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WIGSTOCK AND THE KULTURKAMPF:
SUPREME COURT STORYTELLING,
THE CULTURE WAR, AND ROMER v. EVANS

Richard F. Duncan*

Argument is insufficient; America needs exorcism.
—Peter Kreeft1

I. INTRODUCTION

Our society is deeply divided over the meaning of good and evil. We tell clashing stories about things that matter a great deal, things such as abortion, marriage and family, education, the role of religion in the public square, and the ethics of human sexuality.2 James Davison Hunter observed that this culture war is a struggle between starkly polarized moral communities and that it represents "a strain upon the course of democratic practice."3 Indeed, I often think America was a good idea that, sadly, has failed. Perhaps there is too much pluribus for there to be unum.

Certainly one might well reach that conclusion after reading the majority and dissenting opinions in Romer v. Evans;4 the recent

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1 Peter Kreeft, ECUMENICAL JIHAD 17 (1996).
3 Id. at 316.
Supreme Court decision that invalidated Colorado Amendment 25 under the Equal Protection Clause. The opinions in Romer, although nearly devoid of rigorous legal analysis, are nevertheless compelling as narratives of the culture war.

The purpose of this Article is to analyze both the doctrine and the stories of Romer. At the end of the day, I hope to demonstrate that although Romer makes an insignificant contribution to the development of constitutional law, it does much to limn the nature of the Kulturkampf that threatens to irrevocably destroy our national unity.

II. THE DOCTRINE OF ROMER

If the only tool you own is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.6 Justice Kennedy apparently thinks the people of Colorado used a hammer—Amendment 2—when a more precise instrument was called for.

Indeed, Amendment 2 is a blunt device. Even many of us who defended its constitutionality were uncomfortable with its breadth. The Amendment singled out a class of persons—homosexuals and bisexuals—and amended the state constitution to forbid all levels of state and local government from adopting any statute, ordinance, or policy designed to protect this group against discrimination. The Amendment’s breadth made it possible to imagine cases in which it would bar policies designed to protect homosexuals from harms that all would acknowledge to be wrongful.

For example, suppose there was good reason to believe that certain members of the police force would refuse to protect homosexuals from violent criminal attacks.7 And suppose further that the police

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5 If allowed to go into effect, Amendment 2 would have been COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b:

No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.

Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.

6 I believe this proverb is an old one, but I most recently encountered it in an article by Frederick Schauer. Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 989, 1004 (1995).

7 Say, for example, a local newspaper had published a story about a rash of assaults on homosexuals in public parks, and undisclosed members of the police force...
department, wishing to reassure the gay community that it would be served equally, adopted a policy stating that "the services of the police department are available to all without regard to race, gender, religion or sexual orientation." This policy, which no one could seriously object to, would have violated the Colorado state constitution if Amendment 2 had been allowed to go into effect.8

Of course, the people of Colorado were not seeking to deny police protection to gays and lesbians when they ratified Amendment 2. Rather, they were primarily concerned about protecting the liberty and associational rights of employers and landlords against restrictive "gay rights" ordinances enacted in Colorado's more progressive municipalities.9 But the broad language of the Amendment swept well beyond this reasonable terrain and literally prohibited all attempts by all levels of government to protect individuals against discrimination on the basis of homosexual "orientation, conduct, practices or relationships."10 As Justice Kennedy observed, under the Amendment homosexuals could "obtain specific protection against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the state constitution."11

If one searches for sophisticated legal reasoning in the Court's decision in Romer he will be disappointed, because "there is no there there."12 Although media and academic spin doctors have pro-

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8 Laurence Tribe and several other scholars wrote a very influential amicus brief in Romer that repeatedly urged the Court to consider the all-encompassing scope of Amendment 2. Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, and Kathleen M. Sullivan, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter Tribe Brief]. Tribe argued that:

[...]

Id. at 3.


10 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.

11 Id. at 1627.

claimed Romer as a landmark victory for gay rights, the reality is that the opinion written by the Court is hardly a Magna Carta for homosexuals. The Court did not reverse Bowers v. Hardwick. It did not find any new fundamental rights lurking in the penumbras of the written Constitution. It did not hold that homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. It did not hold that moral disapproval of homosexual conduct is invidious. It did not hold that it is illegitimate or irrational for government to make distinctions designed to discourage homosexuality. Most emphatically, it did not say anything that calls in question laws rejecting homosexual marriage. It did apply the lowest level of scrutiny—the rational basis test—to laws disadvantaging homosexuals and explicitly held that such laws will be upheld so long as they are “narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context” for the Court to ascertain that there exists “some relation between the classification and the purpose it served.”

In short, the problem with Amendment 2 was its all-encompassing breadth. Romer is not a landmark decision endorsing gay rights; it is a narrow and rather trivial application of what the Court called its “ordinary” rule that “a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for

Stephen Gillers, who agrees with the results in Romer, describes Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion as “so weak as to be astonishing.” Getting a Read on Romer v. Evans, LEGAL TIMES, May 27, 1996, at 8.

13 On the ReligionLaw discussion group, Romer was compared to Brown v. Board of Education by some and said to have effectively overruled Bowers v. Hardwick by others. Newspapers across the country proclaimed a great victory for homosexual rights. The headline in the New York Times, which proclaimed “Gay Rights Laws Can’t Be Banned, High Court Rules,” was typical of this spin on Romer. See Linda Greenhouse, Gay Rights Laws Can’t Be Banned, High Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1996, at A1. One legal analyst went so far as to suggest that Romer may require the states to recognize same-sex marriage because the heterosexual norm for civil marriage is based upon a “‘bare animus’ against a group of people.” Getting a Read on Romer v. Evans, supra note 12, at 8. See also William Eskridge, Credit Is Due, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 17, 1996, at 11. For a discussion of Romer’s impact on marriage laws, see infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.


15 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.

16 Id.

17 At oral argument Justice Kennedy described Amendment 2 as creating a classification “adopted to fence out” homosexuals “for all purposes.” He then remarked “I’ve never seen a statute like that.” U.S. Supreme Court Official transcript at *5, Romer, 1995 WL 605822 (No. 94-1039).
it seems tenuous.\textsuperscript{18} Although Colorado advanced many clearly legitimate interests in support of the Amendment—the liberty and associational interests of landlords and employers, and administrative efficiency “in conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups,” to name a few\textsuperscript{19}—the breadth of the Amendment was “so far removed from these particular justifications” that the Court found it “impossible to credit them.”\textsuperscript{20} Once the Court concluded that the extreme breadth of the Amendment outran and belied “any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it,”\textsuperscript{21} there was nothing left to do but to invalidate it on its face under the ordinary test applied by the Court in run-of-the-mill equal protection cases. So when all the cheering and spin-doctoring are over, \textit{Bowers} is still the champ and \textit{Romer} not even a contender.

\textbf{A. Bowers and Romer}

The argument that \textit{Romer} significantly advances the cause of homosexual rights begins by describing the decision as inconsistent with \textit{Bowers} and concludes that moral opposition to homosexuality is no longer a legitimate basis for laws that disadvantage homosexuals.\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Bowers}, of course, is the Court’s 1986 landmark decision upholding the collective right of democratic self-government, the most basic liberty of a free people,\textsuperscript{23} against the claim that consensual homosexual acts are covered by a fundamental (though unenumerated) constitutional right. The Court noted that sodomy was a criminal offense at common law, was forbidden “by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights,” and was a crime in “all but 5 of the 37 States” in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.\textsuperscript{24} Indeed, the proscription has ancient roots nourished by “mil-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} \textit{Romer}, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
\item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{Id.} at 1629.
\item \textsuperscript{20} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{21} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{22} We had a lengthy group discussion of this issue on the ReligionLaw list. My views and insights have been enriched and honed by these cyberspace exchanges.
\item \textsuperscript{23} As Robert Bork has observed, “[t]he freedom of the majority to govern and the freedom of the individual not to be governed remain forever in tension.” \textit{Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America} 139 (1990). Justice White was very much aware of this tension in \textit{Bowers}, and he was particularly concerned about the legitimacy of the Court adopting an expansive view of its authority to “discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause.” \textit{Bowers}, 478 U.S. at 194. “The Court is most vulnerable,” proclaimed Justice White, “and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.” \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{24} \textit{Bowers}, 478 U.S. at 192-93.
\end{itemize}
lennia of moral teaching," and the Court declared it would be "facetious" for it to recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. Finally, and importantly for present purposes, Bowers applied a rational basis test and held that the "presumed belief" of the majority that "homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable" was an adequate basis for Georgia's criminal prohibition of that conduct. Indeed, as Justice White understood, law is "constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated...the courts will be very busy indeed."

The argument that Romer has effectively reversed Bowers proceeds backwards from Justice Scalia's dissent in the former case. Scalia argued that it should be "obvious" that Amendment 2 is constitutional after Bowers because if Georgia may criminalize homosexual sodomy "surely it is constitutionally permissible" for the people of Colorado to enact a law "merely disfavoring homosexual conduct." But the Court held that Amendment 2 fails the rational basis test because it was not "directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective." So to Scalia the legal logic is: if Bowers, then Romer is wrong. Gay rights advocates turn Scalia's analysis around and argue: if Romer, then Bowers is no longer good law.

A careful reading of Romer, however, demonstrates that both Scalia's criticism and the advocates' reverse spin are unjustified. Bowers was not dispositive of the issues in Romer, and therefore Romer does not signal the demise of Bowers. The primary significance of Romer in the evolution of constitutional law lies not in any expansion of homosexual rights, but rather upon the issue of facial challenges to overbroad legislation.

There are many rational and legitimate reasons for the government to enact laws disadvantaging (or withholding some benefit from) homosexuals. Public morality, property rights, religious liberty, and associational freedom are clearly proper ends of public policy, and any one of these purposes is an adequate foundation for typical laws that classify on the basis of sexual orientation. Amendment 2, however, went well beyond the point of implementing these purposes. It was severely overbroad in two ways. First, it imposed what the Court called a "broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named

25 Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
26 Id. at 194.
27 Id. at 196.
28 Id.
29 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 1629.
group” and proscribed laws, regulations, and policies designed to protect that group against “exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.” Second, it allowed this disability to be lifted only by the extraordinarily difficult step of amending the state constitution. This extreme overbreadth clearly troubled Justice Kennedy and the majority. It is one thing for a state to outlaw homosexual sodomy or to define marriage to exclude same-sex relationships; it is quite a different thing for the state constitution to declare homosexuals—including, apparently, those who abstain from homosexual conduct—to be akin to outlaws by denying them access to even the “possibility of protection under the laws of the state from the wrongs that may befall them.”

Amendment 2 would have done much that is good had it been allowed to go into effect. However, as the parade of horribles raised by the Justices at oral argument revealed, it also might have prevented government policies designed to protect homosexuals against what everyone would agree are invidious (if unlikely) harms. If homosexuals should ever be denied police or fire protection, access to public libraries, or treatment at public hospitals, surely there can be no legitimate reason to forbid government from adopting remedial policies mandating that these services shall be available without regard to sexual orientation. Yet, under Amendment 2 these policies might be

32 Id. at 1627 (emphasis added).
33 Id.
34 Tribe Brief, supra note 8, at 8.
35 Laws forbidding private discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation restrict liberty, and stigmatize traditional beliefs about sexual ethics as invidious and immoral. For example, when the law tells a deeply religious landlord that it is wrong for her to refuse to rent an apartment to a homosexual couple, it has the effect of legitimizing homosexuality and delegitimizing the landlord’s traditional religious beliefs. By passing Amendment 2, the people of Colorado decided to remove the stigma and associated harms inflicted on traditionalists by state and local homosexual rights legislation. This, in my opinion, is a very good thing to do. See Duncan & Young, supra note 9, at 126-30.
36 Justice Kennedy declared that he had never before seen a law that classifies a particular group and fences it out “for all purposes.” Justice O’Connor worried that a homosexual who was denied the right to borrow a library book would apparently have no legal recourse. Justice Ginsburg was concerned that a hospital might deny homosexuals access to a kidney dialysis machine. Other questions focused on homosexuals hypothetically being denied services by the police, the health department, and the insurance commissioner. See, U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript, Romer, 1995 WL 605892 (No. 94-1039); Linda Greenhouse, U.S. Justices Hear, and Also Debate, a Gay Rights Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1995, at A1.
forbidden because they treat sexual orientation (including homosexuality and bisexuality) as a protected class.

At least in theory, Amendment 2 extended well beyond any legitimate state interest and, therefore, denied homosexuals equal protection of the law. This modest position represents the sum of Romer's impact on the equal protection issue. It poses no threat to the continued vitality of the Court's ruling in Bowers, because Bowers involved a law "narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context" to enable the Court to ascertain a reasonable relation between the conduct prohibited (homosexual sodomy) and Georgia's legitimate interest in prohibiting immoral behavior. 37

B. Romer, Overbreadth, and Facial Invalidation

In Romer, the respondents' attack on Amendment 2 was a facial challenge, and the Court's facial invalidation of Amendment 2 means it may not be enforced under any circumstances. 38 In contrast, when a court holds a statute unconstitutional "as applied" to a particular set of facts, the law may be enforced in other circumstances. 39

In United States v. Salerno, 40 the Court held that a facial challenge to a legislative act can succeed only if the challenger establishes "that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." 41 In other words, a facial attack on a law "will fail if the statute has any constitutional application." 42 The Salerno Court expressly stated that the overbreadth doctrine, which holds that a party may claim a statute should not be applied to him solely because it would be unconstitutional to apply it in different circumstances to a hypothetical third party, 43 does not apply "outside the limited context of the First Amendment." 44

37 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
38 See id. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 745.
42 Dorf, supra note 39, at 239. Professor Dorf calls the Salerno test a "truly draconian standard" and argues that the test "finds little support in the Supreme Court's cases and is unsound in principle." Id. at 239, 294. Dorf argues that "substantially overbroad" laws—in the sense that potentially invalid applications are substantial when compared to valid applications—should be subject to facial invalidation. Id. at 276.
43 See id. at 261.
44 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
In his Romer dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the facial challenge to Amendment 2 must fail under Salerno, because the Amendment was "unquestionably" constitutional in at least some applications.\textsuperscript{45} Certainly, Scalia's argument has force. But I think there is a counterargument that also has resonance. As Professor Dorf has shown, if a statute has an "impermissible purpose, courts cannot save it by severing its unconstitutional applications. The invalid legislative purpose pervades all of the provision's applications."\textsuperscript{46}

Dorf's insight seems to explain Romer. Although the shallowness of Justice Kennedy's opinion rivals that of the Platte River in a drought year, he seems to conclude that the extreme breadth of Amendment 2 suggests an impermissible purpose that permeates all of the Amendment's applications. Indeed, Kennedy repeatedly makes the point that the "sheer breadth" of Amendment 2 "seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects,"\textsuperscript{47} and therefore outruns and belies "any legitimate justifications that may be claimed" in support of the Amendment.\textsuperscript{48} If you can go this far with the Court, the rest seems to follow. Because of the inference of animus drawn from the conceivably unlimited reach of the initiative, the clearly legitimate purposes advanced by the State in support of Amendment 2 were tainted and "impossible to credit."\textsuperscript{49} This positions the case squarely within the rule of Salerno and facial invalidation follows inexorably.\textsuperscript{50}

Although the Romer opinion adopts a defensible application of rational basis review even in the context of a facial challenge, I believe the case was wrongly decided. The defensibility of the opinion turns on the Court's almost single-minded focus on the conceivable breadth of Amendment 2. Yes, if police officers refuse to protect homosexual

\textsuperscript{45} Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{46} Dorf, supra note 39, at 279. Dorf cites Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), as evidence that the Salerno rule "does not apply to facial challenges to statutes with an unconstitutional purpose." \textit{Id.} at 280.
\textsuperscript{47} Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Id.} at 1629.
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Id.} The primary reasons advanced by the State in support of the Amendment were the liberty interests of employers and landlords, and Colorado's interest in "conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups." \textit{Id.} These interests are clearly legitimate ones. They failed to support Amendment 2 only because the Court found the "breadth of the Amendment" was "so far removed from these particular justifications" as to render them inoperative. \textit{Id.} Having made this determination, the Court concluded that the Amendment "is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests." \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Id.}
crime victims and if library clerks refuse to allow homosexuals to borrow books, Amendment 2 might be interpreted to prohibit remedial policies specifically declaring that the government does not discriminate in the provision of these services on the basis of sexual orientation. And yes, these results are not related to any legitimate governmental purpose. But why should we think these scenarios will ever occur or were intended by the voters of Colorado when they approved the initiative? Isn't it at least possible that this hypothetical problem might be cured through a narrow interpretation of Amendment 2 when (and if) such a case should ever arise? As Justice Kennedy himself said in *Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,* courts should not invalidate laws "on a facial challenge based upon a worst-case analysis that may never occur."

If Amendment 2 had been judged based upon its likely (as opposed to its imagined) applications, it would easily have survived a facial challenge under a rational basis test. Its likely and immediate impact would have been to prohibit laws and policies giving homosexuals special protection against discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations. It would not have required public or private discrimination against homosexuals; it would simply have forbidden government from adopting policies treating homosexual acts and inclinations as protected traits. It would have proscribed laws—like those enacted in Boulder, Aspen, and Denver—that specifically forbid discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Unlike laws that generally forbid arbitrary discrimination by public or quasi-public institutions, "gay-rights" laws single out sexual behavior and inclinations as specially protected categories and then employ the law's coercion to force dissenters to comply with this particular vision of justice.

Certainly, the people of Colorado might have had many rational and legitimate reasons for supporting a constitutional amendment designed to invalidate laws that conflate the values of the sexual revolution with those of the civil rights movement. Gay rights laws such as those enacted in Aspen, Boulder, and Denver do not bestow benefits without costs. For every economic and symbolic benefit provided homosexuals and bisexuals by gay rights laws there is a corresponding economic and social cost imposed upon others in the

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51 *See Dorf, supra* note 39, at 274-75. *See, e.g.*, Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that no rational basis exists "for permitting one student to assault another based on the victim's sexual orientation" where a public school failed to protect an openly gay student from physical assaults and harassment).


53 *Id.* at 514.
community. Homosexuals gain protected status in employment and housing; employers and landlords lose freedom of choice, control over their businesses, and perhaps even religious freedom. Homosexuals gain social legitimacy when the law (in effect) declares sexual orientation, like race and gender, to be irrelevant to a person's character or worth; traditionalists, however, are stigmatized and delegitimized when the law (in effect) adopts the proposition "that opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias." Just as it is rational and legitimate for homosexuals and their advocates to support gay rights laws to acquire these benefits, it is rational and legitimate for others to seek to avoid these costs by supporting laws like Amendment 2.

C. Romer As Law: Some Specific Applications

Although Romer will be cited by gay rights advocates as controlling every case in which a law or government policy classifies on the basis of sexual orientation or behavior, the majority's narrow holding in the case suggests that this strategy is likely to be unproductive. In fact, the narrow holding of Romer suggests quite strongly that typical laws disadvantaging homosexuals do not offend the Equal Protection Clause. Consider, for example, the following specific applications of Romer.

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54 For example, the Aspen ordinance, which prohibits discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation, contains no exceptions. It applies to all employers, all housing, and all public accommodations without regard to the size of the business or the religious conscience of persons subject to the restrictions. There is not even an exception for churches and religious ministries. See Aspen, Colo. Mun. Code § 13-98. In his dissenting opinion in Evans v. Romer, Colorado Supreme Court Justice Erickson stated that the Aspen ordinance requires "churches to open their facilities to homosexual organizations if the facilities were opened to any community organization." Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1363 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (Erickson, J., dissenting), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). Thus, if a church in Aspen allows, say, a local right-to-life group to conduct a meeting on its premises, it must grant equal access to homosexual organizations. Of course, at least some religiously motivated dissenters might be able to claim a religious freedom exception under the First Amendment or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. See generally Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 393 (1994). But litigating a free exercise claim is not a cost-free process, and religious freedom exemptions do nothing for employers and property owners whose opposition to homosexuality is based upon secular notions of sexual morality.

55 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1. State Constitutional Amendments

Suppose that in response to Romer, the people of some state pass an initiative amending the state constitution to forbid all state and local government action that restricts "the right of private employers and property owners to take sexual orientation into account when making decisions regarding employment or the sale or rental of real property." This hypothetical initiative accomplishes much of Amendment 2's agenda, but it differs in significant respects from that unconstitutional provision. First, since everyone has sexual orientation, it creates a "disability" that applies to everyone, not to a "single named group." Under the hypothetical initiative, no one may use the law's coercion to forbid private employers and landlords from treating sexual orientation as a relevant qualification for employment or housing opportunities.

Second, the hypothetical amendment applies only to a narrow range of activities and does not create a "broad and undifferentiated disability" that denies "protection across the board." The parade of horribles imagined by the Romer majority cannot be used to slander this initiative. The hypothetical law thus succeeds where Amendment 2 failed—it is "narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context" to enable the Court to ascertain that there exists "some relation between the classification and the purpose it served."

For example, the proposed initiative serves the legitimate interests of protecting the economic liberties, associational freedom, and rights of religious and moral conscience of private employers and landlords. In a free society, these interests are clearly legitimate ones. Indeed, only two years ago the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the "right to exclude others is 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'"

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56 Id. at 1627. This is what Justice Kennedy presumably meant when he said Amendment 2 "is at once too narrow and too broad." Id. at 1628. The Amendment was too narrow because it "targeted" a "single named group"—homosexuals and bisexuals. Id. at 1626-27. It was too broad because it imposed "a broad and undifferentiated disability" on that targeted class by denying them "protection across the board." Id. at 1627-28. The hypothetical initiative does not single out a small group of persons; rather, it applies to a trait—sexual orientation—shared by every single person in the human community, because each one of us has sexual orientation.

57 Id. at 1627.
58 Id. at 1628.
59 Id. at 1627.
60 See Duncan & Young, supra note 9, at 130-34.
The Romer majority specifically addressed these legitimate interests and said that they failed to support Amendment 2 only because the breadth of that provision was "so far removed from these particular justifications." The hypothetical amendment, however, is not fatally overbroad; there is a reasonable fit between that provision and legitimate governmental purposes.

Romer does not stand in the way of this initiative. If the Court is to strike it down, it will need to find some other rationale.

2. Marriage Laws

Within a week after the Court announced its decision in Romer, David Sobelsohn, a Washington lawyer and former chief legislative counsel of a leading homosexual advocacy group, confidently predicted that "Romer will help the constitutional case against state refusal to recognize same-sex marriage" because "[a]fter all, one can also trace that refusal to 'bare animus' against a group of people." I think this view is based upon a mistaken understanding of both Romer and state marriage laws.

Same-sex marriage has been unanimously and consistently rejected by the laws of every state in this country. Indeed, at present no country or state in the world recognizes homosexual unions as marriages. This unanimous, international, and multicultural consensus on the meaning of marriage has a solid, rational, and clearly legitimate basis.

The proposed initiative also serves the legitimate interest of preserving "traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores" by passing local ordinances that equate opposition to sexual immorality with racism and sexism. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Professor William Eskridge, an articulate academic advocate of the homosexual legal agenda, made the same point in a recent essay calling for legal recognition of homosexual marriage. Eskridge, supra note 13, at 11.

The phrases "same-sex marriage" and "homosexual marriage," as used in this Article, refer to a legal marriage between persons of the same gender.

See Richard F. Duncan, Homosexual Marriage and the Myth of Tolerance: Is Cardinal O'Connor a "Homophobe"?, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 587, 589 (1996). In Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the Hawaii marriage statute, which does not permit same-sex marriage, discriminates on the basis of gender and therefore triggers strict scrutiny under the state constitution. The case was remanded to the trial court to allow the state an opportunity to meet its burden of justifying the marriage law "by demonstrating that it furthers compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of constitutional rights." Id. at 68.
mate foundation that should easily withstand any assault based upon \textit{Romer}.

State marriage laws do not create a broad and undifferentiated disability denying homosexuals "across the board" protection against an infinite number of potential wrongs. These laws have a specific context that easily permits the courts to apply rational basis analysis.\footnote{67 The analysis in this Article is limited to the impact of \textit{Romer} on marriage laws. \textit{Romer} applied a rational basis test to Amendment 2. Some commentators have argued in favor of stricter scrutiny for laws that deny recognition to homosexual "marriages." \textit{See}, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, \textit{Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination}, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197 (1994).}

It is crucial to recognize that when homosexual activists seek validity for same-sex marriages they are demanding much more than tolerance. Marriage is a governmentally endorsed and specially preferred legal status that is recognized as fundamentally important to an ordered and healthy society.\footnote{68 \textit{See} Duncan, \textit{supra} note 66, at 592-93.} The unanimous international consensus supporting conventional marriage is based upon the widely accepted understanding that a man and woman united in marriage "constitute a unit that is more complete, more comprehensive, more whole, more balanced, more complementary, and more liberating than any relationship of two persons of the same sex can ever be."\footnote{69 \textit{Id.} at 596 (quoting Professor Lynn Wardle).} In other words, the "heterosexual marriage requirement . . . recognizes the unique social importance of the institution of marriage for relationships, complementarity, and generativity that lie at the heart of the social interest in marriage."\footnote{70 Lynn D. Wardle, \textit{A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage}, 1996 BYU L. Rev. 1, 85-86.} Far from being based upon a desire to engage in invidious discrimination for its own sake, conventional marriage laws recognize "the equal contribution of both sexes to an important social institution."\footnote{71 \textit{Id.} at 87.}

The case for conventional marriage laws may be debatable,\footnote{72 For an articulate argument in support of legal recognition of homosexual marriages, see Andrew Sullivan, \textit{Virtually Normal: An Argument About Homosexuality}, 178-87 (1995).} but it is neither irrational nor invidious. And \textit{Romer} is no threat to the heterosexual paradigm of civil marriage.
3. Homosexuals in the Military

The exclusion of homosexuals from military service has a long and interesting history. That history, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, I will focus briefly on the most recent policy regarding homosexuals in the military—the 1993 legislation popularly known as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy—and consider the impact of Romer on that controversial rule.

The statutory policy provides that a member of the armed forces shall be separated from service if any one of the following circumstances is shown: 1) the service member engages or attempts to engage in homosexual acts; 2) the service member states that “he or she is a homosexual or bisexual . . . unless there is a further finding . . . that the member has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts;” or 3) the service member “has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same biological sex.” This policy excludes from military service a class of persons defined with reference to conduct or propensity to engage in conduct. Moreover, it creates a rebuttable presumption that self-declared “homosexuals” or “bisexuals” are members of that class. Once this presumption arises, the individual can rebut it only by showing that he or she is not a person who has a propensity to engage in homosexual acts. In sum, the statutory scheme creates “a class-based exclusion policy premised upon the principle that homosexuality is defined by and inextricably linked to homosexual conduct and is, therefore, incompatible with military service.”

Like the other laws discussed in the two immediately preceding sections of this Article, the statutory policy is sufficiently narrow to

75 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(b)(1). The term “homosexual act” is defined as “any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires.” Id. § 654(f)(3).
76 Id. § 654(b)(2).
77 Id. § 654(b)(3).
78 See Woodruff, supra note 73, at 155. In other words, a self-declared “homosexual” must demonstrate that he or she is not a “homosexual” as defined by the statutory policy. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(f)(1) (defining “homosexual” as “a person regardless of sex, who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts . . . .”)
79 See Woodruff, supra note 73, at 155.
enable the courts to ascertain whether it is a reasonable means of furthering legitimate governmental interests. Indeed, the Congressional findings of fact establishing the purpose of and need for the policy provide a reasoned and measured justification for excluding practicing homosexuals (and those with a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct) from military service.80 These findings recognize the unique context of military service. The primary purpose of the American armed forces is to "prepare for and to prevail in combat should the need arise."81 This requires military personnel to make "extraordinary sacrifices" and to accept life in "military units that are characterized by high morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion."82 William A. Woodruff, a law professor and former chief litigator in the Judge Advocate General's Corps, explains the unique context of military service as follows:

The American Armed Forces are unique. In a government based upon the consent of the governed, the military is autocratic. In a society that treasures individual freedom, the soldier must conform and sacrifice individual freedom for mission accomplishment. In a country where the right to speak one's mind is paramount, the soldier is called upon to defend that right while not enjoying its full extent. To some, it is paradoxical that the defenders of freedom must forfeit their own freedom. Consider the mission of the military, however, and the paradox vanishes. The mission of the United States Armed Forces is to fight and win our nation's wars. It takes an army to do that, not a debating society.83

It is in light of this extraordinary context that the courts must consider the reasonableness of the Congressional determination that "[t]he presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability."84 Nothing in Romer suggests that this determination is an illegitimate basis for Congressional action. Congress did not base its policy upon "bare animus" or invidious bigotry; "rather, it focused on military effectiveness, unit cohesion, the unique nature of military life, and the impact homosexual conduct in the military would have, ulti-

80 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a).
81 Id. § 654(a)(4).
82 Id. § 654(a)(5), (6).
83 Woodruff, supra note 73, at 123.
mately, on success on the battlefield.” As Professor Woodruff has said, the policy “is not ‘anti-gay;'” it is “‘pro-combat effectiveness.'” Moreover, Congress adopted the policy only after an “exhaustive examination” of the issue “in the Executive and Legislative branches.” Far from being based upon a visceral dislike of homosexual persons, the policy “reflects month upon month of political negotiation and deliberation.” Although an exhaustive analysis of the issue of homosexuals in the military is beyond the scope of this Article, suffice it to say I am confident that Romer does not bear upon the issue.

85 Woodruff, supra note 73, at 165. When Justice Kennedy was on the Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit, he specifically found that the Navy’s “general policy of discharging all homosexuals is rational.” Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 809 n.20 (9th Cir. 1980). This precedent did not escape Justice Scalia’s notice in Romer. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

86 Woodruff, supra note 73, at 165. Soldiers and sailors often are required to live in “communal settings that force intimacy and provide little privacy." Id. at 161 (quoting General Colin Powell). Woodruff provides a cogent explanation of how homosexuality—in this unique context—can disrupt the bonding and cohesion essential to military effectiveness:

To provide a modicum of privacy in these situations, the military has traditionally segregated bathing and sleeping facilities by gender. The presumption underlying gender segregation is that people are sexually attracted to the opposite sex. Thus, most people view being forced to sleep, shower, and use toilet facilities with members of the opposite sex as an infringement of their privacy. When the underlying presumption is not valid, e.g., when individuals find members of the same gender sexually attractive, the invasion of privacy occurs even in gender segregated facilities. This, in turn, disrupts the bonding and cohesion vital to military effectiveness.

Id. Andrew Koppelman argues that the privacy argument fails because the “sexual gaze” of homosexuals “is not peculiar to the military. Civilians experience it all the time in public restrooms and changing rooms at the beach or in the gym.” Andrew Koppelman, Case in the Military: A Response to Professor Woodruff, 64 UMKC L. Rev. 179, 190 (1995). This counterargument is unpersuasive. Civilians are not required to share living and sleeping quarters with strangers who may be sexually attracted to them. Woodruff’s point is that even soldiers are entitled to “a modicum of privacy in these situations.” Woodruff, supra note 73, at 161.

87 Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 922 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3305 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1996) (No. 96-1). In Thomasson, the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the statutory policy.

88 Id. at 922. The court noted that extensive Congressional hearings were held on the issue and the witnesses who testified at these hearings “represented a broad range of views and backgrounds." Id. at 922.

89 Professor Woodruff’s important article has already performed that task. See Woodruff, supra note 73, at 155-78. Woodruff makes an important distinction between the statutory policy and the Department of Defense regulations issued to implement the law. He believes the latter “contradict the expressed views of Congress in several important areas, are inconsistent with the statutory scheme in other respects, and weaken the overall basis of the statute by creating irrational and illogical pre-
III. Supreme Court Storytelling: Herein of Homosexual Fundamentalism, Attainder, and Kulturkampf

Viewed as legal precedent, Romer (as I've suggested) does not even register on the landmark meter. But when the majority and dissenting opinions are read as narratives of contemporary culture, they tell fascinating stories from starkly different perspectives.

A. Justice Kennedy's Story: Fighting for the Right to Be Queer

Justice Kennedy's opinion reminds me of one of my favorite films of the nineties, Wigstock: The Movie.90 Wigstock is a documentary about the drag queen festival held on Labor Day each year in—did you need to ask?—New York City. Wigstock is camp. It is outrageous. It is bizarre. It is screamingly funny and wrenchingly sad—just like Justice Kennedy's opinion in Romer.

And, also like Kennedy's opinion, the film adopts a viewpoint that can best be described as homosexual fundamentalism. By homosexual fundamentalism I mean a point of view that confidently and aggressively proclaims the self-evident goodness of homosexuality—of "queerness" to use the vernacular of homosexual activism—and concomitantly equates traditional sexual morality with racial bigotry and hatred. This viewpoint is captured by the battle cry of the homosexual rights movement—"We're here. We're queer. Get used to it."91—and in the rhetoric of homosexual writers such as the late Paul Monette, whose list of "our enemies" included "Nazi Popes and all their brocaded minions [and] the wacko fundamentalists and their Book of

90 Wigstock: The Movie (Goldwyn 1995). Wigstock features performances by Missstress Formika, RuPaul, The Lady Bunny, and (my personal favorite) the Duelling Bankheads, "a pair of dressed-in-black queens who do Tallulah Bankhead singing 'Born to Be Wild.'" Edward Guthmann, Lady Bunny Goes Uptown in Drag/Mainstream Release for "Wigstock," S.F. CHRON., June 20, 1995, at E1. The movie also introduces us to the Wigstock Dancers, a troop of heel-kicking drag queens described in the film as having been "recruited from all over—the Port Authority men's room, Rikers Island, the piers." Barry Shils, the writer and director of Wigstock, said in an interview that the film was designed to make drag "mainstream." Id.

91 The homosexual activist group Queer Nation has been credited with coining this rallying cry. See Chris Dickinson, The Music is the Message: Some Radical Gay Bands Put Their Sexuality Way Up Front, St. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 21, 1996, at 3C (Magazine).
Lies."\(^{92}\) It is also an important theme of *Wigstock* and is captured best in a song performed by Misstress Formika:

> You want to come out, but you don't know how.  
> You tell your mom you're gay, and she has a f—ing cow.  
> She sends you to a shrink, but it just don't work.  
> 'Cuz you still feel the same, it's the shrink that's the jerk.  
> You've got to fight for your right to be queer.  
> You've got to fight for your right to be queer.\(^{93}\)

Although Justice Kennedy was less confrontational than Queer Nation, less impassioned than Monette, and less flamboyant than Misstress Formika, their fundamentalism echoes in his majority opinion.

Kennedy's decision to invalidate Amendment 2 on its face is sensible only if—as Akhil Amar suggests—Kennedy accepts the homosexual fundamentalist narrative as the true story of Amendment 2.\(^{94}\) According to this story, which is the dominant one among the educated elite in American society,\(^{95}\) the Amendment was intended to stigmatize homosexuals as an unclean, untouchable, and unworthy class of persons.\(^{96}\) If you believe this narrative, then Colorado is indeed the "hate state" and Amendment 2 is the equivalent of a bill of

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\(^{92}\) Paul Monette, *Becoming a Man: Half a Life Story* (1992). Monette won the 1992 National Book Award for this autobiographical account of growing up homosexual in America. Monette's hatred for people of faith and the Word of God calls to mind the following proverb: "An unjust man is an abomination to the righteous, and he who is upright in the way is an abomination to the wicked." *Proverbs* 29:27. Of course, the reason we are waging Kulturkampf is we don't agree on the identity of the "wicked" and the "upright." However, it is clear that homosexual fundamentalists—such as Monette—believe that traditional Christianity is homophobic and, therefore, an abomination. Justice Kennedy's opinion in *Romer*, while not going this far, employs some of the same frightening rhetoric.

\(^{93}\) *Wigstock: The Movie* (Goldwyn 1995). Misstress Formika, whose real name is Michael, also provides a less theatrical analysis of contemporary culture. Offstage and sans wig, she/he observes: "They're trying to brainwash us to be prejudiced, to be close-minded, to be Republicans. It's not going to happen. Not as long as I'm around."


\(^{95}\) Professor Stephen Gillers agrees that Kennedy's opinion is a product of the dominant insider narrative. As he puts it, the *Romer* majority simply seemed to be saying "We read the press and the better magazines" and we understand that Amendment 2 is based upon "hate and we won't tolerate hate, so beat it." *Getting a Read on Romer v. Evans*, supra note 12, at 8.

\(^{96}\) Amar, supra note 94, at 224.
attainder, a law serving no purpose other than a "bare . . . desire to
harm a politically unpopular group." 98

Professor Amar makes an admirable attempt to persuade us that
"Justice Kennedy's opinion reaches the right result, and for the right
reason." 99 Amar argues that Amendment 2 is like a bill of attainder
because it names a class of persons and pins a "badge of opprobrium"
on members of the class based upon their status. 100 It was, says Amar,
"a kind of 'No Queers' sign writ large," 101 a "legal and social outlawry
in cowboy country—a targeting of outsiders, a badge of second-class
citizenship, a tainting of queers, a scarlet Q." 102

Amar argues that Amendment 2 is like a law that provides: "Akhil
Reed Amar shall be placed in the public stocks for two hours. His
private parts shall be painted red. Passersby may mock, insult, and
humiliate him." 103 Or one that provides: "Akhil Reed Amar shall be
ineligible to be a government employee or a union leader." 104 These
laws violate the non-attainder principle, Amar argues, because their
"purpose and social meaning . . . is to stigmatize or degrade a named
person—to 'taint' or 'stain' him, or to label him as less worthy or de-
serving of less respect or trust than his fellow citizens . . . ." 105 He says
Amendment 2 violates this non-attainder principle because "there is a
right not to be singled out by name in a law that, metaphorically
speaking, paints one's private parts red." 106

Interestingly, Professor Amar believes there would have been no
attainder problem if Amendment 2 had been symmetrical. In other
words, a law that provides sexual orientation may not be a protected
trait under anti-discrimination laws would pass muster, because such a
law would not single out a particular class of persons as untouchable
and unclean. 107 I doubt if this formal revision would have satisfied the

97 See Amar, supra note 94.
98 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)).
99 Amar, supra note 94, at 222. Amar's analysis of Romer is thoughtful, creative,
and provocative. However, it is unpersuasive because it is based on the same unrealis-
tic narrative that animates Kennedy's opinion. For a discussion of why the narrative
of homosexual fundamentalism is not the true story of Amendment 2, see infra notes
120-54 and accompanying text.
100 Id. at 207.
101 Id. at 208.
102 Id. at 211.
103 Id. at 212.
104 Id. at 213.
105 Id. at 219.
106 Id. at 224-25.
107 See id. at 207.
Romer Court. The revised amendment would still prohibit laws, regulations, and policies designed to protect the trait of sexual orientation against "an almost limitless number" of conceivable wrongs. For example, the revised amendment would not cure the parade of horribles—involving such things as police protection and library services—produced by the Court's obsession with the conceivable reach of Amendment 2. Although Amar's attainder analysis provides an interesting angle from which to view Romer, the case was decided as "an ordinary equal protection case," and substituting the trait of sexual orientation for that of homosexuality in the text of the Amendment should not significantly affect its review under the rational basis test. Its "sheer breadth" would seemingly still be seen by Justice Kennedy as discrediting any legitimate justification put forward on its behalf.

Amar is correct, however, when he observes that the majority opinion is animated by the homosexual fundamentalist narrative. It is surely no accident that Justice Kennedy begins his story by quoting Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: "One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.'" Of course, Kennedy understands that notwithstanding Harlan's famous aphorism the Constitution does indeed tolerate all sorts of classes. Most laws divide citizens into classes (the poor get food stamps, the wealthy do not; the elderly receive social security payments, the young pay social security taxes), and most laws do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. As Justice Rehnquist once put it, the

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108 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
109 See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. I am not arguing that the asymmetry of Amendment 2 was irrelevant to the decision in Romer. Justice Kennedy clearly believed that Amendment 2 was "at once too narrow and too broad." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628. See supra note 56. The revised amendment cures the "narrowness" problem by denying protection not only to "homos and bis" but also to "heteros." Amar, supra note 94, at 207. However, the revision leaves uncorrected the excessive breadth problem, and this is probably sufficient to run afool of the majority decision in Romer. For an example of a revised amendment that cures both the narrowness and the breadth problem, see supra Section II.C.1.
111 Amar, supra note 94, at 222-24 ("Justice Kennedy's opinion ranges beyond text and form to ponder the exclusionary social meaning beneath the surface of Amendment 2."); see also id. at 207.
112 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
113 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). You do not need to be Fellini to understand the symbolic significance of Kennedy's rhetorical linkage of Romer and Plessy. See Amar, supra note 94, at 222-23.
114 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
problem presented by the Equal Protection Clause is one of sorting through mounds of perfectly legitimate legislative distinctions in order to isolate and invalidate those few "which involve invidiously unequal treatment." 115

But Kennedy saw Amendment 2 as denying protection to homosexuals "across the board"116 and thereby raising "the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected."117 Kennedy's fundamentalism made it impossible for him to see anything but a "bare desire" to harm homosexuals motivating the people of Colorado when they enacted Amendment 2.118 It made it impossible for him "to credit" the many legitimate justifications offered in support of the Amendment.119 In other words, his narrative blinded him to the social reality of Amendment 2, a reality that is much more complex and nuanced than the black and white dogmatism of Kennedy's insider narrative.

B. Justice Scalia and the Kulturkampf

Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Romer has been criticized harshly by a number of legal scholars and pundits. Professor Amar calls it "derisive"120 and "uncharitable."121 William Lockard said he was "infuriated" by "the hatefulness bubbling underneath the dissent"122 and terrified by "Scalia's skillful weaving of an emotional anti-homosexual motif through his text."123 Richard Rodriguez stigmatized the opinion as "venomous."124 Although I believe the dissent is none of these things, I am not surprised at this reaction. Scalia explicitly rejects the homosexual fundamentalist narrative as the true story of Amendment 2 and, of course, that makes him a "homophobe" and a "bigot" to insiders such as these critics.125

116 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1629.
120 Amar, supra note 94, at 228.
121 Id. at 234.
122 Getting a Read on Romer v. Evans, supra note 12, at 8. Lockard, a vice president and legal counsel of MGM, also called the dissent "vicious" and "homophobic." Id.
123 Id.
124 Richard Rodriguez, The Revolution Occurs by the Christmas Tree, BALTIMORE SUN, May 24, 1996, at 23A.
125 For a discussion of the meaning of "homosexual fundamentalism," see supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
Like Justice Kennedy before him, Justice Scalia wasted no time before telling his version of the Amendment 2 story. “The Court,” said Scalia:

has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The constitutional amendment before us here is not the manifestation of a “bare... desire to harm” homosexuals, but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws.

In contrast to Kennedy’s simplistic “hate state” fundamentalism, Scalia understood that Amendment 2 has a history, and its purpose can be gleaned only by one who takes account of that history. Amendment 2 is part of a complex struggle between modernism and traditionalism, between competing and conflicting notions of the good life. The Amendment was not a mean-spirited attempt to stigmatize, degrade, or “taint” a class of persons. Rather, it was a defensive measure designed to prevent the law’s coercion from being used to legitimize homosexuality and delegitimize traditional notions of sexual morality.

In a 1993 law review article, Professor Larry Yackle declared that “American society is now absorbed in yet another great civil rights movement, this one on behalf of gay, lesbian, and ambisexual citizens, which will lead ineluctably to the elimination of legal burdens on the basis of sexual orientation.” Moreover, when this codification of the sexual revolution is accomplished, “private homophobia, deprived

126 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
127 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128 Justice Scalia noted that persons “who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities” and often amass substantial political power in those communities. Id. at 1634. This political power can be used to enact laws designed to produce “not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of homosexuality.” Id. Scalia then placed Amendment 2 in its social context, explaining that by the time Colorado citizens were asked to vote on the initiative “their exposure to homosexuals’ quest for social endorsement” had been informed by enactment of restrictive gay rights laws in Aspen, Boulder, and Denver. Id. These laws, noted Scalia, had the effect of “equating the moral disapproval of homosexual conduct with racial and religious bigotry.” Id.
129 I have written extensively elsewhere of the stigmatization of traditionalists by gay rights laws such as those passed in Denver, Aspen, and Boulder. See Duncan & Young, supra note 9, at 124-30. Viewed against this background, Amendment 2 was designed not to stigmatize and harm homosexuals, but rather to remove the stigma and associated harms inflicted on traditionalists by state and local gay rights laws. Id. at 120.
of legal sanction, will . . . be discredited and forced to the margin."\textsuperscript{131} As the people of Colorado understood, this "private homophobia" that is to be discredited by the educative effects of laws enacting homosexual rights is what others call "traditional sexual morality," and the "homophobes" who are in the process of being stigmatized and marginalized are ordinary people like themselves. In other words, they came to understand the social meaning of "We're here. We're queer. Get used to it."\textsuperscript{132} It was the "get used to it" part that informed and animated support for Amendment 2 among these "seemingly tolerant" Coloradans.\textsuperscript{133}

Justice Scalia understood the social reality of Amendment 2, and he ridiculed the majority's unrealistic "portrayal of Coloradans as a society fallen victim to pointless, hate-filled 'gay-bashing' so false as to be comical."\textsuperscript{134} Not only had Colorado repealed its antisodomy laws, observed Scalia, but it was one of the first states to do so.\textsuperscript{135} However, three cities in Colorado had gone well beyond the point of tolerating homosexual conduct and had passed laws "equating the moral disapproval of homosexual conduct with racial and religious bigotry."\textsuperscript{136} This, said Scalia, is all well and good. Homosexuals, like everyone else in a democratic society, are "entitled to use the legal system for reinforcement of their moral sentiments."\textsuperscript{137} However, those who use the system to impose their moral preferences on others should not be heard to complain when their agenda is "countered by lawful, democratic countermeasures" such as Amendment 2.\textsuperscript{138}

Not only did Justice Scalia understand this complex social reality of Colorado, he also understood the social reality of the Supreme

\textsuperscript{131} Id. at 792.
\textsuperscript{132} This phrase has become the rallying cry of the homosexual rights movement. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. Its social meaning is one of intolerance. It tells traditionalists that "homosexuality is good and legitimate, and if you have a problem with that you are going to have to change." Indeed, if we accept the major premise—a premise that declares the equal goodness of homosexuality, bisexuality, and heterosexuality—the logic is compelling. If homosexual unions are good and legitimate, institutions and persons who proclaim traditional sexual morality are "homophobic" and roughly equivalent to the Ku Klux Klan and similar racist organizations. If homosexuality is good, the Bible—as it is understood by traditional Jews, Catholics, and Protestants—is hate literature. If homosexuality is legitimate, Paul Monette was a prophet, not a religious bigot. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{133} See supra text accompanying note 127.
\textsuperscript{134} Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{135} Id.
\textsuperscript{136} Id. at 1634.
\textsuperscript{137} Id.
\textsuperscript{138} Id.
Court and, more generally, of the legal profession. In one of the most
candid assessments of the Court and the legal system ever written in a
Supreme court opinion, Scalia implied that traditionalists cannot re-
scribe a fair hearing in litigation raising issues such as those in *Romer*:

When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with
the knights rather than the villeins—and more specifically with the
Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from
which the Court's Members are drawn. How that class feels about
homosexuality will be evident to anyone who wishes to interview job
applicants at virtually any of the Nation's law schools. The inter-
viewer may refuse to offer a job because the applicant is a Republi-
can; because he is an adulterer; because he went to the wrong prep
school or belongs to the wrong country club; because he eats snails;
because he is a womanizer; because she wears real-animal fur; or
even because he hates the Chicago Cubs. But if the interviewer
should wish not to be an associate or partner of an applicant be-
because he disapproves of the applicant's homosexuality, then he will
have violated the pledge which the Association of American Law
Schools requires all its member-schools to exact from job interview-
ers . . . .

In other words, elite institutions like the Court and legal
academia have accepted homosexual fundamentalism as true and are
committed to "stamp[ing] out" the "more plebeian" narrative that
equates *gay rights* with *special rights*. Thus, the decision by the majority in *Romer* was "an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political
will."

C. A Personal Narrative

It should already be obvious which of the *Romer* narratives I be-
lieve best captures the "true" story of Amendment 2. The people of
Colorado did not vote for the Amendment out of hatred or animosity
for gays and lesbians. They believed that gay rights legislation, such as
that enacted in Aspen, Boulder, and Denver, sweeps beyond the point
of tolerance and grants "special rights" to homosexuals.

I was an advocate in *Romer*. I wrote an amicus brief in support of
the Amendment. My personal support for the Amendment was

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139 *Id.* at 1637.
140 *Id.*
141 *Id.*
animated by libertarian considerations. As I have argued at length elsewhere,\textsuperscript{143} I believe Professor Yackle is correct when he links enactment of gay rights laws with the discrediting and marginalization of traditional notions of sexual morality and religion.\textsuperscript{144} As Justice Scalia understood, laws that list sexual orientation as an impermissible ground for private discrimination have the educative effect of "equating the moral disapproval of homosexual conduct with racial and religious bigotry."\textsuperscript{145} It is in this sense that laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation grant "special rights."

When a state or local government codifies the sexual revolution by treating sexual lifestyles as protected categories under antidiscrimination laws, it stigmatizes, marginalizes, and silences religious and moral traditionalists and fences them out from authentic participation in the economic and social life of the community.\textsuperscript{146} Consider the case of Evelyn Smith, a devout Christian widow who is trying to raise her children on the rental income generated by two duplexes she owns in Chico, California.\textsuperscript{147} Smith refused to rent to an unmarried couple who wished to cohabit in one of her apartments because she "believes that sex outside of marriage is sinful, and that it is a sin for her to rent . . . to people who will engage in nonmarital sex on her property."\textsuperscript{148} The California Supreme Court held that the state fair housing laws protected unmarried cohabitants from discrimination and that Mrs. Smith was not entitled to a religious freedom exemption.\textsuperscript{149}

A full and complete analysis of Smith is beyond the scope of this Article. I wish to focus on only one significant thread of the case: the court's refusal to recognize that Smith's religion was "substantially burdened" by the coercive impact of a law requiring her to do what her religious conscious condemned as a sin.\textsuperscript{150} The court held that Smith's religious freedom was not substantially burdened because she

\textsuperscript{143} See Duncan, supra note 66.
\textsuperscript{144} See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{145} Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Andrew Koppelman agrees that gay rights laws "implicitly tell those whose religious beliefs sanction such discrimination that their religious beliefs are false and that they ought to change them." ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 152 (1996)
\textsuperscript{146} See Duncan & Young, supra note 9, at 126.
\textsuperscript{148} Id. at 703.
\textsuperscript{149} Id. at 705-22.
\textsuperscript{150} Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, government may not "substantially burden a person's exercise of religion" without a compelling justification. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994). Thus, the "substantial burden" standard is the threshold for protection of religious freedom under the Act.
had the option of "selling her units and redeploying the capital in other investments." The fact that rental income from her duplexes was the "major source of income" for Mrs. Smith, a widow, and her children apparently was irrelevant.

In other words, when people of faith choose to engage in commercial activities in California they waive their right to religious freedom. If the state's restrictive commercial laws conflict with the exercise of religion, believers are free to go out of business or move to a more tolerant state. "We're here. We want to shack up on your property. And if you can't get used to it, get out of business, you religious bigot!" That was the lesson Mrs. Smith learned when she asked the California Supreme Court to protect her religious freedom against restrictive laws codifying the values of the sexual revolution. The "legal and dignity interests" of unmarried cohabitants were too important to yield, even a little, to the demands of God on Mrs. Smith's business ethics. The world has indeed turned upside down, and good has become evil and evil good.

I supported Amendment 2 because I understood the stigmatizing effect of gay rights laws on persons who cling steadfastly to traditional notions of sexual morality in post-modern America. The sexual revolution has wreaked havoc on the quality of life in our society. It has infected our corporate health, polluted the popular culture, and damaged the lives of countless children and families.

Individual liberty and religious freedom are also beginning to turn up on the casualty list. When the state codifies the sexual revolution and treats human sexuality as a protected civil rights category, it slanders traditional morality and constrains individual liberty and freedom of conscience. I believe the people of Colorado understood this when they voted for Amendment 2. Thus, they were motivated not by irrational animus, but by the spirit of liberty and tolerance.

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151 Smith, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716. Interestingly, the court stated that the "proposition that a burden on religion is not substantial if one can avoid it" by going out of business is not "a generally applicable test for identifying substantial burdens." Id. Apparently, it is a special rule that applies in special cases such as when the court wishes to advance the "dignity interests" of unmarried cohabitants. Id.

152 Id. at 737 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).

153 Id. at 716.

154 Isaiah's prophetic wisdom has never been more timely: "Woe to those who call evil good, and good evil; Who put darkness for light, and light for darkness; Who put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!" Isaiah 5:20.
IV. Conclusion

It bears repeating that the Supreme Court’s decision in *Romer* is of trivial doctrinal import. The Court did not recognize homosexuals as a suspect or quasi-suspect class, nor did it reverse or undermine its landmark decision in *Bowers v. Hardwick*. Moreover, the narrow holding of *Romer* suggests quite strongly that typical laws disadvantaging homosexuals—the military exclusion, the heterosexual paradigm of civil marriage, and perhaps even better-crafted and more narrow versions of Amendment 2—do not offend the Equal Protection Clause. These laws rationally advance legitimate government interests and should easily pass scrutiny under the rational basis test applied by the majority in *Romer*.

However, the majority and dissenting opinions in *Romer* are significant in one respect—they tell clashing and fascinating stories about the culture war that is currently raging in our pluralistic and disunited society. Justice Kennedy paints a surrealistic picture of Colorado as the hate state. This is the narrative of homosexual fundamentalism, and it is the one that is currently dominant among America’s progressive elites. Justice Scalia’s story of the Kulturkampf is more trenchant. Scalia understands that Amendment 2 was an attempt by “tolerant Coloradans” to prevent civil rights laws from being used to legitimize homosexual conduct and delegitimize traditional notions of sexual morality. Kennedy’s fundamentalism blinded him to the social reality that the citizens of Colorado had many rational and legitimate reasons for supporting a constitutional amendment designed to invalidate laws which conflate the values of the sexual revolution with those of the civil rights movement. Scalia understood these complexities of modern America; and for all the public criticism his opinion has received from the Templar class in society, it rings true.