

# Supporting Appendix

to the paper


## Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing

(not for publication)

This document presents the results of statistical models that I conducted but, due to space constraints, were not able to report in the paper.

- Figure A1 displays the distribution of estimated coefficients on *Revolutionary Leader* in 2,048 models that are all possible combinations of control variables. The estimated coefficient remains positive, ranging from 1.1 to 2.3, and statistically significant at the 5% level.
- Table A1 provides summary statistics on variables used in the analysis.
- Table A2 examines the bivariate relationship between revolutionary leaders and mass killing onsets or incidence. The patterns shown in Table A2 support the finding illustrated in Figure ?? of the main text. More mass killings have occurred under revolutionary governments than under non-revolutionary governments.
- Tables A3 and A4 re-estimate Tables 1 and 2 in the main text using a multiply imputed dataset that includes all mass killing onsets from 1955 to 2004.
- Table A5 implements the Firth's penalized likelihood method to reduce rare events bias. Results remain similar.
- Table A6 examines the incidence of genocide and politicide rather than the onset of genocide and politicide. Revolutionary leaders are associated with a greater risk of mass killing, regardless of whether I look at the onset or incidence of mass killing.
- Tables A7 and A8 re-produce the models 1 to 5 of Table ?? with the subsample of autocratic country-years and with that of country-years having irregular leaders. Table ?? of the main text considers the entire sample of country years or the subsample of state failure country years. The results of Tables A7 and A8 are consistent with those reported in Table ??.

- Table A9 presents the balance statistics before and after the coarsened exact matching. Table A10 estimates the model 2 of Table 1 using matched datasets.
- Table A11 examines whether the effects of revolutionary leaders are driven by political instability in the aftermath of the revolution. As in Figure ?? in the main text, I add  $\{R_0, \dots, R_7\}$  to the baseline model specifications of Table ?. Figure ?? displays only the results of Model 2 in Table ?. Additionally, Table A12 uses four dummies for non-overlapping ten-year post-revolutionary periods instead of five-years periods, while Table A13 uses 10 dummies for three-year post-revolutionary periods. Regardless of how to split revolutionary leaders into several time periods, results show that the heightened risk of mass killing does not simply fade away as leaders' time in office increases.
- Table A14 adds a binary indicator of revolutions as events to the baseline specification of Table ?. After the indicator of revolution picks up the effect of political turmoil in the midst of revolution, the relationship between revolutionary leaders and genocide/politicide outbreak remains positive and significant.
- Tables A15 and A16 examine whether the effect of revolutionary leaders is conditional on internal or interstate wars. Table A15 includes an interaction term between revolutionary leaders and civil conflict, and Table A16 adds an interaction term between revolutionary leaders and interstate war to the baseline specification. Both interaction terms are not statistically significant at conventional levels. These results suggest that the effects of revolutionary leaders on mass killing outbreak are not conditional on internal and interstate war.
- Tables A17 through A19 control for additional variables. Table A17 adds a measure of executive constraints, emphasized in Colaresi and Carey (1008), to the baseline specification of Table ?; Table A18 includes various types of authoritarian regimes taken from Geddes et al. (2014); and Table A19 adds a measure of oil income, discussed in Straus (2015). I obtain the measure of executive constraints taken from the Polity IV data and the measure of oil income from Ross (2012). Ross operationalizes oil income per capita as the value of a country's oil and gas production in constant 2000 dollars, divided by its midyear population, and its natural logarithm is used for my analyses since it is highly skewed. Across different specifications, the estimated coefficients of revolutionary leaders remain positive and statistically different from zero.



**Figure A1.** Distribution of estimates on revolutionary leaders. This figure depicts the distribution of the estimates on revolutionary leaders from 2,048 models that are unique combinations of 11 control variables. Vertical line indicates the estimate of *Revolutionary leaders* as reported in Model 2 of Table 1.

**Table A1.** Summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Median
Revolutionary Leader	5814	.13	.33	0	1	0
Non-revolutionary&Irregular	5814	.16	.37	0	1	0
Violent revolutionary	5814	.07	.25	0	1	0
Non-violent revolutionary	5814	.06	.24	0	1	0
Seeking ideology/religion changes	5805	.04	.19	0	1	0
Seeking no changes	5805	.87	.33	0	1	1
Civil Conflict	5814	.13	.34	0	1	0
Interstate Conflict	5814	.02	.13	0	1	0
Polity 2	5814	9.91	7.54	0	20	8
Political Instability	5814	.18	.38	0	1	0
ln(GDPpc)	5814	7.96	1.05	5.33	10.34	7.95
Ethnic Fractionalization	5814	.46	.27	0	.95	.49
Post-Cold War	5814	.33	.47	0	1	0
ln(Oil Income)	5578	2.39	2.84	0	11.22	.85
Executive constraints	5814	1.27	15.14	-88	7	3
State Failure	5814	.14	.35	0	1	0
Peace years	5814	24.44	14.35	0	49	24
Peace years 2	5814	803.17	731.95	0	2401	576
Peace years 3	5814	29796.97	34365.77	0	117649	13824

**Table A2.** Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing

	Mass killing onset		
	Non-revolutionary	Revolutionary	Total
0	5,670 (99.6%)	822 (98.0%)	6,492 (99.4%)
1	24 (0.4%)	17 (2.0%)	41 (0.6%)
Total	5,694	839	6,533

	Mass killing incidence		
	Non-revolutionary	Revolutionary	Total
0	5,670 (97.2%)	822 (88.7%)	6,492 (96.0%)
1	162 (2.8%)	105 (11.3%)	267 (4.0%)
Total	5,832	927	6,759

**Table A3.** Reestimating Table 1 using multiply imputed data

	All country-years					State failure years	
	Logit	Logit	ReLogit	RE Logit	FE Logit	Logit	Logit
Revolutionary Leader	1.41*** (0.34)	1.22*** (0.43)	1.20*** (0.43)	1.41*** (0.48)	1.76** (0.87)	1.04*** (0.36)	0.78* (0.45)
Nonrevolutionary & Irregular		0.13 (0.53)	0.18 (0.53)	0.02 (0.56)	0.07 (0.91)	0.18 (0.45)	-0.06 (0.51)
Civil Conflict		1.59*** (0.42)	1.57*** (0.42)	1.84*** (0.47)	1.50** (0.70)		0.34 (0.43)
Interstate conflict		1.76*** (0.56)	1.86*** (0.56)	1.63** (0.73)	0.86 (0.90)		1.28*** (0.45)
Polity 2		0.24** (0.11)	0.21* (0.11)	0.25 (0.16)	0.09 (0.27)		0.22* (0.12)
Polity 2 (squared)		-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)		-0.02** (0.01)
Political Instability		1.33*** (0.35)	1.31*** (0.35)	1.52*** (0.45)	2.63*** (0.70)		0.63 (0.44)
ln(GDPpc)		-0.11 (0.27)	-0.11 (0.27)	-0.22 (0.30)	-0.44 (0.80)		-0.00 (0.26)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.37 (0.87)	0.36 (0.87)	0.37 (0.92)	3.87 (32.26)		0.25 (0.87)
Post-Cold War		-0.95 (0.59)	-0.87 (0.59)	-1.49** (0.71)	-4.37*** (1.13)		-1.11** (0.52)
Constant	-4.99*** (0.56)	-6.66** (2.71)	-6.42** (2.71)	-7.46*** (2.61)		-3.81 (0.28)	-4.35* (2.42)
Observations	6417	6266	6266	6266	964	929	901
Countries	162	162	162	162	162	162	162
Onsets	41	41	41	41	41	41	41

**Note:** Regular leader is the baseline category. Model 3 estimates the rare-events logit model, Model 4 a random effects logit model, and Model 5 a conditional logit fixed effects model; all other models employ a logit regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses (except in Models 4 and 5). A cubic polynomial of years since the last mass killing (Models 1 through 5) or state failure years (Models 6 and 7) is included in all models but not reported to save space.

**Table A4.** Reestimating Table 2 using multiply imputed data

	All country-years		State failure years	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Violent revolutionary	1.58*** (0.45)		0.88* (0.48)	
Nonviolent revolutionary	0.58 (0.73)		0.55 (0.81)	
Revolutionary, Exclusive Ideology		1.87*** (0.49)		1.42*** (0.52)
Revolutionary, No Exclusive Ideology		0.31 (0.53)		-0.09 (0.46)
Nonrevolutionary & Irregular	0.12 (0.53)	0.11 (0.54)	-0.06 (0.51)	-0.05 (0.52)
Civil Conflict	1.46*** (0.45)	1.60*** (0.43)	0.32 (0.43)	0.36 (0.44)
Interstate conflict	1.75*** (0.52)	1.70*** (0.55)	1.25*** (0.45)	1.16** (0.50)
Polity 2	0.26** (0.12)	0.27** (0.12)	0.22* (0.12)	0.27* (0.14)
Polity 2 (squared)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
Political Instability	1.37*** (0.36)	1.42*** (0.38)	0.67 (0.46)	0.67 (0.51)
ln(GDPpc)	-0.17 (0.30)	-0.19 (0.26)	-0.01 (0.26)	-0.09 (0.24)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.10 (0.95)	0.45 (0.86)	0.16 (0.94)	0.32 (0.89)
Post-Cold War	-1.03 (0.64)	-0.94* (0.56)	-1.10** (0.52)	-1.11** (0.51)
Constant	-6.10** (2.88)	-6.34** (2.60)	-4.23* (2.45)	-4.00* (2.26)
Observations	6266	6266	901	901
Countries	162	162	162	162
Onsets	41	41	41	41

**Note:** Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.

**Table A5.** Penalized maximum likelihood logit estimates.

	All country-years		State failure years	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Revolutionary Leader	1.59*** (0.35)	1.42*** (0.43)	1.24*** (0.36)	0.95** (0.43)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular	0.69 (0.42)	0.27 (0.53)	0.43 (0.43)	0.03 (0.53)
Civil Conflict		1.71*** (0.41)		0.40 (0.45)
Interstate Conflict		2.04*** (0.63)		1.16 (0.72)
Polity 2		0.14 (0.15)		0.12 (0.16)
Polity 2 (squared)		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)
Political Instability		1.20*** (0.41)		0.47 (0.44)
ln(GDPpc)		-0.08 (0.26)		0.05 (0.26)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.35 (0.71)		0.20 (0.77)
Post-Cold War		-0.79 (0.57)		-0.90* (0.51)
Constant	-5.12*** (0.53)	-6.39*** (2.24)	-4.36*** (0.31)	-4.26* (2.23)
Observations	6417	5814	6417	816

**Note:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.



**Table A6.** Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing Incidence

	All country-years					State failure years	
	Logit	Logit	Rare ReLogit	RE Logit	FE Logit	Logit	Logit
Revolutionary Leader	0.91*** (0.32)	1.17*** (0.39)	1.15*** (0.39)	1.21*** (0.37)	0.92* (0.51)	0.86** (0.35)	0.91** (0.43)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular	0.49* (0.27)	0.36 (0.29)	0.37 (0.29)	0.35 (0.39)	0.27 (0.49)	0.34 (0.31)	0.12 (0.33)
Lagged incidence	6.52*** (0.54)	6.34*** (0.75)	6.10*** (0.74)	6.32*** (0.79)	5.94*** (0.92)	6.12*** (0.34)	6.17*** (0.45)
Civil Conflict		1.53*** (0.32)	1.52*** (0.31)	1.59*** (0.34)	1.20*** (0.42)		0.54 (0.39)
Interstate Conflict		1.25** (0.63)	1.30** (0.63)	1.26* (0.68)	0.87 (0.66)		0.76* (0.45)
Polity 2		0.23** (0.09)	0.22** (0.09)	0.24* (0.12)	0.11 (0.16)		0.08 (0.11)
Polity 2 (squared)		-0.01*** (0.01)	-0.01** (0.01)	-0.01** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)
Political Instability		0.72** (0.33)	0.70** (0.33)	0.76** (0.33)	0.97*** (0.37)		0.43 (0.38)
ln(GDPpc)		-0.12 (0.17)	-0.12 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.20)	0.26 (0.59)		0.25 (0.24)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.61 (0.51)	0.59 (0.51)	0.60 (0.63)	57.41 (2833.67)		1.11 (0.74)
Post-Cold War		-1.64*** (0.36)	-1.60*** (0.35)	-1.79*** (0.46)	-2.31*** (0.45)		-1.75*** (0.44)
Constant	-5.12*** (0.57)	-6.08*** (1.95)	-5.88*** (1.95)	-6.58*** (1.91)		-3.84*** (0.23)	-6.26*** (2.21)
Observations	6673	6016	6016	6016	1049	1171	1029
Countries	163	150	150	150	24	98	90
Onsets	267	229	229	229	226	267	229
Log-Likelihood	-328.60	-242.29		-241.87	-142.58	-207.61	-156.64

**Note:** Column 4 estimates a random effects logit model; Column 5 estimates a conditional logit fixed effects model; all other models use a logit model. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses (except in Columns 4); \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.

**Table A7.** Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing Onset For Autocratic Country-years

	Autocratic country years				
	Logit	Logit	ReLogit	RE Logit	FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader	1.46*** (0.46)	1.60*** (0.43)	1.51*** (0.42)	2.18*** (0.77)	4.64** (1.86)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular	0.52 (0.54)	0.30 (0.62)	0.31 (0.61)	0.46 (0.82)	4.13** (1.80)
Civil Conflict		2.20*** (0.65)	2.15*** (0.65)	2.67*** (0.69)	2.43** (1.10)
Interstate Conflict		2.15*** (0.47)	2.21*** (0.47)	2.22*** (0.84)	2.35* (1.21)
Polity 2		0.43** (0.21)	0.38* (0.21)	0.43 (0.26)	0.57 (0.41)
Polity 2 (squared)		-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)
Political Instability		0.84 (0.58)	0.87 (0.58)	1.21* (0.67)	5.38*** (1.68)
ln(GDPpc)		-0.08 (0.43)	-0.06 (0.42)	-0.19 (0.42)	-2.69* (1.55)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.55 (1.20)	0.49 (1.19)	0.65 (1.25)	10.90 (9355.46)
Post-Cold War		-0.36 (0.78)	-0.24 (0.77)	-0.45 (0.91)	-3.04* (1.56)
Constant	-6.19*** (0.74)	-8.80** (3.88)	-8.31** (3.86)	-11.34*** (4.02)	
Observations	2860	2562	2562	2562	404
Countries	114	104	104	104	17
Onsets	28	24	24	24	24
Log-Likelihood	-146.66	-104.09		-102.29	-29.06

**Note:** Column 4 estimates the rare-events logit model; Column 5 estimates a random effects logit model; Column 6 estimates a conditional logit fixed effects model; all other models use a logit model. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses (except in Columns 4); \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.

**Table A8.** Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing Onset For Irregular Leaders

	Irregular country years				
	Logit	Logit	ReLogit	RE Logit	FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader	0.98** (0.44)	1.25** (0.55)	1.16** (0.54)	1.73** (0.74)	3.89** (1.89)
Civil Conflict		1.77*** (0.59)	1.73*** (0.59)	2.13*** (0.70)	4.15** (1.67)
Interstate Conflict		1.65*** (0.50)	1.76*** (0.49)	1.57 (0.99)	1.24 (1.48)
Polity 2		-0.13 (0.22)	-0.20 (0.22)	-0.20 (0.27)	0.21 (0.44)
Polity 2 (squared)		0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
Political Instability		1.25*** (0.44)	1.23*** (0.44)	1.58** (0.62)	8.24*** (2.88)
ln(GDPpc)		0.04 (0.40)	0.04 (0.40)	-0.13 (0.45)	7.28** (3.12)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.82 (1.22)	0.77 (1.21)	1.04 (1.33)	4.51 (8982.46)
Post-Cold War		-1.04 (0.85)	-0.90 (0.85)	-1.57 (0.98)	-4.74** (1.93)
Constant	-5.57*** (0.87)	-7.55* (4.12)	-6.98* (4.09)	-9.02** (3.92)	
Observations	1903	1681	1681	1681	380
Countries	96	85	85	85	18
Onsets	25	22	22	22	22
Log-Likelihood	-126.15	-98.44		-97.59	-21.78

**Note:** Column 3 estimates the rare-events logit model; Column 4 estimates a random effects logit model; Column 5 estimates a conditional logit fixed effects model; all other models use a logit model. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses (except in Columns 4); \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.

**Table A9.** Imbalance Statistics

Variable	Before matching		After CEM	
	L1 distance	Diff-in-Means	L1 distance	Diff-in-Means
Civil Conflict	0.04	0.04	$4.1 \cdot 10^{-15}$	$1.1 \cdot 10^{-15}$
Interstate Conflict	0.02	0.02	$1.4 \cdot 10^{-15}$	$1.5 \cdot 10^{-15}$
Polity 2	0.44	-6.12	0.22	0.04
Polity 2 (squared)	0.41	-136.87	0.07	-5.47
Political Instability	0.06	0.06	$4.8 \cdot 10^{-15}$	$1.9 \cdot 10^{-15}$
ln(GDPpc)	0.36	-0.78	0.11	-0.01
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.22	0.06	0.15	0.01
Post-Cold War	0.07	-0.07	$5.5 \cdot 10^{-15}$	$1.4 \cdot 10^{-15}$

**Table A10.** On Matched Sample

	Listwise deletion	Multiple imputation
	(1)	(2)
Revolutionary Leader	1.98** (0.88)	1.57** (0.73)
Irregular/Nonrevolutionary	1.28 (0.93)	1.09 (0.90)
Civil Conflict	1.93* (1.02)	1.66*** (0.63)
Interstate conflict	1.38 (1.12)	1.61 (1.03)
Polity 2	-0.06 (0.38)	0.02 (0.30)
Polity 2 (squared)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)
Political Instability	1.32** (0.61)	1.78*** (0.49)
ln(GDPpc)	0.28 (0.75)	0.17 (0.69)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.29 (1.30)	1.62 (1.34)
Post-Cold War	-1.24 (0.97)	-1.54 (0.99)
Constant	-10.71* (6.50)	-10.05* (5.79)
Observations	3079	3406
Log-Likelihood	-132.10	.

**Note:** Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.

**Table A11.** Dividing Revolutionary Leaders by Time Period

	Logit	Logit	ReLogit	RE Logit	FE Logit
5 years before revolution	1.03** (0.40)	0.66 (0.48)	0.71 (0.48)	0.81 (0.59)	0.87 (1.00)
First 5 revolutionary years	1.93*** (0.44)	1.44*** (0.51)	1.42*** (0.48)	1.71*** (0.61)	2.74** (1.12)
Second 5 revolutionary years	0.16 (1.13)	0.38 (1.19)		0.56 (1.13)	-1.43 (3.10)
Third 5 revolutionary years	1.90*** (0.60)	2.09*** (0.74)	2.09*** (0.72)	2.39*** (0.74)	2.94** (1.18)
Fourth 5 revolutionary years	2.15*** (0.64)	1.77** (0.88)	1.88** (0.88)	2.07** (0.94)	2.22 (1.57)
Fifth 5 revolutionary years	1.55 (1.12)	2.51** (1.09)	2.82*** (1.08)	2.92** (1.27)	4.03** (1.83)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular	0.62 (0.44)	0.19 (0.59)	0.22 (0.57)	0.11 (0.60)	0.49 (0.91)
Civil Conflict		1.65*** (0.51)	1.62*** (0.50)	1.83*** (0.49)	1.69** (0.74)
Interstate Conflict		1.91*** (0.50)	1.99*** (0.50)	1.87** (0.76)	1.25 (1.00)
Polity 2		0.16 (0.12)	0.14 (0.12)	0.15 (0.17)	0.05 (0.29)
Polity 2 (squared)		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)
Political Instability		1.33*** (0.44)	1.30*** (0.44)	1.51*** (0.51)	2.38*** (0.74)
ln(GDPpc)		-0.06 (0.29)	-0.06 (0.29)	-0.19 (0.32)	-0.40 (0.92)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.32 (0.90)	0.32 (0.90)	0.35 (0.94)	39.22 (8612.27)
Post-Cold War		-0.69 (0.59)	-0.62 (0.58)	-1.09 (0.72)	-3.37*** (1.13)
Sixth 5 revolutionary years					-0.04 (3682.41)
30 or greater revolutionary years					-11.08 (2802.38)
Constant	-5.35*** (0.65)	-6.89** (2.99)	-6.55** (2.87)	-7.41*** (2.75)	
Observations	6331	5729	5814	5729	851
Countries	162	148	148	148	24
Onsets	41	32	32	32	32
Log-Likelihood	-222.21	-151.60		-150.40	-55.52

**Note:** Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses (except in Columns 4); \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. The full set of baseline controls is included in all models but not reported to save space. Several periods are dropped in Columns 1 to 3, because they perfectly predict the absence of mass killing.

**Table A12.** Using Ten-year Periods

	Logit	Logit	ReLogit	RE Logit	FE Logit
First 10 revolutionary years	1.50*** (0.45)	1.17** (0.53)	1.17** (0.52)	1.37** (0.57)	1.74* (0.93)
Second 10 revolutionary years	1.99*** (0.48)	2.02*** (0.66)	2.01*** (0.66)	2.25*** (0.66)	2.55** (1.05)
Third 10 revolutionary years	1.04 (1.02)	1.84* (1.07)	2.23** (1.07)	2.10* (1.22)	3.25** (1.58)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular	0.66 (0.43)	0.20 (0.58)	0.25 (0.58)	0.11 (0.59)	0.39 (0.93)
Civil Conflict		1.73*** (0.48)	1.71*** (0.48)	1.90*** (0.49)	1.66** (0.73)
Interstate Conflict		1.82*** (0.52)	1.90*** (0.52)	1.77** (0.75)	0.89 (0.95)
Polity 2		0.17 (0.12)	0.14 (0.12)	0.18 (0.17)	0.14 (0.28)
Polity 2 (squared)		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Political Instability		1.40*** (0.45)	1.37*** (0.44)	1.55*** (0.49)	2.52*** (0.75)
ln(GDPpc)		-0.10 (0.30)	-0.09 (0.30)	-0.22 (0.32)	-0.31 (0.89)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.33 (0.90)	0.32 (0.90)	0.35 (0.91)	33.56 (8683.58)
Post-Cold War		-0.90 (0.61)	-0.82 (0.61)	-1.38* (0.74)	-4.02*** (1.08)
Fourth 10 revolutionary years					-12.62 (5617.43)
Constant	-5.21*** (0.62)	-6.60** (3.03)	-6.35** (3.02)	-7.06*** (2.67)	
Observations	6371	5768	5814	5768	851
Countries	162	148	148	148	24
Onsets	41	32	32	32	32
Log-Likelihood	-227.08	-153.58		-152.60	-58.76

**Note:** Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.

**Table A13.** Using Three-year Periods

	Logit	Logit	ReLogit	RE Logit	FE Logit
3 years before revolution	1.04** (0.53)	0.50 (0.55)	0.64 (0.55)	0.56 (0.71)	-0.01 (1.06)
1st 3 revolutionary years	2.39*** (0.44)	1.77*** (0.51)	1.89*** (0.49)	2.03*** (0.62)	2.64** (1.13)
4th 3 revolutionary years	1.44* (0.85)	1.67* (0.89)	1.98** (0.88)	1.88** (0.88)	1.16 (1.36)
5th 3 revolutionary years	2.29*** (0.72)	2.40*** (0.87)	2.60*** (0.86)	2.70*** (0.82)	3.20** (1.43)
6th 3 revolutionary years	2.02*** (0.75)	1.44 (1.15)	1.97* (1.14)	1.72 (1.16)	2.20 (1.56)
7th 3 revolutionary years	2.70*** (0.78)	2.78*** (0.81)	3.00*** (0.81)	3.07*** (1.02)	3.31* (1.76)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular	0.63 (0.44)	0.21 (0.58)	0.39 (0.57)	0.12 (0.59)	0.38 (0.91)
Civil Conflict		1.67*** (0.49)	1.62*** (0.49)	1.87*** (0.50)	1.79** (0.74)
Interstate Conflict		1.70*** (0.51)	1.76*** (0.52)	1.68** (0.80)	0.90 (1.02)
Polity 2		0.19 (0.12)	0.15 (0.13)	0.17 (0.18)	0.10 (0.29)
Polity 2 (squared)		-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Political Instability		1.20*** (0.46)	1.19*** (0.46)	1.37*** (0.52)	2.35*** (0.79)
ln(GDPpc)		-0.10 (0.29)	-0.08 (0.29)	-0.22 (0.32)	-0.22 (0.88)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.23 (0.90)	0.26 (0.91)	0.29 (0.93)	47.72 (17665.58)
Post-Cold War		-0.77 (0.59)	-0.72 (0.59)	-1.19 (0.74)	-3.84*** (1.15)
2nd 3 revolutionary years					-13.73 (1878.73)
3rd 3 revolutionary years					-14.04 (1860.92)
8th 3 revolutionary years					-13.87 (9753.95)
9th 3 revolutionary years					-13.66 (8121.67)
30 or greater revolutionary years					-12.79 (5817.30)
Constant	-5.29*** (0.64)	-6.40** (2.85)	-6.44** (2.83)	-6.86** (2.72)	
Observations	6065	5503	5814	5503	851
Countries					
Onsets					
Log-Likelihood	-215.91	-146.73		-145.56	-53.63

**Note:** Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses; \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.



**Table A14.** Adding Revolution as One-off Event

	Logit	Logit	ReLogit	RE Logit	FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader	1.73*** (0.51)	1.26** (0.52)	1.24** (0.52)	1.46*** (0.56)	1.72* (0.96)
Revolution	1.72*** (0.60)	1.34* (0.70)	1.38** (0.70)	1.43** (0.72)	1.28 (0.90)
Revolution (t-1)	1.01 (0.83)	0.11 (0.95)	0.31 (0.95)	0.08 (0.89)	0.41 (1.08)
Revolution (t+1)	2.41*** (0.57)	1.80*** (0.62)	1.87*** (0.62)	1.93*** (0.73)	1.45 (0.96)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular	0.81 (0.54)	0.21 (0.59)	0.26 (0.59)	0.15 (0.59)	0.42 (0.89)
Civil Conflict		1.74*** (0.48)	1.70*** (0.48)	1.97*** (0.49)	1.56** (0.68)
Interstate Conflict		2.05*** (0.55)	2.13*** (0.55)	2.04*** (0.74)	1.17 (0.94)
Polity 2		0.19* (0.12)	0.17 (0.12)	0.18 (0.17)	0.08 (0.27)
Polity 2 (squared)		-0.01** (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Political Instability		1.02** (0.40)	1.01** (0.40)	1.21** (0.49)	2.14*** (0.75)
ln(GDPpc)		-0.06 (0.29)	-0.06 (0.29)	-0.18 (0.32)	-0.41 (0.93)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.40 (0.93)	0.39 (0.92)	0.41 (0.92)	26.83 (13791.88)
Post-Cold War		-0.78 (0.65)	-0.71 (0.65)	-1.15 (0.71)	-3.45*** (1.11)
Constant	-5.92*** (0.67)	-6.85** (2.89)	-6.59** (2.88)	-7.37*** (2.70)	
Observations	5668	5668	5668	5668	830
Countries	148	148	148	148	24
Onsets	32	32	32	32	32
Log-Likelihood	-170.26	-150.46		-149.29	-57.48

**Note:** Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses; \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.

**Table A15.** Interacting Revolutionary Leaders with Civil Conflict

	Logit	ReLogit	RE Logit	FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader	1.78*** (0.55)	1.71*** (0.55)	1.86*** (0.60)	1.85** (0.90)
Civil Conflict	2.07*** (0.59)	2.02*** (0.58)	2.12*** (0.59)	1.23 (0.81)
Revolutionary leader $\times$ Conflict	-0.73 (0.76)	-0.66 (0.76)	-0.57 (0.81)	0.69 (1.14)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular	0.18 (0.60)	0.23 (0.60)	0.11 (0.59)	0.46 (0.92)
Interstate Conflict	1.93*** (0.50)	2.02*** (0.50)	1.88** (0.73)	0.92 (0.91)
Polity 2	0.17 (0.12)	0.14 (0.12)	0.18 (0.17)	0.05 (0.27)
Polity 2 (squared)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Political Instability	1.22*** (0.41)	1.20*** (0.41)	1.38*** (0.47)	2.51*** (0.74)
ln(GDPpc)	-0.09 (0.29)	-0.08 (0.29)	-0.20 (0.31)	-0.46 (0.87)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.40 (0.86)	0.40 (0.86)	0.39 (0.89)	29.34 (12276.89)
Post-Cold War	-0.82 (0.60)	-0.75 (0.60)	-1.27* (0.73)	-3.88*** (1.08)
Constant	-6.74** (2.94)	-6.47** (2.93)	-7.10*** (2.62)	
Observations	5814	5814	5814	851
Log-Likelihood	-154.31		-153.59	-59.44

Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses (except in Columns 3); \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . The full set of baseline controls is included in all models but not reported to save space.

**Table A16.** Interacting Revolutionary Leaders with Interstate Conflict

	Logit	ReLogit	RE Logit	FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader	1.39*** (0.46)	1.37*** (0.46)	1.58*** (0.52)	1.90** (0.90)
Interstate Conflict	1.62 (1.05)	2.05** (1.04)	1.52 (1.13)	0.55 (1.28)
Revolutionary Leader $\times$ Conflict	0.58 (1.23)	0.26 (1.22)	0.67 (1.40)	0.66 (1.54)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular	0.22 (0.58)	0.26 (0.58)	0.12 (0.59)	0.38 (0.92)
Civil Conflict	1.72*** (0.47)	1.70*** (0.47)	1.88*** (0.48)	1.52** (0.69)
Polity 2	0.17 (0.12)	0.14 (0.12)	0.18 (0.17)	0.10 (0.28)
Polity 2 (squared)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Political Instability	1.22*** (0.40)	1.20*** (0.40)	1.38*** (0.47)	2.40*** (0.75)
ln(GDPpc)	-0.09 (0.30)	-0.09 (0.29)	-0.21 (0.31)	-0.37 (0.87)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.36 (0.89)	0.35 (0.89)	0.37 (0.91)	25.85 (5399.07)
Post-Cold War	-0.85 (0.62)	-0.78 (0.61)	-1.31* (0.72)	-3.89*** (1.08)
Constant	-6.54** (2.99)	-6.30** (2.98)	-7.02*** (2.65)	
Observations	5814	5814	5814	851
Log-Likelihood	-154.69		-153.72	-59.52

Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses (except in Columns 3); \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . The full set of baseline controls is included in all models but not reported to save space.

**Table A17.** Controlling for Executive Constraints

	Logit	Logit	ReLogit	RE Logit	FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader	1.84*** (0.47)	1.54*** (0.51)	1.49*** (0.50)	2.09*** (0.76)	4.84*** (1.76)
Executive constraints	-0.17** (0.09)	-0.22 (0.22)	-0.20 (0.22)	-0.29 (0.34)	-1.62* (0.86)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular	0.90* (0.49)	0.48 (0.56)	0.50 (0.55)	0.46 (0.72)	3.52** (1.49)
Civil Conflict		1.94*** (0.51)	1.91*** (0.50)	2.31*** (0.61)	2.04** (0.99)
Interstate Conflict		2.14*** (0.49)	2.22*** (0.48)	2.20*** (0.82)	3.03** (1.29)
Polity 2		0.21 (0.14)	0.19 (0.14)	0.25 (0.22)	1.09** (0.52)
Polity 2 (squared)		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)
Political Instability		1.10*** (0.42)	1.08** (0.42)	1.55*** (0.58)	4.46*** (1.31)
ln(GDPpc)		-0.20 (0.35)	-0.19 (0.35)	-0.49 (0.47)	-1.55 (1.62)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.52 (0.92)	0.49 (0.91)	0.82 (1.30)	-6.11 (6851.76)
Post-Cold War		-0.96 (0.74)	-0.86 (0.74)	-1.66* (0.89)	-5.85*** (1.77)
Constant	-6.06*** (0.83)	-6.42* (3.37)	-6.14* (3.36)	-7.83** (3.64)	
Observations	6079	5638	5638	5638	695
Countries	161	148	148	148	21
Onsets	30	27	27	27	27
Log-Likelihood	-167.22	-131.01		-129.51	-34.30

**Note:** Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.

**Table A18.** Controlling for Geddes's Authoritarian Regime Types

	Logit	Logit	ReLogit	RE Logit	FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader	1.14** (0.47)	1.26*** (0.44)	1.22*** (0.44)	1.50*** (0.55)	1.79* (1.02)
Party-based Autocracy	0.77 (0.61)	1.25 (1.02)	1.06 (1.01)	1.34 (0.91)	0.99 (1.37)
Personalist Autocracy	1.00 (0.66)	1.08 (1.04)	0.91 (1.04)	0.97 (0.98)	0.34 (1.44)
Military Autocracy	0.95 (0.75)	0.97 (1.04)	0.83 (1.04)	0.98 (0.99)	0.23 (1.13)
Monarch Autocracy	-0.25 (0.99)	0.46 (0.90)	0.72 (0.90)	0.63 (1.40)	0.51 (1.91)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular	0.37 (0.50)	0.12 (0.61)	0.16 (0.60)	0.06 (0.62)	0.25 (1.00)
Civil Conflict		1.77*** (0.48)	1.75*** (0.48)	1.94*** (0.49)	1.52** (0.71)
Interstate Conflict		1.98*** (0.50)	2.08*** (0.50)	1.90*** (0.74)	0.88 (0.93)
Polity 2		0.13 (0.14)	0.11 (0.14)	0.13 (0.18)	0.07 (0.28)
Polity 2 (squared)		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Political Instability		1.32*** (0.39)	1.30*** (0.39)	1.50*** (0.48)	2.39*** (0.76)
ln(GDPpc)		-0.07 (0.31)	-0.06 (0.31)	-0.19 (0.32)	-0.47 (0.91)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.41 (0.85)	0.40 (0.85)	0.48 (0.93)	22.75 (7689.26)
Post-Cold War		-0.93 (0.63)	-0.86 (0.63)	-1.37* (0.73)	-3.86*** (1.12)
Constant	-5.53*** (0.84)	-7.68** (3.55)	-7.22** (3.53)	-8.25*** (2.89)	
Observations	5979	5668	5668	5668	850
Countries	150	144	144	144	24
Onsets	40	32	32	32	32
Log-Likelihood	-219.49	-153.25		-152.33	-59.26

**Note:** Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses; \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.

**Table A19.** Controlling for Oil Income

	Logit	Logit	ReLogit	RE Logit	FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader	1.45*** (0.36)	1.37*** (0.43)	1.33*** (0.43)	1.58*** (0.52)	2.20** (0.93)
ln(Oil Income)	0.02 (0.06)	0.24*** (0.08)	0.23*** (0.08)	0.27** (0.12)	0.26 (0.29)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular		0.11 (0.56)	0.16 (0.56)	0.06 (0.59)	0.35 (0.92)
Civil Conflict		1.65*** (0.48)	1.62*** (0.48)	1.83*** (0.50)	1.47** (0.70)
Interstate Conflict		1.64*** (0.48)	1.72*** (0.48)	1.62** (0.73)	0.85 (0.93)
Polity 2		0.22* (0.12)	0.19 (0.12)	0.22 (0.17)	0.12 (0.28)
Polity 2 (squared)		-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Political Instability		1.27*** (0.42)	1.25*** (0.42)	1.41*** (0.49)	2.59*** (0.77)
ln(GDPpc)		-0.62* (0.33)	-0.59* (0.33)	-0.76* (0.40)	-0.65 (0.94)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.07 (0.89)	0.07 (0.89)	-0.00 (0.90)	24.06 (6095.43)
Post-Cold War		-1.25** (0.63)	-1.15* (0.63)	-1.65** (0.76)	-3.92*** (1.09)
Constant	-4.88*** (0.61)	-3.20 (2.94)	-3.02 (2.93)	-3.36 (2.94)	
Observations	6062	5578	5578	5578	821
Countries	159	148	148	148	24
Onsets	39	32	32	32	32
Log-Likelihood	-216.45	-150.88		-150.27	-59.20

**Note:** Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses; \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.

## Appendix References

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