October 1996


Daniel A. Smith
University of Denver, Denver, CO

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsresearch
Part of the Other International and Area Studies Commons

http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsresearch/291

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Great Plains Studies, Center for at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Great Plains Research: A Journal of Natural and Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Daniel A. Smith
Department of Political Science
University of Denver
Denver, CO 80208

Abstract. In 1992, Douglas Bruce, a non-practicing lawyer and landlord from Colorado Springs, Colorado, successfully "mobilized" popular support for Amendment 1, a ballot initiative that has restricted the taxing and spending powers of state and local governments in Colorado. For most Coloradans, "Douglas Bruce" is now a household name. Using a historical perspective to examine the role Bruce played in advancing Amendment 1, this study offers the analytic concepts of faux populism, populist entrepreneurs, and the public mood. Faux populism is the transposition of an ill-defined, but tangible public mood into a ready-made ballot initiative that is offered to the people by a populist entrepreneur. The primary question driving this inquiry is: How did Douglas Bruce successfully tap the widespread, but ambiguous animosity held by many Coloradans towards government and taxes, and turn it into his particular cause of limiting the taxing and spending powers of state and local governments?

This is a chance for the alienated, disenfranchised voter who thinks that his position doesn't count anymore to regain some control in many, many different ways.

—Douglas Bruce (Roberts 1992d)

We've ended the tyranny of unlimited taxation, and they don't like it.

—Douglas Bruce (Claiborne 1993)

On November 3, 1992, Colorado voters approved a state-wide ballot measure designed to severely restrict the taxing and spending powers of all state and local government entities. The measure, known as Amendment 1, required that a public vote be held on any new or increase in taxes or government debt, and limited future government spending to a set formula based on population growth and the consumer price index. Furthermore, the measure held, among other provisions, that if the total annual revenue of a
An amendment to the Colorado constitution to require voter approval for certain state and local government tax revenue increases and debt; to restrict property, income and other taxes; to limit the rate of increase in state and local government spending; to allow additional initiative and referendum elections; and to provide for the mailing of information to registered voters.

Figure 1. The abbreviated ballot tile of Amendment 1.

given governmental unit exceeded its total annual spending, the governmental unit would have to refund the difference to taxpayers (Fig. 1). Hailed by its author as “the single most important political event in Colorado since statehood” (Roberts 1992d), the complex, 1,703 word ballot initiative was marketed by its primary supporter as a way to curb “runaway taxes” and downsize the state’s “bureaucratic Big Brother” (Roberts 1992a).

The success of Amendment 1 was directly attributable to the yeoman-like effort of Colorado Springs real estate investor and non-practicing attorney, Douglas Bruce. Bruce, the impassioned and often irreverent author of the tax-limitation measure, was aided in his crusade by the organization that he had founded four years earlier, the “Taxpayers Bill of Rights” Committee (TABOR). Using the direct initiative process, Bruce and his small band of voluntary as well as paid petition circulators successfully gathered nearly twice the required 49,279 valid signatures of Colorado residents, during the late fall and winter of 1991. After withstanding a stiff legal challenge by opponents of the initiative over the validity of some of the petitioned signatures, Colorado Secretary of State Natalie Meyer reluctantly approved the controversial measure and placed it on the November ballot (Racine 1992a). On November 3, despite the negative campaigning by the adversarial political committees—the “No On #1 Committee” and “Common Sense Colorado”—Bruce’s measure passed with relative ease, garnering 53.6% of the vote.
The 1992 election was not the first time that residents of Colorado were
given the opportunity to vote on an anti-tax/government-limitation initia-
tive. Coloradans had voted down two similar measures in 1988 and 1990 that
Bruce had placed on the ballot through the initiative process. Prior to Bruce’s
involvement, Colorado residents had cast their votes six times since 1966 on
a variety of anti-tax popular initiatives; each time, the public defeated the
proposed measure (Gavin 1991c; Roberts 1992a). Thus, for many residents
of the state, it came as somewhat of a shock when Amendment 1 won the
approval of a majority of the state’s voters.

Without question, Bruce’s ballot initiative altered the political land-
scape of Colorado. In the process, “Douglas Bruce” became a household
name for most Coloradans. A professional gadfly who disseminates calling
cards with the embossed sub-titles “Terrorist” and “Patriot” beneath his
name (Knight 1992; Bruce 1996), Bruce was recognized by an amazing 70%
of the state’s residents in 1995; 41% of those polled, though, viewed him in
a negative light (Sanko 1995a). Still, despite his low popularity rating, Bruce
has transformed the way Colorado state and local governments must conduct
their business. His ballot measure has put a crimp in the way towns, cities,
counties, special districts, school districts, and the state must raise and spend
their tax dollars.

The Public Mood, Populist Entrepreneurs,
and the Faux Populist Moment

This article attempts to isolate and identify the phenomenon of how an
ambiguous mass sentiment in Colorado evolved into what many observers
perceived to be a populist movement. Specifically, it analyzes how Douglas
Bruce, over a six year period, was able to transmute the widespread, but
amorphous anti-tax and anti-government mood in Colorado into the particu-
lar cause of placing tax and spending limitations on state and local govern-
ments.

As a result of his ballot initiative campaigns for tax and government
limitation, many political observers have characterized Douglas Bruce as a
populist, and his endeavor as a traditional populist movement (Romano
1994a, 1994b; Lipsher 1994a, 1994b). Unfortunately, the concept of popu-
lism has lost much of its analytic precision over the years. As Richard
Hofstadter commented over 40 years ago, populism has had “an ambiguous
character” in the saga of American history (Hofstadter 1955:18). In the
vernacular, David Laycock notes, populism has come to connote “any folksy
appeal to the ‘average guy,’ or some allegedly general will’ (Laycock 1990:15). Indeed, “[t]he habit of branding as ‘populist’ everything from Bruce Springsteen to Rush Limbaugh to loose-fitting cotton trousers,” historian Michael Kazin writes, results from the “glib” attempt “to capture the volatile tastes of the public” (Kazin 1995:5). Nevertheless, the concept of populism still seems to constitute “an attempt to create a mass political movement, mobilized around symbols and traditions congruent with the popular culture, which expresses a group’s sense of threat, arising from presumably powerful ‘outside’ elements and directed at its perceived ‘peoplehood’” (Harrison 1995:5). Populism, however embattled a concept, remains a powerful signifier of popular discontent and active mass protest. Populist movements necessarily ascend from the grassroots, as they are bottom-up, educative forms of protest that demand the active participation of and by the masses (Goodwyn 1978). As the case study reveals, Douglas Bruce and his campaign for Amendment 1 lacked many of the qualities of a populist movement.

Yet, Bruce cannot be written off as a crank demagogue. Bruce did not merely appeal to the base prejudices of the populace; he grasped and articulated for the people many of their concerns. Upon closer scrutiny, it is clear that Bruce’s brand of populism falls outside the parameters of the populist tradition in America. It is more akin to what might be called “faux populism” —a populist rhetoric and message without “the people.” To fill the theoretical gap and to better understand this alternative brand of populism, the article offers an analytic framework focusing on the conditions that lead to successful faux populist endeavors such as the one piloted by Bruce.

For contemporary faux populist ventures such as the one engineered by Bruce to achieve a level of success, two necessary conditions need to be present. First, an unequivocal (though usually latent) public mood must resonate among the populace. The public mood—understood collectively as popularly held sentiments—is understood as a common sentiment held by a large number of people in a given area. Second, a populist entrepreneur who has sufficient charisma and organizational resources to capitalize on the amorphous, popular sentiment, channels and fashions the public mood into a coherent, popular message. The public mood is real, but is often poorly articulated. The populist entrepreneur, seizing an opportunity, taps into an ill-defined public mood, defines it as a problem, and attaches his or her own pet solution to it. The role of populist entrepreneur, similar to that of a “policy entrepreneur” (Kingdon 1984) or a “moral entrepreneur” (Eder 1993), is to craft a popular message, place it on the public agenda via the initiative process, and push it as the solution to the widely perceived public
problem. When a public mood is tapped by an able populist entrepreneur, it is quite possible that a populist movement—or more accurately, a faux populist moment—will occur.

Absent from faux populist moments is the active laboring and protest of the masses. Faux populist moments are fairly sterile. They are a far cry from traditional populist or even broader social movements, as they lack the "organized, nongovernmental efforts of large numbers of people to attain significant social and personal change" (Burns 1990:xii). With faux populist moments, common people do not organize themselves to promote change. The mass mobilization and organization of a "common people" is dropped from the equation. A faux populist moment, in terms of the collective commitment of its supporters, is a much more limited form of protest than a populist or social movement. With the faux populist moment, turnout on election day, and more specifically the casting of a vote for a particular ballot initiative, supplants the mass movement of the people.

The lack of mobilized protest in faux populist moments does not imply that the widely held sentiments of common people are unimportant. The public mood of the people, while vague, is real and identifiable. Because the public mood exists, the populist entrepreneur’s efforts are readily legitimized if he or she is able to successfully tap into it. The popular sentiment, of course, may be perceived in a variety of ways; the populist entrepreneur is left with considerable discretion when interpreting, shaping, and packaging the ambiguous public mood into a popular initiative that satisfies the common concerns of the people. Whether or not the populist entrepreneur is accurate in that approximation is determined by the voters in the voting booth—the faux populist moment.

While this article offers only a single case-study of one populist entrepreneur’s role in molding a public mood into a concrete, “populist” message, it should provide ample evidence to begin to identify and isolate these two key ingredients. In generalizing from the case study, the faux populism framework should help scholars better understand and explain the dynamics of other contemporary faux populist moments and populist entrepreneurs of such moments who are able to manufacture mass appeal in support of their endeavors.

**Amendment 1: The Evolution of a Faux Populist Moment**

During the fall of 1992, Douglas Bruce knew that his 1992 initiative faced an uphill battle. Prior to the passage of Amendment 1, Coloradans had defeated a number of similar tax and government limitation statewide ballot
initiatives. Indeed, in 1988 and 1990, Bruce’s first two anti-tax/government limitation initiatives went down to defeat at the hands of Colorado voters. Furthermore, in 1986, two years prior to Bruce’s first ballot initiative effort, Colorado voters overwhelmingly defeated a similar measure, Amendment 4, that would have diminished the taxing authority of state and local government. Seemingly, Coloradans did not have a great penchant to reduce the taxation powers of the state.

The story behind the success of Bruce’s 1992 Amendment 1 can be traced to 1986. On November 4, 1986, Coloradans soundly rejected Amendment 4 by 243,500 votes—a sizable 24% margin (Schrader 1986c). Amendment 4, the first popular initiative placed on the Colorado ballot in nearly a decade, was the brainchild of John and Diane Cox, farmers from Palisade, Colorado. The initiative literally began at the grassroots. Concerned with rising property taxes, increased government spending, and the falling property value of their western slope farm, the Coxes started a petition drive by contacting their fellow farmers (Schrader 1986a). Establishing a political committee, the Association for Colorado Taxpayers, to support their effort, the Coxes and their network of friends collected over 80,000 signatures to have the initiative placed on the statewide ballot by the Secretary of State. Amendment 4 stipulated that state and local elected officials could not impose new or increase taxes without the majority of voters approving such a measure during a general election in an even-numbered year (Roberts and Kowalski 1986). The measure received most of its popular support west of the Continental Divide, but was aided by the organizational efforts of the Colorado Union of Taxpayers, the financial support of prominent Denver businessman and official spokesman of the initiative, Jacob Jabs, the backing of the Colorado chapter of the National Conservative Political Action Committee, and the out-of-state support of Paul Gann, co-author with Howard Jarvis of California’s successful 1978 initiative, Proposition 13 (Schrader 1986b; Pope 1986; Miller 1986). (Fig. 2.)

Early on, the measure faced no formal opposition, but that changed when an alliance of over fifty business, education, and government interests allied to form a political committee, Citizens for Representative Government, to fight Amendment 4. Among the outspoken opponents of the measure was the three-term Governor of Colorado, Dick Lamm (Denver Post 1986). By late October, Citizens for Representative Government had raised $274,910 to oppose the measure, whereas the Association of Colorado Taxpayers had raised only $24,986 (Roberts 1986). Out-spending and out-advertising the proponents of the initiative by a twelve-to-one margin, the
opposition group was able to gradually sway public opinion against the measure (Fulcher 1988a).

Although a resident of Colorado for less than a year, Bruce participated in the effort to pass Amendment 4. He served as the El Paso County spokesman for Amendment 4, and put in “about forty hours” campaigning for the measure between August and November (Bruce 1996). A California transplant, Bruce was quite familiar with, but not active in Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann’s various tax-limitation efforts. In contrast to Proposition 13, the successful 1978 California property tax and government limitation measure, Bruce thought the Coxes’ initiative was “not well written,” and the Association for Colorado Taxpayers had, “no organization, no campaign.” Instead, Bruce was attracted to Amendment 4 because it was a “statement of principle” (Bruce 1996).

After the defeat of Amendment 4, a group of people who had been involved in promoting the measure called a meeting to critically assess “what went wrong” (Bruce 1996). Bruce was the only attorney in the group, but he was new to the state and was seen as an outsider. After the meeting,
Bruce drew up a draft of a tax and government limitation ballot measure, but others in the group thought it was too long; they wanted a more simple version. The tax limitation group then split into “two factions.” The faction opposed to Bruce’s measure—the “kick ‘em in the balls school”—was dominated by residents of Fremont County who wanted a measure similar to California’s Proposition 13, except that it would include commercial properties in a property tax cut (Bruce 1996). The other faction, led by Bruce, wanted a broad tax relief measure “that would work.” Both factions collected signatures in an effort to get their measures on the ballot: “we did, they didn’t” (Bruce 1996).

Calling the Coxes’ failed 1986 initiative, “just a tap on the shoulder” of government officials bent on spending hard-earned tax dollars, Bruce characterized his 1988 initiative—labeled Amendment 6 by the Secretary of State—as “a rap across the knuckles with a ruler” (George 1988). At the press conference he called to launch his 1988 campaign, Bruce shunned the label “tax protestor,” claiming that the image conjured up “tax evaders, people that live up in the Idaho Panhandle with a gun under their bed and meet around bonfires.” Rather, Bruce emphasized, his supporters “are ordinary citizens of all stripes, all walks of life, all income levels” (Roberts 1988a).

Bruce’s initiative, bolstered by his newly created political committee, the Taxpayers Bill of Rights (TABOR), ended up being one of four anti-tax measures proposed by various anti-tax groups that year. In addition to the measure proposed to the Secretary of State by the Fremont County group, John Cox and the Association of Colorado Taxpayers and Joseph Dodge and the newly formed Citizens That Love Colorado both submitted tax limitation measures (Roberts 1987, 1988b). However, Bruce’s initiative was the only tax reduction measure to gather enough signatures to be placed on the November ballot. After surviving a stiff challenge in September by the Citizens for Representative Government who challenged the validity of some of the petitioned signatures, Denver District Judge John McMullen ruled that Secretary of State Natalie Meyer had wrongly removed valid signatures from TABOR’s petitions, and that the initiative should be placed on the ballot (Pankratz 1988).

Amendment 6 was a more ambitious initiative than its immediate predecessor, Amendment 4. The measure would have subjected new taxes and tax hikes to voter approval, cut state income taxes by ten percent, and limited residential property taxes to one percent of market value (Roberts 1988a). Despite being more restrictive, Bruce claimed that his measure was “a
moderate, comprehensive, responsible tax-and-spend limitation policy,” and “not a radical major tax cut. It’s not as devastating as they want to claim” (Finley 1988). During the campaign, Bruce asserted that his initiative was being maligned by establishment forces: “People will lie in order to get our money, and the government wants our money.” When questioned as to what would happen if his initiative suffered the same fate as Amendment 4 in 1986, Bruce commented, “If they buy this election, we will be back next time . . . with a two-by-four to hit them on the back of the head. . . . And like Dorothy, they will wake up in Kansas” (Miller 1988). Yet, contrary to his prediction that “On Nov. 8, the voice of the people will send a message that cannot be ignored—that government cannot push us around anymore, that it has no divine right to take our money without our permission,” Colorado voters defeated Bruce’s first ballot initiative (Garnaas 1988).

Falling woefully short of passage, Amendment 6 gained only 38% of the popular vote. Bruce was shocked by the poor showing in favor of his initiative, and with good reason. Just one month before the election, on October 1, 1988, an independent poll showed that the public favored his measure by a 62 to 29% margin (Roberts 1988c). Part of the explanation for the wide margin of support for Bruce’s measure in October, was that opponents of Amendment 6 were slow to mobilize. Many groups opposed to Bruce’s initiative expected that Judge McMullen would invalidate Bruce’s measure. Citizens for Representative Government, the group that had formed two years earlier to oppose Amendment 4, had a paltry $3,000 in the bank in mid-October. Bruce, on the other hand, had a small but respectable $10,000 on hand less than a month before the election (Roberts 1988c). But in only a few weeks, opponents of Amendment 6 raised close to a quarter of a million dollars to bolster their campaign to defeat Bruce’s initiative (Fulcher 1988a). Furthermore, several prominent Coloradans began to speak out against the measure, including prominent business magnates, organized labor, Governor Roy Romer and three former governors, and arch-conservative U.S. Senator, Bill Armstrong (Fulcher 1988b; Dubroff 1988; Fulcher and Graf 1988). Even tax-limitation proponent Joe Dodge, author of his own 1988 measure that failed to amass enough signatures to be placed on the ballot, called Bruce’s Amendment 6 “a bad initiative” (Roberts 1988c). Bruce, despite pumping $50,000 of his own money into TABOR only days before the election, was only able to raise an additional $35,049 on behalf of his measure prior to the election, which was not nearly enough to hold off the advance of the better-heeled opposition (Colorado: Office of the Secretary of State 1988).
In late 1989, Bruce was back in the news. Despite telling one reporter after his 1988 defeat that “he wouldn’t try again,” Bruce later recanted. According to the reporter, Bruce “blithely acknowledged that he’d lied” because he wanted “to put the media off his trail, allowing him time to regroup” (Schomp 1991). Less than a year after his 1988 defeat, Bruce and his small band of loyal supporters were successfully gathering enough signatures to place his second anti-tax/government limitation measure on the November 6, 1990 ballot. According to Bruce, the new measure, designated on the ballot as Amendment 1, was “significantly rewritten to answer several criticisms of last year’s Amendment 6” (Roberts 1989). Although Bruce’s new measure would restrict property tax increases and would require voter approval of any new or increased taxes or fees that exceeded an index based on the rate of inflation and population growth, it allowed for emergency tax increases. Called by one political observer, a “toned-down and polished-up successor to Amendment 6,” Amendment 1 was nevertheless an unwieldy measure consisting of 1,857 words (Brown 1990a, 1990b). “For sheer complexity,” one journalist lamented, Amendment 1 “deserves a prize” (Lyons 1990). Not surprisingly, Bruce brushed aside criticisms, referring instead to his initiative as a “moderate, responsible curb on the tax-and-spend politics of the recent past” (Bruce 1990).

As was the case two years earlier, Bruce’s measure faced strong opposition. During the spring of 1989, the Colorado legislature considered placing its own version of a tax limitation referendum on the 1990 ballot in order to defuse Bruce’s efforts. In addition, business groups, in an attempt to preempt what they perceived as Bruce’s more radical anti-tax/government limitation measure, led a brief campaign to get their own version of tax limitation on the ballot. However, the two business umbrella groups leading the effort—the National Federation of Independent Business and the Colorado Association of Commerce and Industry—failed to gather enough signatures to place their alternative measure on the November ballot. Still, foes of Bruce’s amendment began to unite earlier than they did in 1988, with Governor Romer, himself running for re-election, spearheading the opposition (Gavin 1990b; Smith 1990). Calling themselves Common Sense Colorado, opponents of Bruce’s brainchild once again gathered an impressive array of supporters from the ranks of business, labor, and government. Fearing the end of municipal bonds in Colorado, the Bond Dealers Association of Colorado alone donated $43,000 to defeat Amendment 1 (Racine 1990). Although ultimately raising less than in 1988, Common Sense Colorado had raised $83,000 by mid-October in opposition of Amendment 1 (Colorado: Office of the Secretary of State 1990; Gavin 1990c).
Bruce accurately predicted that TABOR would “be outspent by the special interests, the politicians, and the bond dealers” (Racine 1990). However, Bruce was also able to round up some influential supporters of his own. Many people were attracted to his softer, less austere measure and agreed with Bruce that opponents of his 1988 measure, “basically bought and stole the election” (White 1990). John Andrews, the Republican Party’s nominee for governor, Vern Bickel, a wealthy Boulder businessman and Director of the Colorado Union of Taxpayers, prominent state Senators Terry Considine and Joe Winkler, and a handful of state Representatives all came out in support of Amendment 1 (Gavin 1990a; Bickel 1990). Calling Bruce “a great Colorado patriot,” Andrews appointed himself as the “chief political spokesman” for Amendment 1, although Bruce insisted that he was still in charge of the proposal (Gavin 1990d; Bruce 1996). By mid-October, largely because of the high profile endorsements of Amendment 1 as well as using mailing lists he had purchased from the Republican party to solicit contributions, Bruce and his TABOR Committee had on hand over four times as much money as it did in 1988. Between January and September, 1990, TABOR received small contributions from over 700 people, and collected over $45,000 in support of Amendment 1 (Colorado: Office of the Secretary of State 1990).

On November 6, 1990, Bruce’s statewide initiative lost by the thinnest of margins, 51 to 49%. This round, Bruce’s proposed amendment to the state constitution won a majority of votes in 17 of the state’s 63 counties, whereas in 1988, Bruce’s measure posted a majority of votes in only six counties (Brown 1990c). Not only did Bruce’s measure do better at the polls in 1990 than it did in 1988, his political organization, TABOR, ended up raising $179,000 for Amendment 1, although it included two $15,000 contributions made by Bruce and Vern Bickel (Colorado: Office of the Secretary of State 1990; Brown 1990e). The major group opposed to Amendment 1, Common Sense Colorado, raised $443,787 in 1990, $24,865 more than its predecessor, Citizens for Responsible Government, was able to amass to defeat Amendment 6 in 1988 (Brown 1990c). Bruce, once again claiming that the political establishment “outspent and outscared us,” surprisingly assigned some of the blame for the measure’s defeat on the voters themselves, who “did not fight back, but they timidly and gullibly surrendered to this blackmail” (Fulcher 1990). Reluctant to admit defeat, Bruce reflected that it did not seem as though in the future citizens of Colorado were “going to enact anything close to Amendment 1” (Brown 1990c). Bruce’s measures evidently failed to capture the public mood in Colorado. Two short years later, however, Bruce would prove himself wrong.
Bruce may not have successfully tapped the public mood in 1990, but Amendment 1 was a step in the right direction. "Many taxpayers out there," Bruce noted in 1990, "are just frustrated enough—particularly at the federal government—they're just wanting to strike out against something" (Gavin 1990c). Colorado legislators were visibly shaken by the near victory of Bruce’s 1990 measure. They too felt the frustrations of Colorado taxpayers. Many in the state capitol sensed the impending triumph of a popular tax revolt led by Bruce. Before the Colorado legislature began its 1991 session, legislative leaders placed on their legislative calendar a tax limitation measure that would incorporate “about 65 percent of Amendment 1’s provisions” (Gavin 1991a). Legislative leaders, though, made it quite clear they would not “be bullied into Doug Bruce’s calendar” (Gavin 1991b).

While state legislators again slowly deliberated their own measure under the dome of the state capitol, Bruce was busy foisting his anti-tax efforts on his hometown, Colorado Springs. Shutout in his first two statewide efforts, Bruce and his supporters collected enough signatures in Colorado Springs to place two tax limitation measures on the city’s April 2, 1991, ballot. With almost no organized opposition, both of Bruce’s measures passed easily. Amending the city’s charter, the initiatives required that “a public vote be held on any proposed tax increases, limited the property tax rate to 7 mills, and lowered the city’s sales tax” (Gibney 1991a; 1991b). His “campaign rekindled,” Bruce indicated that “we have our eye on” other Colorado municipalities, including Arvada, Lakewood, Grand Junction and Pueblo (Brown 1991). As Bruce warned, “This is really guerrilla warfare. . . . You go around and you grab a city here and one there, and pretty soon you are ready to take the capital” (Racine 1991).

In fact, Bruce had no intention of giving up his statewide tax reform effort. Immediately after his triumph in Colorado Springs, Bruce curtly reminded state legislators that “the clock is ticking,” and that “If they think they can stall and the issue will go away, they’re mistaken” (Racine 1991). Bruce threatened to place another initiative on the 1992 ballot if the state legislature did not pass what he considered to be a satisfactory tax and government limitation bill by the end of the legislative session. Bruce made good on his threat when both the House and Senate failed to muster two-thirds majorities to place a referendum on the 1992 ballot.

In January 1992, Bruce and his supporters managed to collect enough signatures to land his third state-wide attempt on the November ballot (Fig. 3). Bruce survived a bitter legal challenge concerning the validity of some of the petitioned signatures, some of which he paid people to collect, as well as
Figure 3. Populist entrepreneur, Douglas Bruce, delivering boxes of signed petitions to the Office of the Secretary of State. In each of his campaigns, Bruce relied heavily on the media, calling numerous press conferences to promote his ballot initiatives. Photograph courtesy of *The Denver Post*, Denver, Colorado.
a heated, public confrontation with Secretary of State Natalie Meyer, in which he called her "Meyer the liar" and "the Secretary of Sleaze" (Anderson 1992a, 1992b; Denver Post 1992). In addition, the Colorado state legislature during the spring of 1992, contemplated placing on the November ballot their own watered-down version of a tax-limitation referendum. Not surprisingly, the two legislative chambers failed to achieve super-majorities to place a measure on the ballot for the voters to consider (Gavin 1992). Bruce's initiative, again dubbed Amendment 1 by the Office of the Secretary of State, was the sole tax and government limitation ballot measure that the voters would consider in November.

Bruce's 1992 version of tax and government reform partially resembled its 1990 namesake. On the whole, it was a much more complicated measure than any of its predecessors. The measure not only restricted the revenue raising ability of state and local governments; it also limited the spending ability of state and local governments. Specifically, Amendment 1, called for a popular vote on any new taxes, tax hikes, or government debt, required the state government to limit its annual spending to the rate of inflation plus population changes, constrained local governments to limit their annual spending to the rate of inflation plus changes in the property tax rate, and limited the annual growth of school district spending to the rate of inflation plus changes in student enrollment. Unlike the previous initiative, though, Bruce's 1992 measure would not include fee increases for voter approval, or place a ceiling on property taxes. The numerous enigmatic provisions of the 1,703 word, labyrinth-like document made it difficult for critics to analyze; many claimed that the measure was "too lengthy and ambiguous" (Roberts 1992a). John Lay, chairman of the No On #1 Committee, for example, said of Amendment 1, "I think it has kind of a devilish, counterproductive side to it"; even the proponents of the measure, "don't necessarily know what it's going to do, they know good and well it's not going to be positive. They just want to be disruptive" (Roberts 1992a). Throughout the fall, Amendment 1's "ponderous complexities" were frequently the subject of critical political commentary (Hornby 1992; Dittemore 1992; Denver Post 1992; Yates 1992).

Despite the ongoing criticism of his latest proposal, Bruce and his TABOR committee were able to generate considerable support for Amendment 1. Bruce liked to tout that his measure was, "explicitly endorsed by the Republican nominees for governor and lieutenant governor, and [it] received the endorsement of 71% of the delegates to the Republican state convention" (Cordtz 1990). Bruce also tried to separate the measure from himself, claiming, "I'm no anarchist. I'm a short-haired, middle-aged bachelor with a
paunch living in the suburbs with a puppy. I’m not a threat. I just don’t like
government paternalism” (Johnson 1992). Distancing himself from his mea-
ure seemed to work. Contributions to Bruce’s TABOR organization in 1992
wound up exceeding $220,000, more than either of his two previous cam-
paigns. However, it must be noted that $87,000 of the $220,000 raised was
actually a “loan” Bruce gave to his own campaign, and another $64,000 of it
came from Vern Bickel, including one check made out to TABOR in October

Organized opposition to Bruce’s measure was again solid in 1992. As in
past years, many elected officials were critical of Bruce’s effort. Common
Sense Colorado and the No On #1 Committee, the two primary groups
opposing the measure, had little difficulty raising money to foil Amendment
1. Common Sense Colorado, comprised of businesses and government offi-
cials, launched a $450,000 campaign against Bruce’s measure. The No On #1
Committee had the solid backing of the Greater Denver Chamber of Com-
merce and other Colorado businesses, the Colorado Education Association,
and the Colorado Municipal Bond Dealers Association (Roberts 1992b).

Bruce’s TABOR Committee was outspent three to one by the opposition

The fight over Amendment 1, however, was not nearly as rancorous as
in previous years. Other initiatives on the November ballot, especially
Amendment 2—the anti-gay rights initiative—seemed to distract the media’s
attention from Amendment 1. As journalist John Racine perceptively noted
(Racine 1992d):

In past years, the amendment and its author . . . have been turned
back with an aggressive, well-financed campaign waged by the
state’s bond dealers, business interests, government groups, and
leading politicians. . . . This year, however, the diverse and complex
mix of ballot issues may divert attention away from Mr. Bruce.

Bruce too showed that he understood the significance of the relative lack of
attention directed toward his measure when he stated, “The boring old tax
limitation which usually loses isn’t getting the attention it usually does”
(Racine 1992d). In addition to the national focus on Amendment 2, Gover-
nor Romer, who again campaigned against Bruce’s measure, attended to it
with much less energy. Romer’s rather lackluster effort against Amendment
1 was partly due to the fact that he was lobbying against Amendment 2, as
well as on behalf of his own statutory referendum that would increase the
state sales tax to raise $300 million annually for Colorado public schools. Bruce, realizing that Romer would not be able to focus his time against Amendment 1, commented sarcastically, “I’m happy the governor’s going to be on the ballot. . . . He’s basically just given me the election. I’m thinking about calling a press conference and appointing him my honorary chairman” (Racine 1992c).

Sounding more confident than in earlier attempts, Bruce predicted that, “I think this is the year we win. Taxes are a major issue in the national races. . . . They’re playing my song” (Racine 1992b). This time, Bruce proved to be right. On November 3, 1992, Colorado voters passed Amendment 1 by nearly 8 percentage points. According to political pollster, Floyd Ciruli, the 54% of Coloradans who voted for Amendment 1 wanted “to ‘send a message’ of disgust without much regard to the details” (Weber 1994). After the victory, Bruce pronounced, “We have sent a message to the politicians; thou shall not steal. . . . It is a new day in Colorado. We shall be the freest state in America. We have proven beyond a doubt who is in charge in Colorado—we the people” (Roberts 1992c).

**Faux Populism and the Populist Moment in Colorado**

As should be clear from the brief presentation of Douglas Bruce’s three attempts to amend the Colorado constitution with his tax and spending limitations, Bruce was not the leader of a populist movement. Rather, Bruce presided over a series of populist moments. Persevering, Bruce, the indefatigable populist entrepreneur waged a war of attrition. In 1992, Bruce successfully tapped the anti-tax/government limitation public mood after his two previous attempts had failed. Bruce’s push for Amendment 1 can be understood not as a populist movement, but as a faux populist moment. While it garnered the majority of votes cast by Coloradans in 1992, Amendment 1 was not the product of or by the people. Bruce fashioned his constitutional amendment on behalf of the people; his measure successfully captured the prevailing public mood in Colorado.

Unlike a populist movement, the central feature of which is the collective, insurgent effort of a common people against the establishment, a faux populist moment is but a fleeting expression of the people, directed from above by a populist entrepreneur. Populism signifies a grassroots process of, by, and for the people; faux populism inverts the process. Instead of a common people laboring and protesting for a cause, faux populism is but an ephemeral expression. The people momentarily participate by voting on a
popular initiative which is broadly supportive of the *vox populi*. With *faux* populism, a populist entrepreneur, sensing a definite but ambiguous public mood among a quiescent population, taps into the widespread but immobilized sentiment. Seizing the opportunity to push his or her own agenda, the self-appointed populist entrepreneur interprets the public mood, and anoints himself or herself as spokesperson of the newly specified cause. The people play only a brief role in the process of *faux* populism. That role is to cast a vote for or against a question placed on a ballot by the populist entrepreneur. Once the votes are cast, the moment is over. To explain how the anti-tax/government limitation amendment Bruce engineered was a *faux* populist moment and not a populist movement, the public mood in Colorado and the role of Bruce as populist entrepreneur must be highlighted.

**The Public Mood in Colorado: Tax and Government Limitation**

The widespread tax and government limitation mood in Colorado long preceded Bruce's arrival to Colorado in the mid-1980s. Nearly half a century ago, journalist John Gunther commented that Colorado “is conservative politically, economically, financially. . . . I do not mean reactionary. Just conservative, with the kind of conservativeness that does not budge an inch for anybody or anything unless pinched or pushed” (Gunther 1947: 213). As far back as 1936, Don Sowers, a professor at the University of Colorado at Boulder, wrote that, “The overall tax limitation movement [in Colorado] is of comparatively recent development, and may be said to be an outgrowth of the depression period” (Sowers 1936: 5). The political culture of Colorado was much the same in the 1990s: a rugged individualism, frontier ethos espousing economic freedom and limited government. Political scientist Daniel Elazar has characterized aptly Colorado’s political culture as a state with a “populist-cum-moralistic bent” (Elazar 1993: xxxi). And two students of Colorado state politics have suggested that, “Colorado is a pro-business, pro-work, antigovernment, and antitax state” (Cronin and Loevy 1993: 18). The anti-tax/government limitation attitude of Coloradans was not just a fleeting reflection of the national anti-tax and government limitation mood that permeated the U.S. during the 1980s. Coloradans did not blindly follow the lead of Californians and the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. But the approval of Amendment 1 in 1992 demonstrated the deeper anti-tax/government limitation attitude held by many Coloradans.

Polling data from the early 1990s reflected the anti-tax/government limitation mood of Coloradans. In the fall of 1990, 69% of Coloradans
polled in a state-wide survey “said state government is doing only a fair or poor job of ‘keeping state taxes down’” (Cronin and Loevy 1993:116). Another 57% of those polled in the same survey “agreed with the statement that ‘taxes in Colorado are too high, and the state legislature has got to do something about cutting the state’s tax burden’” (Cronin and Loevy 1993:116). Coloradans, feeling the state’s economic downturn of the 1980s, generally wanted the state to curtail taxes.

It should be noted, though, that when Amendment 1 passed in 1992, Colorado’s taxes were not uncommonly high. Between 1983 and 1988, state and local taxes in Colorado rose 44.6%, while the nation saw an average tax rate increase of 45.7% (Brown 1990d). In 1990, compared with other states, the three percent state sales tax in Colorado was one of the lowest, the state’s corporate income tax rates were among the lowest, and personal income taxes ranged in the middle. The property tax was the only tax in Colorado that was above the national average. While local property taxes in 1992 were slightly higher than the national average, Colorado’s state taxes were relatively low. “On balance,” Thomas Cronin and Robert Loevy noted in 1993, “Colorado taxes, state and local combined, are at the national mean” (Cronin and Loevy 1993:300). As one longtime observer of Colorado politics observed, “This isn’t a tax-happy state. If anything, it’s too tax-timid for its own fiscal health. The legislature started slashing taxes in 1977, when there was a big budget surplus, and didn’t stop even after the economy started to go sour in 1982” (Brown 1992). Despite the numbers to the contrary, the perception among Coloradans was that their state and local governments in the early 1990s were appropriating too many taxes from them.

With respect to state government, a surprising number of Coloradans in the early 1990s were generally suspicious of their government. Of those Coloradans polled in a 1990 state-wide survey, less than 40% believed their state government was run “efficiently and effectively”; more than half of those polled “believed their state government was wasteful and inefficient” (Cronin and Loevy 1993:108-11). Most Coloradans also believed that special interests had “undue influence and that state officials do not decide in the best interests of the people” (Cronin and Loevy 1993:111). Furthermore, despite Colorado’s reputation for a “squeaking clean” state government, Coloradans in the early 1990s expressed deep-seeded skepticism toward state government (Rosenthal 1993:103-04). Of those polled in 1990, over 50% believed that they could trust the state government “almost never” or only “some of the time.” Sixty percent of those polled believed that state government was “unduly influence[d] by big campaign contributions.”
Over three-fifths of those surveyed believed that “the state does what is right only some of the time, or ‘almost never.’” “On balance,” the authors of the survey concluded, “Coloradans are skeptical, if not hostile, to state government” (Cronin and Loevy 1993:111). Yet, while the widespread negative attitude of Coloradans in the early 1990s towards their government and state and local taxes was indeed striking, the enmity of Coloradans did not run all that deep. Regarding the views of Coloradans towards the taxation powers of the state, political pollster Floyd Ciruli noted that, “While Colorado public opinion is in favor of tax limitation, its views are not strongly held” (Cronin and Loevy 1993:300).

**Douglas Bruce as Populist Entrepreneur**

An appreciation of the prevalent public mood towards taxes and government in Colorado is essential to explain Douglas Bruce’s role as populist entrepreneur. Bruce, as mentioned previously, did not act as a demagogue in pushing his anti-tax/government limitation message. He never once tried to obtain power, did not make impassioned pleas to the masses, and did not play on the base prejudices of the populace. Nor, though, did Bruce serve as a leader of a populist movement. Although his rhetoric often called on the people to rise up and take control of government, Bruce never attempted to mobilize or lead any mass political movement in an effort to attain economic or political changes. Instead, acting as a populist entrepreneur, he tapped into the pervasive anti-tax and government limitation public mood which was present, but not actualized by Coloradans. Bruce offered many Coloradans a tenable solution to their concerns about taxes and government. The anti-tax/government limitation mood in Colorado was ready for the tapping; outlasting his opponents, Bruce seized the opportunity.

Bruce savored his role as populist entrepreneur. A property owner in Colorado since 1981, Bruce moved to the state from California in 1986 (Bruce 1996), and quickly became attuned to the pervasive anti-tax/government limitation public mood in Colorado. Inspired by the success of California’s tax-limiting Proposition 13—what he referred to as an inflammatory “hot rod” that stirred up government—Bruce was determined to transform the political scene of his adopted state (Sinisi 1988). Like Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann and their Proposition 13 supporters in California, Bruce eschewed mass-mobilization as the method to get his message across to Coloradans and public officials. Rather, Bruce spread his message from the top-down. A clever, able rhetorician, Bruce was a master of the sound-
bide. Lacking the organizational resources to mobilize grassroots support, Bruce relied on the media to get out his message. Like the “aspiring spokesmen of the ‘plain people’ in nineteenth-century America,” Bruce understood that “the obstacles to the recruitment of a mass movement were many, varied, subtle, and in the aggregate, overwhelming” (Hofstadter 1955: 99). Indeed, Bruce, who has remarked that “people are cheap,” “shallow,” and “superficial,” realized the importance of waging “superficial campaigns” in order to build support for his initiatives (Bruce 1996). Instead of relying on mass mobilization as a way to build support for his message, Bruce adopted a faux populist strategy. Bruce offered his popular initiative as the solution to public mood held by many Coloradans. By doing so, Bruce was able to transform the ill-defined mass sentiment into a particular faux populist moment.

As a populist entrepreneur, Bruce chose not to mobilize the common people to act on their hostile feelings towards state and local governments and the taxes they levied. Indeed, between 1988 to 1992, there were no mass demonstrations (spontaneous or planned) on behalf of Bruce’s measures. The largest display of support for any of Bruce’s proposals was in 1990, when “15 of his disciples showed up at the hearing” of a competing ballot measure, and “raised hell” (Brown 1990a). Instead of rousing the masses, Bruce would call up reporters to “ask for coverage and to unabashedly mooch free advertising—asking reporters to list telephone numbers in stories, hoping for contributions,” and demanding not “to be referred to as a tax protester” (Hilliard 1990). Instead of urging common people to act upon and mobilize their antipathy towards government and its taxing powers, Bruce did the leg work for them. Instead of relying on volunteers to collect petition signatures to place his measures on the ballot, Bruce paid people to collect signatures. In terms of mobilizing popular support for his measures, all Bruce had to do was convince people to cast a “yes” vote for his ballot initiative on election day.

Without question, direct legislation by the people via the ballot initiative invites this alternative brand of populism. With a faux populist moment, voting for a ballot initiative replaces the mass, insurgent movement of the people. Using the process of direct democracy that is available to them, populist entrepreneurs are able to avoid much of the dirty work required to mobilize popular support for a popular cause. Since 1910, Coloradans have had the right to petition for statutory and constitutional amendments through the process of citizen-initiated measures. For over eighty years, Coloradans have used the initiative process to achieve policy changes. Obstacles to a
successful initiative, though, are much easier to overcome today. Most significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1988 invalidated a Colorado law banning paid petition circulators. Mass mailing lists have replaced labor-intensive efforts to mobilize popular support and to solicit financial contributions. Support for a ballot initiative is somewhat akin to what one group of scholars terms, “checkbook quasi-movements,” “where individual identification [for a cause] may not extend beyond a bumper sticker” (Larana, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994:12). The successful populist entrepreneur is able to deliver a message to the quiescent populace with only a shell of an organization; people actively supporting the initiative are conspicuously absent in *faux* populist moments. A few sizable financial contributions provide a *faux* populist campaign with immediate credibility and presence. Newspaper, and especially television and radio ads are able to reach a wide audience with little effort. Substantive disagreements over the ballot initiatives are reduced to juicy soundbites. In sum, populist entrepreneurs abbreviate the traditional grassroots process of direct democracy when advancing their ballot initiatives.

**Conclusion: The *Faux* Populist Moment**

Without question, populism of the 1990s is a far cry from the populism of a century ago. To call Douglas Bruce a populist and his six-year battle to limit the taxing and spending powers of state and local governments in Colorado a populist movement debases the concept and does little to explain Bruce’s actions. Endeavors such as Bruce’s, which seemingly are becoming more and more the norm in the states that allow ballot initiatives, are not adequately understood, much less explained, by journalists or scholars. In an effort to understand this alternative form of populism, this article has offered an alternative concept—*faux* populism—to characterize the undertakings of populist entrepreneurs such as Bruce.

In his classic examination of the “democratic movement-building” of populist causes, Lawrence Goodwyn argues that there are four sequential stages in the building of any democratic, populist movement: the movement forming, the movement recruiting, the movement educating, and the movement politicized (Goodwyn 1978). This arduous, but democratic process was necessarily of, by, and for the people. Today’s brand of *faux* populism is rarely of or by the people. Populist entrepreneurs have largely supplanted the traditional mass populist movement, as they are able to abbreviate the four-step process of “democratic movement-building” by directly tapping the
popular sentiment and attaching a ready-made political solution to soothe the public mood. Comprehending how a popular mass sentiment, ambiguous and ill-defined, can be tapped by a populist entrepreneur is the first step to understanding this contemporary brand of populism.

Acknowledgments

This research was partially funded by a Faculty Research Grant from the University of Denver. Earlier drafts were presented at the 20th Annual Interdisciplinary Symposium of the Politics and Culture of the Great Plains, Lincoln, Nebraska, April 11-13, 1996, and the 1996 Western Political Science Association Conference, San Francisco, March 14-16, 1996. Research assistance was ably provided by Nate Golich.

References


Racine, J. 1992d. From bears to bonds, Colorado voters’ ballot likely to have it all. The Bond Buyer, August 3:1.