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Book Reviews: Broome, John. Rationality through Reasoning.

Andrew Cullison

Aaron Bronfman

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that puts distance between realist, cognitive metaethical theories and nonrealist, noncognitive, or emotivist theories. If you think that moral judgment is largely based on inputs with propositional content that don't involve emotion, the view that moral judgments are straightforwardly cognitive attitudes that have propositions as their objects is easier to defend. However, if emotions are a central part of how we come to have evidence for a moral proposition and our moral judgments can be based on these emotions that are caused by our perception, then there is some room to ask: Why shouldn't we simply think that our moral judgments just are some kind of expression of those emotions? So bringing emotions into the theory of moral perception might yield interesting ways to defend moral realism from challenges, but it also introduces avenues for antirealist challenges.

There is one final worry about bringing emotions into a theory of moral perception that might be best drawn out with an analogy to nonmoral perception. Suppose we were beings with a slightly different nonmoral perceptual apparatus. Suppose phenomenal qualia that we typically experience when we observe objects also showed up in our cognitive life when we weren't experiencing the presence of an object. Basically, we would periodically have apparent perceptions of objects when there were no objects. Furthermore, suppose we could know that this was sometimes the case. I suspect we would feel rational pressure to be a bit more skeptical about our nonmoral judgments based on perception.

One might argue that we're kind of in that situation if our moral perception apparatus includes an emotional component. We often experience emotions when there is nothing moral about the situation we're in, and so by analogy to the perception case, we might think that we should be a bit more skeptical about moral judgments. A possible virtue of a moral perception view that didn't make emotions a component of the view might not have to address this worry, but if emotions are indeed an important part of Audi's moral perception theory, then it is worth asking why we shouldn't take ourselves to have some defeaters for moral beliefs.

CONCLUSION

This book is a clear defense of a novel view in moral perception. It's well worth the read for anyone working on moral perception. It raises new and interesting puzzles for the moral perception view and will likely be an important thread in many new and interesting developments on the question whether moral perception is possible.

Andrew Cullison
State University of New York at Fredonia

Broome, John. *Rationality through Reasoning*.
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The official topic of John Broome's *Rationality through Reasoning* is the "motivation question": How does the belief that you ought to do something cause you to intend to do that thing? And indeed, the parts of the book do combine to offer

an answer to that question. But, as Broome himself suggests, much of the interest comes from the steps along the way. The book greatly expands and develops Broome's earlier work, drawing rich connections throughout (addressing how ought figures in requirements of rationality, how reasons may be defined in terms of ought, whether there is reason to be rational, how rationality is connected to the process of reasoning, etc.). This review considers Broome's account of four main concepts in turn: ought, reasons, rationality, and reasoning.

OUGHT

Broome aims to identify and characterize what he calls "the central ought." This is the ought that many would refer to as normative, or as the one connected to reasons. While some would try to analyze the central ought in those terms, for Broome, it is the central ought that is conceptually basic. Accordingly, he offers no definition of it but rather elucidates some of its features.

First, central oughts are *owned* by agents. In "Alison ought to get a sun hat," Alison would normally be the owner of the ought, in the sense that it is required of *her* that she get a sun hat. The owner of an ought need not always be found in the subject position: if Alison is a child, it might be that her parents own this ought, in that it is required of *them* that she get a sun hat. Second, central oughts relate their owner N to a *proposition* p, rather than to an action or property: they ascribe a kind of responsibility to N for its being the case that p. Third, and most important to singling out the central ought, it figures in the principle of Enkrasia, which holds roughly that "rationality requires of you that, if you believe that you yourself ought that you F, you intend that you F" (23).

This third feature is used to argue that the central ought is not an objective ought, where what one ought to do can depend on all manner of unknowable facts, but rather a *prospective* ought, where what one ought to do depends on one's evidence and perhaps one's beliefs. Broome considers cases along the following lines: at a casino, you may bet all your money on any given number on a roulette wheel, or you may refrain from betting. You know that, objectively, refraining from betting would be suboptimal (since it would be better to bet on the winning number). So you know that you objectively ought not refrain from betting and hence that you objectively ought to bet. But you may, without irrationality, hold this belief that you objectively ought to bet and yet not intend to bet. Thus, Broome concludes, the objective ought does not figure in Enkrasia and so cannot be the central ought.

This type of argument, however, appears to work against almost any candidate for the central ought, including Broome's prospective ought, at least given his other views. Broome holds that one may be rationally uncertain about what one ought, in the central sense, to do (e.g., because one is rationally uncertain what moral theory is true). In such cases, he holds that one may rationally take account of how bad each option is *if* it is in fact not what one ought to do. Thus he holds one may rationally intend a safe option F which, while it is probably not what one ought to do, is safer than ~F in that ~F might be very wrong. So consider a case with three options where one can either (i) keep one's promise to A, (ii) keep one's promise to B, or (iii) keep one's promises to both. One is rationally uncertain what moral theory is true, in that one is uncertain just what conditions

make a promise binding (e.g., what conditions would make a promise coerced, and so not binding). In this case, suppose one has gotten far enough to know that exactly one of the two promises is binding, but does not know which and regards each as equally likely to be binding. One is certain that one ought not do (iii), since, while one ought to keep the binding promise (whichever it may be), there is no reason to keep the other, and it would be slightly inconvenient to do so. So one is certain one ought to keep exactly one promise. Nevertheless, one might rationally intend (iii) on the grounds that it is a "safe option" which avoids the risk of doing something very wrong (namely, failing to keep the binding promise). Here, one can be perfectly rational while believing one ought to keep exactly one promise but not intending to do so. Thus, given Broome's views, it may be that the central ought does not in fact satisfy Enkrasia.

REASONS

Although Broome does not define the central ought (hereafter simply "ought"), he does define normative reasons in terms of it along with nonnormative concepts of explanation. In particular, he defines two kinds of normative reasons.

First, "a *pro toto* reason for N to F is an explanation of why N ought to F." A *pro toto* reason "need not be full or complete," and what counts as one "may depend on the context" (50). Thus, Broome notes that the fact that Mr. Reed is the best dentist around can constitute a *pro toto* reason for you to visit Mr. Reed. Broome's example works since in the right context (e.g., one in which it is understood that you need and can afford a good dentist), this fact alone would constitute an acceptable answer to "Why is it true that I ought to visit Mr. Reed?"

Second, "a *pro tanto* reason for N to F is something that plays the for-F role in a weighing explanation" of (i) why N ought to F, (ii) why N ought not to F, or (iii) why neither is true (53). Again, what counts as a *pro tanto* reason depends on context, including background information. Crucially for Broome's definition, the concepts it invokes, including the concept of the "for-F" role, must be nonnormative. Thus, we cannot rely on a prior understanding of playing the for-F role as counting in favor of F in some normative way. Accordingly, Broome appeals to a general, nonnormative concept of a weighing explanation that covers mechanical cases (such as explaining why a balance tips to the left) and normative ones: various factors have weights, these weights combine (although perhaps not by simple addition), and one side wins. For the case of reasons, when there is a weighing explanation of why you ought to F, the factors that play the for-F role are simply those on the winning side.

Granting Broome that he relies only on nonnormative concepts of explanation, it is not clear how well his defined concepts match up with the intuitive notion of a reason. To take one of Broome's examples, suppose you promised your friend you would F (some onerous task), but your friend has released you from your promise. Accordingly, you ought not F. Broome holds that the fact that your friend released you plays a canceling role in the explanation of why you ought not F but that it is not itself a reason not to F (62). However, the contextual flexibility of his view seems to undermine this verdict. In the right context (e.g., one where it is understood that F is onerous and you ought not do it unless you are bound to), if you were to ask "Why is it true that I ought not F?" it would be

sufficient to answer this question by reminding you, "Your friend released you from your promise." We would then have to count the fact that your friend released you from your promise as a *pro toto* reason for you not to F, contrary to Broome's intuition about the case. The same issue arises for enabling conditions, since these can be cited as explanations of ought facts, even when they intuitively do not normatively favor the action they enable.

RATIONALITY

Broome takes rationality to be, like prudence, morality, or the law, a source of requirements or prescriptions. In itself, this does not tell us much about rationality: (i) Broome offers no general characterization of "what sort of thing" a source of requirements is (116), (ii) the requirements issued by a source need not obey most principles of deontic logic (e.g., the law might require both p and ~p), and (iii) requirements can exist without there being any normative reason to comply with them. Broome does endorse a few general features of requirements of rationality. First, the fact that rationality requires something of you is necessarily a reason to do it, but Broome is explicit that he has "no argument" in support of this (193). Second, requirements of rationality supervene on the mind; hence, while they may involve your intending an external action, they do not involve your actually performing it. Finally, rationality does not require you to hold or not hold a given attitude (with the exception of a requirement not to believe the conjunction p & ~p). Instead, the requirements of rationality involve multiple attitudes, just as Enkrasia rules out the combination of a normative belief and the lack of a corresponding intention. Requirements of rationality thus take a wide scope (over some compound of multiple attitudes), rather than a narrow scope (over a single attitude or lack of attitude).

Broome works out in detail the content of a variety of requirements of rationality: apart from Enkrasia, there are requirements of noncontradiction in belief or intention, means-end coherence, persistence of belief and intention over time, requirements that one's beliefs not be incomplete in certain ways, and prohibitions and permissions governing which attitudes may stand in the basing relation to each other. He appeals to intuition, rather than to a "general method" to identify these (150). This will be a stumbling block for readers who do not have quite so clear a grip on the concept of rationality that is being invoked. While we can narrow things down with some paradigm cases (e.g., typical cases of contradictory beliefs are irrational), it is not so clear what is at issue in drawing the boundaries of rationality. Here are two features of Broome's requirements that raise the question of the significance of the boundaries. First, Broome's requirements treat idealization unevenly. Broome aims to describe what it is to be "fully rational" or "rational to the highest degree" (71). Accordingly, he accepts synchronic requirements, even though they require an instantaneous and so perhaps impossible response to a learning experience; he also accepts a requirement not to both believe p and believe ~p, even though it would be impossible or pointless for us to search out and eliminate all such pairs. On the other side, though, he allows larger sets of inconsistent beliefs to count as fully rational, despite holding that an ideal agent would have no such inconsistencies. Second, his requirements treat epistemic and practical rationality unevenly. The epistemic

requirements ultimately build in substantive norms of good epistemic reasoning, such as "inductive inference" and "inference to the best explanation" (191). Yet the practical requirements appear not to build in substantive norms of good practical reasoning, insofar as they allow someone in Derek Parfit's imagined scenario to rationally form the intentions characteristic of Future Tuesday Indifference (104).

REASONING

Broome aims to characterize only the "core type" of reasoning, which he identifies as both active and conscious (222). Such reasoning is "a rule-governed operation on the contents of your conscious attitudes" (234). Broome is "inclined to think" that these attitudes, which can include at least beliefs and intentions, must be made explicit in language (255). So *modus ponens* reasoning, for example, would involve expressing one's beliefs that p and that if p then q to oneself and then following the *modus ponens* rule to derive the conclusion q. For you to count as following a rule, the process must "seem right" to you; this seeming, however, need not be a phenomenal state (it may instead involve the absence of phenomenal states) and must involve openness to the possibility of the process ceasing to seem right (238). This characterization of reasoning allows for both correct and incorrect reasoning. What distinguishes correct from incorrect reasoning are the rational prohibitions and permissions on the basing relation, mentioned above. Rationality permits you to base a belief that q on the beliefs that p and if p then q, which makes this a correct pattern of reasoning. On the other hand, rationality prohibits you from basing a belief that q on the beliefs that p and if q then p, which makes this an incorrect pattern of reasoning.

Instances of this "core type" of reasoning appear to be quite rare; this is especially striking since Broome is agnostic as to whether there is any type of reasoning other than the core type. We typically form beliefs and intentions without being conscious of all our premises, much less making them explicit in language. Indeed, Broome notes that when our attention settles on one of his synchronic requirements of theoretical rationality that we do not satisfy, we generally come to satisfy it so quickly that no reasoning is involved; accordingly, he illustrates reasoning with an unusual example where "you have just woken up and are gathering your wits" and so you do need to make your premises explicit (216). It would be a significant strike against an account of reasoning if it ultimately characterized theoretical reasoning as something done only in the most tedious instances of belief formation.

Broome may be inclined to draw the core type of reasoning narrowly so as to ensure that it is genuinely something "we do," as opposed to a mere automatic process that occurs within us (208). He cites in particular "a process's seeming right to you" as a "sort of personal endorsement from you," which thereby helps to make the process "something you do" (238). But it is not clear that his characterization of the core type succeeds in drawing the desired distinction. We might be conscious of the operation of an automatic process, even of one that operates on contents we have made explicit in language (consider the way one's mind may automatically supply the next line of a song or poem). And a phenomenal or nonphenomenal seeming need not constitute an agent's endorsement of its

point of view (consider the phenomenal seemings that attend walking over a glass bridge at a significant height, even when one knows the bridge to be safe).

PUTTING IT TOGETHER

With these materials, Broome is in a position to offer an answer to the "motivation question." Consider a case in which one believes one ought (in the central sense) to F but does not intend to F. Related to the requirement of Enkrasia, there is a general rational permission for a belief that one ought to F to serve as the basis for an intention to F. In accord with this permission, one may apply a corresponding rule to one's belief that one ought to F and thereby derive an intention to F. In doing so, one reasons; indeed, one reasons correctly. Because reasoning is something we do, in reasoning to this intention, "we motivate ourselves" (294). And by bringing ourselves into conformity with the rational requirement of Enkrasia, we achieve rationality through reasoning.

It is useful to have an account of how we might achieve rationality through reasoning. And it may be that Broome's materials can help us go further. As Broome notes, in a case of enkratic reasoning, we may end up with an intention that we have no reason to have, apart from whatever reason there was to be rational (198). So we might raise the more general question of how reasoning enables us to respond to reasons. In answering this question, we might use the idea of evidence (which Broome appeals to in various places) and basing permissions that govern correct reasoning from evidence to beliefs and intentions. This might help explain how we achieve, not just rationality but also reason responsiveness, through reasoning.

Aaron Bronfman
University of Nebraska–Lincoln