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How State-Level Dynamics Shape Individual-Level Welfare Payments

Jamy Rentschler
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, jrentschler@huskers.unl.edu

HOW STATE-LEVEL DYNAMICS SHAPE INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL WELFARE PAYMENTS

by

Jamy K. Rentschler

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Jamy K. Rentschler, MA

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Advisor: Regina Werum

This thesis examines how welfare program implementation varies across states, and what those differences in implementation mean for welfare (TANF) recipients across the country. Specifically, I examine the extent to which state-level context related demographics and economics as well as political ideology, religious culture and race may contribute to contemporary disparate economic outcomes for low-income racial and ethnic minorities in the United States. This study relies on a sample of welfare recipients from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) during 1998-2013 to examine individual recipients' average monthly TANF payments. Analyses combine SIPP data with state-level information drawn from several secondary sources including the Urban Institute, State Partisan Balance Database, U.S. Census Bureau and Religious Congregations and Membership Study.

The study tests four distinct empirical hypotheses grounded in extant empirical literature as well as group threat theory. Results from a comparison of subclass mean differences and complex survey design adjusted OLS models support the hypotheses and indicate that state-level characteristics do influence individuals' average monthly TANF payments. Findings suggest that recipients in states with a more conservative political

ideology, a larger percentage of African Americans, or a higher rate of Evangelicals will have lower average monthly TANF payments compared to recipients in more liberal states, states with a lower percentage of African Americans, or states with a lower rate of Evangelicals. In addition, a state's percentage of African Americans interacts with other state-level characteristics to produce different estimated average monthly TANF payments based on states' proportion of African Americans. The results support group threat theory as both white and black recipients receive lower average TANF payments in states with a higher percentage of African Americans. This raises questions about how social policies are implemented at the state level and to what extent state contextual factors shape social policies in a way that maintains existing systemic inequalities.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

As a recognized leader in the global economy, the United States has the fifth highest per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and the fourth highest per capita net national income among the 35-member countries of the OECD (OECD 2018b). Simultaneously, the United States is underperforming among the OECD countries regarding inequality measures. For example, in 2016, the United States had the second highest poverty gap ratio (0.400), defined as the proportion of people that fall below one-half of the country's median household income, and the sixth highest poverty rate (0.168) (OECD 2018a). The disparity in these results and other research suggests that despite the United States' economic success, its social policies have not been as successful in reducing the poverty rate compared to other Western countries (Brady, Fullerton, and Cross 2009).

Esping-Andersen (1990) classified the Western welfare states into three different types: social-democratic, corporatist, and liberal. The regimes are distinguished by their primary focus: the social-democratic regime focuses on equality of outcomes, the liberal regime focuses on market-driven outcomes, and the corporatist regime focuses on maintaining status differentials and traditional family roles. On one hand, the U.S. fits the description of a liberal welfare state well with its work-focused welfare policies. On the other hand, U.S. welfare policy is unique compared to other Western countries in that the eligibility requirements and benefit levels are determined at the state level, not the federal level (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001). U.S. states receive a set amount of federal funding governed by a few, but key, federal mandates including a lifetime limit on cash assistance of five years, meeting various caseload work participation requirements, and

restricting assistance to legal immigrants until they have resided in the U.S. for five years (CBPP 2016) . The states then develop their own independent welfare programs that can vary in the eligibility requirements, the types of benefits available, the level of benefits received, and the sanctions enforced for not meeting program guidelines.

Differences in state government political ideology have been shown to affect the types of welfare programs implemented and the generosity in the level of benefits provided (Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss et al. 2001). While the political ideology of the state government representatives is important, the political ideology of the state citizens is influential as well. For example, Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) found that states' policies generally conform to the state citizens' ideology through the influence of public opinion on party elites and state representatives. Prior research has looked at the effect of various levels of policy devolution, from federal to state and from state to more local oversight such as county or program administration (Fording, Soss, and Schram 2011, 2007; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2008). However, the extent to which contextual state-level characteristics result in a greater variation in individuals' TANF cash assistance payments across states has yet to be fully examined.

An additional ideological factor that has been shown to influence one's views regarding social policy is religious belief (Brint and Abrutyn 2010; Steensland and Wright 2014). In the U.S., religious beliefs generally inform people's views on the government's role in helping the poor and those in some conservative Christian denominations believe the government does more harm than good (Pew Research Center 2015).

Another unique factor of the U.S. welfare regime is that it developed under a highly racialized context that largely excluded African Americans and other racial/ethnic minorities from receiving assistance for much of the twentieth century. U.S. welfare policies have often disadvantaged African Americans resulting in explicit and latent discrimination (Katz 2013; Quadagno 1996; Schram, Soss, and Fording 2003). The legacy of slavery and Jim Crow left a disproportionate number of African Americans in deep poverty. Unable to access benefits since the beginning of federal welfare programs in the 1930s, African Americans were largely excluded from receiving benefits (Brown 1999; Quadagno 1996). For example, from the 1930s to the 1960s African American mothers were denied benefits based on "suitable" household policy provisions (Gordon 2011). During this same time, southern "black codes" excluded providing benefits during planting and harvest seasons so that low-income mothers would be more motivated to participate in the lowly paid agricultural workforce (Hall 2005; Steinberg 1990). After the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, the narrative surrounding welfare became racialized through negative stereotypes and misleading media portrayals of African Americans as "welfare queens" taking advantage of the system (Abramovitz 2006). Several studies have identified disparities in the amount of benefits provided and the severity of program restrictions in the welfare programs of states with higher percentages of minority recipients both pre and post the major welfare reform in 1996 (Fording et al. 2011; Quadagno 1996; Soss et al. 2001). This raises the question whether contemporary welfare policy implementation continues to contribute to broad racial disparities in the distribution of benefits and sanctions and how this affects individual TANF recipients.

Thus, the goal of this research project is to explore how state contextual factors affect individuals' level of welfare benefits. The effects of political ideology, religious culture and race on the implementation of state welfare policies may contribute to contemporary disparate outcomes for economically disadvantaged racial and ethnic minorities in the United States (Fording et al. 2011; Schram et al. 2003). For instance, according to data from the 2015 U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey, the percentage of minority Americans that live below the federal poverty line (Blacks – 24%, Hispanics – 21%, Other – 14%) is higher compared to white Americans (9%) (KFF 2016). In addition, a disproportionate number of welfare recipients identify as black (29.1%), Hispanic (36.9%), or as another non-white race/ethnicity (6.4%) (ACF 2016a).

Research Question and Hypothesis

This study seeks to understand how state-level characteristics are associated with individuals' welfare benefits. Specifically, I am interested in exploring how states' political, racial, and religious contexts may affect recipients' level of benefits. First, to what extent does an association exist between state political ideology and the average monthly cash TANF payment received by families? Second, to what extent does the average monthly TANF payment received between white and black recipients differ? Is the difference larger in more conservative states compared to more liberal states? How do other cultural contexts such as religion affect the average monthly TANF payment? To answer these questions, data from 1998-2013 of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is used to examine how individuals' monthly average TANF cash assistance payments vary by characteristics such as race, political ideology, and religious belief. This research project addresses the following four hypotheses.

H1: On average, TANF recipients will receive higher monthly TANF cash benefits in states with a more liberal political ideology compared to states with a more conservative ideology.

H2: On average, white TANF recipients will receive higher monthly TANF cash benefits compared to black TANF recipients.

H3: On average, states with a larger African American population will have lower average monthly TANF benefits compared to states with a smaller African American population.

H4: On average, states with a higher rate of Evangelicals will have lower average monthly TANF benefits compared to states with a lower rate of Evangelicals.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

How Do State Welfare Programs Vary?

Prior to 1997, welfare was distributed through the federally-mandated Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Although states had flexibility in forming their own welfare programs, federal requirements and oversight helped ensure those who met federal eligibility criteria received benefits (Page and Larner 1997). After the implementation of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program in 1997, states set their own eligibility requirements for benefits which include "establish[ing] income definitions, income tests, earned income disregards, and need standards" (Rowe and Giannarelli 2006:1). For example, in 2016 the lowest maximum income eligibility per month for a family of three was $269 in Alabama and the highest was $2,243 in Minnesota, a difference of -733.83% (The Urban Institute 2016). The amount of cash assistance a family can receive also varies by state. In 2016, the maximum monthly benefit for a family of three in Alabama was $215 and $532 in Minnesota, a difference of -147.44%. Federal regulations restrict how long a family may receive cash assistance to lifetime limit of five years, but states may set a shorter time limit. In 2016, Arizona has the shortest lifetime limit of 12 months. Thus, depending upon the state of residence, a family's access to and assistance from TANF varies dramatically.

Consequently, states now vary greatly in the amount spent to provide basic cash assistance. For example, in 2015 Arizona spent 6% of its federal and state TANF funds on basic cash assistance, whereas Kentucky spent 55% (CBPP 2017). Looking at just cash assistance, Kentucky spent more than five times as much as Arizona, despite the fact

that Kentucky had on average only twice as many TANF recipients (48,274) as Arizona (23,522) in 2015 (ACF 2016b). Overall, the amount of states' budgets spent on basic assistance decreased by 64% from 1997-2016 (CBPP 2017). Other TANF benefits may also include job training programs, childcare assistance, transportation assistance, or other support services offered for low-income families (CBPP 2016). While nationwide TANF spending for non-cash benefits represents nearly 75% of total state and federal TANF expenditures in 2016 (CBPP 2017), this research focuses on cash income assistance because it is the most consistent TANF benefit to compare across states (Rowe and Giannarelli 2006). Non-cash benefits can be difficult to compare across states due to the variation in the types of support services offered by different states. In addition, when considering effects at the individual level, people are more likely to know how much they receive in cash assistance as opposed to the dollar value of the TANF non-cash services they may receive. Therefore, this research project focuses on TANF cash assistance benefits.

How Does Racialization Shape Welfare Policies?

Racial context has been, and continues to be, a very influential factor in the development of the U.S. welfare state (Schram et al. 2003). Race is not just an individual-level attribute, it is a social construct embedded in laws and policies that affect every aspect of life (Werum 1997). Omi and Winnat describe race as a "*master category* – a fundamental concept that has profoundly shaped, and continues to shape, the history, polity, economic structure, and culture of the United States" (Omi and Winant 2014:106). During the 1930s-1960s, African Americans and other racial minorities were largely excluded from receiving welfare benefits (Brown 1999; Quadagno 1996). During that

period, African American mothers were denied benefits by “suitable household” policy provisions that disqualified any unmarried woman found living with a man from receiving benefits (Quadagno 1996). Also at that time, southern “black codes” excluded providing benefits during planting and harvest seasons so that low-income mothers would be more motivated to participate in the lowly paid agricultural workforce (Hall 2005; Steinberg 1990).

After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it became more difficult to deny benefits outright to African Americans. As the number of African American welfare recipients increased, the narrative around and sentiments toward welfare began to change (Katz 2013; Quadagno 1996). Whereas poverty was once seen as the problem to solve, the poor themselves became viewed as the problem. The Moynihan report released in 1965 blamed the disintegration of black families as the primary cause of the increased need for welfare (Quadagno 1996). Racial stereotypes and media portrayals of the poor as deviant African Americans living in the ghetto supported this perspective. Unfortunately, many of the negative stereotypes that associate welfare with poor African Americans persist today. The perception that blacks are lazy is highly influential of white respondents’ opposition to welfare spending and negative attitude towards welfare, even more so than the overall perception that poor people are lazy (Gilens 1996).

Americans opposed to welfare claimed that the program would have detrimental effects on the country (Katz 2013). Many of the arguments against welfare can be explained by group threat theory that posits when perceived characteristics of an outgroup are thought to threaten the ingroup, the ingroup experiences increased prejudice and discrimination against the outgroup (Giles and Hertz 1994; Stephan and Stephan

2009). Based on group threat theory, racial threat is experienced when the dominant racial group (whites in the U.S.) views or is concerned with a racial minority group increasing in size or power (King and Wheelock 2007; Quillian 1996).

Threats to a group typically fall into two categories: realistic and symbolic. Realistic group threats are described as those that threaten "a group's power, resources, and general welfare …[while] symbolic group threats are threats to a group's religion, values, belief system, ideology, philosophy, morality, or worldview" (Stephan and Stephan 2009:5). One study found that measures of realistic threat was a significant predictor of people's attitudes towards affirmative action (Renfro et al. 2006). Brown (2013) found that media and opinion pieces included racialized discourse regarding welfare reform in Georgia. However, in Alabama a non-racialized dispute influenced the welfare reform debate. The difference between the two states' welfare policies was notable, with Georgia instituting more restrictive and stringent welfare policies (Brown 2013). That is not to say that racialized discourse does not occur in Alabama, but rather it highlights how policies shift when the dominant group feels threatened.

Racial dynamics continue to be an influential factor in state welfare programs today. Despite efforts to establish a "post-racial" society, research points to the enduring salience of race and ethnicity (Dawson and Bobo 2009; Smith, McPherson, and Smith-Lovin 2014). For example, white people feel more threatened as the size of a minority group increases within a given population (Brown 2013). Research has shown that states with a higher percentage of African Americans receiving welfare is significantly associated with more stringent sanctions, stricter time limits, and family caps (Gooden 2006; Rodgers, Payne, and Chervachidze 2006; Soss 2001). Therefore, I expect to find a

difference in the average monthly TANF cash assistance payment between white and black TANF recipients.

Ideological/Cultural Context Matters

The political ideology of a state can shape state-level welfare policies, such that the policies tend to conform to the values of the dominant political ideology. Social conservatives generally view the causes of poverty as individualistic, where individuals are deemed to live in poverty due to poor choices or mistakes (Zucker and Weiner 1993). Liberals, on the other hand, tend to view poverty as the result of structural or systematic barriers outside of the individual's control. Libertarians believe that individual freedoms grant people the opportunity to succeed and therefore are strongly opposed to state-sponsored redistributive policies (Zwolinski et al. 2016). While many different factors may contribute to people's views on poverty, ideologically-based perceptions regarding how responsible the poor are for their circumstances can influence whether people are considered deserving or undeserving of assistance (Katz 2013). People typically assign responsibility towards one level or the other, and the side they choose is often closely related to their political ideology (Kelso 1994; Zucker and Weiner 1993). The coalescence of individuals' ideological beliefs forms a collective culture that influences the social structure of society. As Bourdieu (1989:1) notes "there exist, within the social world itself…objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining their practices or their representations."

Researchers have developed several ways to gauge a state's ideological leanings. For instance, Erikson, Wright Jr., and McIver (1989) found a strong correlation between the mean ideological position of the state and the ideological positions of party elites.

They also found that citizen preferences were more influential in the level of state policy liberalism compared to state economic and social factors (Wright Jr, Erikson, and McIver 1987). State representatives' political ideology is influenced by the opinions of active state citizens in an effort to be elected or re-elected and by party elites to maintain party support (Berry et al. 2010). Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (2010) found state government ideology scores to be relatively stable, but other states did experience ideological fluctuations over time. In contrast, the state citizen ideology scores were less volatile during the same time period (Berry et al. 2010).

State government control, defined as the political party that has the majority control of the state legislature and the governor's office, is measured because partisanship is expected to influence policy outcomes (Schmidt 1996). The reason why this is of interest at the state level is because party representation is less balanced at the state level compared to the federal level. In 2016, seats in the U.S. Senate and the House were almost evenly split between Republican and Democratic Party control (52% and 55% respectively). In comparison, partisan power is becoming more concentrated in the state governments. A state government trifecta occurs when a party is in control of the governor's office and holds a majority in the House and Senate. In 2016, 32 states had a state government trifecta with 81% of those controlled by Republicans and 19% controlled by Democrats (Lucy Burns Institute 2017).

The effects of partisan control in the state government are further exacerbated by the growing political ideological divide between Democrats and Republicans (Pew Research Center 2014). Party ideology can frame the perceived causes of poverty, thereby influencing proposed social policy solutions. Welfare policy reform requirements

reflect the notion that people in poverty are lazy or irresponsible. For example, the belief that people on welfare chose not to work contributed to the implementation of a five-year lifetime limit on TANF benefits (Schram et al. 2003).

Religious belief is another factor that may influence one's views on welfare. A Pew Research Center study found that approximately 50% of adults in the sample say that religion is very important to their views on government assistance to the poor and that of those same adults 57% think it does more harm than good (Pew Research Center 2015). Of the various religious denominations, only Evangelical Protestant and Mormon respondents (56% and 64%, respectively) stated government assistance does more harm than good. Given that 25.4% of the Christians in the U.S. identify as Evangelical Protestants and that they are more likely to have a stronger religious affiliation, it is possible that the prevalence of conservative Christians in a state may affect welfare policy (Pew Research Center 2015; Schwadel 2012).

Evangelicals' lack of support for welfare may be based on perceptions of welfare recipients, or more broadly the poor, which threaten their traditional family values and culture. Brint and Abrutyn (2010) found that moral standards traditionalism, defined as a cognitive framework founded in moral absolutism and resistance to change, significantly affected Evangelicals views on government social spending. Specifically, Steensland and Wright (2014) found that negative stereotypes about welfare recipients as single, teenage mothers having multiple babies out of wedlock threaten Evangelicals' norms regarding sexual purity and family structure.

Demographic Context Matters

Different welfare policies at the state level serve as a type of natural experiment in which to examine how state-level political ideology affects individual welfare recipients' benefits and whether that effect is moderated by the individuals' race. The interaction between race and political ideology is likely complicated and may not even be a conscious decision for most. Gainous (2012) found that people's desire for limited government may hide a racial bias, since people can object on the basis of what appears to be a non-racial issue. Craig and Richeson (2014) found that by highlighting racial demographics of growing minority populations resulted in unaffiliated white Americans expressing more conservative opinions and leaning more towards the Republican party. However, in experiments that included conditioning which reaffirmed white Americans' status in the racial hierarchy (eliminating the notion of racial minorities as a threat), the shift in conservative ideology did not occur. Clearly, there is more to understand regarding how race influences political ideology and how those together affect welfare policies.

Different social contexts can influence public policy design and implementation resulting in unequal distributions of power and privilege for various groups (Bedolla 2007). Prior studies focused on variations in state TANF programs found differences associated with state characteristics such as the state economy, the political party in power, and racial discrimination. My research expands the analysis of state welfare variations by focusing on how state characteristics are associated with individual outcomes, controlling for individual-level and state-level factors.

CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS

Data Source on Welfare Payments and Other Individual-level Measures

The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a longitudinal nationwide survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, provides the basis for my analyses. For this study, data from partial waves of the 1996 panel and full waves of the 2002, 2004, 2008 panels were used, such that the years covered include 1998-2013. Each wave covers a four-month period and each panel contains anywhere between ten to sixteen waves, so panels typically cross over three to six years. The survey was primarily designed to collect a nationally representative sample of detailed income information and participation in government assistance programs, along with demographic and contextual data. In addition, low-income households were oversampled to provide a sufficient number of participants of government transfer programs for analysis (U.S. Census Bureau 2008).

The sample is based on residents of the United States ages 15 years and older, excluding those living in institutions or military barracks. The sampling frame includes a list of U.S. counties and independent cities. To select the sample, SIPP uses a two-stage sampling design. The first stage involves the selection of primary sampling units (PSUs). Smaller PSUs, referred to as non-self-representing (NSR), are grouped with other same-state similar PSUs based on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics to form strata. A sample of the NSR PSUs is selected to represent all PSUs within a given stratum. The second stage of sampling is the selection of addresses from the PSUs. Addresses are selected from three independent, non-overlapping sampling frames that include unit, group quarters, and housing unit coverage. For each sample PSU, addresses

are grouped into clusters. The clusters are then sampled to select the interview addresses. Everyone in the household is asked to participate in the interview. (U.S. Census Bureau 2008).

Coverage errors in the SIPP may include missed living quarters, missed persons within a sample household, people who have moved that cannot be reached, and more transient populations such as the homeless. One particular coverage issue for the SIPP is differential undercoverage of minority subgroups, primarily black and Hispanic adult males. For example, in the 2004 panel the coverage ratio for all people together was about 0.89 but was approximately 0.69 and 0.64 for black and Hispanic adult males, respectively. The U.S. Census Bureau addresses the undercoverage issue by using post-stratification adjustments and non-interview adjustments in developing the final weights (U.S. Census Bureau 2008).

The SIPP includes several different weight variables to account for nonresponse, attrition, poststratification adjustments, and subsampling within clusters. The dataset includes a strata variable (GVARSTR) as well as a cluster variable (GHLFSAM) to adjust the variance estimation due to the complex survey design. The longitudinal calendar year person weight (LGTCY*x*WT) was used to adjust for sampling design. Final calendar year weights were calculated only for people for whom data were collected for each month in the year (US Census Bureau 2018).

SIPP addresses missing data in a few different ways. According to chapter four of the SIPP user guide (US Census Bureau 2008), for item nonresponse data editing is used when the information can be inferred from other provided data. When data editing is not possible, data imputation is used instead. SIPP uses a sequential hot-deck data imputation

method where missing data is replaced with data from another person or household with similar characteristics. This process starts with a hot deck array created for each variable and is stratified by select demographic variables such as age, race, and sex. Hot decks are initially loaded with cold deck values and then are supplemented with complete responses that become available donors. The imputation process is fully deterministic such that using the same file and edit program will replicate the same imputations. The imputations are done in two phases where waves one through four are imputed cross-sectionally. After that, phase two includes longitudinal edits of select demographic variables across the four waves.

The SIPP accounts for most types of unit nonresponse by using weighting adjustments. However, for a specific type of unit nonresponse data imputation is used instead. Interviews designated as Type Z are those where at least one household member was interviewed but interviews were not obtained from one or more other people in the household. In Type Z imputations, the data for an entire unit is imputed from a single donor. Donors are selected using hierarchical sorting and matching based on a set of non-missing variables for both the donor and the recipient. In the first wave, the definition of the hot deck cells is based on only current wave responses. In subsequent waves, hot deck cell definitions may include values from prior waves although the donor values are only taken from the current wave. Survey analysts strive to maintain the univariate distribution for each imputed variable.

Data Subsample

The monthly data for each person was consolidated over each calendar year to create one observation per person per year. The consolidation procedure for each variable

is included in the variable descriptions below. Only people listed as a TANF authorized representative at some point during the calendar year are included in the sample. An authorized recipient is the person who actually received the income for all people in their program unit. A program unit is defined as "each adult and child, [that] received benefits (either directly or by virtue of his or her relationship to another person designated as the principal recipient) from [the] program each month" (US Census Bureau 2008). From 1998-2013, the total number of people identified as TANF authorized representatives was 9,197.

Congruent with the research questions, only respondents who identified as white or black are included in the subsample examined here. Respondents who identified as a race other than white or black were excluded (n=928). People from the state of Nebraska were excluded due to the nonpartisan design of its unicameral state government, as has been done in other analyses including state governments (n=36) (Soss et al. 2008). People from Washington D.C. were also excluded since D.C. is not a state (n=56). People who moved to a different state, moved and were unable to be followed, or moved and were out of scope during a calendar year were also excluded (n=127). Lastly, people with a calendar year weight of zero, meaning they did not have data for all months of the calendar year, were excluded (n=2,936).

Variables

Overall, the subsample contained 5,114 respondents identified as TANF authorized representatives from 49 states during the period of 1998-2013. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the sample. The dependent variable in the analysis is the average monthly TANF cash assistance payment received per program unit. This data

was collected for each month and averaged over the number of months the respondent received benefits for each calendar year. The average monthly TANF payment was $266.31 (sd=224.13). The key respondent independent variable is race. In the subsample 61.85% of the respondents identified as white (n=3,163) and 38.15% identified as black (n=1,951).

Other respondent variables used as controls include the person's average monthly earned income, sex, months employed, and number of children in the household[1]. Earned income is used to determine eligibility and level of welfare benefits (Giannarelli et al. 2017). The average monthly earned income (m=$396.56, se: $951.05) is the person's earned income averaged over the calendar year. Gender is included in the model to explore how welfare policy developed under a patriarchal system that affects a disproportion number women may support or reinforce gender inequalities (Orloff 1996). The sex variable had two categories: male (11.9%, n=607) and female (88.1%, n=4,507). The recipients' term of employment is included to examine how the duration of employment may affects a recipients' benefits independent of the income actually earned (Dodson 2013). Months employed is the number of months a person had some type of employment during a given calendar year (mean=10.93, se: 2.41). Dependent children are taken into consideration when determining the level of welfare benefits (Giannarelli et al. 2017). For the number of children in the household under the age of 18 years old, the responses were collapsed into four different categories: zero children (16.6%, n=847), one child (26.1%, n=1,333), two children (25.3%, n=1,296), and three or more children (32.1%, n=1,638).

[1] Initial models also included the recipient's age, education, and marital status as control variables, but are not in the final models due to nonsignificant coefficients.

Sources for State-level Data

State-level data were retrieved from a multitude of sources and were merged into SIPP observations using state and year. A state-level race variable, the percentage of the state population identified as black, is included to test the group threat theory at the state level (King and Wheelock 2007). Data on state population by race came from the U.S. Census Bureau's annual estimation of state population characteristics. A political ideology variable is included because it informs perceptions of deservingness and approaches to addressing poverty that influences the development and implementation of welfare policies (Katz 2013; Zucker and Weiner 1993). I use the state citizen ideology[2] measure developed by Berry, Fording, Rinquist, Hanson, and Klarner (2010). State citizen ideology is a yearly measure based on an analysis of votes for congressional seats and interest-group ratings of members of Congress. Other researchers frequently use these measures as demonstrated by more than 1,500 citations (Berry et al. 1998). The scale of the measures ranges from zero to one-hundred, with zero representing fully conservative and one-hundred representing fully liberal. The state citizen ideology mean was 55.62 (sd: 11.94).

Including state-level economic indicators facilitates exploring how a state's economic conditions may affect how it implements social policy (Jacobs and Callaghan 2013). The Urban Institute provided the state and local tax revenue per capita data that came from the U.S. Census Bureau Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances and Census of Governments (The Urban Institute 2017). The mean state

[2] I also tested state government ideology from Berry et al. (2010) and a state government control variable from a database created by Klarner (2003) based on three parts of the state government: the house, the senate, and the governor's office. The model explored each ideology variable individually and state citizen ideology was selected because it had the largest standardized coefficient of the three ideology variables.

revenue per capita[3] was $4,539 (sd: 1,119) and was adjusted for inflation to 2013 dollars using the U.S. Consumer Price Index.

Religious beliefs may influence states constituents' views on social programs such as TANF (Steensland and Wright 2014). Therefore, the rate of Evangelical Protestants is included to assess the effect of religious beliefs separately from political beliefs. Data for the rate of Evangelical Protestants per 1,000 people per state came from the Religious Congregations and Membership Study 2000 and 2010 surveys administered by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (The Association of Religion Data Archives 2012). The data on rates of Evangelical Protestants were only available for the years 2000 and 2010, thus the rate for 2000 was used for years 1998-2005 and the 2010 rate was used for years 2006-2013. The average rate of Evangelical Protestants per 1,000 people was 125.29 (sd: 97.38).

In the SIPP 1996 and 2002 panels, certain states were combined and reported together. Vermont and Maine were combined into one state unit and North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming were combined into another state unit. Adjustments were made to the state-level data for these states in all years using a weighted average based on the state population for each year.

Analytic Methods

First, subclass mean differences are estimated using the svy: mean procedures and the lincom post estimation command in Stata 15. Both analyses include survey weight and sampling design adjustments (Heeringa, West, and Berglund 2017). The subclasses

[3] Other state economic indicators tested include state median household income, state poverty rate, state GDP, and state unemployment rate. State revenue per capita was retained because it had the largest standardized coefficient of all the state economic indicators. The other state economic variables were dropped from the model to reduce multicollinearity.

reflect primary independent variables including the recipient's race, the state's percent of black residents, state political ideology, and the state's proportion of Evangelicals. For the mean difference comparisons, the continuous variables are transformed into binary variables using the 50th percentile as the cutoff point. The binary variable for a state's black population is sorted into lower black population (50.39%, n=2,577) and higher black population (49.61%, n=2,537). The binary variable of state citizen ideology is categorized as more conservative (51%, n=2,608) and more liberal (49%, n=2,506). The binary variable of a state's proportion of Evangelicals is grouped into fewer Evangelicals (48.42%, n=2,476) and greater Evangelicals (51.58%, n=2,638).

Next, analyses using a survey design adjusted OLS regression model (svy: regress function) focus on four distinct models: one with individual-level variables only (Model 1), one with state-level variables only (Model 2), one with both individual-level and state-level variables (the full model, Model 3), and the full model plus the interaction terms (Model 4). To test the group threat theory, a state's black population is multiplied with state citizen ideology, state evangelical rate, and state revenue per capita to form three interaction terms. Appendix A includes tables for descriptive statistics, subclass mean differences, and OLS regression models.

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS

Single Subclass Comparisons

Results from the single subclass means tests are presented in Table 3 and support all four hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 tested whether TANF recipients in states with a more liberal political ideology receive larger monthly cash assistance payments compared to TANF recipients in states with a more conservative political ideology. Analyses suggest support for this hypothesis. Specifically, TANF recipients in states with a more conservative political ideology received on average $234.40 per month and recipients in more liberal states received on average $298.01 per month. The results show that recipients in more conservative states receive on average 27.14% less per month ($63.61, $p < 0.001$) compared to recipients in more liberal states.

Hypothesis 2 tested whether white TANF recipients receive larger average monthly TANF payments compared to black TANF recipients. Results indicate support for this hypothesis as well. Specifically, the average monthly TANF payment for white recipients was $277.70 and $251.79 for black recipients. On average, black recipients receive 9.33% ($25.91, $p<0.004$) less than white recipients.

Hypothesis 3 explored the extent to which monthly TANF payments vary across states with a lower black population versus a higher black population. Mean difference outcomes demonstrate concurrence with this hypnosis. For example, TANF recipients in states with a lower black population received on average $321.26 per month and recipients in states with a higher black population received $212.95 per month. On average, TANF recipients in states with a lower black population receive 33.71% more ($108.31, $p<0.001$) than recipients in states with higher black populations.

Hypothesis 4 posits that states with more Evangelicals provide lower average monthly TANF benefits compared to states with fewer Evangelicals. TANF recipients in states with fewer Evangelicals receive on average $316.85 per month and recipients in states with a greater number of Evangelicals receive on average $214.16 per month. Recipients in states with fewer Evangelicals receive on average 32.41% more ($102.68, $p<0.001$) than recipients in states with a larger proportion of Evangelicals.

Multiple Subclass Comparisons

Congruent with group threat theory, more detailed subclasses explore how average monthly TANF payments vary by the primary state-level characteristics and a state's black population. Table 4 shows the mean differences based on state political ideology and Evangelical rate were further differentiated by a state's black population. The largest difference in average monthly TANF payments was for more liberal states with a lower black population that received on average 47% more ($167.63, $p<0.001$) compared to more conservative states with a higher black population. Conversely, the lowest difference was between more conservative states with a lower black population only received on average 16.1% ($45.26, $p=0.001$) more than more liberal states with a higher black population. These results indicate that the effects of state political ideology and state racial composition may be exacerbated or offset, resulting in differential average monthly TANF payments for individuals. For example, more conservative states have a lower monthly average TANF payment ($234.40) and states with higher black population also have a lower monthly average TANF payment ($212.95). States with both characteristics are doubly impacted with an average monthly TANF payment that is 12.5% lower still ($189.36).

Likewise, TANF recipients' average monthly TANF payment is further differentiated by the combined effects of a state's Evangelical rate and black population, as shown in Table 4. The largest difference was for states with fewer Evangelicals and a lower black population received on average 44.1% more ($162.20, $p<0.001$) than states with a greater number of Evangelicals and a higher black population. There was no significant difference for recipients in states with a lower black population and a greater number of Evangelicals ($230.57) compared to states with a higher black population and a fewer Evangelicals ($225.91). The results indicate that the effect of a state's Evangelical rate merges with the effect of its black population resulting in significant differences. For example, individuals in states with a higher black population receive on average $212.95 and individuals in states with a greater number of Evangelicals receive $214.16. Individuals in states with both characteristics receive on average 3.6% less ($205.30). Compared to other variables described above, this effect appears relatively moderate or small in its impact on TANF payments.

OLS Linear Regression

While the difference in means is statistically significant, it does not take in to account other factors that may affect the average monthly TANF payment. A survey design adjusted multiple linear regression analysis helps evaluate how the key variables shape individual monthly TANF cash assistance payments. Table 5 shows various progressions of the estimated model including individual-level predictors only (Model 1), state-level predictors only (Model 2), individual- and state-level characteristics together (the full model, Model 3), and the full model with interaction terms (Model 4). Given that

the models are all very similar, the discussion of the analysis will focus on Models 4, with comments regarding where the other models differ.

A model using only individual-level predictors (Model 1), explains 13.64% of the variance in the average monthly TANF payment ($F_{(7,108)}$=56.28, p<0.001). Including only state-level predictors (Model 2) explains 5.72% of the variance in the monthly average TANF payment ($F_{(4,111)}$=42.66, p<0.001). The fact that the state-level predictors predict a smaller portion of the variance is not surprising considering that the level of TANF benefits is set based on individual characteristics such as household earned income and number of dependent children. However, the state-level characteristics are also important because they can affect how the various levels of benefits are determined (Rowe and Giannarelli 2006). The variance explained by the full model, including both individual- and state-level characteristics with interaction terms (Model 4) is 20.8% ($F_{(14,101)}$=41.46, p<0.001).

Individual-Level Characteristics

A recipient's average monthly earned income is statistically significant but does not have a very large effect on the predicted monthly TANF payment (β=-0.03, se:0.01, p=0.006). For example, a single mother with one child earning $500 per month is estimated to have an average monthly TANF payment of $224.45 (other predictors held at the mean). If that same woman's average monthly earned income increases to $1,000 per month, her expected average monthly TANF payment decreases by 6.6% ($14.83). The number of months employed in a year has a larger effect with a decrease of $9.53 (se: 1.35, p<0.001) in the monthly average TANF payment for each month employed. For example, if a single mother with one child worked four months (other variables held at

the mean), her estimated monthly TANF payment would be $235.95. If she worked eights month, her estimated monthly TANF payment would be $197.84, a reduction of 16.2% ($38.12).

A recipient's sex is a significant predictor with women receiving on average $41.80 more (se: 11.29, $p<0.001$) per month than men. This reflects the patriarchal influence in policy design that views men as the primary breadwinners and therefore are expected to earn more. The number of children in the household 18 years or younger has the strongest effect on the predicted average monthly TANF payment (1 child: $\beta=95.07$, se: 10.34; 2 children: $\beta=139.30$, se: 11.51; 3+ children: $\beta=208.83$, se: 12.71; all $p<0.001$). For example, a single mother with one child is expected to receive on average $172.97 per month (other variables held at mean) versus a single mother with three children is expected to receive on average $286.73, an increase of 65.8% ($113.76).

In the full models, the recipient's race is no longer a significant predictor. It is interesting to note that when only individual characteristics are included in the model (Model 1), an individual's race appears as a statistically significant predictor (black recipients expected to receive on average $36.87 less (se: 8.64, $p<0.001$) than white recipients). The fact that this strong predictor in the partial model drops out entirely in the full model indicates a spurious relationship and points to the importance of previously omitted variables that drive the individual-level results. In this case, findings indicate the average monthly TANF payment received does not depend on the individual race of recipients per se. Instead, the model indicates that differences between white and black recipients' average monthly TANF payment is being driven by state-level characteristics.

This finding may seem counterintuitive but is reasonable considering that the formulas for determining benefits cannot vary based upon race. However, we do know from previous research that African Americans are discriminated against in other ways including increased and more severe sanctioning for program noncompliance (Fording et al. 2011; Schram, Soss, and Fording 2010).

State-Level Characteristics

A state's political ideological leaning has a significant impact on TANF recipients' monthly payments. Looking first at the full model without interaction terms (Model 3), state citizen ideology has a positive association (β=1.30, se: 0.514, p=0.013) indicating that as a state's political ideology leans more liberal, the average monthly TANF payment is expected to increase. For example, a single mother with one child in a moderately liberal state is estimated to receive an average monthly TANF payment of $205.25 compared to $140.07 in a moderately conservative state, an increase of 46.5% ($65.18).

A state's religious composition also significantly affects TANF recipients' average monthly payments. Referring to Model 3, the data show a negative association between the rate of Evangelical Protestants and the average monthly TANF payment (β=-4.44, se: 0.586, p<0.001). The model predicts that a single mother with one child in a state with a lower than average rate of Evangelicals (25^{th} percentile, 5.7%) would receive an average monthly payment of $219.04 holding all other variables at the mean. That same mother in a state with a higher than average number of Evangelicals (75^{th} percentile, 14%) would receive on average $182.22 per month, a decrease of 20.2% (-$36.82).

A state's economic condition can also impact a TANF recipient's monthly payment, but to a lesser degree. Using Model 3, a state's revenue per capita has a negative association with a TANF recipient's average monthly payment (β=-14.2, se: 4.72, p=0.003). Continuing with the example above, a single mother with one child in a moderately poor state (25th percentile, $3,559 per capita) receives an average monthly TANF payment of $171.17 compared to a similar single mother in a moderately wealthy state (75th percentile, $4,682 per capita) who receives $187.11, a difference of 9.3% ($15.94). This seems counterintuitive on one hand because a state with more revenue should have more funding available for programs like TANF. On the other hand, it may reflect an increased social distance between the rich and the poor that may result in less generous policies based on welfare stereotypes.

A state's racial composition also influences the average monthly payment received by TANF recipients. Model 3 shows a negative association between a state's black population and the average monthly TANF payment individuals receive (β=-3.04, se: 0.67, p<0.001). For example, a single mother with one child in a state with a lower than average black population (25th percentile, 7%) is expected to receive on average $194.10. If that single mother lived in a state with an higher than average black population (75th percentile, 16%), she would receive $166.72, a decrease of 16.4% (-$27.38). Model 3 only shows part of the story, as a state's percent of African Americans also interacts with other state characteristics to further affect an individual's monthly average TANF payment.

Interaction of State-Level Characteristics

Model 4 presents the full model of individual- and state-level characteristics adding interactions between a state's black population and the three other state-level characteristics including state citizen political ideology, state Evangelical rate, and state revenue per capita. The coefficient for the interaction between state citizen ideology and state black population is 20.427 (se: 6.639, p=0.003). Figure 1 shows the predicted average monthly TANF payment for a single mother with one child in a state with a lower than average black population (25th percentile, 7%) compared to a state with a higher than average black population (75th percentile, 16%).

Figure 1. Estimated Average Monthly TANF Payment for a Single Mother with One Child



The graph shows the difference in the average monthly TANF payment is greater for recipients in states with a lower black population compared to states with a higher black population. In contrast, in moderately liberal states there is very little difference in

estimated payments for recipients in states with a lower black population compared to states with a greater black population.

The interaction coefficient between states' black population and Evangelical rate is 2.63 (se: 0.605, $p<0.001$). Figure 2 shows the estimated decrease in average monthly TANF payments for recipients in states with a higher rate of Evangelicals.

Figure 2. Estimated Average Monthly TANF Payment for a Single Mother with One Child



For states with a lower than average Evangelical rate (25th percentile, 5.7%) the difference in the estimated average monthly TANF payment between states with a lower than average percent of African Americans compared to states with a higher than average percent of African Americans is $55.51. The same comparison in states with a higher than average rate of Evangelicals (75th percentile, 14%) results in a difference of $35.86.

This indicates the "penalty" for living in a state with a higher percentage of African Americans is slightly offset in states with a higher rate of Evangelicals.

There is a negative association between a state's revenue per capita and the state's percentage of African Americans (β=-0.355, se: 0.085, p<0.001). Figure 3 shows that as a state's revenue per capita increases, the difference in the average monthly TANF payment increases between states with a lower than average percent of African Americans versus states with a higher than average percent of African Americans.

Figure 3. Estimated Average Monthly TANF Payment for a Single Mother with One Child



For example, in states with a lower state revenue per capita (25th percentile, $3,559) the difference in the estimated average monthly TANF payment is $13.96. In states with a higher state revenue per capita (75th percentile, $4,682), the difference in the estimated average monthly TANF payment is $54.21. This indicates that a higher percentage of

African Americans in the population is perceived as more of a threat in states with a higher revenue per capita.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS

This study explored how state political context shapes individuals' average monthly TANF cash assistance payments. Models operationalized state characteristics as state citizen ideology, state Evangelical composition, state revenue per capita, and the state black population. The analyses included a progression of OLS regression models adjusted for complex survey design. In addition, subclass means were used to test for group differences.

Difference in means tests as well as the OLS regression results support all four hypotheses. The models show a positive association between a state's political ideology leaning and average monthly TANF payment. This indicates that as a state's ideology leans more liberal, the average monthly TANF payment increases. In contrast, there is a negative association between a state's religious composition and average monthly TANF payment such that as the rate of Evangelicals increases, the predicted average monthly TANF payment decreases. Similarly, a negative association exists with the state's revenue per capita whereas the state's revenue per capita increases the expected average monthly TANF payment decreases. Lastly, the results show how states with a larger percent of African Americans directly and indirectly negatively affects recipients' average monthly TANF payment.

The results support previous literature that identifies racial discrimination in welfare programs (Quadagno 1996; Schram et al. 2010). The results also support the group threat theory in that as the percent of African Americans increase in the state, the average monthly TANF payment is expected to decrease (King and Wheelock 2007). In addition, the results back the notation that the state political ideology can affect

individuals' average monthly TANF payment (Kelso 1994; Zucker and Weiner 1993). While many studies have focused on the U.S. welfare system, few have investigated how state characteristics may be associated with individual-level welfare cash benefits. This study expands the literature by investigating the association of state-level characteristics such as political ideology, racial and religious composition, and economic factors on individuals' monthly TANF cash assistance payments using a national, representative sample.

Limitations of this study include the modeling limitations in answering the research question. Ideally, a survey design adjusted multilevel model is the preferable method for analyzing the data and evaluating the between-group variance. However, it would require a three-level model (observations nested within people nested within states) that would then need to be adjusted for the complex survey design. Researchers are still in the process of developing models that can handle the complexities of three-level models and complex survey design (Heeringa et al. 2017).

TANF is an important program for aiding low-income families in need. However, not all families may receive equal assistance. Welfare recipients are still disadvantaged by systemic racial bias that perpetuates economic inequalities. With welfare policy delegated to the state level, state characteristics may also influence the level of benefits available to families. Further research is needed to evaluate if state differences in TANF programs ameliorate or exacerbate racial disparities in and overall success of lifting families out of poverty.

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APPENDIX A: TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of SIPP TANF Recipients and Related State Characteristics for 1998-2013

Dependent Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Average monthly TANF cash payment	266.31	224.13
Individual-level Independent Variables		
Ave. monthly earned income	396.56	951.05
Months employed per year	10.93	2.41
	Freq.	**Percent**
Race		
White	3,163	61.85%
Black	1,951	38.15%
Sex		
Male	607	11.87%
Female	4,507	88.13%
No. of children in household		
Zero children	847	16.56%
One child	1,333	26.07%
Two children	1,296	25.34%
Three or more children	1,638	32.08%
State-level Independent Variables	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
State citizen ideology	55.62	11.94
State revenue per capita	4,538.97	1,119.09
State evangelical rate (per 1,000 population)	125.29	97.38
Percent state population - Black	0.12	0.07

Table 2. Correlation Table for Continuous Variables

Variable	Ave. monthly welfare payment	Ave. monthly earned income	No. months employed per year	State revenue per capita	State evangelical rate	State citizen ideology	State population - % black
Ave. monthly welfare payment	1.0000						
Ave. monthly earned income	-0.1204	1.0000					
No. months employed per year	-0.0917	-0.0019	1.0000				
State revenue per capita	0.0669	-0.0374	-0.0743	1.0000			
State evangelical rate	-0.2099	-0.0027	0.0165	-0.6336	1.0000		
State citizen ideology	0.1395	-0.0269	-0.0835	0.6960	-0.6913	1.0000	
State population - % black	-0.1706	-0.0089	0.0468	0.0650	0.3288	-0.0612	1.0000

Table 3. Differences in Average Monthly TANF Payments by Single Characteristic

Average Monthly TANF Payments by Recipient Race

Race	Mean	Std. Err.		
White	277.70	6.46		
Black	251.79	6.61		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	p-value
T-test	25.91	8.74	2.97	0.004
Percent Difference	9.33%			

Average Monthly TANF Payments by State Population - Percent Black

	Mean	Std. Err.		
Lower Black Population	321.26	7.24		
Higher Black Population	212.95	5.85		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	p-value
T-test	108.31	9.00	12.04	<0.001
Percent Difference	33.71%			

Average Monthly TANF Payments by Political Ideology

	Mean	Std. Err.		
More Conservative	234.40	5.64		
More Liberal	298.01	6.92		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	p-value
T-test	-63.61	8.50	-7.48	<0.001
Percent Difference	-27.14%			

Average Monthly TANF Payments by Evangelical Rate

	Mean	Std. Err.		
Fewer Evangelicals	316.85	6.85		
Greater Evangelicals	214.16	5.24		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	p-value
T-test	102.68	7.94	12.93	<0.001
Percent Difference	32.41%			

Table 4. Differences in Average Monthly TANF Payments by Multiple Characteristics

Average Monthly Welfare Payments by State Population (Black) & Political Ideology	Mean	Std. Err.		
More Conservative States with Lower Black Population	281.26	8.81		
More Liberal States with Lower Black Population	357.00	10.16		
More Conservative States with Higher Black Population	189.36	6.14		
More Liberal States with Higher Black Population	236.00	9.16		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	p-value
States with Lower Black Population in More Conservative vs More Liberal States	-75.74	13.18	-5.57	<0.001
States with Higher Black Population in More Conservative vs More Liberal States	-46.64	10.81	-4.31	<0.001
More Conservative States with Lower Black Population vs Higher Black Population	91.89	9.88	9.3	<0.001
More Liberal States with Lower Black Population vs Higher Black Population	121.00	14.20	8.52	<0.001
More Conservative States with Lower Black Population vs More Liberal States with Higher Black Population	45.26	12.71	3.56	0.001
More Liberal States with Lower Black Population vs More Conservative States with Higher Black Population	167.63	11.19	14.98	<0.001
Average Monthly Welfare Payments by State Population (Black) & Evangelical Rate	Mean	Std. Err.		
States with Lower Black Population & Fewer Evangelicals	367.49	9.62		
States with Lower Black Population & Greater Evangelicals	230.57	9.01		
States with Higher Black Population & Fewer Evangelicals	225.91	8.48		
States with Higher Black Population & Greater Evangelicals	205.30	6.58		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	p-value
States with Lower Black Population & Fewer Evangelicals vs Greater Evangelicals	136.92	13.98	9.79	<0.001
States with Higher Black Population & Fewer Evangelicals vs Greater Evangelicals	20.62	9.25	2.23	0.028
States with Fewer Evangelicals & Lower Black Population vs Higher Black Population	141.58	13.69	10.34	<0.001
States with Greater Evangelicals & Lower Black Population vs Higher Black Population	25.27	11.30	2.24	0.027
States with Lower Black Population & Fewer Evangelicals vs States with Higher Black Population & Greater Evangelicals	162.20	10.55	15.38	<0.001
States with Lower Black Population & Greater Evangelicals vs States with Higher Black Population & Fewer Evangelicals	4.65	12.34	0.38	0.707

Table 5. Estimated Coefficients of OLS Regression Models Predicting Individual Average Monthly TANF Payments

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Individual-level Characteristics Only		State-level Characteristics Only		Full Model		Full Model with Interaction Terms	
Variables	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Average monthly earned income	-0.029 **	0.010			-0.029 **	0.010	-0.030 **	0.010
Number of months employed in a year[a]	-10.912 ***	1.496			-10.350 ***	1.377	-9.530 ***	1.350
Recipient's race								
White (ref)	-	-			-	-	-	-
Black	-36.868 ***	8.638			-11.416	8.475	-6.674	8.261
Sex								
Male (ref)	-	-			-	-	-	-
Female	35.976	10.475			39.695 **	11.210	41.798 ***	11.286
Number of children in the household								
Zero (ref)	-	-			-	-	-	-
One child	93.087 ***	10.577			97.462 ***	10.459	95.068 ***	10.343
Two children	137.363 ***	12.065			141.409 ***	11.370	139.299 ***	11.509
Three or more children	207.720 ***	12.849			211.099 ***	12.962	208.826 ***	12.706
State evangelical rate (per 1,000 people)[a]			-0.413 ***	0.067	-0.444 ***	0.059	-0.867 ***	0.100
State citizen ideology[a]			1.561 **	0.545	1.304 *	0.514	-0.894	0.837
Percent state population - Black[a]			-337.336 ***	68.124	-304.191 ***	66.896	-299.925	436.422
State revenue per capita (in thousands)[a]			-0.020 ***	0.005	-0.014 **	0.005	0.035 **	0.012
State Citizen Ideology * State Population - Black							20.427 **	6.639
State Evangelical Rate * State Population - Black							2.629 ***	0.605
State Rev per Capita * State Population - Black							-0.355 ***	0.085
Intercept	126.282		258.898		316.4794		270.576	
N	5114		5114		5114		5114	
F-test	56.28 ***		42.66 ***		47.25		41.46	
F-test degrees of freedom	(7, 108)		(4, 111)		(11, 104)		(14, 101)	
R-squared	0.1364		0.0572		0.1923		0.208	

*$p < .05$ **$p < .01$ ***$p < .001$

[a] Variables are mean centered