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Frederick C. Luebke

*University of Nebraska-Lincoln*, [fredluebke@comcast.net](mailto:fredluebke@comcast.net)

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## 14.

# Images of German Immigrants in the United States and Brazil, 1890 – 1918: Some Comparisons

FREDERICK C. LUEBKE

IN THE 1890s, following a decade of unprecedented immigration from Europe, the United States experienced a period in which national identity was greatly stressed. The term “Americanization” came into frequent usage as many citizens, privately and through various organizations, stressed conformity to the dominant culture in language, manners, and religious belief.

During these same years a similar development, in some respects stronger than in the United States, could be detected in Brazil. In 1889 the empire of Brazil ended when Pedro II went into exile and Brazilian leaders introduced a republican form of government. During the preceding decade Brazil, like the United States, had experienced heavy immigration from Europe.<sup>1</sup> The abolition of slavery in 1888 had created a labor shortage, chiefly in the central and southern states, that the government had sought to relieve through the recruitment of Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and German immigrants. During the 1890s the Brazilian Republic, unsure of itself in its first years, experienced a wave of nativism much like that in the United States. The new Brazilian leaders, motivated strongly by doctrines of Comtean Positivism, insisted on a new national unity. They felt strongly that immigrants should resist the natural tendency to remain separate. To speak a different language, to wear different clothing, to eat different foods, to attend different schools, and to worship a different god all seemed undesirable because such behavior threatened to alter national identity and to undermine the confidence of the republicans to govern their huge, diverse, and undeveloped country.<sup>2</sup>

German immigrants and their children were conspicuous in both countries. Approximately 5 million Germans had arrived in the United States during the nineteenth century. In each of the peak years of 1854 and 1882 more than two hundred thousand persons arrived. Although 85 percent of the Germans settled in the northeastern quarter of the country, they could be found in all states of the Union. Two-thirds lived in urban places (a proportion much higher than that for the American population generally at that time), but they were also strongly attracted to agriculture, especially dairy farming in the Midwest. By the end of the century there were about 8 million first- and second-generation Germans in the United States, roughly 10 percent of the total population. Unusually diverse in origin, occupation, residence patterns, and religious belief, they were easily the largest non-English speaking group in America.<sup>3</sup>

The Brazilian pattern was similar but on a much smaller scale. The German immigration to Brazil had begun in the 1820s, largely as a consequence of vigorous recruitment efforts sponsored by the Brazilian government. The annual totals seldom exceeded two thousand, yet after seventy-five years the Germans had multiplied and prospered until they numbered nearly four hundred thousand persons, mostly Brazilian-born and German-speaking. Although important colonies developed in the large cities and seaports of Brazil, the majority of Teuto-Brazilians (as they were called) settled in rural regions, where they founded exclusive settlements chiefly in the two southernmost states of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina, in which they accounted for one-fifth of the population by 1910. There, even more than in the United States, they created a society within a society—a large, isolated, diverse, structured community with its own values, attitudes, language, and folkways. They adapted their agricultural practices to subtropical realities, raised large families, and built churches, schools, and towns. Like the German-Americans, the Teuto-Brazilians were of diverse provincial origins and were divided between the Catholic and Protestant faiths. Like their American counterparts, the Teuto-Brazilians developed a substantial German-language press and an amazing array of voluntary associations.<sup>4</sup>

Stereotypes naturally developed in both countries. Each receiving society tended to regard the Germans in their midst as a unified group with common characteristics. Provincial differences, linguistic variations, religious divisions, and social and political distinctions were usually lost on the native-born, who tended to lump all German immigrants together on the basis of their presumably common language. Since

Germany did not exist as a unified state until 1871, a German was simply someone who spoke the German language.

There was no uniform or consistent content to the images of the German immigrant. Wealthy and educated Americans, for example, generally registered more favorable impressions than did the lower classes. Rarely rubbing shoulders with ordinary newcomers, these Americans more often encountered persons who had adapted quickly to American ways and who, like themselves, were educated and successful. Moreover, their impressions were conditioned by notions about Germany itself, such as the preeminence of German learning. In the nineteenth century, approximately ten thousand Americans had studied in various German universities. They discovered a quality of scholarship, a depth of thought, and an appreciation for learning and academic freedom that led them to place Germany on a cultural pedestal. Although such impressions of Germany and its institutions must be separated from ideas about German immigrants, they contributed to a generally high regard for them among the upper strata of society.<sup>5</sup>

The ordinary American of the nineteenth century, however, had little contact with the products of German universities and still less with their books and essays. He gained his impressions of things German from the immigrants who lived next door or on a nearby farm, worked in the same factory, shopped in his store, clipped his beard, repaired his shoes, or deposited savings in his bank.

Perhaps the most prominent elements in the American stereotype of German immigrants were industriousness, thrift, and honesty—admirable virtues in the American value system. The German seemed strongly attached to his family; he was orderly, disciplined, and stable. A bit too authoritarian by American standards, he was nonetheless admired for his ability to achieve material success through hard work. Similarly attractive was his reputation for mechanical ingenuity. The Germans were usually perceived as an intelligent people, though somewhat plodding in their mental processes. And if they tended to be unimaginatively thorough, they sometimes also seemed stubborn and graceless in manner. But the German wife and mother was commonly regarded as a model of cleanliness and efficiency; her daughter was valued as a reliable house servant or maid. Although some native Americans thought that the Germans treated their women badly, on the whole they considered these newcomers desirable additions to the American population.


But there were negative elements in the image as well. Some felt that Germans were unwarrantably proud of their origins and culture.

Others had ambivalent feelings about German festivities. It seemed as though the Germans had a celebration for every occasion, complete with parades and contests both athletic and cultural. Even their church affairs often took a festive air. Especially offensive was what puritanical Americans perceived as abandoned dancing and boorish swilling of beer, especially on the Sabbath, the day that God had set aside for worship, rest, and spiritual contemplation. Still others were put off by the apparent radicalism of German immigrants. The American labor movement seemed to have among its leaders an unusually large number of Germans who preached alien doctrines of communism, anarchism, and varying degrees of socialism. Impressions drawn from such unfortunate and widely publicized affairs as the Chicago Haymarket Riot of 1886 strengthened the image of at least some Germans as dangerous revolutionaries.<sup>6</sup>

Clashes between native and immigrant cultures produced some of the most potent political issues of the late nineteenth century. Although many German immigrants were interested in political reform, economic development, and the tariff and currency questions, they responded more strongly to issues related to ethnocultural conflict. In addition to political and economic liberties, they wanted social and cultural freedom. By the 1890s prohibition had become the dominant political manifestation of cultural conflict. Woman suffrage, Sabbatarianism, and efforts to regulate (if not close down) parochial school education were closely related issues that were capable of producing remarkable, though temporary, levels of uniformity in the voting behavior of German immigrants.<sup>7</sup>

Ethnocultural politics had an impact on nativist attitudes. Awareness of ethnic group identities was greatly intensified among immigrants and nativists alike. Thinking in stereotypes and symbols was encouraged; tolerance and understanding diminished. The live-and-let-live attitudes common in earlier decades were weakened by organized political action. Changes in attitudes toward immigrants were also fostered by some of the most respected social scientists of the day, whose study of the immigration question led them to conclude that socially undesirable characteristics were hereditary and were more typical of some ethnic groups than others. Both negative and positive qualities were thus thought to be fixed or rigid.<sup>8</sup>

Still, as such ideas gained currency at the end of the nineteenth century, the German-Americans fared well. Although there were dissents from the general view, most Americans considered the Germans to be a desirable people. Moreover, as racial thinking became increas-



Germantown as “Germanopolis.” The title page of the souvenir program for the 225th anniversary of the first German settlement in America reveals the proud—and sometimes haughty—mood of German-Americans at that time. The parades in celebration of “German Day” in 1908 were particularly elaborate and fancy and in Germantown the foundation-stone of the Pastorius monument was laid. However, at the same time the ethnic press began to take note of the fact that the reduced numbers of immigrants coming to the United States from Germany threatened to alter the character and substance of the German-American community. (Roughwood Collection)

ingly common early in the twentieth century, some German-American intellectuals were stimulated, in countless speeches and articles, to laud and magnify the achievements of their group, ranging from such early contributions as those of Baron von Steuben in the Revolutionary War to the more recent accomplishments of such engineers as John Roebling and his American-born son, who designed and built the Brooklyn Bridge. This indulgence in cultural chauvinism was partly an effort to lay claim to a share in American greatness, but it was also intended to balance Anglo-Saxonist notions of racial superiority and preeminence in world affairs.<sup>9</sup>

By the beginning of World War I, the leaders of the rapidly assimilating German element in the United States, understandably proud of their cultural heritage, were encouraged in their ethnocentrism by the stereotypes native-born Americans generally held of them. Some were

even prompted to promote their heritage as a culture counter to the dominant Anglo-American. But this was a dangerous course in a period of resurgent nativism. Deviations from American norms were but lightly tolerated by persons unwilling or unable to distinguish cultural chauvinism from the political or nationalistic variety.

In Brazil, German immigrants were generally perceived favorably in the nineteenth century, especially by the ruling classes, who regarded them as desirable additions to Brazilian society. The Germans, they thought, would not only bring valued skills to Brazil but would also "whiten" the population, which in 1890 was only 44 percent white. The Brazilian elite, like the American, was strongly influenced by racist theories based on presumably scientific criteria that gave the highest rating to so-called Nordic peoples, which, of course, included the Germans.<sup>10</sup> As in the United States, they were admired for their industry, orderliness, and stability.

Even though the Germans were welcomed and valued for the contributions they were making to Brazilian development, the Brazilian image, even more than the American, rested on inadequate and distorted information, rhetorical exaggeration, and myth<sup>11</sup> because the multiracial Brazilian society was considerably more divided than the American between rich and poor, the literate and the illiterate. German immigrant society in Brazil was both more concentrated spatially and more isolated socially than in the United States, especially in the rural settlements. Moreover, the German enclaves in the Brazilian cities were often dominated by wealthy, educated *Reichsdeutsche* (subjects of the German kaiser). Such persons—bankers, industrialists, merchants, journalists, technicians, and various representatives of large German firms—frequently considered life in Brazil to be temporary. Moreover, they were often contemptuous of Luso-Brazilian culture,<sup>12</sup> an attitude that did not go unnoticed by the Brazilians with whom they were in frequent contact.

Some Teuto-Brazilian leaders also shared this attitude of condescension for Brazilian culture. Feeding on ethnocentric German nationalist propaganda of the turn of the century, they considered Brazilian culture to be decidedly inferior to their own. In one example of such literature, a German writer on Brazil recommended stout resistance to assimilation on the ground that Brazilian culture was worthless. "What the Lusitanians have created in America," he wrote, "is a country that has produced nothing memorable in any field, including economics and culture; in the economic sphere . . . this state . . . is crippled, . . . a poorly organized community of seventeen million people. And these

seventeen million, who rule over a rich and productive area the size of Europe, are unable to colonize anything, nor are they able to establish a properly functioning means of transportation and communication, regulate their financial affairs, guarantee justice, build a fleet, nor maintain an army other than one that is really nothing more than a privileged band of robbers."<sup>13</sup> This statement is so extreme, of course, that it cannot be considered typical. Still, many Teuto-Brazilians regarded Brazilian culture as weak and ineffectual; the Luso-Brazilians themselves seemed to combine indolence and ignorance with ridiculous conceit. The Portuguese language was useful to know for practical reasons, they thought, but it seemed to offer few literary treasures compared to the German.<sup>14</sup> Like the most extravagant of German-American cultural chauvinists, some Teuto-Brazilians insisted that the Germans would perform their best service as loyal citizens by infusing the culture of their adopted country with their presumably superior German qualities. If German language and culture were allowed to fade from use, they argued, Brazil would be deprived of the invaluable German sense of duty and commitment to the work ethic. Many felt that the chances for successful maintenance of German language and culture were greater in Brazil than in the United States, where, they believed, Anglo-American Protestant culture was so strong that German immigrants were virtually unable to withstand its assimilative power.<sup>15</sup>

The status of the Germans in Brazilian society was not a topic of national debate. At most it was a regional issue discussed in the states where the Germans were concentrated and where upper-class perceptions were drawn primarily from the behavior of unrepresentative persons who perpetuated immigrant culture because it served their economic interests and psychological needs. Hence most educated Brazilians had little comprehension of the diversity of the German immigrant group, such as the differences that divided Catholics from Protestants or the disparate values and behaviors that distinguished the rural farmers from the urban workers and the economic and social elite. Moreover, they failed to understand how the physical environment, in conjunction with unique events in Brazilian history, promoted German isolationism. They were often mystified by the German spirit of separatism. They could not understand why the Germans would want to perpetuate their own language and culture indefinitely, especially since Brazilian culture was so attractive. In their view, Brazilian culture was open, tolerant, hospitable, adaptable, nonideological, humane, and free of rigid stratification. Brazilians, they believed,



were motivated by a spirit of conciliation that sought compromise and rejected extremist measures. Above all, they considered themselves to be a nonviolent people.<sup>16</sup>

It is not possible to determine the extent to which the illiterate and unskilled classes in Brazilian society shared the concerns of the elite. Because of the isolated character of most German rural settlements, the social interaction of the Germans with other Brazilians was infrequent and often superficial. Furthermore, the Germans, like any other social group, differed widely in education, skills, health, and working habits, and large numbers experienced a deterioration in social and economic circumstances as they struggled to survive in the Brazilian environment. But the prevailing image was that the Germans were better housed and fed; that their system of private and parochial schools was often superior to what passed for public education in Brazil at that time; and that their homes and persons were cleaner and healthier. The Germans also seemed willing to work very hard, at least in contrast to the impoverished *caboclos* (persons of mixed Indian and Portuguese descent), among whom labor was intermittent and subject to frequent and long interruptions. One may assume that some Brazilians of the less privileged classes regarded the Germans with resentment and jealousy, but even so, there is no record of persistent cultural conflict based on ethnic differences.<sup>17</sup>

Of course, most Brazilians, rich or poor, white, black, mulatto, or *caboclo*, rarely thought about the Germans at all, much less in any systematic way. Similarly, the ordinary Teuto-Brazilian people went about their daily business, adapting to their surroundings and rarely giving the problems of assimilation any consideration. Like any other immigrant group, the Germans included many persons who were favorably disposed toward the language and culture of the host society and wanted to become part of it as quickly and painlessly as possible. Through daily contacts at work, at the store, at church, in school, or even in the home, they learned Portuguese readily. Whether they learned quickly or slowly depended upon individual circumstances and whether they had good or poor opportunities for interaction with speakers of Portuguese. Obviously, the isolated, exclusive rural colonies offered few such chances.

The existence of colonies where there were no Portuguese-language schools and where hundreds of second- and third-generation children had only rudimentary knowledge of Portuguese began to concern members of the Brazilian elite as the nineteenth century drew to a close. When they tried to identify typical German attitudes they

naturally paid attention to the most conspicuous persons—the articulate German-Brazilian idealists who made speeches and wrote editorials, essays, and letters demanding their right to maintain their cultural separatism. Some persons in government were eager to break up the rural German enclaves, especially in Rio Grande do Sul, and to guarantee that new settlements would consist of a mixture of ethnic groups. Several efforts were made on both the state and national levels to restrict the growth of the colonies, but none were effective. In Santa Catarina the attack on immigrant institutions centered on private schools. For example, a law enacted in 1913, mild by present-day standards, ordered inspection by state officials and required that statistics of attendance be reported. It further specified that any schools that accepted subventions from either state or local governments were required to use Portuguese as the language of instruction.<sup>18</sup>

Luso-Brazilian fears that the Germans in the southern states were becoming so numerous that they could never be assimilated were heightened by much discussion of the so-called “German peril”—a commonly held belief that Germany had set itself upon a course of worldwide imperialism, based in part on the presence of German immigrants in various underdeveloped countries, including Brazil. At the same time, German aggressiveness was observed in the South Pacific, China, the Philippines, and the Caribbean. When in 1904 the Germans threatened the integrity of Venezuela in a debt-collection controversy, alarmists saw the first steps in a plan designed to create a German protectorate over southern Brazil and possibly a state that would be German in language and culture.<sup>19</sup>

Meanwhile in Germany the noisy, supernationalistic Pan-German League fueled new fears of German imperialism. In its widely distributed publications, this organization emphasized the cultural kinship of Germans all over the world and agitated vociferously for a colonial empire, for an enlarged navy, for war as an instrument of national policy, and for the preservation of German language and culture in German settlements overseas. A symptom rather than a cause of the rampant nationalism of the time, the Pan-German League was identified by English and French propagandists as the coordinating agency of German imperialism. Although the league’s importance was grossly exaggerated, a flood of articles exposing the alleged Pan-Germanist conspiracy soon appeared in newspapers and periodicals in Europe and America. In Brazil, the noted Brazilian literary critic Sylvio Romero produced a lengthy tract entitled *O Allemanismo no sul do Brasil* (1906). Although he welcomed the influx of German immigrants,

Romero warned his countrymen of the German peril, outlined steps that could be taken to combat the threat, and urged that measures be taken to assimilate the German colonists into Brazilian society.<sup>20</sup> Other Brazilian writers expressed similar fears.

When world war engulfed Europe in 1914, the governments of both the United States and Brazil declared their neutrality. For most ordinary people in both countries, but especially in Brazil, the war in Europe was a distant affair of no particular consequence. It seemed to affect their daily lives in no direct or discernible fashion. Still, the war tended to evoke sympathies for one side or the other. Immigrants and their descendants naturally felt an emotional bond with their ancestral homeland and were convinced of the justice of its cause. Leaders of the German ethnic groups in both countries tended to be extravagant in their partisanship for Germany. Opinion among the educated or "established" groups in both the United States and Brazil, however, tended to favor the Allied powers. In Brazil, even more than in the United States, the press was disposed against Germany.

In 1917 the neutrality period came to an end when both the United States and Brazil declared war on Germany, ostensibly because vessels in their respective merchant marines had been torpedoed by German submarines. Although there were strong similarities in the behavior of Brazilians and Americans toward the Germans in their midst, the differences are striking.

In the United States, the war introduced a period of persecution for German-Americans. Many citizens of German origin were suspected of disloyalty. Individuals were harassed in various ways as the American people were swept up in a wave of anti-German feeling. In effect, there was a war against German language and culture. The climate of suspicion produced such measures as bans on German-composed music and the renaming of persons, foods, streets, parks, and towns. German-language instruction in the schools was restricted or eliminated, and German-language newspapers were closely regulated. There were scores of patriotic demonstrations in which German-Americans were forced to kiss the American flag, buy war bonds, or sing the national anthem. Ceremonies were held at which German-language books were burned. There were frequent instances of vandalism, beatings, arrests for allegedly unpatriotic utterances, and even a lynching of a German alien in Illinois.<sup>21</sup>

But the American behavior pales in contrast to the Brazilian. Following the Brazilian break in diplomatic relations with Germany in April 1917, German-Brazilians were victims of numerous destruc-

tive riots. Property damage was enormous as hundreds of residences, German-language newspaper offices, churches, schools, clubhouses, businesses, factories, and warehouses were damaged or destroyed by mobs. Six months later, following Brazil's declaration of war in October, a second series of riots resulted in more destruction. Martial law was declared in Rio de Janeiro and all southern states, where the great majority of the Teuto-Brazilians lived. All publications in the German language were forbidden. All instruction in the German language was banned in all schools at all levels. All German-language church services were outlawed. The president was empowered to seize the property of enemy aliens and to sell all goods consigned to them. Enforcement of these repressive measures was inconsistent and sometimes haphazard, but Brazilian behavior was remarkably violent and repressive compared with the American.<sup>22</sup>

It is easy to explain the Brazilian response to the German problem in terms of the classic stereotype of the Latin temperament as irresponsible, unrestrained, volatile, emotional, and spontaneous. But such a simple interpretation would explain very little. It is more useful to compare Teuto-Brazilian circumstances with the American. Although Germans represented a much smaller proportion of Brazilian society than of the American, their settlement patterns were more highly concentrated, exclusive, and isolated in Brazil. Usually better educated and often wealthier than the average Brazilian, the Germans were more slowly assimilated than in America. As northern Europeans, the Teuto-Brazilians, in contrast to the more numerous Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese immigrants in Brazil, had a language and a culture that were significantly different from those of the host society. Differentness in turn promoted a heightened sense of minority group identity in addition to a full complement of ethnic institutions—churches, schools, social organizations, a German-language press—that tended to be more closely tied to Germany than were their equivalents in the United States. All these elements combined to promote a general sense of cultural superiority that had no equal in the United States. Moreover, leadership was more often vested in *Reichsdeutsche*, whose bonds with Germany were close. Finally, compared to their American cousins, the Germans in Brazil wielded greater economic power, but their political influence was weaker.

The comparison should be carried a step further. Brazilian society, compared to the American, was more highly stratified: its rich were richer and its poor poorer. Its economy was less developed and its political institutions less democratic; it had no long-standing constitu-

tional tradition. Illiteracy was pervasive. In such a social setting, the relatively prosperous Germans naturally tended to evoke antagonism, the Brazilian reputation for tolerance and goodwill notwithstanding.

As the spirit of nationalism swelled early in the twentieth century, the Brazilians, like the Americans, naturally acted on the basis of stereotypes that obscured individual differences and beclouded interpersonal relationships. Lacking both knowledge and understanding of the separatistic German subsociety, its manners and institutions, they demanded an unprecedented measure of conformity to established Brazilian ways. When war came in 1917, they treated their Germans with a severity surpassing anything generally experienced by Germans in the United States. Had the German-Americans been as divergent from the American norms as the Teuto-Brazilians were from Brazilian, it is likely that they too would have suffered from destructive riots, as did nineteenth-century Chinese in mining camps of the American West, or American blacks in Chicago, East St. Louis, Tulsa, and elsewhere in the immediate postwar period. Had their number been small enough, they might have been herded into concentration camps, as were Japanese-Americans in World War II.

### Notes

1. For the Brazilian portion of this essay, I have relied heavily on my article "A Prelude to Conflict: The German Ethnic Group in Brazilian Society, 1890-1917," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 6 (January 1983): 1-17. For accessible statistics of German immigration to Brazil, see Imre Ferenczi, comp., and Walter F. Willcox, ed., *International Migrations*, vol. 1: *Statistics* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929), 695, 700-701.

2. Gilberto Freyre, *Order and Progress: Brazil from Monarchy to Republic*, ed. and trans. Rod W. Horton (New York: Knopf, 1970); E. Bradford Burns, *A History of Brazil* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 250-54; Fernando de Azevedo, *Brazilian Culture* (New York: Knopf, 1966), 159-60, 414-18; Gilberto Freyre, *New World in the Tropics: The Culture of Modern Brazil* (New York: Knopf, 1966), 154; José Honório Rodrigues, *The Brazilians: Their Character and Aspirations* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), 96. European immigration is placed within the context of racist thought and Brazilian nationalism in Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 38-68, 124-44.

3. For the American portion of this essay, I have drawn extensively on my book *Bonds of Loyalty: German Americans and World War I* (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974), esp. chap. 2. See also U.S., Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 57; Edward P. Hutchinson, *Immigrants and Their Children, 1850-1950* (New York: Wiley, 1956), 123-24.

4. The most comprehensive study of Germans in Brazil is by Jean Roche, *La colonisation allemande et la Rio Grande do Sul* (Paris: Institut des Hautes Études de l'Amérique Latine, 1959). Among useful surveys is Karl Fouquet, *Der deutsche Einwanderer und sein Nachkommen in Brasilien: 1808-1824-1974* (São Paulo: Instituto Hans Staden, 1974). See also Karl H. Oberacker, Jr., *Der Deutsche Beitrag zum Aufbau der brasilianischen Nation* (São Paulo: Herder, 1955); Oberacker, "Die Deutschen in Brasilien," in Hartmut Fröschle, ed., *Die Deutschen in Lateinamerika*, (Tübingen: Erdmann, 1979), 169-300.

5. Walter P. Metzger, *Academic Freedom in the Age of the University* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 93-107, 119-24; Clara E. Schieber, *The Transformation of American Sentiment toward Germany, 1870-1914* (Boston: Cornhill, 1923), 256.

6. Luebke, *Bonds of Loyalty*, 59-63.

7. A considerable literature has been produced on ethnocultural conflict in the last decades of the nineteenth century. See, as examples, Paul Kleppner, *The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900* (New York: Free Press, 1970); Richard Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-1900* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); and Frederick C. Luebke, *Immigrants and Politics: The Germans of Nebraska, 1880-1900* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969).

8. See the writings of Josiah Strong, Edward A. Ross, John R. Commons, Edward Channing, John W. Burgess, and many others. The voluminous reports of the Immigration Commission, published in 1911, also reflect these attitudes.

9. Luebke, *Bonds of Loyalty*, 47-51.

10. Skidmore, *Black into White*, 38-77. See especially the tendency of Brazilian writers to compare Brazilian experience with that of the United States, 69-77.

11. Egon Schaden, "Die Deutschbrasilianer—Ein Problem," *Staden-Jahrbuch: Beiträge zur Brasilkunde* 2 (1954): 184.

12. Portuguese-Brazilian. The term derives from Lusitania, the name of the ancient province virtually coterminous with modern Portugal. Its usage is comparable to Anglo-American in the United States.

13. Walter Kundt, *Brasilien und seine Bedeutung für Deutschlands Handel und Industrie* (Berlin: Siemenroth, 1903), 18.

14. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Porto Alegre), October 20, 1917; Oskar Canstatt, *Brasilien: Land und Leute* (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler, 1877), 251, 416; Ernest Tonnelat, *L'expansion allemande hors d'Europe* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1908), 125, 141; Clarence H. Haring, *The Germans of South America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1920), 43.

15. Schaden, "Die Deutschbrasilianer," 183-84; Emilio Willems, "Immigrants and Their Assimilation in Brazil," in T. Lynn Smith and Alexander Marchant, eds., *Brazil: Portrait of Half a Continent* (1951; rpt. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972), 209.

16. Rodrigues, *The Brazilians*, 60-61; A. H. Neiva and M. Diegues, Jr., "The Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants in Brazil," in W. D. Borrie, ed., *The Cultural Integration of Immigrants* (Paris: UNESCO, 1959), 185.

17. Although Emilio Willems is in no way responsible for my interpretation here, I have relied in part on his numerous works and have modified my views in consequence of private correspondence with him. See Emilio Willems, *A aculturação dos alemães no Brasil*, 2d ed. (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1980). Among his English-language articles, see his "Assimilation of German Immigrants in Brazil," *Sociology and*

*Social Research* 25 (1940): 125–32, and “Some Aspects of Cultural Conflict and Acculturation in Southern Rural Brazil,” *Rural Sociology* 7 (1942): 375–84.

18. G. Entres, ed., *Der Staat Santa Catharina in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Deutschtums* (Florianopolis: Livraria Central, 1929), 223; Ferdinand Schröder, *Brasilien und Wittenberg: Ursprung und Gestaltung deutschen evangelischen Kirchentums in Brasilien* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1936), 356; Martin Braunschweig, “Die rechtliche Stellung des deutschen Schulwesens in Südbrasilien,” in Bruno Geissler, ed., *Die Kulturbedeutung der evangelischen Kirche in Brasilien* (Leipzig: Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1922), 51.

19. Schieber, *Transformation of American Sentiment*, 88, 136, 171, 177, 178.

20. Mildred S. Wertheimer, *The Pan-German League, 1890–1914* (New York: Columbia University, 1924), 65, 74, 117, 126; Sylvio Romero, *O allematismo no sul do Brasil, seus perigo e os meios de os conjurar* (Rio de Janeiro: Ribeiro, 1906). See also Skidmore, *Black into White*, 32–37, 56.

21. Luebke, *Bonds of Loyalty*; Carl Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War* (Columbus: Ohio State Historical Society, 1936); Donald R. Hickey, “The Prager Affair: A Study in Wartime Hysteria,” *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 62 (Summer 1969): 117–34. A variety of other studies on the local level have been published during the past decade. See also Phyllis Keller, *States of Belonging: German-American Intellectuals and the First World War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

22. Detailed accounts of the Brazilian riots may be found in various metropolitan newspapers, April 16–18, 1917, for example, *A Federação* and *Correio do Povo* of Porto Alegre and *Jornal do Commercio* of Rio de Janeiro. For summary accounts of the April riots in the German-language press, see *Deutsche Post* of São Leopoldo, April 24, 1917, and *Germania* of São Paulo, April 25, 1917. Because publication in the German language was forbidden in November 1917, comparable accounts for the November riots do not exist. The *New York Times* published numerous translations of dispatches from Brazilian newspapers. The full text of *Lei da guerra* (War Law) is given in English translation in Andrew Boyle, ed., *The Brazilian Green Book: Consisting of Documents Relating to Brazil's Attitude with Regard to the European War, 1914–1917* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1918), 99–102. For a useful survey of Brazil's role in the war, see Percy Alvin Martin, *Latin America and the War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1925), 30–106.

From:

# America and the Germans

AN ASSESSMENT OF  
A THREE-HUNDRED-YEAR HISTORY

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Frank Trommler  
and Joseph McVeigh, EDITORS

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VOLUME ONE

Immigration, Language, Ethnicity



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## Preface

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