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EDITOR’S NOTE

One of the great things about editing the journal of the American Judges Association is that you can ask some of the leading experts in various legal fields to write articles for us, and because they will be speaking directly to judges, they usually agree. Our lead article in this issue is a great example.

The United States Supreme Court has had several decisions in recent years regarding constitutional limits on punitive-damage awards, and it had appeared that another would come in the October 2008 Term of the Court. It heard oral argument in December 2008 in a case from Oregon, but in March it dismissed the certiorari petition as improvidently granted. What should we make of that? And what should judges—especially at the trial level—do to make sure that jury instructions conform to constitutional standards as presently interpreted?

We asked Benjamin Zipursky, coauthor of one of the leading casebooks on tort law, to help us out, and he readily agreed. He provides a careful analysis of the Supreme Court’s decisions, along with his own suggestions for dealing with the analytical and jury-instruction problems created by them.

Our second article addresses one solution to a widely recognized problem: the use of commissions to help eliminate racial and ethnic bias in the judicial system. Based on several years of successful work with Nebraska’s commission, Elizabeth Neeley reviews the factors that can lead to success by such a commission. Those same factors would likely be relevant to any ongoing initiative a court or court system might wish to undertake.

We also have an essay in this issue from Judge Donald Shaver telling about his experience learning about the European Court of Human Rights. That court differs from those found in the United States and Canada—the European Court of Human Rights is superior to the highest courts of nations on civil-rights issues. We think you’ll find his quick overview of the court of interest.

This issue closes with a ten-year index to the articles found in Court Review from 1998 forward. All of these articles are available to American Judges Association members on our website—and we don’t think there is a more useful collection of resources for the average judge anywhere. I hope you’ll set this issue aside and use the index from time to time. For those of you who are electronically inclined, we will have the index online, and we will keep it updated in the coming years. Each entry includes the URL at which you may find the article online. —Steve Leben

The Quarterly Journal of the American Judges Association

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As your president, I have attended meetings of the Conference of the Chief Justices and of the National Association for Court Management. The focus of both conferences was the fiscal crisis confronting us. From chief justices to nonjudicial employees, the dominating topic of conversation was how do we survive the harsh reality of our economic times? I thought it would be of interest to share with you information collected by NCSC’s Budget Resource Center as to what some states have done in response.

The almost universal action taken has been to implement an immediate hiring freeze. This freeze is not only as to nonjudicial employees but also to the filling of judicial vacancies. Although a freeze may make sense, it could not have come at a worse time. The very same economic catastrophe that has caused the budget crisis has also caused an increase in filings of such cases as unlawful detainers, domestic-violence restraining orders, civil restraining orders, divorces, and criminal misdemeanors and felonies. More of us are seeing a significant increase in our caseload with fewer resources and assistance.

Another common tactic is to modify the hours of court operation. This modification has varied from closing courts on a regular basis to closing them occasionally. For example, Oregon closed its courts every Friday beginning from mid-March through June 2009. Iowa closed all of its courts one day in February, and Vermont closed its courts a half day every week as well as closing them a full day on certain designated days. Those who have not shut the doors on some days have reduced operation hours instead, such as Maine.

Unpaid furloughs have also been utilized. California has implemented a voluntary day off each month with comparative reduction in pay while Iowa requires all court employees to take seven days of unpaid leave. In Idaho, that number was two days of unpaid leave and in Oregon 16 unpaid days before the end of June 2009. More furloughs will undoubtedly have been announced before this issue arrives in your mailbox. New Hampshire specifically extended unpaid furloughs to judicial officers. At the meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices, several chief justices mentioned that even if judges were not subject to unpaid furloughs, they should consider doing so in order to bolster morale among other court employees.

The economic crisis has also caused us to eliminate suppliers of traditional court services. In Utah, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, court reporters have either been replaced by digital audio recordings or had their hours significantly reduced. Massachusetts has also reduced the number of full-time interpreters. Minnesota has cut back using assigned retired judges.

Judges have been directly impacted in other ways too. Many states, such as South Carolina, Florida, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, have eliminated out-of-state travel allowances. South Carolina and Massachusetts have eliminated law book subscriptions, advance sheets, and compilations of recent court decisions. The Los Angeles Times recently reported that Ohio would accept new case filings only from people who bring their own paper, claiming that the court has just enough paper to handle hearing notices. Minnesota has closed down a satellite court and Massachusetts has cancelled all judicial education conferences. Maine has announced that there will be no court facility repairs unless life- or health-safety concerns require them. Some states, such as Iowa and Connecticut, have offered “golden handshake” incentives for early judicial retirement.

What is especially alarming is that some states have had to utilize drastic measures to deal with the fiscal crisis. For example, Minnesota has had to reduce the daily per diem to its jurors by roughly half.

In these frightening times that threaten the economic stability of our court system, the American Judges Association becomes even more important in its role as the Voice of the Judiciary. It is critical that AJA continue to serve as a networking source for solution sharing among its members. We all face common problems, and AJA should not only be viewed as a forum where we can air our concerns but also can learn what others are doing to respond to them. Fully realizing that travel allowances and budgets are being eliminated or severely curtailed, one of my goals is to implement an online education program for our members who cannot attend our conferences. Judge Michael Cicconetti has been highly instrumental in attempting to obtain federal funding for us to accomplish this.

The bottom line is that AJA is even more necessary to us now than it has ever been before.
We followed President Barack Obama into Strasbourg, France, last April, but our group of 27 judges and justices did not generate quite as many headlines as he did. Not surprising, since it was only coincidence that our seminar on the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), sponsored by the International Judicial Academy, happen to follow a NATO summit meeting also occurring in Strasbourg. No worries, we were all excited to be there anyway.

The International Judicial Academy, our sponsor, is a nonprofit organization that funds judicial education on international justice through grants from private foundations. The Academy chose 24 state and federal judges and justices from the United States and three justices from Argentina for this seminar on international human rights.

Strasbourg is a picturesque and welcoming town, and we were all anxious to find out what this whole “Court of Human Rights” thing was about. After a short bus ride down the Allee De la Robertsau, we arrived at the complex known as the “Institutions Européennes,” where the “Parlement Européen” (European Parliament), “Counseil De L'Europe” (European Council), and “Cour Européenne Des Droits De L'Homme” (European Court of Human Rights) are located. The ECHR building is a shiny, ultra-modern steel and glass structure with little resemblance to a traditional courthouse.

In order to understand the role of the ECHR, you can think of it as a sort of civil-rights supreme court for the European member countries. Individual citizens can file claims, called “applications,” against a member nation alleging a violation of the basic human-rights law, the European Convention on Human Rights, which all members have adopted. The court can adjudicate the case and, if appropriate, render a money judgment, called “just satisfaction,” against the state, which is required to honor the judgment. In fact, the Court has recently
rendered a number of judgments against Russia totaling more than 350,000 Euros on claims brought by Chechen citizens for human-rights violations committed by Russian troops in the uprising in Chechnya. Russia has paid these judgments.

The ECHR grew out of the efforts following World War II to formulate an international bill of rights, similar to the ones in the United States and elsewhere. The resulting document was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, now widely recognized as the model statement of the minimum rights to which any citizen should be entitled. The idea was that, based on this model, each of seven major regions of the world would negotiate their own specific binding conventions on human rights, suitable to their region. Three of the regions have actually succeeded in doing so: the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States (comprising North and South America), and the African Union. But in all the regions except Europe, the member countries were unwilling to establish a court with superior jurisdiction to the national courts. In Europe, however, owing primarily to the dramatic human-rights abuses witnessed during World War II, the member countries agreed to a strong independent enforcement agency. Thus, in 1959, the ECHR was born.

Although other regions have human-rights courts, their judgments are considered advisory. The ECHR is unique in that it is the only human-rights court where the judgment is binding on its members and superior to the national courts in most instances. Forty-seven countries are members, and with one judge elected from each member country, that makes the ECHR the largest international court in the world. Claims may be submitted in any of the 41 languages used in the member states.

The court has rendered judgments on a number of current and controversial topics, many of which will be familiar to American lawyers, finding, for example, that:

- maximum detention periods pending questioning or charging may not be circumvented by the device of releasing and immediately rebooking the defendant;
- detention of an inmate pending admission to a psychiatric facility in the general jail population may not be unduly prolonged;
- dismissal of homosexuals from the military for that reason alone is a privacy violation;
- refusal to perform a therapeutic abortion necessary to protect the health of the mother is a violation;
- detention of a journalist who refuses to disclose confidential sources is a violation;
- a requirement that employees join a union as a condition of employment is a violation;
- termination of employment based on religious beliefs is a violation; and,
- members of Parliament may not be required to swear an oath based on the Gospels.

With the ECHR acting as the judicial branch in adjudicating claims, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe acts as the executive branch in enforcing the judgments, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe acts as the legislative branch, enacting new laws or amendments to the European Convention on Human Rights. But why would a country such as Russia see it in their interest to honor the judgments of the ECHR? The answer is simple: the free-market economy. Many emerging democracies see involvement in the free market through the European Union as the pathway to prosperity, and the European Union has unofficially linked membership in the EU to membership in the ECHR.

We listened with rapt attention to presentations from Jean-Paul Costa, president of the ECHR, and ECHR Judges Lech Garlicki (Poland) and Egbert Myjer (Netherlands). As Americans, where this function has always been carried out by our national courts, we had a difficult time imagining a scenario where an international court could have the last word over our Supreme Court, but as unlikely as that is to happen here, its works well for the 800 million citizens of the patchwork of independent countries that make up Europe. We came away with an appreciation for how unique the ECHR is—there truly is nothing quite like it in the world.

Donald Shaver hears criminal cases as a judge on the Superior Court in Modesto, California. He is cochair of the International Criminal Law Committee for the ABA Section of International Law. In 2006, he became the first American judge to work with the International Criminal Court in The Hague, on paid sabbatical as a visiting professional sponsored by the California Judicial Council.
Punitive Damages After
Philip Morris USA v. Williams

Benjamin C. Zipursky

For a single tort case in which liability is no longer contested, Philip Morris USA v. Williams proved remarkably difficult to bring to closure. Like many plaintiffs since the 1990s, Mayola Williams persuaded a jury that Philip Morris fraudulently concealed the addictive and carcinogenic aspects of its product from the public and thereby killed her husband. The jury awarded $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages. That is a nearly 100:1 ratio, far greater than the single-digit ratio designated by the Court as a presumptive limit only four years earlier in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell. It is therefore unsurprising that, in 2007—eight years after the case went to trial—the United States Supreme Court briddled at the award in Williams and remanded it to the Oregon Supreme Court to examine whether there had been a procedural due-process violation in the trial judge’s handling of the case, especially its jury instructions. It is equally unsurprising that the Oregon Supreme Court, aiming to preserve the autonomy of its tort law and hostile to a perceived pro-business orientation on the Roberts Court, wished to keep the $79.5 million dollar verdict intact and promptly reaffirmed the verdict. The surprise is that after three visits to the Court, plenty of hand-wringing, and a volatile oral argument in December of 2008, the United States Supreme Court simply backed down and permitted a visibly defiant Oregon Supreme Court to have its way. On March 31, the Supreme Court issued a one-line per curiam order dismissing the certiorari petition in Williams as improvidently granted.

What happened? The short answer appears to be that the United States Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Roberts replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Alito replacing Justice O’Connor, has become queasy about doing constitutional excessiveness review of the sort commenced in BMW v. Gore. Not only did the Supreme Court decline to cut the damages award in Williams, it did not even address the size of the award. Indeed, in initially granting Philip Morris’s certiorari petition last year, the Court pointedly declined to hear arguments on the size of the award. Oral argument in Williams during the 2006 Term had little or nothing to do with excessiveness, and even though the Court had granted certiorari on the BMW excessiveness issue in Williams, Justice Breyer expressly declined to address that issue in his opinion. As the recent 80% reduction of the Alaskan fisherman’s verdict in the Exxon Valdez case indicates, a majority of the Court is willing to cut a punitive-damages verdict, but that case was decided on federal statutory grounds; the Court had pointedly declined to grant certiorari on the constitutional excessiveness issue.

The 2007 decision in Williams therefore appeared to represent a decision to move in a new direction, but the Court was able to do so only tentatively; moreover, the Court was unwilling to bring Philip Morris relief because it was uncomfortable utilizing its most potent tool for punitive damages: constitutional excessiveness review.

Why would the Roberts Court suddenly become dissatisfied with BMWs approach to punitive damages? What is it about the arrival of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito that might have precipitated this change? While one can only conjecture, certain conjectures are quite plausible. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have always rejected excessiveness review as another example of substantive due process, which they reject for both jurisprudential and ideological reasons, associating BMW v. Gore with both Roe v. Wade and Lochner v. New York. If Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito shared the Scalia/Thomas hostility to substantive due process and shared their sense (and that of Justice Ginsburg) of the institutional competence and federalist reasons against excessiveness review, they would have ample reason to be uncomfortable with BMW and its progeny. Before pouring more into that framework and even before tolerating it, the new Justices would perhaps be attracted to the idea of a foundation that is not so perilously close to sheer second-guessing of state court judgments of what constitutes “too big.” Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito appear to have believed they could have it all by switching to procedural due process, and their willingness to sign onto Philip Morris’s victory in 2007 seems to reflect this precise strategy.

I am grateful to John Goldberg and Anthony Sebok for helpful comments on an earlier draft and to Damian Treffs for his excellent research assistance.

Footnotes
5. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 2904 (June 9, 2008) (granting certiorari on first issue only), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (March 31, 2009).
6. Williams, 549 U.S. at 358.
8. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 492 (Oct 29, 2007) (granting certiorari limited to issues 1, 2, 3(1) – where 3(2) was excessiveness under Due Process Clause issue).
10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
This article is an exploration of the Court’s new direction in Williams, written with the hope of providing guidance to the courts now required to apply it. The constitutional doctrine of punitive damages before Williams is briefly set forth in Part I. Part II recounts Justice Breyer’s majority opinion for the Court, as well as the dissents filed by Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg, and closes with a short overview of the subsequent progress of the case. Part III elaborates on the problems of Williams—both those that arise from the opinion itself and those that have arisen or are likely to arise for courts striving to understand the case moving forward—and argues that the problems stem from basic lack of clarity regarding the justification for the treatment of nonparty harm. Part IV sets forth a theoretical model that makes sense of the nonparty-harm rule and resolves the tensions within Williams. In doing so, it draws from my own prior work and sounds themes articulated by scholars such as Thomas Colby and Dan Markel in recent articles also addressing Williams. The clarifications of Part IV guide a discussion in Part V of model jury instructions that some jurisdictions have produced in light of Williams and in Part VI of a variety of difficult issues that have confronted courts in the aftermath of Williams.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES BEFORE WILLIAMS

The United States Supreme Court has issued exactly eight significant decisions regarding the constitutional scrutiny of punitive damages: Browning-Ferris v. Kelco,13 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,14 TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,15 Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,16 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,17 Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,18 State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,19 and Williams itself. While each could sustain (and has sustained) substantial commentary, the doctrine itself remains quite straightforward. In Browning-Ferris, a 7-2 majority held that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause did not apply to punitive damages. The Court in Haslip and TXO held that the common-law procedures associated with punitive damages were not per se violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause but that at some point a grossly excessive punitive damages award might be so unreasonable as to violate the Due Process Clause. In neither case did the Court find the awards grossly excessive. Honda v. Oberg, the least cited of the eight decisions, held that a state statute knocking out all but the most minimal appellate review of punitive damages awards departed from the common-law protections afforded defendants and therefore violated the Due Process Clause. Prior to BMW v. Gore, the Court had ruled out the Excessive Fines Clause, had ruled out any broad due-process attack based on inadequate state procedures, and had left open the possibility of some enormous punitive damages award “crossing the line” of what it considered constitutionally permissible.

BMW v. Gore, decided in 1996, remains the Court’s most important punitive-damages decision because it is the first to strike down a punitive-damages award as excessive and therefore unconstitutional. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Stevens set out a three-guidepost test for determining whether an award was grossly excessive. Courts should consider the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the ratio of punitive damages to the actual (or potential harm) suffered by the plaintiff, and the size of the award relative to sanctions prescribed by civil or criminal statutes of the jurisdiction for comparable conduct. Alabama’s Supreme Court had permitted the plaintiff, Ira Gore, to recover a two-million-dollar punitive damages award based on minimally reprehensible conduct of BMW, namely, the failure to disclose that because of flaws in the original paint job of his $40,000 BMW, the company had repainted it before sale. The economic damages associated were $4,000, leaving a ratio of 500 to 1, and comparable sanctions in Alabama were relatively puny. Justice Stevens easily concluded that this was excessive and therefore a violation of due process. As a theoretical matter, he opined that fair notice was a core value of the Due Process Clause and that grossly excessive awards were inconsistent with this value.

Cooper v. Leatherman and State Farm v. Campbell put teeth in the gross-excessiveness test of BMW. An 8-1 majority held in Cooper (per Justice Stevens) that appellate review of gross excessiveness was to be de novo. A 6-3 majority held in State Farm v. Campbell (per Justice Kennedy) that the ratio between

11. The general lines of the analysis in this article are in some ways anticipated in a more sustained piece, Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (2005), but that piece was written before the Court’s decision in Williams.
12. See Thomas R. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 Yale L.J. 392 (2008); Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 183 (2009). Neither the interpretive nor the normative account of Williams or of punitive damages borrows from these articles, with which I am in substantial disagreement. However, I also refrain from presenting or criticizing the content of the articles here, leaving that for another occasion. Cf. Zipursky, supra note 11 (criticizing earlier article by Colby). Readers should be aware, however, that these authors have made significant contributions to the scholarly literature identifying and working through a central, but insufficiently analyzed issue in Williams: whether punitive damages call for different levels of constitutional scrutiny depending on the extent to which they are functioning in a private-law mold or a public-law mold.
20. BMW, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996) (maximum Alabama fine for Deceptive Trade Practices would be $2,000, compared to $2 million imposed on BMW).
Several important themes have dominated the opinions of those justices resisting constitutional scrutiny of punitive damages. In Browning-Ferris, the Court reasoned that punitive damages should not be regarded as a form of fine because the state does not initiate tort suits and because it does not keep the money. In that case and in the middle-of-the-road opinion for the Court in Haslip (as well as the concurrences), a majority of the Justices gave significant weight to the historical pedigree of punitive damages within the common law. Justice Scalia's powerful concurring opinion in Haslip declared that the historical acceptance of punitive damages with civil/tort-law safeguards by definition rules out any procedural “due process” critique now. Justice Thomas has remained true to that line; indeed, Justice Thomas recently authored a 5-4 opinion for the Court recognizing the presence and legitimacy of punitive damages in the common law of admiralty and therefore permitting punitive damages in (at least a large subset of) admiralty personal-injury cases. Both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have also vigorously criticized Justice Stevens and other members of the BMW majority for engaging in the sort of substantive due process that made Lochner notorious (and that, on their view, plagues the post-Griswold privacy decisions). Finally, Justice Ginsburg wrote an important dissenting opinion in BMW (with which Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred and whose thrust is shared by Scalia and Thomas) emphasizing that federalist and institutional competence concerns should lead the Court to stay out of the punitive-damages area where it does not belong.

Conversely, two voices in favor of punitive damages scrutiny before Williams did not write any majority opinions on punitive damages but nevertheless contributed substantially to the Court’s thought in this area. From the outset, Justice O’Connor strongly agreed with the defendants challenging contemporary punitive-damages awards, and her dissenting opinion in Browning-Ferris (with which Justice Stevens concurred) favored use of the Excessive Fines Clause for what she regarded as arbitrary and excessive state fines secured through private plaintiffs. Again, in her dissent in Haslip, Justice O’Connor made a forceful argument that punitive-damages law in Alabama was patently unacceptable as a procedural due-process matter, whether one applied void-for-vagueness standards or one applied Mathews v. Eldridge. Concern with procedural due process and cabining jury discretion was at the core of Justice Breyer’s important concurring opinion in BMW v. Gore, with which Justice O’Connor and Justice Souter concurred. It is notable that the author of the opinion for the Court in Williams was Justice Breyer—the leading voice of procedural due-process concerns in punitive-damages cases on the Court since Justice O’Connor stepped down.

II. THE WILLIAMS OPINIONS
A. THE OPINION OF THE COURT

The opinion of the Court, for a majority of five, was written by Justice Stephen Breyer; Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Justice Alito concurred. The Court began by describing the facts and procedural history of the case and noting that, although it had granted certiorari on whether there was a nonparty harm problem and whether the award was grossly excessive, it was only going to address the former. Thus, while the object of the Court’s scrutiny was “a large state punitive damages award,” the question addressed was “whether the Constitution’s Due Process Clause permits a jury to base that award in part on its desire to punish the defendant for harming persons who are not before the court (e.g., victims whom the parties do not represent).” Justice Breyer’s answer, speaking for the Court, was negative: “We hold that such an award would amount to a taking of ‘property’ from the defendant without due process.” In light of that holding, the Court vacated the Oregon judgment and remedied to the Oregon Supreme Court for “further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”

Justice Breyer offered two arguments for the statement that...
it is a violation of due process to permit the jury to punish the defendant for injuring nonparties: The first is that Philip Morris is entitled, as a matter of due process, to have an opportunity to defend itself against the charges made, “by showing, for example in a case such as this, that the other victim was not entitled to damages because he or she knew that smoking was dangerous or did not rely upon the defendant’s statements to the contrary.” 41 Breyer’s tacit assumption appears to be that the alleged other victims’ nonparty status renders it procedurally infeasible to run this, and other, defenses.

The second argument is that the number of nonparties and the extent of their harm are too “standardsless” to pass muster under the Due Process Clause.

How many such victims are there? How seriously were they injured? Under what circumstances did the injury occur? The trial will not likely answer such questions as to nonparty victims. The jury will be left to speculate. And the fundamental due process concern to which our punitive damages cases refer—risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of notice—will be magnified. 42

After offering a dense argument that this treatment of the nonparty-harm rule was not inconsistent with its prior decisions on punitive damages—particularly BMW—the Court went on to concede that a plaintiff may present evidence of harm to nonparties because “harm to others shows more reprehensible conduct.” 43

Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a risk of harm to the public, or the reverse. Yet for the reasons given above, a jury may not go further than this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties. 44

An insufficiently recognized feature of the Court’s opinion is that it yielded not one but five interrelated procedural due-process dictates . . .

Because the Court believed that Philip Morris’s appeal was considered by the Oregon Supreme Court within a framework that, understandably but incorrectly, rejected the five points I have just discussed, the Court concluded its opinion by remanding to the Oregon Supreme Court to reconsider Philip Morris’s appeal by applying “the standard we have set forth.” 50 Critically, the Court appears to have left it open for the courts below it in Williams to remedy any nonparty-harm problem it might find in either of two ways: retrial or remittitur. “Because the application of this new standard may lead to the need for a new trial, or a change in the level of the punitive damages award, we shall not consider whether the award is constitutionally ‘grossly excessive.’” 51

**B. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS**

Justice Stevens 52 and Justice Thomas 53 each wrote a solo dissenting opinion. Justice Ginsburg also wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas concurred. 54

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41 Id. at 353-54.
42 Id. at 354.
43 Id. at 355.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 353.
46 Id. at 356-57 (“We did not previously hold explicitly that a jury may not punish for the harm caused others. But we do so hold now.”).
47 Id. at 355.
48 Id. at 357.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 358.
51 Id.
52 Williams, 549 U.S. at 358 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53 Williams, 549 U.S. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
54 Williams, 549 U.S. at 362 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
(2) the Court has drawn an elusive and unjustifiable distinction between the impermissibility of punishing for nonparty harm and adding damages for increased reprehensibility demonstrated by nonparty harm; and (3) the core of the Court’s due-process doctrine on punitive damages is about substantive due process and excessiveness, and it is unwise to break new ground as the Court has here.

For our purposes, (2) is the most important. Justice Stevens’s paragraph encapsulating this critique is the most often quoted by those scholars who criticize the Court’s decision:

While apparently recognizing the novelty of its holding, the majority relies on a distinction between taking third-party harm into account in order to assess the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct—which is permitted—from doing so in order to punish the defendant “directly”—which is forbidden. The nuance eludes me. When a jury increases a punitive damages award because injuries to third parties enhanced the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the jury is by definition punishing the defendant—directly—for third-party harm. A murderer who kills his victim by throwing a bomb that injures dozens of bystanders should be punished more severely than one who harms no one other than his intended victim. Similarly, there is no reason why the measure of the appropriate punishment for engaging in a campaign of deceit in distributing a poisonous addictive substance to thousands of cigarette smokers statewide should not include consideration of the harm to those “bystanders” as well as the harm to the individual plaintiff.55

2. Justice Thomas’s Dissent

Justice Thomas dissented separately in order to reiterate his opposition to constitutional review of the size of punitive-damages awards based on the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.56 While Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court styled itself as “procedural” rather than comfortably embracing the “substantive” label that Justice Stevens prefers, Justice Thomas registered his opinion that the different word choice concealed an underlying commonality between the Court’s approach in this case and its approach to prior cases, which he (along with Justice Scalia) vigorously opposed. “It matters not that the Court styles today’s holding as ‘procedural’ because the ‘procedural’ rule is simply a confusing implementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has created for punitive damages.”57

By far the most notable feature of Justice Thomas’s dissent is what is missing: Justice Scalia’s agreement. The originalist approach to the Due Process Clause is of course the hallmark of Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Haslip and his dissents in BMW and State Farm; indeed, it is a hallmark of Justice Scalia’s originalism more generally. It is tempting to infer that Justice Scalia may be closer in his view of due process in Williams to that of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito; he may regard the difference between procedural due process and substantive due process as significant at least in the context of this litigation in the state of Oregon, which has a split-recovery statute.58 Justice Scalia’s decision to join Justice Ginsburg’s dissent (see below) is consistent with the possibility that he regards the procedural due-process line on punitive damages, in states with newfangled punitive-damages law, as consistent with originalism.

3. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent

Justice Ginsburg’s opinion may not be as conciliatory as it appears; it is unclear. It asserts that she agrees with the Court’s recognition of the role of nonparty harm to the issue of reprehensibility. However, once the Court decided to permit nonparty harm to come into play, the opinion contends, the Court has undermined any reasons for criticizing the Oregon Supreme Court. Like Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg seemed to balk at the idea that there is a difference between punishing indirectly, through the added reprehensibility nonparty harm indicates, and punishing directly for injuring nonparties.

Justice Ginsburg’s skepticism about the Court’s distinction becomes clearer with her second argument: that the only issue preserved by Philip Morris on appeal regarding nonparty harm is the issue of whether the trial court erred by declining to give Philip Morris’s proposed jury instruction. The proposed instruction cautioned the jury that they may consider nonparty harm in determining the reasonable relationship between the punishment of Philip Morris and the harm caused to the party, Jesse Williams, but “you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons. . . .”59

Her criticism echoes Justice Stevens’s: “Under that charge, just what use could the jury properly make of ‘the extent of harm suffered by others’? The answer slips from my grasp. A judge seeking to enlighten rather than confuse surely would resist delivering the directed charge.”59 In a piece of the analysis that figured significantly in oral argument and anticipated subsequent proceedings in the Oregon Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg opined that an affirmance, not a remand, was in order because the only argument Philip Morris had preserved

55. Id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 363 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting App. 280a).
59. Id. at 363 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
on appeal pertained to the rejected jury instruction, which the trial judge correctly decided.

C. WILLIAMS ON REMAND IN OREGON AND IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S 2008 TERM

The Oregon Supreme Court was plainly disconcerted to find itself with Williams again; equally plainly, the Court did not feel it needed to waste much time or energy on remand. It simply reaffirmed the rejection of Philip Morris’s appeal notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s critique of its analytical framework and consequent remand. 60 The Oregon Supreme Court used its special competency in Oregon law to narrow the grounds of the appeal. It first reasoned that, since Philip Morris had not objected to the instructions actually given, it could not appeal the instructions given, only the refusal to give its proposed instruction. The Court then reasoned, critically, that refusal to give the instruction would not have been an error unless the instruction was completely correct. “In Oregon, there is a well-understood standard governing claims of error respecting a trial judge’s refusal to give a proffered instruction: An appellate court will not reverse a trial court’s refusal to give a proposed jury instruction, unless the proposed instruction was “clear and correct in all respects, both in form and in substance, and . . . altogether free from error.” 61

Its resolution of the issue therefore turned on whether Philip Morris’s proposed nonparty-harm rule was correct in all respects and free from error. The Oregon Supreme Court easily concluded that, as a matter of Oregon law, the proposed instruction was incorrect in many respects. It therefore rejected Philip Morris’s appeal and affirmed the punitive damages verdict. 62

Philip Morris petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari again on two issues:

1. Whether, after this Court has adjudicated the merits of a party’s federal claim and remanded the case to state court with instructions to “apply” the correct constitutional standard, the state court may interpose - for the first time in the litigation - a state-law procedural bar that is neither firmly established nor regularly followed.

2. Whether a punitive-damages award that is 97 times the compensatory damages may be upheld on the ground that the reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct can “override” the constitutional requirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to the plaintiff’s harm. 63

The Supreme Court granted certiorari but limited it to the first issue. 64 Oral argument took place on December 3, 2008, but on March 31, 2009, the Court dismissed the petition as improvidently granted in a one-sentence per curiam order. 65

III. TROUBLES WITH WILLIAMS

Justice Breyer offered two arguments for the statement that it is a violation of due process to permit the jury to punish the defendant for injuring nonparties, but neither is persuasive. The first is that Philip Morris ought to be able to defend itself against the charges that it has caused injury to nonparties, and their nonparty status renders this procedurally infeasible. The problem with this superficially plausible complaint is that, while the right to defend oneself against the charge of having wronged another by litigating against the alleged victim is highly relevant if the issue involves liability for the costs of that victim’s injury, the reason for that appears to be the relevance of the connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the victim’s alleged damages. The existence of the harm goes to damages and requires litigating against the victim; the connection between the wrongdoing and the harm is an issue of causation, and again requires the victim. The entitlement of the victim to shift these costs is under attack when affirmative defenses are being considered and again requires litigating against the victim. But all of these appear irrelevant if the issue is whether the defendant should be punished for the wrongdoing rather than whether the defendant should be held responsible for the harm inflicted upon the plaintiff. Perhaps the most powerful proof of this point is that a crime victim is not a party to a criminal prosecution.

The second argument is that the number of nonparties and the extent of their harm is too vague for due-process standards, and therefore the defendant cannot be punished for the harm to nonparties. But then it is entirely perplexing why the number of nonparties and extent of harm should be permitted to come in under the guise of reprehensibility. If punishment can be extended for added reprehensibility, and number and extent of harm is a permissible basis for inferring added reprehensibility, then the same vagueness problem exists.

There are other problems with the Court’s opinion in Philip Morris, and they exist at many levels. For one thing, although the Court does acknowledge that some of its earlier decisions—including BMW v. Gore—appear to treat the inclusion of nonparty harm as an entirely normal and unobjectionable aspect of state tort law, it does so almost grudgingly, making little effort to be candid about the mixed messages of prior decisions or about the need for an increasingly pro-defendant line on this point. The larger concern on this point is a federalist one: inclusion of nonparty harm frequently is a feature—and an accepted feature—of state tort law of punitive damages; the better entrenched, utilized, and recognized an aspect of state tort law, the higher the demand for a genuinely thought

61. Williams, 176 P.3d at 1261 (quoting Beglau v. Albertus, 536 P.2d 1251 (Or. 1975)).
62. Id. at 1263-64.
64. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 2904 (June 9, 2008) (granting certiorari on first issue only).
through constitutional basis for deeming it impermissible.

Perhaps the largest problem is whether the Court has a genuine basis for its subtle distinction between the impermissibility of increasing punitive damages because one is punishing for injuries to nonparties and the permissibility of increasing punitive damages because the harm to other parties displays added reprehensibility of the conduct that injured the plaintiff. Justice Stevens openly displayed complete disbelief on this point, and leading commentators have shared this assessment.\(^66\)

Justice Breyer anticipated Stevens’s criticism, but neither of his responses to it is persuasive. One is that recidivists can be punished more seriously because of prior conduct that is not part of the particular crime at issue; the prior wrongful conduct seems, in some sense, to be a ground for deeming the reprehensibility level to be higher.\(^67\) This is an unhelpful point because the prior conduct will have been subjected to appropriate procedural safeguards, unlike that which is permitted in the punitive context. More helpful, it seems, is Breyer’s recognition that

\[\text{evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible—although counsel may argue in a particular case that conduct resulting in no harm to others nevertheless posed a grave risk to the public, or the converse. Yet for the reasons given above, a jury may not go further than this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to have visited on nonparties.}\(^68\)

The problem is that Breyer’s distinction seems to become unimportant, to the point of triviality, in certain contexts, and Williams—indeed, most punitive damages cases involving large manufacturers—involves exactly that context. If the defendant’s knowledge or tortious marketing of a dangerous product to a large group is in question, then the magnitude of the risk generated by that marketing campaign is relevant to the reprehensibility of the marketing campaign. So long as the number of people injured can be used to demonstrate the magnitude of the risk generated, then the number of people injured can be used to demonstrate the reprehensibility of the conduct. Moreover, punishing the defendant for conduct that was particularly reprehensible because it generated such a high amount of risk—and showing that by indicating how many people were injured—appears only marginally different than punishing them for injuring the others. After all, one might think, what we are really punishing when we punish for injuring people is the conduct that injured the people, not the fact of their having been injured. If the conduct that injured or killed the plaintiff was the conduct that injured all of these others, and that conduct was more reprehensible because of its demonstrated potentiality to injure others, then its having injured others is going to come into the reprehensibility analysis.

Although lower courts will soon be forced to deal with the problems inherent in Williams’s lack of clarity, they have not thus far faced huge challenges. That is due largely to a peculiar and perhaps intentional feature of the Court’s decision in Williams: while it crafted a potentially broad due-process right of defendants to be judged by properly instructed juries, the Court included language that could be interpreted as suggesting there would be no violation of such a right unless the defendant had proffered an appropriately protective jury instruction which the lower court wrongly rejected.\(^69\) If this is so, then for any appeal based on litigation before Williams there is unlikely to be any viable due-process claim unless the defendant at the time of trial anticipated the Court’s ruling in Williams and proposed jury instructions suited to this anticipated decision. Unsurprisingly, this rarely occurred. Hence, a number of cases appealed since Williams have been affirmed on the ground that no proper jury instruction was requested by the defendant.\(^70\)

The protection of plaintiffs stemming from pre-Williams requests for jury instructions will only last so long, of course. Indeed, today’s defense lawyers are bound to be offering a wide variety of Williams-crafted jury instructions and motions more generally, some dictated by incontrovertible readings of the opinion, some by more aggressive and pro-defendant readings. At a minimum, courts are to instruct a jury, at least when requested, that when nonparty harm is used for reprehensibility, the jury must be cautioned not to punish the defendant for causing nonparty harm. Part IV, which follows, sketches an explanation of what this could mean and why it is justifiable.

\(^66\) See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip Morris v. Williams, 27 REV. LITIG. 9, 30 (2007). But see Mark A. Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 263 (2008) (offering an entirely different way of justifying the Court’s effort to split these issues).

\(^67\) Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 357 (citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995)).

\(^68\) Id. at 355.

\(^69\) Id. at 337 (“where the risk of that misunderstanding is a significant one—because, for instance, of the sort of evidence that was introduced at trial or the kinds of argument the plaintiff made to the jury—a court, upon request, must protect against that risk.”). The words “upon request” may create the impression that there is a requirement of a request of some sort of precaution. However, in just the prior sentence the Court had indicated a broader-sounding duty: “state courts cannot authorize procedures that create an unreasonable and unnecessary risk” that juries will punish defendants for injuring nonparties under “the rubric of reprehensibility.”

\(^70\) See Part VI.B, infra.
We must begin with the reality that punitive-damages awards in virtually every state today can, and often do, involve a compound of different legal principles.

of view of constitutional doctrine:

Simple public-sanction/private-damages dichotomy:
Since punitive damages involve the state’s imposition of a punitive sanction upon a defendant for an especially wrongful act, punitive damages are properly subjected to whatever heightened level of constitutional scrutiny is applicable to state punishments and punitive sanctions for wrongful conduct.

There is substantial legal plausibility to the idea that punitive damages are enough like punishments that the constitutional safeguards provided to criminal defendants should be applied to defendants facing claims for punitive damages by private plaintiffs. Indeed, in the years preceding the Court’s early decisions on punitive damages, a small but significant cluster of analytically impressive articles made essentially that point.71 But every judge and lawyer should also see that the Supreme Court has never adopted this view, and has, in fact, adopted a civil framework for understanding punitive damages that does not demand criminal procedural safeguards. Moreover, the Supreme Court (like the overwhelming majority of state courts) seems to have looked the quasi-criminal aspects of punitive damages straight in the eye and decided that while they might be something of a civil/criminal hybrid, they shall be regarded as civil damages for constitutional purposes.72 And so it is natural to reject the public-sanction/private-damages dichotomy as the foundation for analyzing the constitutional status of punitive damages, putting to an end the hope that such a simple observation will really clarify matters.

In recent years, I—and a handful of other scholars of torts, legal history, and constitutional law, including Judge Guido Calabresi and Professors Colby, Goldberg, Markel, and Sebok—have decided to give the public-sanction/private-damages dichotomy a second look.73 I believe the results have been fruitful, and lead, somewhat surprisingly, back to this simple idea as the way to understand the constitutional status of punitive damages. But the idea cannot remain quite so straightforward if it is to withstand serious evaluation, and indeed there is a variety of different academic accounts of punitive damages, each with its own complications. However, the gist of the analysis can be stated quite simply.

We must begin with the reality that punitive-damages awards in virtually every state today can, and often do, involve a compound of different legal principles: they frequently embody both a state-imposed sanction and a private-damages award intended as part of the remedy to which the injured plaintiff is entitled.74

Second, the idea that a punitive-damages award offers a means of deterring corporate actors from engaging in public wrongs is largely a development of the twentieth century, and—while it may have been well-motivated—can nevertheless be understood as a graft of something foreign onto the traditional common-law conception of punitive damages, not within the core notion of punitive damages before that time.75 By contrast, the notion of permitting a private plaintiff to be vindicated by allowing her to exact damages beyond what is needed to make herself whole when she was wronged in a particularly willful or wanton manner lies at the common-law core of punitive damages.76 While both of these ideas are


72. In Haslip, Justice Blackmun wrote for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens: “It is true, of course, that under Alabama law, as under the law of most States, punitive damages are imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence. [ ] They have been described as quasi-criminal. [ ] But this itself does not provide the answer.” Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, at 19 (citations omitted).


75. Goldberg, supra note 73.

76. Id. Zipursky, supra note 11, at 151-55. Sebok, supra note 73, at 983-1008.
about being punitive and deterring powerful actors by communicating that they will be held accountable, the more traditional one is really intended predominantly to supplement the private redress to which a victim is normally entitled, while the more modern notion is intended to supplement state enforcement efforts by adding sanctions through tort law. I will refer to the former, more traditional model, as “the private-redress model” and the latter, more modern one, as “the public-sanction model.”

The third point is that the private-redress model is on a different constitutional footing than the public-sanction model both as a historical matter and as a political theoretic matter. Professor Colby’s version of this point was sufficiently powerfully made to attract the attention of the Fifth District Court of Appeals in California. Historically, the “grandfathering” of punitive damages under the Due Process Clause makes some sense if the phrase “punitive damages” today refers to the same principles and forms of law that existed when the clause was ratified; it makes little sense if it is entirely different legal creature hiding behind the same words. And as a political theoretic matter—as I have argued at length elsewhere—the state’s involvement when it is exacting damages from an individual in order to empower the victim of a wrong is quite different than when it is doing so as a matter of sanctioning actors for violating state-created legal rules of conduct. It is justifiable that our requirements of due process are different, and more modest, when the state is playing its role in facilitating a plaintiff’s efforts to achieve private redress than when it is imposing sanctions albeit through the efforts of private parties.

The most striking difference in constitutional safeguards has to do with notice of which conduct will warrant state sanction and which sanction, or range of sanctions, the defendant will be subjected to. Criminal law has exacting versions of such standards; the common law of torts is evolutionary, incremental, and depends on individual damages awards, and our constitutional system has always deemed that adequate. Regulations lie in-between; substantial notice of the nature of conduct prohibited and the magnitude of the sanctions is required. State law that fails this test is void for vagueness. Thus, where the state is doing public-sanction imposition without adequate delineation of prohibited conduct or range of permissible sanctions (thereby granting the jury too much discretion to impose a monetary penalty), there is a procedural due-process problem.

B. THE NONPARTY-HARM RULE AS A PUBLIC SANCTION DETECTION TEST

In every jurisdiction that has what I am calling “compound” punitive-damages law, different verdicts may embody quite different proportions (so to speak) of the two models, and some do so quite clearly while others remain quite ambiguous. Even where a jurisdiction openly embraces a public-sanction justification for its punitive-damages law, it may well be that jurors in a particular case are conceiving the punitive damages on a private-redress model. Conversely, in jurisdictions where courts have not gone out of their way to direct jurors to a public-sanction model, plaintiffs’ lawyers and the narrative of the litigation may have done effectively the same thing, and in such cases, the state’s enforcement of a judgment on a jury verdict must be understood as involving the public-sanction model. BMW v. Gore was such a case, as I have argued elsewhere. Other cases are quite ambiguous. In these, it is clear enough that the jury wished the defendant to be deterred as well as wishing the plaintiff to be afforded greater redress. But it is not clear whether the legal system is essentially想象 imagining giving the plaintiff a higher verdict in order that she or he be empowered to exact damages because of the wrong to her or him or whether the jury is understanding the state to be, in effect, kicking in its own public-sanction system, regardless of whether the victim is entitled to that redress.

The constitutional status of the award turns on this. If the state is simply empowering a private plaintiff to exact greater damages in order to recognize a heightened level of redress, there is no ground for altering the constitutional scrutiny to which defendant is entitled from that which state tort law ordinarily provides. However, if the plaintiff’s lawsuit is in part a vehicle for the state to impose its own public sanctions, then greater constitutional safeguards are in order. That is the constitutional defect.

The framework just elaborated raises a critical question in a wide swath of cases: Is the verdict part state-imposed public sanction or not? If it is, and the state supplied only its usual process for tort plaintiffs, then the process was constitutionally inadequate. If not—if the entire verdict could plausibly be

77. See Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793 (Ct. App. 2003) (applying Colby’s theory). The California Supreme Court expressly rejected Colby’s theory in reversing a case similar to Romo. See note 98, infra, for further discussion.
78. Zipursky, supra note 11, at 143; Colby, supra note 73, at 650.
79. Zipursky, supra note 11, at 164-68.
83. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); BMW, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 42-48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor referred to this as a “void-for-vagueness” problem; the phrase may seem superficially awkward because, in most states, there is no statute governing punitive damages imposition (and, a fortiori, no statute whose wording is too vague). But so much the worse, of course, for the alleged ground of the public sanction—there is not even a statute.
84. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, at 161-64.
In short, a “public-sanction detection test” is needed.

understood as simply private redress—then there is no need, as a constitutional matter, for better defined constraints on conduct definition or sanction levels. The answer to the question therefore determines whether there is a procedural due-process problem.

There are four different kinds of frameworks that a court asked to do constitutional review of punitive damages might adopt. The simplest would be to assume, in a spirit of deference to state courts and anxiety about drawing the distinction, that all punitive damages should be understood to be more or less exclusively a version of what was contemplated in the common law of the nineteenth century: as a part of individual private redress (albeit sometimes aimed at deterrence or making an example of a defendant). In this case, there would be no basis for constitutional review, at least on the analysis offered. The dissenters in BMW appear to have favored this view.

The polar opposite approach would be to assume that no punitive-damages awards in today’s legal system are exclusively of the private-redress type. On that view, all are to that degree in need of greater process than they receive. Justice O’Connor’s Haslip dissent can be interpreted as taking this view. Had it been adopted by the majority in Haslip, it would have entailed an immediate crisis of constitutionality for punitive damages in every jurisdiction.

If neither of these extremes is selected, then what is needed is an intermediate position that would require the Court to articulate a criterion or criteria for determining whether a given award should be understood as, at least in part, a public sanction. In short, a “public-sanction detection test” is needed. Here again one is faced with a choice: should the criteria be facial or contextual or a combination of the two? By “facial” (in this context) I mean that a court could take stock of concrete changes that have been made in various jurisdictions in the structure of their punitive-damages law as possible grounds for an across-the-board recategorization of the awards in that state. Thus, for example, a state’s decision to funnel punitive-damages awards to the state revenue would be a strong basis for inferring that all of the awards in that state are conceived of as, at least in part, public sanctions; in this scenario, all should be subject to void-for-vagueness scrutiny.

A contextual public-sanction detection test, by contrast, would aim to evaluate the evidence presented to the jury, the narrative presented to the jury, the instruction of the jury by the Court, and the verdict the jury arrived at. This evaluation would help ascertain whether the jury’s damages award is plausibly understood as simply a judgment by the jury of what the plaintiff was entitled to exact from the defendant as a matter of private redress for the wrong done to him or whether it must be understood, at least in part, as the delivery of a public sanction. If the result is the latter, then the award violates due process because the tort process fails, on void-for-vagueness grounds, to comply with what the Constitution requires of public sanctions.

The nonparty-harm rule of Williams may be seen as a contextual public-sanction detection test. Where the jury is asked to punish the defendant for harm to nonparties, the punitive damages are plainly aimed as something beyond redress for the injury done to the private plaintiff. They are specifically about the injury done to others, not the injury done to the plaintiff. Thus, we must infer that the award is intended in part as a public sanction. But if this is so, then the tort process is not enough, and there is a procedural due-process violation.

The Court in Williams was interestingly misled by the procedural soundness of the nonparty-harm rule to think that the procedural defect was the very same attribute that made the punitive-damages award detectable as a public sanction: the additional, nonjoined persons whom the plaintiff is alleging which eight Justices deemed appropriate in Haslip.

The proposal here is that live Justices in the Williams majority can be understood as implicitly setting forth conditions on when they will be willing to indulge the Haslip majority presumption that punitive damages are operating as private redress, and when they will no longer be willing to indulge that presumption, and will, instead, treat punitive damages as public sanctions. Notably, two of the Justices who joined the Court’s opinion in BMW—Souter and (again) O’Connor—embraced the discretion-curbing conception of due process as applicable to punitive damages awards in Justice Breyer’s concurrence. Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in State Farm displays perhaps the Court’s most vigorous expression to date of concern over the unchanneled discretion applied by the Utah jury to the punitive-damages award in that case and therefore seemed to regard punitive-damages awards as properly susceptible to vagueness-based procedural due-process challenges. Although Justice O’Connor is no longer on the Court, the other three—Justice Breyer, Justice Souter, and Justice Kennedy—were the very three members of the Rehnquist Court whom Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were willing to join. Of the eight Justices voting against the petitioner in Haslip, only three remain: Justice Kennedy (who has become an impassioned critic of punitive damages), Justice Stevens, and Justice Scalia. The latter two are, of course, part of the dissent in Williams.


86. Because the foregoing analysis obviously seizes upon a void-for-vagueness procedural due-process critique of punitive damages, it may seem to be inconsistent with current Supreme Court doctrine. After all, the Court’s opinion in Haslip expressly rejected a void-for-vagueness challenge. Only Justice O’Connor was willing to embrace the void-for-vagueness critique.

Reading too much significance into the 8-1 ruling in Haslip is a mistake of black-and-white thinking. The framework I have laid out contemplates that not all punitive damages awards fall into the same constitutional category. That is, of course, just the point. While there are some punitive damages awards that are fairly viewed as purely a matter of private redress, there are others that are not fairly so viewed and those must be viewed as, at least in part, public sanction. The Haslap Court did not reject this view; it did not even address this question. There is no reason to attribute to those Justices an opinion on whether punitive damages can be viewed as coming in different types and whether, if so, some of the types should be subject to a different level of scrutiny than that
were harmed by the defendant and in light of whom extra damages ought to be imposed. That was a mistake. The nonjoiner of nonparties simply makes it clear that the state is imposing damages on defendant for injuring someone but not as a matter of permitting the victim/plaintiff to redress the wrong to her; it follows that the state is permitting the imposition of damages as a state-imposed sanction, not as private redress. But once we know that, we know there are more fundamental procedural due-process violations, viz., those sounding in void-for-vagueness doctrine.

**C. THE REPREHENSIBILITY CRITIQUE REVISITED**

Let us now turn to the “reprehensibility” critiques, both theoretical and practical. The theoretical critique said that it was incoherent to forbid inflation of punitive damages on a one-step route in which the defendant is punished for injuring nonparties, while simultaneously permitting punitive-damages inflation on a two-step reprehensibility route. On the two-step route, the jury is permitted to inflate punitive damages in light of the added reprehensibility of defendant’s conduct, and it is permitted to find the defendant’s conduct more reprehensible because the defendant injured nonparties. Either way, injuring nonparties leads to greater punitive damages, the argument goes.

The critique is easily met on the public-sanction-detection-test theory. Reprehensibility is relevant to punitive damages both within the private-redress model and within the public-sanction theory, but a threshold question must be answered either way: which of the defendant’s allegedly reprehensible acts is the jury to be evaluating? Trivially, the answer is this: whichever act is the basis of defendant’s liability is the act whose reprehensibility is to be evaluated for punitive damages. The reprehensibility evaluation on the public-sanction model targets whatever acts the defendant is being sanctioned for. The sanction can be imposed for injury to nonparties, or even for conduct that is considered only on the basis of its potential (but unrealized) impact, not its actual impact. For example, inchoate crimes including attempts and conspiracy can be penalized, so can the act of risking injury to a wide range of people. By contrast, on the private-redress model, the focus is much narrower: the act whose reprehensibility is to be evaluated is the wronging of the plaintiff. It is the latter that should guide the reprehensibility analysis given the logic ascribed to the majority in *Williams*.

Contrary to what Justice Stevens asserted, then, harm to nonparties is not directly relevant to the reprehensibility analysis. Although harm to nonparties might be directly relevant on the public-sanction model, it is not directly relevant on the private-redress model, and the latter is what should count. If it is relevant at all on the private-redress model, it is indirectly relevant. Greater injury to nonparties can display greater riskiness, which in turn could entail greater reprehensibility. But we need to be more careful here because the act of risking is not the basis of liability; the act of tortiously injuring is the basis of liability. Does the reprehensibility of the tortious injuring of the plaintiff change depending on how risky the conduct was and how many others were injured? Perhaps. If, for example, a defendant sold a product knowing full well that the same product had killed hundreds of people in the past, that action is more reprehensible than selling a product that occasionally has caused some health problems. Prior injury to nonparties, if the defendant knew of it or remained willfully blind to such injuries, is evidence that the defendant recklessly injured the plaintiff, rather than negligently doing so, for example. Indeed, actual or constructive knowledge of prior injury to nonparties is grounds for ratcheting up the reprehensibility of the manner in which the defendant injured the plaintiff.

On the other hand, concurrent or subsequent injury to nonparties will typically not be relevant to the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct under the private-redress model. Ordinarily, it will not tend to show any greater degree of recklessness or indifference in the risks that the defendant was taking toward the plaintiff when the defendant tortiously injured him. For the same reason, past injuries of which the defendant neither was aware nor should have been aware will not ordinarily be relevant to the reprehensibility of the defendant’s wrongdoing of the plaintiff. The reprehensibility of the defendant’s injuring of the plaintiff does not lie in the riskiness of the conduct per se but in the riskiness willfully or recklessly undertaken.

For related reasons, there are some cases in which the reprehensibility concept within the private-redress model will not justify admitting evidence of prior nonparty harm and will not justify attention within a jury instruction. If the defendant has already admitted knowledge of the degree of riskiness of the conduct in question or if the evidence of prior nonparty harm does not in any way add to the extent of evidence on that issue, then the defendant may well have a sound argument for excluding such evidence. It is not simply its duplication that might warrant exclusion, but also the risk that it will be considered for the wrong reasons altogether; that defendant will be punished for injuring nonparties. If that is occurring, then punitive damages are functioning as a public sanction, and less deferential standards of process are applicable; the law is void for vagueness.

Evidence of nonparty harm will often be probative of several issues in a tort action, and when that is true, it should normally not be excluded. In some of these scenarios, it might be appropriate to caution the jury not to punish for harm to nonparties, but it would be unnecessary or even confusing in others. Imagine, for example, that a certain plaintiff is suing a defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer alleging the product caused him to develop heart disease. In most jurisdictions, the standard for design defect requires the jury to perform a risk/utility test regarding the products design (as compared to alternative designs). In this context, it might well be permissible for the plaintiff to introduce evidence that the design feature that causes heart problems has also caused birth defects when a woman taking the product becomes pregnant. The harm to infants who are in no way related to the litigation is therefore relevant to liability. Whether the jury is likely to consider such evidence in imposing punitive damages without a
caution is questionable, given that the harmful effect he suffered is quite different. Similarly, evidence of others suffering heart disease from a drug with the same chemical makeup might well be relevant to general causation (i.e., this compound can cause this disease), even if the drug were made by a different manufacturer. Again, nonparty harm is probative, but there is little chance the defendant would be punished for harm caused by another manufacturer if that harm were only introduced for showing general causation. A cautionary instruction might be unnecessarily confusing or counterproductive as it may suggest a line of inference that would not have crossed the jury's mind in the first place.

By contrast, suppose that there is evidence that this manufacturer's drug caused prior injuries to nonparties, introduced to show general causation, design defect, and awareness of the risks of the drug. Here, the jury might well be drawn to punishing for the injury to nonparties, and more generally to punishing for the risky course of conduct. It should be cautioned that it is relevant to punitive damages only to the extent that it bears on the reprehensibility of the defendant's injuring the plaintiff through this course of conduct.

On rare occasions, there may be cases in which harm to nonparties—even concurrent or subsequent harm to nonparties—would be relevant in a quite different way to the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; in the cases I am envisioning, harm to nonparties might be probative of what it is the defendant actually did. Thus, for example, suppose the defendant surreptitiously put some alcohol in a punch that he believed the unsuspecting plaintiff would drink at a social event, and plaintiff was hospitalized after drinking the punch. Imagine that the defendant and the plaintiff dispute how great a risk the defendant was taking for the plaintiff (and therefore how reprehensible his injuring of her was). Under these circumstances, a relatively high number of other involuntarily intoxicated event attendees who drank the punch would be indirectly relevant to the reprehensibility of defendant's conduct toward the plaintiff, because it would shed light on how much alcohol defendant had put in the punch, and, in turn, how great a risk to the plaintiff the defendant had deliberately taken.

V. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AFTER WILLIAMS
The Model Jury Instructions published in several states and circuits have made an effort to incorporate the lessons of Williams. Below is a sampling from Ohio, California, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

Ohio's Model Jury Instructions—as updated in August of 2008—include the following:

6. DAMAGES TO NON-PARTIES (ADDITIONAL). Evidence was introduced that (insert name of defendant)'s conduct has resulted in harm to persons other than (insert name of plaintiff). This evidence may only be considered for the purpose of helping you decide whether (insert name of defendant) showed a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that had a great probability of causing substantial harm. However, you are not to punish (insert name of defendant) for the direct harm his/her/its alleged misconduct caused to other persons.87

California's are quite different:
In arriving at any award of punitive damages, consider the following factors:

(1) The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant;
(2) The amount of punitive damages which will have a deterrent effect on the defendant in the light of defendant's financial condition;
(3) That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation to the injury, harm, or damage [actually] suffered by the plaintiff.

[The phrase “injury, harm, or damage” includes not only that actually caused by the defendant's conduct but also potential injury, harm, or damage caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct.]

[If you find that defendant had a practice of engaging in, and profiting from wrongful conduct [occurring in California] similar to that which injured the plaintiff, that evidence may be considered in deciding the issues of reprehensibility, whether punitive damages should be assessed, and if so, the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. Do not include in your award of damages any sum that represents damages for injuries to any person other than the plaintiff[s].]88

The Eighth Circuit's Instructions read in part:
If you decide to award punitive damages, you should consider the following in deciding the amount of punitive damages to award:
1. how [reprehensible] [bad] [offensive] the defendant's conduct was. In this regard, you may consider whether the harm suffered by the plaintiff was physical or economic or both; whether there was violence, deceit, intentional malice, reckless disregard for human health or safety; whether others were harmed by the same conduct of the defendant that harmed the plaintiff; and whether there was any repetition of the wrongful conduct and past conduct of the sort that harmed the plaintiff;
2. how much harm actually resulted to the plaintiff, [but not to others,] from the defendant's wrongful conduct [and not from the defendant's general conduct].89

One thing that can be said in favor of all of these model instructions is that they are less confusing than that which Philip Morris proffered in Williams, which read in part: “The size of any punishment should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm caused to Jesse Williams by the defendant's punishable misconduct.

While Justice Stevens was probably right to point out the great (and perhaps elusive) nuance of the distinction between punishing for harming others (which is impermissible, according to the majority) and finding greater reprehensibility because of harm to others (which is permissible), that distinction was not really the principal problem of Philip Morris’s instruction. The problem was that these issues were further entangled by the concept of a “reasonable relationship” between the punishment of Philip Morris and the harm to Jesse Williams. Presumably, Philip Morris was conceding that the damages could be greater where there was greater reprehensibility but was trying to insist that the relationship to actual harm (ratio) must remain reasonable. However, that message is itself quite complicated. Merging that idea with the subtle distinction noted by Justice Stevens was simply too confusing. All three of the model instructions quoted above avoid that pitfall. California’s even manages to do so while retaining the concept of a “reasonable relationship,” prudently set forth in a different portion of the instruction.

None of the instructions set out above is patently in conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams; indeed, all three are plainly designed to conform to Williams, and all three do conform to what might be called “the letter of Williams.” Whether they conform to the spirit of Williams is a question that cannot really be answered without the imposition of a theoretical framework upon the quite sparse majority opinion. From the perspective of the framework put forth in this article, all three are vulnerable to criticism.

The Eighth Circuit describes a very broad domain of conduct that may be considered with regard to the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct. There is no limitation on where the conduct took place. Past and subsequent conduct is included. It is permissible to include harm to others in considering reprehensibility, but there is no effort by the Eighth Circuit to specify the reasons that this is relevant to reprehensibility.

California’s instruction is both better and worse on this question. It is (arguably) better because only conduct in California is to be considered and because harm to others is not specifically mentioned as relevant (which reduces confusion). It is worse, however, because the jury is told that they are entitled to consider the question of whether there is a pattern of conduct by defendant. This suggests two quite concerning points: first, that the wrongs-to-others point is not being used to ascertain the level of risk generated by the act that injured plaintiff—Justice Breyer’s explanation of why it is relevant to reprehensibility; second, that the wrongs-to-others point is being used to invite the jury to punish the defendant for a RICO-like “pattern of conduct” rather than for the particular act or acts that injured the plaintiff. In short, it actually looks more like an instruction directing the jury to punish in the spirit of a “public sanction.”

Of the three instructions offered here, Ohio’s is clearly the closest to the theoretical model proposed in this article. It also appears to be the shortest, the clearest, and the most likely to be digestible and helpful to juries: Evidence of harm to others cannot be the basis of extra punishment but can only be considered to help the jury decide whether the defendant “showed a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that had a great probability of causing substantial harm.” But it, too, is not beyond reproach. It does not mention risk itself but only conscious disregard of risk; while the theoretical model introduced here suggests this is a more defensible view, the view is farther, not closer, to what the Court’s opinion actually says. Relatedly, defense lawyers might argue from this instruction that jurors should not be permitted to consider injuries incurred by nonparties of which the defendant was not aware (or could not have been aware) prior to the conduct that injured the plaintiff, whether Ohio intended such a restrictive approach (which this article would likely favor, but the Court has not indicated) is unclear. Moreover, the instruction does not define reprehensibility at a minimum, highly misleading, and is almost certainly incorrect. It seems self-evident that part of the reason for instructing the jury on “reasonable relationship” is that under both BMW and virtually every jurisdiction’s common law of excessiveness on punitive damages, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages is a consideration in assessing the permissibility of the award; “reasonable relationship” is a rough version of what courts think about when they assess the ratio. If that is so, however, then potential harm should stay out of the picture for it is clearly not what the higher courts—especially the Supreme Court—are including in the ratio assessment.

90. It is also of concern that the California instruction tells the jury that:

(3) That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation to the injury, harm, or damage [actually] suffered by the plaintiff.
[The phrase “injury, harm, or damage” includes not only that actually caused by the defendant’s conduct but also potential injury, harm, or damage caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct.]

It is true that punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation to the injury, harm, or damage suffered by the plaintiff, and it is true that the jury can consider the potential injury, harm, or damage caused by the defendant. But the conjunction of these two is, at a minimum, highly misleading, and is almost certainly incorrect. It seems self-evident that part of the reason for instructing the jury on “reasonable relationship” is that under both BMW and virtually every jurisdiction’s common law of excessiveness on punitive damages, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages is a consideration in assessing the permissibility of the award; “reasonable relationship” is a rough version of what courts think about when they assess the ratio. If that is so, however, then potential harm should stay out of the picture for it is clearly not what the higher courts—especially the Supreme Court—are including in the ratio assessment.

not indicate whether harm to others should be considered where the plaintiff's theory is that the defendant's conduct was intended to cause injury to the plaintiff; in such instances, punitives would be available but evidence of conscious disregard would seem irrelevant.

VI. POST-WILLIAMS CASE LAW: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION

While hundreds of courts have cited to Williams, far fewer courts have actually applied it, and fewer still have applied it with any care. This section reviews a (concededly unsystematic) selection of published decisions that apply Williams, subdividing the cases into the four topics that appear to be most worthy of attention: (1) whether the failure to provide a cautionary instruction of the sort favored by the Williams Court has generated a reversal, remand, or remittitur; (2) whether waiver and forfeiture arguments based on failure to proffer an adequate instruction will defeat a Williams-based appeal; (3) how courts treat the relationship between nonparty harm and reprehensibility; and (4) whether the Supreme Court's analysis of due process and punitive damages is perceived by lower courts as a relatively minor or a relatively major development for state punitive-damages law.

A. STRAIGHTFORWARD REVERSAL AND REMAND

Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.92 represents the post-Supreme Court victory that Philip Morris thought it should obtain in Oregon. As in the trial court in Williams, counsel for Philip Morris drafted a proposed jury instruction that cautioned the jury that it may not punish for harm to nonparties but may punish for reprehensibility. As in Williams, the trial judge refused the instruction, and the jury came in with a very large verdict. Philip Morris took the Supreme Court’s Williams opinion and used it to demand of the appellate court that the jury verdict be vacated in light of an improper refusal to give the proffered jury instruction, which seemed to track the principles laid out by the Court. Unlike the Supreme Court of Oregon, however, the California Court of Appeals accepted Philip Morris's argument and vacated the jury verdict on the ground that Philip Morris's proposed cautionary instruction ought to have been given. The case was remanded for a new trial on punitive damages.

Ford Motor Company similarly obtained a reversal and remand from a panel of the Ninth Circuit in White v. Ford Motor Company.93 In 1994, the plaintiffs’ three-year-old son was playing in his father’s Ford pickup truck, which was parked facing downhill in the family’s sloped driveway. He accidentally knocked the gearshift from first gear into neutral, and the parking brake did not hold. When the boy fell or climbed out of the rolling truck, he fell underneath the truck, and the parking brake did not hold. When the boy fell or climbed out of the rolling truck, he fell underneath the truck, which rolled over him and killed him. Based on evidence obtained during discovery documenting a known propensity for the parking break of this model to slip, leading to the truck rolls that caused damage, the Whites persuaded a jury that Ford should have recalled the truck or warned consumers of this danger, rather than consciously refusing to do either.

After a jury trial on liability, compensatory and punitive damages, a reversal and remand (prior to Williams), and a second jury trial on punitive damages, the District Court of Nevada generated a compensatory-damages award of $2.3 million and a punitive-damages award of $52 million. In the second trial, the plaintiffs’ counsel told the jury that Ford was aware of 54 people who had been injured by rollaways before 1999. Ford objected to the trial court’s jury instruction and “requested an instruction that would prevent the jury from punishing it ‘in this case not just for the harm to these plaintiffs, but for harm to other plaintiffs, whether in state or out of state.’”94 The district court refused to give the proposed instruction. Because of that refusal, the Ninth Circuit panel reversed and remanded with a direction that “the district court must explain to the jury that although evidence of harm to nonparties may bear on Ford’s reprehensibility, any award of punitive damages cannot be used to ‘punish [Ford] directly for harms to . . . non-parties.’”95

Fourteen years after the loss of their son, the White’s are still litigating this case against Ford; in that respect, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to remand a second time might seem remarkably accommodating to Ford under the circumstances. Nevertheless, the discussion in this article might also lead to the conclusion that district court, and even the Ninth Circuit, remained too accommodating to the plaintiffs in their treatment of punitive damages even in this last round. It is hard to see why rollover injuries occurring after 1994 should be deemed relevant to Ford’s reprehensibility for the purposes of punitive damages, but the district court permitted just this and the Ninth Circuit did not comment upon any problem. Post-Williams, defendants in Ford's situation should object to such inclusion. They have nothing to do with the reprehensibility of Ford's wrongdoing of the White child because they occurred after his accident.

B. WAIVED RIGHTS, FORFEITURE OF RIGHTS

There are other straightforward decisions to reverse and remand in light of refused jury instructions since Williams, but not many (at least among those in published reporters).96 The

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93. 500 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2007).
94. Id. at 972.
95. Id. at 973 (quoting Williams, 549 U.S. at 355).
96. See also Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2007), infra.
The Ninth Circuit had no trouble concluding that there was a real risk in this case that the jury punished the defendants for the harm they caused to nonparties.

Where the defendant did not propose nonparty-harm jury instructions of the right sort, plaintiffs will argue that the right to such an instruction was waived. Indeed, even where the defendant did propose such instructions, plaintiffs are likely to argue (as they did on remand in Williams), that the instructions proposed were not quite right and that the trial court’s rejection of them does not warrant remand. That is exactly the argument plaintiff Buell-Wilson made against Ford at the California Court of Appeal last year, and the Court of Appeal accepted the plaintiff’s argument. Thus, in Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., the appellate court expressed its approval of the trial judge’s rejection of Ford’s proposed Special Jury Instruction No. 21:

In determining the appropriate amount of punitive damages, if any, in this case, you may consider only the harm to the plaintiffs. Any individuals other than the plaintiffs who might claim to have been harmed by Ford have the right to bring their own lawsuit seeking damages for any alleged injuries they may have incurred. Therefore, if you decide to award any punitive damages, your award must be limited to redressing the injuries incurred only by the plaintiffs in this lawsuit.

The trial judge was right to reject this instruction, according to the appellate court, because the instruction “did not merely tell the jury it could not impose punishment for harm suffered by third parties. Rather, it told the jury it could not consider third party harm for any purpose, including in assessing the reprehensibility of Ford’s conduct.” The instruction ran afoul of Williams; indeed, its impermissibility was evident from the Supreme Court’s prior decision in State Farm. Moreover, it contradicted the trial court’s other instructions, which indicated that the jury should consider how reprehensible the defendant’s conduct was. In what can be read as a rather harsh comment on what it regarded as overreaching by Ford at trial, the appellate court concluded: “Thus, by proposing an instruction that was an incorrect and misleading statement of law, Ford has forfeited the right to assert instructional error before this court.”

The defendant Paul Revere Life Insurance Company overcame a similar forfeiture waiver argument before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit when it sought a Williams-based remand in Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.

97. In an unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit shows a striking lack of concern for a defendant who wished the district court to alter jury instructions based on Williams, which had been decided after the briefing before the district court. The defendant’s delay of a few weeks in writing a letter to the district court regarding the recently decided Williams played a role in the Tenth Circuit’s ruling; so, too, did its perception that the ruling in Williams was sufficiently telegraphed by State Farm to put the defendant on notice that it should request nonparty-harm instructions. Cook v. Medical Savings Ins. Co., 287 Fed. App’x. 657, 2008 WL 2805472 (10th Cir. 2008).

98. Indeed, Ford rather dramatically lost an argument quite like Williams in the California Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 113 P.3d 82 (Cal. 2005). In Johnson, Ford was defending an argument made successfully at the Court of Appeal for the 5th District that a plaintiff may not justify a $10 million punitive-damages award on a compensatory award of $17,811.60 by depicting the scope and profitability of the defendant’s fraudulent conduct. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283 (Ct. App. 2005). That decision, in turn, applied the reasoning of the same appellate court in Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793 (Ct. App. 2003). Romo expressly applied the theoretical analysis of Thomas H. Colby’s article, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003) [Colby, supra note 73]. To summarize: the Court of Appeals for the 5th District followed Colby on a nonparty-harm-type argument in Romo; the 5th District applied its own rule in Johnson; the California Supreme Court reversed the 5th District, indicating it was not persuaded by Colby or by the idea that the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt a nonparty harm-rule.

99. 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277 (Ct. App. 2008).

100. Buell-Wilson, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 324 (quoting Ford’s proposed Special Jury Instruction No. 21).

101. Id. at 326.

102. Id. at 326-27.


104. 500 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2007).
tion, which the district court rejected.\textsuperscript{105} The Ninth Circuit had no trouble concluding that there was a real risk in this case that the jury punished the defendants for the harm they caused to nonparties. And the court correctly noted that the defendant had made a timely request for a jury instruction to guard against such a risk. However, the court also credited the plaintiff’s argument that the proposed jury instruction was misleading because it did not indicate that harm to others may enter the reprehensibility analysis.\textsuperscript{106} This meant that the plaintiff had a reasonably good argument that the district court judge was right to reject the proposed jury instruction. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit ruled for defendant, reasoning that “where a proposed instruction is supported by law and not adequately covered by other instructions, the court should give a non-misleading instruction that captures the substance of the proposed instruction.”\textsuperscript{107} The court concluded that the failure to give a nonparty-harm instruction was therefore error, and remanded for a new trial on punitive damages.\textsuperscript{108}

More straightforward discussions of waiver are found in \textit{Rinehart v. Shelter General Ins. Co.},\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Kauffman v. Maxim Healthcare Servs. Inc.},\textsuperscript{110} and \textit{American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miell}.\textsuperscript{111} After noting that Philip Morris had requested a protective jury instruction in the trial court in \textit{Williams} and that the Supreme Court specifically indicated that a trial court must offer such protection “on request,”\textsuperscript{112} the \textit{Rinehart} court inferred that the defendant’s failure to request such an instruction at trial waived the right to raise the failure to give such an instruction on appeal; virtually the same analysis is articulated by the district court in \textit{Kauffman}, an employment-discrimination case.\textsuperscript{113} The district judge in \textit{Miell} noted that although the trial was held after \textit{Williams} was decided, and although Iowa Uniform Jury Instructions had already been amended to reflect \textit{Williams}, the jury was not instructed that it could consider defendant’s prior similar conduct or that it could not punish defendant for harm caused to others. The district court ruled, however, that the defendant waived the right to have such an instruction because the defendant failed to request it. Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2) sometimes permits a court to consider plain error notwithstanding a party’s failure to raise the issue, it does so only when the error affects substantial rights. The court rejected this argument because it determined that any mention of nonparty harm would have had little or no impact on the outcome.\textsuperscript{114}

\textit{Merrick} and \textit{Miell} are together quite illuminating but also create another puzzle about the path of \textit{Williams}. They are illuminating because they indicate that whether the defendant’s proposal of a protective jury instruction was exactly correct is not necessarily the beginning and end of whether the punitive damages award should be vacated under \textit{Williams} for lack of a protective jury instruction. \textit{Merrick} reasoned that a defendant’s proffer of a flawed instruction that captures an essential protection triggers an obligation in the court to craft an acceptable instruction capturing that protection; \textit{Miell} reasoned that a defendant’s failure to request a jury instruction will not relieve the court of an obligation to provide such an instruction if the protection is properly viewed as guarding substantial rights in the case before the court, but it concluded that the defendant had not met that standard or anything like it. What now appears odd, however, is the Oregon Supreme Court’s narrow focus in \textit{Williams} (on second remand) on the question of whether Philip Morris’s instruction was perfectly correct under Oregon law. As the discussion in Part II of this article indicates,\textsuperscript{115} the majority opinion in \textit{Williams} contains several holdings about the procedural due-process protection a defendant is entitled to with regard to punishment for nonparty harm; the right to a jury instruction when proposed is only the most specific of the holdings.

\section*{C. REPREHENSIBILITY}

Justice Stevens and the academic critiques of the majority suggest that the greatest problems in applying \textit{Williams} might involve reprehensibility.\textsuperscript{116} Several cases bear out that prediction. An unusual (and quite disturbing) example is \textit{Snyder v. Phelps},\textsuperscript{117} from the United States District Court in the District of Maryland. The litigation stems from a funeral at a Catholic church in the town of Westminster, Maryland, held for Matthew A. Snyder, the son of plaintiff Albert Snyder. Raised in Westminster, Matthew Snyder served as a Marine Lance Corporal in Iraq, where he was killed in the line of duty. Snyder was gay, which is what caught the attention of the defendants: Fred W. Phelps, his daughters Shirley Phelps-Roper, Rebekah Phelps-Davis, and Westboro Baptist Church, Inc. of Topeka, Kansas, which Phelps founded. Phelps and his church are anti-gay activists.\textsuperscript{118} The defendants traveled from Kansas to Maryland and brought members of the congregation

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{105}Id. at 1015. The proposed instruction was: “In deciding whether or in what amount to award punitive damages, you may consider only the specific conduct by Defendant that injured Plaintiff. You may not punish Defendants for conduct or practices that did not affect Plaintiff, even if you believe that such conduct or practices were wrongful or deserving of punishment. The law provides other means to punish wrongdoing unrelated to Plaintiff.”
\item \textsuperscript{106}Id. at 1017.
\item \textsuperscript{107}Id. (citing Ragsdell v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 688 F.2d 1281, 1285 (9th Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original).”
\item \textsuperscript{108}Id. at 1017-18.
\item \textsuperscript{109}261 S.W.3d 583 (Mo. App. 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{110}509 F. Supp. 2d 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
\item \textsuperscript{111}569 F. Supp. 2d 841 (N.D. Iowa 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{112}261 S.W.3d at 597-98 (quoting \textit{Williams}, 549 U.S. at 357).
\item \textsuperscript{113}509 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
\item \textsuperscript{114}569 F. Supp. 2d at 852-53.
\item \textsuperscript{115}See Part II.A., supra.
\item \textsuperscript{116}See Part II.B.1, supra.
\item \textsuperscript{117}533 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{118}Id. at 571.
\end{itemize}
in order to picket Snyder's funeral. In Westminster, at the actual funeral and funeral procession, they carried signs featuring messages such as: “God Hates the USA,” “America is doomed,” “Pope in hell,” “Fag troops,” “You're going to hell,” “God hates you,” “Semper fi fags,” and “Thank God for dead soldiers.” Even after the funeral, the activities continued; Rebekah Phelps-Roper created an entire documentary (which she placed on the church's website, www.godhatesfags.com) critically depicting Snyder and his parents.

Albert Snyder sued the four defendants on several theories and obtained a verdict of $10.9 million on intentional infliction emotional distress and intrusion-upon-seclusion claims (linked via civil conspiracy). Of that, $2.9 million was compensatory damages (compensating him predominantly for the severe emotional harm he incurred and continues to incur), and $8 million in punitive damages ($2 million for each defendant). In its motion for new trial or remittitur, the defendants argued that the award should be reduced both under BMW and under Williams. It appears that the defendants had engaged in such demonstrations at gay soldiers’ funerals before Snyder's and that they intended to continue doing so. The defendants' intention to continue doing so was brought to the jury's attention; the plaintiff's lawyer, in arguing for a punitive-damages award, told the jury that its award should say “don't do this in Maryland again. Do not bring your circus of hate to Maryland again. That no son or daughter of Maryland shall have [his or her] funeral defiled by the malicious tactics of the [D]efendants again and that no future father or mother suffers this.”

The district judge rejected defendants' Williams challenge, reasoning that “[p]laintiff's counsel did not mention past harm to third parties, only future harm to third parties.” Nonetheless, the $8 million verdict was reduced to $2.1 million on state-law grounds principally concerning the inability of the defendants to pay.

The district judge in Snyder is plainly correct in stating that Williams addresses the unconstitutionality of punishing for prior harm to nonparties rather than deterring future acts toward nonparties, and to that extent, the judge's holding is beyond reproach. However, it does not take much imagination to generate the following concern: if the punitive-damages award is functioning as a deterrent for future conduct, is it not functioning as a public sanction, rather than private redress? And if that is so, then the constitutional safeguards appropriate to public sanctions should be applied, and the damages award should have been vacated under the interpretation of Williams constructed in this article.

The foregoing anticipated objection is understandable, but it misconceives the peculiar role that punitive damages hold under the common-law conception. Variously called “vindictive damages,” “punitive damages,” “exemplary damages,” and “smart money,” the common law simultaneously embraced two ideas: one concerning what grounds justify a plaintiff's entitlement to a punitive-damages award and another concerning what worthwhile social functions might be served if punitive damages were awarded. Plainly, the courts conceived the entitlement as grounded in an individual victim's right to redress the wrong done to him or her by the wrongdoer. But that did not preclude the damages serving some sort of social function too; it is just that the social function was not needed to provide an adequate ground for imposing the damages. It is therefore a mistake to infer from the fact that it serves a deterrent role—or even that the jurors paid attention to its possible deterrent role when thinking of what damages to award—that the ground of entitlement to have the award imposed was precisely its future deterrent role. So long as the award could be understood as something that the private plaintiff was entitled to exact by virtue of the scope of his right to redress this wrong, the fact that jurors used deterrent considerations to select a higher sanction from within this legitimate range does not mean that the award ought to be classified as a public sanction.

The real question regarding reprehensibility in Snyder was actually never asked. It is whether, in light of how the jury was instructed and in light of the evidence supplied to the jury, it was plausible to understand the jury's decision to impose $2 million dollars of punitive damages on each of these defendants as a decision that Mr. Snyder was entitled to exact by virtue of the scope of his right to redress this wrong, the fact that jurors used deterrent considerations to select a higher sanction from within this legitimate range does not mean that the award ought to be classified as a public sanction.

A far broader conception of reprehensibility is embraced by the Eleventh Circuit in Action Marine Inc. v. Continental Carbon Inc., in which a manufacturer of black carbon was held liable to the owners of property that was polluted, discolored, and devalued by emissions from the manufacturer's plant. The legal theories asserted were negligence, wanton conduct, and

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119. Id. at 592.
120. Id. The court also rejected the BMW challenge to the size of the award as well as all other grounds for the defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law, j.n.o.v., new trial, and relief from judgment. However, the court granted in part the defendants' motions for remittitur to $2.1 million under Maryland commonlaw principles regarding punitive damages. More particularly, under Bowden v. Caldor Inc., 710 A.2d 267 (Md. 1998), the court decided that the duplicativeness of the two causes of action and the limited ability of defendants to pay the punitive damages awards justified a reduction of Westboro to $1 million, Fred Phelps to $300,000, Rebekah Phelps-Davis to $200,000, and Shirley Phelps-Roper (who authored the documentary) to $600,000.
breach of duty to warn, fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, nuisance, trespass, and strict liability. After a ten-day trial, an Alabama jury returned a verdict of approximately $1.2 million in compensatory damages, $1.3 million in attorney fees, and $17.5 million in punitive damages.

In its evaluation of the defendant’s appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered Williams’s holding that punitive damages may not be used to punish nonparties, but the risk of harm to others may be part of the reprehensibility analysis. It reasoned that because “Continental’s actions likely harmed a great number of people and businesses who are not parties to this litigation,” Continental’s actions and inaction were “exceedingly reprehensible.” A similar approach is taken by a Louisiana appellate court in Grefer v. Alpha Technical; the damage to nonparties done by the defendant Exxon’s polluting behavior is said to warrant a very high finding of reprehensibility, which in turn justifies a higher punitive-damages award.

On the theoretical model offered here, those courts’ interpretation of Williams—while consistent enough with the terse language of Justice Breyer’s opinion—is not consistent with a theoretically sound understanding of the rationale for the non-party-harm rule. In both Action Marine and Grefer, there were sustained accounts of the defendants’ awareness of the harm they were doing to the plaintiffs and therefore of the recklessness or indifference of the defendants harming the plaintiffs. That other victims were similarly situated and also endured harm from these wrongful activities does not in any way alter the characterization of the nature of the wrong to the plaintiffs in those cases. In other words, harm to nonparties was not probative of the reprehensibility of the defendants’ injuring of the plaintiffs. Reprehensibility was purely a back door for punitive damages operating as a public sanction for the wrongful conduct. The evidence of harm to nonparties, in these cases, was such that the jury should have been cautioned not to consider it in evaluating the reprehensibility of the defendant for purposes of imposing punitive damages. To the extent that motions for remittitur invited the courts in these cases to reduce the punitive-damages award commensurate with their sense of how the impermissible considerations might have inflated the award, the courts should have done so.

D. LARGER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

In its litigation before the United States Supreme Court and the Oregon Supreme Court, Philip Morris has focused upon the trial judge’s refusal to instruct the jury in what Philip Morris alleges was the constitutionally required manner. The record in Williams produces several other issues that revolve around the same idea: (1) was there evidence admitted that should not have been because irrelevant or prejudicial; (2) were there statements made during witness questioning or during opening or closing statements that should not have been made; (3) were there motions in limine that ought to have been granted; and (4) was the award excessive in light of the evidence that could properly have been considered? As several of the cases considered above indicate, defendants in the lower courts have already begun asserting many of these arguments, and lower courts—quite appropriately—have taken them seriously as offshoots of Williams.

There are, however, much larger questions about punitive-damages law that Williams may force lower courts to confront. These questions revolve around the disquieting possibility that the United States Supreme Court in Williams was expressing its disapproval of a whole way of thinking about punitive damages that is in fact very popular in state tort law. I have suggested that Williams can be understood as containing a litmus test for when punitive damages are functioning as a public sanction for antisocial or harmful conduct that the state wishes to punish. When the litmus test is positive, then punitive damages are not plausibly viewed as functioning wholly within the private-redress model. They therefore require the greater due-process protection that tort cases traditionally have had. Or so the argument went.

The problem with this view is that many states—perhaps most—openly regard punitive damages as a public sanction for socially harmful and wrongful conduct. Many articulate this approach quite explicitly; many have adopted clear-and-convincing evidence standards, split-recovery statutes, and nonin- surability of punitive-damages awards for this very reason. If Williams is so understood, does that not suggest that such states’ punitive-damages law is categorically unconstitutional?

Some courts have begun to worry about this possibility. Thus, a federal judge in the District of Colorado read the defendant’s argument as “inviting” the court to hold a Colorado statute governing punitive damages “unconstitutional,” an invitation the court declined. Similarly, the Chief Judge in the Western District of Oklahoma in a pair of thoughtful post-Williams opinions voiced her concerns that Oklahoma’s punitive-damages statute is “ripe” for judicial review because “[i]n its face, [the statute] contemplates harm to third parties as the foundation for any award of punitive damages.”

While these two courts may well have been exaggerating, the general concern is entirely sensible. States that funnel punitive-damages awards to the state revenue do not generally

122. Id. at 1320.
123. Id.
regard themselves as doing a taking of the plaintiff’s property. They regard the state as being at least equally entitled, or more entitled, to the proceeds of the punitive-damages awards. This very idea appears to undercut the hypothesis that punitive damages are awarded as an expanded version of what the plaintiff is entitled to receive as a matter of private redress. It appears to concede that the punitive damages award is functioning as a public sanction. If so, then the procedural due-process analysis urged here arguably carries over to every instance in which a court applies a split-recovery statute without affording to the plaintiff a process far less vague in its standard than that which the private law of torts typically provides. And split-recovery statutes are simply one example. Although we are not currently seeing these broad critical arguments from defendants, we should expect to see more of this in coming years unless the federal courts decide to take Williams in a particularly narrow direction; in the terms of this article, if they adhere to purely contextual, rather than facial, public-sanction detection tests. Whether the Supreme Court or circuit courts would actually embrace such broad elaborations of constitutional punitive-damages doctrine is, of course, simply a matter of conjecture at this stage.

**CONCLUSION**

Philip Morris USA v. Williams should be seen for what it is: the Roberts Court's first foray into the constitutional status of punitive damages. It marks a shift from the sort of excessiveness review that sometimes goes under the label of “substantive due process” to a nuanced but potentially quite aggressive form of “procedural due-process” review that looks less at the size of the award and more at the process used to reach it. As with many procedural decisions, Williams is easy to discount as technical and relatively unimportant. This would be a mistake. Both in its content and in what it foreshadows about possible directions for the constitutional scrutiny of punitive damages, Williams is hugely important. Although declining to exercise its power to vacate or remit the award against Philip Morris, the Court did something potentially more significant: it began to question whether states can use punitive damages as an instrument of public law to sanction wrongdoers given the relatively meager procedural protection defendants have to defend themselves when such “public wrong” arguments are thrown at them in front of a jury in an individual tort case. Thus far, Williams has generated only modest changes in jury instructions and a surprisingly narrow array of appeals and motions to remit by defendants who have met with mixed success. One should not be surprised, however, if defendants start to see Williams as a blueprint for bold criticisms of state punitive-damages law.

The dissenting Justices in Williams—Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg—were understandably resistant to the arguments of Philip Morris and the majority because the nonparty-harm rule adopted by the Court is difficult to reconcile with the prominence of reprehensibility in punitive-damages law. Moreover, there is a substantial potentiality for intrusiveness of a sort inimical to federalist values. Nevertheless, this article has taken a more optimistic and constructive approach to the Court’s opinion in Williams, one which aims to guide future courts both in recognizing the constitutional justification at the basis of the decision and in applying the standards set forth in a cogent manner.

The essential holding of Williams is that while a punitive-damages award aimed at punishing the defendant for injuring a party may be constitutionally permissible, a punitive-damages award aimed at punishing the defendant for injuring nonparties is a violation of the Due Process Clause. The basic principle here, according to this article, is quite clear: punitive damages are operating as part of the traditional common law of torts when the plaintiff is seeking to redress the defendant’s injuring of her but that cannot be what is happening when the state is punishing the defendant for injuring nonparties. To the extent that the punitive damages award is punishing the defendant for injuring nonparties, it is serving as a form of public sanction, not simply as a form of private redress that can deliver some of the same deterrent effect as a public sanction. If this is so, then the process applicable to public sanctions—criminal at most and regulatory at least—must come into play. State tort law typically lacks such process, and therefore the punitive-damages awards are unconstitutional on this developed version of the principles underlying Williams. The nonparty-harm rule of Williams can thus be understood as a litmus test for when the punitive-damages award is operating as a public sanction; for awards that show up positive on the litmus test, there is a procedural due-process problem inherent in the vague standards of state tort law.

It remains to be seen how far the United States Supreme Court would really be willing to push this line of thinking. Meanwhile, however, a variety of medium-sized analytical problems will face courts operating under Williams. How to conceive of reprehensibility, how to instruct a jury, when to permit evidence of nonparty harm (and for what purposes)—these are some of the many questions with which lower courts have already begun to grapple. The nonparty-harm rule analyzed as a public-sanction detection test permits us to begin to answer those questions.

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From Investigation to Implementation:
Factors for Successful Commissions on the Elimination of Racial and Ethnic Bias

Elizabeth Neeley

In the 1980s, states began to study racial and ethnic bias in their judicial systems. Now that more than 25 states, along with scores of academics, have examined issues of racial fairness in the courts, models and strategies exist for effectively conducting these investigations. The National Center for State Courts, in conjunction with the National Consortium on Racial and Ethnic Bias in the Courts, developed a best practices model for establishing and operating a task force or commission on racial and ethnic bias in the courts. The publication provides guidance on: creating the necessary momentum for establishing a task force or commission on racial and ethnic bias in the courts, fashioning the mandate or charge to the task force, outlining the roles and responsibilities of those involved, financing the initiative, managing the task-force process, establishing and implementing the research agenda, and disseminating the results. All of these components comprise what this author describes as the investigation phase of the process.

In the concluding chapter of Establishing and Operating a Task Force or Commission on Racial and Ethnic Bias in the Courts, the authors suggest that a task force should develop an interim strategy for implementing its recommendations and monitoring court progress. The advantages of extending into a long-term implementation phase are that it: “maintains the momentum for making relevant changes and reforms, ensures the continuity of the task force, maintains a cadre of committed persons who have a history of working together, and sustains the expression of the strength of the court's commitment to the elimination of bias.”

While much is known about how to effectively investigate racial and ethnic bias in state court systems, less is known about the factors and strategies that make for a successful implementation phase; there is little empirical research or best-practices commentary that can guide a state's work to effectively implement policies to reduce racial and ethnic bias in the courts. This article offers guidance to other jurisdictions establishing policy reform initiatives relating to racial and ethnic fairness in the courts by (1) discussing the structure and activities of one successful state initiative, and (2) discussing the factors and strategies that have contributed to a state's success during the implementation phase.

I. THE NEBRASKA MODEL

THE INVESTIGATION PHASE: NEBRASKA’S MINORITY JUSTICE TASK FORCE

In 2001, the Nebraska State Bar Association, representing the private sector, the Nebraska Supreme Court, representing the governmental sector, and the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center, representing higher education, established a joint task force, which was charged to examine issues of racial and ethnic bias in the court system and legal profession. The task force’s 18-month investigation examined numerous topics relating to four major areas: access to the justice system, diversity in the court workforce, diversity in the legal profession, and disparities in the juvenile and adult justice systems.

The research design incorporated both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data included surveys of judges, attorneys, jurors, court personnel, and the public; data on arrests, sentencing, and incarceration rates; and demographic data on the court workforce, law-school students, legal professionals, and the judiciary. Qualitative data was primarily gathered from public hearings held in minority communities across the state of Nebraska, during which testimony was solicited regarding minority groups' experiences with the justice system and perceptions of it. Written testimony was received from

Footnotes


5. The topics explored by states vary. The National Center for State Courts provides a database of findings from state studies on racial and ethnic bias in the courts. The database is searchable by state and topic: http://www.ncsconline.org/Projects_Initiatives/REFI/rel.htm.


prison inmates on their experiences and perceptions of bias, and focus groups were conducted with attorneys and law students of color on the perceived barriers to employment in the legal profession.

The investigation concluded in January of 2003 with the public release of the task force’s Final Report.8 Findings were made in regard to the four focus areas, briefly summarized below.9

Access to Justice

The court system was unprepared for the influx of non-English speakers that Nebraska has experienced over the past several decades. There is a shortage of qualified language interpreters in the state. At the time of the study, there were only 6 individuals qualified to interpret in Nebraska’s court system (which includes 93 county courts, 93 district courts, and 3 separate juvenile courts). There is a lack of translated court documents, and many of the available translated documents are of poor quality.

Legal Profession

Minorities are drastically underrepresented among Nebraska attorneys. There are fewer than 150 minorities among the state’s 5,000 attorneys. Minority attorneys believe that there are fewer opportunities in private firms for minority law-school graduates and that little effort is made to recruit and retain those minority bar members who are hired. Minority attorneys also believe there are fewer opportunities for mentoring, networking, and other opportunities for professional advancement.

Court Workforce

In regards to the court workforce, only one of Nebraska’s 93 counties had a court staff that was at least equal to the diversity of the county population. Many district courts do not have discrimination complaint procedures or equal-employment-opportunity policies in place. Court personnel and bar members report having witnessed inappropriate comments, racial or ethnic slurs, and disrespectful and discourteous treatment of minority defendants, litigants, and attorneys.

Racial Disparities

Similar to national trends, racial and ethnic minorities are disproportionately charged, convicted, sentenced to longer terms, and incarcerated in Nebraska in comparison to their white counterparts. Nebraska’s jury pools are not representative of the diversity of their communities.

THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE: NEBRASKA’S MINORITY JUSTICE COMMITTEE

The primary recommendation of the task force’s Final Report was to establish a standing committee to implement recommendations aimed at reducing racial and ethnic bias in the justice system. In May of 2003, the Nebraska Supreme Court appointed a diverse group of judges, attorneys, and state and community leaders to the Minority Justice Committee to achieve three primary aims: (1) address racial disparities in both the juvenile and adult justice systems; (2) ensure equal access to the justice system; and (3) increase the diversity of Nebraska’s judicial workforce and legal profession.

One of the primary functions of the Nebraska Minority Justice Committee is to engage in policy analysis to determine if the documented racial disparities throughout the justice system result from the fair application of neutral policies or the uneven or prejudicial application of the law. Policy reform in Nebraska has been accomplished through three primary mechanisms: legislative reforms, changes to court rules, and programmatic initiatives.

Legislative Reforms

The task force’s research revealed that there was no statutory requirement for counties to periodically update their jury pool lists.10 Because of this, there were counties in Nebraska that had not updated their jury pool lists anywhere from 5-20 years. The significant demographic change in Nebraska over the past two decades coupled with the counties’ decision not to refresh their jury pool lists created a situation in which there was a significant difference between the racial/ethnic composition of the county and the composition of the jury pool. To remedy this, a bill was passed by the Nebraska Legislature that requires all counties in Nebraska to refresh their jury pool lists annually.11

This legislative change has had a substantial impact in the 44 counties that were not regularly refreshing their jury pools.12 More specifically, researchers concluded that more than 25% of counties reported noticing either great or some change in the racial or ethnic composition of the jury pool following annual updates. Of the 10 counties with the highest minority populations in the state, half (50%) reported noticing either great or some change in the composition of the jury pool following the annual updates. These statistics suggest that the legislative change has had its intended effect in a number of counties.

Court Rule Changes

In addition to legislative changes, reforms have been implemented through changes to Nebraska’s court rules. The inves-
Reforms with fiscal implications may need to go through the legislature so that they may be adequately funded ...

In an effort to ensure equal access to bonds, the Minority Justice Committee developed a translated packet of information to be shared with defendants. The packet informs defendants of their rights as a defendant in-custody, the right to post bond, and a bilingual financial affidavit so that they can apply for a bond hearing. This packet is intended to serve an informative purpose; non-English-speaking detainees are advised of the bond schedule and can post bond or contact someone to post bond for them. If defendants are not able to post bond, they can use the financial affidavit to request a personal-recognition bond. This procedure has the potential to reduce disparities in jail populations and to relieve jail overcrowding. The documents are also available on video and cassette to address any issues of illiteracy.

**Programmatic Initiatives**

In addition to policy reform, it is hoped that change will be sustained through education initiatives and by creating opportunities for a change in culture. To date, the Minority Justice Committee’s programmatic and educational initiatives have targeted three groups: the legal profession, the public, and students.

**Legal Profession**

The Minority Justice Committee is working to create a legal culture that is cognizant of the unique issues faced by racial and ethnic minorities and the systems of inequality within the legal profession and the justice system. Efforts have included education on: how to effectively use language interpreters in the courts, the unique legal issues faced by Native Americans and immigrants in Nebraska, and seminars for minority attorneys on how to apply for judicial vacancies. Arm the legal professionals with this knowledge can improve the representation that they provide their clients and can assist minority attorneys with successfully navigating their own legal careers.

**Public**

Attitudes toward the courts can affect the way individuals perceive their role in the justice system. When people believe that the justice system is fair, it increases their willingness to comply with laws, report crimes, file suits, and otherwise act within the constraints of the legal system, rather than resorting to extralegal means. Educating the public about the court system not only can improve perceptions but also can help improve the public’s experience with the legal system.

13. See Final Report, supra note 6, at 10-17.
16. See Nebraska Supreme Court Forms Used in Bond Advisement, available at http://www.supremecourt.ne.gov/forms/index.shtml. Forms available are Notice of Rights of an In Custody Defendant; Notice of Right to Post Bond; Affidavit in Support of Personal Recognizance Bond; Memo & Court Order to Sheriff, Jailer & Others; and Guidelines for Implementing Bilingual Bail/Bond Documents.
For example, unlike voting, jury service is a mandatory duty for U.S. citizens. Because jury service is not covered in the curriculum for becoming a U.S. citizen, many new Americans, some of whom are likely to already be distrustful of the justice system, may not respond to their juror summons. Failure to comply with a juror summons can result in the juror summons being issued by law enforcement, a fine, or the potential juror being held in contempt of court. The absence of new Americans from juries also impacts the extent to which juries are representative of their communities.

In response, the Minority Justice Committee undertook a statewide campaign in 2006 that was designed to educate minority communities about the importance of jury service and is working to have jury service become a component of the curriculum for citizenship. As part of this project, the Minority Justice Committee also hosted “law day” events at local minority community centers in order to help answer legal questions and provide communities with a resource for the law and positive experience with it.

Students
Nebraska’s Minority Justice Committee is working to expand employment opportunities for minorities interested in pursuing a legal career in the state of Nebraska. Their annual legal diversity summit is a regional event for Nebraska legal employers and regional law students of color. The intent of the summit is to create awareness in Nebraska’s legal profession about the value of diversity, educate legal employers on how to increase their efforts to recruit and retain attorneys of color, and provide minority law students from Nebraska and surrounding states with the opportunity to interview with employers and learn more about legal-employment opportunities in Nebraska. In a related action, a Nebraska Legal Diversity Website was created by the Minority Justice Committee to promote diversity in the legal profession by providing online mentoring, job postings, and scholarship information.

II. NEBRASKA’S LESSONS FOR OTHER STATES: FACTORS FOR SUCCESS

While numerous models, strategies, and resources exist for states undertaking investigations of racial and ethnic bias in the courts, much less is known about the factors that make for a successful implementation phase. Here, the leadership of Nebraska’s Minority Justice Committee reflects on the procedural and organizational factors that have contributed to its success during the implementation phase. The term Racial Justice Commission will be used when referring to implementation initiatives in general, the term Minority Justice Committee will be used to denote experiences specific to Nebraska.

BUILDING CREDIBILITY

Credibility for the implementation phase begins with the credibility built by the investigation phase via a task force or commission’s Final Report. One way to enhance credibility is to partner with academic researchers. Many states have outsourced the development and implementation of their research agenda both for the sake of objectivity and for the expertise that a university or private-sector firm can provide. Nebraska’s Minority Justice Committee partnered with the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center to provide objectivity and expertise in the planning and execution of their research agenda. The Public Policy Center organized a thorough review of other states’ research, methodologies, and recommendations and brought together university faculty to help inform the initial development of the study; it provided staff with the skills and expertise necessary to conduct the research and used their existing networks to link with minority communities across Nebraska. During the implementation phase, the partnership with the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center increases the Minority Justice Committee’s competitiveness for grant funding, provides the skills and expertise necessary to conduct smaller-scale research projects, and links the initiative with faculty research/expertise both locally and nationally.

Additional steps can be taken to enhance the credibility of a task force’s Final Report; Nebraska’s Minority Justice Task Force, for example, submitted its research to a rigorous review process conducted by academic scholars in law and the social sciences (e.g., political science, psychology, sociology, and criminal justice), throughout the University of Nebraska system. University faculty were contacted and asked to provide an assessment of data collection, data quality, data analysis,


24. See http://www.nelegaldiversity.org/

25. See supra notes 2 and 3.

Credibility during the implementation phase means following the discourse with action.

The support of a state’s major legal institutions is also fundamental to credibility. Endorsements of the Final Report, therefore, enhance the credibility of the recommendations and actions that follow. These entities will vary by state and may include law schools, legislatures, governors, bar associations and state supreme courts. In Nebraska, the task force’s Final Report was submitted to and adopted by Nebraska’s Supreme Court and was unanimously approved by the Nebraska State Bar Association’s House of Delegates. Their endorsements of the Final Report were made public through press conferences and the print media surrounding the release of the Final Report. Just as the support of a state’s Chief Justice is institutionally and symbolically important in establishing a task force or commission to investigate racial and ethnic bias in the courts, the Chief Justice’s endorsement of the Final Report is also important. Nebraska’s Chief Justice John Hendry publicly endorsed the Final Report: “The judges, lawyers and court employees of the state should accept this report as a call to action. If there is one institution in this society that should be completely free of bias it is the courts.” Statements such as these confirm the courts’ commitment to action and engender cooperation from all court personnel in obtaining that action.

Credibility during the implementation phase means following the discourse with action. Effective action breeds institutional and community support and builds momentum within the Racial Justice Commission itself. Following the release of its Final Report, the Nebraska Minority Justice Committee returned to the communities that the task force has solicited public hearing testimony from. These town hall meetings gave the Minority Justice Committee a chance to report back to each community on the findings of the study and the recommendations for change. The fact that the Minority Justice Committee took the time to report back directly to the minority constituencies involved in the study built credibility in the eyes of the public.

Many states choose to release annual reports on the efforts of their implementation phase. Nebraska has also adopted a dissemination strategy for their annual progress report that allows them to build political capital by informing policy makers of their work, to keep racial justice issues on the radar of the public and the justice system, and to pique the interest of possible funding entities. For example, state senators have contacted the Minority Justice Committee leadership and offered their services in advancing legislative initiatives proposed by the Minority Justice Committee. Additionally, disseminating the annual progress reports, which tout the accomplishments of the Minority Justice Committee, has assisted with starting dialogues with both local and national funding agencies.

A SEAMLESS TRANSITION

According to the National Center for State Courts, states that have transitioned from the investigation to the implementation phase may experience between a six-to-eighteen-month lag between the final report and a fully staffed implementation commission. In order to capitalize on the momentum generated from the investigation, it is important to take the steps necessary for a seamless transition as possible. Common barriers to a seamless transition include staffing and funding.


28. See supra note 3 at 15.


32. Supra note 3, at 54.
Retention of key leadership and staff can ensure institutional memory between the investigation and implementation phases, reducing the time lost on the “learning curve” that would be needed by new staff or leadership.\(^{33}\)

Funding can also impact the transition time. Some states have been fortunate to have a steady funding stream across phases. Others may have to search for different sources of funding from the investigation to the implementation phase. Nebraska’s investigation phase was primarily funded by two grants from the State Justice Institute and some additional funding and in-kind support was provided by the Nebraska State Bar Association. As the initiative transitioned from the investigation to the implementation phase, the Nebraska State Bar Association took on the responsibility of fully funding the Minority Justice Committee with the understanding that other permanent sources of funding would be secured in the future (funding is discussed in more detail under “Sustainability” later in this article).

**ORGANIZATION, LEADERSHIP, AND COMPOSITION**

**Organization**

The organization and composition of states’ Racial Justice Commissions varies considerably. Most state initiatives are led by the court. Nebraska’s partnership between the State Supreme Court and the State Bar Association has provided it considerable leverage in making sustainable policy reforms. In addition to political leverage, this relationship is beneficial for the additional resources and funding available to the project. Nebraska also boasts a university partnership, which is able to provide the Minority Justice Committee with research resources and academic expertise. Although the court and the bar had previously had a cordial relationship, the joint task force was the first formal and large-scale joint initiative between these entities.

**Leadership**

Strong leadership is vital in the implementation phase of the initiative. Many Racial Justice Commissions are chaired by members of the judiciary. In contrast, the leadership of Nebraska’s initiative illustrates the close partnership between the court and the bar association. The Minority Justice Committee is co-chaired by a justice of the state supreme court and a past president of the state bar association. The co-chairs provide leadership, motivation, and direction for the Minority Justice Committee as well as serve as liaisons to the supreme court and bar leadership, act as spokespersons for public relations, and make determinations regarding the composition of the Minority Justice Committee.

Leadership is also important at the subcommittee level. Each of Nebraska’s subcommittees is co-chaired by members of the Minority Justice Committee. Subcommittee chairs provide leadership and direction for the subcommittee, make determinations regarding the use of ad-hoc members to provide the subcommittee with additional expertise, facilitate discussion, and in some instances may manage conflict within the subcommittees. Minority Justice committee and subcommittee chairs deal with conflict in a variety of ways depending on the issue (i.e., ideological conflict, procedural conflict, personality conflict, or power conflicts). While some debate can aid in understanding the complexity of issues, fractures within a subcommittee can create a stalemate and stall the Minority Justice Committee’s progress.

**Committee Composition**

While there is no formal recommendation regarding the size of a Racial Justice Commission, ideally the commission will balance the need to contain membership size with maximum representation. The initiative (in both phases) should have members from each of the racial and ethnic minority groups represented within the state.\(^{34}\) This factor not only contributes to the credibility of the initiative but may assist the Racial Justice Commission with generating community support. Representation on the Racial Justice Commission should also be statewide and represent both urban and rural interests.

The composition of the Racial Justice Commission is a strategic decision. While it is not necessary to use the exact same members for the investigation and implementation phase, it is recommended that there be some congruency to promote institutional memory.\(^{35}\) Some members may intentionally not be retained across phases, and some may elect not to continue their service. The transition from the investigation to the implementation phase can be an ideal time to appoint new members to the Racial Justice Commission. New members can provide new perspectives and enthusiasm to the project. New members will also be appointed as veteran members retire, move, change jobs, and so forth. Based on Nebraska’s experience, incorporating new members is more effective when the staff and/or leadership make a formal effort to (1) orient the new members on the history, operation, and direction of the committee; (2) provide new members with an opportunity to ask questions; and (3) discuss the expectations associated with service.

Members of the Racial Justice Commission should be the decision makers for the institutions they represent, and members should ideally represent a diversity of interests. Members should strategically be chosen to foster investment in the cause and to avoid duplication of existing efforts. Nebraska’s membership includes representation from the courts, including: trial and appellate judges, court clerks, and administrators. State agencies are also represented including: the Nebraska Attorney General’s Office, Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission, and others.

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33. Supra note 3, at 55.
34. Supra note 3.
35. Supra note 3, at 56.
There are numerous factors that can be considered when determining how recommendations will be prioritized, including importance, cost, and time.

University School of Law. Through these alliances, the Minority Justice Committee is often able to gain the enthusiastic backing of the public and the major institutions needed to promote change in the court system and legal profession.

PRIORITIZATION

When faced with an overwhelming list of recommendations, the Nebraska Minority Justice Committee's first step was to prioritize the recommendations and develop concrete action steps to accomplish their goals. There are numerous factors that can be considered when determining how recommendations will be prioritized, including importance, cost, and time. Nebraska’s Minority Justice Committee decided, as a matter of priority, to first address the issues that affected due process. The Minority Justice Committee quickly acted on these recommendations, worked to advance legislation for jury pool refreshment, and helped to develop new supreme court rules regarding language interpreters. The action-oriented beginning developed credibility for the implementation phase (following discourse with action) and built a sense of momentum for the Minority Justice Committee.

EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIPS

Involving various institutional decision makers can lead to synergistic action among partners. For example, based on the task force's research regarding minority law-school admissions, the University of Nebraska College of Law began to undertake its own efforts to promote diversity. In 2003, they established a Pre-Law Institute, a summer program developed to prepare students for both the law-school-application process and law school itself, expose them to a broad cross-section of the legal community, and establish individualized mentoring relationships. This initiative was funded through the Law School Admissions Council and is now in its fifth year of operation.

Partnerships outside of Minority Justice Committee membership can also be effective. One of the goals of Nebraska’s Minority Justice Committee is to “expand the pipeline” of racial and ethnically diverse students applying to and enrolling in Nebraska law schools. The Minority Justice Committee itself does not have the time, resources, or expertise to establish an effective youth-mentoring program. Instead, the Minority Justice Committee partners with existing effective mentoring programs within communities to bring together attorney mentors and minority youth.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

Many models exist for strategic planning. Based on Nebraska’s experience, it is important to choose a model that is appropriate for the Racial Justice Commission’s mission, culture, complexity and size. Nebraska’s Minority Justice Committee initiated a strategic-planning process after three years of implementing reforms. It was at this point that some of the Minority Justice Committee’s subcommittees had accomplished their primary goals and requested guidance for future direction. In addition to assisting the Minority Justice Committee with prioritizing their goals, developing action steps, and addressing new policy issues, the strategic-planning retreat facilitated a way for members to consider why racial justice issues were important to them and to reconnect with that passion.

SUSTAINABILITY

An important question that any Racial Justice Commission must answer is: is this a temporary or permanent initiative? If it is decided that the initiative is permanent, the Minority Justice Committee will need to take steps to “institutionalize” their efforts and secure a long-term funding mechanism.

The success of a Racial Justice Commission is largely attributed to the work of its membership. But the risk of relying heavily on members is the possible loss the commission would experience if a key member left the Racial Justice Commission. To the extent possible, commitments need to be developed with institutions, not just the individuals representing those institutions. Nebraska learned this lesson the hard way when one of its primary research partners left for a position in another state. This time, as Nebraska works to rebuild its research base, it strives for institutional commitment in addition to an individual commitment.

There are numerous mechanisms for funding. In hindsight, the Nebraska Minority Justice Committee wishes it had insisted on state funding from the beginning. Nebraska’s initiative is primarily funded by the Nebraska State Bar Association. Funding has also been sought via the courts' bud-
get (subject to approval by the Nebraska legislature) every year since 2005. It has been difficult to convince the legislature that they should fund a program that has been operating under private funding, even though the work directly benefits the court system and court users. In the mean time, the Minority Justice Committee has attempted to relieve the financial burden on the bar association by obtaining grants from local, state, and national funding agencies. Additionally, through the Nebraska State Bar Association’s Foundation, the Minority Justice Committee has acquired 501(c)(3) status and obtains additional funds through charitable contributions and corporate donations.41

RESOURCES

National Consortium for Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts

States that are considering undertaking a statewide examination of racial justice issues can consult with the National Consortium on Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts (“National Consortium”).42 The National Consortium is committed (1) to encouraging states to examine the treatment accorded minorities in their courts; (2) to sharing the collective knowledge of task forces and commissions with courts, law enforcement, and the community; and (3) to providing technical assistance and expertise to commissions, task forces, and other interested organizations and individuals on the subject of racial and ethnic fairness.

National Center for State Courts

At the request of the National Consortium, the National Center for State Courts established a clearinghouse for the main findings and recommendations of state commissions that were established to investigate and improve racial and ethnic fairness in the courts.43 The website allows viewers to search by state and/or topic.

Additionally, the National Center for State Courts has compiled information on promising practices relating to five areas: (1) diverse and representative state judicial workforces; (2) fair and unbiased behaviors on the part of judges, court staff, attorneys, and others subject to court authority in the courthouse; (3) comprehensive, system-wide improvements to reduce racial and ethnic disparities in criminal, domestic violence, juvenile, and abuse and neglect cases; (4) the availability of timely and high-quality services to improve access to the courts for people with limited English proficiency; and (5) diverse and representative juries. A website has been created for this campaign that includes a searchable database, and an e-newsletter has been prepared to spotlight program across the country that address racial and ethnic fairness.44

III. SUMMARY

Ideally, states that undertake investigations to document and begin to understand racial disparities within state court systems will also establish an implementation phase to execute evidence-based policy reforms. This article highlights some of the ways (legislative reform, supreme court rule changes, and programmatic initiatives) that Nebraska has made reforms for a more equitable system. This article also reflects on the factors that have made this initiative successful, including: building credibility; a seamless transition between phases; organization, leadership, and composition; effective partnerships; strategic planning; sustainability; and utilizing existing national resources.

Elizabeth Neeley, Ph.D. is the senior research manager of the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center’s Access to Justice core priority area. Her primary role is as the director of Nebraska’s Minority Justice Committee, a joint initiative of the Nebraska Supreme Court and Nebraska State Bar Association established to address issues of racial fairness in the courts. In this capacity Neeley serves on the board of directors of the National Consortium on Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts. She is a member of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s Interpreter Advisory Committee and the Nebraska Crime Commission’s Committee on Disproportionate Minority Confinement. Neeley received her B.S. in sociology at Doane College in 2000; she received a master’s degree in sociology in 2001 and a Ph.D. in sociology in 2004, both from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

42. See the National Consortium’s website online at: http://www.consortiumonline.net/
43. See the National Center for State Court’s Racial Fairness Initiative Database online at: http://www.ncsconline.org/Projects_Initiatives/REFI/REFI.htm
44. See http://www.ncsconline.org/ref/.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)


Civil Procedure


Using Our Index

No publication has published more practical information for judges in the past decade than Court Review. Now there’s a handy way for members of the American Judges Association to easily access all of it: every article published from 1998 to the present is available at the American Judges Association’s website, and we now have a subject-matter index to help guide you to anything that might be of interest.

For example, if you are interested in mediation, you’d look at the entries for Alternative Dispute Resolution on this page. (And if you looked up Mediation, you’d see a cross-reference to Alternative Dispute Resolution.) You’d quickly find Judge Morton Denlow’s helpful article on how to make sure that the case you thought you’d just settled stayed settled as well as Judge Karen Arnold-Burger’s helpful guide to using mediation in municipal court. Both articles—like many in Court Review—give you the benefit of lessons learned by other judges through years of experience.

You’ll also be able quickly to locate lots of articles for which we receive regular requests to reprint for use at judicial-education programs: psychologist Isaiah Zimmerman’s Isolation in the Judicial Career (under Judges and Judging); law professor Julie Kunce Field’s Visits in Cases Marked by Violence: Judicial Actions That Can Keep Children and Victims Safe (Domestic Violence); Black’s Law Dictionary editor Bryan Garner’s Clearing the Cobwebs from Judicial Opinions or Judge Richard Posner’s reply, Against Footnotes (Legal Writing); or public-opinion consultant John Russonello’s Speak to Values: How to Promote the Courts and Blunt Attacks on the Judiciary (Public Opinion).

We hope you’ll set aside this issue for easy reference to all of these articles. Each entry provides the specific URL address where you can find the full article at the AJA’s website. As a further benefit of your AJA membership, we will keep the index updated on the website, and the web version will include easy-to-click hyperlinks to take you to each article.


Constitutional Law


**Courts – Appellate**


**Courts – Federal**


**Courts – General**


Problem-Solving Courts: Do They Create Judicial Independence Problems or Opportunities or Both? Panel Discussion: Michael R. McAdam, moderator; Kevin S. Burke and Mary Campbell McQueen, panelists. Fall/Winter 2005 at 28. <http://aja.ncsc dni.us/courtrv/cr41-3and4/CR41-3-4 ProbSolv.pdf>


Courts – Municipal


Courts – State


Court Technology


Courts – Traffic


Criminal Procedure


**Damages**


**Divorce/Domestic Relations**

See *Family Law.*

**Domestic Violence**


**Drug Courts**


**Due Process**


**Elections**

See *Judicial Selection.*

**Ethics**

See *Judicial Ethics.*

**Evidence**


Family Law


Federal Courts

See Courts – Federal.

Federal Government – Justice Department


History – Judges


Impeachment


Judges and Judging – General


Judicial Compensation


Judicial Discipline


Judicial Ethics


Judicial Selection


Judicial Selection – Federal


Judicial Selection – State

Problem-Solving Courts

See Courts – General, Therapeutic Jurisprudence.

Psychology and Law


Public Opinion


Public Trust and Confidence


Punitive Damages

See Damages.

Sentencing

See Criminal Procedure.
Sex Offenders


State Courts

See Courts – State.

State Justice Institute


Technology

See Court Technology

Therapeutic Jurisprudence


Voir Dire

See Jury Trials and Jury Reform.

Witnesses


Writing

See Legal Writing.
NOTICE FOR AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION MEMBERS

The newsletter of the American Judges Association, *Benchmark*, has been moved from print to electronic publication. If we have your email address on file, we will send *Benchmark* to you each time it is published. *Benchmark* is the official newsletter of the AJA, and it contains notice of AJA activities, elections, awards, and events. This move will help us make sure that you get timely notice of AJA information, and it will also help us in keeping AJA dues as low as possible.

You will continue to receive *Court Review* in the mail.

If you haven't provided your email address to the AJA, please send it to us at aja@ncsc.dni.us. We will use it only for authorized correspondence from the AJA.
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Greg Mize cochaired the 1997-98 D.C. Jury Project, which produced a detailed jury-reform agenda for both federal and local courts in the District of Columbia. Since leaving the bench in 2002, he has been a judicial fellow at the National Center for State Courts. (He also serves on Court Review's Editorial Board.) Most recently, Mize has directed a project in which model curricula were prepared for judicial-education programs. Whether you want help in presenting a good educational program or simply want to know more about handling jury issues for your own courtroom, these materials are well worth a look.

Mize had the support of an advisory committee of nationally recognized jury-trial experts, including two who wrote articles for Court Review’s 2004 special issue on jury-reform issues: Judge B. Michael Dann and Professor Shari Diamond. (See our 10-year index at page 179 of this issue for those and other Court Review articles on jury-trial issues.) That group developed detailed learning objectives for teaching curricula on two subjects: “Managing Jury Selection Effectively” and “Helping Troubled Deliberating Juries.” Mize then developed both a teaching guide—consisting of learning objectives, group exercises, and a bibliography—and PowerPoint slides for 11 separate educational programs.

The “Managing Jury Selection Effectively” curriculum contains six modules, which can be taught in either 60- or 90-minute lengths:
- Obtaining Crucial Information from Prospective Jurors;
- Ruling on For-Cause and Peremptory Challenges;
- Judge & Lawyer Collaboration During Jury Selection;
- Time Management; and
- Promoting Judge-as-Educator During Jury Selection.

The “Helping Troubled Deliberating Juries” curriculum contains five modules, which are suggested for presentation in a 60-minute format:
- Improving the Deliberative Process;
- Helping Jurors Overcome Jargon;
- Responding to Deliberating Juries Having Questions or Reporting an Impasse;
- Responding to Misconduct/Mishaps in Deliberations;
- Respecting Juror Privacy & Responding to Their Stress.

Several of the modules were “road tested” during their preparation. Two were presented at the 2009 annual conference of the Nevada District Judges Association, and two others were presented at the 2009 National Jury Summit sponsored by the American Board of Trial Advocates. In addition, both the National Center for State Courts and the National Judicial College have agreed to maintain a “rolling roster of experienced jurists, empirical researchers, respected veteran trial lawyers, trial consultants, and articulate former jurors” who might serve as faculty for educational programs using these curriculum modules. These national speakers would supplement local presenters so that programs would best meet the dual objectives of local relevance and information-rich programming.

Judicial educators will no doubt be bringing some of these programs to a conference near you. In the meantime, you could learn a great deal about handling jury issues by working through the Learning Objectives and Activities documents, along with reviewing some of the key articles and resources cited there.

All of the materials can be downloaded in .pdf format from the website. To obtain documents in Word format, you can contact either Judge Gregory E. Mize (gmize@ncsc.org) or Paula Hannaford-Agor (phannaford@ncsc.org), director of the Center for Jury Studies at the National Center for State Courts.