Hendricks Symposium--Department of Political Science

Ecological Analysis of a System of Organized Interests

Paul E. Johnson — Fri, 13 Oct 2006 08:46:07 PDT

This is a report on a long-term research project about the evolution of system of political organizations. An agent-based computer simulation model is developed with the aim of exploring the inter-connection between tools and concepts from the field of political science with the emerging field of complex systems analysis and the simulation of ecological processes. In political science, we can draw on the exchange theory of interest group formation as well as research on the so-called “ecology of organizations.” Many of the individual level premises that are implicit in the political models are made explicit by considering the interest group world as a complex adaptive system. Beginning from some basic premises individual-level premises about the way that individual agents behave and the process of organizational recruitment, the aim is to build a multi-level understanding of the process of political representation. While the development of the architecture of the simulation model has absorbed most of the effort up to this point, there are important substantive questions for which some answers are beginning to come into focus. Insights into the tendency of some organizations to take positions in the center of the ideological spectrum, while others are on the fringes, can be had from the model. The tendency of organizations to specialize their issue-stances in small “niches” can also be considered. The differences in mobilization and position-taking between different kinds of organizations can also be illustrated.

Effects of "In-Your-Face" Television Discourse on Perceptions of a Legitimate Opposition

Diana C. Mutz — Wed, 11 Oct 2006 12:52:13 PDT

How do Americans acquire the impression that their political foes have some understandable basis for their views, and thus represent a legitimate opposition? How do they come to believe that reasonable people may disagree on any given political controversy? Given that few people talk regularly to those of opposing perspectives, some theorize that mass media, and television in particular, serve as an important source of exposure to the rationales for oppositional views. A series of experimental studies suggests that television does, indeed, have the capacity to encourage greater awareness of oppositional perspectives. However, common characteristics of televised political discourse cause audiences to view oppositional issue perspectives as less legitimate than they would have otherwise. I discuss the broader implications of these findings for assessments of the impact of television on the political process, and for the role that televised political discourse may play in encouraging polarized political views.

The Political Consequences of Perceived Threat and Felt Insecurity

Leonie Huddy et al. — Wed, 11 Oct 2006 08:34:45 PDT

We draw on data from a national RDD telephone sample of 1549 adult Americans conducted between October 15, 2001 and March 2, 2002 to explore the impact of a need for security on support for national security policies in the aftermath of the 911 terrorist attacks. In past research, an external threat has been assumed to have uniform impact on an affected population, a claim that has met with growing research scrutiny. We advance research on threat through an examination of the political effects of individual differences in one’s ability to feel secure in the aftermath of terrorism, exploring the interaction between perceived threat and felt security. Most Americans reported a sense of security after the 911 attacks. But a sense of insecurity among a minority of Americans coupled with a perceived threat of future terrorism increased support for both domestic and international security policy-- the curtailment of domestic civil liberties, tougher visa checks, and support for the war in Afghanistan. Our findings underscore the diverse ways in which individuals react politically to a common external threat. We draw on attachment (Bowlby 1982/1969) and terror management theory (Pyzszcynski et al 2002) to understand the origins of individual differences in felt security.

Empathy and Collective Action in the Prisoner's Dilemma

John A. Sautter — Wed, 11 Oct 2006 08:31:22 PDT

Economists guided by evolutionary psychology have theorized that in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma reciprocal behavior is a product of evolutionary design, where individuals are guided by an innate sense of fairness for equal outcomes. Empathy as a pro-social emotion could be a key to understanding the psychological underpinnings of why and who tends to cooperate in a collective act. In short, why are some individuals more prone to participate in collective-action? The hypothesis that a pro-social psychological disposition stemming from self-reported empathy will lead to grouporiented behavior in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is tested. Results suggest that an empathetic disposition does not lead to a higher rate of cooperation, but interacts with environmental conditioning to produce either a highly cooperative or highly uncooperative personality type.

Judgments about cooperators and freeriders on a Shuar work team: An evolutionary psychological perspective

Michael E. Price — Tue, 10 Oct 2006 09:10:08 PDT

Evolutionary biological theories of group cooperation predict that (1) group members will tend to judge cooperative co-members favorably, and freeriding co-members negatively and (2) members who themselves cooperate more frequently will be especially likely to make these social judgments. An experiment tested these predictions among Shuar hunter-horticulturalists. Subjects viewed depictions of pairs of workers who varied in the extent to which they had contributed to, and benefited from, a team project. Subjects were then asked to judge which worker deserved more respect, and which deserved more punishment. When judging between unequalcontributors, all subjects tended to favor more cooperative (i.e., higher-contributing) workers. However, when judging between equal-contributors/unequal-benefiters, male subjects who themselves often engaged in team cooperation tended to favor more cooperative (i.e., lower-benefiting) workers, while subjects who were female and who therefore rarely engaged in team cooperation tended to favor less cooperative (i.e., higher-benefiting) workers.

The Neural Basis of Representative Democracy

John R. Alford et al. — Tue, 10 Oct 2006 09:08:03 PDT

In politics specifically and society generally people often make decisions on behalf of others or experience the results of decisions made on their behalf. In exactly what manner is this important class of decisions different from traditional situations in which people make decisions on their own behalf? How are people’s behavioral and thinking patterns altered by shifting from personal to representational decision-making? Empirical social science research has provided little information on these questions, so in this paper, we draw on evolutionary theory and current knowledge of neuroanatomy to formulate a set of expectations regarding the differences between the decisions and brain processes apparent when people make decisions for themselves and when they make decisions on behalf of others (representation). Using laboratory experiments and, eventually, brain scans, we then provide tests of these hypotheses. One finding of potential interest is that representatives are nearly as mindful of their constituents’ resources as they are of their own resources. Though this result would seem to go against standard principal-agent theory, it makes perfect sense when seen in an evolutionary context. Evolution has likely selected for people who care about what others think of them and who take pleasure when they have been the cause of someone else’s good fortune. We conclude by describing a set of brain scans (fMRIs) we are in the process of conducting that will make it possible to identify any distinct brain activation patterns occurring when representational as opposed to standard (self) decisions are being made.

Balancing Ambition and Gender Among Decision Makers

Christopher W. Larimer et al. — Tue, 10 Oct 2006 09:04:57 PDT

Survey research from political science indicates that people are quite suspicious of ambitious decision makers; that people who desire power are self-serving and not to be trusted. In this paper, we use an original laboratory experiment to test not only whether people prefer nonambitious decision makers, but also whether people will seek to balance ambitious decision makers with non-ambitious decision makers, allowing for interactions with gender. In the experiment, participants are told two decision makers will be dividing some valuable resource on their behalf. One decision maker (either high or low in ambition) is “appointed.” Participants vote from a slate of candidates, about whom they have information on gender and ambition, for the second decision maker. We find that people tend to associate high ambition with male and self-interested behavior, and that the selection of the second decision maker, regardless of ambition, falls along gender lines, suggesting important implications for research on vote choice and representation.

Personality and Emtional Response: Strategic and Tactical Responses to Changing Political Circumstances

Jennifer Wolak et al. — Tue, 10 Oct 2006 09:00:51 PDT

Emotions help people navigate political environments, differentiating familiar situations where standard operating procedures are suitable from unfamiliar terrain when more attention is needed. While previous research identifies consequences of emotion, we know less about what triggers affective response. In this paper, we investigate what role personality has in the operation of the systems of affective intelligence. Using experimental data as well as responses from the 2000 and 2004 American National Election Studies, we first consider whether personality affects the activation of emotional response. Next, we explore the degree to which citizen attitudes like openness to information and compromise are explained by personality characteristics and subconscious emotional response. Finally, we consider the implications of these results for our normative understanding of democratic citizenship.

The Neuroeconomics of Trust

Paul J. Zak — Mon, 09 Oct 2006 18:33:51 PDT

A possible explanation for the substantial amount of “irrational” behavior observed in markets (and elsewhere) is that humans are a highly social species and to an extent value what other humans think of them. This behavior can be termed trustworthiness— cooperating when someone places trust in us. Indeed, we inculcate children nearly from birth to share and care about others. In economic nomenclature, reciprocating what others expect us to do may provide a utility flow itself (Frey ****). Loosely, it is possible that it “feels good” to fulfill others’ expectations in us. If such a cooperative instinct exists, it must be conditioned on the particular environment of exchange, including the history of interactions (if any) with a potential exchange partner. If conditional cooperation where not the case, individuals would be gullible, and the genes that code for gullibility would not have survived over evolutionary time (Boyd et al. 2003).

Instead, conditional on the parties involved in trade, budget and time constraints, and the social, economic, and legal institutions in place, individuals may exhibit high degrees of cooperation or nearly complete selfishness. This leads one to ask which institutional arrangements promote or inhibit trustworthiness. A second question is, for a fixed institutional environment, what are the mechanisms that allow us to decide who to trust, and when to be trustworthy? Relatedly, for a given institutional setting, why is there variation among individuals if the incentives to trust or be trustworthy are identical?

This chapter sketches a neuroeconomic model of trust and provides several forms of evidence in support of this model. Neuroeconomics (Zak, 2004) is an emerging transdisciplinary field that utilizes the measurement techniques of neuroscience to understand how people make economic decisions. This approach is of particular interest in studying trust because subjects in a laboratory who can choose to trust others and be trustworthy are unable to articulate why they make their decisions. Taking neurophysiological measurements during trust experiments permits researchers to directly identify how subjects make decisions even when the subjects themselves are unaware of how they do this. Readers are referred to Zak (2004) for a full description of neuroscientific techniques used to measure brain activity. These tools open the black box inside the skull and provide radical new insights in economics. Trust is among the most interesting of the topics being studied.

The Genetic Basics of Political Cooperation

James H. Fowler et al. — Mon, 09 Oct 2006 18:27:47 PDT

Cooperation has been a focus of intense interest in the biological and social sciences. Yet in spite of a tremendous effort to develop evolutionary models and laboratory experiments that explain the existence of cooperation in humans, relatively little effort has been invested in documenting the prevalence of largescale cooperation in well-mixed populations and the extent to which it may be the result of biological or social forces. In this article we study voter behaviour as a form of cooperation that bears close resemblance to theoretical models in which individuals in a large population make anonymous decisions about whether or not to contribute to a public good. Matching public voter turnout records to an adult twin registry, we compare concordance in political behaviour between monozygotic and dizygotic twins. The results show that the decision to cooperate by choosing to vote is primarily determined by genetic factors. These results suggest that humans exhibit genetic variation in their tendency to cooperate and that biological evolution has played an important role in the development of political cooperation.

Audience Effects on Moralistic Punishment

Robert Kurzban et al. — Thu, 05 Oct 2006 11:20:49 PDT

Punishment has been proposed as being central to two distinctively human phenomena: cooperation in groups and morality. Here we investigate moralistic punishment, a behavior designed to inflict costs on another individual in response to a perceived moral violation. There is currently no consensus on which evolutionary model best accounts for this phenomenon in humans. Models that turn on individuals’ cultivating reputations as moralistic punishers clearly predict that psychological systems should be designed to increase punishment in response to information that one’s decisions to punish will be known by others. We report two experiments in which we induce participants to commit moral violations and then present third parties with the opportunity to pay to punish wrongdoers. Varying conditions of anonymity, we find that the presence of an audience—even if only the experimenter— causes an increase in moralistic punishment.

Evolutionary Model of Racial Attitude Formation Socially Shared and Idiosyncratic Racial Attitudes

Thomas Craemer — Thu, 05 Oct 2006 11:15:45 PDT

A growing body of research in political science has uncovered evidence of a “split personality” among Americans when it comes to racial attitudes, whereby people express different attitudes in public than they personally hold. A common assumption is that people adjust their personal attitudes to conform to dominant social norms. At present, however, there is no theoretical model that could account for the emergence of racial norms that are at odds with people’s personal attitudes. This paper proposes a simple neural model of racial attitude formation that makes an important distinction between socially shared and idiosyncratic racial attitudes. Socially shared attitudes reflect evaluations that are culturally transmitted and may not necessarily represent an individual’s personal views. In contrast, idiosyncratic attitudes represent a sense of interpersonal ‘chemistry’ that may be at odds with dominant social norms. A computational model based on Kimura’s (1983) Neutral Theory of Evolution predicts that socially shared racist attitudes may be able to coexist with, and eventually be replaced by, more favorable idiosyncratic racial attitudes.

In order to investigate racial attitudes unencumbered by considerations of social desirability and ‘political correctness,’ this study augments traditional survey measures with a number of reaction time based measures of non-conscious racial attitudes. Socially shared, non-conscious attitudes are measured using implicit racial priming based on a lexical decision task. Idiosyncratic non-conscious attitudes are measured using a timed trait rating procedure to measure feelings of implicit closeness towards African Americans and White Americans.

Experimental results (N=555) support the predictions derived from the computational model. They suggest that socially shared racial attitudes (as measured by implicit priming) are biased in a pro-White and anti-Black direction, even among non-White participants. This bias is interpreted as a subconscious remnant of old racist norms. On the idiosyncratic level, however, an entirely different picture emerges. Attitudes that are measured by the timed trait rating procedure are much more favorable toward African Americans. A multivariate analysis suggests that implicit closeness to Blacks drives support for race related policies such as affirmative action. Thus, idiosyncratic racial attitudes may be able to overcome the lingering effect of socially shared racist attitudes. The implications of the theoretical model and the empirical findings of this study are discussed and future research projects are proposed.

Testosterone, Cortisol, and Aggression in a Simulated Crisis Game

Rose McDermott — Thu, 05 Oct 2006 11:13:42 PDT

This study investigated the impact of testosterone and cortisol on aggression in a crisis simulation game. We found a significant relationship between level of testosterone and aggression. Men were much more likely to engage in aggressive action than women. They were more likely to lose their fights as well. In addition, we found a significant inverse relationship between cortisol level and aggression. We end with some speculation about why we did not find victory effects in this population.

Genetic Configurations of Political Phenomena: New Theories, New Methods

Ira H. Carmen — Thu, 05 Oct 2006 11:10:37 PDT

Recent research by E.O. Wilson, James Q. Wilson, Simon, Alford-Hibbing, Carmen and others indicates that the competing social science paradigms of behavioralism and rational choice are in their last throes. Their salient weakness is insensitivity, bordering on ignorance, to politics as a biologically-orchestrated phenomenon. More specifically, political scientists know precious little about either genetics or evolutionary dynamics.

In this paper, I present a new theory--sociogenomics--to replace the shopworn conceptions of yesterday’s political science. I then demonstrate how social scientists can employ the tools of molecular biology to flesh out the genes coding for baseline political attitudes and behaviors. The theory and methods of sociogenomics will serve to synthesize the social sciences with the natural sciences in a broader consilient framework, so that the laboratory of Darwinian investigation can become the laboratory of Aristotelian investigation.

'Heroism' in Warfare

Oleg Smirnov et al. — Thu, 05 Oct 2006 11:03:36 PDT

The willingness of people to risk their lives fighting on behalf of their nation (which we call heroism) is a background assumption in the study of war, thus of international relations, but also an evolutionary puzzle. We use two computer simulations to explore the possibility that heroism could have evolved as a domain specific form of altruism, selected through humans’ ancient past as a consequence of warfare. In the first, “altruism” is modeled as a generalized disposition that promotes both heroism and other, non-military, forms of group-benefiting behaviors—which we call communitarianism. In the second, heroism and communitarianism are modeled as domain specific dispositions free to evolve independently. Warfare promotes weak selection on generalized altruism, somewhat stronger selection on communitarianism, and substantial selection on heroism. Heroism evolves more readily when groups are small and relatively equal in size. However, the level of evolved heroism is unaffected by whether war is rare or common. An analytic model indicates that heroism should evolve to higher levels when the rate of casualties in defeated groups is high. Our results suggest why special purpose modes of altruism might evolve more readily than a generalized propensity for altruistic behavior.

When Can Politicians Scare Citizens Into Supporting Bad Policies? A Theory of Incentives With Fear Based Content

Arthur Lupia et al. — Thu, 05 Oct 2006 08:48:32 PDT

Analysts make competing claims about when and how politicians can use fear to gain support for suboptimal policies. Using a model, we clarify how common attributes of fear affect politicians’ abilities to achieve self-serving outcomes that are bad for voters. In it, a politician provides information about a threat. His statement need not be true. How citizens respond differs from most game-theoretic models – we proceed from more dynamic (and realistic) assumptions about how citizens think. Our conclusions counter popular claims about how easily politicians use fear to manipulate citizens, yield different policy advice than does recent scholarship on counterterrorism, and highlight issues (abstract, distant) and leaders (secretive) for which recent findings by political psychologists and public opinion scholars will – and will not – generalize.

Minorities Within Minorities: Equality, Rights, & Diversity

Mon, 02 Oct 2006 12:57:44 PDT

Schedule, agenda, and brochure for HENDRICKS SYMPOSIUM 2002
Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights & Diversity

This symposium has been made possible through the support of the University of Nebraska’s Hendricks Fund. Established through the generosity of Mr. G. E. Hendricks, this fund is dedicated to supporting the exploration of “current controversial political questions… in a nonpartisan, unbiased manner.” Mr. Hendricks, an alumnus of the University and later an attorney in Colorado, believed that a more intelligent examination and consideration of political questions would lead to better government.

The Hendricks Fund is administered by the Political Science Department. Additional support has been provided by the Women’s Studies Program and the Human Rights & Human Diversity Initative at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln.