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Watching the Hen House: Judicial Rulemaking and Judicial Review

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Watching the Hen House: Judicial Rulemaking and Judicial Review

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“Federal states distinguish between ordinary political action, which takes
place within the existing framework of political institutions, and political ac-
tion which changes that very framework.”1

I. INTRODUCTION

Congress has historically delegated its procedural rulemaking authority to the courts.2 As a result, part of federal judges’ responsibi-
ties is to adopt internal administrative rules for the effective functioning of their courts. This delegation doctrine, however, says nothing about the allocation of rulemaking authority with reference to exercise of the delegation, particularly with reference to rule content. As a result, much has been written on the constitutionally permissible scope of this judicial rulemaking.

Much of this scholarly literature deals with either which entity (Congress or the courts) should have ultimate control over judicial practice and procedure\(^3\) or how far courts may go in exercising non-

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traditional court functions, such as budgeting, under the doctrine of inherent powers. Challenges to court-made rules typically have posed the question whether the judiciary, in promulgating a particular rule, has violated the Rules Enabling Act (REA). On the topic of how much of practice and procedure may be considered to be within the inherent powers of the courts, there is a lack of uniformity and consistency in federal-court decisions, as well as a lack of literature that is national in scope.

“[J]udicial interpretations dealing with the separation of powers and rulemaking provision are extremely varied.”7 “[T]here is a dearth of controlling authority or guidance at the federal level.”8 As Felix Stumpf has explained, despite the extensive exercise of putative inherent rulemaking powers by courts, “learned writers have described the concept as ‘shadowy’ and ‘nebulous,’ or as ‘a problem of definition that has eluded or bedeviled many courts and commentators for years.’”9


7. Wolf, supra note 6, at 520.

8. Id.

A discussion of who decides these questions and how is almost entirely absent from the scholarly literature. The scholarly literature that does address even part of these subjects focuses on the promulgation of the nationwide Federal Rules of Evidence, Civil Procedure, and Criminal Procedure through the committee process that ultimately results in Supreme Court approval and presentment to Congress, not the local rules and general orders that are promulgated far less formally and vary between and among districts. It is this morass into which this Article attempts to hurl itself.

Judicial rulemaking invokes many of the same concerns as administrative rulemaking. Article I was structured to discourage factional legislation. The framers specifically designed the legislative process to include safeguards against factions, safeguards that judicial rulemaking lacks. These safeguards protect not just community
welfare, but also important constitutional values: electoral accountability and protection of the rights of those who are regulated (those whose liberty and property are affected by court rules).\footnote{13} Fundamentally, legislators, unlike federal judges, are accountable because their continuance in office depends upon reelection.\footnote{14}

In comparison, judicial rulemaking vests the power in one institution. It radically reduces the number of individuals involved in adopting procedural rules; none of those individuals (under Article III) are elected or accountable to elected officials for their decisions, and all of them are life tenured,\footnote{15} dramatically undercutting accountability.\footnote{16}

The idea was that representatives would return home to explain to their constituents how parochial desires could not be achieved, bringing maturation. See Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers, supra, at 373. The framers believed that a republic with legislative bodies large enough to include representatives from many factions would hinder factions. See The Federalist No. 10, at 81–84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing the advantages of large republics in guarding against factions); The Federalist No. 51, at 325 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (concluding that the variety of interests embraced by the American republic would discourage oppression by factional majorities); The Federalist No. 55, at 383 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that requiring the concurrence of a select and stable body would promote accountability for long-term consequences). The idea was that bringing many different factions together in one process would increase the chance that factions would frustrate each other. See Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers, supra, at 373–74. In sum, “Madisonian republicanism was intended, in part, to make a virtue of gridlock.” Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process: Congressional Referral and Judicial Resistance in the Schiavo Controversy, 22 Const. Comment. 505, 519 (2005).


Delegation to administrative agencies is often defended on the ground that agencies are as accountable to the public as legislators because the President, who appoints the agency officials exercising rulemaking authority, is elected. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices resolving the competing interest which Congress itself inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in the light of everyday realities.”). See generally Richard Pierce, Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Re-
Judges, as a group, are unrepresentative of the population. They are insulated from much of the "real world." Unlike executive-branch agencies that must follow the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA), judicial rulemaking is rarely subject to meaningful notice and comment. As a result, only a few, if any, interests are heard prior to rule adoption. Often the only interests heard from will be from partisan, organized groups within the judicial system, such as law-enforcement agencies or prosecutors' offices. Even if citizen organizations become involved, those organizations have the resources to intervene in only a small fraction of all matters that affect their constituencies and likely would not address matters of importance to other citizens. In this way, rather than reducing the power of factions by playing them off against one another, judicial rulemaking typically accentuates the power of factions because its processes render judge-rulemakers dependent upon a combination of vested special interest groups and recently graduated law clerks for information and input. In sum, judicial rulemaking lacks

sponse To Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391 (1987) (arguing that courts are institutionally incompetent to create and apply a workable delegation doctrine). Of course, such an argument cannot be made on behalf of Article III judges.

17. See Michael McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89, 105 (1988). They are all lawyers and, on average, are older, richer, whiter, and more male than the general population of the United States. See id.

18. Id.

19. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006); see 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (requiring agencies to follow adjudicatory procedures whenever Congress requires a hearing on the record); 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (requiring an agency to follow the APA's rulemaking procedures unless a limited set of exceptions apply). Congress enacted the APA as a "working compromise, in which broad delegations of discretion were tolerated as long as they were checked by extensive procedural safeguards." Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HArv. L. REV. 1193, 1248 (1982).

20. See infra section III.B.


all of the structural features upon which the framers relied to protect against factions. 24 In addition, judicial rulemaking can be used to defy or dilute the substantive policy preferences of the legislative and executive branches. 25 Unlike when it reviews rulemaking performed by an administrative agency, Congress cannot always simply ratify or overrule judicial rulemaking by statute or foster informed dialogue by forcing the courts to articulate the basis for their rules, because not every exercise of rulemaking authority by a court is an exercise of delegated power. 26

24. The scholarly literature has advanced arguments against judicial rulemaking, including: judicial resistance to change; judges’ bias favoring their own preferences; judges being out of touch with the needs of litigants and members of the bar; the perception that the legislature better reflects the public will; and concern that judicial rulemaking will restrict or create substantive rights. See Bruce L. Dean, *Rule-Making in Texas: Clarifying the Judiciary’s Power to Promulgate Rules of Civil Procedure*, 20 St. Mary’s L.J. 139, 149–50 (1988); see also Kenneth S. Gallant, *Judicial Rule Making, Absent Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers*, 38 Okla. L. Rev. 447 (1985) (criticizing the theory that rulemaking can safely be entrusted to courts without fear that they will invade the legislative domain).

These concerns are all the more significant in light of the recent work of statistical analysis by Sunstein and Miles demonstrating that significant elements of judging can be explained in terms of the jurist’s political world view, particularly since rulemaking is less likely than adjudication to turn on the specific facts of one case. See Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles, *Depoliticizing Administrative Law*, 58 Duke L.J. 2193 (2009) (indicating that judicial outcomes are affected by judges’ political orientations, but that such effect is moderated when judges of differing political orientations sit together in panels).

This is not meant to suggest, naively, that legislatures and executive-branch agencies are immune to special-interest pressure or always act deliberatively and in the common good, see, e.g., Samaha, *supra* note 12, at 528 (documenting the excessive congressional response to the controversy arising out of the Schiavo case, Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court’s denial of two parents’ request for a temporary restraining order to reinsert their daughter’s feeding tube) and concluding that “[t]here were probably few actors less likely to make a sound decision about the merits of the case than the United States Congress”); cf. *The Federalist* No. 10 at 129–30 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens . . . that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.”), but rather that the secretive and insulated procedures of judicial rulemaking may be worse. Cf. Sotirios Barber, *The Ninth Amendment: Inkblot or Another Hard Nut to Crack?*, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 67 (1988) (arguing that the process of discovering the truth “is nothing other than giving and exchanging reasons in an open-minded and public-spirited way about what to believe and how to live”).

25. *See* *infra* section III.A (discussing the various sources of judicial rulemaking authority); *cf*. Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185–86 (1935)
Two centuries ago, Jeremy Bentham argued that almost everything wrong with procedure could be attributed to "Judge and Company." In Bentham's view, judicially created procedure, endemic to the common law, was also its bane, and he attributed all procedural evil to guild self-interest: Judges, former lawyers who consorted with lawyers and who derived income from fees, had created a system benefiting only judges and lawyers. In other words, Bentham viewed procedural rules as professional featherbedding and feared that procedural designers and procedural consumers were too closely joined.

The thesis of this Article is a simple one: Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction. Although this Article focuses on the concerns arising from judicial review of judicial rulemaking, it includes some observations as to why, as a matter of policy, expansive judicial rulemaking authority itself is concerning. It, therefore, joins the extensive scholarly debate surrounding the relative fairness, competency, and efficiency of the respective branches of government to promulgate procedural rules.

Part II describes the increasing prevalence of quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts in the past half-century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon non-legislative actors and a Balkanization of the rules of procedure between and among local districts.

Part III outlines the rulemaking authority of the federal courts, which emanates from the REA, the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure, the U.S. Constitution, and the "inherent-authority" doctrine. It also traces the major limitations on this power: the prohibition against courts making rules affecting "substantive" matters, the Case and Controversy Clause of Article III, and the notice and comment requirements of the REA and the Due Process Clause.

Part IV describes a case study in local judicial rulemaking: courtroom-security rules, which are generally promulgated without an op-

(“Every exertion of the police power, either by the legislature or by an administrative body, is an exercise of delegated power. Where it is by statute, the legislature has acted under power delegated to it through the Constitution. Where the regulation is by an order of an administrative body, that body acts under a delegation from the legislature.”).

28. See id. at 9–10.
portunity for public notice and comment. Part V describes the problem(s) that this Article seeks to address: the frequent promulgation of local rules governing subject matters that are arguably beyond the scope of judicial rulemaking authority, which are then reviewed by the very courts that issued them in the first instance, and the claims of actual bias, the appearance of partiality, or both that can result. It argues that it is improper for a judge who participated in promulgating a local rule to sit in judgment over the validity of that rule when it is challenged in a specific case after adoption because the process by which many of these local court rules are issued gives rise to a structural conflict of interest in having any judge of the promulgating district review a challenge to the promulgation and enforcement thereof. It also notes that there is little case law governing who has standing to challenge court rules or the scope or standard of a court’s review of a court-created rule.

Part VI concludes that, in enacting arguably substantive local rules, federal courts are exercising powers constitutionally committed to Congress and, in doing so, impeding sufficient independent review of such exercises and creating a diffusion of rulemaking responsibility.

II. THE INCREASING PREVALENCE OF JUDICIAL RULEMAKING

Judicial rulemaking, whatever its source, dominated the scene for most of the first century of the American judiciary, although state and federal courts alike relied heavily on the English system for their rules of practice and procedure. The court-created system was characterized by common law writs, forms of actions, fact pleadings, and separate courts of law and equity and was criticized as being “cum-


30. See infra Part III.

brous, dilatory, expensive, [and] ultra-formal.”32 Judges and lawyers resisted change, and the judiciary sparingly exercised its early rulemaking in pursuit of procedural reform.33

In the early part of the twentieth century, efforts were made to reform the practice and procedure of federal courts. The end results were the REA, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the beginning of the modern era of judicial rulemaking.34

Substantial changes in the structure and personnel of rulemaking have occurred in the sixty years since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first promulgated.35 Legislatures have responded by delegating to courts more and more authority over the field; most prominently, “Congress has accorded to the federal judiciary primary responsibility for its own effectiveness.”36 Over the past half century, the judiciary has moved from its original role as arbiter of the ultimate fairness of proposed rules to that of initial drafters of the rules.37 Since the passage of the first REA in 1934,38 multiple additional layers of rulemaking have been added, and judicial participation in the drafting process has dramatically increased.39 Judges have now replaced practicing attorneys as the dominant players in the rulemaking process.40

During the same time period, the rulemaking process has moved from a relatively flat process of proposal and promulgation to a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision by multiple committees.41 The rulemaking process depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors—area-specific advisory committees, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court—to develop, refine, and approve court rules.42 The agendas for the semi-annual Judicial Conference meet-

32. Pound, supra note 3, at 599.
33. See Lawson, supra note 31, at 540.
34. See id. at 541.
35. See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 229.
37. See id.
39. See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 232.
40. See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 237. No statute specifies the composition of the Rules Advisory Committee, but recent practice has seen a majority or near-majority of judges and a judge as chair. See id. at 243. Seven out of thirteen members of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, including the chair, are judges, comprising more than half of the membership. See Koppel, supra note 21, at 1008. Eight of the fifteen members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules are judges. See id. The Judicial Conference membership consists entirely of judges. See id.
41. See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 231.
42. See Stancil, supra note 21, at 72. In 1958, Congress enacted legislation transferring the major responsibility for the rulemaking function from the Supreme
ings include a disparate miscellany of items, ranging from air conditioning in courthouses to the assignment of visiting judges to judicial discipline. Article III judges control every veto gate in this rulemaking process unless Congress intervenes.

In 1990, Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements Act, an omnibus bill that created ninety-four amateur rulemaking groups throughout the federal judicial system. One result of this shift to a

Court to the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006)). The Conference was mandated to “carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the [federal] rules” and to recommend appropriate amendments in the rules. Id. The Supreme Court retained its statutory authority to promulgate the rules, but it would henceforth do so by acting on recommendations made by the Judicial Conference. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2073. Following enactment of the 1958 legislation, the Judicial Conference established a Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and five advisory committees to amend or create the civil, criminal, bankruptcy, appellate, and admiralty rules. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 6–7 (1958). The Standing Committee’s mission was to supervise the rulemaking process for the Conference and to coordinate and approve the work of the advisory committees. See id.; see also Maris, supra note 29, at 772 (explaining the authorization and role of the Standing Committee). Although changes have been made in operating procedures, the rulemaking structure today, having been codified in the REA, “is essentially the same as that established by the Judicial Conference following the 1958 legislation assigning it the central role in drafting and monitoring the federal rules.” Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1664 & n.65 (1995). The Standing Committee “supervises the rulemaking process and recommends to the Conference such changes to the rules as it believes are necessary to maintain consistency and promote the interest of justice.” Id. at 1664. Five advisory committees assist the Standing Committee, each of which is responsible for one set of federal rules (civil, criminal, appellate, bankruptcy, or evidence). See id. “The advisory committees conduct ongoing studies of the operation of their respective rules, prepare appropriate amendments and new rules, draft explanatory committee notes, conduct hearings, and submit proposed changes through the Standing Committee to the Judicial Conference.” Id. “On most occasions, the Court has deferred to the Judicial Conference and has prescribed without change proposed rules amendments submitted by the Judicial Conference.” Id. at 1674.

43. See Yeazell, supra note 3, at 246.
44. See Stancil, supra note 21, at 99. “Their control is direct in the case of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference, and the Chief Justice, acting as the chair of the Judicial Conference, appoints members of the Standing Committee and the various advisory committees (many of whom are Article III judges themselves).” Id. For a list of the handful of congressional interventions in the judicial rulemaking process from 1973 to 1985, see H.R. Rep. No. 99-422, at 8–9 n.20 (1984) (House Committee Report accompanying a precursor bill to the 1988 statute amending the REA). Most involved changes to the Rules of Evidence. See Stancil, supra note 21, at 78 n.36.
46. See Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 3, at 376.
multi-tiered system of rule promulgation has been a Balkanization of the rules of procedure. Each of the ninety-four trial districts and eleven federal circuits now has its own, separate set of local rules. In addition to the local advisory groups and the local district and circuit rules, the Federal Advisory Committees on Civil and Criminal Rules remain in existence, continually drafting further revisions to the general federal rules, a task that parallels the work of the local advisory groups. These rules govern court access, shape the structure of lawsuits, and significantly influence the course of pretrial proceedings. There are now more than 5,000 local rules regulating civil procedure alone, not including standing orders and other local procedural requirements.

In addition to increasing in complexity, judicial rulemaking has also become increasingly legislative in nature. “Federal procedural

47. See id. at 380. In 1984, the Judicial Conference authorized its Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to study and treat the problems that the local proliferation of rules causes. See Robel, supra note 10, at 1467 n.33. The following year, the Conference empowered the Reporter of the Committee to collect and organize all the district court rules, as well as other judicial commands that operate like rules, into one source. See id. The Reporter was also instructed to design a project to study the growing number of divergent local rules. This “Local Rules Project” discovered that the ninety-four federal court districts had an aggregate of almost 5,000 local rules, “not including many 'sub-rules,' standing orders and standard operating procedures.” COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. AND PROC., JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PRACTICE 1 (1989). See generally Subrin, supra note 10 (discussing the history and current state of local rules and demonstrating that local rules may not be consistent with the general federal rules of procedure). Cf. A. Leo Levin, Local Rules As Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1567 (1991) (approving of Federal Rule Civil Procedure 83’s creation of “local laboratories” for new rules). As one commentator noted, “[t]he arguments for uniformity are strong and obvious,” Robel, supra note 10, at 1449, but not the focus of this Article.

48. See Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 3, at 381.

49. See id. at 381–82.


51. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 21 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that the federal rules “operate on all litigants, with the binding effect of law” and that “[t]he Court’s function in the process of promulgation of the Rules today virtually amounts to the adoption of legislation”); Bone, supra note 3, at 889 (“[C]ourt rulemaking has moved toward a legislative model and away from the traditional model based on reasoned deliberation and expertise.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 849 (1993) (noting that the rulemaking process has “come to resemble the legislative process,” which is “an overtly political process”); cf. MELVIN ABRON EISENSBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 4–7 (1988) (explaining that courts inevitably make law, not only as a by-product of adjudication but also to enrich the body of legal rules).
rulemaking has for the past fifty years been counter-majoritarian and predicated on a model of expertise.”

III. GOVERNING STANDARDS

Briefly summarized, the delegation doctrine dictates that Congress may not delegate any legislative power to an administrative agency that Article I of the U.S. Constitution assigns to the legislative process. Critics of the delegation doctrine have argued that, when courts face petitions to review administrative lawmaking, they are inevitably tempted to make policy in the guise of judicial review. What if the issue is not one of Congress delegating a particular rulemaking power, or courts reviewing that delegation by making rules of their own, however, but rather of the courts seizing the rulemaking power in the first instance?

A. The Rulemaking Authority of Federal Courts

The United States Constitution was adopted without a provision explicitly governing judicial rulemaking, but the Supreme Court “at an early date by rule of court considered that . . . it had the power to regulate its own procedure.” Article III merely vests the “judicial Power” in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress “ordain and establish” and extends that power to a select list of “Cases” and “Controversies.” Article III’s textual brevity, which provides little guidance as to the proper extent of judicial authority, poses a distinct problem for courts deciding separation of powers cases that involve the judiciary. Unlike Articles I and II, which extensively

52. Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 3, at 439. See Carrington, supra note 36, at 310 (“The Rules Enabling Act was avowedly anti-democratic in the sense that it withdrew ‘procedural’ lawmaking from the political arena and made it the activity of professional technicians.”) (describing the original version of the REA and the philosophy of expertise that animated allocation of procedural rulemaking to the judicial branch).


55. Riedl, supra note 31, at 601.


58. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1316.
delineate the powers of Congress and the Presidency, Article III merely vests “judicial power” in the federal courts.\textsuperscript{60} Other than providing for life tenure and prohibiting salary diminution, Article III does not indicate what comprises this judicial power.\textsuperscript{61}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{59} See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”).
\item \textsuperscript{60} Section 1 of Article III provides:
\begin{quote}
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
\end{quote}
U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
\item Many state constitutions, in contrast, specifically grant the judiciary the power to regulate practice and procedure within the court system. See, Alaska Const. art. IV, § 15 (requiring the courts to adopt rules); Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5 (authorizing the courts to adopt rules relating to “procedural matters”); Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21 (authorizing the courts to adopt rules relating to “practice and procedure”); Fla. Const. art. V, § 2(a) (granting the supreme court exclusive power to “adopt rules for the practice and procedure in courts” but reserving for the state legislature the power of review and disapproval); Md. Const. art. IV, § 18 (empowering Maryland courts to prescribe rules but reserving a power of review and disapproval for the Maryland General Assembly); Mo. Const. art. V, § 5 (granting specific rulemaking authority to the courts and providing for no express legislative oversight or restriction as to court rules); N.C. Const. art. V, § 25 (authorizing the courts to adopt rules relating to “practice and procedure”); Ohio Const. art. IV, § 5(B) (empowering the Ohio courts to prescribe rules but reserving for the state legislature a power of review and disapproval); Pa. Const. art. V, § 10(C) (granting the courts “the power to prescribe the general rules governing, practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts” as long as they do not abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights); Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4 (authorizing the courts to adopt rules of evidence); Vt. Const. ch. II, § 37 (requiring the courts to adopt rules). See generally Walstad v. State, 818 P.2d 695 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (construing the Alaska courts’ rulemaking authority to be exclusive); State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801 (Ariz. 1987) (construing the Arizona courts’ rulemaking authority to be exclusive); Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 414 (N.J. 1950) (invalidating legislation that extended the time for appeal beyond that permitted by court-made rules because the New Jersey Constitution vested the exclusive power to make rules of practice and procedure in the courts); In re Pa. C. S. 1703, 394 A.2d 444, 447 (Pa. 1978) (interpreting Pa. Const. art. V, § 10(C)); White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 103 (Wyo. 1984) (invalidating a statute regulating pleading in medical-malpractice cases because the Wyoming Constitution vested the exclusive power to make rules of practice and procedure in the courts).
\item \textsuperscript{61} See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; see also Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and The Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return To Normalcy?, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 668, 684 (1990) (discussing the Framers’ concern for guaranteeing the personal independence of judges). Presumably, enabling legislation is unnecessary and the inherent-powers would be redundant in these states.
The Supreme Court has recognized three general sources of judicial rulemaking power. First, Article III defines the exercise of judicial power to include deciding “cases” and “controversies.” Second, the Court recognizes that Article I gives Congress limited power to delegate to the judiciary powers beyond the Article III powers, so long as the delegation does not threaten “an independent and impartial adjudication by the federal judiciary of matters within the judicial power of the United States,”62 assign “tasks that are more properly accomplished by [other] branches,”63 or otherwise “impermissibly threaten[ ] the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.”64 Third, the Court maintains that federal courts have “inherent” authority to exercise certain nonadjudicatory powers.65

The authority of the United States District Courts to adopt and promulgate local rules emanates from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5766 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83, which the Supreme Court adopted pursuant to its authority under the REA and which authorize the creation of local rules. Congress also vested federal district and circuit courts with the independent authority to prescribe local rules of practice consistent with Acts of Congress and the rules of practice and procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court.67


63. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383 (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 851) (internal quotation marks omitted).

64. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46–49 (1991) (discussing the inherent power to sanction litigants for bad faith conduct); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987) (discussing the inherent power of the courts to initiate contempt proceedings and to appoint counsel to prosecute them); In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985) (discussing the inherent power of the courts to suspend or disbar attorneys).

65. Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part:

Each district court acting by a majority of its district judges may, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment, make and amend rules governing its practice. A local rule must be consistent with—but not duplicative of—federal statutes and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 and must conform to any uniform numbering system prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States.


66. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2006) (“The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under [the REA].”).
1. The REA and the Federal Rules of Procedure

Congress, through the REA, has delegated to the Supreme Court the authority to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for the federal courts. The REA enables the judiciary to promulgate federal rules of practice and procedure, as long as those rules do “not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” In delegating its authority, Congress imposed an obligation on the Court to report its actions and fixed a deferred effective date for adopted rules to allow for congressional disapproval, if desired. The result is that the REA embodies the constitutional separation of powers limitations on the respective allocation of rulemaking authority between Congress and

68. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). The first section of the REA provides that “the Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals.” Id.

The REA was not Congress’s first delegation of rule-promulgation power to the courts. It was merely the codification at the federal level of a long series of statutory delegations of procedural rulemaking authority to the courts. See Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Court Rule-Making Procedures 55–63 (1977) (providing a historical overview of rulemaking authority); Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 5–5; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (providing rulemaking authority for local rules of court). See generally The Rule-Making Function and The Judicial Conference of the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117 (1957) (containing statements of various judges addressing a congressional proposal to authorize the Judicial Conference to make recommendations for revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Burbank, REA, supra note 3 (providing a history of the REA); Maris, supra note 29 (discussing the history of judicial rulemaking and the Judicial Conference). Once the Constitution was ratified, Congress empowered the federal courts to adopt rules for practice and procedure. Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 stated that the circuit courts, as well as other federal courts, had the authority “to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789) (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 2071). During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the development of independent federal procedural rules was hampered by the Process Acts of 1789, Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (1789), and 1792, Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792), and the Conformity Act of 1872, Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 5, 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872), which required federal courts to follow state procedures in actions at law. See Weinstein, supra, at 64–66. The undesirability of this arrangement ultimately led to the twentieth century reform movement for a uniform set of federal procedural rules, which culminated in the enactment of the REA in 1934, which granted the Supreme Court the power to make “general rules of practice and procedure.” Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072). See Weinstein, supra, at 66–69.


69. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a)–(b).

70. See § 2074.
the courts.\textsuperscript{71} The first provision of the REA was “a delegation of some federal law-making power created by Article III, which authorizes Congress to establish lower federal courts.”\textsuperscript{72} In other words, “[t]he Rules Enabling Act is just that: a statute that ‘enables’ the Supreme Court to exercise its inherent procedural rulemaking function.”\textsuperscript{73} Perhaps as a result, besides authorizing general rulemaking authority, the Act provides few details.\textsuperscript{74} It does not require a particular rulemaking process or state what the new procedural rules should do.\textsuperscript{75}

The statutory limitations allocate the \textit{substantive} rulemaking power to the legislative branch, and the \textit{procedural} rulemaking power to the courts.\textsuperscript{76} However difficult this distinction between substantive and procedural has proven in theory and application,\textsuperscript{77} it nonetheless has been the conceptual paradigm for defining each branch’s rulemaking authority.\textsuperscript{78} The language of the REA and the cases construing it have always recognized this division of rulemaking authority.\textsuperscript{79}

Rule 57 only authorizes the district courts to adopt local rules that are narrow in scope and regulate “matters of detail.”\textsuperscript{80} Both \textit{Federal Rule of Civil Procedure} 83 and \textit{Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure} 57

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{71} See Mullenix, \textit{Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra} note 3, at 1329.
\bibitem{72} Carrington, \textit{supra} note 36, at 287.
\bibitem{73} Mullenix, \textit{Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra} note 3, at 1334.
\bibitem{75} See id.
\bibitem{77} See infra subsection III.A.3.
\bibitem{78} See Mullenix, \textit{Counter-Reformation, supra} note 3, at 429.
\bibitem{80} See Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 17 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court’s adoption of a rule constraining the issuance of subpoenas seeking client-related information from lawyers fell outside the permissible scope of rulemaking authority because it went beyond “matters of detail” appropriate for local rulemaking and worked a fundamental procedural change); Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Sup. Ct. of Penn., 975 F.2d 102, 107 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the adoption and enforcement against federal prosecutors of a local rule that required prior judicial approval before service of a grand jury subpoena on an attorney in a criminal proceeding fell outside the rulemaking authority of the federal district court because it went beyond “matters of detail” appropriate for local rulemaking).
\end{thebibliography}
limit the scope of local rules promulgated under either authority to
rules concerning “practice.” Court-created rules are not supposed to
create or affect substantive rights.81 If a court, in fashioning a rule,
alters substantive rights by promulgating rules of general effect, it
engages in unconstitutional lawmaking.82 “Local rules that fail to com-
ply with those requirements are nullities.”83 In keeping with these
principles, in Frazier v. Heebe, the Supreme Court struck down a local
rule that it deemed “unnecessary and irrational.”84

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57 authorizes a majority of
district judges to adopt, make, and amend local rules governing its prac-
tice. Likewise, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 authorizes district
courts to promulgate local rules that are “not inconsistent” with the
Federal Rules. Section 2071 of the REA specifically forbids the pro-
mulgation of local rules “other than under this section.”85 The pur-
pose of this exclusivity clause was to avoid the promulgation of the
equivalent of local rules under various other rubrics, such as “stand-
ing orders.”86

2. Inherent Rulemaking Authority

The Supreme Court has, at times, recognized that the federal
courts have certain inherent rulemaking powers, arising from the na-
ture of the judicial process, to control their internal process and the

81. See 18 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006); Fed. R. Crim. P. 57(b) (permitting the local regu-
lation of practice only when it is done in a manner “consistent with federal law”); Min-
er v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 651–52 (1960) (holding that a local admiralty rule
authorizing oral discovery depositions exceeded the district court’s rulemaking
authority and reasoning that the rule, “though concededly ‘procedural,’ may be of
as great importance to litigants as many a ‘substantive’ doctrine,” and was there-
fore too basic to be effectuated through local rulemaking). The second provi-
sion of the REA dictates that the rules that the court-created rules that it authorizes
“shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” § 2072(b). This pro-
vision of the REA codified the repeated provision in predecessor statutes that
prohibited courts from promulgating any procedural rules that “were repugnant
82. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1328.
83. Baylson, 975 F.3d at 107; see Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 646 (1986).
84. See Frazier, 482 U.S. at 646.
86. See Robel, supra note 10, at 1468.
conduct of litigation. The Supreme Court has defined these “inherent powers” as those necessary for a court to function.

The inherent-authority theory posits that, once Congress creates federal courts and vests them with jurisdiction, it must also vest them with those powers necessary for them to administer justice and to

87. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). While the existence of inherent executive power is well established, see, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318–19 (1936) (stating that the unenumerated power of the federal government over foreign affairs rests principally with the President), that of inherent judicial power is much less so. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1320. Nonetheless, the concept that courts have certain powers directly resulting from their mere existence is not new. In 1928, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin explained: “[C]ertain powers have been conceded to courts, because they are courts. Such powers have been conceded, because without them they could neither maintain their dignity, transact their business, nor accomplish the purpose of their existence.” State v. Cannon, 221 N.W. 603, 603 (Wis. 1928).

Whether this inherent power to promulgate rules exists has been described as a “purely academic” issue. Burbank, REA, supra note 3, at 1021 n.19. Most commentators at least agree that “courts possess a certain measure of inherent rule-making power.” Charles W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 623, 626 (1957). See Burbank, REA, supra note 3, at 1116 (agreeing with the basic theory of inherent rulemaking authority, but noting that “arguments [for the power] often reflect[ ] the passion of the reformer more than the detachment of the scholar”); Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 3 (conceding the existence of “an alleged inherent power to engage in rule-making”). Scholars do not agree, however, about the nature of the power, compare Wigmore, supra note 3, at 276 (arguing that rulemaking is so essential to the judicial power that it preempts the field and renders all legislative encroachment improper and unconstitutional), with Benjamin Kaplan & Warren J. Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 234, 251 (1951) (observing that “Wigmore’s omnibus argument is better taken as the jeu d’esprit of a master than as a serious constitutional analysis”), and Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 3, or its scope, see, e.g., Joiner & Miller, supra, at 626.

Scholars generally divide these powers into negative and affirmative ones. See, e.g., Stumpf, supra note 3. The inherent negative power of the courts is their power to invalidate legislative intrusions into their rulemaking realm. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 518. The inherent affirmative power of the courts is the power to engage in judicial rulemaking. A great deal of scholarly literature has been devoted to the former, but it is the latter of these two types of powers that tends to be more controversial, see Wolf, supra note 6, at 521, and with which this Article is concerned.

88. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1320; cf. Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979) (defining a court’s inherent powers as those that were necessary to exercise its jurisdiction, administer justice, and preserve its independence and integrity). The Texas Supreme Court explained: “The inherent judicial power of a court is not derived from legislative grant or specific constitutional provisions, but from the very fact that the court has been created and charged by the constitution with certain duties and responsibilities.” Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398.

89. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 58 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (identifying Article III as the constitutional source of the Court’s power to protect “the integrity of its proceed-
preserve their status as part of an independent branch. Federal courts have thus recognized a variety of powers as inherent, including the powers to control their own proceedings and dockets; punish contempts; impose sanctions on litigants; provide for process

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90. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1321. For the most part, this asserted inherent authority is consistent with a vision of separated powers that recognizes the courts’ need to be able to protect the integrity of their proceedings without undue reliance on the political branches. See, e.g., the court’s exercise of authority in United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987) (“The ability to punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as essential to ensuring that the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other Branches.”).


92. See Young, 481 U.S. at 795–96; Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M., & O. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65–66 (1924); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911) (explaining that “the power of courts to punish for contempts is a necessary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary, and is absolutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed on them by law”); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874) (“That the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is essential to the administration of justice. The courts of the United States, when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction over any subject, at once become possessed of the power.”); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821); Ex parte Barnett, 600 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. 1980) (holding that courts had the inherent power to punishing a party for refusing to obey a court order); see generally Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010 (1924) (finding no constitutional impediment when Congress confers contempt powers to courts). The power of contempt is vital to the judiciary in maintaining order, controlling the courtroom, and enforcing orders and final judgments. Therefore, other branches of government cannot pass regulations dictating to judges when and how to exercise their contempt powers. See Murneigh v. Gainer, 685 N.E.2d 1357 (Ill. 1997).

where none exists;94 “impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates;”95 “control admission to [their] bar[s] and to discipline attorneys who appear before [them];”96 “vacate [their] own judgment[s] upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated upon the court;”97 “bar from the courtroom a criminal defendant who disrupts a trial;”98 “dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens;”99 “act sua sponte to dismiss a suit for failure to prosecute;”100 consolidate cases;101 appoint auditors;102 and promulgate internal procedural rules for the conduct of litigation in the federal courts.103

94. See Att’y Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 426 A.2d 929, 934 (Md. 1981) (quoting State v. Cannon, 221 N.W. 603, 603–04 (Wis. 1928)).

95. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204, 227 (1821)).

96. See, e.g., United States v. Colo. Supreme Court et al., 988 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Colo. 1998) (noting that courts have the inherent power to discipline lawyers licensed by it or practicing before them).

97. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44.

98. Id.


101. See Bowen v. Chase, 94 U.S. 812, 824 (1876) (acknowledging the court’s inherent power to consolidate actions arising out of single controversy).

102. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (holding that the district court had the inherent power to appoint an auditor to assist in performance of its judicial duties).

103. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1297. Congress endorsed this inherent power in the REA, by statutorily conferring authority on the federal courts to promulgate procedural rules. See id. Even scholars who argue for concurrent roles for the judiciary and the legislature in the area of procedural rulemaking recognize that there are certain powers and functions which must remain within the ultimate control of the court:

[There is a third realm of judicial activity, neither substantive nor adjective law, a realm of “proceedings which are so vital to the efficient functioning of a court as to be beyond legislative power.” This is the area of minimum functional integrity of the courts, “what is essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the court as a constitutional tribunal and from the very fact that it is a court.”]

Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 31–32 (internal citations omitted).

Regarding the conduct of judges, see, for example, Weinstock v. Holden, 995 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1999) (determining that a statute governing the disqualification of judges violated the separation of powers provisions of the Missouri Constitution); In re Kading, 235 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1975) (holding that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had the inherent authority to adopt the Code of Judicial Conduct, including a specific rule requiring the filing of annual financial statements). Regarding the conduct of attorneys, see, e.g., In re Edwards, 266 P. 665 (Idaho 1928) (holding that the Idaho Supreme Court had the inherent power to adopt rules and regulations prescribing the qualifications of persons seeking to practice law);
There are “two primary theoretical basis for inherent judicial powers. The first is the separation-of-powers doctrine. The second is the power inherent in a court because of its sheer existence.”\textsuperscript{104} The theories are not mutually exclusive, however, and courts have utilized both doctrines in upholding the judiciary's exercise of a particular inherent power.\textsuperscript{105}

Consistent with these principles, the Supreme Court has upheld the authority of district courts to promulgate local rules as long as (1) they do not conflict with an Act of Congress; (2) they do not conflict with the rules of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court; (3) they are not constitutionally infirm; and (4) the subject matter governed by the rule is within the power of the district court to regulate.\textsuperscript{106} Although the Constitution assigns to Congress the power to create inferior courts and confer on them jurisdiction, once created, these courts have the inherent power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure not in contravention of substantive law.\textsuperscript{107} In other words, the inherent power of the courts, once called into existence by Article III, includes the powers to protect themselves, to administer justice, to promulgate rules for practice, and to provide process where none exists.\textsuperscript{108} Thus, the judicial power permits the exercise of legislative-like authority if it is ancillary to existing judicial powers.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{104} S TUMPF, supra note 3, at 6.

\textsuperscript{105} See, e.g., State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723 (Conn. 1974).

\textsuperscript{106} See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 654, (1986) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159–60, 162–64 (1973); Miner v. Atlas, 363 U.S. 641, 651–52, (1960); Story v. Livingston, 38 U.S. 359, 368 (1839)). Consistent with these principles, Stumpf has recognized that trial courts are uniformly found to have inherent powers “so that the adjudicative process can function” where rules and statutes are silent. See STUMPF, supra note 3, at 37.

\textsuperscript{107} See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1334.

\textsuperscript{108} See id. at 1297.

\textsuperscript{109} See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (upholding judicial power to define what constitutes a “restraint of trade”); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 45 (1825) (holding that Congress could properly delegate to the courts the power to prescribe the method in which officers execute judgments)); Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1433 (1984) (arguing that the courts' power to make procedural rules is ancillary to Article III, analogous to the ancillary authority of the President under Article II). Courts' inherent powers are not necessarily exclusive. Although some functions are within the core powers of the judicial branch upon which other branches may
The focus of most separation of powers cases has been on judicial independence as to decision-making rather than determining which powers are necessarily part of the court system.110 What is clear is that the local rule making authority of federal courts is supposed to be limited.111 Courts usually rely on specific statutory authority, rather than their “inherent powers,” for rulemaking out of a desire not to create unnecessary antagonism and confrontation with legislatures.112 This traditional judicial restraint has also reflected the superior ability of legislatures to gather information within certain areas.113

3. Defining “Procedural”

“Procedure is substance.”114 Congressional rulemaking control has always been premised on concerns about the allocation of federal powers, and, in particular, on a concern that the legislature, not the courts, should engage in “policy choices with a predictable and identifiable impact on rights claimed under substantive law.”115 By statute, federal procedural rules are initiated by the judicial branch,116 subject to congressional approval,

not intrude, see Barland v. Eau Claire County, 575 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Wis. 1998) (discussing the judiciary’s exclusive authority over supervision of judicial assistants), the vast majority fall in the great borderland of shared authority between the courts and legislatures. See id. In many situations, the power of legislatures and the courts overlap. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 517. Thus, the Court’s implied rulemaking authority, although generally recognized, is subservient to that of Congress unless the Court is exercising its rulemaking power in defense of judicial authority or integrity. See Beale, supra, at 1472; Robel, supra note 10, at 1480.

110. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 525; see, e.g., French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 448–53 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing that Article III establishes three safeguards of judicial independence: (1) tenure of office; (2) protection against financial penalties; and (3) the rule (an implication of establishing a “judicial power”) that final judgment must be carried out).

111. See United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 760 (1st Cir. 1994); cf. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9–10 (emphasizing that court rules are adopted under a limited congressional grant of legislative power).

112. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 523. This avoidance is particularly important in the federal system, where there has been a long-standing recognition that Congress has the power to prescribe rules of practice for the federal courts. See Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965); Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 19.

113. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 529.

114. Stancil, supra note 21, at 71.

115. Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKL.J. 1012, 1019–20 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank, Hold the Corks]. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 13–14 (arguing that courts are likely to impinge upon substantive rights in exercising rulemaking powers, “not because judges would make rules governing substantive law as such, but rather because procedure and substance are inextricably interwoven”).

which can occur by way of inaction.117 The now-familiar statutory allocation of power between Congress and the courts relies on the distinction between substance and procedure,118 and disputes about the proper scope of judicial rulemaking have traditionally centered on discerning which matters are “substantive” and which are “procedural.”119

117. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006). Pursuant to the 1988 REA amendments, rules proposed by the Court under § 2072 or § 2073 go into effect unless Congress acts to prevent their implementation within seven months after the Chief Justice reports the proposed rules to Congress. See § 2074(a).

118. See Robel, supra note 10, at 1473; see also Joiner & Miller, supra note 87, at 634 (“It is fundamental that court rules cannot . . . abrogate or modify substantive law.”); Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 14 (“Nothing could be clearer than the fact that courts in the exercise of the rule-making power have no competence to promulgate rules governing substantive law.”).

119. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156–57 (1973); Schlagenhau v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 113–14 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 433 n.5 (1956); Miss. Pub'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1946); Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 7–14 (1941). Almost immediately after enactment of the REA, the Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and set the stage for the first of its most influential opinions on the meaning of the words “practice and procedure.” Sibbach, 312 U.S. 1. Sibbach filed a diversity-jurisdiction personal-injury action in federal court. The district court ordered him to submit to a physical examination, as authorized by a newly adopted federal rule, but he refused, contending that adoption of the examination rule exceeded the Supreme Court’s authority under the REA because it abridged his substantive rights. The Court rejected this contention, upheld the examination rule, and provided the following definition of procedure: “The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” Id. at 14.


Hanna was also a personal-injury case filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The complaint filed by Plummer, the executor of the decedent’s estate, was served in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide for delivery of process to a defendant’s residence, but not under a provision of the corresponding state limitations statute, which required personal service upon the defendant. See id. at 461. The district court concluded that state law governed service of process and granted summary judgment for Hanna, and
Of course, the devil with judicial rulemaking is in the detail of the distinction between procedural and substantive rules (the former courts being permitted to promulgate, the latter being forbidden). 120 Procedural rules almost inevitably influence the determination of substantive rights. 121 The problem in determining what is procedural versus substantive renders the process of identifying that part of the procedural functions that are inherent in the judiciary extremely difficult, and commentators have argued that procedural rulemaking, by necessity, also affects the substantive rights of the parties. 122 The classification of rules as either substantive or procedural is difficult.

the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, describing the rules governing service of process as a “substantive rather than a procedural matter” and concluding that Erie dictated that the state statute governed the issue. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463. The question on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari was whether “service of process [in a diversity case] shall be made in the manner prescribed by state law or that set forth in Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461. The Court concluded that the Federal Rules controlled the service of process and reversed. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463–64.

The Court, for the first time, drew a sharp line between the two issues that had coalesced in earlier opinions: the authority of the Court to adopt rules of procedure and the obligation of federal courts to apply state law in diversity cases. The first, a separation of powers problem, was governed by the REA; the second, a federalism problem, was governed by Erie and its progeny. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. More importantly for the purpose of this Article, with regard to court rulemaking powers, the Court reaffirmed its Sibbach definition of “procedure” and clarified the means by which to measure rules that may have both substantive and procedural components:

[The constitutional provision for a federal court system . . . carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either. Id. at 472.

Justice Harlan suggested in his concurring opinion that this test, which he characterized as “arguably procedural,” was overly generous in its description of judicial rulemaking authority and did little to ease the difficulty of distinguishing between “substance” and “procedure.” Id. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court has since attempted to qualify its position by clarifying that court-adopted rules may have an “incidental” effect on substantive rights without exceeding the rulemaking authority delegated by the REA. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987); see also Carrington, supra note 36, at 299 (“Implied in Burlington Northern is a constraint on rules of court affecting substantive rights in ways that are more than ‘incidental.’”).

120. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch Relations, 95 Geo. L. J. 909, 1006–07 (2007); Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 115; Carrington, supra note 36, at 301.

121. See Weinstein, supra note 68, at 55; Bone, supra note 3, at 954 (conceding that “there is no clear normative divide between procedure and substance”); Robel, supra note 10, at 1477–78.

122. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 520, 524. The need for legislative review in these cases arises from the fact that these procedures are so intimately related with substan-
partly because substance and procedure are almost inextricably intertwined and partly because the two concepts remain imprecisely defined even after decades of doctrinal development.\(^{123}\) As a result, the task of differentiating the substantive from the procedural has been an elusive one for many courts.\(^{124}\)

The difficulty that courts have had in defining what is procedural has thwarted a uniform interpretation of inherent procedural pow-

\(^{123}\) See Lawson, \textit{supra} note 3, at 551.
\(^{124}\) See Wolf, \textit{supra} note 6, at 527. For example, during the Congressional hearings on the adoption of the \textit{Federal Rules of Evidence}, former Supreme Court Justice Goldberg testified that the law of evidence is more substantive than procedural and falls within the domain of the legislature. \textit{See Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Spec. Subcomm. on Reform of Fed. Crim. Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 73, 142–46 (1973) (testimony of Hon. Arthur J. Goldberg).} On the other hand, Judge Maris, who had been involved in the formulation of the rules, testified that the lawyers, judges, and scholars who had worked on the rules were “fully satisfied that rules of evidence are . . . basically procedural, and . . . within the rule-making power of the Court.” \textit{Id.} at 76 (statement of Albert B. Maris). Legal scholars have written extensively on this substance-versus-procedure problem. \textit{See, e.g.,} Burbank, \textit{REA, supra} note 3, at 1187–88 (“Everybody knows that ‘procedure’ and ‘substance’ are elusive words that must be approached in context, and that there can be no one, indeed any, bright line to mark off their respective preserves.”); Carrington, \textit{supra} note 36, at 297–98 (characterizing Hanna’s “arguably procedural” test as a “false step” that had “led us off the trail with respect to the Court’s power to enact . . . law based on the broad penum-bra of the substance-procedure distinction”); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., \textit{Federalism and Federal Rule of Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82 Geo. L.J. 1781, 1781, 1797 (1984) (placing the substance/procedure boundary between rules “designed to affect conduct outside the courtroom” and rules designed “to enhance the accuracy of the fact finding process”); John Hart Ely, \textit{The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693 (1974); Charles Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429, 434 (1957) (arguing that court rules must “regulate the method of proving cases” and implicate “no other pol-icy . . . involving matters other than the orderly dispatch of judicial business”); Joiner & Miller, \textit{supra} note 87, at 629–30 (characterizing the procedure/sub-stance distinction as “a twilight zone of indefiniteness” and proposing a standard for distinguishing between the two); Levin & Amsterdam, \textit{supra} note 3, at 15 (describing the task of precisely locating the line between substance and procedure as “well-nigh impossible”); Edmund M. Morgan, \textit{Rules of Evidence-Substan-tive or Procedural, 10 VAND. L. Rev. 467, 468 (1957) (proposing that “rules which determine the legal relations between the parties when all the facts are known or assumed are rules of substance”); Riedl, \textit{supra} note 31, at 604 (arguing that “because of carelessness in the use of the terms . . . it is now impossible to determine what is meant by the terms ‘substantive law’ and ‘procedural law.’”); Olin Guy Welborn III, \textit{The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 371, 404 (1977) (suggesting, in the context of the rules of evidence, that “a rule is substantive . . . (a) if it has a nonprocedural purpose, or (b) even if its purposes are entirely procedural, if it is calculated to affect behavior at the planning as distinguished from the disputative stage of activity”).}
Of course, the inability to reach a consensus concerning what is procedural complicates the broader issue of which procedural powers are inherent to the courts. Ultimately, the substance/procedure divide that defines the outer limits of judicial rulemaking authority devolves into “a policy question where a series of arguments . . . must be weighed and balanced.”

4. Cases and Controversies

Article III of the United States Constitution gives the courts the power to pronounce the law only in a particular case or controversy. That power is “not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy.” Beyond this [the judicial power] does not extend, and unless it is asserted in a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution, the power to exercise it is nowhere conferred.

The inherent powers of federal courts are strictly tied to their adjudicative functions. While courts’ authority is not limited solely to adjudication, but includes certain ancillary functions incidental to the adjudicatory role, such as rulemaking and judicial administration that are essential if the courts are to carry out their constitutional mandate, the courts “cannot make substantive rules by any means other than writing opinions in ‘cases or controversies,’ without taking leave of [their] role as defined by Article III.”

Rulemaking is neither “part of the case adjudication process” nor “ancillary” to that process. Thus, to use the REA to make substantive policy would violate Article III. “[W]hen the Supreme Court makes law through supervisory court rules, it is engaged in an enterprise that, both practically and normatively, is different in important respects from the enterprise in which the Court, or any federal court, is engaged when it makes federal common law.” If substance and

125. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 527.
126. Weinstein, supra note 68, at 54.
129. See Wolf, supra note 6, at 518.
131. Carrington, supra note 36, at 287. Judge Weinstein has argued that the ban on advisory opinions also might vitiate judicial rulemaking authority because rulemaking authority represents a similar infringement on legislative power. See Weinstein, supra note 68, at 44–55.
132. See Redish, supra note 51, at 21.
133. See Carrington, supra note 36, at 287.
procedure are mutually exclusive,\textsuperscript{135} designating the procedural function of the REA in the first sentence excludes any ability to make substantive rules. Therefore, by shielding substantive rights from abridgment and modification, the REA expresses constitutional principles that derive from the case and controversy limitation of Article III.\textsuperscript{136}

Unlike state courts, federal courts are not common law courts.\textsuperscript{137} This distinction is important because the tradition that the details of legal procedure “for the most part of Anglo-American legal history had been left to rules of court”\textsuperscript{138} is a common law one.\textsuperscript{139}

B. Statutory and Due Process Requirements of Notice and Comment

The REA contemplates that committees of the Judicial Conference will propose rule changes to the Conference and that these proposals will be transmitted to the Supreme Court and then, if approved, to Congress.\textsuperscript{140} Pursuant to two provisions added in 1988 with the intent to open the rulemaking process to public scrutiny,\textsuperscript{141} the REA requires committees charged with rulemaking responsibility to hold their meetings in public—after public notice—to ensure that proposed rules are subject to comment before transmission.\textsuperscript{142}

*Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure* 57(a) and *Federal Rule of Civil Procedure* 83 implement the statutory proscriptions of § 2071 of the REA. Section 2071 authorizes district courts “to prescript rules for the conduct of their business . . . only after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment.”\textsuperscript{143} Rule 57 authorizes a majority of district judges to adopt, make, and amend local rules governing

\textsuperscript{135} See supra subsection III.A.3.
\textsuperscript{136} See Carrington, supra note 36, at 287. Carrington also argues that the REA’s supersession clause confirms the constitutional allocation of lawmaking and rulemaking authority to the legislative and judicial branches, respectively. See id. at 322–26.
\textsuperscript{137} See United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 697 n.9 (4th Cir. 1982).
\textsuperscript{139} See Wolf, supra note 6, at 525–26.
\textsuperscript{142} See U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1)–(2). The other changes that the 1988 legislation imposed repeated the emphasis on openness and accountability in the rulemaking process. Congress repealed the former REA and replaced it with separate sections, U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074, which were designed to open national rulemaking to public scrutiny and to give Congress a longer time period during which it could interrupt the rulemaking process. See Robel, supra note 10, at 1468.
\textsuperscript{143} 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a)–(b) (2006).
its practice only “after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment.”144

The statute requires advance notice of advisory committee meetings, written minutes, and explanatory and dissenting statements regarding proposed rule revisions, as well as an opportunity for the public to attend committee meetings. It does not, however, incorporate an opportunity to be heard,145 a traditional hallmark of procedural due process.146 The result is that, unlike in the context of administrative rulemaking, stakeholders in the judicial rulemaking process lack hearing and appeal rights.

Any court rule affecting a deprivation of property or liberty should trigger, at a minimum, the core procedural due process requirements of reasonable predeprivation notice to parties in interest and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.147 While the Advisory Committees, Standing Committees, and Judicial Conference148 responsible in the first instance for the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Civil Procedure, and Criminal Procedure follow these procedural requirements, district courts often do not follow them during the promulgation of their local rules and general orders, and, despite the relatively straightforward requirements laid out in the REA, there is

148. The United States Judicial Conference is made up of the Chief Justice and chief judges from each of the thirteen courts of appeal, the Chief Judge of the Court of International Trade, and twelve district judges chosen from each circuit by the judges of that circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006); A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A Report from the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 687 (1995) [hereinafter Self-Study]. District judges are selected by the circuit and district judges within their circuit and serve terms of three-to-five years. See U.S.C. § 331. Among other things, the Judicial Conference is tasked with reviewing the business of the federal courts, including review of rules of practice and procedure. See id. The Conference meets twice a year to “consider the administrative problems and policy issues affecting the federal judiciary and to make recommendations to Congress concerning legislation affecting the federal judicial system.” Self-Study, supra, at 687. It is expressly authorized to propose rules to the Supreme Court, but, as a practical matter, its proposals are nearly always vetted through the Standing Committee and the relevant advisory committee before transmission to the Supreme Court. Stancil, supra note 21, at 77 n.25. To date, it has empanelled advisory committees in connection with the rules of Appellate Procedure, Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence. Id. at 77 n.26.
little case law addressing when district courts must engage in notice
and comment rulemaking in the promulgation of their local rules. One of the few cases addressing the issue is United States v. Terry.149
In Terry, a single district judge had issued a general order regarding
the procedures for filing declarations in support of certain criminal
motions.150 Terry filed a criminal motion in violation of that general
order, but asserted that he had no notice (actual or constructive) of
the order.151 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found that the general order in question was subject to the notice and
comment provisions of Rule 57.152 The court held:

While we do not doubt the district court's power to regulate its practice in
criminal cases in a manner consistent with the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure and Local Rules, we find the notice of G.O. 384 was inadequate. In
Wardlow, we held that the district court properly denied a request for an evi-
dentiary hearing on a motion to suppress evidence because Wardlow forfeited
his right to an evidentiary hearing by not properly submitting a declaration
pursuant to a local rule. However, Wardlow is distinguishable in that, in this
case, the court relied on a General Order of which neither the defendant nor
his attorney had notice. We recognize that, in promulgating local rules, a dis-
trict court has “considerable latitude” in calibrating its public notice method
to the individual needs of its jurisdiction. However, G.O. 384, which was used
as a basis to deny Terry an evidentiary hearing, is a one-judge order posted on
the courthouse bulletin board and published in a local legal newspaper. Terry
and his attorney received no actual notice of G.O. 384. Therefore, the district
court abused its discretion in denying the motion to suppress without allowing
Terry an opportunity to present evidence.153

Terry appears at least to require some procedural due process protec-
tions when a district court promulgates a general order that concerns
practice requirements.

In Truesdale v. Moore,154 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered a challenge to an order adopted by its
Judicial Council. That order, which governed death-penalty represen-
tation within the circuit, had several purposes, one of which was chal-
enged in Truesdale:

Order No. 113 imposes on district courts and the circuit court a timetable for
deciding petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255 by defendants
who are under sentence of death. District courts are instructed to render a
decision and enter final judgment within 180 days of the date on which the
petition is filed, subject to an extension of up to thirty days if the court deter-
mines that justice so requires. The court of appeals is directed to render a
decision within 120 days of the date on which petitioner's reply brief is filed.
The court of appeals is also to rule on any petition for rehearing or suggestion
for rehearing en banc within thirty days of the date the petition or suggestion

149. 11 F.3d 110 (9th Cir. 1993).
150. Id. at 111–12.
151. Id. at 113.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 113 (citation omitted).
154. 142 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 1998).
is filed or the date a response thereto is filed, whichever is later. And if re-
hearing is granted, any hearing must be conducted and a final decision ren-
dered within 120 days of the entry of the order granting rehearing. If a case is 
not timely decided the Circuit Executive may seek an explanation of the rea-
sons why the court has not complied with the time limitations. One reasona-
ble explanation, for example, would be that a court needed to hold a case for a 
critical decision of the Supreme Court or the Fourth Circuit.155

Truesdale argued that the Judicial Council of the Fourth Circuit had 
violated 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1), which contains a notice and comment 
 provision similar to that contained in Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 57 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83. Specifically, 
§ 332(d)(1) requires that any rule or order “relating to practice and 
procedure shall be made or amended only after giving appropriate 
public notice and opportunity for comment.”156 The Truesdale court 
rejected the argument that Order No. 113 was invalid for failing to 
comply with the notice and comment requirement, reasoning:

In drafting and considering Order No. 113, the Judicial Council addressed a 
simple, internal problem: the delay within the Fourth Circuit in cases involv-
ing collateral review of capital sentences. The Council selected an internal 
solution to that problem and determined that no public notice and comment 
period were necessary. Order No. 113 imposes requirements on judges and 
courts within the Fourth Circuit. The order is not addressed to litigants or 
litigators, the usual focus of procedural rules. Nothing in the order alters any 
briefing or other deadlines placed on counsel. Nothing creates a right in any 
party to enforce the court’s internal deadlines. Thus Order No. 113 is not a 
rule of practice or procedure for which notice and comment are required.157

Truesdale, therefore, distinguished between purely internal, adminis-
trative rules and rules that “impact” upon litigants or litigators.

IV. CASE STUDY: COURTROOM SECURITY

On February 15, 2006, the judges of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of California (Eastern District) adopted 
General Order 441, which required, in pertinent part: “At initial ap-
pearances, all defendants will be fully shackled.”158 General Order 
441 was issued after having been adopted by an unidentified majority 
of the judges in the Eastern District.159 The order was signed by 
Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern District, David F.

155. Id. at 758.
157. Truesdale, 142 F.3d. at 760.
158. General Order No. 411 at 2, United States v. Evans, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56062 
(E.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 1:06-CR-00131 OWW). The judges of the Eastern District promulgated General Order 441 in light of and in putative compliance with United States v. Howard, 429 F.3d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing and vacat-
Levi, “for the Court.” The order defined “fully shackled” as “leg shackles, waist chains, and handcuffs.” In support of the policy, the judges of the Eastern District found that: (1) the United States Marshal for the Eastern District “recommend[ed] full shackling of all detained defendants at all proceedings in order to assure the safety of all persons in the courtroom, including the judge, lawyers, interpreters, court personnel, defendants, and the public”; (2) the Eastern District “ha[d] a heavy criminal caseload” that required “the movement of many detained prisoners in and out of the courtroom”; (3) “[m]ost criminal proceedings are brief such that the time in which a defendant [wa]s before the court fully shackled [wa]s minimal”; and (4) the alternatives to full shackling were not practical, would require greater numbers of deputy marshals with no significant increase in decorum or dignity for the defendant in a district in which the “resources of the Marshal service” were “finite” and “[u]nshackling all defendants for all proceedings would cause very considerable delays and would disrupt the operation . . . of the calendar court [and] potentially of all other courtrooms . . . to provide additional deputies necessary to assure security when defendants [we]re unshackled.”

Attached to General Order 441 was an “Open Letter to the Courts [of] the Eastern District of California” regarding “Restraint Issues concern[ing] prisoners in U.S. Courts” from Antonio C. Amador, United States Marshal, reflecting the belief of the United States Marshals Service (USMS) that “it [wa]s in the best interest to maintain the highest level of detainee security: such as, the uniform use of full restraints during all pretrial proceedings.” General Order 441 did not provide for any individualized determinations regarding the appropriateness of full body shackling.

General Order 441 was not adopted pursuant to notice and comment rulemaking. It was promulgated without a public hearing or any hearing at which sworn testimony or other evidence was taken or subject to cross-examination, without an opportunity for the affected parties to offer counter-evidence, and without any other meaningful review of the asserted rationality of the USMS policy, solely on the basis of the “open letter” to the judges from Marshal Amador, who was neither under oath nor subject to confrontation by an adverse party, which would not itself have been admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Instead, prior to its adoption, representatives of the

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160. *Id.* at *4.
161. *Id.* at *3–4.
162. *Id.* at *5.
163. *See United States v. Brandau,* 578 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2009).
165. *Federal Rule of Evidence* 101 dictates that the *Federal Rules of Evidence* govern proceedings in the courts of the United States and before the United States magistrate judges, to the extent and with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101. Rule
local Federal Defender’s Office and the local United States Attorney’s Office met with one magistrate judge and representatives of the local USMS, which ended in “an impasse on the [shackling] issue.” At no time did any affected pretrial arrestee have the opportunity to address the “evidence” offered by USMS or to offer additional evidence prior to the adoption of the policy.

The Eastern District is not alone in using local rules, general orders, or both to issue regulations relating to courtroom security. Courts have used general orders, for instance, to authorize maximum security measures in high-publicity cases.

1101 dictates that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply generally to criminal cases and proceedings, with the exception of a few specifically delineated miscellaneous proceedings. Rule 102 dictates that the Federal Rules of Evidence should be construed to secure, inter alia, fairness in administration, ascertainment of truth, and the just determination of proceedings.

The subsequent rule-based history of shackling in the Eastern District is tortured. On a consolidated appeal by several defendants from the magistrate’s shackling orders their cases, a judge of the Eastern District concluded that General Order No. 441 had not been promulgated with the appropriate public notice and comment rulemaking procedure. See id. at *56–57. He referred the General Order to all of the judges of the Eastern District for repromulgation. See Brandau, 578 F.3d at 1066. The Eastern District judges then issued General Order No. 449, adopting Local Rule Criminal 43-401, which set out a “new” shackling policy for initial appearances in the Sacramento and Fresno courthouses, and directing a period of public notice and comment. Id. The judges then vacated that Order and adopted modified rules twice more. Id. The present rule, announced in the second modification, General Order No. 465, applies only to the Sacramento courthouse and requires that “[u]nless the Court determines otherwise, at the commencement of initial appearances, all in custody defendants shall be in leg restraints (including waist chains).” Id. (alteration in original). The rule is different from General Order No. 441 in certain key respects: the present rule allows for the possibility of individualized determinations, applies only to in-custody defendants, and establishes a general practice of leg and waist shackling but not of handcuffing. Id. The new rule, however, does not apply to the courthouses in Fresno and Yosemite National Park. Id. General Order No. 465 was accompanied by written findings, which noted “the exclusion of the Fresno division from this policy” and explained that “each judge in that division is responsible for, and committed to the safety and decorum of the proceedings, and makes shackling decisions on individual cases in consultation with counsel, parties and the United States Marshal.” Id. at 1066–67. The findings further explain that General Order No. 465 does not apply at all to the courthouse in Yosemite “because of the type of facilities at [that] location[,] and because the security in [that] location[,] is provided by federal agencies other than the Marshal Service and whose primary functions do not include courtroom security.” Id. at 1067 (alteration in original).

See United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 526 (8th Cir. 1977) (reviewing a general order authorizing “the presence of five plain clothes United States Marshals in the courtroom, the posting of several Marshals outside the front doors of the courtroom and the use of an electronic metal detecting device on all spectators entering the courtroom”). See also United States v. Edwards, 235 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing a local court rule requiring that all exhibits be
V. THE PROBLEM

A local rule must be constitutional and rational, and its subject matter must be within the ambit of the court’s regulatory power. For separation of powers purposes, the REA codifies Congress’s legislative power to enact substantive laws and the federal judiciary’s judicial power to enact rules of practice and procedure for proceedings in its courts.

Unfortunately, many courts have erroneously viewed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 as a charter for local court procedural independence, causing one commentator to note that the goal of uniformity “has often been honored in the breach in practice in the federal trial districts.” Restricting the use of local rules was one of the purposes of the 1988 amendments to the REA. The amendments “set forth procedural requirements for courts to follow in adopting rules and provide an oversight mechanism to ensure their consistency with each other and with national rules.” Nonetheless, challenging local rules presents its own difficulties, particularly with the mechanisms presently available.

With regard to the shackling case study, on the one hand, the oversight of persons who are part of the judicial process has generally been accepted to be within the realm of judicial control, and the control of courtroom procedures is generally considered to be within the exclusive control of the courts. Courts have thus determined that they have the inherent power to adopt rules of conduct for judges, lawyers, and other court personnel. Some courts have gone so far as to say...
that the judiciary has the inherent power to control all practice and procedure within the courtroom. On the other hand, defendants are not judicial personnel. Statutes of limitation and speedy-trial rules are generally enacted by legislatures and legislative time limits for post-trial proceedings have been upheld as constitutional under the separation of powers doctrine.

In sum, it is not clear how far the inherent judicial rulemaking powers extend or whether, for example, they authorize the Eastern District to promulgate its court security rules as local rules. It appears that the adoption of some of these court security rules may exceed the rulemaking authority over those “matters of detail” contemplated by the federal rules of procedure, and these rules are often promulgated without prior notice and an opportunity for all affected parties to be heard. Local rules regarding the in-court shackling of defendants involve (or should involve) weighing a number of substantive policy considerations involving litigants and litigators as they appear in court, communicate, and conduct business concerning their rights and liberty and the demeanor, decorum, and appearance of fairness in the administration of criminal justice. While one would hope that the judges’ rulemaking decisions would reflect the various constituencies who use the courts, there is presently no requirement that they do so, and it is highly questionable whether local judicial rulemaking functions should include choosing between competing, and compelling, public values. The lack of the basic procedural protections of notice and comment rulemaking and the scope of the matters that these rules govern ought to render these local rules nullities and void for lack of due process, requiring a reviewing court to

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179. See Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993).
182. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562–63 (1974); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 831 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Hawaii’s system for classified and treating sex offenders violated Neal’s right to “minimum due process protections” because it resulted in his being labeled a “sex offender” when he never had prior notice and “an opportunity to formally challenge the imposition of the ‘sex offender’ label in an adversarial setting”). “When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–70 (footnote omitted). Notice must be “reasonably
order them rescinded. Of course, these rules are standing orders applicable in all cases; they are not the result of individual adjudications and so do not fall under the courts’ jurisdiction to resolve cases and controversies. On the contrary, they were promulgated in a way that avoided challenge in an individual case. In other words, a good argument could be made that these court-made regulations are more than merely procedural rulemaking, since they do not directly affect a core function of courts, but rather affect the substantive rights of the parties.

There is already a body of scholarly literature critiquing the promulgation of local rules on the ground that they pose a threat to the goal of uniform, simple rules of federal practice, particularly when they are inconsistent with the national rules or that they involve subject matter that is not appropriate for judicial rulemaking. After all, it is well-known that “substance” often gets packaged as “procedure,” in what commentators have described as “substantive considerations secreted in procedural interstices.” The problem that this Article addresses is a different one, essentially one of venue and standing: To whom does a litigant make the argument that a court-made rule is inappropriate, either in substance or procedure, and which litigants can? These questions are particularly acute in the case of courtroom security rules, since judges are not only the makers of the rules, but also their primary intended beneficiary. Nonetheless, cases and commentary are almost entirely devoid of answers to these questions.

calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the tendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

183. Cf. Guenther v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that a party’s due process rights would be infringed if they were “unfairly prejudiced” by ex parte communication).

184. The core functions of courts have been defined as: “(1) protection of constitutional rights; (2) determination of controversies between parties, including construing constitutional and statutory provisions; and (3) enforcement of final judgments.” Wolf, supra note 6, at 534.


186. See Robert N. Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study on the Need for Reform of the Rules Enabling Acts, 63 IOWA L. REV. 15, 52 (1977) (arguing that some rule amendments have pushed “the rulemaking process into controversial, uncharted areas of law and thus have been affecting the rights of litigants in a fashion more likely to create the kind of pressure from the public and the legal profession that generates congressional response”).

187. Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 19.
A. Judicial Legislation Subject to Judicial Review

One of the problems with the statutory and constitutional allocation of rulemaking authority to the courts is that it is enforced by the judicial-review process, which is supposed to ensure that the rulemaking allocation is not transgressed when the courts exercise their rulemaking power. Unlike administrative rulemaking, however, judicial rulemaking is not subject to judicial review—at least not in the APA sense.

An even more fundamental problem is that, to the extent that court-made rules are reviewed, they are reviewed by the same courts that have promulgated them in the first place. Procedurally, the present system permits local rules regulating practice to be both adopted and reviewed by local judges, at least at the first instance, in their own courts. In other words, if a litigant challenges a local dis-

188. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 1330.
189. The APA governs judicial review of administrative agency actions generally. Once primary authority for a matter has been placed in agency hands, the judicial role becomes one of oversight, and § 706(2) of the APA sets the general standards for performing that role. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006):

To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall—

(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.

In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.

191. See Coleman, supra note 74, at 287 n.167 (“[I]n thinking of judicial review, it would be odd for the Court to review its own originally drafted rules and amendments.”); Yeazell, supra note 3, at 250–51 (noting that one advantage to taking judges out of the rulemaking process would be that the Supreme Court could more legitimately give the rules “judicial review” because it would no longer hesitate to act for or against a rule because of the pressure that comes with the rule having been created by its “brethren”).
district court rule as being beyond the scope of the court’s power to promulgate, a judge on that same court would ordinarily review that challenge. The Supreme Court has the ultimate responsibility of deciding whether a rule, on its face or as applied, violates the REA and its prohibition against rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” As other commentators have noted, however, the Supreme Court has never held any Rule to violate the REA.

Substantively, rulemaking also involves policy decisions. The current system permits these policy decisions to be made in the first instance and presumably reviewed in the second by unelected federal judges. In other words, courts are tasked with determining whether their own rules are the result of reasoned decision making. The result is that this judicial review of judicial rulemaking entirely removes both the substance and the procedure of the rules being promulgated (i.e., “justice”) from the domain of politics and the public discussion. This self-review problem is then compounded by the doctrine of precedent, which complicates error correction at a later stage of review. As one commentator has explained: “Constitutional democracy is based in no small part on the insistence that no one can be trusted with unrestrained power.”

194. This is not to suggest that Congress has no power to engage in its own review of court-promulgated rules, see, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (“Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution.”), although the scope of that power is the subject of a great deal of scholarly debate. For the purpose of this Article, it suffices to say that, historically, Congress has not exercised its powers of review and intervention over court rules often, see Burbank, REA, supra note 3, at 1018 (describing the “long-enduring pattern of congressional acquiescence” to rules adopted by the Court), and it is impractical to expect that it would do so in the context of any objectionable local district court rule, particularly one that does involve a high-profile issue. See Pound, supra note 3, at 602 (“Legislatures today are so busy, the pressure of work is so heavy, the demands of legislation in matters of state finance, of economic and social legislation, and of provision for the needs of a new urban and industrial society are so multifarious, that it is idle to expect legislatures to take a real interest in anything so remote from newspaper interest, so technical, and so recondite as legal procedure.”).
195. See McConnell, supra note 17, at 105–06. In this context, the practice of following precedent can have drawbacks, if it prevents courts from adjusting rules to meet new conditions. The relative advantages and disadvantages of a doctrine of precedent, however, are beyond the scope of this Article.
196. Id. at 91.
B. Bias, the Appearance of Partiality, and Recusal

As other commentators have noted, when judges rather than lawyers frame the rules of court, they open themselves to the perception of partiality, in light of their self-interest in the substantive outcome of such rules.197 Frederick Schauer has argued, in the context of adjudicatory rules, that the courts' need to resolve concrete disputes generates cognitive biases that distort judicial development of legal rules.198 These concerns are even more prescient in the context of codified rule promulgation, which is not bound by precedent199 or ana-

197. Yeazell, supra note 3, at 240; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 627, 631–32 (1994) (arguing that the possibility that judges seek to maximize self-interest is “particularly valid in the context of a discussion about procedural rules” because they are “promulgated under the direction of judges”). But see Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647 (1994) (disputing many of Macey’s contentions about judicial self-interest).


Whether courts are, in fact, constrained by precedent rules is a subject of much debate. See Schauer, supra, at 185–87 (discussing precedent rules implicit in judicial opinions); Frederick Schauer, Prescriptions in Three Dimensions, 82 IOWA L. REV. 911, 916–18 (1997) (suggesting that rules need not be canonical in order to be determinate). Most notably, legal realists are known for their skepticism about the ability of rules to constrain decisionmaking. See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra, at 66–69 (discussing the malleability of precedent rules); see also Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 50–53 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005) (identifying skepticism about the constraint of rules as part of the legal realism school). For counterarguments in favor of the capacity of rules to carry determinate meaning, see Schauer, supra, at 53–62 (defending a theory of
logical reasoning. Judicial domination of court rulemaking presents a significant risk of self-dealing because “judges face at least some incentive to pursue rules that . . . may be contrary to congressional intent, but attractive to the judiciary for other reasons.”

Semantic autonomy); Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 568–70, 607–21 (1993) (defending certain qualified understandings of the objectivity of law). This is not an issue that this Article seeks to resolve. For the purposes of this Article, it suffices simply to say that courts generally view themselves as bound to follow precedents in adjudication of disputes and, consequently, that they regularly study prior opinions in search of applicable rules, and that this attention to precedent can help correct bias at the time judges first consider and announce rules because judges who believe that they must take precedent into account will feel obliged to review prior opinions with care before deciding a case and preparing an explanatory opinion. See Emily Sherwin, Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 919, 925–26 (2006).

200. “Analogy is a method of decision when no precedent rule applies (or perhaps when a judge wishes to avoid a seemingly applicable rule by narrowing its scope).” Sherwin, supra note 199, at 927. The analogical practitioner studies an array of intuitively related cases and “abduces” criteria that make them relevantly similar or different. See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 925, 962–63 (1996) (describing the process of drawing an “analogy-warranting rule” from the facts of prior cases as “abduction”). The practitioner “then decides the case at hand in a manner that conforms to the outcomes of prior cases classed as similar.” Sherwin, supra note 199, at 927. One effect of the practice of analogical reasoning is to narrow the scope of judicial lawmaking. See id. at 929. “The rules and reasons courts cite in support of analogies tend to operate at a low level of generality.” Id.” Thus, the perceived obligation to draw analogies helps to keep judicial lawmaking incremental. Of course, incremental lawmaking does not in itself counteract situational biases; in fact, it may exacerbate the bias by narrowing the scope of the court’s inquiry.” Id. But it can minimize the harm done when bias distorts judicial reasoning. See Schauer, supra note 199, at 186 (noting that, even without authoritative precedent, judges who search for analogies remain constrained by the “existing linguistic and conceptual structure”). For more on the subject of analogical reasoning, see Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 199, at 128–35 (assessing the advantages and disadvantages of analogical reasoning and concluding that it can only be justified on “second-best” grounds); Steven J. Burton, An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning 27–41 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the three steps of analogical reasoning: identifying an authoritative precedent, assessing factual similarities and differences from the precedent case, and judging whether the similarities or differences are more important); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 1–6 (1949) (explaining that legal reasoning primarily consists of “reasoning by example” on a case-by-case basis); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 62–100 (1996) (arguing that courts are drawn to analogical reasoning largely because analogies do not require completely theorized agreements); Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 57, 80–86 (1996) (arguing that analogical reasoning entrenches the erroneous outcomes of past decisions); Brewer, supra, at 925–29, 962–63 (delineating a three-step model of analogical reasoning and claiming that analogical reasoning can produce results with rational force).

201. Stancil, supra note 21, at 100.
concern that has been expressed is that the result of this will be the creation of procedural rules by insulated judges acting on their own prejudices.\textsuperscript{202}

This Article is concerned with a related but different question: Whether it is improper for a judge who participated in promulgating a local rule to sit in judgment over the validity of that rule when it is challenged in a specific case after adoption. As Judge Weinstein has noted: “One matter of some concern [is] the ability of any court to remain impartial in its consideration of a rule when an attack was made upon the rule’s wisdom or constitutionality, since the same body that promulgated the rule was passing upon it.”\textsuperscript{203}

28 U.S.C. § 47 (2006) provides: “No judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.”\textsuperscript{204} While the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to construe § 47, it has strictly construed its predecessor, the Judiciary Act of 1891. In \textit{Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.},\textsuperscript{205} the Court held:

\begin{quote}
The terms of the statute . . . are both direct and comprehensive. Its manifest purpose is to require that the circuit court of appeals be composed in every hearing of judges none of whom will be in the attitude of passing upon the propriety, scope, or effect of any ruling of his own made in the progress of the cause in the court of first instance, and to this end the disqualification is made to arise, not only when the judge has tried or heard the whole cause in the court below, but also when he has tried or heard any question therein which it is the duty of the circuit court of appeals to consider and pass upon.\textsuperscript{206}
\end{quote}

In \textit{Moran v. Dillingham},\textsuperscript{207} the Court explained:

\begin{quote}
The intention of congress in enacting that no judge before whom “a cause or question may have been tried or heard” in a district or circuit court, “shall sit on the trial or hearing of such cause or question” in the circuit court of appeals, manifestly, was to require that court to be constituted of judges uncommitted and uninfluenced by having expressed or formed an opinion in the court of first instance. . . .

The enactment, alike by its language and by its purpose, is not restricted to the case of a judge’s sitting on a direct appeal from his own decree upon a
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{202} \textit{Weinstein, supra} note 68, at 8–11, 54–55.


\textsuperscript{204} \textit{See, e.g.}, \textit{Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.}, 431 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1970) (Craven, J.) (disqualifying himself as a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the hearing and disposition of an appeal of desegregation orders issued by the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina because, as a district judge in the same district, he had heard and determined a case involving the same parties and ultimate question relating to the sufficiency of the school board’s actions in complying with the constitutional requirements of desegregation).

\textsuperscript{205} 228 U.S. 339 (1913).

\textsuperscript{206} \textit{Id.} at 343–44 (citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{207} 174 U.S. 153 (1899).
whole cause, or upon a single question. . . . [A] judge who has once heard the cause upon its merits in the court of first instance is certainly disqualified from sitting in the circuit court of appeals on the hearing and decision of any question in the same cause which involves in any degree matter upon which he had occasion to pass in the lower court.208


(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
   (1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
   (2) Where . . . the judge . . . has been a material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
   (3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity has participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
   (4) He knows that he . . . has . . . any . . . interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding . . . .

(d) For the purposes of this section. . . . "proceeding" includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation. . . .

"The statute imposes a self-enforcing duty on the judge."209 Under § 455(a), a judge "does not have to be subjectively biased or prejudiced, so long as he appears to be so."210 Section 455 requires not only that judges be subjectively confident of their ability to be even-handed, but

208. Id. at 156–57 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 827).
209. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553 n.2 (1994). The "extrajudicial-source" doctrine, which the Supreme Court explored in great detail in Liteky, finds its origins in earlier recusal cases, including United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, (1966), which involved 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2006) (requiring recusal of a judge, upon motion, for bias or prejudice). Grinnell held that "[t]he alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case." Id. at 583. See United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that "[r]ecusal is required only if the bias or prejudice stems from an extrajudicial source and not from conduct or rulings made during the course of proceedings." (quoting Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1991))).

Liteky applied the extrajudicial-source doctrine to § 455, but clarified that the existence of an "extrajudicial source" was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for "bias or prejudice" recusal. The presence of an extrajudicial source is not sufficient on its own, because "some opinions acquired outside the context of judicial proceedings (for example, the judge's view of the law acquired in scholarly reading) will not warrant recusal." Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554. Neither Liteky nor any other case further distinguishes between the types of extrajudicial information that would demand recusal and those that would not.

The presence of information from an extrajudicial source is not a necessary condition for recusal because bias could also exist "in the rarest of circumstances" where no extrajudicial source is involved if the judge displayed "deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible." Id. at 556.
also that an informed, rational, objective observer would not doubt the judges' impartiality.\footnote{211} That is true because § 455(a) concerns not only fairness to individual litigants, but also the public's confidence in the federal judiciary, which may be irreparably harmed if a case is allowed to proceed before a judge who appears to be tainted.\footnote{212} "[T]he test under either subsection (a) or (b) is the same, namely, whether or not given all the facts of the case there are reasonable grounds for finding that the judge could not try the case fairly, either because of the appearance or the fact of bias or prejudice."\footnote{213}

\footnote{211}{Bernard v. Coyne, 31 F.3d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 1994).}
\footnote{212}{Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859–60 (1988); see also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (holding that the right to trial by an impartial judge "is a basic requirement of due process"); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (explaining that the Court must guard against district judges "sitting themselves in judgment upon misconduct of counsel where the contempt charged is entangled with the judge's personal feeling against the lawyer").}
\footnote{213}{Conforte, 624 F.2d at 881. See In re Kensington Int'l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a federal judge hearing consolidated bankruptcy cases was irreversibly tainted, warranting disqualification from some of the cases, by a structural conflict of interest arising from the judge's extensive ex parte discussions with two neutral advisors that covered all of the major issues in the consolidated cases, including one advisor's drafting of legal opinions, and from extensive and substantive ex parte meetings with the parties, which added to the appearance of partiality); Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a federal district judge should have recused himself, sua sponte, from presiding over the adjudication of a habeas corpus petition challenging a state-court trial and conviction over which he presided in his former capacity as a state-court judge); In re Brooks, 383 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that a special master, who had been appointed in connection with underlying litigation relating to mismanagement of Indian trust accounts, should have been recused from contempt proceedings brought against various government employees because the special master's tasks in the underlying litigation resulted in numerous ex parte communications with witnesses and third parties, the special master's tasks in the contempt proceedings were adjudicative in nature, and the nature and extent of the special master's ex parte contacts would have caused an informed observer reasonably to question his impartiality); Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court clearly erred in appointing a Court Monitor as a Special Master-Monitor where his numerous ex parte communications and his significant prior knowledge obtained as Court Monitor, on the basis of which he had formed and expressed opinions of continuing relevance to the litigation, cast doubt on his impartiality); Edgar v. K.L., 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that a judge's actions in meeting, ex parte, with a panel of experts that he had appointed to investigate Illinois's mental-health institutions and programs, in order to receive a preview of the panel's conclusions, was grounds for disqualification and that prohibiting opposing counsel from discovering what was said in the meetings resulted in unauthorized private investigation by the judge raising concerns about the judge's impartiality); United States v. Arnpriester, 37 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a district judge could not adjudicate a case since, while serving as an Assistant United States Attorney, he had been responsible for the investigation leading to the defendant's indictment); United States v. Winston, 613 F.2d 221, 222 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding...}
The common gravamen of the cases interpreting § 47 and § 455 is that, when a court has been privy to ex parte communications and deliberations that affected a prior decision, that court is disqualified from ruling on the same issue(s) when it is raised in a subsequent proceeding. This is because such a ruling would constitute a determination of “an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by” that court, in violation of § 47, because the court’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned” in the subsequent proceeding, in violation of § 455(a), or because the prior ex parte communication would imbue the court with “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding,” render the court “a material witness concerning” the matter in controversy, or provide the court with an “interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the [subsequent] proceeding,” in violation of § 455(b).

The process by which many of these local court rules are issued, as well as the practice of courts reviewing the local rules that they have issued, gives rise to a structural conflict of interest in having any district judge of the promulgating district review a challenge to the promulgation and enforcement thereof. The result of the typical judicial rulemaking process is that each of the district judges possess two types of extrajudicial information that warrant their recusal: (1) knowledge of the procedural history of the promulgation of the local rule; and (2) knowledge of the substantive necessity of the rule beyond that set forth in the written record of adjudication.

Unfortunately, there is very little case law addressing this type of extrajudicial-source bias in the context of the promulgation of local court rules that are subsequently challenged. In a typical recusal case, the recused judge was previously involved in the individualized application of the law to a particular party. An analogous, although not entirely parallel, situation to a district judge evaluating the legality of a local district rule would be if a legislator voted for a piece of legislation and was then appointed to a court hearing challenges to

that the district judge was not required to recuse himself merely because he had received a psychiatric report of a codefendant and had found the codefendant incompetent to stand trial. Edgar relied upon two additional cases that are informative: In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992) and Hathcock v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 53 F.3d 36, 41 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1995). The judge in School Asbestos Litigation had attended a partisan workshop covering material that was the subject of a key merits issue in an ongoing case, 977 F.2d at 770, while the judge in Hathcock made a speech to a Trial Lawyer’s Association seminar containing remarks that were “pointedly hostile toward defendants” while a jury trial on the issue of damages was pending before him. Hathcock, 53 F.3d at 39. Even though the seminar and the speech were not directly connected with the ongoing litigation, the events were open to the public, and evidence could be taken about the proceedings, they were still grounds for mandatory recusal as they indicated the judges' bias or inclination for or against a particular party on substantive legal issues.
the constitutionality of that same statute. The problem, however, is that there is no case law squarely deciding that such former legislator could not rule on the constitutionality of such legislation.

Nonetheless, many of the circumstances found problematic in cases like Edgar v. K.L., In re Kensington, In re School Asbestos Litigation, and Hathcock v. Navistar are present in the context of judicial review of judicially created rules. If nothing else, all of the judges who participated in the promulgation of these rules were likely privy to ex parte communications regarding their necessity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that recusal was warranted on appeal of the Eastern District's court-promulgated shackling policy:

On remand, the consolidated case—which challenges the constitutionality of a rule promulgated by the judges of the Eastern District, as well as their very authority to promulgate it—shall be assigned to an out-of-district judge. Although we do not suggest that there is any actual bias on the part of the judges, our ethics rules require recusal where a judge's impartiality "might reasonably be questioned." Here, the circumstances surrounding adoption of these orders suggest that an objective observer might reasonably question the impartiality of the judges.

What is noteworthy about the Ninth Circuit's remand order in Brandau, however, is not its analysis, which is insightful, but its anomalousness. In finding that a judge of the district that promulgated a local rule could not adjudicate the constitutionality of that rule, much less that all of the judges of the district should be treated as parties in any subsequent proceedings, the Ninth Circuit cited no apposite precedent, either controlling or persuasive, for its holding, and the author of this Article could find none.

C. Standing, Scope, and Standard of Review

In the context of administrative rulemaking, the Supreme Court has clearly interpreted constitutional and statutory standing requirements, enabling a wide variety of stakeholders to seek judicial review of agency rules. By contrast, there is little case law governing who

214. See supra, note 213 and accompanying text.
215. United States v. Brandau, 578 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006)). In remanding the case for further proceedings, the court of appeals suggested that the district judges who had promulgated the local rule in question could "retain separate [from the United States Attorney's Office] counsel to represent their interests at that proceeding" so that they could "intervene in the proceedings" or "file an amicus brief." Id.
216. See, e.g., Ass'n of Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–53 (1970) (holding that a plaintiff could satisfy the Article III case or controversy requirement by alleging that the "challenged action caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise" or by seeking to protect an interest that was "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question").
has standing to challenge court rules—for example, what injury an individual must suffer as a result of a judicially created rule to give rise to a case or controversy that a reviewing court could decide. In the Brandau case, the Government sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to dismiss Brandau’s challenge to the shackling rule at issue on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge it.\textsuperscript{217}

The same lack of governing case law exists for the scope and standard of a court’s review of a court-created rule—for example, if a court refused to adopt a rule, whether such action would be reviewable at all and, if so, how much deference the reviewing court would be required to give either to a court-created rule or to the lack thereof. In the context of administrative rulemaking, courts generally answer these rules by interpreting the legislative intent of Congress in delegating the rulemaking power in the first instance.\textsuperscript{218} Because the text of the REA is silent on this issue and neither the legislative history nor the statutory structure gives any suggestion of the answer to these questions,\textsuperscript{219} however, courts have not answered these questions in the context of judicial rulemaking. While courts’ review of agency rulemaking roughly follows the same general approach as they have followed for judicial review of adjudication,\textsuperscript{220} they have not addressed the question of whether this framework should also apply to the review of court-made rules or how much deference they should give to the decisions of judicial rulemakers. The purpose of judicial review of agency rules is to allow courts to determine whether they are consistent with the legislative intent behind the statute enabling them.\textsuperscript{221} The purpose of judicial review of judicial rules is unclear, most importantly the question of how much deference a reviewing court should give to a promulgating court’s rulemaking (particularly when that promulgation might have been its own).

\begin{footnotes}
\item[217] See Brandau, 378 F.3d at 1067–69.
\item[218] See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (announcing the two-part test for judicial review of administrative agency rulemaking delegated by Congress through enabling statutes). When courts review agency adjudication, if Congress’s intent is clear, the issue is a question of law that is reviewable de novo. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947) (upholding judicial enforcement of an NLRB order requiring Packard to bargain with a union); see also NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951) (finding that the definition of a “union” was a question of law reviewable de novo by the courts). When Congress’s intent is unclear, the issue becomes a mixed question of law and fact, and courts must defer to the agency’s decision-making. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
\item[219] This is likely because the statute seeks largely to codify the vague mandate of Article III and the inherent rulemaking powers that courts had at common law.
\item[221] See id. at 864–65 (proposing that judicial review should be thought of as a way to compensate for limitations in the performance of other branches of government).
\end{footnotes}
VI. CONCLUSION

When reorganizing government just before the Revolution, the predominant concern of Americans had been freeing legislative and judicial power from executive control. The judiciary was not yet clearly conceptualized as a distinct branch of government. Rather, the administration of justice was commonly conflated with the executive power. The power of adjudication implicated the Crown fully because colonial judges served at the King’s pleasure and the Privy Council was the court of last resort for the colonists. When the colonies turned to creating the first wave of new constitutions, their focus was on curbing the magistracy and establishing the broad scope of legislative power. Judges were freed from the power of the governor, but subjected in substantial measure to legislative supervision.222

Historically, the Supreme Court has been more willing to assert its inherent rulemaking authority in the context of the promulgation of rules governing criminal, rather than civil, proceedings,223 asserting a “supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.”224 There is no reason for this greater willingness in Article III, the REA, or logic.


223. Robel, supra note 10, at 1478; see Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 382–83 (2003) (exercising inherent supervisory authority to establish a procedural rule requiring a district court to notify a pro se litigant about the consequences of recharacterizing a prisoner’s post-trial motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus before doing so); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 455 U.S. 858, 878–79 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (urging the Court to exercise its inherent authority to impose a standard regarding the detention of deportable aliens who are material witnesses in criminal cases); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190–92 (1981) (exercising inherent authority to establish a procedural rule requiring district courts to inquire into racial prejudice during voir dire when there is a possibility that racial prejudice could influence the jury); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463–64 (1969) (exercising inherent authority to establish a procedural rule entitling a defendant to vacate a guilty plea if the district court accepted it in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11); Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 199 (1943) (exercising inherent authority to prohibit comment on a criminal defendant’s refusal to testify). But see Thiel v. S. Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946) (requiring, under the Court’s “power of supervision over the administration of justice in the federal courts,” that federal civil juries be chosen from a cross-section of the community in order to preserve the integrity of the federal courts’ processes).

224. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (asserting the power to supervise lower federal courts by devising procedures for them not otherwise required by the Constitution or statute and ordering the suppression of McNabb’s confession in his federal murder trial because it resulted from a coercive delay in presenting him before a magistrate judge after his arrest). Adjudicatory supervisory authority and the authority to promulgate codified rules are, or should be, distinct concepts. See Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court...
The framers saw the separation of powers as a protection of civil rights. In arguing against amending the Constitution to include enumerated rights, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the Constitution without a bill of rights is "in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS."225 Under the separation of powers doctrine, any regulation is permissible unless it is prohibited by proper legal action. The Constitution authorizes the government to regulate only in one way—"through a legislative process structured to minimize prohibitions for factional purposes."226

Judicial rulemaking sacrifices many of the protections of the full legislative process, particularly the requirement of action by three distinct institutions. Rather than the typical separation of powers ques-

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226. Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers, supra note 12, at 381.
tion of delegation, however, judicial rulemaking gives rise to the opposite question of usurpation. Article III does not speak to the federal courts’ rulemaking authority, and the cases dealing with congressional delegations of power and modification of federal court jurisdiction are largely unavailing in resolving the issue of judicial usurpation of rulemaking power.227

In enacting substantive local rules, federal courts are exercising powers constitutionally committed to Congress and thereby impeding sufficient independent review of such exercises.228 The result is a diffusion of responsibility: “Because so many people and so many layers are involved in rulemaking, in a broader sense, no one is in charge.”229 As Stephen Carter has aptly explained: “The entire point of a constitution that governs structure is to enable government to function while restraining the ability of government to restructure itself.”230

227. There is a significant line of decisions dealing with problems of the scope of Article III case and controversy judicial power. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63–76 (1982) (discussing judicial power in terms of the types of cases and controversies the Framers assigned to an independent Article III branch and the three situations where Article III does not bar creation of legislative courts or delegations to administrative agencies). These cases typically involve an issue concerning congressional delegation to a legislative court or administrative agency that allegedly transgresses the scope of Article III jurisdiction by conferring judicial powers on persons lacking Article III independence. See id. at 64–70. In Northern Pipeline, for example, supporters of the Bankruptcy Act argued that, since Article I empowered Congress to create legislative courts, it could have thus “constituted” the bankruptcy courts as their equivalents. Id. at 63. The Court, however, rejected this assertion. It viewed situations allowing Article III creation of legislative courts as “exceptional” and grounded in constitutional text or in historical consensus. Id. at 68–70. “The Court has never considered rulemaking authority per se to be an attribute of the judicial power under Article III.” Robel, supra note 10, at 1481 n.221. These cases, therefore, provide problematic analogies for construing judicial rulemaking beyond the scope of explicitly delegated powers, which does not create a legislative court nor delegate power to an administrative agency.

228. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment on the Burger Court’s Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1110–11 (1987) (suggesting that the Court focus on three inquiries in evaluating separation of powers issues: whether one branch is exercising powers constitutionally committed to another, preventing another from performing its functions or duties, or acting in a manner that prevents sufficient review or control by another, or both). “Of course, if Congress cares enough about a given procedural change, it can always act directly to amend the relevant rules by statute.” Stancil, supra note 21, at 128 n.167. This Article leaves for others the explanation of why relying on Congress to undo ill-advised court rules is an inadequate remedy.

229. Yeazell, supra note 3, at 231.