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Review of *The Turn to the Native: Studies in Criticism and Culture* By Arnold Krupat

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REVIEW ESSAY


IN THE SERVICE OF EMPIRE

[A]ccepting the reality of being a colonizer means agreeing to be a nonlegitimate privileged person, that is, a usurper. To be sure, a usurper claims his place and, if need be, will defend it by every means at his disposal. . . . He endeavors to falsify history, he rewrites laws, he would extinguish memories—anything to succeed in transforming his usurpation into legitimacy.

—Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized

In the final essay of his most recent book, The Turn to the Native: Studies in Criticism and Culture, self-styled “ethnocritic” Arnold Krupat wonders aloud whether, through his interpretive activities, he hasn’t become a “leftist colonizer” of the very sort critiqued so scathingly by Tunisian revolutionary theorist Albert Memmi more than three decades ago (p. 126). This worthy query, seemingly posed mainly as a rhetorical device allowing its author to absolve himself of the charge—he shortly concludes that simply by being “someone who reads and writes about Native American literatures” he has made himself “useful without vanity” and is therefore merely “a nice Jewish boy among the Indians” (p. 130)—is plainly deserving of a deeper, less self-interested interrogation.

Leaving aside the conundrum of personal vanity imbedded in the decision by any writer to publish an autobiographical piece, and the thoroughly begged question of the perspective from which Krupat’s work might be judged useful (on the book’s dust jacket, its publisher announces that The Turn to the Native has been “long-awaited,” but neglects to mention by whom or why), this thin volume contains no shortage of material upon which to base a more detached and scrupulous sort of analysis. A close reading of the overall text leads unerringly to an understanding of the author’s sentiments radically at odds with the carefully-contrived air of innocence and good intentions he adopts toward its end.

One need venture no further than the opening pages of the first essay, “Criticism and Native American Literature,” to appreciate both the magnitude of Krupat’s anti-Indian bias and the lengths to which he is prepared to go in alternately defending and denying it. In this single twenty-nine page endeavor, he manages not only to “debunk” virtually every indigenous author who has lately contributed significantly to the field of literary/cultural criticism—a roster extending alphabetically from Sherman Alexie to Robert Allen Warrior—but to align himself openly with positions assumed by many of the dominant society’s worst appropriationists: Michael Castro, Sam Gill, Jerry Mander, and Werner Sollors, to name a few.2 Along the way, he offers a tacit endorsement of such unabashedly Indian-hating diatribes as those compiled by James Clifton as The Invented
Indian (p. 11), a collection with which he seems unfamiliar since he not only fails to cite it directly but seriously misstates the thrust of its major argument.3

Ultimately, one is left with the distinct impression that there is hardly a white “interpreter” of Native America Krupat is not prepared to support in one way or several, scarcely an indigenous writer he is not prepared to manipulate, misrepresent, or degrade. Take, for example, his casual dismissal of several detailed native critiques of the material put forth by “James Clifton, Werner Sollors, and Sam Gill, among others” as “ad hominem attacks.” This cavalier and misleading depiction is offered on the very page where he opines, after barely a sentence of analysis and no quotations, that remarks critical of a “prominent non-Native scholar” made in 1992 by Lakota poet/essayist Elizabeth Cook-Lynn were “racist” (p. 11).4 The Turn to the Native is littered from start to finish with similar polemical distortions.

The motives underlying Krupat’s performance are not especially mysterious. His own preferred station in life—“the work that now names me,” as he puts it (p. 127)—is to serve as one of Euro-America’s “leading practitioners” of Native American studies (dust jacket), reconnoitering the terrain of indigenous reality and then “explaining” it—not least to the natives themselves—in a manner which affirms the propriety, or at least the inevitability, of their collective place in the prevailing politico-economic structure.5 He is in effect rewarded, both materially and in terms of the social privileges and prestige attending his professorial posting, for his facility in rendering hegemonic reinforcement to the status quo.6

This raises the question of the nature of the order to which Krupat has been harnessed—or has harnessed himself. Even he readily admits—as part of a caveat about why he considers “postcolonial” an inappropriate descriptor of American Indian literature—that the position of indigenous people in contemporary North America remains one of “inter-

nal colonial” subordination to a system of “domestic imperialism” (p. 30).7 The function of his role as a settler culture “translator” and “teacher” of things native is perhaps best illuminated with an insight offered by Martin Carnoy:

There are two very important points here: First, the colonizer needs the poverty and degradation of the colonized to justify his own place in the society. After all, where would he be if it were not for the colonized? He would not be able to do as well economically, since the colonial system exploits the colonized to the profit of the colonizer. He would lose much of his self-importance if he were simply one among many of his own kind. Second, the colonial situation manufactures colonists, just as it manufactures the colonized. It is not just the predisposition to become a colonizer or colonized that produces these roles . . . but the colonial situation itself. The colonial comes with power into the colonial context: he has the economic and military might of the metropole behind him. The colonized has no power. If he attempts to fight, he is physically conquered. The colonized is not free to choose between being colonized or not. The colonizer can enforce his usurpation with great punishment. The colonized adjusts to this situation by developing those traits with which the colonizer characterizes him . . . Many of these traits are incompatible with each other, but that doesn’t bother the colonizer, because the general traits are designed to destroy any culture or history that the colonized brings to the relationship.8

“The history which is taught [the colonized] is not his own,” adds Memmi. “At the basis of the entire construction, one finds a common motive; the colonizer’s economic and basic needs, which he substitutes for logic, and which shape and explain each of the traits he assigns to the colonized.”9
In order for the colonizer to be a complete master, it is not enough for him to be so in actual fact, but he must also believe in its legitimacy. In order for that legitimacy to be complete, it is not enough for the colonized to be a slave, he must also accept this role. The bond between colonizer and colonized is thus destructive and creative. It destroys and re-creates the two partners of colonization into colonizer and colonized. One is disfigured into an oppressor, a partial, unpatriotic and treacherous being, worrying only about his privileges and their defense; the other, into an oppressed creature, whose development is broken and who compromises by his defeat.10

Is such an assessment too harsh (an "ad hominem attack," as it were)? Do Krupat's main positions really conform to the specification that they shore up the material/cultural/psychological structure of US internal colonial domination in the manner described by Carnoy, Memmi, and others? Whatever else may be said of colonialism, and there is much, it devolves only initially upon a forcible preemption of the sovereign standing of the colonized nation/people. It is maintained thereafter not primarily by physical force, but through an increasingly complex and systematic indoctrination of colonizer and colonized alike to believe that any genuine resumption of sovereignty by the latter is not simply "undesirable," but "unrealistic" and "impossible."11

The critical lens through which any work emanating from within a colonial context must be examined, if its true utility is to be apprehended, can be located with precision in the stance of its author concerning the rights of the colonized to political and economic self-determination.12

On this score Krupat is straightforward. After noting that a reassertion of sovereignty is indeed a legitimate aspiration of American Indians (p. 14), he waxes momentarily humble, conceding that it "is not for [him] to say what should or might happen between the federal government and [native nations] in these regards," before proceeding immediately to do just that: "I think it is, however, reasonable to say that whatever happens, it is unlikely that Native American nations, in any foreseeable future, will possess sovereignty in anything like the literal dictionary definition of the word" (p. 15). From there, he becomes more specific. The idea that indigenous nations might achieve a restoration of their status as territories existing as independent states is "inappropriate . . . inasmuch as even nineteenth-century [federal] proposals for the creation of an Indian state never assumed that this state might be any more independent (i.e., a nation-state) of the federal government than were any of the existing states" (p. 15).

Having thus firmly embraced and advanced the colonizer's own limits on "reasonable" and "appropriate" discussion, Krupat applies the finishing touches to his negation not only of native hopes, but the most fundamental requirements of international law.13 In the end, all tangible forms of genuine native sovereignty—he lists the possibilities, only to reject them, each in turn—are sloughed off as "hardly realistic likelihoods" (p. 15). With that said, he next presumes to describe—ostensibly on the basis of the vast expertise he's obtained through a reading of a single book—the "proper" standing of indigenous nations vis-à-vis the US.14 This, essentially, is as an aggregate "third level" of the federal government itself (pp. 15-16). Unmentioned is the fact that the recipe—formal incorporation of indigenous governments into the US as sub-parts of the federal system—is identical to that recently formulated by the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs as an expedient to perfecting America's internal colonial structure.15 Krupat rationalizes his position by resorting to the obfuscatory "logic" Memmi referred to above:

Lest this seem to denigrate Native Americans' desire in these regards, it should be said that in the present moment of transnational capitalism, no state or nation has sovereignty in the strong sense of the dictionary
definition. Even the United States is subject to the requirements of international corporatism, as, for example, in the instance of American economic policy toward Mexico, a policy largely determined by the need to bail out Citibank. Mexican "sovereignty," meanwhile, like the "sovereignty" of all developing nations, is thoroughly compromised by the demands of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. (P. 15)

While this is true enough, it is also irrelevant unless meant to imply that there is no practical difference between the political standing of the US on the one hand, and Third World countries on the other. If so, then the argument could be deployed with equal validity to redeem not only the US domination of Native North America, but the French colonization of Algeria and Indochina, the British of India and Kenya, or even the Nazi régime in Poland.\textsuperscript{16} Subordinator or subordinated, colonizer or colonized, occupier or occupied, it makes no difference, since the sovereignty of all countries is mediated and constrained by one factor or fifty:

In this regard, legal sovereignty and cultural sovereignty—to get to this matter at last—although they may seem to be digital (on/off, either/or, you have it or you don't), are in fact more nearly analogue (loud/soft, hot/cold, more or less). Both political sovereignty and cultural sovereignty are meaningful only contextually and conjecturally. In the first instance, sovereignty is the material outcome of negotiations on a variety of levels between Native American tribes or nations and a multiplicity of non-Native institutions and governmental entities. In the second instance, sovereignty is yet again the result of complex negotiations and encounters between traditional cultural practices and the practices, impossible to circumvent or ignore, of Euramerican cultures. (P. 16)

This is nonsense. Political sovereignty does not accrue from negotiations or encounters, no matter how pervasive and complex. Rather, as virtually all thoughtful commentators on the topic concur, it is an inherent and immutable characteristic of any entity through which it is manifested (indeed, the whole concept of sovereignty originates in an idea of powers bestowed by divinity, not humanity). This is the principle firmly articulated in political philosophy and the laws of nations, not the "contextual and conjectural" equivocation Krupat presents.\textsuperscript{17} While it is true that the exercise of sovereignty can be— and usually is—mediated by the processes to which he refers, the legitimacy of resulting constraints is entirely dependent upon their voluntary acceptance by all parties to the negotiation or encounter. Imposition by one nation of what it intends to be a permanent abridgment of sovereign rights upon another, as is the case in any colonial setting, is illegitimate by black letter international legal definition.\textsuperscript{18} The same pertains to what Krupat calls "cultural sovereignty" (by which he apparently means cultural autonomy), a matter inseparably linked with the exercise of national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{19} While it is certainly true that cultures tend to be interactive and acquisitive, perhaps intrinsically so, the real question is whether each entity involved in a process of cultural exchange remains in control of the terms of its own participation, trading and adapting cultural/intellectual property in accordance with its own perceptions of need and interest, however dynamic and evolving these may be.\textsuperscript{20} Should one party to the "encounter" directly impose itself upon another, however, especially when it does so with the express intent of negating the other culture and assimilating its members—as the US has done to American Indians for well over a century—an altogether different situation presents itself.\textsuperscript{21} Under such circumstances, indicative as they are of advanced colonial systems, the struggle to restore cultural autonomy must be
seen as not only integral to but in some ways spearheading efforts by the colonized to achieve more tangible forms of decolonization. Of necessity as well as by inclination, this entails in the first instance a conscious and deliberate strategy on the part of the colonized to heal the cultural rupture induced through colonial intervention by affirming the traditions of their precolonial past. As Ella Shohat has observed, this “assertion of culture prior to conquest forms part of the fight against continuing forms of annihilation.”

From there, the object is to use the reclaimed sense of national culture not as an end in itself, but as a basis upon which to integrate those elements of the colonizer’s imposition that may be employed, jujitsu-style, to further the broader project of liberation.

It is at this juncture that Krupat digs in most deeply to defend the status quo. Ridiculing the very notion that there is—or even could be—anything resembling an emergent body of authentically autonomous native intellectuality, he insists that whatever of literary/theoretical consequence is produced by indigenous writers/scholars “ought to be included in the [American] canon . . . so that [it] might illuminate and interact with the texts of the dominant, Euroamerican culture, to produce a genuinely heterodox national canon” (p. 19). At base, this is the equivalent of arguing that material produced by Vietnamese and Algerian resistance figures during the 1950s should be categorized as French literature in order that France might reflect a proper heterodoxy in its national canon. It also dovetails nicely, at the cultural level, with the government’s current plan to complete its absorption of Native America into the US politico-economic/territorial corpus.

The crux of Krupat’s contention, he claims, is both “linguistic” and “conceptual”: because indigenous writers rely upon English as our main vehicle of expression and communication, our claim to offer a “uniquely American Indian perspective” is, ipso facto, invalid. If, on the other hand, we generate material in our own languages, we are invalidated because our work is textually rendered—Krupat erroneously believing print to be a Eurospecific or exclusively Euroderivative presentational format (p. 17)—and because it is self-consciously offered as a literature corresponding to “Western” classifications of content:

“Native American philosophy” is a Western category, and so is “Native American literature.” So too “Native American religion” and “Native American art” are Western categories. Traditional cultures abound in philosophical thought, powerful verbal and visual expression, and deeply felt relations to the divine or supernatural. But traditional cultures neither conceptualize nor linguistically articulate the generalized abstract categories of philosophy, literature, and religion. (P. 17)

Hence, to “consider . . . native thinkers as ‘autonomous,’ ‘unique,’ ‘self-sufficient,’ or ‘intellectually sovereign’—as comprehensible apart from Western intellectualism—is simply not possible” (p. 18). By the same line of thought, Italian cuisine cannot be considered Italian, since the idea of pasta (noodles) was brought back by Marco Polo from East Asia, while both tomatoes and peppers originated in the Americas; may we assume, therefore, that Krupat expects to order spaghetti in a Chinese restaurant or to find a good recipe for marinara sauce in a guidebook to American Indian cookery?

For that matter, given the nature of the “logic” he applies so gratuitously to Indians, one is entitled to wonder wherein he finds a basis for the existence of “Western intellectualism” itself. Surely he is aware that many of its essential ingredients were acquired elsewhere: gunpowder, that fundament of European weapons technologies, came from China (although the English sought to attribute its invention to Roger Bacon), as did many “Western” astronomical, geographical, and cartographical methodologies; the West’s
mathematics, its engineering and architectural principles, its medical practices, even its understanding of Greek philosophy were “borrowed,” without anything approaching proper attribution, from Islam (i.e., “the East”); most of the vegetal foodstuffs that laid the foundation for modern “Western” agriculture came from the New World, along with pharmacology and much else. 25

Such an itemization could be extended to great length, making it quite possible—nay, inevitable for anyone willing to adopt Krupat’s brand of “reasoning”—to arrive at the diametrical opposite of his own preferred conclusion: nothing at all is really comprehensible in conjunction with Western intellectualism because that tradition is in itself a mirage-like composite of elements, none of which can be understood apart from some other intellectual tradition. But, then, none of these other traditions has meaning apart from . . . Eventually we are left with little but a vacuum of incomprehensibility.

Before wandering off into this absurd realm of meaninglessness, one might well inquire whether there haven’t been more constructive interpretations of the linguistic, conceptual, cultural phenomena Krupat purports to address. Consider, for instance, Memmi’s observation that an imposed colonial language can, if approached correctly, be used in juxtaposition with native language to afford the colonized a “second tool” of liberation. 26 Or take the remarks of Kenyan novelist Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, partially quoted by Krupat (p. 19), to the effect that all weapons—linguistic, cultural, and otherwise—are appropriately deployed in the struggle to “decolonize the minds” of oppressed and oppressor alike. Perhaps most germane are the reflections of Frantz Fanon, French-speaking and French-educated black Martiniquais theorist of the Algerian revolution:

We believe that the conscious and organized undertaking by a colonized people to re-establish the sovereignty of that nation constitutes the most complete and obvious cultural manifestation that exists. It is not alone the success of the struggle which afterward gives validity and vigor to culture; culture is not put into cold storage during the conflict. The struggle itself in its development and in its internal progression sends culture along different paths and traces out entirely new ones for it. The struggle for freedom does not give back to the national culture its former value and shapes; this struggle which aims at a fundamentally different set of relations between men cannot leave intact either the form or the content of the people’s culture. After the conflict there is not only the disappearance of colonialism but also the disappearance of the colonized man. 27

This, it seems to me, sums up the understandings and objectives of the American Indian intelligentsia rather admirably. None of us seek the circumscribed, static, and reified cultural constructs to which Krupat would consign us in the name of our identities, nor do we accept that to be anything other than what he defines as legitimately native is to become synonymous with our colonization. Rather, as Shohat has noted, we are “obliged by circumstances to assert, for [our] very survival, a lost and even irretrievable past” in order to attain a new synthesis between what was and what is, creating thereby what can be: the resurrection of our cultures—and thus our nations—as vibrant, living entities, evolving and participating fully in the real world. 28 This is true, whatever our differences, whether one’s point of reference is to me or to Robert Allen Warrior, to Elizabeth Cook-Lynn or to Vine Deloria, to Jimmy Durham or to Wendy Rose, Terry Wilson, John Mohawk, Leslie Marmon Silko, Sherman Alexie or any of the scores of others, named and unnamed, who are discounted in The Turn to the Native. All of us, each in his or her own way, has cast off the lot of compromise and oppression described by Memmi. We are not creatures broken by our defeat(s). On the contrary, we will speak our own history, create our own
realisms and possibilities, define for ourselves the nature of our relations to others, forge the future of our generations in our own terms.

As to Arnold Krupat, he answers, by virtue of the various sophistries he employs in seeking to deny us our autonomy and our integrity—and in trying to retain his imagined position of primacy over us—the question he is quoted as posing at the outset of this critique. Far from being “nice,” he is indeed a colonizer, a “usurper,” a “partial, unpatriotic and treacherous being, worrying only about his privileges and their defense.” Krupat and the colleagues to whom he refers so often and approvingly—not only those already mentioned, but others like Brian Swann, Alan Velie, Marvin Harris, Jerome Rothenberg, Gary Snyder, and Armand Schwerner—are useful only to the colonial order, never to the colonized they profess to serve.

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NOTES


3. Krupat, whose annotation is often exceedingly vague, in this instance references my own analysis of James A. Clifton's The Invented Indian: Cultural Fictions and Government Policies (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1990) in Fantasies of the Master Race (note 2 above). He goes on, however, to describe Clifton’s book as “an intense critique of Indian self-identifications,” a characterization much closer to fitting the latter's Being and Becoming Indian: Biographical Studies of North American Frontiers (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1989). The Invented Indian's salient argument is that Native Americans do not exist and have never really existed in any form at all.

4. According to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, “ad hominem” means either “appealing to a person’s feelings or prejudices rather than his intellect” or “marked by an attack on an opponent’s character rather than by an answer to his contentions.” Neither usage is accurate or appropriate in describing Cook-Lynn’s work.


6. Perhaps the best explication of the concept of hegemony in the sense intended here will be found in Walter L. Adamson’s Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

7. Even while conceding the accuracy of the terms, Krupat seeks to blunt their implications, quoting his colleague Alan Velie to the effect that “not all Native Americans are ‘victims’ enmeshed in a ‘culture of poverty’” because there are a “great many oil-rich natives” in Oklahoma, and “in Connecticut, the Mashantucket Pequots number among the super-rich” (p. 31).


12. For further methodological details, see, for example, the selection of readings assembled by Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson, eds., De-Scribing Empire: Post-colonialism and Textuality (London: Routledge, 1994).

13. Under provision of the United Nations Charter (1946), all colonial powers are required to inscribe their colonies on a U.N.-administered list of “Non-Self-Governing Territories,” subject to internationally-supervised decolonization procedures. The principles enshrined therein are amplified in the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries, an instrument which pronounces unequivocally that the
"right of all peoples to self-determination" is fundamental, and prescribes the very complete independence of colonized peoples Krupat calls "unrealistic" as the sole legal remedy to colonialism. See, for instance, Nunnan Hurst, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990).


15. Krupat seeks to disguise the direction in which he is leading readers by referencing his argument to Vine Deloria's famous observation that indigenous nations are, at worst, entitled to stand "on the same footing with respect to the United States as does Monaco toward France, San Marino toward Italy, and Liechtenstein toward Switzerland and Austria," rather than to the Senate Select Committee (p. 15); Deloria and Lytle, Nations Within (note 15 above), p. 329. What is avoided in the process is that Deloria was/is seeking to establish concrete markers by which indigenous peoples can use self-governance as a route to the reassertion of a much broader range of sovereign prerogatives—affirming their status as entities related to but distinct from the US—while the Senate initiative is a subterfuge designed to foreclose on sovereignty legally by institutionalizing native governments as part of the federal apparatus itself. Krupat's overall treatment of the sovereignty question clearly reveals which of these two perspectives he is aligned with.


21. US assimilationist policy combined both elements in roughly equal measures: indigenous cultural practices were universally criminalized towards the end of the nineteenth century while native children were subjected en masse to a compulsory "educational" process designed explicitly to indoctrinate them with the cultural values and orientation of their colonizers. See, for example, David Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875-1928 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995). Although some of the more virulent practices have been abandoned—probably because they are seen as having long since accomplished their objectives—the goal of "mainstreaming" Indians remains a predominating aspiration of American pedagogy to the present day.


23. The analogy is hardly farfetched. In the case of Algeria, France actually maintained that the colony was part of its "home" territoriality in much the same manner that the US claims Native America as part of itself. See, for instance, Joseph Kraft, The Struggle for Algeria (New York: Doubleday, 1961). Those wishing to object that Algeria was "different" because of its separation from France by a body of ocean water should consider the circumstance of Native Hawaiians; see, for example, Haunani-Kay Trask, From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai'i (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1993).

24. "In 1403 the Koreans produced the first metal type known to history," establishing the basis for a printing system that may have been in use in China and Japan as well as Korea by the time of Johann
Gutenberg's "belated discovery in Europe" a half-century later, according to Will Durant, *Our Oriental Heritage* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1935) p. 730. The idea of the text is even less "Western." Indeed, several forms of textual production in Native America are known to have predated the European invasion. In any event, a contemporary American Indian writer availing him- or herself of print technology to produce texts is no more inherently "un-Indian" than was a seventeenth-century native hunter who traded for steel traps and knives, or a nineteenth-century warrior who appropriated guns and ammunition with which to defend his people. It is also extremely dubious that the system of classification at issue is even "Western" in origin. More likely, it was pioneered by the Egyptians, worked out by the Greeks, and subjected to considerable refinement by Islamic scholars before being acquired by Europe's comparatively primitive intellectual establishment somewhere around 1300 C.E.; see Hichem Djait, *Europe and Islam: Cultures and Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 105-14.
