Benjamin Harrison And The American West

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In a speech in Pocatello, Idaho, in 1891, President Benjamin Harrison expressed his admiration for the pioneers of the American West:

My sympathy and interest have always gone out to those who, leaving the settled and populous parts of our country, have pushed the frontiers of civilization farther and farther to the westward until they have met the Pacific Ocean and the setting sun. Pioneers have always been enterprising people. If they had not been they would have remained at home; they endured great hardships and perils in opening these great mines . . . and in bringing into subjection these wild plains and making them blossom like gardens.¹

Harrison had always been fascinated by the West. To a college chum he spoke of settling in either San Francisco or Chicago, and in 1854 he chose Indianapolis as his home town. By the time he had served six years as a U.S. senator and was nominated for president in 1888, he was described as a westerner. His only son, Russell, lived in territorial Montana for several years. President Harrison's stance on the issue of Chinese immigration gives further evidence of his close contact with western attitudes.

Harrison had widespread support for the Republican nomination for president at Chicago in 1888. He had served in the Senate from 1881 to 1887, and most western senators in the convention gave him their vote. Harrison received much of the support that would have gone to James G. Blaine, had he been candidate. Blaine took himself out of the race and Stephen Benton Elkins, a financier from New York City and West Virginia with important connections in New Mexico, helped engineer Harrison's nomination on the eighth ballot. By that time, the votes of delegates from the West, as well as from certain populous eastern states, pushed his total above the majority mark. Westerners regarded Harrison as a candidate from their area who would under-

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stand the special problems of the West.

Many of the domestic issues facing the Harrison administration (1889-1893) were of immediate concern to western interests: statehood for western territories, appointments to public office, national policy for natural resources, the monetary issue of silver, and the role of the federal government in local affairs. Tariff policy, a dominant issue elsewhere in the country, was relatively less vital to most of the American West at this time.

**NEW STATES IN THE WEST**

In his inaugural address President Harrison said, “It is a subject of congratulations that there is a near prospect of the admission into the Union of the Dakotas and Montana and Washington Territories. This act of justice has been unreasonably delayed.” So the time was ripe for new states; none had been admitted since Colorado in 1876. Most territorial residents saw statehood as an opportunity for greater self-government, and the 1888 election of a Republican majority in both houses of Congress raised their hopes for such a change. Over the course of nine days in November 1889, four new states were admitted—North and South Dakota, Montana, and Washington. Eight months later, in early July 1980, Idaho and Wyoming were given statehood.

The population of Dakota Territory had long been sufficient for statehood. While in the Senate, Harrison had sponsored a Dakota statehood bill that passed early in 1886. A Democratic-controlled House committee considered the possibility of New Mexico as a state to “match” Dakota, but ultimately refused to submit the Harrison bill. Dominant groups in Dakota Territory favored admission as two states, and their goal was obtainable when Harrison was elected. At the end of the Cleveland administration, the lame-duck Congress of 1888-89 passed the enabling legislation, knowing that their action provided an immediate political liability to the Democratic party. 

Harrison signed the admission proclamation for the twin states of North and South Dakota on 2 November 1889. In his History of South Dakota Herbert Schell observes that “neither state can claim priority over the other, as President Harrison purposely shuffled the admission documents so that none might know which came first. By common agreement reached in later years North Dakota holds thirty-ninth and South Dakota fortieth rank among the states of the Union.” In Montana, consensus for statehood was widespread and the formal proclamation was signed on 8 November 1889. Washington statehood came two days later, and in 1890, on 3 July and 10 July, Idaho and Wyoming were added to the roster of states. With these new states, Republican strength in the Senate was increased by twelve, and there were seven more Republicans in the House. No other president in U.S. history signed admission papers for as many states as Harrison did.

**APPOINTMENTS TO PUBLIC OFFICE**

Patronage demands created the most difficulty for President Harrison and were the basis for the greatest number of complaints against his administration. Popular myths, repeated almost a century later, hold that Harrison said, “When I came into power I found that the party managers had taken it all to themselves. I could not name my own Cabinet. They sold out every place to pay the elections expenses.” Testimony is much stronger that this was a fallacious report and that Harrison actually had the final say on appointments. Even Matt Quay, who became Harrison’s campaign manager after the national nominating convention, “received almost incontrovertible evidence that the Hoosier would not bargain.” Western railroad magnate James J. Hill was reputed to have offered fifty thousand dollars to the fall campaign on condition that Harrison would select a secretary of the interior from a list of three names provided by Hill. Harrison always said no to offers like Hill’s. Throughout the period he wrote letters such as the following to a correspondent from Ohio:
I was nominated at Chicago without the smallest promise of any sort relating to federal appointments and I am now absolutely without any promise or entanglements of any sort. I deemed it altogether improper to commit myself to any such matter before the convention and I have regarded the same rule as the only right one since. It is impossible, therefore, for me to discuss now the question which you present for my consideration. If I should be elected, I will not only be willing but would regard it as a duty to listen to the suggestions and counsel of my Republican friends and to give them such weight as they seem to be entitled to.

Harrison spend much of his time between the election and inauguration in considering appointments to the cabinet and to other positions. He employed a "carefully graded and recognized system of institutional standing" in making his appointments. Senatorial courtesy played a large role in what he did and he customarily queried people he knew about a candidate's qualifications. Cabinet appointments were made to people he had not known previously, and he interviewed such candidates. As a member of the Blaine faction of the Republican party, he could hardly avoid choosing the "Plumed Knight" from Maine as his secretary of state, but when he made the appointment he was criticized both for selecting Blaine and for delaying that action so long. Harrison was determined to name a cabinet that included no state party bosses, and for that he was criticized. In his cabinet members he wanted party loyalty as well as identification with particular states. Three of Harrison's eight cabinet appointees were from western states; his attorney general was a nonpolitical law partner from Indianapolis, W. H. H. Miller.

Filling the cabinet positions was a long and involved process. With less than five weeks before inauguration only Blaine had been appointed and Harrison replied to one correspondent that "I cannot and have not appor-

When I have concluded that it would be right to give a certain state or section a cabinet appointment the next thing is to find a man to fill the place creditably. When I have done that I am frequently, indeed usually, met with opposition to the appointment, the suggestion coming that it would be rather hurtful than helpful. Indeed, I have about reached the conclusion that it is quite doubtful whether a cabinet appointment in any state is of much local benefit.

Harrison refused to consider New Yorkers for secretary of the treasury: in his estimation they were too close to Wall Street. Determined to have a westerner instead, he sought Senator William B. Allison of Iowa. When Allison declined, Harrison picked William Windom of Minnesota, who had served in that post in Garfield's cabinet. Apparently, David J. Brewer, judge of the federal circuit court at Leavenworth, Kansas, was under consideration for some position, but Harrison was advised that "he cannot afford a Cabinet place and should be constrained to decline if the place were offered him." Brewer was subsequently appointed to the first vacancy in the U.S. Supreme Court. John W. Noble, of St. Louis, Missouri, was named secretary of the interior. When the secretary of agriculture was elevated to cabinet status on 9 February 1889, another cabinet position was available, and on the eve of inauguration, a close friend of Harrison's, Senator John C. Spooner of Wisconsin, secured that post for Wisconsin Governor Jeremiah M. Rusk.

Unfortunately for Harrison's political future, his method of building a cabinet made no attempt to "balance off claims of party bosses and reformers." Neither did it "reward indiscriminately younger politicians with a promising future." Even in his later cabinet appointments Harrison tended to disregard personal political advantage.
dependent choice of a cabinet brought a chilling comment from an advisor, Stephen B. Elkins: "Republicans complain that of the eight men in the Cabinet only one of them was in the Convention. Not one of the whole Cabinet did anything for you to bring about your nomination and ... this is an abandonment of friends." 19 Except for Blaine, the members of Harrison's cabinet were obscure nationally and weak politically. It was "well balanced, but neither brilliant nor exceptionally strong." 20 Harrison would be his own boss and the important matters in his administration would have his imprint. The friendly New York Tribune published this comment on 6 March 1889:

The cabinet represented National Republicanism. It belongs to no faction, appeals to no prejudice and threatens no revenges. From the first name to the last it is made up in the interest of good government. . . .

The cabinet represents and will carry into execution the policies and instincts of President Harrison and of the united party in whose name he will see to it that the Republic takes no harm.

James Clarkson of Iowa was appointed the first assistant postmaster general, with primary responsibility for satisfying local Republican patronage demands. Clarkson and James Tanner of New York, who was named commissioner of pensions, were Harrison's most controversial appointments. Tanner lasted only six months, whereas Clarkson resigned in September 1890 to organize Republican congressional campaigns. Clarkson, never restrained in his job by Harrison, was under obligation to find loyal Republicans for the fourth-class postmaster positions all over the country. In a letter dated 25 May 1889, he wrote that he was "most anxious to get through with [his] task here and leave" as he was "simply on detail from the National Committee to see that some of the men who fought with us splendidly last year are re-

warded."21 Both Tanner and Clarkson had sufficient political clout to receive federal appointments when Theodore Roosevelt was in the White House.22

During the presidential campaign of 1888 President Harrison barely mentioned the topic of civil service reform. Reformers supporting a federal merit system split between Harrison and Cleveland. With Harrison's election the reformers expected great advances on behalf of the merit system, and except for Cleveland's lame-duck additions, they were soon disappointed. Only in his appointments of Theodore Roosevelt and Hugh S. Thompson to the Civil Service Commission did Harrison get good marks from reformers.23 However, half of Harrison's cabinet members were sympathetic with the work of the Civil Service Commission, one was passive, and only three—Blaine, Wanamaker, and Miller—were on the reformers' blacklist.24

President Harrison spent from four to six hours each day during his first eighteen months in office working on patronage. Demands for federal appointments were so insistent and pressing that he could not do enough to satisfy the job seekers. Neither did he satisfy the advocates of civil service reform. Rarely did Harrison have an uninterrupted hour at his desk during his first year as president. It was no wonder that "he seemed suspicious of people, was noncommittal in conversation, and often assumed a superior air which was exasperating to many who came in contact with him."25 Through this period Harrison gained a reputation as a cool, insensitive iceberg in the White House, a reputation that has been enhanced in the retelling. Harrison recalled later that "in the power of appointment to office the President finds the most exacting, unrelenting, and distracting of his duties. In the nature of things he begins to make enemies from the start, and has no way to escape."26 Years later his private secretary summed up general criticism of Benjamin Harrison as growing "almost entirely out of appointments."27

Not until the second half of his administra-
tion did Harrison add employees to the merit system. By executive order on 13 April 1891, he granted 626 physicians and other agency employees in the Indian Service, primarily located in the West, a civil service classification. In 1892, 140 members of the Fish Commission were included in civil service. These additions to the merit system came because of Harrison's willingness to "recognize the importance of special training and skill where party interests were not especially vital." Most of the 10,535 positions Harrison added to the merit system were acted on during the lame-duck part of his term.

POLICY ON NATURAL RESOURCES

Perhaps the most important and longest-lasting piece of legislation affecting the West to come out of the Harrison administration was a small section in the general land revision act that was passed on 3 March 1891. The entire law reversed more than a century of federal land policy aimed at transferring public land to private ownership. Section 24 of this law became known as the Forest Reserve Act of 1891. Belatedly added to the 1891 law and passed without the usual parliamentary procedures—it was not printed for study by members of Congress before it was approved—this act was the basic legislation providing for the creation of national forests in the United States. It stated that

the President of the United States may, from time to time, set apart and reserve, in any State or Territory having public land bearing forests, in any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial value or not, as public reservations, and the President shall, by public proclamation, declare the establishment of such reservations and the limits thereof.

Details are lacking on how the forest reserve proposal was added to the land act of 1891, but certain actions tie Benjamin Harrison to the clause favoring the new national reserves. For instance, in April 1890, representatives of the law committee of the American Forestry Congress (renamed the next year as the American Forestry Association) presented a petition to President Harrison and described the necessity of protecting the nation's rich natural resources. As was his manner, Harrison made no direct reply to the petition, but he cordially received the committee and forwarded the petition to Congress. Later the same committee met with Secretary of the Interior John W. Noble and they memorialized Congress on the need to set aside forest reservations.

The chief of the Division of Forestry, Dr. Bernhard Fernow, later recalled that Secretary Noble told the joint conference committee in the eleventh hour that he "would not let the President sign the bill . . . unless the Reservation clause were inserted." A contemporary observer stated that Section 24 "was in the hands of western men to a large extent." Since Harrison and Noble were dissatisfied with the initial bill, "western Senators went back and forth to the White House during the night in an effort to have it shaped up so as to secure the Presidential approval."

In a speech delivered in 1908, John W. Noble recalled that the "first impressive appeal" for a forest reservation policy came slightly earlier, in January 1890, when Harrison "transmitted to Congress, a memorial . . . and recommended that adequate steps be taken to prevent the rapid destruction of our great forest areas and the loss of our water supplies." Noble also described the night of 3 March 1891, when President Harrison waited in an anteroom near Congress to sign bills that had been approved. When the land revision bill came for his signature, he asked Noble whether it was "as it should be, and being advised it was, because of the authority to make reservations was thereby given, he said 'Then I will sign it' and he did."

In addition to Fernow and Noble, Edward A. Bowers of the General Land Office, Senators R. E. Pettigrew and Preston Plumb, and
Robert Underwood Johnson all claimed credit for the success of getting Section 24 through Congress. Others, including John Muir and numerous congressmen, deserved recognition also, as the idea of national forests had been around for years. Bowers was the probable author of the forest reserve paragraph, which contained neither a purpose for the reserves nor a means of administering them.

Before a month had passed, President Harrison authorized a forest reserve in Wyoming adjacent to Yellowstone Park, and it was enlarged later in the same year. Fourteen additional reserves in the territories of Alaska, Arizona, and New Mexico and in the states of California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington were established during the remainder of his term. Harrison's proclamations brought the total national forest area to more than twenty-two million acres, about 11 1/2 percent of the national forest system of later years.

Some accounts of the Forest Reserve Act have emphasized the fortuitous circumstances that brought the federal government into a conservation program when the Senate was historically opposed to such measures. Others believed that the withdrawals carried out by Harrison and others "provoked bitter opposition on the part of many inhabitants and interests in the West." More recent scholarship holds that Section 24 was not "thrust on an unwilling Congress," and that the West did not declare "war upon the reserves." In fact, throughout the Harrison and the second Cleveland administrations, western opinion was as supportive of Section 24 as was Congress. Western newspapers made almost no comment, and most of these forest reservations were created because of petitions signed by area citizens. Neither was there any move in Congress to deprive the president of authority to set aside forest lands or cancel existing reserves.

Gifford Pinchot, later chief forester, called Section 24 "the most important legislation in the history of Forestry in America."

The Free Silver Question

Certainly, silver legislation of some kind was inevitable for the Harrison administration. William Stewart, a senator from Nevada, queried Harrison on the free silver issue before the Republican convention in 1888 and felt assured that the Indianan would not oppose a free coinage bill. Consequently, western delegates gravitated to Harrison as other westerners dropped out of the race, and he won the nomination. Cleveland, his opponent for president, was a known opponent of silver, while Harrison "posed as a friend of silver without ever committing himself to free coinage."

Following the election a cordial letter from Harrison to Senator Henry M. Teller, of Colorado, strengthened the impression that Harrison favored free silver. Moreover, Harrison's selection of William Windom as his secretary of the treasury was considered another good sign for silver. In his first annual message to Congress, Harrison stated, "I have always been an advocate of the use of silver in our currency. We are large producers of that metal and should not discredit it." Most of the new members of Congress from the six recently admitted states favored free coinage of silver and added their support.

So it was a surprise to Senator Teller, one of the leaders of the silver movement, to learn on a visit to the White House in January 1890 that Harrison was not the strong advocate of silver that he had expected. Teller met with Harrison to tell him of his opposition to Secretary of the Treasury Windom's plan to increase the use of silver in the money supply on the grounds that the plan did not go far enough. Harrison agreed that Windom's proposal had shortcomings, but he identified it as a "Republican bill" and announced that he would veto a bill "going so far as to be unsound." A bill that included Windom's compromise scheme for buying most of the nation's silver output was one of the more than twenty silver bills introduced into Congress. As such, it gained little support from either silverites or gold standard men.

By 7 June 1890, a Senate bill to purchase 4 1/2 million ounces of silver each month was approved by a House committee. Before a final
vote, supporters of free silver balked and delayed action. Later that month the Senate passed a bill providing free coinage of silver. House Speaker Thomas Reed worked hard to defeat the measure, and his efforts were successful by a narrow margin. Finally, on 7 July 1890 Congress passed another compromise bill, similar to the bill that had almost been approved a month earlier. The passage of this bill, known as the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, was described as a victory by President Harrison. Some members of Congress who would have been expected to oppose this measure supported it because they were wary of Harrison’s action should he be confronted with a more extreme bill that was fully supported by western silverites. Unsure about the president’s attitude, these congressmen feared he might “feel at liberty to veto” a free silver bill.45

Harrison believed that he would “end a controversy by signing” the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, but this compromise failed to still the critics. Since he had been tardy in clarifying his position on free silver, he quickly lost the support of Silver Republicans, including Senator Teller.46 Legislation favored by Harrison—the federal elections bill as well as the Blair educational bill—failed to make it through Congress. Part of the blame rests with the conflicts over silver. The outcome of the midterm election of 1890, which produced a sizable majority for the Democrats in the House of Representatives, shows the volatile character of the silver issue and the other measures passed during the first half of the Harrison administration. Still, the president wrote on 14 April 1891 that he had “always believed, and do now more than ever believe in bimetallism, and favor the fullest use of silver in connection with our currency that is compatible with the maintenance of the parity of gold and silver dollars in their commercial use.” He added that he had been “assured by leading advocates of free coinage—representatives of the silver States”—that the Sherman Silver Purchase Act would “promptly and permanently bring silver to $1.29 per ounce and keep it there. That anticipation has not been realized.”48

In a 1907 publication dealing with the silver issue and other national problems, Davis Rich Dewey, a nonwestern writer, expressed the opinion that the responsibility for this compromise and its failure was in the hands of Benjamin Harrison and his eastern advisers. In Dewey’s view,

No incident in our national history more forcibly illustrates the lack of determined statesmanship. If the president, supported by senators and representatives from the East, who had opposed the free coinage of silver, without an international agreement, had fought the silver propositions at every step, it would have been impossible to pass the silver-purchase bill.48

LOCAL ISSUES IN THE WEST

A variety of western local issues faced Harrison as a candidate and as a president. He made two extensive journeys into the West—one hurriedly arranged just before the elections of 1890 and a longer one in April and May 1891. Like other Americans in the late nineteenth century, westerners were anxious about a growing national role in local affairs. On the other hand, the president received much correspondence asking for federal intervention, and some of it was easily justified.

One issue that strongly affected California was Harrison’s position on Chinese immigration. Since he had opposed the Chinese Exclusion Act as a senator, opposition newspapers in California labeled Harrison as the pro-Chinese candidate of the Republican party.49 Harrison received a number of letters from friends regarding this issue. One explained that the Chinese immigration question “interests the people of the Pacific Coast almost as much as the tariff and the question of remonetization of silver.” Harrison was advised to take a strong, clear stand on the problem.50 Consequently, Harrison explained that he had opposed the Chinese exclusion bill because he
thought it would violate the Burlingame Treaty with China, and also because he thought exclusion un-American. Later, in a letter of acceptance of his nomination to the presidency, Harrison wrote,

> The objections to Chinese immigration are distinctive and conclusive, and are now so generally accepted as such that the question has passed entirely beyond the stage of argument. The laws relating to this subject would, if I should be charged with their enforcement, be faithfully executed. Such amendments or further legislation as may be necessary and proper to prevent evasions of the laws and to stop further Chinese immigration would also meet with my approval.

In his inaugural address, Harrison did not mention the Chinese problem at all, stating only that "our naturalization laws should be so amended as to make the inquiry into the character and good disposition of persons applying for citizenship more careful and searching. . . . There are men of all races, even the best, whose coming is necessarily a burden upon our public revenues or a threat to social order." Later, Harrison's attorney general directed federal agents on the West Coast to investigate and prosecute illegal immigration by way of British Columbia.

Specific acts of violence in the West also demanded Harrison's attention. He was startled by a death rate of twenty deputy federal marshals per year in Oklahoma Territory alone. This situation led to a request for rules supporting federal marshals and for federal statutes providing prosecution and penalties for killing a federal officer in line of duty.

The Battle or Massacre of Wounded Knee on 29 December 1890 prompted a presidential letter to the general in the field requesting information. The president, whose message was relayed by the commanding general, had heard with great regret of the failure of your efforts to secure the settlement of the Sioux difficulties without bloodshed. . . . He hopes that the report of the killing of women and children in the affair at Wounded Knee is unfounded, and directs that you cause an immediate inquiry to be made and report the result to the Department. If there was any unsoldierly conduct, you will relieve responsible officers, and so use the troops engaged there as to avoid its repetition.

Even more of the president's time was spent on a case in which a former chief justice of the Supreme Court of California, David S. Terry, was shot and killed by a U.S. deputy marshal who was guarding Stephen J. Field, an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Field was on circuit duty in California at the time. Terry had a long, stormy career and became an embittered enemy of Field, with whom he had served in a California court, when Field handed down a verdict of guilty in a case involving Terry and his wife. Terry's appeal for redress by the U.S. Supreme Court was denied, and President Cleveland refused him a pardon. President Harrison, anticipating violence, asked his attorney general to provide Field with the protection of a deputy marshal. This agent shot Terry when he was attacking Field from behind. The deputy marshal was arrested under California law, and eventually the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case, setting the marshal free without trial. Even earlier, Harrison had asked Congress to enact federal laws that would apply to cases of this nature.

Other western local issues attracting the attention of Harrison and his administration include the Louisiana Lottery and a projected North Dakota lottery, which were limited in their use of the U.S. mails; the character of schools on Indian reservations, which were modified, in part, from religious to public schools; considerable expansion, mostly in the West, of agricultural experimentation on sugar production; a grant of amnesty for certain persons in Utah accused earlier of polygamous marriages; and intervention in the Coeur
d’Alene strike in Idaho.

Benjamin Harrison believed strongly in the separation of the executive and legislative functions of the federal government—he was a Whig at heart. Likewise, he interfered very little in the departments administered by his cabinet officers. Nevertheless, Republican control of both houses of Congress in 1889–90 was interpreted as a mandate for change. Legislation during the first two years of the Harrison administration was so active and innovative that voters in 1890 recoiled from the prospect of a “vigorous government with enhanced powers to affect the lives of private citizens.” Following the disastrous defeat of Republican congressmen in the election of 1890, Harrison was not the person to “rally his party’s flagging spirits.” Most of the domestic legislation sponsored by the Harrison administration, and most of its activity in response to western interests, occurred in the first two years. Far more of President Harrison’s time in the final years of his administration was devoted to the issues in the field of foreign affairs.

NOTES

3. Howard Roberts Lamar, Dakota Territory, 1861–1889: A Study of Frontier Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1956), pp. 264–65. Harrison wrote Frank J. Mead, of Mandan, Dakota Territory, on 24 May 1884, that it was “an outrage” that the Democrats would not approve admission for South Dakota. See letter in reel 5, Benjamin Harrison Papers, Library of Congress.
9. Letter from Harrison to Henry C. Greiner, Somerset, Ohio, 9 October 1888, reel 12, Harrison Papers.
12. Letter from Harrison to Mrs. Anna Louisa Ingalls, 31 January 1889, reel 17, Harrison Papers.
21. Sievers, Harrison, p.74, citing a letter from Clarkson to Grenville M. Dodge.
25. Dunn, From Harrison to Harding, p. 11.
33. Dunn, From Harrison to Harding, pp. 73-74.
34. John W. Noble, speech in Indianapolis, Indiana, 27 October 1908, series 18, container 6, Harrison Papers.
40. McGeary, Pinchot, p. 36; Robinson, Forest Service, p. 4.
41. Sievers, Harrison, p. 145.
42. Ibid., p. 146.
43. Kehl, Boss Rule, p. 128.
44. Elmer Ellis, Henry Moore Teller: Defender of the West (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1941), p. 188.
46. Ellis, Teller, p. 191.
47. Harrison, Speeches, p. 288. This comment was in a letter to the Western States Commercial Congress, Kansas City, Missouri.
49. “An Address from the Workingmen of San Francisco to their brothers on the Pacific Coast,” Metropolitan Hotel, 16 August 1888, pp. 1–2, 10, 20, in series 18, container 4, Harrison Papers.
50. Letters to Harrison from Senator William M. Stewart, 29 June 1888, from A. May of Lemoore, California, 29 June 1888, and from Congressman John A. Anderson, 30 June 1888, reel 9, Harrison Papers.
52. Harrison, Speeches, p. 112.
53. Ibid., pp. 198–99.
55. Ibid., p. 368.