a Technical Intelligence Coordinator attached to G2 of the Army?
   
   Answer: Closer coordination was established between the
task and key personnel of various task force headquarters and the combat
troops. The flow of information and material from the teams in the field
12. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES (10 minutes)

a. Instructor Comment: The liberation of the Philippines provided with excellent examples of the techniques developed by the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company. The methods of the Technical Intelligence Units attached to the Sixth Army are worth detailed study because the principles we have discussed were here applied with a striking force.

b. QUESTION: WHAT WERE THE DUTIES OF THE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATOR ATTACHED TO 62 SIXTH ARMY?

Answer: The Technical Intelligence Coordinator with Sixth Army evaluated and compiled all field team reports. He also cooperated with other intelligence specialists in dissemination of information and intelligence to combat units on captured enemy material.

c. QUESTION: WHAT WERE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE FIELD UNIT ATTACHED TO SIXTH ARMY AS A PROVISIONAL FIELD DEPOT?

Answer: The Field Unit operating the provisional field depot acted as a central collection and storage agency for all captured material. This unit also conducted rapid laboratory analysis in the field for the Field Units.

d. QUESTION: HOW WERE THE FIELD UNITS INITIALLY ORGANIZED AND ALLOCATED?

Answer: Each Field Unit consisted of six field teams, generally one officer and two (2) men, representing the six major branches of service concerned with supply. They were initially assigned with divisions.

e. QUESTION: DESCRIBE THE LIAISON ESTABLISHED BY THE FIELD UNITS TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION OF FIELD INVESTIGATION AND COLLECTION.

Answer: Liaison was maintained between the division G2 and the commanding officer of the unit. Each team, in turn, established liaison with its respective Service Chief at the division headquarters.
f. QUESTION: How was reporting accomplished so that it benefited both technical services and combat troops?

Answer: Unit activities reports were submitted monthly through G2 channels. Technical reports were widely disseminated, copies being forwarded directly to the Chiefs of Service and to G2, USASCS. Many of the technical reports were published in the Technical Intelligence Section of the Sixth Army G2 Weekly Report, prepared by the Sixth Army Technical Intelligence Coordinator. Results of the tests conducted by the Field Units or teams were made available to all agencies concerned and were of immediate tactical value.

g. QUESTION: What changes were made in the basis of assignment (field units during operations in Europe)?

Answer: The original plan of placing Field Units with divisions, where they operated under the Division G2 and were confined to the division zone, was found to be too rigid. Assignment directly to corps decreased liaison difficulties and permitted a wider scope for the operations of field teams.

h. QUESTION: As a result of experience gained in this operation, what changes were made in the organization of field units?

Answer: Experience gained, resulted in the omission of Quartermaster and Medical teams from the Field Units. Thereafter, units were composed of Ordnance, Engineer, Signal, and Chemical teams. One Quartermaster and one Medical officer were assigned to operate directly under the control of the Corps G2 where they handled the technical intelligence of their branches.

i. Instructor Comment: One point, should be emphasized, and that is the great flexibility of operation that was permitted by the organization of the 5256th Technical Intelligence Company. Do not consider the organization of the Field Units as rigid. We have discussed the make up of teams and the operational procedures in general terms to point out the standards achieved and the development of principles to
accomplish the technical intelligence mission. In actual practice, units, arms, and coordinators were tailored for specific operations. Training and organization could be planned for each operation by the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company. Units operating with the Armies and task forces could organize to meet the changing situation in the campaign.

13. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE POST WAR PERIOD (8 minutes).

a. Instructor Comment: After the surrender of Germany and Japan, the technical intelligence organization built up during the last year of the war altered radically under the influences of rapid demobilization, the changing missions of the occupation, a lack of funds, and the loss of specialist personnel.

b. QUESTION: WHAT WAS THE PRINCIPAL MISSION OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS IN GERMANY AND JAPAN DURING THE SURRENDER PERIOD?

Answer: Technical intelligence units examined enemy production facilities, production exports and research and development installations. Targets were assigned by the War Department.

c. QUESTION: AFTER THE 5250TH TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY INACTIVATED ITS INVESTIGATION OF JAPANESE PRODUCTION AND RESEARCH INSTALLATIONS, WHAT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE WAS MADE TO CONFORM WITH OCCUPATION MISSIONS?

Answer: The 5250th Technical Intelligence Company was inactivated in June 1947. The Technical Intelligence Detachment, General Headquarters, Far East Command was activated in its place.

d. QUESTION: WHAT FUNCTIONS WERE ASSIGNED THE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT GEO, FCC?

Answer: The Technical Intelligence Detachment carried out investigations, maintained surveillance of Japanese production facilities, and made reports in support of the civil agencies of SCAP, the directing authority of the military government of Japan.
e. Instructor Comment: We see that technical intelligence activities in the immediate post war period went through two stages. First, an investigation of the enemy production and research effort which provided a mass of valuable material for strategic intelligence purposes. Then, the second phase, the trained specialists remaining after demobilization were utilized to support the military government activities of the Allies of Occupation.

f. QUESTION: WHAT HAS BEEN OUR PRINCIPAL PEACETIME AGENCY FOR THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION FOR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE?

Answer: Our principal peacetime agency has been the Military Attaché system.

g. QUESTION: WHAT KIND OF SUPPORT HAVE THE TECHNICAL SERVICES BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN FOR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE SINCE 1945?

Answer: The technical services have maintained small intelligence organizations, usually within the chief of service's office, to process information for technical intelligence. They have been hampered by a lack of funds and specialist personnel.

h. QUESTION: IN THE POSTWAR CHANGES OF THE ARMY ORGANIZATION, WHAT WERE THE CHANGES MADE IN WHAT WE HAVE CALLED "WAR DEPARTMENT TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE"?

Answer: Department of the Army, G2 assumed the responsibility for technical intelligence from G2 Army Service Forces when ASF functions were placed under G4 Department of the Army. The functions of both G2 ASF and the Military Branch, Military Intelligence Service as pertains to technical intelligence were placed under Technical Branch, Intelligence Group, Intelligence Division, General Staff, Department of the Army.

14. SUMMARY (5 minutes). e. Instructor Comment: The beginning of World War II found us without an organization for technical intelligence. While we had received some information from our military attaches in the years before the war, we depended upon our allies for the technical
intelligence vital to a scientific research and development program, strategic planning, combat intelligence, and the training of troops in the first part of the war. We still maintain close liaison with the efficient and productive Technical Intelligence of the British Commonwealth.

b. We soon realized our needs. Regulation of the flow of captured material and the fixing of responsibility for reporting was the first step. Then, it was directed that the primary use of captured material was for intelligence. This accelerated the development at War Department (Di.) level of an organization to process technical intelligence. Each of the services expanded its intelligence organization. Experience dictated that collection could be best done by trained specialists operating in small detachments in the forward areas. But the first employment in North Africa of Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams, composed of specialists from the six services was a failure. These teams did not, because of their organization and operating procedures, produce the combat intelligence needed by the fighting troops.

c. In Europe, teams from a single service, operated with armies, corps, and divisions. Generally speaking they were under the control of the special staff officer of their service and maintained informal liaison with the intelligence officer of the command with which they were operating. Combat intelligence aspects of technical intelligence were provided through the interchange of information between special and general staff officers.

d. In the Pacific, to support an amphibious war, a Technical Intelligence Company was formed as a theater unit. Operating forces had attached Technical Intelligence Field Units composed of teams from each service, trained for the specific operation, and capable of conducting field investigation and collection and rapid field test and analysis. Generally speaking, these units operated under the G2 of the command and maintained liaison with each special staff officer of the force headquarters. A technical Intelligence Coordinator was attached to the G2.
to insure coordination in technical intelligence activities.

e. In the post war period, the occupation mission, loss of specialist personnel, and a lack of funds, changed the organization of technical intelligence to meet new needs under altered conditions. Study of the experiences of World War II, has resulted in the adoption of features of both the organization as developed in the Pacific and of the organization developed in Europe. The objectives have been well defined and based on past experience we can expect the organization to develop to meet the varying needs of fluid operations on a global scale.
Abbreviations

AC of S G2 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
USASOS - US Army Services of Supply
ATIS - Australian Technical Intelligence Service
CWS - Chemical Warfare Service
ENGS - Corps of Engineer
ORD - Ordnance Department
QM - Quartermaster Corps
SIG C - Signal Corps
SURG - Surgeon General [Medical Department]

Organization chart:

AC of S G2 USASOS

GO 5250th TI Cc and TI COORDINATOR

C/O CWS

C/ENGS

C/CRD

C/QM

C/SIG C

C/SURG

CWS INTEL SEC CHIEF

ENG INTEL SEC CHIEF

ORD INTEL SEC CHIEF

QMC INTEL SEC CHIEF

SIG INTEL SEC CHIEF

MED INTEL SEC CHIEF

ADMIN & ANAL UNIT

ADMIN & ANAL UNIT

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HISTORY OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

SECTION I

OUTLINE OF CONFERENCE

1. SCOPE. Organization and operations of technical intelligence during and immediately following World War II.

2. INTRODUCTION. Technical intelligence has been conducted in some form throughout history. Only in recent years, however, has system and organization been introduced in the conduct of technical and scientific intelligence. In the United States Army, technical intelligence organization dates from World War II.

3. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE AT THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II.
   a. The United States. In the years just prior to the United States entry in the war, the principal collecting agency for technical intelligence information had been the military attaches stationed in foreign capitals. They were hampered by a lack of funds and in some cases had used their own funds to carry out the collection of technical information. Each of the technical services had a small intelligence organization, but there was no overall direction of technical intelligence activities by the War Department. In 1940 the National Defense Research Committee had been formed and, when in 1941 this became the Office of Scientific Research and Development, the U. S. had an effective scientific development effort. This agency required technical intelligence but Pearl Harbor day found the U. S. without the necessary supporting intelligence organization.

   b. Germany. The Germans had a three-fold program consisting of a national scientific development system, a technical intelligence organization in the armed forces, and a supporting intelligence source within the industrial cartel system organized in the early 1930s. The cartel system, through control of patents and industrial information, tapped foreign countries for technical and scientific information. At the same time this system carefully guarded German industrial, scientific and technical developments. For example while Germany acquired US developments in aircraft instruments, the cartel denied the US important chemical developments.

   c. The British Commonwealth. The British had an extremely effective technical intelligence organization, MI-10, which will be discussed in detail in another class. Initially the US depended upon MI-10 for the technical intelligence needed desperately in the US conduct of the war. While the US was to continue the close cooperation with the British and Australians, it was soon found that a comparable organization was needed to fill the U. S. specialized needs.

4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE.

   a. War Department Technical Intelligence was charged to the Military Intelligence Service of the General Staff and the technical services' functions were placed under G2 Army Service Forces. Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams (EETS Teams) were formed with representatives of all six services in each team and the teams were employed in North Africa in early 1943.
b. The EEIS Teams had four duties:

(1) To gather enemy equipment for study.
(2) To examine enemy production facilities after capture.
(3) To question and examine enemy production experts when captured.
(4) To determine faults that appeared in our own equipment under combat conditions.

c. The EEIS Teams were considered to be failures in North Africa. Partly because of a lack of experience in the teams, but mainly because of organization and procedures, the teams failed to produce the desired results. The emphasis in operations was on the collection of enemy equipment. Little or no technical intelligence was passed from the teams to the intelligence officers and technical service staff officers within the theater, nor was the collection effort itself sound. Non-selective collection benefitted neither the theater nor the War Department. One result of the hasty collection of ill-assorted material was to hamper the collection activities of British Technical Intelligence who had been producing information for combat intelligence.

d. As a result of the experience in North Africa, changes were made in War Department Technical Intelligence organization. In June 1944, MIS concentrated its technical intelligence activities in a single section, The Military Research Section, Military Branch. A concurrent step was the issuance of a directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff that set the most important use for captured enemy equipment was for intelligence purposes.

e. To implement this decision the War Department, through a circular, established priorities for captured enemy equipment.

(1) Intelligence requirements of United States and Allied governments.
(2) Operational and training requirements within the theater where captured.
(3) Training requirements for troops in the United States and for overseas US Commands.
(4) Requirements for displays for purposes such as industrial incentive, war manpower recruiting, or war bond promotion.

f. With these changes at the War Department level, after June 1944, Technical Intelligence Teams were to operate under MIS general control at theater level with general coordination and assignment of priority targets from the War Department. Teams were to operate with Army, Corps, and Division, where they were charged with the collection of captured enemy material for intelligence purposes.

g. Directives established a system of evacuation and reporting for all captured material. Captured material would be evacuated through supply and service channels to the Theater Chief of Service who was responsible to ship it to the appropriate test and analysis installation in the Zone of Interior. Reports were also forwarded through technical
service channels to the Theater Chief of Service who reported to Chief of Service at War Department. Any vital information or intelligence was to be furnished the S2/G2 by the technical service staff officer at each level. The result was that technical intelligence was available for combat intelligence use both as spot reports in the field and as finished studies disseminated by the Chief of Service or the MIS.

5. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS.

a. While War Department Technical Intelligence had changed its organization after the experience gained in North Africa, the changes were within the ETO were due to lessons learned in North Africa and Italy by the commanders and staffs assembled in England preparing for the Normandy invasion as well as the recent changes at War Department level. As a typical example of the trend in the ETO, the Theater Chief of Engineers found that units were reporting as now, mines that had already been encountered by another unit. The lack of prompt dissemination within the theater was causing needless loss of life, equipment and time. A study was made of British methods of handling engineer technical intelligence.

b. As a result of this study it was recommended to the Chief of Engineers that engineer technical intelligence teams be organized and attached to US Corps and Army Headquarters. These teams would collect enemy engineer equipment and information about such equipment, and disseminate such data and material as quickly as possible when of immediate importance, to the combat troops. In any event the information and material was sent to the Zone of Interior for research and analysis. War Department collection and target information was provided by the MIS organization at theater level through the Theater Chief Engineer.

c. The other services activated technical intelligence teams that operated in the same manner. All teams, however, were more or less dependent upon their subordinates when operating in the field. There was no formal link between the intelligence officer nor was their any coordination in the collection efforts between teams of different services. liaison and coordination was up to the team commander. Yet excellent results were achieved in the campaign on the continent. The degree of assistance given the team by the combat troops through the S2/G2 was in most cases in direct proportion to the amount of technical intelligence furnished by the team for combat intelligence use.

d. When in late 1944 and early 1945 an artillery ammunition shortage developed in the ETO and ETO the teams did outstanding work in providing the necessary intelligence to turn captured guns against the Germans. In France, Third Army's XX Corps employing thirty-nine captured pieces including ten 25mm guns and four 76.2mm Soviet guns fired 30,820 rounds in support of US troops. In one week 80% of the artillery ammunition fired by the Corps was captured material. In Italy ammunition interchangeability charts prepared by Ordnance Technical Intelligence allowed US units to fire thousands of rounds of captured Italian and German 81mm mortar ammunition. Training literature produced by Signal Technical Intelligence enabled US forces to use quantities of captured field telephone equipment.

c. One variation in the evacuation system was made by SHAEF. Since excellent facilities existed in the United Kingdom for test and analysis, captured material was evacuated to the United Kingdom for processing by the British technical intelligence agency. Results of the tests were in the hands of the troops in a matter of days. Samples and
REPORTS of the tests made were sent to the United States for further
detailed test and analysis by the technical service concerned. Finished
studies were then disseminated to US troops in Europe.

6. EARLY TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE PACIFIC.

a. Until November 1942 there was little technical intelligence
activity in the Pacific. No US technical intelligence team operated in
the field. Enemy equipment captured by both American and Australian
forces was evacuated to Land Headquarters, Australian Army in Australia when
it was tested and analyzed by expert personnel. The entire channel of
evacuation, initially, was Australian. When US technical intelligence
personnel began to arrive in the theater, the Australian technical in-
telligence service assisted in their training. One invaluable aid was
the extensive collection of captured material available in Australia.

b. US technical intelligence in the Pacific area dates from
November 1942 when a War Department circular established a system of
processing for captured material. Under this directive, the flow of
material was from combat zone, through normal recovery channels, to the
Theater Special Staff Officer of the appropriate service where a preliminary
expet analysis was made before the material was forwarded to the
21st Service Command. Theater directed that half of the
material be sent to the US and half to Australia for test and analysis
by Australian Forces. Informational reports on material passed through
channels from combat troops to S2 or G2, then to G2, GHQ, to the War Dep-
artment, as well as interchangeably among the service troops handling
the material.

c. A system for evacuation and reporting had been established,
but not until December 1942 was a beginning made in field collection by
trained technical intelligence teams. Ordnance and Chemical Warfare
teams were the first in the field and the organization, because of its
early success, of the Ordnance team set the pattern for all subsequent
team operations.

d. The Ordnance team was divided into three sections:

(1) Administrative Section, responsible for general super-
vision, reports, and liaison with other intelligence
agencies.

(2) Field Teams, operating with task forces, divisions, corps,
collected material and after making preliminary
reports shipped the material to the analysis section.

(3) The Analysis Section, analyzed the material received
from field teams, wrote reports, and then shipped
the material to the United States.

e. The successful operation of the Ordnance and Chemical team
brought a realization that the theater organization was inadequate for
their support. So in May 1943 CO of United States Army Services of
Supply (USASOS), the theater rear echelon) was directed to establish a Captured
Enemy Equipment Depot in Australia. To control the flow of material be-
tween allies, each with varying needs, a Joint Allied Captured Equipment
Board was formed at the same time. This board consisted of two Ameri-
cans, one British, and one Naval Officer. The board, for the rest of the war,
determined on the basis of technical need where material was to be proc-
used for test and analysis.
7. THE 5250TH TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY. a. In December 1943, all technical intelligence activities of US Forces in the Pacific were delegated to US/SSS. This headquarters activated the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company, which, with its controlling headquarters and field teams from each of the six services, was capable of coordinated collection in the field. The Pacific War was an amphibious war in which task forces attacked small land masses in a vast area. For operations in the Pacific the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company had distinct advantages for its organization permitted:

(1) A grouping of specialists from six technical services with the possibility of coordinated effort among them.

(2) A specific table of organization and equipment to facilitate field operations.

(3) Flexible operation and movement resulting in a more diversified and complete coverage.

(4) Rapid dissemination of technical intelligence and information through grouped analysis sections.

(5) Control and distribution of captured enemy equipment by a central agency to meet the training and technical needs of the Theater and the Zone of Interior.

(6) Formation of well trained teams for field exploitation.

b. With these advantages inherent in the company’s organization, it was assigned the following missions.

(1) To evaluate all available enemy material, and from such evaluation to deduce the state of enemy resources for war, to effect the prompt development of counter weapons and counter tactics, and to exploit new ideas for our benefit.

(2) To provide promptly literature, experienced personnel and other aids which would assist in the training of troops in the Theater and in the Zone of Interior in the use and maintenance of enemy equipment.

(3) To supervise the retention or disposition of enemy material by military organizations or individuals, thereby assuring the supply of all available items which would assist Technical Intelligence personnel in the fulfillment of the assigned objective.

c. To accomplish its assigned missions, the company was composed of a controlling and administrative headquarters and six technical sections. The company commander in addition to commanding the company functioned as the G2 Technical Intelligence Coordinator in the Office of IC of C, G2, US/SSS. Each Technical Section was composed of a Laboratory Team and an Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Team. The Technical Section operated under the Technical supervision of the Theater Chief of Service of the service to which it belonged and under the direct supervision of the G2 US/SSS through the Company Commander. Within each section, the laboratory functions of test and analysis were handled by Administrative and Analysis Unit (Laboratory Team personnel) and the field collection and reports were handled by the Field Unit (EEIS Team personnel).
d. The company maintained liaison with the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) of GHQ by assigning a liaison officer to that section. Each Technical Section kept a liaison officer on duty in their respective Chief of Service's Office.

e. The company maintained the Technical Intelligence Depot, which was a single captured enemy equipment depot operated under the supervision of the Chief, Quartermaster Analysis Section. Here captured equipment was received, classified, recorded, and delivered to the appropriate service as directed by the Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board.

f. As indicated in the assigned mission some items were returned to the capturing individual or unit. This was one way of solving the ever-present souvenir problem.

8. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION. a. In the initial operations undertaken by the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company, the Field Unit operated independently because there was no one to coordinate the operations in the headquarters of the force to which they were attached. The many problems that arose were solved satisfactorily by the assignment of a Technical Intelligence officer, after July 1944, to the headquarters of armies or task forces. This officer, working in the office of the Chief of G2, was responsible to coordinate the activities of the Field Units furnished by USASOS to the force. He had the following duties:

1. Coordinated the activities of all Technical Intelligence Units placed on temporary duty with the Army.

2. Maintained liaison between G2 Army and G2 USASOS.

3. Advised G2 USASOS as to the number and composition of troops from 5250th Technical Intelligence Company needed by Army.

4. Supervised the training program for troops on technical intelligence matters.

5. Acted as liaison officer for the United States Technical Intelligence Depot (the captured enemy equipment depot in the 5250th T.I. Co.) to insure the flow of captured material.

b. As a result of the Technical Intelligence Coordinator system, closer coordination was established between the teams and key personnel of various task force headquarters and the combat troops. The flow of information and material from the teams in the field and the depot was considerably expedited.

9. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES. a. The operational techniques of the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company can be studied in the Sixth Army's campaign in the Philippines.

b. The Technical Intelligence Coordinator with Sixth Army evaluated and compiled all field team reports. He also cooperated with other intelligence specialists in dissemination of information and intelligence to combat units on captured enemy equipment. One Field Unit operated the provisional field depot and acted as a central collection and storage agency for all captured material. This unit also conducted rapid laboratory analysis in the field for the Field Units. The other Field Units the operation each consisted of six field teams, generally one officer
and two men, representing the six major services concerned with supply. Initially these units were assigned to divisions. The commanding officer of the unit maintained liaison with the G2 of the division with which the unit was operating. Each team, in turn, established liaison with its respective Chief of Service at the division headquarters.

c. Unit activities reports were submitted monthly through G2 channels. Technical reports were widely disseminated, copies being forwarded directly to the Chiefs of Service and the G2 of USAFS. Many of the technical reports were published in the Technical Intelligence Section of the Sixth Army Technical Intelligence Coordinator. Results of the tests conducted by the Field Units or teams were made available to all agencies concerned and were of immediate tactical value.

d. Changes were made in the basis of assignment of the Field Units during the operations in Luzon, because it was found that assignment to division, where they operated under the Division G2, was too rigid and limited operations to the division zone. Assignment directly to Corps decreased liaison difficulties and permitted wider scope for the operations of Field teams. Experience in this operation also resulted in changes in the organization of the Field Units. The Medical and Quartermaster teams were omitted and one Quartermaster and one Medical officer were assigned to operate directly under the Corps G2 where they helped the technical intelligence of their branches formerly conducted by the teams,

10. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE POST WAR PERIOD. a. During the surrender period, both in Germany and Japan, technical intelligence units examined enemy production facilities, production experts, and research and development installations. Targets were assigned by the War Department. In Japan the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company finished its investigation of Japanese production and research installations and occupation missions gradually altered the composition of the company. To conform with the new missions the 5250th T.I. Co was inactivated in June 1947 and the Technical Intelligence Detachment, GHQ, Far East Command was activated in its place. This unit carried out investigations, maintained surveillance of Japanese production facilities, and made reports in support of the civil agencies of SCAP the directing authority of the military government of Japan.

b. Demobilization, lack of funds, loss of specialist personnel, occupation missions, all tended to alter the technical intelligence organization built up during the war. As before the war the principal peacetime collecting agency to the military attaché serving in foreign capitals, the technical services have maintained intelligence organizations in the "Chief of Services" Office, but in the post war era were hampered by a lack of funds and the loss of specialist personnel through the rapid demobilization of the Army.

c. What had been called "War Department Technical Intelligence" was reorganized during the post war changes in Army organization. Department of the Army G2 assumed the responsibility for technical intelligence from 02 Army Service Forces when ASF functions were placed under G2 Department of the Army. The Functions of both G2 ASF and The Military Branch, Military Intelligence Service as pertains to technical intelligence were placed under Technical Branch, Intelligence Group, Intelligence Division, General Staff, Department of the Army.

11. SUMMARY: a. The US had no organization for technical intelligence at the beginning of the war. At first the US relied upon British and Australians but soon realized the importance of technical intelligence and began to develop an organization. Objectives were defined and systems
of evacuating and reporting captured enemy equipment were developed. A directing authority was established at the War Department level and the chiefs of the technical services charged with the production of intelligence on enemy equipment based upon each service's responsibility for similar US items.

b. Operation of technical intelligence units became a theater responsibility, which, after initial experience in North Africa, was handled in a different manner by each theater. In all theaters it was soon realized that technical intelligence had an immediate combat intelligence application as well as a research and development application. In the ETO teams generally were under technical service operational control and liaison was maintained with the intelligence officers by the teams engaged in field collection. In the Pacific teams were generally under intelligence control and the operating teams maintained liaison with technical services' staff officer. It was found by technical intelligence units operating in the Pacific that a technical intelligence officer to coordinate activities in the field was highly desirable.

c. Demobilization resulted in the loss of the physical structure of the technical intelligence organization, but the objectives and general principles had been well established.

SECTION II
CONDUCT OF INSTRUCTION
1. TYPE OF CLASS: Conference.
2. TIME ALLOTED: One hundred ten (110) minutes.

SECTION III
ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS
1. REFERENCE MATERIALS:
   a. Required: Study Student Summary, I-2906.
   b. Supplemental: None.
2. BRING TO CLASS: Student Summary I-2906.
3. UNIFORM: Uniform of the day.
4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: None.