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REBEL GROUP COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND FOREIGN STATE SPONSORSHIP

by

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REBEL GROUP COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND FOREIGN STATE SPONSORSHIP

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While rebel groups are obligated to comply with international humanitarian law (IHL) only indirectly, many rebel groups express intent to comply with IHL. Previous research has examined the conditions that make compliance likely. While these studies emphasize legitimacy-seeking, little research considers whether there are tangible benefits for rebel groups that comply with IHL. Studying whether rebel groups that comply with IHL are more likely to receive either military or diplomatic support from a foreign state provides an opportunity to bridge the literature on rebel group compliance with the literature on foreign state sponsorship of rebel groups. This study considers rebel group compliance with IHL alongside more extensively studied determinants of rebel group sponsorship, such as regime type and relative military capabilities, in order to assess whether rebel groups that comply with IHL are more likely to receive support from a foreign state. The results of the Firth logit regressions performed in this analysis indicate that democratic sponsors are less likely to sponsor rebel groups that use child soldiers, but that when democratic and autocratic sponsors are considered jointly, rebel group compliance with IHL does not appear to influence sponsorship decisions.

I. Introduction

On February 23, 1998, the United States' special envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, categorized the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as a terrorist group while speaking in Belgrade. Among other crimes, the KLA drew condemnation from the U.S. for killing and abducting civilians, specifically ethnic Serbs, both during and after its fight for an independent Kosovo (Human Rights Watch, 2001). Despite Gelbard's censure, Richard Holbrooke, acting as a private citizen at President Clinton's behest, met with KLA leadership in the summer of 1998. Perhaps even more puzzling, NATO provided air support to bolster the KLA's position against Serbian forces during Operation Allied Force from March to June 1999. How, then, did the KLA go from being a labeled a terrorist organization to receiving both diplomatic and military support from the U.S. and its NATO allies?

A myriad of potential explanations exist, such as NATO's history in the region and the higher rate of atrocity committed by Milosevic's Serbian forces. However, I argue that an overlooked factor is the KLA's publication of a document in November 1998 instructing KLA fighters to exercise restraint when engaged militarily. For example, order No. 3 in this document asserts, "Improper behavior with respect to the civilian population is to be prevented in all KLA units." (KLA, 1998). This order was given in response to pressure from the U.S. and served to characterize the KLA as the "good" actor in the conflict. It would have been untenable for NATO to carry out a humanitarian intervention by allying itself with an actor know to be in violation international humanitarian law (IHL).

The KLA's issuance of this order is an instance of the broader phenomenon of rebel groups expressing intent to comply with IHL, an act that is surprising since rebel groups do not have legal standing to formally ratify the Geneva Conventions. Since there is neither a direct nor an enforceable obligation for non-state actors like rebel groups to comply with IHL and since compliance should at least in theory produce better humanitarian outcomes, it is important to study which factors may encourage rebel group compliance. Specifically, this analysis focuses on foreign state sponsorship to ask: how does rebel group compliance with IHL influence the likelihood of a rebel group receiving support from a foreign state?

An analysis of Cunningham et al.'s (2013) Non-State Actor data and Jo's (2015) data indicates that from 1989-2009, during the time period in which approximately 20 percent of rebel groups committed themselves to comply with some aspect of IHL, only 11 percent of rebel groups received support from democratic states while 48 percent of rebel groups received foreign state support. This indicates that not only democratic governments are providing military or diplomatic support to rebel groups that declare themselves in compliance with IHL. Since both democratic and non-democratic states alike provide support to rebel groups that comply with IHL, it is appropriate to ask how rebel group compliance with IHL influences foreign state decisions to provide military or diplomatic support to a rebel group. This question is important for foreign policy, as it is possible that both democratic and non-democratic states are reluctant to support rebel groups that commit atrocities. Understanding the mechanisms that underlie this dynamic can help policymakers learn how to incentivize more rebel groups to comply with IHL, without the applicability being limited to democratic governments.

I argue that foreign states are more likely to provide support to rebel groups that comply with IHL regardless of whether the foreign states providing support are democracies. Furthermore, I expect that rebel group compliance with IHL is a significant enough factor in sponsorship decisions to maintain relevance alongside other strategic considerations such as regime type, proximity, and relative power. By bringing together the broader literature regarding foreign state support for rebel groups in civil war and rebel group compliance with IHL, I am able to robustly test the relationship between compliance and support.

III. Literature Review

I draw on and integrate two broad bodies of literature in this analysis: First, the literature regarding foreign state support for rebel groups and second, the literature regarding rebel group compliance with IHL. The literature on foreign state support for rebel groups considers more traditional determinants of foreign state sponsorship, such as geopolitical incentives. Next, I discuss the applicability of IHL to rebel groups before considering the nexus of rebel group compliance and foreign state support. The combination of these two literatures is the foundation of this analysis. Jo (2015) assumes that "support and recognition are not forthcoming without the sense of approval or expectation about the viability of authority of a rebel group" (p. 27). This analysis bridges the gap between the rebel group compliance literature and the foreign state support literature by including compliance in models of support. Focusing on support circumvents the intangible concept of legitimacy, enabling the rigorous empirical analysis of a specific outcome of compliance. By integrating these two literatures, it is

possible to study whether foreign state sponsors are more likely to provide military or diplomatic support when rebel groups are compliant with IHL. Finally, I conclude the literature review by considering counter-points to the notion potential sponsors are influenced by rebel group compliance with IHL. Throughout this analysis, I adopt Jo's (2015) definition of rebel groups as "military organizations that fight against a central government" (p. 36), with a focus on those groups that "engage in direct hostilities and launch military attacks on governments." (p. 38).

Foreign State Support for Rebel Groups in Civil War Literature

Common approaches to studying foreign state support for rebel groups are to conceptualize rebel groups as extensions of alliances, to characterize support as a means to harass rival states, to emphasize the role of neighboring states in providing rebel group support, or to consider how outside involvement impacts the likelihood of civil war (on alliances: Saideman, 2002[1]; San-Akca, 2009; San-Akca, 2016; on rivalry: Salehyan, 2008; Salehyan et al. 2011; Maoz & San-Akca, 2012; San-Akca, 2016; on neighboring states: Byman et al., 2001; Harbom & Wallensteen, 2005; on the likelihood of civil war: Gleditsch, 2007[2]; Salehyan, 2007). With the exception of Salehyan et al. (2014), who consider the number of human rights organizations (HROs) in foreign state sponsors of rebel groups, this literature largely neglects to consider whether rebel group compliance with IHL increases the likelihood of receiving military or diplomatic support. In

[1] Saideman's (2002) findings are inconclusive regarding whether relative power of the host state influences external support (including from non-state actors) for groups in ethnic conflict.

[2] Gleditsch (2007) studies how a number of transnational linkages affect the risk of violent civil conflict, including conflict in neighboring states.

addition, prior to the work by Salehyan et al. (2011) little of this literature considers characteristics of rebel groups that influence the likelihood of receiving support. Instead, the majority of the literature studies characteristics within foreign state-host state dyads.

One of the most studied state characteristics in considering support for rebel groups is regime type of both the foreign state (sponsoring state) and the host state (state that the rebel group is fighting). This literature began with interstate war and the findings have since been adapted to the civil war literature. Chan (1984) finds that in dyads democracies are less willing to go to war with each other, although they are no less likely to fight non-democracies. Bremer (1992) extends this finding using Chan's (1984) data by suggesting that at least one democracy in a dyad decreases the chance of interstate war. An independent effect of political system type on the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes was detected when Maoz & Russett (1992) controlled for distance, wealth, economic growth, alliances, and political stability. During the Cold War, Forsythe (1992) notes that this relationship didn't fully extend to intrastate conflict because the U.S. was willing to covertly sponsor action against other industrialized democracies as concern with containment took precedence over the principal of non-intervention. However, in general the literature that considers support for rebel groups as a means to undermine a rival state applies the regime type findings of the interstate conflict literature to internal conflict (Salehyan, 2008; Salehyan et al. 2011; Maoz & San-Akca, 2012; San-Akca, 2016).

More recently, a small body of literature has started to incorporate rebel group characteristics such as the group's strength, transnational constituencies, and the number of civilians killed by a group (Salehyan et al., 2011; 2014). Through the application of a

principal-agent framework, Salehyan et al. (2011) find that a rebel group's strength and the presence of transnational constituencies with links to the group influence the likelihood of foreign state support for the group. A later study suggests that states that value IHL may either refuse to sponsor groups that commit violations or that these states may pressure groups to comply with IHL after sponsorship (Salehyan et al., 2014). The finding that rebel group characteristics are relevant to sponsorship decisions helps motivate my argument that foreign states are more likely to sponsor compliant rebel groups. I diverge from Salehyan et al. (2014) by arguing that both democratic and non-democratic states are more likely to support groups that comply rather than focusing on democracies.

Rebel Group Compliance with International Humanitarian Law

On July 12, 1978, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions entered into force. An extension of Common Article 3, this Protocol extends much of the humanitarian law governing international wars to internal armed conflicts (ICRC, n.d.). When the Protocol was adopted in 1977, eighty percent of armed conflicts since 1945 had been internal rather than international (ICRC, n.d.). In response to this new reality, a central goal of Additional Protocol II was, and remains, to increase protection for civilians in the midst of internal armed conflict.

However, only state actors can ratify and thus formally agree to be bound by international law; traditionally, non-state actors are merely indirectly bound by the state in which they operate (Forsythe, 1978). Although rebel groups can't formally ratify the Geneva Conventions, the consensus in the international legal community is that

international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to all parties in internal armed conflicts, including rebel groups, specifically through Additional Protocol II[3] (Cassese, 1981; Meron, 1995; Sivakumaran, 2006; Sassóli, 2010; Kamatali, 2013). In summary, rebel groups are expected to comply with IHL, and, despite the lack of an enforcement mechanism, rebel groups have frequently signaled their intent to comply. They are able to do so through mechanisms such as unilateral declarations and "bilateral agreements with governments, international organizations, and NGOS." (Jo, 2015, p. 87). For example, about 20 percent of the 250 rebel groups involved in civil wars from 1990-2010 expressed intent to comply with some aspect of international law (Jo, 2015, p. 87).

States may choose to support rebel groups that are compliant with IHL for a variety of reasons. First, a sponsoring state's value for IHL may inform decisions to support compliant rebel groups (Salehyan et al., 2014; Jo, 2015; Stanton, 2016). Alternatively, a fear of public backlash for supporting non-compliant rebel groups could drive states to consider compliance when making sponsorship decisions (Aldrich et al., 1989; Murdie & Davis, 2012; Wallace, 2013; Kreps and Wallace, 2016; Wallace, 2019). Third, states that do not place a high value on IHL and that have more limited domestic audiences may still be sensitive to potential consequences from the international community or domestic political elites for supporting non-compliant groups (Weeks, 2008; 2012; Hafner-Burton, 2009; Tomz, 2012). For example, these consequences could range from loss of reputation to public condemnation to sanctions. These consequences

[3] There is, however, disagreement over the legal justification of the application of IHL in internal armed conflicts. See Cassese (1981), Sivakumaran (2006), Sassóli (2010), and Kamatali (2013).

are not mutually exclusive; public condemnation can harm a state's reputation, which in turn can produce backlash from domestic elites.

Scholars that ask why rebel groups comply with IHL largely argue that compliant rebel groups are more likely to be perceived as legitimate, both by domestic audiences and by the international community (Ewumbe-Monono, 2006; Sivakumaran, 2006; Ryngaert, 2008; Higgins, 2009; Bellamy, 2012; Jo, 2015; Stanton, 2016). Legitimacy is derived from a rebel group's goals, the means by which it achieves those goals, as well as characteristics of the group itself. Compliance with IHL can legitimize a rebel group's means, but this does not mean that rebel groups that comply are inherently legitimate, as their goals or characteristics may still not be. However, it is possible for legitimate means to influence perceptions of a rebel group's goals. Compliance is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for legitimacy. Both domestically and internationally, legitimacy plays a role in signifying the "right" of the rebel group to fight against the government.

However, this analysis takes a step beyond legitimacy, which is intangible. Instead, I argue that rebel groups that comply with IHL are more likely to receive international support. If we accept the argument that compliance with IHL serves to validate a rebel group's goals, then foreign states should be more likely to provide material support to those rebel groups that comply with IHL. This analysis sets aside the question of whether the goals of compliant rebel groups are more likely to be perceived as valid by domestic actors in the state in which the conflict takes place (the host state) in order to consider whether rebel groups that comply with international humanitarian law are more likely to draw material support from foreign states.

While previous work suggests a link between the desire for legitimacy and rebel group compliance with IHL (Ewumbe-Monono, 2006; Sivakumaran, 2006; Ryngaert, 2008; Higgins, 2009; Bellamy, 2012), Jo's (2015) work is the first book to rigorously test this link. Jo's (2015) central argument is that rebel groups seeking legitimacy are more likely to comply with IHL. The database she uses to test her claim serves as the basis for the database constructed for this analysis. Like Salehyan et al. (2011), by adopting McCubbins & Kiewiet's (1991) principal-agent framework of congressional delegation to a principal-agent framework of rebel group compliance, Jo (2015) argues that foreign states (principals) can influence the behavior of rebel groups (agents) (p. 66). She specifically considers the possibility that a foreign sponsor may provide tangible support, such as arms, when a rebel group shares sufficient common interests with the sponsor (Jo, 2015). Compliance with IHL indicates that rebel groups are willing to shift from the short-term gains of violence against civilians to the long-term benefits of being perceived as legitimate for adhering to humanitarian norms. One possible, and testable, benefit of being perceived as legitimate is an increased likelihood of receiving support from a foreign state.

Scholarship regarding rebel group compliance often focuses on how compliance with IHL can legitimize rebel groups specifically in the eyes of Western democratic governments (Salehyan et al., 2014; Jo, 2015; Stanton, 2016). For example, Stanton (2016) argues, "Belligerents can seek assistance from Western governments and IGOs by demonstrating a commitment to democracy and human rights." (p. 7). In support of this, Jo (2015) finds that the higher the number of human rights organizations (HROs) in a sponsor state, the less likely the rebel group is to kill civilians. Also lending support to

this argument are experimental findings indicating that the U.S. public opinion is sensitive to violations of international law in the context of torture (Wallace, 2013), drone strikes (Kreps & Wallace, 2016). Furthermore, in his analysis of cross-national data, Wallace (2019) finds that support for violence in conflict decreases when individuals are aware of IHL. Wallace's (2019) results suggest responsiveness to IHL in both democracies and non-democracies. Complimentary to this, I argue that focusing on the relationship between rebel group compliance and perceptions of legitimacy among democracies ignores the reality that the majority of support for compliant rebel groups comes from non-democratic governments. Furthermore, although Stanton (2016) suggests a link between compliance and assistance, testing this claim is outside the scope of her research. On this matter, Stanton (2016) indicates that although rebel groups may comply with IHL in order to gain international support, they do not necessarily succeed.

Attention is also paid in the literature to the time period during which rebel groups became more likely to comply with IHL. One group of scholars argues that rebel groups became more likely to comply after the end of the Cold War as strategic rivalries faded and advances in information technology increased awareness of mass atrocity (Bellamy, 2012[4]; Jo, 2015; Stanton, 2016). While Stanton's (2016) statistical analysis provides support for the argument that governments adhere more closely to IHL post-1989, her results for rebel group compliance post-1989 are insignificant. In contrast, Ewumbe-Monono (2006) and Higgins (2009) emphasize the proliferation of national liberation movements after World War II and consider IHL compliance by rebel groups in this

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[4] According the Bellamy's (2012) logic, the norm of civilian immunity should be strongest after the end of the Cold War, but weakened after 2001 due to increasing military incentives to target civilians.

context rather than the post-Cold War era, but do not provide empirical evidence to support this distinction. This distinction is important, as it informs decisions to study the impact of rebel group compliance in a pre- or post-Cold War context. Since Stanton (2016) finds that governments tend to adhere to IHL more closely since 1989, it is appropriate to use Jo's (2015) database as the basis of my own.

In summary, scholars who study why rebel groups comply with IHL largely focus on legitimacy, but in doing so generally don't consider whether legitimacy can be converted into material support. By considering whether foreign states are more likely to provide support to rebel groups that comply with IHL, I am able to conduct an empirical analysis that furthers our understanding of why rebel groups comply that is not limited by the intangibility of legitimacy. In addition, by focusing on the post-Cold War era, I am able to analyze the outcomes of rebel group compliance during a time period in which governments demonstrate greater value for compliance, reflected through their own increased compliance.

Accidents of Interest: Privileging National Security over Compliance

In direct opposition to the previously discussed literature, Goldsmith & Posner (2005) argue that states comply with international law due to coincidences of interest, coercion, cooperation, or coordination. Notably absent is compliance due to an acknowledged legal obligation (Goldsmith & Posner, 2005). This logic suggests that states themselves comply with international humanitarian law due to its reciprocal nature; not targeting a foreign state's civilians helps ensure that a state's own citizens will not be targeted in turn. It is no accident that IHL compliance is most likely when the laws can

be reciprocally enforced (Morrow, 2007): Compliance is in states' interests. This reciprocal framework does not exist with respect to rebel group compliance with IHL because a potential sponsor state is not concerned that a rebel group fighting in an internal conflict may one day attack civilians within its own borders.

Applying Goldsmith & Posner's (2005) logic to rebel sponsorship indicates that because it is a coincidence of interest that states themselves comply with IHL, there is no reason for states to coerce potential sponsor states to only sponsor those rebel groups that comply with IHL. As evidence, Goldsmith & Posner (2005) call attention to the United States' inconsistent enforcement of human rights abroad (p. 117). In a similar vein, Guzman (2008)[5] argues that the reputational costs of defaulting on international commitments are marginal at best. Where advancing security interests comes at the cost of reputation, states tend to make reputational sacrifices.

Even when states do have a sincere interest in upholding international human rights law, there is an incentive to free ride. As long as there is a possibility that another state will punish the offending state, states have a decreased incentive to intervene (Posner, 2014). There could, then, be a collective action problem with respect to sanctioning the sponsors of non-compliant rebel groups. Additionally, Hopgood (2013) argues that the validity of human rights norms themselves are under attack; since human rights have been overtly tied to national security and economic interests and espoused as foreign policy, their moral underpinnings have eroded. Taken together, one could surmise from these works that: 1. States have never had a strong incentive to punish

[5] While Goldsmith & Posner (2005) and Guzman (2008) consider overlapping interests, coordination, and cooperation as the basis of compliance with international law, Guzman (2008) emphasizes the role of reputation, contrasting with Goldsmith & Posner (2005).

states that sponsor rebel groups that commit mass atrocity; and 2. Even when states do sanction such sponsorship, they inadvertently undermine the foundations of IHL by framing such intervention as in the interest of national security.

III. Theory

Since states are expected to support rebel groups that they perceive as legitimate, and since IHL compliance is argued to legitimize rebel groups, I argue that foreign states are more likely to provide diplomatic or military support to compliant rebel groups. Furthermore, I argue that this relationship holds regardless of whether the sponsor state is a democracy or a non-democracy. While the audience that holds the leaders of democratic and non-democratic states accountable varies, the end result is the same for both groups. In general, states are more likely to provide military or diplomatic support to compliant groups.

Democratic states are generally considered to value IHL highly (Salehyan et al., 2014; Jo, 2015; Stanton, 2016). This value is rooted in the public's ability to hold the leaders of democratic states accountable for behaving in ways that the public views as undesirable, and this extends to foreign policy (Aldrich et al., 1989; Murdie & Davis, 2012; Wallace, 2013; Kreps and Wallace, 2016; Wallace, 2019). If the public finds the actions of a rebel group objectionable, there is little incentive for democratic leaders to provide support to the group. However, it is also the case that non-democracies are susceptible to similar pressures. Non-democracies are sensitive to pressure from both political elites and from the international community, if not from a robust civil society (Weeks, 2008; 2012; Hafner-Burton, 2009; Tomz, 2012). As I argue below, these

sensitivities constitute a feedback loop that creates an incentive structure for non-democracies to value rebel group compliance with IHL when making sponsorship decisions in as meaningful a way as do democracies.

Non-democracies are often treated as a unified group despite variation in the structures of non-democracies (Weeks, 2008; 2012). Building upon Fearon's (1994) conceptualization of audience costs, Weeks (2008) demonstrates that single party regimes can signal threats as credibly as democracies and that civilian regimes are no more likely to engage in conflict than democracies (Weeks, 2012). This is due to the small circle of powerful elites that have the ability to push the leaders of these types of non-democracies out of power; these elites check the power of autocrats in much the same way that the broader public checks the power of democratically elected leaders (Weeks, 2008; 2012). These elites are sensitive to actions by the leader that can reduce the bargaining position of the state within the broader international community, and I as soon demonstrate, sponsorship of non-compliant rebel groups may reduce a state's bargaining position. (Weeks, 2008; 2012). A potential caveat is that leaders who face forcible removal from office may initiate conflict as a distraction from domestic threats to their position (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011). However, rebel sponsorship is an avoidance of direct conflict, so I argue it is insufficient to serve as a distraction.

The connecting point in this feedback loop is located in the relationship between both democratic and autocratic states and the international community. Tomz (2012) outlines a framework of cooperation and credibility, underpinned by the concepts of issue linkage and repeat play, in order to explain how reputation drives international loaning and repayment behavior. He theorizes that because states will continue to encounter one

another and because misbehavior in one issue area may impact a separate issue area, states will tend to cooperate in order to maintain their reputation (Tomz, 2012). As a human rights example of this phenomenon, Hafner-Burton (2009) demonstrates that Western democracies frequently link human rights conditions to preferential free trade agreements.

Autocratic states do not need a voting public in order to value rebel compliance with IHL. Instead, they are held accountable by elites reacting to a reduction in the state's international bargaining position. The feedback loop is as such: If non-democratic states support rebel groups that commit atrocity and this has reputational costs with economic consequences, elites in those states are able to hold their leader accountable with the threat of removal from office.

Consider, for example, the case of Sudanese support for the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) (along with other non-compliant groups). As Stanton (2016) notes, Sudan's support for several rebel groups designated as terrorist groups, including the GIA, provoked the United States to place Sudan on its list of state sponsors of terrorism. This undercut Sudan's ability to receive international financial assistance, reducing its bargaining position. Sufficiently violent rebel groups can attract the attention of the international community and such scrutiny may result in the punishment of the sponsor states that enabled the violence. Omar al-Bashir's support for a host of non-compliant rebel groups came at the cost of a reduction of foreign aid and trade partners. This signals to other states considering sponsorship that supporting rebel groups that violate IHL may not be costless. While al-Bashir did not lose power as a result, leaders with a

more tenuous grasp on power must consider the potential reputational consequences of providing support to rebel groups that commit mass atrocity.

Supporting non-compliant rebel groups is a doubly problematic for both autocratic and democratic leaders: First, the leaders expend resources supporting the group and second, the leaders may face reputational costs that result in economic consequences, catalyzing their removal from office. Democratic states strive to maintain their reputation of upholding the human rights architecture, and, through the dominance of the neoliberal order, draw in non-democratic states. Tomz's (2012) argument indicates that this is due to a desire to foster cooperation across issue areas and keep reputations intact. If the leader of State A is considering providing support to a rebel group that violates IHL and the leader of State A believes that State A may incur reputational losses for providing support, he or she must consider the possibility of losing office. If the leader of State A is uncertain about his or her ability to retain office after sponsorship, the leader of State A should be less likely to provide support to the rebel group. Here, the expectation of consequences from reputational losses outstrips the importance of actual consequences; states don't need to be punished, but merely to act as if they might be for this framework to apply.

Since Western democratic states are the architects of IHL, these states should be expected to consider rebel group compliance when making sponsorship decisions.

> *Hypothesis I:* Democratic states are more likely to sponsor a rebel group when the rebel group expresses intent to comply with IHL.

However, the above theory suggests that this relationship should hold for both democracies and autocracies.

> *Hypothesis II:* A foreign state is more likely to sponsor a rebel group when the rebel group expresses intent to comply with IHL, regardless of regime type.

The final section of the literature review indicates that all states, regardless of regime type, face similar disincentives to punish states that aid rebel groups that violate IHL. National security interests arising from the dyadic relationship between the host state and the sponsor state may dominate humanitarian concerns.

> *Hypothesis III:* A foreign state is no more likely to sponsor a rebel group when the group expresses intent to comply with IHL, regardless of regime type.

In sum, I first argue that democratic states should be more likely to provide support to rebel groups that comply with IHL. I further theorize that autocratic states also have an incentive to support such rebel groups. As a result, I expect rebel group compliance with IHL to be positively related to the likelihood of foreign states providing support to rebel groups regardless of whether the foreign states are democracies or autocracies. In contrast, I consider the possibility that the relationship between the host state and sponsor state dominates sponsorship decisions and that these decisions are not impacted by how rebel groups behave towards civilians. In the following section, I examine the empirical evidence both for and against each of these propositions.

IV. Analyzing the Relationship Between Foreign State Support and Rebel Compliance

I conduct a quantitative analysis of the relationship between foreign state sponsorship and rebel group compliance using a Firth logit regression, which is appropriate since the dependent variable, *foreign state support*, is binary. This variable is from the Non-State Actors (NSA) data, coded to reflect whether rebel groups did or did

not receive foreign state sponsorship (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2013). There are three degrees of support considered in this dataset: no support, alleged support, and explicit support. Support consists of military and diplomatic support. Like Salehyan et al. (2014), I include only the categories of no support and explicit support; alleged support is coded as no support. This coding provides a more rigorous test of the hypotheses.

The independent variable, *rebel group compliance with IHL*, is operationalized as the number of civilians killed by the rebel group. This variable is drawn from Jo's (2015) dataset; Jo sourced this variable from the UCDP One-sided Violence dataset (Eck & Hultman, 2007; Allansson, Melander, & Themnér, 2017). Jo (2015) notes that data regarding rebel groups is especially sparse prior to the 2000s and that data is collected more extensively on certain rebel groups than others. Missing data regarding civilians killed is therefore a limitation in this analysis. Despite its flaws, this measure is appropriate since it captures the actions of rebel groups rather than expressions of intent to comply with IHL. A model including the actions of rebel groups avoids biasing the results in favor of *Hypotheses I* and *II* by excluding public statements of intent to comply. Public statements of compliance may not necessarily translate to compliance, so talk may be "cheap" and more frequent than actual restraint. By operationalizing compliance as the number of civilians killed by a rebel group each year, it is possible to capture actual compliance.

I include in the analysis two additional models that operationalize rebel group compliance differently. First, I consider the use of child soldiers by rebel groups. This

variable is drawn from Jo's (2015) data[6] and is coded as 1 if a group uses child soldiers and as 0 if a group does not. Second, also from Jo's (2015)[7] data, I analyze access to detention facilities. This variable is coded as 0 for no access, 1 for partial access, and 2 for complete access. As Jo (2015) explains, a no access coding can be problematic, as it captures cases in which the rebel group doesn't detain at all and in which the government prevents the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from entering the country or in which the country is too unsafe for the ICRC to visit (p. 273). However, this coding should over-represent "no access" and bias the model against significant findings that suggest allowing access to detention centers increases the likelihood of foreign state sponsorship.

Several control variables are also necessary. Several of these address the relationship between the host state and the sponsor state: the relative power of the sponsor state compared to the host state, whether a sponsor-host dyad is democratic, and whether the sponsor state and host state are contiguous. First, San-Akca (2016) argues that sponsor states view rebel groups as extensions of alliances and value rebel groups for their ability to undermine the relative power of the host state. Maoz & San-Akca (2012) find that weaker states are more likely to sponsor rebel groups in order to harass stronger rivals rather than directly confronting them. The *relative power* variable accounts for the relative strength of the sponsor state in comparison to the host state. The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) from the Correlates of War Project National Military Capabilities (v5.0) data is used for this measure (Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey,

[6] She attributes this data to Child Solider International, Lasley (2012), and Beber & Blattman (2013)
[7] Originally from Jo and Thomson (2013)

1972). The CINC measure of the host state is divided by the CINC measures of the host plus the sponsor states. A value greater than 0.5 signifies that the sponsor state is weaker than the host state.

Second, democracies are less likely to engage in militarized disputes with other democracies, which extends to an unwillingness to sponsor rebel groups fighting against more democratic host states (Chan, 1984; Bremer, 1992; Maoz & Russett 1992; Salehyan, 2008; Salehyan et al. 2011; Maoz & San-Akca, 2012; San-Akca, 2016). To formulate the *democratic dyad variable,* in keeping with Salehyan et al. (2014) and Jo (2015), the polities of the sponsor and host states are sourced from the Polity IV data from the Center for Systemic Peace (2017). The "*Polity2*" variable is used, as it is more appropriate for time-series analysis: interruptions are treated as missing, anarchy is scored as zero, and transitions are prorated across the amount of time in which the transition occurred (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2017). Salehyan et al. (2014) code states with a polity score greater than or equal to 6 as democracies and states with a polity score less than 6 as non-democracies and I adopt this coding. Dyads in which both states are democracies are coded as 1; dyads in which only one state or neither state is a democracy are coded as 0.

Third, Byman et al. (2001), Harbom & Wallensteen (2005), and Salehyan (2007) indicate that states are more likely to provide support to rebel groups in the same neighborhood. The *contiguity* variable accounts for whether the host and sponsor states share any measure of contiguity. It is sourced from the Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2016 (v3.2) (Stinnett, Tir, Schafe, Diehl, Gochman, 2002). For

the purpose of this analysis, states that are separated by 400 miles of water or less receive a 1 and states that are separated by more receive a zero.

A second group of control variables deals with characteristics of a given conflict: the length of the conflict and the intensity of the conflict. When conflicts last longer, rebels become more likely to receive sponsorship and civilian casualties will accumulate. *Duration* is calculated as the total number of years a conflict had lasted by 2009, based upon the NSA data (Cunningham et al. 2013). In higher intensity conflicts more civilian casualties may be inflicted, yet these higher intensity conflicts may also increase the interest of foreign states and the likelihood that they will become involved in the conflict through rebel group sponsorship. The *intensity* variable is sourced from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, version 17.2 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, Strand, 2002). The ACD codes minor conflicts as 1 (25-999 battle deaths per year) and war as 2 (over 1,000 battle deaths per year). I use the maximum value for intensity over the course of a conflict, coding war as 1 and minor conflicts as 0 in order to account for the possibility that the status of a conflict as war influences the likelihood of foreign state support for a rebel group.

The final set of control variables relates to the rebel groups themselves: a comparison of the violence of the rebel group with the violence of the host state, whether the rebel group has a political wing, the strength of the rebel group's command structure, and whether the rebel group has a transnational constituency. It may be that absolute civilian casualties are less important than relative civilian casualties. If the government is killing more civilians than a rebel group, sponsorship may be more likely even if the rebel group is also killing civilians. *Civilians killed by host* is also drawn from Jo's

(2015) dataset, and, as with the variable regarding civilians killed by rebel groups, Jo (2015) sourced this variable from the UCDP One-sided Violence dataset (Eck & Hultman, 2007; Allansson, Melander, & Themnér, 2017).

Rebel groups with a political wing may be more likely to seek domestic legitimacy by minimizing civilian casualties, and potential sponsors may be attracted to more firmly established groups. *Rebel group political wing* is sourced from the NSA data (Cunningham et al., 2013). It is coded as 1 if the rebel group has a political wing and as 0 otherwise. Similarly, rebel groups with stronger command structures may be better able to enforce IHL compliance within their ranks and potential sponsors may be more willing to commit to more organized groups. Also from the NSA dataset, *strength of command structure* ranges from low (1) to moderate (2) to high (3) (Cunningham et al., 2013). Lastly, the presence of transnational constituencies with ties to the rebel group appears to increase the likelihood that a group will receive support (Salehyan et al., 2011). Whether a rebel group has *transnational constituency support* is drawn from the Non-State Actors in Conflict Dyadic data (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2009). If a rebel group has explicit or tacit transnational constituency support, this is coded as 1; if not, 0.

As mentioned previously, a Firth logit is used since support, a rare event, is only coded for 170 out of 41,185 observations. This is a dyadic dataset, employing rebel group-potential sponsor state pair as the unit analysis, with one entry for each rebel group-potential sponsor state pair. Every state is paired with every rebel group; if a state provides support to a rebel group, this is noted with a "1" for the dependent variable. As a result, the dataset is 41,185 observations, with only 170 instances of support. Since Jo

(2015) and Stanton (2016) suggest that IHL compliance should factor more heavily into sponsorship decisions since the end of the Cold War, this analysis includes internal conflicts identified by the Non-State Actors in Conflict Dyadic data from 1989-2009 (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2013). The endpoint is 2009, as Jo's (2015) compliance measures are employed.

Results

This dyadic dataset contains one entry for each potential sponsor-rebel group pair. In the case of quantitative variables, yearly data is averaged over the course of the conflict. The median value is used for categorical data[8]. A disadvantage of this approach is that it is impossible to assess when sponsorship occurred in relation to annual civilian casualties. This is a limitation of existing data. As a result, each year of a conflict is coded as 1 if support was given at any point in the conflict and coded as 0 if support was never given. This is discussed at length later in the analysis. This method could potentially skew the support data by making it appear that more rebel groups received support than did due a high number of sponsors for a particular group. However, the potential error resulting from this appears to be random and doesn't skew the support variable. In the NSA data, 44.8% of rebel groups received foreign state support and *Table 1* indicates that in this dataset, 44.5% of rebel groups received support. This is in part due to the difference in rebel groups represented in the NSA data and those with compliance measures in Jo's (2015) data.

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[8] This does not systematically impact results; see Appendix for models with minimum and maximum categorical values.

Table 1. Summary Statistics for all Variables

Variables	Min	Max	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
Support (military or diplomatic)	0	1	0.004	.065	41,185
Civilians killed by rebel group (average per year)	0	14,796.5	101.705	951.905	41,185
Child soldiers used by rebel group	0	1	.327	.469	39,701
Detention visits allowed by rebel group	0	2	0 (median)		32,547
Democratic dyad	0	1	0.155	.362	41,185
Relative power (host/host+sponsor)	.0002	.999	0.583	0.334	40,060
Contiguity	0	1	.050	.402	41,185
Duration	0	40	4.572	6.484	41,185
Intensity (minor conflict vs war)	0	1	.363	.481	38,345
Civilians killed by host (average per year)	0	21,978.66	162.35	1444.38	38,748
Rebel political wing	0	1	.328	.470	39,546
Rebel command strength	1	3	2 (median)		34,616
Transnational constituency (support for rebel group)	0	1	.343	.475	37,593

The average number of civilians killed per year by rebel groups ranges greatly, from as few as zero to as many as 14,796. For example, in 1996, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, killed 27,445 civilians during the First Congo War. While *Hypotheses I* and *II* suggest that foreign state support is unlikely when rebel groups don't

minimize civilian casualties, the AFDL received support from Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, and Zambia. Rwanda is an outlier with respect to the number of civilians killed by the government. An average number of nearly 22,000 civilians killed per year puts Rwanda approximately 20,000 civilians ahead of the next closest host state. Due the presence of extreme outliers, the log of the average number of civilians killed by both rebel groups and governments is used.

The summary statistics include averages across all potential sponsor-rebel group pairs, so the summary statistics for host state-potential sponsor state characteristics reflect all entries, not just entries where support occurs. The mean CINC ratio where support occurs is 0.352, with a standard deviation of 0.278. This indicates that, contrary to expectations, the host is on average weaker than the sponsor. Also of note, 32.3% of states shared some degree of contiguity in cases of sponsorship.

In approximately 5% of cases where sponsorship occurs the sponsor and host states are both democratic. These include a conflict in Papua New Guinea in which the Solomon Islands sponsored the secessionist Bougainville Revolutionary Army and rebel sponsorship by India in conflicts in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. While approximately 95% of cases do not involve democratic dyads, the presence of any democratic dyads is of theoretical interest. The democratic peace literature suggests that democracies do not go to war with other democracies, yet San-Akca (2016) argues that sponsorship can be conceptualized as an extension of an alliance. Democratic sponsorship of rebel groups fighting against democratic hosts provides a challenge for the democratic peace literature. Analysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this study, but future research should consider whether such sponsorship undermines the democratic peace.

Table 2. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State Support by Democracies

Regressor	Partial Slope Coefficients (Standard Error)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Civilians killed by rebel group (average per year)	-.069 (.110)		
Child soldiers used by rebel group		.104 (.413)	
Detention visits allowed by rebel group			.361 (.276)
Relative power (host/(host+sponsor))	-2.096*** (.595)	-2.102*** (.593)	-2.062** (.640)
Contiguity	.646*** (.148)	.656*** (.148)	.668*** (.154)
Duration	.071*** (.020)	.640** (.020)	.063** (.020)
Intensity (minor conflict vs war)	.604 (.401)	.474 (.393)	.596 (.433)
Civilians killed by host (average per year)	-.193* (.090)	-.201* (.090)	-.190* (.091)
Rebel political wing (Median value)	.024 (.410)	.111 (.386)	.391 (.404)
Rebel command strength (Median value)	.550~ (.311)	.548~ (.313)	.473 (.333)
Transnational constituency (support for rebel group) (Median value)	.353 (.360)	.337 (.360)	.422 (.379)
Constant	-6.768*** (.825)	-6.780*** (.845)	-6.966*** (.937)
Wald chi2	59.27***	59.08***	53.26***
Number of observations	13,980	13,792	11,733

~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit

Table 2 reports the partial slope coefficients for each variable in order to assess *Hypothesis I*, which posits that democracies should be more likely to provide support to rebel groups that comply with IHL. Note that democratic dyad is excluded from these models, as it is related to democracy. The results do not support the hypothesis: there is no significant relationship between support and rebel killing of civilians, rebel use of child soldiers, or the allowance detention visits. The most consistent findings across operationalizations of compliance are that democracies are more likely to provide support to rebel groups that are fighting in neighboring states, democracies are more likely to support rebels fighting in relatively weaker states, and longer conflicts are associated with an increased likelihood of rebel support. In addition, democracies are less likely to intervene on the side of the rebels as the number of civilians killed by the host government increases.

Interestingly, the results presented in *Table 3* indicate that autocracies behave markedly similar to democracies in their sponsorship of rebel groups. The results for democratic sponsors regarding relative power, contiguity, and conflict duration all replicate for autocratic sponsors. However, for autocracies there is no relationship between the number of civilians killed by the host state and the likelihood of sponsorship. In addition, autocracies are less likely to sponsor rebel groups with a political wing.

Table 3. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State Support by Autocracies

Regressor	Partial Slope Coefficients (Standard Error)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Civilians killed by rebel group (average per year)	.087~ (.046		
Child soldiers used by rebel group		.122 (.213)	
Detention visits allowed by rebel group			.244~ (.139)
Relative power (host/(host+sponsor))	-2.956*** (.343)	-2.908*** (.349)	-2.856*** (.372)
Contiguity	.485*** (.088)	.480*** (.089)	.407*** (.102)
Duration	.056*** (.014)	.053*** (.015)	.062*** (.014)
Intensity (minor conflict vs war)	.296 (.220)	.481* (.215)	.319 (.248)
Civilians killed by host (average per year)	.045 (.040)	.043 (.040)	.044 (.044)
Rebel political wing (Median value)	-.778** (.250)	-.807** (.248)	-.773** (.265)
Rebel command strength (Median value)	-.238 (.155)	-.235 (.159)	-.171 (.173)
Transnational constituency (support for rebel group) (Median value)	.081 (.210)	.187 (.205)	.149 (.216)
Constant	-3.594*** (.396)	-3.838*** (.410)	-3.781*** (.467)
Wald chi2	128.87***	121.69***	102.84***
Number of observations	14,602	14,304	11,999

~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit

Below, *Table 4* addresses *Hypotheses II* and *III.* These hypotheses are the opposite of one another; *Hypothesis II* maintains that sponsorship decisions will be influenced by rebel group compliance with IHL regardless of regime type, whereas *Hypothesis III* makes the counter-point that compliance is not a factor in sponsorship decisions. The results provide the strongest support for *Hypothesis III:* no operationalization of compliance is statistically significant at the .05 level. As in the autocratic and democratic models, contrary to expectations stronger sponsor states tended to support rebel groups fighting in weaker host states. This holds even when contiguity, a typical source of rivalry, is excluded from the model. This could be because weaker states have fewer resources with which to sponsor rebel groups.

Consistent with expectations, democracies are far less likely to sponsor rebel groups that are fighting against other democracies. This holds regardless of how rebel group compliance is conceptualized. As in the democracy and autocracy models, contiguous states are significantly more likely to sponsor rebel groups operating in neighboring states. Again, as expected, sponsorship is increasingly likely as conflicts continue, which is not surprising, as there is simply more opportunity for foreign states to become involved on the side of rebels. Finally, states are less likely to sponsor rebel groups with a political wing. While this is negative, strength of command structure is also included in the models. The most likely explanation is that rebel groups with a political wing but a weak command structure are seen as less desirable by potential sponsors states. Such political wings may have inconsistent policies and have difficulty achieving goals.

Table 4. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State Support

Regressor	Partial Slope Coefficients (Standard Error)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Civilians killed by rebel group (average per year)	.052 (.042)		
Child soldiers used by rebel group		.081 (.186)	
Detention visits allowed by rebel group			.209~ (.125)
Relative power (host/(host+sponsor))	-2.359*** (.288)	-2.341*** (.291)	-2.243*** (.312)
Democratic dyad	-.957** (.347)	-.923** (.348)	-1.295** (.449)
Contiguity	.599*** (.075)	.598*** (.076)	.554*** (.084)
Duration	.061*** (.011)	.059*** (.012)	.065*** (.012)
Intensity (minor conflict vs war)	.299 (.195)	.423* (.189)	.363~ (.217)
Civilians killed by host (average per year)	-.013 (.036)	-.016 (.036)	-.018 (.039)
Rebel political wing (Median value)	-.564** (.209)	-.582** (.205)	-.479* (.217)
Rebel command strength (Median value)	-.093 (.137)	-.084 (.140)	-.056 (.152)
Transnational constituency (support for rebel group) (Median value)	.173 (.181)	.228 (.178)	.239 (.188)
Constant	-4.459*** (.353)	-4.504*** (.364)	-4.681*** (.414)
Wald chi2	159.84***	153.86***	132.60***

Number of observations	28,582	28,096	23,732

~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit

These results suggest that democracies are as unresponsive as autocracies to rebel group compliance. Instead, both democracies and autocracies are more likely to become involved on the side of rebels in conflicts that are geographically close, which is consistent with existing work. When democracies and autocracies are considered together, a pattern of stronger states sponsoring rebel groups operating in weaker states emerges. It is likely that weaker states simply can't afford to intervene on behalf of rebel groups as often as can wealthier states. This limits the ability of weaker states to undermine stronger rivals through sponsorship.

VI. Conclusion

The results of this analysis suggest that *Hypothesis III,* that there is no relationship between foreign state support and rebel group compliance, be accepted. This indicates that in the aggregate, IHL compliance does not consistently inform state decisions to provide military or diplomatic support to rebel groups. Rather, the difference in military capabilities between the host state and sponsor state, the presence of democracy in both the host and sponsor, the duration of the conflict, and the geographic location of the host state and potential sponsor state are most important factors. The general trend, then, is that characteristics of the host and sponsor state, as well as characteristics of the conflict, are better predictors of sponsorship than rebel compliance with IHL.

Appendix

Table 5. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State Support by Democracies (Minimum Values)

Regressor	Partial Slope Coefficients (Standard Error)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Civilians killed by rebel group (average per year)	-.071 (.111)		
Child soldiers used by rebel group		.147 (.417)	
Detention visits allowed by rebel group			.361 (.274)
Relative power (host/(host+sponsor))	-2.099*** (.595)	-2.105*** (.592)	-2.068** (.639)
Contiguity	.643*** (.148)	.654*** (.148)	.665*** (.154)
Duration	.070*** (.020)	.062** (.020)	.062** (.020)
Intensity (minor conflict vs war)	.646 (.398)	.503 (.389)	.627 (.431)
Civilians killed by host (average per year)	-.194* (.090)	-.204* (.090)	-.192* (.091)
Rebel political wing (Minimum value)	.083 (.414)	.177 (.386)	.435 (.402)
Rebel command strength (Minimum value)	.566~ (.308)	.571~ (.312)	.492 (.332)
Transnational constituency (support for rebel group) (Minimum value)	.329 (.363)	.306 (.360)	.395 (.375)
Constant	-6.808*** (.818)	-6.841*** (.846)	-6.993*** (.923)
Wald chi2	59.46***	59.21***	53.59***
Number of observations	13,980	13,792	11,733

~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit

Table 6. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State Support by Democracies (Maximum Values)

Regressor	Partial Slope Coefficients (Standard Error)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Civilians killed by rebel group (average per year)	-.046 (.105)		
Child soldiers used by rebel group		.155 (.414)	
Detention visits allowed by rebel group			.436 (.277)
Relative power (host/(host+sponsor))	-2.104*** (.595)	-2.106*** (.593)	-2.059** (.640)
Contiguity	.643*** (.148)	.653*** (.147)	.667*** (.154)
Duration	.066** (.019)	.060** (.019)	.062** (.019)
Intensity (minor conflict vs war)	.606 (.400)	.479 (.387)	.578 (.425)
Civilians killed by host (average per year)	-.191* (.090)	-.196* (.090)	-.176~ (.091)
Rebel political wing (Maximum value)	.453 (.373)	.493 (.362)	.842* (.395)
Rebel command strength (Maximum value)	.507~ (.306)	.508~ (.308)	.433 (.324)
Transnational constituency (support for rebel group) (Maximum value)	.284 (.355)	.287 (.357)	.406 (.377)

Constant	-6.844***	-6.872***	-7.187***
	(.813)	(.838)	(.935)
Wald chi2	60.86***	60.42***	55.28***
Number of observations	13,980	13,792	11,733

~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit

Table 7. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State Support by Autocracies (Minimum Values)

Regressor	Partial Slope Coefficients (Standard Error)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Civilians killed by rebel group (average per year)	.095* (.046)		
Child soldiers used by rebel group		.114 (.214)	
Detention visits allowed by rebel group			.265~ (.139)
Relative power (host/(host+sponsor))	-2.937*** (.343)	-2.882*** (.349)	-2.833*** (.372)
Contiguity	.489*** (.088)	.484*** (.089)	.409*** (.102)
Duration	.056*** (.014)	.054*** (.015)	.062*** (.014)
Intensity (minor conflict vs war)	.290 (.219)	.488* (.215)	.320 (.249)
Civilians killed by host (average per year)	.043 (.040)	.041 (.040)	.042 (.044)
Rebel political wing (Minimum value)	-.718** (.252)	-.752** (.250)	-.718** (.266)
Rebel command strength (Minimum value)	-.198 (.154)	-.187 (.159)	-.131 (.172

Transnational constituency (support for rebel group) (Minimum value)	.032 (.215)	.185 (.208)	.147 (.219)
Constant	-3.693*** (.395)	-3.756*** (.412)	-3.896*** (.462)
Wald chi2	126.78***	119.05***	101.06***
Number of observations	14,602	14,304	11,999

~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit

Table 8. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State Support by Autocracies (Maximum Values)

Regressor	Partial Slope Coefficients (Standard Error)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Civilians killed by rebel group (average per year)	.100* (.045)		
Child soldiers used by rebel group		.125 (.213)	
Detention visits allowed by rebel group			.259~ (.139)
Relative power (host/(host+sponsor))	-2.931*** (.342)	-2.81*** (.348)	-2.829*** (.371)
Contiguity	.484*** (.088)	.478*** (.089)	.405*** (.101)
Duration	.051*** (.013)	.049** (.014)	.056*** (.014)
Intensity (minor conflict vs war)	.344 (.220)	.546* (.215)	.391 (.249)
Civilians killed by host (average per year)	.029 (.040)	.030 (.040)	.032 (.044)
Rebel political wing (Maximum value)	-.404~ (.219)	-.442* (.218)	-.353 (.232)

Rebel command strength (Maximum value)	-.244 (.151)	-.249 (.155)	-.189 (.169)
Transnational constituency (support for rebel group) (Maximum value)	.055 (.207)	.173 (.203)	.149 (.214)
Constant	-3.628*** (.391)	-3.657*** (.404)	-3.829*** (.462)
Wald chi2	124.77***	116.64***	97.33***
Number of observations	14,602	14,304	11,999

~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit

Table 9. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State Support (Minimum Values)

Regressor	Partial Slope Coefficients (Standard Error)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Civilians killed by rebel group (average per year)	.056 (.042)		
Child soldiers used by rebel group		.092 (.187)	
Detention visits allowed by rebel group			.226~ (.124)
Democratic dyad	-.956** (.348)	-.927** (.348)	-1.295** (.450)
Relative power (host/(host+sponsor))	-2.348*** (.288)	-2.327*** (.292)	-2.231*** (.312)
Contiguity	.600*** (.075)	.599*** (.076)	.554*** (.084)
Duration	.061*** (.011)	.059*** (.012)	.064*** (.012)

Intensity (minor conflict vs war)	.308 (.194)	.437* (.188)	.374~ (.216)
Civilians killed by host (average per year)	-.015 (.036)	-.018 (.036)	-.021 (.039)
Rebel political wing (Minimum value)	-.517** (.211)	-.539** (.207)	-.439* (.218)
Rebel command strength (Minimum value)	-.064 (.136)	-.050 (.140)	-.027 (.152)
Transnational constituency (support for rebel group) (Minimum value)	.141 (.185)	.224 (.181)	.241 (.189)
Constant	-4.529*** (.351)	-4.592*** (.365)	-4.758*** (.408)
Wald chi2	158.32***	152.14***	131.69***
Number of observations	28,582	28,096	23,732

~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit

Table 10. Firth Logit Regression of Rebel Group Compliance on Foreign State Support (Maximum Values)

Regressor	Partial Slope Coefficients (Standard Error)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Civilians killed by rebel group (average per year)	.070~ (.041)		
Child soldiers used by rebel group		.085 (.186)	
Detention visits allowed by rebel group			.229~ (.125)
Democratic dyad	-.956** (.348)	-.918** (.349)	-1.285** (.450)
Relative power (host/(host+sponsor))	-2.350*** (.287)	-2.329*** (.291)	-2.233*** (.311)

Contiguity	.595***	.593***	.550***
	(.075)	(.076)	(.083)
Duration	.056***	.055***	.060***
	(.011)	(.012)	(.011)
Intensity	.344~	.495**	.436*
(minor conflict vs war)	(.193)	(.188)	(.215)
Civilians killed by host	-.027	-.027	-.028
(average per year)	(.036)	(.036)	(.039)
Rebel political wing	-.190	-.219	-.075
(Maximum value)	(.184)	(.183)	(.194)
Rebel command strength	-.106	-.101	-.074
(Maximum value)	(.133)	(.136)	(.145)
Transnational constituency	.139	.207	.231
(support for rebel group)	(.178)	(.177)	(.186)
(Maximum value)			
Constant	-4.501***	-4.541***	-4.758***
	(.347)	(.358)	(.409)
Wald chi2	154.40***	147.56***	127.26***
Number of observations	28,582	28,096	23,732

~p-statistic<.10 *p-statistic<0.05 **p-statistic<0.01 ***p-statistic<0.001
Model 1=Civilian Deaths; Model 2=Child Soldiering; Model 3=Detention Visit

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