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Public Buildings and Civic Benefactions in Western Rough Cilicia: insights from signaling theory

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An Offprint of

ROUGH CILICIA

NEW HISTORICAL AND
ARCHAEOLOGICAL APPROACHES

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Edited by

Michael C. Hoff and Rhys F. Townsend

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PREFACE

The region of Rough Cilicia, known in antiquity as Cilicia Tracheia, constitutes the western part of the larger area of Cilicia and is characterized by the ruggedness of its territory, especially as compared to its ‘smooth’ sister-region to the immediate east, Cilicia Pedias. The mountainous landscape had fundamental consequences for the history of the region. It limited agricultural production that in turn must have had an impact on the economy and size of population centers of the region relative to the larger urban centers of its agriculture-rich neighbors, Smooth Cilicia and Pamphylia, which bordered Rough Cilicia on the west. The forests that dominated the mountains of Tracheiotis, however, compensated to some extent for the restricted farming. Well known from the Hellenistic period through the Roman Empire as a source of timber, primarily for shipbuilding, this natural resource had potential for considerable income. The rugged terrain also offered protection to the inhabitants during times of invasion and played a major role in the acculturation process of the region. In addition, the protection afforded by the high mountains combined with the rugged seacoast fostered the prolific piracy that developed in the late Hellenistic period, bringing much notoriety to Rough Cilicia, to such an extent that the terms “Rough Cilicia” and “piracy” go hand in hand.

Until relatively recently, however, Rough Cilicia could be considered *terra incognita* to modern scholarship. The pioneers of Rough Cilicia studies are few: Beaufort, Heberdey, Wilhelm, Bean, Mitford, Rosenbaum, Huber, Russell, Karamut, Tomaschitz, Equini Schneider, and Rauh. The past few decades, however, have seen a shift in scholarly attention paid to the region. Beginning in the 1960s the well-preserved remains of Anemurium were systematically exposed by James Russell. More recently Syedra and Elaiussa Sebaste have also undergone excavation. In the mid-1960s the survey led by Elizabeth Rosenbaum-Alföldi and Gerhard Huber produced the first extensive investigation of the architectural remains of Rough Cilicia. The resulting publication (Rosenbaum 1967) has yet to be superseded,

although beginning in 1996 the Rough Cilicia Survey Project (RCSP), led by Nicholas Rauh, has explored a portion of the region in a controlled systematic fashion. The recently published preliminary report (Rauh et al. 2009) offers the first systematic view of the long-term urban development of Rough Cilicia, setting the stage for future research.

Such recent work has added considerably to our understanding of the region. Unavoidably, however, the findings have been diffuse, the product of individual specialists and teams of researchers from a wide array of countries: Turkey, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom, United States, among others. Several colloquia have helped to overcome this deficiency, and our purpose in convening the conference, *Rough Cilicia: New Historical and Archaeological Approaches* at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in 2007, was simple: to add to this process of synthesis by drawing upon the expertise of those scholars who have conducted important research in Rough Cilicia in order to assess the state of knowledge regarding the region.

The papers in the volume are presented in approximate chronological order. Spelling conventions, always vexing in classical publications, are particularly problematic in a volume of this sort, which ranges widely from prehistory through Greek and Roman eras into the medieval period. Recognizing that no one convention is satisfactory, the editors have elected to use the Latin rather than the Greek spelling of all proper names in order to maintain consistency, hence, e.g., Selinus rather than Selinos and Antiochia ad Cragum rather than Antiocheia epi Krago.

The editors would like to thank the other organizing committee members, Hugh Elton, Ismail Karamut, Nicholas Rauh, and the late Kurt Tomaschitz, for their thoughtful help and suggestions that ultimately made the conference a success. We would also like to thank the individual contributors, for their cooperation in revising their conference presentations and their patience in seeing this volume to publication. A special note of appreciation is given to James Russell, not only for his help in the conference organization

Preface

and subsequent editing of the papers, but also because of his pioneering work in the archaeology of Rough Cilicia.

The conference would not have been possible without the financial assistance of a number of sponsors. The University of Nebraska–Lincoln has earned our deep gratitude for its generous support of the conference. In particular we would like to thank the following: UNL Research Council; MEDICI; Edward Forde, Chair, Department of Art and Art History; and Giacomo Oliva, Dean, Hixson-Lied College of Fine and Performing Arts.

We also extend our appreciation to Bailey Barnard, Emma Clute, and Amanda Washburn who assisted in certain editorial

aspects of these proceedings, to Christy Aggens for her graphic designs and web mastery, and to Clare Litt at Oxbow Books for editorial and publication advice. Special thanks are due to the two anonymous reviewers of the submitted manuscripts who made the papers better.

Finally, we would like to dedicate this volume to Kurt Tomaschitz, a member of our organizing committee, who was to present a paper at the conference but whose failing health at the time would not allow travel to Nebraska, and whose subsequent tragic death has left a great void in Rough Cilicia studies. Thank you, Kurt.

MCH & RFT

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations used in this volume are those of the *American Journal of Archaeology* (<http://www.ajaonline.org/submissions/abbreviations>) with the following additions:

ANMED

Anadolu Akdenizi Archeoloji Haberleri. News of Archaeology from Anatolia's Mediterranean Areas. Antalya: Suna – Inan Kıraç Akdeniz Medeniyetleri Araştırma Enstitüsü.

ATL

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Bean and Mitford 1970

G.E. Bean and T.B. Mitford. 1970. *Journeys in Rough Cilicia, 1964-1968. DenkschrWien* 102. Tituli Asiae Minoris, Ergänzungsband 3. Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

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Bean and Mitford 1962

G.E. Bean and T. B. Mitford. 1962. "Sites Old and New in Rough Cilicia." *AnatSt* 12:185–217.

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C. Berns, H. von Hesberg, L. Vandeput, and M. Waelkens, eds. 2002. *Patris und Imperium. Kulturelle und politische Identität in den Städten in den römischen Provinzen Kleinasiens in der frühen Kaiserzeit. Kolloquium Köln, November 1998. Babesch Supplementa* 8. Leuven: Peeters.

BMC Cilicia

G.F. Hill. 1900. *Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Lycaonia, Isauria, and Cilicia. BMC* 21. London: British Museum.

CHR

F. Blondé, P. Ballet, and J.-F. Salles, eds. 2002. *Céramiques hellénistiques et romaines: Productions et diffusion en Méditerranée orientale (Chypre, Égypte et côte syro-palestinienne)*. Lyon: Maison de l'Orient méditerranéen – Jean Pouilloux.

De Anatolia Antiqua

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Elaiussa Sebaste II

E. Equini Schneider, ed. 2003. *Elaiussa Sebaste*. Vol. 2, *Un Porto tra Oriente e Occidente*. Rome: L'Erma di Bretschneider.

GGM

C. Müller. 1855–61. *Geographici Graeci Minores*. Paris: Didot.

Hansen, *City-State*

M.H. Hansen, ed. 1993. *The Ancient Greek City-State*. *Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser* 67. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters.

Kilise Tepe 1994–98

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LRCW I

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LRCW 3

S. Menchelli, S. Santoro, M. Pasquinucci, and G. Guiducci, eds. *LRCW 3: Late Roman Coarse Wares, Cooking Wares and Amphorae in the Mediterranean*. *Archaeology and Archaeometry*. *Comparison between Western and Eastern Mediterranean*. BAR-IS 2185. Oxford: Archeopress.

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SNG Levante-France

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SNG Levante-Switzerland

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SNG Levante-Suppl.

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SNG von Aulock

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14.

Public Buildings and Civic Benefactions in Western Rough Cilicia: insights from signaling theory

LuAnn Wandsnider

1. Introduction

In the Hellenistic and Roman world of the eastern Mediterranean, Greek and Greco-Roman cities came to be defined by their physical cityscape, with public buildings that were the seat of various civic transactions among citizens and other residents. These buildings were constructed by specific city institutions, such as the council and the assembly, and financed through city funds, mass subscription and, importantly, public benefactions. Public benefactions, which also included support for festivals and competitions, were made by certain elite and usually wealthy individuals to the benefit of a defined community of citizens (and sometimes non-citizens, as in the case of fortification walls). Institutions within the benefiting community, again the council and the assembly, acknowledged these gifts with a published decree and inscriptions or statues situated in places of honor.

Various scholars have commented on the appearance, form, and nature of the Greco-Roman cityscape in Anatolia. Here, I explore the utility of viewing this phenomenon through the lens of multi-level signaling theory. I suggest these public buildings constitute a conjoined individual-communal “signal” that relayed important information to attentive citizens, nearby cities, and agents of Rome. This signal synergistically satisfied four ends: the elite effectively and materially conveyed their hidden talents to a diverse community, establishing position in a dynamic hierarchy and

winning various rewards for themselves and family; non-elite citizens learned of and could make decisions about which of various contenders for positions of authority to support; city institutions materially signaled their communal values, maintaining the support of the citizens in spite of increasing wealth differentials; and finally the city communicated to external audiences (other local cities, Rome’s client kings, and later agents of imperial Rome) its ability to mount significant collective actions, thereby remaining viable if not outcompeting other cities for access to contested resources.

I focus especially on western Rough Cilicia where both honorific inscriptions acknowledging civic benefactions and public building increase in frequency in the later first century after Christ and then decline in the later third century after Christ,¹ a pattern seen more generally for provincial Asia Minor.² Western Rough Cilicia departs from other parts of Asia Minor in the composition of its cityscapes, which included public buildings like agoras, bouleuteria, and baths but show little evidence of larger public structures like arenas and theatres.³ Signaling theory,⁴ a body of theory based in evolutionary thinking that focuses on the differential benefits to individuals and groups who effectively send and receive signals about their hidden qualities (see below), offers insights as to why civic benefactions and public building should look different here compared with western Asia Minor.

2. Civic buildings and public benefactions in Hellenistic Anatolia and provincial Asia Minor

The Hellenistic period of the eastern Mediterranean was, as John Ma notes, the “age of the city-states [or] *poleis*... of kings...and of elephants, gigantic warships, imperial processions, and stupendous feasting and drinking.”⁵ During this time Greek city culture expanded both within the greater Mediterranean basin and also to the east beyond through colonization and other means. Whereas the hundreds of colonies established during the heyday of early Greek colonization (750 – 550 BC) had been confined to coastal areas around the Mediterranean and Black Sea, during the Hellenistic period new cities (perhaps as many as 150) appeared in the wake of Alexander throughout Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia.⁶ These cities likely represented previously existing cities that now included a Greek population, a new Greek name, and, critically, Greek civic institutions.⁷ Simultaneously, some non-Greek cities in Anatolia, such as Alabanda, came to adopt Greek political language and civic apparatus at this time.⁸

Roman presence in the area gradually increased during the late Republic as the usurper Aristonikos and the Mithridatic rebellion on land and, later, piracy at sea attracted direct Roman involvement. By the imperial period, population centers of indigenous peoples along with resident Greeks and Romans (especially in interior Asia Minor) were deliberately organized into communities by agents of Rome and a city government based on a modified Greek model was installed. Towns and other units were formally designated and made subordinate to nearby cities.⁹

Public buildings

The cityscape of Hellenistic Anatolian cities represented an accommodation to recent city history, topography, and the relative health of various institutions characteristic of Greek cities.¹⁰ The thriving urban culture of the Hellenistic cities is seen in the almost uniform presence of civic institutions with a material or architectural expression: an agora with nearby prytaneion, bouleuterion, stoas, temples and sanctuaries (some now dedicated to cults originating from Alexander’s East), gymnasium or gymnasia, a theatre, a stadium, an auditorium, a library, a commercial agora with shops, and city walls along with a secure water supply.¹¹

Early imperial Greco-Roman cities, almost by definition, featured earlier Hellenistic fortifications (walls, gates, and towers), religious structures (temples, sanctuaries, and altars), political meeting places (bouleuteria or basilicas and also large areas for public assemblies), well-defined cultural or educational structures associated with high urban culture (gymnasia, odeia, theatres, libraries), and civic amenities having

to do with water supplies (baths, aqueducts, nymphaia).¹² An additional feature of the city at this time were large decorative monuments, such as arches, statues, monumental inscriptions, and heroes’ tombs, that reflected and amplified the prestige of the wealthy and powerful, including the Roman emperor. Importantly for the discussion that follows, city status was indexed to the splendor of the cityscape.¹³

Construction costs were quite high in antiquity with, for example, a single medium-sized temple in North Africa in the second century after Christ costing 60,000 – 70,000 sesterces¹⁴ or the equivalent of the annual subsistence for some 500 people.¹⁵ Thus construction of a public building was not a trivial matter. Some public buildings were built with labor donated by citizens but most seem to have been financed in one of several ways. In the early Hellenistic era, the Successors to Alexander, in their attempts to recruit local support, may have gifted particular structures to cities. One may cite, for example, contributions to rebuild Rhodes after a devastating earthquake in 228/227 BC coming from Ptolemy III, Antigonus Doseon, Seleucus III, Mithridates II, and others.¹⁶ Also seen are instances of local kings outfitting their capital cities through publicly acknowledged gifts, as Eumenes did for Pergamon.¹⁷ In the later Hellenistic and Imperial periods, local wealthy individuals gifted their respective cities with structures, perhaps of their own volition, through peer pressure¹⁸ and pressure from subordinates,¹⁹ or through solicitation by the council or assembly.²⁰ Similarly, a wealthy patron from outside the city may have contributed funds.²¹ In addition, the city may have solicited funds from citizens as public subscriptions to underwrite the cost of constructing specific buildings, at least in later Hellenistic times.²² In the case of these funding sources, we see material acknowledgement of the benefaction by the city council and assembly in inscriptions or statues placed in a prominent location.

In addition, however, cities may have funded construction through internal resources, relying on taxes from trade and money-changing, rent, and annual payments for office by city magistrates.²³ Recent analysis of city documents for Bithynia, Lycia, and Ephesus shows that, contrary to previous interpretations, internal city funds might have been quite substantial.²⁴ On this basis, Arjan Zuiderhoek argues that cities had more than adequate funding to build and maintain their splendid cityscapes without depending on the munificence of elite citizens.²⁵

Public benefactions

As mentioned above, benefactions by elites were one means by which public buildings came to be constructed. That is, they were a product of an institution sometimes referred to as *euergetism*.²⁶ In addition to benefactions of public buildings,

several other kinds of public benefactions are attested to in inscriptions. Some gifts were singular phenomena (such as underwriting a treasury deficit) while others were more enduring (designating funds for regularly occurring festivals or a public building such as a bath). Some may be readily experienced by the citizens (funerary banquets, bathing oils) or by visiting foreign visitors (cult festivals, contests, games). Still others were appreciated either from within (bath, library, gymnasium) or from afar (fortification walls).

For Paul Veyne and succeeding commentators, euergetism comprises several essential elements. It involved a particular and sizable gift, such as oil for baths, a foundation to support annual festivals remembering a loved one or god, food in time of crisis, a public building, and, later in Roman times, gladiatorial contests. In addition, the gift was made to all or to particular elements of the citizenry, in some cases reinforcing status differentials within the citizenry²⁷ and, increasingly in late Hellenistic times, to non-citizens who were nevertheless residents of the polis or city. Of course, the gift of a public building could perhaps be seen by all, even if they did not directly benefit from or participate in the transactions occurring therein.

The gift size, nature, and location (in the case of buildings) were negotiated with “the people” (the city assembly) and sometimes were deliberately recruited by the council²⁸ or the assembly.²⁹ The gift was in fact made, as opposed to merely being promised, which also occurred and against which laws were enacted.³⁰ And, as importantly, the gift was acknowledged by the city in city records, in honorary decrees set up in a public place, perhaps with a statue of the benefactor, or both. As Zuiderhoek emphasizes in his recent treatment of public benefactions during the Imperial period, a *euergetes* was not a euergetes until his or her benefaction was acknowledged.³¹ Thus, the gift and its acknowledgement represented the end result of a successful (and sometimes protracted) negotiation between the benefactor and city institutions (council and assembly).

Veyne, Maud Gleason, and Zuiderhoek emphasize the activist ethos of Greek culture within which public benefactions occurred.³² That is, one’s virtues were demonstrated through one’s deeds. Thus, benevolence, excellence, love of honor, generosity, love of goodness, zeal, munificence were deliberately put on display through acts of public benefaction by the elite and such displays justified their positions of power. This is the emic aspect of public benefactions.

Scholars have also offered various etic perspectives on public benefactions, recently reviewed by Zuiderhoek. To these he adds another, arguing that for the cities of Roman Asia Minor, public benefactions served as the mechanism by which the civic oligarchy (that is, wealthy elite selected to the city council for life by other wealthy elite and then affirmed through popular vote) and the non-elite citizens

together reaffirmed their status quo relationship. Thus he sees euergetism as an act of legitimation both on the part of the benefactor elite citizen and the non-elite citizen recipient that served several ends.³³ The first was to maintain the stability and internal cohesion of the city when extreme wealth differentials had developed. The second was to mask the apparent decline in the power of the democratic assemblies (by which cities still presented themselves to the world, as seen in inscriptions). And, lastly, Zuiderhoek sees civic benefaction as the means to naturalize the ongoing transition from that of the classical Greek ideology of *isonomia*, that is, the political equality of citizens,³⁴ to an ideology more congruent with the extant hierarchical order.

Zuiderhoek has amassed a database of more than 500 benefactions from inscriptions from throughout Asia Minor, especially emphasizing the west, where likely more inscriptions were produced and more have been found through dedicated epigraphic and archaeological work. His inscriptions come from cities with some antiquity as well as provinces with newer Greek cities. Elsewhere I have suggested that his interpretation of civic benefaction as an act of legitimation may well describe the situation for the older Greek cities.³⁵ For the newer cities of Lycia, for example, where tribal lineages rather than democratic Greek institutions may have played a more important role in organizing social interactions, other interpretations, explored below, may be necessary.

Public benefactions are associated with critical interactions occurring both within the city and also between cities. Within the city, the rise of public benefactions seems associated with both increased inter-individual competition and expanding wealth that allowed for social mobility among citizens in the Hellenistic period and later among freedman in the early Imperial period.³⁶ Gleason and Price highlight the competition for reputation that occurred among elite individuals and families during the early Imperial period in Asia Minor.³⁷ In part, the inter-individual competition may have been driven by simple scalar effects: in two cities – one small, one large, both with the same civic institutions – the opportunities for individual access to those institutions will be more limited in the case of the city with a larger body of citizens. However, differential wealth seems to have exacerbated this situation, so that for the later Hellenistic and early imperial times, the emergence of an oligarchy, with more of the sacral offices becoming secular and more of the secular civic offices being assumed by individuals and families for life, is evident.³⁸

For the Imperial period (and perhaps extendable to the earlier Hellenistic period), Zuiderhoek offers a neo-Ricardian analysis that highlights increasing population and limited agricultural land, leading to the relative scarcity and hence increased value of the latter.³⁹ Thus, holders of agricultural land became relatively wealthier over this interval. One may also note the climatic amelioration that occurred during the

later Hellenistic and early Imperial period, which may have led to increased agricultural productivity at this time.⁴⁰

Along with expanding wealth, however, were growing disparities in the distribution of wealth both in the later Hellenistic period and Imperial period.⁴¹ By the Imperial period, an estimated five percent of the population – senators, knights, and councilors – held most of the wealth.⁴² Coincidentally and, I argue below, exactly what might be expected, we see an increase in ostentatious displays in habit and in the kinds of benefactions now made.⁴³

Finally, there is another component to the dynamic of inter-individual or inter-family competition that is likely demographic in nature. As has been argued for classical Athens, demographic processes operated to introduce an element of uncertainty with consequences for the maintenance of familial wealth.⁴⁴ That is, given deliberately limited fertility, husbands typically 10 years older than wives, manipulated birth/sex ratios that favored males, and possible early death, the likelihood that a wealthy elite family remained a wealthy elite family for more than several generations was low.⁴⁵

At the inter-city or regional level, various kinds of interaction have been recognized. Ma sees the Greek cities of Anatolia as more or less homologous polities that engaged in inter-state arbitration; requests for and granting of *asylia* (inviolability) between cities, effected through individual negotiations; the dispatching of envoys from cities with famous shrines and festivals to announce festivals to other cities, where they were grandly received; and the practice of foreign arbitrators responding to requests from individual cities.⁴⁶ The culture shared by the Greek cities is reflected in their common architectural, ideological, and textual idioms,⁴⁷ a textbook example of the kind of interaction Renfrew and Cherry define for peer polities.⁴⁸

In addition to more amicable relations, competition is also seen. Territorial disputes are rife in the Hellenistic period⁴⁹ and continue into the Imperial period, even in the pacified environment created under Augustus.⁵⁰ In addition, long-standing rivalries between various cities continued, as for Ephesus and Pergamum, Ephesus and Smyrna, Prusa and Apameia, Tyre and Sidon, Nicaea and Nicomedia. Emperors bestowed or removed the titles of “First City of...” and cities competed for these titles. City status might determine tax relief or might bring other resources from the emperor.⁵¹ Furthermore, city status would determine how city delegations were seated at games and order in processions at religious festivals and “[g]overnors would play rival cities off against each other and in this way, hide their wrong-doing.”⁵²

Inter-city rivalries had a material component, with cities attempting to outdo the other with grand building plans. There was a danger in being too grandiose, however, as a *corrector* might be dispatched by Rome to reorganize city finances.⁵³

During the high Imperial period, competitive civic building gave way to agonistic inter-city competitions.⁵⁴

In sum, the practice of acknowledged public benefactions is a social, political, and economic phenomenon recognized for the Greek urban world that continues in an evolved form into the Roman Imperial period where it joined the more Roman practice of patronage. Over the years, researchers have sought to explain its existence and frequency using a variety of perspectives sketched above.⁵⁵ Below, I argue for viewing it as a costly signal emitted by individuals and by groups, by citizens and by cities; framing it in this fashion buys us the ability to better parse the processes of urbanization that unfolded very differently in tribal societies of a borderlands like western Rough Cilicia versus the older Greek cities of Anatolia.

3. Signaling theory

Signaling theory is a subset of Darwinian thinking that considers the benefits that accrue to individuals or groups who rapidly learn about each other’s capabilities through non-lethal means. The signal, a behavioral or material display with particular characteristics, serves as the conduit of communication. With this information about individual or group attributes, people can make decisions in their best self-interest. People can decide to avoid the shirker and marry the over-achiever. Similarly, groups may decide to stay clear of a formidable group or, if nearby and potentially threatening, may decide to ally themselves. The point of departure for signaling theory is that through acts on the part of a signaler, hidden qualities are accurately displayed; assessments of those hidden qualities are thus made and then acted upon by the receiver.

Signaling theory, focusing on quality and other properties of the signal, has been the subject of much recent scholarship in anthropology.⁵⁶ Fraser Neiman first deployed these ideas in archaeological interpretation and since then others have followed.⁵⁷ In their recent review, Bird and Smith find common ground between costly signaling and ideas explored by Thorstein Veblen on conspicuous consumption by the newly rich, Marcel Mauss on gift-giving in non-capitalist societies as the means to win and keep prestige and political authority, and Pierre Bourdieu on the notion of social capital and its relationship to economic and symbolic capital.⁵⁸

While a costly signaling approach to social analysis may be dismissed as another simplistic reductionist approach that assumes human behavior is rational, I use it here as a device to organize research that examines the tension between the individual and the group (in this case, the citizen and the city), which may drive institutional changes, and to consider the materiality of social transactions.

Signaling is usefully described in terms of the signals exchanged between more or less homologous entities, senders and receivers.⁵⁹ Senders send a signal in the form of material displays – underwriting a festival, constructing a monument, wearing 15 kilos of fancy jades – that advertise critical hidden capabilities such as access to resources, kin groups, or knowledge or personal characteristics (relative health, charisma, organizational skills, strength, endurance). Individual receivers, receiving signals from multiple senders, assess the quality of the signal and infer the quality of the sender, especially with regard to the hidden capabilities of interest.

Signals have a variety of properties. They may be of varying quality, they may be emitted frequently or infrequently, they may be broadcast far or directed towards nearby audiences. Signals may have target audiences of varying composition. Signaling theory is usually discussed in terms of individual or family signaling and more recently in terms of the social group of varying sizes and composition.

Costly signaling has been the focus of most anthropological applications of signaling theory and seeks to make understandable conspicuous displays seen in a range of societies. The idea here is that “the cost of the display functions to ensure that only high-quality individuals can afford them at all. Thus, the signal value of conspicuous consumption is maintained by its costs; these costs in turn are the price wealthy individuals pay for prestige.”⁶⁰ Treatments of social behaviors from a costly signaling perspective make several empirically demonstrable and reasonable assumptions. For one, variation exists: particular desirable attributes such as mediation skills, charisma, physical stamina and family connections all vary within a population of individuals. Within a population of groups, *asabiyya*, or the ability of a group of individuals to act as a coherent unit, may also vary.⁶¹ Second, it is in the best self-interest of the sender to try to deceive the receivers, that is, to try to project themselves as wealthier, or stronger, or better connected than they actually are. This being the case, it is therefore also in the best interest of the receivers to accurately evaluate the signals being sent. These factors operating together create a situation wherein costly signals in fact honestly represent the capabilities of the senders. Only those individuals or groups that actually are wealthy, strong, or well-endowed with connections will be able to sustain this costly signal.

Most treatments of costly signaling in anthropology have focused on signaling occurring within a single level, that is, at the level of individuals or families, although some consideration of piggy-backing, that is, conjoined individual-group signaling, has also been offered.⁶² A recent examination for contact era New Guinea by Paul Roscoe offers a compelling analysis of what he terms social signaling, which plays out at both the individual and group levels but also links these levels.⁶³ By social signaling, Roscoe refers

to symbolic or ritualized fighting in which true fighting capabilities are put on display but little blood is actually shed. For individuals signaling their capacities within complex and dynamic social groups, social signaling is critical to the maintenance of group effectiveness, if not harmony. To resolve internal conflicts, men engage in public, ritualized contests of song, dance, or head-thumping; superiority is established and all live to fight for the group the next day. Abilities critical to supporting group competitiveness – stamina, courage, strength, mental agility, and acuity – are put on display for all to evaluate and individuals and families accordingly decide whom to support.

At the group level, Roscoe recognizes social signaling by clans to other clans and by villages to other villages. He distinguishes three forms: conspicuous distributions (fabulous feasts), conspicuous performances (“elaborately choreographed exhibitions of singing, dancing, and music mounted by spectacularly decorated performers”),⁶⁴ and conspicuous constructions (gigantic cult houses built by clans). In the elaborate dances, the contributions of the individual are masked by costumes as they are in the massive cult house constructions. All three media – material, performance, and architecture – reliably communicate the number of kin and allies willing to support collective projects, the abilities of contributing individuals, and the fact that individuals are willing to bend their interests to larger-scale, well-organized efforts. That is, they are an index of a group’s *asabiyya* or their potential for effective collective action. Roscoe also recognizes another kind of signal that may allow for prevarication. Thus, some groups may be so effective in manipulating their media that through aesthetics that they can present an image of power and danger that is not matched by actual strength.

Already mentioned are different signaling media – song contests and duels at the individual level, choreographed dances and structures at the group level. This bespeaks that to some extent, signaling is conducted in a shared language. If the sender signals via poetry recitations in archaic Greek and the audience is expecting blood sports in Latin, the message may be interpreted improperly. In other words, signaling occurs between individuals within a community of peers or between polities within a region of peer polities, which by definition share a common language in architecture, prestige trade, and ideological motifs.⁶⁵

Signal degradation occurs over space and time. A dance may be an effective signal if the audience is within hailing distance of the dancers and decidedly less effective if at greater distances.⁶⁶ Communication may occur over larger distances, however, through monumental architecture. A fortification wall may serve the purpose of defense but may also serve as a deterrent, signaling to more distant groups “effective community within.”

James Boone obliquely considers signal frequency in his examination of magnanimity, an apparently altruistic act of conspicuous generosity seen in intra- and inter-community feasting.⁶⁷ Boone argues that such acts are the means by which an individual with high social status affirms that status, demonstrating that they and their family still retain social power, and therefore access to resources and allies. In reviewing ethnographic cases from the American northwest coast and southwest he finds that such displays are often offered annually. In addition I would note that individuals, in that they are biological entities that mature and age, are dynamic in their abilities and capabilities for action and the same can be said of groups, composed as they are of individuals. Thus, the recurring broadcast of signals by individuals and groups is understandable and expectable to both maintain and assert claims of high status.

What do senders and receivers gain from all of this signaling? In a competitive situation, both winners and losers nevertheless survive and the qualities of each are exposed. Over the short-term, while the sender incurs a cost, the successful sender reaps benefits in the form of increased access to mates or higher quality marriage arrangements,⁶⁸ preferential access to resources in bad times,⁶⁹ or access to other political or social offices. Receivers also gain in that they come to know with whom to ally themselves.⁷⁰ In the case of groups in a competitive environment, successful groups survive and maintain access to territory. They may also recruit defecting individuals from elsewhere and we may see the institutions of successful groups being emulated in less effective groups,⁷¹ as in for example the apparent spread of Greek civic institutions during the Hellenistic period.

The signaling potential of architecture is important to arguments that follow and so it is useful to briefly highlight that potential here. Several researchers have observed that public architecture seems to be often constructed in stressful (but not catastrophic) times, such as in the initial phase of a new social, political, or economic formation.⁷² Elliot Abrams interprets this pattern in terms of the deliberate formation of a group identity; a signaling interpretation might emphasize that individuals and groups are asserting not only identity so as to differentiate “us” from “them” but, also as importantly, signaling their competence and capability to attract continuing support.

On the costliness of the signal, Bruce Trigger points to monumental architecture, specifically those structures that exceed in scale and degree of elaboration that which is required by their functional role, as communicating where the seat of power in a society lies.⁷³ The larger or more elaborate the structure, the greater the display of power. Those in power may also manipulate space and the positioning of architecture to restrict and screen or to encompass and awe.⁷⁴ Importantly, public architecture is particularly potent in

conveying messages to linguistically and ethnically diverse groups, such as those commonly making up the populace of early and later states.⁷⁵ Regarding the potential of architecture to send an enduring message, Richard Blanton observed, commenting on monumental architecture in the Valley of Oaxaca in Mexico: “As communications media, monumental architecture is actually relatively efficient. The initial costs of construction may be great, but once built a massive building or plaza can be seen by thousands of people over great lengths of time, broadcasting continuously for even thousands of years.”⁷⁶

In terms of social signaling, Paul Roscoe argues for architecture as one of three effective group signals that serves as an index of collective action, one that also masks the contribution of the individual.⁷⁷ Boone seems to ignore the physicality and thus durable signaling capacity of monumental architecture.⁷⁸ He focuses only on its cost, suggesting that such structures are similar to the destructive potlatches known historically for American northwest coast groups, when during community displays, resources were deliberately “burned” or removed from circulation; material goods likely became more valuable but also unavailable to actually feed or clothe potlatch attendees. I suggest instead that the importance resides in the materiality or physicality of this architecture, which our stereoscopic vision is adept at reading.

In sum, signaling theory and social signaling highlight that deeds transcend words in communicating the hidden talents of individuals to diverse groups of individuals and of groups to other groups. Roscoe’s work is especially important here, focusing as it does on the effectiveness of individual signaling within groups and also group signaling to other groups within regions.⁷⁹ In effect, he is arguing for a form of multi-level signaling, a kind of thinking in evolutionary circles that brings “the group” back into equations that until recently only reckoned the selective benefits of behaviors on individuals and their kin. Group effectiveness and thus selection for solidarist behaviors on the part of individuals seems especially critical in environments that are rife with inter-group competition,⁸⁰ or are otherwise inchoate.⁸¹

4. Civic buildings and public benefactions as individual and communal signals in Hellenistic Anatolia and imperial Asia Minor

In the emic sense, the public benefactions documented for Hellenistic Anatolia and early imperial Asia Minor were, as represented in texts, gifts of elite benefactors to the citizenry. From an etic perspective, however, they may be considered signals being emitted by individuals within a dynamic community composed of other individuals and also

deliberately recruited and emitted by communities sharing Greek urban culture within a dynamic social landscape. The acknowledgement of the benefactions, testified to in inscriptions and statues, tells us certain signals were received and accepted by institutions of the citizenry.

In considering public benefactions as signals, in which a material display references hidden capabilities, I suggest an argument similar to that offered by Neiman for the so-called Maya collapse: pyramid construction and stelae erection,⁸² signals emitted by competing families, ceased as potential receivers defected to more productive locales.⁸³ For Hellenistic Anatolia and Imperial Asia Minor, civic benefactions appear when and where they do as conditions associated with signaling at both individual and communal levels prevail. The nature of the signal, such as public buildings versus other kinds of benefactions, also varies through time as the potential audience expands to include diverse groups within the city or observers external to the city. Conditions associated with signaling differ according to political geography and scalar factors, specifically the composition and sizes of receiving audiences as well as the availability of wealth to be devoted towards signaling. Thus, the trajectory of civic benefactions seen in western Rough Cilicia should look somewhat different from that observed farther to the west because of its status as a borderlands, because of the smaller cities there, and because of the limited wealth available to support individual signaling. That communities may have been attempting to relay commitment to Roman social order in a time of unrest, a version of what Blanton refers to in his analysis of domestic architecture as canonical communication,⁸⁴ may also be important in the case of western Rough Cilicia.

Cities within regions

At the level of cities within a region, it is useful to distinguish between a region like western Anatolia and Asia Minor, interacting with peer cities, and a borderlands situation, like that seen for western Rough Cilicia and possibly also Lycia, where interacting communities appear not to have shared a common parlance.

Peer cities

The textbook treatment of euergetism and civic benefactions was offered by Veyne and others for the interacting polities of Hellenistic western Anatolia and later Imperial Asia Minor.⁸⁵ Here, polities, operating within a shared Greek urban culture, both cooperated and competed with each other through challenges of the microimperialism of neighboring cities and local dynasts, natural disasters such as earthquakes, and the geopolitical turmoil associated with the expanding Roman

core polity, itself a dynamic entity. And, even with the *Pax Romana*, the emperor and other agents of Rome contended with the recurring squabbles of the Greek cities each vying for territory and status.⁸⁶

By the Hellenistic period, Greek cities in this region shared the institutional apparatus for collective action, such as an increasingly oligarchic council and assembly. Nevertheless, history is clear that some cities were more adept than others in making corporate decisions and executing collective acts. Cities differentially survived and thrived. Analysis of the differential success of individual cities considers the effectiveness of military action,⁸⁷ as well as diplomatic embassies, in waging and weathering the “small wars” for territory.⁸⁸ In the case of the so-called “big wars,” waged by vying Successor kings and external core polities for tribute, it is clear that city or city factions made both good and bad decisions. Thus, some cities, formerly part of the Attalid kingdom (for example, Pergamum, Ephesus, and Sardis), were granted freedom by Rome to acknowledge their support during the war against the usurper Aristonicus. On the other hand, many Greek cities were punished for their decision to support Mithridates IV in his rebellion against Rome with exorbitant tribute requirements, inheritances stripped, and fees charged for boarding Roman troops.⁸⁹

Signaling theory invites us to consider the role of communal signals – and I especially emphasize public architecture – in communicating the potential for effective collective action to local enemies and allies, in the case of the little wars for territory and, more distantly, to agents of Rome and other core polities. Fortification walls and forts served to protect but also may have served as a costly signal and hence as a deterrent. For example, John Camp reports for Herakleia under Latmos in Asia Minor that the city circuit walls appear deliberately monumental.⁹⁰ More generally, in the Hellenistic period, prytaneia and bouleuteria became more massive and were built of expensive exotic materials; they are often ornately outfitted as previously seen only for temples.⁹¹ And, for the early Imperial period, temples and sanctuaries for the imperial cult transformed the cities of Asia Minor.⁹² With the high Imperial period, massive bath complexes (fed by aqueducts carrying water across previously hostile territories now quiet owing to the *Pax Romana*) dominated cities.⁹³ But not all cities were equally outfitted with monumental architecture. Did some cities, such as those building elaborate fortifications or public buildings, fare better in attracting new citizens or favors from the emperor? Signaling theory would anticipate that this is the case, but the proposition requires evaluation.

Cities in Borderlands

As emphasized above, signaling is effective only if it is

carried out by senders and receivers that share the same cultural language. In borderlands, while interaction may take place, by definition, it occurs across power or culture frontiers. Borderlands are ambiguous landscapes wherein “two or more groups come into contact with each other, where people of different cultural backgrounds occupy the same territory and where the space between them grows intimate.”⁹⁴ While some borderlands are rather simple, with just a few articulating cultures and with some degree of temporal stability, Hellenistic and Roman western Rough Cilicia were borderlands in the extreme. As summarized by Nicholas Rauh et al., the rugged landscape of western Rough Cilicia was occupied in antiquity by small (compared with Greek cities of western Anatolia or Asia Minor) communities of Luwian-speakers with a subsistence base dominated by pastoralism or agro-pastoralism and organized in terms of lineages.⁹⁵ Texts indicate that western Rough Cilicia was claimed and possibly partially developed by local chieftains as well as a series of core polities that included Persia, various Hellenistic Successors, and finally Rome. The relatively accessible stands of cedar and other strategic resources critical to sea-power in the region seem to have attracted the attention of polities but all were attempting to assert their claims over relatively large distances, meaning that their claims were always difficult to sustain for any stretch of time. This rugged borderland situation also contributed to western Rough Cilicia becoming a haven for pirates and brigands, especially during the late Hellenistic period, with which various core polities grappled in succession.⁹⁶

The critical point here is that it was not until imperial Roman times that many or most of the local polities in interior Anatolia in general and western Rough Cilicia in particular came to share a semblance of Greco-Roman civic culture.⁹⁷ In the case of western Rough Cilicia, Roman involvement in the area was via client kings and queens who, with help from Roman troops, struggled with local rebellions through the early Imperial period.⁹⁸ From the high Imperial period, inscriptions mention the *probouloi* (panel of 12 councilors, which ran the city council), *dekaprotoi* (local dignitaries who assumed responsibility for paying taxes and levies), and city officers, thus obliquely referring to Hellenistic civic institutions.⁹⁹

In addition, public buildings – agoras, bouleuteria, baths, and temples as well as enclosures for display of honorific statues – were constructed at this time, their relative age at various sites established through association with Roman period ceramics and affinities with other dated structures.¹⁰⁰ Conspicuous in their absence are other structures commonly seen in contemporaneous Greco-Roman cities to the east and west: arenas, gymnasia, and theatres.¹⁰¹ Given that the architecture of western Rough Cilicia is known solely through what is expressed on the surface, it is possible that such structures are yet to be found, although, given the large size

of the missing structures, this seems unlikely. Importantly, other public structures – monumental tombs situated within the city proper – bespeak other, presumably indigenous, influences.¹⁰²

Regarding the nature of interaction, whether competitive or cooperative, between and among the small cities of western Rough Cilicia, some evidence exists. For the Hellenistic period, occupational remains in the form of ceramics and burials appear confined to defensible hilltops, and Rauh reports Hellenistic fortifications throughout the area.¹⁰³ For the early Imperial period, Kurt Tomaschitz’s analysis of inscriptions points to participation in the region-wide network of agonistic festivals, suggesting inter-city competition occurred within the constraints of *Pax Romana*.¹⁰⁴

I have already alluded to regional unrest in the early Imperial period as well as in the third century and beyond. Under these circumstances, sending communal signals that relay a strong commitment to Imperial Roman world order, as well as the emperor and his intermediaries, local client kings and queens, may have been well rewarded. That is, agoras were not simply marketplaces for transacting various commercial activities; their form also communicated participation in the larger Greco-Roman world (communicating to external agents) and possibly also served as media in the public relations war with other local communities. Thus, to the extent allowed by surface remains, it may be useful to consider city size and endurance with respect to the outlay of public structures – their monumentality, the degree to which they are incorporated into the fabric of the city – present here.

Individuals within cities

The benefactions of wealthy elite individuals must also be considered in the context of inter-individual interaction, that is, interactions between citizens within the city. These interactions may differ because of simple scalar differences between populous and less populous cities and also because of the presence and distribution of societal wealth.

Focusing on the latter first, through Hellenistic and especially imperial times there seems to be a general increase in personal wealth. For the imperial period, scholars attribute this increase to the lack of major conflict and the construction of all-weather roads that linked cities and reduced the cost of commerce as well as the creation of a coherent legal system.¹⁰⁵ Outside of Rough Cilicia, evidence for the increase in circulating wealth is found in more meat consumption and taller stature.¹⁰⁶

In addition to an increase in personal wealth, however, there seems to be a marked increase in wealth differentials, at least in western Asia Minor, as sketched above. Landed individuals became relatively more wealthy compared to others as population increased and land became relatively

scarcer,¹⁰⁷ and possibly also as agriculture became more productive owing to climatic shifts.¹⁰⁸ Zuiderhoek finds that, excluding gifts of entire buildings, 60% of the public benefactions attested to by inscription in his database are small, 1000 denarii or less.¹⁰⁹ But, by Zuiderhoek's reckoning, 1000 denarii represents 80% of the annual income that would come from rent on land valued at 25,000 denarii, the minimum wealth requirement for a citizen seeking a position as a councilor. So, even these small benefactions are being made by a class of families we might call wealthy, although perhaps not excessively wealthy.

But were what appear to be costly signals indeed costly? Zuiderhoek argues that the benefactions offered by the wealthy were not particularly burdensome, representing a small fraction – perhaps 5% – of elite wealth.¹¹⁰ His characterization may be true when the merely wealthy and the super-wealthy are considered in aggregate. As the costly signaling literature emphasizes, however, whether a signal is costly depends on how it impacts an individual's reproductive capacity, something very difficult for us to assess. For the Imperial period, we know individuals attempted to shift imposed liturgies to others and that civic obligations might ruin a family and had to be managed very carefully.¹¹¹ This pattern suggests that real costs are being incurred by at least some of the wealthy. And finally sumptuary laws were enacted during the period 100 BC to AD 50 to rein in the incredible displays of wealth being made by individuals, thereby providing cover so aristocrats could avoid bankruptcy.¹¹² In spite of being excused from liturgies, in the second century after Christ we see individuals nevertheless making substantial benefactions, which are duly noted in inscriptions.¹¹³ All of this suggests that public benefactions represent individual or family signals that were indeed costly.

What did these individual signals convey? Certainly they conveyed family wealth, some of which could be directed towards other citizens or solidaristic activities, but other talents were also exposed. I suggest that individuals with the education, charisma, and skills to successfully negotiate complex gifts with council and assembly are being identified and these same skills are recruited for use by the city on embassies to or as mediators in other cities,¹¹⁴ or to the local agent of Rome to lobby for favors.¹¹⁵ Marc Waelkens sees this role as important for the later Hellenistic period but downplays it for the Imperial period,¹¹⁶ yet others highlight the importance of these talents in dealing with agents of Rome.¹¹⁷ Especially in the times of unrest, such as the first century BC in western Asia Minor, these talents were valued and rewarded; in the mid-first century after Christ for southern Asia Minor, the unrest here might also have created an environment in which diplomatic talent could shine.

Along with increasing wealth and wealth differentials, the Hellenistic and Imperial periods are marked by an increased

dynamism to the social landscape as more families with means vie for a restricted number of seats of power. Council size was more or less scaled to city size, with smaller cities (for example, Halicarnassus) having councils of 100 or under and moderate sized cities like Aphrodisias a council of 200; Ephesus, one of the larger cities in Asia Minor, seated a council of 450 members.¹¹⁸ Given more contenders for a set number of council positions, the ostentatious behavior by wealthy elites in the late Hellenistic and early Imperial periods and the increasing gate fees incurred to enter into council membership become understandable. Part and parcel of this may be the propaganda offered on particular individuals; in her analysis of inscriptions referring to aedilician euergetism in Hellenistic Anatolia, Laure Marest-Caffey notes important changes, from brief descriptions of *euergetai* and euergetism in Anatolian cities for the middle Hellenistic period (prior to the second century BC) to lengthy descriptions of the education, grooming, career, and many benefactions of the *euergetai* in the later Hellenistic (from the second century to 33 BC).¹¹⁹

By imperial times, council membership had become quite exclusive, with the council composed of ex-magistrates and men of hereditary wealth. To enter the council, initiates must have owned property above a specific threshold and perhaps have been a member of the *ephebia*. They sometimes paid an honorarium to enter the council and were seated for life. If magistrates were elected (by the citizens), their candidacy was predetermined by the extant council. By the high Imperial period, councilors and their families began to identify themselves as the ruling class and assumed a defining lifestyle expressed in gymnasial athletics, distinct forms of literature, and euergetism.¹²⁰

In effect, Zuiderhoek argues that benefactions had two different audiences. Potential members of the council are demonstrating their many virtues to seated members of the council through acts of beneficence.¹²¹ In the parlance of signaling – and similar to Veblen's observations on the nouveau riche of late 19th century America¹²² – the wealthy elite are signaling their virtues to the gatekeepers of power, other wealthy councilors. There is a second audience, however: the various professional *collegia* exercised some power and the assembly also retained some clout.¹²³ Thus, a signal designed to impress both elites and the demos was likely the most effective.

5. Signaling in western Asia Minor and western Rough Cilicia

With these general observations on wealth and the dynamic social landscape of individuals, let us now consider how signaling may play out in sizable cities of western Asia Minor compared with the smaller communities found both in the west and in western Rough Cilicia.

Individuals in large cities

Larger cities, such as Pergamon and Ephesus, saw the co-residence of multiple kin groups as well as, by imperial times, portions of families, as individual family members pursued opportunities throughout the greater Mediterranean world.¹²⁴ Multiple languages – Greek, native, “foreign” and later Latin – were spoken here, with Greek the language of civic discourse and with Greek and Latin beginning to replace local native languages.¹²⁵

In such a diverse social context, we might expect to see signaling that has a major material or physical component, such as monumental public architecture, as individuals speak to an international, multi-lingual audience. Moreover, given the costs of building in antiquity, the construction of monumental structures sends a powerful signal about the capabilities of the contenders.

Individuals in smaller cities

In smaller cities and communities, individuals, families, and the capabilities of each might be well known to the other residents, a domain in which signaling may be of less utility, per discussion by Neiman. On the other hand, Boone and Roscoe highlight the role of signaling as families attempt to assert and maintain their status within a community that allows for some social mobility.

Where multiple language communities were highlighted for the larger cities of western Asia Minor, the (male) residents of interior villages and cities may have been monolingual, speaking their native language, or bilingual, with some acquired knowledge of Greek.¹²⁶ In the smaller cities of Rough Cilicia, residents likely spoke Luwian and later Greek as well. Ten Cate’s analysis shows that compound Luwian-Greek names appear late in the sequence, when urban communities develop in interior Rough Cilicia under Vespasian. Analysis by Rauh and colleagues allows differentiation between coastal and inland cities: for inland sites, almost 100% of the names appearing in inscriptions are Luwian or Greco-Luwian; in coastal cities, 75% (Coracesium) to 88% (Iotape) are Luwian or Greco-Luwian, the remainder being Greek or Latin.¹²⁷ In more or less linguistically homogenous communities such as these, architecture may be a less effective communication device.

In the case of western Rough Cilicia, we are dealing with smaller communities with much smaller capacities overall for wealth. The bouleuterion at Asar Tepe seated an estimated 55–60 councilors, while at Nephelion, the structure there interpreted as a small theatre or bouleuterion, likely accommodated fewer than 100.¹²⁸ Wealth in antiquity is scaled primarily to the holding of agricultural land, which in

western Rough Cilicia may have been quite limited given the rugged terrain here. On the other hand, this area possessed tracts of highly valued cedars, presumably still under native control.¹²⁹ Depending on the native land use system in place, the usual calculation of wealth may have to be reconfigured to account for wealth generated by access to strategic resources, with those resources possibly managed not by individuals or individual families, but by tribal lineages.

The presumed native lineage system seems to have been quite strong here, as evidenced by frequent references to family members in honorific inscriptions.¹³⁰ In addition to population size and degree of wealth then, the number and sizes of these lineages may be even more critical to an understanding of signaling. That is, if a community consists of just a few lineages, again following Neiman’s arguments, there is little advantage in investing in signals; no new knowledge is gained. On the other hand, if lineages are numerous and in an environment made inchoate by dint of demographic forces, new sources of power and wealth made available by access to the wider Mediterranean under the *Pax Romana*, and instability fostered by resistance to the Roman world order, then we might expect to see a more significant expression of signaling by lineages.

6. Signaling in western Rough Cilicia

In the case of western Rough Cilicia, signaling via civic benefactions and public buildings is expected but the impetus for – and form of that signal – should vary from that seen further to the west or east.

At the scale of communities, the degree and kind of inter-city interaction is difficult to gauge, but what does seem important is signaling to agents of Rome about the commitment of a community to support the Roman order, which seems to have had a somewhat fragile hold with recurring need for support. Thus, construction of public buildings, like agoras, bouleuteria, and baths, but especially temples or other signs of the emperor cult, such as additions to the honorific enclosed areas, might have conveyed this signal, both to agents of Rome and would be rebellious factions.

Elsewhere in the greater Mediterranean basin during the early Imperial period we find the construction of arenas or the refitting of theatres to support games. To date, no sign of such populace-oriented structures have been found in western Rough Cilicia, although Karamut and Russell do describe one structure at Nephelion as a possible small theatre.¹³¹ Rauh and colleagues interpret this pattern as evidence for the large influence of the council, seating the heads of local native families, who used, in the parlance suggested here, modest forms of Roman order architecture to signal their elite status.¹³² Two other possibilities follow: the amount of

circulating wealth may have been insufficient to support such massive constructions, or, alternatively, the way that wealth was managed by lineage structures meant that only relatively smaller public buildings could be constructed.

7. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have attempted to argue that civic benefactions, in part responsible for the construction of public buildings in Asia Minor, are more than simply individual gifts. Rather, these material manifestations in effect substantially signal the competence and pro-social orientation of individuals and lineages. Aggregated by the city, they also signal that the community itself is competent and able to recruit and recognize the individual talents of its citizens. The application of social signaling to the Greco-Roman world, with its institution of public benefactions and monumental “habit,” appears very productive. Finally, as a result of examining social signaling in this context, this exercise also expands the utility of social signaling as an analytic construct.

In the area of Asia Minor urbanism, the signaling approach focuses attention on the differential success, i.e., persistence and spread, of civic structures or the citizens who fashioned them. More specifically, it posits a relationship between the splendor of communal signals and the persistence of communities emitting them, something quite researchable with the textual, archaeological, and numismatic record for Asia Minor. It also suggests that public buildings should be an important signal early on, communicating very graphically the presence of civic institutions to linguistically diverse audiences. Such structures may also have helped to attract citizen recruits¹³³ as well as favors from Rome. Once the cityscape was constructed, however, other means of communal signaling were found; the “architecture channel” was already “saturated.” At this point, an increase in festivals and competitions should be seen.¹³⁴

In the case of urbanism in western Rough Cilicia, other expectations are inspired by signaling thinking. The question of wealth – amount and distribution – becomes prominent. How much wealth can be garnered from the agricultural or mixed agricultural-pastoral-marine subsistence base? (How ancient are the terraced inner valleys here, which today support seemingly very productive “Gardens of Eden”?) Alternatively, was wealth available to these communities from the harvest of stands of cedar? Should the occurrence of small-scale bouleuteria, baths, and somewhat grand (for example, Lamus) agoras here, but no arenas or theatres, be read as an index of the relative wealth of the area? How did western Rough Cilicia communities with different kinds or numbers of public buildings fare with respect to support from Rome during times of unrest? Did such structures attract

unwelcome attention from fractious native elements in the Isaurian hinterland?

In the area of signaling, I have offered several elaborations, including the role of peer interaction. That is, signaling does not exist in a vacuum but occurs between more or less homologous entities that speak the same cultural language. Having said this, it is worth noting that communal signaling to receivers beyond peers, in this case by newly recognized western Rough Cilicia communities to agents of Rome, may be quite important, especially in times of unrest and rebellion.

Finally, much of the literature on signaling expressly focuses on individuals, families, and larger kin structures.¹³⁵ Here, the focus is on cities with particular republican (that is, supra-kin forms of law-based government) civic structures, which supplant or augment kin structures. Cities competing with other cities for citizens and for favors from Rome engaged in a kind of signaling appropriate to their context, with public buildings sometimes donated by wealthy elites and sometimes constructed by “the city.” Other signals, games and festivals, also served as the media of inter-city competition.

In sum, the signaling approach opens a broad avenue for research on the nature and form of urbanism in Anatolia and Asia Minor. The rich textual, archaeological, and numismatic record from this landscape, along with the natural challenges posed by in-silting harbors and earthquakes, allow for an extraordinary laboratory within which to explore the relationship between social signal form and consequence, especially at the communal level.

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Notes

- 1 Rauh et al. 2009; Tomaschitz 2003a.
- 2 Zuiderhoek 2009b.

- 3 Townsend and Hoff 2004; but see Karamut and Russell 1999.
- 4 See Bird and Smith 2005 for a recent comprehensive overview. Other discussion follows below.
- 5 Ma 2003, 13.
- 6 Hansen 2000b, 1994; but see also Yağcı, this volume.
- 7 Billows 2003, 198.
- 8 Ma 2003, 25–6, 38.
- 9 Mitchell 1993, 176–79.
- 10 See contributors to Parrish 2001.
- 11 Billows 2003, 209; Ma 2003.
- 12 Mitchell 1993, 80.
- 13 Gleason 2006; Price 1984; Mitchell 1993; Waelkens 2002.
- 14 Duncan-Jones 1990, 177.
- 15 Assuming subsistence for one individual amounted to 115 HS/year; Zuiderhoek 2009b, 25.
- 16 Cohen 1995, 25.
- 17 Radt 2001.
- 18 Veyne 1976.
- 19 Gleason 2006, 239.
- 20 Price 1984, 64.
- 21 Ferrary 1997; Gauthier 1985.
- 22 Migeotte 1984, 1992, 1995.
- 23 Duncan-Jones 1990, 174–77.
- 24 Schwartz 2001.
- 25 Zuiderhoek 2009b; see Reger (2003) for a similar assessment for the cities of Hellenistic Anatolia.
- 26 Public benefaction or euergetism was first systematically explored by the social historian Paul Veyne in his monumental publication *Le Pain et le cirque* (1976). Veyne described and explained various forms of euergetism such the liturgical practice of aristocrats of Classical Greece, the gifting practices of the “notables” (newly wealthy, i.e., the elite, individuals and families) of the Hellenistic and late Republican period as well as the members of the ruling city oligarchies in Imperial Rome, and also in imperial Rome, the provisions of food and gladiatorial games made by the emperor and contenders to senatorial and other offices. The earlier Greek Archaic practice of gift-giving between equals is argued by Gygas (2006); Veyne (1976) considers gifting in Classical Greece as well; Gauthier (1985, 1992), Migeotte (1992, 1995, 1997), and most recently, Marest-Caffey (2008) focus on public benefactions in the Hellenistic world; for imperial Roman times, see Price (1984), Quass (1993), and Zuiderhoek (2005, 2009) for this practice in provincial cities; Lomas and Cornell (2003) consider this practice in Roman Italy.
- 27 Gleason 2006; Zuiderhoek 2009b.
- 28 Price 1984, 64.
- 29 Zuiderhoek 2009a.
- 30 Dmitriev 2005, 146–53; Price 1984.
- 31 Zuiderhoek 2009b, 11.
- 32 Veyne 1976; Gleason 2006, 229; Zuiderhoek 2009b, 13.
- 33 See also Gleason 2006.
- 34 See Vlastos 1953 and Hansen 1999, 73–84.
- 35 Wandsnider 2011.
- 36 Veyne 1976.
- 37 Gleason 2006; Price 1984, 62–4.
- 38 See materials in Dmitriev 2005.
- 39 Zuiderhoek 2005, 2009b.
- 40 DeMenocal et al. 2000; Lamb 1972; Reale and Dirmeyer 2000; Reale and Shukla 2000.
- 41 Hellenistic: Marest-Caffey 2008; Imperial period: Zuiderhoek 2005, 2009b.
- 42 Zuiderhoek 2009b, 5.
- 43 Zuiderhoek 2008.
- 44 Davies 1981.
- 45 Pomeroy 1997; Zuiderhoek 2009b, 63, 137.
- 46 Ma (2003) relies on Renfrew and Cherry’s (1986) concept of peer polities; but contra see Hansen 2000.
- 47 Billows 2003; Ma 2003.
- 48 Renfrew and Cherry 1986.
- 49 Chaniotis 2005; Ma 2003.
- 50 Mitchell 1993, 204, 206.
- 51 Price 1984, 64–7; Veyne 1976.
- 52 Gleason 2006, 246.
- 53 Gleason 2006.
- 54 Mitchell 1993, 217–25.
- 55 See Zuiderhoek 2009b for a recent comprehensive review.
- 56 See especially Bird and Smith 2003; Boone 1998; Hawkes and Bird 2002; Roscoe 2009; also for handicap strategy, see Zahavi 1975, and Grafen 1990a, 1990b.
- 57 Neiman 1997; McGuire and Hildebrandt 2003.
- 58 Bird and Smith 2003; Veblen 1899; Mauss 1924; Bourdieu 1977, 1984, 1990.
- 59 Neiman 1997.
- 60 Bird and Smith 2005, 223.
- 61 Khaldan 1958; Turchin 2003.
- 62 On individual signaling, see Hawkes and Bird 2002; for families: Boone 1998 and 2000; conjoined group signaling: Bird and Smith 2005.
- 63 Roscoe 2009.
- 64 Roscoe 2009, 95.
- 65 Renfrew and Cherry 1986.
- 66 E.g., Mills 2007, applying Hall’s (1966, 1972) proxemics.
- 67 Boone 1998, 2000.
- 68 Hawkes and Bird 2002.
- 69 Boone 1998, 2000.
- 70 Roscoe 2009.
- 71 Heinrich 2006; Richerson et al. 2003; Soltis et al. 1995.
- 72 Abrams 1989; Childe 1945.
- 73 Trigger 1990.
- 74 Moore 1996; Smith 2003.
- 75 Abrams 1989; Trigger 1990.
- 76 Blanton 1989, 413.
- 77 Roscoe 2009; see also *infra*.
- 78 Boone 1998, 16.
- 79 Roscoe 2009.
- 80 Wilson and Wilson 2008; O’Gorman et al. 2008.
- 81 Landa 2008.
- 82 These stelae are intricately carved upright slabs of stone found both within communities and at borders and used to project political messages; Borowicz 2003.
- 83 Neiman 1997.
- 84 Blanton 1994.

- 85 Veyne 1976.
- 86 Millar 1993.
- 87 Chaniotis 2005.
- 88 John Ma (2000) reads through the lines of the accounts of the big wars being waged by the Successor kings and by Roman civil war combatants to recognize the smaller wars that poleis fought with each other and against defecting factions; see also Rigsby 1996.
- 89 Kallet-Marx 1995; Marest-Caffey 2008, 84.
- 90 Camp 2000, 43.
- 91 Hansen and Fischer-Hansen 1994.
- 92 Mitchell 1993, 216; Price 1984.
- 93 Mitchell 1993, 216–17.
- 94 Naum 2010, 101.
- 95 Rauh et al. 2009; for lineage, see Tomaschitz 2003a.
- 96 de Souza 2000; Gabrielsen 2003; Rauh et al. 2000.
- 97 Mitchell 1993.
- 98 Rauh et al. 2009; Tomaschitz 2003a.
- 99 Rauh et al. 2009, 293.
- 100 Rauh et al. 2009.
- 101 But see Karamut and Russell 1999.
- 102 Townsend and Hoff 2004.
- 103 Rauh, this volume.
- 104 Tomaschitz 2003a.
- 105 Jongman 2002, 2007; Zuiderhoek 2008.
- 106 Jongman 2002, 2007.
- 107 Zuiderhoek 2009a, 27–9.
- 108 Lamb 1972.
- 109 Zuiderhoek 2009b, 29.
- 110 Zuiderhoek 2005, 2009a, 2009b.
- 111 Gleason 2006; Price 1984; Veyne 1976; Zuiderhoek 2009b.
- 112 Parkins 1997, 90–1; Zanker 1988, 25.
- 113 Dmitriev 2005, 118.
- 114 Such as the Termessian Manesas at Sagalassos; Waelkens 2002, 64–5.
- 115 E.g., Menippos and Polemaios, who headed up several embassies on behalf of their city Colophon; Marest-Caffey 2008, 82–3.
- 116 Waelkens 2002, 65.
- 117 Ferrary 1997, 107; Gleason 2006; Price 1984.
- 118 Gleason 2006, 231; see information on council sizes compiled by Liebenam (1900, 229–30), Broughton (1938, 814), and Magie (1950, 1505).
- 119 Marest-Caffey 2008; see also Gauthier 1985.
- 120 Gleason 2006; Zuiderhoek 2008, 430.
- 121 Zuiderhoek 2009b.
- 122 Veblen 1899.
- 123 Van Nijf 1997; Zuiderhoek 2008.
- 124 Pomeroy 1997.
- 125 Gleason 2006; Jones 1963. On Greek and Latin replacing local languages, see Mitchell 1993, 172–75.
- 126 Mitchell 1993, 170–76.
- 127 Houwink Ten Cate 1961, 36–44; Rauh et al. 2009, 296–98.
- 128 Asar Tepe: Townsend and Hoff 2004; Nephelion: Karamut and Russell (1999, 361), who note the presence of at least seven rows of stepped seating.
- 129 Contra the situation described for Asia, Bithynia, and Galatia by Mitchell (1993, 154–57), where land claims by pastoral residents were perhaps subverted and where vast estates came to be owned by Romans as local elite landowners mortgaged their property to pay the taxes now required by Rome.
- 130 Tomaschitz 2003a.
- 131 Karamut and Russell 1999, 361.
- 132 Rauh et al. 2009, 295–96.
- 133 Oliver (2011) explores how civic benefactions were deployed by cities to retain and attract (male) citizens and, especially in the later Hellenistic period, non-citizens.
- 134 Preliminary analysis by Zuiderhoek (2009b, Appendix 3) finds support for these expectations. See Wandsnider 2011.
- 135 Individuals: Hawkes and Bird 2002; families: Boone 1998, 2000; larger kin structures: Roscoe 2009.