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Knowledge and Symbolization in Saint John of the Cross

Elizabeth Wilhelmsen
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Elizabeth Wilhelmsen

Knowledge and Symbolization in Saint John of the Cross
The works of Juan de la Cruz contain numerous passages dealing with human cognition both ordinary and mystical. This study traces San Juan's examination of the mystic's knowledge in and through God. The sixteenth-century Spanish thinker stresses that conditionality is a fundamental character of all human knowledge, and brings to light a complex movement of contiguity between one and another mode of cognitive activity. Also discussed is the expression, through the instruments of prose and poetry, of the mystic's supereminent and therefore ineffable experience of knowledge and love. Relying upon Juan de la Cruz's own texts, it is shown how a relative communication can be effected despite the barriers separating mystical from ordinary cognition. The exposition highlights how San Juan turns for poetic symbols to the *analogia entis*, while at once basing his symbolism upon mysterious correlations between mystical, immediate cognition and ordinary acts of intellection mediated through sensation.

Elizabeth Wilhelmsen holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Hispanic Languages and Literatures from Saint Louis University, and has pursued studies in Philosophy as well. She has held teaching positions at the University of Salamanca, at the State University of New York at Geneseo and since 1988 at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Her research interests lie in the history of Spanish mysticism, Spanish poetry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the thought of Miguel de Cervantes.
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Printed in Germany 1 2 3 5 6 7
to Michael
St. John of the Cross
Anonymous Portrait
XVI Century
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My sincere gratitude, first of all, to the Dirección General de Bellas Artes y Archivos of the Spanish Ministry of Culture, for granting me permission to publish the portrait of St. John of the Cross which appears at the beginning of this work. Said oil painting is held at the Museo de Santa Cruz in Toledo.

I am further indebted to various persons who have helped me with the technical aspects of the preparation of this manuscript, including Fr. Joseph Koterski of the Jesuit Community of Loyola in Chicago and my now deceased aunt Miss Carolyn Berton, both of whom patiently purged errata from the first edition. A very particular word of thanks is due to Mr. Pedro Pablo Hoyos Salcedo, doctoral candidate in Modern Languages at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, for having corrected and revised the indices on very short notice.

I should again like to express my gratitude to those who read this monograph in its earlier phase, before the publication of the first edition, in particular to the late poet and critic Dr. Jorge Guillén.

Last but not least, I would also like to express my gratefulness to my academic institution, the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, for having defrayed some of the expense involved in publishing this manuscript. I would indeed like to take this opportunity to thank this institution very sincerely for its support of my research in general.

The first edition of this study was published in 1985. The present, revised one has been motivated, on the one hand, by numerous expressions of interest from individuals who found the first edition out of print; and on the other, by the flurry of activities occasioned by the fourth centenary of the death of St. John of the Cross in 1991. If these pages should serve the purpose of making the immortal master from Fontiveros more accessible to some of his readers, the revision will have been worth its effort.
Throughout this study, the citations from the works of John of the Cross are taken from the edition rendered by Lucinio Ruano [Vida y obras de San Juan de la Cruz, 9th edition (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1975)]. For titles of our author's prose works, the following abbreviations are used:

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<th>S</th>
<th>Subida del Monte Carmelo</th>
<th>(The Ascent of Mount Carmel)</th>
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<td>N</td>
<td>Noche oscura del alma</td>
<td>(The Dark Night of the Soul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Cántico espiritual</td>
<td>(The Spiritual Canticle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Llama de amor viva</td>
<td>(The Living Flame of Love)</td>
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When citing the poems, the full titles are used and placed between quotation marks. This form is intended to prevent any confusion between poems and corresponding commentaries which bear identical names.

Unless otherwise stated, the texts from the Cántico espiritual are taken from the second redaction, usually called Cántico-B. The citations of the poem, "Cántico espiritual" are also according to the second arrangement. Likewise, the Llama de amor viva is cited according to its second redaction. When quoting texts which appear in italics in the edition utilized, we have reproduced the italics. When added emphasis is our own, it is explicitly stated.

The Sanjuanist texts which are cited in the body of our study have been translated into English for the convenience of the reader. Said translations of both prose and poetry are our own. The original Spanish appears in the notes. We have followed the same procedure when citing secondary sources written in languages other than English.
INTRODUCTION

San Juan de la Cruz has been known throughout the past four centuries for various remarkable deeds. At the popular level he is known as a saint and an outstanding Christian mystic. This widespread image of him corresponds to the historical reality, for his primary concern was indeed the achievement of virtue, perfection and communion with God. San Juan de la Cruz is also recognized for the central role he played in the reform of the Carmelite Order. It is further acknowledged that he was endowed by nature with a gift for poetic creation and a talent for precise, systematic prose composition, both of which he placed at the service of his primary love and commitment.

In his lyrics, Juan de la Cruz endeavored to incarnate his ineffable and mysterious experience of the presence of God, while in his treatises he developed a thorough psychology and theology of mysticism. His articulations are such that this sixteenth-century thinker is unsurpassed in the history of Christian mysticism as either prose writer or poet. His position of preeminence can be gleaned from two sublime titles he bears: that of Patron of Hispanic Poets, granted to him by the Spanish Royal Academy, and the parallel title of Doctor Mysticus of the universal Church.

This study is an investigation of Juan de la Cruz's understanding of knowledge, symbolization and communication. Throughout his works, our author focuses upon cognition as exercised by all men; upon that specific form of intuitive knowledge occasioned by the poetic metaphor; and upon the immediate knowledge of God peculiar to the mystic's experience. As these pages attempt to manifest, he presents a well-developed and cohesive science of noetics in which different modes of human knowing are analyzed. It should be indicated parenthetically that the term "science" is employed here much the same way San Juan himself makes use of it, in the broad and legitimate sense of referring to a demonstrative body of knowledge concerning a given subject, and not in the conventional sense which restricts it to empiriological domains [Cf. O.E.D., s.v.].

The methodology employed throughout this study has consisted fundamentally in thorough and repeated readings of the works of John of the Cross. This approach has permitted the isolation of the texts pertaining to the subject of human noetic operations, whether ordinary or mystical. There are multiple texts on the role of the external and internal senses; on the relative functions of the active and passive intellects; on the differences between ordinary cognition following perception and knowledge infused without the mediation of sensation; and on the conditioned character of all knowledge. The texts on poetic expression, symbolization and communication are few in number, yet central in importance.

The present monograph is of an interdisciplinary nature. The first five chapters constitute essentially an epistemological analysis, while the remaining four deal with poetic expression as understood and practiced by our author. Previous studies have been made on many of the topics which appear in this work. What has not been carried out to date, however, is a study on cognition in Juan de la Cruz which relates his expositions of the various modes of human knowing to one another. To the end of providing such an analysis, San Juan's understanding of the principles governing ordinary cognition have been linked with his elucidation and justification of the mystic's knowledge in and through God, and these in turn with the efficacy of each of the literary genres he employs to give symbolic form to mystical experiences.
The order of exposition in this study has been determined with its objective in mind. First are investigated the historical genetic factors that informed San Juan de la Cruz. Thus chapters I and II are dedicated to examine his academic and intellectual formation, and simultaneously to explain his use of certain axiological terms. Once this background is established, the various stages of the quest portrayed by our author are analyzed. The study therefore follows attentively his narrative description of the twilight, the night, and the dawn of the mystical ascent, viewed as an experience of human cognition.

Unlike many commentators of mystical questions, San Juan de la Cruz recognizes consistently both the substantiality and the limits of the realities he deals with. In his examination of human noetic processes, he points in a demonstrative or scientific manner to causality and real relationships among existents. His exposition relies on relations between causes and effects in which various potentialities for knowing are successively brought to be actual. He then indicates similarities and distinctions between these causal relations in the different orders of cognition. Juan de la Cruz further brings to light a complex movement of contiguity between one and another sphere of human noetic activity, and illustrates how the knowing subject gives rise to this movement by determining his field of consciousness and conditioning his cognitive powers. San Juan's analysis of the highest form of knowledge, the mystic's knowledge of God, moves within the framework of Christian revelation. However, even when dealing with this most ineffable and extraordinary form of human cognition, his explications have scientific rigor and clarity.

The last four chapters of this study examine the communication from the mystic to the reader, a process which engages them both, and which is from the standpoint of the author a creative or poetic one, and from that of the reader a noetic one. The exploration of this communicative process is based upon San Juan's own texts, for his thought contains not only a developed psychology of knowledge but as well a theory of poetic communication consistent with it. The present work thus links San Juan's observations concerning man's ordinary knowledge of his surroundings with those concerning his cognitive grasp of God, and both in turn are related to the reader's understanding of the mystic's experience occasioned by the latter's literary expression. The discussion leads in turn to a consideration of Juan de la Cruz's poetry and prose as two complementary orders or modes of symbolization, which together offer the reader a unique synthesis of beauty and intelligibility. They are focussed upon as instruments employed to convey something of the mystic's ultimately ineffable experience, his or her supereminent communion with God in knowledge and love. It is thus highlighted how Juan de la Cruz's literary ensemble of verse and prose communicates, in a remarkably human way, divine things and the most sublime of temporal experiences.
CHAPTER I

THE SPECULATIVE LEGACY

It is not extremely difficult to trace the intellectual history of San Juan de la Cruz. Although some details pertinent to his formation still remain obscure, reliable scholarship has established beyond doubt an extensive amount of information concerning his early life and education. Such information performs the function of indicating the particular schools of thought to which this Spanish mystic was exposed. There is also a great quantity of historical data available with which one may reconstruct the cultural and intellectual milieu in which he was formed.

Most of the childhood and early youth of Juan de Yepes y Alvarez was spent in Medina del Campo, a town situated in the heart of the Castilian plain which bustled with commercial activity. It was there that he attended, during the years spanning from 1559 to 1563, the recently founded college of the Jesuit fathers. The college was intended primarily for the formation of future members of the Society of Jesus, but was also open to young laymen, who at this time were enrolling in the school in ever greater numbers.¹ As one of the biographers of our subject states: "The school of the Society of Jesus was experiencing fully the fervor characteristic of the age of Humanism." The humanities were taught there "with the same thoroughness, scope and competency as in the best Spanish universities."²

It was during this period that Juan de Yepes became versed in Latin, Greek and rhetoric.³ Being a bright and studious pupil, "in a few years he mastered Latin and rhetoric."⁴ Historians are led to conclude that "the first contact, and perhaps the most abiding one, of the future author of the Cántico espiritual with Latin and Spanish classical writers took place during these years. No doubt his preference for Renaissance forms also dates from this time. For the exposure given to model works of literature was not at all superficial, as it was based on extensive reading, exercises and compositions."⁵ In this environment of humanistic or literary studies, Juan underwent a training which was to prove indispensable for his future literary production. The emphasis was upon exposure to classical and contemporary works of literature, the development of good taste, and the acquisition of the technical skills for composing in either Latin or Castilian.⁶

The Salamanca Environment

Juan de la Cruz's thorough education in philosophy and theology was to follow his humanistic, literary formation. At the age of twenty-one, having graduated from the Jesuit College, he joined the Carmelite Order and took the name of Juan de Santo Matía. He was to retain this name until five years later when, through his own efforts and those of Saint Theresa, the Carmelite Order was reformed. Juan de la Cruz would be his name from that point forward. As Fray Juan de Santo Matía, he was sent to Salamanca for further studies. It was in
this city that he received, in the opinion of numerous scholars, the best instruction available in the sixteenth century in the fields of philosophy and theology.9

It is well known that San Juan attended the University of Salamanca during the most outstanding days of its existence, in the period often referred to as the Silver Age of Scholasticism.8 In recent years the university had seen among its faculty outstanding figures such as Francisco de Vitoria, Melchor Cano, Domingo de Soto and many others. The famed Fray Luis de León held a chair of theology during the same time that Juan de Santo Matía attended the university. The intellectual or academic community, however, can only be considered one dimension of the formative milieu into which Juan had entered. There was also the city itself as a cultural and artistic phenomenon, with a style and a harmony of its own.

In those days Salamanca was already a city of superb, well-balanced architectural structures. There were various Romanesque churches including the Norman-built cathedral, with its Byzantine towers. Monasteries and colegios mayores had recently been constructed in the best of Spanish Renaissance style, with arcaded cloisters and, occasionally, with a masterpiece painting in the chapel, such as the altar retablo by Berruguete in the Colegio Mayor Fonseca. The university buildings displayed intricately ornamented Plateresque façades, which were both delights to the eye and reminders of the preeminence of the academic community. All such buildings were constructed of golden-hued sandstone, reflecting the intense luminosity of the Castilian sky.

Scholars have often regretted that there is so little documentation available pertaining to the particulars of Saint John of the Cross' intellectual formation. The matter is not totally without significance, as a wide range of philosophical and theological views was represented at the University of Salamanca. The intellectual atmosphere was somewhat pluralistic and, in fact, polemics were not unusual within the academic world.9 A notorious controversy taking place during that period concerned different approaches to Holy Scripture. Some years later the university would again be divided, this time over the nature of grace and human freedom.10 Many assertions have been made, some themselves polemical, over which schools of thought John of the Cross adhered to, and over what stance he took regarding various speculative questions.11

When speaking of the intellectual pluralism which reigned in that environment, however, one should qualify this consideration. At a certain period, there was in Salamanca a movement towards a predominance of Thomas Aquinas' thought over other schools of philosophy and speculative theology. When Juan de la Cruz enrolled in the university in January of 1565, this movement toward a more unified understanding represented "the newest orientation of Salamanca."12 Melquiades Andrés points out that we may distinguish three "theological generations" throughout the sixteenth century in Spanish universities. The first was the "humanista," a period when no particular school of thought was emphasized above the others, but also a time of limited intellectual integration. The second, the "vitoriana," named after Francisco de Vitoria, was a period in which there flowered "a serene Thomism which exclusively sought the truth and fearlessly wished to embrace it, regardless of the person who professed it." The last was a period of "an exaggerated, rigid Thomism" in which there took place "a rebirth of the medieval spirit of the schools, which became more and more unyielding, and caused the former intellectual openness to disappear from the theological milieu..."13 Juan de la Cruz was fortunate in that he received his formation during the second and clearly the healthiest period, a time of growth toward a cohesive understanding within a framework of intellectual openness.
Personal Orientation

Fray Juan proved to be an excellent student at Salamanca. He was not known, however, for entering openly into the speculative discussions being carried on in that environment. This can be attributed in part to temperament, but also to the fact that his main concern was not to comprehend philosophically all things. Far from it, his primary orientation was not speculative but practical, and pertained to the life of prayer, sanctification and contemplation. His intellectual curiosity was oriented to ascertaining the means to this end. The writings he was to produce years after his schooling at Salamanca reflected this hierarchy of concerns. Their objective was to instruct and to guide others in the life of the spirit. His compositions are not at all devoid of subtle philosophical concepts and reasoning, yet these are only utilized inasmuch as they serve to illustrate or explain something pertaining to the life of prayer and sanctification.

San Juan de la Cruz's biographers relate certain facts which reveal that he already had a well-defined intellectual orientation in his days as a student in Salamanca. Not only was he given to prayer and mortification, but further, as Crisógono states, "it was during these days that questions surrounding mysticism began to concern Fray Juan." For elucidation from authoritative sources Fray Juan turns to the works of Denis the Aereopagite and Gregory the Great. As "prefect of students" in the college of his Order, he was expected on occasion to give lectures and to clarify issues before the assembled community. One of these discursos was on the problem of prayer, in which he presented in the light of the teaching of the Fathers of the Church his evaluation of certain practices which were in vogue at that time. The content of this speech was not recorded and preserved, which is quite lamentable.

This incident in his life, however, leaves us with a very representative and valuable image of San Juan de la Cruz, an image which befits him not only in his youth but throughout his whole life. It depicts him as a person whose primary concern is the life of grace and the perfection of the soul. By extension, he is concerned with other persons' achievement of the same perfection. This end, however, is not thought of as being attainable through good will alone. A certain understanding of the means is indispensable, an understanding which may be obtained through the study of Scripture, the Fathers and Doctors of the Church and the philosophers. Therefore, the outstanding student, the reflective thinker, the well-trained theologian, is neither more nor less than the practical servant of the unpretentious friar who is in pursuit of moral and spiritual perfection, or union with God.

Theory of Cognition

Within the writings of San Juan de la Cruz there may be found numerous texts dealing with the psychology of knowledge. The entire corpus of his works, in fact, may be considered as dealing with knowledge, if one keeps in mind that one aspect of the mystical life is a perfecting and uplifting of human cognition. It would be erroneous to think, however, that our author's works contain a complete and fully developed epistemology or theory of knowledge; as it would also be to imagine that he is an original thinker on fundamental points pertaining to ordinary human cognitive processes. It is more accurate to say that he accepts a body of
thought handed down to him by tradition, from which he later draws according to the neces­
sities of his own doctrine.

In presenting his understanding of human cognitive powers and their operations, our au­
thor has two objectives in mind. The first, which is an entirely practical one, is that by un­
derstanding the principles which govern human knowledge one may be able to control it and
direct it to certain ends. The end with which Juan de la Cruz is concerned, of course, is
knowledge of God, immediate, intuitive, experiential, non-discursive knowledge. The second
objective is to reveal that, given the structure of the human psyche and its potential for cogni­
tion, it is neither impossible nor unreasonable to acquire the knowledge of God of which he
speaks. He seeks, in other words, to offer "proofs and 'evidence' on which he may solidly es­

tablish his ideas."17 This concern for intelligible consistency, for reasonable demonstrations,

makes of Saint John of the Cross a "scientist" of mysticism.18 In his expositions "the divine
phenomena are explained by their causes and theology joins hands with philosophy and

science."19

In this study, we take the terms "cognition" and "knowledge" as practically synonymous,

and we use them in the same extensive sense that San Juan uses the terms conocimiento, in­
teligencia and noticia.20 Cognition or knowledge in these senses includes man's awareness of

things through sensation, his understanding them by intuition, his grasping of concepts through

simple apprehension, his reaching conclusions through reasoning, as well as those less com­

mon forms of consciousness and knowledge of which the mystics speak. We intend to analyze

in this study San Juan de la Cruz's philosophical understanding of knowledge, and we shall

trace how he justifies in the light of the same principles the mystic's apprehension of God. In

the second part of this study we shall examine his choice of the means to communicate to

others the nature of a noetic experience which is both extraordinary and unfathomable.

Our author's psychology of knowledge is Aristotelian and Thomistic in its basic con­
tours. This implies that he is an adherent of an epistemology which does not admit any form of
innatism, and according to which the mind's potentiality for knowledge is limited in some
respects by its own nature. This view, which makes of Fray Juan an "epistemological realist,"
is not surprising from one perspective, for one may see such an understanding as flowing natu­

rally from his intellectual training. There are many who would expect a mystic, however, to
be Platonic or Neoplatonic in his inclinations, admitting some sort of innatism of ideas which
would in turn allow for a Neoplatonic ascent of the soul towards God. Nevertheless, one of the
philosophical principles most solidly established in the thought of the Mystical Doctor is the
substantial unity of man, or the unity of his nature in one supposit.21 This position implies a
strict dependence of the cognitive powers upon sensation.

In more than one passage, Fray Juan states that the first requisite for knowledge is sense
perception. Thus, "the soul, save for that which is communicated to it through the senses...
could acquire nothing, in the course of nature, in any other way."22 He further states that:
"...as the philosophers say, the soul, when God infuses it into the body, is like a smooth,
blank tablet upon which nothing is painted; and, except for that which it experiences through
the senses, nothing is communicated to it, in the course of nature, from any other source."23 It
can thus be validly stated that "this text confirms John of the Cross' adherence to the
Scholastic-Aristotelian principle, nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu, which
severs the possibility of any innatism of Platonic origin."24

It is held within Aristotelian doctrine that the knower registers that which is communi­
cated to him through the five senses by means of what is called the "sensible species." The ac-
tive intellect then proceeds to abstract meaning or formality from the "sensible species," producing the "intelligible species," which is in turn presented to the passive intellect. It is this latter mentioned faculty that performs the action of understanding properly speaking. The mind might further proceed to emit a judgment on, or to reason about, that which it has come to know. The distinction between intellect as active and passive, and role played by each mode in the act of knowing, is among the tenets of Aristotelianism assimilated by Juan de la Cruz. The same doctrine further implies that man, being a composite of body and soul, and being dependent upon sensation for knowledge, can have no fully imageless, formless thoughts. In this matter also is the Aristotelian understanding shared by San Juan. He affirms that "man can know nothing on his own other than in a natural manner, which is only that which he attains by means of the senses. For this to take place the phantasms and the forms of objects must be present to him in themselves or in their likenesses; it cannot be in any other manner."26

San Juan makes explicit reference to the formal assimilation of the known by the knower which is likewise held by the Aristotelian tradition. "As the philosophers say, ab objecto et potentia paritur notitia. That is, from the object that is present and from the faculty, knowledge is born in the soul. Whence, if one should hear of things of which he has never had knowledge, and whose likeness he has never seen, he would in no way be enlightened about them any more than if nothing had been said."27 The object known, therefore, impresses its likeness upon the mind, which actualizes its potential for knowing. The known informs the mind, or the soul, giving it its own image and likeness. Juan de la Cruz follows here very closely an Aristotelian principle which was further developed by Thomas Aquinas.28

The aspect of this principle to which San Juan gives particular emphasis is the progressive and directional character of the informing of the mind. The latter starts out as a "blank tablet" ["una tabla rasa"], as pure potency, and is subsequently actualized by the assimilation of specific things. Specific actualization means specific further potentiality. New knowledge will transcend previous assimilations, although it must always be built upon their foundation. New knowledge is a cognition but also in part a re-cognition. Thus, as quoted above, "if one should hear of things of which he has never had knowledge, and whose likeness he has never seen," he would in no way be able to comprehend or assimilate them.29 For this reason he says, again quoting "los filósofos," that for cognition to take place there must be a proportion between the knower and the known.30

A further tenet in San Juan's psychology is that a thing must be known before there can be any volitional movement towards it. "The will cannot love other than what the intellect distinctly understands."31 Knowing precedes and also has a certain conditioning effect upon volition, in that what is known establishes the field of selectivity for the will.32 The field of choice in turn is altered throughout a subject's life in accordance with the changes in the contents of cognition. This operative principle has numerous practical consequences of which Juan de la Cruz reveals himself to be most conscious.

The Carmelite thinker's analysis of cognition is intended only as a framework, or as a point of departure. He establishes the structure of man's noetic operations and can then proceed to illustrate how the same operations can be purified, perfected and enlightened. He adopts an understanding of knowledge which has been handed down to him by a long tradition. The basic epistemological principles which he adheres to could be sketched as follows: (1) Sensation is the first step in the knowing process. (2) Perception leads to the production of phantasms or sensible images, which are indispensable for the operations of the intellect. (3) The intellect as active abstracts the intelligible form from the sensible image, which in turn activates and informs the intellect as receptive for understanding. (4) Knowledge is always
proportionate to the actual capacities of the subject knowing. And finally, (5) the subject must know a thing before there can be any volitional motion towards it. We shall have occasion to return to each of these principles throughout this study.

What is remarkable in the thought of Juan de la Cruz is that these principles are never abandoned. "In the educational system of San Juan, as in his psychology, there are no vacuums nor unbridgeable gaps: all is intimately interwoven and connected: the high and the low touch one another..." When he is dealing with questions pertaining to the highest degree of mystical knowledge and union, many qualifications are furnished. The first work which Fray Juan composed was the Subida del Monte Carmelo, in which he lays down philosophically the principles for the mystical life. Next were the Noche oscura, the Cántico espiritual and the Llama de amor viva, which deal progressively, although with some overlapping, with higher stages of the mystical ascent. As the subject matter shifts, so do the style of the prose and authorities cited. In the Subida and the Noche there is a dependence upon Aristotle and Boethius, whereas in the Cántico it is upon Augustine, and in the Llama the references are almost exclusively Scriptural. However, the basic and underlying structure of human noetic operations is not left behind. In the following chapters we intend to trace the Sanjuanist thought on how man, who is endowed with powers proportionate to his finite nature, can come to know and be in communion with that which is wholly spiritual, limitless and ineffable.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I


3. His professor of rhetoric, Juan Bonifacio, indicates the specific texts he utilized for instruction: "Me presto sin dificultad a leer a Valeriano Máximo, a Suetonio, a Aliciato; declaro algunos pasajes de Amiano Marcelino, de Plinio, de Pomponio Mela; traduzco algunos trozos difíciles del Breviario y algunos himnos eclesiásticos, el Catecismo, las cartas de San Jerónimo y el Concilio Tridentino. A mis discípulos ordinarios les leo Cicerón, Virgilio y alguna vez las tragedias de Séneca; Horacio y Marcial expurgados, César, Salustio, Livio y Curcio, para que tengan ejemplos y modelos de todo: de oraciones, de poesía y de historia." See Crisórgono, *op. cit.*, p. 39, n. 50.

4. "...en pocos años salió buen latino y retórico." José de Velasco, *Vida y virtudes del venerable varón Francisco de Yepes*, 2nd edition (Valladolid: Jerónimo Murillo, 1617), chapter I, p. 90. This first-hand historical account is on the life of San Juan's brother Francisco, who also came to be known for his outstanding virtue. The work contains valuable information pertaining to the childhood and early youth of Juan de la Cruz. See Crisórgono, *op. cit.*, pp. 16 and 39.

5. "...a estos años hay, pues, que referir, indudablemente, el primer contacto --el primero y quizás el más fuerte-- del futuro autor del *Cántico espiritual* con los clásicos latinos y españoles y la iniciación en sus preferencias renacentistas; contacto e iniciación nada superficiales, ya que son a base de abundancia de ejercicios, lecturas y composiciones." Crisórgono, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

Concerning this same period of schooling in Medina del Campo, Federico Ruiz Salvador, O.C.D. notes that: "Juan de Yepes, que posee dotes y curiosidad intelectual, recibira: formación de base, técnica literaria, contacto con los clásicos y su mundo de imágenes, estímulo a la composición personal, sensibilidad. La resonancia que encontramos en sus escritos hace pensar que los años de Medina fueron de contacto con la literatura, y precisamente con la poesía de su época.... El método del colegio comportaba lectura y análisis de autores clásicos y contemporáneos. Tenía para ello todas las facilidades. Ha bebido el joven estudiante en Garcilaso o, si se quiere, en otros autores profanos. No entiendo por lectura la ojeada rápida, que mide los versos, o recoge palabras y frases poéticas del autor, descarnadas de su contexto y de su mundo, como si fuera un diccionario. Así no encuentra pabulo el poeta. Juan ha captado el mundo humano de Garcilaso, su lirismo terreno, sus idilios." *Introducción a San Juan de la Cruz: el hombre, los escritos, el sistema* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1968), pp. 18-19. See also Dámaso Alonso, *La poesía de San Juan de la Cruz: desde esta ladera* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Antonio de Nebrija, 1942), pp. 96-97.

6. It should be noted that the curriculum at the Jesuit College of Medina included no theology at all and only a small amount of philosophy. See Crisórgono, *op. cit.*, p. 39. During
the sixteenth century, however, the liberal arts, "las artes," were considered propaedeutics to
the study of philosophy and theology. A thorough knowledge of the classical languages was re­
quired for Biblical studies. A command of rhetoric was considered essential in teaching. The
Jesuits emphasized in particular the importance of polished style in sermons addressed to the
general public. These attitudes, however, were quite new, and represented Renaissance trends.
For several generations a struggle had been taking place between "los humanistas" and "los
teólogos" over the status of "las ciencias humanas." The latter were said in reference to lan­
guages and the literary heritage, while "las ciencias divinas" referred to philosophy and theology.
By the time of Juan de la Cruz the cause had been practically won in favor of a much
closer alliance between the two branches of knowledge. Outstanding personages involved in
the long strife were Cardinal Ximénez de Cisneros, Antonio de Nebrija and Luis Vives, among
others. A study of these trends which has become a classic is, of course, Marcel Bataillon,
Erasme et l’Espagne. This work is published in Spanish as Erasmo y España, translated by
recent detailed investigation of the same epoch and related trends is Melquiades Andrés, La
teología española en el siglo XVI, 2 vols., Serie Maior (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristia­
nos, 1976).

7. "San Juan de la Cruz... cursa filosofía y teología en la Universidad de Salamanca.
Recibe la mejor formación que puede recibir un religioso español en el siglo XVI." Robert Ri­
card, Estudios de literatura española, translated by Manuel Muñoz Cortés, Biblioteca Hispáni­
con una sólida formación científica. Lo demuestra su actuación posterior como rector en Alca­
lá y Baeza. Le reconocen todos conocimiento profundo de la Sagrada Escritura, familiaridad
con los Padres, principios y explicaciones teológicas, buen criterio y agudeza. Ese equilibrio
descansa en bases fundamentalmente tomistas, o escolásticas." Ruiz Salvador, op. cit., p. 20.

8. Concerning the academic preeminence of the intellectual community of Salamanca
and the historical role it was carrying out, we turn to the previously mentioned work by Mel­
quiades Andrés. "Gracias principalmente a Cisneros y a los dominicos de San Esteban, el cetro
de la teología, tenido por París desde el siglo XIII, pasó en el XVI a España, y floreció de
modo especial en la ciudad del Tormes" (1:138). "La gloria de la escuela teológica de Sala­
manca en los años anteriores al concilio de Trento y durante el mismo consistió en librar a la
ciencia divina del peso del verbosismo y del positivismo bíblico de protestantes y de algunos
humanistas, armonizando fuentes y especulación, principios revelados y razón humana, por
medio de los que [Melchor] Cano llamará lugares teológicos. Este método confirmó autori­
dad, seguridad y eficacia a la teología, la salvó de los bizantinismos del puro raciocinio, la
bró de quedarse en pura exégesis bíblica y le marcó un camino preciso para llegar con rapidez
da lo nuclear de los problemas" (2:375). "La trascendencia de la renovación teológica de la pri­
mera mitad del siglo XVI en España, especialmente en Salamanca... queda más de relieve si la
contrastamos con el ambiente verbosista que privaba en las principales universidades europeas,
y ponemos a la par la acción concreta de los teólogos españoles y de los fundadores de ins­
tituciones teológicas con otros teólogos y fundadores de instituciones teológicas universitarias
 europeas de su tiempo.... La influencia de Salamanca se debe a la orientación antropológica de
la teología y al método teológico. Salamanca fue la cuna científica de la teología católica posi­
tiva o histórica... El método teológico, codificado por Melchor Cano, ha marcado a la teología
católica hasta bien entrado el siglo XX.... La concepción del hombre como imagen de Dios y
de la ley natural como participación en la ley eterna es otro de los aspectos de mayor interés en
la pervivencia de la escuela..." (2:381) A perspective of the impact of the Salmantine thinkers
can perhaps be obtained by considering that the Dominican convent of San Esteban alone "se
gloría con razón de haber sido la casa religiosa que ofrendó mayor número de padres y teó­
logros al concilio [de Trento]. Realmente su aportación ha sido considerada como única en la historia de la Iglesia de aquel tiempo. Los religiosos del célebre convento de Salamanca miraron con el mismo espíritu y penetración a la vieja Europa y al continente recién descubierto." (1:215).

9. In Crisógono's view, the pluralism within the field of philosophy was quite acute. See his "Introducción al estudio de la filosofía en el misticismo de San Juan de la Cruz," Revista de espiritualidad, 1(1942)231-240, especially p.239; and also, Vida de San Juan de la Cruz, pp. 56-57. Similar pluralism was to be found within the teaching of theology. It might be well to point out an innovation brought about in 1508 by Cardinal Ximénez de Cisneros in the University of Alcalá, which was shortly adopted at Salamanca. "El ideal para Cisneros era una teología única; pero dado que ello no era posible en aquel tiempo de escuelas teológicas más o menos cerradas e independientes, Cisneros llevó a su Universidad las tres escuelas principales: la tomista, la escotista y la nominalista, y mandó enseñar la teología según estas tres vías.... El conocer [los tres sistemas] con perfección se consideró entonces como algo perteneciente a la visión integral de la teología.... Ello intensificó el estudio de la teología, ayudó a superar el espíritu cerrado de escuela y abrió a los teólogos al sentido histórico.... Nuestros teólogos, sobre todo hasta la muerte de Suárez, se distinguen por el conocimiento de la teología integral en las diversas escuelas." Melquiades Andrés, op. cit., 1:224. Regarding Juan de la Cruz's formation, it is also important to recall that he not only attended classes at the University but also at the college of his own convent of San Andrés. Here he was exposed to the teachings of two doctors of the Carmelite Order, Michael of Bologna and John Baconthorp, referred to by Spaniards as Juan Bacón.

10. Early in the sixteenth century a renewal of interest in Biblical studies had taken place at Alcalá de Henares under the guidance of Cardinal Cisneros, whose efforts led to the publication of the famous Poliglot Bible, in 1517. The school of Alcalá, whose approach was to spread to other centers, emphasized literal, textual analysis of Scripture, based upon a thorough knowledge of Biblical languages. An outstanding member of the school was Cistercian Cipriano de la Huerga, who taught Hebrew to both Arias Montano and Fray Luis de León. The approach stood opposite to an older school, which based its method of exegesis on the Fathers of the Church and which utilized only the Vulgate. Cf. Marcel Bataillon, Erasme et l'Espagne, particularly chapters I and XIV. By the middle of the century "conviven todavía en España dos orientaciones exegéticas: la medieval y la humanista de los teólogos versados en las lenguas sagradas.... La directriz medieval sigue el rítmio de los cuatro sentidos bíblicos tradicionales. La humanista atiende de modo especial al sentido literal." Andrés, op. cit., 2:630. The controversy between the "latinistas" or traditionalists, and the "hebraístas" or reformers, grew in intensity and scope, the latter group being generally the object of suspicion and attack. Fear of misinterpretations of Scripture led to the prohibition in 1551 of circulating Bibles in the vernacular. For having supposedly violated this prohibition, Fray Luis de León, who was then an eminent professor at Salamanca, was incarcerated by the Inquisition in 1572. The second debate mentioned was on the question of how to reconcile divine causality and human freedom in human acts. In this controversy the Jesuits were divided against the Dominicans, the former group being led by Luis de Molina (1535-1600) and the latter by Domingo Báñez (1528-1604). Molina and his followers, desirous of safeguarding human freedom, held that God knows how any human would react freely to any set of circumstances, while the contending theologians affirmed that this view diminished God's providence, Báñez, zealous to preserve divine providence, held that God's knowledge and activity must be prior to and independent of the free act of the human being. God, thus, knows how men will act freely. For information on this issue, see Gerard Smith, S.J., Natural Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1951), Appendix, pp. 273-277; and by the same author, Freedom in Molina (Chicago: Loyola
The dispute between the two rivaling groups led Pope Clement VII to set up a special congregation, known as the Congregatio de Auxiliis, to examine the issue. It was determined that both positions were permissible, but it was insisted that the Jesuits should no longer call the Dominicans Calvinists, and Dominicans should not call the Jesuits Pelagians. It should be noted, though, that this controversy did not take place while Juan de la Cruz was a student at Salamanca, but a number of years afterwards.

11. A few of the works which point to the presence of Thomism in Saint John of the Cross are: Juan G. Arintero, O.P., "Influencia de Santo Tomás en la mística de San Juan de la Cruz," Vida sobrenatural 7(1934)165-182; Crisog6no de Jesús, "El tomismo de San Juan de la Cruz," Mensajero de Santa Teresa 8(1930)270-276; Marcelo del Niño Jesús, O.C.D., El tomismo de San Juan de la Cruz (Burgos: Editorial el Monte Carmelo, 1930). A work which draws parallels between Aquinas and John of the Cross is Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., Perfection chrétienne et contemplation selon S. Thomas d'Aquin et S. Jean de la Croix, Editions de la Vie Spirituelle (Paris: Desclée, 1923). Also, see Jacques Maritain, Distinguer pour unir ou les degrés du savoir, 4th edition (Paris: Desclée, 1946), especially pp. 615-697. The question has also been raised as to whether there may be in Saint John of the Cross some dependence upon Moslem spirituality. See Miguel Asín Palacios, Hijuelas del Islam (Madrid: Editorial Espasa, 1941). One may also consult, by the same author, "Un précurseur hispano-musulman de saint Jean de la Croix," Etudes carmelitaines mystiques et missionnaires (April, 1932)113-167. His thesis of a strong dependence of Saint John of the Cross upon sufí doctrine has found an echo in a number of more recent scholars. However, it was refuted decades ago by Bruno de Jesus-Marie, Saint Jean de la Croix (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1929), chapter XVII, who draws lines of demarcation between a natural mysticism, such as may be found in Islam, and supernaturally infused contemplative graces. His views are more fully expressed in chapter XVII of the 1932 edition of the same work, pp. ii-iii and 264, where he addresses himself to Asín Palacios' thesis on both theological and textual grounds. It is also opportune to recall that much of Arabic religious thought is itself derived historically from Christian sources. This point is insisted upon by A. J. Denomy, C.S.B., "An Inquiry into the Origins of Courtly Love," Mediaeval Studies 6(1944)175-260, especially p. 243. The presence of Augustinianism in Juan de la Cruz has been less controversial and less thoroughly investigated. A good introduction is: Alberto de la Virgen del Carmen, O.C.D., "Presencia de San Agustín en Sta. Teresa y S. Juan de la Cruz," Revista de espiritualidad 14(1955)170-184. A work which points to numerous similarities between the thought of Saint Augustine and that of Juan de la Cruz is Victorino Capánaga de San Agustín, San Juan de la Cruz: valor psicológico de su doctrina (Madrid: Premio de las Universidades Españolas en el IV Centenario de San Juan de la Cruz, 1950). San Juan's approach to Holy Scripture is examined by Jean Vilnet, Bible et mystique chez saint Jean de la Croix, Les Etudes Carmelitaines (Paris: Desclée, 1949). Vilnet asserts that San Juan de la Cruz adhered to the principles of exegesis being promoted then at Alcalá and Salamanca, thus never sacrificing the literal sense of the Biblical text. However, unlike his contemporary "hebraístas," he does not limit himself to that one level, citing often in an "accommodated" sense. See also, Lawrence Sullivan, "The Moralia of Pope St. Gregory the Great and Its Influence on St. John of the Cross," Ephemeresides Carmeliticae 27(1976)453-488, who stresses San Juan's links with an earlier method of exegesis.

12. Andrés, op. cit., 1:190. This author's investigation, which is very recent, has revealed that intellectual currents were developing and gaining sway at a very accelerated pace during those days at Salamanca. It has become clear that during John of the Cross' years there as a student, the prestige of the thought of Thomas Aquinas was increasing. Francisco de Vitoria established "la Suma Teológica, del Doctor Angélico, como libro de texto, al comenzar su magisterio en Salamanca.... La decisión de Salamanca, hecha vida primeramente y convertida
más tarde en estatuto universitario, es aceptada por casi todas las universidades españolas, por la Compañía de Jesús, por los dominicos, jerónimos, agustinos y, más tarde, por los carmelitas descalzos.... La Suma Teológica se constituyó en modelo de método teológico, alejado por igual del verbosismo nominalista y de la pura exégesis, propiciada por Erasmo y Lutero.... Santo Tomás, gracias a Vitoria y a la primera escuela de Salamanca, dejó de ser considerado como jefe de una escuela teológica y pasó a ser realmente el maestro universal o Doctor Común." Andrés, op. cit., 2:331-332. It was in the year 1561 that the Summa became an official textbook by promulgation of a university statute. Ibid., 1:164 and 190. It so happened that "Juan de Santo Matía --San Juan de la Cruz-- llegó a Salamanca en 1564, tres años después de la promulgación de los estatutos, en que oficialmente se consagra la Suma Teológica como libro de texto." Ibid., 1:164. Regarding this same question of Fray Juan's intellectual formation, one may also consult the previously cited work by Bruno de Jesus-Marie, Saint Jean de la Croix, pp. 28-44 of the first edition. This biographer shares the opinion of Melquíades Andrés that Thomism was the prevailing intellectual current among the professors of the future mystic. Crisólogo's position is that "si en teología era la doctrina tomista la que iba imponiéndose y desplazando los demás sistemas --las cátedras de Escoto y Durando quedaban como símbolos de unas reminiscencias cada día más débiles de aquellas escuelas--, en filosofía seguía preponderando la doctrina puramente aristotélica." See his "Introducción al estudio de la filosofía en el misticismo de San Juan de la Cruz," p. 234. Writing a number of years after Crisólogo, however, Fr. Marcelo insists that "esta enseñanza tomista prevaleció también en las cátedras de Filosofía," and he cites convincing evidence to this effect. Op. cit., pp. 69-70.

As mentioned previously, the students at the convent of San Andrés were taught the doctrines of John Baconthorp, while at the university they were exposed to the thought of the more extensively known theologians. This fact definitely indicates a certain pluralism. Baconthorp has for centuries been thought of as a Latin Averroist and has even been called "Princps Averroistarum," a title which Crisólogo recognizes as due to him (Vida de San Juan de la Cruz, p. 60). This could indicate that Baconthorp advocated a disjunction or irreconcilability between faith and reason, or between philosophy and theology. However, this evaluation of Baconthorp's doctrine has been refuted in recent decades. We are told that "from the list of Latin Averroists should be struck the name of the Carmelite John Baconthrop..." See Etienne Gilson, A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 521 and p. 796, note 60. See also, Etienne Gilson, La philosophie au moyen âge, Petite Bibliothèque Payot, 2 vols. (Paris: Payot, 1976), 2:688. These facts add weight to the opinion that although there was a certain pluralism in the academic environment in which San Juan was formed, it was within a framework of some common intellectual ground. Fr. Marcelo, on his part, holds that "en la Descalcez fue siempre Santo Tomás su Preceptor y en la Antigua Observancia aparece también el Ángelico como el Doctor Común durante el siglo XVI.... La dirección marcadamente baconiana sólo aparece clara en los siglos XVII y XVIII, como puede comprobarse por los mismos títulos de las obras filosóficas y teológicas que en ellos se escribieron." Op. cit., p. 74.

13. "El entusiasmo por la triple via empezó al bajar a su ocaso los profesores nominales venidos de París e imponer en las aulas, por medio de Vitoria, un tomismo sereno, que busca únicamente la verdad y no teme abrazarse con ella, sin atender a la escuela de la persona que la expresa. Hasta el triunfo del tomismo rígido en San Esteban, consagrado como esencia del tomismo por Báñez y sus discípulos, es normal en la universidad española el tomismo abierto.. .. Con el tomismo exagerado y las disputas de auxilis renace el espíritu medieval de escuela, cada vez más intransigente, y desaparece del medio ambiente teológico aquella apertura de horizontes, característica del nominalismo como postura humanística, y de la escuela de Vitoria y de sus discípulos como tomismo templado en humanismo. Estas tres tendencias constituyen tres claras generaciones teológicas en España: la nominal o humanista, la vitoriana o
tomismo moderado y la llamada tomismo exagerado, junto con las reacciones de escuela que se producen a la vez en los franciscanos, jesuitas, agustinos, dominicos y carmelitas." Andrés, op. cit., 1:50-51. Also, 1:164 and 2:376. It is clear, thus, that a certain predominance of the thought of Thomas Aquinas was being established in the university world in which San Juan moved. Without entering into the question in depth, it is important to recall that the works of St. Thomas are extremely rich in their presentation of the thought of the Greeks, the Arabians, the Church Fathers and the entire speculative tradition which preceded him. See, Vernon J. Bourke, Aquinas' Search for Wisdom (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1965); Etienne Gilson, Le thomisme, 6th edition (Paris: Librairie J. Vrin, 1972).

14. "...en estos días comienza a preocupar a fray Juan el problema místico.... Le interesa fijar la naturaleza de la contemplación. Unas doctrinas nuevas, que van adquiriendo empuje --probablemente ideas de tipo iluminista--, le dan la impresión de una desviación de la verdadera doctrina espiritual de los Padres y Doctores. Fray Juan lo examina y compara." Crisólogo, Vida de San Juan de la Cruz, p. 61.

15. This important piece of information concerning the authors Juan de la Cruz read at this point in his life is recorded by an early biographer, José de Jesús María Quiroga, O.C.D., Historia de la vida y virtudes del Venerable P. Fr. Juan de la Cruz (Brussels: John Meerbeek, 1628), book I, chapter iv.

16. "Sabemos por testimonio de uno de sus condiscípulos, fray Alonso de Villalba, uno de los que le acompañaban, vestido con su capa blanca, a las clases de la Universidad, que fray Juan destaca por su aventajado ingenio y por su aplicación. Un hecho demuestra que Fray Alonso de Villalba no exagera: el que Fray Juan de Santo Matía es nombrado prefecto de estudiantes. Es un oficio que se confiere al más aventajado. Tiene que explicar una clase, defender tesis públicas, intervenir con el maestro regente en la solución de las objeciones que se presenten." Crisólogo, Vida de San Juan de la Cruz, pp. 60-61.

17. Richard P. Hardy, "The Hidden God and Juan de la Cruz (1542-1591)," Ephemerides Carmeliticae 27(1976)241-262, p. 245. It has been noted that the historical period we are dealing with had a particular need of philosophically well-founded expositions of spiritual and mystical questions. A person such as Juan de la Cruz "que vive y se forma intelectual y moralmente en el contraste de la Reforma y el Renacimiento, sentirá la necesidad, no sólo de dar a sus tratados místicos un carácter de razonamiento y de convicción, sino de revisar el concepto general de la mística, como se revisaban por entonces el de la teología dogmática y el de la filosofía.... Era necesaria toda una arquitectura intelectual." Crisólogo, "Introducción al estudio de la filosofía...", pp. 231-232.

18. "Triple puede ser el carácter que el problema místico tiene en un autor o en una obra: puramente experimental, puramente doctrinal y, finalmente, científico. En el primer caso, el autor se limita a referir lo que ha visto o sentido en medio de la divina y misteriosa comunicación, sin inquirir las causas o la naturaleza del fenómeno experimentado.... En el segundo caso, cuando la obra tiene un carácter puramente doctrinal, no existe conciencia de los fenómenos referidos. Se suponen. El autor da fe al místico experimental que los testifica y a base de ellos edifica él toda su obra inductiva y de deducción.... En cambio, en el tercer caso, cuando tiene la obra un carácter científico, van armonizados los dos elementos: el experimental y el discursivo. Para ello es necesario que sea uno mismo el sujeto de la experiencia y el autor de la doctrina.... Apenas es necesario advertir, después de esto, que no es uno mismo el valor de estas diversas soluciones que se dan al problema místico. La puramente experimental tiene el mérito de ser la base insustituible de cualesquiera solución que se intente. En cambio, la
... doctrinal tiene un valor muy relativo, porque es una soluci6n extrlnseca.... La única que satisface plenamente es la soluci6n cientifica, que tiene todas las ventajas de la experimental, completadas por las de un orden discursivo. Al primer género, pertenecen los libros de Santa Teresa; al segundo, los de los escolásticos y tratadistas; y en el tercero quizá no se pueda señalar más que un caso en toda la historia de la Iglesia: las obras de San Juan de la Cruz." Crisógono de Jesús, San Juan de la Cruz: el hombre, el doctor, el poeta, 2nd edition (Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1946), pp. 56-57. "El santo de Hontiveros ha sido calificado de filósofo de la mística, ante todo por el modo científico y sistemático con que ha tratado y explicado los fenómenos místicos, pero también por el bagaje de ideas subyacente a sus análisis teológicos, y concerniente sobre todo a la psicología, necesaria para esclarecer la actividad superior del espíritu." Guillermo Fraile, O.P., Historia de la filosofía española, desde la época romana hasta fines del siglo XVII (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1971), pp. 268-269.

19. "...los fenómenos quedan explicados por sus causas y la teología se hermana con la filosofía y con la ciencia. El análisis de los estados del alma adquiere una dignidad suprema y en la misma base del saber teológico se asientan los principios de la filosofía de Aristóteles siguiendo los dictados de Santo Tomás y de Bacon el carmelita. Las lecturas del sabio reformador, en las que no faltaban ni la Biblia, ni San Agustín, el Areopagita, San Bernardo, Rusbroeck y Talero, eran tan amplias y abarcaban tan dilatados horizontes, que su sedimentación universitaria dejó una huella eficiente en sus escritos." Manuel Morales Borrero, La geometría mística del alma en la literatura española del Siglo de Oro (Madrid: Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca and Fundación Universitaria Española, 1975), pp. 241-242.

20. On San Juan de la Cruz's use of the term noticia as signifying "knowledge" or "conocimiento," see Robert A. Herrera, "Conocimiento y metáfora en San Juan de la Cruz," Revista de espiritualidad 25(1966)587-598, especially p. 594.

21. The texts which make explicit reference to the unity of man in one supposit are: N1,4,2; NII,1,1 and 3,1; C,13,4. "El punto de partida de toda la psicología escolástica es la afirmación de la unidad sustancial del hombre; y problema capital de la misma ciencia es también la consecuencia que forzosamente se desprende de esa unión sustancial, a saber, la solidadad o comercio entre el alma y el cuerpo. Estas dos afirmaciones, explicadas por la existencia de una sola forma sustancial en el compuesto humano, forman la tesis central del sistema antropológico aristotélico-tomista, dentro del cual se mueve San Juan de la Cruz, suponiendo esas afirmaciones como base psicológica de los múltiples fenómenos que estudia... No se puede... dudar que el Santo fue un perfecto tomista en esta doctrina fundamental de la escuela, pues a ella acude para dar la razón psicológica de muchos hechos ascéticos y místicos..." Marcelo del Niño Jesús, op. cit., p. 99. See, ibid., pp. 99-111.

22. "...si no es lo que por los sentidos se le comunica [al alma]... naturalmente por otra vía nada alcanzaría." Sl,3,3.

23. "Como dicen los filósofos, el alma, luego que Dios la infunde en el cuerpo, está como una tabla rasa y lisa en que no está pintado nada; y si no es lo que por los sentidos va conociendo, de otra parte naturalmente no se le comunica nada." Sl,3,3. "Cum cognitio hominis a sensu incipiat quasi ab exteriori..." Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II,8,1. "...el místico Doctor comienza por poner en los sentidos el principio de todo conocimiento." Crisógono, San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica y su obra literaria, 2 vols. (Madrid-Avila: El Mensajero de Santa Teresa, 1929), 1:84. On how he establishes the objectivity of human knowledge, ibid., 1.91.

25. C,39,12 and C,14-15,14. Crisógono synopsizes "el proceso del humano conocimiento, según San Juan de la Cruz" according to the following stages: "percepción del objeto material por los sentidos exteriores, formación del fantasma en las potencias corporales u orgánicas interiores, actuación del entendimiento agente sobre el fantasma sensitivo, y formal intelección por el entendimiento pasivo. Luego queda la imagen de la cosa entendida, imagen espiritual en la memoria intelectiva y sensible en la fantasía." San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica...*, 1:90-91. A more detailed summary is offered by Fr. Marcelo, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-151, which includes the citation of parallel texts in Aquinas.


27. "Como dicen los filósofos, *ob objecto et potentia partitur notitia*. Esto es: del objeto presente y de la potencia nace en el alma la noticia. De donde, si a uno le dijesen cosas que él nunca alcanzó a conocer ni jamás vio semejanza de ellas, en ninguna manera le quedaría más luz de ellas que si no las hubiesen dicho." SI,3,2.

28. "The mind is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable, though actually it is nothing until it has thought. What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-tablet on which as yet nothing actually stands written: this is exactly what happens with mind." Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III,429b29-430a1. Aquinas, *In Aristotelis Librum de Anima Commentarium*, III,9,722. In Aquinas, see also, *Summa Theologiae*, I,85,2, ad 1; *In Aristotelis Librum de Anima Commentarium*, II,12,377.
29. He continues: "Pongo ejemplo: si a uno le dijiesen que en cierta isla hay un animal que él nunca vio, si no le dicen de aquel animal alguna semejanza que él haya visto en otros no le quedará más noticia ni figura de aquel animal que antes, aunque más le estén diciendo dél. Y por otro ejemplo más claro se entenderá mejor: Si a uno que nació ciego (el cual nunca vio color alguno) le estuviesen diciendo cómo es el color blanco o el amarillo, aunque más le dijiesen, no entendería más así que así, porque nunca vio los tales colores ni sus semejanzas para poder juzgar de ellos; solamente se le quedaría el nombre dellos, porque aquello púdolo percibir con el oído, mas la forma y figura no, porque nunca la vio." SII,3,2.

30. For example, NII,16,4.

31. "La voluntad no ama sino lo que distintamente entiende el entendimiento." L,3,49. Similarly: "por vía natural es imposible amar si no se entiende primero lo que se ama." C,26,8.

32. "...estas potencias [voluntad y memoria], según sus operaciones dependen del intelecto..." SI,8,2. "...las operaciones de las unas [potencias] dependen de las otras..." SIII,1,1. Also, NII,16,2. Capánaga remarks that "el mundo exterior, que se nos mete dentro por los sentidos y la imaginación, es un reino de valores, que solicitan, despiertan y calman nuestros deseos. Las cosas, en su mayor parte, tienen un fin, una aptitud, una suma de conveniencias y de provechos para el sujeto que los percibe. O para hablar en términos psicológicos, son excitantes que provocan determinadas reacciones psíquicas. El conocimiento es en su esencia reactivo. En las esferas ontológicas más altas, decimos que el Verbo aspira amor, Verbum spira ... amor. Se inicia, pues, ya aquí en esta porción sensible que estamos analizando, una forma de amor, una actividad que nos orienta a un fin más o menos preciso, imprimiendo a nuestras energías una dirección determinada." Op. cit., p. 156.

33. "No hay vacíos ni saltos imposibles en el sistema educativo de San Juan, como no los hay en su psicología: todo se halla íntimamente trabado y conexo: lo alto y lo bajo se unen..." Capánaga, op. cit., p. 204. This continuity between the higher and the lower dimensions of man's psyche follows from his unity in one supposit. See above, note 21, and Marcello, op. cit., chapter IX, "Influencia mutua del alma y el cuerpo," pp. 99-111.

34. "It is not surprising that Juan's superior intellectual training which he received at Salamanca (1565-1568) should find expression in the first major work which he composed.... It is at the very beginning of his literary output that Juan sets out the philosophical basis for most of his ideas which he will later develop and express in a much more poetic and symbolic fashion." Hardy, op. cit., p. 245. "El santo Doctor llevará a sus libros profundas y abundantes reminiscencias de sus estudios universitarios. Primero utilizará hasta el método aprendido en las aulas; después, desentendiéndose de éste, nos dará sus ideas envueltas en un ropaje poético.... La Subida del Monte Carmelo sabe a escuela. El santo escritor sigue en ella un método rigurosamente escolástico, con divisiones y subdivisiones abundantes y minuciosas, con la aplicación de unos principios universales y la lógica deducción de sus consecuencias, hasta con el uso de argumentos en forma silogística. En la Noche oscura afloja un poco ese método, y en el Cántico espiritual y en la Llama de amor viva desaparece completamente. Diríamos que la Subida está redactada al estilo aristotélico, el Cántico al estilo platonico; ...en ésta se entabla un diálogo bellísimo en el que alternan todas las criaturas.... Pudéramos decir que en la Subida la filosofía está ante todo en el método; en el Cántico lo está en el contenido; en la Subida, por lo mismo que hay envoltura filosófica, se ve mejor; en el Cántico hay que acertar a descubrirlo bajo el bello ropaje poético de metáforas, apólogos y alegorías con que el autor vistió su ex-tático pensamiento." Crisógono, "Introducción al estudio de la filosofía...", p. 240.
35. The citations in the writings of John of the Cross to sources other than Scripture are to be found in the following texts:

- **Aristotle:** SII,8,6; M,4,2; MII,5,3; MII,8,2; MII,16,4.
- **Augustine:** SI,5,1; M,12,5; MII,19,4; C1;6; C,5,1.
- **Bernard of Clairvaux:** MII,18,5; MII,19 and 20.
- **Boethius:** SII,21,8; SII,16,6.
- **Boscán:** L, Prologue.
- **Pseudo-Dionysius:** SII,8,6; MII,5,3; C,14-15,16; L,3;49.
- **Francis of Assisi:** C,14-15,5.
- **Gregory the Great:** SIII,31,8; MII,20,4; L2,3; L,3,23.
- **Theresa of Jesus:** C,13,7.
- **Thomas Aquinas:** SII,24,1; MII,17,2; M,18,5; MII,19-20; C,38,4.

There are also a number of references to "los filósofos," "los teólogos," and "los espirituales." This listing was published in part by Alberto de la Virgen del Carmen in the article cited above in note 11. We have added a few references to it, and believe it to be complete. The majority of these references are also listed by Crisógono, *Vida de San Juan de la Cruz*, p. 255. It should be pointed out that the text of Boscán referred to is actually Garcilaso's. The text attributed to St. Bernard and St. Thomas which is cited in MII,18-20 is spurious. (See the note by Lucinio Ruano in the 1975 BAC edition of San Juan's works, p. 678.) However, the fact that Juan paraphrased it throughout two chapters of the *Noche* manifests the esteem in which he held these authors. Crisógono is of the belief that there are throughout San Juan's works works allusions to the thought of John Baconthorp, Tauler and Ruysbroeck. See, *San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica...*, I:26-52. The names of these authors are nowhere mentioned by Juan de la Cruz, which no doubt has its own significance. For an index of Scriptural citations, see the previously mentioned edition of John of the Cross' works, p. 1012-1018.
CHAPTER II

THE MYSTICAL LEGACY

Primacy of Revelation and Practicality of Concern

If Juan de la Cruz is heir to Scholasticism and medieval speculation, it is no less true that he is also an heir to a vast and ancient tradition referred to as "the mystical tradition." Generally speaking, we might characterize the medieval scholastics as being primarily concerned with manifesting the accord between faith and reason. Representatives of the mystical tradition, on the other hand, assume the Christian faith and concentrate on issues pertaining to man's tending in time towards his ultimate destiny. Thinkers of this tradition focus on man in his present condition, suspended in time on his way back to the sinus patris. There is an acknowledgment of man as a fundamentally incomplete and anguished creature seeking perfection. The primary emphasis is thus on manifesting how man achieves his supernatural end by using the proper means. The speculator, on the other hand, may also consider the same realities --man, his end, the means to the end-- but he is not so concerned with instructing and guiding in the detailed achievement of the end, but in answering a different series of questions that pertain to distinct orders of inquiry.

The procedure employed by the speculator of mysticism focuses on how to achieve certain ends, for which reason this approach has been considered eminently practical. Jacques Maritain, for example, distinguishes between what he calls the "practically speculative" thought of the scholastics, and the "practically practical" doctrine of commentators of mysticism and the spiritual life such as Juan de la Cruz. However, these two approaches should not be thought of as mutually exclusive. Much to the contrary, both are present as complementary modes of procedure in the writings of the great Christian thinkers such as Augustine, Aquinas and Bonaventure. Juan de la Cruz shares his central concerns with members of the mystical tradition. His thought on this issues, however, represents a synthesis which has employed both "speculative" and "practical" approaches.

It is important to realize that speculation concerning mystical questions takes its point of departure from revealed truths, upon which may be built a science of spirituality. Its fundamental principles are believed by faith, such as God's existence, God's providential operating in history to bring about the perfection of men, and God's tripersonal unity. It can be called a science in the classical sense in that it deals with universal laws. The understanding achieved, however, is dependent and follows upon faith: credo ut intelligam. Thus St. Augustine, an outstanding figure of the Christian mystical tradition, tends to neglect a purely abstract and natural view of man in favor of considering him a creature destined to share the life of God, redeemed by Christ after the Fall. Christ, thus, becomes the central and unifying factor in any interpretation of history. In this matter of taking the Christian faith as a point of departure, writers of the mystical tradition differ from scholastics, who stress that authority is the weakest of arguments in certain contexts. An irony is revealed in that the most practical orientation is linked with the most fiduciary stance. Yet it does not seems so ironical when one reflects that
man's ultimate finality within the Christian understanding, the beatific vision or union with God, is known only through divine revelation.

The father of the great medieval tradition referred to as the mystical school of thought is considered to be St. Augustine. Among his numerous and varied successors we find thinkers such as St. Gregory the Great, St. Anselm, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, St. Bonaventure, as well as numerous other figures including St. Francis of Assisi, Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, St. Catherine of Siena, the Rhineland mystics, as well as the Spanish Franciscans, Bernardino de Laredo and Francisco de Osuna. These names should also be linked with the important figure of Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite who, being among the Greek theological writers cannot be considered a disciple of St. Augustine. Some of the thinkers following the Augustinian tradition, however, were to assimilate also the ideas of Dionysius. He was held in very high esteem during the Middle Ages, among other reasons because he was considered to have been a direct disciple of St. Paul, as well as a canonized saint. During certain periods he was regarded as the highest authority on mystical questions.\(^4\)

Juan de la Cruz has many intellectual links with Augustinianism. A revelatory fact is that he cites Augustine more often than any other single author. A recorded historical circumstance of great interest is that Fray Juan kept in his cell some of Augustine's works alongside his Bible.\(^5\) Other writers cited by John of the Cross are Dionysius, St. Gregory the Great, St. Bernard and St. Francis of Assisi. There has been much scholarly investigation attempting to establish direct and indirect links between numerous other members of the mystical tradition and Juan de la Cruz.\(^6\) A further fact worthy of attention is that there is a pronounced correspondence of vocabulary between St. Bonaventure and our Spanish thinker.\(^7\)

**Imagery both Platonic and Scriptural**

We are dealing with a vast and diversified tradition within which there are various schools of thought. Some of these schools are formed by individuals belonging to the same religious order. There are, of course, significant differences to be found among the various branches or schools, and less pronounced ones among the individual thinkers of each group. Aside from their common Scriptural foundation, though, a characteristic they all share is the assimilation in varying degrees of Platonic elements. Some of the central motifs handed down by this tradition have Platonic, Plotinian or Dionysian sources: the concept of the eternal Father as the exemplar of all things; the image of man being in the darkness of ignorance, in pursuit of illumination; the ascent of man from his earthly condition into the world of light, thus completing the *exitus reditus* schema. This body of concepts and images, which reached its full flowering in the symbolic theology of St. Bonaventure, may be considered part of a common heritage. The darkness, the flight, the ray of illumination, all make their appearance in the poetry and theology of Juan de la Cruz, having been stamped with his own peculiar form of thinking.

It must be remarked in passing, however, that the presence of Platonic imagery and even of Platonic concepts does not make of these thinkers philosophical or metaphysical Platonists. It is a question of a wholly Christianized Platonism, in which the doctrine of redemption through Christ and salvation through grace is central. The world of multiplicity is not considered as an emanation from the One, but is a creation of a free God, made in his image. Fur-
her, following St. John the Evangelist, God is considered to be love: in St. John, ἀγάπη, in the Western Fathers, caritas. And grace is thought of as a gratuitous invitation to participate in the life of God. Concerning Augustine, who is both the father of the mystical tradition as well as the central historical transmitter of Neoplatonic thought to Christian speculation, it is said that his thought is characterized by "an explicit interiorism born of Christian wisdom, based on the primacy and the dynamic of supernatural faith and love. Out of its very nature this interiorism impels the soul towards the vision of God. It is produced in the soul by supernatural faith, it develops through charity and the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the vision of God can be its only terminus." But there is also "in Augustinianism the implicit but equally real Plotinian interiorism, born of a Platonic metaphysics and a Platonic conception of man and intended as a method by means of which the soul may discover progressively its own divinity as well as its divine prerogatives." Similar Neoplatonic frameworks can be discerned in the thought of numerous other mystical writers prior to John of the Cross.

The position given to Platonic imagery in the mystical tradition is second to that occupied by Biblical imagery. There is an unbroken presence of nuptial symbolism throughout the centuries reaching back to the Canticle of Canticles, by which the love between God and the soul is represented. A parallel instance of symbolization throughout this tradition, also with roots in the Old Testament, is the use of the image of fire to represent the love which is one with the Spirit of God. Likewise one might mention the symbol of the ascent which, though fundamental in Plotinus, makes its appearance as well in Genesis in the figure of Jacob's ladder. These various Biblical images, along with their corresponding significations, emerge as central in the works of John of the Cross.

The relation between Platonic and Scriptural elements is not simply one of less to more. Elements of Platonic origin are indeed present in Juan de la Cruz, but they provide neither a philosophy of salvation nor a theology of mysticism. It is important to stress that a position dominated by Plotinianism would grant the science of metaphysics primacy over divine revelation, and salvation or union with God would consist in a noetic experience achieved through metaphysical knowledge. According to divine revelation, however, redemption and salvation are both through love; first, the love of God for us, and second, our response to him. With this doctrine as a foundation, Bernard of Clairvaux was to wed medieval mystical theology to a "nouvelle métaphysique de l'amour," wherein perfection in charity was at once conformity with God's will and a sharing in his very Being. It is this understanding of salvation and union with God which is assimilated by St. John of the Cross.

Augustinian Trinitarian Psychology

The doctrine of man being created in the image of God had a powerful impact upon medieval theologians. The early Greek Fathers focussed upon the soul as image of God in his unity, whereas with Saint Augustine strong emphasis is placed on the reflection of God as Trinity which creatures manifest. Creatures of the mineral and animal kingdom are considered to bear a "vestigial" trinitarian likeness to God, while the likeness granted to human beings has sufficient dignity to be called an "image." This matter is greatly stressed by Augustine, but receives an even fuller development in Bonaventure, who understands the created universe in terms of intricately woven and superimposed translucent trinitarian structures, which manifest and reflect the divine light and essence.
The Augustinian-Bonaventurean tradition divides the rational powers of man into three and correlates them with the three divine Persons. Etienne Gilson tells us that in Augustine's understanding

the three constitutive powers of the soul, memory, intellect and will, correspond, by their very names, to the three divine Persons. And this correspondence extends further, for it is not enough to say that there exist in man three spiritual powers as there exist in God three divine Persons. It is also necessary to say that these three powers of the soul, grafted upon the unity of the soul to which they belong, reproduce an internal pattern for which the divine essence furnishes the model. In God, unity of essence and distinction of Persons; in man, unity of essence and distinction of acts. Better yet, there is an exact correspondence between the order and the reciprocal relations of the elements which constitute these two trinities. Just as the Father engenders the eternal knowledge of the Word which expresses it, and as the word in its turn binds itself to the Father by the Spirit, likewise memory or thought, rich with ideas it contains, engenders the knowledge of the intellect or the Word, and love is born of the one and of the other as the bond that joins them. What we have here is not a matter of an accidental correspondence; the structure of the creative Trinity conditions and therefore explains the structure of the human soul...\[14\]

For Augustine and his followers, thus, the power of memory, the means by which we retain our past throughout our journey and by which we can project ourselves into the future, is the analogue of the Father, source and end of all being. The intellect, the power by which we know God, ourselves and other creatures, mirrors the Person of the Son, image and wisdom of the Father. The will, the power by which we choose to return God's love and thus be united with him, is the analogue of the Holy Spirit, who is the love between the Father and the Son.

In harmony with the pre-existing tradition, San Juan de la Cruz adopts the Augustinian three-fold division of the powers.\[15\] We shall have occasion to return to this subject numerous times throughout this study, as the subject of the rational powers and their activities is one with that of the cognitive processes. Augustine and his successors in the mystical tradition differ from numerous scholastics on this question of the structure of the soul. The former usually consider the soul to be endowed with three powers, memory, intellect and will; whereas the latter think of it as having two "faculties," intellect and will. Garrigou-Lagrange has explained in a brief passage the fundamental difference between the two positions:

Saint Thomas explains it well --I, q. 79, a. 7-- for he says that the faculties are specified by their formal object, and there is no difference of formal object between the intelligence (specified by intelligible being or the true) and intellectual memory, which preserves ideas and judgments.

St. Thomas poses as an objection in this article (1st objection) that St. Augustine (De Trinitate X, 10 and 11) says: "Within the spirit there is memory, intelligence and will," and thereby seems to distinguish among them. Then he responds that St. Augustine, as it is indicated in De Trinitate XIV, 7, understood by memory the spirit conserving habitually its recollections, by intelligence the act of intellec-
tion, and by will the act of volition. In other words, St. Augustine assumed the descriptive viewpoint of experimental psychology, or of introspection (and it is thus that St. John of the Cross continues to speak), while St. Thomas, as a metaphysician, assumes the ontological point of view, and distinguishes among the faculties according to their formal object; now there is no such distinction between the intelligence and the intellectual memory. 16

The trinitarian character of man's soul is an image of the divine Persons, and by the progressive perfecting of the image man draws closer to God. Saint John of the Cross tells us that God created man in his image so that the latter could come to be "transformed in the three Persons." 17 The powers, "with the wretchedness of their base operation and natural capacities are fallen and low." 18 Advancement in virtue, however, elevates the powers to be ever purer and more perfect reflections of the divine Persons. A purified soul becomes "a most beautiful and perfect image of God." 19 The greater the likeness, the greater the proximity and union by grace, "and it was that she might come to this end that he created her in his image and likeness." 20

The reasons for maintaining the tripartite division of the powers are not exclusively Biblical nor strictly theological. As indicated above by Garrigou-Lagrange, the inclusion of the memory among the powers yields an understanding of the soul which is descriptive of its psychological activities. Jacques Maritain has made a similar analysis. He remarks that

It is known... that Saint John of the Cross uses constantly, as do the Franciscan authors who were habitually read by the Carmelites of the Reform, the Augustinian division of the superior faculties into intellect, memory, and will. In fact, from the point of view of speculative and ontological analysis, the bipartite division into intellect and will is the only one which conforms to the real. However, from the point of view of a practical analysis, which must distinguish the powers, not according to their essential ontological articulations, but according to the principal concrete modes of activity of the subject with respect to his ends, it is the Augustinian division that is the right one; it is this one that conforms to reality, to that reality in question. From this point of view there is a need to distinguish the three principal functions of the subject taken in his living totality. Sometimes he turns towards objects in order to know them in themselves, and this activity will be the understanding... Sometimes the subject turns towards things inasmuch as he has chosen them and is to live by them, as they strike his interest, as they touch his personal experience, as they have some practical value for him, as they compose the web of that constantly growing past --which, as Bergson says, continually presses in upon the present in order to occupy it--, which is the activity of the memory... Sometimes the subject turns towards things in order to choose and love them, to move towards them, to allow them to become his interior weight, which is willing. 21
Man's Historical Condition and the Role of Memory

San Juan de la Cruz's understanding of memory deserves some attention in its own right. As abstracted from the other powers, the memory may be looked upon as being a retainer of images or information. Seen in its context, however, this power relates to the whole of man's past experience, and therefore to his orientation as an historical being. As insinuated by Maritain, this quality of the memory accounts for San Juan's inclusion of it among the rational powers. Various thinkers have pointed to Augustine as a probable source of Juan's understanding of memory. Laín Entralgo cites Augustine as stating that "there, in my memory, are all the things which I recall having experienced or believed." He comments that "the sight of his personal inner being presents itself immediately to the reflexive look of Saint Augustine as in-gens aula memoriae (Conf., X,8,14). Such a discovery is not surprising. Man is, therefore, that which he has been, and he can know that which he has been and continues to be inasmuch as he possesses the virtue he terms memory." In other words: "The I which Augustine is sees himself in his memory."22

The parallel between the thought of the early medieval speculator and the early modern one on this question is not hard to ascertain. Juan describes the memory as being like "an archive and receptacle of the intellect, in which all intelligible forms and images are received; and thus, it holds them within itself as it were in a mirror." All things experienced, whether personally or vicariously, are therein contained. Referring to the memory as an archive is in accord with Fray Juan's other description of the memory as an instrument of possession: possession of all those things experienced and learned, which means possession of ourselves, for we know ourselves only in and through our historical experiences.23

It should also be pointed out that for Juan de la Cruz the memory allows man to act as a temporal, historical being. This notion may also be expressed by stating that the memory gives man his unique position midway between purely corporeal beings and purely spiritual ones, in that for the first there is nothing but sheer flux and discontinuity, and for the second all things intellected are timelessly present. San Juan succinctly states that the memory is the power "through which the soul operates in time." By this phrase, we may understand that memory gives the element of duration or continuity to that which would be otherwise a sheer succession of events. On the other hand, that which would be known timelessly if we were pure intellects is known temporally, that is to say successively, with an admixture of potency and act.

Thus, if we understand by time that junction where succession and duration meet, we may correctly say that it is by the operation of the memory that man functions as a temporal or historical being. Or as Laín Entralgo has put it, memory is that power "in which the temporality of human existence becomes primarily manifested." Regarding this aspect of the memory, there is again some relationship between Juan and Augustine, his predecessor in the mystical tradition, for whom "memory is, above all, the mirror and the testimony of our human temporality." However, the link between duration and memory, as well as the emphasis upon memory as retainer andpreserver of the unbroken and self-accumulating experience of the human subject, have also been noted and expounded within modern philosophy.29

In San Juan de la Cruz the memory ties man's past and present into an experiential unity. Thus it is that Ruiz Salvador can remark that according to our author "the memory is the totalizing power of our existence, which as a whole rejoins the temporal instant, conferring upon it a density that is properly human." We can further say that the unity formed by the
intellect and the "totalizing power," the memory, can be looked upon as constituting the whole personality, the psyche or the ego, all levels of consciousness included. It is within the framework of this complex structure that the power of the will performs its activity, although the free choices it performs cannot be said to be reducible to it.

It is also to be kept in mind that within the Sanjuanist framework, as the memory sets man within the dimension of the temporal, it thereby constrains him to orient himself towards his future and to make judgments and choices in terms of his past as remembered, referring constantly that-which-is-to-be to that-which-has-been. The past as lived represents the foundation for the configurations which we project into the future. Given the preceding, it is easier to see why within the mystical tradition the memory is correlated with the eternal Father, who is the source, container, as well as the end of all things. If symbolically the memory is related to God the Father, from a psychological point of view its functions are to retain sensible images, to temporalize, to carry the past as living into the present, to "totalize" or unify human experience and to establish a horizon for future possibilities.

We are now in a position to better appreciate why Juan de la Cruz, a practitioner of things of the soul, not only includes the memory among the rational powers but also devotes great attention to its role in psychological processes. It is important to realize at the same time that San Juan considers the powers to be characterized by a definite elasticity or flexibility. He tells us that the powers are "as profound as they are capable of receiving great blessings." Their perfection, in turn, consists in the performance by the soul of the most perfect and noble acts, "which will be when all its strength it understands, loves and enjoys God."

In relating Juan de la Cruz to his predecessors in the mystical tradition, we may summarize by saying that the elements he shares with them are: (1) primacy of divine revelation; (2) practicality of concern; (3) imagery derived from both Biblical and Platonic sources. The Scriptural basis is the most important element in the thought of Juan of the Cross. It is divine revelation that allows his mystical theology and lived experience to be, in pure Johanine and Pauline fashion, Christocentric, incarnational, sacramental and trinitarian. It is the doctrine of the Trinity of divine Persons, in conjunction with that of man being created in God's image, that furnishes the model for the structure of the human soul. As an Augustine, Anselm or Bonaventure, San Juan is secure in reasoning from premises given by faith. Regarding the Platonic imagery, it is fundamental to realize that the symbols and concepts are not utilized as in their original sources, but are adapted to communicate Christian doctrine.

The objective of Juan de la Cruz's written work is eminently practical as distinguished from purely speculative. He wishes to lead the soul along the path of moral and spiritual perfection, that it may increase in grace and perfect the image of God it bears in itself, and thus return to the source and exemplar. "With this Juan enters the whole Augustinian tradition: ...our heart is restless until it rests in you..." It is his practicality of concern that leads him to dwell upon the power of memory, understood as a psychological constituent which gathers and portrays man's existence in his historical condition.

San Juan de la Cruz, though, was to carry the science of spirituality to unprecedented heights. His method is to employ principles known by faith, as numerous writers within the mystical tradition, and to simultaneously apply principles known by reason alone. Juan de la Cruz should not be thought of as the first to employ simultaneously these two methodologies. His original mark, however, lies in the particular application of this double methodology to mystical questions. This uniqueness is manifested in his procedure of describing the progressing actualization of the spiritual life within man. His presentation focuses upon spiritual expe-
riences in terms of human nature and human psychological operations. Yet, he easily shifts to another mode of consideration when describing the same phenomena as the actual working of the supernatural within the natural. We shall examine throughout the following chapters this unique analysis of mystical experiences. For the time being, suffice it to say that San Juan's doctrine is not only logically consistent as well as in harmony with Christian faith. It also has a solid metaphysical and epistemological basis. Further, his expositions of mystical phenomena are in accord with human nature and human psychological operations as we know they by reflection upon experience.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II


3. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I,1,8 ad 2. "...argumentari ex auctoritate est maxime proprium huius doctrinae [i.e. sacra doctrina]: eo quod principia huius doctrinae per revelationem habentur, et sic oportet quod auctoritati auctoritati eorum quibus revelatio facta est. Nec hoc derogat dignitati huius doctrinae: nam licet locus ab auctoritate quaie fundatur super ratione humana, sit infirmissimus..." The priority given to faith by Juan de la Cruz over any other form of knowledge is evident in passages such as the following: "para decir algo desta noche oscura, no fiaré ni de experiencia ni de scienza, porque lo uno y lo otro puede faltar y engañar; mas, no dejándome de ayudar en lo que pudiere destas dos cosas, aprovecharme he para todo lo que con el favor divino hubiere de decir --a lo menos para lo más importante y oscuro de entender-- de la divina Escritura, por la cual guiándonos no podemos errar, pues que el que en ella habla es el Espíritu Santo." *S*, Prologue, 2. Similar passages are to be found in *C*, Prologue, 4 and *L*, Prologue.


Studies which relate San Juan to Saint Bonaventure and later members of the Franciscan school are: Ignacio Omaechevarría, O.F.M., "Teología mística de San Buenaventura," in *Obras de San Buenaventura*, vol. 4, 2nd edition (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1963), pp. 3-85; Basilio de Rubí, O.F.M. Cap., "Mística sanjuanista y sus relaciones con la escuela franciscana," *Estudios franciscanos* 52(1951)77-95; J. H. Probst, "Le B. Ramon Lull:


7. "Hay que advertir que aún no se han hecho estudios serios acerca de la influencia, directa o indirecta, de San Buenaventura sobre nuestros grandes místicos. Interesaría explicar no sólo la dependencia de un Fr. Francisco de Osuna, San Pedro de Alcántara o Fr. Juan de los Ángeles, sino las coincidencias de vocabulario y de doctrina que se notan, por ejemplo, hasta en San Juan de la Cruz. Así, mística sabiduría, para significar la contemplación infusa, equivale a la mystica sapientia del Itinerarium, c. 7, n. 4; sentido, en contraposición a espíritu, no refiriéndose sólo a los sentidos corporales, equivale al sensus del Santo en cuanto se contrapone a spiritus y mens en el Itin. c. 1, n. 4 y otros lugares; sentimientos espirituales parece corresponder a los sensus spirituales... noche, noche oscura corresponde a caligo, ten­ebra, o, mejor aún, a nox... en Brevil., p. 5, c. 5, n. 7..." Ignacio Omaechevarría, op. cit., p. 9, note 4.

8. The source of both doctrines may be found in the following text of John the Evangelist, who uses exclusively the term agape for love: "for God is charity. By this hath the charity of God appeared towards us, because God hath sent his only begotten Son into the world, that we may live by him. In this is charity; not as though we had loved God, but because he hath first loved us.... God is charity; and he that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him." 1 John 4:8-10 and 16. It is true that certain early Eastern Christian speculators, heavily influenced by Platonic concepts, found it acceptable for God to be called eros. However, even these thinkers acknowledged that the term agape applies to God as well. Such is the case of Dionysius the Areopagite, who applies both terms to God in The Divine Names, chapter IV. Agape is translated into English as love and eros as yearning. Similarly, Origin states that both terms are applicable to God. See Charles Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1886), p. 188.

In general, eros designates a love for self-fulfillment or self-actualization. It is often translated as desire, and connotes a concern for the self to the exclusion of others.
Agape, on the other hand, has been used since the early days of philosophy to designate the love of friendship, that is, a love which implies concern and generosity towards others for their own sake. It is true that God loves himself. However, eros in itself leaves no room for bountifulness, for generosity, for grace. Thus, agape is better said of God than eros. Such has been the opinion of the greatest theologians and speculators of mysticism in the history of Christianity. Following directly in the footsteps of the Evangelist, Augustine, Bernard, Bonaventure and numerous others have utilized the term caritas, the Latin equivalent of agape, when referring to God's nature or to his love for creatures. It is pointed out that "in his theological and exegetical works which were destined for the Christians, Augustine was wont to express this concept predominantly by the term charity. In his apologetic and philosophical treatise, the City of God, he uses the secular word love because the work was intended for a non-Christian political society of the day. The philosophy and theology of Augustine's conception of love are the same... It merely differs in manner of expression." Stanislaus Grabowski, The Church: An Introduction to the Theology of St. Augustine (London-St. Louis: B. Herder, 1957), p. 492. Further, the concept of God as charity is central to the theology of one of the authors esteemed by Juan de la Cruz, St. Bernard of Clairvaux. San Juan inherits, thus, a long and rich tradition on this subject. Also, it is probable that he was aware that: "En attribuant à Dieu l'amour, nous ne devons d'ailleurs pas l'imager comme affecté d'une passion, ou tendance, qui se distinguera de sa volonté et l'afferchterait lui-même.... Il ne se faut pas se représenter la bonté des choses comme provoquant Dieu à les aimer. Leur bonté, c'est lui qui l'infuse en elles et qui la crée. Aimer ses créatures, c'est toujours pour Dieu s'aimer lui-même, de l'acte simple dont il se veut et qui est identique à son exister." Etienne Gilson, Le thomisme, pp. 138-139. Gilson adverts to Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, 1,20,2. One may also consult on the matter, A. Hilary Armstrong, "Platonic eros and Christian agape," The Downside Review 79(1961)105-121.

There is no reason to think that Juan de la Cruz understood God in terms of the Plotinian doctrine of eros, which would make of God no more than a blind and impersonal nature seeking to maintain its own perfection. Nevertheless, such an interpretation is found in Eugene A. Maio, St. John of the Cross: The Imagery of Eros, Plaza Mayor Scholar (Madrid: Editorial Playor, 1973), pp. 225 and 271.


10. Etienne Gilson says of Dionysius the Areopagite that his "view of the world emanating from God and flowing back to its source will become the common property of all the Christian theologians. The doctrine of Denis called for many precisions and corrections or, rather, for a reinterpretation in terms of a metaphysics of being; yet, such as it was, it has provided Christian thinkers with a general framework within which their interpretation of the world could easily take place.... Among his followers, some will embrace his Platonism with enthusiasm; others will strive to tone it down and to make it more acceptable to Latin minds." With respect to Eckhart, Tauler and Ruysbroeck, one must not "imagine these speculatives as Platonic philosophers in monastic garb. They were Christians who, especially preoccupied with supernatural contemplation, naturally found in Platonism a language and an intellectual technique better adapted to their needs than those of Aristotle's empiricism." History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 85 and 444.

Despite a statement such as this one, there are those who would not only consider Tauler and Ruysbroeck but also Juan de la Cruz as "Platonic philosophers in monastic garb," and would further consider Juan to be even more Platonic than the Pseudo-Areopagite. Such is the view espoused by Eugene A. Maio in St. John of the Cross: The Imagery of Eros. (See above, note 8.) This author begins with premises that cannot be substantiated historically such as: "Platonism was the prevailing philosophic outlook when John of the Cross was studying at
Medina del Campo and Salamanca" (p. 39). He thus concludes that "John of the Cross will lean heavily on the Plotinian doctrine of Eros salvation" (p. 52). "As John of the Cross describes the path up Mount Carmel to the summit of perfection, a polarity is set up between the nothingness of the soul and the plenitude of God. The intermediary between the two extremes in this state of polarization is desire. In John of the Cross the progenitors of desire are Nothing and All (Nada-Todo).... First there is the movement towards the base of the axiological scale, nothingness. The soul must desire to be nothing in order to come to possess all. Secondly, there is the movement of desire toward the summit of the scale, plenitude" (p. 60). Maio does not offer a reasonable explanation for how a human being who has disavowed his nature to the point of becoming "nothingness" can generate the power to move upwards towards the possession of a desired object. And yet he insists that it is exclusively *eros* that impels the soul in this movement towards possession of the All. The doctrine of the Redemption through grace merited for us by Christ makes no appearance in Maio's interpretation of Juan de la Cruz. If Maio were correct in his interpretation, he would also be correct in his assertion that the mysticism of San Juan stands in opposition to true Christian doctrine (p. 260). Much to the contrary, though, the doctrine of grace as a participation in the nature of God, God's *agape*, is foundational in the thought of San Juan. See, for example C,31,8, where he quotes 1 John 4:10: "In this is charity; not as though we had loved God, but because he hath first loved us." One of Maio's fundamental misconceptions is that *eros* and *agape* are incompatible and cannot subsist in one same subject. This understanding may have been assimilated from Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, translated by Philip S. Watson, 2nd edition (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), upon whom Maio relies heavily for his interpretation of Juan de la Cruz. Nygren severs sharply *eros* and *agape*, thus placing nature and grace in dialectical opposition. For an understanding of this issue which is in harmony with the thought of Juan de la Cruz, see St. Bernard's *De Diligendo Deo*, VIII-XV, wherein the relationship between the lower and higher loves is discussed, and how the latter perfect the former without replacing them.


There are, nevertheless, certain parallels between Plotinus and John of the Cross, notably the fact that both understand mystical experience in terms of intentionality, or immanent acts of the human soul. As A. H. Armstrong explains, this phenomenon in Plotinus is based upon Aristotelian psychology, in which the mind becomes what it thinks. See *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), p. 40; and E. Wilhelmsen, "Plotinus and St. John of the Cross: Concurrencyes and Divergencies," *Saints, Sovereigns and Scholars*, edited by Robert Herrera and James Lehrberger (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), pp. 179-192.


13. St. Bonaventure tells us that the Holy Trinity is source, exemplar and end of all good things, in Soliloquium, Prologue, 1, and that irrational creatures bear a "vestigium Creatoris." Ibid., 1,7. Within his view of the world, "todo lo que sea o tenga idea de fontalidad, primacia, eficiencia, causalidad, origen, es un vestigio del Padre. Toda procedencia, generación, conocimiento, ejemplaridad, [del] Hijo; toda finalidad, complementación, amor, bondad, plenitud, nexo, [del] Espíritu Santo." Olegario González, Misterio trinitario y existencia humana (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1966), p. 569. Although the theme of the trinitarian image in creatures is emphasized most fully by members of the Augustinian school, we may note that it also appears in Thomas Aquinas. For instance, see De Potentia, 9,9, res.

14. "...les trois puissances constitutives de l'âme, mémoire, intellect et volonté, correspondent, par leur nombre même, aux trois personnes divines; et cette correspondance s'étend d'ailleurs plus loin, car il ne suffit pas de dire qu'il existe en l'homme trois puissances spirituelles comme il existe en Dieu trois personnes divines, il faut dire encore que ces trois puissances de l'âme, entées sur l'unité de l'âme à laquelle elles appartiennent, reproduisent un plan interne dont l'essence divine fournit le modèle. En Dieu, unité d'essence et distinction des personnes; en l'homme, unité d'essence et distinction des actes. Bien mieux encore, il y a correspondance exacte entre l'ordre et les relations reciproques des éléments dont ces deux trinités sont constituées. De même que le Père engendre la connaissance éternelle du Verbe qui l'exprime, et que le Verbe à son tour se relie au Père par l'Esprit, de même la mémoire ou pensée, grosse des idées qu'elle enferme, engendre la connaissance de l'intellect ou verbe, et l'amour naît de l'un et de l'autre comme le lien qui les unit. Or ce n'est pas d'une correspondance accidentelle qu'il s'agit ici; la structure de la Trinité créatrice conditionne et par conséquent explique la structure de l'âme humaine..." Gilson, La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure, 2nd edition (Paris: Librairie J. Vrin, 1978), p. 180. For references, see above, note 12. Augustine's trinitarian psychology and its consequences in the realm of mysticism are discussed at length by A. Gardeil, La structure de l'âme et l'experience mystique, 2nd edition, 2 vols. (Paris: Victor Lecoffre, 1927), particularly in vol. 1. There are numerous others who consider the image of the Trinity to be thus present in man, including St. Bernard of Clairvaux (Sermons Super Canonica Cantorum, Sermon XI,5); William of Saint-Thierry (De Natura et Dignitate Amoris, II,3); St. Bonaventure (Soliloquium, I,3); and St. Catherine of Siena (La dottrina del ponte, 79). For a development of this theme in Bernard and William of Saint-Thierry, see Gilson's La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure; and Olegario González, Misterio trinitario y existencia humana.
The matter is approached somewhat differently by Aquinas, who considers the human soul to have two rational faculties, intellect and will. He finds an image of God in the operation of these faculties. After considering the vestigial similitude of creatures to the Trinity, "quod representat pedem sicut effectus causam," he turns to consider the more perfect image of the Trinity found in the activities of knowing and loving exercised by rational creatures. This higher likeness he establishes is "secundum eamdem rationem operationis; et sic represetatur in creature rationali tantum, quae potest se intelligere et amare, sicut et Deus, et sic verbum et amorem sui producere, et haec dicitur similitudo naturalis imaginis..." De Potentia, 9,9, res. Thus, aside from the more elementary trinitarian vestiges borne by all creatures, "in intellectualibus substantiis, quae sunt nobilissimae creaturae, est etiam processio secundum operationem intellectus et voluntatis; et quantum ad hoc invenitur in eis increatae Trinitatis imago." Ibid., 10,1, ad 5. St. Thomas finds a Scriptural basis for the first similitude in Job XI,7: "Forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes?" For the second, he notes Genesis I,26: "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram." We shall consider the third mode of similitude, "per unitatem obiecti," in chapter V, note 65. There we consider the similitude found in the rational creature's knowing and loving God in a manner "quae in solis sanctis inventur qui idem intelligunt et amant quod Deus." Concerning this highest similitude, Thomas turns to II Corinthians, III,18: "Nos enim omnes revelata facie gloriam Domini speculantes, in eamdem imaginem transformatur." It is this which is called the imago recreationis. De Potentia, 9,9, res.

15. There are numerous passages in which San Juan deals with the three powers, memory, intellect and will. See, namely: SI,8,2; SI,9,6; SII,4,8; SII,5,1; SII,6; SII,7,1; SII,14,6; SII,1,1; SII,2,14; SII,3,6; NI,9,7; NII,3,3; NII,4,1; NII,21,11; C,2,6-7; C,16,10; C,18,5; C,20-21, 4 and 8; C,26,8; C,27,7; C,28,3,5 and 8; C35,5; L,1,17; L,2,33-34; L,3,18,29,41 and 68. Not only is this tripartite division maintained throughout his works, but it is also central to his thought, as he teaches that communion with God is achieved by the purification and perfection of these same three powers.

The following remark on San Juan's terminology is worth remembering: "Le mot potencias a deux sens differents. Au sens large, ce sont toutes les forces de l'homme aussi bien sensitives que spirituelles (S II 14 6), qui appartiennent aux deux parties (porciones) de l'ame: la partie inferieure et sensitive, la partie superieure et spirituelle (N II 24 1-2); autrement dit, le sens et l'esprit (S Prologue 6) ou encore la sensualite (sensualidad N I 4 2) et la partie rationnelle (C 16 10). Dans un sens plus strict, potencias designe les trois puissances de l'esprit: entendement, memoire, volonté. On trouve generalement potencias del alma, mais aussi potencias espirituales, et encore «les puissances de la partie superieure» (N II 25 3), ou tout simplement «les trois puissances» (NII 21 11, C 2 6-7), et meme tres frequemment «les puissances» S III 2 1)." Andre Bord, Memoire et esperance chez Jean de la Croix, Biblioteque de Spiritualite (Paris: Beauchesne, 1971), pp. 71-72.

16. "Saint Thomas l'explique bien, 1a, q. 79, a. 7, car, dit-il, les facultes sont spéci­fiées par leur objet formel, et il n'y a pas de difference d'objet formel pour l'intelligence (spé­cifiée par l'etre intelligible ou le vrai) et la memoire intellectuelle qui conserve les idees et les jugements. Saint Thomas s'objecte en cet article (1a objectio) que saint Augustin (De Trinitate, 1. X, ch. x et xi) dit: «Il y a dans l'esprit la memoire, l'intelligence et la volonté», et par la semble les distinguer. Puis il res pond que saint Augustin, comme il est indique De Trinitate, 1. XIV, ch. vii, entendait par memoire l'esprit conservant habituellement ses souvenirs, par in­telligence l'acte d'intellection, et par volonté l'acte de vouloir. En d'autres termes saint Augus­tin se plaçait au point de vue descriptif de la psychologie experimentale, ou de l'introspection (c'est ainsii que parle en saint Jean de la Croix), tandis que saint Thomas, comme metaphysicien, se place au point de vue ontologique, de la distinction reelle des facultes selon leur objet
formel; or une telle distinction n'existe pas entre l'intelligence et la mémoire intellectuelle."

Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., Les trois âges de la vie intérieure, 2 vols. (Paris: Les Edition du Cerf, 1938), 1:468, note 3. The text of Aquinas cited by Garrigou-Lagrange, *Summa Theologiae*, 1,79,7, is worth reading in its entirety. André Bord discusses what might be the sources of Juan de la Cruz's tripartite division of the powers. Op. cit., pp. 291-299. Tracing this understanding of the structure of the soul from Augustine through the *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard to John Baconthorp, Bord concludes that "il est évident que Jean de la Croix a emprunté directement ou indirectement cette division de l'âme à l'aigle d'Hippone" (p. 299). However, it is likely that Juan de la Cruz was also exposed to Aquinas' faculty psychology. One can reasonably assume that he reflected upon both analyses of the soul and in time elected the one best suited for his purposes.

17. "...transformada en las tres Personas." C, 39, 4.

18. "...con la miseria de su baja operación y caudal natural están caídas y bajas." C,32, 8.

19. "...hermosísima y acabada imagen de Dios." SI, 9,1.

20. "...y para que pudiera venir a esto la crió a su imagen y semejanza." C, 39, 4. Regarding the use of feminine pronouns to refer to the soul, it might be opportune to point out that there is a long tradition among mystics of considering that the relationship between God and the soul can be conceptualized in terms of the human relationship between man and woman. Thus in the treatises the soul is often portrayed as a female who stands to God as woman does to man. The expression of this conceptualization is greatly facilitated, and rendered quite natural, by the fact that in Latin and the Romance languages the word for soul, *anima* and its vernacular derivatives, is grammatically feminine. For this reason, when translating John of the Cross it is textually literal to use exclusively feminine pronouns when referring to the soul, i. e., she, her, hers. As this is somewhat jarring in English, however, we use the neuter *it* and *its* most of the time, reserving the feminine pronouns for texts from the *Cántico* and the *Llama*, works which are exaltedly poetic in tone throughout.

21. "On sait... que saint Jean de la Croix use constamment, comme les auteurs franciscains dont la lecture était habituelle chez les Carmes de la Réforme, de la division augustinienne des facultés supérieures en entendement, mémoire et volonté. Et en fait, si au point de vue de l'analyse spéculative et ontologique la division bi-partite, en intelligence et volonté, est seule conforme au réel, --au point de vue d'une analyse pratique, qui doit distinguer les puissances, non pas selon leurs articulations ontologiques essentielles, mais selon les principaux modes concrets d'activité du sujet par rapport à ses fins, c'est la division augustinienne qui est la bonne, c'est elle qui est conforme à la réalité, à cette réalité-là."

"A ce point de vue il y a bien lieu de distinguer trois fonctions principales du sujet pris dans sa totalité vivante, tantôt il se tourne vers les objets pour les connaître en eux-mêmes, ce sera l'entendement... tantôt le sujet se tourne vers les choses en tant même qu'il les a vécues et les vivra, qu'elles l'intéressent, qu'elles touchent à son expérience personnelle, qu'elles ont pour lui valeur pratique, qu'elles composent la trame de ce passé sans cesse grossissant qui, comme dit M. Bergson, fait constamment pression sur le présent pour l'occuper, ce sera la mémoire.... Tantôt le sujet se tourne vers les choses pour les désirer et les aimer, et se mouvoir vers elles, elles deviennent son poids intérieur, c'est la volonté." Maritain, *Les degrés du savoir*, pp. 655-656.

A veritable controversy has been waged over whether San Juan considers the memory to be "truly" distinct from the intellect, that is, whether it is a power of the soul in its own
right. Crisórgono states that our thinker "se aparta aquí decididamente santo Tomás y aun de todos los escolásticos para proclamar la memoria como una potencia realmente distinta del entendimiento." San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica..., 1:79ff. The same view is reiterated in his "Introducción al estudio de la filosofía en el misticismo de San Juan de la Cruz," pp. 239-240. A commentator who holds a similar view is Alberto de la Virgen del Carmen, O.C.D., "Naturaleza de la memoria espiritual según San Juan de la Cruz," Revista de espiritualidad 11(1952)291-299 and 12(1953)431-450; as well as André Bord, op. cit., pp. 291-305. On the other hand, Marcelo del Niño Jesús has upheld the fundamental accord between the Sanjuanist and the Thomistic analyses of the soul. He points out, in the first place, that there is no text in our mystical author which asserts a distinción real between the intellect and the memory. We have not found any such text either. Marcelo also brings to light that people commonly speak of the memory as though it were a faculty or power of the soul; and that this is done by persons ranging from the least educated to the most erudite, including philosophers and theologians. There is thus a broad sense in which the term faculty or power is used to designate "toda propiedad que dimana de la esencia del alma," which would include retentive capacities (op. cit., p. 123); and a stricter one with reference to ontological characteristics such as formal object and whether the power be or not be ordained to operation. Cf. ibid., pp. 112-124. The English terms power and faculty seem to correspond respectively to these two conceptualizations. For this reason, we use the former when expounding John of the Cross' views on memory.

We again refer the reader to the texts cited above on pages 20-21 of this chapter by Garrigou-Lagrange and Jacques Maritain, in which the issue seems to be sufficiently resolved in brief form. As indicated in the passage by Garrigou-Lagrange, Aquinas reveals in 1,79,7 that he was conscious of the Augustinian tripartite division. It is significant that the Common Doctor considers Augustine's interpretation to be legitimate, and not irreconcilable with his own faculty psychology. I have examined the issue in greater detail in "La memoria como potencia del alma en San Juan de la Cruz," Carmelus 37(1990)88-145.


23. "...el espectáculo de su personal intimidad se presenta inmediatamente a la mirada reflexiva de San Agustín como ingens aula memoriae (Conf., X,8,14). No es de extrañar tal hallazgo. El hombre es, pues, lo que ha sido, y eso que ha sido y sigue siendo puede saberlo en cuanto posee la virtud por él llamada memoria." Thus: "El yo del hombre Agustín se ve a sí mismo en la memoria." Ibid., pp. 60 and 62. The parallels between Augustine and Juan de la Cruz on the understanding of the memory are discussed by Bord, op. cit., pp. 76-98. Also, by Lain Entralgo, op. cit., part I, chapter IV, "Memoria y esperanza: San Juan de la Cruz," pp. 115-131.

24. "...un archivo y receptáculo del entendimiento, en que se reciben todas las formas y imágenes inteligibles, y así, como si fuese un espejo, las tiene en sí." SII, 16, 2.

25. Texts which refer to the memory as possessing are, among others: SIII,2,3; SIII,7, 1-2; SIII,II,1; SIII,15,1; L,2,34; L,3,21. The concept of memory has in Fray Juan "un primer sentido de memoria imaginativa que conserva y guarda imágenes sensibles para ser utilizadas por el entendimiento.... Pero la memoria tiene también un sentido más profundo: es el matiz de posesión que da razón de su acercamiento al concepto de la esperanza... El análisis de este concepto sanjuanista, que acerca la memoria a la idea de posesión, nos abre camino para una
interesante profundización ontológica: El tener imágenes en la memoria es necesario para que el entendimiento pueda llevar a cabo la inmediata síntesis de la intuición. Si la intuición es un trascender la inmediata acumulación de imágenes o estímulos hasta la unidad profunda de lo real, este *trascender* nos lleva más allá del momento actual, del instante temporal. He aquí una primera aproximación al descubrimiento de este matiz profundo de la memoria: la memoria, integrándonos, nos da la posesión de nuestro ser en el mundo, de nuestra vida; *poseer en la memoria* es tener a nuestra disposición una verdad, es decir, una experiencia de la realidad. Pero tener poseída, guardada y a disposición una experiencia de la realidad es tener algo nuestro, de nuestro ser vivido, en nuestra mano, en mano de nuestro ser de hoy. La memoria, por tanto, antes y más hondamente que *poseer* cosas del mundo, imágenes, formas, etc., es poseernos a nosotros mismos." Fernando Urbina, *La persona humana en San Juan de la Cruz* (Madrid: Instituto Social Leon XIII, 1956), pp. 220-221.

26. "...por donde el alma obra en tiempo..." SII,14,11.

27. "...en que primariamente se patentiza la temporeidad de la existencia humana.... Su operación nos permite vivir el tiempo, más aun, nos obliga a vivirlo." Op. cit., p. 125. "Comme faculte de rappel, comme désir de tout posséder, la mémoire est, en réalité, effort pour totaliser le temps dans le présent. Non seulement elle est reconnaissance du passé comme passé, reconstruction du passé, elle est de plus anticipation de l’avenir: «J’appelle connaissances naturelles de la mémoire toutes celles qui se gravent dans cette puissance au moyen des objets perçus par les cinq sens corporels... ainsi que toutes les connaissances analogues à celles-là, qu’elle a le pouvoir de former et d’inventer». (III 2 4) Elle désire tout posséder de ses richesses passées et tout posséder des richesses que par l’imagination elle est capable de se représenter. Dans ces conditions, il semble bien que la mémoire soit pour saint Jean de la Croix la faculté du temps. Elle est souvenir et espoir, projet de thésaurisation et du passé et de l’avenir dans le présent..." Sanson, op. cit., p. 243.

28. "...la memoria es, ante todo, el espejo y el testimonio de nuestra humana temporeidad." Laín Entralgo, *op. cit.*, p. 60. We might further note that the role and powers of the memory are more extensive in Augustine’s thought than in San Juan’s. Within the former’s understanding, memory is "la faculté de retrouver à tout moment en soi la présence latente de Dieu, particulièrement sa puissance et sa bonté. [Cette mémoire]...exprime simplement le fait, pour parler encore comme saint Augustine, que Dieu est toujours avec nous, même si nous ne sommes pas toujours avec lui. Il y a donc, au sommet de la pensée, un point secret où réside le souvenir latent de sa bonté et de sa puissance; là aussi est en nous le trait le plus profondément gravé de son image, celui qui va évoquer les autres et achever de nous rendre semblables à lui. En Dieu, le Père engendre le Fils, et le Saint-Esprit procède de l’un et de l’autre. De même, en nous immédiatement et sans aucun intervalle de temps, la mémoire engendre la raison, et la volonté procède de l’une et de l’autre. La mémoire possède et contient en soi le terme où l’homme doit tendre; la raison connaît aussitôt qu’il faut y tendre; la volonté y tend, et ces trois facultés sont une sorte d’unité, mais trois efficaces, de même que, dans la Trinité divine, il y a une substance mais trois personnes." Etienne Gilson, *La théologie mystique de Saint Bernard*, p. 222. In San Juan’s understanding the memory does not contain any innate or transtemporal recollections. The contents of memory are for him strictly temporal, acquired by the subject since birth through the channels of sensation. However, this *has-been* temporal existence as retained continues to be man’s means of reference to his ultimate as well as his immediate destiny. For the Spanish saint, "la memoria, en suma, expresa y testimonio la índole a la vez tempórea y supratempórea de la realidad humana." Laín Entralgo, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
An historian of philosophy, James Collins, states that "Bergson uses the famous metaphor of a rolling snowball, to convey the unbroken growth and self-accumulating process of the duration of the self. Our temporal experience moves along under its own impetus, gathering particular states to itself, preserving them in a single whole, and moving forward with the ever increasing weight of the past. The enduring self is nothing distinct from this rolling snowball but is precisely the forward-going movement, inclusive of all its past accretions, its present consistency, and its hurling march toward the future." Thus, "duration is the continuous life of a memory prolonging the past into the present." A History of Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1954), pp. 823 and 825. For a detailed critique of Bergson's understanding of the relationship between self, memory and duration, see ibid., pp. 827 and 830.

30. "...la memoria es la potencia totalizadora de la existencia, que acude entera y revierte sobre el instante, confiriéndole un espesor propiamente humano." op. cit., p. 468. In this there may be found once more a correlation between Juan and Augustine. "A la vez que patentiza la temporeidad del hombre, la memoria, observa ya San Agustín, testimonia la totalidad del ser humano." Lain Entralgo, op. cit., p. 60.

31. With respect to the power of the memory, Bord states that, "sa capacité se dilate et tend à l'infini, vers la possession de Dieu." Op. cit., p. 98. "Lo que califica también al ser humano es cierta profunda elasticidad, por la que pueden crearse diversos centros, unos más interiores que otros.... El agudo analista [San Juan de la Cruz] descubre diversos estratos de que es capaz la interioridad del espíritu. Este no es un ser inerte y atenido en una forma, sino ante todo capacidad y elasticidad maravillosa." Capánaga, op. cit., pp. 292-293. "Profundamente señala San Juan de la Cruz la capacidad del espíritu, comuno de los rasgos esenciales y signos de grandeza. Ya San Agustín había considerado su capacidad de Dios, el ser capax Dei, el ser receptáculo de Dios, como el sello auténtico y peculiar de su magnitud." Ibid., pp. 190-191.

32. "...son tan profundas cuanto de grandes bienes son capaces." L,3,18. In the Llama, our author speaks of "la virtud y fuerza que tiene la sustancia de el alma para sentir y gozar los objetos de las potencias espirituales con que gusta la sabiduría y amor y comunicación de Dios." L,3,69.

33. "...que será cuando con todas sus fuerzas entienda, ame y goce a Dios." L,1,12.

CHAPTER III

THE TWILIGHT, OR COGNITION THROUGH CREATURES

Three Modes of Knowledge

In the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology Dionysius the Areopagite presents three ways in which man may know God: the "way of affirmation," the "way of negation" and the "way of transcending affirmation and negation." The first type of knowledge consists of affirmative judgments or positive concepts. Dionysius' Divine Names is an instance of this affirmative theology, as it is a commentary on the names or attributes given to God in Scripture. Here, Denis discusses in what senses terms such as life, light, truth, goodness, and lord can be predicated of God. The reflection is carried out within the framework of a participationist understanding of creation, in which all things bear some similarity to their prototype or exemplar, which is God. Given this resemblance, knowledge of created things can offer a remote understanding of the nature of God.

The second and third ways of knowing are dealt with in the Mystical Theology. In the "way of negation," as an acknowledgment that God is beyond whatever concept the intellect can formulate or whatever image the imagination can form, one must abandon all sensation and all intellectual activities, all that is sensed and intelligible.1 In the third "way" or "superlative theology", both affirmations and negations are crossed out, as the divine Being is beyond all affirmations by being the all-complete and single cause of all. It is at once beyond all negation: the preeminence of that absolutely absolved from all and beyond the whole.2 The divine nature, thus, is wholly beyond the grasp of human intellection. It is consequently wholly ineffable for those who have been united with it experientially, or mystically.3 One may resort, though, in this stage to stating that God is hyper-goodness, hyper-life, hyper-truth, so long as we keep in mind that we cannot grasp the significance of these attributes as applied to God.

This three-fold approach to the understanding of God has made its appearance in many speculators throughout the centuries. The three ways have been referred to as the via affirmationis, the via negationis and the via eminentiae.4 This doctrine of the three viae can be correlated with three progressive stages within the mystical ascent which appear in San Juan de la Cruz. These stages are in themselves different modes of knowing, which allow for three corresponding forms of loving or affectivity. We do not imply that the Sanjuanist schema can be traced exclusively to Dionysius. On the other contrary, Juan de la Cruz absorbed many sources and was, as well, an original thinker himself. Nor are we suggesting that there is a one to one correlation between the two doctrines. Dionysius deals mostly with conceptual knowledge, and only very timidly with mystical knowledge, the one which comes with presence and experiential union. Nevertheless, for the sake of exposition, we adopt here Dionysius' schema with its terminology of the viae and apply it to the various stages of the mystical ascent as explicated by the Spanish Carmelite.

In the thought of John of the Cross there appear three modes of human knowledge or consciousness. The first is a knowledge through creatures, that is, by means of human cogni-
tive, discursive or imaginative powers, and in terms of creatures. It may be compared to the via affirmationis. The second is a knowledge through faith, a knowledge in darkness, and may be considered a type of via negationis. The third, attained only at the highest stages of mystical experience and in the beatific vision, is knowledge through God's own act of intellection, and may be called in its own way a via eminentiae. These three modes of cognition bear some relation to the stages comprising the mystical ascent, the purgative, illuminative and unitive, without being identical to them. In the present and the following two chapters we shall explore from a philosophical and psychological standpoint the three modes of human knowledge presented by Juan de la Cruz.

In the titles of our chapters we have referred to the three modes of cognition respectively as the twilight, the night, and the dawn. We can be confident in our use of these metaphors, given that San Juan himself applies them to the subject in question. Further, as the three types of knowledge have been discussed by other thinkers, so have they been represented poetically by similar metaphors. The sixteenth-century mystic has a tradition behind him when he states that:

faith... is compared to midnight; and thus we can say that it is darker to the soul than the first night and, in a certain way, than the third. Because the first night, which is that of the sensible part of man [el sentido], is compared to the evening twilight, which is when sensible objects cease to be visible to the eye, and thus it is not so distantly removed from light as midnight. The third part, which is dawn and which precedes immediately the light of day, is not as dark as midnight, for it is close to the enlightenment and the informing effect of the light of day, which is God.

San Juan's text extends the symbolic complex to include a fourth type of knowing, that experienced in the beatific vision. As a veritable and incomparable enlightenment, it is compared to the bright light of day. Similarly, in another passage he states: "The day, which is God in beatitude, where it is daylight to the blessed angels and souls that are now day, communicates and pronounces to them the Word, which is his Son, that they may know and enjoy him."

The same symbols are used with similar meaning by mystics who precede San Juan by several centuries. Sometimes conjoined and sometimes isolated, the evening, the night, the dawn and midday make their appearance in Saint Bernard, Richard of Saint Victor and Saint Bonaventure. It is not surprising that they should also be present in Dante, one of the most excellent poets of the Christian ascent of the soul to God. In the Divine Comedy, the poet is led by Virgil through the shadowy spheres of the Inferno and the Purgatorio to obtain knowledge by the natural light of reason. Then Beatrice comes to his aid as an interpreter of divine revelation to lead him by way of knowledge of God to love of God. Her presence is at first too dazzling for the eye to behold, thus producing blindness, which later gives way to supernatural corporeal vision. Finally, in the Paradiso, amidst images of ever increasing luminosity, the mind is uplifted by states to a perfect and serene intuition of the things previously believed by faith.
The Ordinary Affirmative Way

San Juan de la Cruz deals with the first form of knowledge, the *via affirmationis*, in books I and II of the *Subida* and later in the *Cántico*. He does not pretend to be exhaustive on this subject, as his presentation is only a premise to his exposition of the higher noetic modes. His primary objective is to lead persons from their ordinary mode of cognition through the *via negationis* to the *via eminentiae*. As such, the main purpose in presenting what we have called the *via affirmationis* is to reveal the links between the point of departure, the means and the end of a process.

In book II of the *Subida* it is stated that:

- the intellect can receive knowledge and understanding by two channels: the one natural and the other supernatural. By natural channels we mean all that the intellect can understand, either by means of the corporeal senses, or by itself. The supernatural channel is all that is given to the intellect above and beyond its natural capacity and ability. 9

The Mystical Doctor develops both types further. He makes it quite clear that knowledge which is communicated supernaturally is immensely more perfect than ordinary knowledge. However, whether the communication be received through natural or supernatural channels, the act of understanding takes place by the activity of the natural cognitive powers of the created intellect. Supernaturally communicated knowledge, with the exception of the highest mode of mystical knowledge, is like ordinary knowledge in that it is of a particular object, is clear, distinct, can be retained in memory, and can be recalled and communicated to others inasmuch as apt words may be found to do so. Thus, in relating the ordinary to the extraordinary modes of cognition, Juan de la Cruz points to a continuity of acts experienced by the same subject, a continuity and a commonality stemming from the fact that all these noetic acts, however disparate, are performed by the activity of the subject's intellect. Related in this way, they may be considered jointly as an affirmative way of the knowing, a *via affirmationis*. However, this clear and positive way of knowing stands in contrast to the negative way of the dark night, in which the affirmative content is volitionally negated. It must also be distinguished from the passively infused knowledge of the highest stage of mystical union, which is unlike the others in that what is experienced is an "obscure and general act of knowledge." 10

Saint John of the Cross makes a careful outline of the types of "apprehensions and acts of knowledge which can fall within the intellect." 11 (See schemas, pp. 47-48.) As we have seen above, the first distinction made is between those apprehensions received by ordinary or natural means and those received supernaturally. The "natural apprehensions" (*aprehensiones naturales*) encompass all the acts which the human intellect can perform by its own natural power or light, including simple understanding, judgment and discursive reasoning. 12 The noetic acts of the same category are further classified according to whether the phantasm was obtained through the external or internal corporeal senses. 13 The external senses are enumerated in the traditional manner as sight, sound, smell, taste and touch. The internal senses are given as imagination and fantasy, although sometimes the memory is included among them as well. 14

Special attention is devoted by Juan de la Cruz to the internal senses on account of their prominent role and great efficacy in psychological processes. The difference between the two
is that whereas the imagination "reasons by imagining," the fantasy "forms the imagination, or that which is imagined, by fancying." In the former, thus, there is the presence of a discursive element which is absent in the latter. However, "for our purposes it is equivalent to treat the one as the other; for this reason, whenever we do not name them both, it should be understood that we are speaking of either, as we have said here."

The first characteristic of this combined power of fantasy and imagination is that it has the capacity to contain phantasms obtained through all of the external senses. It is referred to as a common sense, to which "the corporeal senses convene with the forms of their objects, and this sense is the archive and receptacle for them." Our author describes it as "the door and gateway into the soul," as all material perceived by the external senses passes through this common sense on its way to the intellect. Further, the material gathered by the external senses is utilized creatively by the internal sense for the formation of new mental constructs. These newly fabricated sensible species, in turn, are material from which new intelligibility can be abstracted.

The internal sense, thus, can be the source of expanding sensible and intelligible horizons. There is a limitation inherent in this sense, however, in that its constructs are based upon phantasms or "images, forms and figures," and thus can only represent very obliquely and imperfectly anything which transcends the realm of materiality.

The Extraordinary Affirmative Way

Having discussed the "natural apprehensions" [aprehensiones naturales], our author goes on to discuss the "supernatural ones" [las sobrenaturales]. The order of exposition is chosen deliberately, "in order that we may proceed from the lesser to the greater, and from the more exterior to the more interior." Numerous chapters are dedicated to this subject, in the first place because there are many types of "apprehensions" or "acts of knowledge" [inteligencias] to discuss, and also because his purpose is to instruct persons on how to handle and respond to these experiences in order to advance in spiritual perfection. The most fundamental difference between the natural and the supernatural modes of cognition, of course, is that the latter involves some sort of extraordinary divine intervention. It is nothing which the majority of men ever experience. Our objective here is not to convince the skeptic of the actual possibility of such occurrences, nor to discuss these phenomena qua divine interventions. Our concern here is neither apologetic nor theological. Rather, we propose solely to trace and analyze Juan de la Cruz's philosophical or anthropological treatment of such modes of cognition.

What is of great interest in this regard, we find, is that although the origin of such communications is indeed extraordinary, or miraculous, there is little out of the ordinary in the way in which the human intellect comprehends and retains them. San Juan has laid out in other passages that man is equipped by nature with five external and two internal senses, as well as three rational powers. It is by the natural activities of this ensemble of potencies that cognition and remembrance take place, even if it be extraordinary. In communicating something to the person, as we shall see below, God might suspend the activity of the senses and communicate directly to the intellect. Even so, it is still by the activity of the intellectual power that the thing is comprehended, by that of the memory that it is retained, and by that of the will that there may be an affective movement toward or away from it. If Saint John of the Cross were to have said anything else he would have betrayed his psychological realism, which he did not have to do in order to affirm himself as a mystical theologian. In the following key statements of his thought, San Juan reveals himself to be faithful to both faith and reason. He tells
us that the light of the intellect, "of its own power, extends only to natural cognition, although it has a capacity for the supernatural;" and further, "God does not destroy nature, but rather, perfects it."23

We turn, then, to the "supernatural apprehensions," which we should understand as being supernatural in that they involve a communication or revelation from God through extraordinary and immaterial means. Yet, they are not supernatural in the way they are apprehended by the human subject. Very much like the natural modes of cognition, the supernatural ones are classified according to which sense or power receives the communication first, proceeding, as he says, "from the more exterior to the more interior." The first subdivision is between "corporeal supernatural apprehensions" [aprehensiones sobrenaturales corporales], which involve the activity of the senses, and "spiritual supernatural apprehensions" [aprehensiones sobrenaturales espirituales], which bypass the senses and are received directly by the intellect without the means of phantasms. Both categories are further subdivided.

The first is divided according to whether the external or the internal corporeal senses receive the communication. In the former instance, the person perceives through the organs of sight, hearing, smell, touch and taste very much as happens in everyday life. What is extraordinary is the thing itself perceived.24 The second group comprises what are termed "imaginary visions," by which is meant "all things which under the guise of image, form, figure and species can be represented supernaturally to the imagination; for all the apprehensions and species which, stemming from all five corporeal senses, are represented to it and dwell within it in a natural manner, can likewise take place in this power supernaturally, and be represented to it without any assistance of the external senses." These "images and species," which are presented to the imagination without the mediation of the external senses, can be "much more beautiful and vivid" than those which the imagination might compose on its own. "Whence, under these images, God frequently represents numerous things to the soul, and teaches it much wisdom."25

The "spiritual supernatural apprehensions" are different from the preceding categories in that the communication is made directly to the intellect, bypassing both the external and internal senses. According to its ordinary operation, as we know, "the intellect cannot understand anything other than what is contained and falls within the forms and configurations of things received through the corporeal senses."26 These communications, however, "present themselves to the intellect clearly and distinctly, without the mediation of any exterior or interior corporeal sense."27 The act of understanding, thus, entails cognition of intelligibility while being devoid of material phantasms. This is indeed a most unusual mode of knowing, wholly different from that exercised by the vast majority of human beings. Curiously, though, this peculiar type of noetic act can in some way be compared to ordinary understanding following perception. These apprehensions can be called visions of the soul, for we call the understanding of the soul also its sight. And because all these apprehensions are intelligible to the intellect, they are called visible spiritually. And thus, the acts of understanding which take place in the intellect based upon them may be called intellectual visions.28

The parallel is further extended in that the "supernatural spiritual apprehensions" are divided into four types, each of which is related to one of the external bodily senses. The four types are "visions, revelations, locutions and spiritual feelings."29 They are collectively referred to as "visions of the soul" in that they all yield understanding or intellectual vision.30 However,
because these apprehensions are represented to the soul in the same manner as they are to the various senses, it follows that, speaking properly and specifically, that which the intellect receives in the manner of sight (a modo de ver) we call vision, because it can see things spiritually just as (así como) the eyes do corporeally. That which it receives in a manner that is like apprehending and understanding new things we call revelation, just as (así como) the ear hearing things unheard. And that which it receives in the manner of hearing (a manera de oír) we call locution; and that which it receives in the manner of the other senses (a modo de los demás sentidos), such as the cognition of sweet spiritual fragrance and of spiritual taste and of spiritual delight which the soul can savor supernaturally, we call spiritual feelings. From all these the soul derives understanding or spiritual vision, without apprehending any natural form, image or figure of the imagination or fantasy; rather, these things are communicated to the soul without mediation by a supernatural process and by supernatural means. 31

San Juan greatly emphasizes that "the sensory part of man has no capacity for that which is pure spirit," for which reason "the bodily senses are ignorant of spiritual things..." 32 The grandeur of this particular type of communication is that it takes place from spirit to spirit, without the mediation of any material element veiling or impoverishing the message.

However, ordinary concepts and language are dependent upon the sentido, the activity of the sensible part of man. For this reason, to express something concerning these acts of cognition they must be compared to ordinary noetic acts following perception. Thus San Juan states that these "spiritual supernatural apprehensions" are received "in the manner of hearing," "in the manner of the other senses." He corroborates this in other passages by making reference to "the spiritual senses" (los sentidos espirituales). 33 The soul is also endowed with a "common sense," which corresponds to the internal corporeal "common sense of fantasy." 34 The soul is thus established as having a structure paralleling that of the body. Like the body, the soul is equipped with senses. This description may seem to contradict the statements concerning the lack of proportionality between corporeity and the intellect or spirit. By San Juan's own principles, seeing or hearing cannot properly be compared to intellectual apprehension, particularly intellectual apprehension devoid of sensible images.

If we penetrate more deeply into San Juan's comparisons, however, we shall grasp that the analogy is not between things of two different orders such as seeing and intellecting, which admit no proper comparison, but rather, between their effects, both of which pertain to the order of intellection. Perception through the corporeal senses as well as through the spiritual senses is followed by understanding or intellectual "vision." 35 We are dealing here with two forms of understanding, one involving abstraction from something perceived corporeally, and the other received supernaturally by the intellect without phantasms. To tell us that there are differences in mode as well as content among these supernatural communications, San Juan must resort to the differences among the senses. Thus our author will say that a supernatural revelation comes "in the manner of sight," or "in the manner of hearing." Similarly, a certain supernatural communication might be referred to as a "spiritual voice," on account of "the effect which it brings about in the soul, just as the corporeal voice impresses its sound upon the ear..." 36
In reality, "the soul's sight... is its intellect," and "the soul's hearing... is its intellect." Nevertheless, John of the Cross finds a way to relate the most extraordinary to the most common noetic experiences. Apprehensions of a purely spiritual nature, which are neither seen nor heard nor felt, are nevertheless described as being "in the manner of seeing," "in the manner of hearing," or "in the manner of the other senses." Commonality is found within the intellect's capacity for comprehending meaning, no matter how disparate the means of transmission. Differentiation is established by a real, yet to us mysterious, analogy with the effects of corporeal sensation upon cognition. We shall see in later chapters of this study how this relationship made by San Juan between the higher and the lower modes of knowledge is operative in the selection of his poetic metaphors.

The "spiritual supernatural apprehensions," which can be either visions, locutions or spiritual feelings, receive further discussion. Those communications specifically called visions are the ones received "in the manner of seeing." They may be "of corporeal substances... concerning any of the material things which there are in the heavens and on the earth," as well as "of incorporeal substances," such as angels and separated souls. The majority of human beings can in no way conceptualize this type of noetic act, as we have never apprehended corporeal bodies incorporeally, without the instrumentality of the senses and the subsequent production of phantasms. All we have is San Juan's word regarding its possibility and nature. He affirms that it is "like seeing corporeal things with the intellect." The experience is likened to the opening of a door, "through which the soul sees a great light, similar to a lightening flash, which, on a dark night, suddenly sheds light upon things and causes them to be seen clearly and distinctly..."

The communications designated as revelations are received "like apprehending and understanding unknown things, just as the ear would hear things unheard." The category is further subdivided into two groups, one comprehending "acts of understanding of naked truths" and the other, "discovery of hidden secrets and mysteries." The first type yields "knowledge of the truth of things in themselves, and of events and happenings which take place among men," such as being able to know "that which is in the heart or inner spirit, and the inclinations and talents of persons... by supernatural enlightenment." The category comprising "revelations of secrets and hidden mysteries" can be "in two manners. The first is concerning that which God is in himself, and it includes the revelation of the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and the unity of God." These no longer take place, however, "since there are no more articles to be revealed concerning the substance of our Faith." Revelations are still made in our day, on the other hand, "concerning what God is in his works; and herein are included the remaining articles of our Catholic Faith... Under this second group we can also include many other particular things which God ordinarily reveals, both concerning the universe in general as also in particular, regarding kingdoms, provinces, states, families and individual persons." These communications are sometimes "regarding the mysteries of our Faith," and they serve "to unveil and expound to the spirit the truths concerning them."

The intellectual apprehensions called locutions are received "in the manner of hearing." Some of these communications are further described as "successive words" and represent an interesting combination of simple understanding and discursive reasoning. They take place "when the soul is recollected and absorbed very attentively in some consideration; and, in its reflections upon that same matter it is thinking about, it proceeds to reason on its own from one stage to another, forming words and arguments which are very much to the point, with great facility and distinctness. And by means of this reasoning it discovers things unknown to it regarding the subject of its reflections, so that it seems not to be doing this itself, but rather that another person is interiorly developing the argument, responding or teach-
ing." Juan explains that, having been informed passively of some truth by the Holy Spirit, "the intellect, understanding those truths, begins on its own to formulate those propositions relating to the truths which are communicated to it from elsewhere." It is thus a type of conference in which the Holy Spirit, in a supernatural Socratic manner, first informs the intellect and then guides it to reach certain conclusions.

There is one last type of "distinct apprehensions" to discuss: "the apprehensions which the intellect receives from interior feelings supernaturally imparted to the soul." Our author has stated that communications received "in the manner of seeing" he calls visions, and those received "in the manner of hearing" he calls revelations or locutions. He concludes: "...and that which it receives in the manner of the other senses, such as the understanding of sweet spiritual fragrance and of spiritual taste and delight which the soul can savor supernaturally, we call spiritual feelings." This mode of intellectually distinct apprehension is the hardest to fathom. The author himself finds that "it cannot be named." Perhaps, its incomprehensibility stems from the fact that the sense of taste, smell and touch, as we know them, are the ones which perceive their objects most proximately and most wholly, while yielding least intelligible content. Nevertheless, from this supernaturally communicated feeling "an apprehension of knowledge or understanding frequently overflows, as I say, into the intellect; and this is normally a most sublime feeling of God, and most delectable to the intelligence." Although the description remains necessarily obscure, we understand that this type of communication combines clarity of content with intimacy of presence.

We have now mentioned all the types of "apprehensions which can fall within the intellect" according to Juan de la Cruz, with the exception of the act of knowledge which is one with the mystical union. To summarize these diverse modes of cognition, we can return to an earlier statement of our author that the intellect knows "either by way of the corporeal senses, or by itself." What is received "by way of the corporeal senses" is apprehended either intuitively or conceptually; what is known "by itself" is that which is reached through reflection or discursive reasoning. Translating San Juan's statement into less specialized vocabulary, we might say that according to our author there are two fundamental means by which the human mind is informed: there is the surrounding world, which offers us all that nature, art and language can convey; and there is the inner world, the world of reflection and ideas, which depends upon what is absorbed from the outside while having the ability to transcend it. To make a complete summary, though, it must also be stated that any one of these acts of knowledge can be brought about through either natural or supernatural causality, thus multiplying the modes of apprehension. (See schemas, pp. 47-48.)

The Effect of Memory upon Cognition

It is important to note that Juan de la Cruz considers the intellect as "the first power of the soul" on account of its role of informing and giving shape to the human psyche. We have said that the external senses inform the internal ones, and these in turn inform the intellectual power. Similarly, the activity and direction of the intellect determine greatly the characteristics of the person or soul as a whole. Those things which a person remembers and loves must first of all be known. The intellect goes forward first, so to speak, and establishes the extent and limits of the possibilities of the other powers of the soul. "It is not possible that, if the spiritual person instructs his intellect well... he should not, in so doing, instruct likewise the other two powers... for the operations of each power depend upon the others."
Although the intellect holds a certain priority, the role of the memory is not much the lesser in dignity. In the previous chapter we saw how San Juan treats the memory as a power of the soul in its own right. The functioning of this power with respect to the intellect must be taken into consideration for an adequate comprehension of San Juan's understanding of cognition. The memory is described as being

like an archive and receptacle of the intellect, in which all intelligible forms and images are received; and thus, it holds them within itself as it were in a mirror, having received them supernaturally. And thus it presents them to the intellect, whereupon this power considers and judges them.\(^{55}\)

The first function of the memory is to receive and store images which have been presented to the intellect through the mediation of the external or internal senses, thus making recollection possible. It is interesting to note that the memory has the capacity to retain impressions or phantasms received naturally as well as supernaturally. As was said above with respect to the intellect, Juan de la Cruz's explication of extraordinarily caused cognitive phenomena respects the natural order of man's noetic processes. The same may be said concerning the memory, which, without any particular change of operation, may retain in itself "forms and acts of knowledge... of supernatural things, such as visions, revelations, locutions and feelings received by supernatural means. For when these things have passed through the soul, they often leave an impression upon it of some image, form, figure or act of knowledge, whether in the soul, in the memory or in the fantasy..."\(^{56}\)

It should be indicated that the memory, in the understanding of San Juan, not only retains sensible images but also intelligibilities. Sensible and intellectual or spiritual acts of remembering are performed by the same power, for which reason our author distinguishes between a lower and a higher memory. The former depends upon sense images which have been perceived by the external senses or elaborated by the internal senses. The higher memory is exclusively intellectual, and its operation is to recall meaning or intelligibility previously apprehended.\(^{57}\) The memory contains within itself, therefore, subject to reactivation, all that man has ever perceived, imagined or comprehended. This would include, or course, the entire range of intellectual apprehensions, whether natural or supernatural, corporeal or spiritual.\(^{58}\) This discussion leads us back to our statements of chapter II concerning the memory as a "totalizing power," as a power that ties man's past and present into a unity which in turn becomes the basis for any projection into the future.

It has also been said above that in operation the memory follows the intellect. It follows it in the double sense that the memory both goes where the intellect goes and gathers unto itself all that has passed through the intellect. However, when John of the Cross states that "the operations of each power depend upon the others," he is not speaking of an exclusively one-way operation.\(^{59}\) The memory as a totalizing agent, as a container of images of past experiences and judgments, of predispositions, of intellectual habits, has a reciprocal effect upon the operations of the intellect in a proportion which is not at all negligible. Remembered sensible and conceptual material does not fully determine our evaluations and judgments, and is itself subject to control. However, by constituting frameworks of reference, what we remember does have a certain bearing upon how we respond to things and judge them.\(^{60}\) Within this context San Juan states that our retained images and phantasms of God can bear upon our concepts of him, even if we judge by reason that the phantasm in question does not adequately represent him.\(^{61}\) Therefore, if memory follows upon intellection, it is no less true that memory has
certain effects upon intellection, in that it affects one’s judgments and evaluations as well as orienting one towards the future in terms of the past as remembered.

Throughout this chapter we have dealt with one of the kinds of knowledge or cognition recognized by San Juan de la Cruz. It is knowledge which can be communicated to the knowing subject either naturally or supernaturally. It is positive and distinct, of particular objects and rememberable. We have referred to this general category as an "affirmative way of knowing." San Juan's objective in treating this issue is to disclose the role of this mode of cognition in prayer and the spiritual life. To him the primary question, which is a practical one, is to what extent and in what way can this mode of cognition assist man in advancing in moral perfection and union with God. This is no different than asking what is the role of the via affirmationis in relation to the via negationis and the via eminentiae, because for San Juan, to be united with God is to know and love him supereminently, and to become thus united one must first undergo the dark night of positive knowledge.

John of the Cross' stance with respect to this type of cognition takes its point of departure from the belief that all things reflect the greatness and excellence of God. This belief is, of course, common to the whole Christian heritage, although it has received special attention at the hands of thinkers of the mystical tradition. The participationist and exemplarist motifs are particularly developed in thinkers such as Dionysius, Augustine, St. Francis and Bonaventure. Following closely in the footsteps of his predecessors, San Juan acknowledges that "all creatures have, as theologians say, a certain relation to God and bear a certain trace of him --some more and others less, according to their greater or lesser being." Creatures are thus "like a footprint of the passing of God, whereby one can trace his grandeur, power and wisdom." And again like his predecessors, San Juan turns towards the wonders and beauty of creatures as a means to be lifted to contemplation and love of their Creator.

The theme of creation as a mirror and image of God is nowhere expressed more succinctly and poetically than in the stanzas IV and V of the Cántico espiritual:

¡Oh bosques y espesuras
plantadas por la mano del Amado,
oh prado de verduras
de flores esmaltado!,
decid si por vosotros ha pasado.

Mil gracias derramando
pasó por estos montes con presura
y, yéndolos mirando,
con sola su figura
vestidos los dejó hermosura.
Oh woods and thickets
planted by the hand of the Beloved!
Oh meadow of verdure,
enamelled with flowers!
tell me whether by you He has passed.

Scattering a thousand graces,
through these groves he passed in haste,
and, glancing upon them as he went,
left them, by his image alone,
vested in beauty.

The prose commentaries to these lines, in which the poetic metaphors are extensively and specifically explicated, are no less haunting in beauty and depth. The statements are supported by citations from Holy Scripture and St. Augustine. Following the latter, San Juan says that the soul who wishes to advance in knowledge of God must begin to proceed "by knowledge and reflecting upon creatures, moving from these to the knowledge of its Beloved, their Creator. For, after the practice of self-knowledge, this consideration of creatures is the first thing in order along this spiritual road leading to the knowledge of God, for his grandeur and excellence are known through them." Having turned in contemplation to the marvels of God's works, the soul becomes "wounded in love by that trace of the beauty of his Beloved it has recognized in creatures." And consequently, "its love was augmented." A movement takes place, therefore, from the knowledge and appreciation of created things, to a knowledge of the excellence of their cause and maker, to an intensified love of God. A certain approximation to God in knowledge and love is thereby achieved.

The human mind can become informed through the contemplation of nature and art, as well as by study and reflection. Whether concrete or abstract, the objects apprehended are always creatures, and thus they communicate to the mind something concerning the nature, greatness and love of their Creator. Within the works of Juan de la Cruz there are numerous passages on the value of nature, art and reflection with respect to the life of the spirit. He makes specific recommendations concerning religious art. He counsels the seeking of pleasant natural surroundings for the sake of achieving recollection and ease in prayer. Regarding one's inner mental activity, he acknowledges the exercise of meditation, which "is a discursive act by means of images, forms and figures, composed and imagined" by the imagination and fantasy. He adds that "these considerations and forms and manners of meditation are necessary... so that the subject may gradually feed and enkindle himself by means of his sensible dimension... and thus they serve him as remote means to becoming united with God.

John of the Cross reveals a definitely positive stance regarding the role of cognitive activity in the life of prayer. The attitude applies to both esthetic and discursive cognitive activity. San Juan's stance is not only expressed in his writings, but also is extensively manifested in his life. Not only was he studious and reflective, he was also a person of extreme esthetic sensitivity to both art and nature. He tells us that it happens sometimes that "as soon as the will feels delight in that which it hears, sees and does, it soars upward to rejoice in God... For there are souls that are greatly moved to God by sensible objects." In this statement, no doubt, he expressed something he had experienced himself. His biography certainly would seem to indicate so.
Not unlike the author of the *Canticle of the Sun*, whom he echoes, Saint John of the Cross sees beauty, truth and goodness in the things surrounding him, and he knows such qualities to be derived and communicated "from that infinite supernatural beauty of the image of God..." God is sought in the things of the world and the things of the mind, in things learned by natural means and in things communicated supernaturally in numerous diverse ways. The resulting vision reveals something of the perfections and grandeur of God, as the world and man are made in his image. However, this vision of God in things is still only a vision of things, and not of God. It is only a prelude to that perfected vision received at the summit of the mystical ascent, wherein God's creatures are known in and through him. Human noetic acts, no matter how excellent, are always in terms of other creatures and pertain to what we might call the twilight of knowledge. It is not a twilight leading to darkness as the evening to the night, but a twilight of imperfect vision, as though seeing through a glass darkly.
Note: All these acts of intellection, with the exception of the very last, are clear to the cognitive power, and are of particular objects. They are inferior to the noetic act experienced in mystical union. The last act of cognition outlined, which is imageless, confused, obscure and general, is one with mystical contemplation, and is experienced most fully at the summit of mystical communion. It is not of a particular object, but holds within itself all objects simultaneously. It is neither clear nor wholly obscure to the mind. The same intellectual apprehension becomes fully clear and distinct in the beatific vision, while remaining imageless and general.
**THE PROCESS OF COGNITION**

by **natural channels**: object apprehended by the

- **external senses**
  - (function: to perceive)
- **internal senses**
  - (function: to retain and compose phantasms — "forms, images and figures")

by **supernatural channels**: object apprehended by the

- **active intellect**
  - (function: to abstract intelligibility)
- **passive intellect**
  - (function: to comprehend intelligibility)

**Note**: All acts of knowledge caused ordinarily or naturally begin with external or internal perception; the process of cognition then continues its course and terminates in understanding or judgment by the passive intellect. When an act of cognition is caused extraordinarily or supernaturally, it may also begin with external or internal perception; it then proceeds according to the normal course. In this case all the stages preliminary to the act of intellection itself are bypassed. However, even in this instance, the act of intellection itself is not extraordinary with respect to the operation of the knowing subject.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, translated by Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem, (New York: Paulist Press, 1987). "... my advice to you as you look for a sight of the mysterious things, is to leave behind you everything perceived and understood, everything perceptible and understandable, all that is not and all that is, and, with your understanding laid aside, to strive upward as much as you can toward union with him who is beyond all being and knowledge." *The Mystical Knowledge*, chapter I, p. 135.

2. "[The Supreme Cause] is beyond assertion and denial. We make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never of it, for it is both beyond every assertion, being the perfect and unique cause of all things, and, by virtue of its preeminently simple and absolute nature, free of every limitation, beyond every limitation; it is also beyond every denial." *Ibid.*, chapter V, p. 141.


5. "Est igitur triplex cognitio hominis de divinis. Quorum prima est secundum quod homo naturali lumine rationis, per creaturas in Dei cognitionem ascendit. Secunda est prout divina veritas, intellectum humanum excedens, per modum revelationis in nos descendit, non tamen quasi demonstrata ad videndum, sed quasi sermone prolata ad credendum. Tertia est secundum quod mens humana elevabitur ad ea quae sunt revelata perfecta intuenda." *St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles*, IV, I, n. 3343. See also, Bede Frost, *Saint John of the Cross* (New York-London: Harper and Brothers, 1937), particularly the appendix entitled "The Three Ways," pp. 399-406. Frost traces the "three stages or ways, which have also been called the *Purgative, Illuminative and Unitive*" (p. 399), from their first appearance in St. Clement of Alexandria, through Denis the Areopagite, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, St. John of the Cross and a few other authors.

6. ". . . la fe... es comparada a la media noche; y así podemos decir que para el alma es más oscura que la primera [noche] y, en cierta manera, que la tercera, porque la primera, que es la del sentido, es comparada a la prima de la noche, que es cuando cesa la vista de todo objeto sensitivo, y así no está tan remota de la luz como la media noche; la tercera parte, que es el antelucano, que es ya lo que está próximo a la luz del día, no es tan oscura como la media noche, pues ya está inmediata a la ilustración y información de la luz del día, y ésta es comparada a Dios. Aunque es verdad que Dios es para el alma tan oscura noche como la fe hablando naturalmente, pero, porque, acabadas ya estas tres partes de la Noche --que para el alma lo son naturalmente--, ya va Dios ilustrando al alma sobrenaturalmente con el rayo de su divina luz (lo cual es el principio de la perfecta unión que se sigue pasada la tercera noche), se puede decir que es menos oscura." *SII,2,1.*
7. "El día, que es Dios en la bienaventuranza, donde ya es de día, a los bienaventurados ángeles y almas que ya son día, les comunica y pronuncia la Palabra, que es su Hijo, para que le sepan y le gocen." SII,3,5.

8. See Edmund G. Gardner, _Dante and the Mystics_ (New York: Octagon Books, 1968), chapter IX, "The Science of Love," pp. 298-323, in which the author discusses the use of these images in several medieval mystics. Gardner also correlates texts of Aquinas on knowledge and intuition with the visions of Saint Paul and with the stages of mystical ascent as expressed both in the _Divine Comedy_ and in the works of John of the Cross.

9. "...por dos vías puede el entendimiento recibir noticias y inteligencias: la una es natural y la otra sobrenatural. La natural es todo aquello que el entendimiento puede entender, ahora por vía de los sentidos corporales, ahora por sí mismo. La sobrenatural es todo aquel que se da al entendimiento sobre su capacidad y habilidad natural." SII,10,2.

10. "...inteligencia oscura y general..." SII,10,4.

11. "...aprehensiones e inteligencias que pueden caer en el entendimiento." SII,10, chapter title.

12. "...por dos vías puede el entendimiento recibir noticias y inteligencias.... La natural es todo aquello que el entendimiento puede entender, ahora por vía de los sentidos corporales, ahora por sí mismo." SII,10,2.

13. SII,10,3.

14. "...los sentidos corporales exteriores, que son: ver, oír, oler, gustar y tocar." SII,11,1. "...sentidos corporales interiores que se llaman imaginativa y fantasía." SII,12,3. Also, SII,12,1. On the inclusion of the memory among the internal senses, see below, note 58. Within the cognitive process, "los cinco sentidos exteriores representan las imágenes y especies de sus objetos a estos interiores." SII,16,3. The material dependence of the internal senses upon the external ones is reiterated: "la imaginación no puede fabricar ni imaginar cosas algunas fuera de las que con los sentidos exteriores ha experimentado, es a saber: visto con los ojos, oído con los oídos, etc., o, cuando mucho, componer semejanzas destas cosas vistas o oídas y sentidas..." SII,12,4.

15. "...[los] sentidos corporales interiores que se llaman imaginativa y fantasía, los cuales ordenadamente se sirven el uno al otro, porque el uno discurre imaginando, y el otro forma la imaginación o lo imaginado fantasceando. Y para nuestro propósito lo mismo es tratar del uno que del otro; por lo cual, cuando no los nombraremos a ambos, tégase por entendido según aquí habemos de ellos dicho." SII,12,3.

16. "...al sentido común de la fantasía acuden con las formas de sus objetos los sentidos corporales, y él es archivo y receptáculo de ellas." L,3,69. "...todas las aprehensiones y especies que de todos los cinco sentidos corporales se representan [al sentido de la fantasía] y en él hacen asiento..." SII,16,2.

17. "Este sentido de la imaginación y fantasía... es la puerta y entrada para el alma y, como habemos dicho, aquí viene el entendimiento a tomar y dejar, como a puerta o plaza de su provisión; y por eso siempre Dios y también el demonio acuden aquí con sus joyas de imágenes y formas sobrenaturales para ofrecérselas al entendimiento..." SII,16,4. Capánaga remarks
that "la imaginativa es mediadora entre los sentidos y la inteligencia y su oficio es recibir y ofrecer: se surte de los sentidos, fabrica las imágenes de lo corpóreo, descarnadas de grosera materialidad, y las ofrece al entendimiento para que las contemple. Tal es la sustancia de la gnoseología tomista, según la cual, el entendimiento para sus operaciones debe volverse a los fantasmas, *conversio ad phantasma*... El entendimiento puro no tiene contacto inmediato con los sentidos del cuerpo, que son como los porteros de la casa, sino con las damas de honor que son la imaginativa y la fantasía, de los cuales recibe los materiales para la elaboración de sus conceptos. Reina por consiguiente una continuidad, o mejor, graduación entre lo más alto y lo más inferior, *ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora*. La función de la imaginación es doblemente conectiva: con el mundo exterior, cuyas imágenes, suplentes de las cosas, conserva, evoca y modifica, y con el mundo interno, como mediatrix entre la inteligencia y los sentidos. Así comenzamos a divisar mejor la estructura jerárquica del ser humano." Capánaga, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-144.

18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. As Capánaga has told us: "No hay vacíos ni sobresaltos imposibles en el sistema educativo de San Juan, como no los hay en su psicología: lo alto y lo bajo se unen..." *Op. cit.*, p. 204. "sa... saint Jean de la Croix affirme, sur le plan ontologique... que le corps et l'âme sont unis comme la matière et la forme, ou plus exactement que les corps et l'âme ne forment qu'un seul composé (*supuesto*). Il est alors intéressant de révéler les conséquences, d'ordre mystique, qu'implique cette union substantielle. Et d'abord en ce qui concerne les différents types de connaissance. Saint Jean de la Croix distingue les connaissances naturelles, les connaissances surnaturelles et les connaissances proprement spirituelles. Les premières sont celles que l'homme peut se donner, et elles sont toujours sensibles: *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, et ceci en vertu de l'union de l'âme avec le corps. Les secondes sont données par Dieu; mais, si elles sont reçues par l'un des sens, par le sens commun ou par l'une des facultés, d'une façon claire et distincte, pour surnaturelles qu'elles soient dant leur source, elles deviendront humaines dans l'homme.... La connaissance surnaturelle, reçue selon le mode actif de la connaissance naturelle, est naturalisée et denaturée. Enfin les connaissances proprement spirituelles: elles sont surnaturelles, en ce sens qu'elles sont l'œuvre de Dieu en
l'âme; mais elles ne sont pas dénaturées par l'appréhension active de l'homme, car elles sont reçues passivement, l'esprit étant en nudité et pauvreté spirituelles." Sanson, op. cit., pp. 66-67. The continuity which exists between the lower and the higher noetic acts is rooted in the unity of the human being. "Jean de la Croix sait bien, avec les scolastiques, l'unité du composé humain: c'est vraiment un seul sujet, un seul suppôt. Ce composé humain (nous dirions aujourd'hui une personne), Jean de la Croix l'appelle âme. Pour lui l'unité en est patente; tout depend de tout..." Bord, op. cit., p. 73. Texts which make reference to the unity of man in one supposit are the following: NI,4,2; MI,1,1; MI,3,1; C,13,4. This issue has been brought up previously; see chapter I, note 21.

23. "...sólo se extiende de suyo a la sciencia natural, aunque tiene potencia para lo sobrenatural." SII,3,1. "...Dios no destruye la naturaleza, antes la perfecciona." SIII,2,7.

24. "...lo que habemos de tratar en el presente capitulo será de aquellas noticias y aprehensiones que solamente pertenecen al entendimiento sobrenaturalmente por vía de los sentidos corporales exteriores, que son: ver, oír, oler, gustar y tocar, acerca de todas las cuales pueden y suelen nacer a los espírituales representaciones y objetos sobrenaturales. Porque acerca de la vista se les suelen representar figuras y personajes de la otra vida, de algunos santos, y figuras de ángeles buenos y malos, y algunas luces y resplandores extraordinarios. Y con los oídos oír algunas palabras extraordinarias, ahora dichas por esas figuras que ven, ahora sin ver quién las dice. En el olfato sienten a veces olores suaves sensiblemente, sin saber de dónde proceden. También en el gusto acaece sentir muy suave sabor, y en el tacto gran deleite, y a veces tanto, que parece que todas las médulas y huesos gozan y florecen y se bañan en deleite..." SII,II,1.

25. "Ya que hemos tratado de las aprehensiones que naturalmente pueden en sí recibir y en ellas obrar con su discurso la fantasia y imaginativa, conviene aquí tratar de las sobrenaturales, que se llaman visiones imaginarias, que también, por estar ellas debajo de imagen y forma y figura, pertenecen a este sentido ni mas ni menos que las naturales.

"Y es de saber que debajo deste nombre de visiones imaginarias, queremos entender todas las cosas que debajo de imagen, forma y figura y especie sobrenaturalmente se pueden representar a la imaginación; porque todas las aprehensiones y especies que de todos los cinco sentidos corporales se representan a él y en él hacen asiento por vía natural, pueden por vía sobrenatural tener lugar en él y representárselle sin ministerio alguno de los sentidos exteriores....

"Es, pues, de saber que, así como los cinco sentidos exteriores representan las imágenes y especies de sus objetos a estos interiores, así sobrenaturalmente, como decimos, sin los sentidos exteriores puede Dios y el demonio representar las mismas imágenes y especies, y mucho más hermosas y acabadas. De donde debajo de estas imágenes muchas veces representa Dios al alma muchas cosas y la enseña mucha sabiduría.... Estas, como decimos, no se diferencian de las que entran por los sentidos exteriores en cuanto imágenes y especies. Pero, en cuanto al efecto que hacen y perfección de ellas, mucha diferencia hay, porque son más sutiles..." SII,16,1-3.

26. "...el entendimiento no puede entender cosa si no es lo que cabe y está debajo de las formas y fantasía de las cosas que por los sentidos corporales se reciben." SII,8,4.

27. "A las cuales llamamos puramente espirituales, porque no (como las corporales inimaginarias) se comunican al entendimiento por vía de los sentidos corporales, sino sin algún medio de algún sentido corporal exterior o interior se ofrecen al entendimiento clara y distintamente por vía sobrenatural pasivamente, sin poner el alma algún acto o obra de su parte, a lo menos activo." SII,23,1.
28. "...estas... aprehensiones se pueden llamar visiones del alma, porque al entender del alma llamamos también ver del alma, y, por cuanto todas estas aprehensiones son inteligibles al entendimiento, son llamadas visibles espiritualmente; y así, las inteligencias que de ellas se forman en el entendimiento se pueden llamar visiones intelectuales." SII,23,2.

29. "...visiones, revelaciones, locuciones y sentimientos espirituales." SII,23,1. Also, SII,10,4.

30. "...visiones del alma..." SII,23,2.

31. "...porque estas aprehensiones se representan al alma al modo que a los demás sentidos, de aquí es que, hablando propria y específicamente, a lo que recibe el entendimiento a modo de ver (porque puede ver las cosas espiritualmente así como los ojos corporalmente) llamamos visión, y a lo que recibe como aprehendiendo y entendiendo cosas nuevas (así como el oído oyendo cosas no oídas) llamamos revelación, y a lo que recibe a manera de oír llamamos locución, y a lo que recibe a modo de los demás sentidos, como es la inteligencia de suave olor espiritual y de sabor espiritual y deleite espiritual que el alma puede gustar sobrenaturalmente, llamamos sentimientos espirituales. De todo lo cual él saca inteligencia o visión espiritual, sin aprehensión alguna de forma, imagen o figura de imaginación o fantasía natural, sino que inmediatamente estas cosas se comunican al alma por obra sobrenatural y por medio sobrenatural." SII,23. Emphasis ours.

32. "...la parte sensitiva no tiene habilidad para lo que es puro espíritu..." M,9,4. "...ignorante es el sentido corporal de las cosas... espirituales." SII,11,2.


34. Within the higher stages of mystical union, numerous communications are made: "las cuales cosas se reciben y asientan en este sentido de el alma, que, como digo, es la virtud y capacidad que tiene el alma para sentillo, poseello y gustallo todo, administrándoselo las cavernas de las potencias, así como al sentido de la fantasía acuden con las formas de sus objetos los sentidos corporales, y él es receptáculo y archivo de ellas; por lo cual este sentido común del alma, que está hecho receptáculo y archivo de las grandes de Dios, está tan ilustrado y tan rico, cuanto alcanza de esta alta y esclarecida posesión." L,3,69. Emphasis ours.

35. "...todos los objetos de los demás sentidos, como son todo lo que se puede ver, y todo lo que se puede oír, y todo lo que se puede oler y gustar y tocar, son objeto del entendimiento... de aquí es que así como a los ojos corporales todo lo que es visible corporalmente les causa visión corporal, así a los ojos del alma espirituales, que es el entendimiento, todo lo que es inteligible le causa visión espiritual, pues, como habemos dicho, el entenderlo es verlo." SII,23,2.

36. "...la voz espiritual es el efecto que ella hace en el alma, así como la corporal imprime su sonido en el oído..." C,14-15,10.
37. "...la vista del alma... es el entendimiento." SII,14,10. "...el oído del alma... es el entendimiento." C,14-15,13. Also, SII,23,2.

38. "Hablando ahora propiamente de las que son visiones espirituales sin medio de algún sentido corporal, digo que dos maneras de visiones pueden caer en el entendimiento: unas son de sustancias corpóreas, otras de sustancias separadas o incorpóreas. Las de las corpóreas son acerca de todas las cosas materiales que hay en el cielo y en la tierra... [Las] visiones de sustancias incorpóreas... son [de] ángeles y almas..." SII,24,1-2.

39. "...como ver las cosas corporales con el entendimiento." SII,26,2.

40. "...cuando Dios quiere hacer esa merced al alma, comunícala aquella luz sobrenatural que decimos, en que fácilmente y clarísimamente ve las cosas que Dios quiere, ahora del cielo, ahora de la tierra, no haciendo impedimento, ni al caso ausencia ni presencia de ellas. Y es, a veces, como si se le abriese una clarísima puerta, y por ella viese una luz a manera de un relámpago, cuando en una noche oscura súbitamente esclarece las cosas y las hace ver clara y distintamente y luego las deja a escusas, aunque las formas y figuras de ellas se quedan en la fantasía; lo cual en el alma acaece muy perfectamente..." SII,24,5.

41. "...y a lo que recibe como aprehendiendo y entendiendo cosas nuevas (así como el oído oyendo cosas no oídas) llamamos revelación..." SII,23,3.

42. "...las inteligencias de verdades desnudas..." SII,26, chapter title. "...descubrimiento de secretos y misterios..." SII,27, chapter title.

43. "...el conocimiento de la verdad de las cosas en sí y el de los hechos y casos que acaecen entre los hombres." SII,26,11. "...lo que hay en el corazón o espíritu interior, y las inclinaciones y talentos de las personas... por ilustración sobrenatural." Ibid., 14. Our author further states that it was this type of extraordinary and thorough knowledge of created things that was given to Solomon, in whose case the infused awareness and wisdom were sustained continuously, for which reason San Juan calls this particular phenomenon "hábito general de ciencia." SII,26,12.

44. "El segundo género de revelaciones decíamos que era manifestación de secretos y misterios ocultos. Este puede ser en dos maneras: La primera, acerca de lo que Dios es en sí; y en ésta se incluye la revelación del misterio de la Santísima Trinidad y unidad de Dios." SII,27,1.

45. "...por cuanto no hay más artículos que revelar acerca de la sustancia de nuestra fe." SII,27,4.

46. "...acerca de lo que Dios es en sus obras; y en ésta se incluyen los demás artículos de nuestra fe.... Podemos también en esta segunda manera incluir otras muchas cosas particulares que Dios ordinariamente revela, así acerca del universo en general como también en particular, acerca de reinos, provincias y estados y familias y personas particulares." SII,27,1. "...y aun acerca de los misterios de nuestra fe, [suele] descubrir y declarar al espíritu las verdades de ellos." Ibid., 2.

47. "...a lo que recibe a manera de oír llamamos locución..." SII,23,3.
48. "Estas palabras sucesivas, siempre que acaecen es cuando está el espíritu recogido y embevido en alguna consideración muy atento y, en aquella misma materia que piensa, él mismo va discurriendo de uno en otro y formando palabras y razones muy a propósito, con tanta facilidad y distinción y tales cosas no sabidas de él va razonando y descubriendo acerca de aquello, que le parece que no es él el que hace aquello, sino que otra persona interiormente lo va razonando, o respondiendo o enseñando." SII,29,1. "...el entendimiento, entendiendo aquellas verdades, juntamente va formando aquellos dichos él de suyo sobre las verdades que de otra parte se le comunica." Ibid.,2.

49. "...las aprehensiones que recibe el entendimiento de los sentimientos interiores que sobrenaturalmente se le hacen al alma." SII,32, chapter title.

50. "...y a lo que recibe a modo de los demás sentidos, como es la inteligencia de suave olor espiritual y de sabor espiritual y deleite espiritual que el alma puede gustar sobrenaturalmente, llamamos sentimientos espirituales." SII,23,3. Emphasis ours.

51. "...al cual no se puede poner nombre..." SII,32,3. "...redunda en el entendimiento aprehensión de noticia o inteligencia, la cual suele ser un subidísimo sentir de Dios y sabrosísimo en el entendimiento." Ibid.

52. "...ahora por vía de los sentidos corporales, ahora por sí mismo." SII,10,2.

53. "...la primera potencia del alma." Also: "el entendimiento es el receptáculo de todos los demás objetos en su manera..." SIII,1,1.

54. "No es posible que, si el espiritual instruyere bien al entendimiento... no instruya también de camino a las otras dos potencias... pues las operaciones de las unas dependen de las otras." SIII,1,1.

55. "...como un archivo y receptáculo del entendimiento, en que se reciben todas las formas y imágenes inteligibles, y así, como si fuese en un espejo, las tiene en sí, habiéndolas recibido por vía de los cinco sentidos o, como decimos, sobrenaturalmente; y así las presenta al entendimiento, y allí el entendimiento las considera y juzga de ellas." SII,16,2.

56. "...formas y noticias... de cosas sobrenaturales, así como de visiones, revelaciones, locuciones y sentimientos por vía sobrenatural; de las cuales cosas, cuando han pasado por el alma, se suele quedar imagen, forma y figura, o noticia impresa, ahora en el alma ahora en la memoria o la fantasia..." SII,7,1. Saints John of the Cross tells us that the objects of memory are three: "naturales, imaginarios y espirituales, según los cuales también son en tres maneras las noticias de la memoria, es a saber: naturales y sobrenaturales y imaginarias espirituales." SIII,1,2. "Comenzando, pues, por las noticias naturales, digo que noticias naturales en la memoria son todas aquellas que puede formar de los objetos de los cinco sentidos corporales, que son: oír, ver, oler, gustar y palpar, y todas las que a este talle pudiere fabricar y formar." SIII,2,4. There are "otras formas y noticias que guarda la memoria en sí, que son de cosas sobrenaturales, así como de visiones, revelaciones, locuciones y sentimientos por vía sobrenatural; de las cuales cosas, cuando han pasado por el alma, se suele quedar imagen, forma y figura, o noticia impresa, ahora en el alma ahora en la memoria o fantasia, a veces muy viva y eficazmente." SIII,7,1. "Las noticias espirituales pusimos por tercer género de aprehensiones de la memoria, no porque ellas pertenezcan al sentido corporal de la fantasia como las demás (pues no tienen
imagen y forma corporal), pero porque también caen debajo de reminiscencia y memoria espiritual, pues que, después de haber caído en el alma alguna de ellas se puede, cuando quisiere, acordar della; y esto no por la efigie y imagen que dejase la tal aprehensión en el sentido corporal --porque, por ser corporal, como decimos, no tiene capacidad para formas espirituales--; sino que intelectual y espiritualmente se acuerda de ella por la forma que en el alma de sí dejó impresa (que también es forma o noticia o imagen espiritual o formal, por lo cual se acuerda), o por el efecto que hizo. Que por eso pongo estas aprehensiones entre las de la memoria, aunque no pertenezcan a las de la fantasía." SIII,14,1. Emphasis ours. The same distinction is made in SIII,13,7-9.

58. As mentioned in chapter II, note 21, the question of the number of the rational powers in the thought of John of the Cross has been much discussed. Similarly with the issue of the operations of the memory. Our author links in various passages the memorative power with the sentido, and on occasion refers to it as an internal corporeal sense (SIII,16,2; SIII,2,4; SIII,7,1; S III,13,6-8; S III,14,1; C,18,7). It is reasonable to ask how a sensible power can gather and retain the whole of man's past, both sensible and intelligent. Robert A. Herrera, for example, states that "según san Juan de la Cruz, el complejo fantasía-imaginación-memoria, es el receptáculo de formas inteligibles. ¿Cómo se explica esta doctrina?" Op. cit., p. 592. Herrera refers to SIII,16,2. It should be indicated, though, that in the passage referred to, the combined power of fantasy-imagination-memory is said to retain "formas y imágenes inteligibles," which is not to say intelligible species. John of the Cross is simply speaking of phantasms, many times called "formas, imágenes y figuras," from which intelligible species or intelligibility may be abstracted; in other words, phantasms which are intelligible. In the same passage, it is stated that the combined power presents these images or phantasms to the intellect "y allí el entendimiento las considera y juzga de ellas."

The resolution of the issue is the distinction between the lower and the higher memorative powers, or between memoria espiritual and memoria imaginativa. If we look carefully at the texts on memory, we shall find that this power is always considered a sensible one, unless otherwise stated. In these other instances, it is referred to as memoria espiritual, in which case it is one with the intellect, and no phantasms are involved in its operation. In the texts cited in note 57, San Juan discusses the three types of noticias the memory can retain. The first class consists of noticias naturales, which are sensible images. The third category is that of noticias espirituales, which do not pertain to the sentido corporal de la fantasía como las demás. What is being retained here are intelligible species which have been impressed "en el alma... intelectual y espiritualmente." In this context, San Juan continues to use the term memoria, although qualified by the adjective espiritual. He makes it quite clear that the impression retained "es forma o noticia o imagen espiritual o formal." The second category of memorative acts is a bit more complicated. However, there is still no confounding the memory as a sensitive power with the memory as an intellectual habitus. Supernatural communications, such as visions, revelations and locutions are retained as either noticias ("impresas... en el alma"), or imágenes, formas y figuras ("impresas... en la memoria"). This type of noetic act, therefore, is either retained as an intelligible specie, as it was received, or it is brought to mind by an image which has been associated with it. It is certainly not out of the ordinary for the human mind to supply images by association, as when we hear about something but do not see it. Within this same context Juan makes reference to "la imagen y la aprehensión que le causó el amor." SIII, 13,6. The distinction between noticias which are impressed sensibly ("en la fantasía") and formally ("en el alma") is maintained throughout his writings. For a more detailed elaboration of this issue, see E. Wilhelmsen, "La memoria como potencia del alma en San Juan de la Cruz."

As is well known, for Thomas Aquinas the memory is not considered a separate faculty, but rather, "from the point of view of the retention of species, a habitus or plurality of habitus
of the possible intellect; from the aspect of the recall to actual consideration, it is an act of the intellective soul, initiated by the will and involving both the agent and potential intellects. Vernon J. Bourke, "Intellectual Memory in the Thomistic Theory of Knowledge," The Modern Schoolman 18(1941)21-24, p. 23. See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I,78,4; also, I,79,6, ad 1 and 3. For a correlation with the thought of John of the Cross, see the above-mentioned article, "La memoria como potencial del alma...."

57. "...las operaciones de las unas dependen de las otras." SIll,1,1.

60. See SIII,3,2-4; SIII,4,1-2; SIII,6,1-2; SIII,8,3-5; SIII,10,1-2.

59. "...las criaturas... todas ellas tienen, como dicen los teólogos, cierta relación a Dios y rastro de Dios --unas más y otras menos, según su más principal o menos principal ser." SII,8,3.

61. "...es cosa muy fácil juzgar del ser y alteza de Dios menos digna y altamente de lo que conviene a su incomprehensibilidad; porque, aunque la razón y juicio no haga expreso concepto de que Dios será semejante a algo de aquello, todavía la misma estimación de aquellas aprehensiones... hace y causa en el alma un no estimar y sentir de Dios tan altamente como enseña la fe..." SIII,12,1; ibid., 3.

62. "...como un rastro del paso de Dios, por el cual se rastrea su grandeza, potencia y sabiduría." C,5,3.

63. "San Juan de la Cruz no invalida el ascenso desde las criaturas a Dios. No es que lo creado sea extraño o ajeno a Dios. Hasta me atrevería a decir que pocos escritores han celebrado como él la luz de Dios ceñida a la cintura de las cosas hasta dejarlas punto menos que en desmayo de sí mismas, y esto con sólo mirarlas al paso. Lo que sucede es que las cosas, las cosas y el hombre, son anuncio, bandera, semejanza o imagen... Los filósofos que consienten en llegar hasta Dios por las gradas que les ofrecen las cosas, no son desaconsejados por San Juan de la Cruz. En un principio este procedimiento ambulatorio es el único conforme a la naturaleza humana." Thus, "nunca San Juan de la Cruz agusa el ser de las cosas. Al contrario." Adolfo Muñoz Alonso, "El Dios de San Juan de la Cruz," Revista de espiritualidad 27 (1968)461-469, pp. 463 and 466. It has been commented that: "Ni es tampoco nuestro místico hostil al goce casto y conyugal de la hermosura creada. El canto franciscano de las criaturas resuena en el poeta de Castilla, saturado de la doctrina del ejemplarismo agustiniano. Todo le sirve de escala para subir al monte umbroso y excelsor del Verbo divino. Todo es huella, vestigio, sombra y noticiario de Dios. Con qué ojos más puros y frescos miró el universo este amable y austero castellano!... He aquí el destino esencial de las criaturas: servir de libro y de breviario al hombre para leer en sus páginas las glorias del Creador." Capánaga, op. cit., p. 208. See Capánaga’s entire chapter X, "La analogía del ser," pp. 207-219.

For an introduction to participationist motifs in some of Fray Juan’s Spanish contemporaries, see Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, "La estética platónica en los místicos de los siglos XVI y XVII," Historia de las ideas estéticas en España, edited by Enrique Sánchez Reyes, vol. 2; Edición Nacional de las Obras Completas de..., general editor Miguel Artigas, tome 2 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1947), pp. 77-113.

65. "...caminando por la consideración y conocimiento de las criaturas al conocimiento de su Amado, Criador dellas; porque, después de el ejercicio del conocimiento propio, esta consideración de las criaturas es la primera por orden en este camino espiritual para ir conociendo a Dios, considerando su grandeza y excelencia por ellas, según aquello del
Apóstol, que dice: *Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur;* que es como si dijera: Las cosas invisibles de Dios, de el alma son conocidas por las cosas visibles criadas e invisibles (*Rom* 1,20). Habla, pues, el alma en esta canción con las criaturas, preguntándoles por su Amado, y es de notar que, como dice san Agustín, *la pregunta que el alma hace a las criaturas es la consideración que en ellas hace de el Criador de ellas [Confesiones, x,6];* y así, en esta canción se contiene la consideración de los elementos y de las demás criaturas inferiores, y la consideración de los cielos y de las demás criaturas y cosas materiales que Dios creó en ellas, y también la consideración de los espíritus celestiales, diciendo: ¡Oh bosques y espesuras!

"Llama bosques a los elementos, que son tierra, agua, aire y fuego, porque así como amenos bosques están poblados de espesas criaturas, a las cuales llama aquí *espesuras* por el grande número y mucha diferencia que hay delas en cada elemento: en la tierra innumerables variedades de animales y plantas, en el agua innumerables diferencias de peces, y en el aire mucha diversidad de aves, y el elemento del fuego, que concurre con todos para la animación y conservación de ellos; y así cada suerte de animales vive en su elemento y está locada y plantada en él como en su bosque y región donde nace y se cría. Y, a la verdad, así lo mandó Dios en la creación de ellos, mandando a la tierra que produjese las plantas y los animales, y a la mar y agua los peces, y a el aire hizo morada de las aves (*Gen.*,1); y por eso, viendo el alma que Él así lo mandó y que así se hizo, dice el siguiente verso: *plantadas por la mano del Amado."

"En el cual está la consideración, es a saber, que estas diferencias y grandezas solo la mano de el Amado Dios pudo hacerlas y criarlas. Donde es de notar que advertidamente dice: por la mano del Amado, porque, aunque otras muchas cosas hace Dios por mano ajena, como de los ángeles y de los hombres, esta que es criar nunca la hizo ni hace por otra que por la suya propia; y así el alma mucho se mueve a el amor de su Amado Dios por la consideración de las criaturas, viendo que son cosas que por su propia mano fueron hechas. Y dice adelante: *Oh prado de verduras!*

"Esta es la consideración del cielo, al cual llama prado de verduras, porque las cosas que hay en él criadas siempre están con verdura inmarcesible, que ni fenecen ni se maritan con el tiempo, y en ellas como en frescas verduras se recrean y deleitan los justos. En la cual consideración también se comprende toda la diferencia de las hermosas estrellas y otros planetas celestiales.

"Este nombre de verduras pone también la Iglesia a las cosas celestiales, cuando rogando a Dios por las ánimas de los fieles difuntos, hablándolas con ellas, dice: *Constituat vos Dominus inter amoena virentia;* quiere decir: Constituyaoos Dios entre las verduras deleitables. Y dice también que este prado de verduras está *de flores esmaltado.*

"Por cuales las *flores* entiende los ángeles y almas santas, con las cuales está orde­nado aquel lugar y hermoso como un gracioso y subido esmalte en un vaso de oro excelente... Decid si por vosotros ha pasado.

"Esta pregunta es la consideración que arriba queda dicha, y es como si dijera: decid qué excelencias en vosotros ha criado." *C,4,1-7.*

It has been said that "la canción cuarta y sus comentarios nos ofrece una de las muestras más bellas de la literatura universal." Capánaga, *op. cit.*, p. 212. The commentary to the following stanza, however, is no less breathtakingly beautiful:

"En esta canción responden las criaturas a el alma; la cual respuesta, como también dice San Agustín en el mismo lugar, *es el testimonio que dan de sí de la grandezza e excellenza de Dios* a el alma que por la consideración se lo pregunta. Y así, en esta canción lo que se contiene en sustancia es que Dios creó todas las cosas con gran facilidad y brevedad y en ellas dejó algún rastro de quien Él era, no sólo dándoles el ser de nada, mas aun dotándolas de innumerables gracias y virtudes, hermoséándolas con admirable orden y dependencia indeficien­te que tienen unas de otras... Y no solamente les comunicó el ser y gracias naturales... mas
también con sola esta figura de su Hijo las dejó vestidas de hermosura, comunicándoles el ser sobrenatural; lo cual fue cuando se hizo hombre..." C,5,1-4.

Other passages which develop the theme of exemplarism in creation in a striking way are: C,14-15:25-27; and C,39,11.

66. "...llegada en amor por ese rastro que ha conocido en las criaturas de la hermosura de su Amado." C,6,1. "...aumentósele el amor." Ibid., 2.

67. "Y cuanto a lo que toca a las imágenes y retratos... [son] ellas tan importantes para el culto divino y tan necesarias para mover la voluntad a devoción... Y por eso las que más al propio y vivo están sacadas y más mueven la voluntad a devoción se han de escoger..." SIII, 35,2-3. "...por estar unas más al propio que otras y excitar más la devoción unas que otras, conviene aficionarse más a unas que a otras por esta causa..." Ibid., 6.

68. For example: "...a los principiantes bien se les permite y aun les conviene tener algún gusto y jugo sensible acerca de las imágenes, oratorios y otras cosas devotas visibles..." SIII,39,1. "Tres maneras de lugares hallo por medio de las cuales suele Dios mover la voluntad a devoción. La primera es algunas disposiciones de tierras y sitios, que con la agradable apariencia de sus diferencias, ahora en disposición de tierra, ahora de árboles, ahora de solitaria quietud, naturalmente despiertan la devoción; y destos es cosa provechosa usar..." SIII,42,1.

69. "...es acto discursivo por medio de imágenes, formas y figuras, fabricadas e imaginadas..." VII,12,3.

70. "...son necesarias estas consideraciones y formas y modos de meditaciones para ir enamorando y cebando al alma por el sentido... y así le sirven de medios remotos para unirse con Dios..." VII,12,5. "...el estado y ejercicio de principiantes es de meditar y hacer actos y ejercicios discursivos con la imaginación. En este acto necesario le es al alma que se le dé materia para que medite y discurra, y le conviene que de suyo haga actos interiores y se aproveche de el sabor y jugo sensitivo en las cosas espirituales..." L,3,32.


72. "...luego que siente la voluntad el gusto de lo que oye, ve y trata, se levanta a gozar en Dios... porque hay almas que se mueven mucho en Dios por los objetos sensibles." SIII,24,4. "...y es que todas las veces que oyendo músicas o otras cosas, y viendo cosas agradables, y oliendo suaves olores, y gustando algunos sabores y delicados toques, luego al primer movimiento se pone la noticia y afición de la voluntad en Dios... y en esta manera se
puede usar, porque entonces sirven los sensibles al fin para que Dios los crió y dio, que es para ser por ellos más amado y conocido." SIII,24,5.

73. "...aunque desde la ventana de su celda" --dice su primer biógrafo-- "gozaba de toda esta variedad de cosas... con todo eso, algunas veces... sacaba a sus religiosos por aquellos montes hacia algún arroyo ameno o agradable risco"... Es que, no contento con ver de lejos estas bellezas, quería hallarse en medio de ellas para mejor percibir la rítmica armonía de ese himno, que tan regaladamente suena a los oídos del alma de un poeta. Sentirse embelesado al verse envuelto por la espesura del bosque, escondido entre el ramaje de la selva... y su espíritu estático iba bebiendo por los ojos la influencia de aquella hermosura, que se le entraba hasta el alma.... Una relación manuscrita nos le presenta «sentado en el monte en medio de sus discípulos» enseñándoles a subir de las bellezas sensibles a la increada y universal hermosura, y a convadir al cielo, collados y montes a bendecir al Creador." Crisólogo, San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica..., 2:84-85. The first biographer cited is José de Jesús María, Vida de San Juan de la Cruz (Málaga, 1717), book II, chapter XIII, pp. 329-330. The second is Alonso de la Madre de Dios, Vida, virtudes y milagros del santo padre fray Juan de la Cruz..., ms. 1340, Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, book I, chapter XXXVII. It is also reported that during his stay in Andalucía, Fray Juan "hace su oración rodeado de flores silvestres, contemplando el agua de un riachuelo que zigzaguea loma abajo buscando el Guadalquivir." Crisólogo, Vida de San Juan de la Cruz, p. 191.

Florisoone comments that: "Certainement saint Jean de la Croix décrit une nuit qu'il a vue, quand, dans la strophe XV du Cantique Spirituel, l'Épouse dit qu'en son Aimé, elle posède la nuit accoisée --qui laisse devenir l'éveil de l'aurore-- le concert silencieux, la solitude sonore. Et nous connaissons bien, en effet, la predilection de saint Jean de la Croix pour les heures de la nuit..." Florisoone, op. cit., p. 25. "...las relaciones manuscritas nos les pintan en una soledad próxima a Baeza... orando a media noche, sentado en una extendida pradera, y hablando después con el compañero acerca de la hermosura del firmamento, de la luna y de las estrellas, ponderando la armonía de los cielos en sus misteriosas y ordenadas revoluciones. También le vieron pasarse las noches enteras en oración y en cruz debajo de los árboles." Crisólogo, San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica..., 2:81. References are to Alonso de la Madre de Dios, Vida, virtudes y milagros..., book I, chapter XLIII; and to Fray Juan Evangelista, ms. 19404 of the Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, fol. 146.

It has also been observed that San Juan "avait certainement un sens profond de la musique: ses poèmes l'attestent amplement; nous savons qu'il chantait, qu'il jouait au moins d'un instrument et s'en servait pour ponctuer certains exercices de la journée, qu'il goûtait la musique en véritable amateur." Florisoone, op. cit., p. 93.

With respect to John of the Cross' preferences regarding architectural structures, Florisoone makes the following statements: "...à Grenade où il fut élu prieur en 1582, il avait construit de ses propres mains un aqueduc et un cloître. L'aqueduc existe toujours, et le cloître était, dit-on, le plus roulé des cloîtres carmélitains et le plus propre au recueillement. Il était construit en pierres et, d'après Francisco de Santa-Maríá, la disposition des ouvertures pour donner la lumière s'unissait avec un art si merveilleux au ton de dévotion et de simplicité qu'on ne se lassait jamais de l'admirer et de le trouver toujours également irréprochable. En termes plus techniques, cela signifie que le prieur de Grenade opéra à cette occasion une importante modification dans l'architecture des cloîtres: il en diminua sensiblement la hauteur car il estimait que les cloîtres élevés favorisaient mal le recueillement. Est-ce à dire que saint Jean de la Croix prenait ainsi position contre l'esthétique et l'esprit survivant des époques gothiques? La destruction de los Mártires y l'ignorance où nous restons de l'oeuvre réalisée, laissent la question sans réponse, mais il est certain que la spiritualité et la construction des temps romans sont plus proches de son tempérament et de sa sensibilité mystique." op. cit., pp. 125-126. The reference is to Francisco de Santo Maríá, Reforma de los Descalzos (Madrid, 1644-
1655), book IX, chapter IX. Concerning "l'esthetique et l'esprit survivant des époques gothiques," it may be pertinent to point out that during this epoch there were some architectural innovations within Gothic that might be considered distortions of the sensibility which created the original style of an earlier period. See Víctor Nieto Alcaide, *La luz, símbolo y sistema visual: el espacio y la luz en el arte gótico y del Renacimiento*, Cuadernos Arte Catedra (Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, 1978), pp. 132-144. It is only a matter of conjecture what Fray Juan’s reaction may have been, for example, to the cathedrals of Salamanca and Segovia, both built in the "new" Gothic style, and both belonging to cities in which he lived for a considerable period of time.

74. "...hablando ahora según el sentido y afecto de la contemplación y conocimiento de las criaturas, echa de ver el alma haber en ellas tanta abundancia de gracias y virtudes y hermosura de que Dios las dotó, que le parece estar todas vestidas de admirable hermosura y virtud natural, sobrederivada y comunicada de aquella infinita hermosura sobrenatural de la figura de Dios, cuyo mirar viste de hermosura y alegría el mundo y a todos los cielos..." C,6,1.
CHAPTER IV

THE DARK NIGHT, OR THE CONDITIONING OF COGNITION

It is unquestionable that the doctrine of the dark night is central to the thought of Juan de la Cruz, so central that the term and concept make their appearance in the opening page of the first of his works, the *Subida*. He makes here a fundamental distinction between two successive nights which the person must undergo to achieve union with God. The first night pertains to beginners, and it takes place when God commences to place them in the state of contemplation; the spirit also participates in this night, as we shall say in due course. And the second night or purification pertains to those who are already advanced, occurring at the time when God wishes to begin placing them in the state of union with God. And this latter night is a more obscure and dismal and terrible purgation, as we shall say afterwards.

The first night is called active in that the agent is the human subject himself, freely and deliberately bringing about certain changes in his being, by the instrumentality of his natural powers. What is often found attractive in Juan's doctrine is the immense power which is attributed to the human subject over himself, his extensive capacity to control and shape his inner world. In the passive night the process of restructuring and molding the psyche continues. Here, however, the human being's natural capacities are of no avail. It is God who is "the principal agent." The exposition of this second phase of the night definitely moves within the ambit of the Christian faith, and is meaningless without it. A believing Christian is likely to give assent to the explications put forth, whereas a non-believer's point of departure would be the assumption that such a phenomenon is impossible. However, both the believer and unbeliever would find it difficult to verify experimentally whether it is possible of not.

The three books of the *Subida* are dedicated to the active night, while the two of the *Noche* deal with the passive phase of the night. Although the emphasis is different, the *Cántico espiritual* also treats these two broad stages of the ascent which leads to communion with God. There is, however, a further division to be made. San Juan de la Cruz insists that purification must be gradual, as well as ordered from the lower to the higher constituents of man's being. The material and sensible dimensions of man, "el sentido," is what must first undergo the night, the purifying process. Afterwards comes the spiritual dimension, the soul, the rational powers. Each one of the spheres undergoes an active and a passive purification. Thus it is that the dark night is divided into a total of four consecutive stages: (a) the "Active Night of Sense" (*Subida* I); (b) the "Active Night of Spirit" (*Subida* II and III); (c) the "Passive Night of Sense" (*Noche* I); and (d), the "Passive Night of Spirit" (*Noche* II).

What is gradually accomplished throughout this process is a certain independence of the spiritual dimension of man from the material realm. It can also be thought of as an accommodation of the material to the spiritual. The finality is that the spiritual or rational powers may be ever freer to exercise their activities with increased perfection. It should be emphasized here that the union with God which follows the dark night, the mystical union, should not be
considered "mystical" in the ordinary and loose acceptance of the word; that is, as subjective, nebulous or irrational. Rather, it is a spiritual communion which takes place between God, who is spirit, and man. It is effected by means of the transformed operations of man's spiritual or rational powers, although man is not the sole efficient agent. In union there is objective knowing, loving and possessing of God. The purpose of the dark night is to accommodate and prepare the rational powers to perform these acts.

An Integral Approach to Cognition

Within the present chapter we shall discuss the different stages of the dark night, concentrating particularly on tracing the types of noetic activity which are characteristic of it. We shall see how there is realized a gradual negating of one's previous representational and conceptual knowledge of God, which can be referred to as a via negationis of knowledge. There is first of all the recognition that our images of understanding of God do not correspond to him as he is in reality. This is of course recognized by numerous thinkers, and is a favorite theme of Denis the Areopagite. What Juan de la Cruz concentrates on particularly, however, is the inadequacy of this knowledge to yield proximity to God. It is inadequate because if that which is apprehended cognitively is not God, the movement of love will not be toward God either. A condition for union with God is that he be known in himself.

As we shall see throughout this chapter, what is characteristic of San Juan's presentation is a singularly comprehensive approach to knowledge, in which all the powers of the soul play a decisive role. Our author understands that by means of a process involving the activity of the memory, the understanding and the will, each of these powers may be conditioned. This process of conditioning necessarily affects the subject as a whole, as it entails psychological, moral and intellectual changes. John of the Cross is most concerned with directing the soul toward and through the ascetico-mystical ascent or dark night, a most thorough process of conditioning which requires tremendous struggle and which enables the subject to grasp God in himself. This is not only a via negationis of knowledge, but a process demanding a parallel conditioning of memory and volition. It could not be otherwise, as the advancement takes place in virtue of the cooperation among the powers. (Consult page 66 for a schema depicting the stages of the ascent.)

The conditioning of the three spiritual stages is preceded by that of the senses. Throughout this very first stage of the ascent the subject attains dominion over his appetites by means of asceticism and mortification. The author explains that what is aimed for is "the privation of pleasure stemming from any kind of desire." It is described as a night for just as night is none other than privation of light, and consequently of all the objects which can be seen by means of light, whereby the visual faculty is left in emptiness and darkness, likewise mortification of desire can be called night to the soul. For when the soul deprives itself of the pleasure of its desire in all things, it is left, as it were, in darkness and emptiness. For just as the visual faculty, by means of light nourishes and feeds itself on the objects which can be seen, and which, when the light is extinguished, cannot be seen, likewise the soul, by means of desire nourishes and feeds itself on all the things in which it
can take pleasure according to its powers; and when this is also ex-
tinguished, or rather, mortified, the soul ceases to feed upon the
pleasure of all things, and is left, with respect to desire, in darkness
and emptiness. 6

The denial proposed, however, does not consist primarily in depriving oneself from per-
ceiving or possessing things of the surrounding world. It is rather a question of disciplining the
appetites which have these things as objects. Thus,

if the soul rejects and denies that which it can receive through the
senses, we can indeed say that it is left, as it were, in darkness and
emptiness... For although it is true that the soul cannot cease to hear
and see and smell and taste and touch, if the soul denies and rejects
the object it will not be affected by it, nor will it be hindered any more
than if it heard not, saw not, etc.... We are not dealing here with the
actual lack of things --as this does not denude the soul if the latter has a
desire for them--, but rather with detachment from them of taste and
desire, for it is this that leaves the soul unoccupied and free from
them...7

What is proposed, therefore, is achievement of dominion over the appetites and detachment
from the things of the world.

The conditioning of the three spiritual powers is the next stage of the ascent. All three
powers are involved simultaneously in a gradual process of self-perfection: The moral con-
ditioning or purification of the will requires, first of all, growth in fortitude, temperance, jus-
tice and prudence. This, in turn, allows the subject to advance in faith, hope and charity. The
moral conditioning in which the soul grows in the cardinal virtues brings about a perfection
which is desirable on the natural level. Thus, it is reasonable that virtues should be sought "on
account of the benefits which follow from them temporally," even if "man did not do so for
the sake of God and the obligations of Christian perfection."8 San Juan de la Cruz shares in
this matter the stance of the ethician and the natural philosopher, who see temporal and social
good as attainable by a proper use of reason and other human powers. San Juan seeks to have
"the passions ordered according to reason and the desires mortified."9 For our author, though,
as one whose horizons transcend the natural sphere, the most reasonable thing of all is "to turn
the passions towards God" and "to turn them away from all that is not God."10 It is sought that
"the soul rejoice not except in that which is purely honor and glory of God, nor hope for any-
thing else, nor grieve save for what concerns this, nor fear but God..."11

A parallel phenomenon to this moral growth is an intellectual one in which man's powers
of comprehension are expanded and refined. These processes of moral and intellectual
advancement should be understood as reciprocal and interdependent, as are the operations of the
powers which enact them. However, it is the gradual conditioning and perfecting of cog-
nition that concerns us most here. In San Juan's approach, when the will elects that which is
reasonable there follows an ordering which gives clearer vision to the intellect. In turn, the
next step in moral or volitional advancement is dependent upon that newly acquired clarity of
understanding. This spiral-like motion involving all the powers and carrying the entire psyche
forward is maintained throughout all the stages of the ascent.
STAGES OF THE MYSTICAL ASCENT

I. Purgative Way — Illuminative Way — Unitive Way — Beatific State

II. Affirmative Way of Remembering, Knowing and Willing — Negative Way of Remembering, Knowing and Willing — Supereminent Way of Knowing and Willing

III. Subida I: Active Night of Sense; also, Cántico, 1-5 — Subida II and III: Active Night of Sense — Noche I: Passive Night of Sense; also, Cántico, 6-13 — Noche II: Passive Night of Spirit; also, Cántico, 14-35 and 40 — Llama; also, Cántico, 36-39

Note: Line I gives the division according to standard vocabulary. Line II gives the stages in terms of the forms of operations of the rational powers. Line III divides the works of John of the Cross according to the stage discussed in each one. Looking at the chart vertically one can see the correspondence among the three breakdowns.
A fundamental tenet in the thought of Juan de la Cruz is that an ordering of one's passions brings about a tranquility and a detachment which allow increased clarity of understanding and sharpness of judgment. The principle has a history preceding our author. He states, in fact, that in order to obtain "natural knowledge... it suffices to have one's spirit free from the passions of the soul, as Boethius says by these words: *Si vis claro lumine cernere verum, gaudia pelle, timorem spemque fugato, nec dolor adsit.*" Concerning him who has followed the precept and who is no longer tied by his passions to the things of this world, "we may in truth say that having been sensual he has become spiritual, having been animal he has become rational, and even that he is journeying from a human life to a portion which is angelical, and that having been temporal and human he is becoming celestial and divine." Regarding sharpened powers of intuition, he states that those "whose spirits are purged can learn by natural means with great readiness --and some with more readiness than others-- that which is in the interior heart or spirit, and the inclinations and talents of persons; and this by exterior indications, albeit very slight ones, like words, movements and other signs...." Insight and judgment can be further perfected if one's mind is kept free from the presence of multiple "thoughts and acts of cognition stored in memory... and hereby great disposition is acquired for human and divine wisdom..." Thus, when confronted with adversities one is able "to judge them more correctly and to find for them fitting solutions." Thus it becomes clear why prudence, an intellectual virtue held in proportion to the control over the four passions of the soul, should be referred to as "the wisdom of the saints."

The Carving of the Inner World

Man's control over his intellect is not limited to his capacity to increase his powers of understanding and judgment. He also has the ability to steer his mind in one direction or another, to make certain things present to it, to dwell in certain mental or spiritual environments, to dispose it to understand and respond to certain things. Given a particular form of conditioning, particular types of noetic activity will follow. The process involves an interaction of all three rational powers. As mentioned previously, sensation is followed by intellection, and intellection by volition. At the same time, however, human subjects habitually move their intellects by choice to look in one direction or another, even into hitherto unknown fields. The will gives further direction to the intellect by exercising control over both the external and the internal senses. There is thus a continual conditioning of the cognitive activities by the will, "which moves all other powers, even the intellect, to their actions." At the same time, there is a reciprocal conditioning, in that the movement into a new noetic field of selectivity offers an altered environmental structure to the will. This process of conditioning is present in the development of every specialized mental skill, whether speculative or practical. There are many applications of it witnessed in daily life, such as when a person refines his ability to appreciate and judge a certain form of art.

An instance of man's power over his cognitive activities is his ability to carve out and control his inner environment. With an eye toward its practical consequences, Juan de la Cruz is particularly insistent upon this capacity. The first step toward this finality is "to guard the gates to the soul, which are the senses." Regulation of what is perceived by the external senses greatly facilitates, in turn, determination of the contents of the internal ones. San Juan insists upon man's ability to admit or dispel at will any configuration of phantasms. Those realities which the subject chooses to retain become paradigms in terms of which he judges
other things, and projections into the future towards which he journeys. The role of the will in this process of shaping one's inner world is fundamental. St. Augustine had said that the will was the weight of the soul, and San Juan was to echo his statement by affirming that "the soul lives more fully where it loves than where it informs." For this reason, "the soul that loves God lives more fully in the next life than in this one." However, as there are multiple directions in which the soul can tend, there are tremendous disparities among the modes of being which subjects stamp upon themselves or the inner environments they forge. Thus, our author states incisively: "There are souls that wallow in the mud just as animals wallow therein, and there are others that soar like the birds which purify and cleanse themselves in the air."

It can be pointed out that San Juan is lucidly referring to phenomena which are common to humans in all circumstances. Most persons select to one degree or another that which they are sensorially exposed to and what they remember, which in turn affects what they understand and how they interpret it. This selectivity is exercised to the degree to which persons have dominion over themselves. The specific choices are determined by factors such as one's attachments, one's orientations or, speaking generally, one's "interests." Juan de la Cruz simply indicates to what extent this self-conditioning process can be exercised, and what consequences it can have. He is concerned with illustrating how "to raise in operation the harmony of the interior senses and powers," or, as we might say today, how to channel one's psychic energies in totum toward a chosen object. It is by channeling the powers of perception, memory, cognition and affectivity in accordance with a chosen order of priorities that one achieves a true approximation to the most desired objects. We might say that this phenomenon of convergence of psychological activities prescribed by San Juan stands opposite to the distension of the soul in multiple directions so prevalent in our time. The presence to the subject of an almost endless variety of objects of cognition and volition often gives rise to a psychic state in which no one thing becomes either known in its depths nor intimately possessed.

Although the formation of one's inner world is never a finished task, one becomes defined cognitively by that which has been structured. The form according to which one's soul has been molded becomes projected by the subject onto the world, affecting both what one perceives intellectually and how he interprets it. Thus:

we believe others to be in the state we ourselves are in, and we judge others to be as we ourselves are, while this judgment begins in ourselves and proceeds from ourselves and not from outside. Thus, the thief believes that others steal likewise; and he that is lustful, that others lust like himself; and he that is malicious, that others bear malice, his judgment proceeding from his own malice; and the good man thinks well of others, his judgment proceeding from the goodness of his own inner self...

This same basic concept had been entertained numerous times before by other thinkers. According to a classical formulation cited by our author, "whatever is received is held in the received according to the mode in which he receives it." San Juan goes on to state that the person who has chosen his path and orientation, upon looking at others, "believes that everyone else is occupied in the same thing he is, for he thinks that there is nothing else in which to be employed." Thus we see how free specification of the self in turn specifies the self's vision of the world.

One of the salient points in the development of this line of thought is that through the process of conditioning vast differences are established among forms of human consciousness,
which at the same time can be barriers of communicability. The worlds which we structure are definite in their characteristics, which means that many an element will remain foreign to them. On the one hand, Juan insists that "wickedness does not comprehend goodness, nor poverty riches." On the other hand, he whose mind has become purified "has achieved such innocence that he does not understand evil nor does he judge anything as evil; and he will hear things that are very evil, and will see them with his own eyes, but will not be able to understand that they are so, because he has no habitus of evil whereby to judge it..." Thus, the soul who has been purified and brought close to God is advised: "Tell this to the world. But no, proclaim it not of the world, because the world knows nothing of air so gentle, and will not be able to sense thee..." Further, those who have followed this course have become so alienated from things which are ugly or repulsive that "disgusting objects and acts of knowledge make no impression upon them..." And simultaneously, to the degree to which one achieves this immunity to the sordid, he becomes capable of responding to things emotionally and intellectually with contemplative enjoyment.

It should be understood that we are dealing here not simply with an intellectual state, but with a living process which moves forward with its own momentum. As the noetic field becomes defined, the will moves forward toward that which is known, and in this movement there is a further approximation to the desired objects and a further distancing from all other things. The hypothetical person in Juan de la Cruz's exposition "will meddle very little in the affairs of others, for he does not even remember his own." Thus, "having lost taste and appetite, he is sickened even by savory dishes and is troubled and annoyed by everything. In all that presents itself to his thought or sight he has before himself one sole longing and desire, which is for health, and anything that does not lead to it is wearisome and oppressive to him."

The conditioning of the psyche or structuring of the inner world both excludes and includes. With respect to what is perceived by the external senses and retained by the internal ones, permeation by one content excludes another. This is also true with regard to the will, wherein a movement toward one thing excludes a movement toward its opposite. It is not quite the same, however, with the conditioning of the intellectual power itself, which does not consist in a movement toward or an interiorization of certain objects to the exclusion of others. Excluding certain things from being acknowledged or judged would be an exercise in blinding oneself with respect to numerous spheres of reality. This is not what is recommended. Rather, conditioning in this instance is a matter of increasing or decreasing one's powers of insight, intuition, judgment and reasoning, which are, properly speaking, the activities of the intellect.

To illustrate, let us imagine two subjects. On the one hand, let us consider a person whose comprehension of order and the good is limited as a result of a freely chosen orientation. From a moral perspective, this would be a malicious person. The conditioning he has submitted himself to has blinded and narrowed his understanding. He necessarily judges things and persons lowly, and is content to remain ignorant of his own malice. Such is the case of the thief in Juan de la Cruz's text, who knows no higher good than that of thievery. There might be, on the other hand, a subject conditioned in the appreciation of order and reasonableness, a virtuous human being. This person should not be looked upon as being intellectually the opposite of the first subject. His sensitivity toward and awareness of the good is expanded in comparison with that of the first subject. His well-honed intellectualized sense may cause him to perceive the surrounding world as permeated with and radiating forth order, perfection and beauty. We are not to think, however, that such a person dwells in a subjective world and as such is naive or utopian. He may have developed an immunity or a resilience to the sordid and the disorderly, as he is secure in his interiorized world of harmonies. Nevertheless, if he
has truly conditioned his cognitive powers in a positive way, he will readily see where the objective good is lacking. He will recognize limitations where such exist. If this were otherwise, Juan de la Cruz would not be consistent in this regard with his statements concerning the increase in insight which comes with dominion over one's appetites and attachments.

It emerges with greater clarity, thus, how the purification of each power does not operate in the same way. Juan de la Cruz proposes for the external and internal senses, for the will, and for the understanding as the retainer of concepts and ideas, a gradual purification which can indeed be looked upon as an emptying. The conditioning of the intellect, however, does not consist in stifling or mutilating its powers. On the contrary, by the very purification of the other powers, those of the intellect are enhanced. It is important to understand these operative principles in order to avoid various misconceptions concerning the Sanjuanist dark night.

The Conditioning of Knowledge and the Triadic Structure of Cognitive Operations

Interestingly, it is possible to relate the thought of Juan de la Cruz on the conditioning of human cognition to certain concepts developed within contemporary epistemological speculation. The pertinent contemporary analysis of consciousness and knowing is founded upon a distinction between "subsidiary" and "focal" awareness, and a "tacit act" which binds them together in a noetic whole. It is held that subsidiary or background or previously assimilated cognitive elements constitute a frame upon which we rely instrumentally for achieving a coherent response within the movement of existence. The subsidiary dimension, thought of as the world in which each subject dwells and moves, is considered to be constitutive of a manner or mode of response that determines the intrinsic character of an intellectual experience. We are conscious from our subsidiarily indwelled world, which functions as a pointer, to something else. The integration of this "something else" toward which the mind looks "focally," or simply, upon which the mind focuses, is brought about by the "tacit act," which yields an expanded act of consciousness. It relies on those elements existing in previous noetic wholes without explicitly attending to them. Thus, "knowing is a process in two stages, the subsidiary and the focal, and these two can be defined only within the tacit act which relies on the first for attending to the second."

Central to this understanding of human knowledge, thus, is the concept of the "tacit triad," the operative union of: (1) a field of knowledge, a from which, a point of departure; (2) a deliberate, intentional to which or object; and (3) a "tacit act," which will give rise to a new cognitive whole. Needless to say, the knowledge of the intellectual object is conditioned by the existing subsidiary field. The determining effect of subsidiary awareness upon new knowledge, however, is not the only pertinent issue. Also recognized in this view is the active participation of the knower in his acquisition of new knowledge. The first mode of participation is an assent to a framework of knowledge handed to us by others. It is by this activity that the shaping of new knowledge takes place. Through these operations the normal human being habitually forges for himself perceptual, conceptual and effective wholes, which both condition and direct his being. Each act of integration alters somewhat our tacit field of knowledge, which is in turn our point of departure for further triadic cognitive wholes, each of which is partially unconditioned and partially conditioned by the previous tacit field or sub-
sidiary dimension. By these operations our person continually "expands into new modes of being."

Without overlooking vast differences in concern and development, a correlation can be made between Juan de la Cruz’s understanding of the trinitarian or triadic structure of the soul and this contemporary conceptualization in terms of the noetic tacit triad. We have seen that in San Juan's analysis, intellectual activity is conditioned, first of all, by the content of memory acting as frame of reference, as field of selection, as catalyst; and secondly, by the will in its election of directionality. Such an understanding of the operations of knowing is not incompatible with an interpretation in terms of subsidiary awareness (the past, memory), focal awareness (appetite, directionality, choice, the will), and the binding "tacit act" (the act of intellec­tion or integration itself). In both epistemological models there is an understanding of election and intellec­tion as being mutually interdependent and effective, in that the determination or directionality yields the gradual construction of a framework in terms of which all experiences receive their meaning. Further, both developments imply that each knowing subject carves out and assimilates the world to himself in a sustained "give and take" of intellectual search and willful deliberation. Beyond these points, however, links between the two views would necessarily be tenuous. And our correlation, in fact, is only intended as an avenue of access for those who might be more conversant with contemporary trends than with classical or medieval epistemologies.

Progressive Independence from Perception and Conceptualization

John of the Cross necessarily parts company with other thinkers at one point or another. As a mystic, he must indeed leave behind all other speculators as speculators, all luminaries, all artistic visions, for mystical knowledge is other than scientific or poetic representations, and other than the loftiest vision the imagination might sustain. To embark upon the mystical noetic venture, one must first undergo the purification of the senses and later that of the spirit, or the three rational powers. This latter purification entails negating conceptual frameworks, inner landscapes, imaginary visions. It is precisely at this point, at the beginning of the active night of the spirit, that the venture of Juan de la Cruz parts ways with that of non-mystics. This rigorous and thorough conditioning of the psyche is accomplished throughout the active and passive nights of the soul as preliminary to the mystical union. We have referred to this process as a via negationis of cognition, memory and will.

In the previous chapter we discussed John of the Cross' recognition of the affirmative knowledge of God yielded by the contemplation of creatures, by study, reflection and meditation. We have also dealt with Juan's thought regarding the ability of the human being to condition and direct the noetic framework in which he moves. His objective in presenting these issues is to lead the subject to empty his memory of all imaginary representations of God, and his understanding of all concepts regarding him. His reasons for proposing this intellectual conditioning are clearly stated and upheld with principles which he brings to light. Given that the desired objective is union with God, which takes place "according to the powers" ["según las potencias"] through knowing and loving activity, a means must be established to grasp God cognitively. However, there is a basic lack of proportionality between God and creatures. Although creatures bear some resemblance to their Creator, as was discussed in chapter III, they are separated by an even more fundamental difference:
according to a philosophical principle, all means must be proportionate to their end; that is to say, they must have some suitability to and resemblance with the end, such as is enough and sufficient for the desired end to be attained through them. I give an example: ...Fire is to be combined and unified with wood. It is necessary that heat, which is the means, first prepare the wood by transmitting to it so many degrees of warmth, so that it will have a great resemblance and proportion to fire. Whence, if one should attempt to dispose the wood with any other than the proper means, namely, heat --as would be, for example, air, water or earth--, it would be impossible for the wood to become united with the fire; just as it would also be to reach the city without following the road that leads to it. Consequently, in order that the intellect may come to be united with God in this life, inasmuch as is possible, it must of necessity employ those means that unite it with him and that bear a close resemblance to him.

Regarding this, we must point out that among all creatures, the highest as well as the lowest, there is none that bears proximity to God nor that has any resemblance to his Being. For, although it is true that all creatures have, as theologians say, a certain relation to God and bear a certain trace of him --some more and others less, according to their greater or lesser being--, there is still no essential connection nor resemblance between them and God. Rather, the distance between their being and his divine Being is infinite. Wherefore it is impossible for the intellect to reach God by means of creatures, whether celestial or terrestrial, inasmuch as there is no proportion of semblance between them.50

Therefore, creatures or knowledge of created things are of no avail in making God present to man. Even the highest choirs or angels "cannot tell me what I wish to hear."51

San Juan places great stress upon the lack of proportionality between God and our human knowledge of him, which is rooted in the fact that images derived from creatures are the foundation upon which we construct our mental configurations. Our knowledge of God, therefore, is not in terms of his own Being but in terms of creatures. Thus:

anything that the imagination can imagine and the intellect can grasp and understand in this life is not and cannot be proximate means for union with God... Given that the intellect cannot understand but what is contained and falls within the forms and configurations of the things which are received by way of the corporeal senses --which things, we have already said, cannot serve as means-- it can make no use of its natural knowledge to attain this end.... For all that the intellect can understand, the will can delight in and the imagination can compose is most unlike God, as we have said, and disproportionate to him.52

Fray Juan's warning is against reducing the Being of God to a vision, a concept, an experience, that is, to a creature, and thinking that he has therein been grasped.53 The noetic and psychological conditioning which is one with the active night is an exercise in freeing ourselves from the limitations our minds impose upon our knowledge of him, so that he may be known on his own terms. Thus, Fray Juan trains those who would follow him in the pursuit of
union with God to progressively lessen their dependence upon perception,54 upon memory and imagination,52 upon speculative and conceptual knowledge,56 and even upon intelligible knowledge communicated supernaturally.57 As none of these things communicate nor contain the fullness of what is desired or sought, they should not be dealt with as means to that object. The will is to be purified alongside the cognitive powers. Those things the mind and memory must dispel, the heart must not desire nor be attached to.

Juan de la Cruz’s own historical spiritual trajectory can be analyzed in terms of a progressive independence from sensation, despite his acute esthetic sensibility. It has been pointed out that his early youth was imbued with training in the appreciation of art. As a child, he was an apprentice to a sculptor of religious art. Later on he was exposed to the best poetry of his day. Although his sensitivity was never lost, gradually the need for physical beauty as a stimulus to the mind and will was overcome. Thus we hear him expressing preferences for exposure to ever subtler and more spiritualized realities, such as for "solitary and rugged places,"58 which recalls his native Avila, rather than the softer, more fertile landscapes of Granada, familiar to him as well; or his predilection for the stillness of the night;59 or his choice of simplified religious architecture and liturgical vessels.60

We have seen that, on the one hand, San Juan acknowledges that the perfections of creatures reveal some of the grandeur of God; and on the other, that he warns against seeking God in creatures. This apparently ambivalent stance, however, contains no contradiction. What our author wishes is that the subject rely upon the world of creatures in so far as it serves the cause of spiritual advancement. This applies both to the perception of external things as well as to the internal world of imagination and thought. At the same time he advocates that the subject train himself in progressive independence from this instrumentality. What is sought is as much perception or intellection as is needed for the will to be moved to God, but no more. The degree to which the operations of the soul have been spiritualized is the measure in which the instrumentality of perception and intellection should be prescinded from. Thus it is that San Juan’s intellectual pursuits, his enthusiastic praise of the beauties of nature and his genuine interest in esthetic proportions are reconciled with the most rigorous asceticism. It is not simply a question of a middle route between indulgence in esthetic experience or intellectual activities for their own sake, and a total rejection thereof. It is rather a question of tailoring the esthetic and intellectual activities to the conditioned state of each subject, that he may neither become engulfed in the experience nor be left unaffected by it. Continual advancement in knowledge and love of God is to be found by progressively reducing the dependence upon our limited materialized ways of knowing.

Denial and negation are essential to the dark night. However, to have any effect, they must be prudently, which means intelligently, exercised. The key to an advancement is gradual privation, as this is the way for the powers of the soul to progressively become independent from the realm of materiality. With respect to the perception of external things, our author states that:

it is certainly permissible, and even expedient, for beginners to find some sensible pleasure and sweetness in images, oratories and other visible objects of devotion, since they have not weaned nor detached their palate from the things of the world.... But in order to make progress, the spiritual person must also strip himself of all those pleasures and desires in which the will can rejoice, for pure spirituality binds itself very little to any of those objects.... So, although he makes use of images and oratories, he does so only fleetingly, as his spirit rises at once to God, having forgotten all sensible things.61
Michel Florisoone, who seems to have grasped so keenly certain aspects of San Juan's esthetic sensibility and ideas regarding art, states: "That Saint John of the Cross was particularly sensitive to art and that he appreciated it has been well proven; that he admitted and recommended the use of the work of art as an habitual means of sanctification, this is also beyond doubt...." However, "he places limits upon this enjoyment; he knows the dangers of this art, the seduction of which can divert from the subject represented, and which carries its own reprobation." A fundamental recommendation is that the faithful have access to religious art. However, it is further counselled that each subject should expose himself to those works of art which best serve to elevate his will toward God, but which least tie his emotions to the esthetic experience itself.

As the dependence upon external perception is to be overcome and left behind, so too the exercise of meditation, which takes place by the activity of the internal senses. San Juan devotes several chapters of the Subida to outlining how and at what point this practice should be abandoned. Likewise, all the other cognitive operations should eventually be stilled in their efforts to comprehend and grasp God. The fundamental guideline is that the powers should be exercised according to the fullness of their natural capacity. However, since God exceeds the capacity of the powers, when these can do no more on their own one should cease in his attempts to exercise them. The following text succinctly states both the need to quiet the powers and the importance of doing so in the proper way. San Juan says that the reader might become disoriented if he does not understand the context within which we speak; for, otherwise, there might arise within him many questions regarding what he is reading, as might have happened already with respect to what we have said of the intellect and what we shall now say of the memory, and later of the will. For, seeing that we annihilate the powers with respect to their operations, perhaps he will think that we are rather destroying the path of spiritual progress than constructing it. This would be the case if we were only attempting to instruct beginners here, who need to become disposed by means of those apprehensible and discursive apprehensions. But, since we are here giving instructions to progress further in contemplation toward union with God... it is necessary to proceed by this method of disencumbering and emptying the soul, causing the powers to deny themselves their natural jurisdiction and operations, so that they may become capable of receiving infusion and illumination supernaturally; for their capacity cannot attain so sublime an end... It should be emphasized that the Sanjuanist dark night does not call for the cessation of all cognitive or mental activity. John of the Cross does not wish for his novices to ignore or fail in their daily duties, nor to become handicapped in any way, nor much less to turn themselves into somnambulistic zombies. As mentioned previously, he does not expect the subject to deprive himself of all perception, although the exercise of selectivity is certainly advocated. Nor is it expected that all contents of the memory be indiscriminately eradicated. On the contrary, the advice is that "man should not refrain from thinking about and remembering the things he is obliged to do and know, for, as long as he is free of any feelings of attachment, they will not harm him." The intellectual power itself must be retained for discernment within the practical order. To judge things aright, one should be guided by "natural reason, law and evangelical doctrine," confident that "there is no difficulty nor necessity that cannot be solved and remedied by these means..."
"El sereno de la noche oscura"

Before we can continue with our exploration of the dark night, we might point out that Juan de la Cruz’s doctrine on the instrumentality of the rational powers represents in its historical context a confrontation with several extreme and unbalanced positions regarding the same matters. As is well known, the sixteenth century was a time of intense religious controversy and of experimentation with forms of spirituality. Although the various movements were heterogeneous in concerns and in styles, the prevailing forms of spirituality can be grouped around two opposite poles. At one extreme were those who advocated a willed nullification of the activity of the powers, and at the other those who favored their sustained activity through willed excitation in accordance with prescribed norms. Both of these stances represent in reality different forms of voluntarism.

To the first group belong the Quietists and Illuminists, while the second stance was widespread among the clergy and faithful as a fearful reaction against the first. The "quietist" position opts for by-passing human nature in one's ascent to God, proposing that sensible and intelligible experiences are useless as a means of advancing toward union with him. The power of the will alone, without specification by the intellect, is expected to leap out of the realm of immanence and immediately reach the desired object. The "activist" position is healthier with respect to the lowers stages of the ascent, as it proposes deliberate pursuit of the object desired by means of the operations of the powers. Its flaw resides in binding the mind and will to these exercises, which is not appropriate for the subject who is advanced along the way. Needless to say, both extreme positions suffocate the knowing process and therefore preclude entrance into the state of contemplation. The first will not allow the noetic process to get started at all, and the second will not permit it to transcend itself. The first absolutizes the via negationis and the second the via affirmationis.

It has been recognized that San Juan’s mode of spirituality represents a middle position between the two extremes. Yet it might be even better to say that our author proposes the "activism" of the one polarity as well as the "quietism" of the other, although the specific application must be prudently determined by the actual conditioned state of the subject being considered. Juan de la Cruz’s recommendation regarding the usage of religious art follows the same fundamental formula. What is sought is enough perception to stir the mind and will, but not so much as to bind the subject to those particular acts. In this question of the instrumentality of art, San Juan is again confronting two extreme positions which parallel the extreme stances on the practice of meditation. In his own time, there were those in favor of totally barring the presence of religious art, and those in favor of it being marked by frivolity and exaggerated sumptuousness.

John of the Cross realized that the noetic activities of the living, healthy human being are characterized by an inner dynamism which propels them continually to transcend their barriers. Once something is discovered, the will moves the subject to explore a further horizon. It does not matter whether the object of cognition be something perceived externally, as with art, or internally, as in the practice of meditation, or whether it be a concept or idea. The result of this process in which intellect and will operate hand in hand is unceasing expansion of consciousness within a directionality established at will. In the realm of the ascetico-mystical ascent, the process leads to a conditioned state in which the subject is enabled to receive infused knowledge. That is, the process leads to this state if it is not thwarted. Thus the Carmelite reformer is adamant on combating, on the one hand, those who would eliminate the
specification of cognition, and on the other, those who would impose upon it improper limitations. For growth in perfection, thus, "spiritual masters must grant souls their liberty..."77

Affirmation in Faith

As stated previously, the human powers have not the capacity to reach God by their own efforts. No matter what struggles man may undergo, there is an ontological abyss between him and God which he cannot bridge. The only means available to man to reach the desired term is the theological virtue of faith,78 which is, on the one hand, a participation in the divine nature itself,79 and on the other, a communication to the intellect of truths concerning the divine Being.80 What is called for, thus, is "affirmation... in pure faith,"81 which "is the sole proximate and proportionate means for the soul to be united with God.... And, therefore, the greater is the faith in the soul, the more closely it is united to God."82

Juan de la Cruz stresses the inability of the human mind in its earthly condition to comprehend the substance of those things we believe by faith. We cannot grasp the contents as they are in themselves, nor can we fully comprehend the propositions of the Faith with our limited powers of understanding.83 The essence of the Faith is in itself infinite in luminosity and intelligibility. However, it is "a dark night for the soul,"84 due to "our weak intellects, which become darkened and frustrated in so vast a light."85 The contents of the Faith are simply disproportionate to our limited way of knowing, which is bound to materiality.86 As it has been observed, we are dealing with a disproportion between the formal object and the exercise of the intellectual power, in which faith unites the latter with the divine essence itself. From this disproportion stems the "obscurity" to the mind.87 San Juan describes this quality of darkness as bedazzlement caused by a light too brilliant for the mind to behold. He supports this view with citations from Holy Scripture, from Dionysius, and from his most trusted philosopher: "Aristotle says that in the same way that the eyes of the bat respond to the sun, becoming totally darkened by it, our intellect responds to that which is greater light in God, which is total darkness to us. And he further says that the loftier and clearer are the things of God in themselves, the more unknown and obscure they are to us."88

As faith is the sole means of achieving union with God, the subject is admonished to proceed under the exclusive guidance of its light, which means to proceed in darkness. Whatever the person may understand or imagine regarding the contents of the Faith is other than the reality itself, and thus it must be dispelled from the mind. We are not to understand, however, that the required purification of the mind entails denying the propositions of the Faith. The content itself expressed by the propositions is to be affirmed and retained, for "faith... gives certitude to the intellect."89 All mental constructs and configurations pertaining to these truths, however, whether sensorial or conceptual, must be obliterated from the inner world of the subject as means to affective union with God.90 To approach God the subject is to proceed "having placed himself in darkness," expelling from the mind all "lights of distinct acts of understanding" regarding him,91 while "believing his Being, which does not fall within the intellect..."92 And thus it is that the confirmation in faith is also a purification of the intellect. In the active night it is a natural purification brought about by the efforts of the subject.93 The purification is continued in the passive night by divine efficacy. Here the substance of the Faith is communicated to the human intellect, at once enlightening it and bringing it to participate in the divine Being.94
In San Juan's understanding of the efficacy of faith one might see an ultimate instance of fides quaerens intellectum. For Augustine, faith as revealed truth enlightens the mind, thus disclosing the hidden order of the world surrounding us. Juan de la Cruz would certainly not quarrel with this. He has told us, in fact, that discernment is to be carried out under the guidance of reason as well as in the light of evangelical doctrine. In San Juan's thought, however, faith as a theological virtue is also a means of breaking the barriers of our limited ordinary way of understanding. Having undergone the trials of the dark night, a most enlightened faith yields an expanded consciousness and knowledge otherwise inaccessible to the human mind. The intellect, thus, "is to remain in darkness until the daylight of the clear vision of God dawns upon it in the life to come, and, in this life, until the day of transformation and union with God..."

As the intellect must put to rest its natural operations and confirm itself in the darkness of faith, the two other powers must follow with comparable action. The subject is similarly to deny and empty his will and memory, while advancing in the two other theological virtues, charity and hope. These virtues will purify the will and memory respectively, as faith does the intellect. The three theological virtues, which purify the powers and are a gratuitously given participation in the divine nature, are a denial and a risk from the standpoint of human experience not illuminated by faith. The latter is darkness to the intellect. Similarly, hope is dispossession and emptiness to the memory, and charity is dryness of earthly affectivity. Nevertheless, these virtues take the soul into further dimensions of existence. Their exercise leads the powers through the "narrow gate" of denial of their natural operations to an expansion of horizons. The theological virtues lift the limits of the powers, so that they may become in exercise "as profound as they are capable of receiving great blessings, for they cannot be filled with less than the infinite." The end result, which we shall analyze more carefully in the following chapter, is that "all the appetites of the soul and its powers according to its inclinations and operations... become divine."

In relating the activities of the rational powers to the exercise of the theological virtues, Juan de la Cruz is expressing a compact and cohesive line of thought which is foundational to his teaching. Mystical union with God takes place by the operation of the rational powers, that is, by acts of knowing and loving. However, the human rational powers in their natural state are incapable of grasping the object in question. They must therefore undergo a metamorphosis which will transform their mode of operation. The first step is a denial of the ordinary mode of operation of the powers with respect to knowledge, memory and love of God, anchoring the three powers respectively in the virtues of faith, hope and charity, which constitute a most fitting disposition for the soul to become united to God according to its three powers, which are intellect, memory and will. Because faith darkens and voids the intellect of all its natural understanding, and hereby prepares it for union with the divine Wisdom. Hope voids and withdraws the memory from all creaturely possessions, for, as Saint Paul says, hope is for that which is not possessed (Rom., 8,24), and thus it withdraws the memory from that which can be possessed, and sets it on that for which it hopes. And for this reason hope in God alone disposes the memory purely for union with him. Charity, likewise, voids and annihilates the affections and desires of the will for whatever is not God, and sets them upon him alone; and thus this virtue disposes this power and unites it with God through love.

Although a distinction is made among the theological virtues, San Juan makes clear that their activities, as those of the faculties, are intricately interwoven and interdependent, thus...
revealing and reflecting man's metaphysical unity. As an act of the will is dependent upon one of the intellect, charity must be preceded by faith and hope: the object must be apprehended and hoped for if it is to be loved, even when dealing with this negative form of knowledge and hope. Thus, "the more the soul attempts to darken and annihilate itself with respect to all the outward and inward things which it is capable of receiving, the more faith is infused in it, and, consequently, the more love and hope, since these three theological virtues operate together." Thus there is revealed among the virtues a rich and complex interrelationship which complements and parallels the relationships found among the faculties. As love can move the intellectual power to act, charity once enacted in turn strengthens faith and hope. This ascending and spiraling movement in the exercise of the theological virtues disposes the powers for supernatural enlightenment and union with God, for the yielding of the darkness of the night to the rays of the dawn. However, for this to take place the person must have previously undergone the passive night of sense and of spirit. While still in the active night of spirit, the subject is by his own ascetical efforts setting his powers to rest and confirming himself in the darkness of faith, the emptiness of hope, the aridity and dryness of charity. It is at this point that the desolate and disconsolate soul cries out: ¡Oh cristalina fuente!, that is, "Oh, purified faith in Christ!"

The Mode of the Receiver

In the passive stage of the night, by far the darker and more terrifying stage, the purification of the subject as fleshly and spiritual being continues toward its completion. Here the person no longer acts on his own power, because "it surpasses human ability... to dispel that which is natural with one's natural powers." Instead, divine efficacy "causes in the soul said negation of self and of all things." Paralleling the already accomplished active night, the passive one is in two successive phases, one according to the "sentido," and the other according to the "espíritu" or the rational powers. "The first purgation or night is bitter and terrible for the sensible part of man," in which the soul undergoes "dryness... insipidity and bitterness." Part of the experience is an indescribable sense of desolation brought about by the ever more thorough emptying and stilling of the powers, in which the soul can neither "cling with the intellect, rejoice with the will, nor discourse with the memory." The finality is "to bring them out of this ignoble form of love to a higher degree of love... and to liberate them from that base exercise of sensation of discursiveness..." A decisive term is reached upon achieving dominion over the entire range of human passions and rational operations, after which "the soul sallies forth to undertake the road and way of the spirit... which is called by another name, the way of illumination or of infused contemplation, with which God on his
own accord is nourishing and refreshing the soul, without discursiveness or any active assistance of the soul itself. 

The last stage of the "noche oscura," the passive night of the spirit, is the darkest and most horrifying one. Juan's descriptions of its experience are shuddering. However, the subject undergoing this final stage of purification is coming ever closer to his objective. This last phase of the night may be looked upon as an ultimate intellectual and volitional conditioning. The entire experience of the night, as we have seen, is ordered to transforming man's powers that they may be enabled to form increasingly higher and more perfect acts of knowledge and love. The trajectory leads to the "way of illumination" mentioned above, the "vía iluminativa," which we can also call by another phrase a cognitive via eminentiae. Having reached its term, the soul has become "drawn out of its natural limits and functionings, and has been raised above itself." 

Those who have undergone all but the last stage of the night must still be ridded of what Juan de la Cruz calls "la hebetudo mentis," a certain natural dullness of mind "that all men contract by sin," regarding which the soil "must become enlightened, refined and collected..." To the degree to which this spiritualizing process is actualized, man's cognitive powers are expanded to embrace new horizons. The person undergoing this passive night of the spirit is pierced by "a divine light," or, what is the same, by "a divine ray of contemplation," which "darkens, voids and annihilates the soul of its passion concerning its particularized apprehensions and affections, with regards both to higher and lower things..." This divine ray "purges and illuminates with a divine spiritual light, without the soul being aware of its presence..." The communication itself is still imperceptible, that is, dazzling, as the soul is not yet sufficiently conditioned to perceive it. Having been still further purified, however, the subject "will have eyes to see, by the guidance of this light, the blessings of the divine light." 

Throughout this passive stage of the night, the conditioning of knowledge taking place is two-fold. On the one hand, there is the still imperceptible divine light which is preparing the soul for divine union. On the other hand, the powers of cognition are becoming ever keener. Thus, regarding this dark spiritual light by which the soul is assailed, when it has something on which to reverberate, that is, when something spiritual presents itself to be understood... then the soul sees and understands it much more clearly than before it dwelled in this darkness.... And this is the property of the spirit that is purged and annihilated with respect to all particularized affections and acts of cognition, that, in this state of not taking delight in nor understanding anything in particular, dwelling in emptiness and darkness, it has the capacity to embrace everything with great ease... 

Thus the natural powers of discernment and insight are further freed by the mind's state of impeccable cleanliness and utter serenity to perform sharper intellectual acts. "And it should not be understood that... [in this state] the soul loses the habitus of the acquired sciences which it had; for, rather, they become perfected in it with the possession of the more perfect habitus, that of supernatural science, which has been infused into it..."

As any other subject, the person undergoing this experience has continued to determine the psychological milieu in which he dwells and functions. In this instance, however, it has not
been a matter of establishing familiarity with certain things and distance from others. The selection has not been among things. In fact, upon looking at the things of the world, a distant and foreign sight appears before him, which appears in the description of our author as being something akin to a disjointed, surrealistic vision. The soul "goes about marveling at the things it sees and hears, which seem to it most peregrine and unusual, though they are the same ones which it used to deal with commonly. The reason for this is that the soul is now becoming alien and remote from common sense and common cognition of things..."123 In this midway condition between two states of being, "all things seem confining to this soul; it is beside itself but cannot be contained in either the heavens or the earth; it is filled with sorrows even unto darkness and gloom..."124

In the second book of the Noche oscura there begins a play between the concepts and images of darkness and light, of blindness and illumination, of the terrifying dismal fires of purgation and the refreshing flames of divine radiance and love. "Such is the work wrought in the soul by this night which veils the hopes of the light of day."125 Stylistically, San Juan has left us in this work an instance of the Baroque art of contrasting shadows and light, a veritable masterpiece in chiaroscuro. The balance between the contrasting elements, however, is not sustained. Rather, there is a gradual victory of the light over the darkness. What takes place from the darkness to the dawn is a conditioning of the intellect, which goes hand in hand with a parallel conditioning of the will, as the operations of the faculties are interdependent.126 The passage from an intellectual darkness to an enlightenment is superbly represented by the night turning to day, and the communication of God's love to the soul by the branch being kindled with fire.

A sustained operative principle in San Juan's presentation is that that which is received is received according to the mode of the receiver. If the objective is to receive God, the subject must become "so subtle and light and sheer that it can become one with the spirit of God."127 More specifically, the rational powers must become able to operate independently from the realm of materiality. At the same time, they retain and continue to employ their ordinary mode of operation. This condition allows the subject to apprehend God without mediation. On the encounter between the conditioned receiver, who is the soul, and the received, who is Christ, our author states:

And it is to be known that the sheerer a thing is in itself, the ampler and more capacious it is; and the more subtle and delicate it is, the more it is diffusive and communicative. The Word—that is, the touch which touches the soul— is infinitely subtle and delicate; and the soul is the ample and capacious vessel thanks to the great sheerness and purification which belongs to it in this state. Oh, then, thou delicate touch, that thou dost infuse thyself as copiously and abundantly into my soul as thou hast of greater substance and my soul of greater purity!128

The dark night of the soul should be looked upon as a conditioning of the entire person, all levels of his human nature included. It is a process in which all human powers cooperate and all are in turn affected. Beginning with control over external and internal perception, the process culminates in a thorough transformation of the subject's knowing and loving activities. With respect to cognitive operations, the conditioning of the dark night frees man from the limitations inherent in his knowledge which stem, first of all, from affective disorders, and secondly, from the ties which bind ordinary noetic processes to materiality. During the first stages, the conditioning takes place through control exercised by the subject himself as agent. The active stages of the dark night, in fact, can be considered as being no different in essence
than other instances of human self-conditioning. In the later stages of this process, intellectual operations are further brought to perfection by divine efficacy. The passage through this night entails untold struggles and trials. However, San Juan's programme is "todo y nada," that is, "all and nothing:" negation grounded in and for the sake of affirmation. He must suffer the rigours and darkness of the night for the sake of the luminosity of the dawn. Our Castilian Carmelite of delicate sensibility and iron will is to be satisfied with nothing less. And thus, at the apex of the ascent, after a most thorough and radical conditioning, the communication of infused knowledge, once dark and imperceptible, becomes manifest, revealing directly the countenance of God.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. "...[la] primera noche pertenece a los principiantes al tiempo que Dios los comienza a poner en el estado de contemplación, de la cual también participa el espíritu, según diremos a su tiempo. Y la segunda noche o purificación pertenece a los ya aprovechados al tiempo que Dios los quiere ya comenzar a poner en el estado de la unión con Dios; y ésta es más oscura y tenebrosa y terrible purgación, según se dirá después." SI, 1, 3.

In the following chapter, it is stated that: "Por tres cosas podemos decir que se llama noche este tránsito que hace el alma a la unión de Dios: La primera, por parte del término de donde el alma sale, porque ha de ir careciendo el apetito del gusto de todas las cosas del mundo que poseía, en negación de ellas; la cual negación y carencia es como noche para todos los sentidos del hombre. La segunda, por parte del medio o camino por donde ha de ir el alma a esta unión, lo cual es la fe, que es también oscura para el entendimiento como noche. La tercera, por parte del término a donde va, que es Dios, el cual ni más ni menos es noche oscura para el alma en esta vida. Las cuales tres noches han de pasar por el alma, o por mejor decir, el alma por ellas, para venir a la divina unión con Dios." SI, 2, 1. "Y pasada esta tercera noche, que es acabarse de hacer la comunicación de Dios en el espíritu, que se hace ordinariamente en gran tenebria del alma, luego se sigue la unión con la esposa, que es la Sabiduría de Dios.... Estas tres partes de noche todas son una noche; pero tiene tres partes como la noche, porque la primera, que es la del sentido, se compara a la primera noche, que es cuando se acaba de carecer del objeto de las cosas; y la segunda, que es la fe, se compara a la medianoche, que totalmente es oscura; y la tercera, al despídiente, que es Dios, la cual es ya inmediata a la luz del día. Y, para que mejor lo entendamos, iremos tratando de cada una de estas causas de por sí." Ibid., 4-5.

2. Juan de la Cruz's development of the active night has been of interest to persons of many different backgrounds and orientations, some of whom have been agnostics. San Juan's presentations have also been related extensively to various modern and contemporary trends of thought. For a discussion by a psychiatrist of the development of the interior life, with many references to Juan de la Cruz, see Thomas Verner Moore, The Life of Man with God (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956). A well-known analysis from a Hegelian perspective is the previously cited work by George Morel, Le sens de l'existence selon saint Jean de la Croix. A work examining the Subida from a dialectical materialist perspective is Manuel Balleserto's San Juan de la Cruz de la angustia al olvido, Historia, Ciencia, Sociedad, n. 138 (Barcelona: Ediciones 62, 1977). Also worthy of note is the volume edited by Lucien-Marie, O.C.D. and Jacques-Marie Petit, O.C.D., Actualité de Jean de la Croix: recueil des études présentées au Congres de la Plesse (Angers) (Paris: Desclée, 1970). The papers presented at said congress manifest the recent interest in relating San Juan's thought to contemporary intellectual currents, as well as to forms of non-Christian mysticism. Also of interest is Luigi Borriello, O.C.D. and Giovanna della Croce, O.C.D., Conoscere Dio e la vocazione dell'uomo: linee di antropologia mistica in san Giovanni della Croce. Further bibliography may be found in Fernande Pepin, Saint Jean de la Croix: bibliographie et état présent des travaux (Québec: Université de Laval, 1968).

3. "...el principal agente y el guía y movedor de las almas en este negocio no son ellos, sino el Espíritu Santo." L, 3, 46.

4. "...para mover Dios al alma y levantarla del fin extremo de su baja al otro fin y extremo de su alteza en su divina unión, halo de hacer ordenadamente y suavemente y al modo
de la misma alma.... Y desta manera va Dios llevando al alma de grado en grado hasta lo más interior." SII,17,3-4. Commenting upon the verse of the "Noche oscura" which reads, "estando ya mi casa sosegada," it is stated that: "Por cuanto de dos maneras, por medio de aquella guerra de la oscura noche (como queda dicho), es combatida y purgada el alma, conviene a saber, según la parte sensitiva y la espiritual con sus sentidos, potencias y pasiones, también de dos maneras, conviene saber, según estas dos partes, sensitiva y espiritual con todas sus potencias y apetitos, viene el alma a conseguir paz y sosiego. Que por eso, como también queda dicho, repite dos veces este verso, conviene saber, en esta canción y la pasada, por razón destas dos porciones del alma, espiritual y sensitiva; las cuales, para poder ella salir a la divina unión de amor, conviene que estén primero reformadas, ordenadas y quietas acerca de lo sensitivo y espiritual conforme al modo del estado de la inosencia que había en Adán. Y así este verso, que en la primera canción es entendido del sosiego de la porción inferior y sensitiva, en esta segunda se entiende particularmente de la superior y espiritual; que por eso se ha repetido dos veces." MII,24,2.

5. SII,5,7; SII,5,2 and 7; SII,6,1-4; SIII,1,1; SIII,2; SIII,11; SIII,12,3; SIII,15,1; SIII,16,1; NI,14,4; NI,4,2; NI,12,6; NI,13,11; NI,21,11; C,19,4; C,20-21,4; C,26,5-11; C,27,7; C,31,10; C,38,3; C,39; L,1,17; L,2,33-34; L,3,18-22 and 77-78.

6. "...la privación del gusto en el apetito de todas las cosas, porque así como la noche no es otra cosa sino privación de la luz y, por consiguiente, de todos los objetos que se pueden ver mediante la luz, por cuál se queda la potencia visiva a escuras y sin nada, así también se puede decir que privándose el alma del gusto del apetito en todas las cosas, es quedarse como a escuras y sin nada. Porque, así como la potencia visiva mediante la luz se ceba y apacienta de los objetos que se pueden ver, y apagada la luz no se ven, así el alma mediante el apetito se apacienta y ceba de todas las cosas que según sus potencias se pueden gustar, el cual también apagado, o, por mejor decir, mortificado, deja el alma de apacentarse en el gusto de todas las cosas, y así se queda según el apetito a escuras y sin nada." SI,3,1. "...ha de ir careciendo el apetito del gusto de todas las cosas del mundo que poseía, en negación de ellas." SI,2,1. "De manera que el alma que hubiere negado y despedido de sí el gusto de todas las cosas, mortificando su apetito en ellas, podremos decir que está como de noche a escuras, lo cual no es otra cosa sino un vacío en ella de todas las cosas." Ibid., 2.

7. "...si lo que puede recibir por los sentidos ella lo desea y niega, bien podemos decir que se queda como a escuras y vacía... porque, aunque es verdad que no puede dejar de oír y ver y oler y gustar y sentir, no le hace más al caso ni le embaraza más al alma si lo niega y lo deseche, que si no lo viese ni lo oyese, etc.... No tratamos aquí del carecer de las cosas --porque eso no desnuda al alma si tiene apetito de ellas--, sino de la desnudez del gusto y apetito de ellas, que es la que deja al alma libre y vacía de ellas, aunque las tenga; porque no ocupan al alma las cosas de este mundo ni la dañan, pues no entra en ellas sino la voluntad y apetito de ellas que moran en ella." SII,3,4.

"It is not a question of contact with the object presented by the senses; rather, what is opposed to the dark night is the adherence of the will to the object or good with a view to satisfying the appetite or desire." Wojtyła, *Faith According to Saint John of the Cross*, p. 98. "San Juan de la Cruz no enseña a negar la naturaleza para dejar al alma helada; vacía el corazón de un amor imperfecto y bajo, pero es para llenarle de otro perfecto y noble que hermosea el alma." Crisólogo, *San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica...*, 2:47.

8. "Lo cual, aunque el hombre no hiciese por su Dios y lo que le obliga la perfección cristiana, por los provechos que temporalmente se le siguen (demás de los espirituales) había
de libertar perfectamente su corazón de todo gozo... pues... en quitar el gozo de los bienes temporales adquiere virtud de liberalidad.... De más esté, adquiere libertad de ánimo, claridad en la razón, sosiego, tranquilidad y confianza pacífica en Dios... adquiere más gozo y recreción en las criaturas con el desapropio dellos, el cual no se puede gozar en ellas si las mira con asimilación de propiedad, porque éste es un cuidado que como lazo ata al espíritu en la tierra y no le deja anchura de corazón..." SIII,20,2.

"...las virtudes por sí mismas merecen ser amadas y estimadas hablando humanamente... por lo que de bien humana y temporalmente importan al hombre; porque desta manera y por esto los filósofos y sabios y antiguos príncipes las estimaron y las alabaron y procuraron tener y ejercitar; y, aunque gentiles y que sólo ponían los ojos en ellas temporalmente por los bienes que temporal y corporal y naturalmente de ellas conocían seguhrseles, no sólo alcanzaban por ellas los bienes y nombre temporalmente que pretendían, sino, demás esté, Dios... les aumentaba la vida, honra y señorío y paz, como hizo en los romanos, porque usaban de justas leyes." SIII,27,3.

9. "...las pasiones ordenadas en razón y los apetitos mortificados." C,40,4. See also, C,20-21,7, wherein it is indicated that the objective is not to suppress the passions in themselves, as "la ira y la concupiscencia... nunca en el alma faltan." What is undesirable are "los molestos y desordenados actos de ellas."

In Scholastic philosophy, the passions of the soul have been considered to be eleven: love, hate; desire, aversion; joy, sorrow; hope, despair; daring, fear; anger. Saint John of the Cross, however, employs a shorter list consisting of final passions: joy, sorrow, fear and hope. Our author asserts that: "están tan aunadas y tan hermanadas entre sí estas cuatro pasiones del alma, que donde actualmente va la una, las otras también van virtualmente, y si la una se recoge actualmente, las otras tres virtualmente a la misma medida también se recogen; porque, si la voluntad se goza de alguna cosa, consiguientemente a esa misma medida la ha de esperar, y virtualmente va allí incluido el dolor y el temor acerca de ella.... Donde ha de advertir... que dondequiera que fuere una pasión de éstas irá también toda el alma y la voluntad y las demás potencias, y vivirán todas cautivas en la tal pasión... porque, en cuanto estas pasiones reinan, no dejan estar al alma con la tranquilidad y paz que se requiere para la sabiduría que natural y sobrenaturalmente puede recibir." SIII,16,5-6.

10. "...estas potencias, pasiones y apetitos endereza en Dios la voluntad y las desvía de todo lo que no es Dios..." SIII,16,2. See also, ibid., 1. The statement that "dondequiera que fuere una pasión de éstas irá también toda el alma y la voluntad y las demás potencias, y vivirán todas cautivas en la tal pasión" (SIII,16,6), is an example of Juan de la Cruz's sustained awareness of the interrelations among the psychological factors. The human supposit definitely forms an organic whole in the thought of our author. It follows from the quoted statement that to the degree to which the passions of the soul move toward one object, they move away from all others. What we particularly wish to draw attention to within this context is that a movement towards creatures or attachment to them without reference to God is consequently a movement away from God.

However, San Juan has yet another argument for the incompatibility between the love of God and the state of being psychologically bound to creatures. "La razón es porque dos contrarios, según nos enseña la filosofía, no pueden caber en un sujeto; y porque las tinieblas, que son las afeciones en las criaturas, y la luz, que es Dios, son contrarios y ninguna semejanza ni conveniencia tienen entre sí... De aquí es que en el alma no se puede asentar la luz de la divina unión si primero no se ahuyentan las afeciones de ella." Further: "Para que probemos mejor lo dicho, es de saber que la afición y asimilación que el alma tiene a la criatura iguala a la misma alma con la criatura, y cuanto mayor es la afición tanto más la iguala y hace semejante, porque el amor hace semejanza entre lo que ama y es amado." ST,4,2-3. See also, ST,6,1-2; ST,11,6.
11. "...el alma no se goce sino de lo que es puramente honra y gloria de Dios, ni tenga esperanza de otra cosa, ni se duele sino de lo que a esto tocare, ni tema sino sólo a Dios..." SIII,16,2. Similarly: "...se manda al hombre que todas las potencias y apetitos y operaciones y afecciones de su alma emplée en Dios... todo lo cual es gobernado por la voluntad." Ibid., 1-2. When the soul is advanced in moral perfection "las cuatro pasiones del alma todas las tiene ceñidas también a Dios; porque no se goza sino de Dios, ni tiene esperanza en otra cosa que en Dios, ni teme sino a Dios, ni duele sino según Dios, y también todos sus apetitos y cuidados van sólo a Dios." C,28,4. Emphasis added. See also C,40,4.

12. "...conocimiento natural... basta tener el ánimo libre de las pasiones del alma, según lo dice Boecio por estas palabras: Si vis claro lumine cernere verum, gaudia pelle, timorem spemque fugato, nec dolor adsit; esto es: si quieres con claridad natural conocer las verdades, echa de ti el gozo y el temor, y la esperanza y el dolor." SII,21,8. In a parallel text it is added that: "...porque en cuanto estas pasiones reinan, no dejan estar al alma con la tranquilidad y paz que se requiere para la sabiduría que natural y sobrenaturalmente puede recibir." SIII,16,6. The Boethius reference is to the De Consolatione Philosophiae, bk. II, and the phrase employed by San Juan is located in Patrologia Latina 63, 656-657.

The same principle is expressed in various other passages. "Lo tercero que hacen en el alma los apetitos es que la ciegan y escurren.... Y en eso mismo que se escurre según el entendimiento, se entorpece según la voluntad, y según la memoria se entorpece según la voluntad, y según la memoria se entorpece según la voluntad, y según la memoria se entorpece según la voluntad. Y en eso mismo que se escurre según el entendimiento, estando el impedido, claro está lo han de estar desordenadas y turbadas.... Ciega y escurre el apetito al alma, porque el apetito en cuanto apetito ciego es, porque la razón es siempre su mozo de ciego. Y de aquí es que todas las veces que el alma se guía por su apetito se ciega, porque es guiarle el que ve por el que no ve." SI,8,1-3.

13. "...podemos decir con verdad que de sensual se hace espiritual, de animal se hace racional, y aun que de hombre camina a porción angelical, y que de temporal y humano se hace divino y celestial." SIII,26,3. "...en quitar el gozo de los bienes temporales... adquiere libertad de ánimo, claridad en la razón, sosiego, tranquilidad... adquiere más gozo y recreación en las criaturas... adquiere más... clara noticia de ellas para entender bien las verdades acerca de ellas, así natural como sobrenaturalmente; por lo cual las gozas muy diferentemente que el que está asido a ellas, con grandes ventajas y mejorías, porque éste las gusta según la verdad de ellas, esotro según la mentira dellas, éste según lo mejor, esotro según lo peor: éste según la sustancia, esotro (que ase su sentido a ellas) según el accidente, porque el sentido no puede coger ni llegar más que al accidente, y el espíritu purgado de nubes y especie de accidente penetra la verdad y valor de las cosas, porque ése es su objeto. Por lo cual el gozo anubla el juicio como niebla, porque no puede haber gozo voluntario de criatura sin propiedad voluntaria, así como no puede haber gozo en cuanto es pasión, que no haya también propiedad habitual en el corazón; y la negación y purgación de tal gozo deja al juicio claro como al aire los vapores cuando se deshacen." SIII,20,2.

14. "...estos que tienen el espíritu purgado, con mucha facilidad naturalmente pueden conocer --y unos más que otros-- lo que hay en el corazón o espíritu interior, y las inclinaciones y talentos de las personas; y esto por indicios exteriores, aunque sean muy pequeños, como por palabras, movimientos y otras muestras..." SII,26,14. "Si purificas tu alma de extrañas posesiones y apetitos, entenderás en espíritu las cosas; y, si negares el apetito en ellas, gozarás de la verdad de ellas, entendiéndolo en ellas lo cierto." Dichos de luz y amor, n. 48. "...los bienes morales...consigo traen paz y tranquilidad, y recto y ordenado uso de la razón y operaciones acordadas." SIII,27,2. See also SIII,19,4. Conversely, from a certain dis-
orderly predisposition of the will "se sigue, por lo menos, desestima real de las demás cosas, porque, naturalmente, poniendo la estimación en una cosa, se recoge el corazón de las demás cosas en aquella que estima, y deste desprecio real es muy fácil caer en el intencional y voluntario de algunas cosas de esotras, en particular o en general, no sólo en el corazón, sino mostrándolo con la lengua, diciendo: tal o tal cosa, tal o tal persona no es como tal o tal."

SIII,22,2. Likewise, disorderly passions bring about "un embotamiento de la mente acerca de Dios, que le escurece los bienes de Dios, como la niebla escurece al aire para que no sea bien ilustrado de la luz del sol. Aunque no haya malignia concebida en el entendimiento del alma, sólo la concupiscencia y gozo... basta para hacer en ella este primer grado de este daño que es el embotamiento de la mente y la oscuridad del juicio para entender la verdad y juzgar bien de cada cosa como es."

SIII,19,3. "...el alma que de los apetitos está tomada, según el entendimiento está entenebrecida, y no da lugar para que ni el sol de la razón natural... la embista e ilustre de claro." SI,8,1. "Cría este gozo espíritu de confusión algunas veces e insensibilidad acerca de la conciencia y del espíritu, por cuanto debilita mucho la razón y la pone de suerte que no sepa tomar buen consejo ni darle, y queda incapaz para los bienes espirituales y morales, y inútil como un vaso quebrado." SIII,25,6. See also SI,12,3-5 where it is discussed how an act of virtue causes light and understanding in the soul; whereas conversely, an act of disordered appetite brings about darkness and blindness. Also, SI,5,5; SIII,22,5; SIII,25; L.3. 74-75.

15. "...pensamientos y noticias de la memoria... y en esto tiene gran disposición para la sabiduría humana y divina." SIII,6,1. "...acertar mejor a juzgar de ellas y ponerles remedio conveniente." Ibid., 3.


17. "Así como el caminante, que, para ir a nuevas tierras no sabidas, va por caminos nuevos no sabidos ni experimentados, que camina no guiado por lo que sabía antes, sino en dudas y por el dicho de otros, y claro está que éste no podría venir a nuevas tierras ni saber más de lo que antes sabía, si no fuera por caminos nuevos nunca sabidos, y dejados los que sabía. Ni más ni menos el que va sabiendo más particularidades en un oficio o arte, siempre va a escuras, no por su saber primero, porque, si áquel no dejase atrás, nunca saldría del ni aprovecharía en más." MI, 16,8.

18. Aquinas tells us that cognitive or contemplative activity "quantum ad ipsam essentiam actionis, pertinent ad intellectum: quantum autem ad id quod movet ad exercendum talem operationem, pertinent ad voluntatem, quae movet omnes alias potentias, et etiam intellectum, ad suum actum. " Summa Theologiae, II-II,180,1, res. "Dicitur autem amor discernere, inquantum movet rationem ad discernendum." Ibid., 47,1, ad 1. Also, I,82, ad 4 and II-II,9, ad 1.

19. "...guardar las puertas del alma, que son los sentidos." SIII,23,3.

20. "Sólo lo que toca al propósito de cómo se ha de haber la memoria acerca de [las noticias espirituales]... digo que... cuando le hicieren buen efecto se puede acordar de ellas... pero si no le causa el acordarse de ellas buen efecto, nunca quiera pasarlas por la memoria." SIII,14,2. "Y de todas estas noticias y formas se ha de desnudar y vaciar, y procurar perder la aprehensión imaginaria de ellas, de manera que en ella no le dejen impresa noticia ni rastro de cosa, sino que se quede calva y rasa, como si no hubiese pasado por ella, olvidada y suspendida de todo." SIII,2,4. Also, SII4,4; SII1,11; SI1,12,8; SIII,2,13-14; SIII,3,4; SIII,15,1.
21. See chapter III, p. 43 and notes 59, 60 and 61.


23. "...más vive el alma adonde ama que donde anima." C,11,10. "...es de saber que el alma más vive donde ama que en el cuerpo donde anima, porque en el cuerpo ella no tiene su vida, antes ella la da al cuerpo, y ella vive por amor en lo que ama." C,8,3. Also, SIII,16,6.

24. "...el alma que ama a Dios más vive en la otra vida que en ésta." C,11,10.

25. "Hay almas que se revuelcan en el cieno como los animales que se revuelcan en él, y otras que vuelan como las aves, que en el aire se purifican y limpian." *Dichos de luz y amor*, n. 98.

26. "...la evocación está regulada por la ley psicológica de reintegración: *todo el pasado psicológico tiende a revivir y se reproduce en la medida en que dicho estado se compone con las tendencias actuales*. Y tampoco debe olvidarse la del interés: *un proceso tiende a reintegrarse con tanta más perfección, cuanto corresponde mejor a los intereses de la persona*. Todo lo que nos cautiva e interesa, se esculpe y se graba mejor en la conciencia y se reproduce con más frecuencia y facilidad, merced a aquel *glutinum amoris* agustiniano, con que se pegan al espíritu." Capánaga, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

27. "...alzar de obra la armonía de los sentidos y potencias interiores..." M,14,1. "En toda vida armónica, amor y conocimiento tienden a igualarse, es decir, a compenetrarse mutuamente.... Así puede formularse la siguiente ley: Cuando es más perfecta la vida psicológica, hay una mayor compenetración y armonía de las potencias, porque hay mayor unidad y en proporción de la unidad, crece la compenetración de las diversas actividades. Cuando es más perfecto el amor, es más luminoso y racional, adecuándose al orden objetivo del ser. Y la sabiduría cuanto es más elevada, más se nutre de amor." Capánaga, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

28. "...como nosotros estamos, pensamos que están los otros, y como somos, juzgamos a los demás saliendo el juicio y comenzando de nosotros mismos y no de fuera; y así, el ladrón piensa que los otros también hurtan; y el lujurioso piensa que los otros lo son de su condición; y el malicioso, que los otros son maliciosos, saliendo aquel juicio de su malicia; y el bueno piensa bien de los demás, saliendo aquel juicio de la bondad que él tiene en sí concebida; el que es descuidado y dormido, parécele que los otros lo son. Y de aquí es que, cuando nosotros estamos descuidados y dormidos delante de Dios, nos parezca que Dios es el que está dormido y descuidado de nosotros...." L,4,8.

29. "...cualquier cosa que se recibe está en el recipiente del modo que lo recibe." MII,16,4. Similarly: "como dice el Filósofo, cualquier cosa que se recibe está en el recipiente al modo del mismo recipiente." M,4,2. And again: "como dicen los filósofos, «cualquier cosa que se recibe está en el recipiente al modo que se ha el recipiente»." L,3,34. This axiom was common property within medieval speculation, and was generally formulated thusly: *quiquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur; or: quod enim recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo secundum modum recipientis*. San Juan likely considered this notion as an extension of the Aristotelian doctrine concerning the potential and the actual. Within Neoplatonic thought, this axiom expressed a fundamental law in the theory of participation. See, *De Causis*, Proposition XII, n. 103 and Aquinas' *In librum de Causis Expositio*, n. 274. Regarding Aquinas' sources for the axiom, consult R. J. Henle, *St. Thomas and Platonism* (The Hague: Martinue Nijhoff,
Juan de la Cruz could have easily and often encountered its usage in the writings of Aquinas. See, for example, Summa Theologiae I,12,11c; 75,5c; 79,6c; 84,1c; 89,4c; III,11,5c; Summa Contra Gentiles I,43; De Potentia Dei, 7,10; In I Sententis, 8,5,3 sol.; In III Sententis, 13,1,2, sol. 2.

In a less speculative passage, San Juan uses a very simple image to illustrate his point regarding the conditioned character of knowledge: "Lo cual tambien se entendera por esta comparacion: Esta una imagen muy perfecta con muchos y muy subidos primores y delicados y sutiles esmaltes, y algunos tan primos y tan sutiles, que no se pueden bien acabar de determinar por su delicadez y excelencia; a esta imagen, el que tuviere menos clara y purificada vista, menos primores y delicadez echara de ver en la imagen, y el que la tuviere algo mas pura echara de ver mas primores y perfecciones en ella; y si otro la tuviere aun mas pura, vera aun mas perfeccion, y, finalmente, el que mas clara y limpia potencia tuviere ira viendo mas primores y perfecciones..." SII,5,9.

30. "Pero esto tiene la fuerza y vehemencia del amor, que todo le parece posible y todos le parece que andan en lo mismo que anda el, porque no cree que hay otra cosa en que nadie se deba emplear ni buscar sino a quien ella busca y a quien ella ama; pareciéndole que no hay otra cosa que querer ni en qué se emplear sino en aquello, y que tambien todos andan en aquello." MI,13,7.

31. "...la malicia no comprende a la bondad, ni la pobreza a las riquezas." L,1,23. "... los sabios de Dios y los sabios del mundo, los unos son insipientes para los otros, porque ni los unos pueden percibir la sabiduría de Dios y ciencia, ni los otros la del mundo..." C,26,13. Also, L,3,73-74.

32. "...está tan inocente, que no entiende el mal ni cosa juzga a mal, y oirá cosas muy malas y las verá con sus ojos y no podrá entender que lo son, porque no tiene en sí hábito del mal por donde lo juzgar, habiéndole Dios raído los hábitos imperfectos y la ignorancia (en que cae el mal del pecado) con el hábito perfecto de la verdadera sabiduría..." C,26,14.

33. "Di esto al mundo. Mas no lo quieras decir al mundo, porque no sabe de aire delgado y no te sentirá..." L,2,17.

34. "...los objetos y las noticias feas no les hacen... impresión..." SIII,23,4.

35. "De donde al limpio todo lo alto y lo bajo le hace más bien y le sirve para más limpieza, así como el impuro, de lo uno y lo otro, mediante su impureza, suele sacar mal..." SIII,26,6. "...de parte del ojo ya purgado en los gozos de ver se le sigue al alma gozo espiritual, enderezado a Dios en todo cuanto ve, ahora sea divino, ahora profano lo que ve... Porque, así como en el estado de la inocencia a nuestros primeros padres todo cuanto veían y hablaban y comían en el paraíso les servía para mayor sabor de contemplación, por tener ellos bien sujeta y ordenada la parte sensitiva a la razón, así el que tiene el sentido purgado y sujeto al espíritu de todas las cosas sensibles desde el primer movimiento saca deleite de sabrosa advertencia y contemplación de Dios." SIII,26,5.

36. "Esta alma poco se entrometerá en las cosas ajenas, porque aun de las suyas no se acuerda. Porque esta propiedad tiene el espíritu de Dios en el alma donde mora, que luego la inclina a ignorar y no querer saber cosas ajenas, aquellas mayormente que no son para su aprovechamiento." C,26,15.

37. "...tiniendo perdido el gusto y el apetito, de todos los manjares fastidia y todas las cosas le molestan y enojan; sólo en todas las cosas que se le ofrecen al pensamiento o a la vista
tiene presente un sólo apetito y deseo, que es de su salud, y todo lo que a esto no hace le es molesto y pesado." C,10,1. "Y añádese a esta pena la molestia que a este tiempo recibe en cualquiera manera de trato o comunicación de las criaturas, que es muy grande, porque, como ella está con aquella gran fuerza de deseo abisal por la unión de Dios, cualquiera entretenimiento le es gravísimo y molesto." C,17,1. "...y es que tiene perdido el gusto a todas las cosas," and "todas ellas le son molestas, y cualesquiera tratos pesados y enojosos..." C,10,1.

38. It is clear that at any given moment "el alma no puede advertir más que una cosa..." SIII,5,3.

39. "...el alma no tiene más que una voluntad, y ésta, si se embaraza y emplea en algo, no queda libre..." SI,11,6. "...no puede uno poner los ojos de la estimación en una cosa que no los quite de las demás..." SIII,22,2.

40. Cf. SI,12,5.


42. See Polanyi, The Study of Man, pp. 29-32, and The Tacit Dimension, pp. 9-12.

43. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, p. 18. "We meet with another indication of the wide functions of indwelling when we find acceptance to moral teachings described as their interiorization. To interiorize is to identify ourselves with the teachings in question, by making them function as the proximal term of a tacit moral teaching, as applied in practice. This establishes the tacit framework for our moral acts and judgements. And we can trace this kind of indwelling to logically similar acts in the practice of science." Ibid., p. 17.

44. Polanyi, Knowledge and Being, p. 179.


46. "All thought contains components of which we are subsidiarily aware in the focal content of our thinking, and all thought dwells in its subsidiaries, as if they were parts of our body... It has a from-to structure." Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, p. x. Also, see p. 55.

47. "...each new step can be achieved only by entrusting oneself... to a teacher or leader. St. Augustine observed this, when he taught: «Unless you believe, you shall not understand.» It appears then that traditionalism, which requires us to believe before we know, and in order that we may know, is based on a deeper insight into the nature of knowledge and of the communication of knowledge than is a scientific rationalism that would permit us to believe only explicit statements based on tangible data and derived from these by a formal inference, open to repeated testing." Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, pp. 61-62.
48. Polanyi, *The Study of Man*, p. 34. Thus, "knowledge is shaped by the knower's personal action." *Ibid.*, p. 28. It is recognized that "the structure of tacit knowing is Polanyi's major epistemological insight, and his analysis of scientific discovery as an integration of subsidiary clues to achieve a new coherence which becomes their focal object makes decisive the personal participation of the knower in all knowledge." Joseph Kroger, *op. cit.*, p. 2. At the same time, however, there is avoided the danger of pure subjectivity: "...any attempt to avoid responsibility for shaping the beliefs which we accept as true is absurd; but the existentialist claim of choosing our beliefs from zero is now proved absurd too. Thought can live only on grounds which we adopt in the service of a reality to which we submit." *The Tacit Dimension*, p. xi. See also, *ibid.*, p. 77, as well as *The Study of Man*, pp. 27 and 36.

49. For a synopsis of this aspect of Polanyi's thought, see Robert Innis, *op. cit.*, pp. 396-399.


51. "...según regla de filosofía, todos los medios han de ser proporcionados al fin, es a saber: que han de tener alguna conveniencia y semejanza con el fin, tal que baste y sea suficiente para que por ello se pueda conseguir el fin que se pretende. Pongo ejemplo: ...Hase de juntar y unir el fuego en el madero. Es necesario que el calor, que es el medio, disponga al madero primero con tantos grados de calor, que tenga gran semejanza y proporción con el fuego. De donde, si quisiessen disponer al madero con otro medio que el propio, que es el calor, así como con aire, agua o tierra, sería imposible que el madero se pudiera unir con el fuego; así como también lo sería llegar a la ciudad si no va por el propio camino que junta con ella. De donde para que el entendimiento se venga a unir en esta vida con Dios según se puede, necesariamente ha de tomar aquel medio que junta con El y tiene con El próxima semejanza.

"En lo cual hemos de advertir que, entre todas las criaturas superiores ni inferiores, ninguna hay que próximamente junte con Dios ni tenga semejanza con su ser, porque, aunque es verdad que todas ellas tienen, como dicen los teólogos, cierta relación a Dios y rastro de Dios, --unas más y otras menos, según su más principal o menos principal ser--, de Dios a ellas ningún respecto hay ni semejanza esencial, antes la distancia que hay entre su divino ser y el de ellas es infinita; y por eso es imposible que el entendimiento pueda dar en Dios por medio de las criaturas, ahora sean celestiales, ahora terrestres, por cuanto no hay proporción de semejanza." SII,8,2-3.

Throughout the ages of Christian speculation the relationship of analogy between uncreated and created being has been interpreted with varying emphases. We cite a synopsis by Etienne Gilson presenting two major positions:

"Dans la doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin l'analogie renferme en soi et hiérarchise une signification platonicienne et une signification aristotélicienne. Pour satisfaire aux exigences de l'exemplarisme, elle désigne la dépendance et la parenté qui unit les choses particulières à leur modèles éternels; mais, pour satisfaire aux exigences de la logique aristotélicienne, elle sépare l'analogie de l'univoque par une infranchissable ligne de démarcation. Ainsi, lorsqu'on laisse aux termes dont usait saint Thomas la valeur qu'il leur attribuait lui-même, on désigne un rapport de dissimilation non moins que de ressemblance lorsqu'on affirme qu'un être est analogue à un autre être. Mais il faut aller plus loin. Préoccupé surtout de fermer toutes les voies qui conduisent au panthéisme et d'interdire toute communication substantielle d'être entre Dieu et la créature, saint Thomas insiste toujours beaucoup plus volontiers sur la signification séparatrice de l'analogie que sur sa signification unitive. Cette tendance fondamentale de sa pensée se fait jour dès ses premières œuvres et s'affirme d'une manière saisissante des le *Commentaire sur les Sentences*; à l'analogie augustinienne qui relie, rattaché,
cherche toujours des communautés d’origine pour assigner des ressemblances de parenté, saint Thomas oppose l’analogie aristotélicienne qui sépare, distingue, confère aux êtres créés une substantialité et une suffisance relatives, en même temps qu’elle les exclut définitivement de l’être divin." La philosophie de saint Bonaventure, pp. 189-190.

A collective viewing of the Sanjuanist passages on this matter reveals that both the perspectives referred to by Gilson are present in Juan de la Cruz. In C,4,1, C,8,1 and 3, and C,6,1-2, he stresses connection and resemblance. On the other hand, SII,8,3 emphasizes the lack of substantial community and essential similitude between God and creatures. All things considered, it appears that San Juan leans toward St. Thomas’ position. The stance becomes further manifested by his insistence upon the inability of human cognitive powers to reach God on their own, whether by reasoning or any form of prayer, no matter how lofty these be. As there is no great chain of being leading all the way to God, consequently "no hay escalera con que el entendimiento pueda llegar a este alto Señor entre todas las cosas criadas y que pueden caer en entendimiento." SII,8,7. The stress is upon the fundamental disproportionality between created and uncreated being.

It is sufficient to note that, far from approaching the extreme emphasis upon analogy of proportionality that is found within followers of Cajetan, San Juan seems to possess an understanding of analogy more in accord with that developed by St. Thomas, which is both flexible yet capable of precision. For an examination of St. Thomas' teaching, see Bernard Montagnes, La doctrine de l’analogie de l’être d’après saint Thomas d’Aquin (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1963), especially, pp. 93-168.


53. "...todo lo que la imaginación puede imaginar y el entendimiento recibir y entender en esta vida no es ni puede ser medio próximo para unión de Dios... como quiera que el entendimiento no puede entender cosa si no es lo que cabe y está debajo de las formas y fantasía de las cosas que por los sentidos corporales se reciben --las cuales cosas, habemos ya dicho, no pueden servir de medio-- no se puede aprovechar de la inteligencia natural... Porque todo lo que puede entender el entendimiento y gustar la voluntad y fabricar la imaginación es muy disímil y desproportionado (como habemos dicho) a Dios." SII,8,4-5.

Similarly, "ignorante es el sentido corporal de las cosas racionales y aun más (digo) espirituales... porque todas aquellas cosas corporales no tienen, como habemos dicho, proporción alguna con las espirituales." SII,11,2-3. "...el sentido de la parte inferior del hombre... no es ni puede ser capaz de conocer ni comprender a Dios como Dios es; de manera que ni el ojo le puede ver ni cosa que se parezca a El, ni el oído puede oír voz ni sonido que se le parezca, ni el olfato puede oler olor tan suave, ni el gusto alcanza sabor tan subido y sabroso, ni el tacto puede sentir toque tan delicado y tan deleitable ni cosa semejante; ni puede caer en pensamiento ni imaginación su forma, ni figura alguna que le represente." SIII,24,2. "...las criaturas, ahora terrenas, ahora celestiales, y todas las noticias e imágenes distintas, naturales y sobrenaturales, que pueden caer en las potencias del alma, por altas que sean ellas en esta vida, ninguna comparación ni proporción tienen con el ser de Dios, por cuanto Dios no cae debajo de género y especie, y ellas sí, como dicen los teólogos, y el alma en esta vida no es capaz de recibir clara y distintamente sino lo que cae debajo de genero y especie." SIII,12,1. "Y está claro, porque si es espiritú, ya no cae en sentido, y si es que puede comprenderlo el sentido, ya no es puro espiritú, porque cuanto más de ello puede saber el sentido y aprehensión natural, tanto menos tiene de espiritú y de sobrenatural." SII,17,5. "...la parte sensitiva no tiene habilidad para lo que es puro espiritú." MI,9,4. "De aquí queda ahora más claro que lo que para esta unión, como decíamos, no es el entender del alma, ni gustar, ni sentir, ni imaginar de Dios ni de otra cualquier cosa..." SII,5,8. Thus it is that "todo lo que de Dios en esta vida se puede conocer, por mucho que sea, no es conocimiento de vero, porque es conocimiento en parte y muy remoto..." C,6,5. Also, SII,16,7 and L,3,48.
54. "...we find the sanjuanist fear being expressed: making God a creature by thinking we can know him perfectly and fully. As he no doubt had seen personally some of the religious enthusiasts of his time reduce God to a «vision» or a power of healing or a «feeling,» Juan is most careful in his own approach. Here he praises the one who does not try to make God into someone or something that one can grasp and control. Whatever one knows of God is to be constantly surpassed, according to Fray Juan, and then one need not be concerned about worshipping a false god." Richard P. Hardy, op. cit., pp. 260-261.

55. For an environment in which to pray, "aquel lugar se debe escoger que menos ocupe y lleve tras sí el sentido; y así no ha de ser lugar ameno y deleitable al sentido, como suelen procurar algunos, porque, en vez de recoger a Dios el espíritu, no pare en recreación y gusto y sabor del sentido; y por eso es bueno lugar solitario, y aun áspero, para que el espíritu sólida y derechamente suba a Dios no impedido ni detenido en las cosas visibles...." One should thus select "el lugar más libre de objetos y jugos sensibles..." SIII,39,2-3. "Debes, pues... escoger el lugar más apartado y solitario que pudieres..." SIII,40,2. Also, SIII,40,1-2 and SIII,36,3.

Regarding the instrumentality of the work of art, the statements are similar. "La persona devota de veras, en lo invisible principalmente pone su devoción, y pocas imágenes ha menester y de pocas usa, y de aquéllas que más se conforman con lo divino que con lo humano..." SIII,35,5. "Por lo tanto, tenga el fiel este cuidado, que en viendo la imagen no quiera embeber el sentido en ella, ahora sea corporal la imagen, ahora imaginaria; ahora de hermosa hechura, ahora de rico atavío.... No haciendo caso de nada de estos accidentes, no repare más en ella, sino luego levante de ahí la mente a lo que representa..." SIII,37,2.

It should be indicated again that the objective is not deprivation from perception, but emancipation from being psychologically bound to it. Thus our author states that if one's response to perception is such that "todas las veces que oyendo músicas o otras cosas, y viendo cosas agradables, y oliendo suaves olores, y gustando algunos sabores y delicados toques, luego al primer movimiento se pone la noticia y afección de la voluntad en Dios... en esta manera se puede usar, porque entonces sirven los sensibles al fin para que Dios los crió y dio, que es para ser por ellos mas amado y conocido. Y es aquí de saber que aquel a quien estos sensibles hacen el puro efecto espíritual que digo, no por eso tiene apetito, ni se le da casi nada por ellos (aunque cuando se le ofrecen le dan mucho gusto)..." SIII,24,5.

56. "El tercer daño que se sigue al alma por vía de las aprehensiones naturales de la memoria, es privativo, porque la pueden impedir el bien moral y privar del espíritu..... Y de esto cada momento sacamos experiencia, pues vemos que, cada vez que el alma se pone a pensar alguna cosa, queda movida o alterada, o en poco o en mucho, acerca de aquella cosa, según es la aprehensión: si pesada y molesta, saca tristeza u odio, etcétera; si agradable, saca apetito y gozo, etc. De donde, por fuerza, ha de salir después turbación en la mudanza de aquella aprehensión, y así, ahora tiene gozos, ahora tristezas, ahora odio, ahora amor, y no puede perseverar siempre de una manera (que es el efecto de la tranquilidad moral) si no es cuando procura olvidar todas las cosas." SIII,5,1-2. Also, SIII,4,2. At the same time, images present in the imagination and memory are veils which impede apprehending God: "...no puede la memoria estar juntamente unida en Dios y en las formas y noticias distintas.... Dios no tiene forma ni imagen que pueda ser comprendida de la memoria." SIII,2,4. "...para que el alma se venga a unir con Dios en esperanza, ha de renunciar toda posesión de la memoria... nada ha de haber en la memoria que no sea Dios; y como (también habemos dicho) ninguna forma, ni figura, ni imagen, ni otra noticia que pueda caer en la memoria sea Dios ni semejante a El, ahora celestial, ahora terrena, natural o sobrenatural.... Luego necesario le es al alma quedarse desnuda y olvidada de formas y noticias distintas...." SIII,11,1-2.

The stance regarding imagination and memory has consequences pertinent to the practice of meditation. "[A] estas dos potencias [imaginativa y fantasía] pertenece la
meditación, que es acto discursivo por medio de imágenes, formas y figuras, fabricadas por los dichos sentidos..." As all other forms of knowledge involving phantasms or discursiveness, the activity of meditation should gradually be left behind. "Todas las cuales imaginaciones se han de vaciar del alma, quedándose a escuras según este sentido, para llegar a la divina unión, por cuanto no pueden tener alguna proporción de pródigo medio con Dios tampoco, como las corporales que sirven de objeto a los cinco sentidos exteriores." SII,12,3. See also, SII,12,5-8; M,1,1; M,6,6; M,9,8; M,10,1; L,3,32ff.

57. "...grandemente se estorba una alma para venitir a este alto estado de unión con Dios cuando se ase a algún entender, o sentir, o imaginar, o parecer, o voluntad, o modo suyo, o cualquiera otra cosa o obra propia." SII,4,4. See also, ibid., 5. "Y así, a la medida que va llegando más al espíritu acerca del trato con Dios, se va más desnudando y vaciando de las vías del sentido, que son las del discurso y meditación imaginaria." SII,17,5. "...cuanlo el alma se pone más en espíritu, más cesa en obra de las potencias en actos particulares, porque se pone ella más en un acto general y puro, y así, cesan de obrar las potencias que caminaban para aquello donde el alma llegó, así como cesan y paran los pies acabando su jornada." SII, 12,6. See also, ibid., 7 and M,6,6.

58. Regarding acts of knowledge communicated supernaturally, it is said that "todas estas aprehensiones y visiones imaginarias y otras cualesquiera formas o especies, como ellas se ofrezcan debajo de forma o imagen o alguna inteligencia particular... el entendimiento no se ha de embarazar ni cebar en ellas, ni las ha el alma de querer admitir ni tener.... Y desto la razón es porque todas estas formas ya dichas siempre en su aprehensión se representan (según habemos dicho) debajo de algunas maneras y modos limitados, y la Sabiduría de Dios, en que se ha de unir el entendimiento, ningún modo ni manera tiene ni cae debajo de algun límite ni inteligencia distinta y particularmente, porque totalmente es pura y sencilla." SII,16,6-7. Also, ibid., 11-12; SII,17,9. Acts of intelligibility communicated supernaturally free of phantasms are to be handled in the same way. "Destas, pues, también... nos conviene desembarazar aquí el entendimiento, encaminándole y enderezándole por ellas en la noche espiritual de la fe a la divina y sustancial unión de Dios..." SII,23,4. As we saw earlier, this category of noetic acts is subdivided into "visions," "revelations," "locutions" and "spiritual feelings." Chapters 24 through 32 of Subida II give guidelines regarding how each of these supernaturally communicated noetic acts should be dealt with.

59. "...bueno es lugar solitario, y aun áspero..." SIII,39,2.

60. "Une sorte de sympathie mystérieuse unit saint Jean de la Croix et la nuit; elle l'incite à un état tout particulier d'exaltation intérieure et de réceptivité extatique. Il y a adhésion profonde entre lui et la beauté cosmique; elle s'intensifie dans l'ambiance nocturne, c'est-à-dire dans l'absence des réalités trop directement perceptibles ou plutôt au contact de réalités transposées dans une poétisation supra-terrestre et symbolique qui le dispose tout simplement vers le surnaturel." Florisoone, op. cit., p. 26. On this issue, see also chapter III, note 73.


62. "...a los principiantes bien se les permite y aun les conviene tener algún gusto y jugo sensible acerca de las imágenes, oratorios y otras cosas devotas visibles, por cuanto aún no tienen... desarrimado el paladar de las cosas del siglo.... Pero, para ir adelante, también se ha de desnudar el espiritual de todos esos gustos y apetitos en que la voluntad puede gozarse,
porque el puro espíritu muy poco se ata a nada de esos objetos... que, aunque se aprovecha de las imágenes y oratorios, es muy de paso, y luego para su espíritu en Dios, olvidado de todo lo sensible." SIII,39,1. See also, SII,17,3-4.

63. "Que saint Jean de la Croix ait été particulièrement sensible à l'art et ait su l'appré-cier, cela est bien prouvé; qu'il admette et recommande l'utilisation de l'œuvre d'art comme moyen habituel de sanctification, cela aussi est sûr.... Mais il pose les limites de ce goû... a la ruine de la beauté, loin d'amputer le spirituel de la fine pointe de la sensibilité, il fait concourir le sentiment esthétique et l'exaltation naturelle de l'homme vers la beauté, à la conquête de la mortification. C'est méthode de pur artiste, d'authentique manieur de ciseau, de masse et de maillet qu'une telle méthode d'ascétique et de mystique, et en même temps, qui plus est, c'est une méthode de direction et d'affinement de la sensibilité elle-même. Celle-ci s'épure en même temps que l'âme, et quand elle sera entièrement débarrassée de tous les troubles des passions sensuelles, elle accédera à la totale perception de la beauté." Ibid., pp. 138-139.

64. SIII,15,2.

65. "...aunque es bueno gustar de tener aquellas imágenes que ayuden al alma a más devoción (por lo cual siempre se han de escoger las que más mueven), pero no es perfección estar tan asida a ellas que con propiedad las posea, de manera que, si se las quitasen, se entristezca." SIII,35,5. "...por estar unas [imágenes] más al propio que otras y excitar más la devoción unas que otras, conviene aficionarse más a unas que a otras por esta causa sólo... y no... de manera que lo que ha de llevar el espíritu volando por allí a Dios... se lo coma todo el sentido, estando todo engol... de negocio tan alto..." SIII,2,1-2.
Speaking of spiritual directors lacking in subtlety regarding these issues, San Juan states: "...no entendiendo los grados de oración ni vías del espíritu, no echan de ver que aquellos actos que ellos dicen que haga el alma y el quererla hacer caminar con el discurso está ya hecho, pues ya aquella alma ha llegado a la negación y silencio del discurso y ha llegado a la vía del espíritu, que es la contemplación, en la cual cesa la operación del sentido y del discurso propio del alma..." L,3,44.

Employing a clever pun, Eugenio D'Ors states: "Pidiendo excusa por el humor, y sólo para entendimiento de españoles, cabría decir que nuestro poeta no es un noctámbulo, sino el sereno de la «noche oscura del alma»." Estilos de pensar (Madrid: Ediciones y Publicaciones Españolas, 1945), pp. 127-128; the phrase is again used on p. 138. From D'Ors' remark, we may understand that for Juan de la Cruz the experience of the dark night is calm or serene. Secondly, we can realize that one is open-eyed or alert throughout it, as the "sereno," the night watchman. And thirdly, we may consider that San Juan was and is the guardian of this night through his activities as spiritual director and formulator of a body of doctrine.

See pp. 64-65, as well as corresponding notes.

"...no ha de dejar el hombre de pensar y acordarse de lo que debe hacer y saber, que, como no haya afecciones de propiedad, no le harán daño." SIII,15,1. "Lo que ha de hacer, pues... es que todas las veces que le ocurrieren noticias, formas e imágenes distintas, sin hacer asiento en ellas, vuelva luego el alma a Dios en vacío de todo aquello... no pensando ni mirando en aquellas cosas más de lo que le bastan las memorias de ellas para entender y hacer lo que es obligado si ellas fueren de tal cosa..." Ibid. Emphasis ours.

"...hay razón natural y ley y doctrina evangélica por donde muy bastantemente se pueden regir, y no hay dificultad ni necesidad que no se pueda desatar y remediar por estos medios..." SII,21,4. "Es Dios amigo... que por razón natural sea el hombre regido y gobernado." SII,22,9. "...para obrar virtud... basta to la razón y entendimiento." Dichos de luz y amor, 36. "Entra en cuenta con tu razón para hacer lo que ella te dice..." Ibid., 43. Bienaventurado el que... mira las cosas en razón y justicia para hacerlas." Ibid., 44. "El que obra razón es como el que come sustancia..." Ibid., 45.

For an introduction to these various movements, see Marcel Bataillon, op. cit.; Melquiades Andrés, Los recogidos: nueva visión de la mística española (1500-1700) (Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 1975).

Garrigou-Lagrange points out that the Quietists, inclined to inaction, held that to operate actively was to offend God. According to the founder of this doctrine, Miguel de Molinos, "l'activité est enemie de la grâce, les vœux d'accomplir certains acts sont un obstacle à la perfection. En n'agissant plus, l'âme s'annihile et revient à son principe, alors Dieu règne et vit en elle. Telle est la voie intérieure dans laquelle l’âme ne produit plus d’acts de connaissance, ni d’amour de Dieu, et ne pense plus ni à la vie éternelle, ni aux peines de l’enfer; elle ne doit pas désirer connaître si elle plaît à Dieu, ni réfléchir sur ses actes ou sur ses défauts à corriger, elle ne doit pas désirer sa propre perfection, son salut, ni demander à Dieu quelque chose de déterminé; elle n’a plus besoin de résister aux tentations, dont elle n’a plus à tenir compte (cf. Denzinger, 1275-1286).

"Dans l’oraison, selon les quiétistes, il faut rester dans une foi obscure, dans un repos où l’on oublie toute pensée distincte relative à l’Humanité de Jésus ou même aux perfections divines, à la Sainte Trinité. Il faut rester dans ce repos sans produire aucun acte. Quant à la connaissance de foi obscure, elle n’est pas un acte produit par la créature, mais une connaissance qui vient de Dieu seul, c’est, disait Molinos, une contemplation acquise qui s’acquiert par la cessation de nos propres opérations (cf. Denzinger, 1243).
"On voit par là que cette contemplation acquise, que Molinos conseillait à tous, était une passivité acquise à volonté par la cessation de toute opération. Dès lors, il attribuait à la contemplation ainsi acquise ce qui n’est vrai que de l’insufe, et il supprimait d’un trait de plume toute l’ascèse et la pratique des vertus..." Les trois âges de la vie intérieure, 2:387-388.

Quietists thus reached "un état pseudo-passif, non pas insuf, mais acquis et, qui plus est, acquis, non par des actes, mais par la cessation de tout acte, par une sorte de pieuse somnolence. Il y avait là deux erreurs très graves, qui d’un trait de plume supprimaient l’ascèse et dénaturaient la mystique." There are those, on the other hand, who are too concerned with multiplying acts of the powers, "au lieu de tendre à l’oraison affective simplifiée, qui est pour ainsi dire la continuation d’un seul et même acte, comme une communion spirituelle prolonguée." Ibid., 1:213-214, note 2. A concise explanation is in Henricus Denzinger’s Enchiridion Symbolorum 21st-23rd edition (Freiburg: Herder and Co., 1937). See numbers 1221-1288 for an outline of Quietist doctrine.

73. San Juan makes reference to both prescriptions in the following text. Speaking of spiritual directors who insist upon unceasing activity of the powers, he states: "Y con ser este daño más grave y grande que se puede encarecer, es tan común y frecuente, que apenas se hallará un maestro espiritual que no le haga en las almas que comienza Dios a recoger en esta manera de contemplación; porque, cuántas veces está Dios uniéndose al alma contemplativa con alguna unción muy delgada de noticia amorosa, serena, pacífica, solitaria, muy ajena del sentido y de lo que se puede pensar --con la cual no puede meditar ni pensar en cosa alguna, ni gustar de cosa de arriba ni de abajo, por cuanto la trae Dios ocupada en aquella unión solitaria, inclinada a ocio y soledad--, y vendrá un maestro espiritual que no sabe sino martillar y macear con las potencias como herrero y, porque él no enseña más que aquello y no sabe más que meditar, dirá: 'Andá, dejaos de esos reposos, que es ociosidad y perder tiempo; sino tomá y meditá, y haced actos interiores, porque es menester que hagáis de vuestra parte lo que en vos es, que es otro son alumbramientos y cosas de bausanes'." L.3,43.

74. "Si... situamos lo que llamáríamos técnica sanjuanista del vivir espiritual, en el camino histórico, que va del tipo de pasividad, que todavía se manifiesta en España en Francisco de Osuna y que ha de producir aquí el molinismo y en Francia la «prière de simple regard», y el otro tipo, por decirlo así, gimnástico, activo, militante, de los «ejercicios espirituales» de Jiménez de Cisneros, de San Ignacio de Loyola y de sus continuadores, encontraremos que San Juan de la Cruz, sin poder todavía confundirse con el dualismo ascético de estos últimos, no ofrece ya riesgo de equívoco respecto al monismo contemplativo de los primeros. «No hagas nada y encontrarás a Dios», parecen estos decir. «Para encontrar a Dios, hay gran andar y mucho luchar», es la lección de los últimos. Juan de la Cruz ocupa en ello una posición, que llamaríamos intermedia, si no resultase pobre esta fórmula topográfica, ante la plenitud de sentido, revelada por aquella especie de sintética fusión entre la mística y la ascética, revelada por nuestro santo." D’Ors, op. cit., pp. 129-130. [See above, note 68, for an explanation of D’Ors’ phrase, "el sereno de la noche oscura," which we have used here as a subtitle.]

"San Juan de la Cruz ofrece singular interés por su equilibrio clásico entre varios extremos: entre el intelectualismo de la mística germánica y el voluntarismo derretido de San Buenaventura o San Bernardo; entre el que pudieramos llamar misticismo pelagiano, que exagera al modo estoico las fuerzas y la acción del hombre, y el molinismo quietista, que las debilita hasta negarlas y lo deja todo a la moción divina, degenerando al cabo en una ética de temple luterano.... [E]n San Juan conciértese como en nadie quizá la experiencia con el saber filosófico y teológico, con aquella reciedad intelectual que analiza implacable los estados espirituales, dispuesto siempre a rehuir todo fácil iluminismo y a fomentar el esfuerzo y la agilidad mental." José Corts Grau, "San Juan de la Cruz y la personalidad humana," in his Estudios filosóficos y literarios, Biblioteca del Pensamiento Actual, n. 23 (Madrid: Ediciones
We concur that John of the Cross advocates a sustained equilibrium among the rational powers, and thus he can be said to represent a midway position between two extremes. However, the representatives of extreme intellectualist and voluntarist positions may not be accurately chosen by this author.

There are some critics, however, who have associated Juan de la Cruz and other outstanding mystics of the period with a voluntaristic stance. Stephen Gilman is one who puts forth this interpretation in "An Introduction to the Ideology of the Baroque in Spain," Symposium (1946):82-107. Gilman establishes a polarization between asceticism and mysticism and attributes to each "a dependence upon a single faculty of the soul" (p. 91). He maintains that the ascetics formed the "vanguard of the Counter-Reformation" (p. 91) and were characterized by a highly intellectualized approach to reality. They conceived of a sharp duality between "the world as it is vitally perceived" and "the world as it is logically conceived" (p. 88).

"And it is asceticism," Gilman holds, "that is the ideological forerunner of that new system of values, ideas and techniques we call Baroque" (p. 90). The mystics, following the Neoplatonic tradition, maintained "the predominance and worth of the voluntad which they conceived of as the seat of love." In contrast to the secular Neoplatonists, though, the mystic was forced "by the pressures of a crystallizing orthodox society" to "reverse the direction of the grasp of the voluntad, to retreat within himself" (p. 90) in order to preserve his personal unity. Gilman concludes that "if the mystics escaped Neo-Platonically, the ascetics resisted Stoically" (p. 91).

It is admissible to state that among thinkers and artists of the Golden Age there are those who place greater stress upon one of the rational faculties at the expense of the others. However, it is not accurate to polarize asceticism from mysticism, attributing intellectualism to the former and voluntarism to the latter. As is made quite explicit by San Juan, asceticism and mysticism as lived practices form part of one continuous process within which one crowns and perfects the other. Further, within the entire ascetico-mystical ascent, both rational faculties are actively engaged in the realization of the process. Nor is Gilman correct in associating what he considers to be the Intellectualist-Neoscholastic-ascetical movement with the cultural phenomenon of the Baroque --a bleak Baroque it would have been!-- while excluding the great Spanish mystics of the time from it.

75. SIII,15,2; SIII,35,2; SIII,37,1.
76. SIII,15,2; SIII,35,3-6; SIII,37,2.
77. "...no queremos convenir en esta nuestra doctrina con la de aquellos pestiferos hombres que... quisieron quitar de delante de los ojos de los fieles el santo y necesario uso e inclita adoración de las imágenes de Dios y de los santos; antes esta nuestra doctrina es muy diferente de aquella. Porque aquí no tratamos de que no haya imágenes y que no sean adoradas, como ellos, sino damos a entender la diferencia que hay de ellas a Dios, y que de tal manera pasen por lo pintado, que no impidan de ir a lo vivo, haciendo en ello mas presa de la que basta para ir a lo espiritual..." SIII,15,2. In his own cultural milieu, however, the second position was more prevalent and represented greater danger: "Esto se vera bien por el uso abominable que en estos nuestros tiempos usan algunas personas, que... adornan a las imágenes con el traje que la gente vana por tiempo va inventando para el cumplimiento de sus pasatiempos y vanidades.... Y desta manera, la honesta y grave devoción del alma, que en sí echa y arroja toda vanidad y rastro de ella, ya se les queda en poco mas que en ornato de muñecas, no sirviéndose algunos de las imágenes más que de unos idólos en que tienen puesto su gozo." SIII,35,4. Regarding this second tendency, Michel Florissoone comments that: "Saint Jean de la Croix semble bien protester ici contre un certain rôle nouveau qu'on veut faire jouer à l'oeuvre d'art, et sans doute aussi à l'interprétation qu'un en veut tirer. La Renaissance, en effet, négligeant de plus en plus l'essence sacrée de l'art, a tendance à utiliser celui-ci comme

78. "...deben, pues, los maestros espirituales dar libertad a las almas..." L,3,61.

79. "...la fe, la cual es el admirable medio... para ir al término, que es Dios..." SII,2,1.

80. "...Dios es la sustancia de la fe y el concepto della, y la fe es el secreto y el misterio..." C,1,10. "Porque es tanta la semejanza que hay entre ella y Dios, que no hay otra diferencia sino ser visto Dios o creído; porque, así como Dios es infinito, así ella nos le propone infinito, y así como es Trino y Uno nos le propone ella Trino y Uno, y así como Dios es tiniebla para nuestro entendimiento, así ella también ciega y deslumba nuestro entendimiento; y así, por este solo medio, se manifiesta Dios al alma en divina luz..." SII,9,1. "...la fe es sustancia de las cosas que se esperan." SII,6,2. "...la fe nos da y comunica al mismo Dios, pero encubierto con plata de fe; y no por eso nos le deja de dar en verdad, así como el que da un vaso plateado y él es de oro, no porque vaya encubierto de plata deja de dar el vaso de oro." C,12,4. "...pero a la postre desta fe, que será cuando se acabe la fe por la clara visión de Dios, quedará la sustancia de la fe, desnuda del velo de esta plata..." C,12,4. "Las cuales tinieblas todas significan la oscuridad de la fe en que está encubierta la Divinidad comunicándose al alma.... [Y] así la fe, que es figurada por aquellos vasos, contiene en sí la divina luz, la cual acabada y quebrada por la quiebra y fin de esta vida mortal, luego parecerá la gloria y luz de la Divinidad que en sí contenía." SII,9,3.

81. See texts from C,1,10 and SII,9,1 cited in note 80. Also: "La fe dicen los teólogos que es un hábito del alma cierto y oscuro. Y la razón de ser hábito oscuro es porque hace creer verdades reveladas por el mismo Dios, las cuales son sobre toda luz natural..." SII,3,1. "...la fe... aunque le hace cierto al entendimiento, no le hace claro, sino oscuro." SII,6,2. Speaking of these matters, Crisólogo makes the following remarks: "Dos cosas hay que distinguir en la fe, según la doctrina de san Juan de la Cruz: la envoltura y la realidad substancial. La envoltura es la expresión, el continente: la realidad substancial es lo expresado, lo contenido, contenido no en cuanto encerrado y limitado por esa experiencia, sino en cuanto que se esconde tras ella. Lo primero es el hábito de la fe, que, como tal, es criatura; lo segundo es la misma esencia de Dios, realidad infinita, no representación más o menos perfecta de ella. Y por esta parte la fe se identifica con Dios, al cual ofrece tal como es en la realidad de su infinitud." Faith should not be thought of as simply "un concepto o una imagen de la divinidad. La fe contiene al mismo Dios. Lo que el alma percibe a través de ella es la misma realidad que percibirá en el cielo a través del lumin gloriae." San Juan de la Cruz: el hombre, el doctor, el poeta, pp. 87-88.

82. "...sólo se requiere afirmación de todas las potencias y gustos y apetitos espirituales en pura fe; lo cual hecho, se junta el alma con el Amado en una unión de sencillez y pureza y amor y semejanza." SII,1,2.

83. "...es sola el próximo y proporcionado medio para que el alma se una con Dios.... Y, por tanto, cuanto más fe el alma tiene, más unida está con Dios." SII,9,1. "Así concebida la fe, ya no nos extrañan ni los elogios ni la importancia que le concede san Juan de la Cruz. Ciertamente ha de ser ella, en el orden intelectual, centro y norte de todas las actividades del espíritu, si no han de perderse éstas entre fantasmas de divinidad. Razón tiene el insigne Maestro al proclamarla como único medio para la unión de la inteligencia, y razón también al encauzar a ella todas las ideas y concepciones intelectuales por sublimes que sean o parezcan." Crisólogo, San Juan de la Cruz: el hombre, el doctor, el poeta, p. 89.
It has been stated that according to Juan de la Cruz, "fides reddit intellectui similitudinem essentialem Dei, quomodo optime videtur in SII,8, melius adhuc forsit in SII,9, quo fide mediante intellectus capax evadit relationis ad Deum sub intimae ratione Deitatis. Facultas talis abest omnino intellectui soli, infunditur ipsi in fide. Fides tunc meretur designari tamquam facultas transcendentiae theologicae, inquantum intellectum facit transcendere ad Deum non solum sub ratione entis, sed sub ratione intimae essentiae divinae, omnino supernaturalis --sub ratione ipsius Deitatis." Karol Wojtyla, "Quaestio de Fide apud S. Joannem a Cruce," Colletanea Theologica 21(1950)418-468, p. 427. This article is a summary of the more extensive work titled Faith According to St. John of the Cross, which we have cited previously in chapter II, note 10. The longer work, composed earlier in time as a doctoral dissertation, focuses on faith as making God present to the intellect in the intentional order, as object understood. The later summary, on the other hand, places greater stress upon the communication of the divine substance to the soul brought about by theological faith operating in the supernatural modality. This second perspective, as we see it, grasps San Juan’s thought more comprehensively.

On the question of the theological virtue of faith, and its functional aspect in so far as it is operative in contemplation, see also M.-Michel Labourdette, O.P., "La foi théologale et la connaissance mystique d’après saint Jean de la Croix," Revue thomiste 41(1936)593-629; 42(1937)16-57 and 191-229; 43(1937)101-115.

84. "Porque la fe ya vemos que nos dice lo que no se puede entender con el entendimiento." SII,6,2.

85. "...noche oscura para el alma..." SII,3,4.

86. "...nuestros entendimientos flacos, que en tan inmensa luz se oscurecen y quedan frustrados." SII,5,3.

87. "La fe dicen los teólogos que es un hábito del alma cierto y oscuro. Y la razón de ser hábito oscuro es porque hace creer verdades reveladas por el mismo Dios, las cuales son sobre toda luz natural y exceden todo humano entendimiento sin alguna proporción." Our human intellect "ninguna cosa de suyo puede saber sino por vía natural, lo cual es sólo lo que alcanza por los sentidos, para lo cual ha de tener las fantasmas y las figuras de los objetos presentes en sí o en sus semejantes, y de otra manera no; porque, como dicen los filósofos, ab objecto et potentia partitur notitia; esto es, del objeto presente y de la potencia nace en el alma la noticia. De donde, si a uno le dijesen cosas que él nunca alcanzó a conocer ni jamás vio semejanzas de ellas, en ninguna manera le quedaría más luz de ellas que si no se las hubiesen dicho.... De esta manera es la fe para con el alma, que nos dice cosas que nunca vimos ni entendimos en sí ni en sus semejanzas, pues no las tienen; y así de ella no tenemos luz de scienza natural, pues a ningún sentido es proporcionado lo que nos dice..." SII,3,1-3.


89. "Aristóteles dice que de la misma manera que los ojos del murciélago se han con el sol, el cual totalmente les hace tinieblas, así nuestro entendimiento se ha a lo que es más luz en Dios, que totalmente nos es tiniebla. Y dice más: que cuando las cosas de Dios son en sí más altas y más claras, son para nosotros más ignotas y oscuras." SII,8,6. The note in the critical edition tells us that "Andrés de la Encarnación remite (Ms. 3653, previo 5°) a Aristóteles, I Metaph. c. I; S. Thom., ibid., lect. I; Super libr. De Causis, lect. I; De mente, q. 10, a. 11, ad. 13; IV Sent., d. 40, q. 2, a. 6, ad. 3." Note that the reference to De mente is to a section of St. Thomas' De Veritate, 10,11.
Aristotle is cited to the same effect in various other passages: "Que es cosa que parece increíble decir que la luz sobrenatural y divina tanto más oscurece al alma cuanto ella tiene más de claridad y pureza, y cuanto menos, le sea menos oscura. Lo cual, si consideramos lo que arriba queda probado, con la sentencia del Filósofo conviene: que las cosas sobrenaturales tanto son a nuestro entendimiento más oscuras, cuanto ellas en sí son más claras y manifiestas." NII,8,2. Also, SII,14,13. The reference is to Aristotle in Metaphysics II,1,993b-10-11. There are similar passages with references to Dionysius' De Mystica Theologia, I,1, in SII,8,6 and MII,5,3. The passage in SII,8,6 contains also Scriptural references to Baruch 3,23 and 1 Corinthians 3,19. The passage in MII,5,3 contains Biblical references to Psalms 96,2 and 17,13. The same idea is again expressed in MII,16,11, supported by Psalms 17:2-13 and 30, and 1 Corinthians 2,14.

90. "...la fe... hace cierto al entendimiento." SII,6,2. Also, SII,3,1 and 3. As we have seen, Juan is insistent upon the lack of proportionality between the reality or substance of the Faith and anything we might conceptualize or fantasize regarding that reality. Our knowledge always participates of "el sentido," whereas the Faith "a ningún sentido es proporcionado." SII,3,3. The truths proposed, however, are to be believed. See Wojtyla, Faith According to Saint John of the Cross, pp. 179-182.

San Juan notes that said truths are communicated to the human subject by means of the sense of hearing: "...de [la fe] no tenemos luz de scienza natural, pues a ningún sentido es proporcionado lo que nos dice, pero sabemoslo por el oído, creyendo lo que nos enseña, sujeta­ando y cegando nuestra luz natural; porque, como dice san Pablo, Fides ex audita (Rom 10, 17); como si dijera: La fe no es scienza que entra por ningún sentido, sino sólo es consen­timiento del alma de lo que entra por el oído." SII,3,3. Thus this corporal sense is recog­nized to have an ability not shared by any other: that of perceiving communications containing articulate propositions which are beyond our natural powers of understanding. Consequently, San Juan views hearing as the highest among the senses: "...porque el sentido del oído es más espíritual, o, por mejor decir, allégase más a lo espíritual que el tacto..." C,14-15,13. This hierarchy among the bodily senses is paralleled by an identical one among the spiritual senses. See C,14-15, 14 and 15. This question is brought up again in chapter VII, note 38, where we discuss the consequences of this hierarchy regarding the mystical union. See also, chapter V, note 98 and corresponding text.

91. SII,1,1-2; SII,4,1-7; SII,5,4; SII,6,2; SII,9,1; SII,11: 7-8 and 11; SII,12, 6 and 8; SII,16, 6-7 and 10-12; SII,17, 7 and 9; SII,18,4; SII,24,8-9; SII,26,18; SII,27,6; SII,29: 5-7, 9 and 12; SII,30,5-6; SII,2, 4 and 13-14; SII,3,4-6; SII,7,2; SII,10,3; SII,11,1-2; SII,12,3; SII,14,6; SII,15,1. Also L,3,30-67 passim.

92. "...en decir que miremos a la fe que hablaron los profetas como a candela que luce en lugar oscuro (2 Petr 1,19), es decir que nos quedemos a oscuras, cerrados los ojos a todas esas luces, y que, en esta tiniebla, sola la fe --que también es oscura-- sea luz a que nos arrimemos; porque, si no queremos arrimar a esas luces claras de inteligencias distintas, ya nos dejamos de arrimar a la oscura, que es la fe, y nos deja de dar la luz en el lugar oscuro que dice san Pedro; el cual lugar... aquí significa el entendimiento... " SII,16,15.

"This might be misconstrued to mean that man should never inquire into the things of God; that he should leave his mind and reason out of religion. However, this is not what Juan wishes man to do at all. Rather he is urging man to not let the senses and hence the intel­lect blind him to the mystery of God. God cannot be seen except in a unique way which will be different from pure sensation and the consequent comprehension thus obtained. Nor is Juan advocating a functioning in a pure void or utter emptiness.... God is the hidden one: the one who hides within that which appears to be but darkness and emptiness." Hardy, op. cit., p. 250.
Juan de la Cruz's statements concerning approaching God "creyendo su ser" seem possessed of a certain fascination. As mentioned earlier, Bernard of Clairvaux founded his mystical theology upon what has been called by Etienne Gilson "a new metaphysics of love." Perhaps it would not be too daring to affirm that the doctrine of this sixteenth-century successor represents the incorporation of "a new metaphysics of existence" into speculation on mysticism. (See chapter II, note 11.) It is unfortunate, however, that there are so few texts in his writings which approach the question using the vocabulary of the science of metaphysics. We can assume that this stems from the fact that his purpose is to produce a practical rather than a speculative exposition. The texts lead us to wonder, nevertheless, whether a corollary dealing with man and existence cannot be seen here on two levels: within ordinary cognition, existence or being is grasped in and through the activity of judgment; in the realm of supernatural cognition, the Being of God is attained through the judgment of assent to supernatural faith. On the question of man's grasp of being through judgment in Thomistic epistemology, see Joseph Owens, An Interpretation of Existence (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Bruce, 1968), especially pp. 14-43; "Judgement and Truth in Aquinas," Mediaeval Studies 32(1970)138-158. Also pertinent, by the same author: "Aquinas: «Darkness of Ignorance» in the Most Refined Notion of God," Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 5(1974)93-110.

In the text cited above there are two mentions of how the soul advances towards God "creyendo su ser, que no cae en entendimiento." The corpus of San Juan's writings contains, in addition, a great number of references to "el ser de Dios." This divine "ser" is always understood to be the term of the soul's ascent. It must be stressed --although it is a fundamental point in Sanjuanist thought-- that the intended movement of the soul is towards the plenitude of existence or being, a plenitude transcending anything man can ordinarily know. This is diametrically opposite to some interpretations of John of the Cross in which the proposed "nada," which in fact pertains to the affectivity and will and belongs to the order of means, is transformed into a metaphysical "nada" and is placed in the order of the ultimate end.

At the same time, the doctrine of the Spanish Carmelite differs from philosophies concerned with reaching the plenitude of being, but which seek to find it within created existence. Speaking of certain trends in contemporary philosophy, Gilson makes the following statement: "There is only one way to reach pure existence, and the mystics have found it. Not the way that leads, through the denial of essences, to the maddening experience of some existing nothingness, but the one that once led Augustine, Bonaventure and John of the Cross, through overcoming all essences without ever losing them, to reach their common source, itself beyond essences yet containing them all. Not despair, but perfect joy, is the reward of such an experience..." Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd edition (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952), p. 208. It is no accidental formulation that San Juan should say that in the mystical encounter, the divine Spouse "absorbe al alma sobre todo ser a ser de Dios." L,1,35.

94. Hans Urs von Balthasar examines the question of the negation proposed by Juan de la Cruz of all mental representations and concepts of God. He poses the following questions: "La foi qui aime et qui espère, c'est cette énergie divine infinie qui permet et exige que l'on dépasse toutes les figures finies, aussi bien objectives que subjectives. Ce dépassement est crucifiant pour l'homme terrestre, mais pour l'homme céleste il signifie la liberté de l'amour.
Ici se pose la question de la valeur religieuse de toutes les figures de révélation et surtout de celle du Dieu incarné, puis de l’Église en tant qu’institution visible de salut et communion des saints, enfin de l’Écriture dans sa réalité de fait, objective et multiforme. Cette mystique ne survole-t-elle pas le Christ incarné, pour se précipiter, d’un bond, dans le foyer ardent de l’amour trinitaire? Et, plus encore, l’Église, en tant que communauté concrète d’amour, n’est-elle pas laissée en arrière? Ne réduit-on pas irrésistiblement la Parole déterminée de Dieu à une parole unique, supra-humaine, indéchiffrable?" After citing various texts, particularly from SII,22, Balthasar concludes: "Tout ceci nous indique, sans équivoque, que la mystique de Jean de la Croix doit être comprise en un sens christocentrique, et qui n’est théocentrique qu’en passant par le Christ; qu’elle n’est pas philosophique mais théologique, fondée sur l’imitation du Christ; et que toutes les paroles de la Bible, que se soit de l’Ancien ou du Nouveau Testament, s’y trouvent ordonnées concentriquement autour de l’anéantissement du Verbe de Dieu sur la Croix." La gloire et la croix, translated by Robert Givord and Helene Bourboulon; Part II: Styles, vol. 2: De Jean de la Croix à Pégy (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1972), pp. 58 and 61.

95. "Ahora advertimos bien que aquel empeño de san Juan de la Cruz por desterrar imágenes y fantasías, llegando hasta la negación de toda idea particular, no era un esfuerzo por desprenderse de la realidad y perderse en un mundo de abstracciones; era, por el contrario, un ansia de llegar a la realidad infinita, elevada sobre el orden intelectivo natural y oculto tras de las oscuridades de la fe. Llegado aquí, el entendimiento pisa tierra firme." Crisóforo, San Juan de la Cruz: el hombre, el doctor, el poeta, p. 89.

96. "...la fe... no solamente no hace noticia y sciencia, pero, como habemos dicho, priva y ciega de otras cualesquier noticias y sciencia, para que puedan bien juzgar de ella; porque otras sciencias con la luz del entendimiento se alcanzan, mas esta de la fe sin la luz del entendimiento de alcanza (negándola por la fe), y con la luz propia se pierde, si no se escurece; por lo cual dijo Isaías: Si non credideritis, non intelligetis; esto es: Si no creyéredes, no entenderéis (7,9). Luego claro está que la fe es noche oscura y para el alma, y desta manera la da luz, y cuanto más la oscurece más luz la da de sí; porque cegando la da luz, según este dicho de Isaías: Porque, si no creyéredes, no entenderéis, esto es, no tendréis luz." SII,3,4. This night of faith, "en los deleites de mi pura contemplación y unión con Dios... será mi guía." ibid., 6.

97. SII,21,4. See note 71 of the present chapter.

98. "...ha de estar oscuro hasta que le amanezca en la otra vida el día de la clara visión de Dios, y en ésta el de la transformación y unión con Dios..." SII,16,15.

99. MII,21,11.

100. "...angosta puerta..." M,11,4.

101. "...tan profundas cuanto de grandes bienes son capaces, pues no se llenan con menos que infinito." L,3,18.

102. "...todos los apetitos de el alma y sus potencias según sus inclinaciones y operaciones... se truecan en divinas." L,2,33.

103. "...son una acomodadísima disposición para unirse el alma con Dios según sus tres potencias, que son entendimiento, memoria y voluntad. Porque la fe oscurece y vacía al entendimiento de toda su inteligencia natural, y en esto le dispone para unirle con la Sabiduría divi-
na; y la esperanza vacía y aparta la memoria de toda la posesión de criatura, porque, como dice san Pablo, la esperanza es de lo que no se posee (Rom 8,24), y así aparta la memoria de lo que se puede poseer y pónela en lo que espera, y por eso la esperanza de Dios sola dispone la memoria puramente para unirla con Dios; la caridad, ni más ni menos, vacía y aniquila las afeciones y apetitos de la voluntad de cualquier cosa que no es Dios, y sólo se los pone en Él; y así esta virtud dispone a esta potencia y la une con Dios por amor." MII,21,11.

Similarly: "Porque, como habemos dicho, el alma no se une con Dios en esta vida por el entender, ni por el gozar, ni por el imaginar, ni por otro cualquier sentido, sino sólo por la fe según el entendimiento, y por esperanza según la memoria, y por amor según la voluntad. Las cuales tres virtudes todas hacen... vacío en las potencias: la fe en el entendimiento, vacío y oscuridad de entender; la esperanza hace en la memoria vacío de toda posesión; y la caridad vacío en la voluntad y desnudez de todo afecto y gozo de todo lo que no es Dios. Porque la fe ya vemos que nos dice lo que no se puede entender con el entendimiento.... Pues de la esperanza no hay duda sino que también pone a la memoria en vacío y tiniebla de todo acá y de lo allá; porque la esperanza es siempre de lo que no se posee.... La caridad, ni más ni menos, hace vacío en la voluntad de todas las cosas, pues nos obliga a amar a Dios sobre todas ellas, lo cual no puede ser sino apartando el afecto de todas ellas para ponerle entero en Dios." SII,6,1-4. Also, SIII,1,1; L,3,18-22; C,2,6-7.

104. "...cuanto más el alma se quiere escurecer y anihilar acerca de todas las cosas exteriores e interiores que puede recibir, tanto más se infunde de fe y, por consiguiente, de amor y esperanza en ella, por cuanto estas tres virtudes teologales andan en uno." SII,24,8. "Instruida ya la primera potencia del alma, que es el entendimiento, por todas sus aprehensiones en la primera virtud teológica, que es la fe, para que según esta potencia se pueda unir el alma con Dios por medio de pureza de fe, resta ahora hacer lo mismo acerca de las otras dos potencias del alma, que son memoria y voluntad, purificándolas también acerca de sus aprehensiones, para que, según estas dos potencias, el alma se venga a unir con Dios en perfecta esperanza y caridad. Lo cual se hará brevemente en este Tercero Libro, porque habiendo concluido con el entendimiento, que es el receptáculo de todos los demás objetos en su manera... no es posible que, si el espiritual instruyere bien al entendimiento en fe según la doctrina que se le ha dado, no instruya también de camino a las otras dos potencias, pues las operaciones de las unas dependen de las otras." SII,1,1. Also, SIII,32,4.

105. "...cuanto más pura y esmerada está el alma en fe, más tiene de caridad infusa de Dios, y cuanto más caridad tiene, tanto más la alumbran y comunican los dones del Espíritu Santo, porque la caridad es la causa y el medio por donde se les comunica." SII,29,6.


107. "...[es] sobre las fuerzas y habilidad humana... despedir lo natural con habilidad natural..." SIII,2,13.

108. "...causa en el alma la dicha negación de sí misma y de todas las cosas." M, Exposition, 1.

109. "Esta noche que decimos ser la contemplación, dos maneras de tinieblas causa... según las dos partes del hombre, conviene a saber, sensitiva y espiritual; y así, la una noche o purgación será sensitiva, con que se purga el alma según el sentido, acomodándolo a el espíritu, y la otra, es noche o purgación espiritual, con que se purga y desnuda el alma según el espíritu, acomodándole y disponiéndole para la unión de amor con Dios." M,8,1. See schema on p. 66.
110. "La primera purgación o noche es amarga y terrible para el sen tido..." NI,8,2.

111. "...sequedad... sinsabor y amargura..." NI,8,3. Also, NI,14,2-4.

112. "...arrimo en el entendimiento, ni jugo en la voluntad, ni discurso en la memoria..." NI,9,7. Also: "La tercera señal que hay para que se conozca esta purgación del sentido es el no poder ya meditar ni discurrir en el sentido de la imaginación como solía, aunque más haga de su parte; porque, como aquí comienza Dios a comunicársele, no ya por el sentido, como antes hacía por medio del discurso que componía y dividía las noticias, sino por el espíritu puro, en que no cae discurso sucesivamente, comunicándosele con acto de sencilla contemplación—la cual no alcanzan los sentidos de la parte inferior exteriores ni interiores—, de aquí es que la imaginativa y fantasía no pueden hacer arrimo en alguna consideración ni hallar en ella pie ya de ahí en adelante." NI,9,8. Also, NI,10,1.

113. "...sacarlos deste bajo modo de amor a más alto grado de amor... y librarnlos del bajo ejercicio del sentido y discurso..." NI,8,3.

114. NI,14,1.

115. "...salió el alma a comenzar el camino y via del espíritu... que por otro nombre llaman via iluminativa o de contemplación infusa, con que Dios de suyo anda apacentando y reficiendo al alma, sin discurso ni ayuda activa del alma misma." NI,14,1. Concerning the experience of the dark night as a progressive actualization of faith in the subject, Wojtyla makes the following comments: "Ensi theologicum fidei constitutum tamquam pura participatio Deitatis videtur quid ideale et separatum. In concreto tamen istud ens theologicum accidit semper in reali connexione cum subiecto psychologico, cum intellect hominis viatoris, in quo subsistit propriae dicta virtus fidei. In virtute tali utique intima formalitas eius, intima eius essentia consistit in ista theologicum participatione Deitatis, connexa tamen propter rationem subjecti psychologici cum tantis elementis etiam psychologicis, in quibus deget et evolvitur modo vitali. S. Joannes a Cruce docet nos proprie itinerarium huius evolutionis.... Et sic tota eius doctrina de fide consistit in exacta connexione utriusque elementi: exactitudo theologici principii verificatur exactitudine experimentaliter traditi exercitii, quo virtus fidei proprias sibi actualisationes vel actualitates reddit. Experientia una ex parte confirmat et verificat principium abstractum, alia ex parte autem quaerit explicari ab ipso." "Quaestio de Fide apud S. Ioannem a Cruce," pp. 429-431.

116. "Porque, verdaderamente, cuando esta contemplación purgativa aprieta, sombra de muerte y gemidos de muerte y dolores de infierno siente el alma muy a vivo, que consiste en sentirse sin Dios, y castigada y arrojada e indigna de El..." NII,6,2. "Todo lo cual hace Dios por medio desta oscura contemplación, en la cual no sólo padece el alma el vacío y suspensión destos arrimos naturales y aprehensiones, que es un padecer muy congojoso, de manera que si a uno suspensieden o detuviessen el aire, que no respirase; mas también está purgando el alma, aniquilando y vaciando o consumiendo en ella (así como hace el fuego al orín y moho de el metal) todas las afecciones y hábitos imperfectos que ha contraído toda la vida; que, por estar ellos muy arraigados en la sustancia del alma, sobrepadece grave deshacimiento y tormento interior demás de la dicha pobreza y vacío natural y espiritual.... [S]i el no ordenase que estos sentimientos, cuando se avivan en el alma, se adormeciesen presto, moriría muy en breves días. Mas son interpolados los ratos en que se siente su íntima viveza, la cual algunas veces se siente tan a lo vivo, que le parece al alma que ve abierto el infierno a la perdición..." Ibid., 5-6. Thus, "grande compasión conviene tener al alma que Dios pone en esta tempestuosa y horrenda noche..." NII,7,3. Also, NII,9,7.
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117. "...sacándola de sus límites y quicios naturales y subiéndola sobre sí..." SIII,2,3.

118. "Tienen estos también la hebetudo mentis y la rudeza natural que todo hombre contrae por el pecado, y la extracción y exterioridad del espíritu, lo cual conviene que se ilustre, clarifique y recoja por la penalidad y aprieto de aquella noche." NII,2,2.

119. "...divino rayo de contemplación..." NII,8,4. "...divina luz ...la oscurece, vacía y aniquila de la pasión acerca de sus aprehensiones y afecciones particulares, así de arriba como de abajo..." Ibid., 2.

120. "...la purga e ilumina con luz divina espiritual, sin pensar el alma que la tiene..." NII,8,4. Also, NII,5,2-3; NII,12,3-4; NII,13,10-11.

121. "...tendrá ojos para que esta luz la muestre los bienes de la luz divina." NII,13,10.

122. "...en esta luz espiritual de que está embestida el alma, cuando tiene en qué reverberar, esto es, cuando se ofrece alguna cosa que entender... luego la ve y entiende mucho más claramente que antes que estuviese en estas oscuridades... Y esta es la propiedad del espíritu purgado y aniquilado acerca de todas particulares afecciones e inteligencias, que en este no gustar nada ni entender nada en particular, morando en su vacío y tiniebla, lo abraza todo con grande disposición..." NII,8,4-5. Also: "Donde, por ser esta luz espiritual tan sencilla, pura y general, no afectada ni particularizada a ningún particular inteligible natural ni divino... de aquí es que con grande generalidad y facilidad conoce y penetra el alma cualquier cosa de arriba o de abajo que se ofrece..." NII,8,5. "...otro excelente provecho que hay en esta noche y sequedad del sensitivo apetito... y es que en esta noche oscura del apetito... alumbrará Dios a el alma, no sólo dándole conocimiento de su bajeza... sino también de la grandeza de Dios; porque, demás de apagados los apetitos y gustos y arrimos sensibles, queda limpio y libre el entendimiento para entender la verdad..." NII,12,4.

123. "Y no se ha de entender que... pierde allí los hábitos de las ciencias adquisitas que tenía, que antes se le perfeccionan con el más perfecto hábito, que es el de la ciencia sobrenatural que se le ha infundido... Ansí entiende que será en el cielo, que no se corromperán los hábitos que los justos llevaren de ciencia adquisita," although "no les harán a los justos mucho al caso, sabiendo ellos más que eso en la sabiduría divina." C,26,16. We are not to understand, though, that the state of heightened lucidity is maintained in a steady and uninterrupted way throughout the entire ascetico-mystical ascent. On the contrary, during the stages of the purification there are both lapses of memory and moments in which the subject cannot advert to or concentrate upon anything in particular: "...cuanto más va uniéndose la memoria con Dios, más va perfeccionando las noticia distintas hasta perderlas del todo, que es cuando en perfección llega al estado de unión; y así, al principio, cuando ésta se va haciendo, no puede dejar de traer grande olvido acerca de todas las cosas (pues se le van rayando las formas y noticias), y así hace muchas faltas acerca del uso y trato exterior, no acordándose de comer ni de beber, ni si hizo, si vio, si no vio, si dijeron o no dijeron, por el absorbimiento de la memoria en Dios. Pero, ya que llega a tener el hábito de unión... ya no tiene esos olvidos en esa manera en lo que es razón moral y natural..." SIII,2,8. At times, during the passive night the soul "no puede nada; de donde ni rezar ni asistir con advertencia a las cosas divinas puede, ni menos en las demás cosas y tratos temporales. Tiene no sólo esto, sino también muchas veces tales enajenamientos y tan profundos olvidos en la memoria, que se le pasan muchos ratos sin saber lo que se hizo ni qué pensó, ni qué es lo que hace ni qué va a hacer, ni puede advertir, aunque quiera, a nada de aquello en que está." NII,8,1. Also, C,14-15,19 and
The alternating between states of great mental sharpness and pronounced incapacity can be looked upon as an indication that man never operates nor is affected as a disincarnate being. It is reasonable that the thorough process of purgation and transformation which the subject is undergoing should affect him as a psychosomatic unity, causing some temporary malfunctions of both mind and body. These intermittent disorders are comparable to the periods of exhaustion suffered by an athlete who is strengthening his physical system through controlled exertion, or, as has been said before, to the momentary reaction of the eye to exposure to a light of unaccustomed brightness.

The subject finds that it experiences "un temple de peregrinación y extrañeza de todas las cosas, en que le parece que todas son extrañas y de otra manera que solían ser; porque en esto va sacando esta noche el espíritu de su ordinario y común sentir de las cosas, para traerle al sentido divino, el cual es extraño y ajeno de toda humana manera. Aquí le parece a el alma que anda fuera de sí en penas; otras veces piensa que es encantamiento el que tiene o embelesamiento, y anda maravillada de las cosas que ve y oye, pareciéndole muy peregrinas y extrañas, siendo las mismas que solía tratar comunmente; de lo cual es causa el irse haciendo remota el alma y ajena del común sentido y noticia acerca de las cosas..." NII,9,5. "...esta sabiduría mística... algunas veces de tal manera absorbe al alma y sume en su abismo secreto, que el alma echa de ver claro que está puesta alegadísima y remotísima de toda criatura, de suerte que le parece que la colocan un profundísima y anchísima soledad donde no puede llegar alguna humana criatura, como un inmenso desierto que por ninguna parte tiene fin..." NII,17,6. Another text describes the soul as feeling "un enajenamiento y extrañeza... acerca de todas las cosas, con inclinación a soledad y tedio de todas las criaturas y del siglo..." L,3,39.

"Hácesele a esta alma todo angosto; no cabe en sí; no cabe en el cielo ni en la tierra, y llenase de dolores hastas las tinieblas..." NII,11,6.

"Tal es la obra que en [el alma] hace esta noche encubridora de las esperanzas de la luz del día." NII,9,8.

Although this is not the main focus of our essay, it must be emphasized that a moral conditioning occurs along with the perfection and expansion of the cognitive powers. Given San Juan's understanding of the interdependence among the powers of the soul, it could not be otherwise. One dimension of this advancement in moral perfection is an increase in love toward one's neighbors. This is important to point this out, as there is a widespread notion that mystics are rather antisocial creatures who are indifferent to the world surrounding them. However, such is far from the case. "Muchos son los provechos que al alma se le siguen de apartar su corazón de semejante gozo [en los bienes naturales], porque, demás que dispone para el amor de Dios y las otras virtudes, derecho da lugar a la humildad para sí mismo y a la caridad general para con los prójimos, porque, no aficionándose a ninguno por los bienes naturales aparentes... le queda el alma libre y clara para amarlos a todos racional y espíritualmente, como Dios quiere que sean amados.... Y cuando de esta suerte se ama, es muy según Dios y aun con mucho libertad; y si es con asimiento, es con mayor asimiento de Dios, porque entonces, cuanto más crece este amor, tanto más crece el de Dios, y cuanto más el de Dios, tanto más este del prójimo..." SIII,3,1. "Y de aquí nace el amor del prójimo; porque los estima y no los juzga como antes solía..." M,12,8. "Hay otro provecho muy grande en esta noche para el alma, y es que se ejercita en las virtudes de por junto, como en la paciencia y la longanimidad.... Exercítase la caridad de Dios, pues ya no por el gusto atraído y saboreado que halla en la obra es movido, sino sólo por Dios. Exercita aquí también la virtud de la fortaleza.... y finalmente todas las virtudes, así teologales como cardinales y morales." M,13,5. "Darán estos la sangre de su corazón a quien sirve a Dios y ayudarán cuanto es en sí a que
le sirvan." NII,2,8.

128. "...tan sutil y sencillo y delgado, que pueda hacerse uno con el espíritu de Dios." NII,7,3.

129. "Y es de saber que tanto más ancha y capaz es la cosa, cuanto más delgada es en sí, y tanto más difusa y comunicativa es, cuanto es más sutil y delicada. El Verbo es inmensamente sutil y delicado, que es el toque que toca al alma; el alma es el vaso ancho y capaz por la delgadez y purificación grande que tiene en este estado. ¡Oh, pues, toque delicado, que tanto copiosa y abundantemente te infundes en mi alma, cuanto tienes de más sustancia y mi alma de más pureza!" L,2,19. Emphasis ours.

Similarly: "...aquéllos... verán y sentirán tu toque delgado, que, enajenándose del mundo, se pusieren en delgado, conviniendo delgado con delgado, y así te pueden sentir y gozar; a los cuales tanto más delgadamente tocas, cuanto, por estar ya adelgazada y pulida y purificada la sustancia del alma, enajenada de toda criatura y de todo rastro y de todo toque de ella, estás tú escondido morando muy de asiento en ella..." L,2,17. "Y éste es el lenguaje y palabras que trata Dios en las almas purgadas y limpias, que son palabras todas entendidas.... Las cuales palabras, como El mismo dice por san Juan, son espíritu y vida (6,64), la cual sienten las almas que tienen oídos para oírla, que (como digo) son las almas limpias y enamoradas; que los que no tienen el paladar sano, sino que gustan otras cosas, no pueden gustar el espíritu y vida de ella, antes les hacen sinsabor..." L,1,5. "...porque conviene que el que recibe se haya al modo de lo que recibe, y no de otra manera, para poderlo recibir y tener como se lo dan; porque, como dicen los filósofos, «cualquier cosa que se recibe está en el recipiente al modo que se ha el recipiente». De donde está claro que, si el alma entonces no dejase su modo activo natural, no recibiría aquel bien sino a modo natural, y así no le recibiría, sino quedarse há ya solamente con acto natural; porque lo sobrenatural no cabe en el modo natural..." L,3,34. See also, _Dichos de luz y amor_, n. 54; C,14-15,11.
CHAPTER V

THE DAWN, OR THE MYSTICAL ILLUMINATION

"A wondrous thing it is that the night, while being tenebrous, should give light."\(^1\) It is also a wondrous thing that God's communication, which is luminous, should be a night and cause darkness. It is made clear, however, that in reality the light does not darken nor does the darkness enlighten. Rather, "the darkness and the other evils which the soul experiences when this divine light strikes are not darkness nor evils proceeding from this light, but rather from the soul itself,\(^2\) which during the night of purgation is confronting its moral imperfections and psychological limitations, its fundamental ontological disproportionality with God. And yet, the finality of the night is union of the subject with the Light, who is God, the tripersonal Divinity. Such union entails a transformation of the human rational powers which enables one to overcome their limitations and thus receive the Light and Love of God. Throughout the rigorous night the subject undergoes a moral and psychological metamorphosis in which its powers shed their old ways, their habits, their modes, their limitations. Having expelled from itself all the "darkness and imperfections of the soul,\(^3\) the powers are re-enacted by divine grace in an eminent way, being enabled to see and know God as he is, without any mediation.

San Juan de la Cruz does more than simply state that this transformation of the human powers takes place. As a scientist of spirituality, he also endeavors to give his doctrine argumentative support. If one would like to schematize the justification and explication given for the transformation, the point of departure would be that the human rational powers are by nature spiritual, and that as such their capacity of apprehension is endless.\(^4\) This capacity, however, ordinarily remains in the state of potency, and can only be fully actualized with the help of grace.\(^5\) The powers reach a high point of realization in the mystical union, although the full actualization does not take place until after death, in the beatific vision.\(^6\) It is at this last stage that the human powers are elevated far beyond their natural capacities, being enabled to know and love God with the same intensity with which he loves his creatures.\(^7\)

The Metamorphosed Rational Powers

The process of transformation of the powers is one in which there is a continuity and interplay between nature and grace, which culminates with the natural and supernatural fulfillment the human being. To achieve the form of knowledge for which the soul longs, the psyche must be remolded so as to perform a new type of operation. Thus, its ordinary habits and modes of proceeding, which are its limitations as well as its perfections, must be lifted so that others may take their place. It is necessarily a process of breakdown and breakthrough.\(^8\) As we have seen, the "breaking down" takes place throughout the purifying night, the first stages being effected primarily by the efforts of the agent, and the latter stages by divine action, by penetration of the light of God. There are multiple Sanjuanist passages concerning this phenomenon of overcoming the limitations imposed upon the mind by its modes, to thus be able to apprehend God, "who has no mode."\(^9\) Thus,
along this road... to pass on to the goal and to leave one's mode is to enter the goal which has no mode, and which is God. For the soul which reaches this stage no longer has any modes or methods, still less is it attached to any of them or capable of being so. I speak here of modes of understanding, of delighting, of feeling. Nevertheless, the soul holds within itself all modes, in the manner of one who possesses nothing, while possessing all things. For, if the soul has the courage to pass beyond its natural limitations interiorly and exteriorly, it enters within the limits of the supernatural, which has no modes, while holding all of them substantially within itself.  

Similarly, the soul must "expel and annihilate the habitus which it has long carried in itself formed according to its own manner of understanding, so that in its place there may remain the divine illumination and light." Throughout this metamorphosis, "this night is gradually drawing the spirit away from its ordinary and common experience of things, and bringing it nearer to the divine sense, which is foreign and alien to all human ways." Having successfully reached its term, the soul exuberantly cries out: "I sallied forth from my base form of understanding."

The perfectibility of the powers can be partially actualized by purely natural means such as ordering the passions, purifying the phantasms, quieting of the inner self. However, full perfection is not achieved without infused grace. Having shed their content and their habitual mode of operating, the powers experience within themselves a vacuum which calls for form and new activity. "When they are empty and clean, their thirst and hunger and yearning for spiritual nourishment becomes intolerable... and since the divine communication of union with God has not come yet to the soul, the suffering caused by this emptiness and thirst is worse than death..."

Were the mystical venture simply one of nature, the powers would indeed remain empty and inactive. The human psyche in ordinary conditions cannot operate without, first of all, directing itself toward a specific object of apprehension, and secondly, without depending upon phantasms in its reasoning. From an exclusively naturalistic point of view, the modes and habits of the mind are its limitations and its perfections. From a broader perspective, however, the ordinary modes of the mind veil the things which pertain to another order, to a spiritual, all-inclusive order, as Juan de la Cruz insistently states. We are told that, having removed the barriers, having become spiritualized, the powers must necessarily apprehend that which lies beyond.

In his exposition of this line of argumentation, Juan indicates that the mystical illumination may be looked upon as either an infusion of knowledge from God or as a transformation of the noetic operations. In the Sanjuanist texts, the phenomenon is generally approached both theologically and psychologically. Thus:

When in this way the soul voids itself of all things, and achieves emptiness and unattachment regarding them --which, as we have said, is the part that the soul can contribute--, it is impossible, if the soul does what it can on its own, that God should fail to perform his own part by communicating himself to it, at least secretly and in silence. Such is more impossible than for the sun to fail to shed its rays on a serene and unencumbered sight; for just as the sun, when it rises in the morning, will enter your house if you unshutter the window, likewise God, who
slumbers not in keeping Israel (Ps 120,4), nor much less sleeps, will enter into the soul that is empty and will fill it with divine blessings. 16

Similarly, in an even more comprehensive paragraph:

when the soul has completely purified and voided itself of all forms and images that can be apprehended, it will be placed in this pure and simple light, being transformed therein into a state of perfection. This light is never absent from the soul, but it is not infused into it because of the creaturely forms and veils with which the soul is veiled and encumbered. Thus, if these impediments and these veils are wholly removed ... --which leaves the soul in a state of pure detachment and poverty of spirit, having become simple and pure-- the soul is transformed in simple and pure Wisdom, which is the Son of God. For the enamored soul, having been deprived of that which is natural, is then imbued with that which is divine, both naturally and supernaturally, so that a vacuum may not occur in nature. 17

The last cited statement, "is then imbued with that which is divine, both naturally and supernaturally, so that a vacuum may not occur in nature," points to the continuity between nature and grace within this transforming process. It is not simply a matter of ordinary objects of cognition being replaced by the transcendent supernatural Deity so that the powers may not be left void. Given the disproportionality between the latter and the supernatural object, such simple substitution would result in another "vacuum in nature," one by excess instead of by deficiency. Rather, in this mystical union the human cognitive powers are metamorphosed so as to be able to apprehend and love God in an eminent way. Having undergone all the necessary affective and cognitive purifications, at the summit of the ascent the infused presence of God is grasped directly by the knowing power itself, the passive intellect, in an act which bypasses all the lower active stages of human cognition. 18

The subject who has undergone this moral and psychological transformation thus experiences God in himself without leaving his earthly flesh, and would communicate this experience to his fellow man were he capable of finding words equal to the task.

A legitimate question to pose is whether Juan de la Cruz has given an argument of necessity to justify the transformation of the powers of which he speaks. After the subject has purified himself to the degree to which he is capable, God infuses divine wisdom and love into him. But does this necessarily happen? The answer seems to be affirmative, as "it is impossible when the soul does what it can on its own that God should fail to perform his own part in communicating himself to it." 19 Yet, it should be remarked that the reasoning process moves here within the ambit of faith. Revelation tells us that by means of the Cross not only is our nature redeemed, but that God further opens himself to us in love offering us a participation in his very Being. The presence of sanctifying grace in the soul is the seed and origin of this participation, and mystical communion, with all that is concomitant to it, is none other than the full flowering of the life of grace. Mystical graces, thus, do necessarily follow the active nights of purification. They necessarily follow, that is, given that "the Son of God attained this high state for us, and merited for us this exalted role of being able to become sons of God..." 20
The Mystical Doctor states that there are three ways in which God can be present to man. The first form of presence is in all creatures and is called "essential," because by means of this presence he gives them life and being; and if this presence were withdrawn, they would all become annihilated and cease to be. This presence is always there in the soul." The second presence is by grace," and is ordained toward the perfecting of the soul. The third presence is a union of love, in which "God communicates to it certain half-obscure glimpses of his divine beauty." The mystical communion is constituted by the development of the second form of presence into the third, while retaining the first. From the standpoint of cognition, this development is a process of expansion of consciousness. From the affective standpoint, it is a progressive communion and union by love. It is important to realize that there is no sharp discontinuity between one stage and the next, either on the part of God's presence or on the part of the subject. The Trinity of divine Persons is present in the soul from the beginning, although veiled from the human consciousness by its own limitations. The subject himself suffers some drastic changes. He is altered cognitively, affectively and morally. Yet the metamorphoses undergone, no matter how acute, pertain to the psychological and not the essential order. They are ontological but not substantial. It is important to think of the mystical trajectory as both a progressive enlightenment of the intellect and a kindling of the will. Likewise, one should think of its term as both a communication of intelligibility and a communion of persons by love. Similarly, although God's nature is utterly simple, he ought to be thought of as both Light and Love, for intellectual clarity and affectivity are the two primary effects he has upon the soul in communion with him. "For, since God is divine light and love, in the communication of himself which he makes to the soul, he equally informs these two powers, intellect and will, with understanding and love." God as Light illuminates, but the illumination is not an isolated occurrence. By the very same act, God as agape or caritas reaches out to the soul with his own Being, perfecting it and bringing it to himself. "Ubi caritas... Deus ibi est." It is by focussing upon God as Love that we may best understand the mystical transformation as a communication of essence, a sharing of life, a communion of persons. Juan de la Cruz's understanding of the mystical union is well expressed in the following succinct statement: "When this spiritual marriage between God and the soul is consummated, there are two natures in one spirit and love..." By this transformation the person has taken on the life of God: "Wherefore the soul may well say here with Saint Paul: I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me." This living of God's life, being one in spirit and love with God, is also called by the saint a "participation" in God. However, the subject of the union between man and God is a delicate one since in its articulation it is easy to make implications which are not reconcilable with Christian teaching. Juan de la Cruz negates the possible inference that the soul acquires divine nature by stating clearly that the soul and God do not become one "essentially and naturally as the Father and the Son are one," but rather they are so by a participation of love. Similarly, the mystical writer denies that by the union there is a fusion of persons, or a loss of the human nature by its absorption into the Godhead. It is stated clearly that "the substance of this soul --although it is not the substance of God, for it cannot undergo a substantial conversion into him-- has become God through participation in God, being united to and absorbed in him, as it is here in this state." To use the expression of Jacques Maritain, no
"entitative" change has taken place. The soul and God have become one in life, that is, the former now shares by participation in the life of the latter. They remain, however, two in essence, nature or substance, which guarantees the preservation of their distinctiveness. Succinctly expressed, God and the mystical soul have become "two natures in one spirit and love..." A standing principle in the thought of Juan de la Cruz is that "each person acts in conformity with the degree of perfection he has acquired." This principle is the basis for his philosophical justification of the "divinization" of the soul, of its participation in the life of God. If the soul is purified and spiritualized, its operation must necessarily be spiritual. He does not only mean by this that the operations are non-material, but also that they are supernatural as well. The purification itself is a supernatural phenomenon, by an infusion of divine light and warmth into the soul. When the subject comes to perceive what is being communicated, it is God that is revealed to him. He then advances proportionately in love for God and union with him. In the mystical marriage, therefore, a certain oneness of operation between God and the subject takes place, as they both know and love the same things by supernatural communication. Although this oneness of operation commences much earlier, at the heights of mystical union God raises the soul to perform "operation of God in God." Many are the Sanjuanist texts on the sharing in God's acts of knowing and loving which follows upon the natural and supernatural conditioning of the powers.

Since every living being lives by its operation, as the philosophers say, when the soul's operations are in God through its union with him, it lives the life of God.... The intellect, which before this union understood naturally by the strength and vigor of its natural light, by way of the natural senses, is now moved and informed by another higher principle of supernatural divine light, the senses having been set aside. Accordingly, the intellect has become divine, because through union the soul's understanding and that of God are now both one. And the will, which previously loved in a base and death-like fashion, only with its natural affection, has now been changed into the life of divine love; for it loves in a lofty manner with divine affection, moved by the strength of the Holy Spirit in which it now lives the life of love; since, by means of this union, its will and his are only one. And the memory, which of itself perceived only figures and phantasms of created things, has been changed through this union so as to have in its mind the eternal years spoken of by David (Ps 76,6).

He concludes: "...the understanding of this soul is understanding of God; and its will is will of God; and its memory, eternal memory of God; and its delight, delight of God..." Therefore, at the summit of this participation in God, the soul "performs in him, in company with him, the work of the most Blessed Trinity." The subject has here reached "the center of its soul," the full actuation of its powers. For when the soul "has reached God with all the capacity of its being and the strength of its operation and inclination, it will have attained to its final and deepest center in God, which will be when with all its strength it loves and understands and enjoys God." In this state there becomes activated what is called the "common sense of the soul," a power parallel to that of the "common sense of fantasy," which, holding in itself what is apprehended spiritually by the other powers, "has become a receptacle and archive of the grandeurs of God... illuminated and enriched to the extent that it attains this sublime and enlightened possession." Juan de la Cruz's choice of imagery points to a permeation of the whole being by God, who is the object
of the rational powers, their point of convergence, and the means by which their transformation takes place.

The faculties have been admirably transfigured and their operations transformed. The thirst and hunger for God which led them forward have been satisfied as the person is now filled with God. We are not to understand, though, that it is simply a question of the intellect being enlightened and the will being inflamed by supernatural means. As mentioned previously, by the theological virtues the subject shares in the life of God. In the fullness of mystical communion, said sharing becomes also a participation in God's own operations. San Juan insists that the operations of the powers "become divine." In his thought, faith is the virtue by which the soul participates in the divine intellect. Similarly, charity is a sharing in God's own act of Love. By its efficacy the subject aspires "to love God as greatly as he is loved by him," which is possible given that he will be returning to God God's own act of love. In mystical union, thus, after arduous purifications which have brought the powers of the soul to be actualized to the fullness of their natural potentiality, they leave behind their ordinary mode of operation with respect to their divine object, and it is given to the subject to understand through God's own act of cognition and to love through his own act of volition. It is not to be thought, however, that in this oneness of operation with God the human powers have lost their distinctiveness. The powers as such remain distinct from God; it is the operations that are shared. In union, man's intellect is his own, while his understanding is derived from God. If it were otherwise, he could have no experience as a subject of the communion. Likewise, "the will of the soul is not lost there," but rather is one with the divine will by its own consent. In this manner is the soul divinized and participates actively in the life of God.

Participation in the Trinitarian Processions

The union with God of which Juan de la Cruz speaks is simultaneously a transformation in and a communication with the three Persons of the Holy Trinity. By strict necessity this must be so, for the Deity he has encountered is the tripersonal Christian God. There are those who would think of mystical union as an intellectual encounter with an impersonal divine nature, with the One of the philosophers. Such an understanding would come from granting a priority to metaphysical knowledge over perfection in virtue and grace. However, as Juan was to avoid any extreme form of voluntarism, he was also to avoid Neoplatonic or Plotinian intellectualism. In our author's psychology of mysticism, the powers of the soul retain their operative balance. The ascent is neither by volition nor by intellection alone, but by a process in which "these powers are being purged side by side." Both must, therefore, advance harmoniously together. And yet the feat is not accomplished by the natural strength of the powers, but by the theological virtues which perfect them respectively and infuse into them the very Being of God. In this manner, at the culmination of the mystical ascent the soul penetrates into the depth of the Godhead and participates in the ineffable mystery of the life of the Trinity. The Mystical Doctor asserts that "the transformation would not be true and total if the soul did not undergo a transformation in the three Persons of the most Holy Trinity in a clearly revealed and manifest degree." It is for this reason that the trinitarian indwelling or inhabitation in the soul, or the transformation of the soul in the Trinity, is a subject which is central to the thought of Juan de la Cruz.

The communion with the Holy Trinity which crowns the mystical ascent is directly related to our topic of the different modes of cognition. In mystical communion with God, as we
have said, there takes place a perfecting, an elevating, a transforming of the human rational powers and their operations. Looking upon this phenomenon as a union with the tripersonal God, there is revealed a special correlation and relationship between each of the different powers and its symbolically corresponding divine Person. We have mentioned previously the series of trinitarian analogues which are discerned in creation by speculators of the mystical tradition, including John of the Cross. There are three Persons in the Godhead, mirrored by three human rational powers. The latter are elevated to be a more perfect image of the Trinity and communion with the divine Persons by means of the three theological virtues.

From this perspective we can perhaps better appreciate the balance in the operations of the powers prescribed by San Juan's spirituality. It is a balance complemented by a parallel one among the theological virtues which bring the soul into communion with a Trinity of Persons equal in dignity. However, we are not dealing here exclusively with a symbolic theology. There is also in the thought of the Carmelite reformer an operational psychology, that is, a reflection upon the inner working of the human psyche as it advances in moral and intellectual perfection toward mystical union. Our author does not discontinue this reflection at the point in which he deals with the highest stage of mystical phenomena, the trinitarian indwelling, which also represents the highest fulfillment of human nature as well as the most perfect enactment of its operations.

The second stanza of the "Llama" discusses "how the three Persons of the most Holy Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, are they who effect in the soul this divine work of union." The "canción" reads:

¡Oh cautero suave!  
¡Oh regalada llaga!  
¡Oh mano blanda! ¡Oh toque delicado!,  
que a vida eterna sabe  
y toda deuda paga;  
matando, muerte en vida la has trocado.

Oh soft cautery!  
Oh delectable wound!  
Oh gentle hand! Oh delicate touch,  
that tastes of eternal life  
and satisfies every debt!  
Slaying, thou hast changed death into life.

It is explained that the "cautery" is the Holy Spirit, who is "fire of love," wounding, healing and transfiguring in one simultaneous act. The "hand" is "the pious and omnipotent Father," generously extending himself to man, offering "rich and powerful gifts." Addressing the eternal Father, the soul states:

And this thou didst with the liberality of thy generous grace, which thou bestowest upon me in the touch by which thou didst touch me of the splendor of thy glory and the image of thy substance (Hebr 1,3), which is thy only begotten Son; in whom, being thy Wisdom, thou touchest mightily from one end to the other (Wis 7,24). And this thine only begotten Son, oh merciful hand of the Father!, is the delicate touch with which thou didst touch me in the power of thy cautery and didst wound me.
San Juan's articulation is admirable in its subtlety and precision. It is to be noted that the presentation of the divine Persons retains symbolically the unity of the divine substance. God is symbolized by a hand which both touches and cauterizes. We are further told that "the hand, the cautery and the touch are, in substance, one same thing."52

The terms "hand," "touch" and "cautery" are applied respectively to the different divine Persons "by reason of the effect that each one produces."53 The Second Person is understood to proceed from the Father by way of intellect, for which reason he is considered to be the Word, the Logos, the Light, the Wisdom, the Exemplar, "the deposit of the treasures of the Father, the splendor of the eternal light, the stainless mirror and image of his goodness (Wis 7,26)."54 Thus, the enlightenment experienced by the human being in mystical union is attributed to Christ.55 The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son by way of will, for which he is understood as bond, as warmth, as Love, as communicability of divine Being, as "infinite fire of Love."56 Therefore, the dispensation of graces and divine love, the kindling of the will in mystical union, the communion of persons, is attributed to the Holy Spirit.57 Nevertheless, the author keenly reminds us that all three Persons "act in one, and thus everything is attributed to one, and everything to all."58

The mystical indwelling of the Trinity in the soul occurs:

enlightening its intellect in the wisdom of the Son, delighting its will in the Holy Spirit, and by absorbing it powerfully and mightily in the abysmal embrace of the sweetness of the Father.59

What is novel about the doctrine of this Carmelite thinker, though, is not the correlation between the powers and God, but rather his insistence that the human soul in mystical union with God is co-agent, by its perfection in faith and charity, of the divine operations of knowing and loving. In union, "the understanding of this soul is understanding of God; its will is will of God; and its memory, eternal memory of God..."60

Further, given that God's act of understanding is his Son, and that his act of volition is the Holy Spirit, in the mystical marriage the soul participates in the generation of the Son by the Father and in the spiration of the Spirit by the Father and Son. The following concise articulation goes beyond correlating human powers with divine Persons. It also establishes a oneness of human and divine operations, and therefore a participation by the soul in the two divine processions:

There is no reason to consider it impossible that the soul should be capable of so sublime a thing as to breathe ["aspirar"] in God, through participation, as God breathes ["aspira"] in her. For, since God grants her the favor of uniting her in the most Holy Trinity, wherein she becomes deiform and God by participation, it is in no way incredible that she should also perform his work of understanding, knowledge and love --or rather, should have it performed in the Trinity, together with the Trinity, as the Trinity itself, but in a way that is communicated and participated, in which God is performing this operation in the soul herself. For this is what is meant by being transformed in the three Persons in power, wisdom and love. And herein the soul is like unto God, for it was that she might come to this end that he created her in his image and likeness.61
Thus we see how the trinitarian likeness to God with which man is endowed by nature comes to its fulfillment in the mystical union, where the soul participates in the processions which are one with the ecstasy and dynamism of the trinitarian life.

In mystical union as achieved, the soul is no longer simply enlightened by the Son and given warmth by the Spirit. Rather, being one with God in operation, the subject knows through the Logos, in whose very generation he participates: "my intellect... understands no longer by means of its own natural vigor and light, but through the divine Wisdom to which it has been united." Likewise, the soul loves through the Paraclete, in whose spiration it shares. In union, the mystical subject is empowered "to breathe in God the same breath of love that the Father breathes in the Son and the Son in the Father, which is the Holy Spirit himself, who inhales ["aspira"] the soul into the Father and the Son in said transformation, in order to unite her to himself."

Juan de la Cruz insists upon the incomprehensibility and ineffability of this experience. And it is naturally all the more so to us than to him, who had lived it. It appears that the mystical communion is a phenomenon which is too simple in itself to be comprehended by the human mind, for which reason the simplicity and unity of elements must be broken up if the experience is to be conceptualized at all. It is much the same with the question concerning God's nature, to which we attribute differing perfections because we are incapable of comprehending this utterly simple yet all-encompassing Being. Similarly, in the subject of the mystical experience we are dealing with a phenomenon in which there are involved simultaneously: the unity of the divine nature within the Trinity of Persons; the identity of giver and given; as well as the unity of each divine procession with the corresponding transformed human operation.

As Juan de la Cruz must reduce the mystical experience to the conceptualizable and then express it by the instrumentality of human language, it is not surprising that his texts should throw into relief one aspect or facet of it at a time. In *Llama* 2 and 4, the focus is upon the three Persons as agents of this union of love. There are texts throughout all of the major works on the oneness of divine and human operations. In *Cántico* 39, the emphasis is upon the oneness of the intratrinitarian processions and the human operations. Yet the differentiation is only for the sake of exposition, for in reality each divine Person is one with his corresponding procession and in turn one with the corresponding transformed human operation.

The matter is mysterious and ineffable. It is also delicately intricate in as much as the mind can grasp it at all. At the summit of this ascent, the soul and God become one, as Aquinas says, by unity of object. That is, a oneness is achieved in the intentional order by means of acts of mutual knowing and loving; the union of the two subjects takes place in those very same acts. It occurs without the human soul losing its own being as subject in the transforming communion. For the acts of knowing and loving are still its own: they take place in its own passive intellect and its own will, and are experienced as such. And thus far there is no fundamental difference between this and our ordinary relations of intentionality. In God, however, there is identity of subject, acts and object, in virtue of the absolute simplicity of his Being. The soul, thus, having become intentionally one with said divine oneness, shares by this communion in the divine operations of knowing and loving, and therefore in the divine processions of the generation of the Son by way of intellect and of the spiration of the Spirit by way of will. And said communion is so intimate and complete, we are led to understand, that in comparison, any other human experience of affective or intentional oneness is but a pale shadow.
In all things that can be said of the mystical act, simplicity pertains more properly and fully to God than to the human soul. As a lived experience it is no doubt one and indivisible for God, whereas for the human subject it has different aspects or dimensions. For the latter, the experience as act of knowing is not the same as it is as act of loving. Further, the act of cognition itself can be said to have various aspects. When man, whose ontological structure is complex, communes with God's eminently simple Being, he is experienced in a multi-dimensional manner according to the various human powers. This phenomenon can well be compared to the passing of a ray of pure light through a multifaceted crystal, whereby it refracts into lesser ones of varying colors. Here we again see how the received is received according to the mode of the recipient. We also observe here, once more, John of the Cross' characteristic fidelity to man's ontological structure, even when dealing with this highest plane of mystical transformation.

It is to be noted that when referring to the union as achieved, the memory is not correlated to a specific divine operation or procession. Rather, its fulfillment is found in the possession of the divine essence and boundlessness in a generic sense: "the memory, which of itself perceived only figures and phantasms of created things, has been changed through this union so as to have in mind the eternal years spoken of by David (Ps 76,6)." The flames of divine love assail the soul "delighting me in the substance of my soul with the torrent of thy delight, in thy divine contact and substantial union, according to the greater purity of my substance and the capacity and breath of my memory." In other passages, the operation of the memory appears as an extension of the act of knowing: "the memory has become eternal apprehensions of glory." In this state, the soul "fills its memory with divine acts of knowledge," and "according to the memory it drinks recreation and delight in remembrance and feeling of glory."

When we say that in this state the rational powers have reached the fullness of their natural flowering, we are referring particularly to the intellect and the will. As discussed in a previous chapter, the memory, which is not an ontologically distinct faculty of the soul, is the relating of already done, being done, and to be done. Memory is thus the instrument, "through which the soul operated in time." However, "united in pure knowledge, which belongs not to time," man's experiential structuring, unfolding, tending, has been fulfilled and put to rest. Memorative activity as such does not take place in mystical communion. Thus, the last stanza of the "Noche oscura" says:

Quedéme y olvidéme...
dejando mi cuidado
entre las azucenas olvidado.

I abandoned and forgot myself... leaving all my cares forgotten amidst the lilies.

In union, one is in the fatherland, and is one with the eternal "memoring" of the Godhead, if we may so speak.

The act of knowing exercised in the mystical transformation is referred to in many Sanjuanist texts as a "recuerdo," while the act of love is often called "aspiración." The modern reader and especially the English-speaking reader may need to be alerted that the term "recuerdo" is not used here to signify primarily "to remember," but rather "to awaken," "to come to know," or even "to come to understand," as it was commonly used at the time of Juan
de la Cruz, and occasionally even today.\textsuperscript{72} The "recordar" is therefore an "enlightenment," a "discovery," an "awakening." The context in which Juan de la Cruz uses the term fully reveals this to be so.\textsuperscript{73} By the "recuerdo" he denotes "a movement of the Word in the substance of the soul" which communicates "sublime knowledge of the Deity" and of "the excellence of God."\textsuperscript{74} The term "aspirar," or "aspiración," is used subtly by the Carmelite writer in two senses: first, meaning "to inhale," which is its first denotation in Spanish; and secondly, as an adaptation of the Latin "spirare," which in theology designates the act by which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. When using the verb in the first signification the subject is God, who inhales the soul into himself. When it is used in the second sense, both God and soul are subjects, as the soul is co-agent with God by participation of the spiration of the Holy Spirit.

It is interesting to observe that in mystical union the order in which the human powers operate has remained unaltered: volition or love always follows upon and is in proportion to cognition. In this we see, once more, how in the thought of Juan de la Cruz there is an un­bending respect for human nature, for human psychological operations as we know them. During the purgative stages the infused knowledge is perceived dimly through the darkness of the night. At the summit of mystical communion, faith is luminous and yields a certain vision of God.\textsuperscript{76} And yet, we are dealing with an open-ended and self-expanding process in that the greater the charity, the more faith and wisdom are infused.\textsuperscript{77}

It is further worthy of note that the order of activity of the powers parallels the order of operation and efficacy of the other trinitarian structures. Among the powers of the soul, the intellect is the first to act. Among the theological virtues, faith precedes hope and charity. Among the divine Persons, the Son proceeds before the Spirit. In turn, the will, charity and the Holy Spirit follow respectively upon the intellect, faith and the Logos, each performing within its own sphere the function of bond, or nexus, or consummation. Within the mystical ascent there is to be noted a certain sympathy and mutual influence among these trinitarian structures. The access of the soul into the supernatural dimensions is by purification of the intellect by faith, which is the "proportionate means" to communion with God. Advancement in charity follows. At the summit of the ascent, there is communion with Christ, who is "the gate and the way to become united with God,"\textsuperscript{78} and with the Spirit, the dispenser of love and the bond of union. And thus in mystical communion the parallelism among these structures has become also an operational identity: the soul knows with God, whose knowledge is his Image and the Exemplar, and upon so knowing, the soul loves God with God's own Love, which is the Holy Spirit. Thus the act of Love, the "aspirar sabroso," completes the perfection and transformation of the human powers, as well as the union of the human subject with God, as it is first of all the bond of completion within the Trinity itself.

In the hours of the mystical dawn, the state of the human subject is such that his rational powers have been fulfilled, perfected, and expanded beyond the horizon of their natural limits. Having grown in supernatural life, the soul has been bathed in the light and warmth of God and has been brought into intimacy with the Persons of the Trinity themselves. Being thus trans­figured,

the joyful soul who by great fortune attains to this cautery, knows all things, savors all things, does all that she desires, and prospers. No one prevails before her, and nothing touches her.\textsuperscript{79}

No doubt this description applies to many great Western mystics, not only Saint John of the Cross and the co-reformer of Carmel Saint Theresa, but numerous others before and after-
wards, souls advanced in wisdom and inflamed with love for God, whose spiritual energies have overflowed into zeal, temporal action and wondrous achievement.

"En par de los levantes de la aurora"

We shall devote the remainder of the present chapter to discussing the cognitive act which is peculiar to the mystical union. Above it is stated that the mystic "knows all things" ["todo lo sabe"]. Any effort to ascertain the meaning of this statement must assume as its point of departure the incomprehensibility and ineffability of the cognitive experience in question. Nevertheless, certain things can be learned about it by following Juan de la Cruz's texts with care. Interestingly, he discusses at much greater length and in more detail the act of knowledge in mystical union, the "recuerdo," than the act of love, the "aspiración," which for some reason is the more ineffable of the two.

It has been said that the intellect of the mystics is elevated and transformed. A fundamental question must be asked regarding this transformation: can we say unequivocally that the mystical experience carries with it distinctly intelligible cognitive activity? Or to put it another way: does it carry intentional content? As we shall see by following the texts, this question is answerable in the affirmative. In the course of the ascent, the soul moves from enjoying a presence of God by grace alone, which is unperceived and unknown directly, to an actual spiritual perception of that presence in itself. From the initial stages of the summit, faith, which had been dark, becomes luminous and translucent. The issue can be put in terms of the three forms of cognition mentioned, the affirmative, negative and supereminent; in other words, from a point of departure in which God is intentionally present but only in terms of creatures, a transformation takes place through a stage in which all intentional content is deliberately banished, to a culminating one in which God in himself becomes intentionally grasped by the subject.

A common understanding, however, is that mystical experiences are rich emotionally and affectively, but nebulous and obscure to the intellect. This widespread interpretation may come in part form identifying mysticism with external phenomena involving ligature of the senses, such as ecstasies, raptures, levitations etc., which are thought of as entailing a lessening or a total loss of consciousness, or even as a penetration into a world of irrationality. The writings of numerous mystics indicate that this is not so, even in the instance of the above mentioned phenomena, which happen to pertain only to the lower stages of the mystical life. José Luis Aranguren's interpretation of the thought of our Spanish saint can serve as an example of this misunderstanding. Aranguren states that "anegamiento en Dios" takes place renouncing all knowledge, all aspiration to "distinct and particular" knowledge, in order to rest on pure faith.... For [Saint John of the Cross] faith is "to pass on to unknowing," "to enter into the abyss," and its objective, if we may so put it, is the dark and general lack of knowledge, which neither understands nor wishes to understand, which disperses itself and is of nothing in particular: in a word, the Night of Faith. And it is in submergence into that Night where contemplation takes place; further, it is in the Night itself and its experience that contemplation consists.
It is true that there are texts in the corpus of San Juan's writings which might lead to this understanding if they are read in isolation. In *Subida II*, it is said that "for the soul to achieve union with God in this life, and to commune without mediation with him, it must unite itself with the darkness..." Similarly, "contemplation is dark; for which reason it is called by another name *mystical theology*, which means secret or hidden wisdom of God... Some spiritual persons call this contemplation understanding yet not understanding..." Juan de la Cruz further states that God's communication "is confused and dark to the intellect, because it is contemplative knowledge, which is a ray of darkness to the intellect, as St. Dionysius says." And again, a passage from *Cántico* 14-15 states: "In this spiritual sleep that the soul has in the bosom of the Beloved, she possesses and savors all the tranquility, rest and quietude of a peaceful night; and she receives in God together with this an abysmal and obscure divine knowledge.

Many similar texts could be cited. It is important to note, however, that they generally refer to specific stages of the mystical ascent, not to the mystical union or fulfillment as achieved. As we discussed throughout the last chapter, the mystic must undergo the darkness of the active and passive nights. Yet this darkness is a means, a narrow gate which leads to an expansion of consciousness. It is not a finality in itself, as Aranguren, Maio and Ballestero would have it. It should be pointed out that the texts which utilize the image of darkness as applied to contemplation are generally set in the context of a mention of an enlightenment, of the supernatural dawn which follows the nights of purgation. Such is the case with the passages cited above. The text from *Cántico* 14-15, for example, continues thusly:

for this reason she says that her Beloved is to her the tranquil night, at the onset of the rise of dawn ["en par de los levantes de la aurora"]). But she does not say that this tranquil night is like unto a dark night, but rather, that it is like the night that is reaching the onset of dawn; that is, that it is simultaneous with this rising. Because this tranquility and quietude in God is not entirely obscure to the soul as a dark night; but it is a tranquility and quietude in divine light, in a new knowledge of God, in which the spirit is most gently tranquil, being raised to a divine light. And she very appropriately calls this divine light the rise of dawn, which means the morning; for, just as the rising of the morning dispels the darkness of the night and reveals the light of day, likewise this spirit that is tranquil and quiet in God is raised from the darkness of natural knowledge to the matinal light of supernatural knowledge of God...

In the thought of Juan de la Cruz the soul who attains the heights of mystical union undergoes a trajectory described by von Balthasar as "the grand arc of the night." From the initial twilight or vespertine vision shared by all men; through the self-imposed darkness of the active night; through the greater darkness of the passive night, which is one with the soul's inability to perceive God's communication; through a relative enlightenment experienced in mystical communion, sometimes called a "visión matutina;" to the full midday clarity of the beatific vision. The cosmic symbolism chosen is superb for a presentation of the process in question.

Further, a thorough reading of the texts reveals a consistency between John of the Cross' symbols and their signification which is worthy of note. Two clusters of contrasting images are employed here to develop an entire line of thought. On the one hand, there are the images of
darkness: "noche," "abismo," "abisal," "profundidad," "tiniebla," "tenebroso." And on the other hand there are the images of light: "día," "mediodía," "esclarecimiento," "ilustración," "iluminación." Thirdly, there are a number of terms which represent stages between the two extremes: "alba," "aurora," "antelucano," "matutino," "entreoscuco," "entre dos luces," "vislumbrar," "vislumbre," "traslucir," "visear." These images stand without ambiguity in their signification: the terms pertaining to darkness designate unintelligibility, and those pertaining to light and sight indicate intelligibility. Juan is cognizant that obscurity and clarity can only be said by extension of the act of knowing, for the intellect has no need of physical light. However, it is proper to utilize this vocabulary descriptively. "We call the understanding of the soul also its sight," he has told us. Therefore, luminosity, which increases vision, is associated with intellection. Obscurity, which prevents vision, is associated with the lack thereof.

San Juan indicates that mystical communion carries with it a contemplation of God's very Being. Further, by the same act of cognition all of God's creatures are known through him. A careful reading of the texts reveals that this extraordinary act of understanding should not be called precipitously either "obscure" or "clear." One text describes this noetic act as "obscure and general" in contrast with our inferior acts of cognition, which are distinct and particular." An intellectual apprehension of God has to be "general" to correspond to the all-encompassing simplicity of his Being. If it were "particular" it would no longer be of him. Creatures are simultaneously known through God in the same mysterious simple act. The quality of "obscurity" stems from the limitations of being alive in the flesh, which does not allow for clear, full vision of God.

To the soul in the state of actual mystical communion, "everything is there. Everything is known, but is fathomless." Had this all-englobing act of intellection been fully distinct, perhaps Fray Juan would not have referred to Dionysius the Areopagite as "san Dionysio," for the particulars of his historical identity would have been revealed to him along with all other things. Although the image is necessarily inadequate, we might compare this act of cognition to the experience of looking through an unfocused lens. Yet it is also very important to realize that said translucent lens is potentially fully transparent as well.

We can say that the noetic act which is concomitant to mystical communion stands between two opposite poles. At one end is the obscurity which pertains to the night of faith, and at the other, the supreme diaphaneity of "the clear vision" beheld in beatitude. Between the two poles stands the cognition proper to mystical communion, which takes place "by means of a most enlightened faith." This act of cognition is neither totally obscure nor fully clear, but rather,

as night at the onset of the rise of dawn; for just as the night at the time of such rising is neither wholly night nor wholly day, but, as they say, at the break of day, so this divine solitude and tranquility, informed by the divine light, participates to some degree in that light, but without having the fullness of its clarity.

Although full vision of God is not granted until the beatific state, San Juan stresses that the intellectual superenlightenment which takes place in mystical communion immensely surpasses ordinary human understanding. At the beginning of the Cantico it is stated that the soul who reaches such perfections "that she may be united and transformed through love in the Son of God," will become "so fully instructed and learned in his mysteries that, so far as temporal knowledge of him is concerned, she will no longer need to say: Where hast thou hidden thy-
As the soul advances in perfection, it is permeated by a "serene and limpid light" which progressively reveals to it the face of the hidden Beloved. The state of "spiritual betrothal" brings with it an unveiling of the grandeur of her Beloved, which she knows and enjoys in him by means of said union of betrothal. In this divine union the soul sees and savors abundance and inestimable riches ... and understands secrets and alien knowledge of God ... She tastes there a marvelous subtlety and spiritual gratification, discovers true rest and divine light, and tastes sublimely the wisdom of God, which shines forth in the harmony of creatures and the acts of God.... And, above all, she understands and enjoys an inestimable feast of love.

John of the Cross proceeds to discuss at greater length the different facets of the act of cognition exercised in this stage of the mystical ascent. The object of this noetic act is always God, yet the subject may apprehend him in a diversity of ways according to his various spiritual senses. Each one of these distinguishable modes of "perceiving" God is represented by one of the metaphors in stanzas 14 and 15 of the "Cántico espiritual." The "alien islands" stand for "the great, wondrous new things and unusual knowledge, far removed from common understanding, which the soul sees in God." Similarly, "by amorous breezes are understood here the virtues and graces of the Beloved.... And by the whisper of these breezes is meant a most sublime and delectable knowledge of God and of his virtues, which overflows into the intellect." It is called "whisper because, just as the whisper of the breeze enters sharply into the cavity of the ear, likewise this most subtle and delicate knowledge penetrates with marvelous savorness and delight into the innermost substance of the soul.... This is the principal delight of the soul, because it pertains to the intellect; and as theologians say, fruition, or the vision of God, is proper to the intellect." Further, "this divine whisper which penetrates through the ear of the soul is not only, as I have said, the understood substance, but also an unveiling of truths concerning the Divinity and a revelation of his hidden secrets." By the "silent music.... the soul is given to see a wonderful correspondence to and harmony with div-Wisdom in the diversity of his creatures and created works, all and every one of which is endowed with a certain respondence to God.... Further, by virtue of this betrothal, the spiritual powers perceive "most sonorously" a "sounding solitude" in which each creature "raises its voice in testimony to what God is...." The Bridegroom also extends the gift of "the supper that refreshes and enkindles love," concerning which "it is to be known that in Holy Scripture this noun supper denotes divine vision...."

With spiritual marriage the soul is further advanced in knowledge. At this stage the divine Spouse communicates to "sweet mysteries concerning his Incarnation and the modes and ways of human redemption, which is one of the highest works of God...." Through this and "numerous other mysteries" which are disclosed, "God unveils progressively to the soul the orderings and dispositions of his wisdom...." All these communications are made directly to the passive intellect "stripped of accidents and phantasms." San Juan adds that some persons call this form of cognition understanding yet not understanding. For it does not take place in what philosophers call the active intellect, which works upon the forms, fantasies and apprehensions of the corporeal powers. Rather, it is produced in the intellect in its possible or passive dimension, which, without receiving any such forms, etc. simply receives passively substantial knowledge, which is divested of images, and which is given without any operation or active function of the intellect.
Thus we understand that the "not understanding" refers to the fact that in this noetic experience the intellect does not perform its ordinary operations of abstracting intelligibility and reasoning. It is also stated that "we say that the soul does not operate, not because it fails to understand, but because it understands without any operation or effort on its part..." In reality, "the soul senses all these things and understands them most distinctly..."

The mystery of the "recuerdo" can be further dwelt upon. "That which the soul knows and experiences in this awakening concerning the excellence of God is totally beyond words. For, since it is a communication of the excellence of God in the substance of the soul, there is heard in it an immense power in the voice of a multitude of excellences, of thousands upon thousands of virtues of God, which could never be numbered." As mentioned previously, in the heights of mystical communion there is an explicit experience of the Trinity of divine Persons, without a loss of unity. Within God's unity or nature itself, the subject discovers God's infinite attributes, referred to in Llama as "lamps of life," which "give forth knowledge and love of God," kindling and enlightening the soul "within their splendors."

It is explained that "God, in his one and simple Being, is all the virtues and grandeurs of his attributes: for he is omnipotent, wise, good, merciful, just, powerful, loving, etc. and he is other infinite attributes which are unknown to us." Yet the mystical author makes clear that the attributes do not refer to different "facets" of God, for God is not polyfaceted. Rather, his Being is absolutely simple. Thus, "each one of these things is the very Being of God, which is the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit..." In the mystical union, therefore, infinity is unveiled upon infinity, within the infinite divine nature. The fullness of God's essence, which is either the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit, reveals itself again and again through and in the Person of the Son. In an intelligible act which transcends human intellection, God's unity is discovered in his variety, as his variety is found in his unity.

San Juan elucidates this cognitive dimension of the mystical act in even greater detail. However, before we continue following his texts one by one, it behooves us to relate this topic to a question discussed earlier. We find that this teaching of the Castilian saint on the cognitive or intentional dimension of mystical union is useful to render more intelligible other points of his own thought. As was pointed out earlier, one of John of the Cross' most daring doctrines is the "divinization" of the soul, and its concomitant participation in the trinitarian processions. San Juan's own philosophical explanation of this phenomenon is the oneness of operation between God and man which takes place in union. However, the present considerations on intellectual enlightenment in mystical experience can perhaps serve to shed additional light on the same question. If in the state of union there is given specific cognitive or intentional content, as the texts indicate is the case, then parallels can be drawn with ordinary human knowledge. Following a realist epistemology such as is found in Aristotle and Aquinas, in ordinary human cognition the known determines the knower intentionally by permeation of his faculties. In the experience of mystical communion, if the cognitive powers attain God in himself, one can see how it is possible to speak of a "divinization" of the soul, in that the latter is permeated, informed and transformed intentionally by God, without any loss of its own substance. In ordinary cognition, further, there takes place an actuation of what is known, precisely as known. This actuation of the known in the knower can be seen as analogous to the active participation of the soul in the divine operations and/or processions. Speaking metaphorically, Eckhart was wont of saying that the eternal Word was born to the soul, having been begotten therein by God and the mystic. Such an assertion might seem less scandalous, and more intelligible, in the light of this analogue between ordinary and mystical cognition.
"Y vamonos a ver en tu hermosura"

Returning to the specifics of the "recuerdo" experienced at the summit of mystical communion, we are told that it entails a discovery or rediscovery of God's creation, a recovery of all those things the subject had previously deprived himself of and had banished from his interior landscape. San Juan tells us that the soul who reaches this transforming state knows and savors all things, "for this is the prerogative of love: to examine all the good of the Beloved." The soul has journeyed from an evening vision of creatures, a "conocimiento vespertino" perceived through the limited eyes of the flesh and the darkened intellect of fallen nature, to a matutinal vision, a "conocimiento matutino" of all things in their Exemplar, in whom their fullness and perfection are to be found. The knowledge of creatures through God granted to the mystic is symbolized in the "Cántico" by the verse, "el soto y su donaire" ["the grove and its beauty"].

By the grove, since it nurtures within itself many plants and animals, the soul here understands God, since he nurtures and gives being to all creatures, which have their life and root in him; which is for God to show himself to her and reveal himself as Creator. By the beauty of this grove, which the soul also beseeches here for that future moment, she prays for the grace, wisdom and beauty which every earthly and heavenly creature not only has from God but also manifests in its wise, well-ordered, pleasant and harmonious correspondence with other creatures; whether it be of the lower creatures among themselves, or of the higher ones among themselves, or between the higher and the lower --a thing the knowledge of which gives the soul a sense of fascination and great delight. The texts which follow qualify this by stating that however sublime said knowledge may become during this life, "it is still a dark night in comparison with the beatific knowledge which the soul here beseeches..."

It is further indicated that the revealing of the relations of creatures among themselves and to God discloses a cosmic order and harmony previously veiled to man. It should be specified that this apprehension of creatures through God is two-fold. The subject knows them in God as exemplar cause, as being supereminently all that creatures are; and he knows them in God as Creator, as he who gives being to all things. Reference is made to the first vision in Noche II, where Juan states that the soul who has come to communicate with "divine Wisdom... tastes all the flavors of all things in a certain preeminently excellent way." Also, in stanzas 14 and 15 of the "Cántico," concerning which "it must be understood that everything that is expounded here is in God in an eminent and infinite manner..." The second apprehension carries with it a manifestation that "all things in him are life, and in him they live and are and move" in the insistence of John the Evangelist.

Our author makes reference to both aspects of the act of cognition in the following passage:

And although it is true that the soul is able to see there that these things are distinct from God, inasmuch as they have created being, and she sees them in him with their strength, root and vigor, she knows at once...
that God, in his own Being, is all these things in an infinite and preeminent way. This preeminence is made so manifest that the soul understands them better in him than in themselves. And this is the great delight of this awakening: to know creatures through God and not God through creatures; which is to know the effects through their cause and not the cause through its effects; for the latter knowledge is inductive and the former is essential.\textsuperscript{132}

In other words, in this state of hyperenlightenment, God is seen as both metaphysical root and exemplar of creatures; yet the latter are also known as distinct, as having their own "created being," their own "substance," and therefore their own "strength, root and vigor."\textsuperscript{133}

The unveiling of the marvels of God's vast and variegated creation represents an in-calcable recovery of the things previously renounced. "For this reason it has been written," as a literary critic puts it, "that Saint John of the Cross is not the Doctor of Nothingness but the Doctor of All Things, that if he denies everything at the beginning it is to regain it more fully afterwards."\textsuperscript{134} In the saint's own exuberantly joyous exclamation:

\begin{quote}
Mine are the heavens and mine is the earth. All peoples are mine. The just and the sinners are mine. The angels are mine, and the Mother of God, and all things are mine. And God himself is mine and for me, for Christ is mine and all is for me. What dost thou then seek, my soul?
For all this is thine, and everything for thee.\textsuperscript{135}
\end{quote}

San Juan de la Cruz insists upon the otherness and ineffability of any aspect of the mystical communion with God. The person who follows the Sanjuanist trajectory becomes transformed in the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, the powers of his soul being bathed in the fountain of all things and elevated to an eminent way of rejoicing, knowing and loving. It is a wonder of wonders that such a person should return, as does our Castilian Carmelite, using the language of all men, to speak: of his experience. Yet it is emphasized strongly that the knowing and loving exercised in this union do not reach their fullness until the soul's request, "rompe la tela de este dulce encuentro" ["tear the veil of this sweet encounter"],\textsuperscript{136} be granted. Then, in eternity, when all the veils are removed, that which became a presence, although unfathomable and unclear, shines forth brightly and sharply in a crystalline vision.

Whereas the mystical experience yields "a certain image of fruition caused by the union of the intellect and the affectivity with God,"\textsuperscript{137} after death the soul is granted "the essential glory, which consists in seeing the Being of God."\textsuperscript{138} The anticipation of this inexhaustible and most excellent knowing is expressed in the lines of the "Cántico" which read,

\begin{quote}
y vémonos a ver en tu hermosura
al monte y al collado
do mana el agua pura...
\end{quote}

and let us go forth to behold one another in thy beauty, to the mountain top and to the hill, to where the pure water flows...

It is explained that
when the soul says to the Spouse... Let us go forth to behold one another in thy beauty, to the mountain top, she means: transform me in the beauty of the divine wisdom, and make me like unto it, which wisdom, as we have said, is the Word, the Son of God. And in saying, to the hill, she is beseeching also to be informed in the beauty of this other lesser wisdom which he is in his creatures and mysterious works.\textsuperscript{139}

The soul anticipates reaching the high mountain crest "where the knowledge and wisdom of God --which is here called pure water-- are given to the intellect clean and free from accidents and fantasies, and crystal clear without a shadow of ignorance. The soul always hungers for this clear and pure understanding of divine truths."\textsuperscript{140}

While still alive in the flesh, the mystical soul longs for the beatific vision not only as an end in itself, but also as a means to attain perfection in love for God. During one's lifetime, "since the soul cannot succeed in equaling the perfection of love with which she is loved by God, she desires the clear transformation of glory, in which she will succeed in equaling said love."\textsuperscript{141} Our author similarly states that "it is impossible to attain perfect love of God without perfect vision of God."\textsuperscript{142} In these passages San Juan indicates that in the culminating experience of beatitude, volition follows and is in direct proportion to cognition. As the infinite understanding is, so will be the inexhaustible delight and perfection in love.\textsuperscript{143} Thus we see how in this ultimate context Juan de la Cruz's thought is still faithful to human psychological operations as we live them and know them. The fundamental principles observable in our ordinary cognitive processes which are still operative throughout the stages of purgation are no less applicable to the soul in eternity.

Throughout the stages of cognitive and moral development, the human person undergoes one and another modification regarding his experiences of knowing and loving. Endowed with a soul which is trinitarian in the structure of its powers, man's rational activities culminate the trajectory towards their own perfection in participation by knowing and loving activity in the divine processions themselves, and thus in sharing the very life of the Trinity. And yet the transfiguring metamorphoses involved entail no ontological discontinuity between one stage and the next, no mutation, but simply an enactment of previously existing potentialities. And thus after numerous purgations, the unity of knowing and loving which is true to the creature is not destroyed in beatitude, but is perfected and transfigured through the final purgation of death.
NOTES TO CHAPTER V


2. "...las tinieblas y los demás males que el alma siente cuando esta divina luz embiste, no son tinieblas ni males de la luz, sino de la misma alma." MI,13,10. "Y así, estas tinieblas suyas sentirán en tanto que la luz las embistiere, porque no pueden las almas ver sus tinieblas si no embistiere en ellas la divina luz, hasta que, expeliéndolas la luz, quede ilustrada el alma y vea la luz en sí transformada..." L,1,22. "Esta contemplación infusa, por cuanto es sabiduría de Dios amorosa, hace dos principales efectos en el alma, porque la dispone purgándola e iluminándola para la unión de amor de Dios; de donde la misma sabiduría amorosa que purga los espíritus bienaventurados, ilustrándolos, es la misma que aquí purga al alma y la ilumina." MI,5,1. Also, L,1,19.

It is important to understand that the experience of the dark night follows upon the nature of the human subject and not the nature or Being of God. Having undergone the active purifications of the intellect and will, the subject experiences a most acute sense of emptiness and desolation. This state is followed, though, by the infusion of supernatural knowledge and love. There have been commentators, however, who have associated the dark night with the term of mystical experience, knowledge of God's Being, the Absolute. See, for example, Albert Béguin, L'âme romantique et le rêve (Paris: Librairie José Corti, 1963), pp. 213 and 401. See also, below, note 47. Von Balthasar, on the other hand, comments that "minuit est déjà objectivement la lumière la plus claire... Jean souligne constamment que la lumière de Dieu brille, éternellement inchangée et semblable à elle-même, et que c'est seulement l'état non purifié de ceux qui s'en approchent qui la leur fait éprouver tout d'abord comme ténèbres et tourment du purgatoire." La gloire et la croix, part 2, 2:36-37.

3. "...tinieblas e imperfecciones del alma..." MI,13,10.

4. "Estas cavernas son las potencias de el alma: memoria, entendimiento y voluntad --las cuales son tan profundas cuanto de grandes bienes son capaces, pues no se llenan con menos que infinito..." L,3,18. "Es, pues, profunda la capacidad de estas cavernas, porque en ellas lo que puede caber, que es Dios, es profundo e infinito; y así será en cierta manera su capacidad infinita..." Ibid., 22. "... harto propiamente las llama aquí el alma cavernas profundas, porque, como siente que en ellas caben las profundas inteligencias y resplandores de las lámparas de fuego [i.e., los atributos divinos], conoce que tiene tanta capacidad y senos cuantas cosas distintas recibe de inteligencias, de sabores, de gozos, de deleites, etc., de Dios." Ibid., 69.

5. "...la luz... del entendimiento... sólo se extiende de suyo a la sciencia natural, aunque tiene potencia para lo sobrenatural..." SII,3,1. "...la luz que se le ha de dar es una altísima luz divina que excede toda luz natural, que no cabe naturalmente en el entendimiento." MI,9,2.

6. SII,9,3-4; C,12, 6 and 8; C,14-15,16; C,37,2-8; C,38,3; C,39:2 and 8-13; L,3,80-81.

7. L,3,77-83; C,38,3; C,39,2-9.

8. "This is the thrust forward beyond the limitations of human consciousness into a participation in the trinitarian consciousness. To achieve this breakthrough we have to die to
the limitations of our purely human way of knowing and loving. That is why the mystics talk of the breakdown of human images, concepts, the human process of discursive reasoning, and confront us with what may appear to be a void, a darkness, a death. For this transformation of human consciousness is given ultimately through a revolution and not through a straight-line evolutionary process. And because the inbuilt limitations of our present human condition are intrinsic to our human existence on this side of death, we can only transcend these intrinsic limitations in the revolution on the other side of death." Odo Brooke, "A Psychological Aspect of the Trinitarian Indwelling," The Downside Review, 90(1972)155-168, p. 166.

9. "...que no tiene modo..." SII,4,5.

10. "...en este camino, el... pasar al término y dejar su modo es entrar en el término que no tiene modo, que es Dios; porque el alma que a este estado llega ya no tiene modos ni maneras, ni menos se ase ni puede asir a ellos --digo modos de entender, ni de sentir, aunque en sí encierra todos los modos, al modo del que no tiene nada, que lo tiene todo--, porque tiniendo ánimo para pasar de su limitado natural, interior y exteriormente entra en límite sobrenatural que no tiene modo alguno, teniendo en sustancia todos los modos." SII, 4,5.

The soul is to strive to "estar desasida, desnuda, pura y sencilla, sin algún modo y manera..." SII,16,6. "...al espíritu le conviene estar sencillo, puro y desnudo de todas maneras de afecciones naturales, así actuales como habituales, para poder comunicar con libertad con la anchura del espíritu con divina Sabiduría, en que por su limpieza gusta todos los sabores de todas las cosas con cierta eminencia de excelencia." MII,9,1. Also, MII,16,4. In the following passage, the soul calls in graphic, descriptive terms for a new form or mold: "En esta sazón, sintiéndose el alma con tanta vehemencia de ir a Dios como la piedra cuando se va más llegando a su centro, y sintiéndose también estar como la cera que comenzó a recibir la impresión del sello y no se acabó de figurar; y, además de esto, conociendo que está como la imagen de la primera mano y dibujo clamando al que la dibujó para que la acabe de pintar y formar; teniendo aquí la fe tan ilustrada, que la hace viser unos divinos semblantes muy claros del alzaza de su Dios, no sabe qué se hacer sino volverse a la misma fe como la que en sí encierra y encubre la figura y hermosura de su Amado, de la cual ella también recibe los dichos dibujos y prendas de amor..." C,12,1.

11. "...esperar y aniquilar el hábito que de mucho tiempo tiene y a su manera de entender en sí formado, y en su lugar quede la ilustración y luz divina." MII,9,3.

12. "...va sacando esta noche al espíritu de su ordinario y común sentir de las cosas, para traerle al sentido divino, el cual es extraño y ajeno de toda humana manera." MII,9,5.

13. "...salt... de mi bajo modo de entender, y de mi flaca suerte de amar, y de mi po- bre y escasa manera de gustar..." MII,4,1. "...cuando una alma en el camino espiritual ha llegado a tanto que se ha perdido a todos los caminos y vías naturales de proceder en el trato con Dios, que ya no le busca por consideraciones ni formas ni sentimientos ni otros modos algunos de criaturas ni sentido, sino que pasó sobre todo eso y sobre todo modo suyo y manera, tratando y gozando a Dios en fe y amor, entonces se dice haberse de veras ganado a Dios, porque de veras se ha perdido a todo lo que no es Dios y a lo que es en sí." C,29,11.

14. "Cuando están vacías y limpias, es intolerable la sed y hambre y ansia del sentido espiritual... y, como todavía no se le comunica lo divino en unión de Dios, llega el penar de este vacío y sed más que a morir..." L,3,18.

It is worth citing the passage in which the vacuum of each rational power is described in relation to its proper supernatural object:
"Cuanto a la primera caverna que aquí ponemos, que es el entendimiento, su vacío es sed de Dios, y ésta es tan grande cuando él está dispuesto, que la compara David a la del ciervo —no hallando otra mayor a qué compararla—, que dicen es vehementísima, diciendo: Así como desea el ciervo las fuentes de las aguas, así mi alma desea a ti, Dios (Ps 41,1); y esta sed es de las aguas de la sabiduría de Dios, que es el objeto del entendimiento.

"La segunda caverna es la voluntad, y el vacío de ésta es hambre de Dios tan grande que hace desfallecer al alma, según lo dice también David, diciendo: Codicia y desfallece mi alma a los tabernáculos del Señor (Ps 83,3); y esta hambre es de la perfección de amor que el alma pretende.

"La tercera caverna es la memoria, y el vacío de ésta es deshacimiento y deteriormento de el alma por la posesión de Dios; como lo nota Jeremías diciendo: Memoria me­mo ero, et tabescet in me anima mea; esto es: Como con memoria me acordaré y de él mucho me acordaré, y derretirse ha mi alma en mí (Thren 3,20); revolviendo estas cosas en mi corazón, viveré en esperanza de Dios.

"Es, pues, profunda la capacidad de estas cavernas, porque lo que en ellas puede caber, que es Dios, es profundo e infinito; y así, será en cierta manera su capacidad infinita, y así su sed es infinita, su deshacimiento y pena es muerte infinita..."

15. In SII,14,6, Juan de la Cruz recognizes that if the subject were to completely still the operations of the powers before the infusion of supernatural activity took place, "seguirse hfa que ni haría nada ni tendría nada el alma, porque, dejando la meditación, mediante la cual obra el alma discurriendo con las potencias sensitivas, y fallándole también la contemplación... en la cual tiene el alma actuadas las potencias espirituales, que son memoria, entendimiento y voluntad... faltarle hfa necesariamente al alma todo ejercicio acerca de Dios..."

16. "Y vacando de esta manera el alma a todas las cosas, llegando a estar vacía y des­propiada acerca de ellas, que es, como habemos dicho, lo que puede hacer de su parte el alma, es imposible, cuando hace lo que es de su parte, que Dios deje de hacer lo que es de la suya en comunicársele, a lo menos en secreto y en silencio. Más imposible es esto que dejar de dar el rayo del sol en lugar sereno y descumbrado; pues que, así como el sol está madrugando y dando en tu casa para entrar si destapas la ventana así Dios, que en guardar a Israel ni dormita (Ps 210,4) ni menos duerme, entrará en el alma vacía y la llenará de bienes divinos." L,3,46.

Likewise, the purified subject reaches a state in which "está ya muy espiritualizada e ilustrada y adelgazada, que no se deja de traslucir la Divinidad en ella." L,1,32. "Y así lo que yo entiendo como se haga este recuerdo y vista de el alma, es que, estando el alma en Dios sustancialmente, como lo está toda criatura, quítale de delante algunos de los muchos velos y cortinas que ella tiene antepuestos para poderle ver como El es, y entonces traslúcese y viséase algo entre oscuramente (porque no se quitan todos los velos) aquel rostro suyo lleno de gracias..." L,4,7.

17. "...como el alma se acabe de purificar y vaciar de todas las formas y imágenes aprehensibles, se quedará en esta pura y sencilla luz, transformándose en ella en estado de perfección, porque esta luz nunca falta en el alma, pero por las formas y velos de criatura con que el alma está velada y embarazada no se le infunde; que, si quitase estos impedimentos y velos del todo... quedándose en la pura desnudez y pobreza de espíritu, luego el alma, ya sencilla y pura, se transforma en la sencilla y pura sabiduría, que es el Hijo de Dios, porque, faltando lo natural al alma enamorada, luego se infunde de lo divino, natural y sobrenaturalmente, por que no se dé vacío en la naturaleza." SII,15,4.

18. "...esto no se hace en el entendimiento que llaman los filósofos activo, cuya obra es en las formas y fantasías y aprehensiones de las potencias corporales, más hácense en el
entendimiento en cuanto posible y pasivo, el cual, sin recibir las tales formas, etc. sólo pasivamente recibe inteligencia sustancial desnuda de imagen, la cual le es dada sin ninguna obra ni oficio suyo activo." C,39,12. "...en el entendimiento que llaman los filósofos posible..." SII, 32,4. See also, SII,11,6; SII,15,2; SII,16,11; SII,23,1; SII,26, 16 and 18; L,3,34.

19. "...es imposible, cuando [el alma] hace lo que es de su parte, que Dios deje de hacer lo que es de la suya en comunicársele." L,3,46. There are those who distinguish between acquired and infused mystical contemplation, the former being a type which often precedes the latter, and which is characterized by being natural and attainable without supernatural divine assistance. After the necessary purifications, a subject could experience acquired contemplation without ever progressing to the reception of the infused. See Crisógono, San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica..., 2:173-187. Other theologians, however, refute the distinction, asserting that all true mystical contemplation is derived from the presence of sanctifying grace in the soul, and thus is infused and supernatural at all of its stages. In this view the purifications themselves are effected by this supernatural presence. See Garrigou-Lagrange, Les trois âges de la vie intérieure, 2:380-385 and 437. See also Juan G. Arintero, O.P., Cuestiones místicas (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1956), pp. 294-316; and "Inanidad de la contemplación adquirida," La ciencia tomista 29(1924)331-349; and 30(1924)15-27.

20. "...el Hijo de Dios nos alcanzó este alto estado y nos mereció este subido puesto de poder ser hijos de Dios, como dice san Juan (1,12)." C,39,5. Von Balthasar has insisted upon this point. He states that "la auténtica noche mística... no puede ser entendida cristianamente sino desde la Cruz: no en primer lugar como un fenómeno de «purificación» que de algún modo viniera a situarse al principio de un camino espiritual, sino ante todo como una gracia cristiana..." El cristiano y la angustia, translated by José María Valverde, Cristianismo y Hombre Actual, n. 6, 2nd edition (Madrid: Ediciones Guadarrama, 1964), p. 95. "On doit ici mettre fortement en relief que Jean de la Croix ne veut pas construire une mystique philosophique, mais veut ouvrir l'expérience du Dieu vivant, biblique, de l'amour, et la dimension des vertus théologales devenant conscientes, pour autant qu'elles sont vie trinitaire infuse: le monde du Saint-Esprit. Tout au plus peut-on demander si la beata nox qu'il décrit signifie davantage une theologia crucis ou davantage une theologia gloriae." Von Balthasar, La gloire et la croix, part 2, 2:38. Also, ibid., p. 37.

It is important to point out that, on both textual and theological grounds, the San­juanist mystical communion should not be identified with a natural mystical experience, such as might be obtained by a contemplative non-Christian, nor with any sort of philosophical noetic experience. True Christian mysticism is derived from infused grace and is thus wholly supernatural. It is for this reason that San Juan speaks of contemplation, which is the cognitive dimension of the mystical experience, as being communicated to the soul by the theological virtue of charity. "La contemplación es ciencia de amor, lo cual... es noticia infusa de Dios amorosa, que juntamente va ilustrando y enamorando el alma..." NII,18,5. For the same reason, contemplation is associated in some of Fray Juan's texts with one or several of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. "Cuanto más caridad tiene, tanto más la alumbrá y comunica los dones del Espíritu Santo..." SII,29,6. This view is shared by the most authoritative modern theologians of mysticism and the spiritual life. "L'acte de contemplation infuse procède de la foi vive comme de son principal radical, et du don de sagesse ou de celui d'intelligence comme de son principe prochain actualisé par l'inspiration divine..." Garrigou-Lagrange, Les trois âges de la vie intérieure, 2:421. See also, ibid., 1:102 and 106ff.; 2:60ff., 400ff., 493 and 697. On the relationship between contemplation and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, see also Arintero, Cuestiones místicas, pp. 413-435.
21. "...esencial... porque con esta presencia les da vida y ser y, si esta presencia esencial les faltase, todas se aniquilarían y dejarían de ser, y ésta nunca falta en el alma. La segunda presencia es por gracia.... La tercera es por afectación espiritual" in which "le comunica Dios ciertos visos entreoscuros de su divina hermosura..." C,11,3-4. "...el Verbo Hijo de Dios, juntamente con el Padre y el Espíritu Santo, esencial y presencialmente está escondido en el íntimo ser del alma; por tanto el alma que le ha de hallar conviene salir de todas las cosas según la afectación y voluntad y entrarse en sumo recogimiento dentro de sí misma..." C,1,6. "De manera que el alma no ha menester más que desnudarse destas contrariedades y disimilitúdines naturales para que Dios, que se le está comunicando naturalmente por naturaleza, se le comunique sobrenaturalmente por gracia." SII,5,4. Also, see SII,5,3.

22. Some commentators of Juan de la Cruz, however, do not quite understand his doctrine in this way. Eugene E. Maio offers one example of a misinterpretation. "The Neoplatonic dichotomy between the world of Ideas and the world of appearances necessarily leads to a discontinuity between the finite and the infinite, the sensible and the spiritual. There is no possibility of any cooperation between the human and the divine. Any type of gradual evolution between a less perfect and a more perfect union with God is unthinkable.... The natural operations of the intellect and will, the use of created things, and the love of other persons and things have no value in themselves. They positively impede the ascent to God. Faith, hope, and charity do not supplement or support the activity of the intellect and will; they supplant these human activities. What a person achieves with his intellect and will has no continuity with the larger goal of reaching union with God.... The dissembling of the person is actually a disenfranchisement of the human, for the human and divine are discontinuous." Op. cit., pp. 88-90. "The image of the dark night means that in the religious experience there must be a privation or annihilation of human nature because of the dichotomy between nature and supernatural." Ibid., p. 101. Commenting upon the verse of "Noche oscura" 2, "estando ya mi casa sosegada," this author states: "...the abode of the lover's intellect, memory, imagination, will and senses, are now stilled. They have been annihilated in their natural activity." Ibid., p. 102. "The intellect, in its own natural operation, necessarily moves away from God." Ibid., p. 107.

There are several misconceptions here, the core one being that this author assumes that for John of the Cross there is a fundamental ontological dichotomy between the created and the uncreated. If such were the case, the human person would indeed have to shed his nature and his whole being to come into communion with God. Nothing could be more erroneously said about the doctrine of Juan de la Cruz, for whom union with God is the ultimate fulfillment of human nature. Maio has overlooked that the mystical itinerary as presented by the Carmelite reformer takes its point of departure from a fundamental community between God and man which exists both by nature --in that there is an intimate presence of God by essence to the whole of creation-- and by grace --which is a gratuitous addition to nature that makes God present to man as an object of knowledge and of love (SII,5,3-4; C,1,6; C,11,3-4). Maio's interpretation also overlooks the fact that the mystical ascent takes its point of departure from knowledge of God in terms of creatures (SII,12,5; C,1-5). This interpretation further ignores that the entire mystical trajectory consists in a gradual and continuous conditioning and informing, which is culminated by the beatific vision (SII,9; C, "Argument," 1-2). And lastly, It is ignored that the negating of the operations of the powers, which is ordained through purification toward their perfection, only takes place in a circumscribed and qualified sense.

23. "...podemos decir que es como luz caliente... porque aquella luz juntamente enamora.... Que, por cuanto Dios es divina luz y amor, en la comunicación que hace de sí al alma igualmente informa estas dos potencias, entendimiento y voluntad, con inteligencia y amor." L,3,49.
24. "...Dieu même est amour, comme Saint Jean l’a annoncé. Comprénons que si Dieu a plusieurs noms propres, et que si lui-même devant Moïse il s’est appelé Celui qui est, et si la sagesse grecque a connu son nom de Pensée de la Pensée, l’Évangile nous livre de lui un nom plus secret encore, en nous montrant qu’il est l’Amour subsistant." Jacques Maritain, Les degrés du savoir, p. 642.

25. "...consumado este matrimonio espiritual entre Dios y el alma, son dos naturalezas en un espíritu y amor..." C,22,3.


27. We are told that spiritual marriage "es una transformación total en el Amado, en que se entregan ambas las partes por total posesión de la una a la otra, con cierta consumación de unión de amor, en que está el alma hecha divina y Dios por participación cuanto se puede en esta vida." C,22,3. "De donde las almas esos mismos bienes poseen por participación que El por naturaleza; por lo cual verdaderamente son dioses por participación, iguales y compañeros suyos de Dios." C,39,6. "...estando ella aquí hecha una misma cosa en él, en cierta manera es ella Dios por participación, que, aunque no tan perfectamente como en la otra vida, es... como sombra de Dios." L,3,78. Also, NII,20,5.

28. "...una cosa esencial y naturalmente como lo son el Padre y el Hijo..." C,39,5. Emphasis added. See also, SII,5,6-7; NII,20,5; C,22,3; C,24,5; C,39,4-6; Dichos de luz y amor, 106.

29. "...la sustancia de esta alma --aunque no es sustancia de Dios, porque no puede sustancialmente convertirse en El, pero estando unida como aquí está con El y asimismo absorta en El-- es Dios por participación de Dios." L,2,34.

"En dando lugar el alma --que es quitar de sí todo velo y mancha de criatura, lo cual consiste en tener la voluntad perfectamente unida con la de Dios, porque el amar es obrar en despojarse y desnudarse por Dios de todo lo que no es Dios--, luego queda esclarecida y transformada en Dios, y le comunica su ser sobrenatural de tal manera, que parece el mismo Dios y tiene lo que el mismo Dios. Y se hace tal unión cuando Dios hace al alma esta sobrenatural merced, que todas las cosas de Dios y el alma son unas en transformación participante; y el alma más parece Dios que alma, y aun es Dios por participación; aunque es verdad que su ser naturalmente tan distinto se le tiene del de Dios como antes, aunque está transformada; como también la vidriera le tiene distinto del rayo, estando del transformada." SII,5,7.

"En medio de los esplendores de la unión el alma siente y obra, y la conciencia de sí misma brilla, según San Juan de la Cruz, entera e inextinguible. Es la negación del pantecismo. Es la negación del pantecismo místico." Crisógeno, San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica..., 2:367.


31. "...dos naturalezas en un espíritu y amor..." C,22,3. Inadequate understanding of these issues leads Albert Béguin to state that within mysticism "la contemplación nous fait concevoir notre existence séparée comme un pur non-être;" and similarly, that mystical experience entails an "absorption qui est anéantissement du moi séparé..." Poésie de la presence, Série Blanche a la Baconnière (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1957), pp. 26 and 31. However: "Que ce contact de substance à substance n’aille pas du tout dans la direction d’une «unión esencial o
sustancial» panthéiste (SII,5,3), Jean le dit avec toute la clarté désirée. Rien chez lui ne s’arrête au degré d’une conception abstraite de la substance: tout se passe dans la sphère des actualisations spirituelles et personnelles qui, pourtant, n’émanent pas accidentellement d’une substance spirituelle placée à l’arrière-plan, mais enflammé celle-ci même et la blessent jusqu’au cœur.... On voit ici clairement pourquoi la mystique de Jean de la Croix ne peut s’achever que dans l’ordre trinitaire; c’est que tout son système tend avec force à dépasser deux solutions fausses opposées l’une à l’autre: la solution panthéiste qui serait pour lui une horreur imaginaire, et celle, miserable, qui limiterait l’union d’amour avec le Dieu de la révélation à des actes purement accidentels." Von Balthasar, La gloire et la croix, part 2, 2:40-41.

Along similar lines, Henri Sanson comments that: "L’anthropologie plotinienne ne marque peut-être pas assez la transcendance de Dieu; mais l’anthropologie scolastique, en voulant la sauvegarder, risque de trop couper l’ordre naturel de l’ordre surnaturel. Dans un cas, l’union à Dieu risque de n’être qu’une union à soi; dans l’autre, elle risque d’apparaître comme une aliénation. Deux dangers guettent donc saint Jean de la Croix, d’une part un monisme à saveur idéalisté, de l’autre, un dualisme qui, à la limite, serait un extrinsècisme. Dans un cas, l’expérience mystique ne serait que l’expérience charismatique de la vie de la grâce sanctifiante en nous, mais d’une grâce qui viendrait tellement d’un Autre qu’il nous serait étranger. La solution de saint Jean de la Croix est une hereuse synthèse de l’anthropologie plotinienne et de l’anthropologie scolastique." Op. cit., p. 49. Sanson is ambiguous here about what he terms "Scholasticism." He points out well, however, that San Juan avoids two metaphysical positions which would have untenable theological implications.

32. "...cada uno obra conforme al hábito de perfección que tiene." NI,1,3.

33. "El que no vive ya según el sentido, todas las operaciones de sus sentidos y potencias son enderezadas a divina contemplación, porque siendo verdad en buena filosofía que cada cosa, según el ser que tiene vida que vive es su operación, si el alma vive vida espiritual (mortificada la animal), claro está que sin contradicción --siendo ya todas sus acciones y movimientos espirituales de vida espiritual-- ha de ir con todo a Dios." SII,26,6. "Cuando acaece que aquellas mercedes se le hacen al alma en celada, que es sólo (como habemos dicho) en espíritu, suele en algunas de ellas el alma verse (sin saber cómo es aquello) tan apartada y alexada según la parte espiritual y superior de la porción inferior y sensitiva, que conoce en sí dos partes tan distintas entre sí, que le parece no tiene que ver la una con la otra, pareciéndole que está muy remota y apartada de la una. Y a la verdad, en cierta manera así lo está, porque según la operación, que entonces es toda espiritual, no comunica en la parte sensitiva. Desta suerte se va haciendo el alma toda espiritual." NI,23,14.

34. "...operación de Dios en Dios." L,1,4. "...y así todos los movimientos de tal alma son divinos." Ibid., 9.

35. "Y, como quiera que cada viviente viva por su operación, como dicen los filósofos, tieniendo el alma sus operaciones en Dios por la unión que tiene con Dios, vive vida de Dios.... Porque el entendimiento, que antes de esta unión entendía naturalmente con la fuerza y vigor de su lumbre natural por la vía de los sentidos naturales, es ya movido e informado de otro más alto principio de lumbre sobrenatural de Dios, dejados aparte los sentidos, y así, se ha trocado en divino, porque, por la unión, su entendimiento y el de Dios todo es uno. Y la voluntad, que antes amaba baja y muertamente sólo con su afecto natural, ahora se ha trocado en vida de amor divino, porque ama altamente con afecto divino, movida por la fuerza de el Espíritu Santo, en que ya vive vida de amor, porque, por medio de esta unión, la voluntad de él y de ella ya sola es una voluntad. Y la memoria, que de suyo percibia sólo las figuras y fantasmas de las criaturas, es trocada por medio de esta unión a tener en la mente los años
eternos que David dice (Ps 76,6).... De tal manera, según lo que está dicho, el entendimiento de esta alma es entendimiento de Dios, y la voluntad suya es voluntad de Dios; y su memoria, memoria de Dios, y su deleite, deleite de Dios...." L,2,34.

"....salía del trato y operación humana mía a operación y trato de Dios; es a saber: mi entendimiento salió de sí, volviéndose de humano y natural en divino, porque, uniéndose por medio de esta purgación con Dios, ya no entiende por su vigor y luz natural, sino por la divina Sabiduría con que se unió. Y mi voluntad salió de sí, haciéndose divina, porque, unida con el divino amor, ya no ama bajamente con su fuerza natural, sino con la fuerza y pureza del Espíritu Santo, y así la voluntad acerca de Dios no obra humanamente. Y, ni más ni menos, la memoria se ha trocado en aprehensiones eternas de gloria." NII,4,2.

"Lo cual no es otra cosa sino alumbrarle el entendimiento con la lumbre sobrenatural, de manera que el entendimiento humano se haga divino unido con el divino; y, ni más ni menos, informarle la voluntad de amor divino, de manera que ya no sea voluntad menos que divina, no amando menos que divinamente, hecha y unida en uno con la divina voluntad y amor; y la memoria, ni más ni menos; y también las afecciones y apetitos todos mudados y vueltos según Dios, divinamente. Y así, esta alma será ya alma del cielo celestial y más divina que humana. Todo lo cual, según se ha ido viendo por lo que habemos dicho, va Dios haciendo y obrando en ella por medio de esta noche, ilustrándola e inflamándola divinamente con ansias de sólo Dios, y no de otra cosa alguna." NII,13,11.

"...el alma se transforma en Dios, según la cual transformación bebe el alma de su Dios según la sustancia de ella y según sus potencias espirituales; porque según el entendimiento bebe sabiduría y ciencia, y según la voluntad bebe amor suavísimo, y según la memoria bebe recreación y deleite en recordación y sentimiento de gloria." C,26,5.

"El la guía y mueve y levanta a las cosas divinas; conviene a saber, su entendimiento a las divinas inteligencias, porque ya está solo y desnudo de otras contrarias y peregrinas inteligencias; y su voluntad mueve libremente al amor de Dios, porque ya está sola y libre de otras afecciones; y llena su memoria de divinas noticias, porque también está ya sola y vacía de otras imaginaciones y fantasías." C,35,5.

"¡Oh encendido amor, que con tus amorosos movimientos regaladamente estás glorificándome según la mayor capacidad y fuerza de mi alma!; es a saber, dándome inteligencia divina según toda la habilidad y capacidad de mi entendimiento; y comunicándome el amor según la mayor fuerza de mi voluntad; y deleitándome en la sustancia de el alma con el torrente de tu deleite en tu divino contacto y junta sustancial, según la mayor pureza de mi sustancia y la capacidad y anchura de mi memoria." L,1,17. See also: SI,5,7; III,2,8-9; L,3,78-83.

On this same issue of the soul's participating in God's own immanent acts of knowledge and love as it appears in Aquinas, see William J. Hill, O.P., Proper Relations to the Indwelling Divine Persons (Washington, D.C.: The Thomist Press, 1955), particularly pp. 100 and 102.

36. "...obra en él acompañadamente con él la obra de la Santísima Trinidad." C,39,6.

37. "...el centro del alma... al cual cuando ella hubiere llegado según toda la capacidad de su ser y según la fuerza de su operación e inclinación, habrá llegado al último y más profundo centro suyo en Dios, que será cuando con todas sus fuerzas entienda, ame y goce a Dios." L,1,12.

38. "Todas las cuales cosas se reciben y asientan en este sentido de el alma, que, como digo, es la virtud y capacidad que tiene el alma para sentillo, poseello y gustallo todo, administrándoselo las cavernas de las potencias, así como al sentido común de la fantasia acuden con las formas de sus objetos los sentidos corporales, y el es receptáculo y archivo de ellas;
por lo cual este sentido común del alma, que está hecho receptáculo y archivo de las grandezas de Dios, está tan ilustrado y tan rico, cuanto alcanza de esta alta y esclarecida posesión." L,3,69.

39. "...se truecan en divinas." L,2,33.

40. "...porque, además de enseñar Dios allí a amar al alma pura y libremente sin interés como El nos ama, la hace amar con la fuerza que El la ama, transformándola en su amor, como habemos dicho; en lo cual le da su misma fuerza con que pueda amalle, que es como ponelle el instrumento en las manos y decirle cómo lo ha de hacer, haciéndolo juntamente con ella; lo cual es mostrarle a amar y darle la habilidad para ello. Hasta llegar a esto no está el alma contenta, ni en la otra vida lo estaría, si... no sintiese que ama a Dios tanto cuanto de El es amada..." C,38,4.

"...conforme al primer primor con que el entendimiento recibe la sabiduría divina --hecho el entendimiento uno con el de Dios-- es el primor con que lo da el alma, porque no lo puede dar sino al modo que se lo dan; y conforme al primor con que la voluntad está unida en la bondad, es el primor con que El la da a Dios en Dios la misma bondad... y ni más ni menos según el primor con que en la grandeza de Dios conoce, estando unida en ella, luce y da calor de amor.... Y a este talle, siendo ella por medio de esta sustancial transformación sombra de Dios, hace ella en Dios por Dios lo que El hace en ella por sí mismo al modo que El lo hace, porque la voluntad de los dos es una, y así la operación de Dios y de ella es una." L,3,78.

41. L,3,78-80.

42. "...allí no está perdida la voluntad del alma..." C,38,3. "...los movimientos de tal alma son divinos; y, aunque son [de Dios], de ella lo son, porque los hace Dios en ella con ella que da su voluntad y consentimiento." L,1,9. "Y así entre Dios y el alma está actualmente formado un amor recíproco en conformidad de la unión y entrega matrimonial, en que los bienes de entrambos, que son la divina esencia, poseyéndolos cada uno libremente por razón de la entrega voluntaria del uno al otro, los poseen entrambos juntos..." L,3,79. "De donde como Dios se le está dando con libre y graciosa voluntad así también ella, teniendo la voluntad tanto más libre y generosa cuanto más unida en Dios, está dando a Dios al mismo Dios en Dios..." L,3,78. On the increase of freedom acquired as a consequence of communion with God, see also, SI,4,6.

43. "Il est très remarquable, et de très haute conséquence, qu’à ce sommet de la vie spirituelle et de l’expérience mystique, l’âme débouche expressément dans les profondeurs du mystère le plus sacré de la révélation chrétienne, —transformée en flamme d’amour, en laquelle se communiquent à elle le Père, le Fils et l’Esprit-Saint;— c’est que dès le début la contemplation —si elle est authentiquement mystique —a procédé de la foi vive et des dons surnaturels, l’a introduite non pas à l’Un des philosophes, à Dieu connu du dehors et par ses effects, mais à Dieu atteint selon sa propre essence divine, à la déité même et comme telle, qui dans sa vie absolument propre et intime est Trinité des Personnes, resplendissante et tranquille société des Trois en la même indivisible essence et lumière d’amour.... Essentiellement supra-philosophique, parce que son principe prochain et proportionné est la foi illuminée par les dons, l’expérience mystique tend dès le principe à la connaissance amoureuse et fruitive des trois Personnes incrées. «La connaissance de la Trinité dans l’unité», dit saint Thomas d’Aquin, «est le fruit et la fin de toute notre vie». Et saint Augustin: «les réalités dont nous avons à jouir, sont le Père, et le Fils, et l’Esprit-Saint.» Jacques Maritain, Les degrés du savoir, pp. 754-755. The Aquinas reference is Scriptum Super Sententis Petri Lombardi 1,2, expos. textus, and to ibid., I,1,2,2. The Augustine text is from De Doctrina Christiana, I,5.
See also, Anselm Stolz, O.S.B., Theologie der Mystik (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1936), the chapter titled "Trinitätmystik," pp. 228-244.

44. "...estas potencias van purgando a la par..." MII,13,3.

45. The truths of Revelation "etaient la respiration même de saint Jean de la Croix.... C'est pourquoi l'idée que la pure connaissance où la pure intelligence pourrait être le moyen proportionné de l'union à Dieu lui apparaît comme l'absurdité même. C'est pourquoi il est persuadé, avec tout le christianisme, que la contemplation n'est pas son but à elle-même, qu'elle demeure un moyen (moyen par excellence et déjà uni à la fin), qu'elle est pour l'union d'amour avec Dieu; et qu'elle est elle-même une connaissance d'amour, une «attention amoureuse à Dieu».

46. "...no será verdadera y total transformación si no se transformase el alma en las tres Personas de la Santísima Trinidad en revelado y manifiesto grado." C,39,3. Also, L, Prologue, 2; L,1,6; L,2,1ff.

47. On this matter, San Juan is in accord with a long tradition which holds that "it is the glorious fate of man... to be caught up into that Triune life --to be some day one with the Father, wise with Him Who is Begotten Wisdom, wrapped up in the love of the Spirit." Hill, op. cit., p. 116. The trinitarian character of San Juan's mystical theology has been focussed upon from different angles by various commentators. See, for example, Urbina, op. cit., pp. 349 359; Sanson, op. cit., pp. 321-332; Von Balthasar, La gloire et la croix, part 2, 2:41-42; Ruiz Salvador, op. cit., pp. 399-401, 645-650 and 656; Morel, op. cit., 2:216-223; Maritain, see above, note 43; Wojtyla, Faith According to St. John of the Cross, p. 172; Eulogio de San Juan de la Cruz, O.C.D., La transformación total del alma en Dios según san Juan de la Cruz (Madrid: Editorial de Espiritualidad, 1963), pp. 194-208; Efrén de la Madre de Dios Montalva, O.C.D., La Santísima Trinidad, venero espiritual en San Juan de la Cruz, Estudios trinitarios 13(1979)209-219; Carlos Disandro, Tres poetas españoles (La Plata: Hostería Volante, 1967), pp. 44-68. The last mentioned commentator considers the mystical experience to be of the Trinity of Persons only in its final stages, whereas he interprets the experiences of the earlier moments as encounters with the divine nature. "En el poema Noche oscura... el nombre de la nocturnidad... es el descubrimiento, la experiencia y la nominación de la esencia misteriosa de la vida intratrinitaria. Salvo que aquí está asida por el lado de la deidad o unidad indivisa, y
no por el lado de la dynamis comunicante y abierta. Es la mística del ser divino..." The "Llama," on the other hand, is said to represent the final and trinitarian stage of the encounter with the divinity. In this culminating phase, the soul "alcanza, si así puede decirse, la escondida dynamis perikhorética trinitaria, según dijimos, la indivisa irradiación y el indiviso latido del sinus Patri, desde donde contempla el exhaustivo ciclo trinitario en su misteriosa inhabitation dentro del alma.... Mientras el símbolo de la noche apunta a la natura divina --expresada en su inacabable nocturnidad sin bordes ni rupturas, una noche inconsc�til y plena-- el símbolo del fuego se orienta a subrayar la extrema palpitación, o como dirí San Juan de la Cruz, el extremo vibramiento sustancial del Urgrund inaccesible trinitario." Op. cit., pp. 58-59.

In the previously cited work by Jean Baruzi there are some statements which make an even sharper separation between God's nature and the Trinity of Persons. "La synthèse s'est accomplie en lui, plus vivante qu'en aucun autre mystique catholique peut-être, parce qu'à un intense amour d'un Dieu qui est Père, Fils et Esprit s'est jointe l'adhésion pure à la Divinité essentielle, à la «Deïte» et, bien que le term ne figure pas en sa langue --à l'Un. Plus profondément, on pourrait dire que le Dieu qui, dans la Nuit, est posé par delà toute appréhension distinte est un Dieu sans mode vers qui se tend une âme éprise de devenir elle-même sans mode, mais que le Dieu qu'elle-même atteint dans l'état théopathique est un Dieu qui opère, qui agit, dont tous les attributs infiniment infinis son en quelque sorte la vie de l'âme." Op. cit., p. 675.

It should be recalled that the «night» does not represent an encounter with God in his indivisibility and infinity as these authors suggest. Rather, the «darkness» represents the limitations of the human soul itself, as we saw earlier in this chapter. See above, note 2. Secondly, God's nature or Being cannot be separated from the divine Persons, any more than one can have human nature without human personhood. Within the doctrine of Juan de la Cruz, communion with God is always qua Trinity, from the initial essential presence of God in the soul to the final stages at the summit of mystical communion. In the experience of this communion there is a progressive discovery of this personal Deity. It is true that throughout the ascent, God often manifests himself to the soul as one or another divine Person, whereas at the culmination the experience is manifestly trinitarian. The fundamental point, however, is that at no stage is the experience of God impersonal, or of his nature alone.

48. "En esta canciones da a entender el alma cómo las tres personas de la Santísima Trinidad, Padre, Hijo y Espíritu Sancto, son los que hacen en ella esta divina obra de unión..." L,2,1.

49. "Este cautero, como habemos dicho, es aquí el Espíritu Sancto, porque es... fuego de amor." L,2,2.

50. "La cual mano... es el piadoso y omnipotente Padre; la cual habemos de entender que... ricas y poderosas dávidas da al alma..." L,2,16.

51. "Y esto hiciste tú con la liberalidad de tu generosa gracia, de que usaste conmigo con el toque que me tocaste del resplandor de tu gloria y figura de tu sustancia (Hebr 1,3), que es tu Unigénito Hijo, en el cual, siendo tu sabiduría, tocas fuertemente desde un fin hasta otro fin (Sap 7,24); y este Unigénito Hijo tuyo, ¡oh mano misericordiosa del Padre!, es el toque delicado con que me tocaste en la fuerza de tu cautero y me llagaste." L,2,16.

52. "...la mano y el cautero y el toque, en sustancia, son una misma cosa." L,2,1. In another moment the author makes reference to "el mismo ser de Dios que es el Padre o el Hijo o el Espíritu Sancto..." L,3,2.
53. "...la mano y el cauterio y el toque, en sustancia, son una misma cosa. Y pónelos estos nombres, por cuanto por el efecto que hace cada una les conviene..." $L,2,1$.

54. "...el depósito de los tesoros del Padre, el resplandor de la luz eterna, espejo sin mancilla e imagen de su bondad (Sap 7,26)." $L,3,17$.

55. "...pon los ojos en [Cristo], y hallarás ocultísimos misterios y sabiduría y maravillas de Dios... En el cual Hijo de Dios están escondidos todos los tesoros de sabiduría y ciencia de Dios (Col 2,3) ..." $SII,22,6$. "...este lecho del alma es el Esposo Hijo de Dios... porque, estando ella ya unida y recostada en él hecha esposa, se le comunica el pecho y el amor del Amado, lo cual es comunicárselo la sabiduría y secretos y gracias y virtudes y dones de Dios." $C,24,3$. "¡Recuérdanos tú y alumbra, Señor mío, para que conozcamos y amemos los bienes que siempre nos tienes propuestos, y conozcamos que te moviste a hacernos mercedes y que te acordaste de nosotros!" $L,4,9$. See also, $L,4,3-13$.

56. "...infinito fuego de amor..." $L,2,2$.

57. The mystical soul calls upon "el Espíritu Santo, que es el que ha de ahuyentar esta sequedad del alma y el que sustenta en ella y aumenta el amor del Espíritu, y también ponga el alma en ejercicio interior de las virtudes." $C,17,2$. "...por este aire entiende el alma al Espíritu Santo, el cual dice que recuerda los amores, porque, cuando este divino aire embiste en el alma, de tal manera la inflama toda y la regala y aviva y recuerda la voluntad y levanta los apetitos que antes estaban caídos y dormidos al amor de Dios, que se puede bien decir que recuerda los amores de él y de ella." $C,17,4$. "En este aspirar el Espíritu Santo por el alma, que es visitación suya en amor a ella, se comunica en alta manera el Esposo Hijo de Dios..." $C,17,8$. See also: $NII,17,2$; $NII,20,4$; $C,13,11$; $C,24,6$; $C,25,7$; $C,26$, 1 and 3; $C,31,4$; $L,1,35$; $L,2,2ff$.

58. "...obran en uno, y así todo lo atribuye a uno, y todo a todos." $L,2,1$. See Aquinas' Summa Theologiae I,37,1, ad 4 and I,37,2, ad 2 for an introductory discussion of the ways in which it is proper to attribute different causalities to the different Persons of the Trinity.

59. "...ilustrándole el entendimiento divinamente en la sabiduría de el Hijo, y deleitándole la voluntad en el Espíritu Santo, y absorbiéndola el Padre poderosa y fuertemente en el abrazo abisal de su dulzura." $L,1,15$.

60. "...el entendimiento de esta alma es entendimiento de Dios, y la voluntad suya es voluntad de Dios, y su memoria, memoria eterna de Dios..." $L,2,34$.

61. "Y no hay que tener por imposible que el alma pueda una cosa tan alta que el alma aspire en Dios como Dios aspira en ella por modo participado, porque, dado que Dios le haga la merced de unirla en la Santísima Trinidad, en que el alma se hace deiforme y Dios por participación, ¿qué increíble cosa es que obre ella también su obra de entendimiento, noticia y amor, o, por mejor decir, la tenga obrada en la Trinidad juntamente con ella como la misma Trinidad, pero por modo comunicado y participado, obrándolo Dios en la misma alma? Porque esto es estar transformada en las tres Personas en potencia, sabiduría y amor, y en esto es semejante el alma a Dios, y para que pudiera venir a esto la crió a su imagen y semejanza." $C,39,4$. Emphasis ours. For the denotations of the term "aspirar", translated here as "to breathe," see p. 119 of the present chapter.
Similarly, "el alma participara al mismo Dios, que sera obrando en él acompañadamente con él la obra de la Santisima Trinidad..." C,39,6. "Y cómo se no hay más saber ni poder para decirlo, sino dar a entender cómo el Hijo de Dios nos alcanza este estado y nos mereció este subido puesto de poder ser hijos de Dios, como dice san Juan (1,12), y así lo pidió al Padre por el mismo san Juan, diciendo: Padre, quiero que los que me has dado, que donde yo estoy también ellos estén conmigo, para que vean la claridad que me diste (17,24); es a saber, que hagan por participación en nosotros la misma obra que yo por naturaleza, que es aspirar el Espiritu Santo. Y dice más: No ruego, Padre, solamente por estos presentes, sino también por aquellos que han de creer por su doctrina en mí; que todos ellos sean una misma cosa, de la manera que tú, Padre, estás en mí y yo en ti, así ellos en nosotros sean una misma cosa. Y yo la claridad que me has dado he dado a ellos, para que sean una misma cosa, como nosotros somos una misma cosa, yo en ellos y tú en mí por que sean perfectos en uno, por que conozca el mundo que tú me enviaste y los amaste como me amaste a mí (17,20-23), que es comunicándoles el mismo amor que al Hijo, aunque no naturalmente como al Hijo, sino, como habemos dicho, por unidad y transformación de amor." C,39,5.

62. "...mi entendimiento... ya no entiende por su vigor y luz natural, sino por la divina Sabiduría con que se unió." NÍ,4,2. "...porque por tu limpieza, ¡oh sabiduría divina!, muchas cosas se ven en ti viéndose una, porque tú eres el depósito de los tesoros del Padre..." L,3,17. "...se le comunica toda la Sabiduría de Dios..., que es el Hijo de Dios..." SII,29,6. In Cántico 36, the soul speaks of anticipating "la noticia matutina y esencial de Dios, que es conocimiento en el Verbo divino.... En decir, pues, el alma al Esposo, vámmonos a ver en tu hermosura al monte, es decir: transformame y aseméjame en la hermosura de la sabiduría divina que (como declamos) es el Verbo Hijo de Dios." C,36,6-7. "Y así dice la esposa en esta canción que, después de haber entrado más adentro en la Sabiduría divina, esto es, más adentro del matrimonio espiritual que ahora posee --que será en la gloria viendo a Dios cara a cara, unida el alma con esta Sabiduría divina, que es el Hijo de Dios-- conocerá el alma los subidos misterios de Dios y Hombre, que están muy subidos en sabiduría escondidos en Dios." C,37,2. See also, ibid., 4-8.

63. "Este aspirar del aire es una habilidad que el alma dice que le dará Dios allí en la comunicación de el Espíritu Santo, el cual, a manera de aspirar, con aquella su aspiración divina muy subidamente levanta el alma y la inflama y habilita para que ella aspire en Dios la misma aspiración de amor que el Padre aspira en el Hijo y el Hijo en el Padre, que es el mismo Espíritu Santo, que a ella la aspira en el Padre y el Hijo en la dicha transformación, para unirla consigo... [P]orque el alma, unida y transformada en Dios, aspira en Dios a Dios la misma aspiración divina que Dios --estando ella en El transformada-- aspira en sí mismo a ella." C,39,3. "...ama el alma a Dios con voluntad y fuerza del mismo Dios, unida con la misma fuerza de amor con que es amada de Dios. La cual fuerza es en el Espíritu Santo, en el cual está el alma allí transformada." C,38,3. "Esta llama de amor es el espíritu de su Esposo, que es el Espíritu Santo, al cual siente ya el alma en sí, no sólo como fuego que la tiene consumada y transformada en suave amor, sino como fuego que, demás de eso, arde en ella y echa llama, como dije.... Y ésta es la operación del Espíritu Santo en el alma transformada en amor, que los actos que hace interiores es llamar, que son inflamaciones de amor, en que, unida la voluntad del alma a Dios subidísimamente, hecha un amor con aquella llama.... de donde al alma le parece que cada vez que llamea esta llama, haciéndola amar con sabor y temple divino, la está dando vida eterna, pues la levanta a operación de Dios en Dios." L,1,3-4. See also, L,2,34.

Maritain makes a comment regarding this issue which is worth noting: "Il est clair qu'une fois de plus le Saint n'emploie pas le vocabulaire du théologien spéculatif, il ne s'agit pas ici, à quelque titre que ce soit, d'une participation entitative de la créature à l'acte d'amour

64. See note 35 of this chapter.

65. In his usual simple language Aquinas tells us that the highest attainable similitude to God is "per unitatem objecti, in quantum creatura rationalis intellegit et amat Deum; et haec est quaedam unionis conformitas, quae in solis sanctis inventur qui idem intelligunt et amant quod Deus." *De Potentia Dei*, 9,9, res. Some of the implications contained in this succinct statement are drawn out more fully in several of the Sanjuanist texts we cite throughout this chapter. Yet, it has been recognized that according to Aquinas, it is not simply a "quidditative intuition; it is rather a contuition..." Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 113. In the thought of both Doctors, it is a question of a *knowing with*, and not just a *knowing of*.

66. "...la memoria, que de suyo percibía sólo las figuras y fantasmas de las criaturas, es trocada por medio de esta unión a tener en la mente los años eternos que David dice (Ps 76,6)." *L*,1,17. On this matter, see E. Wilhelmsen, "La memoria como potencia del alma en San Juan de la Cruz," pp. 122-129.

67. "...deleitándome en la sustancia de el alma con el torrente de tu deleite en tu divino contacto y junta sustancial, según la mayor pureza de mi sustancia y la capacidad y anchura de mi memoria." *L*,1,17.

68. "...la memoria se ha trocado en aprehensiones eternas de gloria." *II*,4,2.


70. "...por donde el alma obraba en tiempo ... unida en inteligencia pura, que no está en tiempo..." *III*,14,11.

71. It should be remarked parenthetically that the "olvidos" to which Juan de la Cruz makes reference various times are not characteristic of the condition of the advanced mystic. As mentioned in note 123 of the previous chapter, the suspensions of the memorative activity take place during the lower stages of the ascent. "Pero, ya que llega a tener el hábito de unión... ya no tiene esos olvidos en esa manera en lo que es razón moral y natural; antes en las operaciones convenientes y necesarias tiene mucha mayor perfección. Aunque éstas no las obra ya por formas y noticias de la memoria, porque, en habiendo hábito de unión... desfallece del todo la memoria y las demás potencias en sus naturales operaciones, y pasan de su término natural al de Dios, que es sobrenatural; y así, estando la memoria transformada en Dios, no se le pueden imprimir formas ni noticias de cosas. Por lo cual, las operaciones de la memoria... no son distintas.... Y de aquí es que las obras de las tales almas sólo son las que convienen y son razonables, y no las que no convienen; porque el espíritu de Dios las hace saber lo que han de saber, y ignorar lo que conviene ignorar, y acordarse de lo que se han de acordar sin formas o con formas y olvidar lo que es de olvidar..." *III*,2,8-9. He proceeds to state also that although it may be the case some times, "apenas se hallará alma que en todo y por todo tiempo sea movida de Dios, tiniendo tan continua unión con Dios que sin miedo [i.e., medio] de alguna forma sean sus potencias siempre movidas divinamente..." *Ibid.*, 16. In another passage it is stated that "aunque está el alma siempre en este estado de matrimonio después que le ha puesto en él, no, empero, siempre en actual unión según las dichas poten-
cias, aunque según la sustancia del alma sí; pero en esta unión sustancial del alma muy frecuentemente se unen también las potencias..." C,26,11. Emphasis ours. See also, SII,5,2.

The Sanjuanist texts would seem to lead one to the conclusion that when the soul is in "actual unión según las potencias," their operation takes place "sin formas." In this state the subject knows all that he needs to know directly through God and without phantasms, and thus the memory as such is suspended. The habitual condition of the very advanced mystic, however, is to be united "según la sustancia del alma," in which state neither the memory nor the experience of time are suspended. Here the mind would have to know the ordinary things of the world "con formas," that is, through the instrumentality of the external senses and memory. See Laín Entralgo, op. cit., p. 131, for a description of the memorative activity and the simultaneous experience of time and eternity in the progressed mystic.

72. *The Collins Spanish Dictionary* (London and Glasgow: Collins, 1971) translates "recordar" as "to remember," "to recollect," "to recall," and also as "to call up," "to evoke," "to bring to mind." It indicates that the term is used in certain Latin American countries as "to rouse" and "to awaken." The *Diccionario Durván de la lengua española* (Bilbao: Durván, 1970) gives the following equivalences: a) "traer a la memoria una cosa;" b) "excitar a uno a que tenga presente algo que tomó a su cuidado;" and c) "despertar al que está dormido."

73. See SII,14,11 where the verb "recordar" is used to signify "to become conscious," "to come to." In the *Llama* the term "recuerdo" is said of the apparent awakening of God in the soul, although in reality "debemos aquí decir que el alma en este movimiento es la movida y la recordada de el sueño de vista natural a vista sobrenatural, y por eso le pone bien propiamente nombre de recuerdo." L,4,6. Also, ibid., 9.

74. "...un movimiento que hace el Verbo en la sustancia del alma..." L,4,4. "...alto conocimiento de la Deidad..." Ibid., 17. "...la excelencia de Dios..." Ibid., 10.

75. The sustained rule is that "al modo que es la inteligencia en el entendimiento, es también el amor en la voluntad." L,3,49. During the stage of passive purgation, "como en el entendimiento esta noticia que le infunde Dios es general y oscura sin distinción alguna de inteligencia, también la voluntad ama en general sin distinción alguna de cosa particular entendi­da." L,3,49. At the heights of mystical communion the same operative relationship between the powers is in effect. There takes place in this state "una aspiración que hace al alma Dios, en que, por aquel recuerdo del alto conocimiento de la Deidad, la aspira el Espíritu Sancto con la misma proporción que jUe la inteligencia y noticia de Dios... enamorándola con primor y delicadeza divina según aquello que vio en Dios." L,4,17. Emphasis ours. "El mosto que dice aquí la esposa que gustaran ella y el Esposo de estas granadas, es la fruición y el deleite de amor de Dios que en la noticia y conocimiento de ellas redunda en el alma." C,37,8. "Por el vuelo entiende la contemplación de aquel éxtasis que habemos dicho, y por el aire entiende aquel espíritu de amor que causa en el alma este vuelo de contemplación. Y llama aquí a este amor causado por el vuelo aire harto apropiadamente, porque el Espíritu Santo, que es amor, también se compara en la divina Escritura al aire, porque es aspirado de el Padre y del Hijo; y así como allí es aire del vuelo, esto es, que de la contemplación y sabiduría del Padre y del Hijo procede y es aspirado, así aquí a este amor de el alma llama el Esposo aire, porque de la contemplación y noticia que a este tiempo tiene de Dios le procede." C,13,11. See also, MII, 12,5; C,38,3; C,39,14-15; L,2,29; L,3,3; L,4,16.

76. A distinction is made between the love infused passively during the purgative stages, and the act of love freely executed in any stage of the mystical ascent. "Por qué, pues estas potencias van purgando a la par, se siente a los principios más comúnmente en la volun-
tod la inflamación y amor de la contemplación purgativa que en el entendimiento la inteligencia de ella? A esto se responde que aquí no hiere derecho este amor pasivo en la voluntad porque la voluntad es libre, y esta inflamación de amor es más pasión de amor que acto libre de la voluntad, porque hiere en la sustancia de el alma este calor de amor, y así mueve las afeciones pasivamente; y así, ésta antes se llama pasión de amor que acto libre de la voluntad, el cual en tanto se llama acto de la voluntad en cuanto es libre." MI,13,3. This passage re-states Juan's standing principle that activity of the will always follows upon that of the intellect. An initial inclination toward an object can be established by the appetites, though. In this case the pre-volitional movement of desire is supernaturally caused.

77. SII,29,6.

78. "...la puerta y el camino para unirse con Dios." SII,7,11. Also, ibid., 6.

79. "Y así, la dichosa alma que por grande ventura a este cauterio llega todo lo sabe, todo lo gusta, todo lo que quiere hace, y se prospera, y ninguno prevalece delante de ella, nada le toca." L,2,4.

80. At the end of the Llama, after a lengthy development of the "recuerdo" experienced in mystical communion, there is this succinct statement: "En la cual aspiración, llena de bien y gloria y delicado amor de Dios para el alma, yo no querría hablar, ni aun quiero, porque veo claro que no lo tengo de saber decir, y parecería que ello es, si lo dijese." L,4,17.

81. "...renunciando a todo conocimiento, a toda pretensión de conocimiento <distinto y particular>, para estribar en pura fe.... Para [San Juan de la Cruz] la fe es "pasar al no saber", «entrar en el abismo» y su objeto, si es que puede hablarse así, la inteligencia oscura y general, que no entiende ni quiere entender, dispersarse, de nada ni nada en particular: en una palabra, la Noche de la Fe. Y es en el hundirse en esa Noche, donde ocurre la contemplación; aun más, es en la Noche misma y su experiencia, en lo que consiste la contemplación." San Juan de la Cruz (Madrid: Ediciones Júcar, 1973), p. 81.

A view which is even more extreme is held by Eugene Maio. "The soul united itself with God not through any intellectual concept or imagination. The union is beyond any knowledge." Op. cit., p. 246. Therefore, the subject must undergo not only a "surrender of intellectual activity" but "a loss of personal autonomy" as well. Ibid., pp. 250 and 196. Maio's book comes to such conclusions after taking numerous citations wholly out of context and drawing simplistic correlations with the doctrine of Plotinus.

Among recent commentators, Manuel Ballestero is another to hold that a suspension of cognitive activity or consciousness and a loss of self are inherent in the mystical experience as presented by Juan de la Cruz. Ballestero's assessment of this issue is based upon an analysis of the three books of the Subida del Monte Carmelo alone. A reading of this work in isolation from the others can certainly not give an overview of San Juan's thought, particularly given that the Subida deals exclusively with the stages of active deprivation. Ballestero focusses particularly on the uncommented last stanzas of the "Noche oscura," without turning to the texts in the later works which could shed light on them. Discussing the verses "Quedéme y olvidéme... dejando mi cuidado / entre las azucenas olvidado," he states that: "El corte que se instala en «dejéme» delimita la primera capa de intuición, aún carcada con formas reflexivas. En su interior, son perceptibles distintos grados de autosupresión. El inicial quedéme transporta un rayo alusivo al quedamiento, límite anterior de una esencia espiritual luego profundizada en el olvido: de lo absorbto en un instante inextenso al vacío y total desaparición a sí de la memoria borrada. Círculos de significación que se entrelazan para individualizar la zona de la última serenidad no conturbada. Es en este espacio donde se insinúa
otro momento de intuición: el del escondimiento, «el rostro reclina sobre el Amado», ocultación de la identidad, enterrada en la sombra protectora de otro cuerpo. Cuando todo ha cesado en esta oscuridad, «dejando» introduce en una cámara aún más apartada, lejana. Ya no hay un yo presente, ni se trata de abandonos o vacíos reflexivos: el dejado ahora deja. El quedado abandona algo que, originario, latía y pervivió por debajo del yo; purgado el yo, invisible y no visible en el hombro del otro, puede por fin abrir la mano y soltar lo que aún aferraba, lo que era su propia y más honda sustancia: el cuidado, la angustia. El último relieve intuido en la estrofa no es el de un yo desvanecido. Juan de la Cruz otea más allá y por el fondo ese desprendimiento de ansiedad; sin yo, pero más lejos, un yo que se descarga de su fardo. El poema empezó en la esfera de la indeterminación, en el camino de la noche, y conlleva avanzando hasta un olvido, Leteo, agua lustral, que purga de existencia.» Op. cit., pp. 59-60.

And in another passage: "El anclaje en la autonegación dolorosa será matriz del renacer; la contracción abatida, punto inicial de una expansión ascendente; la desposesión es sólo umbral de otro mundo, porque la voluntad aniquilada «de sensual se hace espiritual, de animal se hace racional, y aún que de hombre camina a porción angelical, y que de temporal y humano se hace divino y celestial» (SIII,26,3). Y no se trata, como impropiamente acaba de decirse, de que la experiencia de abatimiento prepare al otro estado; en lo que a Juan de la Cruz concierne, no es posible pensar la estancia en pobreza y servidumbre, el momento de sístole, como distinto y previo al de la expansión; en el centro de la voluntad abatida está ya dado el proceso de su reconstrucción; agonía animal y brillo espiritual coinciden. En ningún modo se separan estancia purgativa y acceso a lo puro. La voluntad aniquilada es voluntad espiritual porque, insertada en la pobreza, pronto descubre que esa radical desposesión es la propia del ser, ya que éste, transcendente, equivale al vacío." Ibid., pp. 253-254.

Ballestero supports his interpretations with references to an assorted number of writers, including Husserl, Heidegger, Cassirer, Liebrucks, Lukacs, Ernst Bloch and Herbert Marcuse. The only commentator of John of the Cross which is significantly present in Ballestero's book is Jean Baruzzi, who has curiously been turned into an Italian and referred to throughout as "Baruzzi."

82. "...para venir el alma en esta vida a unirse con Dios y comunicar inmediatamente con El, tiene necesidad de unirse con la tiniebla..." SII,9,4.

83. "...la contemplación es oscura; que por eso la llaman por otro nombre Mística Teología, que quiere decir sabiduría de Dios secreta o escondida... Lo cual algunos espirituales llaman entender no entendiendo..." C,39,12.

84. "...es confusa y oscura para el entendimiento, porque es noticia de contemplación, la cual, como dice san Dionisio, es rayo de tiniebla para el entendimiento." L,3,49.

85. "En este sueño espiritual que el alma tiene en el pecho de su Amado, posee y gusta todo el sosiego y descanso y quietud de la pacífica noche, y recibe juntamente en Dios una abisal y oscura inteligencia divina." C,14-15,22. See also, SII,4, and NII,5,3.

86. "...y por eso dice que su Amado es para ella la noche sosegada / en par de los levantes de la aurora. Pero esta noche sosegada dice que es, no de manera que sea escura noche, sino como la noche junto ya a los levantes de la mañana, id est, compareja con los levantes; porque este sosiego y quietud en Dios no le es al alma del todo oscuro como oscura noche, sino sosiego y quietud en la luz divina en conocimiento de Dios nuevo, en que el espíritu está suavísimamente quieto, levantado a luz divina. Y llama bien propiamente aquí a esta luz divina levantes de la aurora, que quiere decir la mañana, porque, así como los levantes de
la mañana despiden la escurididad de la noche y descubren la luz del día, así este espíritu sosegado y quieto en Dios es levantado de las tinieblas del conocimiento natural a la luz matutinal del conocimiento sobrenatural de Dios... En este sosiego se ve el entendimiento levantado de las tinieblas del conocimiento natural a la luz matutinal del conocimiento sobrenatural de Dios... En este sosiego se ve el entendimiento levantado con extraña novedad sobre todo natural entender a la divina luz, bien así como el que, después de un largo sueño, abre los ojos a la luz que no esperaba. C,14-15,22-24.

"...san Dionisio y otros místicos teólogos llaman a esta contemplación infusa rayo de tiniebla --conviene a saber, para el alma no ilustrada y purgada..." NII,5,3. "Aquí, como se va más purgando el entendimiento por medio de esta tiniebla, acaece que algunas veces esta mística y amorosa teología, juntamente con inflamar la voluntad, hierve también ilustrando la otra potencia del entendimiento con alguna noticia y lumbre divina..." NII,12,5. See also, NII, 17,3 and all of NII,9, wherein the contiguity and relation between the "darkness" and the "light" is sharply brought to the fore.

87. "...le grand arc de la nuit." La gloire et la croix, part 2, 2:39.
88. "...al entender del alma llamamos también ver del alma..." SII,23,2.
89. "...oscura y general." SII,10,4.
90. L,1:1, 12 and 29-31; SII,5,2; C,8,3; C,13,3.
91. Hardy, op. cit., p. 261.
92. "...la clara visión..." C,12,6.
93. "...por medio de la fe ilustradísima." L,3,80. "...teniendo aquí la fe tan ilustrada, que la hace visear unos divinos semblantes muy claros del alteza de su Dios..." C,12,1.
94. "...como noche en par de los levantes de la aurora; porque así como la noche en par de los levantes ni del todo es noche ni del todo es día, sino, como dicen, entre dos luces, así esta soledad y sosiego divino, ni con toda claridad es informado de la luz divina ni deja de participar algo della." C,14-15,23.

...el alma aquí une el entendimiento en la omnipotencia, sapiencia, bondad, etc. (aunque no claramente como en la otra vida)..." L,3,83. "Y tampoco se ha de entender que, porque el alma siente tan subidamente de Dios en lo que vamos diciendo, ve a Dios esencial y claramente; que no es sino una fuerte y copiosa comunicación y vislumbre de lo que El es en sí;..." C,14-15,5. "Y no se ha de entender que esto que el alma entiende, porque sea sustancia desnuda (como habemos dicho), sea la perfecta y clara fruición como en el cielo, porque, aunque es desnuda de accidentes, no por eso es clara, sino oscura, porque es contemplación, la cual en esta vida, como dice san Dionisio, es rayo de tiniebla; y así podemos decir que es un rayo de imagen de fruición, por cuanto es en el entendimiento, en que consiste la fruición." C,14-15,16. There are numerous texts which compare the act of mystical contemplation to the beatific vision, presenting the latter as the fulfillment and term of the former. See, for example, C,12,6-8; C,37,1-2; C,38,5-8; C,39, 2 and 13; L,2,21; L,3,80-81.

95. "...que se una y transforme por amor en el... Hijo de Dios... de manera que se sienta tan junta con El y tan instruida y sabia en sus misterios, que, cuanto a lo que toca a conocerle en esta vida, no tenga necesidad de decir: ¿Adónde te escondiste?" C,1,10.
96. "...serena y limpia luz..." SII,15,3.
97. "...las grandezas de su Amado, las cuales conoce y goza por la dicha unión de el desposorio.... Ve el alma y gusta en esta divina unión abundancia y riquezas inestimables... y entiende secretos e inteligencias de Dios extrañas... y gusta allí admirable suavidad y deleite de espiritu, halla verdadero sosiego y luz divina y gusta altamente de la sabiduría de Dios, que en la armonía de las criaturas y hechos de Dios relucen; ...y, sobre todo, entiende y goza de inestimable refección de amor..." C,14-15, 2 and 4.

98. See pp. 39-42 and 178-181 with their respective notes, and chapter IV, note 90.

99. "...por las grandes y admirables novedades y noticias extrañas alexadas del conocimiento común que el alma ve en Dios, le llama insulas extrañas." C,14-15,8.

100. "...por los aires amorosos se entienden aquí las virtudes y gracias del Amado.... Y al silbo de estos aires llama una subdísima y sabrosísima inteligencia de Dios y de sus virtudes, la cual redunda en el entendimiento..." C,14-15,12.

101. "Y llámale silbo porque, así como el silbo del aire causado se entra agudamente en el vasillo del oído, así esta sutilísima y delicada inteligencia se entra con admirable sabor y deleite en lo íntimo de la sustancia del alma.... lo cual es el principal deleite del alma, porque es en el entendimiento en que consiste la fruición (como dicen los teólogos) que es ver a Dios." C,14-15,14.

102. "Este divino silbo que entra por el oído del alma, no solamente es sustancia (como habemos dicho) entendida, sino también descubrimiento de verdades de la Divinidad y revelación de secretos suyos ocultos." C,14-15,15.

103. "...música callada.... echa de ver el alma una admirable conveniencia y disposición de la Sabiduría en las diferencias de todas sus criaturas y obras, todas ellas y cada una de ellas dotadas con cierta respondencia a Dios..." C,14-15,25.

104. "Y no sólo eso, sino que también es la soledad sonora... porque [las potencias espirituales]... pueden recibir bien el sonido espiritual sonorísimamente en el espíritu de la excelencia de Dios y de sus criaturas... [E]cha de ver el alma en aquella sabiduría sosegada en todas las criaturas... dar cada una su voz de testimonio de lo que es Dios...." C,14-15:26-27.

105. "...la cena que recrea y enamora... Es de saber que en la Escritura divina este nombre cena se entiende por la divina visión..." C,14-15,28.

106. "...dulces misterios de su Encarnación y los modos y maneras de la redención humana, que es una de las mas altas obras de Dios...." C,23,1.

107. "...aunque otros muchos misterios la comunica.... le va Dios descubriendo las ordenanzas y disposiciones de su sabiduría..." C,23, 1 and 5.

108. "...desnuda de accidentes y fantasmas..." C,14-15,14.

109. "...entender no entendiendo, porque esto no se hace en el entendimiento que llaman los filósofos activo, cuya obra es en las formas y fantasías y aprehensiones de las potencias corporales, más hácese en el entendimiento en cuanto posible y pasivo, el cual, sin recibir las tales formas, etc., sólo pasivamente recibe inteligencia sustancial desnuda de imagen, la cual le es dada sin ninguna obra ni oficio suyo activo." C,39,12.
110. In a nearby passage: "...Mística Teología, que quiere decir sabiduría de Dios secreta o escondida, en la cual, sin ruido de palabras y sin ayuda de algún sentido corporal ni espiritual, como en silencio y quietud, a oscuras de todo lo sensitivo y natural, enseña Dios ocultísima y secretísimamente al alma sin saber ella cómo." C,39,12. See also, MII,17:2-3. In these texts we see again how the mysteriousness pertains more to the unaccustomed mode of knowing than to any lack of intelligibility or clarity experienced in that act of knowing.

111. "...dícese que no obra [el alma], no porque no entiende, sino porque entiende lo que no le cuesta su industria..." SII,15,2.

112. "Todas estas cosas siente el alma y las entiende distintísimamente..." L,1,28.

113. "Totalmente es indecible lo que el alma conoce y siente en este recuerdo de la excelencia de Dios, porque siendo comunicación de la excelencia de Dios en la sustancia del alma... suena en el alma una potencia inmensa en voz de multitud de excelencias de millares de millares de virtudes de virtudes nunca numerables de Dios." L,4,10.

"Y, por cuanto en un solo acto de esta unión recibe el alma las noticias de estos atributos, juntamente le es al alma el mismo Dios muchas lámparas, que distintamente le lucen y dan calor, pues de cada una tiene distinta noticia..." L,3,3. "...como el alma aquí une el entendimiento en la omnipotencia, sabiduría, bondad, etc. (aunque no claramente como será en la otra vida), grandemente se deleita en todas estas cosas entendidas distintamente..." L,3,83. The soul is given to know "muchas grandezas de Dios, que aquí el alma en un solo sonido de un paso que Dios da por ella distintamente conoce." L,3,16. "¿Cuál pensamos que será la posesión de inteligencia y amor y gloria que tienen ya en la dicha unión con Dios el entendimiento, voluntad y memoria" L,3,68. See also, L,3,76.

114. "...lámparas de fuego... que de Dios dan noticia y amor..." L,3,3.

115. "...dentro de sus resplandores..." L,3,9. "...esta alma... es como horno encendido, con visión tanto más pacífica y gloriosa y tierna, cuanto la llama es más clara y resplandeciente..." L,1,16.

116. "...Dios, en su único y simple ser es todas las virtudes y grandezas de sus atributos: porque es omnipotente, es sabio, es bueno, es misericordioso, es justo, es fuerte, es amoroso, etc. y otros infinitos atributos que no conocemos." L,3,2.

117. "Y como cada una de esas cosas sea el mismo ser de Dios que es el Padre o el Hijo o el Espíritu Sancto..." L,3,2. "...todos estos atributos son un ser, como habemos dicho..." L,3,3.

118. "...y, siendo El todas estas cosas en su simple ser, estando El único con el alma... echa de ver distintamente en El todas estas virtudes y grandezas, conviene saber, omnipotencia, sabiduría, bondad, misericordia, etc. Y como cada una de estas cosas sea el mismo ser de Dios... de aquí es que en cada uno de estos innumerables atributos luzga y de calor como Dios..." L,3,2.

119. "¡Oh sabiduría divina!, muchas cosas se ven en ti viéndose una, porque tú eres el depósito de los tesoros del Padre..." L,3,17. This question of cognition of God’s infinite attributes and virtues through Christ is also brought up in the Cántico. Discussing the verse, "y el mosto de las granadas gustaremos," it is said: "Las granadas significan aquí los misterios de
Cristo y los juicios de la sabiduría de Dios y las virtudes y atributos de Dios que del conocimiento de estos misterios y juicios se conocen en Dios, que son innumerables. Porque, así como las granadas tienen muchos granos, nacidos y sustentados en aquel seno circular, así cada uno de los atributos y misterios y juicios y virtudes de Dios contiene en sí gran multitud de ordenaciones maravillosas y admirables efectos de Dios, contenidos y sustentados en el seno esférico de virtud y misterio, etc. a que pertenecen aquellos tales efectos. Y notamos aquí la figura circular o esférica de la granada, porque cada granada entendemos aquélla por cualquiera virtud y atributo de Dios, el cual atributo o virtud de Dios es el mismo Dios, el cual es significado por la figura circular o esférica, porque no tiene principio ni fin. "C, 37, 7.

120. "Así el alma, por ser divina en su origen y trinitaria en su constitución, puede conocer la Trinidad y en el conocer deviene más divina y conforme a ella.... La gracia y la gloria perfeccionan este conocer trinitarios, hasta llegar a una participación en las mismas procesiones divinas, que entraña una transformación en las personas, según la atrevidísima doctrina de un doctor de la Iglesia, san Juan de la Cruz, que sigue siendo todavía para los teólogos una piedra de escándalo, por no saber cómo ello sea así, aunque sepan que así debe ser." Olegario González, op. cit., p. 401.

121. See p. 113 of the present chapter, and corresponding notes.

122. "In Aristotle... to perceive or to know means that the cognitive agent has become and is something other than what he is physically. The tenet is expressed succinctly in the quite terse statement: "...the soul is in a way all existing things; for existing things are either sensible or thinkable, and knowledge is in a way what is knowable, and sensation is in a way what is sensible. [De Anima, III 8, 431b21-23]. What does this imply? The assertion covers all cognition, both perception and thought. In either case, according to the description, the soul is the thing attained in the cognition." Also: "The Aristotelian conception of awareness means that what the mind is cognitively, is first and foremost and directly the external sensible object [De Anima, II 5, 417b20-21]." Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., "Aristotle: Cognition a Way of Being," in Aristotle: The Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, edited by John R. Caton (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), pp. 74 and 80.

123. "...the actuation of what is known and of the faculty of knowing is one and the same but it is present in the faculty and not in the known. It is an actuation of the known and is caused by the known, while simultaneously it also is an actuation of the knower too and, in fact, is solely in the knower... The very same actuation which pre-cognitively conditions, determines, forms the faculty by being present in it... is also the actuation of that which is known (precisely as known, though, and not as it is outside the cognitive process...) and which is causing it in the knower. Through this actuation, which is in and of the knower and of and from the known, the object known is the content-determining-cause of my knowledge and, thereby, also the cause of my love." Leo Sweeney, S.J., "Can St. Thomas Speak to the Modern World?," One Hundred Years of Thomism, edited by V. B. Brezik (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1981), pp. 119-141, especially pp. 137-138. Similarly: "Cognition undoubtedly has the percipient or knower as its efficient cause. It is he who is doing the perceiving or knowing, and therefore causing the object's new existence in which the cognition consists. He is also performing the activity in accord with his own forms and powers... To this extent he is the efficient cause and the specifying principle of the cognitive activity. But that is only part of the story. The form of the thing perceived or known, the form of the thing directly attained in cognition, is the form that basically determines any particular act of cognition." Joseph Owens, "Aquinas on Cognition as Existence," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 48(1974)74-85, especially p. 81. See above, p. 5 and note 28.

125. "...porque ésta es la propiedad de el amor: escudriñar todos los bienes de el Amado." L,2,4.

126. "Por el soto, por cuanto cría en sí muchas plantas y animales, entiende aquí a Dios en cuanto cría y da ser a todas las criaturas, las cuales en Él tienen su vida y raíz, lo cual es mostrarla Dios y dársela a conocer en cuanto es Criador. Por el donaire de este soto, que también pide al Esposo el alma aquí para entonces, pide la gracia y sabiduría y la belleza que de Dios tiene no sólo cada una de las criaturas así terrestres como celestes, sino también la que hacen entre sí en la respondencia sabia, ordenada, graciosa y amigable de unas a otras, así de las inferiores entre sí como de las superiores también entre sí, y entre las superiores y las inferiores, que es cosa que hace al alma gran donaire y deleite conocerla." C,39,11.

This act of knowing creatures through God according to San Juan is discussed by Capánaga, op. cit., pp. 385-392 and Urbina, op. cit., pp. 363-366. "Anticipation of the vision éternelle (toute en étant continuellement crucifié à ce monde), c’est ce qui explique chez Jean la reconquête paradoxale du monde définitivement abandonné et perdu en Dieu. C’est dans le Cántico, qui continent plus de motifs augustinien que les autres œuvres, qu’apparaît clairement, pour la première fois, cette idée: il ne s’agit pas de s’éléver vers Dieu, par exemple par une contemplation anagogique, antique et médiévale, des créatures, mais de retrouver la créature en Dieu dans la vision de Dieu seul, par une sorte d’anticipation de la cognitio matutina." Further: "Le contemplatif ne voit pas seulement la beauté de Dieu et en elle la beauté du monde, il voit pour ainsi dire au même instant l’analogia entis." Similarly: "Sur ce fond d’or nocturne que forment la charité, l’espérance et la foi, les figures finies, elles aussi, s’éclairent dans leur beauté véritable, éternelle. C’est seulement lorsque l’amant cherche le réel de son unique Aimé, que ses yeux à lui s’ouvrent à tout l’éclat de la beauté que l’Aimé, par le regard de ses yeux, a fait naître dans le monde." Von Balthasar, La gloire et la croix, part 2, 2: 46, 48 and 56.

127. "...todavía es noche oscura en comparación de la beatifica que aquí pide..." C,39,13. We have been mentioning throughout the relative obscurity or lack of full distinctness of this act of cognition. We are led to understand, however, that in some instances the being of certain creatures is revealed distinctly. "Más no se contenta el alma que llega a este puesto de perfección de engrandecer y loar las excelencias de su Amado... sino también refiere las que hace a las demás almas; porque lo uno y lo otro echa de ver el alma en esta bienaventurada unión de amor..." C,25,1. In a letter to a Carmelite sister and collaborator in the reform, Fray Juan states: "Si desea comunicar sus trabajos conmigo, váyase a aquel espejo sin mancha del Eterno Padre que es su Hijo, que allí miro yo su alma cada día..." Letter n. 4.

128. "En aquel sosiego y silencio de la noche ya dicha y en aquella noticia de la luz divina echa de ver el alma una admirable conveniencia y disposición de la Sabiduría en las diferencias de todas sus criaturas y obras, todas ellas y cada una dellas dotadas con cierta respondencia a Dios, en que cada una en su manera dé su voz de lo que en ella es Dios; de suerte que le parece una armonía de música subdivisima, que sobrepuja todos saraos y melodías
del mundo." C,14-15,25. "...las potencias espirituales... pueden recibir bien el sentido espiritual sonorísimamente en el espíritu de la excelencia de Dios en sí y en sus criaturas... lo cual es... cierto conocimiento de las alabanzas de los bienaventurados que cada uno en su manera de gloria hace a Dios continuamente; lo cual es como música, porque, así como cada uno posee diferentemente sus dones, así cada uno canta su alabanza diferentemente y todos en una concordancia de amor, bien así como música. A este mismo modo echa de ver el alma en aquella sabiduría sosegada en todas las criaturas, no sólo superiores, sino también inferiores (según lo que ellas tienen en sí cada una recibido de Dios), dar cada una su voz de testimonio de lo que es Dios, y ve que cada una en su manera engrandece a Dios... y así, todas estas voces hacen una voz de música de grandeza de Dios y sabiduría y ciencia admirable." C,14-15: 26-27.

129. "...la divina Sabiduría... gusta todos los sabores de todas las cosas con cierta eminencia de excelencia." MI,9,1.

130. "...se ha de entender que todo lo que aquí se declara está en Dios eminentemente en infinita manera..." C,14-15,5.

131. "...todas las cosas en él son vida, y en él viven y son y se mueven..." John 1,4, cited by Fray Juan in L,4,4. Reference is also made to Acts 17,28.

132. "Y, aunque es verdad que echa allí de ver el alma que estas cosas son distintas de Dios en cuanto tienen ser criado, y las ve en El con su fuerza, raíz y vigor, es tanto lo que conoce ser Dios en su ser con infinita inminencia todas estas cosas, que las conoce mejor en su ser que en ellas mismas. Y éste es el deleite grande de este recuerdo: conocer por Dios las criaturas, y no por las criaturas a Dios; que es conocer los efectos por su causa y no la causa por los efectos, que es conocimiento trasero, y es otro esencial." L,4,5.

Creatures as beheld in this act of contemplation "no sólo parecen moverse, sino que también todos descubren las bellezas de su ser, virtud y hermosura y gracias, y la raíz de su duración y vida; porque echa allí de ver el alma cómo todas las criaturas de arriba y de abajo tienen su vida y duración y fuerza en él, y ve claro lo que el dice en el libro de los Proverbios: Por mí reinan los reyes y por mí gobiernan los príncipes, y los poderosos ejercitan justicia y la entienden (Prov 8,15-16)." L,4,5. "Pero Dios siempre se está así, como el alma lo echó de ver, moviendo, rigiendo y dando ser y virtud y gracias y dones a todas las criaturas, tiniéndolas en sí virtual y presencial y sustancialmente, viendo el alma lo que Dios es en sí y lo que en sus criaturas, en una sola vista..." L,4,7.

133. "...ser criado..." L,4,5; "...sustancia..." L,2,34; "...fuerza, raíz y vigor..." L,4,5. See notes 28-31 and corresponding text of the present chapter.

134. "Por eso ha podido escribirse que San Juan de la Cruz no es el Doctor de la Nada sino el Doctor del Todo, y que si lo niega todo en principio es para ganarlo después mejor." Gabriel Celaya, "La poesía de vuelta en San Juan de la Cruz," Exploración de la poesía, Biblioteca Breve, 2nd edition (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1971), p. 177.


137. "...cierta imagen de fruición causada de la unión del entendimiento y afecto con Dios..." L,3,81.

138. "...la gloria esencial, que consiste en ver el ser de Dios." C,38,5.

139. "En decir... el alma al Esposo, vémonos a ver en tu hermosura al monte, es decir: transforméame y asemejame en la hermosura de la sabiduría divina que (como decíamos) es el Verbo Hijo de Dios. Y en decir: al collado, es pedirle también que me informe en la hermosura de esta otra sabiduría menor que es sus criaturas y misteriosas obras." C,36,7.

140. "Donde se da la noticia y sabiduría de Dios --que aquí llama agua pura-- a el entendimiento limpia y desnuda de accidentes y fantasías y clara sin tinieblas de ignorancia. Este apetito tiene siempre el alma de entender clara y puramente las verdades divinas." C,36,9.

Similarly, it is stated that the soul awaits "pura y clara contemplación de la esencia divina..." C,39,2. "...esto es, en la contemplación ya clara y beatífica, de manera que deje ya de ser noche en la contemplación oscura acá, y se vuelva en contemplación de vista clara y serena de Dios allá." Ibid., 13. "...después de haber entrado más adentro en la Sabiduría divina, esto es, más adentro del matrimonio espiritual que ahora posee --que será en la gloria viendo a Dios cara a cara, unida el alma con esta Sabiduría divina, que es el Hijo de Dios-- conocerá el alma los subidos misterios de Dios y Hombre, que están muy subidos en sabiduría escondidos en Dios." C,37,2. The soul also requests that "entremos más adentro en la espesura. En la espesura de tus maravillosas obras y profundos juicios, cuya multitud es tanta y de tantas diferencias, que se puede llamar espesura... [E]l alma en esta espesura e incomprehensibilidad de juicios y vías desea entrar, porque muere en deseo de entrar en el conocimiento de ellos muy adentro, porque el conocer en ellos es deleite inestimable..." C,36,10-11.

141. "...como el alma... no puede llegar a igualar con la perfección de amor con que de Dios es amada, desea la clara transformación de gloria, en que llegará a igualar con el dicho amor." C,38,3.

142. "...es imposible venir a perfecto amor de Dios sin perfecta visión de Dios." C,38,5.

143. "...en la noticia de [los subidos misterios de Dios] se entrarán, engolflándose e infundiéndose el alma en ellos, y gustarán ella y el Esposo el sabor y deleite que causa el conocimiento de ellos..." C,37,2. "El mosto que dice aquí la esposa que gustarán ella y el Esposo de estas granadas, es la fruición y el deleite de amor de Dios que en la noticia y conocimiento de ellas redunda en el alma." C,37,8.
CHAPTER VI

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE MYSTIC AND THE EXPRESSION OF THE ARTIST

In this chapter the second subject of this monograph begins to be treated, the symbolization and communication to the reader of the mystic's experience. It is perhaps best to look upon this instance of expression and communication as a process in various phases. As will be illustrated in the next few chapters, it is indeed a process, one which initiates with a poietic, expressive and symbol-generating act in the writer, and terminates with a noetic act or a series thereof in the reader. Interestingly, almost every phase along this expressive and cognitive chain can be understood in terms of John of the Cross' own elucidations.

We have seen throughout the previous pages of this work that there is in our author a cohesive science of noetics, upon which he builds an epistemology of mysticism. There is likewise to be found in his thought "a complete poetics," in the words of Jorge Guillén.1 Similarly, it is stated that "from the midst of his works one can construct a veritable doctrine of art in which theory is inseparable form practice."2 Both his poetics and his theory of art bear, of course, a relationship to the theory of cognition upon which they are grounded. We are thus placed before a comprehensive body of thought concerning human knowledge, within which ordinary and extraordinary forms cognition are considered, as well as communication by means of artistic expression. The remaining chapters will thus be devoted to examining Juan de la Cruz's understanding of poetic expression, symbolization and communication.

It will be shown how within this context our author reveals the same realism, the same concreteness, the same fidelity to actual human cognitive powers, as he does when dealing with either ordinary or mystical knowledge. The focus of the analysis will be directly upon San Juan's poetry and prose as means employed to relay the riches of his mystical experience. By drawing from Juan de la Cruz's texts on the subjects of knowledge and its transmission in general, and literary, poetic or artistic expression in particular, we shall be analyzing the communicativeness of his works in the light of his own principles.

In the present chapter some distinctions will be drawn between the experience of the mystic qua mystic and the literary expression which he produces to communicate that experience. In chapter VII, we shall concentrate upon examining the means resorted to by John of the Cross to relate something concerning an experience which is in itself ineffable. In chapter VIII the examination of Juan's means of expression will continue, distinguishing between the relative and complementary functions of the prose and the poetry. In chapter IX we shall look at the symbolic or metaphorical dimension of John of the Cross' poetic creations themselves. In the light of his commentaries, it will be revealed how he is utilizing multi-leveled, compact symbols with extensive fields of virtual meaning. Such symbolic matrices recapitulate the entire mystical ascent as psychological and moral transformation, and also as progressive communion of persons. And yet, this extensive message succinctly articulated in Juan de la Cruz's "dichos de amor" is only apprehended by the reader to the degree to which he is one in spirit and formation with the mystical author.
As mystical theologian San Juan de la Cruz has stressed that the *Verbum* is communicated only to those who have undergone a conditioning which allows them to perceive it. Analogously, in the communication between author and reader there must be a certain affinity of spirit by either experience, formation, or a combination of both. In both cases there must be a fundamental likeness between the knower and the known for communication to take place. And further, the known will be conditioned in the mind of the knower according to his or her own complex perfections and limitations. Although John of the Cross' thought is subtle, and in some areas far more explicated than in others, we can say that a fundamental principle of his understanding of knowledge and communication is that "that which is received is received according to the mode of the receiver." In these last chapters, therefore, we link John of the Cross' understanding of human cognition with his comprehension of poetic communication and esthetic experience.

When dealing with the issue of communication in Juan de la Cruz, the first question we might ask is: Why does he write? What motivates him to incarnate in words anything pertinent to his most mysterious communion with God? A motivation which applies in particular to the composition of his poetry may be found in Fray Juan's naturally artistic temperament. Michel Florisoon, after a thorough analysis of the biographical data, makes the following observation: "The spirit of John of the Cross turns towards art with utter spontaneity. In him there is a sort of artistic instinct which emerges, no matter what he does, in his attitude, his conversation, his style. An artistic sensibility characterizes his behavior of each day, manifesting itself especially in the expressions and images he employs with full ease in his writings; they come to his thought and pen in a way that is totally natural, without effort..." Further, the poems and prose of John of the Cross may be looked upon as an example of a peculiar grace, an instance of contemplation overflowing into admirable action. This is what he himself seems to state in the Prologue of the *Cántico*: "...the wisdom and love of God are so vast that, as is said in the Book of Wisdom, *they reach from one end to the other* (8,1), and the soul that is informed and moved by them carries in some measure this same abundance and impetus in its speech..."

The fact that John of the Cross sang and spontaneously composed lyrics can be seen in part as a fulfillment of a personal inclination. However, the writing down of those lyrics and particularly the composing of the works in prose were motivated by a desire to communicate his experiences to his fellow man. It is worthwhile to note that it was during the last fifteen years of his life, after he had reached the highest of mystical summits and moral perfection, that San Juan composed his major poems and their commentaries. It would be preposterous to think that at this stage his primary motivation for writing could have been either human vanity or the need for self-expression. Rather, "it is the moving force of charity... that impelled him to communicate to others his experience and his song." Juan de la Cruz never lost sight of his fellow man as he did not depart from his task of gently guiding individual souls to their perfection. And further, the more he advanced in mystical communion, the more he grew in charity toward others. The love of God burning within his breast sustained in him a concern for his neighbors, and this movement toward them was in turn the source of a prodigious fecundity of both lyrical beauty and conceptual clarity. For the sake of others he struggled to incarnate the joys of his ineffable experiences in literary forms which were to astonish with their beauty, and to lay down intelligible guidelines for achieving comparable heights of perfection and joy. His poetry and prose are both addressed to his fellow man, and indeed, for four centuries they have served as helping hands, as actual graces, to those concerned with following in his holy footsteps.
Mystical Act and Poietic Act

There is implicit herein a definite distinction between the act of mystical communion with God and the act of forging an expression to communicate that experience. The first can be referred to, for the sake of brevity, as the "mystical act." The second can be termed the "poietic act," the act of producing or making, which we apply here collectively to the composition the prose and the poetry. "The heart of the mystical act is beyond the heart of the poetic act; the heart of the latter is peripheral to that of the former..."66 This distinction should be insisted upon as there is a tendency to link these two acts in various imprecise ways. In this connection there is a widespread, popular notion that Juan de la Cruz composed his poetry while in mystical ecstasy. The biographical data indicate, much to the contrary, that he composed with his mental faculties fully in act according to their normal or ordinary functioning.7 This information is the first valid argument against those who seek to establish too close a relationship between the mystical act and the poietic act.

A clue regarding the state of the mystic at the moment of artistic creativity can be gleaned from Fray Juan's own distinctions. He observes that in the advanced mystic there are two types of union with God: on the one hand, actual union, which is according to both the substance of the soul and its faculties; and on the other, habitual union, which is according to the substance of the soul alone.8 The first state fills the powers completely with God; it therefore draws the subject fully out of time and of ordinary cognition through phantasms. However, this state of mystical union most properly speaking, is only temporary. The second form of union represents the ordinary and sustained condition of the mystic. In it, we are given to understand, God's presence is felt powerfully, although in a manner that is somewhat diffused. The cognitive powers remain operative according to their normal mode. Things are perceived, remembered, reasoned about. The mystic goes about his daily tasks unimpaired. He or she carries in memory the experience of actual union and, at once, his or her other temporal recollections. In the movement towards the production of a poetic expression, the mystic would spontaneously draw from both. This habitual union is the only mystical condition in which a poietic act could take place, for the utter simplicity and transcendence of the state of actual union would preclude the imaginative and discursive activity which is indispensable to poetic creativity.

Reasoning along lines which are in accord with the preceding, as well as with the biographical data, Jorge Guillén states insistently that "first of all came the experience. But this origin, a mystical one, must not be confused with its result. Let us avoid any intrusion of the «genetic fallacy»." Nothing "could be further removed from San Juan de la Cruz than any form of automatic writing.... San Juan de la Cruz does not let himself be carried away."9 Indeed, there are numerous commentators and literary critics who likewise assume that, as a poet, John of the Cross operates as would any other poet. The esthetic process takes place, in this understanding, by means of a conscious effort of the artist to construct a work.10 He does so by drawing from the fullness of the resources of his personality as retained in memory, but the result is something new. It is a created work.

There are various assumptions which can account for the tendency to link too closely mystical act and poietic act. One of them is the failure to understand the absolute simplicity of the cognitive dimension of the experience of union. Another, which often takes place in conjunction with the first, is the belief that poetry is a type of knowledge rather than a creation of
an artist. Being thought of as an act of knowing, the "poetic intuition" or "poetic experience" is superficially linked with the act of knowing and loving which is one with mystical union. However, we can agree with Gilson that "art is not a kind of knowledge or, in other words, it is not a manner of knowing. On the contrary, art belongs in an order other than that of knowledge, namely, in the order making or, as they say, in that of "factivity." The artist or potential artist may be a keenly intuitive soul, and may have a profound or even privileged understanding of things. However, none of these factors constitute art nor do they produce it. In order for works of art to come into existence,

man has to grope for them, inventing and generating them totally, even with respect to their very seminal notion. This is the reason why philosophy of art has to look for its object in the direction of factivity, which is the human analogue to divine creativity, rather than in the direction of man's powers of cognition, which presuppose the existence of their objects and do not cause them.\[11\]

The poetic stanzas of Juan de la Cruz, as any other lyrics, have positive ontological status. However, they cannot be said to have existed as actual poems either in the mystical experience or in any non-mystical act of cognition which preceded their composition. There is every reason to believe that San Juan operated as would any other poet: searching, groping, composing, and probably correcting many times.

Poetry Elevated to Mysticism

This propensity to merge the two acts, the mystical and the poietic, is not at all limited to commentators of Juan de la Cruz. Far from it, it has been the result of many an attempt to unveil the mysteries represented by the words "mysticism" and "poetry." An understanding of the poetic act which has been widely accepted since the days of Romanticism is that the experience which precedes poetic composition entails, "beyond the rational knowledge which humanity has slowly acquired, a direct, intuitive communion with things..."\[12\] Direct, intuitive communion with a divinized cosmos generates in turn "an efficacy which is quite akin to that recognized in magical powers, in mystical efforts and in the contemplative flights of the speculative spirit."\[13\] It is no wonder that, as Béguin states, "the characteristics by which the essence of poetry has been recently defined have led numerous souls to wonder whether there is not an absolute identity, or at least a profound convergence, between the motions of the poet and those of the mystic."\[14\] Thus it is that the emotional and cognitive state of consciously experienced communion with the universe, or with created being, has been identified with the mystical act, which is communion with the absolute, with Being. To comprehend that this reasoning is fallacious, one need only reflect briefly upon the disproportionality between uncreated Being and created being or, what is the same, on the transcendence of Go and the limitations inherent in human cognitive powers. As the same literary critic observes, "whatever be the value attributed to the poetic act, it remains necessarily a «mediate» act (and not an immediate union), an act subject to the necessity of form, to laws which are those of matter."\[15\]

However, what is often termed "poetic experience" can perhaps be considered an analogue to the mystical experience in some manner. One can perhaps speak legitimately of a human cognitive act which is an intuition of the unity of all things in being. This sudden illu-
mination of the community of things among themselves and with us is often referred to as a "poetic experience" or as "poetic knowledge." Utilizing this last phrase, Thomas Gilby speaks of a cognitive act which engages to an unusual degree the totality of human powers --senses, memory, imagination, affectivity, intellect-- and yields an experience far more fecund than our common, daily acts of understanding. These rare moments of heightened lucidity and intensified emotion can indeed be considered an analogue, yet only an analogue, to mystical experience, to knowledge of and communion with all things at the source of their existence.

What Raïssa and Jacques Maritain call "poetic knowledge" and describe as an intuition of the unity of all things in being, while not being identifiable with mystical experience, is certainly not excluded from mystical knowledge as described by Juan de la Cruz. Let us recall that the mystical act as an intellectual experience brings with it a knowing of all creatures through God without the mediation of phantasms. In passages we have cited in the previous chapter it was stated that the mystic in the state of union sees things as possessing their own being, and simultaneously as being in and through God. Thus what is intuited by the mystic includes and far surpasses that which is intuited by the non-mystic poet, whose experience and intellectual apprehension do not extend beyond created existence. At the same time, Juan de la Cruz can be said to have fulfilled the Romantic dream of being absorbed "into the oneness and lack of differentiation of the origin of all things." Yet, he did not achieve such feats as the Romantic would attempt to, by submerging himself into the obscure inner world of dreams and free associations, and by subsequently forging ever more nebulous concepts and formless phantasms. He reached those sublime heights --the knowing and communing with all things and with their source-- the only way they can truly be attained: through mystical knowledge, which expands human intuitive and affective powers to the necessary capacity, elevating them far beyond their natural limits.

Mysticism Reduced to Poetry

The Romantic tends to identify mysticism and poetry by elevating "poetic knowledge" or "poetic experience" to the level and dignity of mystical experience, thus making a mystic out of every poet. There is somewhat of an inverse movement, perhaps bearing its own Romantic traits, of thinking of the poem or the poetic symbol as somehow "conceived" in the mystical union. The danger of this stance is that it implies a reduction of the mystical experience to the level of the symbolic matrix wrought to express it. Here, mystical communion is divested both of its transcendence and of its absolute simplicity. Jean Baruzi, for example, holds that in St. John of the Cross, "there would be such an intimate fusion of the image and the experience that we would no longer be able to speak of an effort to represent plastically an interior drama. The symbolization would reveal to us, perhaps directly, a fact which no other mode of thought had permitted us to attain. And hence there would no longer be a translation of an experience by a symbol; there would be, in the strict sense of the word, a symbolic experience." Commenting upon the analysis of this author, Jorge Guillén observes: "Jean Baruzi, distinguishing perspicaciously between the functions of symbol and of allegory, sees among the symbols used by San Juan some that are intimately related to the mystic experience itself.... Among the unreal images used by the poet, if this hypothesis is true, these symbols have imposed themselves upon him: they are the only points of immediate continuity between his life and his poetry." The symbols referred to here by Baruzi, and in turn by Guillén, are those of the night and the flame, which admittedly are central to the Sanjuanist poetic corpus.
Baruzi's understanding of the psychogenesis of these symbols is shared to a certain degree by his disciple, Max Milner. "It would be folly to attempt to penetrate with any certitude into regions so secret of the conscience of a poet. But is it not possible at least to discern certain signs which allow us to affirm that Saint John of the Cross has himself lived the symbols he elaborates...?" Similarly, he asks further: "Ought we to think, as Baruzi invites us to, that the symbol of the night, with its multiple prolongations, is the sole one to express fully a lived experience?" Both questions can be answered in the negative. Juan de la Cruz has not lived his poetic symbols along with his mystical experience, nor do his symbols express fully the experience he has lived. He has indeed lived many nights and, as these authors suggest, has loved the Castilian night under whose star lit canopy he has been absorbed in contemplation. But there is no identification nor even a necessary correlation between this cosmic night and the process of purification which is symbolized by the term "night" in his works. The experience of the mystical ascent is said to be "dark," but this adjective is only applied metaphorically following an abstraction from its primary meaning. The darkness of the physical night is not the "darkness" of the various privations and purifications undergone throughout the ascent. It does seem that the authors who hold this inseparability between the literary symbol and the actual experience reduce the mystical union with God and the process leading to it to a series of inter-connected cosmic ecstasies. At least, the danger of this reduction is present in the positions they hold.

The tendency to establish too intimate a link between the mystical act and the poetic expression is found again in Carlos Disandro. This literary critic does seem to deprive the mystical experience of its transcendence, though it is no doubt unwittingly, as he shows immense reverence for the saint and mystical author. However, he makes some statements which seem to be more the fruit of enthusiasm than of reflection. For instance: "Saint John of the Cross has joined mystical experience with lyrical experience, mystical expression with lyrical expression.... As a lyrist he has penetrated into the innermost recesses of his mystical existence...." Consequently, "the poetic res" of Juan de la Cruz is considered "a perennial glimmer of the intelligence of God." It must be pointed out, though, that if in the act of poetic inspiration the whole of man's sensory, noetic and affective powers are engaged in operation with heightened unity and harmony, such cannot take place in the mystical union. In the state of actual union, when the subject is "united according to the powers," the intelligence does not function by the mediation of phantasms, and thus does not recall and does not imagine. We are further told that the language of God "suspends and reduces to silence all the harmony and capacity of the external and internal senses." It is impossible for us to form an image of or relate to such an occurrence, although reason leads us to conclude that it does not coincide with the phenomenon called "poetic experience," which somewhat to the contrary, entails the activity of all these powers in a state of unusual synchronization. The fundamental otherness of the mystical experience will not allow lyrical powers to cross its threshold, "to penetrate into its innermost recesses." Thus, if we wish to say that the mystical experience is lyrical, we must qualify this by indicating that we have drastically changed the sense of the word "lyricism."

From this first inadmissible point in the analysis of Disandro, there follows a second one, which is the assumption that the poems of San Juan can communicate something objective, although in an attenuated manner, of the mystical experience itself. In the poem of the "Llama," Disandro states that there is a noticeable restriction of the means of expression, as if a mysterious coincidence took place between the line of thought com-
municated by the language, the verses, the symbols, etc. and the nature of the realities expressed. From here it follows that this poem could be called an epiphany of the mystical flame, in the act of being such; epiphany of the fire that manifests itself as fire, in its igneous expansion or in its originative and ulterior divine presence. The language and the lyrical word enter as well into the all-inclusiveness of God and of the shadow of God. Probably we would discover here the ultimate root of San Juan's lyrical poetry: the shadow of God is the soul in that lofty, transforming and transfiguring mode of being; such involves a communicability which is a participation in the intratrinitarian communicability; the shadow of the soul, that is, the shadow of the shadow of God, is the poetry; the shadow of the latter, that is, the shadow of the shadow of the shadow of God, is what we discern in the intelligibility of its lyrical vibration. We live, thus, under the shelter of the lyrical veiling, in the fullness of the fire of the formless Deity, and we recover the recondite spaces of the mystical shadow, where there vibrates without defection the emergence itself of the fire of God.\(^29\)

If it were no more difficult "to recover the recondite spaces of the mystical shadow," Juan de la Cruz would have written only his poems. The unearthly struggles of the ascent prescribed in the *Subida* and the *Noche* would be unnecessary.

Disandro continues, utilizing a prose which is captivating in its style though not always accurate:

at the same time such a language is a shadowing, without which we could not lift our sights towards those divine and theandric mysterious realities. We take refuge, thus, in that *obumbratio* or that shadow, and some of that igneous and glowing ladder moves us and urges us onward, into the mysterious shadowed brightness --the "clear and refulgent shadows" of which the saint speaks to us-- of the mystical poem. We hear the poem, we journey through its brilliance, or we repose in its shadow, and some of the primary and originative fire reaches as far as us. Such is the deepest mystery of the human word, that it can become a lyrical one, that it can be at once the most sublime *obumbratio* of man and the most modest *obumbratio* of God. In the parting of these two shadows, the distant in brightness of an intelligible dawn commences; in the gateway between these two roads a new way of understanding is opened to us: harmonizing brightness with brightness, and ascending from shadow to shadow, from dawn to dawn, from sunrise to sunrise, to find ourselves again under the shelter of a beloved and most forcible shadow under a beloved and most forcible sun. Perhaps San Juan discloses for us in this way the living and dynamic context of beatitude, whose ascent from shadow to brightness and from brightness to shadow has neither term nor end.\(^30\)

The cited passages reveal an exalted enthusiasm for the author and the subject under discussion. One might say that it is an enthusiasm which has carried the critic away. We are reminded at this point, however, of San Juan's own observation that serenity brings greater clarity of understanding. There are passages in Disandro, on the other hand, in which the emphasis is shifted:
In the being-as-fire of the poem "Llama de amor viva" there is some thing like a dynamic deepening, as if the language endeavored to attain the most hidden igneous essence in the act of manifesting itself origina­tively as such. That is to say, as if the mystical word of man could coincide with the mystical word or logos of God, which expresses precisely this remote and most hidden instance of being-as-free.... It as if we returned, in the midst of the noise of so much vacuous language, to the silence that dwells in the root of each substantial word and as if through that silence we recovered intact the virtue of what it sig­nifies...

If one places the weight of these statements on the reiterated "as if" ["como si"], then they are fully acceptable. John of the Cross would have wished nothing more intensely than to com­municate fully to other human beings his encounter with God. But the utter ineffability of this encounter was condemned to being one of his greater sources of pain. His poetic expression remains an hypothetical "as if."

"No halla modo ni manera ni símil"

We have thus far drawn some distinctions between the mystical act, which is one of knowledge and love, and the poetic or poietic act, which is one of formulating an expression. We have looked at some positions which move toward confounding the two. An extreme interpre­tation would be to maintain a strict identity between them. Other positions would be to think of the poetic expression as necessarily following from the mystical experience; or to think of the poetic formulation as taking place within said experience; or to imagine that the symbols have grasped and can communicate something of the mystical act as it is. Many of these positions look upon both mystical experience and artistic process as being essentially acts of cognition, and then proceed to approximate or even to merge them. All the positions ex­amined overlook, whether willingly or not, the disproportionality between God and creatures, between immediate knowledge of God and ordinary human cognition. God is made proportionate to man, and a transcendental, ineffable experience is replaced by an im­manentized and cosmologized one.

We have seen that Juan de la Cruz strongly emphasizes this fundamental disproportion­ality. He is equally insistent upon the consequential ineffability of the mystical experience. In discussing the verses of "Cántico" 7 which read,

\[
\begin{align*}
y \text{ déjame muriendo} \\
\text{un no sé qué quedan balbuciendo}
\end{align*}
\]

and leave me dying
of a nameless "something" they keep stammering

San Juan speaks of "a most sublime understanding of God, which cannot be expressed, for which reason it is spoken of as a nameless "something"..." This issue of man's inability to convey fully the mystical experience is brought up many times and in the second book of the
Noche it receives comprehensive and rigorous treatment. The following passage is worth citing despite its length. Contemplation is said to be "secret," among other reasons because even in the illumination, when this wisdom is communicated most clearly, it is still so secret that the soul cannot speak of it nor give it a name by which to call it. For, aside from the fact that the soul has no desire whatsoever to speak of it, it finds neither mode nor manner nor simile which would be suitable to signify such sublime cognition and such delicate spiritual feeling. And thus, no matter how intensely the soul might wish to describe it, and regardless of how many expressions it might attempt to use, it would still remain secret and undescribed. For, since that inner wisdom is so simple, general and spiritual that it did not enter into the intellect wrapped or cloaked in any specie or image subject to sense [="el sentido"] and the imagination, it follows that the sensible powers --as it did not enter through them nor did it assume their form and color-- cannot account for it nor imagine it, so as to be able to say anything about it. Although the soul is clearly aware that it understands and savors that delectable and rare vision. It is similar to one seeing something never seen before, the likeness of which he has not seen either. Though he might understand and have an experience of such a thing, he would be unable to name it or say what it was, no matter how hard he tried; and this in spite of it being a thing he perceived with the senses. How much less, then, could one manifest that which did not come through them!...

Regarding this we have authorities and examples jointly in holy Scripture. For Jeremiah (1,6) showed the incapacity of manifesting it externally and speaking of it when, after God had spoken with him, he was unable to say anything but "Ah, ah, ah!" And the interior incapacity, that is, of the internal sense of the imagination, as well as that of the external senses, was likewise shown by Moses, when he stood before God in the bush (Ex 4,10). Not only did he say to God that after speaking with him he knew not how to speak nor was able to do so, but also that --as is told in the Acts of the Apostles (7,32)-- he did not dare to reflect even with his internal imagination, for it seemed to him that the imagination was very far removed and speechless, not only to express anything pertaining to that which he understood in God, but even to receive anything pertaining to it. Whence, inasmuch as the wisdom of this contemplation is the language of God to the soul, communicated by pure spirit to pure spirit, nothing that is less than spirit, such as the senses, can perceive it, and thus it is secret to them, and they do not know it nor can they express it, nor do they desire to do so, for they see not how.33

It has been said many times that the mystical experience is ineffable because it is "beyond reason," or "non-rational." This is judging hastily, as well as superficially. It is this type of comment that contributes to the vague and widespread notion that there is something irrational, something at odds with the order of the universe, about mysticism. If this were so, the foreign and untrustable world of mystical phenomena could only be a home only for the demented. But such is not the case. It is fundamental to point out that the origin of the ineffability does not lie in the imagined irrationality of the experience, but in the limitations of human noetic and communicative powers. And although it is acceptable to state that the mysti-
cal experience in some ways is beyond human comprehension, it should not be said to be con-
trary to reason.

In chapters IV and V, we dealt with the disproportion between human cognitive powers 
and God, a disproportion which has its roots in man's dependence upon the material phantasm 
for knowledge. As discussed, God is for said reason unimaginable, and therefore cognitively 
unreachable. For the blessed soul who has encountered him in and through extraordinary 
means, God still defies conceptualization, description or symbolization. God is thus known to 
be incommunicable to the rest of mankind. It is important to understand that God is in-
communicable to others by the mystic for the same reason the latter found him initially un-
knowable: that man's noetic powers are linked to phantasms, while God cannot be contained in 
any phantasm. Although the human intellect does abstract from the phantasm for the sake of 
universality, it still knows all things in terms of the phantasm, in terms of material creatures. 
Things must be communicated from man to man in likewise manner: by means of material im-
ages, symbols, forms or sounds, which will evoke in the knower the phantasms in terms of 
which he is to know. God as he is is unknowable to the generality of men. The mystic has 
come to know him, but cannot translate him into any mode of human communication. Suppos-
ing for the sake of argument, though it is impossible, that the mystic could produce a full and 
perfect expression of his experience, the message would still not be apprehended by other 
human beings, for what would be communicated would still remain beyond the cognitive capa-
cities of man's natural powers.

The comportment to be expected from a person who has journeyed into the mysterious 
regions of the mystical experience is a withdrawal in a silence filled with awe, or at most a 
stammer, a stutter, a "balbuceo." However, as Jorge Guillén has stated:

Our poet will never remain content with

\[
Un \text{ no sé qué que quedan balbuciendo.}
\]

A nameless "something" they keep stammering.

This verse, famous for its triple repetition of the syllable *que* (obviously intentional), expresses most felicitously one stage in the real experi-
ence --a stage that must be excelled by poetry. The saint has found "a 
most lofty understanding of God, which cannot be expressed, and for 
that reason is called a «something»." But the poet does not confine him-
self to "stammering." For "to stammer" means "to talk as do children, 
and not to convey and express perfectly that which they have to say." 
San Juan de la Cruz is the least infantile of poets. Poetry cannot be 
either a stammering or a mere interjection.34

The poetic artifact comes to be as a result of an effort to incarnate, to give concrete form to an 
experience or an idea. Whereas it is much easier to remain content with the experience or idea 
alone, the production of the work of art entails labor. If this is so with respect to all art and 
poetry, it is much more the case with John of the Cross, whose colossal task is to express the 
knowing and loving union between himself and the immanently transcendent tripersonal God.

Both Gabriel Celaya and Jorge Guillén have correlated San Juan's stance regarding the 
religious doctrine of Quietism to his performance as a productive artist. As we saw briefly in 
chapter IV, the Quietist, much to the contrary of Juan de la Cruz, opts for a state of total in-
activity, of surrender of the will without any specification by the intellect, of leaving all actualization of perfectibility to God.\textsuperscript{33} Similarly, in the sphere of art one can assume the type of "Quietism" pointed out by Guillén, of believing that poetic inspiration suffices for poetry, and that poetry as inspired is all the purer and more authentic than poetry translated into verbal form.\textsuperscript{36} Or, one can assume the "Quietism" discussed by Celaya, of despairfully sinking into silence upon confronting the inability of language to capture and express the absolute.\textsuperscript{37} Again, both positions are far removed from John of the Cross', who would have agreed with the statement that "poetry properly said... is always that of the poet-workers and not that of the «dexados»."\textsuperscript{38} In the words of Guillén, "San Juan de la Cruz does not fall into the heresy of Quietism either when searching for the treasure or when wishing to display his find."\textsuperscript{39} As a result of Fray Juan's constructive efforts, "his poem is erected like the most subtle work of architecture, in which each piece has been wrought with the most elaborate care in the hope of achieving perfection; and artistic perfection is joined to spiritual."\textsuperscript{40}

For the sake of exposition, we might distinguish between a "mystical ascent" or accommodation to God and a "communicative descent" or accommodation to man. John of the Cross has stated that:

\begin{quote}
the soul can neither work, nor receive that which has been wrought in it, other than by way of these two types of powers, sensitive and spiritual. For as we have said, by means of the sensitive powers it can reason and search and compose acts of cognition pertaining to things, and by means of the spiritual powers it can enjoy acts of knowledge which it has received already formed in these powers...\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}

We have seen that the movement of the mystical ascent involves a freeing of man's powers from the "sentido" so that they may operate according to the "espiritu." This is the itinerary the mystic must follow. If afterwards he wishes to relate experience to other human beings, he must necessarily traverse the same grounds journeying in the opposite direction. The purely spiritual experience must be accommodated to the "sentido" through a communicative descent. That which was known as formless and imageless and limitless has to be garbed in phantasms, images and propositions; for human beings cannot understand in any other way.

The accommodation of the mystical experience to any non-mystical mode of communication entails a great loss. It is inevitable that that which is most peculiar to the "vivencia" or lived experience of the mystic will remain unarticulated.\textsuperscript{42} It is likely that nothing at all would have been expressed in written form without Juan de la Cruz's high caliber of intellectual formation, his natural artistic abilities and his great willingness to make an effort. Thanks to these personal qualities, he was to produce a poetic world which was to comprise "an echo and a nostalgic indication of the original divine spiratio" which had been his prerogative to experience.\textsuperscript{43} But the poetic articulation was to be no more than an echo and a faint image, because it could not. Without forgetting the ultimate ineffability of the mystical experience, we shall examine in the next three chapters this accommodation to "el sentido," this return of the mystic to sensation and ordinary modes of cognition for the sake of communicating his message.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI


3. "Tout naturellement l'esprit de saint Jean de la Croix se tourne vers l'art; il y a en lui une sorte d'instinct artistique qui émerge, quoi qu'il fasse, dans son attitude, sa conversation, son style. Une habitude artistique marque son comportement de chaque jour, qui se manifeste surtout en des expressions et des images qu'il emploie avec une aisance toute naturelle dans ses écrits; elles lui viennent à la pensée et sous la plume, d'une façon toute normale, sans effort...." Florisoone, *op. cit.*, p. 131.


4. "...la sabiduría y amor [de Dios] es tan inmenso, que, como se dice en el libro de la Sabiduría, *toca desde un fin hasta otro fin* (8,1), y el alma que de él es informada y movida en alguna manera esa misma abundancia e impetu lleva en él su decir..." *C*, Prologue, 1.

Various commentators have pointed to the meeting in San Juan de la Cruz of a spontaneously lyrical character with the intense, overflowing joys of the mystical experience. "En aparente antagonismo con su viva sensación de lo indecible, tiene el místico una inclinación irrefrenable a la expresión. No puede contenerse, y exclama, exterioriza, prorrumpé. Lo siente a manera de necesidad orgánica. No persigue con ello finalidad didáctica alguna; canta por cantar. Así lo han hecho literalmente algunos místicos, cantando como pajarillos del bosque, sin que nadie les escuche. Fray Juan cantaba sus versos, según dijo él, infinitas veces en la cárcel solitaria. Espontaneidad lírica que se encarna más en el espíritu cuando participan todas las capacidades perceptivas o emotivas del hombre.... La raíz de la necesidad se halla en la vinculación indisoluble del cuerpo a las vivencias del espíritu.... Este es el caso de san Juan de la Cruz: místico hasta los huesos, artista de cuerpo entero. Sensible a lo divino y ganoso de expresarlo en formas bellas, inventa mil maneras." Ruiz Salvador, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-107. "Si por una parte el místico puede sentir el impulso de permanecer en el silencio ante la imposibilidad de expresar lo inefable por otra el estado de extremo gozo le hace casi imposible el contener sus ansias acrecidas de alabar a Dios." Thus, "la expresión literaria y especialmente en el máximo grado emocional de la poesía y del canto se produce en el místico como necesario e inevitable. El desbordarse del alma en expresión de gozo y fiesta por sentirse llena de Dios no se produce como caso aislado, sino como fenómeno frecuente." Emilio Orozco Díaz, *Poesía y mística: introducción a la lírica de san Juan de la Cruz* (Madrid: Ediciones Guadarrama, 1959), pp. 58 and 61-62.

5. "...es el movimiento de la caridad... quien le conduce a comunicar su experiencia y su canto." Gabriel Celaya, *op. cit.*, p. 179. "Lo más benéfico de la mística española consiste --como es tópico pero cierto, decir-- en que retorna al mundo. No hay en esto ninguna contradicción doctrinal, como no la hay en el hecho de que el Doctor de la Nada cultivara la Poesía.
Entendamos esto: entendamos por qué... los verdaderos místicos retornan de un modo tanto más entero y total a la realidad inmediata cuanto más alto han llegado en la unión.... Dos son los frutos de la caridad llamada cristiana: el amor de Dios y el amor del prójimo. Y si bien se mira, ambos son idénticos. Porque esta doctrina... enseña a amar a Cristo en cualquier hombre; y porque el amor de él, se nos dice, es amor de lo que él ama. Por eso San Bernardo, abundando en estas convicciones, señala que el «matrimonio espiritual» no conduce a la contemplación pura sino, en última instancia, a una doble solicitación de la vida activa y de la contemplativa, que se sustentan entonces una a la otra.... Henos aquí ante una conclusión simple pero muy útil: al poema --y dudo en último extremo de que existan estados poéticos sin poema-- le es indispensable un deseo de comunicación --y ahora digo comunicación, no comunión-- para ser, y esto no es sino caridad, aunque lo sea de una forma rudimentaria y no necesariamente religiosa." Ibid., pp. 177-179. "Lo maravilloso, pues, no es sólo la perfección de la obra [de San Juan de la Cruz], sino que toda esa obra, verso, comentario, aforismo o carta, fue escrita por fuerza de amor, para enseñar a otros el camino del amor." Luis Cernuda, Poesía y literatura, Biblioteca Breve (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1960), p. 53.


7. Reflecting upon the famous drawing of the crucified Christ made by John of the Cross, Michel Florisoone states: "Bouleversant témoignage d'un contact direct avec le Christ lui-même, dans quelles conditions ce croquis fut-il dessiné? «Revenu à soi», nous précise le P. Bruno: saint Jean de la Croix l'a tracé en pleine possession de sa volonté et de ses moyens." Thus, "il n’est pas possible de prétendre que ce dessin fut exécuté au cours de phénomène mystique lui-même: il le fut dans l’ambiance de l’état habituel où le père vivait alors..." Op. cit., p. 99. In a scene from his life which has become well-known, Fray Juan was asked where did he obtain the lofty words with which he composed the "Cántico." He responded nonchalantly that "algunas veces me las daba Dios, y otras las buscaba yo." Jerónimo de San José, Historia del venerable padre Fr. Juan de la Cruz (Madrid: Diego Díaz de la Carrera, 1641), book III, chapter XIII, cited by Ruiz Salvador, op. cit., p. 111. At least in the instances in which he himself "las buscaba," we can assume he was operating with his powers in their ordinary state. It is certainly admissible to think that his poetic work was in part divinely inspired --"algunas veces me las daba Dios"-- but, what is important to keep in mind is that even in these instances poetic inspiration is not to be identified with the mystical experience itself.

8. "...aunque está el alma siempre en este alto estado de matrimonio después que le ha puesto en él, no, empero, siempre en actual unión según las dichas potencias, aunque según la sustancia del alma sí; pero en esta unión sustancial del alma muy frecuentemente se unen también las potencias..." C,26,11. "Ahora sólo trato de esta unión total y permanente según la sustancia del alma y sus potencias en cuanto al hábito oscuro de unión; porque en cuanto al
acto... no puede haber unión permanente en las potencias en esta vida..." SII,5,2. See also, above, chapter V, note 71.

9. Guillén, op. cit., pp. 89 and 99-100. Similarly: "Especie muy acariciada por casi todos los que se han ocupado de la poesía de san Juan de la Cruz ha sido la de que el poeta compuso sus versos por una especie de inconsciencia artística, estado misterioso del alma en el cual, poseído el hombre por un furor divino, siente necesidad de cantar y canta sin sujeción a reglas ni preceptos literarios.... Pero hoy ya no es sostenible esta idea." Crisogono, San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica..., 2:17; see also, ibid., 2:218 and 239-240.

10. "Ante todo, cabe distinguir entre la experiencia mística propiamente dicha y la operación poética que la plasma. Aquélla podría ser extraordinaria y quedar fuera de nuestro alcance, sin que eso nos vedara el tratar de comprender la operación poética que, como tal, se limita a transmitir aquélla por procedimientos que en principio no tenemos por qué suponer distintos a los de otros poetas cuando nos transmiten sus experiencias de otro orden. Es más, aun cuando diéramos por bueno que San Juan de la Cruz estaba divinamente inspirado cuando compuso sus Canciones, siempre cabrá recordar, cristianamente hablando, que la Gracia no anula la naturaleza ni la destruye, sino que la perfecciona, y que por tanto nuestro poeta debió proceder como otros proceden aunque fuera en un grado excelente." Celaya, op. cit., p. 158. "Hoy nadie cree en lo que se llama inconsciencia artística. Si la obra poética ha de ser un todo orgánico perfecto, es fuerza que vaya la inteligencia delante marcando la ruta al sentimiento. No basta el calor, ha de haber también luz y claridad." Crisogono, San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica..., 2:218. "...ce n'est pas en tant que grand mystique, mais en tant que grand poète que saint Jean de la Croix réussit à produire un chant aussi parfait. Si les résonances de ce chant nous paraissent étranges, c'est parce que l'expérience qu'il traduit n'est pas celle du commun des poètes, mais les procédés de traduction sont les mêmes." Max Milner, Poésie et vie mystique chez saint Jean de la Croix, La Vigne du Carmel (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1951), p. 108.

11. Etienne Gilson, Arts of the Beautiful (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965), pp. 9 and 60. "No doubt, knowledge always accompanies creation, but in the complex interaction of knowledge and artistic production, knowledge does not produce. It would be more correct to say that knowledge is at the service of production. The will to make comes first; only afterwards does a man ask himself: What am I going to make? Imagination, much more than understanding, offers one or several possible answers. A period of trial and error follows, and only then comes execution. The noetic approach to reality, so natural to speculative minds, blinds them to the evidence that the first moment of any art is an impulse to produce something. It is a desire, an urge, often even a need to bring into being some material object having certain shape --a sonnet, a structure of musical sounds-- and worthwhile for its own sake. The result of artistic production is always the existence of knowable objects, but bringing them into being remains the essential moment of the calopoietic function." Ibid., pp. 73-74. Thus, "metaphysicians who hope to find the justification of art deeply rooted in being are right; any reflection upon art leads to metaphysics, that is to say, to ontology. Far from blaming them for this, we would rather regret that, while constantly claiming being as their principle, they do not adhere to it, for the kind of being from which art springs is not the abstract notion that is the proper object of ontological speculation. It is not being as known: it is rather the being that is and acts because it itself is act." Ibid., p. 74. "...in the artist's mind, images themselves are less imitations of ready-made things than models of things to be made. They are directly conceived and formed as prototypes of so many possible works, waiting for the artist to give them the actual existence they lack. The will to make, which moves the artist, intimately informs the image of what he will do. Insofar as he is an artist, his first thought is a project." Ibid., p. 75.
12. "...par delà de la connaissance rationnelle qu'a lentement acquise l'humanité, une communication direct, intuitive, avec les choses..." Albert Béguin, Poésie de la présence, p. 16. As mentioned earlier, Béguin is sometimes not extremely accurate in his assessments of the nature of Christian mysticism. See chapter V, notes 2 and 31. However, being well-versed in the poetic movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, he is quite familiar with the mystical and divine prerogatives attributed to the poet and to poetry by the Romantics. In several of his works, Béguin refutes these claims in the name of the utter simplicity of the mystical cognitive experience. What he does not emphasize, however, is the transcendence of the mystical experience. See, for example, Poésie de la présence, pp. 22-23 and Création et destinée I (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1973), pp. 210-211.


14. "...les caractères par lesquels on a défini récemment l'essence de la poésie ont amené bien des esprits à se demander s'il n'y avait pas identité absolue, ou tout au moins convergence profonde, entre les démarches du poète et du mystique." Béguin, Poésie de la présence, p. 17. Béguin further specifies that the Romantic poet "veut à la fois épanouir tous ses pouvoirs, intégrer dans l'acte essentiel les instincts et les automatismes, et en même temps écarter de lui ce qui est intellectuel uniquement. Ainsi arrive-t-il à cette poésie dont les manifestations ont quelque ressemblance avec les produits de l'âme primitive; tout y est correspondance entre des plans que dissocie l'analyse intellectuelle, toute chose y est animée, et semble être à l'état de perpétuelle naissance. Poésie du monde en genèse et de l'être en formation, où transparaît sans cesse une nostalgie, l'appel de l'âme vers un paradis perdu, vers l'âge d'or primitif, que connaissent tous les mythes. Poésie de l'enfance, du rêve, du souvenir, semblable à un ciel immense où les nuages dessinent des formes fugitives.... Toutes ces démarches se ramènent bien à un seul et même geste fondamental, qui est d'attribuer un pouvoir de découverte à l'acte même de créer le poème, d'associer librement les images, et de faire jaillir la métaphore. Au-delà de tous ces abandons à la multiplicité des figures de l'esprit et à la variété inépuisable des formes et des choses, le propos du poète est de rejoindre l'unité essentielle: unité de l'esprit et du monde, cherchée passionnément, pathétiquement, aussi bien dans la contemplation du spectacle extérieur que dans l'appréhension des données obscures du monde profond." Ibid., pp. 18-19.

15. "...quelle que soit la valeur que l'on attribue à l'acte poétique, il reste nécessairement un acte «mediat» (et non une union immédiate), un act soumis à la nécessité de la forme." Ibid., p. 28.

16. Jacques and Raïssa Maritain wrote on this subject on several occasions. "The source of poetry and of all creative intuition is in a certain experience which one can call an obscure and savory «knowledge», with a thoroughly spiritual flavor, for at these depths all is spirit and life, and every poet knows that he penetrates there by a concentration of all his senses into unity, however fleeting it be --and that is a primary condition of poetic conception." Thus, "poetry is the fruit of a contact of the spirit with reality, which is in itself ineffable, and with the source of reality, which we believe to be God himself in that movement
of love which causes him to create images of his beauty." R. Maritain, *The Situation of Poetry*, pp. 14-15 and 21. "Things are not just what they are; they pass unceasingly beyond themselves, and give more than they have, because they are traversed from every direction by the influx of Existence in pure act, and they love that Existence more than themselves. They are better, and worse, than themselves, because being superabounds.... Thus they communicate in existence, under an infinity of modes and by an infinity of actions and contacts, of correspondences, of sympathies and malices, of breakings and reformings, and --insofar as they possess immateriality-- of forms of interiorization of being and forms of giving. This communication in the act of existence and in the spiritual flux from which existence proceeds, a communication which is not certainly pure existence, and which is not the essences and the proper names (though it presupposes them), but which is in things as if the secret of the creative sources, this is perhaps above all what the poet receives and suffers, in however small a measure...." J. Maritain, "The Experience of the Poet," *The Situation of Poetry*, p. 79.

17. Thomas Gilby focusses on poetic knowledge as that knowing in which objects are apprehended as wholes and are not abstracted from by subjects whose every power, including the movement of love, is engaged in the apprehending. Such an experience carries with it a deeper communion with existence than ordinary knowledge can yield. Gilby describes the poetic experience as an intellectual act in which "every resource is brought into play --the natural appetite for a physical union, the will's desire for the individual impelling the mind to a closer possession and informing it with a deeper realisation, the fusion of mind and sense to perceive the singleness and wholeness of a splendid particular. There is no sense of distance or separation from the thing, such as attends purely conceptual knowledge. All the activities of the self are loosed in enjoyment, unanimous in a single activity which breaks through the framework of aspects enclosing our ordinary rational activity, and which experiences for a moment or longer a reality that is really possessed. Now the mind is most alive, and at peace."

However, "as poetry does not submit to a standard but expresses a thing, so the poetic experience is not concerned with reasons but with instances. It comes about through the united activity of every force of one substance --mind, will, senses-- directed to the multiple attraction of another single substance; the action of all is fused into an irreducible singleness under the influence of appetite. *Quasi totum et ideo pulchrum*, says St. Augustine." For, "three levels of knowledge are implied in poetry, sensuous, rational, and aesthetic." Gilby explains that "by poets we mean not the artists only, but also the lovers; all who have felt spellbound whether by a scene, a person, a symphony, the drive of a yacht in a high wind, or the sense of the reason beyond reason for everything. Many have the heart of a poet, says George Eliot, without the voice. The phrase «poetic experience» is taken to cover all knowledge that seems in immediate contact with the real; whether expressed in words, sounds, colour, or heroic deeds; whether hidden in silence or lost in suffering." *Poetic Experience* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1934), pp. 78, 89, 93 and 10-11.

The work cited above in notes 13 and 16 by Raïssa and Jacques Maritain was published in 1955. The one by Thomas Gilby quoted in this note is from 1934. Writing in the mid-sixties, Etienne Gilson was to focus upon the nature of art in general and poetry in particular from a new perspective. He does not use the expressions "poetic knowledge," "poetic experience," or "creative intuition," nor would he admit to the existence of poets who have not composed poetry. In this view, the cognitive and affective states referred to by the above mentioned authors should not be looked upon as constituting art nor even as sources of art, because they do not produce it. However, Gilson does not deny that those experiences take place, nor that the artist draws from them. The major contribution of Gilson's reinterpretation is that the principle or source of art is no longer seen in being as known by the artist, but is placed a step further into existence, so to speak, and thus seen in the fecundity of the act of being of the personal substance as creative agent. See above, note 11. Also, see Gilson's *Arts of the Beautiful*, chapter III. Gilson's analysis, we believe, is more comprehensive.
18. "Of the poet one would have to say: in the principle of his creative movement he knows as unknown the communion of things (among themselves and with him) in the passage of spirit which makes them be, and this is still another manner --quite different from the mystical one-- of visiting with God." Jacques Maritain, "The Experience of the Poet," *The Situation of Poetry*, p. 80. Following the general line of thought developed by Maritain, Orozco Díaz draws some parallels between mystical and poetic experience. "Conviene... recordar, aunque sea apresuradamente, cómo nos encontramos ante dos experiencias de naturaleza distintas, pero análogas como conformidad de conocimiento; dos formas de conocer por inclinación o connaturalización --como señala Maritain aplicando una doctrina de santo Tomás-- que quedan sobre lo racional; una que, trascendida la realidad sensible, alcanza el conocimiento directo de la esencia divina, otro que penetra en la realidad por intuición, en visión sintética, descubriendo las ocultas y misteriosas relaciones de los seres entre sí." *Op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.

Gabriel Celaya makes some comments pertinent to the same issue. "En qué sentido es pues «divina»... toda Poesía? En términos generales podríamos decir que lo es en tanto que el poeta establece contacto con Dios como creador suyo, es decir, con la raíz de su existencia que es la raíz de toda existencia. Porque es elemental en Teología, y casi pre-teológica, que Dios mora sustancialmente en nosotros como causa nuestra. Antes que como Padre y principio de esa vida de la Gracia, que es la propiamente religiosa en cristiano, Dios está en todas las criaturas, se dice, como creador y conservador de su ser, o como el origen en lo originado. Y ésta es la unión sustancial o natural que San Juan de la Cruz distingue expresamente de la unión mística, que es de amor, de semejanza o sobrenatural.... Es claro que... la Poesía es la súbita iluminación de ese hábito oscuro de la unión natural." *Op. cit.*, pp. 168-169.

19. See chapter V, pp. 125-128 and corresponding notes.


"Mai le symbolisme nocturne va en quelque sorte au delà de toute expression verbale particulière et il ne suffit pas, pour l’entendre, de démêler les vocables qui le traduisent littéralement; il faut errer, en quelque sorte avec Jean de la Croix lui-même, à travers un monde mystérieux et retrouver, ça et là, le «paysage intérieur» où se sont épanouies les images qui aboutissent à la nuit. Comment parler d’images, puisque la nuit en signifiera la négation? Certes le lyrisme fera surgir des images dont l’émergence constituerait à elle seule un problème. Pourtant, ces images ne s’incorporeront pas à la vie mystique tout entière. Mais il est d’autres images qui sont inhérentes à la pensée profonde et accompagnent toute la construction mystique. C’est en elles que le poète continue de vivre, tandis que sa fantaisie, par un paradoxe lyrique, se plaît à évoquer toute la beauté du monde. Images si intimes qu’elles semblent concerner à la fois l’expérience et la traduction de l’expérience. Paysage universel et, comme Jean
de la Croix eût dit lui-même, abyssal. En cette région nue se crée un univers nouveau, riche de tout ce qui n'est pas notre monde. C'est cet univers nouveau que le symbolisme nocturne devra figurer. C'est lui aussi qui prolongera le mouvement lyrique le plus pur." *Ibid.*, pp. 311-312.


23. "Ce serait folie de vouloir pénétrer avec certitude dans des régions aussi secrètes d'une conscience de prêtre. Mais ne peut-on pas à tout le moins discerner certains indices nous permettant d'affirmer que saint Jean de la Croix a lui-même vécu les symboles qu'il élabore...?" And further: "Devons-nous penser, ainsi que M. Baruzi nous y invite, que le symbole de la nuit, avec ses multiples prolongements, est le seul que exprime totalement une expérience vécue?" *Op. cit.*, pp. 112 and 114. Emphasis Milner's.

24. The Sanjuanist symbol of the night has intrigued many authors. Angel Custodio Vega offers an suggestion regarding its genesis which seems quite plausible. Speaking of the poem "Noche oscura," he calls attention to the fact that "las estrofas tienen cierto aire autobiográfico y que la noche, el sosiego de la casa, la salida disfrazado y en secreto, que nadie me vela, ni yo miraba cosa, sin otra luz y guía sino la que en el corazón ardía, aquesta me guaba adonde me esperaba quien yo bien me sabía, en parte donde nadie parescía, etc. Todo esto nos parece recordar su fuga de la carcel..." *Op. cit.*, p. 211, note 33. San Juan's escape from prison in Toledo during the darkest and stillest nocturnal hours, after months of intense suffering and humiliation in a dismal cell, certainly could have been the source of inspiration for his usage of the symbol of the night. But this is very different from holding that this symbol of the night is inseparable from the mystical experience.

25. We again cite Baruzi. Stanzas 14-15 of the "Cántico" are described as "un chant qui exprime directement une extase cosmique. Les vocables choisis disent une immensité, une solitude, un silence et en même temps un fracas, synthèses mystérieuses où se prolongue un souvenir abyssal. Ce n'est point là seulement une réflexion lyrique sur l'extase; mais c'est l'extase elle-même qui s'exprime... Ici, Jean de la Croix ne «saisit» pas; il «est saisit». Mais comme son expérience est faite de renoncement à toutes les appréhensions distinctes, comme elle est pénétrée aussi, en dépit de toutes les négations, d'un intense amour de la nature, une synthèse s'accomplit de l'univers et de Dieu même. Et cette synthèse constitue la seule extase que, dans son oeuvre théorique, Jean de la Croix ait considérée comme créatrice." *Op. cit.*, pp. 639-640.

26. "San Juan de la Cruz ha unido experiencia mística y experiencia lírica, expresión mística y expresión poética.... Como lírico ha penetrado en las entrañas de su interioridad mística.... La res poética.... es... un destello perenne de la inteligencia en Dios." Disandro, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-19.

27. "...unida según las potencias..." C,26,11. See also, above, note 8.

28. "...hace cesar y enmudecer toda la armonía y habilidad de los sentidos exteriores y interiores." MII,17,3.

29. "...hay una notable restricción de los medios expresivos, como si la línea del lenguaje, del verbo, de los símbolos, etc. coincidiera de una manera misteriosa con la naturaleza de las realidades que expresa. De ahí que podría llamarse a este poema epifanía de la llama mística, en el acto de ser tal; epifanía del fuego que se manifiesta como fuego, en su expansión ígnea o en su originaria y relagada presencia divina. El lenguaje y la lírica entran tam-
bien en la *perikhoresis* de Dios y de la sombra de Dios. Aquí descubriríamos probablemente la raíz última de la lírica de San Juan: la sombra de Dios es el alma en aquel subido modo transformante y transfigurante; ello implica una comunicabilidad que es participación de la comunicabilidad intratrinitaria; la sombra del alma, o sea, la sombra de la sombra de Dios, es la poesía, más concretamente esta poesía lírica; la sombra de ésta, o sea, la sombra de la sombra de la sombra de Dios, es lo que advertimos nosotros en la inteligibilidad plena de su vibración lírica. Vivimos pues al amparo de la obumbración lírica, en pleno fuego de la deidad sin figura, y recobramos los recónditos espacios de la sombra mística, donde vibra sin deflexión alguna la mismísima patencia del fuego de Dios." *Op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

30. "...al mismo tiempo tal lenguaje es una obumbración, sin la que no podríamos levantar la mirada hacia aquellas misteriosas realidades divinas y teádricas. Nos amparamos pues en esa *obumbratio* o en esa sombra, y algo de aquella escala ígnea y flamígera nos conmueve y nos urge, en la misteriosa claridad obumbrada --las «claras y encendidas sombras» de que habla el santo-- del poema místico. Ofmos el poema, transitamos por su lumbre, o reposamos en su sombra, y algo del fuego fontal y originante llega hasta nosotros. Tal es el misterio hondísimo de la palabra humana, que puede trocarse en palabra lírica, que puede ser a su vez la más subida obumbración del hombre y la más modesta obumbración de Dios. En la disyunción de esas dos sombras, comienzan las claridades lejanas de un alba inteligible, en el pótico entre esas dos rutas se abre para nosotros un nuevo modo de entender: conciliando lumbre con lumbre y subiendo de sombra en sombra, de alba en alba, de aurora en aurora, para estar otra vez al amparo de una sombra entrañable y fortísima bajo un sol entrañable y fortísimo. Tal vez San Juan desentraña de este modo el contexto viviente y dinámico de la beatitud, cuyo ascenso de sombra en lumbre y de lumbre en sombra no tiene término ni fin." *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

31. "En el ser-fuego del poema *Llama de amor viva* hay como una abismación dinámica, *como si* el lenguaje pretendiera alcanzar la escondidísima esencia ígnea en el acto de expresarse originariamente como tal. Es decir, *como si* el verbo místico del hombre pudiera coincidir con el verbo o *logos* místico de Dios, que expresa precisamente esa relegada y escondidísima instancia del ser-fuego.... *Es como si* retornáramos, en medio del ruido de tanto lenguaje vacío, al silencio que mora en la *ral* de cada palabra sustancial y *como si* a través de ese silencio recuperáramos la intacta virtud de lo que significa..." *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62. Emphasis ours.

32. "...un altísimo entender de Dios que no se sabe decir (que por eso lo llama *no sé qué*)..." C,7,9. "...así como no se entiende, así tampoco se sabe decir.... Por eso dice que le quedan las criaturas babuciendo, porque no lo acaban de dar a entender; que eso quiere decir *babucir*, que es el hablar de los niños, que es no acertar a decir y dar a entender qué hay que decir." *Ibid.*, 10.

33. "...en la iluminación, cuando más a las claras se le comunica esta sabiduría, le es al alma tan secreta para decir y ponerle nombre para decílo, que, demás de que ninguna gana le dé al alma de decirla, *no halla modo ni manera ni símil* que le cuadre para poder significar inteligencia tan subida y sentimiento espiritual tan delicado; y así, aunque más gana tuviese de decirlo y más significaciones truxese, siempre se quedaría secreto y por decir, porque, como aquella sabiduría interior es tan sencilla y tan general y espiritual, *que no entró al entendimiento envueltal ni paliada con alguna especie o imagen sujeta al sentido, de aquí es que el sentido e imaginativa, como no entró por ellas ni sintieron su traje y color, no saben dar razón ni imaginarla para decir algo della*; aunque claramente ve que entiende y gusta aquella sabrosa y peregrina sabiduría; bien así como el que viese una cosa nunca vista cuyo semejante tampoco jamás vio, que, aunque la entendiese y gustase, no le sabría poner nombre ni decir lo que es, aunque mas hiciere; y esto con ser cosa que la percibió con los sentidos, ¡cuánto menos, pues, se podrá manifestar lo que no entró por ellos!....
"De lo cual tenemos autoridades y ejemplos juntamente en la divina Escritura; porque la cortedad del manifestarlo y hablarlo exteriormente mostró Jeremías cuando, habiendo Dios hablado con él, no supo qué decir sino A, A, A, (1,6); y la cortedad interior, esto es, del sentido interior de la imaginación y juntamente la del exterior acerca de esto, también la manifestó Moisés delante de Dios en la zarza (Ex 4,10), cuando no solamente dijo a Dios que después que hablaba con El no sabía ni acertaba a hablar, pero aun --según se dice en los Actos de los Apóstoles (7,32)-- con la imaginación interior no se atrevía a considerar, pareciéndole que la imaginación estaba muy lejos y muda no sólo para formar algo de aquello que entendía en Dios, pero ni aun capacidad para recibir algo dello. De donde, por cuanto la sabiduría de esta contemplación es lenguaje de Dios al alma de puro espíritu a puro espíritu, todo lo que es menos que espíritu, como son los sentidos, no lo perciben, y así les es secreto y no lo saben ni pueden decir, ni tienen gana, porque no ven como." NII,17,3-4. Emphasis ours.

"... sería ignorancia pensar que los dichos de amor en inteligencia mistica, cuales son los de las presentes Canciones, con alguna manera de palabras se pueden bien explicar.... Porque ¿quién podrá escribir lo que a las almas amorosas donde El mora hace entender? ¿y quién podrá manifestar con palabras lo que las hace sentir? ¿y quién, finalmente, lo que las hace desear? Cierto, nadie lo puede; cierto, ni ellas mismas por quien pasa lo pueden." C, Prologue, 1. "Alguna repugnancia he tenido... en declarar estas cuatro canciones que Vuestra Merced me ha pedido; porque, por ser de cosas tan interiores y espirituales para las cuales comunmente falta lenguaje (porque lo espiritual excede al sentido), con dificultad se dice algo de la sustancia.... y como se lleve entendido que todo lo que se dijere es tanto menor de lo que allí hay, como es lo pintado que lo vivo, me atreveré a decir lo que supiere." L, Prologue, 1. "...no hay poder comprender las verdades ocultas de Dios que hay en sus dichos y multitud de sentidos. El está sobre el cielo y habla en camino de eternidad; nosotros, ciegos, sobre la tierra, y no entendemos sino vías de carne y tiempo." SII,20,5.

34. Guillén, op. cit., p. 99. Similarly: "... las Canciones de San Juan de la Cruz no tartamudean, ni zumban, ni derivan, sino que se constituyen en algo que no es un mero flujo.... El poema de San Juan de la Cruz representa algo estable..." Celaya, op. cit., p. 190.

35. Pp. 75-76 and corresponding notes.

36. "Poetry is achieved by means of art: the art of the poem. It must be pointed out that San Juan de la Cruz has found the supreme equilibrium between poetry of inspiration and constructed poetry, unlike so many modern writers for whom poetry and art represent an irreconcilable contradiction. (For them any voluntary attempt at fitting or adjustment, any effort to compose, would ruin or nullify the inspiration of the poet, who abandons himself with complete passivity to his muse, or, to say it with scientific pretensions, to his subconscious.)" Op. cit., pp. 87-88.

37. "Existe, en una palabra, un iluminismo poético que en Bécquer y Rimbaud hemos visto apuntar, autodestruyéndose y conduciendo al balbuceo informulado y a la nada: a la negación misma del arte." Celaya, op. cit., p. 173. On the silence of the vanquished and resigned poet, see also, Béguin, Poésie de la présence, pp. 23-24. On the other hand, it is recognized that "un movimiento hacia los hombres concretos y diferenciados no es tan fácil como parece para el poeta. Porque precisamente la vivencia poética es, como indiqué, una subsunción en la raíz de la existencia, en lo indiferenciado y uno del origen.... Pero si --al margen de la comunión así vivida-- no consideramos la necesidad de comunicar con otros, ya no hay ni obra de Arte, ni Cultura, ni humanidad propiamente dicha. Queda sólo ese falso éxtasis en que nos sentimos vacíos, tragados, destruidos por una existencia que todo lo devora, sin recuerdos, sin sentimientos, sin historia, sin vestigios de una existencia propia, anónimos,
 impersonales, en un estar sin ser que es una mera virtualidad. Por eso, aunque con cierta exageración, he hablado antes de «quietismo». Y por eso también, San Juan de la Cruz, que tanto luchó contra las formas aberrantes de la Mística, nos enseña en otro plano, con su «Poésia de Vuelta», lo que puede haber de también aberrante en cierta poesía." Celaya, op. cit., pp. 179-180. "¿En qué sentido la Metapoesía puede convertirse en un remedio? Por de pronto, en cuanto tiende a negar el poema-objeto en nombre de lo inefable y de la Poésia como estado pseudo-místico e invitación al silencio; y también en cuanto, aun sin llegar a esta última conclusión, tiende a disminuir lo que en el poema hay de empeño y realización, de obra de Arte y concreción ofrecida a otros hombres." Ibid., p. 181. "De lo que debemos preocuparnos por tanto, humanamente hablando, es de realizar la Poésia, en lugar de vivirla indeterminadamente, aun cuando sea cierto que esa Poésia brota siempre de ese trasfondo de la existencia como tal que nos muestra todas las cosas como si las viéramos por primera vez, y nos sume a la vez en su maravilla y en su sencillez, y en el misterio del simbolismo universal." Ibid., pp. 181-182.

38. "...la Poésia propiamente dicha... es siempre la de los obreros-poetas y no la de los «dexados»." Ibid., p. 183. " Dexado" (contemporary form, "dejado"), a colloquialism for a person given to passivity in matters of spirituality, such as an Illuminist or Quietist.


40. Ibid. It is similarly stated that San Juan's poetic creation "transcende evidentemente a arte y a artesanía --no olvidemos los antecedentes artesanos en la vida de Juan de Yepes--; a oficio refinado y, por consiguiente, a la posición psíquica más lejana al avasallamiento balsaciento, que parece constante síntoma de la mística embriaguez." D'Ors, op. cit., p. 135.

41. "...el alma no puede obrar ni recibir lo obrado si no es por vía destas dos maneras de potencias sensitivas y espirituales; porque, como habemos dicho, mediante las potencias sensitivas puede ella discurrir y buscar y obrar las noticias de los objetos y mediante las potencias espirituales puede gozar las noticias ya recibidas en estas dichas potencias..." MII,14,6.

42. "S'il y a dans toute poésie une transmutation du langage, une alchimie du verbe, nulle part elle n'est plus étonnante que dans la poésie de saint Jean de la Croix, car nulle part la disproportion n'est aussi flagrante entre la chose signifiée et le moyen employé pour la faire surgir." Milner, op. cit., p. 62.

43. "...un écho et une indication nostalgique de la spiratio divine originelle..." Von Balthasar, La gloire et la croix, part 2, 2:27.
CHAPTER VII

THE SEARCH FOR SYMBOLIZATION
AND
THE OVERCOMING OF THE INEFFABLE

In the previous chapter we recognized some distinctions between the act of mystical communion and the poietic act exercised in order to express it. The two acts we have maintained to be distinct must now again be united, not to identify or merge them, but to return them to the one subject who enacted them both, and to find in that subject the source of their commonality. Needless to say, every work of art or literature is destined to carry the stamp of its creator's sensitivity and character. Such is recognized, for example, by Miguel de Cervantes in the Prologue to his masterpiece, *Don Quijote*: "You may believe me," he states addressing the reader, "that I would have liked this book, as the child of my intellect, to be the fairest and most sensible one that could be imagined. But I have been unable to contravene the order of nature, in which each being engenders its like. What, then, could my own sterile and poorly cultivated mind ["ingenio"] beget...?"¹ We can disregard Cervantes' modesty regarding his parched "ingenio" and accept the universal law he formulates, which is applicable to Juan de la Cruz no less than to other writers.

All artistic creation draws upon "the deepest resources of the personality; if the latter happens to be that of a saint, the poetry will bear its marks."² Much the same can be said if the work in question is prose. In Juan de la Cruz we do not have "an artist who is principally an artist, but a saint," whose poetry bears the stamp of his spiritual perfection, and whose work would not represent "the highest pinnacle of Spanish poetry" had he not risen first of all to sanctity.³ Juan de la Cruz has been brought into the intimacy of the intratrinitarian life, and has been bathed in glory. As he turns to other human beings and the world of material things, he is still inebriated by the waters of the divine fountain from which he has drunk. This mystic poet, as would any other poet, engages his powers of memory, intellect and will in the labor of the esthetic creation. His own particular powers, however, have been bathed in the waters of the Father, enlightened by the Son, and kindled in the fire of the Holy Spirit. Drawing from an experience utterly without comparison, from an understanding taken far beyond the horizons of its ordinary capacity, and moved by the purest of loves, this Christian mystic *par excellence* has also been celebrated as a prince among poets. His lyrical world bears the stamp of an author radiant with multiple perfections, permeated with joy, most sensitive to the beauties of creation, and who "has never lost sight of this invisible Presence which he must deliver to souls..."⁴

The Deliberate Turning of the Gaze

In this chapter we shall deal with the transition from the mystical act to the poietic act, not as though we could have any full conceptualization or vision of it, but rather by bringing to light some principles operative in this transition which we have abstracted primarily from
Juan de la Cruz's own texts. We can begin by indicating that from the standpoint of the creating agent, the search for adequate symbolization is a movement which entails both directionality and deliberation. In the case of our mystic poet, this movement toward expression can be looked upon as a downward motion, as a turning of the gaze toward the material universe and toward his fellow human beings. Some critics have made reference to a "moment of return" or a "recovery of the creature."5 This return or recovery should not be interpreted, however, as though the mystic had psychologically abandoned or lost contact with the world surrounding him, for this is not the case. But one may speak of a "return," a "descent" or a "recovery" as a deliberate focussing upon the material world as a source of symbolization, within a movement ordained toward the production of an expression intended for the benefit of other human beings.

In this communicative or poietic process, there takes place an interacting among the powers of the soul which is essentially no different from that which took place in the ascent toward mystical communion. Within both processes, the powers function according to the same, normal order: the activities of remembering and intellecting occur first, and are followed by volition. At the same time, however, as we saw in chapter IV, volition establishes a directionality which conditions remembering and knowing.6 This noetic and affective movement, which is neither mystical nor extraordinary, can be looked upon in terms of a triadic pattern of human consciousness. As we saw in chapter IV, within contemporary speculation a distinction is made within the structure of knowing between subsidiary awareness --previously assimilated knowledge operating as framework or background--, focal awareness --that which is explicitly adverted to--, and a tacit act which, integrating the focal awareness into the subsidiary, yields a new noetic act or cognitive whole. Such an operational noetic triad may be related to San Juan's understanding of cognitive processes in that they involve not only the intellect but the two other rational powers as well, in an organic relation of interdependence and interaction. The role of memory in the cognitive process as understood by the Spanish mystic may be correlated with subsidiary awareness, the function of volition with focal awareness, and the role of intellectation with the tacit act.

In chapter IV, it was pointed out how these operations were discernible in any process of human consciousness or knowledge, including the program of intellectual asceticism which leads toward mystical communion. We should like to indicate here that the same interpretation of cognitive activities is applicable to the operations undergone by the mystic poet or mystic prose writer in his movement of search for adequate expression. In this instance as an historical reality, the subsidiary awareness or memory would be the cognition experienced in actual mystical communion, knowledge in and through the divine Logos, retained free of phantasms by the intellectual memorative power. Such recollection would combine with the habitual, diffused presence of the divine Spouse, the presence as experienced "according to the substance of the soul," to constitute a noetic field within which the subject dwelled and which was the seat of all his other activities. The object of the focal awareness or deliberative, volitional movement of the mind would be the need of other human beings to be enriched by the treasures he carried within. The tacit act or binding act of intellectation would take place as the mystic found in the sensible world of the external and internal cosmos those images which he judged to be most suitable for the elaboration of a symbolization.

In the preceding paragraph, the movement of the mystic in search for expression was looked upon as a process of cognition. However, this same movement is also a process of volition, of affectivity, of freely established directionality, as we mentioned earlier as well. The conceptualization in terms of the operational triad can also be applied to this movement seen as
an act or process of volition. One could speak of a *subsidiary* or background affective field, which in this case would be the supereminent act of Love permeating the mystic's being; a *focal* act of the will, which would be his concrete deliberation to communicate to others; and a *tacit*, binding act of choice which would enact the poietic process itself.

Throughout the first chapters of this study we spoke of the *triplex via cognoscendi* as a schema in terms of which one can look at the different stages of the ascent toward the mystical state. We traced the three modes of knowing, the *via affirmationis*, the *via negationis* and the *via supereminentiae* in three successive chapters. Focussing at present upon the "communicative descent" of the mystic, the deliberate movement toward others through which an expression is forged, we find that there is in this descent a sort of inverted *triplex via* of knowing. There is the *affirmative* way of the union itself, the transcending and ineffable experience of knowing and loving. There is subsequently the *negative* moment of confrontation with the limitations inherent in human speech. This is the stage of the unintelligible utterances, the "stammering," referred to in the Sanjuanist poetry in verses such as,

*Un no sé qué que quedan balbuciendo.*

A nameless "something" they keep stammering.

And,

*... un no sé qué*

*que se halla por ventura.*

*...a nameless "something"*

*which is found by good fortune.*

Yet this moment of powerlessness is transcended in what we can call a *supereminent* stage, in which the poet elects and orders the images which will furnish him the raw material for his symbolization.

We have thus far seen that the medieval *triplex via cognoscendi*, as well as the understanding of noetic processes in terms of the operational triad, can both be applied to the mystical ascent as well as to the subsequent descent or move toward an artistic expression. Two vastly different developments regarding human cognition, the one medieval and the other contemporary, are nevertheless found applicable. This factor points to a characteristic of Juan de la Cruz's thought we have noted before, namely, that the fundamental structure of human psychological operations remains unaltered even when mystical phenomena are involved. Here we see once more how the continuity of the operations is not broken with respect to the subject, no matter how disparate these operations may be regarding their objects.
Symbolism Based on Analogy between Creatures and God

The mystic's deliberation to express his peculiar experience entails a reconciliation to the instrumentality of the phantasm despite its inherent limitations. Human beings cannot transmit meaning to others without the utilization of sensory images, as they cannot understand meaning without the mediation of the material phantasm. In the "communicative descent" of the mystic, which in some ways is a retracing of the steps of the "ascetico-mystical ascent," there is a search for or recall of material phantasms. The mental images the mystic selects as adequate for usage in symbolization might well be, ironically, the very same ones he had previously exiled from his consciousness due to their disproportionality with the object they represented. "If as a mystic he was forced to disassociate his night and his love from any trace of the anecdotal," observes Jorge Guillén, "later as a poet he was forced to have recourse to the sternly rejected «imagination or fancy» in order to allude to the ultimately inconceivable and inexpressible indistinctions." The imagination of his readers would be appealed to or awakened by images, and the images were to be obtained from the beauties of nature and harmonies of the cosmos. Utilized as symbols in his poetry, these images would in turn evoke in some measure the existence and perfections of God as known by the mystic.

Theologians affirm that there is a fundamental relationship of analogy, that is, of simultaneous similarity and dissimilarity between creation and God, in virtue of which creatures are themselves manifestations, however remote, of God and his perfections. There are numerous texts in the Sanjuanist corpus which allude to this relationship: "...God created all things with great facility and brevity and left in them some trace of whom he was. He did so not only by giving them being out of nothing, but by further endowing them with innumerable graces and virtues, beautifying them with admirable order..." Similarly, "creatures are like a footstep of the passing of God, whereby one can trace his grandeur, power and wisdom..." And thus, "in the vivid contemplation and knowledge of creatures, the soul sees that there is in them such an abundance of graces and virtues and beauty with which God has endowed them, that it seems to her that they are all clothed with admirable natural beauty and virtue, derived from and communicated by that infinite supernatural beauty of the image of God, whose glance clothes the world and all the heavens with beauty and joy."

Images of creatures will thus be utilized as poetic symbols, whose fecundity and richness stem from Juan de la Cruz's having "come, in the deepest ontological vision of the being of things, to discover the mysterious analogies which link the beings of the material universe with the beings of the spiritual universe." Though all things are mysteriously analogical to God, our poet turns his gaze in particular to the beauties of nature and the harmonies of the cosmos. Throughout the ages man has been absorbed in wonder at the perfections discernible within said realities. And as filled with perfections yet veiled in mystery, Fray Juan finds them adequate for his artistic purpose. The mystic has first contemplated the beauty of God through nature, and later the beauty of nature through God. For the sake of his poetic creation, Juan de la Cruz descends voluntarily from the second contemplative stance to the first and assumes the vespertine vision, the vision of God through creatures, from which he will draw his images.

It is opportune to point out that the asceticism undergone by the mystic brings about as a consequence a purification and refining of the natural sensibility, much as it causes a sharpening of the intellectual power. We might recall that through the process of the dark night the subject "raises in operation the harmony of his interior senses and powers." Writing lucidly on this issue, Michel Florisoone observes that "the sensibility... purifies itself along with the
soul, and when the latter is entirely disencumbered from the unrest of its sensual passions, it will accede to the total perception of beauty."\(^{13}\) Having reached the summit of the mystical ascent, the sensitivity is likewise most perfected. At this point "the soul has purified its glance, and creation rises suddenly before it as being a beauty derived from God, an expression... of the face of God."\(^{14}\)

In dealing with Juan de la Cruz, we speak of a human being who was both sensitive temperamentally to the beauties of the cosmos, and artistically creative by nature. These predispositions were to be coupled with an ever sharpened perceptiveness to the harmonies and splendors of the universe. As a result of this felicitous combination of factors he was able to produce an artistic expression, a poetic *verbun*, amosr remarkable for its own esthetic qualities and communicative powers. He would select those things from nature which manifested greatest excellence and could be endowed with most symbolic depth. He would then utilize them as poetic symbols placed at the service of his communion with God.\(^{15}\) If the beauties of creation serve the human person, as they did Juan de la Cruz, to manifest God and elevate the soul toward him, the poetic expression of this mystic was to render the same effect, for it has become another trace of God present in our world, another "rastro del paso del Amado."

*Symbolism Based on Analogy between Two Orders of Cognition*

We have said that the images San Juan utilizes acquire their symbolic function in virtue of the fundamental analogy between creatures and God. However, there seems to be operative in his selection of images yet another principle. In chapter III, we pointed out that there are certain mysterious affinities between ordinary human knowledge and certain purely spiritual acts of knowing. This affinity leads to the positing of a set of "spiritual senses" which parallel the corporeal ones. In the second book of the *Subida*, as we indicated, a correlation is established between purely spiritual, phantasmless, intelligible communications received supernaturally and ordinary noetic acts dependent upon sensation. Juan states that these spiritual communications take place "in the manner of sight," "in the manner of hearing" or "in the manner of the other senses."\(^{16}\) Our author is here reflecting upon the relations between causes and effects in human phantasmless knowing, and he indicates similarities between these relations and those linking causes and effects in human knowing dependent upon sensation. We are still dealing with analogical relations, yet no longer with the analogy of eminence between creatures and God, but analogical relationships between two orders of human knowing.\(^{17}\)

As mentioned in chapter III, the affinity established is not between acts of two different orders such as seeing and intellecting, which admit no proper comparison. Rather, two acts of understanding are compared, one abstracted from something perceived through one or another corporeal sense, and the other infused supernaturally without phantasms. The acts compared are most disparate regarding their objects or their content, yet some affinity is found rooted in the unity of the knowing subject. The affinity, although objective, certainly remains mysterious to us, for we can only relate to one of the terms of the comparison. Thus, when confronted with the statement that Juan de la Cruz has discovered "the mysterious analogies which link the beings of the material universe with the beings of the spiritual universe,"\(^{18}\) we are led to add that these analogies entail more similarity than we can comprehend, yet are more mysterious than we could possibly imagine.
In the text from *Subida II,* 23.3 cited above, San Juan is referring to "spiritual intellectual apprehensions" ["aprehensiones intelectuales espirituales"], which do not pertain to the highest stages of the mystical union. However, the correlation between noetic acts following physical perception and spiritual knowing is extended to the higher stages. *Cántico* 14 and 15, for example, deal with the stage of the spiritual betrothal, that is, the beginning of the illuminative or contemplative state, or of the *via supereminentiae* of knowledge. In this stage the intelligible communication is general (i.e., not of a particular object) as well as relatively obscure to the noetic power. The texts indicate that in this communication several or all of the spiritual senses are active simultaneously. This reveals that here too, in the spiritual betrothal, the act of contemplation bears some comparison to noetic activity which follows upon sensation through one or another or several physical senses. The same passages also indicate that this contemplative experience varies from person to person according to which of the spiritual senses is active. On the other hand, passages explicating the highest stages of union do not make explicit correlations between particular spiritual senses and the corresponding corporeal ones. However, this does not imply that the spiritual senses are inactive in this stage. Perhaps, they are all the more active and perfectly synchronized, apprehending the one, indivisible object of knowledge and love. Something of this seems to be implied in the passage which makes reference to the "common sense of the soul:"

All these things are received and become established in this sense of the soul, which is, as I say, the virtue and capacity which the soul has to perceive, possess and savor all things. The caverns of the powers administer this to it, *just as the corporeal senses flock with the forms of their objects to the common sense of fantasy, and this sense is the receptacle and archive for them.* For which reason, *this common sense of the soul,* which has become a *receptacle* and *archive* for the grandeurs of God, is enlightened and made rich to the extent that it attains this sublime and glorious possession.

Juan de la Cruz's literary expression can be seen, as we have said before, as an accommodation of the "espiritu" to the "sentido." When our mystical author composed poetry, he did so with his faculties operating according to their ordinary state. His mystical experiences were present to him as retained in memory. We can speculate that the process of accommodation entailed a search for symbolization in which his mind moved "downward" through various memorative realms. Through this movement he was to trace those mysterious affinities existing between the higher stages of contemplation and the lower ones, and between the lower ones and our ordinary way of cognition. The point of departure would have been the recollection of the mode of cognition proper to the highest stage of contemplation, in which all the spiritual senses are enacted. The next step would have been to focus upon the stage in which supernatural communications are made via one of the spiritual senses, either "in the manner of sight," "in the manner of hearing," or "in the manner of" the other senses. This mode of apprehension would in turn have been related to the realm of noetic activity dependent upon sensation.

The search for symbolization would thus be constituted by two fundamental acts or moments. First, there would take place the isolating of one aspect of the noetic act of contemplation according to its apprehension by one or another spiritual sense. The movement would therefore be from knowing a non-particularized object, spiritually and without phantasms, "in the manner of" all the senses, to knowing the same "in the manner of" one of the senses. The second step would be the relating of this communication to cognition through the corresponding physical sense, adding simultaneously materialization and particularization. A material
image would then be chosen which engaged that particular corporeal sense in the imagination. Thus, we arrive at the stage in which verbal signs representing material images of light, sound and touch, are elected in accord with whether the symbolized spiritual reality is perceived by the mystic "in the manner of sight," "in the manner of hearing," or "in the manner of" the other senses. We can call this, if we wish, the "in the manner of" principle, the correlation being based upon real, yet mysterious affinities between the corporeal and spiritual senses.

Following this principle, God becomes symbolized under the forms of silence, music, harmony, wind, fire, flame, heat and light. It is not a question of stating that he is like a glowing fire or the whistling of the wind, for these things can only be said of him metaphorically. Rather, it is a question of founding the symbolization upon some affinity --mysterious to us-- between the intellectual acts which follow physical perception through one or several senses, and certain acts of knowing God spiritually. This operative principle seems to be applicable to the formation of the symbolization present in that section of San Juan's poetic work which represents the mystical union itself. This is not to say, however, that it is the only operative principle, for many of the images are chosen in accordance with long standing traditions.

The "Just as" or "In the Manner of" Principle

The prose commentaries to stanzas 14 and 15 of the "Cántico" are most interesting in that here we find, along with the development of the signification intended by the images, an exposition of the principle governing their very selection. Although in some instances there are multiple reasons for the utilization of a particular image, these passages reveal that one of them is a correlation between the physical sense stimulated by the poetic image and the spiritual sense activated by the aspect of the mystical communication being represented. There is a particular translucence about this text which seems to allow us to penetrate the serene, enlightened mind of Juan de la Cruz and observe him moving through worlds of noetic forms. Beginning in regions unknown to us, he descends to the realms which partake of the material, correlating one cognitive act with another, thus relating his experience to the noetic cosmos within which we move.

"Cántico" 14 and 15 present the Beloved under the forms of

...las montañas,
los valles solitarios nemorosos,
las ínsulas extrañas,
los ríos sonorosos,
el silbo de los aires amorosos;

la noche sosegada
en par de los levantes de la aurora,
lá música callada,
lá soledad sonora,
lá cena que recrea y enamora.

...the mountains,
the solitary, wooded valleys,
the singular islands,
the resounding rivers,
the whisper of amorous breezes;

the tranquil night
at the onset of the rise of dawn,
the secret music,
the sounding solitude,
the supper that refreshes and enkindles love.

In addition to the detailed exposition of what is intended by each image, the author finds it advisable to clarify some issues regarding the experience being related. He notes, first of all, that the verses refer to an act of communication of intelligibility or meaning in which the soul becomes "robed with knowledge of God" and in which "she understands secrets and alien acts of understanding of God." Secondly, he observes that the intellectual apprehension is received without phantasms directly by the passive intellect. Further, he indicates that what is here experienced is not "like seeing things in the light, or creatures in God," but rather, that "each one of these grandeurs is said to be God and all of them collectively are God." And finally, he establishes that this act of cognition is not fully clear and distinct to the intellect, as will be the beatific vision, but is simply "a powerful and copious communication and a glimpse of what God is in himself."

If one looks carefully at the lines of the two stanzas it is observable that collectively the images presented engage in the imagination all five senses. Similarly, the experience being related is described in the commentary as a state in which "the soul sees and savors abundance and inestimable riches... and perceives in God a terrible power and strength... and she tastes there a marvelous subtlety and spiritual delight, discovers true rest and divine light, and tastes sublimely the wisdom of God, which shine forth in the harmony of creatures and the works of God." In these introductory remarks, which are only a synopsis of the development that follows, several of the acts of physical sensation are either mentioned or alluded to. Of course, there is neither physical perception nor phantasms in the experience being dealt with, and a superficial reading of the text might lead one to conclude that John of the Cross is simply speaking metaphorically. However, we can take the terms used as meaning that in this state "there is knowing like the knowing which follows seeing," "there is knowing like the knowing which follows hearing," and so on, such as we have explained in chapter III and earlier in the present one. If this interpretation is valid, then there is between these terms signifying acts of perception and the experience signified a correlation which is stricter than metaphorical.

There is evidence in subsequent passages of Cantico 14-15 which points to this stricter commonality, this closer affinity between the ordinary and the extraordinary noetic acts in question. In the prose commentary corresponding to some images, the author simply relies upon the poetic image to illustrate some aspect of the mystical experience being described. In these instances no particular correlation is made explicit between the physical sense activated by the image and the corresponding spiritual sense. This is the case, for example, with the visual images of "las montañas" ["the mountains"], and "los valles solitarios nemorosos" ["the solitary, wooded valleys"]. In some other instances a passing, casual correlation is made between physical and spiritual perception. Referring to the visual image of "las islás extrañas" ["the singular islands"], it is said that "thus, on account of the great and admirable wonders and singular acts of knowledge, far removed from common cognition, which the soul sees in God, he is called here singular islands."
In other texts the parallelism is made much more explicit. Before we cite any of these passages, we should like to point out that the formula "as! como... asi..." appears frequently in them. This can be translated into English as "just as... likewise...", or "even as... similarly...". In these texts the first term, "as! como" ["just as"], is followed by terms signifying an act of perceiving something physically; and the second term, "asi" ["likewise"], is followed by terms denoting the act of cognition pertaining to this mystical union. A comparison is thus established between two acts. A qualification follows in some of the texts indicating that the similarity is between the "efecto" of the physical perception and the "efecto" of the spiritual communication. The comparison is therefore specified to be between two acts of knowing. It might also be pointed out, parenthetically, that the comparative adverbial formula "as! como" ["just as"] is quite unlike the hypothetical formula "como si" ["as if"] mentioned in the previous chapter. The "as! como" utilized numerous times in Cántico 14-15 is for all purposes the equivalent of the "a modo de" ["in the manner of"] employed in Subida II,23,3.

Returning now to the texts, let us look at the development given the verse, "en par de los levantes de la aurora" ["at the onset of the rise of dawn"]. The commentary notes that the soul "very appropriately calls this divine light the rise of dawn, which means the morning; for, just as the rising of the morning dispels the darkness of the night and reveals the light of day, likewise, this spirit which is tranquil and quiet in God is raised from the darkness of natural knowledge to the matutinal light of supernatural knowledge of God..." The verse which reads, "la cena que recrea y enamora" ["the supper that refreshes and enkindles love"], presents a gustatory and olfactory image in one. It is explicated that "by supper is understood the divine vision," a communication generously extended by the Beloved, "which is nothing other than his very own sweetness and the delights that he himself enjoys." This dimension of the experience is called "supper" because "just as the supper is the end of the day's work and the beginning of the night's rest, likewise this act of knowledge which we have called tranquil causes the soul to feel a certain end to evil things and possession of goods..." He concludes by stating that "thus, by these words the effect of the divine union is expressed..."

The passages which develop the verses containing sound images are even more explicit regarding the reasons governing their selection. Stanza 14, verse four, speaks of "los rios sonorosos" ["the resounding rivers"], which produce "a spiritual voice and resonance which surpasses every sound and voice." The "hearing" of such resonance "is like an immense interior voice and sound which invests the soul with power and fortitude." Similarly, "God is an infinite voice, and when he communicates himself to the soul in said manner, he produces upon her the effect of an immense voice." The following sentence is of great significance in that it traces the process which starts with perception and concludes with intellection, and likens it to the apprehension of the spiritual communication: "By this it is not to be understood that the soul fails to receive in its spirit the sound of the spiritual voice, whence it is to be noted that the spiritual voice is the effect that it produces in the soul, just as physical voice impresses its sound upon the ear and gives rise to the act of understanding in the spirit." We are led to understand that the spiritual communication is apprehended directly by the intellect, and then, by way of affinity, it is retrospectively associated by the author with the act of corporeal hearing and with physical sound.

"La música callada" ["the silent music"] is described as representing a "tranquil and quiet knowledge" which to the soul seems "a harmony of the most sublime music." The next verse introduces "la soledad sonora" ["the sounding solitude"], which "is almost the same thing as the silent music", for, even though that music is silent to the senses and natural powers, it is a most sounding solitude to the spiritual powers; for when these are alone and empty of all natural forms and apprehensions, they can easily receive most sonorously in the spirit the spiritual sense of the excellence of God, both in himself and in his creatures..."
The line which reads, "el silbo de los aires amorosos" ["the whisper of amorous breezes"], presents a tactile and acoustic image in one.

By amorous breezes are understood here the virtues and graces of the Beloved... And by the whisper of these breezes is meant a most sublime and delectable knowledge of God and of his virtues, which knowledge overflows into the intellect from the touch made by these virtues in the substance of the soul.

The author goes on to draw parallels between physical and spiritual touch, and between physical and spiritual hearing.

And in order that what has been said may be better understood, it must be noted that just as two things are perceived in the wind, namely, its touch and its whisper or sound, likewise in this communication of the Spouse two other things are perceived, which are feeling of delight and knowledge. And just as the touch of the wind is felt with the sense of touch and the whisper of the same wind with the sense of hearing, likewise also the touch of the virtues of the Beloved is felt and enjoyed with the sense of touch of this soul, which is in its substance, and the knowledge of such virtues of God is felt in its sense of hearing...

There follows a similar statement comparing the perception of sound to the spiritual apprehension being described: "just as the whisper which is caused by the wind enters sharply into the cavity of the ear, likewise this most subtle and delicate knowledge enters with admirable sweetness and delight into the inmost substance of the soul..."38

As the Whisper of the Wind is Heard

Sufficient texts have been cited to manifest that in the presentation of San Juan de la Cruz the mystical union as act of knowledge has different aspects or dimensions, notwithstanding the utter simplicity and indivisibility of the object. The differences among these aspects bear some resemblance to the differences among the modes of cognition which follow perception by one or another physical sense. Thus, the images which appear in the stanzas referred to, as well as the terms signifying perception utilized in their commentaries, are not exclusively based upon the analogy of eminence by which all creatures are in God simpliciter. They are also founded upon a relationship of proportionality existing between two orders of cognition exercised by one same human subject. For as perception through a specific physical sense is to the subsequent act of intellection, perception through the corresponding spiritual sense is to the ensuing mystical noetic act.

We can theorize from the preceding that in the composition of his poetry Juan de la Cruz first isolated according to one "spiritual sense," and then chose an image which would engage in the imagination the corresponding physical sense. The author moved from the "espíritu" to the "sentido" so that the reader might in turn be moved from the physically perceived reality toward the higher spiritual meanings intended. Most readers, of course, will only travel a short
distance along this road ascending from the "sentido" to the "espiritu." Another mystic of comparable attainment, however, probably would be able to grasp the full meaning of the lyrics without reference to the explanations offered by the commentaries. Other mystics are already familiar with the mysterious affinities.

The texts which make explicit this principle of selectivity of imagery are those of Cántico 14-15. The same principle could well be operative in the other stanzas dealing with the mystical union. It is worth questioning, for example, whether this principle might have played a role in the election of the central symbol of the "Llama," the flame. Exposure to fire brings about a rich and intense perceptual experience, as it can be seen, felt, heard and smelled. Perhaps, for this reason it was deemed most apt to represent the fullest phase of mystical communion, a stage in which God is described as permeating the "common sense of the soul."

Images which engage only one or two senses were used to represent the spiritual betrothal, which is a communication via one or two spiritual senses. In the "Llama," following the same pattern, a multi-sensorial image is chosen to represent a spiritual communication which engages every spiritual cognitive power. These same considerations can also be applied to the election of the symbol of the night. Fire engages many senses, which in turn gives rise to a multi-dimensional act of consciousness. The darkness of the night, conversely, engages nothing in the senses and consequently nothing in the intellect. Thus, as there is a mysterious affinity between an encounter with fire and the highest act of contemplation, there is a comparable one between the effect of darkness upon the noetic power and the absence of cognition characterizing various stages of the ascent.

No doubt there were other considerations present in the construction of San Juan's poetic symbolism, but these need not be exclusive of the ones we have discussed here. This mode of selecting imagery evidences once more John of the Cross' comprehensive approach to the human psyche. Man is understood to be equipped with corporeal senses paralleled by spiritual ones, all of which conduct to the center of his being, wherein he knows and loves. Man is understood as capable of the most disparate noetic and volitional acts, while always being himself, always the same subject, always the master of his freely chosen acts. Juan de la Cruz never lost sight of man as a totum, as an incarnate reality. It is precisely this approach which allows him to communicate something of his fully spiritual and most mysterious ventures to the rest of mankind. He does so by establishing links between those experiences and others of our ordinary lives, based upon the elements common to them both, human consciousness and human affectivity.

In chapters IV, V, and VI, we insisted upon a fundamental disproportionality between our ordinary acts of cognition and the mystical union as noetic act. It is appropriate to recall here that the disproportionality pertains to the objects grasped by the intellectual power, whereas the affinities brought to light in this chapter are based upon the subject knowing. The objects of the intellectual power, as we saw, can be either material, spiritual-particular or spiritual-general. In the first instance, cognition takes place by means of phantasms; in the last two, cognition is phantasmless, which makes this knowledge disproportionate to ordinary experience both by reason of its object and by reason of its form. However, forms of cognition, and corresponding noetic acts, bear a relation both to the object apprehended and to the subject apprehending. Thus one may distinguish diverse modes of cognition following perception through each of the senses, and this applies to ordinary as well as to purely spiritual intellection. These modes of knowing, inasmuch as they are rooted in the ontological structure of the subject --in the corporeal senses and in something analogous on another level termed the spiritual senses--, bear some mysterious affinities and differences among themselves which cross the barriers separating ordinary from purely spiritual cognition.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. "...me podrás creer que quisiera que este libro, como hijo del entendimiento, fuera el más gallardo y más discreto que pudiera imaginarse. Pero no he podido yo contravenir el orden de la naturaleza; que en ella cada cosa engendra su semejante. Y así ¿qué podra engendrar el estéril y mal cultivado ingenio mío...?" *Don Quijote de la Mancha*, edited by Martín de Riquer (Barcelona: Editorial Juventud, 1968), p. 19.

2. "...les ressources les plus profondes de la personnalité; si celle-ci se trouve être d'un saint, la poésie en portera forcément la marque." Milner, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

3. "San Juan de la Cruz is the one who realizes absolutely the type of poet Baudelaire was to dream of three centuries later: «like a perfect chemist and a sainted soul» (*Comme un parfait chimiste et comme une âme sainte*). San Juan de la Cruz is precisely that, a sainted soul and a perfect chemist. Saint and poet: the twofold authority makes itself felt in each one of his verses, which are among the best, perhaps the best, in the Spanish language.

Entremos más adentro en la espesura.

Let us enter deeper into the thicket.

When has there been so happy a fusion of soul and art? San Juan de la Cruz achieves a poetry that is everything: illumination and perfection." Guillén, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-121. The line from Baudelaire is from *Les fleurs du mal* (Paris: José Corti, 1942), "Ebauche d'un Epilogue pour la deuxieme edition," p. 216.

3. "But poetry never came to be his principal task; it was something extra, overflowing from a life consecrated to religious zeal, the true name for which is none other than «sainthood». The highest pinnacle in Spanish poetry is reached not by an artist who is principally an artist, but by a saint, who ascends to this height by his most rigorous road to perfection." Guillén, *op. cit.*, p. 80.


"El Cántico denuncia que junto a esa inteligencia [de San Juan de la Cruz] fulguraba una fantasía fresca y exuberante, cargada de colores y galas orientales: fantasía que recoge todas las bellezas de la creación visible en prados, montes y riberas, noches y amaneceres, aguas y silbos amorosos, ciervos vulnerados y blancas palomas, ríos y viñedos, flores mañaneras y cuevas de leones, llamas y pastores, oteros y majadas, abismos y ventalle de cedros, manzanos y campos de azucenas, para tejer con hilos de luz el manto nupcial de la bella esposa enamorada.

"Y al fin, la explosión en la Llama de amor viva, donde todo —ideas, imágenes, y palabras— parece incandescente. La pluma no hace más que remover ascuas, provocando lla-
maradas. Todas las criaturas aparecen bañadas en la luz de unas lámparas de fuego que iluminan hasta las más profundas cavernas del sentido. El corazón del Santo, incandescente ya por la llama eterna, va dejando un rastro de luz y color que no se borrará nunca...

"Así fue San Juan de la Cruz,... Fue reformador y maestro, santo, y doctor, y poeta. Sus pies descalzos, que no pisaron más que espinas, hicieron florecer su camino en pos de él; y sus labios, que gustaron tantas hieles, no exhalaron más que poesía." Crisógono, Vida de San Juan de la Cruz, p. 355.

5. See, for example, Baruzi, op. cit., p. 330. Also, see Gabriel Celaya, who is led to the conclusion that "este retorno místico hace posible entre otras cosas el que San Juan de la Cruz escriba sus versos." Op. cit., 179.

Along the same line of thought, Jorge Guillén observes that in John of the Cross "this inner life gives rise to the most lofty affirmation of the world and its creatures; and humbly taking the ineffability of experience as its point of departure, San Juan achieves one of man's greatest triumphs over language." op. cit., pp. 119-120.

The preceding is a felicitously formulated statement on San Juan's stance toward the world and things. Behind this acute insight by one outstanding Castilian poet into the mind of another, there is a background of commonality. Not unlike San Juan, Guillén has appreciated profoundly the goodness of existence and the perfections inherent in creation and things. It is thus that the entire body of his poetic work constitutes a vigorous affirmation and celebration of created existence; an analogue, we might say, of Fray Juan's poetic ecstatic exultation of the same world and the same human nature as redeemed and transfigured by grace.

6. Chapter IV, pp. 65-70 and corresponding notes.

7. "Cántico" 7, and refrain of poem number 11, entitled "Glosas a lo divino."

8. He continues: "By means of this contradiction San Juan was able to make the transition from his life to his poetry. The mystic relegated to the category of possessions of the senses that «interior fabric of the imaginative discourse» that is to be the fabric of the poem. Oh ninfas de Judea, «Oh nymphs of Judea!» exclaims the saint in one verse of the Spiritual Canticle. What do these historically hybrid women signify? «By Judea she means the lower part of the soul, which is that of the senses.... And by nymphs she means all the imaginations, fancies and motions and affections of this lower part», he explains in the commentary. Although the saint shut these nymphs outside, «in the outskirts» —«And do not dare to pass across our threshold», -- the poet calls out from the threshold to the creatures thus rejected; and, thanks to them, the verse comes into being. In the verse there «finds a foothold» what is referred to in the Flame with stern disdain as el gitano del sentido, «the Egyptian of sense», which is another way of saying «the gypsy of sense». Just what can the degree of mysticism be of a work that has been forcibly «gypsified»? Op. cit., pp. 102-103. References are to C,18,4 and L,3,38.

9. "...Dios crió todas las cosas con gran facilidad y brevedad y en ellas dejó algún rastro de quien Él era, no sólo dándoles el ser de nada, mas aun dotándoles de innumerables gracias y virtudes, hermoséándolas con admirable orden..." C,S,1. "...las criaturas son como un rastro del paso de Dios, por el cual se rastrea su grandeza, potencia y sabiduría..." Ibid., 3. "...las criaturas dieron al alma señas de su Amado mostrándole en sí rastro de su hermosura y excelencia..." C,6,2.

10. "...en la viva contemplación y conocimiento de las criaturas, echa de ver el alma haber en ellas tanta abundancia de gracias y virtudes y hermosura de que Dios las dotó, que le
parece estar todas vestidas de admirable hermosura y virtud natural, sobrederivada y comunica-
dera de aquella infinita hermosura sobrenatural de la figura de Dios, cuyo mirar viste de her-
mosura y alegría el mundo y a todos los cielos.... Y, por tanto, llegada el alma en amor por
eso rastro que ha conocido de las criaturas de la hermosura de su Amado, con ansias de ver
aquella invisible hermosura que esta visible hermosura causó, dice la siguiente canción." C, 6,1. "....comienza a caminar [el alma] por la consideración y conocimiento de las criaturas al
conocimiento de su Amado, Criador ellas; porque, después de el ejercicio del conocimiento
propio, esta consideración de las criaturas es la primera por orden en este camino espiritual
para ir conociendo a Dios, considerando su grandeza y excelencia por ellas, según aquello del
Apóstol, que dice: Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta,
conspiciuntur; que es como si dijera: Las cosas de Dios, de el alma son conocidas por las co-
sas visibles criadas e invisibles (Rom 1,20)." C,4,1. Aside from the texts which stress the ex-
emplarism and dependence which unite creatures to their eternal models, there are in Juan de
la Cruz passages which safeguard the ontologically substantial differences between God and
creation. This issue was discussed previously in chapter IV, note 50.

11. "...ha llegado, ella visión ontológica más honda del ser de las cosas, a descubrir
las misteriosas analogías que ligan los seres del universo material con los seres del universo
espiritual." Urbina, op. cit., pp. 17-18. Stanzas 14 and 15 of the "Cántico," for example, con-
tain a number of images representing valleys, mountains, rivers, islands. It is explained that
"por ser Dios todas las cosas al alma y el bien de todas ellas, se declara la comunicació
de este exceso por la semejanza de la bondad de las cosas en las dichas canciones.... En lo cual se
da a entender que todo lo que aquí se declara está en Dios eminentemente en infinita
manera...." C,14-15,5.

The particular type of analogy which links creatures and God is called analogy of
eminence in the vocabulary of Thomistic thinkers. The characteristics of this type of analogy
are analyzed in Summa Theologiae I,13,6c. Fernando Urbina remarks that when reading San
Juan, one must "valerse del hilo conductor de la analogía mística, es decir, de esas analogías
que usa el místico al valerse de palabras significativas de experiencias ordinarias --las palabras
únicas que el lenguaje dispone-- para significar sus experiencias extraordinarias. Dichas analo-
gías, como veremos, tienen un fundamento real: la relación de eminencia entre el ser des-
236. Only the mystic "tiene juntos en su espíritu los dos términos: el contenido místico y el
lenguaje de la experiencia ordinaria. Pues bien; él de hecho expresa el contenido místico me-
diante el lenguaje. Aun teniendo en cuenta de que lo último y peculiar de este contenido queda
sin expresar para aquel que no haya tenido la experiencia... sin embargo, él expresará de he-
cho este contenido valiéndose del lenguaje directo (estilo metafísico) o indirecto y simbólico
(estilo poético). Al hacerlo así es que tiene conciencia de la posibilidad de una expresión rela-
tiva de dicho contenido.... A esta semejanza llamamos «analogía mística». Es, en efecto, una
relación que existe entre dos seres de estructura diferente. Según la definición tomista de Ana-
logía: relación intrínseca de proporción entre dos seres de estructura diferente: simpliciter
diversa, secundum quid similia." Ibid., p. 243.

The relation of analogy which the mystic poet utilizes as a basis upon which to
build his symbolization "responde a una verdadera relación ontológica que descubre el místico
entre el ser percibido en su experiencia interior y las cosas de la naturaleza.... Esta analogía
es, pues, una analogía de eminencia. El carácter ontológico de la analogía entre el ser des-
cubierto por la experiencia mística es una relación de eminencia analógica: «la bondad de las
cosas está contenida en Dios eminentemente». Ahora bien, dicha analogía de eminencia es dis-
tinta de la via eminentiae de la Teología natural. En la Teología natural la via eminentiae es
una operación de la actividad racional de la inteligencia por la cual, una vez captada la esencia
de una perfección, se prescinde de las imperfecciones adheridas a esta esencia por su manera
de estar en las criaturas y se la considera en toda su plenitud. En la mística la analogía de eminencia es un simple acto del espíritu por el cual descubre cómo el ser intuido en la experiencia mística contiene eminentemente las bondades y perfecciones de los seres conocidos en la experiencia ordinaria. En la Teología natural se trata de la *via ascensus*, por la cual el entendimiento de un hombre sumido en las condiciones temporales de este mundo procura trabajosamente, partiendo de las cosas que experimenta, hacerse una idea analógica de un ser que no experimenta. Mientras que en la mística es más bien un movimiento inverso, *via descensus*: el místico que ha experimentado (aunque no con plena claridad) el ser inefable encuentra contenidas en él, eminentemente perfeccionadas, las cosas que le permitirían expresar su experiencia mística por medio de la palabra analógica." *Ibid.*, pp. 249-252.

12. "...alza de obra la armonía de los sentidos y potencias interiores." *M*, 14, 1.

13. "...la sensibilidad... s'énepure en mème temps que l’âme, et quand elle sera entièrement débarrassée de tous les troubles des passions sensuelles, elle accédera à la totale perception de la beauté." *Op. cit.*, p. 139. In the words of another commentator: "Y como la belleza no se percibe más que con el entendimiento, para comprenderla es necesario la purgación de la inteligencia por la muerte del apetito.... Por eso el primer libro de la *Subida*, que enseña a mortificarlo, es todo un tratado de preparación estética, que expone el arte de limpiar aquel ojo del alma por el cual se ve la hermosura.... Pudiera decirse que el misticismo de san Juan de la Cruz es esencialmente estético. Hasta aquella parte de su doctrina, que parece matar el sentimiento de la hermosura, es una excelente disposición para conocerla.... Por eso cuando el alma ha logrado purificarse de la herrumbre de los vicios y ha reprimido el desordenado movimiento de las pasiones, llegando a tal pureza que el ojo del espíritu está simple y sencillo, apto para ver la belleza de las criaturas sin que se le pegue nada del lodo que puede haber en ellas, san Juan de la Cruz no sólo permite al hombre la casta contemplación de las bellezas naturales, es él quien le pone obligación de hacerlo.... Purificados los ojos del alma, entrará la belleza por ellos como una luz plácida, difusa, que baña al espíritu en gloria." Crisógono, *San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica*..., 2:50-54.

14. "...l’âme a purifié son regard, et la création se lève tout à coup devant elle comme étant une beauté de Dieu, une expression... de la face de Dieu." Florisone, *op. cit.*, p. 32. "...en retour, c’est la beauté spirituelle qui révèlera à l’homme devenu spirituel la véritable beauté physique qu’il percevra enfin dans son authenticité de création divine, tout en acquérant la claire conscience de la beauté de Dieu. Tant que la beauté des créatures n’aura été perçue que dans son contour, dans son volume, dans sa masse et dans son espace, on peut dire que, comparée à l’infinie beauté de Dieu, elle est de la plus grande laideur, d’une extrême difformité et mal proportionnée (S1,4,4). Ou plutôt, c’est ainsi qu’elle devrait apparaître à nos yeux de pécheurs non purifiés si nous avions la moindre idée de la beauté de Dieu. Mais dès que nous aurons trouvé la beauté de Dieu, dès que nous aurons été transformés en elle, alors, du même coup, nos paupières seront dessillées et nous verrons la nature. En ce sens, la *Montée du Carmel* nous enseigne le meilleur moyen pour conquérir la beauté, aussi bien humaine et naturelle que divine, car, à mesure que nous gravirons l’étroit chemin escarpé, l’oeil de notre sensibilité se lavera et se clarifiera en même temps que l’œil de l’âme s’épurera. Du haut du mont, il contemplera la nature, faite d’abord excellente par Dieu, puis totalement «revêtue de beauté et dignité» par l’Incarnation et la Résurrection de son Fils (C,5,4), et l’âme lui apprendra à voir clairement «l’admirable beauté naturelle» des créatures (C,6,1). Et le poète du *Cantique Spirituel* ne se lassera jamais, nous l’avons vu, d’adorer, d’observer, d’analyser la création dans sa réalité précise dont il sait la grâce et reconnaît les vertus, mais où son âme voit aussi, et d’abord le reflet du visage de l’Époux: «D’un reflet de son visage, il les laissa tout revêtus de beauté». Saint Jean de la Croix ne sépare jamais ces deux beautés, la beauté de Dieu et la beauté des créatures." *Ibid.*, pp. 163-164.

16. "...a modo de ver... a modo de oír... a modo de los demás sentidos..." SII,23,3. See above, pp. 40-41, 113, 123-124 and chapter IV, note 90.

17. This second type of analogy is called by students of Aquinas analogy of proper proportionality, and is discussed by St. Thomas in De Veritate 2,llc. It is a four-term analogy, usually taking the form of a proposition (schematically expressed as A:B :: C:D) which states that a perfection found in one analogate is similarly but proportionately found in another analogate. An example given by Aquinas is the following proportion: as vision is to the power of sight, so simple apprehension is to the power of intellect. Much has been written on the various types of analogy and their pertinence to different problems in philosophy and theology. Among many others, B. Montagnes, op. cit.; and James F. Anderson, The Bond of Being (New York: Greenwood Press, 1967), pp. 3-20. See also, Leo Sweeney, A Metaphysics of Authentic Existentialism (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965). This author discusses how the analogy of eminence "is truly a situation of similarity/diversity, but one in which diversity is almost maximal, similarity minimal." The analogy of proportionality, on the other hand, which is generally between creatures, "is another situation of similarity/diversity, but one in which neither diversity nor similarity is extreme." See pp. 144-145. Also, see p. 183 for a summary of the different types of analogy.

18. See above, note 11.

19. C,14-15,4 and the following paragraphs.


21. "Todas las cuales cosas se reciben y asientan en este sentido de el alma, que, como digo, es la virtud y capacidad que tiene el alma para sentillo, poseello y gustallo todo, administrándoselo las cavernas de las potencias, así como al sentido común de la fantasia acuden con las formas de sus objetos los sentidos corporales, y él es receptáculo y archivo de ellas; por lo cual este sentido común del alma, que está hecho receptáculo y archivo de las grandezas de Dios, está tan ilustrado y tan rico, cuanto alcanza de esta alta y esclarecida posesión." L,3,69. Emphasis ours.

22. For a more detailed development of this issue, see E. Wilhelmsen, "San Juan de la Cruz: «percepción» espiritual e imagen poética," p. 300ff.

23. "...vistiéndola de conocimiento de Dios..." C,14-15,2. "...entiende secretos e inteligencias de Dios extrañas." Ibid., 4. The same point is reiterated throughout the chapter. "Y así, por las grandes y admirables novedades y noticias extrañas alejadas del conocimiento común que ve el alma en Dios, le llama insulas extrañas." Ibid., 8. "Y al silbo de estos aires llama una subidísima y sabrosísima inteligencia de Dios y de sus virtudes, la cual redunda en el entendimiento..." Ibid., 12. "...la inteligencia de las tales virtudes de Dios se sienten en el oído del alma, que es el entendimiento." Ibid., 13. "...se le comunican las virtudes del Amado
en él, de lo cual se deriva en el entendimiento el silbo de la inteligencia." *Ibid.*, 14. "Este divino silbo que entra por el oído del alma, no solamente es sustancia (como he dicho) entendida, sino también descubrimiento de verdades de la Divinidad y revelación de secretos suyos ocultos.... Porque así como la fe, como también nos dice san Pablo, *es por el oído* (*Rom 10, 17*) corporal, así también lo que nos dice la fe, que es la sustancia entendida, es por el oído espiritual.... En lo cual se da claro a entender que el oíllo con el oído de el alma es verlo con el ojo del entendimiento pasivo que dijimos.... Luego este ofr de el alma es ver con el entendimiento." *Ibid.*, 15. "....el susurro significa aquella comunicación y toque de virtudes de donde se comunica al entendimiento la dicha sustancia entendida.... [A]sf como al tiempo que se van a dormir los hombres les suele oprimir y atemorizar una visión que llaman pesadilla, la cual les acaece entre el sueño y la vigilia, que es en aquel punto que comienza el sueño, así al tiempo de este traspaso espiritual entre el sueño de la ignorancia natural y la vigilía del conocimiento sobrenatural, que es el principio del arrobamiento o éxtasis, le hace temor y temblor la visión espiritual que entonces se les comunica." *Ibid.*, 18. "...este esf'ritu sosegado y quieto en Dios es levantado de las tinieblas del conocimiento natural a la luz matutinal del conocimiento sobrenatural de Dios..... *Ibid.*, 23. "En aquel sosiego y silencio de la noche ya dicha y en aquella noticia de la luz divina echa de ver el alma una admirable conveniencia y disposición de la Sabiduría en las diferencias de todas sus criaturas y obras.... Y llama a esta música *callada*, porque (como habemos dicho) es inteligencia sosegada y quiet..." *Ibid.*, 25. "...la cual fue en esf'ritu y no de cítaras materiales, sino cierto conocimiento de las alabanzas de los bienaventurados que cada uno en su manera de gloria hace a Dios continuamente...."


25. By means of the images in these stanzas, "dice la esposa que todas estas cosas es su Amado en su, y lo es para ella; porque en lo que Dios suele comunicar en semejantes excesos siente el alma y conoce la verdad de aquel dicho que dijo san Francisco, es a saber: ¡Dios mío y todas las cosas! De donde, por ser Dios todas las cosas al alma y el bien de todas ellas, se declara la comunicación de este exceso por la semejanza de la bondad de las cosas en las dichas canciones, según en cada verso dellas se irá declarando. En lo cual se ha de entender que todo lo que aquí se declara está en Dios eminentemente en infinita manera, o, por mejor decir, *cada una de estas grandezas que se dicen es Dios* y todas ellas juntas son Dios.... Y así no se ha de entender que lo que aquí se dice que siente el alma es como ver las cosas en la luz o las criaturas en Dios, sino que en aquella posesión siente serle todas las cosas Dios." *Ibid.*, 5. Emphasis added.

26. "Y tampoco se ha de entender que, porque el alma siente tan subidamente de Dios en lo que vamos diciendo, ve a Dios esencial y claramente; que no es sino una fuerte y copiosa comunicación y vislumbre de lo que El es en su;..." *Ibid.*, 5. "Y no se ha de entender que esto que el alma entiende, porque sea sustancia desnuda (como habemos dicho), sea la perfecta y clara fruición como en el cielo, porque, aunque es desnuda de accidentes, no es por eso clara, sino oscura, porque es contemplación, la cual en esta vida, como dice san Dionisio, *es rayo de tiniebla*; y así podemos decir que es un rayo de imagen de fruición, por cuanto es en el entendimiento, en que consiste la fruición." *Ibid.*, 16. "En este sueño espiritual que el alma tiene en el pecho de su Amado, posee y gusta todo el sosiego y descanso y quietud de la pacífica noche, y recibe juntamente en Dios una abisal y oscura inteligencia divina." *Ibid.*, 22. "...este
espiritu sosegado y quieto en Dios es levantado de las tinieblas del conocimiento natural a la luz matutinal del conocimiento sobrenatural de Dios, no claro, sino (como dicho es) escuro, como noche en par de los levantones ni del todo es noche ni del todo es día, sino, como dicen, entre dos luces, así esta soledad y sosiego divino, ni con toda claridad es informado de la luz divina ni deja de participar algo della.\textit{Ibid.}, 23.

27. "Ve el alma y gusta en esta divina unión abundancia y riquezas inestimables... y siente en Dios un terrible poder y fuerza... y gusta allí admirable suavidad y deleite de espíritu, halla verdadero sosiego y luz divina y gusta altamente de la sabiduría de Dios, que en la armonía de las criaturas y hechos de Dios relucen." \textit{Ibid.}, 4. Emphasis ours.


29. "...así, por las grandes y admirables novedades y noticias extrañas alegadas del conocimiento común que el alma Ve en Dios, le llama \textit{insulas extrañas}." \textit{Ibid.}, 8. The emphasis on "ve" is ours. Other emphases are by the Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos editor. In texts cited throughout the rest of the present chapter, we have similarly placed emphasis on certain key terms pertinent to the issues being discussed. Throughout, emphasis placed on Juan de la Cruz's citations of Scripture or his own poetry are by the B.A.C. editor.

30. See chapter VI, p. 160.

31. "...llama bien propiamente aquí a esta luz divina \textit{levantes de la aurora}, que quiere decir la mañana, porque, así como los levantes de la mañana despiden la escuridad de la noche y descubren la luz del día, así este espíritu sosegado y quieto en Dios es levantado de las tinieblas del conocimiento natural a la luz matutinal del conocimiento sobrenatural de Dios..." \textit{Ibid.}, 23. Similarly: "...esta noche sosegada dice que es, no de manera que sea como escura noche, sino como la noche junto ya a los levantes de la aurora, id est, compareja con los levantes.... porque \textit{así como} la noche en par de los levantes ni del todo es noche ni del todo es día, sino, como dicen, entre dos luces, así esta soledad y sosiego divino, ni con toda claridad es informado de la luz divina ni deja de participar algo della." The comparison is sustained in the text immediately following: "En este sosiego se ve el entendimiento levantado con extraña novedad sobre todo natural entender a la divina luz, bien \textit{así como} el que, después de un largo sueño, abre los ojos a la luz que no esperaba." \textit{Ibid.}, 23 and 24.

32. "...\textit{cena} se entiende por la visión divina..." \textit{Ibid.}, 28. "...la cual no es otra cosa sino su propio sabor y deleite de que el mismo goza..." \textit{Ibid.}, 29. "...así como la cena es remate del día y principio del descanso de la noche, \textit{así} esta noticia que habemos dicho sosegada le hace sentir al alma cierto fin de males y posesión de bienes..." \textit{Ibid.}, 28. "Y así, en estas palabras se da a entender el efecto de la divina unión..." \textit{Ibid.}, 29.

33. "...un ruido y voz espiritual que es sobre todo sonido y \textit{voz}..." \textit{Ibid.}, 9.

34. "...\textit{es como} una voz y sonido inmenso interior que viste el alma de poder y fortaleza.... Dios es voz infinita y, comunicándose al alma en la dicha manera, hácele efecto de inmensa voz." \textit{Ibid.}, 10.
35. "Y no por eso se ha de entender que deja el alma de recibir el sonido de la voz espiritual en el espíritu, donde es de notar que la voz espiritual es el efecto que hace en el alma, así como la corporal imprime su sonido en el oído, y la inteligencia en el espíritu." Ibid., 10.

"Esta voz oyó san Juan en el Apocalipsis, y dice que la voz que oyó del cielo erat tamquam vocem aquarum multarum et tamquam vocem tonitru magni; quiere decir que era la voz que oyó como voz de muchas aguas y como voz de un grande trueno (14,2). Y por que no se entiende que esta voz, por ser tan grande, era pesada y áspera, añade luego, diciendo que esta misma voz era tan suave, que erat sicut citharoedorum citharizantium in citharis suis; que quiere decir: Era como de muchos tañedores que citarizaban en sus cítaras (ibid.). Y Ezequiel dice que este sonido como de muchas aguas era quasi sonum sublimis Dei; es a saber, como sonido del Altísimo Dios (1,24); esto es, que altísima y suavísimamente se comunicaba en él esta voz infinita; porque (como decíamos) es el mismo Dios que se comunica haciendo voz en el alma --mas cíñese a cada alma dando voz de virtud según le cuadra limitadamente--, y hace gran deleite y grandezza al alma; y por eso dijo a la esposa en los Cantares: Sonet vox tua in auribus meis, voz enim tua dulcis; que quiere decir: Suene tu voz en mis oídos, porque es dulce tu voz (2,14)." Ibid., 11.

36. "En aquel sosiego y silencio de la noche ya dicha y en aquella noticia de la luz divina echa de ver el alma una admirable conveniencia y disposición de la Sabiduría en las diferencias de todas sus criaturas y obras, todas ellas y cada una dellas dotadas con cierta correspondencia a Dios, en que cada una en su manera dé su voz de lo que en ella es Dios; de suerte que le parece una armonía de música subísimas, que sobrepusa todos saraoys y melodías del mundo. Y llama a esta música callada, porque (como habemos dicho) es inteligencia sosegada y quieta, sin ruido de voces, y así se goza en ella la suavidad de la música y la quietud del silencio; y así dice que su Amado es esta música callada, porque en él se conoce y gusta esta armonía de música espiritual." Ibid., 25.

The majority of the texts making these correlations are in Cántico 14-15. However, an exception to this rule is a passage of Cántico 39 which we should like to point out. Commenting on the verse which reads, "el canto de la dulce filomena," it is stated: "Lo que nace en el alma de aquel aspirar del aire es la dulce voz de su Amado a ella, en la cual ella hace a él su sabrosa jubilación; y lo uno y lo otro llama aquí canto de filomena; porque, así como el canto de filomena, que es el ruiseñor, se oye en la primavera pasados ya los fríos, lluvias y variedades del invierno, y hace melodía al oído, y al espíritu recreación, así en esta actual comunicación y transformación de amor que tiene ya la esposa en esta vida, amparada ya y libre de todas las turbaciones y variedades temporales, y desnuda y purgada de las imperfecciones, penalidades y nieblas así del sentido como de el espíritu, siente nueva primavera en libertad y anchura y alegria de espíritu, en la cual siente la dulce voz del Esposo, que es su dulce filomena."  C,39,8. Notice, again, the "así como... así..."
38. "Por los aires amorosos se entienden aquí las virtudes y gracias del Amado.... Y al silbo de estos aires llama una subídísima y sabrosísima inteligencia de Dios y de sus virtudes, la cual redunda en el entendimiento del toque que hacen estas virtudes de Dios en la sustancia del alma.... Y para que mejor se entienda lo dicho, es de notar que, ast como en el aire se sienten dos cosas, que son toque y silbo o sonido, ast en esta comunicación del Esposó se sienten otras dos cosas, que son sentimiento de deleite e inteligencia; y ast como el toque del aire se gusta en el sentido del tacto y el silbo del mismo aire con el oído, ast también el toque de las virtudes de el Amado se sienten y gozan con el tacto de esta alma, que es en la sustancia de ella, y la inteligencia en las tales virtudes de Dios se sienten en el oído del alma..." Ibid., 12-13. "...ast como el silbo del aire causado se entra agudamente en el vasiello del oído, ast esta sutilísima y delicada inteligencia se entra con admirable sabor y deleite en lo íntimo de la sustancia del alma..." Ibid., 14.

As mentioned briefly in chapter IV, note 90, Juan de la Cruz's texts reveal a hierarchy among the physical senses which is paralleled by an identical one among the spiritual senses. In our author's thought the sense of hearing seems to be the highest in both orders. "...así como el toque del aire se gusta en el sentido del tacto y el silbo del mismo aire con el oído, así también el toque de las virtudes de el Amado se sienten y gozan con el tacto de esta alma, que es la sustancia della, y la inteligencia de las tales virtudes de Dios se sienten en el oído del alma, que es el entendimiento. Y es de saber que entonces se dice venir el aire amoroso cuando sabrosamente hiere, satisfaciendo el apetito del que deseaba el tal refrigerio, porque entonces se regala y recrea el sentido del tacto, y con este regalo del tacto siente el oído gran regalo y deleite en el sonido y silbo del aire, mucho más que el tacto en el toque del aire; porque el sentido del oído es más espiritual, o, por mejor decir, allégase más a lo espiritual que el tacto, y ast el deleite que causa es más espiritual que el que causa el tacto." Ibid., 13. The communication signified by "el silbo de los aires amorosos" penetrates "con admirable sabor y deleite en lo íntimo de la sustancia del alma, que es muy mayor deleite que todos los demás. La causa es porque se le da sustancia entendida y desnuda de accidentes y fantasmas... lo cual es el principal deleite del alma, porque es en el entendimiento en que consiste la fruición (como dicen los teólogos) que es ver a Dios.... Y así es muy alto y cierto esto que se dice comunicar Dios por el oído.... Porque así como la fe, como también dice san Pablo, es por el oído (Rom 10,17) corporal, así también lo que nos dice la fe, que es la sustancia entendida, es por el oído espiritual.... Luego este oír de el alma es ver con el entendimiento." Ibid., 14 and 15.

One should note that not only is there the same hierarchy in both orders of senses, but also that the higher the sense is the higher the depth of understanding which follows perception by that sense. In the spiritual realm all "perceptions" are acts of knowing, yet we are led to understand that there is something more revelatory, more intelligible, more diaphanous to the intellectual power when the higher spiritual senses are activated. A consequence of this more extensive and intensive cognition related to the hierarchy among the senses, is a proportionate increase in delight or joy. Regarding this preeminent place given the sense of hearing on the scale, we should remember that our author is dealing with man as he operates in his ordinary condition, and in mystical union. He is not dealing with the beatific vision, where spiritual sight is granted the full, clear vision of the divine essence. Authors who have treated the subject of the spiritual senses in Juan de la Cruz are Urbina, op. cit., pp. 255-265, and Florissoone, op. cit., pp. 139-141.

39. "...sentido común del alma..." L,3,69.
CHAPTER VIII

BEAUTY AND TRUTH, OR THE POETRY AND THE PROSE

Having devoted our attention in the two previous chapters to the process of creating an expression from the standpoint of the author, in the present chapter we shall look at the communicative powers of this verbal expression with respect to the reader. Since Juan de la Cruz utilized the genres of both poetry and prose, we shall examine the particular abilities of each to communicate mystical experiences. It is essential to note initially that only another mystic can fully understand either the prose or the poetry, a fact Juan de la Cruz reminds his readers of numerous times. Yet it is also important to realize that among his immediate audience there were many mystics, such as Ana de Jesús, the Carmelite nun to whom the *Cántico espiritual* was dedicated. These persons could relate to what was intended by possessing in memory a field of experiences similar to that of the author. The mystical experiences they had undergone always stood ready to be resuscitated by reading, hearing or seeing something which represented them.

Whether a communication be between God and man or between man and other men, it is a constant that "that which is received is received according to the mode of the receiver." It is the mystic who makes the most fitting reader of the writings of mystical authors, for in these persons the potentiality to know and love supernaturally has been actualized. Thus, when these experiences are referred to they can assimilate the full meaning intended. The effect of the same texts upon non-mystics will vary immensely from one subject to another, yet in all instances it will be lacking with respect to the effect upon a mystic. A person's ability to receive the meaning a mystical author wishes to convey will depend upon factors such as his or her natural sensitivity, affective state, as well as his or her cultural and literary formation. The almost infinite number of possible combinations of said variants accounts for an equally endless variety of responses and reactions to the same piece of poetry or prose. This is essentially no different than what was stated earlier in chapter IV, where we discussed how knowledge is always conditioned by the knower. The character of this conditioning is determined, as we pointed out, by the person's entire past as made present to him by memory, and by his future orientation as a willfully self-structured projection. In chapter IV, we were referring primarily to the saint in his mystical ascent toward God. Nevertheless, the same principle of comprehension and response is active in the reader who turns to the poems of Juan de la Cruz, as it is in us as we read any piece of prose or poetry, and in all men as they acquire knowledge in their daily lives.

It can therefore be generalized that upon reading the texts of John of the Cross the experience of the reader will be an echo of that of the author to the degree to which he or she is one in spirit with him. That is, to the degree that there are affinities of character, formation or orientation between the two subjects. A mystic will not only comprehend the meaning most fully, but further, by abandoning himself to the memories evoked by the reading he might even be uplifted into rapture. This sort of phenomenon is common in the biographies of the mystics. At the opposite end of the scale, the same reading or hearing would communicate nothing to a person either unusually insensitive or totally uninterested, which individual would be left completely unmoved. Between the two extremes, there are multitudinous intermediary modes of receptivity and response.
We do not intend to insinuate that the understanding yielded by reading the Sanjuanist texts is simply a matter of "more" or "less" according to greater or lesser affinity with the author. As mentioned above, many elements pertaining to the psyche come into play as variants, resulting in affinities and disparities which are diverse in quantity as well as in quality. Thus, given a certain combination of factors which includes natural aptitudes, a particular reader might be tremendously receptive to the created beauty of the Sanjuanist poetry. This seems to be the case, for example, with literary critic Dámaso Alonso, whose comments upon San Juan's lyrics bespeak an intense appreciation of their beauty, an appreciation rooted in a sensitivity to the harmonies in the physical world of sight and sound which seems to far surpass the mean. Much the same can be said for those individual who have a particular ability to relate to and interpret a certain dimension of John of the Cross' thought or style. Going from the writings of one lucid commentator to another can be, in fact, like assembling a mosaic of what was the original, living, rich mind of Juan de la Cruz.

Receptivity and response vary greatly in type and intensity, therefore, from subject to subject. Among the almost infinite possibilities, there is only one sharp dividing line to be recognized, and that is between non-mystic and mystic readers. Among the former, the understanding yielded by such readings always pertains to that which we have called the noetic via affirmationis. The resulting cognition will always be in terms of creatures, which is then applicable to mystical communion with God only by analogy. The non-mystic's potentiality for any higher mode of knowing has not yet been actualized. For the mystic, on the other hand, the reading or hearing of texts dealing with a preeminent communion with and experience of God can evoke and reactualize those very same experiences.

The Poetry: Beautiful Objects Made Present

Within the writings of San Juan de la Cruz, no absolute differentiation should be made between his prose and poetry regarding either style or effect upon the reader. In fact, the two genres share certain traits. However, each one does have some dominant characteristics which are either wholly absent or minimally present in the other. The relation between the two is one of a complementarity which can be the source of fuller understanding and appreciation of the collective message of the mystical author.

It is of the nature of poetry to represent objects concretely and as wholes, to be grasped by the reader as such. In poetry dealing with mystical communion, the subjects cannot be represented as they are. However, they can be made present as whole concrete existents by the instrumentality of metaphors. The latter stand for specific, whole beings or acts, although they do not represent them in their entirety. It is not surprising that our mystical author should turn to the metaphor as a means to incarnate his ineffable and transcendent experience. In the poems of San Juan, the lover and the Beloved, their romance and their union, are all made present, certainly not as they are, but nevertheless, present. And thus, by means of artifacts constructed upon metaphors he conveys both beauty and truth which are faint echoes of the original experience.

It has often been asserted that within the Sanjuanist corpus, the poetry far surpasses the prose in excellence as a vehicle of communication. One reason behind this extensively shared
opinion is that the poetry presents objects which the reader can gaze upon, apprehend and delight in without abstracting from. There can be no doubt that "our deepest desire is to know the real, the whole real," which "is concrete." And further, that this knowing of complete whole beings is the most perfecting form of knowledge. This is not to say that cognition gains in perfection the closer it remains to consciousness of material concreteness; but rather, that this highest mode of intellectual actualization regarding either a material or a spiritual object is to apprehend it as a whole individual existent without abstracting from it. This mode of knowing, which is characteristic of the esthetic experience, involves the immediate presence of the object to the mind. It is an act of contemplating or beholding an object and knowing it intuitively without abstraction or discursiveness. One can readily see that this form of mental activity is analogous to the act of mystical contemplation, in that in both there is immediate presence of an object which is grasped by the subject as a whole. In both there is contemplation and subsequent delight. Herein lies one reason for the appropriateness of poetry as a genre for communicating the mystical experience and for its superiority over prose, which sacrifices concretion and wholeness for the sake of universality.

A sense of presence, thus, is one of the fundamental accomplishments of poetry. Another is the creation of beauty. It has been held that the function of poetry as art form, and specifically, as one of the fine arts, is the production of beautiful objects precisely qua beautiful. Following traditional definitions, by "a beautiful thing," we mean a thing the contemplation of which pleases. And by "beauty," we mean a quality characteristic of things endowed with wholeness or perfection, harmony and proportion among their parts, and a certain splendor or radiance. As a work of art, the poem can be said to have no other function than to be beautiful and by its pulchritude to delight. It is important to understand, though, that the particular beauty of poetry does not consist only in the pictorial grace of the images employed, but also in the sonorous qualities of the verse as a linguistic construct. In addition to beauty, poetry also communicates signification, of course, but the meaning is not what makes the language poetic nor the expression a poem. Now, if poetry as a verbal expression constructed by metaphors is an apt vehicle for the communication of mystical experience, poetry as artifact of beauty is no less an excellent means for the same finality.

Metaphysicians have insisted that beauty is one of the transcendent characteristics of being. That is to say that along with unity, goodness and truth, beauty is one of the properties which surpass every kind of limit and category. Beauty is rooted in existential actuality, and its range and scope is equal to being itself. Given its property of co-extensiveness with existence, a movement toward the beautiful is also a motion toward the plenitude of being.

The very perception of the beauty of corporeal things unfolds a vista of undreamed-of beauty hidden in the mystery of being whose inexhaustible wealth of meaning we glimpse confusedly in that first revelation. We but lift the corner of the veil, and the vast realm of beauty lies disclosed before us; vaguely, no doubt, and obscurely, but truly extending to infinity. So, the delight which beauty brings is not the mere pleasure of the sense through which we perceive things beautiful. The eye is not filled with seeing, nor the ear with hearing. Through the senses comes the knowledge of the inner luminous structure of reality. Or as Gilson puts it: "Art creates beauty. The beautiful is a transcendental of being, and to approach being as such is always to reach the threshold of the sacred." Such approach entails a certain communication with being in its transcendent qualities.
Theologically, beauty is understood to be an attribute of God, and as such, one with his Being. All created being is considered to be a participation in the splendor of God's uncreated and infinite beauty. Thus, while perception of any beautiful thing is like a glimpse of the divine, the highest experience man can attain of the beautiful is in the act of contemplation.

The essence, the form of things is the source of their real beauty, and that form is the likeness of divine beauty. To know and love the beautiful is, thus, implicitly to know and love the beauty of God. Those who hunger for the joy which beauty brings are really seeking, though perhaps all unawares, for the joys and delights of the vision of God.

The soul of man is so sensitively made that it responds to the peculiar charm of all that is. The poet may linger in sheer delight upon the beauty of a word, the artist may revel in the joy of contemplating a spot of color, the aesthetic man may sit and gaze, transfixed, upon the beauty of a boulder or a stump because in them the power to apprehend the soul of beauty in the most commonplace things is as keen as the scientist's "nose for facts." To the artistically cultivated soul, that vision may be ecstatic, rapturous; but it never fails to urge him onward to a deeper penetration and a greater clarity of insight. Thus, the saint and the artist move in the same direction; the latter may perhaps live and die unconscious of the true direction of his movement. The former will find what the latter seeking...

Our Carmelite saint was indeed to find it. He knew well that "the true seat of beauty is contemplation, and that the latter is elevated beyond all the limited forms of this world." Through the afflictions of the dark nights he approached "this God whom he could not adore other than as source of beauty." The beauty he encountered was "the transcendent source from which proceeds the singular force of his lyricism," and the song which he subsequently intoned was to become "a perpetual hymn to beauty." We shall not insist upon the beauty of Juan de la Cruz's poetic creations, nor much less attempt to determine what makes them be so intensely and exquisitely beautiful, nor shall we endeavor to describe their effect upon the sensibility of the reader. This is all quite mysterious. However, countless literary critics from Menéndez Pelayo to those of our present day have testified to the pulchritude of these lyrics, and their testimony stands on its own.

Menéndez Pelayo was of the opinion that "the stanzas of Saint John of the Cross... reach such heights that they seem no longer human but angelic." And further, that said poetry is

so angelic, celestial and divine, that it seems to proceed from another world; it is hardly possible to appraise it with literary criteria. More ardently passionate than any profane poetry, it is as elegant and exquisite in its form, and as plastic and expressive as the most delectable fruits of the Renaissance.... The spirit of God has passed through this poetry, beautifying and sanctifying everything on its way.

This judgement is not too distant from that emitted by Dámaso Alonso. Let us listen to the evaluation of this critic, the highest authority on Spanish literature of recent decades:

amidst all these artists in a frenzy, one man advances serene, imperturbable, in a straight line: he does not bother to chisel, as he does not care about formal perfection, and perhaps does not even know what it is; he does not detain himself even to pick a flower along his path. He advances irretrievably attracted by the obsessive
center. This man is not an artist, but he surpasses --even in the art he did not attempt-- all these great artists.

For behold that artists anguishing for the sake of perfection have collectively created nothing, nothing, which pierces us more secretly, more exquisitely than these three poems and those two couplets. Their author --that man who advances indifferently-- is a friar of small proportions, almost a "half friar," who, let us say it frankly, could not have cared less about art for art's sake, nor even for art at all. The only thing that mattered to him was the love of God.

These poems (the "Cantico espiritual," the "Noche" and the "Llama"), those couplets ("Aunque es de noche" and "Tras un amoroso lance"), are such that literature the world wide has not produced anything more perturbing and emanating of nostalgia, in which each word seems to have received the plenitude of esthetic grace. Their power to transfuse is such that our soul, virginally refreshed, urged forward in flames, has never felt itself closer to the greatest delights.

Behold us here, thus, pushed to the edge of the precipice, without the possibility of retreating: there below is where our human reason is going to be shattered into a thousand particles.

There is nothing left for us to do save abandon ourselves into the arms of God. And to exclaim, as I now exclaim:

"Because of Saint John of the Cross, I believe! I believe in the possibility of prodigy!"27

This judgment was pronounced by Dámaso Alonso after numerous years of arduous study of the formal perfections of John of the Cross' lyrics. Yet, what is important to us here is not that this poetry be found mysterious, or prodigious, or defiant to technical analysis of its constituent elements, as though, indeed, derived from above. What concerns us is simply that these lyrics should be judged to be so bedazzling, so breathtaking, so inebriatingly beautiful. To that very same degree they communicate a quality of God's own Being.

The Poetry: Meaning by Association

We have said that poetic images make certain beings present to the reading subject and that, further, in accordance with the function proper to the genre of poetry, the objects are presented as beautiful. The next characteristic of the lyrics of Juan de la Cruz we should like to point to is the communication of meaning by the same images. This has already been implied when we stated that objects are made present, because presence brings about awareness. But there is more than this. In reading or hearing the poetry, the mind is led beyond the material objects which the terms signify and present, toward the realities for which the terms stand. There is also a certain apprehension of the traits or features of this represented reality.

It has been affirmed frequently that San Juan's poetic images are rich and compact, endowed with many levels of potential signification. This intensity which characterizes them is due, of course, to the particular type of images he selects, and to the way in which he utilizes them. Although we have hitherto referred to the "images" of the Sanjuanist poetry without any further qualification, let us recall at present that there are diverse types of poetic images, including allegory, symbol and metaphor. Allegory, according to a very basic definition, is "a translation of abstract notions into a picture language, which is itself nothing but an abstraction
from objects of the senses." A symbol, on the other hand, "is characterized by a translucence of the special in the individual, or of the general in the special... above all, by a translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal."28 Symbols can be verbal signs, gestures or sensible objects such as a flag, a crown or a cross. The essential characteristic of the symbol, in any case, is that it points to something beyond itself, to some other reality, either by convention or in virtue of a relationship of analogy. Metaphor is not tremendously different from symbol, although it is always verbal. In this figure of speech there is a transfer of meaning, a "carrying over" as the term itself signifies, from an expressed modifier to a subject, either expressed or elliptical. Metaphor points to one particular aspect or quality of the subject. To call a ship a plow, for example, is to construct a metaphor. It is likewise to speak of "the river of time," a "sweet melody," or to state that a certain man "is a lion."29

Some commentators of Juan de la Cruz consider his poetry to be symbolic. Others refer to it as metaphorical.30 Our own preference is to describe his images as metaphors, although they certainly do exercise the function of the symbol of leading the mind to something beyond what is represented sensorially. Our reason is that in certain literary circles the term symbol denotes a signifier whose signified meaning is linked to it by conventionality or tradition,31 whereas metaphor is understood as a more dynamic figure of speech which is peculiar and unique in each instance, creating novel senses for words for particular occasions. Utilizing the terms according to these definitions, we would say that the vast majority of the images in the Sanjuanist lyrics are metaphors. What concerns us most here, however, is that critics concur in maintaining that Juan de la Cruz's poetry is not allegorical. Far from it, the means of expression upon which it is constructed are those that can be endowed with greatest symbolic depth. Our author's poetic genius, coupled with the extensiveness of his education and the depth of his experience, enabled him to employ these means in an unusually intense manner, informing them with great compactness, multiple connotations and extensive power of suggestion.32 Simultaneously, his images are remarkably flexible, in that what is evoked in one reader will not coincide absolutely with what is evoked in another.33

Metaphors and symbols communicate meaning or truth by activating the cognitive powers in a peculiar way. John of the Cross reveals his awareness of this phenomenon in the prologue to his Cántico:

Who can put into writing that which he reveals to the loving souls wherein he dwells? And who can express in words that which he makes them feel? And lastly, who can articulate that which he makes them desire? Certainly, no one can. Indeed, not even they who receive these communications can. It is for this reason that they are more likely to allow something of what they feel to overflow, and to utter secrets and mysteries from the abundance of their spirit, by means of figures, comparisons and similitudes, than they are to explain these things rationally. These similitudes, if they are not read with the simplicity of the spirit of love and knowledge which they contain, will appear to be absurdities ["dislates"] rather than reasonable utterances, as may be seen in the divine Song of Solomon and in other books of Sacred Scripture, where the Holy Spirit, unable to express the abundance of his meaning in common and vulgar terms, utters mysteries in strange figures and similitudes.

...Since these stanzas, then, were composed in a love flowing from an abundance of mystical cognition, they cannot be fairly elucidated, nor is it my intention to do so. I only wish to shed some
general light upon them, since Your Reverence has so desired. And I think this to be for the best, for the sayings of love are best expounded in their broadest sense, so that each person may derive profit from them according to the mode and capacity of his own spirit ["según su modo y caudal de espíritu"], rather than being abbreviated into a single sense to which not every taste can accommodate. And thus, even though they are expounded in a certain way, there is no reason to be bound to this explanation. For mystical wisdom --which comes through love, the love which is the subject of these stanzas--, need not be understood distinctly ["entenderse distintamente"] in order to produce love and affection in the soul, for it is given according to the mode of faith, through which we love God without understanding him. 34

This is a well-known passage, and justifiably so. It is the most important exposition of Juan de la Cruz's understanding of poetic communication. It is the text in which "we discover a complete poetics," in the words of Jorge Guillén. 35 Four fundamental points are expressed here which are directly related to our present topic. Our Carmelite thinker tells us: (1) that symbols and metaphors communicate to a certain degree and in a particular way the experience of the mystic; (2) that it is a fuller communication than the prose can bring about; (3) that certain conditions must be met in the reading subject no less than in the object read for this communication to take place; and (4) that his lyrics effect a consciousness without full advertence or understanding --"without being understood distinctly"-- , which nevertheless can elicit an emotional or affective response.

According to Carlos Bousoño, what San Juan intends to state in the passage cited above from the Cantico is that "his verses allow an overflowing of what the doctrinal word elucidates; that there is in them a «plus», and that said «plus» is ineffable, obscure and is not understood distinctly..." 36 Robert Herrera makes the following comments concerning these rare powers of communication which the lyrics of the Spanish mystic seem to possess, and to which he himself made reference:

Could it not be that poetry, by the use of metaphors and symbols, is the means of expression --an expression necessarily lacking, but truthful-- of those realities which outstep our intellectual powers sensu strictu, leading us towards the very frontiers of mystery, that is to say, of realities which are beyond that barrier? Poetry, thus, reaches out and touches mystery in its overflowing fullness, and stammers what it can of that experience. It expresses, through symbols and metaphors, that which is structurally unattainable by rational investigation. Authentic poetry is not a contrafactum, a simple substitution of a sacred meaning for a profane one. Very much to the contrary, it is a real though partial penetration of mystery. And the paradigm of all mysteries is God. Metaphor is thus, an extension of knowledge, taken in a wide sense, which allows a "knowing" which transcends the limits of discursive reasoning." 37

Herrera's suggestions, however, offer no explication as to how poetry accomplishes these feats. There seems to be an insinuation in his text that the poetry of Juan de la Cruz has magical powers, or that a special miracle takes place in each of us when we read it.

Our author states explicitly that his poems have an ability to communicate mysterious matters which surpasses that of the prose. The question is: what is the rational explanation for
this phenomenon? It would seem that in the apprehension of an intelligible object which evokes in the reader multiple meanings, the power of memory must play a decisive role. It is clear that an image in its function of making present a sensible object engages the sensibility and yields an experience of the beautiful, while the same image in its symbolic or metaphorical function leads the mind beyond the sensible object to an apprehension of the re-presented realities. This is not accomplished by enacting a process of reasoning leading to a conclusion, but by associations. It is the memory and the imagination that are at work. The perception of a sensible image brings to the fore of the mind not simply the object represented, but an entire range of phantasms pertaining to realities related to it. If a sensible image has been linked by association in the experience of the subject to a particular situation, reality or concept, these latter entities will be evoked by the perception of the sensible image. Images which have been closely associated to our lives and experiences evoke, not one set of phantasms, but another and another, resuscitating vast reservoirs of previously assimilated cognition and experience. The "logic" dictating the associations made is internal to the reading subject. 38 This is to say that the relationship and order among the realities brought to mind by association is one with how the reader has experienced them and retained them in memory.

The background for this operation of response is formed by the entire gamut of retained experiences, including those pertaining to personal history, cultural and literary conventions, religious formation, and the like. The precise nature of the associations made and the degree of penetration reached will be determined, thus, by the subsidiary or memorative field of the reader, by what is in him subject to resuscitation and evocation. This is how the mind naturally and spontaneously responds to metaphor and symbol. It is a self-moving, spontaneous psychological process, unless it be deliberately thwarted or repressed. It is, again, a question of the conditioning of an object by a conditioned subject. What has been said is applicable to any particular case of metaphor or symbol, including, of course, the poetry of our mystical author. It is also in accord with San Juan's own statements regarding how his lyrics will take effect. He has said that each reader will benefit from his verses "according to the mode and capacity of his own spirit" ["según su modo y caudal de espíritu"], a key and revelatory statement on how he understands this process. He makes it clear that while the potential meaning of the lyrics is in itself inexhaustible due to their subject matter, the precise response and degree of comprehension will be determined by the reader.

Juan de la Cruz's lyrics are built around a cluster of essential symbols: the hunt, courtship and marriage, the night, the fire. Each has a history of its own in secular and religious poetry, and is based upon an archetypal human experience or situation. Each of these archetypal realities has many analogues within the sphere of human experience, and in turn can be looked upon as analogous to the relationship between man and God. The symbols which he chooses have the power to carry the reader from the perception of a tangibly concrete object through the realms of the archetypal and cosmic, to the communication of a spiritual reality. A movement is effected in various stages from "a lo humano" ["in a human mode"] to "a lo divino" ["in a divine mode"].

The image central to the "Cántico," that of the nuptials, is a natural, archetypal, literary and Biblical symbol of unity. Its efficacy in conveying a spiritual relationship is based, on the one hand, upon a real analogy among relations: spouse and spouse, Christ and the Church, Christ and each soul; and on the other hand, upon a Scriptural tradition reaching back to the Canticle of Canticles, which has employed this image to represent the love between God and Israel, or between God and the individual human being. The case of the "living flame" is similar. In this image one can discern, beginning with the lowest levels of signification, light, heat, radiance, mystery, intellectual illumination, the warmth of affectivity, communicability,
purification, rebirth. The reader informed in the Christian tradition will further recognize in San Juan's flame an image whose historical roots reach back to the encounter of Moses with the burning bush which was not consumed. He will recognize the Spirit of God, the Holy Ghost of endless communicability, light and love. As mentioned previously, the mystic will plummet the depth of these images, grasping far more than could ever be articulated in words by any person. Among non-mystics the apprehension is subject to endless variations in associations made and to the level of comprehension achieved. Needless to say, the greater the affinity with the author, whether in esthetic sensibility, in religious or literary formation, or in moral perfection, the closer one will come to grasping their ultimate meaning.

The metaphors of San Juan are potentially inexhaustible, as has been recognized numerous times. This is so in two senses. Firstly, in that they can lead the mind as far as God, if the mind's capacities for such a venture have been previously actualized. Secondly, in that they can take on the form and extension of an endless number of intellects, penetrating the most recondite dimensions and resuscitating by association the most hidden realities therein lying dormant. They are boundless, thus, in both depth and in breadth. It is important to realize, also, that this inexhaustibility is rooted in the meeting of two sets of factors: those pertaining to the lyrics themselves, which are invariable and can be called the objective factors; and those pertaining to the reader, which are variable and can be termed the subjective ones. The objective factors have been determined by the particular experience, formation and poetic genius of the author; while on the side of the reader there are his own experiences and formation as stored in memory, his subsidiary field of knowledge, "the mode and capacity of his own spirit." All that is there can be brought again to consciousness.

It seems that authors commenting upon these issues frequently overemphasize the function of the objective factors in contrast to the subjective ones, or vice versa. In the text by Robert Herrera cited above, it is stated that the Sanjuanist metaphor is "an extension of knowledge." The metaphor definitely penetrates the psyche to its depth and resuscitates level upon level of previously assimilated knowledge. It does not, however, have the power to extend comprehension of a given object, nor to resuscitate something which has never been there. The metaphor, even the Sanjuanist metaphor, is not endowed with magical powers. It does not break the laws which govern our acquisition and communication of knowledge.

Somewhat of an inverse position is the view that in the response to San Juan's lyrics the determining factors are exclusively those in the reader. This implies that the Sanjuanist images are absolute in their malleability regarding the meaning they communicate. It should be remembered that despite their great flexibility and fecundity, each of these metaphors communicates a core intelligibility which is irreducible and invariable. This irreducibility is rooted in the archetypal character of the images. By this we mean that they are images which represent and point to realities experienced by men at all times. Inasmuch as the experiences are common, the responses must likewise be common. The night, the dawn, the flame, the hunt, the fountain, the nuptials: these are symbols which communicate to any normal person a reality fundamental to the human experience, regardless of his cultural milieu. This reality is, in turn, seen as carrying numerous implications. It is in the realm of the implications brought to mind that the flexibility of the image is rooted. The image is archetypal inasmuch as it conveys the same meanings universally, and it is flexible inasmuch as each mind discerns in it some variation in signification. Despite all its flexibility, thus, at its core the lyrical production of our mystic "is not an «harmonious buzzing», nor a spontaneous and fleeting rhyme, but rather a stable object, capable of resisting the winds of fantasy..."

At the end of the lengthy passage from the Cántico cited above, San Juan establishes a triple analogy between the reading of his "canciones," the act of mystical contemplation, and
theological faith. The commonality pointed to is that they all communicate knowledge obscurely, "without being understood distinctly," and that an affective movement toward the object of cognition is allowed or elicited despite the obscurity of the intellection. Faith and contemplation are, of course, forms of infused knowledge. Some enthusiastic critics of Juan de la Cruz irreflectively fall into the temptation of thinking that his lyrics also infuse some type of nebulous yet profound knowledge. There is no reason, in principle, to believe this. As mentioned above, the reading of the poems does not in itself extend cognition. What the reading of the lyrics shares with the other two analogues is the lack of "distinction" or distinctiveness, a certain darkness of intellection. Yet this characteristic admits of a perfectly rational and natural explanation. We believe that here again the activity of the memory plays an important role. In the normal response to metaphor or symbol, it is the memorative power that is principally active, bringing to the foreground of the mind phantasms representing a multiplicity of subjects. These realities are adverted to, and in turn an emotional response is brought about. In this act, the mind is tied to a marked degree to the sensorial level, to the operations of the internal senses of memory, imagination and fantasy. The entities made present are recognized by the intellectual power, and thus, cognition does occur; however, there occurs very little abstraction, conceptualization or discursive reasoning. It is true that each subject brought to the fore carries with it its own field of implicit meaning, ideas, concepts, beliefs. Yet these remain very much incarnated, and therefore implicit, in the sensible images which represent them. In the act of reading the poem, unless the subject begins to look at his own responses analytically through reflection, the "why" and "how" those realities are brought to mind remain obscure, "without being understood distinctly." They are simply there, and are loved according to the subject's predispositions.

The preceding analysis of how the lyrics of Juan de la Cruz take their effect in the reader is consistent with his own articulation in the Prologue of the *Cántico*. He maintains, as summarized above: (1) that symbols and metaphors have a special power to communicate things which are in themselves quite mysterious. Our analysis has led us to the conclusion that this communication takes place by associations brought about in the mind of the reader. He further holds, as we saw previously: (2) that this form of expression is able to convey more than the prose. This is so, it seems, for at least two reasons: images make the symbolized objects present, as noted earlier; also, because a communication which enacts a process of associations can reach memorative and psychic depths which an abstractive exposition could not touch. Our author further holds, to continue recapitulating: (3) that a certain conditioning is required to understand the lyrics. We have extensively commented upon this factor, pointing both to the affinity with the author needed to comprehend them properly, and to the multiplicity of forms which they can assume in different readers. He maintains, finally: (4) that there is a certain awareness or apprehension, "without distinct understanding," in some way analogous to infused knowledge. We understand this to refer to the absence of reasoning and conceptualization within the mental movement of effecting associations.

We have asserted that the power of memory plays a preeminent role in this entire psychological cognitive process. Here we speculate on our own, for Juan de la Cruz does not mention memory in the famed text of the *Cántico* in which he formulates his understanding of poetic communication. There are exponents of literary theory, though, who have linked the activity of the imagination, and occasionally that of the memory, to the esthetic experience. In our relating the memory to the effect of the poetry upon the reader, we have been guided and supported by certain statements of San Juan which link the activity of the memory with the natural psychological response to the visual arts. Our author recognizes that exposure to a work of plastic art activates the memory. Further, he is aware that in the subject's response to a perceived artifact there is an interplay of objective factors and subjective ones.
A religious statue or painting, thus, assuming that it has some artistic quality, will bring to mind the subject represented. However, it will do so to the degree that and in the manner in which the same subject is retained in the memory of the beholder. San Juan directs the faithful, thus, to select those works of art which are in fullest conformity with what is represented and at once in greatest accord with their own sensibility. He simultaneously admonishes them, though, to elevate their minds and affections to the realities represented when contemplating said works, rather than allowing themselves to become distracted by the initial sensible image or others that might accrue to it in the mind. No doubt, he would make the same recommendation regarding devotional lyrics. What we wish to point out is that Juan de la Cruz is drawing attention to a cognitive process which, beginning with the perception of a sensible object, activates a number of stored phantasms which in turn carry implicit meaning. The particular associations and emotional responses will vary from person to person. The process is fundamentally no different than that enacted by reading the poetry. In both instances the mnemonic power is greatly responsible for the cognitive effects.

The Prose: Formulation of Truth

In the previous section it was stated that the poetry of San Juan de la Cruz, not unlike other verse, makes its subjects present, yields an experience of the beautiful and evokes meaning. The lyrics carry out these functions by activating the sensitivity, the imagination and the memory. The intellect is active in that there is consciousness of the things beheld. There is simple apprehension. However, not much discursive reasoning or conceptual knowledge occurs. It is not advisable to draw absolute distinctions between the poetry and the prose, for each shares at least minimally some of the traits of the other. However, the most distinctive characteristic of our author's prose is that it aims at communicating truth, the truth of its subject matter. So it is with most expository prose. And as in other cases, this finality is carried out primarily by appealing to and engaging the intellectual power.

The prose is not alone in conveying intelligibility. The poetry performs this function as well through its metaphors, as stated above. Yet, the meaning obtained from the poetry is a recall of what was previously assimilated and retained by the reader. It is subjective, connotative knowing, and as such it is open to deviation from the meaning intended by the author. It is for this reason that we have referred to it as "meaning" instead of as "truth." The function of the prose, on the contrary, is not to evoke. Instead, its finality is to explicate the issue at hand. It aims at communicating the truth of said matter. And truth, being a correspondence of the intellect to the thing, or a conformity between the mind and the thing, is necessarily objective. As we saw earlier concerning the beautiful, the true is also one of the transcendental characters of being, convertible with it. And like beauty, truth is one of the divine attributes, identifiable with God's own existence. As in the case of beauty, an approximation to truth is necessarily a movement toward being in its plenitude, and simultaneously toward God.

It has been remarked that with respect to meaning conveyed, the poems of San Juan are obscure. He himself observed that they cannot "be understood distinctly." He further recognized that to unprepared readers certain stanzas "seem rather to be absurdities than reasonable utterances." Some of his poems, on the contrary, communicate meaning with great clarity.
Yet in most of these cases, the clear meaning conveyed pertains to the level of the symbolic construct. It is not the intended or symbolized meaning. This can be said in particular of some of the minor poems such as "Tras de un amoroso lance." In either case, however, the intended meaning, the true "sentido," must be made explicit. This is the function of the prose.

It is imprecise to state that the saint's poetry "does not need any elucidation and can stand on its own," as it is to consider the primacy of the poetry over the prose to be absolute. There is indeed a primacy of the one genre over the other, as many critics and the author himself have said. It is a relative one, however, as it does not apply in every respect. The prose surpasses the poetry in its ability to convey truth pertinent to the subject in question. Without the aid of the prose, only a mystic could understand the poetry. And even so, to be able to respond to the particular symbols utilized, the mystic would need to have a cultural, literary and theological formation similar to that of the author. As it is, though, by means of the prose vast horizons of intelligibility are opened to us, which in turn allows for a deepened understanding of the poetry.

As is well known, our Carmelite author's mystical treatises constitute at the same time extensive commentaries upon his previously composed lyrics. The latter, which contain his entire doctrine in germinal and symbolic form, are expounded verse by verse and word by word throughout the prose works. One usage of a single term is often found to have numerous meanings. Fray Juan discloses, thus, the various levels of signification, each one more profound than the prior, which are contained compactly in one expression. He explicates the implicit, brings the figurative meaning to be literal and the intensive to be extensive. As several literary critics have put it, in the prose he reduces the metaphors to the allegorical level. There are a few particular stanzas which are conceptually incoherent and which admittedly "seem rather to be absurdities." These receive their intended intelligibility exclusively from the prose.

If the poetry evokes, the principal function of the prose is to explicate, to make intelligible. The commentaries elucidate the meaning of the poetry, which is to say they expound upon the entire venture or itinerary of the mystical soul. In this prose, Juan de la Cruz formulates the "why," the "what" and the "how" of said experience to the degree to which it can be conceptualized and expressed in words. His exposition is logical and consistent, not only when laying out practical guidelines, but also in his analysis of how mystical phenomena can take place. The mystical communion with God cannot be understood by us as it is. However, what Juan de la Cruz achieves is that it be seen in its rationality, in its intelligibility, in its pervasiveness by logos. It has been recognized numerous times that his articulations have not been surpassed in history. If as a lyrist he expressed his experiences intimately and delicately in mystery-clad verses, in the prose he emerges as well-trained theologian, as universal doctor of spirituality and mysticism.

Fray Juan's work in prose takes the form of a philosophical discussion, that is, of an analytic treatment. Real things, including the mystical experience of God, are concrete, whole and individual. Intuition comes closest to apprehending them as such. However, to the degree to which things are outside the grasp of immediate intuition, their concreteness, wholeness and individuality must be sacrificed to achieve an understanding of them. The process of intellection in these cases involves abstraction, conceptualization, reasoning, judgment and generalization. The knowledge resulting from this process is scientific or discursive, in which one understands conceptually through a series of cognitive acts linked by relations of reason. Following this procedure, which is natural to the intellectual power, our author inquires, analyzes, gives rational support, formulates objections to his propositions and then resolves the difficul-
ties posed through argumentation. In this mode he demonstrates the possibility of mystical phenomena, exposes its rationality and formulates guidelines. The numerous enigmatic paradoxes which appear in the Sanjuanist lyrics are resolved in the prose into propositions devoid of contradictory elements. We are told that "on the yonder heights of the hill, to die is to live, the flame burns pleasingly, to lose oneself is to gain oneself, to efface oneself is to reach the stars, to be in ignorance is to transcend all knowledge." Such may be affirmed of the poetic heights, which are intimately linked to images. But it would be inappropriate to look upon the mystical summit itself, or the intellectual heights to which the prose can take us, as essentially paradoxical. In the prose works the poetic metaphors are explicated by terms or phrases utilized in their literal senses.

Similarly, the world of the prose does not draw us mysteriously into a dark night which becomes the scenery for the meeting of unidentified lovers. Nor do we cast our glance any longer across a paradisiacal landscape peopled by shepherds, sheep folds, stags and doves. We are no longer placed in the presence of a young beloved resting her head in the arms of her lover, while her hair is gently scattered by the breeze. In lieu of the enigmatic night, there appears in the prose a process of purgation in various consecutive stages, explicated throughout five works. The stag is revealed to represent Christ, and the dove the soul who seeks him. The shepherds become "the desires, affections and sighs" of the enamoured soul, while the sheep folds are "the hierarchies and choirs of angels" which carry said desires and prayers to the Beloved, to Christ. The union which culminates this unique romance is communion with the Persons of the Holy Trinity and participation in the dynamism of the intratrinitarian life.

In the movement from the poetry to the prose, there is a shift from metaphorical to literal, proper predication. The meaning of the prose is to be found in the literal level itself, not by leaving the literal level behind. When the subject is one of the divine Persons, he is generally not represented under forms of creatures, whose perfections are necessarily limited. When speaking of God, terms are used which signify or can signify unlimited perfections, such as "life," "being," "beauty," "strength," "goodness," "love," "wisdom." Thus, in the poetry we are presented with the intensive, vivid, compact phrase: "¡Oh lámparas de fuego!" ["Oh lamps of fire!"]. In the corresponding prose commentary, on the other hand, it is said that:

God, in his one and simple Being, is all the virtues and grandeurs of his attributes: for he is omnipotent, wise, good, merciful, just, strong, loving, etc., and he is other infinite attributes and virtues which are unknown to us. And, as he is all these things in his simple Being, when he is united with the soul... the latter is given to see distinctly in him all these virtues and grandeurs, namely, omnipotence, wisdom, goodness, mercy, etc. And given that each one of these things is the Being of God itself, which Being is the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, and God being infinite light and infinite divine fire --as we said above--, it follows from this that each one of these innumerable attributes gives forth light and heat as God, and thus each one of these attributes is a lamp which gives the soul light and the warmth of love.

The author himself remarks that "things of immensity have this property, that all terms expressing excellence, quality, grandeur and goodness are suitable to them ["le cuadran"], but none of these terms describe such things, nor all of them together." We have previously spoken of the ultimate ineffability of the topics of discussion developed by San Juan. It is true
that we cannot conceive or imagine unlimited being, life, beauty or goodness, as we cannot fully comprehend the mystical experience. Yet, it is also important to recognize that we can predicate them and have some nominal or conceptual comprehension of them, even though this comprehension consists simply in knowing ever better through judgment that those perfections are eminently superior to anything we can comprehend. And it is here that we are approximating the true advantage of the prose over the poetry. The prose engages more fully the intellectual power, which is spiritual and consequently has limitless horizons. The intellect is potentially infinite in its capacity to know, and it can recognize this by reflecting upon the ability which permits it to not be limited to knowing any one thing. Indeed, our cognitive processes are tied to phantasms which are not of themselves conducive toward conceiving things that are spiritual or infinite. We cannot picture such things. By means of abstractions joined with refined judgements, however, we can soar intellectually far beyond our power to imagine and visualize.

The prose at times sets forth crucial negative judgements in its qualification of the poetry. By "unsaying" the poetic metaphors, however, San Juan is conveying something most positive, for he is leading the reader to affirm the eminent infinite transcendence of God and of the mystic's communion with him. This "unsaying" can be considered a type of via negationis, in which the mind and imagination of the reader are disciplined so as to not reduce God or the mystical experience to the creaturely level. This process of intellectual discipline offers to the cognitive power an opportunity to soar toward God. In San Juan's prose, propositions regarding the divine nature or the mystical communion are formulated abstractly, yet properly. He uses words and phrases which "cuadran," which are applicable to the subject in question though they cannot be commensurate with it. Thus one can fully assent to the literal meaning of his propositions. Commentators have in fact expressed their admiration at the great clarity with which San Juan succeeds in communicating concepts pertinent to such abstruse issues. Our author is generally extremely modest regarding his own prowess as a writer. An occasional passage, however, reveals self-assuredness with respect to his own articulations. After a certain exposition in the Llama, for example, he addresses the reader with a touch of annoyance and states: "And if you still have any doubts, I know not what else to tell you other than to suggest that you read it again; perhaps then you will understand it, for what has been said is the substance of the truth..."

To do justice to Juan de la Cruz's prose from the standpoint of method and style, one would have to point so many differences among each of his major works. A full analysis of these differences would comprise a lengthy exposition. At present we can briefly point out that the observable divergences in style stem primarily from two factors: the expected audience and the subject matter. The Subida-Noche is addressed to a comparatively wide audience, Fray Juan's brothers and sisters in the reformed Carmelite Order. The subject is broad in scope: he wishes to outline and justify his entire understanding of the communion with God attainable in life. To this end, San Juan develops a full mystical theology, grounded philosophically and psychologically. It is a complete "system" of thought, if one wishes to call it thusly. Given a relatively wide audience and an extensive subject, the development is appropriately quite analytical, formal, demonstrative and expository. The work abounds in definitions, distinctions, syllogisms, classifications, the posing and resolving of objections. It is the most scientific of his treatises, the style being that of the schools. With the exception of the dominant and all-encompassing symbol of the night, images are used minimally. The Subida-Noche presents the spiritual itinerary to be followed as an ascent replete with harsh denials and indispensable intellectual negations, like a rugged climb up a shadowy, desolate mountain.

The Cántico espiritual was addressed to a person lacking "the exercise of scholastic theology" but not "that of mystical knowledge." Its author probably knew that in time this
treatise would be disseminated and read extensively, but nevertheless, the mode of presentation is adjusted to the intellectual abilities of this particular reader. In this work there is far less emphasis on demonstrating the possibility of the mystical communion, as well as on conveying the means to achieve it. Here the mystical itinerary is presented as a personal ascent to Christ culminating in transfiguring participation in the intratrinitarian communicability. It is an ascent retraced from the point of view of those who have lived it, like a lyrical outpouring voiced from the mountaintop. Despite passages referring to the sorrowful moments of absence, the Cantico carries a tone of triumphant joy, of ecstatic delight, which is necessarily absent in the Subida-Noche. The first major work was said to be argumentative and demonstrative; the Cantico, in contrast, without ceasing to be expository and analytical, is experiential and descriptive. Much unlike the former work, it is replete with vivid imagery. It can be pointed out that these qualities of the Cantico also characterize the poem being explicated. There is here, thus, a certain stylistic approximation or affinity between the original poem and the commentary.70 It is, after all, in the Prologue to the Cantico where it is stated that "the sayings of love are better expounded in their broadest sense..."71 The exposition ["declaración"] indeed retains much of the "breadth" ["anchura"] of the poem and many of its poetic qualities.

Fray Juan's last major work, the Llama de amor viva, is dedicated to a "very noble and devout lady" who was known to have been gifted with mystical graces.72 The subject matter is that of the highest and most ineffable stage of the mystical experience, that of the intratrinitarian communion. As in the previous two works, there is a correspondence between the topic discussed, the style in which it is presented, and the capacities of comprehension of the person to whom it is addressed. Not unlike the Cantico, the prose of the Llama is descriptive of an experience achieved. The realities being described are fully spiritual, such as God's attributes, the effects of each divine Person upon the soul, the participation in the trinitarian processions. These same realities, which are represented in the poem by means of metaphors, are here expressed by way of abstract terms. And yet, for the sake of maximum effectiveness of communication, the central metaphor of the flame is retained along with other images derived from it, which appear in the work side by side with abstract terms expressing universal properties. Although the presentation is analytical, supported by both reasons and authorities, the tone of the Llama is charged with emotion. It is exclamatory, explosive, igneous, paralleling the poem it explicates. It has been called "an ecstatic prose," and yet is recognized as being nevertheless "clear and logical."73

Complementarity

The relation between Juan de la Cruz's prose and his poetry can be best synopsized by saying that while the former gives us logical, intelligible concepts, the lyrics put before us whole and concrete subjects, dazzling in beauty, evocative and capable of powerfully moving the emotions. The prose fulfills the need of the intellect properly speaking, whereas the poetry appeals to and engages a wider spectrum of human powers, such as sensibility, imagination and memory. It can be said that the experience engendered by the poetry is more fully human in that it draws our entire being into an exuberant world and allows us to delight therein.74 Further, we know this experience to be reminiscent of that other fully human experience we call mystical. The deepest limitation of the poetry is that it is such a remote and improper incarnation of the reality represented. It could not be otherwise, given that it depends upon imagery and the material phantasms, whereas the reality symbolized is wholly spiritual.
If the function of the poetry is to reproduce the experience in the reader, which it can only do in a distant and remote way, that of the prose is to disclose some of the intelligibility of said mystical encounter. By so doing it satisfies the natural desire to understand. The prose sacrifices the positive qualities of the poetry for the sake of yielding an intellectual grasp of the symbolized reality: of what it is and how it can be; of how it is to be sought; of how it is rational and in harmony with reality as we know it. The prose allows us to understand the mystical act itself, although in an abstract, partial and limited manner, whereas the far more concrete experience which the poetry engenders is only a remote echo of that mystical act. At the necessary price of losing the sense of concreteness, proximity and sensible beauty, the prose gains in that other beauty which is the splendor and radiance of truth. The consequence of reading the prose is to render the collective effect of both prose and poetry all the more perfectly human, and somewhat less remotely reminiscent of the original experience of knowledge and love of the mystical author.

Juan de la Cruz's poetry and prose communicate collectively beauty and truth. They do so as artifacts which manifest the transcendent characters of being of beauty and truth, and which participate at once in the divine attributes by the same names. And though there are many beautiful and true things wrought by man, among them the beauty and truth of this poetry and prose are those in greatest conformity with the beauty and truth of God as known by the mystic who has communed with him. In so transmitting this beauty which floods with delight, and this truth which perfects the mind, the powers of the person as a whole --sensitivity, imagination, memory, emotions, intellect-- are engaged and activated. Some persons are more affected by one genre than by another, according to their particular talents and sensibilities. Nevertheless, the collective effect of the two genres is to attract the reader, even to lure him, toward that beautiful, true and good object which these works concern. If some of the beauty and the truth of the mystical experience have been communicated, it is precisely so that the person will seek the good of that very experience itself. That good is sought by means of holiness. Neither the joys of the poetry, however, nor the reasoned truths of the prose can make us holy by themselves, nor bring us into the presence of God. San Juan de la Cruz instructs and delights us with his works. His finality in so doing is that we enact that one power which can only be moved from within, the will, in a movement toward full possession of the desired object which is inexhaustibly beautiful, true and good.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1. At the beginning of the commentary to the third stanza of the "Llama" it is stated: "Dios se ha servido de dar aquí su favor, que cierto es menester mucho, para declarar la profundidad de esta canción; y el que la leyere habrá menester advertencia, porque, si no tiene experiencia quizá le será algo oscura y prolija, como también, si la tuviese, por ventura le sería clara y gustosa." L,3,1. The act of mystical contemplation manifests most clearly that "queda muy baja toda condición de criatura acerca deste supremo saber y sentir divino," while it also allows the subject to comprehend "cuán bajos y cortos y en alguna manera impropios son todos los términos y vocablos con que en esta vida se trata de las cosas divinas, y cómo es imposible por vía y modo natural, aunque más alta y sabiamente se hable en ellas, poder conocer ni sentir de ellas como ellas son, sin la iluminación de esta mística teología." NII,17,6. Similarly, Saint Theresa states about one of her passages: "Por claro que quiera yo decir estas cosas de oración, será bien escuro para quien no tuviese esperiencia." Vida, 10, 9.

San Juan points out, as cited previously, that "si a uno le dijesen cosas que él nunca alcanzó a conocer ni jamás vio semejanza de ellas, en ninguna manera le quedaría más luz de ellas que si no se las hubiesen dicho. Pongo ejemplo: Si a uno le dijesen que en cierta isla hay un animal que el nunca vio, si no le dicen de aquel animal alguna semejanza que él haya visto en otros, no le quedará más noticia ni figura de aquel animal que antes, aunque más le estén diciendo dél. Y por otro ejemplo más claro se entenderá mejor: Si a uno que nació ciego (el cual nunca vio color alguno) le estuviesen diciendo cómo es el color blanco o el amarillo, aunque más le dijesen, no entendería más así que así, porque nunca vio los tales colores ni sus semejanzas para poder juzgar de ellos; solamente se le quedaría el nombre dellos, porque aquello púdolo percibir con el oído, mas la forma y figura no, porque nunca la vio." SII,3,2. For a non-mystic to hear or read about mystical experiences is an instance comparable to these examples.

2. In his dedication to Ana de Jesús, Fray Juan states that throughout the Cántico "hablo con V. R. por su mandado, a la cual nuestro Señor ha hecho merced de habérle sacado de esos principios y llevándole más adentro al seno de su amor divino; y así espero que, aunque se escriban aquí algunos [puntos] de teología escolástica cerca de el trato interior del alma con su Dios, no será en vano haber hablado algo a lo puro de espiritual en tal manera, pues, aunque a V. R. le falte el ejercicio de teología escolástica con que se entienden las verdades divinas, no le falta el de la mística, que se sabe por amor en que, no solamente se saben, mas juntamente se gustan." C, Prologue, 3.

3. In the following passage Juan makes reference to certain conditionings which he deems necessary for understanding his Subida. "Y por cuanto esta doctrina es de la noche oscura por donde el alma ha de ir a Dios, no se maraville el lector si le pareciere algo oscura; lo cual entiendo yo que será al principio que la comenzare a leer, mas, como pase adelante, irá entendiendo mejor lo primero, porque con lo uno se va declarando lo otro, y después, si lo leyere la segunda vez, entiendo le parecerá más claro, y la doctrina más sana. Y si algunas personas con esta doctrina no se hallaren bien, hacerlo ha mi poco saber y bajo estilo, porque la materia de suyo buena es y harto necesaria. Pero parézeme que, aunque se escribiera más acabada y perfectamente de lo que aquí va, no se aprovecharán de ello sino los menos; porque aquí no se escribirán cosas muy morales y sabrosas para todos los espírituales que gustan de ir por cosas dulces y sabrosas a Dios, sino doctrina sustancial y sólida, así para los unos como para los otros, si quisieren pasar a la desnudez de espíritu que aquí se escribe. Ni aun mi principal intento es hablar con todos, sino con algunas personas de nuestra sagrada Religión de los
primitivos del Monte Carmelo, así frailes como monjas, por habermelo ellos pedido, a quien Dios hace merced de meter en la senda deste Monte, los cuales, como ya están bien desnudos de las cosas temporales deste siglo, entenderán mejor la doctrina de la desnudez del espíritu."

S., Prologue, 8-9. We have added emphasis to draw attention to the different types of conditioning alluded to: first, intellectual; second, orientational; and third, moral.

4. See, for example, "El misterio técnico en la poesía de San Juan de la Cruz," Poesía española: ensayo de métodos y límites estilísticos, Colección Románica Hispánica, 5th edition (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1966), pp. 266-268 and 292-305; also, La poesía de San Juan de la Cruz: desde esta ladera, pp. 89-90; 158-161; 180-182; 201-227; 239-242.

5. See for example, Dámaso Alonso, La poesía de San Juan de la Cruz, pp. 197 and 218-221; Gabriel Celaya, op. cit., p. 192; José María Valverde, "San Juan de la Cruz y los extremos del lenguaje," Estudios sobre la palabra poética, Biblioteca del Pensamiento Actual, n. 21, 2nd edition (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1958), pp. 203-211. This view is also held by some theologians. See von Balthasar, La gloire et la croix, part 2, 2:68.

6. Thomas Gilby, op. cit., p. 12. "...it remains true that rational thoughts are never commensurate with the things they are about. They imply a certain withdrawal from whole things just as they exist in nature to an ideal conception of their real meaning." Similarly, "within the mind itself there is a natural desire, which must be distinguished from the consequent desire of the will. It is the first inclination of mind, its pondus naturae... for perfect union with being, and this underlies all mental activity. It is the primitive impulse of the mind towards the concrete, the individual, the whole substance, the person --the noblest thing in nature-- and for a union with it closer than can be obtained through concepts." Ibid., pp. 23 and 32. Gilby refers us to Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, III,2,2 and I,29,3.

7. "Knowledge grows in perfection the more it approaches concretion, and diminishes with abstraction.... The higher the knowledge the completer the comprehension, the more is an object grasped in all its many-sidedness. Every resource of the personality must be brought into play if a thing is to be enveloped and possessed as a whole, complete, concrete, irreducible." Gilby, op. cit., p. 49.

8. "By intuitive knowledge in the Thomistic sense, we know a thing immediately through its presence, either in itself, or in its proper species. This is at the opposite pole from discursive knowledge, wherein there is a succession of cognitive acts representing the various notes of an object, and their unification through relations being established between them. In the act of esthetic perception we do not stop to analyze and dissect the object presented to us, we yield naturally and spontaneously to its influence, and give ourselves over to contemplation.... This operation of the mind apprehending the beautiful is also termed contemplation, which Richard of St. Victor has defined as «the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze»." Leonard Callahan, A Theory of Esthetic According to the Principles of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1927), p. 42. Emphasis, Callahan's. The author remits to Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, II-II,180,3, ad 1. The text from Richard of St. Victor is from De Gratia Contemplationis, 1,3; Patrologia Latina 196, 66D-67D. Similarly: "The approximation to an immediate knowledge of the concrete, which seems to happen in the esthetic experience, suggests that there must be a presence of the object to the concrete wholeness of the acting personality, not only an entrance into the partial and abstract medium formed by the reasoning intellect." Gilby, op. cit., p. 50.

9. Within the mystic's experience, "the knowledge is not abstract, it is neither obtained through a representation or notion, nor expressed as such in a judgement. An abstract
manner of knowing divine things may exist without sanctifying grace.... But the mystical knowledge of God is by affinity and nature, and comes about by a real not representational assimilation of the mind to divine things. The mind does not mirror divine truths, it lives them. Knowledge by sympathy demands real union of lover and beloved." Gilby, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

"Perfect knowledge implies perfect union. This is achieved in the vision of God, and nowhere else. Only God can flood the mind wholly, only by knowing Him in perfect immediacy can our knowledge be really ultimate." *Ibid.*, p. 66. Gilby further extends the analogy between esthetic and mystic experience to the beatific vision, wherein this most perfect form of knowledge is fulfilled. "Closeness and wholeness, these are the marks of perfect knowledge; perfect mode, perfect object. The intrinsic desire of mind and the partner appetite of will are eager for both. In heaven they will be satisfied, and nowhere else, by the possession of a perfect object in perfect intimacy.... The beatific vision is the only perfect immediate union." *Ibid.*, p. 51.

The esthetic experience, "analogous to that mystical knowledge which is based on the presence of God in the soul, is immediate, but obscure and mysterious." It can further be considered "a presage of the time when the mind will be completely itself, plunged into the fountain of being, not confined to the trim and formal paths of reason.... Really real knowledge is reserved for those moments when the mind seizes and possesses a substance in a moving and intimate experience. It may be religious, the sense of sharing in the movement of all things to God; or affectionate, as when two fall in love; or compassionate, as when tragedy is joined in sacrifice; or poetical, an echo of horns far away; or even philosophical, the sight in one flash of the distinction between essence and existence. All are beyond meaning, interpretation, expression. A man says he «knows» such things without felt need for apology or elucidation. They are really part of him. Now is the mind most truly itself, a faculty of the real. Such knowledge is not for the instructors, the spectators... but for those who strive and suffer, the players, the makers, the poets, the saints." *Ibid.*, pp. 105-107.


12. "...ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, integritas sive perfectio.... Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas...." Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I,39, 8c. Said quality can be present in material, sensible objects; in intellectual propositions or concepts, whose beauty is "the splendor of truth;" and in spiritual realities such as God, Whose beauty is one with His nature. For further discussion of this topic, see Phelan, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-180 and Gilson, *Arts of the Beautiful*, pp. 28-34.


15. "...the beautiful is a mode of being." And "like the true and the good, the beautiful is a transcendental. Therefore it participates in the primary, irreducible and not deducible character of the first principle, namely being." The beautiful "is the most modest of all those
modalities of being, since it is merely the good of sensible apperception of being, when there is conformity between the object of sense and the sensibility of an intelligent subject." Gilson, *Arts of the Beautiful*, pp. 27, 29 and 182. See also, Sweeney, *A Metaphysics of Authentic Existentialism*, pp. 151-164. Also, Umberto Eco, *Il problema estetico in Tommaso d'Aquino*, Idee Nuove, 2nd edition (Milano: Valeriano Bompiani, 1970), pp. 39-68. This investigator traces some central notions regarding the concept of beauty from their early Medieval sources through Thomas Aquinas, thus touching upon the various currents which may have formed the background of John of the Cross' own understanding.

16. "...the beautiful belongs to the order of the transcendental s, that is to say, objects of thought which transcend every limit of genus or category, and which do not allow themselves to be enclosed in any class, because they imbue everything and are to be found everywhere. Like the one, the true and the good, the beautiful is being itself considered from a certain aspect; it is a property of being. It is not an accident superadded to being, it adds to being only a relation of reason: it is being considered as delighting, by the mere intuition of it, an intellectual nature. Thus everything is beautiful, just as everything is good, at least in a certain relation. And as being is everywhere present and everywhere varied the beautiful likewise is diffused everywhere and is everywhere varied. Like being and the other transcendentals, it is essentially analogous, that is to say, it is predicated for diverse reasons, sub diversa ratione, of the diverse subjects of which it is predicated..." Jacques Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism and the Frontiers of Poetry*, translated by Joseph W. Evans (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), p. 30.

"Beauty... belongs to all things which are, simply because they are. It comes not from any accidental adjunct but from the very inner being of what is.... Its degrees and kinds are determined only by the degrees of being. What is more perfectly real, more fully being, more complete in the order of existence is, by this very fact, more beautiful. In a word, the relation in which the beautiful stands to the perceiving subject is a metaphysical relation of the transcendental order.... Thus, beauty is a constituent of the real as such, part and parcel of whatever is." Phelan, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-168. "...the act of existing is the fundamental source not only of reality but of unity, of otherness, of intelligibility, of perfection, and of beauty as well.... But metaphysical transcendentals are nothing other than actually existing items immediately representing themselves within the human knower in their very actuality." Sweeney, *A Metaphysics of Authentic Existentialism*, p. 164. Further, "such existents establish the existence of an Existent Who by nature is Actuality, and thereby is subsistent Perfection, Order, Harmony, Clarity --in a word, Beauty..." *Ibid.*, p. 161.


20. For an elaboration of this topic see, for example, Dionysius the Areopagite, *On the Divine Names*, chapter IV, p. 77. Also, Jacques Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism and the Frontiers of Poetry*, p. 30 and corresponding notes. In Saint John of the Cross, see C,11,2; C, 36 and 37; L,3, 14 and 78. Cf. Ruiz Salvador, *op. cit.*, pp. 343-347, the chapter entitled "La hermosura de Dios." This author indicates that "revela el Santo, teólogo y místico, marcada preferencia por la hermosura divina." He also states that beauty is the divine attribute most often mentioned by John of the Cross, who also is consistent upon beauty being "el mismísimo ser de Dios, Dios Trinidad," revealed in his Son Jesus Christ. *Ibid.*, p. 345-346. See also, Crisólogo, *San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica...,* 2:56-60.
21. "...beauty is a constituent of the real as such, part and parcel of whatever is. Whence it follows that beauty must be analogically possessed by whatever may be said to be: primarily, therefore, of God; derivatively, of finite things." It is easy to understand that "God alone realizes in His essence the complete and absolute meaning of being and truth and goodness. All finite things are true and are good only by sharing, or, to use the correct technical term, participating in the Being, Truth and Goodness of God... By existing, by participating in the being of God, all finite realities are rendered analogous to Him, and specifically, their beauty is analogous to the beauty of the Creator." Phelan, *op. cit.*, pp. 168 and 179.

God is "beauty itself, because He gives beauty to all created beings, according to the particular nature of each, and because He is the cause of all consonance and all brightness. Every form indeed, that is to say, every light, is a certain irradiation proceeding from the first brightness, a participation in the divine brightness. And every consonance or every harmony, every concord, every friendship and every union whatsoever among beings proceeds from the divine beauty, the primordial and super-eminent type of all consonance, which gathers all things together and which calls them all to itself, meriting well in this the name *xaòs*, which derives from 'to call'. Thus, the beauty of anything created is nothing else than a similitude of divine beauty participated in by things, and, on the other hand, as every form is a principle of being and as every consonance or every harmony is preservative of being, it must be said that divine beauty is the cause of the being of all that is." Jacques Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism and the Frontiers of Poetry*, p. 31. Maritain refers us to Aquinas' *In Librum Beati Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus Expositio*, lectio 5.

The same theme appears in John of the Cross in SII,21,2; C,5,1-4; and C,6,1-2. "Mientras los místicos de la Edad Media concibieron el mundo como una escala, que remata en Dios --la scala paradisi de san Juan Climaco-- o como un sendero que lleva a él --el itinerarium de san Buenaventura--... san Juan de la Cruz concebía el mundo como

...bosques y espesuras
plantadas por la mano del Amado,
...prado de verduras
de flores esmaltado.

"...La creación será para él como un inmenso concierto, que las criaturas entonan al Creador; voces adornadas y armónicas, que cantan las perfecciones divinas... Es la concepción medio pitagórica, medio platónica, que san Juan de la Cruz debió de aprender de su maestro san Agustín; es la doctrina de los números concordes cristianizada en la Ciudad de Dios y que, iluminada con luces de misticismo, se convierte en música callada en el Cántico espiritual. Pero sobre esta belleza del mundo, hermosura nacida del ser, y que Dios comunicó a las cosas el día de la creación, san Juan de la Cruz descubre otra más alta, que, descansando sobre esa primera hermosura, es como un destello del orden hipostático, una nueva y superior configuración con Dios por la visión del Verbo. No fue sólo la humana naturaleza la que recibió el abrazo del Verbo en la Encarnación; toda la naturaleza fue elevada a ese orden...; ¡Hondo sentimiento del mundo y de la belleza!" Crisógono, *San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica...*, 2:315-317.

22. "Brilliant and luminous in itself, the beauty of being is seen by us only as it is reflected in participated essences of finite things. The dazzling splendor of its origin and source is knowable to our minds only by analogy and likeness. Yet, in the light of that revelation and the ineluctable joy it brings in its train, our spirit moves ever onward to a clearer, fuller, brighter vision which can find its final goal and plenitude only in the splendor of the countenance of God." Phelan, *op. cit.*, p. 166. How should we, then, "discover the realm where beau-
ty reigns supreme, where it is essential to existence? Turn, says St. Thomas, to the life of contemplation! In vita contemplativa quae consistit in actu rationis, per se et essentialiter, inventur pulchritudo. 'Ibid., p. 164. It is thus concluded that "beauty is per se and essentialiter to be found in the contemplative life." Ibid., p. 165. In the second citation, Phelan refers us to Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, II-II,180,2, ad 3. In Juan de la Cruz there are numerous texts on the revelation of God's beauty in contemplation. For example: C,8,5; C,11: 1,4,5,7,8 and 10; C,12,1; C,24, 1 and 6; C,36,5; L,1,31; L,2,21; L,3,72.


24. "...le véritable siège de la beauté, c'est la contemplation, et celle-ci est élevée au-dessus de toutes les formes limitées de ce monde." Von Balthasar, La gloire et la croix, part 2, 2:56. "...ce Dieu que ne peut adorer autrement que comme source de beauté." Ibid., p. 45. "...la source transcendente d'où procède la force inouïe de [son] lyrisme." Ibid., p. 46.


26. "...las canciones de San Juan de la Cruz... no parecen ya de hombre, sino de ángel .... Pero aun hay una poesía más angélica, celestial y divina, que no parece ya de este mundo, ni es posible medirla con criterios literarios, y eso que es más ardiente de pasión que ninguna poesía profana, y tan elegante y exquisita en la forma, y tan plástica y figurativa como los más sabrosos frutos del Renacimiento. Son las Canciones espirituales de San Juan de la Cruz.... Por allí ha pasado el espíritu de Dios, hermoseándolo y santificándolo todo." "La poesía mística en España," Edición nacional de las obras completas de Menéndez Pelayo, general editor Miguel Artigas; tome 7: Estudios y discursos de crítica histórica y literaria, edited by Enrique Sánchez Reyes (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1941), 2:69-110, pp. 94-97.

27. "...entre todos estos artistas en frenesi se adelanta sereno, imperturbable, un hombre, que avanza recto: no burila, no le importa la perfección formal, ni quizás sabe que es; no se detiene ni aun a coger una flor de su camino. Avanza irremisiblemente atraído por el centro obsesionante. Este hombre no es un artista, pero supera --aun en el arte que no se propuso-- a esos grandes artistas.

"Porque he aquí que entre todos los artistas en agonía de perfección no han creado nada, nada, que más secreta, que más exquisitamente nos perturbe que esos tres poemas, que esas dos coplas con su glosa. Su autor --ese hombre que avanza indiferente-- es un frailecico pequeño, casi «medio fraile», al que, digámoslo sin rebozo, le tenía sin cuidado el arte y aun el arte a secas. Lo único que le importaba era el amor de Dios.

"Esos poemas (el Cántico espiritual, la Noche y la Llama), esas coplas (Aunque es de noche y Tras un amoroso lance) son tales, que la literatura mundial no ha producido nada de una emanación más nostálgicamente perturbadora, donde cada palabra parece haber recibido plenitud de gracia estética, con una transfusión tal que nuestra alma, virginalmente oreada, impelida abrasadoramente, no ha sentido nunca más próximas las extremas delicias.

"Hemos aquí, pues, en el borde sobre el precipicio, empujados, sin posibilidad de retroceder: allá abajo es donde la razón humana se nos va a romper en mil partículas.

"No nos queda sino abandonarnos en los brazos de Dios. Y exclamar, como yo ahora exclamo:

"-¡Por San Juan de la Cruz, creo; creo en el prodigio!" "El misterio técnico de la poesía de San Juan de la Cruz," pp. 267-268.

In his first study on this subject, La poesía de San Juan de la Cruz, Dámaso Alonso attempted to examine from a literary and esthetic standpoint the formal structures of the
Sanjuanist lyrics. He proposed to offer some answers to the following questions: "¿En qué relación está la poesía de San Juan de la Cruz con la tradición literaria, inmediata o mediata, que existía en su tiempo? ¿En qué reside la fuerza de su prodigiosa virtualidad estética que aún hondamente, exquisitamente nos perturba?" (p. 19) After a detailed analysis and exposition of the elements, he concludes that "hemos llegado tal vez a determinar cuál es la principal diferencia que separa la magia suave, sedosa, prolongada, del estilo de Garcilaso, de la llama, rauda, veloz, dulcemente heridora, a ratos remansada en perfume y pausada música, del estilo de San Juan de la Cruz" (p. 194). He finds our poet to be "un consumado artífice, dueño del estilo, apreciador del matiz, sabio ordenador de la armonía y contraposición de las partes en el desarrollo del poema. Y todo en él trasciende a inspiración divina, si, pero también a técnica humana" (p. 95).

Some years later, however, Dámaso Alonso's assessment had changed somewhat. In "El misterio técnico de la poesía de San Juan de la Cruz," he no longer is of the opinion that the characteristics of the Sanjuanist lyrics can be fully attributed to the elements which are formally present in them. "Los pobres elementos ajenos, profanos, que... entran en abundancia a formar parte de ese cosmos, desde el momento que son allí asimilados, prodigiosamente se transforman, traspasados como de una ultraterrena luz irradiada que los glorificara aún en la mínima molécula. La poesía de San Juan de la Cruz es misteriosa como un aerolito. Es, en su origen, lo que los paganos llamaban pi?es, monstrum, «signo enviado por la divinidad»" (p. 270). Don Dámaso’s mature, conclusive judgment is that this poetry is beyond analysis. What we face, says the meticulous investigator with admiration and reverence, is a technical prodigy. Alonso thus qualifies in "El misterio técnico...," pp. 269-270, some of the evaluations expressed in his earlier work, La poesía de San Juan de la Cruz. This shift in his interpretation has been noted by Juan Luis Alborg, Historia de la literatura española, vol. 1: Edad Media y Renacimiento, 2nd edition (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1975), pp. 917-918.

28. Samuel Coleridge, Complete Works, edited by Professor Shedd, vol. 1: Aids to Reflection and the Statesman's Manual (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1868), p. 437. Although the literature on this subject is vast and diversified, this fundamental distinction between symbol and allegory is maintained among recent theoreticians of literature and among analysts of John of the Cross. "Desde Cleantes y a través de todos los tratadistas de retórica en las dos veces milenaria tradición grecolatina, «alegoría» vale tanto como metáfora continuada, tropo de sentencia por el que patentizamos un sentido recto y otro figurado. El texto entre uno y otro plano es siempre arbitrario, no necesario, intencional y tiene carácter práctico. Justamente en la intencionalidad y en el fin práctico se apoya la interpretación única que el autor y sólo él, que tiene la clave, puede aclarar." Francisco Ynduráin, "Mística y poesía en san Juan de la Cruz," Revista de literatura 5(1953)9-15, p. 11. "...la alegoría es una invención conceptual más o menos ingeniosa o, como se suele decir, «bien traída», y a su base es frecuente que se encuentre una teoría o, cuanto menos, la incoación de una posible teoría." Symbol, on the other hand, "es una imagen de la experiencia misma, surgida inmediatamente de la realidad profunda de lo vivido.... La correspondencia del símbolo es englobante y misteriosa; la de la alegoría, conceptual y enigmática, es decir, jeroglífica." José Luis Aranguren, San Juan de la Cruz, pp. 23-24. "There is no defined boundary between allegory and symbolism, but the area in which the division between them becomes most apparent is that of the relationship between the language as it appears in the work of literature and the meaning that language is intended to convey. In allegory there should be a one-to-one relationship between the image and the meaning it contains, and in order to follow the meaning of a work it is necessary to decode each image in turn, since it stands for something else which the author wanted to communicate. With symbolic language, no such procedure is possible, because the symbol acquires a life of its own and contains within itself various meanings and levels of understanding." Colin P. Thompson, The Poet and the Mystic: A Study of the "Cántico
"We would define the symbol as being a sign-image (at once Bild and Bedeutung): something sensible signifying an object by reason of a presupposed relationship of analogy." Jacques Maritain, *Ransoming the Time*, translated by Harry Lorin Binsse (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), p. 219. "Algebraic and logical «symbols» are conventional, agreed upon signs; but religious symbols are based on some intrinsic relation between «sign» and thing «signified»; metonymic or metaphoric: the Cross, the Lamb, the Good Shepherd. In literary theory, it seems desirable that the word should be used in this sense: as an object which demands attention in its own right, as a presentation." René Wellek and Austin Warren, *Theory of Literature* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949), p. 193.

"The four basic elements in our whole conception of metaphor would appear to be that of analogy; that of double vision; that of the sensuous image, revelatory of the imperceptible; that of animistic projection. The four in equal measure are never present: attitudes vary from nation to nation and aesthetic period to aesthetic period.... In the Baroque period, characteristic figures are the paradox, the oxymoron, catachresis. These are Christian, mystical, pluralistic figures. Truth is complex. There are many modes of knowledge, each with its own legitimacy. Some kinds of truths have to be stated by negation or calculated distortion. God can be spoken of anthropomorphically, for He made men in His own image; but He is also the transcendent Other. Hence in Baroque religion, truth about God may be expressed through analogical images (the Lamb, the Bridegroom); it may also be expressed through couplings of contradictories or contraries, as in Vaughan's «deep but dazzling darkness»." Wellek and Warren, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-203.


On the other hand, authors who specifically refer to the images of John of the Cross as metaphors are: Menéndez Pelayo, "La poesía mística en España," , pp. 97-98;
31. "Is there any important sense in which «symbol» differs from «image» and «metaphor»? Primarily, we think, in the recurrence and persistence of the «symbol». An «image» may be invoked once as a metaphor, but if it persistently recurs, both as presentation and representation, it becomes a symbol, may even become part of a symbolic (or mythic) system." Wellek and Warren, op. cit., pp. 193-194. The subject of the nature of metaphor has provoked a vast amount of discussion. A valuable introduction to the history of the concept and the particular problems it poses is Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, translated by Robert Czerny (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977). See the section titled, "Metaphor and analogia entis: onto-theology," pp. 272-280.

32. We are told that Juan de la Cruz makes use of "símbolos prototípicos que nunca se pueden reemplazar ni explicar por mejor método." Hatzfeld op. cit., p. 382. "La alegoría «quiere decir»; la poesía «dice».... Y así debemos entender simbólicamente, digo, poéticamen­te, toda la obra sanjuanista." Ynduráin, op. cit., p. 12. "...quizás haya que buscar la nota que mejor define la poesía de San Juan en su extraordinaria intensidad expresiva, ya que cada ima­gen y hasta cada palabra se halla tan cargada de lírico que ello produce por sí solo una ten­sión emocional y estética infinitamente superior a la que suscita el resto de la producción poe­tica de la época. A ello contribuye también el hecho de que San Juan no proceda siempre en su expresión de un modo discursivo, sino mediante una constante yuxtaposición de elementos poéticos de enorme densidad lírica, prescindiendo de nexos estéticamente neutros.... Tal vez estribe otro de los atractivos de esa poesía en la misteriosa sugestión que ejercen, gracias a su forzosa vaguedad e inconcreción, los elementos simbólicos utilizados, ausentes, por ejemplo, de la de Fray Luis de León, de contenido intelectual tan diáfano." José García López, Historia de la literatura española, 18th edition (Barcelona: Editorial Vicens Vives, 1972), p. 219. Dá­maso Alonso has examined the intensity of expression of the Sanjuanist lyrics from the stand­point of syntactical and grammatical factors. See "El misterio técnico de la poesía de San Juan de la Cruz," pp. 292-305. We shall again touch upon the stylistic qualities of Fray Juan's poetry in chapter IX.

Carlos Bousoño insists that our mystical poet's utilization of images constitutes a veritable innovation in the sphere of literature. This critic holds that John of the Cross "como poeta encontró algo que constituía nada menos que una genial revolución, sólo repetida en grande y de modo sistemático en la época contemporánea. Y ese algo que encontré fue nada menos que las imágenes visionarias y los símbolos; ello es, un nuevo concepto de poe­sía sea." Op. cit., p. 287. Bousoño finds that the Sanjuanist images have a unique ability to communicate various levels of meaning and to evoke emotional responses without first convey­ing conceptual clarity. However, in claiming that this utilization of language is without precede­nce, Bousoño overlooks the fact that Fray Juan found its model in Holy Scripture. As the Carmelite thinker himself states in the prologue to the Cántico, if his poems are not read "con la sencillez del espíritu de amor que ellas llevan, antes parecen dislates que dichos puestos en razón, según es de ver en los divinos Cantares de Salomón y en otros libros de la Escritura divina, donde, no pudiendo el Espíritu Santo dar a entender la abundancia de su sentido por términos vulgares y usados, habla misterios en extrañas figuras y semejanzas. C, Prologue, 1. Emphasis ours. Throughout the ages of Christian speculation, Scripture has been considered to have several levels of meaning, some of them not evident to the untrained eye. A basic work on this topic is Henri de Lubac, S.J., Exégèse médiévale: les quatre sens de l'Écriture, 2 parts, 4 vols. (Paris: Editions Aubier-Montaigne, 1959); see, particularly, 1:43-
169 and 2:489-681. On John of the Cross' own training in and practice of Biblical exegesis, see this same work by de Lubac, 4:500-505, as well as the previously cited work by Jean Vilnet. See also, below, note 34 for the rest of the text of the Cántico cited here, and also note 46 for a fuller presentation of Carlos Bousoño's thesis.

33. The poems of Juan de la Cruz "no están allí, sin más, absolutos, diciéndose a sí mismos: invitan a participar en ellos. ¿Y qué es esa participación sino el signo de aquella "poesía de los poetas" que, según decía Becquer, "adquiere las proporciones de la imaginación que impresiona"? San Juan de la Cruz, de un modo curiosamente coincidente con ese texto, escribe: "Los dichos de amor (sus Canciones) es mejor dejarlos en su anchura para que cada uno de ellos se aproveche (cada uno se aproveche de ellos --aclara García Diego--), según su modo y caudal de espíritu". Celaya, op. cit., p. 188. The cited text, which is from C, Prologue, 2, should read: "es mejor declararlos en su anchura."

Other critics who discuss the flexibility of meaning in the poems of San Juan are Guillén, op. cit., pp. 91-92; Mancho Duque, op. cit., passim; Lópeza-Baralt, op. cit., passim; and Thompson, op. cit., pp. 116-117. The qualities of the Sanjuanist lyrics that we have been discussing, such as their ability to convey various levels of meaning which will in turn vary somewhat from reader to reader, do not belong exclusively to this particular poetry. We are told, in fact, that the meaning of poetry, in general, "is its tension", the full organized body of all the extension and intensification that we find in it. The remotest figurative significance that we can derive does not invalidate the extensions of the literal statement.... The meaning that we select at different points along the infinite line between extreme intensification and extreme extension will vary with our personal «drive», or «interest», or «approach»." Allen Tate, "Tension in Poetry," Critiques and Essays in Criticism: 1920-1948, edited by Robert Wooster Stallman (New York: The Ronald Press, 1949), p. 60. What is unique to the work of John of the Cross is that these characteristics are present in his poetry in a most unusual and remarkable measure.

34. "Porque ¿quién podrá escribir lo que a las almas amorosas donde El mora hace entender?, ¿y quién podrá manifestar con palabras lo que las hace desear? Cierto, nadie lo puede; cierto, ni ellas mismas por quien pasa lo pueden; porque ésta es la causa por que con figuras, comparaciones y semejanzas, antes rebosan algo de lo que sienten y de la abundancia de el espíritu vierten secretos y misterios, que con razones lo declaran. Las cuales semejanzas no leídas con la sencillez del espíritu de amor e inteligencia que ellas llevan, antes parecen dislates que dichos puestos en razón, según es de ver en los divinos Cantares de Salomón y en otros libros de la Escritura divina, donde, no pudiendo el Espíritu Santo dar a entender la abundancia de su sentido por términos vulgares y usados, habla misterios en extrañas figuras y semejanzas.

"...Por haberse, pues, estas Canciones compuesto en amor de abundante inteligencia mística, no se podrán declarar al justo, ni mi intento será tal, sino sólo dar alguna luz general, pues V. R. así lo ha querido. Y esto tengo por mejor, porque los dichos de amor es mejor declararlos en su anchura, para que cada uno de ellos se aproveche según su modo y caudal de espíritu, que abreviarlos a un sentido a que no se acomode todo paladar; y así, aunque en alguna manera se declaran, no hay para qué atarse a la declaración, porque la sabiduría mística --la cual es por amor de que las presentes Canciones tratan-- no ha menester distingutamente entenderse para hacer efecto de amor y afición en el alma, porque es a modo de la fe, en la cual amamos a Dios sin entenderle." C, Prologue, 1-2.

35. "One can always find, corresponding to the poetry of every great poet, a more or less well-organized and well-formulated poetics, a general point of view about the poetry already written or still to be written. Even though San Juan de la Cruz does not refer to poetry by that name, in the prologue to his Spiritual Canticle we discover a complete poetics." Op. cit., p. 90.
36. "...lo que quiere expresar en realidad el autor es que sus versos rebosan lo que la letra doctrinal dilucida; que hay en ellos más, y que ese más es inefable, oscuro y no se entiende distintamente..." Carlos Bousoño, op. cit., pp. 186-187.

37. ¿No será la poesía, mediante metáforas y símbolos, el medio de expresión --una expresión necesariamente mancha pero sin embargo veraz-- de esas realidades que superan nuestras potencias intelectuales strictu sensu, conduciéndonos hacia las fronteras mismas del misterio, es decir, de realidades que sobrepasan esa línea? La poesía, pues, llega a tocar el misterio en su desbordante plenitud y babucir lo que puede de esta experiencia. Expresa, a través del símbolo y de la metáfora lo que por estructura propia es inasequible a la investigación racional; la auténtica poesía no es un contrafactum, una simple sustitución del sentido profano por un sentido sagrado. Todo lo contrario: Es una penetración real aunque parcial del misterio. Y el paradigma de todos los misterios es Dios. La metáfora, es pues una extensión del conocimiento, tomado en sentido amplio, que permite un «conocer» más allá de los límites de la razón discursiva..." "Conocimiento y metáfora en san Juan de la Cruz," pp. 597-598. Similarmente: "El papel de la metáfora es, por tanto, principalísimo; lo que el discurso racional es incapaz de explicar, los «desbordamientos» del poeta, son enigmas descifrables a través de la metáfora; los llega a «tocar»." Ibid., p. 597.

38. "There is a mysterious power in the mind, based on habit: the power of association. It belongs to the intellect, to imagination, to memory and to appetite, both volitional and sensory. It is chiefly in connection with memory that association is emphasized, and for which certain rules have been drawn up.... 1. (the law of similarity) that the mind in the presence of any mental state tends to reproduce the like of that state in past experience; 2. (the law of contiguity) that the mind in the presence of an object or event, whether actual or ideal, tends to recall other objects and events, formerly closely connected in space or time with that now present." John Duffy, C.Ss.R., A Philosophy of Poetry Based on Thomistic Principles (Washington. D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1945), pp. 174-175.

Wellek and Warren remark that in poetry using metonymy the "associational logic" which takes place is one "by contiguity, of movement within a single world of discourse," while in poetry using metaphor there is "association by comparison, joining a plurality of worlds, mixing, in the striking phrase of Buhler, a «cocktail of spheres»." Op. cit., pp. 199-200. The poetry of San Juan would certainly fall under the second category.

39. If the reader be a mystic, his or her extraordinary experiences as retained in memory are subject to being actualized anew. This applies to those supernatural communications originally received under the form of sensible phantasms and also to the fully spiritual ones, as the memory can retain them both. See chapter III of this study, notes 57 and 58, and corresponding text.

40. "Si la poesía actúa sobre la mente del lector sustituyendo o contagiando, en cierto modo, su pensamiento y percepción por aquéllos del poeta, en poeta alguno hallará el lector dificultad tanta para que tal hecho se verifique como en San Juan de la Cruz. Porque es necesario que exista cierta afinidad entre ambas mentes, la del poeta y la del lector, aunque en este último el proceso espiritual sea únicamente pasivo, dejando obrar sobre ella la mente activa del primero. ¿Y quién es hoy capaz, aunque sólo sea pasivamente, de acompañar en sus delirios a tan sobrehumano ser como San Juan de la Cruz?" Luis Cernuda, op. cit., p. 48.

41. "...una extensión del conocimiento." See above, note 37.
42. A critic who overlooks the archetypal, invariable character of the meaning conveyed by the Sanjuanist metaphors is Luce López-Baralt. This commentator takes her point of departure from the assumption that the mystical experience is a-rational, a-logical, nebulous, perplexing. *Op. cit.*, p. 28. This acute misunderstanding is widespread. One of its implications is that the experience of the mystic deprives man of one of his two most perfect acts, that of knowing. As we have seen throughout this study, nothing could be farther from the truth. There are several other basic misconceptions about mysticism and communication expressed in the article of López-Baralt. She holds, at any rate, that in order to communicate his experience, Juan de la Cruz "destruye la lengua unívoca y limitada de sus contemporáneos europeos y maneja una palabra que tiene que ensanchar infinitamente para hacerla capaz de la inmensa traducción que le exige" (p. 20). López-Baralt is of the opinion that San Juan succeeds in communicating the ineffable experience by means of "una lengua poética en total estado de disponibilidad," and by prose commentaries with tautological, circular propositions, in which "la lengua se cancela a sí misma porque regresa constantemente al punto de partida: San Juan cae en un panteísmo lingüístico que comienza a minar y a anular su lenguaje" (pp. 25 and 26). So much for San Juan having ever explained or taught anything to anyone! "A través de estas imágenes," she states, "de estos versos y de estas glosas de improbable intelectualidad --y esta vez, coherente-- metáfora total del estado animico de San Juan" (p. 28). "Con esto San Juan esta socavando la concepción tradicional del lenguaje. Su lengua no es tan sólo flexible y amplia sino sin límites. Las palabras pueden --al menos hipotéticamente-- tener cualquier significado. Estamos creando, conjuntamente con el poeta y por su propia sugerencia, un lenguaje infinito. Verdaderamente San Juan de la Cruz ha alcanzado el «lenguaje de Dios» que decía escuchar en el interior de su alma..." (p. 29). According to this interpretation, the highest mystical state is one of nebulousness. A similar nebulousness is what the author seeks to bring about in the reader, thus emulating the original experience. What concerns us most here, however, is that López-Baralt considers that in the response to the poetry the determining factors are exclusively those in the reader, who "re-creates" the meaning --rather, the meaninglessness-- in its entirety. In this analysis the objective factors of the poem, and even those of the prose, are fully denied.

43. "...no es un «zumbido armonioso», ni una rima espontánea y fugitiva, sino un objeto estable y resistente a los vientos de la fantasía." Celaya, *op. cit.*, p. 189. "...si el poema, en cuanto reviviscencia, puede resuscitar aquellos estados, puede... según su propia cronaxia, ordenarlos de un modo coherente, y dejarlos constituidos en algo que, por una parte, recuerda algo que se tuvo y se perdió --y ayuda así a mantenerlo y hasta a reconquistarlo--, y, por otra parte, apela a algo que no es una experiencia subjetiva, sino arquetípica, y tiene por eso el valor de ser algo estable y salvado de las inseguridades y los azares de la experiencia individual. En este sentido es objetivizante, y es --aunque esto, de entrada, indigne a muchos admiradores de nuestro autor-- una poesía didáctica." *Ibid.*, p. 191.

44. "...aunque en alguna manera se declaran [las Canciones], no hay para qué atarse a la declaración, porque la sabiduría mística --la cual es por amor de que las presentes Canciones tratan-- no ha menester distintamente entenderse para hacer efecto de amor y afición en el alma, porque es a modo de la fe, en la cual amamos a Dios sin entenderle." C, Prologue, 2.

45. For an example, we refer the reader again to the passage of Robert A. Herrera cited above in notes 37 and 41. See, also, chapter VI, notes 26 to 31 and corresponding text, wherein the stance of Carlos Disandro is synopsized.
46. Bousono comments upon this quality of the Sanjuanist lyrics as being a great literary novelty: "...bien claro nos dice San Juan, según venimos de subrayar, que sus líricos "dichos de amor" no han menester «distintamente entenderse». Ahora bien: no entenderse "distintamente" unosversos, unas imágenes, en el sentido preciso en que no se entienden de ese modo los versos y las imágenes de San Juan, era cosa nueva y nunca vista en la época que nuestro carmelita vive, y aún siglos después.... Porque San Juan de la Cruz es, rigurosamente, un poeta «contemporáneo».... En efecto: lo es, y lo es, repito, rigurosamente, pues San Juan cuando escribe sus versos los concibe de un modo idéntico en lo sustancial a como los concebía un poeta post-baudeleriano." Op. cit., pp. 287-288. "Frente a la poesía últimamente «racional» (en un sentido que antes precisábamos) de su tiempo, y del que le sigue durante tres centurias, la poesía últimamente «irracional» que San Juan nos ofrece. La primera, para ser disfrutada, y por tanto, para existir, requiere hacerse inmediatamente inteligible, en cuanto a lo que está expresando de la realidad. La segunda, la de San Juan (y la de los poetas «contemporáneos»), no necesita de tal requisito: hace efecto sin que averigüemos previamente la referencia «realista» (oculta \( a_1 a_2 a_3 \)) en que nuestra emoción, sin embargo, descansa, y de la que recibe el ser. Se trata, en verdad, de dos modos contrarios de arte. En uno, antes «sabemos» y luego nos emocionamos. En otro, nos emocionamos de entrada, y únicamente después, y por consiguiente, en un acto superfluo desde el punto de vista estético, podemos, si nos entra esa curiosidad, hallar las razones o apoyaturas realistas del sentimiento o intuición que se nos ha dado. En estilo más rápido y vulgarizador: toda la poesía, desde Homero hasta los románticos, inclusive, pide una clara comprensión de lo que se quiere decir lógicamente con ella. La de San Juan y los «contemporáneos» puede ser y es gozada sin ser, en ese sentido, «entendida». Es asombroso que San Juan, en el siglo XVI, haya podido ejecutar por sí solo tan gigantesca y radical enmienda a la estética de su momento histórico, vuelta por él rigurosamente del revés." Ibid., pp. 298-299. It is always dangerous to describe San Juan's poetry as "irrational." Bousono might have chosen a more appropriate adjective. However, he intends this remark in a very particular sense, which is satisfactorily explained and is acceptable.

47. "Poetry... is almost incredibly the outcome of figures of speech or, what is the same thing, the outcome of the operation of one imagination on another, through the instrumentality of the figures." Wallace Stevens, The Necessary Angel: Essays on Reality and the Imagination (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 117-118. "The representation of concrete, individual objects of beauty are conveyed to the imagination by the external senses, and stored away so that they remain long after the actual contact with external objects has ceased; moreover, owing to the fact that one image is rarely if ever isolated from others, the revival of one implies the recalling of a host of others. This dual function of the imagination, retentiveness and reproduction is of great importance in Esthetic." Callahan, op. cit., pp. 38-39. See also, Gilson, Arts of the Beautiful, pp. 28-29; and Duffy, op. cit., pp. 233-235. "Tolstoy is not alone in observing that the aesthetic experience comes with a sense of memory. There is an ease and familiarity about it, a feeling that it has happened before, that now the mind comes back home, a recovery of a lost learning." Gilby, op. cit., p. 52.

48. "...así como es bueno y necesario el medio para el fin, como lo son las imágenes para acordarnos de Dios y de los santos..." III,15,2. "...las imágenes son de gran provecho para acordarnos de Dios y de los santos y mover la voluntad a devoción usando de ellas... como conviene..." III,37,1. "...a algunas imágenes de Dios espíritu particular en ellas, de manera que queda fijada en la mente la figura de la imagen y devoción que causó, trayéndola como presente, y cuando de repente de ella se acuerda le hace el mismo espíritu que cuando la vio..." III,36,4.
49. Regarding objective qualities, some objects of religious art are described as being wrought "más al propio que otras." SIII,35,3. Similarly, a preference is expressed for works which "más se conforman con lo divino que con lo humano." Ibid., 5. At the same time, there are unfortunately those artisans "que hacen algunas [imágenes] tan mal talladas que antes quitan devoción que la añaden, por lo cual habían de impedir algunos oficiales que en esta arte son cortos y toscos...." SIII,38,2. The subjective factors operative in the esthetic response are recognized in the following text: "...muchas personas tienen devoción más en una hechura que en otras... así como a uno contentará más un rostro de una persona que de otra, y se aficionará más a ella naturalmente, y la traerá más presente en su imaginación, aunque no sea tan hermosa como las otras, porque se inclina su natural a aquella manera de forma y figura." SIII,36,5. See also the following note.

50. "...por estar unas más al propio que otras y excitar más la devoción unas que otras, conviene aficionarse más a unas que a otras..." SIII,35,6. "...las [imágenes] que más mueven la voluntad a devoción se han de escoger..." Ibid., 3. "La persona devota de veras... pocas imágenes ha menester y de pocas usa, y de aquéllas que más se conforman con lo humano que con lo divino, conformándolas a ellas y a sí en ellas con el traje del otro siglo y su condición y no con éste..." Ibid., 5.

51. See SIII,15,2; SIII,35,3; SIII,37,2.

52. "...antes parecen dislates que dichos puestos en razón." C, Proloque, 1. A stylistic analysis of the "Cántico espiritual," for example, concludes stating that "the poem... is precise in the choice of vocabulary, nouns, prepositions and greater symbols; it is compressed in the dense secondary symbols... it is affective in the choice of word order, chaotic enumeration, use of diminutives, use of breath taking dialogue in the first and second person verbs; it is non-informative remaining rather enigmatic in its many nuances of ambiguity; it is concrete as far as the central archetypal symbolism of bride and Groom is concerned; it is imaginative with the grouping and combination of non-related figures; it is spontaneous with the accumulation of nouns, verbs, and adverbs.... The sublimity of the mystical experiences hidden in the poetical lines called for a long and quiet contemplation expressed in chaotic-enumerative stammerings, since no human words can express the content of this contemplation as San Juan de la Cruz himself realized more than once in his attempt to explain it; finally the simplicity and directness of its already mentioned precise vocabulary, combined with the melodiousness and rhythm of its verse and the depth and multivalence of its symbols convey a definite sense of beauty unsurpassed in its lyricism by any Spanish poem." Rosa María Icaza, C.C.V.I., The Stylistic Relationship Between Poetry and Prose in the Cántico espiritual of San Juan de la Cruz (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1957), pp. 185-186. It is to be noted that in this evaluation the only negative characteristic of the "Cántico" is its non-informativeness or its conceptual vagueness. Regarding this quality of the Sanjuanist lyrics, see also below notes 56 and 57.

53. "...no necesita aclaraciones y vale por sí sola..." Ynduráin, op. cit., p. 12.

54. The work in prose "es para el autor de la experiencia y del poema conocido fracaso. En cambio, desde el plano del lector, aporta luz y contenido a la poesía, mejor dicho, descubre los ya existentes." Ruiz Salvador, op. cit., p. 117.

55. The commentary "va reduciendo con tenacidad a alegoría lo que es para nosotros símbolo, y por tanto, imprecisión y bruma." Bousoño, op. cit., p. 297. Similarly, Ynduráín, op. cit., pp. 11-12; Hatzfeld, op. cit., p. 361; Icaza, op. cit., p. 59; Guillén, op. cit., p. 105; Ruiz Salvador, op. cit., p. 118.
56. "...ocurre que alguna que otra estrofa del «Cántico espiritual» es poéticamente ininteligible, y, evidentemente, si no posee sentido poético, sólo puede tener, ya de arranque y desde su propósito inicial, el místico y teológico que San Juan le atribuye fuera de texto." Bousoño, op. cit., pp. 280-281. "Many of the symbols in the poem, «Cántico espiritual», either completely veil their deepest values within the pastoral atmosphere of the work, or they are utterly enigmatic even for a careful reader. Many critics, therefore, have vaguely sensed the beauty and forcefulness of the poem; but few, very few, would have been able to understand it without the invaluable prose commentary which San Juan de la Cruz himself wrote as an explanation of his poetry." Icaza, op. cit., p. 59.

57. Critics have asked themselves various times the following question: "¿Qué tenía San Juan en la cabeza cuando escribía esos desconcertantes fragmentos líricos? ¿El sentido místico o el poético?" Having analyzed the last stanza of the "Cántico" and pointed to its lack-of literal meaning, Bousoño answers the questions he has posed: "Si yo ahora he sacado a relucir ese fallo ha sido para hacer ver al lector que San Juan de la Cruz, cuando escribía la composición susodicha, y otras del mismo estilo, tenía en su mente, sin ningún género de duda, una traba de concepción de teología mística que se proponía exponer líricamente." Similarly: "Yo me hago la siguiente reconstrucción del acto creador de nuestro poeta. San Juan se halla en posesión, antes de empezar su poema, de una experiencia y teoría místicas perfectamente definidas, cuyo esquema general y a veces cuya condensación pormenorizada sigue en su trabajo lírico. De ahí que el hilo conductor del «Cántico» sea, en efecto, místico, no sólo para los comentarios, sino también para nosotros.... Más, sin perder de vista esa tesis, en lo que tiene de genérica ideación, y sobre todo, la experiencia de la que ella nacía, el enorme poeta que había en San Juan, con frecuencia... diríamos que trabaja por su cuenta, en relativo y sólo relativo olvido de la exigentísima determinación doctrinal, a la que no dejaba de tener presente, sin embargo, de un modo oscuro, remoto y como entreteñido. Y es esa libertad de entreteñido la que le permitía el vasto vuelo.... Y luego, una vez rematado el poema, vendría el momento de declararlo y precisarlo; eso es, de retrotraerse y retornar a su intencional origen, previo al acto poético creador, para lo cual era necesario aprisionar cada figura retórica y aun cada palabra en un alvéolo lógico que, en relación con otros, le infundiese doctrina coherente." Op. cit., pp. 280, 282 and 285-286.

Jorge Guillén is of a similar understanding: "It is incredible, but true: all this lyricism conceals another side which is meticulously reasoned out.... The poem unfolds as if it were invariably subservient to the most calculatedly premeditated allegory.... This correspondence between image and meaning rests on a rational foundation.... This mutual adaptation of the poetic and the nonpoetic, which are fitted together so logically, is constant." Op. cit., pp. 105-106.

Dámaso Alonso's opinion, on the other hand, differs from Bousoño's and Guillén's: "Los comentarios, ¿son una interpretación a posteriori, para ajustar el ímpetu lírico a rigurosas líneas doctrinales, o es que su sentido concreto estaba presente al poeta en el momento de la creación?.... Por lo que respecta al «Cántico»... no podemos dudar del ya inicial sentido místico del poema. Pero yo creo que su alegoría nació, sí, según los grados de la escala mística, mas sólo con la vaguedad alusiva del ámbito lírico en el momento del impulso creador. La interpretación concreta y pormenorizada fue, sin duda, un razonador y lento trabajo a posteriori." La poesía de San Juan de la Cruz, p. 205

The issue as to whether the "first impulse" was doctrinal or esthetic is a difficult one to ascertain. Being in essence an historical question, perhaps it cannot be answered definitively. It must be conceded to Dámaso Alonso's thesis that lyrical creativity devoid of spontaneity would seem to be an impossibility. However, it is not quite feasible to think, as Alonso suggests, that the exigencies of the doctrine were not considered until the poems were fully
composed. Fray Juan's mystical theology, even in the first redactions of the Cántico and the Llama, is too intelligible and well developed for the order of its exposition to have been determined extrinsically by the need to follow the lines of an independently composed poem. It should be kept in mind that San Juan's poems were not written overnight, a fact which may shed some light on the issue. "Cántico A" was composed throughout several months of imprisonment in Toledo and retained at first in memory. Thus, even if the first creative moment was more of a spontaneous overflowing of the spirit than an outline of a doctrine, the circumstances of its origin would have allowed for a series of accommodations of the inclinations of the poet to the demands of the theologian. In other words, before he settled on what became the first written version of the "Cántico," Fray Juan would have toiled at the task until he had produced a lyrical structure which he deemed to be satisfactory artistically, as well as apt to symbolize the intended mystical or doctrinal meaning. It could be that a similar set of accommodations took place in the composition of the "Llama."

An author who has gathered the extant documentation concerning the birth of the "Cántico espiritual" is Eulogio de la Virgen del Carmen, O.C.D. See his San Juan de la Cruz y sus escritos (Madrid: Ediciones Cristiandad, 1969), the chapter entitled "Explosión poética en Toledo," pp. 99-150. Writing a few years later under the name Eulogio Pacho, the same author broaches again the subject in Vértice de la poesía y la mística: el «Cántico espiritual» de San Juan de la Cruz, "Proceso redaccional del «Cántico»," pp. 13-40. On the same topic, see also Roger Duvivier, La genèse du «Cantique Spirituel» de saint Jean de la Croix (Paris: Société d'Editions Les Belles Lettres, 1971).

58. Thomas Gilby enumerates several characteristics of discursive knowledge, which he also refers to as "the ordinary activity of reason:" (1) "Rational activity is primarily occupied with generalities --universals, to use the scholastic term.... The concrete is the thing, rounded and whole; the abstract is the meaning, the significant form." (2) "The reason is not in close natural contact with things, but is related to them through a representation or thought....." (3) "The mind is not entirely at rest in thinking about things. The pattern-making part may be satisfied, the part that plays chess, postulates scientific theories, works out theorems, exposes structures and establishes necessary principles. There is pleasure in possessing some of the truth. But the mind must go deeper even than the science of metaphysics for complete content. Truth, accurate and certain, is to be found in this conceptual knowledge, but it is, so to speak, half-truth, a formal and therefore a part-truth, not immediately commensurate with the whole substance of a thing." Op. cit., pp. 4, 7 and 8-9.

Within discursive knowledge "there is a succession of cognitive acts representing the various notes of an object, and their unification through relations being established between them." This form of knowing is described as being "at the opposite pole" from intuitive knowledge, such as is had in either the esthetic or the mystical experience. Callahan, op. cit., p. 42. Another speculator on these matters tells us that "poetic knowledge," by which he means the knowledge acquired through an artistic representation, "is placed last in an order that goes from demonstrative, through dialectical and rhetorical, to poetic argumentation.... This gradation of knowledge can be observed by noting the difference between what is grasped in truly scientific knowledge and what is grasped in poetic knowledge. The scientific universal is attained by abstraction inasmuch as it is removed from matter. Indeed, the more universal, the more necessary, the more removed from material singularity, the more scientific knowledge is. In this respect, the universal of poetic knowledge is inferior. It is a universal that does not, in a sense cannot, depart from matter, from the singulaires of sense. It is a universal wedded to matter; under no condition could it be divorced from singular matter as known by the senses. Furthermore, the scientific universal is indifferent to the mode by which it is expressed.... Such knowledge would fare better if it could by-pass the ambiguity and inadequacy latent and inevitable in verbal expression. In poetic communication, however, the form of verbal expres-
sion matters completely. The very imperfection of language turns out to be a condition of poetic excellence and charm, by the skillful use of that indispensable poetic instrument, the metaphor. Yet the metaphor seduces the human intellect, in so far as it seeks scientific knowledge, by turning it aside from its quest for the literal grasp of truth." This author also remarks that "though it is the death of logic, the metaphor is the life of poetry." John A. Oesterle, "Our Poetic Knowledge," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 29(1955)86-99, pp. 92-93 and 99, note 27.

59. "Un gran intelectual místico como es San Juan de la Cruz utiliza en su obra el estilo metafísico y el estilo poético.... El lenguaje metafísico apunta directamente al contenido revelándolo y sacándolo a la luz adecuadamente, con claridad y determinación.... Esta determinación en el verdadero lenguaje científico llega a tener una precisión técnica. Ahora bien, para llegar a tener esa claridad, determinación y precisión técnica, el lenguaje metafísico ha tenido que coger una palabra del uso vulgar y darle un sentido metafísico o revelar con claridad el sentido metafísico que había en ella. Así, por ejemplo, «intuición», que parte de la visión sensible inmediata. «Sustancia», que parte de la expresión vulgar de «lo que está debajo.... No llegará a comprender con claridad y determinación el valor técnico metafísico de estas palabras aquel que no llegue a descubrir el sentido metafísico de la palabra procedente del uso vulgar. En todo caso, se quedará con una comprensión vaga y oscura. El lenguaje místico se vale de este estilo directo, metafísico. Así, por ejemplo, al describir las características de la contemplación en la *Noche*, las palabras del místico, sin rodeos de símbolos, apuntan directamente a un contenido, y estas palabras pueden llegar a tener una precisión técnica.... Aquí sucede algo parecido a lo indicado en la descripción del lenguaje metafísico, aunque en un nivel más profundo. Para aquel que no haya llegado a «percibir el contenido», el sentido de estas palabras, es decir, para aquel que no haya llegado a tener la experiencia mística, dichas palabras resultarán oscuras, aunque siempre podrá tener una comprensión oscura y general debido a la analogía o semejanza que existe entre las ideas metafísicas que significan estas palabras en el lenguaje de la experiencia ordinaria: «noticia», «contemplación», «inteligencia», «generalidad», etc. y los contenidosísticos a los cuales apuntan directamente. Puede, pues, este lenguaje directo llamarse metafísico en un sentido relativo, pues para el que no haya tenido la experiencia carece de la claridad y determinación propia del estilo metafísico, aunque sigue teniendo un gran valor indicativo, pero oscuro y general." Urbina, *op. cit.*, pp. 244-245.

60. "...allá en las cimas del otero, morir es vivir, la llama abrasa regaladamente, perderse es ganarse, abatirse es subir a los astros, ignorar trascender toda ciencia." Dámaso Alonso, *La poesía de San Juan de la Cruz*, p. 117.


62. "...los deseos, afectos y gemidos..." C,2,2. "...las jerarquías y coros de los ángeles..." Ibid. 5.

63. "Dios en su único y simple ser es todas las virtudes y grandezas de sus atributos: porque es omnipotente, es sabio, es bueno, es misericordioso, es justo, es fuerte, es amoroso, etc., y otros infinitos atributos y virtudes que no conocemos; y, siendo El todas estas cosas en su simple ser, estando El unido con el alma... echa de ver distintamente en El todas estas virtudes y grandezas, conviene saber, omnipotencia, sabiduría, bondad, misericordia, etc. Y
como cada una de estas cosas sea el mismo ser de Dios que es el Padre o el Hijo o el Espíritu Santo, siendo Dios infinita luz y infinito fuego (como arriba queda dicho), de aquí es que en cada uno de estos innumerables atributos es una lámpara que luce al alma y da calor de amor." L,3,2.

It is interesting to note that in the first redaction of the Llama the text we have just cited appears as follows: "Y como quiera que cada una de estas cosas sea el mismo ser de Dios en un solo supuesto suyo que es el Padre o el Hijo o el Espíritu Santo..." In the second redaction, the phrase "en un solo supuesto" has been deleted. It would seem that Fray Juan's first inclination was to include this phrase as a means of stressing the unity and indivisibility of God's nature, whereas after further reflection he concluded that the term "supposit" should not be used after all to designate God's uncreated Being. We thus observe progression and refinement in our author's formulation as he moves from the first to the second prose redaction.

64. "...las cosas inmensas esto tienen, que todos los términos excelentes y de calidad y grandeza y bien le cuadran, mas ninguno de ellos le declaran, ni todos juntos." C,38,8.

65. "El comentario, como suele, va reduciendo con tenacidad a alegoría y nítida delimitación lo que es para nosotros símbolo, y por tanto, imprecisión y bruma. Ciertamente, entendemos el poema como un poema místico.... Pero, ello, sin esa cisoria determinación a que San Juan, cuando habla desde la doctrina, acostumbra, y sin esa parcelación diferenciadora y miembro a miembro que caracteriza a la alegoría y no al símbolo." Bousoño finds, further, that "la versión en prosa es por demás severa en su concreción y rigor." Op. cit., pp. 297 and 286.

"...the poem «Cántico espiritual» is indeed a work of art, while the corresponding prose commentary is primarily a didactic treatise. It actually has many of the characteristics of direct prose composition; for example, the commentary is... informative in the numerous and detailed identifications, in didactic distinctions grafted on the poetic symbols which are strangely forced and split up, in the creation of new merely explanatory similes; it is abstract with the use of general and theoretical terms; it is logical with scholastic distinctions, word order... and crystal-clear presentation of ideas; it is systematized with definite enumerations, and richly graded subordinations. The clarity of the theological truths expounded in the prose commentary together with the precise statements for the requirements that led to the reception of such great mystical gifts are meant to incite to action; and finally the explicit and direct analysis, the elaborated didactic allegories, the scholastic, and at the same time rhetorical, language bring to the fore, as far as possible in human reasoning not only the sublime truths of faith, but particularly the mysteries of the Divine Life within the soul..." Icaza, op. cit., pp. 187-188.

"El estilo erudito y clarificador de la Llama es definitivamente hipotáctico, gradual y global, pero sencillo." Hatzfeld, op. cit., p. 397. See also, Ruiz Salvador, op. cit., pp. 121-122, where he speaks of a quality of "transparencia" displayed by San Juan's prose, which co-exists alongside a certain elasticity according to which "el contexto, el ritmo, la disposición de ánimo nos descubren el significado de cada momento preciso."

66. "Y si tienes más dudas, no sé qué te diga, sino que lo vuelvas a leer; quizás lo entenderás, que dicha está la sustancia de la verdad..." L,3,75. Some critics, however, are reluctant to admit to these qualities of clarity and precision in the Sanjuanist prose. We cite some assessments which are at odds with the evaluations presented in the previous note. Luce López-Baralt is of the opinion that the prose commentaries confound rather than clarify the meaning of the poetry. See her article "San Juan de la Cruz...", particularly pp. 21 and 26, as well as note 42 of the present chapter. Along similar lines of reasoning José María Valverde makes the following comments: "...hay un cambio como de la noche al día al pasar de la poesía [de San
Juan de la Cruz... a la prosa, que, en un primer choque, puede parecer que no dice nada, hasta que poco a poco se advierte que lo que ocurre es precisamente que dice nada, que es una pura transparencia sobre una negrura cada vez más absoluta. Estéticamente, su poesía nos enriquece y su prosa nos empobrece. Por lo menos en un sentido provisional en que «estética» haga alusión a lo sensorial, a lo imaginativo. Hay, en suma, dos lenguajes distintos, diametralmente opuestos, de creación el uno y de aniquilación el otro, aunque secretamente se armonicen detrás de todo..." Op. cit., pp. 206-207. While the poetry creates a cosmos with its own alluring beauty, "en la prosa no hay tal recreación interina de mundos mágicos." The prose is seen as composed "no para un logro, sino para una renuncia progresiva, que sólo muy posteriormente -quizás nunca en esta tierra-- se trocará en enriquecimiento... Entonces el lenguaje tiene dos campos, o dos escapatorias acaso, concordes con su contrariedad diametral: el de la autoaniquilación y el del simbolismo. O la palabra se va borrando a sí misma, a medida que se escribe, gritando su invalidez con más fuerza que su propio sonido, quedándose en puras negaciones, en términos de privación, de carencia, de ignorancia; o bien, en lugar de lanzarse al agua y ahogarse, emprende el rodeo que cerque indefable, y crea símbolos..." Ibid., pp. 209-210.

Would Juan de la Cruz be so impractical as to write seven treatises if there were nothing to be gained from them, if everything expressed had to be simultaneously denied? A distinction which should be made, however, regarding the propositions formulated in the prose, is that while they are maintained to be true and accurate, San Juan warns us that the forms under which we can conceive some of these truths are improper and disproportionate to the realities in question. The same holds true of the propositions which express the dogmas of faith, as Fray Juan also points out. Cf. above, chapter IV, p. 77.


68. Fr. Crisórgono has composed a worthy stylistic analysis of San Juan's prose works, in which he stresses that there is a sustained parallelism between style and subject matter in each of them, for the tone becomes loftier and more poetic as the author progresses from the Subida through the Llama. "La Subida, cuyo objeto es la negación activa llevada a cabo en fuerza de una severa disciplina intelectual, que no consiente transigencias, y que el Maestro quiere imponer no por la autoridad de su palabra sino por el vigor de sus razones, es un libro que tiene que parecerse a una rigurosa explicación de cátedra, en la cual todo se sacrifica a la claridad del discurso y a la fuerza del raciocinio. Por eso el autor procede casi al modo escolástico." In the next work, the Noche oscura, although the author appears "llano al principio de la obra, va elevándose conforme el espíritu sube la misteriosa «escala de amor», que allí se pinta; parece violento y atormentado describiendo las negras torturas del alma en el seno de aquella honda tiniebla sustancial, y va al fin adquiriendo tintes de aurora, luces de sol naciente, a medida que el alma sale de aquel fuego limpia y hermosa, vestida con traje de bodas, con los ojos claros y radiantes como estrellas y la frente tersa, iluminada con resplandores de gloria." San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica..., 2:163 and 171.

69. "...aunque a V. R. le falte el ejercicio de teología escolástica... no le falta el de la mística..." C, Prologue, 3. See also note 2 of the present chapter.

70. "Diríase que el autor [del Cántico] no es el de los aforismos de la Subida, y que es imposible que la pluma que trazó la áspera y escabrosa senda del Monte haya podido escribir las ternezas del Cántico espiritual. Pero el autor no hizo más que dar al pensamiento la propia forma; y si el estilo del Cántico es más delicado, es porque lo son también las ideas y el sentimiento.... Por eso el estilo del Cántico es figurado y esplendido. Cargado de imágenes, casi deslumbra la fantasía, y si no llega a deslumbrarla del todo es porque son tiernas, de-
licadas, casi nunca muy vivas. Si en las ideas y el sentimiento nos parece ver a la esposa, su estilo viene a ser como el manto de bodas que sobre ellos tendió el autor, manto elegante y magnífico, transparente como una gasa, blanco y hermoso como tejido con colores de aurora." Crisógono, San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica..., 2:174-175.

71. "...los dichos de amor es mejor declararlos en su anchura..." C, Prologue, 2.

72. "...muy noble y devota señora..." L, Prologue, 1. The name of the lady in question is doña Ana de Peñalosa.

73. "...esta prosa, a pesar de ser clara y lógica, es una prosa arrebatada." Hatzfeld, op. cit., p. 359.

74. "...esthetic pleasure is admirably adapted to the nature of man. While sensuous pleasures affect only the lower part of his nature, neglecting the intelligence and will; and the more austere delights prompted by the love of the good and the true touch only the superior nature; the joy which arises from contemplation of beauty fills the whole man. In a word, the esthetic sentiment is not only complete, but is essentially human." Callahan, op. cit., p. 51.

75. Valverde rightly comments that "los veneradores poéticos de San Juan de la Cruz suelen ver su prosa como algo subsidiario, salpicado, acá y allá, de momentos luminosos y felices, pero difícilmente transitable y participable a todo lo largo y seguido. Por el contrario, no faltan quienes hayan encontrado en la prosa de San Juan de la Cruz uno de los hechos fundamentales de su formación personal, admirando, en cambio, su poesía de un modo más distanciado y exterior." Op. cit., p. 208. The difference in appreciation is rooted in the individual's sensibility and intellectual capacities, which spontaneously incline him to seek being under one or another of its fundamental modalities. This is always the case behind each of the "great human activities, such as science, philosophy and ethics. The pure true, sought and embraced for its own sake; the pure good, willed as unconditionally desirable, because it is good; unity and order pursued and observed in all domains for their own sake --these are, so to speak, so many ontological modalities. The beautiful is another.... The «beautiful» is neither the «true» nor the «good», it can substitute for neither one, but both need it in order to win access to the hearts of men." Gilson, Arts of the Beautiful, p. 182. A sensibility oriented toward the esthetic modality may be behind the following remarks. In discussing the relative worth of the two genres utilized by San Juan, a critic states that "el poema está más cerca de la experiencia indecible. En este sentido, los admirables comentarios son una obra fracasada; pero en el más gigantesco, genial empeño.... Nunca más cercano a la «confusa y oscura noticia», nunca más claro el divino balbucir, que en el poema. ¡Alta gloria haberse acercado oscuramente hasta el misterio, como nunca con voz de hombre, en el poema; haber intentado escudriñar claridades, como nadie, como nunca, en el comentario! La gloria de la poesía --repito-- consiste en ser la única articulación de la lengua humana que puede aproximarse algo a los misterios de la Divinidad. Las verdaderas cimas místicas de San Juan de la Cruz no las tenemos en sus comentarios, sino en sus poemas." Dámaso Alonso, La poesía de San Juan de la Cruz, pp. 219-221. There are those who for other reasons and from a different perspective would invert the terms of this proposition.
CHAPTER IX

METAPHORICAL RECAPITULATION, OR "POESIA A LO HUMANO"

The friar from Fontiveros was solitary, modest, humble; he had no interest in receiving recognition from the community of men. Gifted with a fecund imagination and a lyrical nature, he expressed his sufferings and joys in verses which he sang spontaneously in the dismal cell of Toledo, and along the roads of Castilla and Andalucía. Yet is no less true that he considered himself to have a social function, an "oficio" to use his own term, that of practitioner of souls, of teacher, of spiritual guide. For this reason he channeled the lyricism of his soul as well as his other talents towards this noble end, endeavoring to produce a work suited to edify and to lead. His poems came into existence as spontaneous outpourings, but their commentaries were composed obligingly at the request of others. With the same purpose of instructing appropriately, his poems were revised some time after their composition, and their commentaries underwent second redactions. It was in the same spirit of service, and for no self-centered finality, that he acceded to undertake the reform of his Order. His work viewed globally --poetry, commentaries, reform, direction of souls--, in conjunction with its historical fruits, exemplify an instance par excellence of the almost unfathomable paradox of the fecundity of the contemplative life.

In the previous chapter we spoke of a complementarity between the Sanjuanist poetry and prose. It should be specified here that the two genres are not complementary in the simple sense that they both operate in different ways towards the same end. Rather, between the effects of the one and those of the other there is a compounding reciprocity which urges the reader continually onward. We have all heard Juan de la Cruz's lyrics referred to as a "poesía a lo divino," and with respect to their subject matter they certainly are. However, regarding their felicitous adaptation to human cognitive and affective processes, they can be considered in the same measure a "poesía a lo humano." This may be affirmed because it is a poetry which by its very balance between emotions aroused and intelligibility conveyed, between symbol and symbolized, spurs the reader on to seek a deeper comprehension. That fuller understanding is to be found, as we have seen in the previous chapter, in the commentaries. The latter, in turn, are also well suited to the task of moving the reader ever onward, for they retain some of the emotional intensity of the poetry and the awesome presence of its central symbols. The prose is necessarily analytical and abstractive, yet it does not dissipate the sense of wonder, the longing to contemplate, the desire to share in the original experience. The reader of the Sanjuanist treatises characteristically returns to the poetry better prepared to delight in it and to be uplifted by it.

In the construction of this literary totum which leads from one genre to the other and back, we see San Juan's genius as a pedagogue; as one who, in fact, continues to perform his educative function generation after generation through the writings he left behind. Throughout this final chapter we shall look at some of the qualities which make his lyrics a poetry delighting, captivating, and ever inviting to return. We shall likewise examine the reciprocity between the poetry and the prose, a prose which in its ancillary role of elucidating lends to the poetry some of its "a lo humano" quality, its ability to fulfill an entire range of human cognitive and affective powers. For it is the prose that prepares for the fuller grasp of the sublime lyrics, wherein all is metaphorically recapitulated, and all is made humanly present.
The Poetry: Meaning and Feeling in Equilibrium

Juan de la Cruz is well aware that all human cognition with the exception of the highest form of mystical knowledge is tied to the phantasm; and further, that to the degree to which the phantasm is abstracted from, as in conceptual knowledge, there is a distancing from the understood subject as an existent reality. This distancing hinders an emotional or affective response, for we are made to know and love things as whole, concrete entities. The majority of human beings do not respond to abstractive propositions alone, no matter how much they accord with reason. Thus in his poetry our author presents subjects under the forms of carefully selected material images, which the mind retains even though it also has a grasp of the symbolized meaning. Luis Cernuda remarks that the Sanjuanist lyrics are like a pool of clear water, in which the reader sees on the surface a faithful reproduction of the image of the world familiar to him, and simultaneously, beneath this image, the depth of the water, which appears to him different and mysterious. Perhaps it is not erroneous to consider these lyrics from this secular or profane perspective, for the reader always does assume, behind the earthly beauty which delights him, the unfathomable depth upon which it lies suspended.

The material images, particularly those which constitute the central symbols, are indeed retained by the reader with all of their earthly beauty and emotional force. They do not fade even after an extensive conceptual comprehension has been acquired from the study of the prose. This effect is not brought about by chance, but by a technique of insistence in which certain symbols are reiterated, sustained throughout several stanzas and even carried from one poem to another. The same insisted upon symbols are retained as images in the prose, and appear side by side with the literal statements. In the final analysis, "impurity enriches."

As mentioned earlier, Jean Baruzi describes the Sanjuanist core symbols as stellar nuclei which radiate forth secondary images. The latter preserve some of the essential characteristics of the parent symbol, while being more easily translatable into concepts. Said investigator considers the core symbols to have been conceived in the mystical experience itself, or to have been mysteriously one with it. Thus he does not hesitate to speak of the mystical union as a "symbolic experience." We have indicated that this position implies an immanentization of the mystical communion with God. However, what Baruzi holds is applicable to the experience of the reader as reader, if not to that of the author. The venture of the mystic as lived in us, his non-mystic readers, including Jean Baruzi, can indeed be considered a "symbolic experience." Regardless of the degree of conceptual comprehension attained, the ascetico-mystical ascent remains a dark night; the early stages of contemplation resemble the breaking of dawn; the mystical communion is an amorous encounter in a magical pastoral setting; the divine nature dwelling in the soul at the term of the ascent blazes and emits warmth as would a fire.

San Juan de la Cruz did not have to convey these issues in this manner. Other speculators have deliberately presented mystical questions in terms which prescind from imagery more than San Juan does in his prose, and incomparably more than in his poetry. It is undeniable that our understanding is always linked to phantasms to a greater or lesser degree. By means of his particular literary style, Juan succeeds in assuring that the tie to the phantasm be strong, that the image stay forcefully in the foreground of the mind. The effect is deliberate, brought
about in view of its psychological consequences. The Sanjuanist poetic image is ubiquitous and resilient. The purpose of its strength is that man's emotions and memorative powers be touched.

However, San Juan's lyrics also convey and evoke a certain amount of intelligibility, which along with the images as sensible entities, draw the mind toward the represented realities. Given man's psychological composition, it is desirable in view of San Juan's practical finality to simultaneously communicate sensorial and conceptual elements. Critics have in fact pointed to a masterful balance between these two elements within the Sanjuanist poems. As Cernuda states, there is the surface of the water with its reflected translucent images, and at once the configurations in the depth of the pool. Hatzfeld, reflecting along these same lines, has referred to our author as "the Spanish realist Juan de la Cruz."

Speaking of how the imagery is handled in the third stanza of the "Llama de amor viva," said critic remarks:

"returning to the poem itself, we make the surprising discovery that this symbol, in its essential indissolubility, maintains the caverns and the spiritual sense of the soul in an equilibrium between concretion and abstraction, an equilibrium which is the basis of all classicism, of all paradox, of all the great religious texts, of all poetry. Here, it is never a question of concrete caverns or a concrete well, nor inversely of abstract capacities and faculties, but of caverns of the spiritual sense. And it is exactly this abstract/concrete fusion of the symbol and the sense symbolized that leads the poem its awesome excellence."

This theme of equilibrium in San Juan's poetry makes its appearance in other literary critics. Eugenio D'Ors contrasts John of the Cross' accomplished lyrics with a type of "anti-intellectual" poetry, an example of which had been the medieval "cantigas de amigo" and which was again coming into prominence during the Baroque. Such poetry combines imagery and rhythm in a way that rouses the emotions of the reader to the point of having an entrancing or bewitching effect. Such poetry creates an atmosphere to which "everything conceptual is foreign. It begins and ends without any other figurative intervention than that of natural elements in interplay with emotional elements." In the poetry of the Castilian friar, on the other hand, the rational element is never absorbed by emotion or rapture. It contains "no Buddhic element, to put it that way; no inclination towards nirvana; no silence imposed upon beings and the world of nature in this poetry whose Baroque characteristics are only incipient, and which do not even corrode the exterior, as we find, earlier, in the Quietists, and later, in some Romantics, such as Novalis."

John of the Cross desires to bring about an emotional response and to elicit an affective movement. The ultimate finality of his poetry is no different than that of any other religious art, "to move the will to devotion." He realizes that volition is always conditioned by the content of cognition and generally bears some relation to an emotional state. He is further aware that if cognition is too abstractive the knowing subject may remain untouched emotionally; whereas, on the other hand, forms of communication which partake of the sensible bear the danger of limiting the act of cognition to the perceptible realities apprehended. When speaking of exposure to the visual arts, San Juan warns against esthetic experiences which do no more than "to immerse the sensible part of man," which drown the subject in the immediate apprehension and emotional response to the artifact as sensible entity.

In his own artistic production he must therefore avoid the double danger of forging an expression which would seem foreign to most men --it could be exceedingly abstract, or
obscure, or stark, or even conceptually too simple--; and on the other hand, of causing an emotional state so overwhelming as to be devoid of cognitive content. Given the practical finality intended, there must be communicated to the reader objects which are known as present, as whole, as delighting and at once intriguing; and thus the pervasiveness throughout his poetry of the material image. Simultaneously, there must be a certain amount of intelligible content; thus the conceptual clarity of some of his minor poems, such as "Que bien sé yo la fone que mana y corre," "Tras de un amoroso lance," the "romances" and "coplas;" and the great symbolic depth of the three major poems, the extensive meaning of which, though obscure, is apprehended and retained by each reader according to his or her capacities. There is thus a sustained balance between the elements inducing emotion and those communicating meaning, without either one being present to an extreme degree or in an exclusive manner.

The Prose: Conditioning the Poetry Reader

In the response to the poetry, however, the act of loving is proportionate to the act of knowing. As we have said various times, volitional response is formally dependent upon intellectual conditioning. Juan de la Cruz knows that each reader of his poems will understand them according to his pre-existing capability. He is not content with this prospect alone, though, for if a reader's ability to comprehend them is drastically limited, the desired movement of love of God will not be elicited. The purpose of his prose works is precisely to expand the subject's comprehension of both the mystical communion and the means to it, so that upon returning to the poetry his response will be all the fuller and richer and in greater accord with the author's finalities.

Jorge Guillén has observed that the poetry takes on unexpected dimensions when it is approached with even a slight understanding of the true subject matter.

The mere knowledge that the author wishes to express something else, and that this purpose is based on a profound experience, is enough to cause the formation of a sort of spiritual accompaniment, though not a conceptual one. An air is insinuated into the verses that gives them a significance at once human and divine. Everything appears circled by a halo, and a mysterious reality maintains communication with the first horizon, which, whether nocturnal or diurnal, is always extremely human. The three poems then are enfolded in an atmosphere that would be very difficult to disperse, and a substantial resonance is added to the song of love.13

The deeper the understanding of the "something else" which the author is attempting to express, the greater is the transcendence which the lyrics acquire. The assimilation of the author's prose writings, wherein his thought and the meaning of his poetry are formulated, allows for the reading of the verses to be an ever fuller, deeper and more comprehensive experience.

By their very stylistic qualities, the poetry seems to lead to the prose, and the latter in turn back to the former. The three major poems, characterized as they are by only partial intelligibility on the literal level, convey a sense of mystery which awakens a desire for fuller
disclosure. The unreal landscapes, the nocturnal flights, the intriguing caverns, the unidentified
lovers, the breeze descending from the turret's height, and most particularly, the awesomeness
and persistence of the enigmatic central symbols. It all contributes to an awareness that the im-
ages and their fragmentary narrative mean more than meets the eye. The prose elucidates, as
we have seen, but it does not dispel the sense of awe. Far from it, the commentaries educe an
inclination to return contemplatively to the originative lyrical expression, thereby to emulate
the author's experience. This effect is brought about, at least in part, by the stylistic measure
of retaining the central symbols. The impression is thereby created that regardless of the
degree of comprehension attained through abstraction and discursiveness, the symbols cannot
be dispensed with, for their full meaning has not yet been unfolded. One is left with the feel-
ing that there is always something more in them --as indeed there is--, and that they should be
gazed upon anew for that more to be disclosed.

The operative factors in this interplay between the genres, however, are not exclusively
stylistic. From the perspective of the psychology of knowledge, it is a process which moves
forward with its own momentum. Further, it is a forward-moving process in which the rational
powers are operative according to their proper and normal order. Juan de la Cruz points out,
as we saw in an earlier chapter, that among the rational powers "the operations of each one
depend upon the others." He indicates, as well, that the intellect is "the first power of the
soul" in the order of operation and its role of informing the human psyche. It is the intellect
that goes forward first, expanding the subject's horizons of consciousness and establishing the
field of selectivity open to the will. The same operative order among the rational powers may
be seen in the reciprocal effectiveness of the two literary forms. Both the poetry and the prose
are for the sake of informing the cognitive powers, and both elicit acts of the will. The lyrical
genre informs the intellect intuitively and by evocation, engaging the memory and other
sensible powers to a marked degree. At the same time, it arouses a certain affective state
which tends to lead to the prose. The latter, in turn, informs discursively and by demonstra-
tion, engaging most fully the power to ratiocinate and reach comprehension of universal prin-
ciples. It is by means of the prose that Fray Juan truly instructs "the first power of the soul,"
offering his reader an expanded understanding of his thought and mystical experience. He car-
rries out this educative task in the hopes that "if the intellect is well instructed," the other
powers will follow suit. His ultimate objective is that the reader should be urged on to
greater love of God. An immediate and partial effect, instrumental in the achievement of the
global end, is that the reader's potentiality to comprehend the poetry is more fully actualized,
and to the same degree an increase is brought about in his or her capacity to be moved affec-
tively and contemplatively by it.

The assimilation of Fray Juan's prose works is a process of conditioning which both ex-
pands and defines. In earlier chapters, we spoke of the normal process of acquisition of knowl-
dge as one in which interior dwelling spaces, inner landscapes were carved out and estab-
lished. In this particular instance we are dealing with a process of intellectual conditioning in
which there come to be ever closer affinities between the inner cosmos of the author and that
of the reader. It is a process which, like any other exercise in learning, necessarily involves the
simultaneous activity of all three rational powers. The memory, "archive and receptacle of the
intellect," follows cognition gathering and retaining all that has been intuited, reasoned to or
otherwise apprehended. The content of memory as gradually incorporated into the psyche, in
turn, has a reciprocal effect upon the degree of comprehension attained in subsequent acts of
 cognition. For the cognitive process to advance with the momentum which is natural to it,
however, the will must actively respond by directing the intellect to seek further comprehen-
sion. Given these factors, the assimilation of our author's prose works will be a process in
which intellection, memory and election are mutually interdependent and effective, yielding
the gradual construction of a framework which represents a certain intellectual affinity with the author, and from which one can better plummet the depths of his unique lyrics.

The Reciprocity between the Genres and the Act of Contemplation

The human rational powers operate spontaneously according to their proper order: knowing precedes and conditions willing. Epistemologically, both literary genres employed by John of the Cross enact cognition and are intended to occasion increases in love. However, when the reader is neither a mystic nor fully one with the author in intellectual conditioning, he must expose himself to both the prose and the poetry for their proper teleology to be actualized. To read one genre to the exclusion of the other brings about an understanding which, due to its limitations, precludes the intended finality.

There are those, either in Juan de la Cruz's own time or in our own, who would assume that the poetry alone can instrumentally occasion the desired end. Such a supposition hints of voluntarism or Quietism, in that it implies that volition is independent from cognition, that the will can leap to its object, so to speak, bypassing cognitive apprehension of the object. Some might expect by following this route to instantaneously soar to the presence and possession of the objects represented, without any previous conditioning. The reality is, however, that they would not get very far off the ground.

To exclude the educating process which the prose imparts and to limit a reader to the poetry would indeed result in a handicap. It would be a tying of the subject to the intellectual content offered by the poetry alone. He would be enabled to undergo the esthetic, symbolic and cognitive experience which the poetry yields initially by itself, but not to transcend it. As mentioned above, our mystical author warns against esthetic experiences which do no more than "to immerse the sensible part of man," which tie the soul to the sensible image while not bringing to mind efficiently the reality represented. This is precisely what would happen if a person were exposed exclusively to the powerful beauty of San Juan's lyrics and left ignorant of their intended signification. Said esthetic experience is certainly not to be depreciated, but we must keep in mind that in Juan de la Cruz's perspective it is only a means to an end.

One could assume a diametrically opposite stance, believing the prose to be in itself a sufficient instrument to lead to the desired term. It should be added parenthetically that in positing this supposition that it might be preferable to limit the reader to the prose, we are not thinking of works such as the Cántico and the Llama, which as running commentaries to the poems are saturated with the latter's images and tone; we have in mind, rather, the five treatises of the Subida-Noche, so rigorously austere stylistically. In any case, a variety of suppositions could be behind such a stance. One might be an intellectualist Neoplatonic belief that approximation to God is achieved through knowledge alone. Although possible, this position was not too prevalent in Juan's cultural milieu. Another possible disposition, influenced by a rigorist understanding of asceticism and detachment, would be that it was morally superior to renounce the poetry. This position would represent another type of voluntarism, one which would disfavor the joys of esthetic experience even when placed at the service of God and moral perfection. In some particular instance, given a subject with an unusual talent, the prose alone might perform the function of informing him or her adequately. Most human beings, however, are not moved by abstractive knowledge alone, and therefore the extreme asceticism
of eliminating the poetry would bear no fruit. Since ancient times, it has been known, for ex­
ample, that the populace is not moved to political action without some degree of rhetoric. 
Similarly, as San Juan himself recognizes, the devotion of the faithful is not spurred on 
without some sensible art, pomp and ritual. And likewise, the person aspiring to the finality 
Juan de la Cruz has in mind, is in need of that act of intuitive knowledge along with its con­
comitant joys, that act of contemplation to which the Sanjuanist lyrics give rise.

In the commentary to the "Llama," San Juan addresses a lengthy passage to spiritual 
directors who advocate incessant activity of the rational powers in the spiritual life, endeavor­
ing to tie the soul to active forms of meditation and prayer. Our Carmelite friar strongly ex­
presses his objection to this inflexibly "activist" method. In his own consideration, once the ra­tional powers have been exercised according to the fullness of their capacities, they should be 
stilled to allow for the reception of infused knowledge. This overemphasis upon the activity 
of the cognitive powers, widespread at that time, seems to have represented a reaction against 
the equally popular movement of Quietism, which strove to suspend the cognitive powers in 
prayer.

Now to counsel an assimilation of Juan de la Cruz's thought as expressed in his prose, 
while excluding the poetry, can be compared to this "activist" form of spirituality we have 
mentioned. However, the two are only comparable, not identical, for Juan is focussing in his 
stance upon the need to transcend all the ordinary modes of cognition to enter into the con­
templative stage; whereas when dealing with the transcendence effected by a proper combina­
tion of prose and poetry, we are speaking of an advancement which does not in itself leave the 
ordinary operation of the powers. What both these stances have in common, though, is the 
preclusion of contemplation. The first precludes contemplation as a supernaturally infused act 
of knowledge; the second impedes that act of contemplating, of beholding, of knowing intuiti­
vely which follows from the poetry, and particularly from returning to the poetry after an in­
tense study of the commentaries. In both instances the advancement of the cognitive process is 
hindered. In the one context as well as the other, San Juan would counsel that souls be allowed 
"liberty and tranquility of spirit," with sufficient "latitude so that their bodily and spiritual 
senses will not become bound to any particular thing, either interior or exterior..."

To limit a reader to the poetry would be a parallel to Illuminism or Quietism, and to 
limit him or her to the prose would be comparable to an overactive, anti-contemplative 
spirituality. Both represent voluntaristic stances, and both result in a stagnation of normal 
noetic processes. In either case, the subject is prevented from being exposed cognitively to 
more, and thus he is barred from advancement in volition or love. The poetry by itself yields 
cognition which is limited in content. The prose alone, on the other hand, communicates un­
derstanding which is extensive, but which is presented in an abstract and therefore partial 
mode. If the first can be referred to using our author's own phrase, as an "immersion of the 
sensible part of man" ["engolfamiento del sentido"], the second could be thought of as an "im­
mersion of the intellect" ["engolfamiento del entendimiento"], in that it does not allow the 
knowing power the fullness of its liberty. The intellect must always be allowed to move for­
ward first, to explore the next horizon of meaning. But it should also be granted its moments 
of contemplative repose, of comprehensive, intuitive apprehension. The treatises are the field 
within which the horizons of meaning are to be sought; the lyrics are the object of the stilled, 
contemplative, all-encompassing gaze.

The knowing activities of the living, healthy human being are characterized by an inner 
dynamism which propels them to transcend their barriers continually. Once something is dis­
covered, the will moves the subject to seek additional meaning. The result is unceasing expan­
sion of consciousness and comprehension, within a directionality determined at well. This is a phenomenon given in human nature, certainly not one created by John of the Cross. His genius within this context is that his combined literary production allows for the spontaneous operation of this psychological process, reaching potentially to infinity. By the wealth and nature of their subject matter, the poetry and prose of our author always contain additional signification to be discovered; by their mutual correspondences they form a complementary unity. Thus, when the reader moves cyclically from the "poesía a lo humano" to the never wholly exhausted expository prose, collectively they offer the possibility of this incessant expansion of consciousness which man naturally seeks. The relation between the two genres, far from being complementary purely and simply, brings about a compounding, intensifying, spiraling effect, in which the reader moves from one to the other achieving greater and greater familiarity with subjects which are in themselves abstruse and quite alien to human intellection. The progressively expanded comprehension, potentially extensible to infinity, allows at each stage for an equally intensified love, and thus for greater approximation to God. In the production of a literary ensemble which allows for such endless progression in the exercise of both understanding and love, Juan de la Cruz manifests himself to be a most skillful teacher and guide.

The Poetry upon Return: "¡Oh cristalina fuente!"

The entire educative process which the prose works impart can be seen as a preparation for the return to the poetry, to that most intimate, spontaneous and freshest expression of the mystical author. The return allows for a contemplative glimpse of the inner world of Juan de la Cruz, for his thought and all he underwent are contained metaphorically his succinct lyrics. As he himself says with respect to the poem "Noche oscura:" "The entire doctrine I intend to treat in this work, The Ascent of Mount Carmel, is included in the following stanzas, and in them is described the manner of ascending to the summit of the mount, which is the high stage of perfection that we here call union of the soul with God."26

If one were to seek an image to represent the effect of this return, perhaps none better could be found than San Juan's own exclamation, "¡Oh cristalina fuente!" of "Cántico" 12.27 Bringing to mind also Cernuda's remark cited at the beginning of this chapter, a crystalline fountain contains both a surface of water and the more mysterious depth of the pool.28 In his commentary, the mystical author explains that his glistening fountain represents the theological virtue of faith.29 The image is appropriate, for in this infused virtue there is included a surface of propositions, and in the depth, largely concealed from sight, the corresponding substance of those same doctrinal formulations. The surface is said to be silvery, that is, mirror-like, outwardly reflecting the surrounding world, while at once concealing its submerged treasure. The latter is said to be golden.30

By extension, the same image can be applied to the Sanjuanist metaphor in itself, which combines a material figure with a profound, unfathomable signification. The veiled dimension of the meaning is not discernible initially. But as the mosaic in the bottom of the fountain gradually becomes perceptible upon gazing, and as the contents of faith are progressively made manifest in their very substance to the mystical soul, so too the gems buried beneath San Juan's metaphors become revealed in some measure to the persistent reader. To put it another way, the poetry of our mystic is itself a crystalline fount; a fountain crystal-clear yet never exhausted. In its sustained contemplation the depth becomes clear first, and later, retrospectively,
the silvered surfaces of the metaphorical construct acquire a diaphaneity they lacked before. As the profundity becomes unveiled, the elements of enigma and literal discontinuity vanish, giving way to a cohesive symbolic and narrative whole. This return to the poetry, this gaze into the fountain of dissipating silvery reflections, can perhaps be considered a natural analogue to enlightened faith. And it is at this point that one can speak unequivocally of the full intelligibility of the lyrics of San Juan de la Cruz.31

As the uninformed reader perceives only the fountain in the garden, likewise with the remaining metaphors of the "Cántico." Upon approaching this poem, said reader discerns only the anecdotal narration of an adventure of love. It is a romance that culminates in union and repose. The initiated reader, on the other hand, discovers in said poetic quest of love the progressive communion between a soul and Christ, and through Christ culminating in partnership with the three divine Persons. The symbolic depth of the other major poems are often similarly undetected.

The allusions within the lyrics to the trinitarian communion at the apex of the mystical scent are particularly unadverted to by the unconditioned eye:

\[
\begin{align*}
&Yo mi claridad daría. \\
&I should bestow my brightness. \\
&("Romance" III) \\
&El canto de la dulce filomena. \\
&The song of the sweet nightingale. \\
&("Cántico," 38) \\
&Recuerdas en mi seno. \\
&Thou awakest in my breast. \\
&("Llama," 4)
\end{align*}
\]

Parallelly:

\[
\begin{align*}
&E l \ aire \ de \ la \ almena. \\
&The breeze from the turret's height. \\
&("Noche oscura," 7) \\
&E l \ aspirar \ del \ aire. \\
&The blowing of the wind. \\
&("Cántico," 38) \\
&C on \ llama \ que \ consume \ y \ no \ da \ pena. \\
&With a painless, consuming flame. \\
&("Cántico," 39)
\end{align*}
\]

The first three of these enigmatic verses refer rather unsuspectingly to the second divine Person, and to the intratrinitarian act of knowledge by which this Person proceeds from the Father. Similarly, the three last verses allude to the Holy Spirit and at once to the divine act of love by which he proceeds from both the Father and the Son.32 In one same act of signification and symbolization, these phrases designate the operation of knowing or that of loving of the human being, which, having been perfected by the theological virtue of faith or charity respectively, has become one with God’s own immanent activity of knowledge or love.33 The
richness of this symbolization, in its simultaneous depth, compactness and extensiveness, is unsurpassable.

Much the same can be said regarding the central image of the "Llama," the living flame of light and warmth, which is probably the most comprehensive symbol in the work of Juan de la Cruz. On the doctrinal level it represents the term of the ascent, but also the source whence the capacity to ascend is derived; on the level of artistic representation, it is the image into which the antithetical symbol of the night becomes resolved. As this image appears at first in the Noche under the form of the log being assailed by fire, it highlights how the darkness and privations suffered by the soul throughout the purgative stages do not stem from God, but from the soul's own coarseness and impenetrability. Darkness and night are manifested to be subjective and internal to man; fire, light and warmth are objective, external and eternal, the term of man's quest as well as the fountain of the fire of purgation and the ray of contemplation by means of which he may ascend.

In the poem of the "Llama" we see the fire casting its glow against the walls of the once shadowy caverns of the soul, "las profundas cavernas del sentido." Having made them resplendent and incandescent, luminosity and warmth are reflected back to their source, herein symbolizing, at once, the communicability of the divine nature, the transfiguration of the soul, its free correspondence to God, and the bond of union between the two. As would seem to be appropriate, this unified yet inclusive symbol of the flame also has a trinitarian dimension. The commentary to the "Llama" notes that this image symbolizes in its unity the divine nature, and in its dynamism the flowering of that nature into a trinity of Persons. The treatise also discloses that the properties of light and warmth represent the two divine processions: that of the Son, who is the light, wisdom and mirror of the Father, by way of intellection; and that of the Holy Spirit, the binding love, by way of will. In one same act of representation, the image also conveys the transformation of each human rational power by its operatively corresponding divine Person. The cavern of the intellect is enlightened by the luminous glow of the fire, that is, by the Son; and the cavern of the will is enkindled by warmth, that is, by the Spirit. The soul's participation in the trinitarian processions is added to the symbolic dimension of the image by the reflection of the two igneous properties back upon the flame.

When the fundamental considerations which form part of San Juan de la Cruz's mystical theology are understood and incorporated into the memorative field of the reader, upon glancing again at the poetry he finds that the lyrics verily have "a significance at once human and divine." All indeed becomes "circled by a halo." The reader may thus observe the poet's journey from the desolate dark night to the soothing rays of the dawn of contemplation with a certain comprehension of this quest as a mystical, supernatural venture. Further, by the mere utterance of the terms "recuerdo" or "claridad," "aire" or "llama," the mystical poet elevates the mind of the reader beyond the limits of the cosmos to a consciousness of the intratrinitarian life, of the two divine processions and of the communion of Persons. Simultaneously, the mind is drawn, through the theological virtues which are light and fire derived from God, to the human soul who by means of his transfigured powers attains the divine Persons and participates in their uncreated, eternal activity. Upon reading the poetry, the prepared reader should truly have "the entire doctrine" ["toda la doctrina"] come to mind. For all that he has retained memoratively from the study of the treatises is in him subject to reactivation, and the reactivation takes place upon return to the poetry. The totality of San Juan's thought and experience are symbolized by his metaphors, in compact, intense form. The metaphors, in turn, awaken the same thought and experience in the mind of the reader, inasmuch as he has come to share the mystical author's weltanschauung.
Our exploration has led us back to every reader's point of departure, to Fray Juan's lyrics, and to a deepened conviction that they can be looked upon without vacillation as a "poesía a lo humano." For they constitute a communication admirably tailored to human psychological make-up, yielding a cognitive experience which is at once esthetic, symbolic, conceptual and contemplative, rousing the emotions and beckoning the entire person to follow. They are further invested with the flexibility necessary to activate the specific potentiality to know of each particular human being. Each receives according to his mode. And yet, these most human lyrics --and here lies perhaps their deepest paradox-- contain in symbolic form the entire divine adventure of the mystical author. Fray Juan has recognized that "we embrace and pursue that which is most resplendent and most fills our eye." He also has stated various times, paraphrasing the Stagirite, that "in the same way that the eyes of the bat respond to the sun, becoming totally darkened by it, our intellect responds to that which is greater light in God..." And similarly: "Divine things, the clearer and more manifest they are in themselves, the darker and more hidden they are to the soul... not because this is so in itself, but it is so to our weak intellects, which become darkened in so vast a light." San Juan de la Cruz has ascended into unknown regions, has gazed upon the serene society of the Blessed Trinity and has communed in the dynamism of its internal life. Any account of his divine journey should be blinding to the human mind. Our Castilian Carmelite has wrought a poetic *verbum* which is indeed capable of evoking the same boundlessness, light and love which he had ventured to make his own. However, his expression is never bedazzling, never blinding. It fills each eye with the light it can withstand and whispers in each ear the language it comprehends. It is eminently a "poesía a lo humano."
NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1. John of the Cross refers explicitly to the function of spiritual director as an "oficio" in L,3, 56 and 62. This term translates into English as "habitual occupation," "profession," "trade," "craft," all of which connote a function of service to others. This might be matter for reflection for those who have the notion that contemplatives are antisocial creatures, severed from the rest of the human community in either concern or deed.

2. "...ve en la superficie copiarse puramente la imagen del mundo que conoce, y bajo ella, al mismo tiempo, distinta y misteriosa, la profundidad misma del agua. Y no hay quizá error en quien de tal modo profano considera estos versos, porque tras la hermosura terrena que en ellos le deleita supone siempre el fondo insondable donde aquella queda suspendida." Cernuda, op. cit., pp. 48-49.


4. See chapter VI, note 21.

5. In Thomas Aquinas, for example, there are multiple texts on the essence of contemplation (Summa Theologiae, I,38,1); on the theological virtues as drawing the person toward union with God (Summa Theologiae, I-II,66,6; and II-II,45,2); on unity of object between God and the soul in mystical communion (De Potentia Dei, 9,9). There are many others which might be cited.


7. The stanza is as follows:

¡Oh lámparas de fuego,
en cuyos resplandores
las profundas cavernas del sentido,
que estaba oscuro y ciego,
con extraños primores
calor y luz dan junto a su querido!

Oh lamps of fire!,
in whose splendors
the deep caverns of sense,
once dark and blind,
now give forth with strange brightness
both warmth and light to their Beloved.

8. "...volviendo al poema mismo, hacemos el sorprendente descubrimiento que en lo esencial de este símbolo indisoluble las cavernas y el sentido espiritual del alma se mantienen en un equilibrio entre lo concreto y lo abstracto, equilibrio que es fundamento de todo clasicismo, de toda paradoja, de todos los grandes textos religiosos, de toda poesía. Nunca se trata aquí de cavernas o de un pozo concretos, ni tampoco inversamente de capacidades y facultades abstractas, sino de cavernas del sentido espiritual. Y es cabalmente esta fusión abstracto concreta del símbolo y el sentido simbolizado lo que presta al poema su maravillosa exquisitez." Op. cit., p. 354.

10. "Ningún elemento, por decirlo así, bíblico; ninguna apetencia nirvánica, ningún silencio impuesto a los seres y a la ambiente naturaleza en esta poesía cuyo barroquismo es sólo incipiente y ni siquiera alcanza a la corrosión de lo exterior, que caracterizó, antes que a ella, a los quietistas; después de ella, a algunos piadosos románticos, como Novalis." *Ibid.*, p. 137.

D'Ors begins this essay by pointing to the characteristic of balance as manifested in Juan de la Cruz's life style. He indicates that in the Carmelite from Fontiveros there coexist the contemplative and the man of action. Alongside of the enamoured mystic there is the solid intellectual, the prudent judge who, "en función vigilante y magistral," was placed in charge of the instruction and guidance of numerous souls and was several times elected within his Order to the office of "definidor." *Ibid.*, p. 128. D'Ors proceeds to examine the balance between conceptual elements conveyed and emotions roused by San Juan's lyrical expression. *Ibid.*, pp. 133-134.

D'Ors' explorations lead him to reiterate that "nuestro poeta no es un noctámbulo, sino el sereno de la «noche oscura del alma»." *Ibid.*, pp. 128 and 138. He concludes that "nuestro análisis estilístico nos ha mostrado, en San Juan de la Cruz, más bien que el contemplador, el teólogo; más bien que el lírico arrebatado, el consciente y siempre avisado artista.... Acordémonos, al llegar a este punto, de lo que pudo significar, en la historia de la arquitectura española, el estilo llamado plateresco, evolución histórica, probablemente, del estilo manuelino portugués. Pero así como en el estilo manuelino la agitación dinámica, su pánica pasión, su continuidad y movimiento decoran las superficies todas y definen como barroca la construcción entera, el plateresco español... encierra la intervención de lo barroco entre límites relativamente estrechos y que no dan movimiento ni continuidad al tono general de la obra entera. Como el barroquismo se inserta en una fábrica plateresca española, el misticismo se inserta en la obra de San Juan de la Cruz. Teología casi escolástica, ascética casi ignaciana definen aquí los grandes planes desnudos: en ellos se insertará el delicado pánico de una voluptuosidad mística. El estilo de San Juan de la Cruz es el estilo plateresco." *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139. This analyst may be generalizing somewhat. Juan de la Cruz's mysticism is not voluptuous, nor is it characterized by a "delicado pánico." However, D'Ors' evaluations of Fray Juan's artistic expression, and the association of the latter with the Plateresque, would seem to be acceptable. Cf. above, chapter IV, notes 68 and 74, and chapter VI, note 40.

Correspondences between the writings of mystics and the pictorial arts are never fully definitive nor absolutely precise, though they may be thought-provoking. With this in mind, we reproduce the following text by Carlos Disandro. Having cited stanzas 14 and 15 of the "Cántico," with their profusion of imagery drawn from the beauties of the cosmos, he states: "Pues precisamente a la mística de las criaturas corresponde la musicalidad contrastante de esta enumeración, o los tonos complementarios y entremezclados que convengan a una atmósfera recatada y diáfana. Pictoricamente hay que pensar en Velázquez. A la mística de la noche corresponde la oscuridad sin borde, la absoluta nocturnidad como nombre divino. No hay enumeración, ni descripción, sino instalación de la noche. Pictoricamente hay que pensar en Rembrandt. A la mística de la luz corresponde finalmente el fulgor del fuego, la llama y la lumbre, o el resplandor luminoso, términos que denotan diversos momentos o diversas situaciones del alma en Dios o de Dios en el alma (pictoricamente correspondería a Fray Angélico)." *Op. cit.*, pp. 43-44. Cf. above, chapter V, note 47.

11. "...mover la voluntad a devoción..." SIII,37,1. Also, SIII,35,3, and SIII,15,2.
12. "...engolfar el sentido..." SIII, 35.6. It often occurs that a work of religious art is apprehended in a way that "se agrada y deleita el sentido y se queda el amor y gozo de la voluntad en ella." Ibid., 3. This response, which is precisely what Fray Juan warns against, can be caused either by a deficiency in the artifact itself or by a disposition of the subject.

Michael Florisone speaks of Juan de la Cruz as a "promotor of classicism" in his concern for art which will produce a balanced effect, neither seducing by its sumptuousness, nor leaving untouched by its starkness. "Que saint Jean de la Croix ait été particulièrement sensible à l'art et ait su l'apprécier, cela est bien prouvé; qu'il admette et recommande l'utilisation de l'œuvre d'art comme moyen habituel de sanctification, cela aussi est sûr, et qu'il lui reconnaît un pouvoir à la fois de concentration, de cristallisation en quelque sorte, puis d'exaltation ou d'explosion, c'est-à-dire pouvant provoquer l'extase ou le ravissement, il l'a lui-même expérimenté. Mais il pose les limites de ce goût, il sait les dangers de cet art dont la séduction peut détourné du sujet même et qui porte lui-même sa réprobation." Op. cit., p. 130.

"Moyen de parvenir à Dieu, certes, l'art l'est très efficacement, mais son emploi est à ce point subtil et dangereux que saint Jean de la Croix a voulu y consacrer, outre ce qu'il dit ailleurs, un capitre entier de la Montée, le capitre xxxv de livre III.... Saint Jean de la Croix y trace jusque dans le détail et avec plus de précision qu'ailleurs les frontières de l'usage de l'art, et, en même temps, il étend jusqu'à ses suites extrêmes le rôle d'intermédiaire providentiel dont est impartie l'œuvre d'art. Encore une fois, il dénonce la vanité et l'illusoire joie que celle-là peut produire dans le coeur de l'homme, et il met en garde contre le plaisir que peut procurer toute peinture ou sculpture, en tant que telle, ou surtout sa décoration aux dépens du sujet. Bientôt il nous révèle le fond de sa pensée: progressant sur ses propos du chapitre xv, il réclame l'oubli de l'oeuvre, la disparition immédiate de ce pretexte, de cette occasion, loin de la mémoire qu'il avait tout à l'heure autorisée à garder le souvenir de l'oeuvre: il faut maintenant accéder à l'invisible dont l'oeuvre n'a fait en quelque sorte que sensibiliser un instant la spirituelle réalité. Le secours de l'art et de ses représentations extérieurs doit être court et son besoin rare." Ibid., pp. 149-150.

Saint John of the Cross recognizes that a work of art "doit d'abord imiter autant que possible la nature et refleter la vie: c' est alors qu' elle touchera l' ame du spectateur." On the other hand, it is essential that "la valeur de la présentation décorative n'accaparent pas une importance personnelle où le sens de l'oeuvre se déséquilibrerait et où son esprit s'affaiblirait.... Une fois encore, saint Jean de la Croix se montre, dans le XVIe siècle espagnol, un des promoteurs du classicisme." Ibid., pp. 154-155. "Combien est donc délicate cette manipulation de l'art pour qu'elle n'entraine pas à des conséquences néfastes, tant l'empreinte de celui-ci est redoutable!" Ibid., pp. 148-149.

13. Guillén, op. cit., p. 116. "...tampoco puede negárse nos el goce del poema, en su esencial valor autónomo, que es admirable, aun haciendo abstracción de lo alegórico y lo biográfico. Sin embargo --y he aquí el milagro poético; poéticamente divino de San Juan--, basta un ligero soplo de religiosa insinuación, para que toda su poesía se nos transforme en armonía celeste." Alborg, op. cit., p. 918.

14. In his stylistic analysis of the Llama, Hatzfeld makes the following observations: 
"San Juan de la Cruz, abierto a la verdad irresistible del universal simbolismo arquetpico hace de la evaluación retrospectiva de la génesis de la «llama de amor viva» el tema central del comentario. El lector ya sabe por obras anteriores que esta llama de Amor es Dios mismo, comprendido y sentido por el alma. Esta llama divina ha transformado el alma convertida en fuego, que antaño era solamente madera verde. Entonces el alma sobrepasó un fuego de fuera, no de dentro (L,1,19-25) [que] enjugándola (I,19) le hizo sudar y humear (I,22). Con el tiempo, la humedad desapareció empujada fuera, el alma se calentó hasta que la llama, penetrando
dentro de ella, entrando y transformándola (I,23), la puso como enjuta yesca donde la centella a cada toque prende (I,33). Esta quemadura poderosa (fuego intenso) al principio se siente como una cauterización. Pero más adelante el alma reconoce que la llaga del cauterio de amor la hace cura (II,8), por una llama (que) no enceniza sino clarifica (II,3). Finalmente, el alma radiante de amor encendida en perfección de amor (I,16) se convierte en horno (una fragua cuando la trabucan) (I,19) y cierta agitación levanta una nueva llama especial, una llama que sube de punto (ib.). El alma divinizada, habiendo recibido la respuesta de Dios, radiante de amor, es verdaderamente una ascua y responde echando llama (I,16). No existe forma mejor de describir esto sino modificando la expresión simbólica: por ejemplo, el fuego centella, echa fuego de sí y llamea (prólogo, 3). San Juan de la Cruz todavía puede seguir expresando esa cualidad arrebatadora de la felicidad suprema de la nueva llama, puesto que el alma es el aire inflamado (III,9), la llama quiere llevar al aire consigo al centro de su esfera (III,10), al subido fuego de gloria (I,27), en la gloriosa consumación de la muerte." Op. cit., pp. 327-328 of the third edition. Hatzfeld also observes that the same work is replete with "medias metáforas", que reflejan de un modo vital los grandiosos símbolos de la obra," and which represent "una forma de «concretar» española, a pesar del tema místico, el modo de tratar filosófico-teológico, y el ideal predominantemente nórdico de una unión sin medio ni forma." Ibid., p. 348.

Constituting a parallel to the Llama, the core symbol of the dark night originates in the poem "Noche oscura," but is retained throughout the entire prose commentary Subida-Noche, complete with prolongations and divisions into sub-symbols. This may be appreciated particularly in SI,1, 2 and 3; SII,1, 2 and 3; and M,1, 9 and 16. Employing a linguistic approach, rather than a stylistic one, María Jesús Mancho Duque examines this symbol in great detail. See op. cit., in particular, pp. 300-303.

15. "...la primera potencia del alma, que es el entendimiento..." SIII,1,1. "...estas potencias [voluntad y memoria], según sus operaciones, dependen del entendimiento..." SI,8,2. See next note.

16. "...no es posible que, si el espiritual instruyere bien el entendimiento en fe según la doctrina que se le ha dado, no instruya también de camino a las otras dos potencias..., pues las operaciones de las unas dependen de las otras." SIII,1,1. See chapter III, p. 42.

17. "...archivo y receptáculo del entendimiento..." SII,16,2. It is also opportune at this moment to recall the concept of memory as "la potencia totalizadora," the power which ties into unity the various dimensions of the past, and furnishes the foundation for any projections into the future. Cf. Ruiz Salvador, op. cit., p. 468. See also, above, pp. 21-22 and 42-43. In the present context it may be said that the progressive assimilation of Juan de la Cruz's doctrine can represent, depending upon the intensity of the interest of the reader, not just a foundation for better understanding his lyrics, but a much broader one which is the basis of an entire outlook. After all, many souls have made of John of the Cross their spiritual and/or intellectual master.

18. The doctrine of Quietism was briefly discussed in chapter IV, pp. 75-76.

19. "...engolfar el sentido..." SIII,35,6. See above, note 12.

20. On this topic, see chapter V, pp. 114-115 and notes 43-45.

21. See chapter IV, pp. 73-75 and notes 59-65.
22. *L,3,30-62.* "...estos espirituales no quieren que el alma repose ni quieite, sino que siempre trabaje y obre de manera que no dé lugar a que Dios obre..." *Ibid.*, 55.

23. "...ya que el alma ha comenzado a entrar en este sencillo y ocioso estado de contemplación, que acaece cuando ya no puede meditar ni acierta a hacerlo, no ha de querer traer delante de sí meditaciones ni arrimarse a jugos ni sabores espirituales... porque ya hemos dicho que la contemplación pura consiste en recibir. No es posible que esta altísima sabiduría y lenguaje de Dios, cual es la contemplación, se pueda recibir menos que en espíritu callado y desarrimado de sabores y noticias discursivas..." *L,3,36-37.*

24. It is an appropriate place to recall that San Juan's own doctrine transcends these two extremes. He proposes the "activism" of the one group to be followed by the "quietism" of the other. The specific moment at which the second should replace the first depends upon the state of the particular subject. See chapter IV, pp. 75-76.

25. "...libertad y tranquilidad de espíritu, dándoles anchura para que no aten el sentido corporal y espiritual a cosa particular interior ni exterior... de manera que no esté atada a alguna noticia particular de arriba o de abajo... o de alguna otra aprehensión..." *L,3,46.* "Deben, pues, los maestros espirituales dar libertad a las almas..." *Ibid.*, 61. Similarly, in a nearby passage our author mentions the need of "libertad y ociosidad" and "ociosa tranquilidad." *Ibid.*, 38.

26. "Toda la doctrina que entiendo tratar en esta *Subida de Monte Carmelo* está incluida en las siguientes canciones, y en ellas se contiene el modo de subir hasta la cumbre del monte, que es el alto estado de la perfección que aquí llamamos unión del alma con Dios." *S*, Argumento.

27. The stanza, which has been given in translation on p. 58, is as follows:

¡Oh cristalina fuente,
si en esos tus semblantes plateados
formases de repente
los ojos deseados
que tengo en mis entrañas dibujados!

28. See above, note 2.

29. "Llama cristalina a la fe por dos cosas: la primera, porque es de Cristo su Esposo; y la segunda, porque tiene las propiedades del cristal en ser pura en las verdades y fuerte y clara, limpia de errores y formas naturales. Y llámala fuente, porque della le manan a el alma las aguas de todos los bienes espirituales." *C,12,3.*

30. "A las proposiciones y artículos que nos propone la fe llama semblantes plateados. Para inteligencia de lo cual y de los demás versos es de saber que la fe es comparada a la plata en las proposiciones que nos enseña, y las verdades y sustancia que en sí contiene son comparadas al oro; porque esa misma sustancia que agora creemos vestida y cubierta con la plata de fe habemos de ver y gozar en la otra vida al descubierto, desnudo el oro de la fe.... Dice, pues, ahora el alma a la fe: ¡Oh si en esos tus semblantes plateados (que son los artículos ya dichos) con que tienes cubierto el oro de los divinos rayos... formases de repente los ojos deseados!" *C,12,4.*
31. Crisórgono holds that the poetry is characterized by "un aire puramente clásico, cuya belleza está en el brillo de la idea, que ilumina dulcemente hasta las letras." San Juan de la Cruz: *su obra científica*..., 2:220. This may be said objectively. Subjectively, however, it is only wholly true from the perspective of the reader who has become versed in the author's thought and symbolism. Thus it would better to hold that the Sanjuanist lyrics have the potentiality to become fully clear.

32. Speaking of the verse, "el aire de la almena" ("Noche oscura," 7), Dámaso Alonso states: "No existen comentarios a las últimas estrofas de la Noche, y así no sabemos la concreta interpretación mística que el poeta habría dado a su rapto lírico. Pero conocida nos es, por los comentarios a otros lugares próximos, del Cántico y de la Llama, la función del «aire» en la criptica simbolización de San Juan de la Cruz: alude a las más íntimas y sutiles operaciones de la Divinidad en los últimos trances de la unión perfecta; es el soplo del Santo Espíritu creador." *La poesía de San Juan de la Cruz*, pp. 68-69. The reference to San Juan's "criptica simbolización" is confirmatory of what we have said regarding the initial relative obscurity of the lyrics and the correlative need for the prose commentaries.

33. Rosa María Icaza, in her stylistic analysis of the "Cántico," examines the multivalence of some of the images cited above in the text, pointing in some instances to the trinitarian symbolism. She tells us that in the verses of said poem there are "three concrete symbols of fire: a) lumbre, b) centella, c) llama. All three enclose in themselves two general connotations: fire and light. In this way, San Juan de la Cruz masterfully condenses in a simple figure the only two ways in which the simplified human soul can possibly be united to God, through intellect-knowledge-light and will-love-fire." Op. cit., p. 64. "...the word lumbre seems to have for [San Juan] a value equal to that of luz; for example, he uses the biblical allusions to God as Padre de las lumbres (L.3.47) and speaks of the Eternal Word as Eres lumbre de mi lumbre.... Luz retains its full Latin meaning of splendor, fulgency, clarity and particularly as the light of the sun." Ibid., p. 65. The central image of the "Llama" represents "the love of the Holy Spirit Himself, the scriptural Flame, the promotor of infused love by infusing Himself into the spiritual senses of the soul." Ibid., p. 67. This investigator holds that the image of the wind, as it appears in the "Cántico," seems "to embody always an idea of love, be it the presence of love, its regretted absence; at other times it refers to the love of the soul as the lover, or to that of God as the Beloved and at still other times in a direct way to the source of all love --the Holy Spirit." Ibid., pp. 68-69. Of the lines, "y el ventall de cedros aire daba" ("Noche," 6) and, "el aire de la almena" ("Noche," 7), she states that "with the help of the prose commentary to the "Cántico espiritual" it may be concluded with certainty that in both instances the wind is the symbol of the Holy Spirit in his action of love-imparting." Ibid., p. 70.

34. The much discussed symbol of the night "es ciertamente la alegoría predilecta del místico Doctor.... Pero no es --como quiere Baruzzi-- el símbolo único de san Juan de la Cruz. Ni encierra en sí todos los otros, ni todos se resuelven en él. Como la nada no es el término de su doctrina, tampoco la noche lo es de su simbolismo, y la veremos resolverse en claridades de día y en resplandores de llama de unas lámparas de fuego...." Crisógono, *San Juan de la Cruz: su obra científica*..., 2:264.

35. In a previous chapter we discussed how the symbol of the flame is most aptly chosen to represent the culminating stage of the mystical ascent as it engages nearly all the physical senses. See above, p. 185. There is a set of correspondences here which is no mere accident. On the level of the symbolized, we are dealing with the theopathic stage of mystical communion, a most ineffable experience of God both in his unity and his variety; that is, in
his nature, attributes, virtues, and simultaneously in the Trinity of Persons. Such an experience activates every human cognitive spiritual power, inundating the "common sense of the soul" with glory and delight. On the level of the symbol, correspondences are to be found both in the image itself and in the perception thereof. In its material structure, the image of fire is unified yet varied, "epiphanic" yet mysterious, as well as endowed with dynamism, power and beauty. As the symbolized supernatural reality engages fully the spiritual powers, the symbolizing material entity activates every physical sense, analogously flooding the soul with wonder and delight, and the corporeal members with light and warmth.

36. See above, note 13.

37. See above, note 26.

38. "... lo que más luce y llena nuestro ojo lo abrazamos y vamos tras de ello." MI, 16,12.

39. "...de la misma manera que los ojos del murciélago se han con el sol, el cual totalmente les hace tinieblas, así nuestro entendimiento se ha a lo que es más luz en Dios..." SII, 8,6. "...cuanto las cosas divinas son en sí más claras y manifiestas, tanto más son al alma de oscuras y ocultas.... no porque en sí ello sea así, sino para nuestros entendimientos flacos, que en tan inmensa luz se oscurecen." MI,5,3. Also: "...cuanto el alma más a El se acerca, más oscuras tinieblas siente y más profunda oscuridad por su flaqueza; así como el que más cerca del sol llegase más tinieblas y pena le causaría por su grande resplandor, por la flaqueza e impureza de su ojo." MI,16,11. "...con la sentencia del Filósofo conviene: que las cosas sobrenaturales tanto son a nuestro entendimiento más oscuras, cuanto ellas en sí son más claras y manifiestas." MI,8,2. The reference is to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, II,1,993b-10-11. Cf. above, chapter IV, note 89.
CONCLUSION

The works of San Juan de la Cruz contain a well-developed analysis of human cognition which deals with ordinary as well as extraordinary knowledge. Notwithstanding tremendous and unfathomable disparities among acts of cognition regarding the objects known, our author finds commonality among these acts with respect to the experience and psychological operations of the knowing subject. A fundamental principle found to be applicable to every form of noetic activity is that intellection is conditioned by the knowing subject.

San Juan illustrates how knowledge is conditioned by one's past as retained in memory and by one's directionality or orientation as established by will. From here it follows that changes pertaining to the memorative or affective orders will in turn alter the subject's mode of cognition and degree of comprehension. Our author's analysis is of great interest in that the human psyche is seen as forming an indissoluble operational unity in which the activity of each rational power affects the other two. San Juan also brings to the fore the human subject's great capacity for dominion over his or her inner world of consciousness, emotion and volition.

Although man can channel himself in an almost endless number of directions, Juan de la Cruz's finality is to lead souls through what he calls the dark night as a means to union with God. This exacting experience is a process in which the entire human being is purified and conditioned, beginning with the sensible dimension and continuing with the three rational powers. With respect to cognitive operations, the conditioning of the dark night frees man from the limitations which are inherent in our ordinary mode of knowing. Said limitations have their root in the ties which link normal cognitive processes with materiality, as well as in affective disorders. During the first stages of the dark night, conditioning takes place through control exercised by the subject himself as agent, and its primary effect in the order of cognition is the overcoming of intellectual limitations caused by moral or affective imperfections. This active phase illustrates to what extent man can exercise control over his or psychic processes and what far-reaching consequences this can have. In the passive phase, cognitive operations are brought to further perfection by divine efficacy. Here the intellect is elevated beyond its naturally attainable potentialities and rendered capable of apprehending God without mediation.

San Juan's analyses of noetic processes include explanations of various types of supernaturally communicated cognitive acts. The higher among these communications circumvent external and internal sensation and are apprehended without phantasms directly by the passive intellect. These imageless acts of cognition, nevertheless, bear some resemblance to ordinary cognition following perception. The mysterious analogies lead to the positing of "spiritual senses" corresponding to the corporeal ones, and a "common sense of the soul" paralleling the internal sense of fantasy.

At the summit of the ascetico-mystical ascent, the subject comes to be united with God in knowledge and love. This communion takes place by the operations of the purified, perfected, transformed rational powers. The intellect grasps God's very Being cognitively. The will responds with a proportionate act of love, which seals the bond between the soul and God. This intentional identity is at the same time a participation in the trinitarian processions, for it is given to the soul to share in God's immanent acts of knowing and loving, the acts which are one with the Trinity of Persons. Within this immanently transcendent state, all things are re-
vealed to the soul through God's act of knowing, who is the Verbum. This all-encompassing act of intuitive intellection includes cognition of both Creator and creatures. It does not disclose all things, however, with utter clarity. The beatific vision is presented as the fulfillment and term of mystical cognition, wherein all things are known distinctly and with crystalline clarity.

The mystic who has so communed with God must resign himself or herself to the ultimate ineffability of this encounter. Whereas ordinary human cognition is linked to the phantasm, and human language to the material sign, the mystic's communion with God is wholly spiritual. There is no proportion between the one and the other form of knowing. John of the Cross was conscious that any translation into ordinary language would be at best a faint image of the original mystical communion. He was further conscious that any resultant understanding of God or the mystical union would be cognition in terms of creatures, as human beings ordinarily know things. Indeed, numerous mystics have preferred to withdraw in silence rather than attempt to articulate their ineffable experience. San Juan de la Cruz, however, was excellently prepared for any task of human communication. He had a natural gift for poetic composition and was highly trained in the humanistic disciplines. Being so equipped, he endeavored for the sake of others to give the optimum expression to the mysteries of his communion with God.

Our author elected to follow two parallel routes, those of poetry and prose, which correspond to two different and complementary forms of human language and cognition. San Juan knew well, to use a phrase of Gerard Manley Hopkins, that "the world is charged with the grandeur of God," and that all created things are supereminently in him. He thus turned to the physical cosmos as a source from which to draw poetic images. Further, many of his images have a previous history in Scripture, in earlier mystics, and in a long secular literary tradition, which endows them with additional symbolic depth.

As is indicated in Cántico 14-15, the structural parallelism between the corporeal and spiritual senses serves as another source of poetic expression. In order to represent a certain dimension of the act of mystical contemplation apprehended through a particular spiritual sense, an image is chosen which engages the corresponding corporeal sense. The basis for this correlation is not an analogy between spiritual and corporeal perception, for the spirit is only said metaphorically "to perceive." The five spiritual senses refer in reality to five different modes of intellecting infused knowledge. The correlation is based upon a mysterious analogy between forms of spiritual cognition and cognition following perception through one or another corporeal sense. By employing this procedure, the author elicits in the reader an experience which mysteriously, yet genuinely, mirrors the original act of contemplation.

San Juan's poetry realizes many of its effects through evocation. He utilizes images, metaphors, symbols, which engage the memory and enact a process of evocation through associations. Strata upon strata of previously assimilated meaning may be resuscitated by exposition to the Sanjuanist lyrics. In his poetry, San Juan does not describe the beauty of the world and then tell us it is a reflection of God, as would Hopkins. He rather puts before us the same created beauty and allows it to point by its own intrinsic power to its Maker's uncreated beauty. Nor does our Castilian poet relate the great epic of man's ascent to God in direct narrative form, as did Dante. His choice is to extend to us a human temporal adventure through a symbolic structure capable of evoking in the mind of the reader both the heroic ascetical ascent and the ecstatic theopathic communion. Only another mystic, though, can fully understand the Sanjuanist lyrics. The comprehension attained by a non-mystic is necessarily far inferior.
Our author is not only a poet, however. He also developed a corpus of thought and expressed it in a scientific expository prose which has earned him the title of "Mystical Doctor." His treatises are at the same time commentaries upon the previously composed poems. His expositions reveal with precision the relations between the poetic symbols and the realities symbolized, making explicit many levels of potential signification. The prose does not aim at evoking but at formulating the intelligibility of the subject matter. Aside from laying down practical spiritual and moral guidelines, these treatises explicate the nature of the extraordinary experiences which are one with the mystical itinerary. By linking causes and effects rationally, these extraordinary, unfathomable realities come to be seen as rationally possible and as intelligible.

The terminology San Juan uses in his prose works is comprehensive, precise and often abstract. The prose, in general, does not yield a sense of concretion and immediate presence as does the poetry. Yet the loss of these characteristics is the necessary price for the attainment of a certain conceptualization of the mystical experience. Whereas the poetry yields to the non-mystic primarily a cognition of the symbolic analogue to the mystical experience, the prose grants limited universality and comprehension of the mystical experience itself. The true, intended meaning of the poetry can only be understood by another mystic, such as the person to whom the Cantico espiritual was dedicated. The prose, on the other hand, is composed specifically for non-mystics, that we may become educated in this abstruse yet eminently human subject matter.

In themselves, neither the prose nor the poetry is proportionate to the question of the mystical union as achieved, nor to God as known by the mystic. These things cannot be expressed in any genre. However, with a non-mystical audience in mind, San Juan seeks in the prose to maximize the powers of communication at his disposal by employing a procedure common to metaphysical discussion. He formulates negative judgments which allow us to better comprehend that our understanding of the unlimited perfections which are one with these subject matters is at best analogical. The articulations are abstract, partial and sometimes based upon negations. However, the reader can assent to their literal meaning with confidence as they are formulated intelligibly, properly and with precision.

The poetry and the prose perform complementary roles. The former evokes meaning and yields an esthetic and emotional experience, while the latter satisfies the desire to understand. Between the two they fulfill and move the entire person. It should be remembered, however, that that which is received is received according to the mode of the receiver. San Juan's fundamental epistemological principles is operative in this process of reading his works no less than elsewhere. The combined effect of the prose and the poetry is to yield an experience which echoes the original mystical encounter. It is the specific degree of affinity with the author, though, that determines the intensity of this echo and its fidelity to the original communication.

The reader's affinity with the author can increase, however, and thus the comprehension achieved can become more complete. Juan de la Cruz's finality is precisely to lead souls ever forward in understanding as well as in love. There is a certain reciprocity between his prose and his poetry which operates toward the realization of this end. On the one hand, the mystical author's entire message is metaphorically contained in his succinct poetic work. On the other hand, the commentaries furnish detailed explications which have the effect of conditioning the cognitive capacities of the reader with respect to the poetry. The assimilation of the prose allows thus for a deeper penetration of the lyrics. Returning from the treatises, the poetry yields an intuitive, contemplative and affective experience which is an ever sharper and clearer echo of the original mystical encounter.
If we are docile, San Juan leads us by the hand to better comprehend how "just as physical voice impresses its sound upon the ear and brings about the act of understanding in the spirit" ["asf como la (voz) corporal imprime su sonido en el oído y la inteligencia en el espíritu"] (Cántico, 14-15,10), in similar manner God communicates himself to mystical souls. Doubtless his ultimate desire is to lead us to such a state of perfection in which we could lay aside his literary instruments of art and science, that we may ourselves hear the subtle divine whispers. Yet we should not lay aside these means too readily, but rather humbly listen to them, as to a delicate polyphony composed by a wise and holy musician. We shall thereby be delighted and awed by what a human being can fabricate; and further, we shall indeed be led to advance in understanding, wisdom and love, and in proximity to the source of beauty and truth.
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