Constitutive Discourse of Turkish Nationalism: Atatürk’s *Nutuk* and the Rhetorical Construction of the “Turkish People”

Aysel Morin  
*East Carolina University, morina@ecu.edu*

Ronald Lee  
*University of Nebraska-Lincoln, rlee1@unl.edu*

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Constitutive Discourse of Turkish Nationalism: Atatürk’s Nutuk and the Rhetorical Construction of the “Turkish People”

Aysel Morin and Ronald Lee

Aysel Morin is Assistant Professor at East Carolina University.
Ronald Lee is Professor at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln.

Corresponding author – Aysel Morin, School of Communication, Joyner East 103A, Greenville, North Carolina, 27858, USA, email morina@ecu.edu

Abstract
This article explores the “Great Speech” Nutuk, delivered in 1927 by Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In analyzing Nutuk and its rhetorical features, we identify the mythic underpinnings Atatürk employed to construct a modern “Turkish people.” We use this case to further our understanding of the constitutive discourses of nationalism. We believe Atatürk’s Nutuk provides a profitable discourse to think with as we attempt to understand Muslim nations and their negotiation of modernity.

Keywords: Atatürk, collective identity, constitutive discourse, myth, nationalism, Nutuk, Turkey

On October 15, 1927, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder and first president of Turkey, stood before the deputies and representatives of the Republican Party in Ankara and began delivering his famous speech, Büyük Nutuk (the Great Public Address). He spoke for more than 36 hours over 6 consecutive days. He told the story of the nation’s rebirth by recounting the resistance to Allied occupation following the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I, the successful prosecution of the Turkish Independence
War (1919–1923), and the establishment of the Republic (1923). Turkey was the first Muslim country in history to become a modern nation-state and a democracy. The speech captured this frontier country’s transition from an empire to a nation-state and its negotiation of modernity.

More than just a speech, Nutuk was a comprehensive public declaration of Turkey’s new official ideology. Shortly after its delivery, Nutuk was published as a book and became a part of the school curriculum, contributing to the indoctrination of succeeding generations into the state ideology. Later translated into several languages and distributed to foreign embassies and libraries, Nutuk also found a prominent place in the works of scholars of history and politics worldwide and became the primary source of official Turkish history.

Nutuk marked a turning point of Turkish nationalism by introducing a series of new powerful myths and concepts into the vernacular of public discourse, such as republic, democracy, sovereignty of the nation, and secularism. Atatürk (1963) designated these concepts as the “most precious treasures” of Turkish people, the “foundations” of their new state, and the preconditions of their future “existence” in his speech (p. 740). Such designations left a lasting imprint in Turkish political culture. Later his ideals were consolidated into the official state ideology of Kemalism and enshrined in the Turkish constitution. These ideals constitute the centerpiece of the Turkish narrative of nationalism today. Turks recite passages from Nutuk from memory and proudly display neatly scribed and framed quotations in private and public spaces all over Turkey as signs of their solidarity and commitment to Kemalist principles. Kemalism in Turkey, Jenkins (2008) writes, has grown into a “personality cult” and a “fully fledged religion,” and, so far, it has kept extremist ideologies at bay (p. 81).

Yet, despite the undeniable influence of Atatürk’s Nutuk, it is virtually unexplored in rhetorical scholarship. Perhaps this oversight is due to the discipline’s traditional preoccupation with Anglo-American discourses. Or, it may stem from the few rhetorical scholars who read and write in the languages required to study Nutuk. We can call to mind important rhetorical scholarship done on non-English discourses, but the cases are notable by their small number. This is not to say that the issues Nutuk presents to the critic have not preoccupied the discipline. On the contrary, understanding the discursive constitution of collective identities has been a prominent feature of the ideological turn in rhetorical studies.

In this article we attempt to contribute to the small number of studies examining constitutive discourses in non-English cultures. Our goal is to investigate the primary characteristics of the constitutive discourses as portrayed in the Turkish case. In what follows we take on four tasks. First, we situate Turkey and Turkish nationalism within the literature of nationalism and rhetoric. Second, we provide historical background on Turkey, Atatürk, and Nutuk. Third, we analyze Nutuk, identify the political myths embedded in the narratives of the speech and discuss their rhetorical functions in reconstituting “the people.” Finally, we discuss the contribution of the Turkish case to the literature.
Why Turkey?

It has long been argued that Islam and nationalism cannot coexist. Among the proponents of such an argument have been both distinguished scholars of political science and radical Islamists. Sayid Qutb, widely regarded as the founder of modern radical Islam, responded to his prosecutor’s questioning of his patriotism during the trial that sentenced him to death in 1966: “I believe that the bonds of ideology and belief are more sturdy than those of patriotism based upon region, and that this false distinction among Muslims on a regional basis is but one consequence of crusading and Zionist imperialism which must be eradicated” (as cited in Zubaida, 2004, p. 407). For Qutb, a Muslim’s nationality was his faith, and his nation was “umma,” the whole of the Islamic world.

Advancing a similar argument, Gellner (1994) also proclaimed the primacy of religion in a Muslim understanding of identity. He argued that the idea of “umma” contradicts “nation.” Equating Islam to “religious fundamentalism,” he set out to prove contradictions between Islam and the modern concepts of liberalism, egalitarianism, and civil society (Mabry, 1998, p. 68). He was not alone. Many who shared his passion for assembling a grand theory of twentieth-century political systems, such as Samuel Huntington (1998), made similar arguments. Neither these scholars nor the fundamentalists had difficulty finding examples of failed nationalist attempts and dysfunctional states among Muslims to support their claims. Arab nationalism produced no results. Nasser’s attempts to unite the Levant failed. Saudi Arabia remained a kingdom. Islamic revolution ended Iranian modernization. Iraq fell into pieces.

Against the backdrop of these arguments, Turkey stands as an exception, an anomaly. In Turkey, nationalism not only took root but flourished. Kemalism in Turkey negotiated the tensions between religious tradition and secular ideology, formulated a distinct Turkish identity beyond the boundaries of “umma,” and successfully transformed an empire to a nation-state.

Turkey’s transition from the Ottoman Empire to a nation-state is significant also in a historical sense. It produced crucial outcomes especially for the Muslim world. The Ottoman Empire (1299–1923) was one of history’s largest and longest living empires. At the peak of its power the empire reigned over a land reaching from North Africa to Asia Minor and Eastern Europe. In the eighteenth century, the empire began losing its power and it shrunk by almost two-thirds by the time World War I began. Nevertheless the Ottomans held the seat of the Caliphate and, as Tibbi (1996) put it, they still were the “only power, which Europe feared” (p. 181). For many in the Muslim world and Europe at the time, the Caliphate represented the hope and also the fear from a possible future Islamic unity. That hope was permanently buried when Turkey unilaterally abolished the Caliphate under Atatürk’s leadership.

The collapse of the Ottomans opened the Arab lands to European colonization, which sowed the seeds of the current anti-Western sentiments in the Middle East. This is not to say that Arab nationalists resented their Ottoman rulers less. In the end, Arab nationalism, to quote Dawn (1991), “rose as an opposition movement in the Ottoman Empire” (p. 23). But the Ottomans, at least, were Muslims and were governed by Sharia. Arab nationalists during the Ottoman Empire mainly sought social reforms and political autonomy (Zeine,

The end of the Ottomans also “brought with it a fundamental redrawing of the map of the Middle East” (Kamrava, 2005, p. 65). Often with a complete disregard for the wishes of the local population, the Great Powers carved up the Middle East into “protectorates,” nominal states (Kamrava, 2005, p. 65). This later led to power struggles and territorial conflicts among these “nation-states” of the Middle East and destabilized the region. Nasser’s attempts to create an Arab nation in the 1950s; the destructive civil wars in Lebanon, Syria, and Algeria; the Arab-Israel conflicts; and even Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait are a few examples of such conflicts.

While the Middle East spiraled downward in a series of bloody conflicts after WWI, Turkey continued to transform itself under the leadership of Atatürk, a “modernizing despot” as Kamrava (2005) called him (p. 53). His was a “milli dava,” a “national quest.” His quest differed from those of his contemporaries: Unlike Islamic and Arab nationalists, Atatürk sought neither religious unity nor leadership in the Muslim world. Atatürk’s antireligious attitude marked Turkish nationalism during this era. Similar to other romantic nationalisms, such as German and Italian, Atatürk’s formulation of Turkish nationalism had ethnicity claims. Unlike them, however, Atatürk’s ethnicity arguments did not evolve into extremist ideologies. Atatürk borrowed from French nationalism the principles of secularism, equality, and sovereignty of all. But unlike in France, nationalism in Turkey was primarily a top-down military movement. This movement also had little in common with third-world nationalisms, which emerged as reactions to European colonization. Turkey has never experienced European colonization.

These unique characteristics make it difficult to explain Turkish nationalism through existing categories and theories of nationalism. Yet the challenges Turkish nationalism poses to the theory point to unique contributions the case can make to the literature.

Broadly speaking, two main schools of thought dominate the literature on nationalism currently: primordialist and modernist approaches. Scholars in the primordialist perspective argue that nations and nationalism are rooted in ethnicity and trace the roots of nations back to primordium. In this perspective, ethnic bonds are regarded as natural, fixed, and given. Shills (1957) conceptualizes ethnicity as a blood tie and calls it “primordial” (p. 142). Geertz (1973) stresses “given-ness” of ethnicity and argues that ethnic bonds cannot be fully explained or analyzed by referring to social interaction only (pp. 255–310). Van den Berghe (1981) argues that human sociality rests on biological relatedness. Reynolds (1983) explains the role of ethnicity in the formation of in-group and out-groups. Primordialists do not argue that nationalism can be explained solely in terms of ethnicity but assert that nationalism builds on ethnocentrism. For a primordialist “nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group, is a . . .” (Connor, 1994, p. 36).

Modernization theorists of nationalism, by contrast, conceptualize “nation” as a modern phenomenon. They locate the roots of nations and nationalism in the changes that occurred during the transition period from an agrarian to an industrial society. Gellner (1983) argues that industrialization made efficiency the determining characteristic of an industrial society and created the need for centralized education. Centralized education increased the literacy rate and led to the standardization of language, centralization of authority, and
eventually homogenization of culture, out of which the illusion of homogeneous nations was born. According to Gellner (1964), “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness” but “the invention of nationalist discourse” (p. 169). This discourse, he argues, “invents nations where they do not exist” (Gellner, 1964, p. 169). Similarly, Anderson (1983) defines nations as “imagined communities.” Hobsbawm (1994) regards them as the products of social engineering. Through invented traditions, Hobsbawm (1994) argues, engineers of social life link the past to the present and provide a sense of cohesive collectivity. For modernists ethnicity is a “convenient tool” that the elite exploit to generate mass support for their struggles for power (Özkırımlı, 2000, p. 109).

Both modernist and primordialist perspectives shed light on different aspects of Turkish nationalism, but neither provides a full explanation. As modernists suggest, Turkish nationalism emerged in the modern era. Contrary to the modernist argument though, Turkish nationalism developed in a predominantly oral culture that had not yet experienced industrialization. Turkey’s industrialization began with the opening of the first sugar factory in Eskişehir in 1933, 10 years after the Republic had already been established. The primordialist perspective is also inadequate to explain Turkish nationalism, because Turkish ethnicity was discursively constructed. As Altınay (2004) explained, a handful of scholars under the strict supervision of Atatürk himself in the newly established Turkish History Association played the central role in the construction of Turkish ethnicity (pp. 22–24). Atatürk denounced the Ottomans as ancestors. Instead he pointed to the ancient tribes of central Asia as Turkish ancestors. Though attempted, it was scientifically impossible to establish a “blood tie” in the primordialist sense between the two groups of people.

It is best to describe Turkish nationalism as a collage. It is modern but claims antiquity. It is liberal yet advances ethnicity arguments. It emerges in the modern era yet in a pre-modern society. It shares common characteristics with the romantic and idealistic, and first- and third-world nationalisms. Such a conceptualization is useful for highlighting the unique characteristics of Turkish nationalism, but it still leaves many important questions unanswered: How did Atatürk create the “Turkish nation?” How and why did his conceptualization of “the people” resonate more with the masses he addressed than the other alternative discourses that existed? Neither of these questions can be answered by referring to primordial ties or modern conditions only. Their answers require an analysis of the discourse that brought the nation into being.

A Rhetorical Frame

In his study of the constitutive rhetoric of the Peuple Quebecois, Maurice Charland (1987) argues that collective identities are constituted through a series of narratives positioning a “people” as subjects within a text. “In the telling of the story of a peuple,” Charland (1987) writes, “a peuple comes to be” (p. 140). Charland’s arguments draw from McGee’s notion of “the people” and Burke’s work on myths. McGee (1975) believes that “the people” exist only as rhetorical artifacts in the texts that constitute them. “The people,” McGee (1975) writes, “are the social and political myths that they accept” (p. 247). For Burke (1989) myths are master stories defining the “essence” of cultures in narrative terms. “To derive a culture from certain mythic ancestry, or ideal mythic type, is a way of stating that culture’s essence
in narrative terms” (Burke, 1989, p. 309). Political discourse often depends on this terminology of essence for its effect when it is verbalized and communicated to masses to create “the people.” Hence myth and ideology are two existentially related concepts: “Ideology is to myth as rhetoric is to poetry” (Burke, 1989, p. 303). Myths help establish claims to hegemony, authority, territory, and sovereign independence and strengthen solidarity (Tudor, 1972). They arrange “the past in patterns that resonate with a culture’s deepest values and aspirations” (Osborne, 2001, p. 43). They evoke and sustain “the feelings of solidarity and alienation which underpin or undermine communities and their boundaries” (Flood, 1996, p. 41).

Political myths grow out of fragmented narratives dispersed through multiple sources (Moore, 1991). The constitutive rhetorics bring together and reformulate these dispersed narratives in order to forge new political alliances and identities (Charland, 1987). These narratives posit a series of past events as causes leading up to the current circumstances; they depict the current moment as a definitive point in history; and they project a future that will be realized when the constituted subjects begin inhabiting and performing their identities or act more or less within the narrative logic the stories suggest. Nutuk presents an illuminating case to the use of myths in constitutive discourses.

**Historical Background**

We cannot trace national movements, memories, and identities back to a single cause, document, person, or idea; and we do not assert that Nutuk was the sole force shaping Turkish memory and nationalism. We do suggest, however, that the narratives employed in Nutuk served as a catalyst for the unique rhetoric characterizing Turkish nationalism since the 1920s.

Turkish nationalism, during the Atatürk era (1919–1938), was a product and extension of 200 years of an identity search in the Ottoman Empire. From its beginnings to its collapse the Ottoman Empire was a multicultural realm. The Ottomans used the “millet” concept to distinguish different cultural groups within the empire. “Millet” roughly corresponds to “nation” in English, but it separated the different groups in the empire on religious bases. In the view of the Ottomans, there were Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Ottoman millets. Beyond that, everyone was an “Ottoman subject” (Ayın, 1998; Keskin, 1998). This inclusive understanding of collective identity helped fuel expansion. By the eighteenth century, it proved ineffective in the face of a rising nationalist consciousness among various Ottoman millets. The empire entered its regression. Unable to keep the empire intact, the Ottoman elite began renegotiating the meaning of “subject.” The result was a plethora of new ideologies and identity formulas ranging from Ottomanism to Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism to Turkism. Ottomanism was an old idea in a new package. It aimed at preserving unity by instilling in all millets a renewed consciousness of being Ottoman. Pan-Islamism promoted the “umma” idea of uniting all Muslims, and Pan-Turkism all Turks, under Ottoman authority. One after another these ideologies failed as unifying discourses that could hold the empire together. By the beginning of World War I, Turkism was the only ideology that had not yet been tried. Turkism advocated an ethnically united state within the approximate borders of today’s Turkey. It meant dividing up the empire willingly and
thus found few supporters. With a new interpretation, Turkism became dominant under
the leadership of Atatürk after the collapse of the Ottomans and establishment of the new
Republic.

Atatürk began his career as a soldier in the Ottoman army. As a commander he first
drew attention to himself during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913). Later the Ottoman Empire
entered WWI on the side of Germany. Atatürk’s successful defeat of British forces at Dar-
danelles (1915) brought him the honorary title of Pasha and made him a legend (Marco-
csson, 1941).

Regardless, WWI ended in defeat of Germany and its allies. The Ottomans were forced
to sign the Mudros Armistice (1918). After the armistice, the Great Powers began to disarm
and dismantle the empire. Under the auspices of the Great Powers, the Greek Army began
its onslaught, starting in western Turkey and moving inland. The Greek attacks faced
Turkish resistance. Atatürk’s landing at Samsun on May 19, 1919, marked the beginning
of an organized resistance. The resistance, now known as the War of Independence, lasted
4 years and ended with the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

After the war, its hero, Atatürk, became a national leader and the first president of Tur-
key. “A visitor to Turkey is immediately struck by the ubiquitous presence of Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk,” observes Gruen (2000), “. . . not only is his statue found in public squares
of every town . . . [but also] his portraits are still prominently positioned on the walls of
government offices and schools, as well as in businesses and many private homes through-
out the country” (p. 311). Many writers draw attention to Atatürk’s drastic reforms to ex-
plain the widespread admiration for him. Birch (2008) defines Atatürk as the “architect” of
“the most successful social modernization program of the 20th century” (p. 44). For
McBride (2000), Atatürk is “George Washington and Henry Ford all rolled into one” (p. 3).
For Lawlor (1996), he is “the father” of modern Turkey (p. 116).

As with any leader, though, Atatürk had his detractors. The voices of opposition became
stronger immediately after the victory. Some wanted to reinstate the old system (Sultanate
and Caliphate); some opposed Atatürk’s ideas or leadership; some rejected his reforms;
and some questioned his methods, calling him a “dictator” (Şimşir, 1991, p. 29). Atatürk
wrote and delivered Nutuk in the midst of these turbulent reform years that followed the
victory. The 1927 elections were fast approaching. Though Atatürk’s position as the presi-
dent of Turkey might have been safe, the future of his reforms was at stake.

Consequently, Nutuk, in many ways, was Atatürk’s response to his critics. He believed
that “writing history is as important as making history. If the writer does not remain true
to the maker, then truths become questionable” (Çambel, 1939, p. 272). Thus, Atatürk took
the matter of writing history into his own hands by composing Nutuk. Hülya Adak (2003)
calls Nutuk “a self-narrative.” Atatürk’s personal memory of the Independence War
shaped Nutuk’s content, structure, arguments, and stories. Yet this personal memory trans-
formed itself into the national memory when Nutuk found a prominent place in Turkish
politics, culture, and education. In Nutuk, Atatürk himself has become a mythical figure—
the embodiment of Turkish heroism—and his narratives the bulwark of national mythology.
In Atatürk’s words, there were “two Mustafa Kemals.” One was the mortal, the “flesh-
and-blood Mustafa Kemal . . . who will pass away.” But the other one was the “ideal of
Mustafa Kemal,” the mythic persona, who stood for the nation’s “dreams” (Ernest, 1944,
Perhaps it is not its historical accuracy or inaccuracy that makes Nutuk mythical, but these “dreams” that found expression in the words of the “father” as he told the story of rebirth.

**Nutuk’s Narratives, Structure, and Strategies**

Nutuk’s story of national rebirth begins on May 19, 1919, with Atatürk’s landing in Samsun, a remote city on the Black Sea. From Samsun, Atatürk sends alarming telegrams to civil and military leaders calling them to unite and resist the invasion. Patriots respond to Atatürk’s call and a resistance forms. The Ottoman Sultan, its government, and its supporters oppose the emerging resistance and try to suppress it. The troops suffer from lack of equipment and arms and the civilians from poverty. Overcoming all obstacles, Atatürk leads Turkey to victory. After winning the war, he proclaims the Republic and establishes a new state modeled after European nations. Turkey begins its move toward a modern future, leaving its Ottoman past behind.

Nutuk’s narrative stands on five political myths. We call these myths the First Duty, Encirclement, Internal Enemy, Ancestor, and Modernity. All five myths radiate out like concentric circles from a central premise: Turks have always been free and independent and they prefer death to subjugation. Thus the innermost circle contains the most dominant First Duty myth in Nutuk. This myth communicates the military values of Turks. It depicts Turks as a historically military nation and justifies the call to arms. The second myth, the Internal Enemy, demonizes Atatürk’s political opponents as traitors. The third myth, the Encirclement, describes the country after World War I. By portraying Turkey as a lonely nation surrounded by enemies, the myth demands self-reliance and justifies great sacrifices. The fourth myth, the Ancestor, stretches Turkish history from the primordium to the present day, glorifies pre-Islamic Turkish history, and offers a heroic image of a new, non-Muslim ancestor. The last myth, Modernity, frames the future imagination of the collective. Promising a modern and a brilliant future, the myth justifies Atatürk’s modernization agenda and his drastic reforms.

**The First Duty: Characterizing the Movement and the “Turkish Nation”**

Constitutive discourses of nationalism attribute a collective character to the people by depicting selected values of the culture as common values. In Nutuk, the First Duty portrays the military values of Turkish culture as historical values and defines the movement as a “National Struggle” (p. 11). Atatürk opens his speech by invoking the First Duty: “Gentlemen, I landed at Samsun on the nineteenth day of May of year 1919. This was the general state of affairs” (p. 1). Beginning with the WWI defeat, the heavy conditions of the armistice, and the invasion, Atatürk describes the grim circumstances that faced the already “exhausted and impoverished” people of the Ottoman Empire (p. 1). “Morally and materially,” he says, “the enemy Powers were openly attacking the Ottoman Empire and the country itself. They were determined to disintegrate and annihilate both” (p. 7). “Those who had driven the people and the country into the World War had fled and now cared for nothing but their own safety” and those who remained, the Sultan and his cabinet, became “subservient” to the
will of the occupiers (p. 1). “Without being aware of it,” Atatürk observes, “the nation had no longer anyone to lead it” (p. 7).

The First Duty designates independence as the first condition of Turkish existence. In Atatürk’s words the “first duty” is to “forever protect and defend Turkish independence” (p. 740). This is the “highest duty” (p. 12). The myth proposes a teleological reading of history by defining Turks as a historically military people. According to this myth, Turks are born soldiers. The idealized image of the Turk is a warrior, ready to make the ultimate sacrifice. Living under a foreign yoke equals slavery. “The foundational principle,” Atatürk says, “is that the Turkish nation should live in honor and dignity. Such a condition can only be attained by complete independence” (p. 9). A nation “deprived of its independence, no longer deserves to be regarded otherwise than as a slave in the eyes of the civilized world” (p. 9). Turks “have never been in such a humiliating state” and “will prefer to perish than subject [themselves] to the life of a slave. Therefore Independence or Death!” (p. 10).

The First Duty in Nutuk serves three main rhetorical functions. First, by characterizing the uprising as a struggle for independence, it legitimizes the movement. Second, by defining Turks as a historically military nation, the myth attributes a collective character to the movement. According to the myth, the urge to take up arms to resist invasion is instinctive to a nation of soldiers. Thus the population was “united” (p. 15); the “entire nation” was in a state of “rebellion” that was “impossible to suppress” (p. 16). “The cry for liberation resounded from one end” of the country “to the other” (p. 310). Third, by depicting the nation as leaderless, the myth justifies Atatürk’s claim to power. At a time when the Sultan and his government “lacked dignity and courage” to carry out their First Duty, a son of the nation, a born-soldier, Atatürk, assumed this responsibility (p. 1). This soldier drew his authority from the nation itself. Describing his actions, following his recall and the order for his arrest, Atatürk says, “I resigned my duties and my commission in the Army. . . . Henceforward I continued to do my duty according to the dictates of my conscience, free from any official rank and restriction, trusting solely to the benevolence and magnanimity of the nation itself, from whom I drew strength, energy and inspiration as from an inexhaustible spring” (p. 35).

The telegrams Atatürk sent from Samsun and presents in Nutuk support his claim to leadership. By his account, the dispersed resistance becomes organized under his leadership. These telegrams position Atatürk as an insider, who witnessed and shaped to a considerable degree these momentous events. This position gives him the authority to speak to, to interpret, and to define “the National Struggle.”

The First Duty also projects a timeline on Nutuk’s narratives. It divides the movement into distinctive phases of the call to duty, the performing of duty, and the eventual victory. McGee (1975) explains the stages of collectivization in social movements as a coming to be, being, and ceasing to be (p. 243). The coming to be is the stage where the discourse depicting individuals as “the people” is formulated; being is when individuals begin to respond to the vision of the collective life depicted through myth; and ceasing to be is when the discourse loses its power and the people become one more time a collection of individuals. These stages in Nutuk’s narratives correspond to the call to duty (1919), the war (1920–1923), and the reform years (after 1923). During the reform years the unity created around
the goal of regaining independence began to dissolve and the voices of opposition became stronger. It seems that Atatürk attempted to revive the weakening unity by invoking the First Duty once more and devoting a majority of his speech in 1927 to recalling the devastating conditions under which Turks won their independence.

Atatürk concludes Nutuk by reminding the future generations of their duty again. “Turkish Youth! Your first duty is forever to preserve and to defend the Turkish Independence and the Turkish Republic. This is the very foundation of your existence and your future. This foundation is your most precious treasure,” Atatürk declares. “In the future, too, there may be malevolent people at home and abroad who will wish to deprive you of this treasure.” He continues, “If some day you are compelled to defend your independence and your Republic, you must not tarry to weigh the possibilities and circumstances of the situation before taking up your duty.” Alluding to the aftermath of WWI, Atatürk describes how dire these circumstances were, and how impossible their task seemed. “Youth of Turkey’s future,” he ends his words, “even in such circumstances it is your duty to save the Turkish Independence and Republic. The strength you need is already imbedded in your noble blood” (pp. 740–741).

Studying war rhetorics in the United States, Robert Ivie (2005) states that democracies are inherently prone to fear because they promote a discourse positioning republics as delicate, vulnerable, transient, and forever open to subversion, seduction, and attack from within and without. “Lady Liberty,” Ivie (1995) writes, “depends upon her male guardians to remain forever vigilant” (p. 491). Such discourse, Ivie (2005) warns, operates against the democratic values, practices, institutions, and norms. Cultivating fear sustains power and inhibits the emergence of dissent, the real pluralism, and creates a “chronic impulse to war” (Ivie & Giner, 2007, p. 580). As the forthcoming years would prove, the First Duty created similar effects in Turkey. Depicting the republic as vulnerable and in need of constant protection by its guardians, Turkish youth put Turkish democracy upon a fighting basis, creating a chronic impulse to military coups. Between 1923 and 2009, Turkey experienced four military coups. In every coup, the generals argued that they were performing their First Duty—protecting democracy. In the words of Kenan Evren (1980), the general who headed the 1980 coup, the army “had to intervene to re-establish Atatürk’s principles, to give them a new strength, and thus to put democracy, which has become unable to control itself, back to its firm foundation.”

The Internal Enemy: The Other Within
Constitutive rhetorics define “the people” in relationship to “others.” In the Turkish case the Internal Enemy myth defines the “other within.” It distinguishes those who are “one of us” from those who are “against us” by demonizing Atatürk’s political adversaries. The Sultan, his cabinet, the old system supporters, and opponents of Atatürk’s reforms are the main adversaries.

Vilification is a rhetorical strategy widely used in political discourse. This strategy appeals primarily to committed audiences. It discredits adversaries by characterizing them as dangerous and malevolent. It presents a cohesive collective of “us” and “them,” helping activists to define themselves and their positions in opposition to those of their adversaries and allowing them to cast themselves as moral agents fighting evil (Varderford, 1989). An
image of a powerful enemy with malicious intent provides a reason for action and helps rouse passion (Edelman, 1987, pp. 66–90).

In *Nutuk*, a group of people who advocated for a foreign mandate (becoming a colony) as a viable solution becomes an Internal Enemy. Atatürk rejects colonization as an option and characterizes the mandate seekers as “weak” and “misguided” (p. 5). For him, a mandate contradicts the fundamental Turkish characteristic and the principle of “complete independence” (p. 9). “To accept the protectorate of a foreign Power is to admit lack of all human qualities, weakness and incapacity. It is not at all thinkable that those who have never been in such a humiliating state will appoint a foreign master out of their own desire” (p. 9).

Other prominent Internal Enemies in *Nutuk* are the Sultan, his cabinet, and their supporters. Atatürk describes the Sultan as the “degenerate occupant of the throne” (p. 1) and a “traitor, who polluted the highest office in the State by his presence” (p. 203). Likewise, the members of the Ottoman cabinet were “cowards and criminals” who failed to “estimate the strength and the will of the nation or their value” (p. 108). Both the Sultan and the cabinet, Atatürk argues, “conspired with foreign countries” to save themselves and played “the part of the traitors to and executioners of the nation and country” (p. 108). They sold their “conscience to foreigners” (p. 108), declared themselves “the most embittered enemy of the national struggle” (p. 11) and “rendered great services to the enemies” (p. 27). These “depraved creatures” incited the population to “butcher one another” and “[preferred] to see all “places where the awakening of the national feeling is developing occupied by foreigners” (p. 150).

The main function of the Internal Enemy in *Nutuk* is to separate rhetorically “the Ottomans” from the “Turks,” the rulers from the ruled. The rulers are “a crowd of madmen, united by neither a moral nor spiritual bond to the country or the nation as a whole” (p. 10). They “acquired the power to rule over the Turkish nation” and “maintained” it “for more than six centuries” by “violence” (p. 577). Now “the nation . . . revolts against these usurpers, puts them in their right place and actually carries on their sovereignty” (p. 577). For Atatürk, sovereignty belongs to the people. “This is an actual fact” and “it must be accepted unconditionally as such” (p. 557). Otherwise, “some heads will be cut off” (p. 577).

The separation of rulers from the ruled was vital for Turkish nationalist discourse for it framed “the question” as “the sovereignty of the dynasty” versus “sovereignty of the nation.” This helped delegitimize the Ottoman regime as oppressive and detached from its people and eradicated the central constructs of the Ottoman system (the Sultanate, Caliphate, and empire) from discussions of identity. This way it prepared the ground to imagine a different political collectivity.

In analyzing Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, Burke (1973) explains the construction of an enemy through “projection.” A brief comparison between *Mein Kampf* and *Nutuk* is useful to identify a conceptual limitation in Burke’s “projection” and to draw distinctions between the two leaders. Burke does not differentiate between internal and external othering when he proposes projection as a rhetorical tool for analysis. Burke (1973) argues that Hitler constructs an “international enemy” (p. 194), but then he proceeds to show how Hitler blamed the Jews for the downfall of the German economy and for poisoning the Aryan blood in-
side (p. 204), and for moral corruption of all humanity outside (p. 209). Differentiating internal and external othering and analyzing them separately would have been useful. It would have explained Nazism’s national versus international goals. This is important because in such a distinction we find a fundamental difference between Atatürk and Hitler, Kemalism and Nazism.

In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler identifies Jews as an “inferior race” and claims the racial “superiority” of Aryans (Burke, 1973, p. 202). He employs a “corrupt use of religious” thought to justify his claims, depicts his war as a struggle between “good and evil” and thus sets out to cleanse the entire world of “evil” (Burke, 1973, p. 201). By contrast, Atatürk diligently constructs his internal and external enemies and differentiates among them. Unlike Hitler, Atatürk does not vilify an entire population of people in *Nutuk*. He others the Sultan, the government, and their supporters as opponents of the national movement. Because he vilifies his adversaries on an ideological basis, Atatürk makes no racial superiority claims over them nor does he use religion and religious imagery while constructing the internal enemy.

Similarly, as we will explain in the following section, Atatürk defines his external enemies on a political basis as “the enemy nations.” He further qualifies his construction as “the military forces” of four distinct nations who were occupying Turkey. This strictly material construction of the enemy is significant. Concurrent with his construction of Jews on racial and religious grounds as the “evil other,” Hitler attempted to annihilate them. He considered this the God given “responsibility” of Aryans (Burke, 1973, p. 209). As easy as it may have been, nowhere in *Nutuk* does Atatürk succumb to the religious mythology to depict the Great Powers as “evil infidels.” Hitler’s demonization of the Jews and radical Islamists’ construction of “the infidel” today may give us an idea about what consequences such a construction may have had for the world. However, as the emphasis on independence and freedom concepts in his myths make clear, Atatürk’s moral guide is not religion but the national rights discourse of his time—specifically the right to self-determination. Consequently his battle is contained within what he considers “national borders.” It is fought against the Great Powers, not the whole world of non-Muslims.

**The Encirclement: The Others**

While the Internal Enemy defines “the other within,” the Encirclement defines “the other without” in *Nutuk*. Othering is essential to the construction of collective identities. Othering distinguishes between the familiar and the foreign. The discursive inclusion and exclusion sets the rhetorical parameters of belonging. It defines national borders and justifies the claim to the land. Othering often involves negative characterizations of out-groups and glorification of the in-groups’ putatively shared character. Othering “erases” and “essentializes” the internal differences in out-groups and in-groups (Jasinski, 2001, pp. 412–413). It presents them as separate but homogenous collectivities within themselves, helping to forge collective identities. Through othering, Atatürk constructs the nation as a homogeneous collective within which audiences are positioned as belonging. The myth identifies the Great Powers and Greeks as external forces, collectively attempting to deprive Turks of their national rights. It portrays Turks as resisting their attacks and moralizes the struggle.
Othering in *Nutuk* occurs through homogenization, separation, conflict, and typification. Homogenization is achieved through depictions of “united enemies” and “unified Turks.” Separation is achieved through the rhetoric of “us” against “them.” Conflict is constructed and moralized through the use of war metaphors and images (such as the encircled nation), just and unjust dichotomies, and the discourse of national rights. Typification occurs through the depiction of history as recurrent: A timeless Turkish nation, whose history spans a mythical past to an indefinite future, always had and always will have powerful enemies trying to destroy it.

The Encirclement invokes the “united enemy” image in *Nutuk* by depicting a nation surrounded on all sides by multiple enemies, the French, English, Italians, and Greeks: “The Vilayet of Adana was occupied by the French; Urfa, Maras, Antep by the English. In Antalya and Konya were the Italians, whilst at Merzifon and Samsun were English troops;” Atatürk says. “Foreign officers and officials and their special agents were very active everywhere. At last, on the 15th May, . . . the Greek Army, with the consent of the Entente Powers, had landed at Izmir” (p. 1). Conversely, the determination to break the enemy circle unites the Turks. “[T]he entire nation take up arms” (p. 12) and stands unified to “assert its rights before the whole world” (p. 23).

Nations, Higson (2002) argues, are both inward and outward looking. They are inward looking because they define themselves in terms of their own internal cultural heritage and history and outward looking because they construct themselves in relation to their differences from other nations. Nations are also both forward and backward looking. Nationness is imagined through the elaboration of a shared past and the projection of a collective future. Nairn’s (1990) metaphoric depiction of nations as “Janus-faced” collectivities explains this notion. Janus, in Roman mythology, is a two-faced god who looks both backward and forward. The Encirclement myth in *Nutuk* functions in similar ways. Through Encirclement, Atatürk differentiates the Turkish nation from its enemies. He mythologizes the recent past by depicting the Independence War as a righteous and collective struggle and predicts a future full of similar struggles. The possibility of again being alone and being surrounded by multiple and powerful enemies emerges strongly, especially in Atatürk’s concluding remarks. “If some day” Turks are “compelled to defend” their existence once again, they are to waste no time assessing the “possibilities and circumstances of the situation” but are to act immediately. “These possibilities and circumstances may turn out to be extremely unfavorable. The enemies conspiring against your independence and your republic may have behind them a victory unprecedented in the annals of the world,” Atatürk says (p. 740). He continues, “It may be that, by violence and ruse, all the fortresses of your beloved fatherland may be captured, all its shipyards occupied, all its armies dispersed and every part of the country invaded. . . . The country may be impoverished, ruined and exhausted” (p. 740). Under such circumstances Turks have to rely on themselves. “The strength” they need is already “imbedded” in their “noble blood” (p. 741).

The Ancestor: The Past
Religion dominated the Ottoman understanding of their history and identity. Within this religiously informed worldview, the Ottomans traced their roots back to the sons of Noah, located themselves within the Islamic civilization and culture and recorded their history
accordingly (Timur, 1998). In 

*Nutuk*, Atatürk promotes a different ancestor. He links the people of Turkey with a mythical bloodline to their pre-Islamic ancestors in ancient central Asia.

This sense of Turkish ancestry has its roots in the Turkology research of European scholars in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The discovery of the Orkhon Inscriptions in 1889 was among the most important findings of this research. Erected in 732 and 735 in the Orkhon Valley of today’s Mongolia, the Orkhon Inscriptions document the history and culture of the Gokturks. The linguistic similarities between the Inscriptions and Turkish led scholars to ethnically link the Ottomans to central Asian civilizations. Shortly after the discovery of the monuments, Leon Cahun published the *Introduction to History of Asia: Turks and Mongols* (Warren, 1993). The book’s translation into Turkish by Necip Asım in 1896 introduced the idea of Turkish ethnicity to the identity discussions of the Ottoman elite and planted the first seeds of Pan-Turkism or “Turanism.” Turanism aimed to unite all Turkish-speaking peoples under Ottoman rule. Among the well-known supporters of this ideology were Yusuf Akçura, Ziya Gökalp, and Namık Kemal. In his controversial book, *Üç Tarzı Siyaset* (Three Types of Politics), Akçura (1998) opposed the multicultural ideologies that dominated Ottoman politics for centuries. Instead he proposed an ethnically unified empire stretching from central Asia to today’s Turkey, which was defined as “Turan.” This ideology found expression in the works of influential poets, writers, and scholars, like Ziya Gökalp (1997): “The homeland is neither Turkey for Turks, nor Turki- stan; the homeland is a vast and eternal land called Turan!” (p. 14).

While constructing the myth of the Ancestor in *Nutuk*, Atatürk appropriates some Turanist readings of history. “In fact,” he argues, “both before and after the rise of Islam, the Turks penetrated into the heart of Europe and attacked and invaded in all directions” (p. 378). He gives examples from the great empires the Turks established. The Huns represent one of these empires. “The Empire of Attila,” Atatürk states, “extended as far as France and the territory of the West” (p. 378). He numbers the Seljuk and Ottoman Empires among the states the Turks established after accepting Islam. In Atatürk’s narrative, Turkish history is a linear succession of various Turkish states. The Ottoman Empire is just a single ring in this long chain of history.

The appropriation of Turanism in *Nutuk* was a decisive rhetorical move, which permanently and officially changed the grounds of identity discussion. This understanding of Turkish ethnicity later led (1930–1937) to the development of the “Turkish History Thesis.” This thesis portrayed citizens of the new Turkey as the direct descendants of ethnic Turks from central Asia (Altınay, 2004, pp. 22–23). This thesis contradicted itself. It held that Turks emigrated from their central Asian origins to all parts of the world, establishing many states. Yet it claimed ethnic purity. It was as if in their long history, going all the way back to the primordium, Turks founded many states in several continents but were never mixed with the local communities living within the borders of their historically multicultu- ral empires and somehow kept their “blood” ethnically “pure.” Flood (1996) notes that myths can bridge eras separated by chunks of time, making them seem continuous. The Ancestor myth in Turkish nationalist discourse operated in similar ways. It offered a re-parative rhetorical continuity between ethnic identity and the historical past by discursively bridging many centuries and depicting various states as successors of one another.
Though Atatürk appropriates the Turanist reading of ethnic history to a degree in *Nutuk*, he strongly opposes the expansionist ideals embedded in this ideology. According to him, Turanism, like all expansionist ideologies of the past, is fallacious:

> To unite different nations under one common name . . . and thus to found a mighty state is a brilliant and attractive political ideal; but it is a misleading one. . . . It is an unrealizable aim to attempt to unite in one tribe all the Turks existing on the earth, thereby abolishing all boundaries. Herein lies a truth which the centuries that have gone by and the men who have lived during these centuries have clearly shown in dark and sanguinary events. (p. 379)

Consequently, the Ancestor myth functions in multiple and seemingly contradictory ways in *Nutuk*. The myth accepts Turanistic ethnicity arguments yet is hostile to Turanism itself. It claims the history and cultural heritage of central Asian Turks but ironically “others” them on political grounds. The myth simultaneously unites and divides Turks. The common ancestor image provides ground for a shared ethnicity between Turkey’s and central Asia’s Turks, but the claim to the “fatherland” (Turkey) distinguishes the Turks living in Turkey from Turks living elsewhere. Hence, in *Nutuk*, ethnicity does not simply refer to biological relatedness. It is discursively constructed within the “national borders” (p. 379).

Atatürk’s contextualization of the “noble blood” helps explain this notion. Though he speaks of a “noble blood,” the Turkish blood is not assumed to be racially superior in ways that, let’s say, the “Aryan blood” is said to be in Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* (Burke, 1973). In Atatürk’s estimation, blood becomes sacred only when spilled in defense of the country. Its sacredness is intrinsically connected to the military values of the Turkish culture. It is this culture of self-sacrifice that makes Turks a nation. It is the blood spilled for Turkey that makes it the fatherland. Nobility of the blood and the membership in the nation are earned. A letter Atatürk sent to the Australian government in remembrance of the Anzac (Australian and New Zealand) soldiers who he fought against and defeated in Gallipolli (1915) is worth mentioning to explain his understanding of the war-blood-nation relationships. Gallipolli was one of the bloodiest battles of WWI. In his letter Atatürk considers the Anzac soldiers who died in Turkey “the sons” of the Turkish nation. His letter is now etched on a memorial in Australia. He probably is the only enemy general who has a monument erected in his honor in another country:

> Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives . . . You now are lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehmets to us where they lie side by side here in this country of ours. . . . You, the mothers, who sent their sons from far away countries, wipe away your tears. Your sons are now living in our bosom and are in peace. Having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well. (Atatürk, 1934)
Modernity: The Future

The projected future is another characteristic of the constitutive discourse of Turkish nationalism. While Atatürk recasts the past through the Ancestor myth, he frames the imagined future collectivity through the myth of Modernity. This myth advocates a break from the Ottoman past, culture, and system. It designates the future place of Turkey among the most developed and prosperous Western nations, as opposed to the Ottomans who saw themselves as the leaders of the Islamic world. The “West,” for Atatürk, is an imaginary destination, symbolized and defined as constant progress. Turkey adopts the progressive ideas of Europe, imports its science and technology, catches up with the West and rises above and beyond it. When celebrating the tenth anniversary of the republic, Atatürk declares, “The major challenge facing us is to elevate our national life to the highest level of civilization and prosperity.” Turks must “raise [the] national culture above and beyond the highest level of civilization” and “rise like the new sun from the high horizon of civilization for the future” (as cited in Keskin, 1998, p. 372).

“Uygarlık” (civilization) and “laiklik” (secularism) are the key words of the Modernity myth. Atatürk often speaks of the “highest level of civilization.” The “highest level of civilization” refers to European modernity. Chakrabarty (2000) explains the conceptualization of modernity in colonial countries. Modernity, he writes, is seen as “something that had already happened elsewhere” and that is to be “reproduced mechanically with a local content” (p. 39). Atatürk’s conceptualization of modernity is similar. He defines modernity in material terms as advancement in technology and positive sciences. He depicts a nation “marching on the road of progress and civilization” toward a brilliant future as “she holds in her hand and in her mind the torch of the positive sciences” (as cited in Keskin, 1998, p. 372). A closer look, however, reveals that Atatürk’s reforms brought Turkey more than just positive sciences. The reforms extended from mere symbolic changes (e.g., the implementation of Western style of dress, Latin alphabet, Gregorian calendar, and the metric system) to structural changes, (e.g., secularization of education, law, and the legal and judicial systems). They politically oriented Turkey toward the West, curtailed Islam’s domination in social and political life and even changed how Turks looked, thought and spoke.

Among the social reforms Atatürk implemented, alphabet reform deserves special attention. Turks had used the Arabic alphabet since their acceptance of Islam (800 AD). Arabic is the alphabet and language of the Qur’an. Language played a central role in Islamic and Arab nationalisms. Both saw Arabic “as the medium of holy scriptures and Prophetic tradition” and “strenuously resisted ideas of language reform,” considering it “against religion and the unity” (Zubaida, 2004, p. 410). Atatürk replaced the Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet, rendering “overnight, virtually the entire nation” illiterate (Ahmad, 1993, p. 80). He then initiated ambitious literacy programs. The literacy rate went up from 9% to 42% between 1923 and 1938 (Aytbars, 1999). Yet the new generations lost the ability to read anything written in Arabic script. Along with holy texts, more than a millennia-long Turkish history became inaccessible to the new literates, turning the interpretation of the national past into a privilege enjoyed only by a handful of elite who made studying the old script their lifework.
Abolishing the Sultanate and Caliphate were, no doubt, the most important political reforms. According to Atatürk, Turks had to secularize to become “modern” and to survive as an independent nation. The Sultanate and Caliphate contradicted the principle of national sovereignty and endangered Turkey’s future existence. Critiquing those who advocated the idea of keeping the Caliphate in Turkey Atatürk says:

[T]hey now spoke of a monarch whose authority extended over a population of three hundred million souls belonging to manifold nations and dwelling in different continents of the world. Into the hands of this great monarch, whose authority was to extend over the whole of Islam, they placed as the only power that of the Turkish people, that is to say, only from 10 to 15 millions of these three hundred million subjects . . . Caliph was to guide the affairs of these Mohamedan peoples . . . He was to defend the rights of all Mohamedans . . . confront every attack . . . and preserve by all means the welfare and spiritual development of Islam. (p. 590)

It is absolutely “absurd,” he continues, to think that “Turkey” and “the handful of men she possesses could be placed at the disposal of the Caliph” (p. 592). Caliphate symbolizes the “utopia” of “found[ing] a state compromising [the] whole of Islam,” and “The Turkish nation is incapable of undertaking such an irrational mission” (p. 592). “The error of looking upon ourselves as masters of the world must cease,” he warns. “Let us put an end to the catastrophes into which the people had been dragged by following those who deceive themselves and misjudge our real rank and position in the world. We cannot conscientiously permit this tragedy to continue (p. 593).

This worldview sets Atatürk apart from many of his contemporaries. Assuming political and cultural superiority, the colonial powers pursued world dominance. The same ambition fueled fascism in Italy and Germany, giving rise to Mussolini and Hitler. Similarly Arab nationalists attempted to unite all Arabs and Islamists all Muslims. In Atatürk, we encounter a relatively modest nationalist leader who rejects the idea of assuming power over others and calls for an end to “the catastrophe.” “Our assembly, Gentlemen, cannot attribute to themselves powers that compromise the whole of Islamic world,” he says in addressing parliament. “Your powers and authority can only extend to the Turkish people and our Turkish country” (p. 584). In Atatürk’s imagination of the modern future world there is no place for multinational empires or imperialism but only nation-states minding their own business.

Conclusion

Contrary to Gellner’s argument, nationalism can and does exist in Islamic cultures and it can formulate a Muslim political identity beyond the boundaries of “umma.” Turkey is a case in point. Despite their internal conflicts, we can add to this list Egypt and Iran who have developed a distinct sense of nationhood. What these countries have in common is that they elevated their pre-Islamic history in their discourses to a level of national pride.
Egypt has the ancient Egyptian civilization, Iran the Persian past, and Turkey the ancient Turkic civilizations to proudly claim. This has not always been the case. The tendency in the Muslim world, especially among Arabs, has been to trace their lineage back to the seventh century, the emergence of Islam. Pre-Islamic history is generally dismissed as “Jahiliyya,” the age of ignorance. This way of thinking assigned religion primacy in identity and colored the Arabists, Pan-Islamists, and Islamic nationalisms, as well as Ottomanism. Taha Hussein’s case is illustrative of especially the Islamists aversion to their pre-Islamic history. Hussein, an Egyptian writer, placed Egyptian history within the Mediterranean and Hellenic world in his book, *The Future of Culture in Egypt*, in 1937. The book “raised a storm of controversy and was attacked by traditionalists and Islamists” (Zubaida, 2004). Similarly seen as divisive, Turkish ethnic identity arguments encountered stiff resistance in the Ottoman Empire until its collapse left no other choice.

Atatürk’s official adoption of pre-Islamic Turkish history, perhaps, was one of the determining moments of Turkish nationalism. It displaced Islam as a single unifying factor and elevated ethnicity in its place. This allowed Atatürk to construct Turkish national identity outside the parameters of religious community, “umma.” 

“Umma” is still an ideal pursued by radical Islamists. From Afgani (1837–1897), Abdur (1849–1905), Rashid Rida (d. 1935), to Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), many ideologues of Arab and Islamist movements (including secular Ba’thists) promoted Islam as a unifying factor (Zubaida, 2004). Drawing from their teachings radical Islamists today still speak of a “global umma.” And they may be right. Nationalism, perhaps, is detrimental to “umma.” It, perhaps, is the only antidote to the radical ambitions of creating such an international community. And Turkey, perhaps, delivered a significant blow to such movements by abolishing the Caliphate.

The drastic changes Turkey went through under Atatürk’s leadership required sweeping reforms and realignments in discourse. The political myths Atatürk constructed helped facilitate these realignments by offering new ways to interpret, to understand, to think, and to speak about Turkish history and identity. Burke (1973) offered four devices for constructing unity: symbolic rebirth, inborn dignity, projection, and commercial use. In *Nutuk* the myths of First Duty and Ancestor capture the symbolic rebirth and inborn dignity and the Encirclement and Internal Enemy capture the projection and commercial use. The Turkish case adds a fifth element to Burke’s rhetorical devices: the promise or dream of the future. Through the myth of Modernity, Atatürk leaves behind a vision, a dream for Turks to achieve. Other significant contributions of the Turkish case to our understanding of constitutive discourses can be summarized as follows.

The Turkish case reveals that the constitutive discourse of nationalism constructs the nation as a coherent and homogenous community, flowing through time and space. This discourse is mythic. Contrary to the generally accepted “Janus” thesis, the nationalist discourse has three (not two) distinct time orientations: the past, present, and future. The nationalist discourse depicts who the people were, who they are now, and who they can become in the future. It mythologizes the past by selectively bringing together and reinterpreting a series of stories, values, and ideological commitments of the community it addresses. In doing so, it creates new narratives—political myths. These new narratives
explain the current conditions. At the same time, they mythologize the moment by depicting it as a determinative point in history, offering images of victims and scapegoats, identifying friends and foes, “us” and “them.” The depiction of the current moment provides a reason for action, the nationalist movement, and propels it. This discourse also projects a future. The images of a future collective life determine the goals and ideals to be achieved and frame the future imagination of the collective.

Othering is an integral part of the constitutive discourses of nationalism. Two forms of othering characterize this discourse: internal othering and external othering. Contrary to previous arguments, nation-ness is not constructed simply by looking inward to common history and outward to the differences from other nations. Nationalism involves internal struggles because it emerges within an already constituted political community and as a reaction or attempt to transform already constituted collective identities. Consequently, “internal othering” is an essential part of constitutive discourses of nationalism. “The other within” defines political adversaries. It determines the conditions of belonging. By vilifying “the others within” the activists define their position in opposition to those of their adversaries and moralize their cause.

Finally, the Turkish case highlights the necessity to consider the futuristic constructions of the rhetors while examining their nationalist discourses. Construction of a future is a rhetorical device that lures individuals to the movement, motivates their actions, determines their goals, facilitates their identification with the discourse and keeps them together as long as the myth remains powerful. In Nutuk this dream is achieving modernity and becoming a significant partner in the “ civilized world.” Hitler, too, had a dream. Burke’s (1973) analysis leaves this dream unexplored. As helpful as it is, an analysis of his ideology and discourse is incomplete without examining what kind of a world and future Hitler (or any rhetor) envisioned for his nation. There, we believe, a critic would find the most striking differences among various ideologies shaping nationalist movements. As an integral part of the constitutive discourse of nationalism the futuristic dreams deserve attention. For future research we invite scholars to explore these dreams within their studies of constitutive discourses.

Notes

1. For consistency, we used Nutuk’s (Atatürk, 1963) official translation into English as the base text for the quotations. There are places where we disagreed with this translation. In those instances, we provide our corrections in brackets. Quotes from other related Turkish sources were translated by the authors.

2. In Turkish culture, “Mehmet” is a general name referring to Turkish soldiers.

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