EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, IDENTITY, AND NATIONAL SELF INTEREST: THE ENDURING NATURE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Tyler R. White

University of Nebraska-Lincoln

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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, IDENTITY, AND NATIONAL SELF INTEREST:
THE ENDURING NATURE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

By

Tyler R. White

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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, IDENTITY, AND NATIONAL SELF INTEREST:

THE ENDURING NATURE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Tyler R. White, Ph.D

University of Nebraska, 2010

Adviser: Patrice McMahon

In the 1950s as European integration begun a group of scholars called the neofunctionalists suggested that as political and economic institutions were created, technical spillovers from integration would result in a new ‘European identity.’ More than 50 years later, Euroenthusiasts have touted the EU as being the institution that will bring Europe together and create a unified ‘European identity.’ While many elites and technocrats feel a closer association to ‘Europe’ there is little evidence that identities are changing as a result of European integration. This dissertation analyzes historical, academic, and journalistic accounts to look for evidence that European integration is indeed changing national narratives and identities. I find that national identities are much more durable than Euroenthusiasts thought they would be. I also find that support for the EU and EU institutions is based on perceived self-interest and not on the promise of a new European narrative or identity. The implications of this research are clear: As integration continues European leaders need to be comfortable with the idea that they do not necessarily need to change identities to ensure the future of the EU. The EU has created an impressive set of national symbols of its own, a flag, an anthem, and even holidays, but identity change takes time, and there are no guarantees that Europeans will ever give up their national identities.
Dedication

For the women who have done so much to shape me personally and professionally

Elise, Karen Patrice, Elizabeth, and Anne
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I would like to thank my dissertation committee who made all of this possible.

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Chapter 1

Who Are the Europeans?

Standing in front of a receptive audience in New York, British comedian Eddie Izzard attempted to explain to Americans how Europeans view the European Union. Izzard mused, “In Europe now we’ve got a new thing, The European Union! 500 million people, 200 Languages, No one’s got a clue what they are saying to each other, but it’s the cutting edge of politics in a very extraordinarily boring way.”\(^1\) The punch line hid a deeper truth however; many Europeans had begun to regard integration as a mysterious process that threatened their national identities and their country’s sovereignty. But this was not what was supposed to happen, not according to the politicians and intellectuals who set out to create an integrated Europe after World War II. According to what I call ‘Euroenthusiasts’ the disintegration of borders, integration of trade and the softening of sovereignty was supposed to create a united Europe with a common European identity.\(^2\) So far those aspirations are yet to materialize. Although a European Union of independent states continues to integrate primarily elites and not their national publics are pushing it.\(^3\) Peering below the surface of EU politics, this dissertation reveals not just a pedestrian conversation between the public and elites in Europe, but an incredibly complex and emotional tug of war over national identity and what it means to be “European” in the 21\(^{st}\) Century.

\(^1\) Izzard, Eddie. “Dressed to Kill.” (1999, WEA corp.)
\(^2\) Haas, Ernst B. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. (University of Notre Dame Press, South Bend, New Edition 2004)
Some sanguine observers and politicians have claimed that there is an entirely new identity in the making in Europe, a pan-European identity that is successfully supplanting old national identities and with it the old problems of Europe. These Euroenthusiasts believe that the creation of a transnational or pan-European identity will lay to rest once and for all the plagues of Europe’s past such as war and economic divisions. Today, Europe is conflict free, economically prosperous, and the conditions are beginning to mirror those that the political scientists in the 1950s predicted would lead to a new European identity.

Euroenthusiasts argue that what is happening in Europe is the creation of a pan-European identity, others call it a transnational identity, and others still refer to it as a common identity. It is true that integration and the European Union have made a deep and binding impact in the lives of Europeans, but the implications for states and for identities is still unclear. This dissertation examines whether a transnational identity or pan-European identity (terms that are interchangeable) has developed in Europe. I am fundamentally interested in testing the causal claims made that economic and political integration ultimately leads to a shift in loyalties and changes in identity. Scholars and practitioners such as Ernst Haas, Jean Monnet, and David Mitrany, starting in the 1950s advocated a new European super-state that deemphasized separate national identities in favor of a larger transnational identity. Based on theories of modernization and

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5 Reid, 2004; Rifkin, 2005
integration, they argued that the nation state had facilitated exclusionary identities that were the cause of war in Europe. Ending violent conflict meant neutralizing identities that were still at odds with one another by creating centralized and interlocking institutions, hence the development of European institutions, starting in 1948.\(^7\) The original Euroenthusiasts like Jean Monnet dreamed of “L’Europe,” the idea of European unity that would be the *sui generis* creation of a common European identity. Yet, despite the 1992 signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the recent EU enlargements, the prognostications that the EU would become a super state or even a United States of Europe have proven thus far inaccurate.\(^8\)

I assume that national identities in Europe may have been changed in some ways since World War II. The question is how? Is there any evidence that a shift in loyalties has taken place? Eurobarometer public opinion data has shown steady support for the growth of the European Union all the way up to Maastricht, but does this support for EU institutions, in fact, translate into a shift in identities?\(^9\) Do EU institutions provide a stable platform for identity transformation and retention? This dissertation addresses this puzzle. I argue that support for EU institutions (dependent variable) correlates with economic self-interest (independent variable). I also argue that support for the EU is not the same as a change in national identity (dependent variable). I contend that even when states support EU institutions because of economic self-interest (independent variable),

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\(^7\) Carrubba, 2005, pp. 669-689; *See also* Haas, 2004, p. 2.; In 1948 the Western European Union was founded under the Treaty of Brussels.


this does not necessarily lead to the “spillover effects” or identity change (dependent variable) as predicted by Euroenthusiasts, particularly the neofunctionalists.

The thesis of this dissertation is that identity change is quite difficult and unpredictable.\textsuperscript{10} National identities endure despite perceived economic self-interest and benefit. No consistent term exists for the identities that appear to be developing in Europe where there is, on the one hand, an apparent desire for more intensive and extensive supra-national institutional integration and, on the other hand, enduring national loyalties and identities.\textsuperscript{11} I contend that support for EU institutions and their perceived effectiveness are largely determined by political elite’s ability to shape and frame discourse on EU integration to mirror and reflect national interests and culture.\textsuperscript{12} What this dissertation argues is that elites play a central role in making the case that further EU integration fits within and supports that I call here “the national narrative.” Even then however, the masses do not necessarily follow the way Euroenthusiasts predicted or hoped.

**The Study of National Identity in Europe**

As early European integrationists long maintained, institutions can create a bulwark against conflict. Nowhere is this truer than in modern Europe.\textsuperscript{13} Since the creation of EU institutions after World War II there have been no armed conflicts between member states. Furthermore no one in the West European arrangement has even come close to conflict. The study of national and supranational identity has sparked a

\textsuperscript{10} A greater discussion of the literature that makes such claims is discussed on pages 8 and 9.
\textsuperscript{11} Herrmann, Brewer, & Risse, 2004, p.3
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid
considerable amount of scholarship among social scientists. The extent to which Europeans are attached to their national or regional identities might go a long way in determining how well integration would work. Finally understanding how the different components of integration either appealed to national identities or threatened them would inform policy makers about the specific steps that should be taken should proceed.

In the early days, pro-European politicians and technocrats like Robert Schumann, hinted that the process of integration and the creation of the new Europe would take a step by step approach saying that “[t]he single Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single comprehensive plan. Rather, it will be built through a series of concrete achievements, each of which will create a de facto solidarity.” This strategy would serve to create inertia and diffuse support for institutions when these institutions could not provide immediate results. Common identities provide mass support when large institutions make decisions that require sacrifice by its members. The politicians of the day based much of their policies and actions on the belief that the identity component

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16 Carey, 2002, pp. 387-413
18 Reid, 2004 p. 43
would naturally follow, but they had no empirical evidence that it would; it was more like a wing and a prayer.

Research on identities, especially those in Europe can be divided into several different camps and includes the research of historians, social scientists as well as journalists. This voluminous literature addresses, among other issues, nations and nationalism, nationalism and violent conflict, ethnic and social identity. National identity has been manifested in vastly different ways in Europe over the second half of the twentieth century. Most of the debate has centered on how different national identities wrought destruction and conflict rather than cooperation and integration. National identity in Europe often defined itself in terms of irredentism and chauvinism. After World War II, in a concerted effort to push national identities toward more cooperative relations, European politicians built institutions to mollify the destructive role of ethnic and national identities. Starting in 1947 several of these institutions were created including the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1948. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), The European Atomic Energy Community (EUROTOM) both of which were established in 1957 followed. These institutions were the forerunners to the

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22 Reid, 2004

European community (EC) which was founded in 1957 and was eventually succeeded by the European Union (EU) in 1992.

Despite obvious accomplishments, Europe has not been problem free. In fact, countries left outside of European integration until the last few decades offer some evidence of the positive role European integration has played. It must also be pointed out that while European states are much more peaceful and the cooperative behavior continue to evolve, there has seen a resurgence of national identity in a couple of unforeseen ways. The lack of coherent response to the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia exposed deep gaps in the transnational response.24 The institutions created in Western Europe to promote peace can seem either at odds with what happened on the ground or they were unable to cope with creating peace without the help of the US.25

Outbreaks of violence in France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy toward immigrants have caused a reexamination of national identity and the subsequent passing of laws aimed at preserving “cultural integrity.”26 The debate over minority rights has inspired new conversations over what it means to “be Italian, German, or French” as new waves of African and Muslim immigrants settle into Europe’s cities and integrate very slowly or sometimes not at all.27 Cultural integrity laws are a nationalist attempt to preserve previously unchallenged identity from new ethnic minorities, despite the EU’s commitment to maintain a wealth of ethnic identities. An unexpected consequence of

27 Pentassuglia, 2002
resurgent nationalisms in Europe in the last decade has been that ethnic minorities are often viewed as a dangerous cultural threat.\textsuperscript{28}

For understandable reasons, political scientists also care about identity, particularly ethnic and national identity. Although there is no consensus on the definition of these terms, ethnic and national identity are defined both from within and from outside. It is how a group identifies itself and how others identify it.\textsuperscript{29} Ernest Gellner focuses on nationalism as a congruency between the political and national unit.\textsuperscript{30} Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer define nationalism in three parts 1) people identify deeply with a community and they 2) believe that the community should have a state that they 3) are willing to defend with their lives.\textsuperscript{31} This informs our views on European identities.

Ethnic identity is all about being in a coherent and tight knit group. One of the broader definitions by George DeVos conceptualizes ethnic identity as a group consciousness that differentiates one culture from another through symbolic markers like cultural, biological, or territorial traits.\textsuperscript{32} As Abner Cohen puts it an ethnic group is “an informal group whose members are distinct from other members of other groups in that they share a measure of compulsory institutions like kinship, religion, and can communicate among themselves easily.”\textsuperscript{33} Anthony Smith defines an ethnic group as “a type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and historical memories, and that is recognized by one or more cultural differences like

\textsuperscript{30} Gellner, 1983, p. 1
\textsuperscript{31} Herrmann, Brewer, & Risse, 2004, p.6.
religion, customs, language, or institutions." Common experience and the mythos of one’s own identity and origins are what make the ethnic group work. Some ethnic groups are more politically active than others. Beyond political institutions or involvement there is still enough commonality to hold an ethnic group together. Generally, ethnic groups share a real or imagined set of traits such as heritage, language, religion, or experience.

Scholars have been able to agree on the fundamental differences between an ethnic group and a nation; the latter has political implications. Again as Anthony Smith argues a nation is “a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.” The definition of a nation is similar to that of an ethnic group, except that nations often seek states and have a common mass culture and legal institutions. National identity requires that the legitimacy of the state should not be hindered by ethnic boundaries within a state. A state itself refers to something one can see on a map, a political entity with borders, a government, and recognized international legal status. Benedict Anderson argues that national identity, like all others, is “imagined,” meaning that they are what people make of them. However there

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34 Smith, 1991, p. 20
35 Eller, 2002
38 Smith, 1991, p. 40
39 Eller, 2002, p. 17
40 Gellner, 1983
41 Eller, 2002
42 Anderson, 1991
are contexts in which the overlap between the EU and the nation causes friction, especially when people are unable to nest one identity in the other.

**Explaining Political Change in Europe**

There is some data on how Europeans see themselves, as citizens of their nation state and of the EU.\(^{43}\) Eurobarometer public opinion polls administered by the European Commission taken over the past 20 years however show no such wholesale abandonment of national identity for a new pan-European one.\(^{44}\) In fact, Eurobarometer data from October 2004 indicates that people in general still feel more attached to their country (92%) and their city (87%) than to Europe as a whole (67%).\(^{45}\) Yet at the same time Eurobarometer data from October 2007 shows that at least 50% of respondents in each EU country believe that their state’s membership in the EU is a good thing. What might be surprising to some is that the most enthusiastic are former Soviet Bloc countries and Ireland.\(^{46}\) Ireland, Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia each had more than 80% of respondents report that their country had benefited from membership, and all of these countries trust EU institutions more than their own governments.\(^{47}\) This is significant especially in Eastern Europe because attachment to national identity remains very high and very stable despite also showing high support for their country’s membership in the

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\(^{45}\) Ibid.


\(^{47}\) Ibid. In Poland 62% of respondents trust the EU while only 17% trust the national government, *Ibid.*
Poland among other former Soviet Bloc countries now in the EU has among the highest rates of approval towards the EU, but also is the most likely to reject identity building measures like the EU constitution.

Not surprisingly, when it came time to ratify the EU constitution in 2003 for example, perhaps solidifying a United States of Europe, the process fell apart. What does this say about the state of identity in Europe? The Eurobarometer data asks specific questions like was the rejection of the EU constitution a referendum on an EU identity or was there something about this Constitution that did not wash with the European public? It was not just Poland that rejected the constitution date. It was states like the Netherlands and France where the EU has historically stood out as architects of Europe that seemed unwilling to take the next step. The constitution is clearly one area where identities in some states are overlapping and are unable to be nested within one another. Most states are clearly in favor of further EU integration, as the recent passing of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) suggests. Moreover this evidence demonstrates that EU states are clearly in favor of more extensive and intensive integration, even in areas that are central to sovereignty like foreign policy. Despite creating institutions that control more sovereignty than the

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51 Successive integration treaties have begun to combine foreign policy making powers and have enhanced the role of the EU parliament, EU commission, and the European Court of Justice. See, Tsebelis, George and Geoffrey Garret. “The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union,” In International Organization (Vol. 55, No. 2 (Spring, 2001) pp. 357-390
intergovernmentalists would acknowledge, these institutions do not seem to be supplanting European national identities that remain strong and are not disappearing.

There have been several attempts to understand political and economic changes in Europe and the evolution of European institutions. Although this is developed further in the literature review (chapter 2), it is important to note that most scholars have either provided normative statements on how and why Europe needs to change or, much later, have attempted to account for these changes. The functionalists and later the neofunctionalists focused on predicting the path of Europe in the post World War II years while the intergovernmentalists took a more post-hoc look at European integration. This section outlines these two approaches and makes the argument that we finally have some data to credibly evaluate both approaches, recognizing what both got right but also, importantly, what they seem to have miscalculated. This dissertation naturally does not suggest that integration theories have gotten it wrong, but it qualifies the argument based on the evidence thus far.

Functionalists and neofunctionalists are best characterized as a group of practitioners and scholars who argued that institutional integration and material benefit would lead to ideational changes and identity in a European context. According to David Mitrany, international interdependence creates a set of functional institutions that solve

economic or technical problems.\textsuperscript{54} Functionalism, as it was called, was a theory about how a set of international institutions or agencies could address universal human needs and focus on developing area expertise. Mitrany argued that the success of international agencies would attract the populations they helped and stimulate functional spillovers into other sectors.\textsuperscript{55} Functionalism rested on the idea that integration was based on human need, that expertise existed to create functional agencies, and perhaps most importantly, states would not interfere with their development.\textsuperscript{56}

When Ernst Haas first commented on European integration he noted that two opposing forces have made their presence felt on the European continent: self-determination and the surrendering of sovereignty to a network of international organizations.\textsuperscript{57} Haas’ theory called neo-functionalism predicted that new transnational identities would form from such humble origins as steel and coal compacts into an entirely new pan-European identity mirroring the institutional process of trading away sovereignty and replacing it with EU institutions.\textsuperscript{58} In other words the spillovers were not just technical. The key to Haas’ theory is that the formation of a new identity is directly linked to support for the evolving institutions of the EU.\textsuperscript{59} Ultimately, neofunctionalism rests on three main propositions: that positive spillover from new economic integration will provide for social, cultural, and national integration; that this process will gather pace, spurring the creation of a new supranational identity; and technocrats (or non-state actors) that help in the transition will eventually replace heads

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{54} Mitrany, David. \textit{Progress of International Government}. (Elliot Books, 1993, 1933)
\bibitem{55} Mitrany, 1993
\bibitem{56} \textit{Ibid.}
\bibitem{57} Haas, 2004, p. 2
\bibitem{58} \textit{Ibid.}, See Introduction.
\end{thebibliography}
of states and hold the reigns of power.\textsuperscript{60} This is not to say that Haas expected that the process would be conflict free, but when augmented with democratic discourse and pluralistic interest representation, national governments would increasingly move toward one another.\textsuperscript{61} As these webs of interconnectivity are continually spun in this environment, national governments will eventually concede the wider scope of integration and spillovers from sector to sector will become an inevitability.\textsuperscript{62}

Neofunctionalism, thus, proposed the idea of consciously creating a web of interconnecting and interlocking institutions to limit sovereign independence.\textsuperscript{63} Processes such as these would foster the growth of more formal bonds between national communities, deemphasizing the state and substituting it with a new federal organism. The outcome of this process would be the union of diverse states under one common purpose, or the creation of one political community in Europe.\textsuperscript{64} Haas defines political community in terms of loyalty of citizens to their government or set of institutions.\textsuperscript{65} In this case, Haas contends that one is loyal to his or her country when they obey injunctions of their authority and depend on the symbols and institutions of the state for the satisfaction of expectations.\textsuperscript{66} The question that has resurfaced in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, and that this dissertation examines, is can we now evaluate these ideas to see if integrationist

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{60} Haas, Ernst B. \textit{Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization}. (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1964), Chapters 1 and 2
\textsuperscript{62} Ruggie, 2005 pp. 278-279.
\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Ibid.} See chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Ibid.}, See Chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{65} Haas, 1964, Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 5.
\end{flushleft}
predictions have come true? Are Haas, Monnet and other neofunctionalists correct in their claims that institutional spillovers lead to ‘supranationalism’?

These ideas have many critics and many have dismissed neofunctionalism as a viable explanation for Europe’s economic and political integration. Intergovernmentalism is a theory developed in the 1960s by Stanley Hoffmann who suggested that European states control the pace of integration. Indeed the stalled integration of the 1970s seemed only to confirm that states controlled integration and they were not going to continue it. Nevertheless, integration picked back up in the 1980s and 1990s leading some like Andrew Moravcsik to modify intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik believed that states would only cooperate if they had similar interests, that the institutions they created had no life of their own, and all integration must be understood in the context of the Cold War. Intergovernmentalism asserts that any institutions created for the sake of Europe have no special powers, no ability to shape reality, context or culture and therefore no ability to create a supranational identity.

It was not until John Ruggie, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Phillip C. Schmitter started to reexamine Haas in 2005 that the contributions of neofunctionalism were recognized. Maastricht and subsequent integrative treaties revived the earlier hopes that as Europe integrated it would also create a new ‘European identity.’ While many of these accounts were published in newspapers and journalistic accounts Ruggie, Katzenstein, Keohane, and Schmitter suggested that Haas did something incredibly rare

67 Hoffmann, Stanley. “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” in Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette. Debates on European Integration: A Reader. (Palgrave Macmillen, New York, 2006) pp. 862-917
69 Moravcsik, 1998
70 Ruggie, 2005, pp. 271–296.
in political science: he predicted historic changes in how Europe would function politically and 40 and 50 years after those predictions much of what he had predicted came true.\textsuperscript{71} The problem faced by new scholars was that European integration and neofunctionalism were becoming practically synonymous but without the accompanying empirical evidence to demonstrate that Europe was indeed coalescing into a super state with a pan-European identity.\textsuperscript{72}

The most recent wave of scholarship on the EU has taken a more empirical and analytical approach to understanding why integration continues to proceed, using public opinion data.\textsuperscript{73} What is immediately apparent is that identities, even national identities and attachments to the nation, are diverse.\textsuperscript{74} It is simply not possible to speak of all Irish, Germans, or Poles as though they had the same opinions on integration which on one hand makes understanding public attitudes more difficult, but on the other provides a richness, context, and complexity to the data collected. Scholars have recently looked to citizens’ sense of social identity to understand whether they feel attached to the European Union. Those with strong in-group sentiments may reject the EU and its pluralistic policies.\textsuperscript{75} Xenophobia, ethnic differences, even religion might also redirect public support from EU policies and European integration toward more nationalist

\textsuperscript{71} Ruggie, 2005, pp. 271–296
\textsuperscript{72} See Rosamond, Ben. *Theories of European Integration* (Basingstoke Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).
\textsuperscript{73} Anderson, Christopher J. “When in Doubt Use Proxies: Attitudes toward Domestic Politics and Support for European Integration” in *Comparative Political Studies* (Vol. 31, No. 5, 569-601)
\textsuperscript{75} Elgün & Tillman, 2007, pp. 391-400
Technocrats and businesspeople on the other hand might see European cosmopolitanism as an attractive alternative, or at the very least a supplement to national identity. There is strong evidence to suggest however, that a host of noneconomic factors determine support for the EU and that some of these factors such as education, income, and employment are found in every EU state.77

The Argument

The subjective nature of identity makes it difficult to consider. Studying national identity is even more challenging because it is difficult to test whether a European identity is being created.78 In this dissertation I argue that the simple explanation is the best one to explain why a pan-European identity is not being created. States that stand to benefit the most economically and politically are more likely to support EU institutions. However, this does not mean that they have embraced a pan-European identity. This argument, thus, sides with rationalist explanations for European integration and the claim that states are still looking out for their own best interests. Elites and citizens in the EU are, indeed, motivated by economic self-interest and this explanation goes a long way to explain support for EU integration. However, rationalist approaches cannot then explain why elites still push for a single European identity.

There are, as this dissertation explores, many instances when elites choose policies that attempt to promote the European identity, such as in Ireland (1994-2009) and Poland (2002-2009) but succeed only in selling the notion that EU membership is in their country’s national interest. Rationalism also cannot easily explain why some elites

76 McLaren, 2002, pp. 551-566
77 Elgün & Tillman, 2007, pp. 391-400.
78 Huddy, 2003, pp. 527-528; See also, Herrmann, Brewer, & Risse, 2004, p. 6.
within EU countries are willing to sacrifice economic gain and actively pursue economic integration. Germany presents the most obvious examples of this. Yet, what the dissertation provides is essentially a cultural, constructivist explanation for why and how EU integration has proceeded. At its core, constructivism takes ideas and identities seriously, seeing them as factors that interact with material interests and shape outcomes. National outcomes are thus the product of discussions that consider both material self-interests and national identity.

I emphasize and draw attention to how national identities endure through elite manipulation and how and when EU integration reinforces or undermines the national narrative. I argue that outcomes related to EU integration are the product of both economic self-interest but also, how and more importantly; self-interest is framed by elites in the context of the country’s national identity. This dissertation concludes that national identities remain central in Europe, despite important economic benefits and institutional changes. Simply put, Euroenthusiasts conflate the desire be part of the EU with a desire or ability to adopt a Pan-European identity. I do not and argue that they are two different phenomena.

It is undeniable that Europe is changing both politically and economically. Its institutions and the relationships that exist between states are unprecedented in the international state system. I hypothesize that EU approval is dependent on the perception of national material benefit, and that elites and technocrats influence this perception and

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thus the attitudes toward the EU. We should be able to test whether people within states that receive aid or benefit from more open and accessible markets approve of EU institutions. Of course this is only the first part of the puzzle, but the far easier one to address. I further hypothesize that any emerging pan-European or EU identity depends on the synergy created between national identity and perceived benefit. Instrumental in shaping this dynamic is the role that elites play in constructing identity, bringing together different segments of society, both in Brussels and in their home state.

My argument is that a pan-European identity is not transplanting national identities even if there is a high level of support for EU institutions. If European citizens judge the EU by how it helps their state, then that means the state, not the nation, is still at the center of their thinking. Institutional spillovers, it seems, may influence identity to a point, but it is not yet sufficient to end national identities on the European continent (at least not at this point in time). If Euroenthusiasts predicted or hoped for a pan-European identity within 50 years, then I argue that what is really happening in Europe is a disappointment.

Although I am interested in explaining support for EU institutions by European citizens, I am more interested in empirical evidence that suggests the development of a European Identity, as predicted by Euroenthusiasts. I argue that economic benefits have always been an important reason for support of EU institutions. However, the next step to the transformation of identity does not follow necessarily or logically. I claim that the creation of a pan-European identity is mediated by national identity, and this intervening variable poses a direct challenge to the transfer of loyalties from the nation state to the European Union.
The following graph depicts these relationships.

Testing exactly how national identity morphs into the development of EU identity is methodologically challenging for many reasons. Eurobarometer survey instruments are inconsistent on this point in particular. It is simply too difficult to ask interpretive and multilayered questions with large public opinion surveys. Isolating my first dependent variable, support for the EU, is relatively easy because Eurobarometer data provides a slew of instruments that get at how people in individual states feel about EU institutions and provisions.\textsuperscript{80} Perhaps the most used Eurobarometer question on this subject is “Generally speaking, do you think that (our country’s) membership of the European Union is….?”\textsuperscript{81} However, just a few Eurobarometer surveys in the early 1990s attempted to measure the dynamic between European and national identity by asking, “Generally speaking do you feel European?”\textsuperscript{82} Results moreover were mixed with most still

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identifying themselves in terms of their own nationality, but these results no matter how
tantalizing they might seem can only be considered a snapshot. No data like this exists
over time making my line if inquiry all the more difficult to measure.

The EU has been meticulous in providing budgetary information, so measuring
actual benefit in terms of aid or even market enlargement is easy to determine. The
Eurobarometer data also provides a handful of measures to determine perceived benefit,
items such as: has your country benefitted from EU membership, or trust in EU
institutions. One would suspect that if Haas were right, states that have been in the EU
the longest would also have the highest level of support regardless of economic benefit.
This can be easily tested with Eurobarometer scores. I look at Eurobarometer scores from
1992 until 2009

The second set of variables are much more difficult to measure because they not
only rely on perception and appear very infrequently in Eurobarometer surveys, but also
explicit measures of identity are not asked. How can we tease out what are shifting
loyalties and identities and what is excitement about perceived economic benefit?
Neofunctionalists would argue that the former causes the latter. The problem with
studying identity is that there are few good proxies. Aside from relying on the
quantitative data in Eurobarometer surveys we must also look at specific case studies that
help us assess how people conceive their own nation or ethnicity and what role that plays
in the wider European community. To what extent does economic benefit change the

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Autumn) Eurobarometer 36, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm; European
European Commission. (1992, Autumn) Eurobarometer 38, from
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm
equation? Can economic and institutional integration sustain something as large and intensive as identity? And what role do elites have in shaping the political reality and ultimately the integration narrative in their own states?

The answers to many of these questions can be found in the dialectical relationship between elites and their constituencies. Jack Snyder argues that elites control the political agenda in the broader marketplace of ideas.\textsuperscript{84} Simply put, understanding how elites manipulate and shape the national narrative in Europe is the best way to understand how identities change. Sound analysis of how elites are shaping and reacting to these intellectual market forces can tell us more about the state of identity in Europe than simple survey data which can be helpful in terms of addressing larger trends but can fall short in describing those trends. It is my hope that through case studies I can shed additional light on the competing identities both within states and without, which holds the key to Europe’s future.

**Case Selection and Design**

Chapter 2 begins to trace the creation of institutions in Europe and their supposed role in this process. It also looks at how academics have attempted to explain change in Europe, focusing specifically on neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. I argue that as these institutions develop, Europe is undeniably drawn together through legal arrangement. Chapter 3 provides an overview of how Europe as a whole sees the EU grappling with the identity question by using available public opinion data and aid budgets to probe the link between perceived benefit and identity.

The basic premise of this dissertation is that neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists argument represent two extremes of what is really going on in Europe. That is, I explore the areas in between, using a constructivist approach to theorize about the implications that self-interest, institutions, and ideas in Europe may have on identity. This framework guides each of my three case studies (chapters 4, 5, and 6). Neofunctionalists argue that the proliferation of European institutions and bureaucracies and the functions these institutions perform will lead to a new and robust European identity, ergo states erode. I test this by looking for evidence that the EU is usurping loyalties by looking at public opinion data, actions and statements by elites, and public reaction. Actions and statements by elites, as well as available and relevant public opinion polls, and votes on EU referenda can be used to assess how committed to total integration Europeans really are.

I am fundamentally interested in the role of national narratives and how they are created, reinforced, maintained and how this shapes the perception of national interest. Important in this process is the role that elites play in shaping their constituencies’ identity.⁸⁵ I look at five cornerstone moments in the integration story, the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, The 2003 Nice Treaty, and the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. Each of these decisions represented important referenda or moments in which European citizens voted on the future of the larger Europe. These are also watershed moments in the construction of a European identity. Playing a central role in the process are the elites who are tasked with informing or persuading their publics about the advantages and disadvantages of EU enlargement.

⁸⁵ See Snyder, 2000
Advanced democracies have a well-developed marketplace of ideas that is used to vet radical or implausible ideas through open discussion and objective expertise.\textsuperscript{86} Jack Snyder calls the arena where public opinion is synthesized and the national narrative is crafted the marketplace of ideas.\textsuperscript{87} It is this marketplace where elites attempt to sell their ideas to the public, and in this case to pitch the pros and cons of integration. The marketplace of ideas is where identities are built and dismantled; it is here I argue, elites try to change identities in Europe. Tracing the causal relationships between elites and the formation of new identities in Europe I hope to show the following:

- National identity remains the primary identity in Europe
- National self-interest still determines the level of support for the EU among the masses
- Elite persuasion is the primary mechanism responsible for promoting identity formation or maintenance in most cases.\textsuperscript{88}

My explanation examines the construction of national narratives and the sources of identity formation focusing on elites and public discourse in a way that neither neofunctionalism nor intergovernmentalism do, and arrives at a different conclusion. Each case sketches the role of elites and the national narrative, exploring the benefits of deeper integration and the relationship that the perception of these benefits has on local identities. I establish patterns of persuasion that elite’s use in guiding the public feelings

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid. p. 54-57.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid. Snyder argues this point from the perspective of nationalism in young democracies, but I find the processes to be similar in the integration process.
on the EU. I hope to find that the discussion of a wider Europe is placed in the context of mutual economic benefit and lower transaction costs and not of one singular identity.

I am interested in the mechanisms that create identity in Europe. Mechanisms are widely understood as hypotheses that explain some social phenomenon by examining the interactions between individuals or between individuals and the aggregate. Mechanisms can also be thought of in terms of social structures that create identity as well as national narratives. According to Alexander Wendt social structures contain three elements: material conditions, interests and ideas. Interests create the significance of material conditions to some extent; in the case of this dissertation I am asking how interests in economics and identity are shaping the drive for integration.

Constructivism emphasizes the creation of structures. For my purposes I look at social structures associated with identity and the legal structures of integration. How does one inform the creation of the other? Europe has benefitted from a groundswell of important ideas, some of which were informed by material conditions and interests. In other words the EU is a product of the institutions constructed to facilitate trade, integrate currency, and promote the free movement of Europeans across boarders. How these ideas are implemented as institutions leaves much to be explored in terms of whether or not new identities are being created or not.

Constructivism is an excellent way to understand how national narratives, or how ideas interact with material factors. Constructivism forces the researcher to consider the

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90 Wendt, 2006, p.139
91 Ibid. p. 139
‘big picture’. How do institutions and elites construct new norms, new identities and, ultimately new institutions that reinforce both? Understanding how actors construct an environment that addresses both ideational and material benefits is the best place to start. Understanding this setting means understanding interests because interests are only given meaning within the social context. As the relationships between material and ideational interests are better understood tracing the development of the national narrative becomes possible.

I have chosen three cases that have different degrees of ethnic homogeneity, income levels, size (both geography and population) and status in the EU. Chapter 4 examines Ireland from 1992 until 2009. Ireland is small, poor, and relies heavily on EU aid for development and agriculture. Ireland tends to be ethnically homogeneous, but that is changing too. Ireland has one of the highest satisfaction rates with EU membership in the entire Union according to numerous Eurobarometer surveys. In Ireland I find that even though there is a great deal of support for the EU there is an equally strong reaction against the adoption of ‘European’ values. I show evidence that the Irish greatly fear EU domination of Irish national identity, the loss of sovereignty, and the loss of Ireland’s neutral military status. The evidence presented also suggests that EU positions on divorce, abortion, and other salient Catholic issues is a cause for concern.

amongst the sizable conservative Catholic population. Chapter 4 demonstrates support for the idea that joining the EU is a matter of national self-interest and that Ireland’s integration is greatly tempered by perceptions that integration will lead to subjugation.

In chapter 5 I look at Germany from 1992-2009. Germany represents a country with a diversifying population but high-income level.\textsuperscript{96} Germany is also Europe’s largest country in terms of population and is perhaps the most salient identity in Europe because it instigated both of Europe’s World Wars leaving a legacy that de-emphasized national identity. Germany is also a founding member of the EU and invests heavily in maintaining the EU bureaucracy. Nevertheless the evidence that I have collected from historians, scholarly journals and news sources indicates that Germans are no more ‘European’ today than they were when they started down the path of integration. German elites were among the most vocal proponents of a ‘European’ identity that would help to dispel fears that Germans would return to destructive nationalism. The evidence indeed suggests that guilt plays a major role in the modern German national narrative, guilt associated with World War II. But the evidence also suggests that this guilt has transformed German identity not into a pan-European identity, but into an ecumenically based German nationalism. Today Germany is the economic engine that drives the rest of Europe, but it is a peaceful engine.\textsuperscript{97}

Rounding out my analysis is Poland, which I examine from 1998-2009. Poland is homogeneous but also has a very strong national identity. Relatively speaking Poland is a young democracy, which is important for a couple of reasons. First, young

\textsuperscript{96} Germany not only has a sizable Turkish population but is also experiencing an increase in immigration from other European and some Middle Eastern states. \textit{See} McLaren, Lauren M. “Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU” in \textit{European Union Politics}, Vol. 8, (2007)
democracies tend to be much more nationalistic than well-established democracies, and second because it was part of EU enlargement meaning it was not an original member of the EU. Yet despite a high attachment to a national identity the Poles show a very high approval rating across the board for EU institutions. Poland never voted on the EU constitution, which would conceivably make EU institutions more powerful in Poland, but many elites in Poland assured the press that the Poles would have rejected the constitution if they had been given the opportunity. Even more curious is the fact that Poles have more trust in EU institutions by far than they do in their own national government. If there is a tension between material benefit and the adoption of a new pan-European identity we will see it in Poland.

The significance of this research is twofold: it asks questions about the theories of neofunctionalism, about intergovernmentalism, and about postfunctionalism. The case studies offer a more detailed ‘sketch’ of how national narratives, and the emerging European narrative described by Euroenthusiasts are converging. This research also investigates the politicization of integration and how elites and the public construct their understandings of integration. Most importantly it provides intensely researched case studies that illuminate the process of identity transformation.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

The literature associated with European identity is developing rapidly. Traditional approaches to understanding the integration and identity literature have usually been chronological, detailing the evolution of neofunctionalism in the 1960’s from its roots in functionalism and then on to intergovernmentalism in the 1970’s and 1980’s, which challenged both. Retracing these steps proves critical in understanding the broader narrative of integration. From the 1990s until today there has been a major reexamination of the questions of integration and identity. The following literature review draws from various disciplines that attempt to understand EU integration and identity, both in how identities are formed and how they change.

Chronological Approach to Integration Theory

People like Jean Monnet focused on what should, or could, happen in Europe. The first such attempt to explain EU integration was functionalism, which argued that intergovernmental bureaucracies would be created to solve problems across borders. Most functionalist theory can be attributed to David Mitrany, who was theorizing about the uniting of Europe during the interwar period. Responses to Mitrany were split between Ernst B. Haas and Karl W. Deutsch who articulated different “pretheories” about

102 Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009
103 Tsebelis, 2001 pp. 357-390
European integration. Haas claims that relevant elites such as politicians, technocrats, and business people manipulate their own governmental systems pushing them toward or away from integration.¹⁰⁶ Perhaps most important to this particular theory is Haas’ interest in the nexus between popular opinion and elite action. Haas argued that most Europeans are somewhat ignorant of important facts regarding the integrative process, and that elites are much better positioned to make the important decisions regarding integration.¹⁰⁷ This being the case, Haas contends that the symbolism of a united Europe has been embraced by leaders not only in government but those at the top of political movements and parties that span the ideological spectrum.¹⁰⁸

Given that elites are in charge of moving their states into an integrated European environment, doing so without any integrative institutions would make no sense. The driving force behind “Europeanism” as a doctrine is to allow local ideologies to grow together around sets of institutions that serve as webs of international integration; bringing each state closer together. Haas’ one shining example of one such “web” would be the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Haas theorized that technocrats begin to construct infrastructure that crisscrossed national borders, those borders will become increasingly less important while the populations relying on these technical services will become increasingly closer and the general will to continue expanding public services will widen the European public space.¹⁰⁹ In a very basic sense, if a new more peaceful European identity was wanted, it was thought that the best way to achieve that was through the creation of new international institutions.

¹⁰⁶ Haas, 2004
¹⁰⁷ Ibid
¹⁰⁸ Ibid
¹⁰⁹ Risse, 2001
Haas reasoned that the costs of staying outside the integration process for elites was simply too high. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein likened it to riding a bike where “elites were condemned to pedal, lest they fall off the bike all together.” With leaders driving integration for economic reasons the hope then was that nationalisms would also begin to ease. Haas described this process as “spillover”, where the consolidation of interstate institutions has the ability to reshape identities. Ultimately Haas was a rationalist, and in later writings, he himself wondered how deep the identity changes could really go. He did recognize that what changes behavior, especially amongst leaders in Europe, were the new functional pressures of integration, which required collective action to solve Europe’s broader problems.

Haas inspired the next generation of integration scholars to operationalize further the idea of neofunctionalism. Joseph Nye created a dynamic regional integration process model in which he argued that integration was building institutional ties rather than emotional ties. While Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold agreed with Nye’s assessment that institutions were driving integration, they also argued that the European polity could be reconciled like a nation-state after the war. If integration operated as theorists predicted, with open public consensus, then spillovers from one sector to society as a whole would no longer be confined to institutions. One way to conceptualize the intellectual movement started by Haas is an early form of social constructivism. To a certain extent, Haas and many of his contemporaries argued that a wider European

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111 Brown, Cote, Lynn-Jones, & Miller, 2000, pp. 64-66.
112 Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009
113 Risse, 2001
115 Lindberg & Schein-Gold, 1970
society could be created out of meaningful institutions. Once those institutions had consolidated themselves then people in different states would essentially have common reference points and the seeds of a new pan-European social order would have been planted.

There were early challenges to Haas’ thinking. The primary intellectual rival to Haas’ neofunctional approach came from Karl W. Deutsch. His cybernetic theory of politics focused on the flow of goods and services as a proxy for growth in Europe.116 The result of his theory (known as communication theory) was volumes of statistical data focusing on comparisons of national economic data.117 Deutsch did not see the possibility of spillovers, or the translation of economic expansion into new identities as Haas did and he was much more skeptical of mass identity than Haas.118 Deutsch did not believe that loyalties and identities could be squeezed out of European institutional change because national institutional change outpaced international institutional establishment. Therefore, people remain more affected by what was going on in their own country than they were by the larger European community.119

Haas later cooled on his theories of identity change, and though it would be revived later in the 1970s and 1980s, the coalescence of a new European identity seemed stalled.120 There are plenty of intervening reasons for this, the most obvious being the Cold War, but theorists reexamined integration theory yet again. In this particular round of revision some argued that what both neofunctionalism and communications theory

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116 Deutsch, Karl W. France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (Scribner, New York, 1967)
117 Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009
118 Deutsch, 1967
119 Ibid
120 Haas, 2001, pp.22-31
lacked was adequate articulation of the relationship between politics, integration and identity. Haas and Deutsch both showed strengths in operationalization and attempting to understand the psychological forces at work in identity formation but could not account for politics.

Intergovernmentalism offered another alternative to explain European integration. In the 1990s intergovernmentalism’s seminal theorists, Andrew Moravcsik and Stanley Hoffmann, placed new emphasis on the fate of the nation state and began to see integration as a willful action by states and not necessarily the result of technical spillovers. Intergovernmentalists asked, what is integration but a complex economic relationship between sovereign partners?

Moravcsik’s theory of intergovernmentalism suggests that economic factors, more importantly the promotion of exports, have driven European integration. Moravcsik contends that integration in Europe actually reflects specific policy desires, most of which are collective solutions to economic possibilities. Moravcsik argues that integration is primarily an economic issue, citing the development of the common market and monetary integration. Moravcsik, and other intergovernmentalists, argue that any supranational control flows directly from the willingness of individual states to cede power away. For intergovernmentalists the question of European integration is one of the states’ willingness to participate. In either case it appeared that alternative

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121 Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009
124 Moravcsik, 1996
125 It is of note here that scholars such as Philippe C. Schmitter regard intergovernmentalism as consisting of the same core assumptions that neo-functionalism does. Schmitter also argues that there is little
explanations were taking shape over the possible selection pressures pushing Europe toward integration.

Stanley Hoffmann argues that for any new centralized power to assert itself it must put those joining it at ease in terms of not just elites, but citizens and their social organizations as well.\textsuperscript{126} The problem Hoffmann sees with Europe is that there is little to no agreement between the European states as to what that should look like. Hoffmann argues that the post-war discussion of shedding the state system and the debate fueled by Haas was premature; the nation state remained.\textsuperscript{127} Western Europe was simply unable to coalesce both politically and culturally because each state faced profoundly different domestic circumstances.\textsuperscript{128} Hoffmann contrasts the logic of Haas with the logic of diversity. Diversity, Hoffmann argues, will apply a double pressure on each state that will lead to integration. The pressure of necessity will force statesmen to integrate sectors untouched by early efforts to reinforce the social fabric. The second pressure will come from men, or the action of the supranational organization that has been created.\textsuperscript{129}

\textbf{Recent Theories on Integration}

The 1990s brought renewed enthusiasm about the possibility for more European integration and even the development of a pan-European identity. The Berlin Wall had collapsed, Germany had been reunited, and the European community expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Scholars asked new questions about European integration,

\textsuperscript{126} Hoffman, 2006, p. 135.
\textsuperscript{127} Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 135-136.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
specifically questions about the development of identity.\textsuperscript{130} However as integration progressed the theories that sought to explain integration changed as well.\textsuperscript{131} One reason for the changing theory was the new “post-Maastricht” feeling that things had fundamentally changed, however no common narrative existed to say exactly what feeling was.\textsuperscript{132} The approaches covered in this section include the multi-disciplinary approaches of social identity theory, ethnic and nation studies, and economic and citizenship studies.

As European integration marched forward, neofunctionalism faded as scholars emphasized other aspects of European political and economic changes.\textsuperscript{133} What was once viewed as a process of institution building that would result in a new identity was reconsidered as theories admitted that identity politics in Europe was complex.\textsuperscript{134} Identities are recognized as international, national, local, cultural, and ethnic. Other patterns exist within these groups; for example those who identify themselves in the broad international European sense tend to be wealthy cosmopolitan elites who travel and trade across the whole of Europe.\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{131} Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009
\textsuperscript{134} Herrmann, Brewer, & Risse, 2004
\textsuperscript{135} Adler, Emanuel, and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998)
There is a literature concerning public attitudes and the EU that are crucial to understanding how institutions shape identities and how identities shape institutions.\textsuperscript{136} Rarely do average citizens have a direct hand in the integrative process, but this does not prevent them from forming strong opinion about how or why integration should proceed.\textsuperscript{137} The politicization of national identity was firmly reestablished with the Maastricht Treaty itself when it sought to create an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen.” The relative lack of democratic institutions actually linking citizens together was problematic for the EU however.

However, little research exists to support the idea that a European identity or European citizenship is materializing.\textsuperscript{138} According to Sean Carey European identities do not seem to be sweeping aside national identities; instead national identities are influencing how citizens feel about integration, especially on an individual level.\textsuperscript{139} Strong causal links were found between trade liberalization and material gains and support for the EU.\textsuperscript{140} But this suggests that support for the EU is based not on a cultural appeal to cosmopolitanism, but a more prosaic economic self-interest.\textsuperscript{141} Furthermore those who are more likely to support EU institutions would be those individuals who

\textsuperscript{138} Carey, 2002, pp. 387-413
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Gabel, Matthew and Harvey Palmer. “Understanding Variation in Public Support for European Integration,” in Political Behavior (Vol. 19, No. 1, 1997)
stand the most to gain: farmers, border residents, technocrats, businesspeople and academics.¹⁴²

There have been several attempts to understand the relationship between economic conditions and support for the EU and its institutions.¹⁴³ Richard Eichenberg and Russell Dalton tested whether economic conditions such as inflation, unemployment, and economic growth influence the public’s evaluation of the national government and the EU.¹⁴⁴ They found that while public knowledge of the EU and how its institutions works can be quite limited in some places there is a relationship between citizens’ perceptions of the economy and their general support for the EU.¹⁴⁵ Later studies found that the relationship between economics and the EU was more muted than previously observed but the variance in support varied within a population.¹⁴⁶ Was it possible that national identity was playing a bigger role in the decision to support the EU, thus supplanting the more traditional economic concerns?

It has been suggested by Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer and Cliff Carrubba that in some cases the EU is able to “buy off” its member states into complying with integration.¹⁴⁷ If various segments of the public were generally unaware of the nuances of integration the EU would still need political elites to buy in. It is also becoming more

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¹⁴² Carey, 2002, pp. 387-413
¹⁴⁴ Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993, pp. 507-534.
¹⁴⁵ Ibid.
apparent that states themselves are unsure about what they are agreeing to, what the benefits of interstate agreements are.\textsuperscript{148} Benefits, especially economic gains associated with membership, have been enough to entice many political elites to not just join the EU but also to oversee a rapid escalation in the level and speed of integration.\textsuperscript{149} To elites, there is a rational, self-interested component to accepting the terms of integration; your country will be wealthier and your electorate happier.\textsuperscript{150} But there is also a subtler normative pressure on elites to accept integration.\textsuperscript{151} As integration progresses elsewhere it builds up a normative momentum and this is starting to shape normative and even legal behavior in Europe.\textsuperscript{152} The choice soon becomes, for political actors, a simple one: do I participate in integration or risk being left behind?\textsuperscript{153} States and their leaders are thus motivated by both the fear that they will lose economic or material benefits by resisting integration and the possibility that with more integration comes more economic or material benefits.\textsuperscript{154} In this sense, integration really is like the bicycle analogy, just a little more nuanced.

Jean Monnet once said “[n]o one falls in love with the common market,” but much of the discussion linking economics and support for the EU to identity seems to be

\textsuperscript{148} Carrubba, 2005, pp. 669-689
\textsuperscript{151} Checkel, 2001, pp. 553-588.
\textsuperscript{152} Beach, Derek. “Why Governments Comply: An Integrative Compliance Model That Bridges the Gap between Instrumental and Normative Models of Compliance.” In Journal of European Public Policy (Vol. 12, No.1, 2005) pp. 113-142.
\textsuperscript{153} Perkins & Neumayer, 2007, pp. 180-206
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Ibid.}
betting on just that. Nevertheless large gaps in wealth exist across the EU with Western Europe having the luxury of more established economies and Eastern Europe playing catch up. How can we expect a common European identity based on the common market when the common market is so complex and uneven? Andrés Rodríguez-Pose argues that economic gaps are creating political complications with the EU. Despite massive institutionalization Europe is still a really diverse place even with supranational market mechanisms. This has led some, especially elites, to conclude that EU membership is a good thing because it benefits “us” economically and materially, but you need to know how to navigate it.

Benefits of economic integration are understood well by the people who use the common market policies, but not well understood by most Europeans. Liesbet Hooghe suggests that despite the outpouring of support for the common market and its accompanying institutions, socialization of citizens as European has been underwhelming. Compounding the challenge of socializing an entire continent is the process of cultural transmission across class lines. Neil Fligstein argues that European cultural transmissions pick up a tremendous amount of static when they try to reach middle and lower classes because the “European story” is only partially relatable to

156 Rodríguez, 2002
157 Ibid.
them.\textsuperscript{160} For those in the economic fast lane (elites) the broader European experience is much more accessible, if not a reality, to doing business across borders, but for most of the population the national narrative still dominates.\textsuperscript{161} The most conceivable scenario in which these obstacles are overcome and a pan-European narrative is constructed would almost have to be reconciliation between classes, not necessarily states or nations.

It seems as though identity formation in Europe, as some scholars suggest, is really a multilevel game where economic concerns, normative and legal factors as well as ethnic or national attachments affect not only identity but integration as well. In the literature discussed so far each author seems able to strategically place their piece of the larger puzzle in its place, but unable to describe the larger picture. It is absolutely essential to consider that the arrangements of these factors (economic reality and perceptions, national identity, and shifting loyalties) affects each state differently because people there will experience integration differently based on local factors. By looking at descriptive statistics on regional, national, and sub-national identities, Sean Carey found that in Great Britain those who considered themselves Scottish, Welsh, or Northern Irish were much more likely to ‘feel European’ than those who identified themselves simply as English.\textsuperscript{162} Carey’s analysis looks only at Britain where there are distinct sub-national differences, but such differences also occur in other large European states, particularly in Germany where there are large Bavarian, Prussian, Rhineland, and Saxon identities.

This discussion would not be complete without mentioning constructivist theory. Constructivism is based on two important assumptions: that environment in which states


\textsuperscript{161} Fligstein, 2009, pp. 155.

\textsuperscript{162} Carey, 2002, pp. 387-413
or actors take action is as social as it is material and that the environment can provide states and actors with an understanding of their interests.\footnote{Checkel, Jeffrey. “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory.” 
\textit{World Politics} (Vol.50, No.2, 1998) pp. 324-348.} Thus the EU is really what actors on all levels make it, and the feelings, attitudes, or even identities that result from integration are both shaped by the process and shape the process of integration itself.\footnote{Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” 

Some approaches scholars like Ted Hopf have focused on European identity through a constructivist framework, but do so by incorporating traits like linguistics.\footnote{Hopf, Ted. \textit{Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1955 and 1999}. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002)} Other constructivists have explored the “nested identity” angle whereby people have multiple identities within larger identities, but they have largely concluded that nesting does not happen at all.\footnote{Lafflan, Brigid. “The European Union ad its Institutions as ‘Identity Builders’” in Herrmann, Richard K. and Marilynn Brewer in Herrmann, Richard K., Thomas Risse and Marilynn B. Brewer. \textit{Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU}, (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanahan, Maryland, 2004)} One surprising conclusion is that as institutions continue to grow and as identities are stretched, reconsidered and constructed, people begin to see themselves as different from the “other”. With this, identities in Europe become sharply contrasted as opposed to unified.\footnote{Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009, p. 8}

Thomas Risse asks if people can and do hold multiple identities in their own nation is there room for Europe?\footnote{Risse, 2004} Those who study identity in Europe from a psychological perspective found that people who feel attached to Europe also feel attached to nation, which again raises the question of how identities are arranged.\footnote{Duchesne & Frognier, 1998; Citrin & Sides, 2004} From the psychological perspective there is agreement with the constructivists that identities
are not always compatible. Despite the institutional attempts to make a “common space” for all Europeans to develop a broader European identity, there are some social contexts in which national and EU narratives conflict.\footnote{Herrmann, Brewer, & Risse, 2004}

Political psychologists on the question of identity and integration in Europe use social identity theory to explain why identities develop and change. In Europe as anywhere, social identities have political consequences. People use their individual and collective senses of self to imagine and conceptualize their sovereignty.\footnote{Ibid.} Sovereignty, statehood, and nation are all products of identifying you vis-à-vis others. In Europe this formative process is now challenged by differing views of who or what best represents sovereignty, the state and the nation.\footnote{Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009} But an institution that help us to formalize our identities and that is what makes integration in Europe so interesting often accompanies these determinations. How do people choose institutions that overlap as they do in Europe especially when they feel like their loyalties are a finite resource?\footnote{Herrmann, Brewer, & Risse, 2004}

Social identity theory seeks to understand how people develop their attachments to the groups they join. Abrams and Hogg suggest that social identity is the psychological link between individuals and the social groups to which they belong.\footnote{Abrams & Hogg, 1990} Henri Tajfel expands on Dominic Abrams and Michael Hogg’s definition of social identity by describing it as “that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value
and emotional significance attached to that membership.” Social identity is more than how one sees oneself, it is how that image is reflected in the larger social pool. Instead of identifying as an individual “I” people begin to identify with others “we.” Marilynn Brewer suggests that the relationship between the individual and the group is a complicated one, but understanding that relationship will help in understanding why individuals and groups act as they do.

Herrmann and Brewer list three distinct aspects of representation in groups: (1) social identity answers the “who is us?” question of who belongs, (2) it poses the “what are we?” question of what symbols, attitudes, and values define us, and (3) it defines the relationship between the “in-groups” and “out-groups.” Herrmann and Brewer argue that there is a link between social identity and institutions in Europe. They attempt to understand how feelings of “us” expands or contracts with the growth of EU institutions. With high levels of self-identification toward a group, an individual can incorporate their own sense of self with that of the group. Jeffery Koch argues that group membership is not even a prerequisite for group identification; instead unassociated individuals may view that group as a “reference group.” But as Brewer argues, the individual experiences both individuality and group membership simultaneously, connecting individual welfare to social welfare.

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177 Herrmann, Brewer, & Risse, 2004, pp. 6-7.
Social identity serves a few important functions in Europe. Perhaps the most useful institutional advantage to a shared social identity is when the EU needs to rely on mass-based support to back international action that may require sacrifice by some countries while it benefits others.¹⁸⁰ Herrmann and Brewer also point to the importance of political identity in the formation of a transnational European identity. Political identity is closely associated with nationalism, which Herrmann and Brewer define as follows: (1) people who identify deeply with a community and who (2) believe that community should have a sovereign state and, (3) are willing to sacrifice, perhaps risk their lives for the achievement of that state’s independence.¹⁸¹ But just as states can fail to create nations, Europe can fail to satisfy these criteria. There is no guarantee that Europe will be able to use institutions to create common narratives and a common European community.¹⁸² In other words, if identity is the prize then there is no guarantee that simply creating new institutions in Europe will be sufficient to get a new supranational narrative started.

From social identity theory we turn to a discussion on ethnicities and nations. The literature on these subjects is also extensive, but some of the themes they deal with are very helpful in understanding how identities work.¹⁸³ Nationality can be thought of in two different ways: the legal and the cultural. The legal interpretation of nationalism applies not only to people, but also to companies, ships, aircraft, and even goods.¹⁸⁴ The

¹⁸⁰ Brewer, 1991, p.475
¹⁸¹ Ibid.
¹⁸⁴ Krejci & Velimsky, 1981, p.32
cultural term is a reference to membership in a larger group often determined by cultural, racial, or linguistic characteristics and is very similar to ethnicity except that a nation claims a homeland.\footnote{Krejci & Velimsky, 1981, pp. 33-34.}

Max Weber offers a more nuanced view suggesting that ethnic groups are “those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or custom or both because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists.”\footnote{Weber, Max, “Ethnic Groups” in John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith. Ethnicity, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996) p. 35} Weber also argues that it is primarily the political community that creates the strongest belief in common ethnicity; this could pose the greatest challenge to the creation of a rival European identity.\footnote{Weber, 1996} Further complicating the process of creating a supra national identity is that ethnic groups are often characterized by their own languages which reflect the contexts and nuances of the shared political community.\footnote{Ibid.} Currently there are about 230 languages spoken in Europe, many of them reflecting different ethnic groups.

Ernest Gellner argues that nations are different from ethnic groups in that nations require a sense of political legitimacy.\footnote{Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1983)} While both nations and ethnic groups are primary sources of identity they differ from one another because nations try to keep ethnic groups outside the bounds of political discourse.\footnote{Gellner, 1983} Since nations usually seek states it should point out that if Europe is going to have one nation then it is already fighting an uphill battle because it would be a state seeking a nation. States can be
defined geographically, and the EU is, but nations are different because they are products of ideas and are constructed. Of course Gellner himself admits that any definition of the nation can be challenged both anthropologically and normatively, but good scholars make a serious attempt to examine what culture is doing in a given circumstance.191

According to Neil Fligstein, if a supranational identity were to emerge in Europe the elites as well as the middle classes would have to reconcile around a common national “story,” which he concludes is almost inconceivable.192 It may very well be true that elites are identifying more and more with each other under a common European identity, but the majority of Europe is not, and by a wide margin.193 Furthermore, most Europeans know very little about EU institutions, and those that do tend to use them in the common market.194 But perhaps the most powerful conclusion that Fligstein comes to is that the elites who identify themselves as Europeans do so because they materially benefit from a wider Europe and the institutions of the EU in particular.195 Fligstein returns the notion that there must be a larger European state to reinforce a national narrative. As Gellner points out, the EU does not fit that criterion, at least not yet.196

As James Caporaso et al. explain Europeanization best captures the relationship between the individual state and the larger European setting.197 Where Europeanization studies have been particularly interesting is in describing the connective tissues between states and Europe, including civil society and collective identification and has done so in

193 Only 12.1% of respondents claimed to be primarily European, and only 24.9% of Europeans had even left their country in the past year. Fligstein, 2009
194 Gabel, Matthew J. Interests and Integration. (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1998)
195 Fligstein, 2009
196 Gellner, 1983; Hooghe, 2003
197 Capasaro, Cowels, & Risse, 2001
an empirical and measurable way. These conclusions contradict the findings from the constructivist camp, namely that identities are or can be nested within one another in Europe. However this strain of literature’s emphasis on polling data and a top down approach tend to place too much emphasis on institutions as the linking mechanisms between government and society; between Europe and its states. It also emphasizes the role of elites, perhaps too much, treating identity as something easily confined to institutions, rights, and deliberation; not necessarily as something that contains a larger truth, story, or common experience.

Conclusion

As this chapter has demonstrated there is no shortage of literature that examines EU integration, national identity, or the recent changes in the EU. European integration has moved from buzzword status in the 1950s to the subject of serious scholarly debate. This is reflected in the direction that the literature on the subject has taken, especially with regard to the development of a European identity. Early scholars spent the bulk of their time “pretheorizing” about how integration would affect the lives of Europeans, concluding that a pan-European identity was in the making. Euroenthusiasts more sanguine take on the development of a new identity through the expansion of new European institutions overstated what had actually happened. Following the functionalist and neofunctionalist approaches was intergovernmentalism, which made some overstated claims of its own. Intergovernmentalists argued that integration was essentially a reflection of state-centered self-interest and discounted entirely the possibility of new

199 Risse, 2001
identities. Nevertheless, identities in Europe are changing; the question is a matter of cause and degree. What these early theories failed to grasp was the complexity of identity formation and the different manifestations identity can take.

The revival of interest in identity formation in Europe really took off in the 1990s and has flourished in the beginning of the 21st century. Where early theories were simple, contemporary theories are proving to be much more complex, but equally diverse. This makes drawing big conclusions difficult, especially when compared the early approaches that focused on the big picture. But new data has created new theories and new conceptualizations of identity have emerged. Hermann and Brewer’s observation that EU identity can coexist with national identity has allowed us to re-imagine what identity means across Europe.

The current crop of literature has provided a new set of lenses through which to view European identity and its manifestations. We can view identity in ethnic, national, and even supra-national terms, with the realization that each one has a unique set of rules and expectations. Increasingly we see Europe as a multi-leveled place where different identities inform basic human interactions on local, national, and regional levels. Through the examination of how identities form and are maintained we understand that identities win out when they are most persuasive to their audience, and that audience can vary even within the same state.
Chapter 3: National Identities: Just Another Commodity in the World’s Largest Common Market?

As the ideas of “One Europe” began to blossom in the 1990s, it did so during a period of unparalleled economic growth and the fall of the Berlin Wall. When European economies slowed in the early part of the 21st century so too did enthusiasm for a common identity. Eurobarometer 70, published in autumn 2008, revealed substantial jumps in pessimism about the economy also and the future of a united Europe. Irish public opinion was among the most dramatically affected. From the spring of 2008 until the autumn of the same year, public optimism about the direction of the EU economy fell off 49%. Eurobarometer measures of support for the EU, its institutions, and its economic future have traditionally been very high in Ireland, and while it is too early to assess the fallout from the 2008 financial crisis, one must ask: if the economy falters in the EU what incentive do states have to support it and its institutions? Or is support for the EU more cogently summed up by a famous American politician when he said, “It’s the economy, stupid”?203

Given the complex theorizing discussed in the previous chapter it is appropriate to ask what evidence suggests that a European identity has been created. European identity has become so politicized that it might be difficult to tell. An emerging difference between ‘cosmopolitan’ and populist conceptions of identity in Europe have complicated scholars’ quest to understand whether a single community and single identity is possible

201 Eurobarometer 70, Autumn 2008.
202 Ibid.
203 Presidential Candidate Bill Clinton used the phrase “It’s the Economy Stupid” during the 1992 Presidential campaign.
204 Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009, p. 19
in Europe. Sanguine hopes for a future of a Europe held together through common values seems to have given way to a tenuous recognition that economic uncertainty, nationalist egoism, and populist pressure still has sway over the direction of Europe and the EU. Cosmopolitanism has further complicated the identity project by advocating for some values like diversity which can be threatening to more conservative populations making the feeling of “Europeanness” much more shallow than previously thought.

In this chapter I test whether support for EU institutions correlates with economic benefits. Amongst elites, there is a sense of European identity as several scholars have indeed shown that European identity is alive and well amongst investors, business professionals, and a handful of other well traveled European elites. However, the same cannot be said for other, larger populations in the European Diaspora. My argument reflects Eichenberg and Dalton’s theory that while most Europeans have limited knowledge of how EU institutions work, they still judge the EU, on some level, by the perception of economic benefit. Neil Fligstein argues that those who meet the definition of a “European” in the sense that Karl Deutsch described are a small group of elites whose economic opportunities and education tend to be greater than the aggregate population. Matthew Gabel also argues that those most likely to embrace the European

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207 Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009, p.45
209 Fligstein, 2009, p.133; See also Gabel, 1998
211 Fligstein, 2009, p. 139
identity are those who have the most to gain from the EU, namely managers, professionals, academics, and farmers.\textsuperscript{212}

Eurobarometer surveys confirm that in 2004 87.3\% of respondents consider themselves “mostly national” while only about 12.7\% consider themselves “mostly European.”\textsuperscript{213} Eurobarometer data also points to a large group (about 56\%) who “sometimes feel European.” This suggests that identities are not necessarily uniform making this the most interesting group of all.\textsuperscript{214} It is undeniable that a new identity has emerged, even if it is sometimes a vast minority. It is also true that most people still pledge their allegiances to their state first, and that the EU is viewed through the context of how it can benefit a citizens’ state.\textsuperscript{215} This chapter seeks to explore the shape of contemporary attitudes toward the EU by comparing the theoretical claims of new identity formation (neofunctionalism) and economic self-interest (intergovernmentalism) with Eurobarometer data. The Eurobarometer is a public opinion survey conducted by the European Commission (EC) on a bi-annual basis. Eurobarometer data tracks changes in public opinion on topics important to the EU over time. The chapter culminates with a regression analysis that finds a statically significant relationship between perceived economic benefit and support of EU institutions.

The limitations of this small study are clear as relying on survey data has its drawbacks, especially as it relates to national identity. Eurobarometer surveys have a couple of instruments offered in each survey, such as “Support for EU membership,” but

\textsuperscript{212} Gabel, 1998, p. 50
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
many of the other questions vary from survey to survey. Ideal questions, like whether the respondents “Feel European,” are asked only over a handful of surveys and only during a narrow period of time. The resulting “snapshot” depicts how Europeans felt at a given time but makes drawing overall conclusions about how attitudes change over a period of time more difficult. Another problem is that the survey data is limited in its qualitative data gathering. We often lack a deeper understanding of how survey questions are interpreted by the respondents. Nevertheless, the Eurobarometer survey data can provide insight to very broad and general patterns and trends in European public opinion over time, and this chapter is focused precisely on that. Subsequent chapters will focus on the qualitative aspects of identity in Europe.

This chapter looks for a correlation between economic benefit and support for the EU. If this is the case then we should find that some aspects of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism are correct. What this means in terms of understanding Europe is that wholesale identity change is not easy, nor the likely outcome of integration, but EU citizens do navigate the modern economic currents together. Integration theories and vocal proponents of a cosmopolitan Europe have championed a grand awakening of a common European experience while others have just as loudly cultivated a neo-nationalist backlash against the EU and “Europe.” I argue that while these extremes get the most attention they are not representative of the majority of Europeans who have

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taken a measured and moderated approach to the future of Europe. It is average European views that I wish to explore.

**Theorizing, Pretheorizing, and what is Measurable**

Commentary on the future of Europe has been a cottage industry for politicians and academics since integration was first contemplated following World War II. A half-century later, with a short but extensive history of institution building in Europe and a wealth of public opinion data, it is possible to evaluate some of these ideas and predictions. This section revisits the core assumptions of integration theories and compares them with Eurobarometer public opinion data.

Neofunctionalism argues that elites who remained outside the integrative process would find it difficult to maintain their status because supranational institutions would be the guiding force behind a “new Europe.” Neofunctionalists place emphasis on integration gathering pace: as institutions begin to consolidate then the creation of new identities and new institutions pick up pace. If this were graphically represented we would see spikes or waves when a spillover occurs. Institutional approval is not enough for neofunctionalists. The spillover process hinges on the public’s ability


218 Rosamond, 2000
to translate institutional support into *allegiance* in supra-national European organizations. In other words new identities form as the European public looks to the European Commission, the European Parliament, and other EU institutions to solve their problems instead of their national governments. This does not necessarily translate into attachments to the EU across all states however.

Eurobarometer data can illuminate some interesting trends like those above. However figures devoid of context cannot support the notion of an identity shift in Europe as it is possible that the support generated for EU institutions has more to do with material benefit than an emerging cosmopolitan majority, more analysis is needed. What is apparent is that the dramatic jumps we might associate with a spillover are absent; approval ratings have remained fairly steady. One possibility explored by Dario Castiglione is that the EU commands a certain level of allegiance without invading the

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219 See Haas, 2004
space reserved for the individual’s home state or nation.\textsuperscript{220} Castiglione calls this a “community of strangers,” a place where people can exercise their liberty through a broader legal and institutional order.\textsuperscript{221} It is difficult to confirm this reading of political identity in the EU, but it raises some important questions about the nature of political community in Europe. If Castiglione is correct in this theory then both individuals and states can navigate the EU within a legal framework that is totally unique. This would put the individual in a position of approval of the EU without sacrificing loyalty to his or her own state. In fact, loyalty to the EU and the state can be complementary.

The “Europeans” as Neil Fligstein calls them are surely a significant part of those who were in favor of the EU and its institutions in the figures above. Fligstein shows evidence that the European identity has evolved among elites such as business professionals and technocrats who spend more time abroad and who rely on the EU for their livelihood.\textsuperscript{222} Fligstein also relies on Eurobarometer data to identify patterns of attitudes in Europe. Fligstein’s argument is that the broader interactions with the rest of Europe are partially responsible for Europeanism that mirrors neofunctionalist spillovers nicely.

However, it may also be possible, as Perkins and Naumayer argue that the EU is attempting to buy support through directed economic policies aimed at EU citizens.\textsuperscript{223} Most Europeans don’t travel outside of their own country; only about 25% reported doing

\textsuperscript{220} Castiglione, Dario. “Reflections on Europe’s Constitutional Future.” In Constellations (2004) 11(3) p. 32
\textsuperscript{221} Castiglione, 2004, p.51
\textsuperscript{222} Fligstein, 2009, pp. 138-39
\textsuperscript{223} Perkins & Neumayer, 2007, pp. 180-206
so according to EB 47. A higher number of conventional Europeans speak a second language (about 61%) but with so few traveling outside their own country their interactions with foreigners is usually on their own soil.

“Generally Speaking, do you think (our country)’s membership of the EU is...?”

Source: Standard Eurobarometer, Survey 68 (Sep-Nov 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU 27</th>
<th>A Good Thing</th>
<th>A Bad Thing</th>
<th>Neither Good Nor Bad</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-39</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-54</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (in years)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 –</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-19</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20+</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Still Working</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation Scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Worker</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Persons</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data above supports the idea that attachments to the EU are much more likely to be found in young people, white-collar workers, and the educated. Fligstein claims that the “Europeans” only comprise about 12-13% of Europe’s population after all is taken into account. Eurobarometer data from the 1990s when the question about “feeling European” was asked consistently confirms Fligstein’s analysis and raises the possibility

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224 Perkins & Neumayer, 2007, p. 144
225 Perkins & Neumayer, 2007, p. 140
that spillovers have happened for a small group, namely elites. It would appear that spillovers could happen across Europe if Europe were made up entirely of wealthy to moderately wealthy international business professionals, but this group is still a minority in Europe. In fact most Europeans still identify at the state and local level, not at the European level.

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“How Attached Do You Feel To…..”
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According to Eurobarometer data, states like the UK and France exhibit the greatest fears of cultural threat that has been characterized as an inward looking. National populist European identity focused on Islamic religious symbols and Eastern European blue-collar workers. State citizens who fear that their culture is in some kind of existential danger from European cosmopolitanism focus on populist notions of cultural

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It should come as no surprise that such sentiments have manifested themselves in extreme right and left wing political parties who argue that their state has little to gain from EU membership. The notion of identity itself has been extremely politicized and a tug of war has ensued in some places between those who feel that European cosmopolitanism and national populism are both mutually exclusive and the only choices available. While these fears do exist among many states, integration is persisting and the EU is beginning to dictate a pace of its own.

Then there is also the matter of paying dues to the EU. A cursory look at EU contributions and expenditures shows that the most powerful countries are subsidizing the poorer countries. In 2006 Germany had a net loss of €5 billion, while much smaller Greece grossed €5 billion. Major redistributive features of the EU include the Common Agricultural Policy, Structural Funds, and Cohesion Funds all of which transferred

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227 Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009, p. 12
229 Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009, pp. 12-13
wealth from the wealthier states of Germany, France, and Denmark to the poorer state of Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. By its very nature the EU budget is a negative sum game for wealthier states. While the generosity of larger states, such as Germany, appears to be reaching its limits, budget demands nevertheless continue to rise for the wealthier states. Below is a typical example from 2002 showing who pays in and who gets paid from the EU coffers.

“Net Contributions to the EU in 2002”

231 Tsoukalis, 1953, p. 134
cosmopolitanism. All EU states benefit from the common market, some benefit from EU funds, some benefit from the expanded cultural exchange and the liberalizing forces of EU requirements on member states. Some states benefit from the EU by using it as a scapegoat by blaming any problems the state might be suffering on its EU membership, while others use the EU to reaffirm its own policies. It should also be pointed out that how people feel about identity itself is always in a state of uncertainty. As Fligstein notes the number of people who identify themselves solely as “Europeans” is rather small, but among the 87% or so people who identify primarily on a national basis, there is about 56% who “sometimes feel European.” If this data and these theories tell us anything it is that the identities and outcomes in Europe are extremely diverse and complex.

Sing When You’re Winning: The Not So Surprising Relationship Between Economic Benefit and Institutional Approval

The model proposed herein attempts to explain the enthusiasm for the EU as expressed in figure 1. I argue that there is a relationship between approval of EU institutions and a European identity, as well as a relationship between an important antecedent variable of economic benefit and a European identity. If this is the case, it may help explain why people sometimes feel European. This would mean that attachment to a pan-European identity is more than just a normative shift; there is a relationship between economic well-being and the creation of a new identity.

Figure 1

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234 Fligstein, 2009, p.140
The data collected to test the variables is based on three basic Eurobarometer and budgetary instruments. To test EU benefit I simply took the 2006 EU budget and subtracted monetary contributions from monetary benefits. The resulting number is the net gain or loss in Euros each of the 25 member states received as a result of EU spending and aid programs in 2006. Selecting from two Eurobarometer instruments helped me to operationalize the other two variables. Approval of EU institutions was expressed by using question QA19_2 in EB66 (Index 2), which simply measures the level of trust in the European Commission. European identity was measured by question QA30 (Index 3) in EB 66, which asks “Do you think of yourself as not only [Nationality], but also European?” I used the data collected for all responses of “often” and “sometimes”. This is where we expect to find an increase amongst the opportunistic Europeans.

The primary question seeks to understand whether there is a relationship between EU benefits and the formation of a European identity. As seen in figure 1, there is a relationship that runs from benefits of EU membership, through approval of its institutions and finally results in identifying as European. Empirically testing the relationship between EU benefits, institutional approval and European identity has been broken down into four models. Each of these models uses data collected from the Eurobarometer surveys. Benefit is measured by examining the budget and is loaded into the linear regression and is measured in €10 million. The measures of approval (EB 66, QA19_2) and identity (EB 66 QA30) are loaded into the linear regression as percentages of respondents.
There is no direct relationship between benefits and EU identity. States that benefit from EU membership are no more or less likely to display a stronger pro-EU identity than states that benefit less. However, benefits have a strong indirect effect through institutional approval. Benefits influences institutional approval, which in turn influences EU identity, as predicted in model 4. There is a statistically significant relationship between economic benefit and approval of EU institutions and a statistically significant relationship between approval of EU institutions and the feeling of European identity. Surprisingly, the relationship between benefit and feeling of European identity was not statistically significant, nor was the relationship between benefit, approval of institutions and European identity. What this suggests is a chain of events in which approval or trust of EU institutions spills over into feelings of a European identity, but it is preceded by the benefits of EU membership. While it is not entirely clear from the
data it is possible that the “sometimes European” crowd is influenced by the benefits they receive from EU.

Given the disparities in dues paid versus benefits received, is it possible that people in the giving states experience the process described in the regression less than those who feel like they are benefitting more? When it comes to people’s hopes and fears it becomes quickly apparent that even if a new European identity is in the making it has done little to lessen the overall feeling of anxiety, especially of those in old member states. Germany and Belgium’s populations, specifically, are showing clear increases in “Eurofragility,” meaning that public opinion data is very mixed on questions of loyalty to the EU or to the state.235 The opposite appears true in the benefiting states such as Ireland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Poland.236 In these newer countries public opinion data shows high amounts of support for “joining the EU.”237

Some of the most salient fears in Europe today, especially in old member states, relate to the erosion of the welfare state and a harsh work environment. The relationship found between benefits and approval of EU institutions in the quantitative study seems in some way to bear itself out here. Privatization of social protection nets and the health care system dominate European fears for the future.238 Of those surveyed, many felt that the EU emphasis on free markets and the movement of people across state lines would threaten the social benefits that they receive as a member of their state in lieu of free market policies that emphasize competition in every sector. This sentiment was most

236 Ibid.
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
apparent among “Eurofragile” adults in old member countries. This suggests that nested within the measure of benefit may be feelings of negative benefit not just in the economic sense, but in the social welfare sector as well.239

Conclusion

The simple quantitative analysis above shows a relationship between receiving aid and the approval of EU institutions. This does not necessarily mean that spillovers are not taking place, nor does it mean that approval of EU institutions is the same as the creation of a new identity. What we have here is a simple relationship that can be used as a foundation for further research. More analysis is needed to determine who the opportunistic Europeans are. Whatever the case, the data demonstrates that a European identity is not something that supplants national identity or is even stable, long lasting, and universally agreed upon with the exception of a handful of European elites.

239 “Eurofragile” citizens: men and women, aged between 25 and 65 years, most of them from the same social strata, expressing ambivalent attitudes towards the European Union in their answers to a few filter questions of the recruitment questionnaire. Ibid.
Chapter 4: The Irish Paradox

Introduction

Unlike many other states in the EU, Ireland must approve all integrative treaties through national referendum. It has a complicated track record of these approving treaties, one of the features of being a very small but very democratic country. Ireland’s social conservatism in conjunction with its proud history and post-colonial neutrality have been at odds with the rapidly increasing standard of living in Ireland, a standard that proponents of EU integration suggest are a direct result of EU membership. So what is a country to do? How do Irish elites convince their constituencies that the increased standard of living is a result of EU membership and that costs outweigh the surrender of just some of its hard fought sovereignty? Despite economic gains the road to the EU has been a difficult one for Ireland.

Ireland’s quest to join the larger European Communities (EC) had a decidedly inauspicious start. In 1973 Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom were able to join the Communities after the long-standing French objection to European enlargement with the retirement of Charles De Gaulle. The disparities between Ireland and its fellow EC members were quite noticeable; Ireland was much poorer than the other EC countries and had a relatively high unemployment rate, somewhere around 18%. Ireland also had a reputation for being suspicious of outside power structures, having been a de facto


\[\text{The term ‘European Communities’ refers more broadly to the grouping of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Economic Community (EEC).}\]

colony of the British for a long time, making their decision to join the EC all the more awkward. Many argued however that new pressures placed on Ireland in the form of trade and economic competition forced the Irish to make concessions on their traditional foreign policy views, particularly their independence from international institutions.\textsuperscript{243}

With isolation no longer a tenable position in Western Europe, Ireland sought to reassert itself in the 1980s as a main advocate for human rights and the rights of small states, having gained outright independence from Britain in 1922.\textsuperscript{244} Perhaps the most meaningful aspect of Irish foreign policy was their commitment to military neutrality that had its roots in Irish antiquity. A dedication to neutrality also placated nationalist sentiment that opposed Irish involvement in the affairs of the European mainland.\textsuperscript{245} Finally the structural and social funds that began to arrive from the EC and later the EU mollified many of the anti-Europe nationalists, though as we will see, many still actively opposed further integration.

Ireland would seemingly be an easy case for the neofunctionalists, meaning that once Ireland begins to integrate into the EU, the Irish will value the new EU institutions, which will be accompanied by economic improvement and support for more integration. Following the neofunctionalist reasoning, we should begin to see both Irish support for the EU and identity change that conforms to a new pan-European standard. It is certainly true that Irish national law has changed significantly to match European standards, especially social laws on divorce, abortion, and homosexuality. Nevertheless, what is


\textsuperscript{244} McMahon, Dierdre. \textit{Republicans and Imperialists: Anglo-Irish Relations in the 1930s} (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984).

\textsuperscript{245} Doherty, Roisin, Ireland, Neutrality, and European Security Integration (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2002)
interesting and surprising is the significant resistance to important parts of European integration in Ireland such as resistance to European treaties.

**Case Methods**

To reiterate my thesis, I argue that integration may, in the EU, lead to support for EU institutions, but does not automatically translate into a greater EU identity for a number of reasons. As per my thesis, I argue that identity change is not only dependent on economic benefit, but also whether the national narrative as told by the elites conforms to the goals of the EU. This means that you can still have EU integration move forward because of perceived economic self-interest, but spillovers are much more limited when it comes to changing national identities. Thus we can see a process whereby Irish enthusiasm for the EU is high, and a commitment to its institutions is strong, but the grip on the Irish national narrative remains strong.

Given the difficulty of quantifying national identity, I use four indirect measures to try and accurately describe the state of the Irish national narrative from January 1986 until October 2009. Using available and relevant data, I have gathered primary and secondary sources concerning Irish views on foreign policy, domestic policy, public opinion, and public discourse. The debate on sovereignty and control over Ireland’s international obligations, most importantly its desire to remain neutral in military conflicts has framed debates on Irish foreign policy. Domestic policy speaks to the heart of the EU agenda and also provides a measure for whether pan-European identity is

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246 Lexis/Nexis sources include titles like the Irish Times, the Economist, and the London Times. Including the name of the treaty and the country did each search. Each one of these searches was done to reflect the time period that would include the public debate and the outcome of the referendum, roughly a 3-year period.
penetrating the Irish national narrative. Some public opinion data does exist on how the Irish public views the EU, in particular EU institutions, but it also reflects how the Irish see themselves vis-à-vis the rest of the European Union. Finally a discussion of public discourse is crucial because it not only frames the debates over integration and what it means to be Irish, but it provides the best evidence for a thick description of the Irish national narrative. Public opinion data may not always be available or contextual, especially at crucial points during integration, but studying letters to the editor or op-ed pieces in major newspapers such as the Irish Times, one can better understand how political issues in contemporary Ireland are defined, discussed, interpreted, and understood.

The general purpose of this qualitative case study is to understand how the European integrative process affects national identity. I define identity as the collective Irish feeling of uniqueness and separateness from surrounding identities, including specifically the emerging cosmopolitan pan-European identity described by neofunctionalism. Using articles retrieved from Lexis/Nexis searches in this study, I narrowed down major and minor themes within the Irish national narrative. After initially collecting data on a wide-ranging collection of articles relating to Ireland they were separated chronologically: The Single European Act (1986), The Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997-1999), the Nice Treaty (2001-2003) and the EU Constitution and Lisbon Treaty (2003-present). Recurring and emphasized themes such as citizenship, changes in domestic law, fear of a super-state, the desire to remain neutral,

conformity funds, jobs, common agricultural policy (CAP), unemployment, and competitiveness were used to further narrow my data points. The goal of this chapter is to understand how the Irish understand the Irish national narrative, how it may have changed, and how economic self-interest may have affected the narrative. Before moving on to the results of my analysis, it is important to have a brief historical background on the state of Irish nationalism and changes in their economic status upon joining the EC in 1973.

The Roots of Irish Nationalism

Freedom from British rule certainly provided more national meaning than wellbeing. Irish incomes were traditionally based on grazing; unlike their more wealthy British neighbors, Ireland was practically devoid of industry. With the establishment of the Irish Free State the first real attempt to industrialize took place in the 1930s but their efforts were hampered by economic warfare when the British government placed huge tariffs on all Irish goods. By the 1960s, Ireland had become more industrialized, but most of its exports (90%) are still going to the UK. Things only get worse in 1977 the Fianna Fail government almost bankrupted Ireland and the Irish currency was overvalued. In 1973, when Ireland joined the EC its economy was among the lowest of its new Western

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249 These categories also represent my independent variables of national identity and economic interest very well. It is also worth noting that I was originally inclined place neutrality in its own category, but decided that it indeed belonged within the Irish Nationalism category, as neutrality is a central phenomenon to the Irish definition of their nation. Nine themes under two larger categories; the first is Economic Self-Interest deals with conformity funds, jobs, common agricultural policy (CAP), unemployment, and competitiveness and the second is Irish Nationalism discussing citizenship, changes in domestic law, fear of a super-state, the desire to remain neutral.

250 Tonra, Ben, Global Citizen and European Republic: Irish Foreign Policy in Transition. (Manchester University Press, New York, 2006)

251 Tonra, 2006
European peers in several notable categories including GNP/GDP, average home prices, life expectancy, and average household income.²⁵²

By 2003 the GNP had tripled, the average home price had gone from €9,000 to €224,000, life expectancies were creeping toward 80, and average household incomes were boosted significantly by an emerging service sector.²⁵³ Perhaps most importantly though, Ireland was no longer beholden to the economic demands of a lone trading partner in Britain as it had expanded its exports to the wider EU and the US. By 1987 the “Tallaght Strategy” of economic and welfare reform, along with tax cuts, reduced borrowing by the central government. These reforms, though unpopular in a country that valued a robust welfare state, ultimately received approval from the EU and Irish citizens.²⁵⁴ As a way of attracting foreign investment in the 1990s, the Irish government drops corporate tax rates and the “social partnership” approach kick-started the ‘Celtic Tiger.”²⁵⁵ Wealth infusions in the form of structural funding from the EU helped to transform Ireland from one of the poorest members of the European Union to one of the wealthiest states in the world.²⁵⁶

Defining the terms of “Irishness” often requires a much longer discussion on Anglo-Irish relations. The Irish make very clear that they are not Anglo-Saxon, but Gaelic, and the resistance of English cultural hegemony is what often drives Irish

²⁵³ Ibid.
Rapacious plundering of Ireland’s resources and population by the British through “union” had a profound impact on the discursive process of identity formation in Ireland.\textsuperscript{258} Tobias Theiler argues that as groups form long-lasting national identities they are fulfilling basic cognitive and emotional needs, and often they orient their identity formation around important uniting institutions, the Irish focused much of their identity building on the Irish Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{259}

Irish struggles for independence also created commonality among the Irish across any class structure that might have existed in the poor British colony.\textsuperscript{260} By the 1800s a convergence of sorts took place when Irish nationalists had aligned themselves with the Catholic Church while the “unionists” who were largely protestant were isolated in what would become Northern Ireland. The Irish nationalists and the Church had long advocated for “home rule” which would fracture the union between Ireland and the British and end the de facto British occupation. In December 1922 Ireland was officially freed under the Anglo-Irish Treaty, though Northern Ireland opted out and the population of mostly protestant Unionists remained under British rule. The challenge to define Ireland as a “free state” ends with self-rule, but desperate poverty and economic isolation.

Although Ireland was an English speaking nation, it wanted little to do with the United Kingdom after partition.\textsuperscript{261} Ireland’s intense desire to distinguish itself from Britain and to be recognized amongst other states shapes Irish national identity to

\textsuperscript{257} Tonra, Ben, Global Citizen and European Republic: Irish Foreign Policy in Transition. (Manchester University Press, New York, 2006)
\textsuperscript{258} Tonra, 2006
\textsuperscript{259} Theiler, Tobias “Culture and European Integration,” (Review Article) in Journal of European Public Policy (Vol. 10, No. 5)
\textsuperscript{260} Tonra, 2006
\textsuperscript{261} Doherty, 2002
emphasize neutrality. According to several historians, such as Ronan Fanning, Irish neutrality was initially more of a means to an end, rather than a truly held principle. It was not until the Treaty of Ports and the 1938 recovery of its British held ports that Ireland could act on its stated neutrality, which they did by abstaining from entry into the Second World War. Because Ireland was poor and possessed so little power in the international community, neutrality was ultimately their most potent expression of their “free state” status, and it was driven primarily by the desire to differentiate Ireland from its former colonizer, Britain.

Today, Ireland continues to see its neutrality as ‘positive, moral, and principled.’ Some have even argued that Irish neutrality has ‘sacred cow’ status amongst the population. Irish neutrality has also been discussed in terms of an absence of threat, one of the advantages to being a small island country. Irish neutrality is different than that of other European states because it focuses not only on abstaining from military conflict, but it also places heavy focus on boosting the development of former colonies and promoting human rights. Mary Robinson, Ireland’s first female President, has long championed human rights through not only her position as President, but as United

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265 Ibid, p. 155; Falkner & Laffan, 2005, pp. 222-223
266 Falkner & Laffan, 2005
267 Keatinge, Patrick. A Singular Stance: Irish Neutrality in the 1980s (Institute of Public Administration, Dublin, 1984); Doherty, 2002; Tonra, 2006
Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, and honorary President of Oxfam.\textsuperscript{268} President Robinson placed unique emphasis on Ireland’s role in helping former colonies deal with poverty and development issues reviving the anti-colonialism foreign policies of the 1970s in which Irish leaders argued that helping former colonies was ‘no longer a matter of charity but one of justice.’\textsuperscript{269}

Some have argued that Ireland’s geostrategic position in Europe makes neutrality a luxury but it has not come without protest from other states.\textsuperscript{270} When Ireland was finally allowed to join, it was often the Western voice for former colonies organizing anti-colonial voting blocks in the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{271} Ireland did not join NATO as its Western neighbors did. Instead, Ireland remained principled and isolated even during the Cold War. One underlying reason that the Irish refused NATO membership was the cold relations between Britain, a key NATO member, and the Irish government.\textsuperscript{272}

**The Single European Act (1986)**

Entering into force on July 1, 1987, the Single European Act (SEA) harmonized the hodge-podge of national economic policies, creating a more recognizable single European market. Much of the Act’s rules and recommendations came from the Dooge Committee’s report to the European Council, which openly advocated creating a common marketplace in Europe. Irish Senator James Dooge who convinced Heads of State and Government to cede major parts of their economic controls over to the European Union

\textsuperscript{268} Robinson brought new vigor to the position of President of Ireland, which is seen as a largely ceremonial role. Her outspokenness on human rights and international development made her extremely popular both at home and abroad.

\textsuperscript{269} Trocaire was set up in 1973 by Irish-Catholic Bishops, See, www.trocaire.org/thecatholicchurch.org, accessed March 31, 2010

\textsuperscript{270} Tonra, 2006

\textsuperscript{271} Lafflan, 2004

\textsuperscript{272} Tonra, 2006
ran the committee.\textsuperscript{273} Signing the SEA improved the EC’s decision making process, formalizing consultations on policy issues between states while fostering cooperation in the areas of technology and research.\textsuperscript{274} European Parliament President Sir Henry Plumb claimed that the Act alone would lower unemployment in Europe while boosting overall growth at least 2 percent per year for the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{275} In Ireland, a country desperately seeking to push down its unemployment numbers and increase growth, decent majorities (roughly 60\%) favored entering a common market.\textsuperscript{276}

Opposition to Irish participation took the form of criticism of economic benefit received thus far from joining the EC. Roland Hill called into question the measure of economic benefit from European economic integration. Hill argues that while Ireland did see a noticeable bump in its economy, it was soon followed by debt and unemployment.\textsuperscript{277} Another, more specific complaint Hill had was his suspicion that Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) money would be cut under the SEA, leaving Irish farmers more susceptible to fluctuating food prices in the continent. This argument however was empirically denied.\textsuperscript{278}

The one objection, however, to the SEA that found the most traction amongst the Irish public was the perceived threat to neutrality posed by the Act. In April 1987 the Irish Supreme Court upheld the argument of Raymond Crotty, an anti-EU campaigner,

\textsuperscript{274}“European Single Act heads down the homestretch: Does it matter?” (1987, May 18) Christian Science Monitor
\textsuperscript{275}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{278}Shlikhter & Yegrov, 1987.
who argued that surrendering control over questions of “political and economic aspects of security” violated the Irish constitution thus forcing the issue to be settled by public referendum.  

Other anti-EU activists, such as Carol Fox, seized upon the ruling by arguing that the SEA violated the spirit of Ireland’s decision to join the EC in 1973 and would inevitably pull Ireland into NATO’s orbit and end the tradition of Irish neutrality.

*Crotty v. An Taoiseach* may have forced the Single European Act to a referendum, but the Act was widely supported by the Fianna Fáil government, Taoiseach Charles Haughey, as well as farmers and employee unions. The referendum on the Act passed 755,423 for to 324,977 against becoming the Tenth Amendment to the Irish constitution. Much of the trepidations over the Act’s effects on Irish neutrality were pacified by adding to the English version of the SEA a provision that stated, “No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Communities, or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the Communities, or institutions thereof, from having the force of law in the State.”

Perhaps a harbinger of future events, the campaign to pass the SEA was led by the party in government and its leaders and was opposed by much smaller private interests. By 1995 the Irish Supreme Court ruled, as a follow up to *Crotty* in *McKenna v. An Taoiseach, an Tánaiste and Others*, that the government could not use public funding to promote either side of the referendum debate. Anthony Coughlan, a committed anti-EU

280 Shlikhter & Yegrov, 1987
281 Addition to Article 29.4.3 of the Single European Act.
campaigner and the secretary of the National Platform for EU Research and Information Centre, won further concessions from the court by demanding and getting an Irish version of the “fairness doctrine” which forced equal time for both sides of the enlargement referendum debate in the media.\textsuperscript{282} This ruling had major implications for all subsequent EU referendums because the opposition to them was relatively small, but by law they were given equal time on television and in newspapers.\textsuperscript{283}

**Maastricht Treaty (1992)**

The 1992 Maastricht treaty took the concessions on economic policy set forth in the SEA and drastically expanded them by creating the pillar structure of the European Union. The pillar structure of the EU consisted of the EC, a Common Foreign Policy and Security Policy (CFSP) to which the Irish had very mixed feelings, and finally the Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC). The implications for Europeanization in Ireland drew them closer to Europe in three important ways: generous fund transfers from the central European budget to the Irish State subsidized the Irish economy, the adoption of the European model of socio-economic development expanded the Irish economy, and the transfer of Irish monetary policy from Sterling to the Euro granted wider in-roads for the Irish into the European economy.\textsuperscript{284}

From a political standpoint, the sell to the Irish people was relatively easy. Taoiseach Albert Reynolds was often fond of saying that “[f]or every one pound Ireland pays into the European Community, we get six pounds back. You cannot argue with

\textsuperscript{282} Tonra, 2006, p. 87
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid. p. 87
\textsuperscript{284} Tonra p. 62-63.
that." To some it sounded like economic bribery for Ireland’s acquiescence in European affairs, but this criticism held little water because Ireland was still getting substantially more than it was putting in. Ireland stood to gain so disproportionately under Maastricht that the British began to openly complain that they did not want to finance Ireland’s economy through their donations to ‘cohesion funds’ that were issued to bring the Irish economy up to par. This sentiment alone would almost certainly be enough to encourage the Irish to vote ‘yes’ in a referendum, using it as another opportunity to stick it to the British, but the good economic prospects kept rolling in.

Nevertheless the opposition, which included Raymond Crotty, argued that the Taoiseach and the parties in power were purposefully inflating the perceived benefit in order to secure passage of Maastricht. To even keep pace with the rest of Europe Ireland would have to maintain three percent growth, a scenario that Crotty in particular doubted if Ireland were to sign on. After Ireland signed Maastricht however, monetary transfers from the EU to Ireland in the form of conformity funds alone grew the economy by seven percent of GNP and are widely credited for not only ending the Irish economic slump, but also fomenting the subsequent boom in Ireland in the late 1990s. Despite the grave forewarnings of a handful of anti-EU economists and activists, elite campaigns attempting to sell Maastricht on the basis of conformity funding alone was nearly an unmitigated success.

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285 Palmer, John. (1992, June 6). Defending the Irish Link In the Chain: Denmark’s No Vote This Week Threw the Maastricht Treaty into Doubt. *The Guardian*, p. 2
286 Palmer, 1992, p. 2
287 Taylor, John. (1992, June 16). ‘Yes’ Vote to Bring Irelank, UK into Real Union Again After 70 Years of Separation. *The Irish Times*, p. 6
289 Murdoch, 1992, p. 8
Debate over the economics of Maastricht continued on two additional but no less important fronts: competition and agriculture. The types of arguments made for and against focused almost entirely on specific interpretations of economic self-interest. At the time of Maastricht most Irish families’ primary source of economic insecurity was the tenuousness of their employment.\textsuperscript{291} Irish pro-EU elites argued successfully that the relatively cheap labor pool available in Ireland as compared to France and Germany would attract new investments, investments that were more European and less British.\textsuperscript{292} The narrative constructed by Irish elites embraced competition as a beneficial force that would raise the Irish standard of living by attracting huge injections of foreign investment in Ireland.\textsuperscript{293}

Irish industry, even in the late twentieth century, still had a sizable agricultural component. The Irish economy stood to benefit rather substantially from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms in Maastricht. Irish farmers could expect disproportionate advantages in market prices for their harvests and generous subsidies and capital investment for their farming operations.\textsuperscript{294} Many Irish saw these policies as Ireland’s ability to change the redistributive capacity of the EU to their benefit.\textsuperscript{295} Albert Reynolds would describe the process as ‘fiscal federalism,’ although at the rate Ireland was absorbing social and agricultural funds it could be more accurately described as unmitigated economic benefit.\textsuperscript{296} While only comprising one percent of EU population,

\textsuperscript{291} Bruton, John. (1992, June 10). “Yes’ vote can make Ireland count in Europe”. \textit{The Irish Times}.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{293} Tonra, 2006, p. 60-63
\textsuperscript{294} Ibid., p. 63.
\textsuperscript{295} Ibid., p. 131
Ireland was gobbling up 13 percent of its budgetary packages.\textsuperscript{297} For its part Ireland moved closer to European markets by relaxing its regulatory schemes and harmonizing its tax codes. As a result, massive foreign investment soon followed.\textsuperscript{298} From an economic perspective this is shaping up to be a “slam dunk” for neofunctionalists. There is profound economic benefit and institutional integration occurring in Ireland during the Maastricht period, so naturally there must be an equivalent shift in Irish identity.

In June 1992 Reynolds said, "Europe is about more than economics - of course it is. It is about jobs, it is about international investment, it is about agriculture and it is about other things such as the Social Charter and women's rights. It is about culture, too - about our heritage."\textsuperscript{299} Reynolds was addressing the controversy over Maastricht’s requirement to harmonize social policy in all EC members. Ireland’s social policies, which were not only socially conservative, but also heavily influenced by the Roman Catholic Church, made Ireland stick out amongst its Western European peers. Ireland also began a long and tedious discussion over what Maastricht meant to its prized neutral status as it did not seem possible to most to accept Maastricht if it meant giving up Irish neutrality.

Public discourse over the abortion issue in particular heated up in Ireland because many felt that Ireland’s constitutional ban on abortion would be threatened by Maastricht.\textsuperscript{300} Indeed the treaty required Ireland to lift its ban on women traveling to other countries to have an abortion.\textsuperscript{301}

\textsuperscript{297} FitzGerald, Garret, Reflections of the Irish State (Irish Academic Press, Dublin, 2003) p. 158
\textsuperscript{298} Tonra, 2006, p. 131
\textsuperscript{300} Ibid.
draftsman and former Irish Prime Minister, inserted a special protocol into the Maastricht treaty that would exempt Ireland from the rule changes it would face on abortion should Maastricht survive the referendum. This strategy was an attempt to reassure Irish voters that Brussels would remain outside of the abortion debate in Ireland, and that the EU would not be able to force the legalization of the procedure.\footnote{Dublin Correspondent. (1992, February 29). \textit{The Economist}.}

Nevertheless, the anti-EU public rhetoric continued to heat up. In early 1992 a 14-year-old girl in Dublin became pregnant from an alleged rape, and the High Court refused to allow her to travel to London to have an abortion. This case highlighted not only the Irish national law prohibiting women from travel to seek abortions, but also the possible changes that Maastricht could bring. To the surprise of the government, the High Court, and policy experts, public opinion polls released in the aftermath of the Court’s decision showed 64 percent of the Irish public opposed the ruling.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} Two-thirds of Irish citizens polled said that they wanted the Irish policy on abortion changed.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} Whether he was listening to the developing outcry over this particular case or not, Walter Van Gerven, the EC Advocate General spoke out against the Irish ruling on the grounds that the national law prevented the free movement of people, a basic guarantee under EC agreements. The Irish Court eventually agreed, striking down their former travel ban.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}

As consensus on the abortion issue no longer existed, the question became whether a consensus on the anti-abortion laws ever existed at all. During its short history, the Roman Catholic Church heavily influenced Ireland. As a result Ireland’s constitution was full of laws that reflected official positions of the Church, including
abortion. But as a competing set of values, European values perhaps, began to intrude on Irish discourse it became more evident that opposition to more traditional Irish laws existed. To be clear, European values however the Irish interpreted them, did not replace Irish values but rather liberalized them. The Roman Catholic Church, sensing new urgency for abortion law reform, issued a series of statements seeking to tie Maastricht and the fate of Irish abortion laws together.\textsuperscript{306} Many of the criticisms the Church had toward policy change not only drew on the Irish national narrative cast by the Catholic Church itself but also included grave warnings that reform on abortion could lead to reformation on divorce and homosexuality laws.\textsuperscript{307}

Conservative stances on social issues like abortion, divorce, and homosexuality seemed sacrosanct in Ireland for most of its history, given the fact that the Church had such a strong presence not only in the Irish national narrative, but in Irish government as well. Pro Life movements cropped up in response to the emerging national debate over the abortion issues, seeking to defend the ‘Irish way of life.’\textsuperscript{308} Mar Lucey, the head of the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child, cast the debate in terms of protecting Irish autonomy by saying, "[t]he main problem, is that abortion is a service in every member state in the community. When the treaty is passed, that will mean that European law will be superior to ours in every way." Europe, she said, is "not relevant to our culture, our ideals. All we've gotten out of Europe are a few roads."\textsuperscript{309} Other pro-life groups used slogans like “Don’t be Maastricked” or “vote no now for a better treaty

\textsuperscript{306} Dublin Correspondent. (1992, June 13). Make O’Break. \textit{The Economist}. p. 52
\textsuperscript{307} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{308} Joyce, Joe. (1992, April 27). Irish Rift on Maastricht Deepend Byline. \textit{The Guardian}. p. 6
later” in order to forestall the referendum. Devout Catholics cast the vote on Maastricht as a final say on the abortion issue and contrasted Ireland’s high religiosity with the relative low church attendance in mainland Europe, and Brussels in particular. As tensions escalated over abortion scuffles broke out in Dublin and other Irish cities. As the referendum grew closer the debate over Maastricht was looking less and less about economic benefit, and more about compromise on moral issues.

While the debate over traditional values was threatening to derail Maastricht, Albert Reynolds appeared to have his work cut out for him. Reynolds was forced to reexamine the protocol attached to Maastricht that allowed for Ireland to opt-out on the abortion issue. In 1983 the anti-abortion amendment to the Constitution passed by a two to one margin, but less than a decade later it seemed that Ireland was ready to revisit the issue. As the debate heated up opposition to the special protocol in Maastricht became pronounced; not just from the left, but the right as well. There is a twist of irony in that the protocol was drafted in an effort to preempt the debate over abortion; the result however was the exact opposite, it fueled the row over abortion. The emerging left in Ireland saw Maastricht as a step forward for women’s rights, and a chance for Ireland to ‘get it right’ by easing or simply repealing the anti-abortion amendment to the constitution. The right of the political spectrum, as well as the Church, argued that

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314 Ibid.
Ireland would be submitting to looser morals of Brussels, and subsequently sacrificing a part of the national soul in signing Maastricht.  

Reynolds responded with a new narrative that made integration central to Ireland’s role as a European republic and a central figure in European affairs. Before the Maastricht referendum Reynolds argued that voting “yes” provided Ireland a unique opportunity to provide a unique style of leadership in Europe. Other government elites repeated Reynolds themes and essentially argued that a “no” vote would exclude Europe from Ireland, robbing Europe of Ireland’s unique and wise perspectives on post-colonial reconstruction, among other things. Reynolds also worked to remind his constituents that Maastricht was less about abortion, divorce, or homosexuality as it was about economic opportunity, and Ireland’s responsibility to lead. He urged the public to join with him in making an “idealistic, yet realistic decision,” by voting for Maastricht.

Responding to the unexpected and paralyzing debate over social issues by evoking a revamped sense of Irish nationalism signaled that the debate over Maastricht was not just about economic self-interest. One more domestic hurdle lay in store for Reynolds and the pro integration government elites: neutrality. Maastricht called for the harmonization of defense policy across Europe. Common NATO membership made this move relatively easy for most states, but it threatened another key aspect of Irish national identity. This challenge to the ratification process had many similarities with the abortion debate, but differed in that a ‘saver clause’ existed in Maastricht (presumably for

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315 LaFranchi, 1992, p. 1
316 Tonra, 2006, p. 65.
318 Ibid.
319 Ibid.
Ireland) that made no legal demands on states wishing to abstain from military affairs. 320 Nevertheless, opposition parties such as the Labour party and Sinn Fein drew lines between treaty provisions and unsubstantiated requirements of Irish acquiescence to them. 321 In truth Ireland would be able to sign Maastricht without making any changes to its previously stated neutrality, nor would it be the only country to do so. 322

Nevertheless anti-EU campaigners attempted to derail Maastricht by claiming that a “yes” vote would force Ireland into NATO and back under the thumb of the British. 323 The rebuttal to such arguments was an equally strong claim that the Irish troops serving alongside British troops in peacekeeping action would only serve to empower Ireland and prove the strength and maturity of the Irish nation being able to work with old rivals as equals. 324 But further scare tactics persisted. A widely circulated poster pictured the face of a 14-year-old girl which the poster proclaimed would be drafted into the European army should the treaty pass. 325 Government officials who decried their scaremongering and countered that no provisions for a European army even existed in the Maastricht treaty met these attacks quickly. 326

The Taoiseach was able to allay most fears himself by arguing that "[t]he world of mutually antagonistic alliances, which gave neutrality its relevance, has gone. On the contrary, there is evidence that, with the end of the Cold War, countries such as Sweden, which maintains extremely modern and sophisticated defenses of its own, intend to play a

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323 Taylor, 1992, p. 6
324 Ibid
very prominent and active role in negotiations on new security and defense structures in Europe.”

Albert Reynolds’ party was long known as a fervent defender of Irish neutrality and his statements about the role Ireland could play as an independent observer in whatever emerging defense structure Europe may come up with reinforced the narrative that the pro-integration movement had begun to develop: Europe needs us.

On November 1, 1993 the Maastricht treaty was enacted, having survived the Irish referendum. However, the issues surrounding the changing Irish national narrative continue to play in subsequent treaties. Beginning with Maastricht the argument began to be made that once integration reaches a certain point, Ireland will no longer be able to say “no” to Brussels. The passage of Maastricht signaled that views on what it meant to be Irish had begun to diverge between those who feared Europe’s effects on Ireland and those who encouraged Ireland’s effects on Europe.

**Amsterdam Treaty (1997)**

The Amsterdam Treaty was an amendment to Maastricht that sought greater emphasis on citizenship issues and individual rights. Amsterdam breaks down into four policy areas that fine-tune previous treaties. The first major policy area addresses inequalities between men and women in a cadre of legal areas, which include employment, immigration, asylum, and visas. The second policy area sought to develop the rights of a European citizen by essentially creating rights for citizens ensured by the EU. Most of these rights were aimed at ending social exclusion and requiring that all EU

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327 Boland, Colm. (1992, June 6). Maastricht Treaty. *The Irish Times*. p. 7. “Developing Europe may force change in neutrality stance While the Government claims that neutrality is not an issue at present, it has chosen to use the Maastricht debate to soften public opinion about future developments in Europe, writes Colm Boland, Diplomatic Correspondent.”

documents be translated into native languages. The third policy area sought the creation of a harmonized external or foreign policy, concentrating on the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP). The final policy area consolidated institutional questions by including national parliaments more in EU decision-making among other things. Other provisions would directly address many of the open debates in Ireland including the free movement of people under the Schengen Agreement, as well as the continued discussions of CFSP. From the Irish perspective however

By 1998 the Irish economic miracle was in full swing and in that year Ireland received four percent of its GDP ($2.7 billion) in EU funding. Among the strongest proponents to the EU in Ireland were rural voters who had benefitted substantially from CAP subsidies. The CAP had become so popular in the Irish countryside that the “cheque for headage” EU agriculture policies almost singlehandedly created huge leaps in rural living standards earning perpetual support for EU integration among farmers. Amsterdam would not change any of this. In fact bargaining over CAP II reforms would be left up to the Irish government, and they would be under tremendous pressure to keep the current policy. Amsterdam was widely supported by the five main parties in Ireland, but many in government felt that the contents of Amsterdam were thought to be so uncontroversial that few in government initially felt the need to advocate for it.

Nevertheless opposition would pose a threat to the Amsterdam referendum, and it caught many of the elites seemingly ‘asleep at the wheel.’ Despite the clear economic

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332 Ibid.
333 Ibid.
benefits conferred to Ireland through their EU membership, strong dissenting voices, especially in the far left and right, began to argue that further integration was anathema to Irish workers. For those on the far left Amsterdam meant that worker’s rights would not be protected, and instead of attracting large international firms who would almost certainly exploit Irish labor.\footnote{Allen, Mike. (1998, May 21). Amsterdam Fails to Tackle Jobs. The Irish Times. p. 13} To the far right Amsterdam made too many commitments to the welfare states to ensure that Ireland would remain competitive vis-à-vis the larger more developed economies on the European mainland.\footnote{Allen, 1998, p. 13} Some argued that “Europhoria” was fading in Ireland and that the impressive gains achieved under previous integrative measures would not last forever, and that it was in Ireland’s best economic interest to stay where it was, opposing all further integration.\footnote{“The Visit.” (1998, May 30). The Economist. p. 52}

A nearly silent majority who saw little economic drawbacks to Amsterdam occupied the middle ground. Indeed, there seemed to be more to lose from stopping the process, and according to some, the commitments to sustainable development along with the tremendous size of the European kitty meant that the risk was substantially lower for a small state like Ireland than it would be for a larger state like Germany.\footnote{Bruton, John. (1998, May 7). Amsterdam Treaty Referendum. The Irish Times. p. 11} Amsterdam, they argued, was such a modest step for Ireland to take, and refusing to do so would create a crisis of confidence in Ireland among its EU partners, the results of which could be the withdrawal of foreign investment and the stoppage of CAP and conformity funds.\footnote{Bruton, 1998, p. 11} Opposition groups pushed back arguing that there was no negative consequence to “no.” Instead the opposition argued that voting “no” did not mean that Ireland was
ungrateful for its EU funding, nor did it mean that it did not like being a member of the EU, all it meant was that the Irish see integration proceeding too fast, and like the Danes, the Irish too wish to slow down the process.\(^339\)

The debate over Amsterdam amounted to one gigantic “Euro-Yawn,” wrote one observer.\(^340\) In fact, according to public polls only 11 percent of Irish voters even knew when the referendum was being held, 67 percent had never even heard of it.\(^341\) Most of those who knew about the referendum were farmers who had a much better grasp on the workings of the EU than did the common city dweller.\(^342\) The loud criticisms of anti-EU campaigners like Anthony Coughlan, who argued that the Irish media and policy-making elites were quietly surrendering Ireland over to Brussels, were almost totally ignored.\(^343\)

The majority of the meaningful debate surrounded fears that Amsterdam might interfere with Ireland’s neutrality. Opposition to the CFSP remained strong in Ireland, but much had changed in Europe since Maastricht, and Europe’s failure to effectively answer the crisis in Bosnia gave the Irish pause this time around.\(^344\) Small but vocal minority advocacy groups, including the Irish Green Party, continued to claim that any new treaty that mentions the CFSP will pull Ireland not only into NATO, but into a subordinate role in a nuclear armed Euro-defense force.\(^345\)


\(^340\) The Times, 1998.


\(^342\) Parlon, 1998, p. 7


Perhaps it was the lengthy process of approving Maastricht, or perhaps it was a lack of credible opposition, but the Irish public did not buy the dire claims made by the anti-EU movement, especially with regard to Ireland’s neutrality. Instead, there is evidence that suggests that the public and politicians alike held such staunch views regarding neutrality that no credible effort to override it could be attempted.346 Once fears had been eased by structural agreements, ensuring not only Irish neutrality, but the neutrality of a handful of other EU states as well, little in the Amsterdam treaty gave the Irish pause.

A few conclusions can be drawn from this episode in Irish integration. The first is that the Amsterdam treaty did not cause a tremendous amount of clash with the Irish national narrative. In fact, Amsterdam addressed many of the concerns the Irish had about continued integration rather well. Specific provisions, in particular, assurances that Ireland could opt-out of the CFSP, allowed the Irish to maintain an important part of their national narrative: neutrality. None of the other provisions were very controversial, most simply clarified points from the Maastricht Treaty. Another possible conclusion is that the Irish narrative of a European Republic had begun to harden and augment Irish nationalism. Perhaps Ireland began to see itself as an integral part of Europe, and opposition to further integration was viewed as counter-productive. The most likely conclusion to draw is that the voting public did just not consider Amsterdam important. It is true that Maastricht had stirred up a lively debate that challenged core assumptions of the Irish national narrative, but Amsterdam was practically ignored by the voting public, with few even able to identify what the Amsterdam Treaty was. It should come as

no surprise then that the referendum on the Amsterdam treaty drew fewer voters to the polls than Maastricht (56% compared to 69% for Maastricht). Some observers explained the lowered turnout as simple “referendum fatigue,” or suggested that Irish voters were more concerned with the ongoing CAP negotiations than they were the Amsterdam Treaty.

**Nice Treaty (2001)**

Amsterdam had proven so uneventful that it was almost a forgone conclusion that Nice, yet another amendment to Maastricht, would sail through as well. Yet in June 2001, Irish voters went to the polls and roundly rejected the treaty. It sent shock waves not only through the stunned Irish government, but also through the whole of Europe, which needed Irish approval before moving forward. Seeking answers, the government blamed Irish rejection on the paltry turn out, only about 34 percent, and sought to reassure the EU that it could secure passage. The reality was that the Irish government had been sleep walking through integration. Pleased with stratospheric public opinion polls showing 85 percent of Irish believing that they are benefitting from EU membership, the government assumed that the prospect of continued benefit would be enough to keep the trend going. They were wrong.

There was a significant drop off in the number of articles written in the run up to Nice I, compared to the numerous op-ed and policy papers written in the run up to

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350 Coakley & Gallagher, 2004, p. 341
Maastricht.\textsuperscript{351} Nice did not really contain anything that was particularly controversial for Ireland, in essence the changes in Nice focused on firming up EU institutions for eastward expansion, as well as recalculating voting weights in the Council of the European Union, where Ireland actually came out ahead. The Irish government was also able to gain more carve outs in Nice I ensuring Irish neutrality.\textsuperscript{352} High approval ratings of the EU, increased voting power, and continued assurances that Ireland’s neutrality will be respected should have pointed to a clear “yes” vote.\textsuperscript{353} What happened?

Quietly, a powerful anti-Nice campaign began to assert itself with ominous red and black posters from Libertarians Against Nice (LAN) that said “No to Nice.”\textsuperscript{354} Other posters made bold claims about a “Boss Europe,” the threat of renewed militarism in Ireland, or the creation of a new “Euro-wall” that was compared to the Berlin wall of the cold war era. The insurgent campaign of far right propaganda refocused the discussion, at least among the voting minority, on one particular version of the Irish national narrative.

As the LAN campaign against Nice argued, no matter how conservative an approach the Irish government took in the integration process the eventual usurpation of Irish sovereignty became more and more inevitable with each new treaty signed.\textsuperscript{355} Moreover LAN argued that saying “no” to Europe would only serve to empower Ireland because small states tend to lose influence and power as integration intensifies with one exception: the de facto veto that small states hold in the treaty ratification process.\textsuperscript{356}

\textsuperscript{351} The number of op-ed articles generated from Lexis/Nexus searches for Nice were much lower than Maastricht.
\textsuperscript{352} Tonra, 2006, p. 89
\textsuperscript{353} Eurobarometer 57 national report - Ireland
\textsuperscript{354} De Breathun, Deaglan. Barrett Leader of No to Nice Campaign. (2002, October 11). \emph{The Irish Times}. p. 11
\textsuperscript{355} Lafflan, 2004; Tonra, 2006
\textsuperscript{356} Tonra, 2006, p. 130.
for the far left, they argued that further integration aligned Ireland with the traditional oppressive colonial powers in Europe and away from the interests of the oppressed colonies.\textsuperscript{357} If this were the case it threatened the unique position within the union that Ireland occupied and directly challenged the Irish national narrative that Taoiseach Reynolds and his government worked so hard to create during the Maastricht campaign.

The few rebuttals to anti-EU campaigners reaffirmed EU membership had contributed to Irish national and economic well-being.\textsuperscript{358} Remarkably however, no one, especially the government, sought to reclaim ground on the national narrative, they just kept repeating the good economic news, assuming of course that this was the basis of the Irish vote. The lost ground on Irish nationalism not only cost the government the referendum, but also was hugely embarrassing on an international level. The Irish government assumed that the silent majority of Irish voters’ economic self interest would rule the day, but when so few of them showed up to vote it was immediately clear that the more disciplined anti-EU voters had the numbers to kill Nice.

Irish soul searching in the aftermath of Nice’s demise led to the reassertion by the government that not only was integration in the best interest of the Irish, but the EU needed Ireland now more than ever. As the Irish government set a new referendum date on Nice, it also ratcheted up a broad sweeping campaign aimed at increasing voter turnout and mobilizing the silent majority that it believed stayed home the first time.\textsuperscript{359} Pro-Nice movements became numerous and quickly outspent their anti-Nice rivals by a

\textsuperscript{357} Ibid. p. 139
\textsuperscript{359} Coakley & Gallagher, 2004
margin of €1.5 million to €170,500.\textsuperscript{360} In efforts clearly aimed at reclaiming control over the Irish national narrative, the Taoiseach argued that if Ireland failed to pass Nice then Ireland’s absence in the EU would cause an economic crisis on the mainland.\textsuperscript{361} The Taoiseach also reminded the Irish that the government had participated fully in the negotiation of Nice and that it protected Irish national interests fully; he argued that a failure to sign would undermine the Irish efforts to protect Irish interests.\textsuperscript{362}

Anthony Coughlan responded to the new campaign by arguing that Nice, in effect, creates a two-tiered European economy, and since Ireland was a small state, it would inevitably end up in the lower tier.\textsuperscript{363} Coughlan’s argument was aimed at persuading the public that the larger states like France and Germany will be able to take control of Ireland’s economic policy, fundamentally dismantling the notion of partnership of equals.\textsuperscript{364} Such a claim would clearly weigh heavily on the Irish national psyche, which is naturally weary of any arrangement that might seek to subjugate Irish interests or possibly smack of neo-colonialism. The response to Coughlan however was much more convincing. Pro-Nice campaigners argued that Ireland had a central role to play in Europe, and that Ireland’s main export was not its products, but its people and ideas.\textsuperscript{365} Pro-Nice campaigners also reminded voters that Ireland had the lowest corporate tax rates in Europe, making it a prime target for American investors interested in Eurozone

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{De} De Breadun, Degaglan. (2002, October 7). Yes Side Spend Far Outweights That of No. \textit{The Irish Times}.
\bibitem{Power2} Power, 2002.
\bibitem{Cou} Coughlan, Anthony. (2002, June 24). Nice is the Legal Path to a Two-Tier, Two-Speed EU. \textit{The Irish Times}., p. 12
\bibitem{Cou2} Coughlan, 2002, p. 12
\bibitem{Debate} Debate on the Nice Treaty (2002, September 18). [Letter to the Editor] \textit{The Irish Times}. p. 15
\end{thebibliography}
trading, and that Nice would not change this.\textsuperscript{366} Perhaps most importantly, pro-Nice campaigners argued that Irish membership in the EU has increased Irish sovereignty by giving it access to new tools that help the Irish further their own interests.\textsuperscript{367} The redirection of the national debate away from the notion that further integration means more restrictions to one where integration equates to greater freedom, dovetailed nicely with the arguments resurrected from Maastricht that Europe needed the Irish more than the Irish needed Europe. One other narrative emerged during the campaign for Nice II that had its roots in previous referendum campaigns: Irish neutrality.

While Nice would not change one aspect of Ireland’s neutral status within the EU, its detractors including LAN made every attempt to convince Irish voters that neutrality was in jeopardy.\textsuperscript{368} During the Nice II campaign, the EU issued several important press releases in which it not only reassured the Irish voters that neutrality was not at issue, but it praised Ireland for its decision to remain neutral, perhaps stroking the ego of Irish nationalists.\textsuperscript{369} Commentators in Ireland reciprocated by asking what if any role Ireland should play in the security of Europe, pointing specifically to the unresolved violence in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{370} Ireland would contribute 850 men to the EU rapid reaction force intended to respond to Bosnia-like crises.\textsuperscript{371} Irish sentiment began to focus however on the role that a

\textsuperscript{368} Newman, Christine. (2002, March 22). Byrne Accused of Belligerence for Attacking Nice Treaty’s Opponents. \textit{The Irish Times}. p. 6
\textsuperscript{370} Nice Treaty Referendum. (2001, June 1). [Letters to the Editor]. \textit{The Irish Times}. p. 15
\textsuperscript{371} Couglan, Anthony. (2002, June 24). Nice is the Legal Path to a Two-Tier, Two-Speed EU. \textit{The Irish Times}., p. 12
neutral country can play as arbitrator in a conflict, carving out a role for Ireland in the larger conflict resolution scheme that did not involve military commitments.372

The second campaign for Nice increased voter turnout in October 2002 by 150 percent and secured the referendum with 60 percent “yes” vote. The lessons to be drawn from Nice are simple: keep the national narrative alive. The Irish government believed that perceived economic self-interest was enough by itself to secure another integrative treaty, but it was not. Polling before the first Nice referendum showed extremely high levels of perceived economic benefit from EU membership, but the “no” vote prevailed because it was able to capitalize on low voter turnout and maximize the number of anti-EU voters by evoking nationalist fears that further integration would lead to Ireland’s eventual subjugation. Nice was relatively benign to Irish national interests, so its defeat was really a signal that the government had lost control of the national narrative, most importantly the part of the narrative explored under Reynolds that the EU needs Ireland. Initial defeat, while shocking, was enough to wake the government and other pro-integration forces and put them back to work.

The resulting tone of the Nice II campaign was an emphasis on Ireland’s uniqueness with respect to its role in the EU. Ireland would be an economic leader with its low taxes and attractive prospects for American investment. Ireland would also maintain a unique role in being the voice of principled neutrality in the ongoing security discussion, imparting their unique experiences to their larger EU partners. The Nice II campaign effectively rallied enough of the Irish national narrative to reassure the voters

that just because Ireland was a small country in the EU, it was still a peer among equals, and it had a unique role to play in the larger European community.

**Lisbon Treaty (2008)**

The failure of the EU Constitution to advance after the French and Dutch “no” votes placed the future of EU integration in question once again. Defeating the constitution, however, did little to imperil the integration process. The Lisbon Treaty took most of the changes that would be made under the EU constitution and applied them to amending Maastricht. Lisbon sought to increase the transparency of the EU decision-making process, increase the role of the EU Parliament in policy formation, and foster a closer relationship between the EU Parliament and the EU Council. The Lisbon Treaty would also make the Charter of Fundamental Rights permanent, many of the same changes that the constitution would have made, but without all of the symbolic language. The Lisbon treaty represented a conciliatory approach to continuing integration without ruffling too many nationalist feathers.

EU efforts to tone down the EU constitution and offer up the changes it sought in the more benign Lisbon Treaty were not enough for Ireland, as they voted “no” in the first national referendum. No longer did it seem that Amsterdam was an aberration, something that could be explained away by low voter turnout or ineffective “yes” campaigns. While voter turnout was relatively low (54%) the margin of defeat for Lisbon was noticeable: 54% to 46% percent opposed.

373 Under this arrangement the UK would stand to lose 40 vetoes, a point that would intuitively be attractive to the Irish.
Like Nice, all of the Eurobarometer data showed widespread approval of the EU, of integration, of the Euro, and of perceived national benefit.\textsuperscript{374} In fact, the rate of perceived benefit from EU membership was 82\% in the spring of 2008, by far the highest approval rate of any EU member state.\textsuperscript{375} Accompanying these numbers, however, is a set of statistics that puts in doubt the amount of knowledge that the average Irish citizen had about the EU.\textsuperscript{376} Like Nice, most Irish voters had little knowledge of the ramifications of Lisbon. Few knew when the vote was being held or even what a “yes” vote meant for Ireland.\textsuperscript{377}

By 2008 the Celtic Tiger was showing clear signs of overheating.\textsuperscript{378} Price speculating had the effect of inflating property values and the strong Euro was beginning to sink Irish exports.\textsuperscript{379} The traditionally steady farm vote was also beginning to waffle with many local growers blaming the EU Trade Commissioner for falling agricultural prices.\textsuperscript{380} The reality was that during the time in the run up to the first referendum, Ireland still had Europe’s lowest unemployment rate and while a recession began to set in on mainland Europe, Ireland maintained very modest positive growth.\textsuperscript{381} Despite the usual cast of detractors, most commentary on Lisbon seemed to indicate that a “yes” could be squeezed from the Irish electorate because the treaty itself was not placing Irish

\textsuperscript{375} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{376} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{377} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{378} The Term “Celtic Tiger” was used to describe the Irish economic miracle, almost certainly borrowing from the term “Asian Tiger.”
\textsuperscript{379} Tansey, Paul. (2008, May 30). Friday Ireland Must Live with a Euro Paradox. \textit{The Irish Times}. p. 6
\textsuperscript{380} McDonald, Henry. (2008, May 18). EU Treaty Opponents Eye Irish Vote: High Court Review to Start on UK Referendum Over Lisbon Reforms as Ireland Prepares to go to the Polls. \textit{The Observer}. p. 22
\textsuperscript{381} Staunton, Denis. (2005, January 8). Ireland has Lowest Jobless Rate in the EUBYLINE. \textit{The Irish Times}. p. 18; Staunton, Denis. (2008, June 10). Yes Oh Yes! Or No No No? \textit{Irish Times}. 
economic interests in jeopardy.\textsuperscript{382} One observer noted, “It’s a dirty job [passing Lisbon] but we can do it.”\textsuperscript{383} Passing the Lisbon Treaty was not really a ‘dirty job,’ as it would have minimal impact on Ireland’s economic situation, and no impact on its neutrality. Conversely the failure to pass Lisbon would open Ireland up to attack from its EU partners and claims that Ireland was about to ‘bite the hand that fed it.’\textsuperscript{384}

Attempting to explain why Ireland rejected Lisbon must be done within the context of Irish national identity. Despite the former EU Commissioner David Sutherland’s statement that “[t]he Lisbon Treaty is by far the most minor of any EU treaty the Irish people have ever been asked to vote on,” the measure failed.\textsuperscript{385} All four major parties including the ruling Fianna Fáil party came out in favor of Lisbon, but their rhetoric was almost always focused on economics, not the Irish role in the EU.\textsuperscript{386} This either hinted that Irish governmental elites were tone deaf to the national narrative or worse, that they did not care and simply assumed that the Irish “yes” was a forgone conclusion. Such conclusions clearly ignored available data on Irish public opinion, which not only showed an unusually strong attachment to national identity when compared to its peer states, but also showed a pronounced detachment from the EU.\textsuperscript{387}

In 2008, 59% of Irish rejected any degree of attachment to Europe and opted to identify themselves only as Irish. The only country with stronger national attachment

\begin{small}
\textsuperscript{382} Staunton, 2005; Staunton, 2008  
\textsuperscript{386} McGreevy, Ronan. (2008, May 26). FF TD Describes SF as ‘Most Strongly Anti-EU Party for Almost 40 Years’. \textit{The Irish Times}.  
\end{small}
was the UK.\textsuperscript{388} In Ireland, high approval ratings for the EU are met with an equally high rejection of a European identity. Rational economic self-interest offers the best solution to this puzzle. What country would not thoroughly approve of an institution that brought per capita wealth from the lowest in Western Europe to the highest in roughly 30 years? The assumption that unparalleled economic benefit would ‘spillover’ into a new pan-European identity could not be more mistaken in Ireland. Nevertheless, Irish refusals to allow integration to continue could have massive repercussions from a Europe that is not amused by Irish idiosyncrasy.

The quest to save Lisbon began with the announcement of a second referendum. But circumstances soon dictated a new tone for “yes” campaigners. In 2008, Ireland found its unprecedented growth countered by an unprecedented recession. Irish banks, like banks all over the world, stopped lending; growth slowed, stopped, and then receded.\textsuperscript{389} Some in the Irish business community began to openly question whether the Euro was making matters worse in Ireland.\textsuperscript{390} Compared to the currencies of Ireland’s two main trading partners, England and the US, the Euro remained comparatively strong, making Irish exports less competitive. Irish fears about losing control of their own economy and subsequently their sovereignty in the midst of a global recession fueled a fresh wave of Euro-skepticism.\textsuperscript{391}

The battle over Lisbon II would come down to two competing narratives. Anti-EU campaigners wasted no time in claiming that Lisbon I and II were referendums not on

\textsuperscript{389} Staunton, 2008
\textsuperscript{390} Tansy, 2008, p. 6
the procedural inner-workings of the EU, but on whether Irish national identity was about to be sacrificed in lieu of a new EU identity.\textsuperscript{392} Anthony Coughlan and Dick Humphres, amongst others, argued that Lisbon I and II were evermore-insidious tools of the ‘Eurocrats’ who sought to subjugate Irish identity by seizing decision-making from Dublin and the Irish people.\textsuperscript{393} Op-ed columns in the papers such as the *Irish Times* were rife with ‘experts’ claiming that Lisbon II opened the door for the EU to become a true federal super-state, and that Ireland would once again be forced under the yoke of imperialism, this time from France and Germany.\textsuperscript{394} The opposition to Lisbon also seized upon the similarities in language that Lisbon shared with the now defunct EU constitution and argued that Lisbon was in fact a stealth constitution that could over-ride Irish sovereignty.\textsuperscript{395}

In the face of the fiercest anti-EU campaign since Maastricht, the Irish government argued that Ireland stood to lose financially and diplomatically if they rejected Lisbon again and began to appeal to the sense of Irish honor to push for passage.\textsuperscript{396} The pro-Lisbon campaign also sought to separate fact from fiction arguing that Lisbon was the least intrusive treaty and required no transfers of sovereignty, made no provisions for the creation of a new kind of citizenship, and did not even advance a particular goal for the EU; it was just an “odds and ends” treaty.\textsuperscript{397} Objectively the government was correct as Lisbon advanced no larger political policy but simply refined legislative and judicial procedure and qualified majority voting to areas like energy,
asylum and immigration policy, and law enforcement co-operation. Fighting myth with facts was proving less potent a strategy to promoting reform for one reason or another. The Irish government had gone to great lengths to explain Lisbon to the voting public while anti-EU agitators had been highly successful at manipulating Irish fears of a European super-state in their insurgent campaign directed at defeating further integration.

Polling conducted in 2008 and 2009 showed that the Irish public knew very little about what the Lisbon Treaty actually was.\textsuperscript{398} After the first referendum, 22\% of “no” voters cited not knowing enough about the Treaty to vote for it and 12\% who voted “no” did so to protect the Irish identity. No other issue was a significant factor.\textsuperscript{399} Of the “no” voters, roughly 75\%, were manual laborers while the majority of the “yes” voters were self-employed or white collar workers.\textsuperscript{400} Given these statistical trends commentators openly wondered whether Lisbon I was a victim of malfunction in Irish democracy, and whether Lisbon II would suffer the same fate.\textsuperscript{401} Limited understanding of Lisbon’s actual provisions in conjunction with a small but effective anti-EU campaign that focused on Irish fears of identity loss can be blamed for the failure of Lisbon I.

On October 1, 2009, the streets of downtown Dublin were flooded with voters who came to try again on Lisbon. Many of the blue-collar workers spoke openly about their fears that Brussels would be making the majority of the policy decisions that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{399} Ibid. “No” voted on traditional issues like abortion and homosexuality were only 2\% of the vote, showing a clear recession of concern over such moral issues.
\item \textsuperscript{400} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{401} The Lisbon Treaty and Ireland. (2008, October 14) \textit{Business & Finance Magazine}. 
\end{itemize}
governed their day-to-day lives. The usual fears were also cited: rumors once again emerged that the Irish people would be conscripted into a European Army, and the Vatican issued an official statement pleading with the Irish to reject the Lisbon treaty because it would bring to an end Ireland’s strict policies on abortion. As in past votes the fears did not match the facts. Ireland was still able to secure carve outs to Lisbon regarding their neutral military status and their stance on abortion. However, close observers to the upcoming vote noticed that economic concerns were trumping the cultural reasons for voting. Michael O’Leary, an entrepreneur and founder of the Irish discount airline Ryanair, said, “[w]e’re bankrupt. The only difference between Iceland and Ireland is not one letter but our membership of Europe and our membership of the euro. The people who are bailing us out are Europe and the European Central Bank.”

Signing Lisbon was viewed by many in Ireland as a precondition for leaning on the EU to finance the Irish economic recovery. There was, however, bitterness to the swing that had pushed the likelihood of an Irish “yes” closer to a reality. Many felt that the Irish government was bullying them into voting “yes” and that their vote was under protest, but the reality remained that without ratifying Lisbon, Ireland would suffer even greater economic setbacks. The anguish over voting “yes” seems to have something to do with the ongoing perception that increased integration will lead to the outright dismantling of the proud Irish tradition. In an interview with National Public Radio, Ben

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402 De Breadun, Deaglan and O’Halloran, Marie. (2009, October 1). Only Sane Vote is a No Vote, Says Ganley. The Irish Times.
405 Gifford, 2009
406 McGee, 2009
Tonra from the University of Dublin said, “[f]or example, in the U.S. with your health debate and people talking about death panels and people talking about, you know, whether or not President Obama is legitimately president by virtue of his birth certificate - you have people here in Ireland today looking at the Lisbon Treaty. We're looking, you know, people making claims about abortion, about forced conscription into European armies, about cuts in our national wage - none of which could or would happen, and everybody has said that. But nonetheless, people are emotionally engaged in this in a way that raises a lot of heat with very little light.”

October 2, 2009 the Irish went to the polls and by a margin of 67% to 33% Ireland passed the Lisbon Treaty. The turnout was high and the results were decisive, but the reasons that the Irish voted to ratify Lisbon remain unclear. Taoiseach Brian Cowen said, "[t]oday the Irish people have spoken with a clear and resounding voice. This is a good day for Ireland and a good day Europe. We as a nation have taken a decisive step for a stronger, fairer and better Ireland and a stronger, fairer and better Europe." The opposition reacted by arguing that the vote was motivated by economic fears that trumped the general will of the people. Before the vote Finance Minister Brian Lenihan admitted that Ireland would see a drop of 12% of GDP in 2009 and that Ireland would have to rely on a €4 billion capital injection from the EU. Despite a large showing for Lisbon II, the fact that the referendum was forced to be held again in conjunction with the economic desperation Ireland has found itself in means that the

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407 Gifford, 2009
408 Waterfield, Bruno and David Barrett. Ireland Votes ‘Yes’ to EU Lisbon Treaty. (2009, October 3), from telegraph.co.uk.
409 Waterfield & Barrett, 2009
410 Crimmins, Carmel. Ireland’s Worsening Finances Raises Lisbon Stakes. (2009, October 2) Thompson Rueters
Standing outside waiting for a fare on October 2, 2009, watching Irish voters move in and out of a downtown polling station, David Weaver, a local taxi driver, told a reporter that the Lisbon treaty “will have a devastating effect on all of society, both our rights, our fundamental rights, our constitutional rights. What they're saying is might is right. The history of Europe can tell you what that leads to. It's not so long ago when the last person wanted an empire of Europe. We all know the consequences.”411 This statement is a good summation of Irish fears about immigration and the subsequent misunderstanding about how the integrative process works. For every treaty that the Irish public has ratified through referendum, the Republic of Ireland has gained tangible economic benefits. Meanwhile, fears that EU efforts to forge a military alliance and trap Ireland within the confines of NATO, or that EU laws regarding abortion, gay rights, or divorce have remained unrealized.

Nevertheless, fears that integration equates to the loss of sovereignty, culture, or identity have proven hard to shake. It is conceivable that Ireland’s history of colonial oppression makes the public more sensitive to any surrender of sovereignty, but it is also possible that the Irish public over-estimates the amount of sovereignty that they are actually giving up. Polling has shown that the Irish public is relatively uninformed about how the integrative process works, what the referenda mean, or even when referenda are held.412 Conservative and liberal movements aimed at stopping integration have been

411 Gifford, 2009
412 McKenna, 1998
successful in pushing the Irish government to hold a follow-up referendum in the last two attempts, but when push comes to shove the Irish have ratified the treaties and pushed integration further along. It seems that while the Irish fiercely defend their own national identity they have also come to the realization that the prosperity visited upon them in the new century is largely due to their membership in the EU. The result is an uneasy if not skeptical attitude toward continuing the process. With new economic problems plaguing Ireland it is hard to imagine that they can afford to stop integration anytime soon.

Ireland’s actions in the past two referenda have thoroughly frustrated their fellow EU members who often blame Ireland for slowing the integrative process. Ben Tonra has often worried aloud that Ireland’s continued skepticism toward the rest of Europe is damaging a relationship that is crucial to Ireland’s economic self-interest. Tonra is not alone in his assessments. Since 1986 almost every Taoiseach and centrist party leader has made the case that playing along with the rest of Europe is right for Ireland. The lengths that the Irish political elites have gone to convince the public that the EU is a worthy commitment deals a significant blow to the neofunctionalist proposition that integration leads to identity change; it has not in Ireland. In fact there is a good case to be made that the further integration progresses the more aware of their national identity the Irish become.

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413 Gifford, 2009
Chapter 5: The Return of German Self-Interest

Introduction

Many of the early “founding fathers” of European integration were German elites who exhibited a strong suspicion of populism. German leaders, like Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl, led Germany by the axiom that a strong economy at home made Germany reliable and predictable in the European community, something Germany was desperately seeking after the Second World War. To ensure that German transition toward being a part of a wider Europe went smoothly, German leaders have not allowed the German public to vote in referenda on European integration. In 2004, only 39 percent of Germans thought that they had benefitted from the EU and almost half of Germans said they would be “very relieved” if the EU would simply disappear. This chapter explores how German leaders are attempting to maximize Germany’s political and economic interests by joining the EU. It provides the national narrative that elites use to try and overcome the difficulties they confront and generate public support for the EU.

After partition following the Second World War, Germany was confronted with the challenge of overcoming the “German ideology,” a mix of radical nationalism and cultural pessimism that defined the Weimar Republic. West Germany was able to create, sustain, and grow an impressive economy, once again becoming a leader in innovation and quality. Great suspicion about German motivations persisted despite

414 “No Love Lost” (2004, September 23) The Economist
416 “No Love Lost” (2004, September 23) The Economist
Germany being divided and occupied. What Germany needed was a rehabilitated image and a large institutional arrangement that would tie Germany down thus reassuring the rest of Europe but also offering Germany the opportunity to be a successful economic and political leader in Europe. Germany needed the European Union.

Neofunctionalism would argue that as the German people began to integrate into Europe the identity question would answer itself. In other words Germans who act like ‘Europeans’ would be less threatening to their neighbors and better trading partners. As this chapter shows, however, the understanding of the German national narrative is beginning to diverge between the elites and the masses. The German penchant for self-abasement seems to be declining as the German economy drives the rest of the EU, and once again the German masses are talking in terms of self-interest.

Case Methods

As I have suggested studying national identity is not easy, and measuring changes to identity is even more difficult. As in the Ireland case I have indirect measures to get at how Germans feel about European integration, particularly EU institutions. Using primary and secondary sources, I sketch out and examine what I call the state of the German national narrative from January 1986 until October 2009. It is impossible to assess national identities over a twenty-year period, what I do here. As in the previous chapter, I focus on five key points in Germany’s integrative history. These data points help me to examine the discourse between the elites and the public. It must be noted however that Germany does not have a referendum process like Ireland and that is

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418 Reid, 2004, p. 41
significant. Instead of focusing on the referenda campaigns, I focus more on public and elite discourse. In other words, while the Ireland case study focused on the run up to the treaty, this case study focuses on how the treaty is received since the German public has little to no say in treaty ratification.

Most of the major institutions in Europe including NATO and the EU have been aimed at limiting German power by providing security and economic opportunity. If there was potential for functional spillovers to happen then we should see it in Germany first despite the East/West divide, yet little evidence exists to validate neofunctionalist claims. Recently, German leaders like Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schroeder and Angela Merkel have attempted to fuse the German national narrative with the European integration process, but only with limited success.\(^{420}\) Kohl famously proclaimed that integration was “irreversible,” making the case that fears of renewed German domination were unnecessary.\(^{421}\) Great effort was put forth to point out the vital contributions to the development of the EU and the general state of peace after World War II by European intellectuals like Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman.\(^{422}\) But today that dream faces challenges from within Germany itself.

What this chapter explores is how German elites committed themselves to deeper and wider EU integration and steering German identity toward a European ideal. Nonetheless, the evidence here suggests that even with these two processes moving forward together we should see support for the EU and a shift in loyalties, but a

\(^{422}\) Banchoff, 1999, p. 273
significant gap still exists between elite aspirations and mass attitudes. Furthermore the evidence in this chapter suggests that as Germany becomes the primary economic engine of Europe, German identity remains unchanged.

In this chapter I measure national identity indirectly by looking at public polling from the Eurobarometer. I also look at how elites package integration by analyzing speeches and documents regarding German positions on EU expansion. After initially collecting data on a wide-ranging collection of articles relating to Germany they were separated chronologically: The Single European Act (1986), The Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997-1999), the Nice Treaty (2001-2003) and the EU Constitution and Lisbon Treaty (2003-present). From these recurring and emphasized themes related to German guilt, European fears of Germany, managing German identities (east/west and regional), German culture, immigration, economic self-interest, and checkbook diplomacy were used to further narrow my data points.

*Roots of German Identity*

After 1945 in the Western occupied parts of Germany, democracy was accompanied by denazification, an intense campaign that tried to use the German shame and guilt after World War II to eviscerate fascism from Germany and replace it with democratic and peaceful values.423 There is a convincing case to be made that German “we-ness” is based on a common sense of shame or guilt.424 Germany has been willing to give up some of its power, or to constrain itself in return for a feeling of legitimacy in

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Europe.\textsuperscript{425} The pacific German identity was under development in the West where the creation of international institutions such as the European Coal and Steel Community were drawing out the best in German ingenuity while simultaneously reassuring the rest of Europe that Germany would not pose a military threat.

From the Marshall Plan to the founding of the European Community, German growth remained steady. German growth defied the neorealist claims that the more economic power Germany attained the more likely it would be to seek a new military superiority.\textsuperscript{426} Instead Germany kept itself locked into NATO and continued to allow the US to keep a large military presence on German soil.\textsuperscript{427} Furthermore, Germany’s membership in the European Union limited its foreign policy making power by institutionally constraining it. Just as Germany was united, its economic power was at an all time high and its future was in its own hands, the Germans decided to tie its own hands with multilateral institutionalism.

What ensued after the fall of the Berlin Wall was the quick incorporation of East Germany into the West German federal structure. In July 1990, the economic and monetary union between East and West became a reality. On September 12, 1990, the Two Plus Four treaty was signed bringing East and West together and being co-signed by the four powers which formerly occupied Germany: France, the UK, the USA, and the USSR. October 3, 1990, was the first day of a united Germany, finally settling the German Question by bringing to an end the partition that was meant to subjugate German

\textsuperscript{427} Reid, 2004, p. 186
nationalism. According to Phillip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, before the issue could be laid to rest with those who still had reservations about the possible hazard posed by the new united Germany, the government in Bonn had to convince the EC that they could manage unification.\footnote{Zelikow, Phillip and Condoleezza Rice. \textit{Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft}. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1995)}

Germany is still experiencing cultural and economic difficulties following reunification in November 1989.\footnote{“Getting Closer: But Eastern and Western Germany may never quite meet” (2010, March 13) \textit{The Economist}} The Soviet approach to dealing with the “German question” was decidedly different than the rehabilitative strategy favored by the Allies. While the Allies believed that Germany could be a force for prosperity, on the other side of the Iron Curtain, the Soviets were more interested in exacting their “pound of flesh” from a country that had killed so many Russians in two recent World Wars.\footnote{Reid, 2004, p. 53} The result was a wider than expected cultural chasm within the German nation after reunification.\footnote{Fulbrook., 2009} Huge differences in development, education, industry, women’s rights, and entrepreneurship were laid bare after unification.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 187.} West Germans were by far wealthier; more educated, and had more children than their Eastern counterparts.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 189.} Political diversity simply did not exist in the East, in fact membership in the Communist Party was a prerequisite for professional advancement, but on the other hand the East’s communist ideology reduced the inequalities associated with the capitalist system that the West embraced.
Domestic politics have more impact on Germans; as far as the EU is concerned Germans often want to use local government to insulate them from EU policies. German leadership, for instance, often struggles internally with the power divide between the Federal government and the regional Länder.\footnote{Mazzucelli, Colette, Ulrike Guèrot, and Almut Metz. “Cooperative Hegemon, Missing Engine or Improbable Core? Explaining French-German Influence in European Treaty Reform.” In Beach, Derek, and Colette Mazzucelli. \textit{Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration} (Palgrave, New York, 2007).} When it comes to the EU many of the Länder feel that Brussels is usurping power that they rightly possess and do not wish to give up.\footnote{Mazzucelli, Guèrot, & Metz, 2007, p. 166.} While German leadership could not be more enthusiastic about continued integration the Länder demanded a stronger voice in the EU treaty negotiating process and in Article 23 in the Basic Law they got it.\footnote{Beach, Derek and Colette Mazzucelli. \textit{Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration}. (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006) p. 166.}

No longer do German Chancellors dream aloud about a ‘United States of Europe,’ or commit to the open ended financing of East European integration. Germany rebounded faster than any other economy in Europe after the 2008 financial crisis.\footnote{“Inside the Miracle: How Germany Weathered the Recession.” (2010, March 13) \textit{The Economist}} This puts Germany in the driver’s seat of Europe and changes the conversation from one of creating a “European Germany” to the possibility of creating a “German Europe.”\footnote{Ibid.} As one observer in \textit{The Economist} recently pointed out that Germany is still a “self-shackled republic” meaning that the characteristic self-abasement is still present, but an economically strong Germany is finally feeling “comfortable in its own skin.”\footnote{“A Muted Normality: United Germany is becoming more comfortable in its skin” (2010, March 13) \textit{The Economist}} Despite a bailout package for Greece, Germany is attempting to end the ‘checkbook diplomacy’ that financed European integration in the 1980s and is favoring instead closer
relationships with France and the UK in an attempt to spread costs out and explore the boundaries of integration.\(^{440}\)

**Single European Act (1986)**

It is almost impossible to talk about the Single European Act and Germany and not mention German reunification. Bringing Europe together in a *sui generis* pacific union meant answering some tough and lingering questions including what to do with the two Germanys. Balancing fears of resurgent German aggressiveness with the impressive economic potential of a united Germany was not easy. If Germany could somehow be harnessed for its economic production but kept from remilitarizing it could be an important asset to the grand European project.\(^{441}\) The main concern, it would seem centered on whether or not the German identity had changed enough for integration to move forward and whether Germans valued integration at all.

West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963), aware of Europe’s anxiousness over Germany, tried to forge a new identity that made Germans responsible for their history while also becoming an integral part of the system of Western states.\(^{442}\) The core tenets of both Communism and Nazism violated the core tenets of human dignity according to Adenauer.\(^{443}\) One result of Adenauer’s efforts was a West German engineered “Rhine Capitalism” that sought co-operation between management and workers, ensured high levels of job and social security, and embraced the protection of

\(^{440}\) “A Muted Normality: United Germany is becoming more comfortable in its skin” (2010, March 13) *The Economist*; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005, p. 83

\(^{441}\) Reid, 2004, p. 53


local industry. Emphasis was also placed on a system of “sound money,” making German savings rates amongst the top of all European nations. Adenauer’s strategy fit well with the rehabilitative tone emanating from Washington D.C. West German identity stressed the recognition of Nazi atrocities and the subsequent responsibility of Germans to seek redemption. Laws prohibiting Nazi symbols as well as memorials built for Holocaust victims and the preservation of concentration camp sights were the most visible policies meant to remind Germans of their terrible past.

East Germans however, experienced an entirely different form of re-socialization. Nazi atrocities were never dealt with openly, much of German history was repressed, and the East Germans endured the punitive socialist restructuring that came from Moscow. East German industrial production paled in comparison to what was happening in the West, on the other hand East German unemployment was extremely low until 1989.

On November 8, 1989, in the midst of West Germany’s commitment to the Single European Act, the new West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl called for an “all German” discussion about the future, pledging a comprehensive assistance package to East Germany should the two Germanys unite once again. When the Berlin Wall fell the very next day, suddenly all the fears about German unification came to the fore.

After the celebrations has subsided it was clear that major differences existed between former East and West Germans. East Germans felt susceptible to a volatile job market and West Germans were not eager to pay higher taxes to subsidize unification.

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444 George & Bache, 2001, p. 149.
446 Fulbrook. 2009, p. 253
447 Ibid.
Economic refugees from the east almost immediately inundated western Germany. Despite internal turmoil, the united Germany was asked to live up to its UN, NATO, and EC commitments. Kohl responded to the internal confusion and the external demands on Germany by trying to speed up integration within Germany. New Länder were quickly established in the east in an attempt to create bureaucracies and infrastructures that would be needed to even out industrial disparities.\(^{448}\)

Integration both within the borders of Germany and Europe seemed to offer the promise of overcoming the old problems of territorial security, trade, and immigration while creating new economic spaces for the European community to prosper. German integration was like a microcosm of what Europe would soon be going through together, but the transitions were not smooth. Western Länder felt that they were losing their funding to eastern Länder.\(^{449}\) Many in former West Germany felt that instead of benefitting from reunification and European integration, new conduits like SEA were driving businesses and individuals to invest in other European states like Ireland and Portugal.\(^{450}\) This begs the question: is the effort to reform Germany’s image paying off in economic terms?

Despite German willingness to bankroll the European experiment in integration, reservations about German intentions lingered.\(^{451}\) For their part Germans were split on whether they were benefitting from their role in the EU. In November 1989, 56 percent of Germans polled believed that they benefited from integration while 26 percent said...

\(^{448}\) Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks, *Multi-level governance and European Integration* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001) pp. 176-177

\(^{449}\) Hooghe & Marks, 2001, p. 176

\(^{450}\) Ibid.

\(^{451}\) Wittlinger, Ruth and Martin Larose. “No Future for Germany’s Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy” in *Journal of the International Association for the Study of German Politics*. (Routledge, 2007)p. 481-495
that they did not. From the outside a divided Germany was weaker, more predictable, and more easily managed.\textsuperscript{452} Unable to credibly oppose reunification and in conjunction with the resurgence of traditional fears over chauvinistic German identity, the SEA emerged as the tool of choice for reassuring Europe that a United Germany was nothing to fear.

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s advocacy for further integration and his welcoming of the SEA dovetailed nicely with the argument that under partition Germany had indeed reformed its ways.\textsuperscript{453} The key for the Germans is that the elites (mostly Kohl) needed to assure Europe that German identity had changed and was cosmopolitan, not fascist. The Germans themselves, however, had multiple regional identities that extended beyond the East/West divide but also included identities closely associated with the Länder. Generational identities existed as well and divisions between those born after the Nazi era and their elders were apparent. Amongst these groups there was not agreement that integration at the level that Kohl suggested was the way to go.\textsuperscript{454}

The best example of German attempts to bring together separated German identities during the process of reunification was the creation of a new German community.\textsuperscript{455} What had the potential to bring Germany together was the notion that German citizenship was not civic, meaning allegiance to the state (either West or East Germany), but cultural, meaning allegiance to a common culture.\textsuperscript{456} Common culture, language, and customs would be foundation Kohl could use to bring the two Germanys

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\textsuperscript{455} Palmowski, 2008, p. 554
\textsuperscript{456} Palmowski, 2008
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back together and using the firmly established and more well tuned public rhetoric of West Germany, it would be possible for Kohl to frame unification in pacific terms that might put the rest of Europe at ease.\textsuperscript{457}

The result the reunification process was the *Volk*, or a set of central popular attitudes that unified the two Germanys through culture-based notions of German identity.\textsuperscript{458} Unification meant reconciling with fellow Germans caught on the other side of the Iron Curtain first and then integrating into a wider Europe second. The price for West European acquiescence to Germany’s policies toward Eastern Europe and unification was a commitment from Kohl that the German economy could bear most of the costs associated with integration in the East.\textsuperscript{459} This type of ‘checkbook diplomacy’ allowed Kohl and other West German elites to seize upon the opportunity to expand integration, signaling to the rest of Europe that Germany was ready to settle down and lead Europe toward the type of integration that would make the possibility of German aggression unthinkable.\textsuperscript{460} German efforts to integrate Eastern Europe resembled the Copenhagen Criteria, a list of institutions and commitments to human rights, democracy, and free markets that would allow a country to join the European Union.

A new more “European” German identity and self-restraint is probably best characterized by looking at European financial institutions that were almost exclusively located in Germany. The Bundesbank, affectionately known as “Buba,” was in charge of controlling currency rates, all of which were pinned on the robust Deutsche Mark.

\textsuperscript{457} Palmowski, 2008, p. 554
\textsuperscript{458} Palmowski, 2008, p. 255
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural adjustment funds, the lifeblood of integration, were all underwritten by Germany and sourced directly from Buba. Without German underwriting of the Single European Act the funding promises that lured states like Ireland, Portugal and Greece into the EC could never have been made. In short, Europe would not be “Europe” as we know it today without German generosity.

Maastricht Treaty (1992)

German unification and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe set off a flurry of diplomatic action in Europe, most originating in Germany itself. Eurobarometer public opinion surveys conducted in the run up to the February 7, 1992 Maastricht Treaty revealed that most Europeans in smaller states were weary of larger states, especially Germany. Most respondents also indicated that they were in favor of the upcoming Maastricht Treaty that would transform the EC into a more comprehensive European Union. Helmut Kohl, nevertheless, pushed Germans hard for integration in the run up to Maastricht, arguing that without the economic power of the new united Germany would be limited. A united Germany already exerted enormous economic power and with that came equally enormous political influence.

The fragility of the new, less threatening German identity was challenged immediately when, in 1992, a group of Neo-Nazis murdered three Turkish Germans by

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462 Anderson, 2005, pp. 77-96
465 “…And the German Question.” (1992, March 6). Christian Science Monitor
setting their house on fire in the German community of Mölln. Bystanders to the event never attempted to help their fellow German citizens inside, raising suspicion abroad that Germans would remain complicit to racially motivated violence. The appearance of anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany drew an immediate response from the government as Chancellor Kohl outlawed Neo-Nazi groups and moved to reassure the international community, specifically Turkey and Israel, that these actions did not represent the new German identity. While there was measurable public outrage toward the actions of NeoNazis by the German public, it did little to soothe the turning tide of public opinion against a unified Germany. For example Horst Harnischfeger, the director of the Goethe Institute, a center for German culture and language abroad said in response: “We have to tell those students coming to Germany that we can no longer guarantee their safety.”

At this point in the integrative story there appeared to be a few good choices for Chancellor Kohl. On one hand, Kohl was attempting to reassure Europe that Germany had changed and changed for the better, but at home there was a chilling wave of Neo-Nazi violence that could only undermine his message. On the other hand Kohl had to convince the German public that their interests lay in an integrated Europe with a strong but peaceful Germany. One action that Kohl did take was reforming citizenship laws to be more inclusive of foreigners and asylum seekers, thus blunting some of the criticisms

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468 Keifer, 1992, p. 7
by other European states that Germany had xenophobic citizenship laws.\textsuperscript{470} This also had the effect of setting the table, at least in Germany, for freedom of movement reforms that would become the norm under the evolving legal architecture of the EU. Critics argued that simply changing laws may not be enough to create new conceptions of citizenship because they ignored the more psychological aspect of using culture and language to create a sense of belonging, meaning in the German case that no amount of paperwork can make you look or sound German.\textsuperscript{471}

One strategy was to minimize what was ‘bad’ about German culture and emphasize what was ‘good’; Chancellor Kohl and his party the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) created the notion of a ‘lead culture’ that did more or less that.\textsuperscript{472} Kohl and the CDU sought to emphasize German industriousness, quality, and democracy, but along with these values Kohl and the CDU also began to emphasize German values that had something in common with broader ‘European values’ such as laicism and enlightenment.\textsuperscript{473} One could see this in German laws that limited popular referenda and limited the use of Nazi symbols or speech. Perhaps the antidote for Germany’s identity problems might be nesting the German identity into a broader more acceptable pan-European identity.

As Kohl tried to coax German identity toward Europe he also made concessions, placing stronger requirements on incoming immigrants who wish to become citizens

\textsuperscript{472} Palmoski, 2008
\textsuperscript{473} \textit{Ibid.}
including learning German in order to meet his critics halfway. Meanwhile German foreign policy minimized national interests while attempting to coordinate deeper integration, advocating European solutions to problems while rarely discussing their own desires for fear of being labeled re-assertive nationalists. Nevertheless after the social unrest, nativist backlash and Neo-Nazi episodes, the question lingered of how a united Germany would behave in Europe. The German government began a campaign, which included highlighting Kohl’s efforts to find congruency between German and European values in an effort to reassure their neighbors (especially France) that during partition they had indeed experienced a profound change. This campaign in conjunction with Germany’s considerable economic power and the Single European Act (SEA) had made Germany, in the words of Jeffrey J. Anderson, an “economic giant, but a diplomatic dwarf.”

To be clear, German elites and not necessarily Germany were advocating EU integration. Public opinion data from the late 1980s and 1990s shows somewhat strong support for the EU. One particular point of contention for Germans was financial integration. Germans were uncomfortable with turning over financial institutions to the EU. Only 47% of Germans favored a EU central bank and only 39% wanted a common

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476 Anderson, 2006
477 Ibid.
currency, instead arguing that the Deutschemark was superior to any common currency.  

According to Jan Palmowski, one area that played a role in moderating German national identity during the early integrative process was collective guilt. Despite German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel’s statement in 1996 before the American Jewish Committee that there was no longer a sense of collective guilt in Germany, there was. The flare-ups of Neo-Nazism after reunification highlighted the fact that many in Germany had not come to terms with the generational guilt that still simmered more than 50 years after World War II. Overcoming this to many German elites meant couching German identity in the terms of European values which would be cosmopolitan and pluralistic.

German elites compromised on almost every front, from the UN to NATO, all in an effort to build a robust European compact while reassuring their neighbors that they had indeed reformed their ways. At the same time, the German public and elites began to chafe at the notion that Germany could still not be trusted. The general feeling amongst German elites was that they truly wanted what was good for Europe but they

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480 Palmowski, 2008, p. 558
481 “No Collective Guilt for Atrocities, Says German Foreign Minister” (1996, May 9) Deutsche Presse-Agentur
483 Palmowsky, 2008
484 Ibid.
485 Ibid.
also had to defend their motives and stand up for German interests, “but their elbows
must not get too sharp!”  

Criticisms and suspicions leveled at Germany during the run up to the SEA were
blunted to some extent by the simultaneous process of integrating East and West
Germany. On the other hand a more coherent united Germany was facing criticisms that
it was attempting to Germanize Europe.  

Immediately, German leaders responded, echoing German Nobel Laureate Thomas Mann who in 1929 wrote, “[w]e do not want a
German Europe, but a European Germany.”  

German elites had plenty of accomplishments to point to including the democratic integration of Germany during
reunification as well as Germany’s commitment to democratic norms in the creation of a
united Europe.  

There seemed to be an attempt to construe German priorities as concurrent with the priorities of Europe.

Polling of German executives in 1992 showed that even amongst the economic
elite, 92% said that German economic policy was not aimed at creating German
hegemony in Europe, but making Europe stronger overall.  

The German public showed consistently high levels of support for using international institutions to create EU policy,
sometimes in lieu of the German legislative process.  

Such unabashed cosmopolitanism in hindsight showed that in order to combat the “great clouds” of their history, Germans
began to nest their identity within the broader European context.  

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486 “…And the German Question.” (1992, March 6). Christian Science Monitor
487 Curley, 2009, p. 658
488 Ash, Timothy Garton “Is Britain European?” in International Affairs (Vol. 77, No. 1, 2001)
489 Ash, 2001, p. 358
490 “…And the German Question.” (1992, March 6). Christian Science Monitor
491 Anderson, 2005, p. 658
492 Curley, 2009, p. 658
described it best when he implied that German unity and European unity were “two sides of the same coin.”

It was clear that convincing the rest of Europe that Germany was indeed earnest in its intentions to promote pan-European unity meant taking an active role in the creation of robust European institutions.

Chancellor Kohl, along with French President Francois Mitterrand, ruled out failure to come to an agreement at Maastricht saying, “[j]udging from the present stage of the negotiations, I see no reason whatsoever to worry that things might come to such a pass.”

Both Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand underlined that the “decisive achievement of Maastricht must be to take an irreversible step towards union.”

Such a deep commitment from Germany served an important purpose: it locked Germany into a supranational community that enabled all of Europe to grow together.

While other states looked to lock Germany in, Kohl believed that German leadership, in creating the European Union, would satisfy the precondition for acceptance of Germany as a major international player once again.

Nevertheless, Germany still had its critics. Some European elites still considered the German Question to be unanswered. One common argument was that even though Germany advanced an agenda that it believed was good for Europe it did so by using its hegemony.

From the German perspective, however, the criticism is unfair. If Germany looks out for its best interests then it is using its hegemony, if it advocates for

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493 Banchoff, 1997, p. 64
495 Ibid.
498 “…And the German Question.” (1992, March 6). Christian Science Monitor
Europe it is being hegemonic, if it sits idle it is failing to lead. Some British elites began to insist that if Maastricht was not fruitful, Germany would take on the conservative identity that would lead to neo-Nazism and race riots. As ridiculous as these statements were, there was a sense amongst European leaders that it is best to take advantage of Germany’s willingness to be integrated into a supranational community of states; that is, of course, before Germany changed its mind.

As the Maastricht conference approached, German public opinion on the desire to integrate flattened out and began to more closely resemble the British position of advocating for a “looser arrangement” of European states. German perceptions of economic benefit from joining the EU also dipped to around 44 percent, down from 56 percent just a few years earlier. At the same time, new French President Jacques Chirac began to waiver, arguing that “Enlargement leads to a European union of countries whose cultures, standards of living and economic and social problems are very different. If you do not want the union to break down or reduce to the level of the lowest common denominator, you must have a system for certain countries to show the way ahead.” German elites including Chancellor Kohl believed that their efforts in Maastricht could do just that.

Internally, Germany was still putting the pieces back together in terms of creating a united German identity. The chasm between former East and West Germany in terms

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500 Rees-Mogg, William. (1992, June 8). Let’s Turn to Germany for a Deal on Europe. The Independent.
of values and norms was much bigger than previously thought.\textsuperscript{504} There was also a chasm between German elites who wanted to unify Germany under a common flag of European German unity and the German public that was still coming to terms with reunification. Seeing that small-scale unrest between east and west was threatening the narrative of benevolence that Kohl and his contemporaries worked so hard to create. Kohl doubled his efforts to contain Germany within larger European structures and counted the days until Maastricht.\textsuperscript{505}

There was a certain amount of backlash emanating from former West German Länder who were unhappy about subsidizing the newly created Länder to the East. According to Liesbet Hooghe, West German Länder joined other wealthy states and voiced their disapproval on the increase in the EC budget ceiling in order to pay for Maastricht’s cohesion policy; eastern Länder however desperately needed these funds.\textsuperscript{506} The new Länder launched a campaign to drive the budget higher, believing that the cohesion funds they were already receiving were inadequate. They wanted Objective 1 status like Portugal, Greece, or Scotland, which would entitle them to more rural structural funding. This move drew criticism not only from Brussels but from Bonn as well. The former West Germans felt like the new Länder were attempting to use their status as Germans to get more money. The west regarded this as clumsy at best, dishonest at worst, and the fissures between the east and west became more apparent.\textsuperscript{507} Just as Chancellor Kohl’s efforts to sell integration to the EC and his public looked to

\textsuperscript{505} Joffe, 1994
\textsuperscript{506} Hooghe, 2003, p. 181
\textsuperscript{507} Ibid., 182
bear fruit, a new fissure amongst his population threatened to derail the process.\textsuperscript{508} This evidence suggests that Kohl had not mastered the German narrative and that major gaps still existed between what the EC wanted and what the German people wanted or thought was fair.

On December 9, 1991, the conference at Maastricht commenced and produced a document that would fuse the EC together into the European Union and created provisions to turn the EMU into the Euro. The Maastricht Treaty was officially signed in February of 1992 and sent to the states for ratification. Almost immediately Denmark rejected the treaty and the ripple effects quickly washed over an increasingly uneasy German population. Former West Germans had held large worker strikes protesting the higher taxes and costs associated with East German modernization.\textsuperscript{509} The perception that German funds would now be flowing out of the country to develop other European states sent some Germans over the edge. In particular, the perception that France would be fleecing adjustment funds from the German coffers struck a chord.\textsuperscript{510} For Germans it was one thing to subsidize East Germans, painful as it was, but a different thing entirely to subsidize French agriculture or the Greek tobacco industry.\textsuperscript{511}

German politician Manfred Brunner filed suit in German courts seeking to declare Maastricht unconstitutional. Brunner argued that it not only undermined German sovereignty, but also that German obligations under Maastricht were unfair.\textsuperscript{512} Brunner was attempting to score political points with those Germans who felt that Maastricht was

\textsuperscript{508} Johnson & Doughty, 1992.
\textsuperscript{509} Johnson & Doughty, 1992
\textsuperscript{510} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{511} Ibid.
a “pan-European madness.”  Unfortunately for Brunner, who was from the more conservative region of Bavaria, few supported him. His own party (the FDP) immediately called for him to drop his complaint in the court, especially in lieu of the upcoming elections. This kind of political theatre took place just in time to keep Chancellor Kohl’s efforts to promote integration from floundering, both from within Germany and amongst the EC members.

There was a realization amongst former West Germans that with the demise of the EMU a new European currency would soon replace their valued Mark. The magnitude of Maastricht kept testing the willingness of the German public to integrate. Maastricht was also testing the political prowess of Chancellor Kohl and his party to keep integration alive. Making his job harder was the fact that Germans were not given a chance to vote on whether to accept Maastricht. On the issue of the Euro alone public opinion polls suggested that Germans would vote against it by a margin of 70 percent if they had the opportunity.  One high-ranking political observer in Bonn suggested that “[m]ost Germans believe we already have a united Europe and they want to know what is in it for the Germans if further integration goes ahead. They certainly do not want to give up the D-mark, which they see as a symbol of Germany's economic miracle after the war.”

Again, the distance between pro-Europe political elites and the German masses became apparent. German financial authorities especially, at Buba, did not seem concerned about upcoming transition to a common currency. Sentiment about the role the Mark had played in rehabilitating German legitimacy seemed lost on economic and

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515 Doughty, 2003  
516 Johnson & Doughty, 1992
political officials and this only fueled feelings of enmity toward the government in Bonn. The unspoken deal at the outset of European integration in the 1957 Treaty of Rome was that France would open its protected markets to German goods if Germany would finance the restructuring of the French economy.\textsuperscript{517} In 1992, many German elites believed that the common currency was the only way to ensure that the virtuous circle created in 1957 could be shared with the rest of Europe.\textsuperscript{518} It was clear that Kohl and his cohorts were taking the unpopular long view on the benefits of integration. The question that remained: could they survive the backlash?

Time may not heal all wounds but it can create a period of reflection; in this case it led to a cooling of anti-Maastricht rhetoric. There was a sober realization amongst the German public that Maastricht would lead to huge systemic changes and perhaps, one day, even the loss of their dear Mark. Josef Joffe, a leading expert on Germany, argued that some of the extreme neo-nationalist rhetoric reminded most Germans of how far they had come and that their new national narrative was ensconced in their ability to be good Europeans.\textsuperscript{519} This reasoning would seemingly promote the argument that joining the EU is in Germany’s economic interest.

If Germany were going to lose its Mark, one day it would thoroughly control the process of coming up with something new. The truth was that no other financial institutions in Europe could handle the task of monetary integration like Germany’s Bundesbank. German policy makers and economic experts were almost fully in control of the upcoming policy shifts associated with the Eurozone and Buba had become

\textsuperscript{517} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{518} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{519} Joffe, 1994
Europe’s defacto central bank.\textsuperscript{520} Surveying the economic landscape, Germany
determined that the pan-European financial merger should be rigid, not flexible, and their
standards were absolute.\textsuperscript{521}

**Amsterdam Treaty (1997)**

In 1998 Helmut Kohl was named an Honorary Citizen of Europe by the European
Heads of State for his efforts to ensure that European integration went forward.\textsuperscript{522} The
award was one of the last things that Kohl would win however as he was soundly
defeated in 1998 by the Minister-President of Lower Saxony, Gerhard Schröder. Before
Kohl left, however, he oversaw the formation of the Amsterdam treaty, which modified
Maastricht in a number of significant ways. Amsterdam gave more power to the
European Parliament, liberalized employment policies and created new foundations for a
European system of security and justice. All of these policy planks represent functional
spillovers from institutions into a broader Europe.

In 1997 during Kohl’s final year he got some help in deflecting the tired old French
suspicions of German hegemony, this time from the British. Prime Minister Tony Blair
said that “warm and strong relations” between Britain and German were not only in the
best interests of the two countries, but in the interests of Europe as well.\textsuperscript{523} Blair
reaffirmed the German desire to offer the benefits of integration to Eastern Europe,
especially Poland. For Kohl, the Amsterdam Treaty represented a fuller and richer vision
of European integration where Germany was not only a leader, but it was also an

\textsuperscript{520} Heisenberg, Dorothee. “From Single Market to Single Currency” in Desmond Dinan *Origins and
\textsuperscript{521} Dinan, 2006, p. 242
\textsuperscript{522} The only other recipient of this award was Jean Monnet.
\textsuperscript{523} “Blair and Kohl Stress Their Close Ties for the Good of Europe” (1997, June 6) *Deutsche
Presse-Agentur*
opportunity to definitively refute the stereotypes about German identity that he and his fellow Germans had worked so hard to defy.

The election of Gerhard Schröder, however, signaled that German identity might not be leading toward the EU and Europe. From Adenauer to Kohl, most German leaders attempted to ‘Europeanize’ German attitudes and values, but once the Berlin Wall came down it was apparent that Germany still had a long way to go in terms of creating consensus within its borders. Conflicts between East and West were to be expected, but conflicts between Bavarians and Berliners, for example, were different. History is important in identity formation, and most of German identity formation has been local, fragmented and full of conflict between regions. There still exists in Germany strong Prussian identities that are different from Saxon or Bavarian identities; there are even significant linguistic differences. But the work that German elites had undertaken to soften the German identity and then embed it in the surrounding European context had made it possible for Germany to rehabilitate its image.

A look at the 1998 election that led to Kohl’s ouster is telling. Kohl argued that Germany needed to keep the costs of Germany’s contributions to the EU down, often citing that Germany provided 70 percent of the EU’s funding. Both the Green Party and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) successfully argued that Germany’s contributions to the EU had swelled under 16 years of Kohl’s leadership and this resonated with

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524 Katzenstein, Peter. Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1997)
527 Mitchell, Judson “German Foreign policy after Kohl” in the Mediterranean Quarterly (Vol. 10, No. 2, 1999)
publics in the wealthier Länder. Furthermore by 1998 only 39 percent of Germans thought that they were benefitting from EU membership. A plurality of those surveyed (33 percent) even said that they would be indifferent if the EU were scrapped, perhaps indicating that they were growing tired of contributing so much to the EU, reforming their image, and getting less and less in return.

The Greens and SPD worked in concert with one another forming the Red-Green coalition tapping into many working class fears that integration may actually work against German national interests. Perhaps the most sensitive issues were the EU’s adoption of the single currency and Amsterdam’s new rules on immigration. The SPD draws its support quite heavily from the working class who was not only stone cold on the notion of giving up the Mark but also stood to lose out from cheaper imported labor that many thought likely under Amsterdam’s more liberal immigration policies. Kohl had labored to produce a Germany less reliant on the welfare state, more open to immigrants, and more economically competitive with the rest of Europe, and open to NATO expansion, but by the 1998 election cycle Germans were apparently having second thoughts.

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528 Mitchell, Judson “German Foreign policy after Kohl” in the Mediterranean Quarterly (Vol. 10, No. 2, 1999)
530 Ibid.
532 Mitchell, Judson “German Foreign policy after Kohl” in the Mediterranean Quarterly (Vol. 10, No. 2, 1999)
533 Ibid.
The 1998 election was really a watershed moment for Germany as the prevailing Red-Green coalition reflected a generational shift in German politics. The Red-Green supporters tended to be younger, born after the World War II and less interested in the politics of guilt. The newest generation of voters were much more likely to delve into Germany’s history confronting their shameful past and remembering the victims of Nazi repression. But this also had a liberating effect on younger Germans as if confronting and denouncing their past made it acceptable to complain about the new waves of immigrants and the perception that they might destroy the German welfare state.

In lieu of the upcoming Amsterdam concessions on immigration as well as the jump in immigration and asylum seeking within German boarders, the Red-Green coalition campaigned on reworking Germany’s citizenship laws to preclude things like dual citizenship. Feeding off the energy of post-Maastricht backlash, the Red-Green coalition railed against EU laws that essentially forced Germany to allow resident aliens the right to vote in local elections.

One of the main components of Amsterdam was ensuring a freer movement of people across Europe, and Germany was a land of opportunity for skilled laborers. Germans began to think seriously about redefining themselves in terms of institutions and physical boundaries when confronted with the influx of foreign workers from Turkey,

534 Palmowski, 2009
535 Judson, 1999
536 “Atoning for Germany’s Past: First the Victims Were Remembered, Now the Perpetrators” (2004, August 14) The Economist
537 Ibid.
538 Palmowski, 2009
Greece, and Poland. Great anxieties dominated the conversation in Germany when many of these immigrants formed their own communities in Germany and did not learn to speak the language or culture of their host country. The Red-Green response, which was to try and protect German workers, directly challenged the claim by some more sanguine pro-EU elites that a sense of transnational or supranational identity was supplanting local identities.

Germans in the west were becoming weary at the prospect of permanently propping up the unification costs, increased welfare costs, and structural adjustment funds for the east in addition to their EU obligations. Anxieties over the probability of losing the Deutsch Mark along with the mandated changes in immigration and employment policy that Amsterdam would bring caused more Germans to believe that the EU was not benefiting them at all. At the same time, the number of Germans who felt that EU membership was a “good thing” was also down to a record low, hovering somewhere below forty percent from 1996 until 1999. Dissatisfaction with integration

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540 Klopp, 2002
542 Nor, 2001
544 Eurobarometer data from 1996 to 1999 shows that more Germans (on average about 45%) believed that the EU was not benefitting Germany while roughly 35% believed that Germany was benefitting from integration. Before Amsterdam there was a feeling that Germany was benefitting more that it was losing out in the EU.
cast a shadow on Kohl leading to his defeat, but Schröder would be hard pressed to maintain Germany’s place in Europe while also dealing with the sour mood in the homeland. Germans were finally asking what it meant to be German, how did they see themselves in relation to the rest of Europe? For the first time in their history Germans were united, their territorial anxieties fulfilled, and their place as a first among equals in Europe assured; why were they still having identity problems?\textsuperscript{546}

Amsterdam moved forward, deepening integration and solidifying Germany’s place at the heart of Europe. Both Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder advocated for continuing the EMU, strengthening the European Parliament, and moving closer toward a pan-European foreign policy.\textsuperscript{547} Ultimately the divide between German elites and the public widened. The plethora of German identities was being forced to not only reconcile with themselves but also the new generation of immigrants who were seeking economic opportunity in Germany. The long and evolving discussion of what it meant to be German was one that would continue into the twenty first century.

Schröder’s approach to Amsterdam was to demand more sovereignty from states and expand institutionalization of Europe.\textsuperscript{548} While this might seem at odds with the general mood of under appreciation in Germany, Schröder took up the mantle of his predecessor. Schröder also realized that with the impending addition of Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, the fulcrum of power in Europe would soon reside in

\textsuperscript{546} Stuart, Gisela. (2000, July 12). “Germans Must Think About Redefining Themselves.” \textit{The Independent}.

\textsuperscript{547} Anderson, 2005, p. 80

\textsuperscript{548} Vincour, John. (2001, February 1). “Germany Seeks a Stance of Moderation in Europe.” \textit{International Herald Tribune}.
Germany any way.\textsuperscript{549} French suspicions again came to the fore, but with British and American support of German regional hegemony, France had little choice but to accept German ascension in Europe. This move did, however, leave Chancellor Schröder in the awkward position of balancing the identity politics that ushered him to power with Germany’s broader economic and European interests.

**Nice Treaty (2001)**

The German approach to European integration was paying dividends. Staunch commitments to driving integration further as well as the desire to drive it east was reassuring Germany’s neighbors but also quietly granting Germany a degree of institutional hegemony within the EU.\textsuperscript{550} Germany’s relationship with France however, was strained once again when Jacques Chirac demanded voting parity in the European Parliament under Nice despite Germany’s larger population.\textsuperscript{551} French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine attacked the German position that the EU should develop into a federal system like the one that exists in Germany by stating that Joschka Fischer, his counterpart, was “a pied piper whose federal tunes were leading Europe to cruel disappointment.”\textsuperscript{552} Nevertheless the Nice Treaty was being written not only to adjust representation in the European Parliament but also to expand membership to East European states. The German solution to managing a larger EU was to federalize it, much like the Länder system.

\textsuperscript{549} Vincour, 2001  
\textsuperscript{550} Mazzucelli, Guèrot, & Metz, 2007  
It is not clear whether France had legitimate reasons for opposing Germany’s proposal or whether they were doing it simply to reassert parity with their occasional strategic partner, but their objections led to serious discussions between French and German officials in the writing of the Nice Treaty. President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder met for a series of strategy sessions where the marriage of convenience that had petered out at the conclusion of the cold war was reinvigorated.\textsuperscript{553} Germany still needed France because its own economic and domestic troubles put its leadership in a vulnerable state, whereas French President Chirac’s executive power allowed him to negotiate from a much stronger position.\textsuperscript{554} The result of this temporary arrangement was that the French and British desire to see integration progress from a sovereign and not federal perspective won the day.\textsuperscript{555}

Negotiations surrounding the Nice Treaty would lay bare another harsh truth for both France and Germany: their days of controlling integration and the EU by themselves were coming to an end.\textsuperscript{556} Reconfiguring the number of representatives in the European Parliament gave France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy the same number of votes despite Germany’s larger population.\textsuperscript{557} This outcome came despite Herr Schröder’s attempt to secure more votes (33) than any other single country.\textsuperscript{558} From the German perspective they had ceded so much of their power to make “Europe” work and when it came to democratic representation based on population they felt that no one was willing

\textsuperscript{553} Bremner, 2002
\textsuperscript{554} Mazzucelli, Guèrot, & Metz, 2007
\textsuperscript{555} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{556} Bremner, 2002
\textsuperscript{557} All of these countries were given 29 votes despite the fact that German population was around 82 million and the second closest the UK had 59 milion.
to acknowledge what they had given up in order to be a part of the wider community.\textsuperscript{559} Schröder said, “I cannot accept a weighting of votes that will give Spain, or later Poland as many votes as Germany, which has double the number of citizens.” “That is not acceptable, everything will unravel.”\textsuperscript{560}

The German position in Nice was a tenable one; they argued that votes should be roughly based on population. In reality, Chancellor Schröder did not have history on his side as President Chirac reminded him of Adenauer’s proclamations that any movement away from French-German parity would be disastrous for Europe.\textsuperscript{561} German demands for more power were in many ways new. Schröder felt that constant German concessions on the big issues and their willingness to bankroll European development, particularly French development had bought them the right to ask for more.\textsuperscript{562} According to The Economist, Schröder was forced to back down because demanding outright institutional hegemony was inconsistent with what many German elites considered their role in the EU.\textsuperscript{563} The outcome of negotiations left the German feeling unappreciated while the French claimed that the real winner was Germany itself.\textsuperscript{564} Germany smarted at the French claims and it quickly became apparent that whatever relationship existed between France and Germany at the dawn of the new millennium, it would not be enough to drive the future of Europe alone.

According to Thomas Banchoff, Chancellor Schröder and his government were concerned with German foreign policy and the structuring of the EU while his public had

\begin{footnotes}
\item[559] Boyes, 2000
\item[560] Ibid.
\item[562] Vincour, 2000
\item[563] “So That’s All Agreed, Then.” (2000, December 16). The Economist
\item[564] “So That’s All Agreed, Then.” (2000, December 16). The Economist
\end{footnotes}
turned inward and began to brood over domestic issues.\textsuperscript{565} The complex structure of the EU and its deeper presence in German life was beginning to test the patience of German citizens.\textsuperscript{566} In the late 1990s the Euro (which was not yet in circulation) took a hit against the soaring Dollar.\textsuperscript{567} The feeling amongst many middle class Germans was that the Euro might be good for industry, but for the individual it was sure to drive up prices and make life more difficult.\textsuperscript{568} The Euro quickly became the scapegoat for Germany’s economic struggles. Some commentators believed that the Euro would set back German exports more than 18 months while others argued that the new currency could not live up to the high standards set by the Mark.\textsuperscript{569}

For all of the concern over the Euro being a bust, the German government took great pains to remind its public that the European Central Bank, which oversaw the Euro, was in Frankfurt after all, and the standards that had made the Mark so successful were being used to guide the new currency. The reaction was puzzling. According to Roger Boyes, the German correspondent for \textit{The Times}, two thirds of Germans were against the Euro but reluctantly accepted it as a political necessity.\textsuperscript{570} In a pattern that would become fairly common, Germans would approach the more intrusive parts of integration with great antipathy but odd acceptance. The Euro would be no different.\textsuperscript{571} Ever since World War II Germans citizens were sold a pan-European identity by their leaders that (at least in the west) emphasized accepting outcomes contrary to German interests ‘in a European

\textsuperscript{565} Banchoff, 1999
\textsuperscript{566} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{568} Andrews, 2001
\textsuperscript{569} Hall, Allan. (2000, October 30). Germans Start Legal Bid to Drop the Euro. \textit{The Scotsman}.  
\textsuperscript{570} Boyes, Roger. (2001, November 21). Germans Award Low Marks to the Euro. \textit{The Times}. 
\textsuperscript{571} “Germans Feel Impact of Euro’s Fall”. (2000, September 25) Deutsche Presse-Agentur
spirit’ despite having more people and more money.\textsuperscript{572} It didn’t matter to most Germans that their banks were the best, or that they were leading the charge for the Euro; from their perspective there was never any guarantee that leadership equated to positive outcomes. Frustrations with Germany’s place in the EU led many citizens to try and strengthen their Länder within the German federal system and wrest power from both Berlin and Brussels.\textsuperscript{573}

Nevertheless the national narrative remained fixed and Germans overall were divided and still guilt-ridden.\textsuperscript{574} There was a deficit of dignity and pride in Germany; even Chancellor Schröder refused to use the words “proud German” aloud because “it could be misunderstood.”\textsuperscript{575} German collective memory and guilt again showed inconsistencies along generational lines. After World War II in West Germany there was a saying ‘Bonn ist nicht Weimar’ meaning that the new West German capitol rejected the historical legacy of Germany’s Nazi past.\textsuperscript{576} The younger supporters of the Red-Green coalition whose members themselves were young challenged the conventional wisdom of the German past by exploring whether ‘Berlin ist nicht Bonn?’\textsuperscript{577}

The Red-Green coalition was successful in knocking off Kohl because it began to ask questions about the nature of Germany that seemed off limits before, but one question above all needed asking: when will Germany be a normal state?\textsuperscript{578} Chancellor Schröder’s position on the relevance of German collective memory seemed to be recognizing the

\textsuperscript{572} Hall, 2000
\textsuperscript{573} Fulbrook, 2009
\textsuperscript{575} Binder, 2002
\textsuperscript{576} Wittlinger, Ruth & Larose, Martin 2007. 'No Future for Germany's Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy'. \textit{German Politics} 16(4): 481-495
\textsuperscript{577} Ibid.
Holocaust, and the sins of Nazi Germany, building memorials thus creating the opportunity to open a new chapter of German history that would allow Germany itself to pursue its own self-interests in a more uninhibited way.\textsuperscript{579} This can certainly be seen in Schröder’s approach to negotiating with France over Nice by asking for more representation for Germany; but it can also be seen in the public’s response to the prospects of having to sacrifice more for Europe. Germans also seemed to feel justified in their pursuing their own interests in part because they believed that their rejection of militarism should be enough to put their neighbors at ease.\textsuperscript{580} Many Red-Green supporters believed that Chancellor Schröder’s opposition to the Iraq war for instance could provide the political cover to be more aggressive diplomatically in Europe.\textsuperscript{581}

Nevertheless integration was proceeding and Germans would be forced to make concessions that left many pessimistic despite the apparent renaissance of the Volk. Added to this pessimism was the loss of the only symbol of post-war success and pride the D-Mark.\textsuperscript{582} Their efforts constantly questioned by their neighbors and their few symbols of national pride threatened, most Germans felt maligned by the very system they had sacrificed so much to create.\textsuperscript{583} There were a number of attempts to challenge the legality of the Euro in the German court system but to no avail.\textsuperscript{584} Germans put off converting their currency and braced for the inflation that they thought was certain to come when their currency was thrown into the pot along with the Lira, the Franc, and

\textsuperscript{579} Wittlinger, Ruth & Larose, Martin 2007. 'No Future for Germany's Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy'. German Politics 16(4): 481-495
\textsuperscript{580} Wittlinger, Ruth & Larose, Martin 2007. 'No Future for Germany's Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy'. German Politics 16(4): 481-495
\textsuperscript{581} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{582} Andrews & Erlanger, 2001
\textsuperscript{583} Boyes, 2001
\textsuperscript{584} Hall, 2000
other less stable currencies. Buba’s offer to enshrine the D-Mark in a new museum offered little comfort to those who regarded the new Euro bills and coins as gaudy reminders that Germany was perpetually at the mercy of countries that were poorer and smaller than itself. In interviews with reporters at during the final days of the transition to the Euro many German citizens felt that the Deutsche Mark had exemplified the struggle of the German people to build something positive and virtuous out of the rubble that Hitler had left behind.

The decision to go forward with the Euro was symbolic of the notion that the ‘European German’ narrative had successfully suppressed its competitive drive. According to available Eurobarometer data taken in the run-up to Maastricht and through the Nice Treaty, Germans did not want to give up the D-Mark. After Germany rehabilitated itself however, there are questions amongst the public about what commitments outside of the German national interest they should maintain.

**EU Constitution (2004)**

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) also known as the European Constitution promised what German leaders had been seeking for the past half decade, namely a “United Europe.” The TCE was an attempt by the EU to institutionalize the integration that they had cobbled together through the series of treaties

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585 Boyes, 2001  
586 Ibid  
589 Wittlinger, Ruth & Larose, Martin 2007. ‘No Future for Germany's Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy’. *German Politics* 16(4): 481-495
signed up to that point. The TCE finalized in Rome in 2004 under the Irish Presidency before it was sent out to EU member states. Germany forbade public referenda so the act of ratification would have to happen in the German legislature. That proved a simple task as the lower house (Bundestag) ratified it 569 in favor to 23 against and the upper house (Bundesrat) voted 66 to zero in favor. Nevertheless Chancellor Schröder made it clear in a battle over the costs of the proposed Constitution that Germany was growing weary of being the biggest net contributor to the EU budget and the biggest net loser when it came to receiving benefits from the EU.590

The German public cautiously endorsed the idea of a EU constitution with a fragile sixty percent approval rating in 2004.591 On the question of continued expansion and the inclusion of other states in the EU, Germany ranked second from the bottom with only thirty six percent willing to open the EU to more countries.592 The message was clear: Germans might be willing to go along with more integration, but they were no longer willing to subsidize the expansion of Europe. When it came to the ratification of the TCE the German public had little to no input anyway, the process of integration was largely out of their hands and the friction between public opinion and elite actions was starting to show.

One of the leaders who had fought hard to stave off opposition to the EU constitution in the Parliament was Angela Merkel. Leading a coalition of the more conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) and the SDP, Merkel was able to break up the

592 Ibid.
Red-Green coalition in late 2005 and was intent on pushing integration forward.\textsuperscript{593} What is remarkable is that no matter which party assumes power in Germany, each Chancellor focuses on consensus building in furthering European integration, even if their approaches and public rhetoric differed. One of Merkel’s major challenges was to bring along Bavaria, the wealthy southern Länder whose population were becoming more and more suspicious of Brussels.\textsuperscript{594} Despite a larger free market and more access to it some wealthy Germans actually turned on EU integration. A paltry 40 percent of Germans had a positive view of the EU.\textsuperscript{595} Anger had begun to grow over the possibility of EU regulations that would not only threaten Bavaria’s growing electric car industry but also the possibility of the EU welcoming Turkey as a member state, a move that Merkel had indirectly endorsed.\textsuperscript{596}

Optimism that had initially existed concerning the EU constitution was beginning to fade as Germany took the EU presidency in the beginning of 2007. The German delegation made it clear that they wanted to secure ratification of the EU constitution by following a comprehensive “road map.”\textsuperscript{597} German leaders were attempting to get out in front of the upcoming referenda in the Netherlands and France, fearing that a French “no” vote would be catastrophic to their efforts.\textsuperscript{598} Chancellor Merkel however was being openly criticized by other EU states for what they perceived as a democratic deficit, but Merkel promptly replied ”This is one of the things that cannot be done out in the open on

\textsuperscript{593} Dempsey, 2005
\textsuperscript{594} Dempsey, 2005
\textsuperscript{596} Dempsey, 2005, p. 3
\textsuperscript{598} “If France Says no to EU…”[Opinion] (2005, April 23) \textit{The Irish Times} p. 13
the market square.” This type of pronouncement might have worked in Germany but it alienated other states that thought German might be making a power play. To counter this several MEP’s, including a prominent Dutch euroskeptic Jens-Peter Bonde, called for a public pan-European referendum on the European Constitution, derailing the German desire to fast track the constitution and speed up the integration process. Surprise defeats of the TCE in the Netherlands and in France brought the process to a dead halt and forced Merkel and the Germans to rethink their strategy in forging a lasting constitutional arrangement.

By 2007 support for a constitution in Germany had surprisingly jumped to seventy-two percent. Yet, the support also coincided with the improvement of the German economy. German attitudes were tied more directly to what was happening domestically and not in the EU. With a better public mood, Chancellor Merkel set out to rescue the EU constitution from total collapse. This time Berlin sought to revive the EU constitution that could be voted on by national legislatures, avoiding the referendum process all together. Germany wanted to have another vote on the Constitution by 2009, but there were rumblings that going ahead with this plan would reinforce the negative perception that the EU had a pronounced democratic deficit. Berlin did have

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601 Buenderman, 2007
604 Ibid.
606 Cecie, 2007
a point however; if the provisions in the TCE could be reconsidered in the form of another integration treaty then it would make sense to bypass the public. This approach had mirrored Germany’s own method when it came to integration but the strange permissiveness of the German public when it came to integration did not exist in every country.


Showing leadership in integration, Germany hosted the celebration of the 50\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of the Rome Treaty in the summer of 2007. Out of the celebration came the Berlin Declaration in which all of the EU member states agreed to have a treaty ready before 2009 Parliamentary elections. Chancellor Merkel led the negotiation process that crafted the new reform treaty. In late 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed and sent to the EU states for ratification. Lisbon was a further amendment to Maastricht that sought to incorporate many of the important changes the TCE would have made, but this time it would not go to a public referendum except in states such as Ireland that required all treaties to be voted on. The changes Lisbon offered were the elimination of the pillar system, more qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers and the creation of a President of the European Council.

With the adoption of Lisbon and the future of the EU hanging in the balance it was clear that Berlin needed to secure the cooperation of the French early on to avoid a repeat of the EU Constitution. The Poles decided to delay in signing the treaty to see how other EU members, particularly Ireland, reacted.\footnote{“Sarkozy’s Timetable for EU to Ratify Lisbon Looks Optimistic.” [Opinion] (2008, July 2). *The Irish Times*. p. 14} But this time Germany had an
ally in new French President Nicolas Sarkozy who assumed the mantle of “EU fixer” trying to assure smaller states like the Czech Republic that Lisbon would not threaten East European states. The French-German relationship was beginning to blossom once again and both Sarkozy and Merkel were pressuring other states to speed up the ratification process. This backfired in Ireland when the Lisbon Treaty was defeated, but France and Germany kept pushing ratification elsewhere hoping that Ireland would vote “yes” in a second referendum.

As Merkel was leading the charge for Lisbon trouble was brewing in her own backyard. Several constitutional challenges had emerged arguing that Lisbon was not compatible with German Basic Law. Euroskeptics, particularly from Bavaria, argued that the Lisbon Treaty trampled basic democratic rights established under the German Constitution. The constitutional argument made by German petitioners was that Lisbon not only stripped rights from the German people but from the German Parliament as well, further empowering Brussels. The German Foreign Minister Walter Steinmeier vehemently defended Lisbon by saying that the treaty only enriches German democratic rights within the EU, and he warned his fellow Germans against, “retreating into a national shell.” What is most significant about the constitutional challenge, however, was the willingness, especially from the Bavarians to fight back against an integrative process that the German public had accepted for so long. Ultimately the challenge failed

608 Ibid.
609 Ibid.
and the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Lisbon did not violate German Common Law, but for the first time there appeared to be a more potent, though isolated, backlash to integration. Chancellor Merkel was welcomed not only the High Court’s decision but also the ratification in the Parliament of the Lisbon Treaty. The decision of the court required that some of the national laws be changed to accommodate German involvement in the EU Parliament.613

The German ratification came rather late in the process as Germany was the 24th of 27 states to ratify, but the process in Germany was wrapped up before the upcoming referendum in Ireland where Euroenthusiasts would be holding their breath.614 In 2008 French President Nicolas Sarkozy presented Chancellor Merkel with the Charlemagne Prize for her work to reform the EU. At home, Merkel still faces stiff battles over social services, decreasing unemployment, and reformation of Germany’s health, education and energy policies.615 According to The Economist however Merkel is enjoying a surge in popularity for her handling of the 2008 financial crisis.616 It remains to be seen however if her popularity will continue as she pushes her reforms forward. The 2008 financial crisis has also forced Germany to recognize that it cannot avoid bailing out financially strapped governments, meaning that Germany will continue to bear the economic brunt of integration in Europe.617

613 Scally, Derek. (2009, September 24) Adoption of Treaty Welcomed by Chancellor. The Irish Times, p. 10
614 Ibid.
615 “Bank Uncertainty Hits UK Shares” (2008, October 6) from news.bbc.co.uk
616 “Steady As She Goes” (2010, March 13) The Economist
617 Scally, Derek. (2009, February 12). “Tough Questions on Lisbon at German Court” The Irish Times; p. 11
Conclusion

This chapter and the evidence gathered from German experts, historians, newspaper articles and elite statements has examined important points in EU integration, demonstrating some trends in German history as it relates to EU integration and national identity. This chapter sheds light on four main points: Elites worked hard to bring along the German public, pushing them toward integration, The German national narrative has a sense of guilt that may influence their self-sacrifice and their decision to integrate, there is also no unified German identity, and finally that Germans became weary of their obligations to the rest of Europe under the EU.

The role that German leaders like Konrad Adenauer, Helmut Schmidt, Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröder, and Angela Merkel played to bring their public along cannot be understated. Each German leader seems to be faced with a nearly impossible task. Constantly watched with weary suspicion by the rest of Europe, Germany must look out for its own best interests and build upon the economic engine that it created after the Second World War. On the domestic front, German leaders must convince their public that some sacrifice is required to make Europe stronger. This great balancing act is made more difficult by the growing pessimism that can often attach itself to institutional and bureaucratic proliferation, a process that German leaders endorse.

German guilt and European fears of Germany both play major roles in how the Germans see themselves in Europe. The very basis of European integration seems to be predicated on the notion that an unconstrained Germany is dangerous and that there is history to prove it. Some German leaders like Adenauer and Kohl believed that situating German identity within a more pacific European identity might reassure other European
states thus allowing Germany to turn its economic potential loose, but even today many Germans are wondering when self-sacrifice will finally translate into trust.\footnote{Dehousse, Renaud, and Florence Deloche-Gaudez. “Is there anyone in charge? Leadership in EU constitutional Negotiations” in Beach, Derek and Colette Mazzucelli. Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration. (Palgrave, New York, 2007)}

What it meant to be a proud German is something that is rarely discussed precisely because of its historical connotations, but there are German achievements worthy of praise. Perhaps the most notable is the creation of the German economy, and the most visible symbol of this was the Deutsch Mark. The adoption of the Euro was a blow to those who felt that the Mark represented a repudiation of the Nazi past and the rebirth of German industry. One response was a political backlash against the EU and the election of Gerhard Schröder who campaigned on limiting EU influence and protecting German cultural symbols. Ironically Schröder and the Red Green Coalition did little to protect German culture and found themselves pushing integration just as their predecessors did.

A sense of cultural threat also comes in the form of increased immigration that the EU has only accelerated. It is true that there were many Turkish laborers already in Germany, but the new legal standards governing the movement of people for economic purposes meant an influx of people from all over Europe into Germany seeking economic opportunity. The results have been mixed. Germans have also spent a considerable amount on Europeans outside of Germany. The Germans have given up their prized Mark, they have held hands with the French, spent a great deal on providing aid and infrastructure to the rest of Europe, and they have gained surprisingly little political capital in return.
A new European identity solves many problems for the Germans. It erases to some extent the shameful historical legacy of the Weimar Republic; it allows Germans to unite under a singular set of cosmopolitan ideals, and it creates space for them to be proud Europeans. But this has not happened, at least not yet. German elites have tried to tie Germany and Europe together for decades but as integration has progressed and its price tag had been revealed German satisfaction with the EU has declined, not increased or transformed. When enthusiasm for EU projects like the TCE or the Euro goes up in Germany it is almost always as a result of an economic upswing suggesting that approval rankings have more to do with economic trends than a new identity. This suggests that Germans see the EU as a political reality, a price for doing business in Europe and not an engine for identity transformation. This does not bode well for neofunctionalists who would argue that a new identity is in the making.

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Chapter 6: Poland Joins the EU

Introduction

Poland’s plan to overcome its economic and political backwardness was predicated on following a two-step course that first sought entrance to NATO and then the EU.620 Elizabeth Pond mused that “[t]he strongest popular motivation (in Poland) for the palpable yearning to become Western was probably the desire to attain the West’s prosperity rather than the freedom and demand for individual initiative.”621 But Poland had a strong Catholic identity and, like Ireland, the search for greener economic pastures of the EU would be tempered by a conservative backlash. Indeed, as Poland gained freedom, self-determination, and a free market it became apparent that each of these had hidden traps that the Poles discovered the hard way.622

As enlargement substantially increased, the number of people in the European Union, Eurobarometer data on some of the old EU members showed a softening in the number of people who identified only with their own country, especially amongst the Dutch, Austrians, Swedes and Finns.623 In 2004 only two percent of Poles identified with anything other than Poland and 94 percent of Poles were proud to be Polish.624 This is to be expected from a rather homogeneous East European state entering the EU. However, joining the EU will open Polish borders, create foreign investment opportunities, and lure Poles into the wealthier West, so the real question is whether the inevitable spillovers of economy and culture from older EU states will soften or transform Polish identity.

620 Pond, 2002, p. 105
621 Ibid.
622 Caplan & Feffer, 1996
624 Ibid.
Case Methods

Poland joined the EU much later than either Ireland or Germany, meaning that the treaty based data points have been abbreviated for this case study. Many accounts of modern Poland and Polish identity are unfortunately in Polish. Using some primary, but mostly secondary sources, I sketch out and examine what I call the state of the Polish national narrative from 1992 until October 2009. Like the previous case studies, the events of this period help me to describe and explain the Polish national narrative as it relates to EU integration.

In this chapter, I measure national identity indirectly by looking at public polling from the Eurobarometer. I also look at how elites package integration by analyzing speeches and documents regarding Polish positions on EU expansion. Primary and secondary documents that address how elites are couching their arguments such as party platforms and political speeches can help us understand how public discourse is led and public opinion polls can tell us how it is received. After initially collecting information on a wide-ranging collection of articles relating to Poland they were separated chronologically: Pre-Membership Years (1992-2004), the Nice Treaty (2001-2003) and the EU Constitution and Lisbon Treaty (2003-present). Recurring and emphasized themes such as economic interest, unemployment, fitting in with the West, Catholic identities, and conservative backlash to integration are the focus of this chapter.

Roots of Polish Identity

Despite their history of being subjugated, Poles have at times adhered to an irredentist point of view that seeks to unite Central Europe under Polish leadership,
especially parts of Lithuania and Ukraine. The Twentieth Century was a reversal of fortune for Poland. German occupation in 1939 was followed Russian occupation placing Poland in a state of Moscow controlled semi-sovereignty in which the Communist party became the only viable political option. The communist party would suffer from internal division when it was split between “liberalizers” and “revisionists.” The revelations about Stalinist rule by Nikita Khrushchev paved the way for disagreement in Communist parties across the Soviet Bloc; Poland was no different. Liberalizers found that their messages of reform and change resonated with the public who was tired of seeing their stead slip further and further in Europe and the rest of the world.

**Pre-Membership Years (1992-2004)**

Market reforms had an inauspicious start in Poland. In 1992 as job losses mounted and economic production plummeted, the Polish economy was stagnant. Poland was committed to a policy of economic ‘shock therapy’ and drastic market reforms without massive unemployment, but nothing goes as smooth as planned and this was the case for Poles after the collapse of the Soviet Union. From Polish Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz’s perspective closing off the economy and becoming protectionist would almost certainly drive inflation up not down and make the goal of ascension to EU impossible.

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626 Von Beyme, 1966, p. 45
627 Reid, 2004, p. 263
Finance Minister Grzegorz W. Kolodko rebranded the Polish economic approach calling it the “Strategy for Poland,” in an attempt to widen the appeal of economic transformation.\textsuperscript{629} The Polish government opted to commercialize some state-run industries instead of privatizing them. Commercialization meant leaving factory management in place but slowly cutting subsidies until they were self-sufficient. In concert with the growth of small private businesses the economy began to turn around in 1993 despite the fact that Polish public opinion remained low across the board.\textsuperscript{630}

Commercialized and private companies began to turn a profit and major Western firms were actively recruiting young Poles.\textsuperscript{631} Soon, private negotiations to reduce Poland’s debt made it easier to borrow money from the Bundesbank and invite foreign investment. By the early 2000s the private sector soon made up more than 70 percent of the Polish economy and monthly wages had risen substantially.\textsuperscript{632} Transitioning from a state of ‘shock therapy,’ high unemployment, and economic uncertainty to a more stable and somewhat promising market, Poland now needed to seriously consider strategies to meet EU entrance criteria. Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, the Secretary of the European Integration Committee (KIE) argued that if Poland remained outside the EU it would enter into a ‘grey zone’ that would politically and economically isolate Poland.\textsuperscript{633} It was

\textsuperscript{629} Sachs, Jeffrey D.  \textit{Poland's Jump to the Market Economy} (MIT Press, 1993)
\textsuperscript{630} Pond, 2002, p. 111.
the goal of the EU to have ascension talks concluded by 2001 and that meant accelerating the integration process not only in Brussels but also in the Sejm, the Polish Parliament.634

Saryusz-Wolski argued that Poland would be capable of meeting the EU enlargement criteria and noted that Poland would be given extra time to meet the legal and normative criteria of EU membership.635 One exception of note is Poland’s request to immediately draw their share of CAP subsidies for farmers.636 The money that they would receive in the form of structural funds and CAP subsidies would bring in billions to the emerging economy. The tough political concessions, it seemed, could wait as long as Poland began to see benefits of joining the EU right away.

Reservations about Poland’s economic readiness emanated not just from wealthy West European state, but from some Poles too. Polling in 1996 and again in 1999 revealed that roughly 80 percent of Poles wanted the join the EU, but of that group more than 50 percent did not think that Poland would be allowed to join because of its economic problems.637 It seemed, even at the turn of the century, that many Poles were aspiring to become a part of the EU but felt that it was still out of reach.

Substantial credit for helping Poland join Western Europe and the EU must go to German leaders who helped lead the charge to get Poland into the European fold. The first step was bringing Poland into NATO and this meant transforming Poland’s Warsaw Pact forces into fully integrated NATO forces. The application process was much smoother for Poland than it was for some of its other Central and Eastern European

634 Ibid.
636 Ibid.
neighbors. On March 12, 1999, Bronislaw Geremek spoke to a gathering of NATO leaders in Independence, Missouri saying, “[f]or the people of Poland, the Cold War, which forcibly excluded our country from the West, ends with our entry to NATO.” After depositing Poland’s treaty in Missouri they quickly began to upgrade their military systems to NATO standards. Poland received 23 MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters from the German Luftwaffe for €1 apiece when the Germans ended their service. Clearly Poland joining NATO was more than just a defense move, it signaled Poland’s desire to play a more prominent role in Europe.

By 2000 Poland was attracting more than $157 billion in foreign investment and the track was set for Poland to join the EU by 2004 if it could meet the Maastricht requirements that other EU member states had. Once discussions began in earnest the benefits of membership became clear to Polish elites. The Office of the European Integration Committee projected an increase in Polish GDP to 40 percent of EU average by 2003, 55 percent by 2011, and 80 percent by 2040. A failure to join would mean that by 2050 even the small Balkan states would surpass the Polish GDP with no problem. The question in Poland as it was in Ireland lay in whether Poles would accept the cultural changes that went along with EU membership.

While only having observer status pending the Nice referendum on EU membership, Poland fared unexpectedly well when it came to reapportioning the EU parliament. Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Wladyslaw Bartoszewski was able to

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638 “Foreign Minister of Poland On NATO Entry” (1999, March 12) from www.fas.org
640 Ibid. p. 128-129
641 “Poland Must Join EU if it Wants to Catch Up With the West.” (2003, April 24). Polish News Bulletin
642 Ibid.
secure 26 votes in the EU parliament, the same number as Spain, and second only to Germany, France, Italy and Britain.\textsuperscript{643} In the opening rounds of Nice the issue for Poland had been the increase in cooperation and funds from the EU not necessarily such a large allotment in the EU parliament, not necessarily votes.\textsuperscript{644} Nevertheless, Bartoszewski boldly proclaimed Poland a part of the new European vanguard, but also hinted that those already in the exclusive leadership roles within the EU had better move over and give Poland its rightful place amongst its new equals.\textsuperscript{645} Never before had a new member of the EU made such bold demands of its fellow member states as Poland did almost immediately after joining the EU.

There was some speculation that Poland’s forceful negotiation tactics at Nice and subsequent treaties was a calculated strategy meant to show other EU countries that Poland would not be intimidated. However, if that was the case, it likely only succeeded in angering older member states.\textsuperscript{646} In any case, Poland began acting like a large country almost immediately. Once Ireland rejected Nice, it was Poland who actively courted Irish elites and the public to reconsider. At the same time, Poland reached out to Spain who was awarded equal voting weight, urging closer ties that would mutually protect their representation in the EU.\textsuperscript{647}

While Poland did not directly address weighted voting at Nice it was clearly on their minds. During the Nice conference in 2000, before Poland was a member of the EU, Bartoszewski sent a letter to the Portuguese EU President Jamie Gama indicating his

\textsuperscript{643} “EU Nice Treaty Meets Polish Expectations” (2001, February 24). \textit{BBC World News}
\textsuperscript{644} Bobinski, Krzysztof. “The Constitutional Treaty and Poland – A New Laggard in the EU?” in Beach, Derek, and Colette Mazzucelli. \textit{Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration} (Palgrave, New York, 2007)
\textsuperscript{645} Bobinski, 2007.
\textsuperscript{646} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{647} \textit{Ibid.}
belief that weighted voting should be handled at the next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) when all the ascending members will be full fledged EU member states. It would be at the next IGC Poland would push for a weight that would give it more than the 26 votes it would receive at Nice.

According to Eurobarometer public opinion surveys from the early negotiations to the favorable outcome of the Nice Treaty, Poles had a higher opinion of the EU’s institutions than their own. According to Eurobarometer data collected in 2004, just over half of Poles believed that EU membership was benefitting Poland and exactly half trusted EU institutions, perhaps reflecting the ambivalence of Polish attitudes during the transition. If faith in the EU seemed a little weak it only underscores the skepticism that many Poles harbored for their own government’s efforts.

Even as the economy began to recover, Poles were torn between the anti-capitalist stance of the Catholic church along with the various “sofa parties” that drew heavily Catholic influence on one hand and the prospect for Western style prosperity on the other. Poles began to buy consumer goods like cars and personal computers, things that they could never attain under communist rule. Small right wing and religious parties such as Catholic National Movement (RKN), Aliance for Poland (PP), and Reconstruction of Poland (ROP) sprang up in national and local elections denouncing the possibility of Poland joining the EU instead proclaiming; “Nationalism - this is our road!

650 Ibid.
651 Ibid.
Nationalism - this is our road!" Some of the protests turned violent with Polish nationalists clashing with police and anti-fascist youth who supported the ascendency of Poland into the EU. According to Aleks Szczepanik, even though these parties were small, some only garnering 20 percent of the shrinking rural vote, they did play a role in shaping the Polish narrative.

In the run up to Poland’s application for EU membership, smaller parties like the Peasant Party began to argue that whatever deal the EU was offering it was not as good of a deal that the EU offered its founding members, and that the sacrifice of Polish sovereignty was not worth second-class citizenship. Polish newspapers were running countless editorials warning Poles to hold out for a better deal from the EU. Blocks of politicians, artists, scholars, and even clergy replied with intense and direct pleas to speed ratification along and hold a referendum on the EU immediately as no “better deal” would materialize or was even possible.

Right wing and religious political groups attacked Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski’s advocacy for Polish integration by accusing him of allowing the EU to control state policy and denigrating the role of the Catholic church, fears that were similar to those of anti-EU advocates in Ireland. Poland’s Catholic News Agency published a series of articles questioning whether the EU would respect Polish Catholic

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653 Ibid.
656 Ibid.
657 Ibid.
identity and made claims similar to those in Ireland that the EU would overrule Polish law over sensitive issues like mercy killing and abortion. Despite reassurances by European Minister Danuta Huebner's that the EU would not interfere with such laws, especially anti-abortion laws the Church remained deeply skeptical.

The strategy for the Catholic Church and other EU skeptics was to keep ascension decisions out of the Polish government and push a public referendum that would force a public decision. In the public arena, the Church would be able to more openly influence an outcome, but the Church’s official position on the EU was murky. Gniezno Archbishop Stanislaw Muszynski said November 2002 that “[t]he church has always urged people to take part in elections, which it considers a civil duty. If you really want the best for your country you have to speak up in such matters. Those who stay away from the ballot will have no moral right to criticize it.” When pressed over whether the Church would support EU membership, Muszynski argued that the Church was not picking sides but that it would, “provide certain values and criteria” for voters.

As the process for ascension was resolved and a referendum was planned to take place in 2003, the Catholic response to EU membership began to fracture, and many important cultural nuances became evident. Conservative Catholic media outlets increased the pace and intensity in their campaign to sink Poland’s EU bid. Their message was simple: Brussels was a liberal, secular, pro-abortion regime that would

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659 “Polish European Minister, Catholic Media Discuss EU Issues” (2002, April 10) PAP News Agency.
661 Ibid.
662 Ibid.
directly threaten the most basic foundations of Polish spiritual life. Many of these groups also pointed out the fact that Prime Minister Leszek Miller never raised the abortion issue when negotiating the terms of Poland’s EU membership. The government’s response was quick; Michal Tober a government spokesman stated that they would “prevent EU opponents from using false arguments that the EU would impose on Poland any regulations concerning moral and religious issues.”

Few doubted the influence of religion, especially Catholicism, in Poland. Even the President, Aleksander Kwasniewski, a self-described agnostic, finished campaigning for the “yes” vote in Gniezo, the spiritual home of Polish Christianity the day before the referendum. Perhaps the most important part of Kwasniewski’s appearance was that he was on stage with Henryk Muszynski the Archbishop of the city, finally bridging gaps between the mainstream Catholic Church and the government over EU membership. Another important endorsement came from the Pope himself. Despite Pope John Paul II’s personal role in reforming his home nation’s abortion laws the official stance of the Catholic Church began to shift toward EU membership as long as they received the same carve outs on “moral laws” that Ireland received. The appeals to Polish Catholic identity seemingly mitigated the conservative backlash enough that the Polish government went into the referendum confidence that it would pass. In conjunction with implicit backing of the Catholic Church, a coherent pro-integration voice began to emerge; arguing that Poland would be held to the same standard as any other EU member.

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664 Ibid.
666 Ibid.
668 Traynor, 2003, p. 17
state. No special standard applied, but more importantly a failure to act swiftly on integration could jeopardize structural adjustment aid Poland was already receiving from the EU. In June 2003 Poles voted overwhelmingly (77.41 percent in favor) to join the EU.

**EU Constitution (2004 - 2006)**

The public approached Poland’s admittance to the EU with some reservations. Roughly 46 percent of Poles felt that their lives “situations had deteriorated in the five years before joining the EU.” A very modest 55 percent of Poles believed that the EU was making things better and Poles still identified unemployment as the most important issue facing them. Poland had the EU’s lowest employment rate (54 percent) and highest unemployment rate in early 2004, but also had one of the fastest growth rates on the continent. Educational standards were improving bringing some younger people into the city, but it is in the rural areas where unemployment and poverty still had the biggest impact, as 42 percent of Poland’s unemployed were farmers.

Mixed economic trends of growth and unemployment did little to endear Poles to the efforts of their government. A 2004 Eurobarometer survey suggests that unemployment was linked to 65 percent of Poles who were dissatisfied with the

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670 “France Hails Poland’s “Yes” Vote to Join EU” (2003, June 9). *XinHua.*
There was however nascent optimism that joining the EU would help to solve the employment problem at home and also allow more Poles to search for work abroad. Just over two-thirds of Poles thought that their voice was important in Europe and 72 percent thought that they would be even more vital to EU affairs in the near future. The public largely ignored the process involved in securing a prominent seat at the EU table however, but it did prove a serious challenge for the Polish government.

The scope of what took place at the Nice Treaty negotiations could not be fully understood until the next Intergovernmental Conference took place. For Poland, discussions pertaining to a new EU constitution put them on the defensive, forcing them to try and maintain the number of weighted votes that they secured under Nice. As the process of drafting a new EU constitution gained pace Germany and France sent official delegates to help shape the draft, Poland however failed to do so. It should have come as no surprise then that Germany and France readdressed the EC voting weights and attempted to scrap the Nice voting formula all together.

It was up to Spain to oppose the proposed changes to Nice as the Polish delegation laid low. Straw polls taken by the Polish representative Danuta Hübner suggested that as many as seventeen countries were unhappy with the reapportionment discussions and the decision to scrap Nice. The revelation that EU member states, especially powerful ones, were willing to negotiate in the absence of a committed Polish

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676 Ibid.
677 Ibid.
678 Bobinski, 2007
679 Ibid.
delegation rang alarm bells in Warsaw. At the same time, the Polish government decided to oppose the changes at the next Council of Ministers meeting and make a plea to Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar to do the same. Polish leaders were banking on the notion that their future political potential would grant them greater power at the bargaining table, but they ignored some key points of contention that were angering their fellow EU members. Poland had recently committed troops and support to the US led effort to oust Saddam Hussein, an action that was reviled by many of the larger West European states.\footnote{680} Poland had also signed major military deals with the US including an agreement to purchase F-16 Viper fighter jets instead of opting for the European produced Typhoon. This contract had rubbed Germany, Italy, and Britain the wrong way because they produced the Typhoon.

Poland’s delegation to the IGC that was drafting the EU constitution found it difficult to talk around their F-16 deal or their commitment to Iraq. Prime Minister Leszek Miller began continued to argue that changing the voting formula and thus erasing Poland’s gains at Nice would destabilize the delicate balance between big, medium, and small states. But the political tensions over Poland’s foreign policy decisions were not the only pressure that Miller was feeling. Miller finally argued that Poland had accepted poor economic conditions when it joined because it believed that it would be politically compensated down the road, and while the Sejm almost unanimously backed him the Polish intelligentsia was beginning to split.\footnote{681}
Slawomir Sierakowski, the editor of the *Krytyka Polityczna* quarterly magazine, ripped the EU delegation, Prime Minister Miller, and the opposition parties for their brash and clumsy political maneuvering during the drafting of the EU constitution. Sierakowski’s argument was that Polish political behavior was angering the very Western European states that Poland needed in order to finance economic reconstruction, and if this type of behavior continued the large countries would simply abandon Poland to the margins of Europe. This argument was a cogent summation of public opinion of the Polish government vis-à-vis the EU. Poles had higher trust in EU institutions than their own and though that the EU was a better functioning democracy than their own government. The norm, of course, in Western Europe was to be skeptical of the EU but be generally happy about the national government.

Spanish officials traveled to Warsaw and informed Miller that they were ready to deal on the Constitution with or without Poland. Miller with the support of his legislature and the opposition parties had successfully alienated their last and only ally in holding out against the rest of Europe. There were discussions as to what type of compromise the Poles would be willing to accept when the terrorist attacks on train depots in Madrid rocked Europe. Spanish Prime Minister Aznar immediately blamed Basque separatists and when that proved inaccurate his government was quickly discredited and he lost

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683 Sierakowski, 2004


power to the Socialist Jose Louis Rodriguez Zapatero who committed Spain to signing a EU constitution. Miller weakened by the political fighting he had endured with Brussels had seen his political support dry up at home. On May 2, 2004 Miller resigned and handed power over to Marek Belka his Finance Minister.

Belka flew to Brussels where he quickly agreed to a compromise that was reasonable but less than the voting formula created under Nice. The political loss in terms of voting power was significantly less than the damage that Miller and the Polish political elites had caused to their reputation within the EU. Once the EU Constitution was completed it would become the subject of referenda all over Europe. Some right-wing parties in Poland openly called for Poles to vote ‘no’ believing that Poland had been shortchanged by larger states. The EU Constitution died before the Poles ever had a chance to vote on it.

At home Poles had become even more disenchanted with their government and their democratic system. By 2005 only 30 percent of Poles were satisfied with the way democracy worked in their country, only Slovaks had less confidence in their government. It also appeared that Poles were more satisfied with the democratic process, regardless of the number of votes they had, in the EU than the EU average, if only slightly. Public opinion data taken during the time that the Polish government was taking a stand over representation indicated that Poles cared about one thing above all others. About 74 percent of those surveyed in Poland believed that unemployment

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688 Ibid.
posed the greatest risk to their country; this figure was nearly double the EU average. As Polish elites worked feverishly on maximizing their representation in the EU parliament the Eurobarometer data suggests that their citizens were primarily concerned about jobs. It is unclear at this point whether Poles were feeling the economic benefits of integration.

Polish members of the EU Parliament explored new ways of offending other EU members when they erected an anti-abortion display in the corridors of the Parliament in Strasbourg. The display showed pictures of concentration camps and compared abortion to Nazi crimes that quickly drew the ire of Ana Gomes, a legislator from Portugal who found herself in the middle of a heated exchange when she demanded it be taken down. This was by no means an isolated incident as more confrontations over women’s rights and homosexuality highlighted significant cultural differences between Polish Catholic orthodoxy and the more secular Western European countries. Michael Cashman, a European parliamentarian from Britain who has campaigned for gay rights, said that, “[n]ew groups have come in from Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Catholicism is certainly becoming a very angry voice against what it sees as a liberal EU.” The new conservative challenge over issues that had been largely settled in the EU parliament was surprising; Cashman added “[o]n women's rights and gay equality, we are fighting battles that we thought we had won years ago.”

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690 Ibid.
692 Bowley, 2005
693 Ibid.
If EU parliamentarians thought that the type of behavior they were witnessing in Strasbourg was representative of all Poles they would be wrong. Despite these clashes over values and the appeal by the Polish government to include Europe’s Christian heritage in the preamble of the Constitution, the Polish public saw these behaviors more and more as out of touch. Christopher Bobinsky, the director of Unia, an EU think-tank in Warsaw claimed that these are cases of “reactionary conservative groups” and that most Poles are more worried about the economy and fear that religious radicals may endanger Poland’s place in the EU.\footnote{Bobinsky might have overstated the opposition to the conservative Catholic backlash slightly as many of these groups did enjoy some popular support. Groups such as the RKN continued to oppose EU membership even after Poland had become a member by challenging the constitutionality of the referendum and claiming that the EU is just another way for Germany to control Poland. Other small extremist groups such as the Catholic League of Polish Families lobbied, and in some cases, succeeded in stopping gay pride marches and killing women’s rights legislation.} The majority of mainstream Catholic parishioners and Priests however generally supported integration and moderation.\footnote{Lisbon Treaty (2008-2009)

The Poles never decided the fate of the EU Constitution. Instead, France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitution in referendums. The attempt to rescue the EU

Constitution after its defeat in France and the Netherlands culminated with the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty. Poland was among the best economic performers in Europe and they were cutting unemployment at a pace faster than France and Spain, countries to which they were often compared.\(^{697}\) Polish women were finally finding good paying jobs, a rarity during the market reforms and the EU application process.\(^{698}\) The economic boom was the culmination of market reforms and the outflow of Poles in search of better jobs in Western Europe.\(^{699}\) By September of 2008, Polish unemployment was down to 6.2 percent.\(^{700}\)

For Poland, who had gotten a late start in Europe, there was also the need to consider adopting the Euro. In October of 2007, Finance Minister Zyta Gilowska announced that Poland’s public finance deficit would not exceed three percent; meeting the last major criteria for admission to the Eurozone.\(^{701}\) Entrance to the Eurozone would erase exchange rates making trade cheaper and easier, but it would also lead to interest rate cuts and make borrowing cheaper. Poland still had significant financial reform ahead of it, but there was now a possibility that by 2011 or 2012 Poles would be using Euros.

Maintaining the high level of economic growth was the priority for the Sejm and some had feared that adopting the Euro would suddenly drive the cost of living through the roof. Civic Platform (PO) leader Donald Tusk said in a public debate, “[u]nlike in


Germany, Italy or Slovenia, in Poland there is a very large group of people with a very low standard of living and even a minor increase in prices could produce dramatic consequences for them. Tusk cautioned that any consideration of joining the Eurozone should not take place until 2013 at the earliest. By 2008, the Polish Zloty had been pegged to the Euro, and in fall of that year the worst financial collapse in Poland’s short history as a sovereign state beset all of Europe.

Andrzej Bratkowski, former deputy governor of the National Bank of Poland, told Forbes magazine that, “[t]his risk (joining the Euro) is worth taking as the crisis won't be over soon so the wait-and-see strategy makes no sense.” Other economic experts echoed this call pointing out that 55 percent of Poland’s exports go to Eurozone countries and that exchange rates are taking a bite out of Polish profits. In late October of 2009 Donald Tusk argued that the financial crisis was the final argument in favor of seriously pursuing the Euro. Tusk convened with the Polish President on October 28, 2009 and laid out a plan to join the Euro by 2012, telling a group of reporters that, “[t]oday, after approving the roadmap and informing the president, I would like to invite leaders of other parties to talk about the constitution and the Euro.”

Tusk was also hinting at the fact that Poland had put the Lisbon treaty on hold in lieu of the second Irish referendum. After generating an unsavory reputation in the EU, Polish political elites were grilled by the Parliament over their commitment to the Lisbon Treaty. The Euro was one thing; but failure to secure Lisbon would have long and lasting

702 Ibid.
703 Ibid.
impacts on Poland’s ability to get anything it wanted in the foreseeable future. After the
failure of the EU constitution the EU Parliament was looking to keep Lisbon off of as
many referendum ballots as possible, the only clear exception of course would be Ireland,
and that was in and of itself was giving EU officials enough to worry about. The fear
was that if the Poles demanded a referendum then the other EU members, especially
Britain, would call for a referendum and possibly block the Lisbon Treaty as they had
blocked the EU Constitution.\textsuperscript{707} The President of Poland quickly assured the EU that
Lisbon would never be presented to the public as a referendum but would be decided in
the legislature, though he did also indicate that Poland would consider Lisbon only after
the second Irish referendum.\textsuperscript{708}

Eurobarometer public opinion data suggested that by 2007 Poles were as
enthusiastic as ever about the EU with 71 percent of those polled saying that they
believed Poland’s membership was a good thing.\textsuperscript{709} However, these feelings toward the
EU were generated almost entirely without the help of political elites; in fact it is possible
that the support for the EU was generated despite them. Most Poles continued to have a
better view of the EU than they did their own government. In 2009, only 21 percent of
Poles trusted their own government while 59 percent trusted the EU and 76 percent
wanted the EU to have more decision making power.\textsuperscript{710} What is most surprising,
however, was that 59 percent of Poles said that they understood how the EU works; this

\textsuperscript{707} “Polish PM Vows to Avoid Poll on Lisbon Treaty.” (2008, March 15). \textit{The Irish Times}.
\textsuperscript{709} European Commission. (2007 Autumn) \textit{Eurobarometer 68}, from
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm
\textsuperscript{710} European Commission. (Spring, 2009) \textit{Eurobarometer 71}, from
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm
the highest number of all EU countries. Overall, Eurobarometer data indicates that Poles are indeed well informed about how the EU works and how the integrative process is proceeding.

Almost immediately after Ireland passed the Lisbon treaty by referendum in October of 2009, Poland followed suit. Notwithstanding this, challenges still exist for the Poles. Despite being on track to join the Euro and taking another crucial step forward in the integration process, Poland is a country with a huge chasm between the public and their government. Most Poles still agree that national laws and policies have the biggest impact on their lives, but with such low approval ratings for the national government and comparatively higher marks for EU institutions, it is almost as if they wished that the EU, not their own government, was playing the bigger role.

Discussions about the Euro and further integration under the Lisbon treaty did generate another round of conservative and religious backlash. The Catholic League of Polish Families set up a new political party called “Forward Poland”, which was in turn supported by Declan Ganley; a well financed Irish businessman and avowed Euroskeptic. “Forward Poland” Challenged more moderate parties for EU parliament seats in the hope of slowing or even stopping any further EU infringements on Polish sovereignty. It is almost universally agreed that Forward Poland stands little chance of making an impact on EU Parliamentary elections, but this is significant because it indicates that not only have religious views moderated with regard to the EU, but that

711 Ibid.
712 Ibid.
714 Ibid.
right-wing religious voices are no longer effective in shaping the public narrative in Poland when it comes to the EU.

Recent studies suggest that views on more traditional issues like divorce and abortion are liberalizing in Poland.\textsuperscript{715} Divorce rates have gone up dramatically in a country where, even in 2004, divorce was almost unheard of. Women are the initiators of most divorces and cite anything from spousal abuse to dissatisfaction with their partners as a reason for the split.\textsuperscript{716} Perhaps the most significant aspect of this phenomenon is that the idea of divorce has been largely introduced by Poles who have traveled to Western Europe and then returned with new views on the meaning of marriage.\textsuperscript{717} The pace at which traditional values are changing in Poland is substantial but it also could indicate a change in Polish culture as a direct result of EU membership.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Knowing what is means to be Polish or assuming that there is a singular Polish narrative is problematic. Historical documents, elite statements, and public opinion data provide some evidence about support for the EU and how that affects the Polish national narrative. The first is that a significant gap exists between the Polish government and the public. One outcome of this gap has been the public placing more trust in EU institutions than their own and preferring EU democracy to Polish democracy. Secondly, Polish Catholicism is still alive and well but its political impact is very complex. While Poland remains a conservative country the extreme Catholic conservative parties have declined


\textsuperscript{716} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{717} Ibid.
in popularity, and even though most Poles still have cool feelings toward abortion laws they have begun to soften their stances on other more traditional issues such as divorce and women’s rights.

Poland has benefitted from EU economic policies; in fact Poles have greater trust in EU institutions than their own, and yet there are no signs that this will change anytime soon. Seemingly, all of the prerequisites for identity transformation exist in Poland, but it has not happened yet. The number of Poles who do not have a strong attachment to Poland has increased since Poland joined the EU but only by one percent.\textsuperscript{718} The remaining 97 percent of Poles who still feel a strong attachment to their home country challenge the notion that functional spillovers are causing identity changes.

One possible explanation is that Poland has not been in the EU long enough to see the kind of identity transformation that neofunctionalism predicts. In all fairness one would expect identity change to happen gradually over time and Poland does seem to be in an environment where neofunctionalists would expect to see identity change. The limits of this case study are clear: Poland has not been a part of the EU very long. This does not mean however that the creation of a European identity in Poland is just a matter of time. Instead, there are plenty of reasons to be skeptical of claims that the European identity has universal appeal. If Poles increasingly identify themselves with Europe and the national narrative in Poland changes to reflect pan-European cosmopolitanism, then the European identity will have passed a very difficult test.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Introduction

We do not lack for theories on how integration in Europe is transforming political and economic institutions. Given the extensive literature on European integration and the questions of support for the EU and the creation of new identities, this dissertation sought to do two things. First in an effort to test theories popular both in the 1950s and reemerging today, I looked for empirical evidence of a new pan-European identity. Second, I examined relationship between EU integration and national identity.

Neofunctionalists and Euroenthusiasts would hold that as EU integration moved forward, it would form the basis for a common identity, one that would bring together the European nations and unite them under a new set of supranational institutions. The evidence I have gathered however shows that the situation in Europe is much more complex.

Neofunctionalists insist that technical spillovers related to political and economic integration lead to new identities. They are right on several accounts. They were correct about integration creating a series of deeper institutions that limited sovereignty. New institutions like the European Parliament, the Euro, and the European Court of Justice certainly bring Europe closer together. Common experiences and common institutions have brought a segment of Europe’s elites together in unprecedented ways. Business leaders, academics, and politicians in general seem keen on the cosmopolitan promises of integration. On the other hand the European identity celebrated by this relatively small pool of well-networked individuals is yet to ‘spillover’ into the larger more nationally oriented masses.
Rationalist approaches offer convincing evidence that economic benefits or the perception of economic benefit translates into support for European Union institutions. Across Europe the EU is fairly well regarded, but why has that support not translated into a broader unifying identity? It is true that some states lose out in the EU budget while others benefit; but in states that benefit it does not always translate into the adoption of a European identity. Clearly a EU identity cannot be bought.

Identity in Europe, as stated earlier, is more complicated than some scholars make it out to be. If there is to be a identity shift in Europe it will be over decades, maybe even centuries, not months and years. Part of the reason that local identities remain so fixed is that those who attempt to change identities (elites) often overlook important cultural cornerstones such as religion and local traditions. Elites often agree with one another that European integration solves many of the political and economic problems that Europe has experienced in the past century, but they seem unable to penetrate and transform the more powerful national narratives that still hold true for many people. Perhaps most importantly, while some elites see a common set of ‘European interests’ the masses seem to be framing the question of European integration in terms of national self-interest, accepting the fruits of integration while remaining skeptical about the costs.

Most recent attempts to understand how the EU works and how it garners support from its member states has focused on the quantitative perspective looking at budgets, votes, and public opinion data. This is a fruitful and insightful strain of literature, but where this dissertation makes a contribution is a deeper examination of the disparate national narratives in EU member countries and the struggles of their leaders, elites, and publics to reconcile local differences with EU institutions, initiatives, and policies. While
never explicitly declared in my case studies, it seems that the old axiom that “all politics is local politics” holds true in Europe. In Ireland, Germany, and Poland, the ever-deeper integration process has not surpassed local realities. In some cases, as it was in Ireland, local realities can threaten the pace of integration all together.

**Understanding Identity in Europe**

When broken down in terms of education and income, Eurobarometer data shows that wealthier and educated people have a stronger attachment to ‘Europe.’ Over time however, it becomes clear that Euroenthusiasts make up only a small part of Europe’s population. Thus, a gap exists between those who believe that one Europe is possible and desirable, and the masses that are more concerned with domestic issues. This does not mean that most Europeans lack a strong sense of identity, quite the opposite really. According to Eurobarometer polling most Europeans still identify strongly with their town, country, or region.

Chapter 2 explored the vast literature on European integration and identity. Much the early theory on integration was optimistic that the creation of institutions would inevitably draw Europe’s states closer together. They believed that as institutions expanded their presence would spill over into a larger social context, ergo a new identity. As integration progressed, however the European identity failed to materialize. Instead a

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period of Eurosclerosis characterized integration in the 1970s. Thus, a new rethinking and reimagining of integration was introduced in the form of intergovernmentalism. Scholars, in an attempt to explain the progression of integration argued that it was states themselves that were driving integration and that they were doing it out of self-interest. This view held that states agreed to integrative steps based on the least common denominator and that creating a new identity that would unite Europe was implausible and unnecessary.

Nevertheless, the notion that a European identity was in the making and was perhaps inevitable persisted in the minds of political elites, technocrats, academics and young people. Journalists picked up on stories about an emerging European polity and there were proclamations being made based on anecdotal evidence that the “European dream” was not dead. European prosperity revealed a class of individuals who were excited about the possibility of a new European identity that could be shared across state lines, reviving L’Europe. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of a divided Europe there was a renewed feeling that a pan-European identity was possible. But researchers found that no reliable evidence existed to substantiate the claims that all of Europe was undergoing a transformation that would unites its many nations into one. Ignacio Sanchez-Crenca found that in other circumstances when people lose faith in their own government as they often do in Eastern Europe they turn to the EU. Yet, there is little statistical evidence to suggest that institutional spillovers are creating a new

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722 Rifkin, 2005
723 Ibid; Reid, 2004
724 Carey, 2002
725 Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000
European identity. Instead, the evidence suggests that people continue to identify on the national, sub-national, and even local levels more often than they do as Europeans.

Constructing identities is far more complex than the Euroenthusiasts might have thought it would be. Identity construction and the social conversation of “what are we” is a multi-layered complex question. As Marilynn Brewer points out, self-identification, a key part of identity, is often an individual decision based on how well that individual recognizes and accepts available identities. What this research demonstrates is that identity is still an unsettled issue in Europe in the sense that different identities exist and overlap. One of the main contributions of this dissertation is exploring how those identities co-exist, overlap, or conflict with one another and how that affects the integrative process.

In Chapter 3 I looked at public opinion data on support for the EU. There is plenty of data that shows perception of benefit leads to institutional support for the EU, but there is not much solid evidence that support for EU institutions translates into “feeling European.” Matthew Gabel suggested that those who were most likely to embrace the cosmopolitan European identity were those who traveled, traded, and went to college. I showed evidence that supported this claim. White-collar workers, business people, and college students show a higher level of support for the EU but are also more likely to feel European. These people however only make up a small percentage of Europeans, and among other demographics support for the EU is evident, but not as strong as the more elite members of society.

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726 Brewer, 1991
I also showed that feelings toward the EU vary from country to country. What accounts for the support? It might have something to do with contributions to the EU. I showed that in states like Germany and England where contributions to the EU are high and benefits received are low, approval of EU institutions is much lower than in states like Belgium and Ireland where contributions are low but benefits received are high. There might be a temptation to conflate approval of institutions with the adoption of a European identity, but enough evidence exists to suggest that people, in general, can like the EU, approve of its institutions, but refuse to give up their local or national identities. Chapter 3 examines support for EU institutions and concludes that support is tied to perceived economic benefit. Finally, Chapter 3 finds little evidence of identity change driven by EU integration.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 take an in-depth look at how integration has influenced identity. These case studies demonstrate the difficulty elites have in penetrating the national narrative in order to create a new pan-European identity. Ireland is an example of a state that significantly benefits from its EU membership. Ireland went from the poorest state in Western Europe when it joined the EU in 1974 to one of the wealthiest right before the financial crisis of 2008. If enjoying the fruits of EU membership led directly to a new European identity then Ireland would not have rejected the last two integration treaties on the first referenda. Understanding Ireland’s long history and suspicion of large powers places their behavior in the appropriate context. The Irish relationship with the EU is complex. While some political elites and a handful cosmopolitan business owners worked hard to convince the Irish public that integration could only benefit their country they consistently faced nationalist backlashes. Irish leaders had to shift tactics by
reassuring the public that their national identity would not be under threat and that Ireland would be able to maintain its neutrality and have a say in the integration process. Still, rumors and anti-EU campaigns persisted, much to the chagrin of Irish leaders who were desperately seeking to further Irish economic interests.

Since joining the EU, Ireland had become a jumping off point for American companies seeking access to the EU marketplace. The service industry had largely replaced its foundering industrial economy and it was the EU who was largely responsible for this “Celtic miracle.” Nevertheless, the Irish resistance to EU integration became more intense as time went on. Many of the campaigns against the EU touched on Irish fears that their culture, religion, and neutrality would be threatened from afar. Efforts to quiet those fears by Irish politicians were successful in that they eventually secured passage of important integrative treaties, but failed in that the national narrative would arise when the next integrative treaty went to public referendum. From an economic standpoint, the Irish have a track record of voting against their own interests. The evidence I provide strongly suggests that perceived cultural threat and a strong national and religious identity were a powerful intervening force when Irish voters went to the polls to vote on integrative treaties. Ultimately Ireland hurt their reputation amongst other EU states by being holding up the integrative process when it came to signing the Lisbon treaty, and the evidence suggests that Ireland’s recent economic collapse had more to do with passing Lisbon than any change of heart amongst the Irish public.

Germany represents another case where most Germans agree that the EU is a good thing, but they also harbor misgivings about the EU. The EU has its origins in the
post-World War II relationship between Germany and France. West Germany sought to rehabilitate its economy and its image by creating strong diplomatic and economic ties with its neighbors in an attempt to reassure them that Germany had indeed turned over a new leaf. The compacts that led Germany and the rest of Europe to the EU benefitted from the strong leadership of German elites like Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl, but these elites also emphasized to their constituency the need to sacrifice for the good of “Europe.” The role that collective guilt played in German outreach and identity cannot be understated. On numerous occasions Germany sacrificed its own economic self-interests in their effort to reassure other states that their intentions were good and pure.

German elites dreamed big, but the nuances of regional economic and identity differences were significant. Unlike Ireland, Germany did not allow a referendum on integration; elites oversaw the process almost exclusively. German elites had an advantage that most other European leaders did not: the cultivated belief amongst most Germans that their interests are best served by restraining their own power. I did find evidence to suggest that some of the changes and sacrifices that Germans have endured to better serve Europe have taken a toll. Giving up the beloved Deutschmark, for example dealt a serious psychological blow to many Germans who believed that their Mark was a symbol of their ability to overcome their own historical failures. German self-sacrifice has served Europe well, but recently Germans are wondering if the price that they have paid for a rehabilitated image is still worth it. Germany has undergone significant identity shifts since 1945, rejecting the chauvinistic militarism that led them to defeat not once but twice in the first half of the 20th Century.
Of all the new members to the EU, Poland seemed like a pretty good bet in terms of economic development. Germany had a strong trade relationship with Poland and its industrial capacity appeared promising to foreign investors. Poland’s path to EU membership went through NATO and a period of serious economic and political adjustments after they achieved absolute sovereignty as the Soviet Bloc disintegrated. Many Poles viewed the EU as a path to legitimacy and prosperity, but few had considered the implications of the reforms that would be necessary to become a membership candidate.

Heated discussions over the possibility of trading away some of Poland’s hard earned sovereignty for economic benefits challenged the assumptions of some that the EU was right for Poland. Ultimately these arguments were trumped by average Poles’ desires to reap the economic benefits that EU states were currently enjoying. But the disconnect between the elites and the public was stark. Polish politicians almost immediately demanded large voting rights and other major political concessions. Defense deals with the United States threatened to alienate EU allies. Opposition parties were clumsy and inexperienced leaving no real political opposition to the elites who were undermining Polish influence in the EU by making demands.

In Poland the EU represents more than just economic prosperity, but political legitimacy. Both Ireland and Germany had established and consolidated democratic traditions upon joining the EU Poland did not. Poles overwhelmingly approve of the EU and disapprove of their own government. According to the evidence I have presented it is not clear that Poles firmly grasp the political nuances of the EU or Western style democracy, but it is clear that they prefer the honesty of EU institutions to the corruption
of their own Polish institutions. This leaves open the possibility that Polish identity might be influenced by “European” norms and values.

The evidence that I have collected suggests that national identities are still the center of life in Europe. It would be inaccurate to say however that integration and common institutions have no effect whatsoever on identities in Europe. The short and simple answer to the question that I set out to answer: “have identities changed in Europe” is that it is complicated. My evidence suggests that identities are changeable, that they can reflect the changes being made in Europe, but that these reactions are often unpredictable. What we can say with authority is that only small groups of political, academic, and business elites seem comfortable identifying as “Europeans,” while most in Europe still very much identify with their nation.

**Limits of this Research and its Future**

Although this dissertation emphasizes thick description of the cases I have selected there are limits to this approach. This dissertation emphasized public opinion data, historical, scholarly, and journalistic accounts in an attempt to understand the state of the national narrative. There is a wealth of relevant data for other EU states that would render different accounts of other national narratives. France and the Netherlands, for example, have focused much more on religious differences, in particular cultural conflicts with Muslims than my case studies have. Do large differences in religion have a galvanizing effect on local populations?

This research draws attention to the national narrative, or the story that elites or the masses tell themselves about who they are, but it relies almost exclusively on secondary sources such as newspaper articles. There are no interviews with policy
makers or ordinary citizens that were used. Instead this dissertation leans heavily on academic and journalistic accounts. The point of this dissertation was to look for evidence of a pan-European identity, not necessarily to prove that it exists.

There is such a vast literature on integration and identity formation that not all of it could be addressed in the space provided. There are plenty of important relationships that are likely influencing these larger shifts in national identity. Support for the EU and EU institutions are multifaceted and complex. Using Eurobarometer data clearly limits researchers ability to determine ‘why’ people chose to support or not to support EU institutions. The link between approval of EU institutions and actual identity formation needs further development. The evidence that I have gathered seems to suggest that institutional approval and identity can and usually are separate, but that process remains somewhat mysterious.

The politicization of identity and the way that political elites use the EU to rally support is another interesting phenomenon that this dissertation only briefly touches on. Is it ever possible that politicians and elites use the negative views of the EU to further their own political career? What effect does that have on national views of integration? The cases I selected illustrate instances in which elites constantly have to convince their publics that the EU is worthwhile, but more attention needs to be paid to those instances in which political parties and politicians use anti-EU feelings as a rallying cry.

Future research could focus on different cases, in particular France and the United Kingdom. Integration does seem, on some level, driven by state interests and there are as many different interests in Europe as there are states. The UK has many subnational groups like the Welsh, Scots, and Northern Irish. Do those groups feel differently about
the EU than the English? France is experiencing problems with immigration and cultural diversity. In what ways have the freedom of movement ensured by the EU impacted French culture? I can only illuminate three states and give a limited accounting of their experiences with integration, but clearly there is a much larger puzzle that needs to be explored.

Implications

The implications of this research are clear. The dreams of a conflict free Europe were based on the notion that out of many nations one uniting identity would emerge paving the way for peace and prosperity on the European continent. The fruits of European integration have are tangible and real, but the identity that was thought to be necessary is yet to truly materialize. Economic conditions do drive EU support to a point, but no conclusive evidence exists that suggests there is a new pan-European identity in the making. This research also shows that even though national identities remain salient and strong they are not static.

National identity needs to be thought of in terms of the prism through which integration is seen for many people in Europe. Dreams of replacing conflicting national identities with a pacific European identity miss the mark. Many of the local and national identities are products of hundreds of years of tectonic political and national evolution that have deep meanings to people. The idea that these deep-seated identifications could be undermined and replaced in a half-century was naive at worst and over-optimistic at best.

The future of the EU seems bright, but this research project highlights a few complex realities that Brussels must confront as integration moves forward. The first
thing Brussels must do is to recognize that many Europeans are very attached to their national identities and symbols. The creation of the Euro might be good for facilitating transactions across states, but many people feel as though the EU is stripping them of a source of national pride as we saw in Germany. The EU has created an impressive set of national symbols of its own, a flag, an anthem, and holidays. While some might see this as a celebration of pan-Europeanism and a triumph of cooperation, others feel as though the EU and Brussels is trivializing, even trying to replace national identities they hold dear.

What Brussels must realize is that identity change takes time. Identities are the products of collective experiences, and loyalties that are earned over long periods of time. The concept of institutional spillovers and using economic benefits to forge a new identity are somewhat noble, but it also ignores the idea that identities take time, lots of time to form. If Brussels pushes pan-Europeanism and ignores national identities they may find that the future of a pan-European identity are bleak. If on the other hand, they embrace local and national differences, celebrate differences and allow states more cultural latitude then the future of pan-Europeanism may bright indeed. Identity is something that happens organically, and while it is a construct it is not something easily constructed by policy makers.

As integration continues European leaders need to be comfortable with the idea that they do not necessarily need to change identities to ensure the future of the EU. Instead they need to trust their publics and be open to the idea that many of them will never give up their national identities in lieu of a pan-European one. This does not mean that the fruits of L’Europe will never been enjoyed, to the contrary, Europe is a peaceful
prosperous place today. The reality is that there are complex interests and identities in Europe that will not simply be pacified the ideals of pan-Europeanism, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. Identity transformation is Europe was really about avoiding the types of conflicts that had plagued Europe in the past. There is a great deal of evidence that suggests the EU and its institutions have already reduced the possibility of another war on European soil without creating a common identity.

If Europe is to overcome criticisms that it lacks full democratic transparency then it will need to be more sensitive to the national and even ethnic identities that make up the group of people we call ‘Europeans.’ A unifying European identity would solve this problem, but as of this writing it seems unlikely to happen. This being the case it seems time for Europe to embrace its diversity not attempt to transform it into universal cosmopolitanism.
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