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# Interrogation of Albert Speer and Members of the Former Reich Ministry of Armaments and War Production

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
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INTERROGATION OF ALBERT SPEER AND MEMBERS OF THE  
FORMER REICH MINISTRY OF ARMAMENTS AND WAR PRODUCTION

Reported By:

Brigadier Fulton, C.I.O.S.  
Lt. Col. McKenzie, C.I.O.S.  
Major Blunden, C.I.O.S.



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APPENDIX "L"

Evaluation Report No. 53 (L)  
20 July 1945

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SUB-COMMITTEE

INTERROGATION OF ALBERT SPEER AND MEMBERS OF THE  
FORMER REICH MINISTRY OF ARMAMENTS AND WAR PRODUCTION

(Target No. 28/5.01)

REPORT NO. 12, based on the interrogation of ALBERT SPEER,  
held at 14:30 - 16:00 hours, Monday, 11 June 1945

SUBJECT: General Policy on Production and on Research  
and Development.

Question No. 1. How was payment of Contractors to Organization  
Todt made?

Answer: In most cases both inside and outside GERMANY  
tenders were called for and "firm price" quoted.  
Payment was made on a contract basis.

Exceptions to this scheme occurred mainly in  
connection with work on the eastern front,  
where due to urgency and small nature of the  
separate works the nearest available contractor  
was directed to the work. Payment cost plus  
50% to 60% of labour costs to -

- (a) remunerate the contractor
- (b) cover overhead and depreciation

Materials were provided by O.T.

This cost plus basis was more expedient but also  
more expensive than the normal contract basis.

This system was not as remunerative as it may  
appear because labour costs were low and the  
total cost of works in most cases small.

German Contractors in foreign countries wore  
O.T. uniform and held O.T. rank, but were paid  
privately by their firms.

Question No. 2. Has Dr. SPEER any knowledge of "Adrena"?

Answer: No; but he knows it has been abandoned in favour  
of the "Hollerith" process. SPEER thinks there  
may be some of the Adrena machines in use in  
industry, but he did not know where.

Question No. 3. What is the Inspection Organization in GERMANY?

Answer: SPEER indicated (a) That it was separately con-  
trolled by each of the services. so independent  
were these separate organizations that if one  
manufacturer was making equipment for more than  
one service the respective services were all  
represented in the factory.

(b) The Chief of the Army Inspection Organization was Col. JUSTROW who was responsible to the Herreswaffenamt (Army Weapon Office). He did not know who controlled Navy and Air Force, but stated that SAUR and MILCH should be able to give the appropriate information.

(c) There was no official relaxation of standards during the war. However, SPEER found during visits to the front that officers expressed the views that the quality of equipment was deteriorating.

(d) SPEER knew nothing of statistical quality control being employed but stated that SAUR may know something about this.

Question No. 4. Did the SPEER Organization carry out any re-conditioning of Service equipment?

Answer: No; but SPEER was anxious to take over responsibility in this direction. The reason for the failure of some such scheme was due to opposition by the Army. This was due primarily to the fixed policy of the High Command to issue 90% of all new equipment to newly raised units and only 10% to troops at battle station. Army opinion as a whole was thus afraid that if front line units relased their equipment rearward of their own base workshops replacements would never be effected.

Question No. 5. Research and Development; what is general policy

Answer: SPEER was of the opinion that the two mainstays of German research were -

(a) High School and Universities; latterly coordinated by Dr. Osenberg.

(b) Industry: He clearly distinguished between Research and Development. The latter is carried out also very largely by industry but also by service establishments. The Army had only one such establishment - Peenemuende. The Navy had a technical "K" Section and Submarine and Torpedo Establishments.

Question No. 6 In view of the above statement on the almost complete control of Development of Army Equipment by Industry, how was the interchange of information on defects and performance between the factory and the field carried out?

Answer: SPEER stated that there was practically no exchange of such information and he considered this a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. He gave specific instance of how, when he was visiting the front, German units were suggesting modifications to Radar Equipment to improve its effectiveness against British bombers.

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The suggested modifications were transmitted rearward through normal channels to High Command level, and thence down the scale again to SPEER. This information finally reached him 2-3 months after he had first heard about it in the field.

In general, no representative of the manufacturer was permitted to go to the field. The whole problem of operational research and introduction of progressive modifications was in SPEER's words "a tinkering business"

SPEER agreed to prepare a "recherche" on his views of Organization of Research and Development on a national basis.

Question No. 7. Does standardization in production produce sterilization?

Answer: It may in time, but in GERMANY, not for a very long time. SPEER appeared to think that German Production methods and design details were so varied that much could have been done to improve production and equipment by standardization.

11 June 1945

Brigadier Fulton, C.I.O.S.  
Lt. Col. McKenzie, C.I.O.S.  
Major Blunden, C.I.O.S.

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APPENDIX "M"

Evaluation Report 53 (M)  
20 July 1945

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SUB-COMMITTEE

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INTERROGATION OF ALBERT SPEER, FORMER REICH MINISTER OF  
ARMAMENTS AND WAR PRODUCTION

(Target No. 28/5.01)

Report No. 13 of 20 June 1945.

SUBJECT: SPEER MINISTRY PERSONNEL.

Below is a "Who's Who" of the SPEER Ministry and its affiliated agencies which has been translated from an original prepared by Albert SPEER himself during the first CIOS interrogations. It contains the names of personnel whom SPEER regards as particularly knowledgeable on the various subjects which were touched upon during the preliminary interrogation. Present whereabouts of the individuals concerned, to the extent that they were known to him, are shown in the list. SPEER supplied brief characteristics of each individual. It will be seen that these judgments, in most cases, refer to their performance while employed under SPEER, rather than to their value as sources of information.

SPEER placed asterisks against the names of those individuals who, in his view, would be of immediate value for interrogation.

PLANUNGSAMT

(Planning Department)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION OR FIELD</u>	<u>LOCALITY</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
* <u>KEHRL</u>	(Head)	Probably in BERLIN, possibly Ludwigslust c/o R.V. KOHLE*)	
* <u>Oberst STOLL</u>	(Deputy)	Not Known	Diligent, but only third rate.
* <u>KISTER</u>	(Ministerialrat)	" "	Very good, fast worker.
* <u>WAGENFUEHR</u>	(Chief of Statistics)	" "	
* <u>WENIGER</u>		" "	Methodical worker, dif- ficult man.

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## ROHSTOFFAMT

(Raw Materials Department)

NAME	POSITION OR FIELD	LOCALITY	COMMENTS
(KEHRL)	(Head)		
* <u>KOLB</u>	(In Charge of chemicals)	c/o Degussa FRANKFURT a/M	Good knowledge of chemical production planning.
<u>KRAUCH</u>	In charge of plant expansion in chemical industry.	Near Hermsdorf	Very diligent and energetic but general approach often biased.
<u>BUETEFISCH</u>	Leuna **		Very good hydrogenation expert.
<u>DR. AMBROS</u>		LUDWIGSHAFEN	Very good young expert familiar with all special materials (T.u.R. Stoffe, Kampstoffe N.Stoff and Buna)
<u>WESTRICK</u>	(Aluminium)	Not Known	Good for planning and also other tasks
<u>GEHM</u>	(Alloys and alloy metals)	Egelstahlwerke, KREFELD	Good
<u>FISCHER</u>	(Oil Production and distribution)	SWITZERLAND	First Class expert also on Rumanian oil.
<u>ROSENKRANTZ</u>	(Mineraloelstelle)	Not known	FISCHER's principal collaborator
* <u>GABEL</u>	Oberberghauptmann, in charge of all mining	" "	Very good expert, diligent but often somewhat fanciful
<u>PLEIGER</u>	(Reichsver, Kohle)	SALZGITTER	Energetic but fitful, of limited use in senior assignments.
<u>ROSENKRANTZ</u>	(Coal)	In his own hunting lodge	Best man in R.V. Kohle for allocation and advance planning, lucid and reliable.
<u>SOGEMEYER</u>	(coal)	Not Known	(R.V. KOHLE). Close collaborator of PLEIGER. Useful but not as good as ROSENKRANTZ
<u>SPRINGORUM</u>	(Coal)	RUHRGEBIET	Representative of R.V. KOHLE in the RUHR. Very good and reliable.
<u>WINKHAUS</u>	(Coal)	RUHRGEBIET MANNESMANN	Very good and a clear thinker. Well suited for R.V. Kohle.

\* KEHRL's whereabouts are not at LUDWIGSLUST.

\*\* Already interrogated by CIOS.

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION OR FIELD</u>	<u>LOCALITY</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
<u>TECHNISCHES AMT.</u>			
(Technical Department)			
* <u>SAUR</u>	Head	Last in Salz- burg ***	Too ambitious and not realist, but good in secondary or tertiary positions. Very diligent and extra ordinary memory for figures.
* <u>FRIESE</u>	Personal Assistant to SAUR	Last in Salz- burg	Very useful for organisation. Good knowledge of all procedures.
<u>ROHLAND</u>	(Steel)	RUHR, c/o VERE- INGITE STAHL- WERKE	Very good worker, fast and thorough, sound expert knowledge. Leading man in R.V. EISEN.
<u>ROCHLING</u>	(Steel)	Last in STUTT- GART, to be found through KELCHNER	Very active despite his age. Very interesting research and development ideas on steel improvement and processing.
<u>KRAEMER</u>	(Steel)	Not Known	Very active in R.V. EISEN; in charge of organizational questions
<u>HOUDREMONT</u>	(metals)	KRUPP, ESSEN	In charge of all conversations of alloy and NF metals. First-Rate expert. Better on theoretical findings than their practical executions.
* <u>Oberst SCHAEDE</u>	Head, Manu- facture Branch	SAALFELD in TH.	Technological matters, rationalisation, good ideas. Good and absorbing other people's ideas. Useful for information and specific tasks.
<u>Oberst GEIST</u>	Head, Development Branch	Not known	Good expert. Very hard working, but too methodical. Especially familiar with ammunition development.

\*  
\*\*\* Available for interrogation with Speer.

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S E C R E T

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION OR FIELD</u>	<u>LOCALITY</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
<u>SOHL</u>	(Steel)	Vereinigte Stahlwerke, RUHR	Closest collaborator of ROHLAND. Very versatile and useful.
* <u>STAHL</u>	SAUR's Deputy Ammunition	Tirschenreuth, HOF	Very good, lucid worker dependable and candid.
<u>TIX</u>	Weapons	HANOMAG, HANNOVER	Clear thinker, good at over-all assessments and long-range planning
* <u>WEISSENBORN</u>	TIX's deputy	With SAUR	Ruthless, very diligent good special knowledge
<u>STIELER VON HEIDENKAMPF</u>	Tanks, AFVs	Not known	One of the best young industrial leaders. Energetic lucid and clean.
<u>OCHEL</u>	Motors	Probably in BERLIN	Previously in charge of tank engines. Very energetic, good planner, very useful.
<u>DR. HASPEL</u>	Aero-Engines	Daimler-Benz, STUTGART	Good knowledge of planning. Decent and loyal.
<u>LUESCHEN</u>	Electrical Engineering	Probably in BERLIN	First rate expert and upright decent character
* <u>HEYNE</u>	(AEG) LEUSCHEN's Deputy	Not Known	Very keen but too ambitious, good knowledge & long term dispositions.
<u>MERKER</u>	Ship-building	ULM, MAGIRUS-WERKE	The best Main Committee Leader. Sound basic ideas coupled with ability to enforce their realisation.
<u>FRYDAG</u>	Airframes	*	Very good, decent and diligent
<u>LANGENOHL</u>	Castings, forgings, etc.	VEREINIGTE STAHLWERKE, RUHR	Very good worker, diligent and dependable. Good at planning
<u>MAUTERER</u>	Steel construction	DORTMUNDER UNION	Very versatile, accomplishes seemingly impossible tasks. An original; loyal and decent.
<u>LANGE</u>	Machinery	Not Known	Not a technician, but knows his way about. Has no constructive ideas. Confused and unsystematic in planning, but quite useful.

\* Available for interrogation with SPEER

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SECRET

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION OR FIELD</u>	<u>LOCALITY</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
<u>NOBEL</u>	Vehicles Commis-sioner	with SAUR	Versatile, but too ambitious
<u>STAMM</u>	General Supplies	Not Known	Energetic, quite useful
<u>DESCH</u>	Shipbuilding Com-missioner	Not Known	Very good worker, tenacious and decent. Also useful on iron construction and iron allocation for building.

PRODUKTIONSAMT

(Production Department)

* <u>SEEBAUER</u>	Head	MUENCHEN, BAYER-ISCHE ELEKTRIZITAETSWERKE	Very quiet but firm and tenacious. Analyzes a situation clearly and carries out his decisions; useful for leading tasks. (Probably knows HUFFAUER's whereabouts).
* <u>BAUER</u>	Deputy	Not Known	Good expert on consumers' goods requirements.

[All leaders of Production Committees in Trade Groups are useful\*]

<u>GOEBEL</u>		MANNHEIM	Was to be appointed SEEBAUER's Deputy. Good team worker. Ambitious.
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ZENTRALAMT

(Central Department)

* <u>HUFFAUER</u>	Chief	MUENCHEN or SONTHOFEN	Unobjectionable character, loyal and without personal ambitions. Very intelligent and observant; steady.
* <u>LIEBEL</u>	Former chief	NUERNBERG	Run down, but decent and loyal; liar. Essential source on political background (STREICHER)**)

\* SPEER explained that in a recent "purge" of the Production Committees, all "inefficient leaders" were eliminated.

\*\* SPEER explained that LIEBEL obtained the resignation of STREICHER as Gauleiter of NUERNBERG. LIEBEL was "the only Mayor who ever managed to get rid of a Gauleiter".

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NAME	POSITION OR FIELD	LOCALITY	COMMENT
<u>WAEGER</u>	former chief of Ruestungsamt		Army Corps Commander in Army Group SCHOERNER. Very honest and loyal; not a "typical officer"; a bit slow. Essential source for activities Ruestungsamt up to 1945 (Labour Supply-SAUCKEL)***
* <u>SCHMELTER</u>	Labour supply	Internment camp near BLANEKENBURG	Very versatile and quick on the uptake. Good expert knowledge
* <u>Oberst von NIKOLAI</u>	SCHMELTER's predecessor	SALZBURG	Very diligent, but pedantic; honest and loyal.
* <u>FRAENK</u>	Organisation	BLANKENBURG ****)	Specialized knowledge, decent but not too diligent, useful.
* <u>BOHR</u>	Personnel	BLANKENBURG	Very versatile, good organiser, suitable for reconstruction of ministerial records.
* <u>MOMMSEN</u>		HAMBURG****)	Very good knowledge of personnel. Inclined to over-hasty judgements.
* <u>HETTLAGE</u>		HAMBURG Commerzbank	Clear and logical thinker, very useful for leading psotions

ZENTRALAMT

(Regional Level)

<u>VOEGLER</u>		VEREINIGTE STAHLWERKE, RUHRGEBIET	Good expert on the RUHR in general. Good at long-range planning. Scientific interests. President of Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft. No personal ambition:
<u>FIEBIG</u>		Not Known, HOLLAND	Very energetic, independent suitable for secondary tasks.
<u>MALZACHER</u>		Probably SALZBURG via NIKOLAI	Upper and Lower SILESIA, Protectorate, Austria. Built up UPPER SILESIA. Good knowledge, one of the best young industrial leaders. Ambitious but decent

\*\*\* WAEGER is familiar with the differences between SAUCKEL and the SPEER Ministry on labour supply questions.

\*\*\*\* Available for interrogation with SPEER.

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION OR FIELD</u>	<u>LOCALITY</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
<u>SCHNEIDER</u>		(Deutsche Waffen u. Munition, POSEN): now probably in Central Germany	Energetic, very hard worker.
<u>LEITNER</u>		BOEHLERSTAHL, KAPFENBERG, AUSTRIA	One of the best Austrian young industrialists, Unprejudiced, fast and conscientious worker suitable for leading positions.
<u>KLARE</u>		Landeswirtschaftsamt SALZBURG	Good chief of a Landeswirtschaftsamt surprisingly fresh and energetic for a Civil Servant.
<u>KLECHNER</u>		Last near STUTTGART	Armaments Commission for the South West. Good technical worker. Too impulsive, but very good in secondary roles.
<u>BECKHURTS</u>		WEIMAR, GUSTLOFFWERKE	Chairman of Armaments Commission for THURINGIA. Good team worker. Tenacious and reliable, a bit nervous in his work.
<u>WOLF</u>		HAMBURG, NORDDEUTSCHER LLOYD	Armaments Commissioner for the North West. Good fast worker. Good knowledge of food and other economic problems, lucid planner.
* <u>HOFFMAN</u>		Not known	Transport organization good ideas, somewhat heavy but solid worker.
<u>MEINDL</u>		STEYR, STEYRWERKE	Chairman of Armaments Commission for AUSTRIA. Very able and quick to decide. Inclined to be an opportunist.
<u>HOFWEBER</u>		MANNHEIM	Armaments Foreman for BADEN. Very good and solid team worker. Responsible, decent and loyal.
		AMT ENERGIE (Power Department)	
* <u>SCHULZE-FIELITZ</u>		HEAD BUTIN AREA	Construction engineer but good expert on power. Slow but thorough worker. Very reliable, but stubborn in a favorable sense.

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NAME	POSITION OR FIELD	LOCALITY	COMMENTS
<u>DR. CARL</u>	Power Planning	Not Known	Fresh and quick on the uptake, but somewhat irresponsible in his judgments. Good team worker.
<u>STEIRINGER</u>	Regional Power distributor	INSBRUCK	Solid and keen. Good team worker.
* <u>FISCHER</u>	REICH Power distributor	Probably near DESSAU	Excellent, the best man in Power Dept. Fast and self-assured worker, dependable in his judgment. Lacks last ounce of energy.

AMT BAU (AUCH FUER GENERALINSP, FUER DAS STRASSENWESEN)

Building Department incl. Inspector-General of Roads.

<u>DORSCH</u>	Head	Not Known	Reprehensible character, ruthless.
* <u>FUCHS</u>	Deputy	Near KLAGENFURT	Best young building expert. Clear and determined good at making decisions and settling differences. Sound judgment on conditions, decides quickly and consistently. Suitable for major tasks.
<u>SCHOENLEBEN</u>		Not known	Recently with G.B. Chemie, previously Reichsautobahnen. Good team worker but not in leading positions. Too diligent and pedantic, no general view but very reliable in secondary or tertiary roles.
<u>ANBERLEN</u>	(?) Roads expert	Not known	Good team worker. Not versatile enough but diligent and reliable.
<u>HENNE</u>	(Einsatzgruppe NORWAY)	Probably OSLO	Best building expert next to FUCHS. Very energetic and too ruthless. Tough and determined good organizer.
<u>WEISS</u>	(Einsatzgruppe Nordwest)	HAMBURG	Very diligent and reliable. Makes up by improvisation and ability for lack of planning. An original.

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION OR FIELD</u>	<u>LOCALITY</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
<u>ADAM</u>	(Einsatzgruppe RHEIN-RUHR)	RUHRBEBIET	Good planner and organiser on a limited scale. de- termined and tenac- ious. Good boss, unprejudiced, thinks too much of himself.
* <u>STOBDE</u> <u>DETHLEFSEN</u>	Former Head	DUSSELDORF or DORTMUND	Building contractor, head of a big firm. Very reliable and agreeable collabora- tor. Candid and upright. Suitable for a leading posi- tion.

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Ministerbuero

(Ministerial S<sub>e</sub>cretariat)

* <u>DR. GOERNER</u>	SPEER's Personal Assistant	HAMBURG c/o Commerzbank	Conscientious and not to be influenced good worker, self- effacing.
* <u>FRAU KEMPF</u>	Secretary		Private secretary for 10 years. Ex- cellent knowledge of procedures and re- cords of Ministry. Very hard working.
* <u>FRL. MAGEBRA</u>	Secretary		For several years with TODT and famil- iar with his activi- ties. Very diligent

20 June 1945

MR. HOEFFDING,

Leader of CIOS Team.

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APPENDIX "N"

Evaluation Report 53 (n)  
21 July 1945.

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SUB-COMMITTEE

EXAMINATION OF ALBERT SPEER AND MEMBERS  
OF THE FORMER REICH MINISTRY OF ARMAMENTS AND WAR PRODUCTION  
(Target No. 28/5.01)

REPORT NO. 14, held at 1500 to 1630 hours on Wednesday, 13 June 1945.

SUBJECTS: A. Supply of Armaments to forces in the field.  
B. Production planning.  
C. Proportion between air frames and aero engines.

SUPPLY OF ARMAMENTS TO FORCES IN THE FIELD

It was pointed out to SPEER that we have been puzzled by the apparent inability of the German high command to utilize the large amount of armaments produced in a more efficient manner. SPEER said that the basic mistake, as far as ground forces were concerned, was one of policy. This policy called for 90% of armament production to go to new, green divisions as against 10% for re-equipping units on the line. Thus the wastage rate of equipment was unnecessarily high because it was continuously given to inexperienced troops who, in their first engagement, lost more than an experienced unit would have under equal conditions of combat. SPEER illustrated this by describing an instance that he had witnessed in the Siegfried Line near ECHTERNACH. An old armored division had been in the line for a long time but had been able to hold many of our attacks. Their manpower and equipment had been "bled white" until they had only ten tanks left, but they were still able to hold. At that point, a new Panzer Division with all new equipment was thrown into the sector. A counter-attack was staged, with 35 Panthers as the backbone. Of those 35 Panthers unloaded, only 25 reached the line of departure. 10 broke down en route through inexperienced handling by the green drivers. The remaining 25 Panthers drove a head-on charge against a battery of American AT-guns, which cost them 15 more tanks lost. The remaining 10 withdrew in a disorderly manner. SPEER stated that this instance was typical.

In the ammunition field the mistake was somewhat different. Here the policy was to establish forward dumps approximately 50 to 100 kilometers behind the front line, especially in RUSSIA. Consequently, a Russian attack when it broke, would find German troops in the line without sufficient ammunition to meet it, let alone to mount a counter-attack. This in turn would enable the Russians to penetrate to such depth as to capture the ammunition dumps themselves. Generally the consideration of shipping space was neglected. Thus spare parts for tanks were never there in sufficient numbers and many tanks had to be abandoned for lack of maybe one spare part. SPEER would have liked to ship many more tank motors instead of complete new tanks. Ten motors require the same space as does one tank. But not until very late was this mistake recognized by the command.

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In the air, especially on the Western front in the initial stages, the mistake was in the dissipation of available power (as previously established). A total of 2000 fighters was released out of GALLAND's reserve for use against the Allied invasion forces, although this reserve had been built up for use against our bomber formations over the REICH proper. The transfer of those fighters to the front took place in small batches. The fields available behind the front were limited in number, and were soon located so far inland that most of the fuel was burned up by the fighters to move to and from the target area, thereby reducing the fighter's combat time to approximately 5 minutes. Moreover, so many fighters had to be jammed into the limited number of fields, that the inevitable destruction of large numbers of aircraft on the ground by our own planes followed. Thus no instance is known to SPEER where the German air force was able to assemble in sufficient strength at any one place (Schwerpunkt) to be favourable to German ground troops, let alone decisive. SPEER and GALLAND were strongly advocating the complete withdrawal of the Luftwaffe from the Western front in favour of an all-out air effort over GERMANY. It was planned, when our long-range fighter escorts began to be of decisive weight, to allow our formations to penetrate as deep as a line running north-south through GERMANY on the longitude of the HARZ mountains. This line, it was estimated, would correspond with the distance from where on the east the Allied fighter escort started worrying about their fuel reserve. It would, at the same time, enable German fighters to come to grips with the enemy at a favourably short distance from their home fields. However, the necessary large number of fighters to carry out this plan was taken away for the above-mentioned purpose.

SPEER illustrated the strategic conditions for air as follows: Allied aluminium production was four times that of GERMANY. In order to keep parity it was necessary to shoot down four Allied fighters for every German fighter lost. This was at no time achieved. On the contrary, the proportion came closer to being reversed, showing in SPEER's opinion the absurdity of employing German fighters against Allied fighters. The proportion became much more favourable if German fighters were employed against Allied bombers. Here SPEER claims the following figures: 100 German fighters were able to shoot down 25 Allied bombers, at a loss of 25 German fighters and 50% or 125 men crew loss. One German fighter thus was the cost for eliminating one Allied bomber. One bomber used nine times as much aluminium as one fighter. The parity requirements were four Allied fighters lost against one German fighter. In terms of aluminium, therefore, the loss of one Allied bomber for the price of one German fighter, gave the Germans an edge of 2.5 fighters in their favour. If SPEER and GALLAND would have been able to employ German fighter strength in the above-mentioned manner at a time and location unfavourable to Allied long-range fighter escorts, we would have been eventually forced to cut down on our bombing missions and/or to draw on the Allied air umbrella over the Western front - thereby changing the odds in favour of German ground forces.

PRODUCTION PLANNING

It was pointed out to SPEER that, contrary to his earlier statements, there was no long range planning in German war production, we had got hold of some Planungsamt index curves which clearly showed long range production planning up to 1946 in some instances. SPEER replied as follows: The long range planning was carried out by KEHRL's Planungsamt on the basis of production capacity. The figures for this so-called

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Industrieprogramm were furnished by the Main Committees (Hauptausschüssen) in each field, with production facilities, i.e. plant space, available machinery and partly labour as the only consideration. The Planungsamt consolidated these data into the long-range production plan, admittedly without much consideration of the raw materials available, also without considering expected production loss through air attack. This Industrieprogramm was not given to the producers, but had more or less the function of an overall barometer. The only planning that was given to producers, was based (as we know) on the raw material allocation every three months. For instance: on the 1st January 1944, 20,000 trucks with 3 tons steel each were to go into production. The pertinent main committee asked for a steel allocation of 60,000 tons. SPEER cut that request by 10,000 tons, thereby insuring himself against raw material hoarding by the industries as well as against the possible piling up of unprocessed raw materials due to the loss of production facilities through air raids. On the 1st June 1944, (six months production time necessary for the programme of 1st January 1944), it became apparent that only 10,000 trucks had been delivered out of the January allocation, thus leaving 20,000 out of the original 50,000 tons of raw material unprocessed. Consequently, the allocation for the quarter beginning on 1st June 1944 was only 30,000 tons, or half of the requested amount of 60,000. SPEER there again made the initial cut of 10,000 tons, plus the 20,000 tons left over from the previous period. Asked for the reasons why it was possible in the machine tool industry to hoard large amounts of raw materials up to the end of the war despite his policy, SPEER said that the machine tool industry was always dominated by policies of investment rather than rationalization and that LANGE even in his function as head of the Hauptausschuss had very much the interest of his industry at heart. SPEER also admitted tolerance of the machine tool situation in order to preserve elasticity in the face of Allied air attack, as well as for reasons of the complexity of types of air engines requested by the Luftwaffe.

PROPORTION BETWEEN AIR FRAMES AND AIR ENGINES

Reminded of an earlier statement to the effect that our bombing of air frames brought about a better balance between frame and engine production, SPEER stated that his remarks had been essentially correct. Asked why such a large discrepancy between high frame and low engine production was allowed to develop during a time which was still free of precision air attacks, SPEER said that the reason was solely in the frequent design changes requested by the Luftwaffe. A plant like the Ostmark Werke in VIENNA was scheduled for a monthly production of 1,000 engines, but never got above 200 or 300. Engines changed (admittedly through tactical necessity) every two or three months while the production of frames could continue undisturbed. SPEER referred to the ME-109 as a typical example, where the same frame was equipped first with the JUMO, then the BMW and finally the DAIMLER-BENZ (I am not sure about the sequence) SPEER emphasized that the raw material and labour planning, as well as the machine tool planning would have been completely sound, had it been possible to stick to the same type over a longer period.

13 June 1945

1st Lt. SKLARZ, USSBS.

APPENDIX "P"

Evaluation Report 53 (p)  
21 July 1945

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SUB-COMMITTEE

EXAMINATION OF ALBERT SPEER AND MEMBERS  
OF THE FORMER REICH MINISTRY OF ARMAMENTS AND WAR PRODUCTION  
(Target No. 28/5.01)

REPORT NO. 16, based on the examination of SAUR,  
Chief of Technisches Amt, held at 1600 hours 23 June, 1945.

SUBJECT: Information on Archives of the Technisches Amt

1. The Technisches Amt as such did not possess a central Archive nor a Geheime Registratur. The distinguishing feature of the department was the complete absence of permanent officials (Beamter). (A). Registries were therefore kept at the working level, viz:

- a. Amtsgruppe - Fortigung; Entwicklung; Vorschlage.  
No vital records were kept by the Amtsgruppen Beauftragte, Motorisierung etc.
- b. Hauptausschusse and Ringe - Records with the Leiter in each case. The Beauftragte retained very little with the exception of material on Schwerpunktbildung and Konzentration.
- c. Entwicklungskommissionen - Records with the Vorsitz in each case. The material in the Amtsgruppe is very superficial.

2. The only files of the Department proper are the stenographic records of the daily meeting where all decisions were taken. This started in March 1944 as the Jagerstab meeting; later, it became the Rustungsstab, and went on to the end. The decisions of the meeting were issued in the form of a circular of the Rustungsstab which went to all the Wehrkreisbeauftragter, the Amtsgruppe and where relevant to the Ausschusse and Entwicklungskommissionen. The location of the Stenographic record (Stenographische Rustungsstabe Protokolle) is probably known to Ministerrat CLIEVER (location unknown), and to the two secretaries who are being transferred to DUSTBIN at this moment.

3. Dispersal of the Department and the Mystery of the Train

At the beginning of March 1945, the ministry was dispersed in eleven towns and villages centred round PLAZENBURG bei KULNBACH where SAUR had a special train which acted as his HQ. (Code name HUBERTUSZUG).

Three further evacuations took place working to the S.E. (north of SALZBURG, South of SALZBURG). Each time the evacuated sections became more and more attenuated; both staff and documents were left en route. Finally the train - reduced to three carriages - was taken to PULLACH (9 kil. South of MUNICH) where it joined the trains of KESSELRING; O.K.W. Sud - General WINTER; Transportchef KOERNER; and others to form the Southern HQ where it remained.

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SAUR insisted that at no time did the train contain documents other than Handaktiven.

4. SAUR was requested to furnish a schematic of the Technisches Amt showing the centres of document holding and their last known locations. This has been done, and the report will be circulated shortly.

5. Personnel

Oberst SCHADE - was at BAD ELSTER (Nr. Czech frontier North of ASCH) on 11 April. Manager of Schade Waschmaschinen at SAALFELD who may have news. Also try Major FRENZEL at Chocolate Factory Meuxion at SAALFELD.

Note (A) - Thus all planning and stats was done by the Planungsamt; raw material computations at the Rohstoffamt; Kontigentierung by the various allocating bodies. The Department's main work was done in Industry.

Generalkonsul STAHL - Try Thiel at RUHLA or MULHAUSEN.

Oberst GEIST - unknown but his deputy  
Oberst GUAL - was at PULLACH on May 28; was cognisant of the working of the development commissions.

23 June 1945

Mr. J. SELWYN, CIOS (F.O.)

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