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## Process versus Power: Studies in Modern Culture

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**PROCESS VERSUS POWER:  
STUDIES IN MODERN CULTURE**



**EUGENE N. ANDERSON**



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**UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA STUDIES**

**NEW SERIES, NO. 9**

**January 1952**

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STUDIES IN MODERN CULTURE**



**EUGENE N. ANDERSON**

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**PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY AT LINCOLN, NEBRASKA**

# THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA



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## PREFACE

The essays in this volume are concerned with the culture of a period of profound change. They are intended to serve the practical purpose of estimating what is the present state of our culture, what are its potentialities, and what are the major obstacles to the achievement of a good life. They deal above all with the problem of the character and the enemies of our industrial culture, in the hope of counteracting pessimism caused by desire for immediate perfection.

The author is aware of the fact that the attempt to handle so vast a problem exposes him to the accusation of presumptuousness. His temerity may be excused on the ground that the confused times lead one to seek answers to vital questions. While many conclusions must remain tentative, the studies will have achieved their aim if they provide any stimulation or assurance to those who are wandering in the twilight.

While no attempt is made to supply footnotes or a bibliography, anyone acquainted with the recent literature in the Social Sciences and the Humanities will recognize the sources of many of the author's ideas. A few names should be mentioned, however, as those of writers to whose works the author is particularly indebted. These are: Lewis Mumford, Peter Drucker; the authors of the current edition of several volumes in the Cambridge Economic Handbook series; the authors of a considerable number of studies published by the League of Nations and the United Nations; Frank H. Knight, Jacob Viner, Barrington Moore; the authors of a number of publications of the Museum of Modern Art; Thorstein Veblen, Franz Neumann, Ralph Turner, Caroline Ware, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Emil Kardiner and Elton Mayo. The author wishes to express his gratitude for the help and encouragement given by associates, both faculty and students, at the University of Nebraska. In the case of one person, his obligation exceeds the possibility of formal acknowledgment. That person is his wife.

## *Chapter I*

### **THE SITUATIONAL APPROACH**

We live in a period of such cultural diversity as man has never known. Within the past half century or less we have participated in the destruction of almost all the social organizations surviving from the Old Regime of the Eighteenth Century; we have seen develop and function the systems of Communism, Fascism and Nazism, together with numerous other authoritarian variants; we have grown acutely aware of the existence of primitive societies in Europe as well as elsewhere, of societies composed of almost self-dependent agricultural localities; we have experienced the unique process of industrialization and seen the elaboration of the social and institutional bases for a culture of freedom such as not even the Athens of Pericles could have imagined. Industrialism, two world wars, and a world economic depression have brought these cultures into such intimate contact that an understanding and evaluation of each type becomes not merely an intellectual exercise but a practical necessity.

Supplementing the variety of cultures in the modern period has been the diversity of speed of action. Events have never proceeded at a faster tempo. The machine process, power politics and war and revolution have accelerated the rate of change to a degree to which so far man has been unable to adapt himself and remain in control of the course of events. Some parts of the transformation, like that of the establishment of the Bolshevik regime in Russia, escaped the influence of the overwhelming majority of society; before man was aware of the fact, a new and hostile culture had been founded. Man has acquired his habits of social behavior in the slow, even tempo of an agrarian culture. While crises did occur in that kind of society, they came at infrequent intervals and allowed much more time for adjustment than we have had at our disposal. One of the most startling facts about our age is the contrast between the social implication of the peaceful, steady, slow rate of change of a Victorian England and that of the furious rate of cultural crisis like the one of this century. We have to recognize the basic significance of rate of change in conditioning the character of a situation. There is such a thing as a cultural crisis, and it evokes qualities and types of action different from those of a peaceful period.



The presence of these cultures in conflict arouses in us the desire to judge the relative merits of each, the sources of strength or weakness and the ways of dealing with each regime. Industrialism and modern democracy are both of such recent origin and so different from anything in history that we are still at the beginning of their development. We have scarcely advanced beyond the threshold of the culture of industrialism; we do not fully understand what the material resources can contribute to social and spiritual life. It appears to be true that technology is more easily improved than the mores; but even in the latter area we can perceive some outlines of possible future accomplishments. It should be a useful adventure to muster and evaluate the present means that with proper care can enable us to achieve the ideals of a free, peaceful, democratic society. Unless we begin to think along these lines, to set our objectives not according to the limited material and experience of an agrarian culture but with an appreciation of the wealth of resources of industrialism, we may fail to exploit our unique opportunity. We therefore need to assess from time to time where we are and where we are going. Are we allowing the machine process to guide us, or are we putting it in the service of society and under human leadership? How should we deal with the opponents or declared enemies of our culture? How can we win to our way of life the peoples of localism, the peoples remaining caught in the moral and intellectual ways of the Old Regime? These are all practical problems which have to be faced and to which each member of a free society must find an answer.

To satisfy our need for knowledge about contemporary cultures requires a method of analysis different from the customary one. Since the cultures differ so widely in basic structure and character, they should first of all be analyzed for what they are without consideration of why or how they arose. The traditional historical approach will not suffice here; built around politics or economics, it does not take into account the full variety of factors. A generation which has experienced Nazism, communism, and other ways of life can no longer accept the limitations to understanding imposed by a political or economic evaluation of social action. History has been so busy trying to explain causes and results that it has failed to identify that with respect to which it has been seeking the causes and the results. It has tended to level all historical periods out to a chronological sequence, so successfully keeping everything in motion through time that we are unable to acquaint ourselves with the characteristics of a particular

event or period in operation. It has inclined toward becoming an exercise of the memory rather than of the intellect; and the individual social sciences have not been much more successful. Since each social science has tended to go its own way alone, it has offered only a partial analysis of a part of the problem with which we are concerned. The economist emphasizes certain aspects, the political scientist certain others, the psychologist still others. How may one analyze the total culture and supply a meaningful answer to our questions? The methodological issues are put to us at present with special force.

These chapters are written in accordance with what may be called the situational approach to the study of society. The main types of cultural situations as they appear in our modern western world are analyzed on both an individual and a comparative basis. For self-evident reasons the cultures of the Old Regime, of free industrialism, and of Nazism and communism are selected for discussion. A situation of a different character is also treated, that of a cultural crisis, because of the fact that our modern society has been and continues to be profoundly conditioned by crises of this kind. Each of these situations reveals a particular characteristic which permeates the whole: in the Old Regime and its modern vestiges the characteristic is localism; in free industrialism, there are the phenomena of bigness and process; in authoritarian regimes, there are power and rigidity; and in a cultural crisis, the phenomenon of crisis. The essays are concerned with the analysis of each situation in terms of its particular basic character structure. In this way the functional interrelationship of the parts and aspects of a culture are revealed; the basic characteristic is perceived to permeate the institutions, personalities, and mores of each situation.

There is nothing artificial about the situational approach. It merely recognizes the fact that a culture of freedom has a different institutional organization and operates in an entirely different way from one of dictatorship, that conditions of peace can be distinguished from those of war, that a time of crisis affects human beings in a way not to be confused with that of normality. The approach can be used with respect to an entire culture or to any part of it, large or small. It is as relevant to the analysis of an event as to an institution, to a personality as to a habit, to a concept as to the rate of change. It assumes that the object under analysis has a unity of its own and that it exists in operational relationship with other objects. The primary,

in fact, the sole rule in using this approach is to begin with the object itself, the *Ding-an-sich*, to find out what it is, in a functional way to work in all directions from this center, and to learn about the object by studying its relations with the other objects in its world.

The situational approach offers the advantage that it enables both unity and diversity, stability and change, to be studied in the intimate relations characteristic of life. An object gains contours and an outer limit by means of the fact that its functioning is followed into all areas necessary to reveal its role in society. The object is observed not as a static thing, but as active in life, as being in motion and affecting and being affected by all other objects around it. This procedure makes it necessary to know the relative importance within the culture or the situation of the various institutions, groups, and ways in the society. It requires the knowledge of how the culture functions and of the role which each element plays within it. Some forces encourage and press for change; others are conservative. Some provide direction for policy-making while others merely follow; and still others may according to circumstances temporarily participate in both groups.

The approach enables the object under consideration to be evaluated as far as possible by objective norms. A set of standards can be developed by the comparative study of various types of cultural situations. Communists, National Socialists, the Old Regime, free democracies have had problems to solve which are common to any culture: for instance, how numerous and varied are the opportunities for the development of personality; how much division of function and how much cooperative interdependence exist; what degree of freedom and what sense of social responsibility are allowed the members; how much emphasis is placed upon creative activity of the individuals as contrasted with destructive or with conservative activity? The way in which each culture and each situation answers these and related questions will reveal its quality and efficiency, and enable one to judge which offers the most propitious conditions for the utilization of the human being, the most basic of all resources.

The advantage of beginning with the *Ding-an-sich* is that the object may set its particular standard. Communism states its values in dogmatic form and proceeds to institutionalize them and to shape the habits of the people in harmony with them. So does Nazism. Democracy postulates certain truths as self-evident, as supported by nature. Each culture tries to create a unified society in accordance with its ideals. In this way each offers criteria by which one can judge whether

it is fulfilling its functions and how it is affecting others. The patterns of behavior can be studied with respect to the entire society: if they recur in various institutions, if they are repeated in the behavior of personalities in various occupations, insight will have been gained into the structure of the entire culture. For example, we shall see how in a free society the principle and practice of representation are to be found in almost all large-scale institutions, thereby dominating in that respect the thinking of individuals. Representation belongs to the basic character structure of the culture, just as dictatorship does to that of Nazism or communism.

Each culture purposes to be unique, distinct from and superior to the others. If any one of its values fails to permeate all aspects of the society, we can assume that its degree of social efficiency is lower than that of one which succeeds in accomplishing this integration. The extent to which it is able to shape the different aspects of society to its pattern of behavior will provide assistance in estimating its probable duration and historical significance. If most of the society refuses to accept its ideals in organization and practice, one may assume that the regime will have increasing difficulty in maintaining itself. The same criterion holds true for an institution or an individual. The importance of each can be measured only by a study of the functional relations of the thing or person with the total society. To what extent does it affect others; to what degree is it affected by others? The balance should reveal its relative significance.

In order to find in a cultural situation the common patterns of behavior and the deviants from each, one should be equipped with the knowledge essential for analyzing that situation. The amount and spread of the necessary knowledge will vary according to the nature of the subject. In one, an understanding of science may be essential; in another, of religion; in another, of literature. In almost all cases the investigator should be acquainted with both the humanities and the social sciences, for since he is dealing with social and individual data he should possess those insights that pertain to cultural analysis.

In current literature the concepts and methods for the analysis of a cultural situation have been worked out only in part, and have been applied to even a less extent in the portrayal of a modern western culture. It is impossible at present to state which ones even among those that have been developed are most useful. Few students of society possess the requisite range of insight and the interest in synthesizing a total culture. Our knowledge remains too fragmentary

for us to perceive the significance of all the factors in a situation. We lack monographs which analyze the *Ding-an-sich* in its functional setting and which show with precision the relationship between two or more well-defined objects. The truth is that we do not yet know how to compare cultures; we do not know how to place an institution, event, person or idea, not of primitive but of modern western society, in its total cultural setting. The most that one can say at present is that humanistic knowledge is as important for this purpose as social scientific, that for many subjects a knowledge of science and technology is as relevant as the others. One must look in a cultural situation for both the unique and that which it possesses in common with others.

The practical need for a method of cultural analysis is revealed to us from every side. For example, we are at the present time embarking on a vast program of armament and we need to be aware of how military training and all its concomitants will affect our way of life. Is military organization compatible with democracy, or is the military by the nature of its function undemocratic? The evidence of history should cause us deep concern. We should analyze the behavior patterns of the military, as seen in its organization and methods of institutionalizing power, and compare these with the ones essential for democracy. We should take special precautions of an institutional nature to prevent the military attitude from being transferred to other aspects of society. We should work out plans either to democratize the military, if its purpose will allow such action without destroying the ability to achieve that purpose, or we must build counter-forces to it of a strong and enduring character.

The analysis of a period of cultural crisis should enable us to perceive that the behavior of man will differ in such a crisis from that in a period of peace and orderliness. We can therefore diagnose what is needed to cope with a crisis in the way of action, institutions, and organizations. We should know what to look for, what to anticipate. We can understand what otherwise would seem to be erratic, irresponsible behavior, the coming of a Hitler, his attractiveness to the masses, and the dangerousness of his type of person in that type of situation. We should immediately devise means of counteracting this influence. One cannot expect the forms of behavior of mid-Victorian Englishmen from Germans who feel humiliated by the outcome of World War I and the overthrow of the imperial regime, and are rendered desperate by the World Economic Crisis. We should be able to judge communism not merely in terms of its military strength but in terms of what it does

to the personality of the people under its domination. Can it win their loyalty and, if so, to what degree? Or is it subject to the ills of absolutism which history records as having brought about the downfall of the Old Regime?

These and many other problems can best be handled by the analysis of a topic in its total cultural situation. Past, present, and future seem to be so tightly interwoven in our period of history that one needs a method of discussing them together. The approach involves one in the evaluation of our society and in the weighing of imponderables. It supports the view that no one set of social factors determines or renders inevitable the course of events but that each conditions the others. It reveals the presence of alternatives in any situation and the crucial importance of human beings in deciding which alternative shall win. While showing the way in which man's actions are affected by institutional and ideological structure and the habits of a given society, it supplies the evidence of man's being able, within wide limits, to shape his own destiny.

## *Chapter II*

### **THE SOCIETY OF LOCALISM**

While modern industrialism, means of transportation and communication have radically changed western society, the impact has been so recent that many examples of earlier conditions can still be found. These examples may cover entire geographic regions or they may have survived in certain patterns of behavior in areas which have become highly industrialized. The tendency has been for the characteristics of the pre-industrial society to be supplanted by others appropriate to the culture of modern industrialism; but the process of transformation has occurred so gradually that the contrast between the two cultures has not been sharply evident; thus, special effort is required to comprehend the ways and values of a society devoid of our technological facilities.

The society prior to modern industrialism may be described as localistic. Except along the sea coast and the navigable rivers, of which Europe has many, the society depended upon the horse, the donkey, the ox, and the human being to supply the power for connecting one locality physically with another. The relations among communities were limited by the bulk and weight which a human being and a four-legged animal could carry or draw and by the speed with which they could travel. Transportation and communication were both thereby restricted, and bad roads or no roads at all augmented the handicap.

The conditions of transportation and communication limited the activity of the pre-industrial society in every essential respect. Government, economy, social organization, intellectual and religious life were all subject to the material dominance of this common factor. The negative impact seems clearer to our present society than the positive. It is easier for us to perceive what the society of the Old Regime (a term used to designate the society of localism in modern Europe from the beginning down to the present, irrespective of the century) could not do than to comprehend the benefits it may have derived from localism. The benefits, which must have been largely moral and aesthetic, could not have out-weighed the material or technological shortcomings and the import of these institutions and forms of behavior. It is the latter which will be discussed in this chapter.

In the culture of localism each community had to be almost entirely self-sufficient. It had to provide most or all of its own food and clothing, its own medicaments, its own technical knowledge and equipment. It had to rely upon its own resources in case of fire, epidemic, or some other natural calamity. It had to manage its own affairs. As commerce developed, local self-sufficiency grew less essential. The larger the town, the more it had to depend upon outside sources and the more it became subject to outside influences; but the villages continued well into the nineteenth century and in many areas remain at the present day fundamentally localistic in character. Transportation over bad roads was too limited and too uncertain for the community to risk curtailing its self-sufficiency. Prior to modern industrialism, large towns dependent upon the frail resources of communication were few in number and constituted a relatively small percentage of the population. They formed the exception, not the rule; and the change from the Old Regime to the society of industrialism may be traced in the quantitative increase in the number of these exceptions until they set the pattern of a qualitatively new culture.

Commerce among communities and regions was restricted to commodities which were not perishable, for example, grain, wool, cloth, those small in bulk and costly like spices and silk, those which could furnish their own motive power like horses and other livestock, those needed in small quantities for food like salt, or for religious purposes like wax. In the case of bulky objects, commerce was confined to regions with a Roman road or with natural means of easy transportation, a river, the sea and only a few places could thus qualify. The nonessential nature of commerce for most of the population is revealed in the ability of communities to do without money by practicing local barter. Money was so scarce that as late as the eighteenth century a king would pay high interest for the sake of having it on hand. He might store it in kegs and keep it in a fortress as a kind of insurance. The use of money was a function of the expansion of commerce and the spread of its employment indicated the diminution of cultural localism.

Since transportation and communication encountered such difficulties, the price and the availability of a given product like wheat or rye varied widely from region to region. Within the range of a few miles the differential might be large. Hunger or starvation in one region of a country as advanced as France in the eighteenth century was occasionally present alongside a plethora of grain in other regions,



and a merchant able to transport commodities to a place in need might make a fortune. The leveling out of these variations was not completed until far into the nineteenth century and marked the development of national economic unification and of international economic interdependence.

The predominance of agriculture as the occupation of local self-sufficiency limited the size of the population that could be supported. As Malthus showed, the population tended to increase beyond the food supply, and since surplus food in other regions could be known about and imported only with such difficulty even over a short distance, the number of the population of each locality depended upon the ability of that particular locality to raise sufficient food. Apart from the few towns and cities with access to outside sources any surplus population had to starve or migrate to an area where it could establish new localistic communities. The process of demographic adjustment is revealed in the agricultural societies of Eastern Europe, Southern Italy, Spain, and elsewhere in the present century. Both the birth rate and the death rate remain excessively high. Hidden unemployment in the rural areas means that agriculture is forced to use far more persons than are needed. Poverty and hunger, the absence of sanitation and of medical and other professional services, the weakening of resistance to disease result in a high death rate, nature's method of keeping the size of the population in proportion to the amount of available food.

In most communities the society of localism tended to reach and maintain a state of equilibrium as the social reflection of the economic self-sufficiency. The limited numbers precluded any extensive division of function, a restriction accentuated by the fact that in agriculture, even up to the present time, each worker whether head man or common laborer performs about the same kinds of tasks. The absence of the possibility for changing occupations in the community deprived individuals of the economic basis of social mobility and assured the preservation of status. These conditions persisted until commerce and especially modern industrialism enabled the urban population to increase in number and make possible the movement, not from one localistic village to another similar in social and occupational structure, but from village to town or city, where a diversity of cultural opportunities was to be met.

The static community appears to have been characterized by two fundamental social patterns. One is seen in the relations between

the noble family and the peasantry. The other is provided by the family.

The relationship between the lord and his family on the one hand and the peasantry on the other was that of superior and inferior. Although they showed some common elements, each possessed a distinctive culture of its own. The power of the lord and his family consisted not merely of legal and economic authority but of superior intellectual, spiritual, and social achievements as well. The upper class disposed of a wider range of sources of prestige and influence than the peasantry. Being situated at least one rank above those who lived at the bottom of the social hierarchy, the members were accustomed to handling not solely crops and oxen but human beings. They had traditional techniques of authority which the peasantry had no opportunity to develop. Their contacts with others of the upper classes enabled them to acquire personal and social qualities known to the peasantry only when manifested by superiors. Except on rare occasions of peasant uprisings the noble lord was free from competitors. As long as the community remained localistic, no one else had comparable experience in governing; no one possessed the knowledge necessary to be able to judge the actions of the lord from the point of view of service to the community. The static nature of life enabled the persons in power to continue to rule; and the self-sufficiency of the community allowed a wide range of incompetence on the part of the ruling family without endangering the life of the whole.

Among the institutions of the community the family played the most important role. It provided the basic unit of economic organization and operation. An unmarried peasant responsible for maintaining a farm was almost inconceivable. Wife and children performed essential economic functions for which a substitute could hardly be found. In view of this fact one would rightly expect the governance of the community as a whole and of the peasant village as a part to be patriarchal. The lord acted as a kind of father over adult children. He, his wife and children had specific functions to perform, the most important of which consisted of controlling and guiding the community; and the peasants had an equally specific role. The face-to-face relations preserved a high degree of personal understanding and give-and-take among the members. Patriarchalism in governance did not necessarily mean autocracy. The members were so dependent upon each other that the destruction or even the appreciable reduction of the sense of responsibility and initiative of each individual necessary

for keeping the community running in the accustomed way might be dangerous. When the lord moved to court, left the community in the hands of a bailiff, and became interested solely in extracting revenues from the peasants, his authority waned and in time his social and economic position was lost. He had disturbed the pattern of community life of the Old Regime and he suffered the consequences of a change to a culture organized on other lines than those of status and the family.

Within the village itself the peasantry consulted among themselves and reached decisions informally but according to tradition. Political institutions remained simple; formal elections would have no purpose in a community of few families where matters could be settled by private discussion. The scale of operations was too small for special machinery of government to be required. The term democracy does not fit the organization of such a village community any better than the concept autocracy; and to call it authoritarian underestimates the traditional necessity for the head man of the village to consult with his people before making decisions. Government within the village can best be described as the adaptation of the familial pattern to the conduct of village affairs.

In this highly personalized society abstract ideas about governance or new kinds of organization were irrelevant. The members lacked the experience necessary for conceiving the reality of an abstract term like the state, the nation, or government. They knew the lord of the manor as a specific person of a specific family; the peasant head of the village could be seen and talked to; neither had anything abstract about him. Each was as real as a field of wheat or an ox; each had definite responsibilities within a definite community. The church might have inculcated the sense for general concepts; but as a believer in theistic religion it encouraged the peasant to picture God and the figures of religion as specific beings, each with a personality of its own. These communities lacked a professional intelligentsia and a middle class with wide commercial interests which might have perceived the reality of general concepts like credit, market, state, nation, as expressions of their own interests and experiences. For the peasantry, and even for the landed nobility in a localistic society, the concepts held no meaning.

The character of the means of transportation and communication made it difficult for outside stimuli to reach the individual communities. Few channels into a locality for alternative or competing con-

ceptions were available, and the opportunities for utilizing new knowledge and ways were so limited that psychological as well as material blocks to doing so prevailed. The nobility, the central government, the military, the church, education and commerce offered possible means; but except in the case of the development of a few large urban centers not one proved effective in breaking up the localistic way of life until modern technological industrialism offered the facilities and the inducement for doing so.

The nobility maintained outside contacts. It associated with its peers in other localities; it went to court; it had intellectual and artistic interests; it served in the army; it purchased articles brought in by merchants from other regions. Whether any of this experience affected the ways of the peasants in the village or the character of the relations between lord and peasant seems doubtful. The introduction by the nobles of reforms in agricultural methods in the eighteenth century did affect directly the peasants, their habits of work, their material prospects. It seems to have stirred some of them to thinking outside the traditional forms of economic and social relations. But in the main the nobility's wealth and superior status prevented any of this experience from being absorbed by the peasantry.

The facilities at the disposal of the central government did not ordinarily reach into the community except through the nobility and did not tend to disrupt the ways of localism. In an age of such slow transportation and communication the problem of developing a system of local government directly and quickly responsible to the central authority proved to be insoluble. Throughout Europe the institutions of local government in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries were similar. Whether in Spain, Russia, France, Prussia, Austria, or England, the geographic unit of local government had to be small enough for an official to govern it on horseback. It had as a rule to be placed in the hands of a local nobleman who could attend to matters of concern to the central government and to the locality while managing his own estate. In France the central government tried to create a professional class of intendants and to prevent them from taking root in the area; but the large number of instances in which the intendant remained in the same locality for years shows the difficulty of enforcing this rule for maintaining central control. In almost every case irrespective of country the local noble official, the Landrat, the Corregidor, the Justice of the Peace, defended local interests against the central government and acted in behalf of the

latter in the capacity of a local patriarch, a local ruler tied closely to his peers in the county and shielding the existing order against menacing innovations. A monarch would have had to be constantly in the saddle to check these officials. Frederick the Great and Peter the Great possessed the energy and the will to try to do so, but no Bourbon did and scarcely a Hapsburg. Even Frederick, in spite of the small size of his state, was sometimes deceived. The small towns and villages under the county official remained in the static condition of localism.

Military service and war did not affect sufficiently large numbers of the population to offer experience making for change in the communities. Even though the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries enjoyed few years free from wars somewhere, the size of armies composed solely of foot soldiers and horsemen continued to be relatively small and the area of fighting localized. The size was limited by the ability to live on the country or to carry one's own food; in either case, with the existing facilities for transportation, an army could scarcely number more than a hundred thousand men except in regions of dense population and unusually good means of transport. One can thereby understand why so many wars occurred in the Low Countries. A major problem of strategy arose with the question of how to move armies by different routes over long distances in such a way as to concentrate all units in time for battle, a problem much simpler to solve with railroads and motor vehicles than with animal locomotion. Certain areas remained almost inaccessible to war because they were equally inaccessible to anything else. Russia was so backward and so far removed from the populous centers of Europe that in spite of its size it could not exert an influence in international affairs commensurate with its resources. Napoleon's march to Moscow proved the difficulty not merely of winter but of logistics in Russia. The Czars suffered from similar troubles in assembling their troops for fighting outside the country. The frontier seemed far away. Unless the war became chronic with armies living on the country for years, few of the population would be affected irrespective of the country. Goethe remained at Weimar undisturbed in his writing during the Battle of Jena a few miles away.

When a soldier returned to his native town or village, he was in the main able to relate stories about having seen merely other towns and villages like his own. Occasionally he may have reached a city; but even some or most of the so-called cities consisted of a cluster of

small towns and villages. His experience offered little or nothing of a character to undermine the acceptance of localism and the status quo. He had no alternative to recommend as an improvement on existing ways.

In the course of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries war affected the local community in a roundabout way. From too much fighting over too many years governments became bankrupt and had to expand the tax basis and reform the methods of collecting and handling public funds. The public financial difficulties of the French monarchy in the eighteenth century helped to bring together the peasantry and the middle class and make the revolution possible. International competition for power forced a state to emulate the most efficiently organized society, and led to social, economic, and political reforms which began the process of overcoming localism in favor of nationalism. Both Prussia and Russia, for example, had in the nineteenth century to initiate this transformation. The need for additional revenue induced the government to press the peasants into the use of money, the first major step in the creation of a nation in place of an agglomeration of localistic societies.

The church offered few if any influential facilities for outside forces to enter and modify the community. Whether Protestant or Catholic, the Church concerned itself far less with the improvement of this life than with saving souls for the next world. Its interest lay in moral goodness and church conformity rather than in the increase of individual and social efficiency within the community. Like other institutions a church could not overcome the material handicaps of its environment. Except for occasional communications about church affairs, a priest or pastor remained as localistic as a peasant. The Protestant pastors stood under the control of the local lord and helped to maintain social stability, and one would hesitate to assert that a Catholic priest fared much better. Not merely the local lord but the bishop as well belonged to the status-minded order of nobility. An occasional encyclical and an occasional pilgrimage merely deepened the general imprint. If a son or daughter of the community entered the church as pastor or priest, monk or nun, he or she fitted into a society of localism or retired from the world.

Education might have proposed means of introducing change into a community. Books and printed matter of lesser size were relatively cheap, and the vicarious experience that they offered might have had some social impact. Transportational difficulties played a relatively

minor role in conditioning the degree of their social effectiveness; rather, the great difficulty lay in the absence of social outlets for the practical employment of knowledge. The churches in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and even in much of the nineteenth continued to control education, especially at the lower levels, and to shape it for their purposes. A peasant could do nothing practical with information he might have obtained in books; an ordinary burgher in a small town did not have much more use for such learning. The occupational distribution of the population precluded the development of much knowledge closely related to practice, such as the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were to produce. Professions were few in number—a churchman, a lawyer, occasionally an engineer or scientist working primarily for the army. A barber-blood-letter needed no more special training from books than a midwife or a blacksmith-toothpuller. Editions of books were limited to a few hundred or a few thousand, for the market was restricted mainly to those who read for pleasure. Under prevalent standards illiteracy proved to be no particular handicap to earning a living.

The middle class and the nobility took the lead in acquiring knowledge from printed matter. Besides reading for pleasure they developed some practical interest in knowledge from books. The middle class needed for their business some training in geography, languages, mathematics, and law; the nobility began to read about improvements in agricultural methods. The spread of this habit of acquiring practical knowledge from books varied in speed and extent according to area. The most developed regions economically speaking, like France and the Low Countries in the eighteenth century, provided the greatest market for books. Even the peasantry and the clergy began to read them. The age of the Enlightenment disclosed one of the most extraordinary phenomena in history: large numbers from all classes in society in many countries found ideas so exciting in themselves that they ceased to accept the standards of the Old Regime and underwent an ideological revolution before the political, social, and economic revolution occurred. The power of an idea in a static, localistic society had a special intensity of impact because of the absence of means of testing the validity of the idea in practice and because of the lack of acquaintance with any competitor. The idea came to middle and lower classes with the force of a revelation; a miraculous insight into reality seemed to be offered. Time after time in the course of the eighteenth century in France and the nineteenth century in Germany,

the peasantry would be immediately won to liberalism by a single speech or a single pamphlet. The people were ready to accept an alternative way of life as soon as it was shown to them. Once the upper classes began to use ideas in a practical way, the lower classes were prepared to follow. The introduction of a working relationship between knowledge and reality marked the change from a static to modern dynamic society. When this point was reached, the Old Regime had come to a close. The ability to spread ideas over a wide area and the presence of receptivity to these ideas meant the overcoming of localism in favor of liberalism, nationalism, and other common standards. Expanding commerce, the expanding role of the state in a highly competitive state system, the increase in population, all these factors and others, began to break down caste distinctions and to develop dynamic institutions and ways of life.

The small size of centers of population and the isolation of most of them from each other preserved conditions in which cruelty and brutality characterized much social behavior. Opportunities were lacking for the division of labor in which scientific and technical knowledge could be developed and applied for relieving human hardship. The stir of minds with diverse interests was so handicapped and the means of earning a livelihood while seeking to apply knowledge to the solution of some practical problem so limited that few individuals could indulge in intellectual activity. These few had to have private means, pursue their studies during their leisure time, or be fortunate enough to find employment in the rare jobs utilizing such interests. The overwhelming fact was that nature treated man cruelly and that man tended to transfer the characteristics of his basic relationship with nature to his social contacts. Physical insecurity from starvation, disease, war, and accidents enhanced the insecurity and emotionalism resulting from the necessity of hard work. Few and inadequate tools and long hours of labor required to keep hunger away caused excessive fatigue and irritability or stolidity. The fatalistic acceptance of nature's brutal and cruel treatment of society as a whole shocks a present-day individual living in the intellectually and technologically advanced western society more than any other single fact of the Old Regime. Religion and art abounded in references to fiery hell and malignant devils while folk ballads and children's stories of cruelty and tragedy reflected the reality of man's struggle for survival.



The universally prevalent variations in the ways of control, in legal relations, property rights, tax burdens, standards of living, in fact in everything of a cultural nature, did not as a rule bother the Old Regime. Inequality was accepted for lack of any kind of practical substitute. In a localistic society the extent of it was scarcely realized: one knew about it in one's own community; but one had little or no way of contrasting one's situation with that in other communities. As long as comparisons could not be made on a broad geographic and social scale common standards could not prevail, and tradition would continue to justify the status quo. Local isolation tended to prevent the development of individuals who might have acquired the necessary knowledge and experience for defying the existing order. Mental inflexibility and fatalism grew out of the local experience, and these traits were not conducive to social criticism and concerted action on a sufficiently wide scale to make criticism constructive. If a person did try to criticize the inequality and act as a leader of revolution, he suffered from the almost insurmountable difficulty of having to operate on a local basis with the small number of local people, few if any of whom had the necessary experience to do other than blindly and angrily revolt. Such revolts could easily be crushed, for they were isolated and inconsequential.

Whenever the traditional sanctions of the society of localism weaken, one may expect an accentuation of brutality in social relations. The lower elements in the local population become aware of alternative ways of existence which are being withheld from them. If the area is particularly backward, like parts of Spain even at the present time, the ruling group will think that it can maintain control by the exercise of force and the suppressed groups will respond in accordance with the methods of behavior set by the upper classes. The absence of a middle class between the two extremes, a class which can keep action and ideal in some kind of practical relationship, deprives the locality of a means of preventing violence. The countries in which localism has persisted into the age of industrialism have been and continue to be centers of revolutionary action. When peasants entered the Duma after the revolution of 1905, they behaved with the awkwardness to be expected of persons of their restricted native environment. They had had no opportunities for the variety of experience necessary for success in their new role. They were unable to adapt themselves to a swiftly changing and diversified society. They were accustomed to the slow and inarticulate ways of Mother Earth, not to

the mobile ones of a complicated and inclusive society. In consequence they proved incompetent for the new function; they could not defend and further those objectives which they had been elected to achieve. The ruling groups were able to take advantage of this ineptitude and made it likely that violence would again be resorted to on both sides. The results have been disastrous. Wherever the ways and habits of the localism of the Old Regime, in politics, economics, society, and intellectual affairs, have been preserved with some degree of strength into the age of modern industrialism, conflict between the two types of culture has occurred. All too frequently, these conflicts have been cruel and bloody affairs.

One cannot regard the term localism as a causal explanation of the Old Regime or of the conflicts of the past hundred and fifty years. Forces bringing about change were manifestly present in localistic society: otherwise that kind of culture would still obtain. The concept, however, provides a convenient means of designating the limitations and handicaps, from our point of view, under which that society lived. The analysis of the cultural pattern of localism may contribute to understanding the interrelatedness of the parts, and to the appreciation of the difficulties facing those individuals and groups who seek to bring about useful or essential reforms. The process of cultural change is seen to be far more complicated than standard political history would make it appear.

## *Chapter III*

### **THE NATURE OF A CULTURAL CRISIS**

Modern history reveals certain periods in which the transformation of medieval into modern European society occurred slowly and almost imperceptibly and others in which the change quickened into a crisis. The contrast may be seen in the difference between the character of eighteenth-century England and of Revolutionary France. This chapter is concerned with the latter type of period and proposes to establish two points: that in the critical periods a structural change in the whole culture was involved, and that the common situation of cultural crisis, irrespective of the time at which the crisis occurred, imposed upon these societies, certain common forms of behavior. The evidence has been drawn mainly from the periods of the Baroque (the late sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century), of Romanticism (the French Revolution), and of Expressionism (the twentieth century).

The phrase "cultural crisis" indicates that the whole culture was implicated, political, economic, social, ideological, and institutional, and that the change occurred with great speed. The situation was characterized by sharp conflict between the forces supporting the existing structure of society, or even looking to the past, and the forces seeking to introduce a new culture in place of the old. The crisis involved those elements in society in which habits, ways, and values are preserved and expressed, namely the institutions and the laws. The old social forces were losing control and no specific set of new ones had yet established its authority. An unusual amount of energy was released, both in defence of the status quo and for the advancement of the new society in the making.

The swift structural transformations meant the expansion of ideological differences into wars and revolutions. In every case civil wars and foreign wars merged. The first half of the seventeenth century, the great age of Baroque, experienced the Thirty Years War, the Fronde, and the Civil War in England. The period of the French Revolution manifested similar phenomena, and coincided with the expression of the content of Romanticism. The twentieth century has, for thirty-five years or more, been fighting or preparing to fight; and Expressionism may, without abusing the original meaning of the term, be applied to the culture of the entire period. In each one of

the three periods cited, the movement for change began peacefully and in small ways, but expanded until it came into bitter conflict with the forces of order, and war resulted. The issues were so crucial that they appeared to be soluble only by the employment of force. The alternative of life or death brought the cultural change to a crisis; action had to be decided on speedily, for where life was at stake, the time factor took precedence.

The three periods under consideration faced problems of basic similarity. The age of the Baroque witnessed the battle among the three main religions, with ideological and military weapons. The supporters of absolutism opposed a variety of interests hostile to them and often hostile to each other. The peasantry was being subjected to intensified control by the lords; the townsmen were angry over their precarious commercial, political, and, frequently, their religious position; the Baroque art, literature, and social forms were supplanting those of the High Renaissance. The French Revolutionary period manifested the conflict between absolutism and liberalism or democracy, between social classes, between economic ideals and practice, between the aesthetic, intellectual, and moral values of the Enlightenment and those of Romanticism. The new Thirty Years War in the twentieth century has shown such a diversity of hostile elements that it is superfluous to mention more than a few essential ones—authoritarianism versus free democracy, communism versus Nazism, proletariat versus upper classes, peasantry versus noble or other big land owners, nation versus nation, capitalism versus collectivism, agriculture versus industrial capitalism, religion versus religion, aesthetic standards of the past versus those of various individuals and groups in the present. In each period, the character of the basic institutions, laws, habits, and ways was at stake. One cannot equate a cultural crisis with a political crisis; but one may say that the latter grew out of, and expressed the conflict between the old system with its values and the new ones struggling for dominance with the old and among themselves. When the issues implicated the structure of the society as fixed in institutions and laws, they carried the controversy into the realm where ultimate force held sway. Aesthetic and moral differences, social and economic difficulties, the change from one culture to another, all culminated in political controversy; and since politics has traditionally implied the use of power, the cultural crisis has been characterised by war.

The areas in Europe in which cultural crises have occurred in modern times have been those which preserved powerful elements of the old culture and produced vigorous forces of opposition to them. Usually more than two hostile forces have been present, the critical elements being especially divided. Up to the twentieth century neither side has manifested unity of objectives and policies; each has constituted a coalition around a tendency, the preservation of the old on the one hand, the development of something new on the other. The basic conflict has been fought between these two coalitions, each of which has been drawn together by hostility to the other. As soon as one has been defeated, the other has tended to fall apart again; but those on the defensive have had more in common than the others, for the existing institutions and ways have supplied them with a tangible foundation for cooperation. The degree of unity among the advocates of a new culture has depended upon the stage in the evolution of the new society at which they have arrived. In every case, they have been deficient in experience about the new society they wish and they have had to utilize ideas of varying degrees of generality or concreteness, depending upon their social and institutional experience, to guide them into the future. In the absence of such experience to serve as a realistic standard of conduct, the elements seeking a new order have broken into competing groups as soon as their common enemy has been eliminated. Each group has had its own set of ideals and objectives, and believed in the superiority of its own method of achieving them, and each group, therefore, has clashed with the others. Some form of dictatorship has followed as a means of protecting the inchoate new culture against the menace of a revival of power on the part of the old order and as a means of consolidating gains and unifying the forces competing for leadership into the future. Differences over the views about the stage at which the new culture has arrived, about the methods which can be used, about what is now possible and practicable have in this way been resolved.

Controversies about the desired organization of society have become increasingly complex and serious as one approaches the present. With the expansion and diversification of experience and of the social basis of ideas, various individuals and groups have envisaged the possibility of establishing a culture fundamentally different from not one but a number of competitors. One can no longer divide the opponents in a cultural crisis into two general camps, each of which is composed of groups differing on questions of timing, method, and stage of

realization but united on the general objective; and the future will probably reveal an increase in the diversity of powerful cultural competitors.

The cultures in which crises have occurred in modern Europe have been distinguished by the presence of at least one party in the conflict which, in outlook and ways, was dogmatic and authoritarian. The earlier crises, the change from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Baroque, displayed these traits conspicuously on both sides. Theology and religion, feudal social and political order, absolutism, caste, and the military all tended toward the expression of extreme views and action. Opposition required the employment of physical force and led to war. Habits of tolerance, reasonableness, and compromise were lacking. In the last century and a half, theology and religion have ceased to be a powerful factor in making for the use of violence; but wherever the others have survived with power, cultural crises have occurred. These elements of the Old Regime developed mores which made it impossible for them to adjust gradually and gracefully to a new culture and, as conditions required, to disappear entirely or to find a place on a new basis in the society. The fact that the Russian, German, Spanish, and Hungarian revolutions of the past thirty years, to mention merely the outstanding ones, occurred in those countries in which the Old Regime survived in the most powerful form reveals how crucial the role of these forces has been in bringing on a cultural crisis. In these countries the authoritarian, dogmatic elements of the Old Regime were supplanted by authoritarian, dogmatic forces of a new type, new except possibly in Fascist Spain, with a different cultural structure and ideology but with similar habits of resolving basic controversies by physical force and with even more efficient ruthlessness than their predecessors had displayed.

Since norms in every phase of life were losing control in a crisis and new ones were not yet established in authority, competition between old and new and among the new ones stimulated an outburst of uncontrolled energy. The opposition to and defence of institutions, ways, and personalities aroused social elements that normally were passive and involved them in a swift-moving and dangerous struggle for power. Social mobility became extraordinarily enhanced, with opportunities for change in position throughout the culture. New leaders arose, or attempted to do so, with new characteristics and new types of ability; institutions and ideas and ways were changing; states

suddenly discovered that the cultural crisis had affected basically their position in the international system, that they had gained or lost in the balance of power, and must stand the test of competitive struggle like the individuals, social groups, institutions, ideas, aesthetic standards, and, in fact, everything of significance within their borders. Nothing in the culture was allowed to stand still. Action was essential, whether defensive or offensive or a combination of the two; and action involved the preservation or introduction of things regarded as of ultimate importance. The burst of released energy made for violence, and those persons in the centers of action who sought to be neutral could survive only by becoming nonentities.

Personal insecurity pervaded all levels of society, from king to peasant. Kings and their families might be deposed and destroyed. International and civil war brought the fear or the certainty of death to soldiers and civilians. Political action culminating in the abolition of laws and institutions in favor of new ones caused the loss of position and occupation for some and gain for others, and reflected the shift in power. Peasants might be serfs one day, free landowners the next, and heavy debtors to the state the next. The opportunities for arbitrariness increased with the disruption of the centers of traditional authority. A law could raise a class to power and destroy another. A single battle or other event might decide the fate of a society. The individual was compelled to act for himself; otherwise he would be acted upon, possibly to his detriment. The situation forced those who were normally passive into unaccustomed roles in self-defense. Insecurity seized hold alike of Louis XVI and of Hermann and Dorothea.

Personal insecurity and the opening of many paths of social mobility were accompanied by change in the relative prestige and power of occupations. Politics and the army offered the two most promising for the rise to authority, for they wielded most power in the crisis in initiating action and in deciding the outcome. The bureaucracy and private business or other economic activities ranked next in importance. The elimination of officials of the Old Regime and the changes in governmental apparatus offered enticing positions to new personnel. The shift in regimes accentuated the danger to economic enterprise, but also augmented the chances of the quick acquisition of wealth. The entrepreneurial spirit was at a premium. Social and political ideas and connections undermined the standing of a certain number of pastors and priests, and permitted the rise of those who had sided with the groups coming into power. And since

cultural standards were competing furiously with each other, the intellectual, the professor, the teacher, and the editor and other persons concerned with disseminating news and inculcating values became crucially important for the whole society and their occupations attracted personnel to an extent far beyond the normal. The role of women expanded in proportion as widely as that of men. The organization of new groups in all fields, political, military, social, economic, religious, educational, aesthetic, required the services of persons who could not have been trained for these positions, since by and large the groups and positions had not previously existed. Talent unfolded itself in every part of this society in flux. It did so irrespective of whether the groups out of which it arose defended the Old Regime or supported the coming of a new one, for the defenders of the existing order had to take on many of the attributes of their opponents or perish. They could not rely upon the sacred prestige of tradition; they had to organize and arouse new or additional leadership and act. Although handicapped by their disinclination to assume these ways, so distasteful to conservatives and so contrary to their mores, in a cultural crisis even a conservative had to take the aggressive and fight for his cause or go under.

In the conflict between the existing regime and the new culture in the making, groups and individuals were involved in varying degrees, depending upon their inclination and interest and their awareness of the issues. Some might be geographically so isolated that they did not participate at all. Others might succeed in effacing themselves even in centers of activity and in surviving physically at the expense of their moral freedom. Relatively few became leaders and preservers or creators. But irrespective of the role they played during the crisis itself, all felt the effects in time of the profound transformation of the structure and norms of society. Neutrality might be possible with regard to participation in action; it failed in such a time as a means of warding off the results of the action of others.

A cultural crisis entailed much destruction and much creativeness. With the society in rapid movement, each side in the conflict destroyed as much as possible of the other. Every law that was passed could not apply to the existing situation except by compulsion, for conditions changed too fast for the law to reflect actuality. It became creative for the future or retrogressive. The situation encouraged a vital and dynamic behavior, which tended to stimulate the individual to violate social norms and to act with freedom. Productivity was thereby in-



creased in all spheres of life, whether in politics, economics, aesthetics, or otherwise; but in the absence of accepted standards it lacked system and reflected the extraordinary wealth of stimuli and opportunities for creativeness. Destruction of the Old Regime did not necessarily mean a release of pent-up energy and values for a new culture, for in certain instances destruction was pushed beyond the point of advantage to the society. It caused so sharp a break with the past that instead of a release of creative energy it led to chaos; and the extreme of chaos was followed by the extreme of tyranny.

The emancipation of energy during the crisis led many participants who were working to establish a new regime to believe that they were living at the beginning of the great age of creativeness and human happiness. The past was regarded as something to be destroyed as quickly as possible. Thus these periods of crisis manifested extremes of exaltation of humanity and the individual and of the most brutal mistreatment of individuals. The dual attitude was taken by the revolutionary not merely toward defenders of the past but toward his own colleagues who disagreed with him. The conservative's low estimate of mankind did not result at any time in more sadistic cruelty toward opponents than that which characterized the behavior of some revolutionary lovers of humanity toward their enemies or competitors. In a crisis situation human life appeared to be cheap; talent was everywhere appearing, and competition became severe. The dogmatic belief in the rectitude of one's own views about ultimate objectives and about methods arose as a means of overcoming a sense of insecurity. In the absence of social norms, one set personal norms; and if others disagreed with them, the dispute was settled by force. Compromise in a crisis might mean the loss of the unique chance to try to impose one's ideals quickly and completely upon society; and if one believed in the indispensability of these ideals for social welfare, one might be quite willing to sacrifice a few lives or even many lives for the sake of possibly assuring mankind a state of happiness in the long run. In such a period cruelty, excessive sexuality, and other forms of moral laxity constituted standard manifestations of social behavior. They were supplemented by the many acts of the purest idealism and unselfishness, and by even more acts which fell between the two extremes. The actions of the revolutionary toward individuals who opposed him were similar to those of conservatives and reactionaries. What one did, the other did. The situation enhanced to an unusual degree the types of behavior which were found, on a limited scale, in a society

at any time. The diversity of forms of behavior attracted more notice because of the increased numbers involved and because of the magnitude of the issues at stake.

The fundamental nature of the issues and the speed-up in action brought about a shift in the relative significance of the instruments of government. Each group sought to increase the power at its disposal so that it could defend or further its interests. Power became essential to self-preservation as well as to the achievement of one's ideals; and as a means upon which all else depended it tended to be regarded as a value in itself. One had to be able to focus it quickly upon any problem that arose; and, since society suffered from a welter of norms the advocates of which were fighting for control, immediate decision had to be followed by immediate action. The executive authority in government gained the dominant position, with the legislative playing a decidedly secondary role and the judiciary serving as an instrument of the first. In a situation making for ruthlessness the legislative worked too slowly and with too open a display of motives and intentions, and judiciousness became a dangerous luxury. Reasonable discussion and compromise, upon which legislative procedure depends, appeared inappropriate. The executive acted without consulting the other bodies of government. Power tended to concentrate at the top, and absolutism or dictatorship emerged as a means of making and enforcing decisions and re-establishing order. The centralized executive, being human, had to consult others; but it assembled a small group of aides, each one often relatively isolated from the others by mutual mistrust and all united by devotion to and dependence upon the person with supreme authority.

The bureaucracy as the instrument of government found itself in a crisis the object of attack from all sides. The defenders of the old order accused it of incompetence, of stifling their initiative, of not being firm against the forces of criticism and chaos. They might blame it for having sapped the strength of the Old Regime. The proponents of a new culture, irrespective of the kind of society they wished, condemned it as an obstacle to the realization of their ideals. They found its motions too slow, too wound in ceremony. They dared not wait for it to act for fear the moment favorable to the realization of their plans would have passed. They wanted action, quick action, not the deliberate procedures of bureaucratic machinery. They distrusted it as being occupationally inclined to support the old order and hostile to cultural change. Criticised and suspected by everyone, the bureau-

cracy found itself ill-adapted to a crisis situation; but it quickly recovered authority. Although personnel and organization might change, as soon as the authoritarian phase of the crisis began, the bureaucracy proved almost immediately to be indispensable as an instrument of control.

In view of the acceleration of social process, problems of relationship assumed an acute form. With norms in flux and structure in transformation, the position of the individual unit in the whole was uncertain. The question of what constituted one's proper function concerned not merely the individual person, but each institution, each idea, each group, in fact everything. The role of God and religion was debated along with that of education and the school, a poem or a piece of music, politics and a political act. Questions of objectives, criteria and methods took on crucial significance for everyone and everything. Not even the peasant and the soil he tended were exempt. Although the peasant might be as passive as the earth, both found their function radically changed. The peasant might be made a free citizen with entirely new responsibilities, the soil might be expected under a new system of ownership and tillage to produce an amount of materials needed to raise the level of living in accordance with new humanitarian ideals. These problems of function involved the relationship of each thing with all the others in the total culture. The relation between the individual and the group concerned not merely human beings, but plants and animals and matter. It involved questions of institutional organization, of social structure, of the structure of matter as well as of the animate world. The connection between ideas and reality, action and inaction—these issues became as vital as those of the relation of the individual and nature and each with God.

The concepts most used in a cultural crisis expressed facets of the common situation. They all denoted a sense of process, that is, of functional change with a high degree of unity. They all implied the essential importance of relationship, whether by way of preserving the old or of introducing new ones. The popularity of such terms as transformation, polarity, dialectic, equilibrium, opposites, totality, organic, pantheism, dynamic, integration, revealed the concern of the society to work out some social system capable of effective operation. While certain terms, like equilibrium and opposites, seemed rather static in nature, in the minds of the persons using them they referred as much as the others to a society in movement. The theory of equilibrium expressed an ideal which tried to give form to change.

The conception of opposites was used to explain how change came about. Certain terms appealed particularly to the advocates of the Old Regime; others satisfied the needs of the supporters of a new culture. In every case, the terms signified an acknowledgment on the part of each side of the essential fact of fast cultural change. Whether the group liked this transition or not, it had to contend with it and to use concepts which applied to the actual cultural process. Each term implied a look backward as well as forward and all around. Each referred to the entire culture in operation. The defenders of the old order were by force of circumstances integrated with that order to an unusual extent and in a variety of new ways. The proponents of the new found themselves dependent upon the assistance of others for the realization of the new ideals to such an extent that they had to employ terms with the import of close, functional relationship. The exigencies of the situation brought each group to employ similar or even common terminology.

Social concepts borrowed from biology proved to be especially satisfying. The term organism was applied both to the individual person and to a wide range of groups, and set for the latter the ideal of unity characteristic of the former. The idea of organism met the need for differentiating among degrees and kinds of integration: some groups were functionally more intimate than others. Some might be excluded as alien or hostile organisms. The striving for group unity capable of sustaining and protecting the members meant a division of function among the members along with equality by virtue of belonging to the group. The concept of democracy carried this multiple meaning of individuality, equality, and functional differentiation. So did nationalism. In each was implicit a sense of socialism, and this sense might in the most acute and dangerous phase of the cultural crisis become explicit. Depending upon leadership and doctrine, even a stronger form of collectivism, like communism, might emerge. Undoubtedly society was more closely integrated, and more acutely aware of that fact, than it was at any other time in its development. The cry for unity might reach a crescendo in the claim of one individual to represent or even personify the desires and will of the whole group. The ultimate expression of the organic or the functional theory of society would then have been achieved.

The emancipation of individual ability plus the powerful sense of interrelatedness led to a new conception of individuality. The individual might be a person, a group, an institution, a building, a

picture, a flower, a waterfall, God. It might be an event or an attitude. It could be anything, large or small, natural or supernatural. Similar characteristics were attributed to each, for the experience of crucial action led the participants to perceive the importance for their fate of the totality of qualities, physical, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual. A person of strong physique, even with well developed rational faculties, could be overcome by one of less endowment in these respects but of richer emotion and spirit. The fullest development of them all provided the most power and the most security and influence. The crisis itself, with its display of action, aroused the emotions, stirred up the mind, required physical endurance and the capacity to out-think competitors. It forced each individual to regard himself as a unit in a larger total and to depend upon the group. When an act occurred, the individuals involved perceived how intimately they were related to the physical environment; the latter assumed human qualities as a participant in the act, whether of battle or house-building or the composition of a poem. Individual persons were so hyper-sensitive to relations with the whole that they included nature, institutions, supernatural powers in the range of their vision, and gave to each an individuality of its own. Thus individuals became parts of larger individuals, and so on, until the whole might be called God. The human and the non-human, the animate and the inanimate, the natural and the supernatural, the finite and the infinite were made to reflect the experience of the individual person in discovering in the crisis the wealth of his own qualities and the dependence of his own welfare upon that of other persons and things.

With the character of the whole culture at stake, each part or aspect of the conflict became significant for the future of the whole. The society was shedding one personality, one cultural structure and set of ways, and developing another. Each person, whether artist, businessman, official, politician or pastor felt compelled to take sides and to show in his own occupation that he was doing so. Each committed himself by the way he handled his own job and utilized the opportunities of the situation. Each felt dependent upon the action of others; each had friends or enemies. While many succeeded in being acted upon rather than in acting positively, even those drab persons had to reveal some color, especially as the institutional facilities for social control grew in number and efficiency. Thus, any and every act had real or potential significance for the distribution of political power. An aesthetic theory, the form and subject-matter of a lyric poem, could

disclose the author's attitude toward the competing regimes as fully as a political tract, a military deed, or the way one conducted a business. In a cultural crisis the split occurred through the whole culture, and positions could be lost and heads topple over differences that in a well-ordered society would arouse no interest. The content of politics expanded to cover, potentially, everything.

The increase of opportunities for action in all fields of culture enabled an extraordinary variety of personalities and of social groups and institutions to come forth. The disruption of the status quo released a diversity of types, some of which looked to different past ages for a model of personal behavior and social organization and some of which let their imagination roam into the future. The enhanced emotionality of the situation and the breaking of rational and institutional controls made certain that many individuals would play an historic role who otherwise would never have risen above the common level. Neurotics, eccentric figures, male and female, and equally eccentric institutions appeared. A greatly expanded sense of the ego was reflected in such statements as *Cogito, ergo sum*. Living was regarded as having powerful feelings, and danger as a condition most conducive to the richest living. The participants revealed the psychological conditions of the crisis in which they lived.

The areas of knowledge and of aesthetic creativeness were broadened and deepened. The enormous variety of experience, actual or potential, called for expression, and unless the crisis became ruthlessly destructive, it greatly expanded the number of persons seeking to be intellectually or spiritually active. Proponents of past ways, of the status quo, of a diversity of plans for the future engaged in ardent expression of their views. Since the culture was changing rapidly, ideas and their various media constituted essential weapons of conflict. The past had to be defended by ideas; the future could be envisaged solely by way of ideas. Policies had to be formulated, criticised, and executed; and any statement of policy had to assume ideological form. Individuals were forced to handle ideas and concepts who would ordinarily never have expected to do so. A rich imagination was required to conceive the reality of the existing situation and the probabilities and possibilities of future development. The imagination took its place among the essential practical tools.

Education became the object of intense interest. The advocates of each conception of society sought to win the educational facilities for their interests. They understood that in a period of rapidly changing

values and social organization, education afforded a powerful instrument for shaping the future. It would embody the ideals of the society and make them part of the mores. The statement that whoever controls the schools controls the future came nearer to being correct than at any other time in history. An outpouring of plans for educational reform occurred, and some of these plans, varying in quality from ones of pure anarchy to ones of practical idealism, led to actual experimentation. All of those persons seeking change tended to emphasize the necessity of freedom for the individual to develop his personality; they rejected traditionalism in favor of experimentation, and they regarded education as essential for enabling the individual and the society to realize their potentialities. Intelligence and imagination were alike considered necessary for finding one's place in a society in the making. New ways and new opportunities and situations called for new skills and new kinds of training. Fundamentals had to be worked out and elaborated in order for society to find some new common standards. Problems of general education were acute; problems of the kinds of needed specialized training became equally acute. The educator gained a position of social power and prestige which he possessed at no other time.

Since a crisis implied the conflict of fundamental values, one would rightly expect those subjects concerned with problems of values to be especially studied. Philosophy flourished in all forms, as the thinkers struggled with the meaning of the issues involved in the crisis. Each individual had to take a stand on many questions of value which at other times he would have ignored as irrelevant. He could no longer depend upon the validity of values embedded in the social structure and mores; he had to decide for himself. Many persons wrote philosophic works of an amateur sort, while the number of professional philosophers increased in response to the same social need. The questions of philosophy became topics of ardent popular and learned discussion and bitter controversy, and because of the practical significance of the issues led to actual physical battles and persecution. Metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, and ethics became as important as political and economic theory. One wished to know what kind of world this is, good or bad. The conservatives said it was bad, the advocates of reform rejoined that it was good. What is the nature of being? What is the basis of knowing? One side gave a pessimistic answer, and built upon it the belief and practice of traditional authoritarianism; the other side supported its desire for freedom and

change by a comparably optimistic reply. The one party believed that man could acquire real knowledge of ultimates; the other asserted that he could not, that he had to derive it from a higher power by revelation. The one thought that man's ability to gain true knowledge fitted him for a life of individual responsibility; the other declared that his dependence upon revelation for true knowledge made it dangerous for him to act with such self-confidence and justified the conservation of traditional discipline. The one developed a philosophy of process and emphasized instrumentalism, the significance of the means of change, the how as well as the what. The other formulated a philosophy of status.

The concept of time gained social importance from the fact of change. Each person felt alone and adrift in a rapid current, and each had a powerful desire to learn how he came to be in that situation, what heritage he possessed for use in the present, what others had done in similar circumstances, and where the process of events was taking him. Each desired arguments in favor of his proposals and his line of conduct. Therefore, the study of history acquired significance as a social force, for the experience of mankind as handed down from the past plus the capacity for philosophic thought in terms of ideals and standards provided man with the two sources for self-identification and justification of his deeds. Man's profound concern with the present and future led him to study the past; his conception of the present and future was reflected in his views of the past. Both conservative and reformer turned to the study of history, each for his own purpose, just as they did to the study of philosophy. Each had to deal with the profound questions of change, process, development, the one to try to diminish the social significance of change, to reduce the speed, to show the futility of much of change, and the inability of man to understand how change occurs and to affect its course in any way, the other to stress the decisive role man plays in change, the intimate relation between this role and that of supernatural forces, the reality of speedy development and of structural transformation, the reality even of progress as an expression of divine and human achievement. Each side turned to philosophy and to history as essential aids to action.

Theology and religion shared with philosophy and history the increased interest, for they also are concerned with ultimate questions of human conduct. They tended to be used more by the conservatives than by the reformers, since they inclined to discourage social initiative and action on the part of sinful man and to stress the need for authority



in this world as a shield against sin. The hoped-for rewards would come, not in this world but in the next. Nonetheless, the reality of the popular concern with theology was manifested, among others, in the conception of fate. Since unforeseen events of decisive import for the future of the individual were happening every day, man came to hold a profound belief in fate. Irrespective of his own activity, he might prosper or be destroyed. The conservative felt that this fact should lead him to accept the status quo and to cease struggling for change; but in a crisis the conservative dares not practice what he preached. The reformer used the sense of fate as a stimulus to the achievement of his objectives; for, he argued, since the unforeseeable may strike one at any moment, one must struggle courageously as long as one can. Success or failure may be one's lot; one has an equal chance at either, and in either case one is not to be entirely blamed for the outcome. In the meantime the opportunities for action are manifold, and it is better to act than to be acted upon. The sense of fate stimulated each side to strenuous effort.

The conflict of norms was manifested in the area of aesthetics. The wealth of experience and of opportunities stimulated individuals to creativeness who might not have been interested at other times or might not have regarded their reactions as of any significance. Since individual experience took on special meaning in a period of competing norms in all aspects of life, no one individual, group or party could claim a monopoly on what was important. New subjects for aesthetic creativeness arose out of actual experience so novel that the actors felt compelled to put it in enduring form. And who could know what was real and what not? A situation of such intense emotionalism—a fight, the loss of one's family, the performance of an heroic act, the sudden rise to fame, the sense of intimacy with nature, the awareness of forces outside one's control, the presence of supernatural elements in a natural experience—these and similar facts demanded expression. The world of reason and of emotion, the natural and the supernatural, seemed inseparable in every act. The outpouring of social energy occurred in the case of the aesthetes as well as of the political figures, the military, and others. Life and power had to be expressed in aesthetic form. Experiments were made in relating forms to content. The old forms might be preserved but used to express thoughts and reactions for which they were not intended. New experience required new forms and new combinations of forms of expression. The vocabulary increased to describe the new experience with words of

extreme meaning particularly popular. Literalness and rich detail embellished a highly emotional subject, and gave it actuality and power. Technique seemed to be admired for its own sake; ability to sing higher than anyone else and to sustain a note longer commanded admiration comparable to that evoked by the exploits of a warrior. The outburst of hot emotions appeared in aesthetic form along with the materialization of the purest ideal. Like the course of political or military events, the change of emotions and moods was accepted as fact, enhanced and exploited for aesthetic expression. A poem or a piece of music was an act. It might deal with politics, economics, war, a pastoral scene, a storm, the relation of man to God, the reality of demons or with any of the diverse questions that plagued the individual in a crisis. No artist could be unconcerned about social topics, political or scientific ones, religious or metaphysical. He sensed the interdependence of society and nature and the supernatural. The creative person sought to clarify what is real and how realities function with respect to each other. Poets turned philosophers, scientists became musicians, artists entered politics. The aesthetes were involved in the midst of the conflicts, whether physically or imaginatively, and expressed the richness and confusion of the situation. They shared in the creativeness, and, like their contemporaries in politics, economics, social organization and every other phase of life, they created a wealth of forms and ideas and norms from which the future generations would draw until the wealth was exhausted and a new culture appeared.

The impending cultural crisis was first reflected in the works of aesthetically creative individuals. These persons acted as the antennae of society; they felt the change coming and expressed it in their media well before the change involved economics and politics and became an actual crisis. Being most sensitive to shifting values, they perceived the transformation of emotional life; and they expressed the developing revolution in mores as no one else could. In the crisis, they might lose contact with the public because of their sensitivity to change in values, for in the crisis the public ceased to possess any common norms and became confused. To which norms should or could the artist appeal? As the crisis continued and experience became richer and more varied, the artist might reflect an increasing confusion or even chaos of forms and subjects, an increasing pessimism. He might give such an accurate expression of the social reality that few persons would understand him. He might reflect conditions of spirit which

the other members of society refused to acknowledge. He gained and he suffered from the cultural crisis as he expressed its heroic and its tragic qualities. And as it declined in favor of some other form of social organization, the artist's creative powers might also decline. These powers flourished in the conditions of freedom and optimism; they might diminish with the diminution of the richness of experience and opportunities to express it.

When the conservative faced a cultural crisis, he acted according to the standards of tradition. He had a low opinion of mankind in general and of all individuals in particular, except those who had proved their value to him or who had traditional power. His form of behavior ran counter to that of persons working for cultural change. He disapproved of rationalism as a standard just as he did of emotionalism; he stood for cool calculation and poise. In evaluating a person or situation he took both reason and the emotions into consideration, but he placed emphasis less upon judiciousness in analysis than upon the preservation of existing forms of social control. He stressed the essentiality of preserving and obeying the law, knowing that thereby he put forth his strongest moral claim to right's being on his side. Individuals might be ousted and replaced by competent ones, he stated; but the system, the structure, should not be touched. It had withstood the test of time. It had preserved the tradition; and if it were undermined, evil man would wreck the good in society and violate the will of God. The moral law required authoritarianism and opposed any manifestation of wilfulness and egoism on the part of sinful man. One must have faith in the validity of tradition as a guide for conduct, and if the tradition met with serious criticism and rebellion one had the moral duty in the name of God and the law to crush by force the efforts toward structural change. The conservative's manner of thinking and acting conformed to the pattern of his total way of life. As a believer in the old order he could not accept defeat without a fight. To him it was total war, and only under physical compulsion administered in a decisive military conflict was he willing to accept the inevitability of compromise which marked the beginning of the end of his way of life. The conflict might be in the form of a revolution or civil war, or it might consist of a foreign war, for the loss of which his way of life was held responsible. It might and usually did consist of a combination of the two. It was also true that economic self-interest helped to undermine the patriarchal or authoritarian way of

life to which the conservative was accustomed. But in every case, the final coup was applied by physical force. The Old Regime died hard.

The opponents of the conservatives consisted of a motley array of individuals and groups upholding a diversity of standards; but all had to substantiate the validity of their ideals for the future by appealing to some ultimate authority. Some emphasized the role of reason, and some of revelation as the source of knowledge; but all of them adhered to a set of complex criteria for true knowledge and action which ranged from reason to intuition and fantasy. For them, knowledge could no longer be compassed by rationalism; they saw irrational actions every day by others and by themselves. The emotions guided them and enriched and stimulated the operations of the mind, and pressed them on from intellectual activity to the deed. In the absence of norms, they had to feel their way into one strange situation after the other. The heart appeared to offer a surer guide than the pure reason, for the other individuals were also behaving in a highly emotional manner. So they had to trust often to instinct, and they learned that it was wise to do so. Rationalism ceased to be attractive or convincing in its bare form, whether Marxian or that of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The connection between reason and emotion led to a view of reason as part of a total process of thinking which included them both plus imagination. The world seemed full of fantastic actions and beings; the fantasy received stimuli of novel kind and intensity. The supernatural appeared as real as the natural. Mystery, the infinite, the divine were manifested in the actions of man and society keyed to superhuman efforts by the exigencies of the crisis situation. Individuals performed miracles of valor, of leadership, of production in the endeavor to create a new culture to last for centuries. The divine seemed to enter into man and enable him to achieve the impossible. Emotion provided so rich a source of stimulation and assurance that man came together with man and with the transcendental forces for a period of almost pure activity. Some of it was destructive, some was creative; but for a time the individuals formed a social unity in a condition of relative freedom from institutional compulsion. The situation brought them together in voluntary effort. The emotional ties were so powerful that for the time being they did not need institutional bonds. The heart united them more firmly than any conservative compulsion would be able to.

As soon as the common pressure of the situation of danger was released, the emotional attitudes became varied, the individuals fell

apart, the objectives became as diverse as the hearts and instincts. In the absence of some common denominators, some universals, some institutions of general acceptance, some rationalistic standards, the unity of individuals gave way to chaos. A dictatorship was established as the means of achieving some kind of order. And since the emotional outburst had led to extreme activity and daring and creativeness beyond human expectation, it was curbed by the exercise of force of an equally extreme character. The dictator fought emotion with emotion, heart with heart, instinct with instinct, until he calmed the outburst and established institutional controls. Then the future depended upon whether the dictator had the statesmanship to relax his power as social structure became once more strong and to turn over the controls to society; or whether power begat fear of reprisals and evil actions on his part, and led him to ever more repression and the use of brutality. In the latter case society would be destined to stagnate except in those areas of significance to the dictator, or another revolution would have to occur to overthrow the dictator set up to curb the anarchy and violence of the first revolution. Society might then oscillate between two revolutions, one against a dictator, after which another dictatorship had to be established in order to overcome the chaos. The oscillation would apparently be stopped only when a dictator had the statesmanship to lead his society back to a peaceful, well-adjusted, free culture.

## *Chapter IV*

### THE SOCIETY OF BIGNESS

As used in these studies the concept bigness refers not merely to something quantitative but to something qualitative. Size alone may enable an institution to be called large-scale, but in its complete form bigness implies a wide-spread participation of human beings. Thus as we shall see, it is most fully realized in the society of process, where every individual shares actively in the conduct of affairs; and it is achieved only in part in the societies of power and rigidity wherein most human being are subordinated to the dictates of an elite. In the former all appropriate organizations become large, whereas in the latter bigness is restricted to instruments of authoritarian control and is not tolerated in those areas of life which among free people constitute the main realm of social activity. From some areas it is excluded by the nature of things: love and family life cannot be gauged by magnitude; but wherever large-scale activity becomes established in an industrial culture it tends to expand into all aspects, and can only be prevented from doing so by physical force.

The characteristic of bigness gives our culture a unique position in history. Almost any civilization of the past offers a few examples—a king or emperor, a bureaucracy, an army, even a business enterprise; but none was permeated by its ideals and practices. None was able to rise above the limits imposed by the fact that its constituent elements were small and that bigness consisted of control by one individual or body over a great diversity of little units. The Roman emperor commanded a large empire; but, apart from some interdependence through commerce and defence and superimposed government, the empire remained an accumulation of almost self-sufficient localities. The thinking of the populace was concentrated upon the small units of life of which each person was a part, and tended to consider the imperial action not as emanating from something large which each should strive to copy but as imposed upon its small world. Bigness meant for peoples prior to our culture the exception, that which affected their lives from outside, not something of which they were an integral, functioning part, not something which they should try to achieve in their own social relations. It offered no set of insti-

tutions and ways for the organization of all elements of society, no objectives for each individual.

In contrast, our own culture has institutionalized bigness to such an extent that every individual is affected by it with respect to the essentials of his way of life. Each person tends to wish to be something on a large scale and to belong to something of similar size. Each feels the impact of bigness within himself, psychologically and materially. We do not consider the essential forces in our lives to be restricted to our locality or area; we know that large institutions and forces affect us to a far greater extent than the local ones are able to do. We find the criterion of size so embedded in our thinking that we have the greatest difficulty in imagining the nature of living in any other kind of society, and have to develop special techniques in anthropology, sociology, and psychology for studying the strange and curious behavior of a so-called primitive, a non-big, people.

The cultural pattern of bigness has developed with the machine process. The existence of the one depends upon that of the other, and follows it in point of time as fast as the machine creates the appropriate material conditions. The relationship explains why this almost universal devotion to large size among us remained unknown to earlier cultures. The modern power-driven machine is able to produce a vast number of identical articles and thus makes quantity production possible. This requires the acquisition of quantity materials for the machine and the distribution of the masses of finished goods turned out by the machine. The machine institutionalizes quantification and creates opportunities for more and more people to exist. People can find work providing materials for the machine, planning, improving, manufacturing, tending the machine, selling and distributing the machine's products. The number of human beings that can be supported by this quantifier depends upon the ingenuity of man in utilizing the services of the new instrument, and in this respect man has to his credit a large degree of success.

The machine process cannot exist without bigness. Machines are costly: they require large amounts of capital and entail the expansion of existing and the formation of new organs of credit. Banking and insurance corporations develop to meet this need. Instruments are created which draw together funds from millions of small sources. Individuals are tied to the organization and ways of bigness by little sums which in the aggregate provide the vast amounts needed by the machine. Circulation and turn-over of goods and of money are

speeded up. The machine renders functional material, space, and time. It makes bigness possible not merely by the increased use of materials, the increased exploitation of a given unit of space, but by the accelerated utilization of a given unit of time. Thus it helps to supply its own resources by augmenting the instances of turn-over, by opening up the possibility of profit at each instance and the accumulation of greater funds for its own use and for the advantage of society. The institutional result is bigness.

Our machine culture inherited the instruments of bigness which had emerged out of medieval society. Three, the national state, the government and the army, were of special importance, with a fourth, the church, occupying in our culture a much lesser role. The three all pertain to the field of politics and political power, and have proved adept at taking advantage of the facilities provided by economic and technological bigness. That they alone were unable to permeate society with the ways of bigness must be apparent. Except in times of crisis, which lasted only for a few years, they were incapable by themselves of supplying the means for creating patterns of social behavior in the mould of bigness. Without the resources and habits engendered by the machine process they would have remained instruments of domination by the few over the indifferent many. Once the machine assured the existence of these resources, psychological as well as material, the political elements were able to make vigorous use of them; but in doing so, as we shall see, they have run the risk of becoming themselves transformed.

Irrespective of the area or purpose, bigness requires a certain type of organization. Government, army, industry, bank, commerce, trade union, press, education, social clubs, church—once they expand beyond the local level with face-to-face relations among the members, they must develop institutions for handling quantity. The larger they grow, the more need they feel for the organization of these functions. This fact creates the bases for common patterns of behavior.

The participation of large numbers in a common enterprise necessitates interdependence of the units, a decrease in the degree of self-dependence, and an increase in the amount of division of function. The fact of interdependence precludes the possibility of each person's deciding all matters for himself and creates common problems of governance. To solve them bigness has developed two means: the profession of leadership and the bureaucracy. The first continues the tradition of earlier cultures set by kings, aristocrats, priests and the



like, but elaborates the occupational range of leadership and the kind of professional training required. The other acts as the leaders' instrument of operation in acquiring information, formulating plans, and executing agreed-upon policies. It tends to expand its functions *pari passu* with the elaboration of the structure of society; for, as the parts of a society become interdependent, they place increasing responsibility upon the central administrative agency.

In any culture of bigness the term "division of labor" does not accurately describe the relationships. It stresses the separateness of the parts. It applies to a pre-machine industrial age more than to our present one. A concept like the commonalty of labor or functional interdependence expresses the characteristics of our society by emphasizing the necessity of cooperative activity in large organizations. The term division of labor could be used without the participants being conscious of the mutual dependence of all members of the group, irrespective of the role which they have in it. The phrase functional interdependence describes the reality, and recognizes the necessity for functional diversity within the framework of the totality. Thus, some are policy-formulators, some are managers, some are bureaucrats, some are technicians, some are unskilled workers: while each contributes his essential part, each depends upon the reliable and efficient performance of the others. All act as members of an interdependent society, whether it be an industry, a bank, a university, a trade union, a state, a world culture.

The extent to which bigness entails planning may be clarified by a comparison with the situation in a society of simple relations and problems like that of a Swiss forest canton. In such a canton each family is able to fill almost all its basic needs, and few problems remain for common action by the entire citizen body. When these few problems arise, the citizens meet together, solve them, and once more disperse to their separate ways of life. In the society of bigness the machine process requires guidance; its quantification of society creates numerous social and political problems which can only be resolved by planning, and thus the ways of planning permeate the entire culture. Large-scale production of goods brings about a comparable increase in the size of the population, which makes for social and political complications requiring the services of expert personnel to plan and administer affairs for them. The process of bigness tends to impose its patterns of organization and action upon all the major aspects of life.

The structure of organization which bigness has developed as appropriate to its needs is that of hierarchy. Two conditions appear to make it necessary: one is the complexity of function; the other is policy-making or planning. Since the two act as parts of one process, they create a hierarchy as an instrument which reflects the variety of interests of the group involved and at the same time enables plans and policies to direct the action of all members of the group. It would be difficult if not impossible to conceive of a large organization built upon principles of absolute equality: the two terms seem utterly incompatible. Wherever bigness obtains, a chain of command becomes essential to hold it together, and chain of command means hierarchy.

Whether the hierarchical order of superior-inferior is employed as a necessary means of organizing bigness for efficiency of operation or whether it is allowed to degenerate into an instrument of authoritarianism, poses a fundamental question. Experience seems to show that either line of action is possible. The Nazis and communists and some of our own leaders have taken the way of authoritarianism; but the nature of bigness seems to incline in the other direction. A certain degree of discipline appears to be as essential in group action as a certain amount of monotonous routine. They both enhance the economy of operation. It makes a great difference in the happiness of the persons and in the efficiency of the organization, however, whether the discipline is largely self-imposed by the individual or whether it is enforced by police or other coercive means. There is no reason why in a free and efficiently-run society the former should not be the case.

The point appears to be decisive when the role of the system of representation is considered in relation to bigness. The distinction must again be drawn between a society characterized throughout by large-scale, functional organizations and one in which certain aspects are so organized while others consist of agglomerations of isolated units under one instrument of control. In the former case the principle of representation must be applied in order for the parts to operate together. In the latter case the principle will not be applied except as a cover for the concentration of power, and some form of authoritarianism will obtain.

Our kind of society could not exist without bigness. We could not support our population; we could not govern ourselves; we could not maintain our cultural facilities. Large size not merely enables us to supply the material resources for our way of life; it also provides us with the social, cultural, and political institutions and mores of

democracy. That it can be abused for other types of culture does not detract from the fact that in its absence we could not survive.

The basic advantage of bigness for our society is derived from the fact that the machine process enables output to be expanded while up to a shifting limit cost is being reduced. The little man is able to afford goods which formerly the élite of society alone could buy. Mass production has created the economic foundation of democracy. The raising of the standard of living of the masses to unprecedented heights has been accompanied by the great improvement in economic security. Famines and the like no longer occur except in crises induced by other than economic forces; and even unemployment has ceased to be the nightmare that it was in the earlier years of modern industrialism. A combination of activities by government, corporations, and trade unions can assure the individual against the hardships of unemployment, sickness, and old age. Bigness in economic institutions has become able to exercise a stabilizing influence upon the economy by virtue of its interest in planning, in anticipating and providing means to overcome economic disturbances, and by virtue of its material resources to carry out these policies. Small industries could never set these objectives as realistic and achievable, for they lack the economic power. As for indulging in nostalgic wishes for the return of the days prior to bigness, we would not accept the price in sacrifice of other things that we should have to pay. We have given demographic and material hostages to the fortune of large-scale production.

The favorable judgment is confirmed by a consideration of the social implications of bigness. The usual social condemnation is based upon two counts: one, that any large-scale enterprise, whether in business, government, army, or what not, imposes upon all the members except a few at the top a change from a position of independence to one of dependence, that it forces a relation of superior-inferior upon its participants; two, that in the name of rationalization and reduction of cost it destroys the psychological satisfaction of individual work and requires the members to endure monotony and routine. These criticisms are based on absolute standards of value which do not consider the factors of time and potentialities and avoid the question of realistic alternatives.

The condemnation on the ground of monotony may be countered by a glance at history or at any contemporary society remaining in the happy condition of pre-industrialism. The amount of incredibly hard work, of monotonous repetition of simple necessary acts, the low

position of women or of men, the exploitation of child labor, these and many more signs explain why, apart from a few exceptions with vested interests, peoples in such condition adapt themselves with enthusiasm to the materials of a culture of bigness. Neither man nor woman of such cultures objects to the aid of a labor-saving machine or to the stir and stimulation of urban life. What they do object to is poverty and wretchedness in the midst of plenty; but one cannot blame bigness for the existence of conditions which man as a rational being can abolish.

It cannot be denied that modern industry and office have preserved in a new form a great deal of routine and monotonous work. They have done so for the sake of economy of operations, which means reduction in cost, which in turn brings articles within the price range of more people and makes living easier than before. A certain amount of monotonous routine seems to be necessary in any line of work, from preparing canvases for painting, to taking notes for writing a book, to turning a screw in the manufacture of a car. If we had the choice—and we do not—between living in a society in which shoes are made by hand and one in which they are made by machines, we would scarcely hesitate about a decision. Cobbling for fourteen or more hours a day on a shoe, then starting another one tomorrow, opens up a tiresome vista of making shoes for the rest of one's life. Handling a machine for manufacturing shoes cannot be much more tedious, lasts only eight or so hours a day, and may be changed for another job. Which is preferable?

The other criticism, that of bigness's having substituted a condition of dependence for one of independence, may seem at first sight to disclose a grave danger to democracy. The relation of superior-inferior might destroy the social bases of our equality by developing in time the habits of status, depriving individuals of the sense of their own importance and destroying thereby the foundation of personal initiative. Such a situation of dependence could transform us into an authoritarian society with a hereditary élite and a hereditary class of subjects. Should this condition come to be, the sources of our way of life would dry up and we should go down in history as another dead-end culture.

If we allow our culture to degenerate in this manner, the fault will lie with us; for bigness provides numerous kinds of inducement to achieve the opposite result. In the first place, large-scale operations in any field create occupations of unprecedented number and diversity.

Members perceive a scale of ascent or descent before them which stimulates their activity as much as, or even more than, any peasant was ever aroused by the possibility of purchasing a neighboring piece of land. In our society occupational mobility is not merely possible; it is essential. Competition in the form of Adam Smith's days may have declined, but it has been vigorously preserved within and among the institutions of bigness. Bureaucrats, army officers, employees, church officials vie with one another in their respective spheres for advancement just as a big corporation or a small business does with its competitors. In fact, the plums have as much richness and color in a culture of bigness as they ever had in the days of kings, nobles, and captains of industry, and they are far more numerous and definitely within reach of anyone with the necessary competence. Bigness has placed a premium upon ability to an unprecedented extent. Since it concentrates so much influence, since its actions are so loaded with social significance, it has to nurse and cultivate talent and subject its prospective leaders to the severest tests of competition.

Bigness in our culture of industrialism involves the exercise of such pressure from within and without that it cannot remain static. Members are constantly threatened by the loss of position and by decline. A comparison of the relative security of the position of a king or nobleman in the Old Regime and of a corporation or a corporation president in ours will reveal the difference. The machine process has introduced a dynamic force into the essence of our culture. It keeps the culture alive and subjects it to constant change. The main force for change affecting the Old Regime, that of international power politics, never had any comparable consistency and persistence. Its pressure was usually sporadic and did not lead to requiring such constant attention. The dynamic character of the large-scale machine process offers constant inducement to improve the process, to exploit it with more efficiency. It keeps alive competition among industries and among existing leaders or aspirants for their position. The stir which it makes causes change to be felt all down the line and affords, at all levels of influence, the opportunity for potential ability to compete for advancement.

In the organizations of bigness of primarily a non-economic character, if one may use a term in a loose sense (for every organization has more or less an economic aspect), organizations like those of a government, trade union, church, and social groups, the competition for position occurs as vigorously as in a corporation. Likewise various

units within an organization compete with each other for influence and personnel and expansion of function. It is a well established method of handling a bureaucracy to assign a similar responsibility to several agencies, and after observing the results of this interesting civilian warfare to decide upon what needs to be done and who can perform the work with most efficiency. A government bureaucracy in the pre-industrial society could go gently to sleep and remain dormant for centuries. Large-scale activity makes this condition of bureaucratic bliss impossible. The machine keeps whirring, the materials continue to be transformed, society keeps alive and dynamic, changes constantly occur: the government and other institutions of bigness might like to take a nap but they are not allowed to. They are at all times confronted with new situations, new problems, new opportunities; and they are subjected to ever-new pressure from within and without to employ their resources in the service of society. Ambition and individual initiative among their members press them into action from within; the play of interests in search of assistance acts upon them from without. Rugged individualism and laissez-faire competition continue an active life within as well as among the organizations of bigness. No such opportunities and incentives on so wide a scale have ever existed in any other culture. Even the Athenians of Pericles' day had slaves and the Metics.

The conditions of employment in big organizations tend to develop traits of character which were much less essential for success in a pre-industrial culture. Are these traits of advantage or disadvantage to the cultivation of a personality? The fundamental social fact in any organization utilizing the services of large numbers is that the members must be able to cooperate with each other, with their equals in the hierarchy, and, what is more difficult, with persons above and below them in rank. If one were to turn back to the Old Regime for light on this problem, one would find that the nobles in particular cultivated the art of living and working easily with colleagues. In spite of profound differences between the aristocratic way of life and that of a member of a modern large organization, one may deduce from this aristocratic precedent the self-evident conclusion that the ability to cooperate with one's colleagues may be regarded as a blessing to be desired and cultivated. The coordination of function within our modern organizations can therefore have a beneficial educational influence in favor of a well-balanced personality. Respect for the qualities and the views of others can be inculcated by way of this ex-

perience as much as, or even more than, in some small private business or profession.

The indispensability of bigness for creating the foundations for democracy may be most clearly seen in the case of the trade union. Prior to our culture the history of the world had concerned itself almost entirely with the élite. The little man acted the anonymous part of slave, serf, laborer, craftsman, or trader. In case a society began as a democracy, it soon ceased to be, for the citizens lacked the institutions and the material means of cooperating. The handling of common problems, few in number because of local self-sufficiency, tended to fall into the hands of a small group, particularly since these common problems were chiefly of a political or military character and thus were rarely acute. When they did become important, they would be extremely so; and under ambitious or unscrupulous leadership they could easily be used to augment authority and ultimately to overthrow democracy. In consequence, democratic ways could be preserved only in small societies like those of the forest cantons of Switzerland or of towns and small cities where all citizens could come together in person for the transaction of business.

The little man first became recognized as a positive historical force when the political and social ideals of the Enlightenment prepared the way for his rise and modern industrialism began to create more of his kind. The functional interdependence of our culture of bigness has given importance to the lowest order of society and afforded its members the opportunity and the inducement to organize into associations able to counter-balance the weight of the corporations and other instruments of authority. The result has been the achievement of equality in certain essentials in a society of inequality in other essentials. The ordinary worker knows that both the president and himself are important to the corporation and to society. In past cultures the little man might have felt materially secure as slave or serf or as a member of the church hierarchy; but, apart from the last named one, those positions all imposed upon the occupants a feeling of dependence that must have hurt. One can see in Aristophanes' *The Wasps* how hungrily the old men clung to a position of personal influence. Our culture has created something new in history by enabling all people to achieve social security and social prestige on a free and equalitarian basis. Through trade unions and political parties the little man, the most endangered member of every society, has acquired large stature. The psychological basis of democratic equality and

individual activity not merely within the union but in civic and political affairs is thereby maintained.

Prior to our own culture, none has ever been able to afford the variety of services for the improvement of living that we have to offer. Not even kings and nobles could obtain the professional assistance that has with us become commonplace; and a cursory comparison between the conditions of life in India and in Denmark will reveal the striking fact that bigness in the exploitation of wealth has enabled the geographically small and by nature poor state of Denmark to afford for everyone medical and dental care, engineering, and numerous other services which in wealthy but unorganized India remain the luxuries of the few. The expansion of tertiary industry, to employ the technical term which designates commerce, the professions and other forms of service, depends upon the presence of organized facilities for the exploitation of resources and the general increase and popular distribution of wealth. The close correlation between bigness in the utilization of those resources and the prerequisites for diffusing society with the achievements makes it evident that large organizations afford the essential means for turning the natural wealth of a country into forms available to the people. A large population requires institutions of proportionate dimensions to help it raise the standard of living. The task must be done by self-help, not by imposition from above; and large-scale instruments alone can enable the population to participate in a common endeavor. Of course, bigness has to develop in accordance with the ability of the people to utilize it; but it must develop, or the society will be unable to support the tertiary industries.

Among these tertiary services may be listed education and research. Magnitude and complexity in a culture render education more essential than ever before. Society can no longer depend upon natural laws and rugged individualism to assure itself of sufficient intellectual resources. Complexity entails intellectual planning, an interest in education and research on the part of business, social organizations, government, and so on. The dependence of each of these units upon the welfare of the whole society imparts to them a concern with the common denominator, the educational institutions. The latter reflect the nature of the society in which they function; and in a culture of bigness they assume similar proportions because of the responsibilities placed upon them. Thus, in our culture, schools and universities tend to become big and to require large sums for maintenance. In a society of social science, chemistry and physics and other expensive fields of



study, the one-room country school is an anachronism. It survives from the days when an education could be obtained from a few Greek and Latin grammars. Under present conditions it is producing a person who, except incidentally and through means outside of school, is deprived of knowledge or experience of the major forces of our world. The college or university which fails to accept the reality of bigness, not necessarily in size of plant but certainly in curriculum, remains at its level in a similar stage.

The significance of bigness for intellectual life may be observed in the situation in a small country. A state like Norway lacks the material resources, the personnel, and the wealth to emulate the educational and research activities of this country. Its industries cannot provide the funds to support any such system or absorb the skilled personnel which might be trained. Since the nation would have to export its brain power, it prefers to forego the effort involved. It is forced by the smallness of its size to rely upon the large-scale educational facilities of foreign countries or to cooperate with other small ones and, like laborers in a trade union, to create a big organization out of several little ones. One cannot conceive of our educational institutions being able to train professional personnel and other experts without the market and the resources which bigness affords, and one cannot imagine bigness surviving very long without this emphasis upon intellectual activities. Magnitude in one necessitates the same scale in the other.

It has been said that our industrial society is hostile to aesthetic expression, and that the pre-machine cultures gave more encouragement to this aspect of man's life. An exact answer to this assertion would be difficult to make, but the existing evidence appears to be in favor of our present culture. Bigness has enormously increased the stimuli to aesthetic activity. It has provided the artist with new subject matter, new materials, new outlets, new opportunities on an unprecedented scale. If a creative individual tires of the subjects, forms and sounds of our age, he has the resources of history at his disposal. If he seeks living reality of a different kind, by a few hours' travel he can be in a pre-industrial society and like Gauguin refresh his soul with the primitive.

Cultural achievement has heretofore been that of a small élite; big industrialism has enabled individuals from all social and economic levels with aesthetic talent to cultivate their abilities and to enrich society. A large population of highly diversified interests and tastes

offers a far greater number of potentially creative persons than any preceding culture. If, as is probable, each age produces about as great a proportion of potential artists as any other, a larger population should at least supply a greater number of creators. Although the multiplier principle of modern economics may not be entirely applicable to this field, one may venture the assertion that the greater number of stimuli plus modern opportunities for development should increase the number of persons of aesthetic ability by several fold.

With the increase of wealth, the expansion of education, the utilization of advertising, and the growth of the feeling of public responsibility for the good life, the number of purchasers or other supporters of aesthetic works has enormously increased. The market for art works has expanded to such an extent that even trade unions, ordinary workers and farmers occasionally or fairly frequently buy something aesthetic or support artistic creativeness by way of taxation. The days when an artist depended solely upon the support of a king, noble or wealthy burgher, a church or a town government are past. Anyone casually familiar with the half-servant position of Mozart will appreciate the vast improvement in social prestige and in sheer material independence which creative persons enjoy in modern times. The democratization of aesthetics, even if not complete, is occurring and society is the richer for it. Bigness has won a victory in the area in which it was not expected.

In spite of these gains the one field of life in which bigness has accomplished least has to do with the practical utilization of the humanities and the social sciences. The machine has improved material conditions; it has most likely reduced greatly the amount of drudgery in life and monotony in the process of production. But it has accomplished very little with respect to the use of leisure time. The popular humanistic interest remains largely restricted to movies, comics, the radio, and the beer parlor. Little opportunity is available for the mass of the population to become aware of the possibilities of creative activity. Metropolitan and even urban living in general sometimes exemplifies conditions at their worst. The possibilities of decentralization are known, but have scarcely as yet begun to be realized. Nonetheless, bigness is enabling us to create facilities for improving all those aspects of life. It produces enough wealth for us to afford them, and it establishes agencies and trains persons with vested interests in achieving them. Business, government, trade unions, educational institutions, and all the other large groups of modern life

show evidence of being astir in this work, each stimulating and competing with the other in experimentation; and there is strong reason for hope.

Bigness in economic activity entails organization of commensurate size in the area of political life. Not merely does large-scale economy create numerous and complex situations for society which demand action by a large-scale public authority, but big business requires services from government of such magnitude that political bigness becomes necessary. The expansion of political responsibility occurs on both a vertical and a horizontal plane, exactly like the economic expansion. The functions of government increase, and more bureaucracy is added. At the same time the geographic coverage of political interest grows and expands. If a people are not politically united into a national state, they become so; if they are, they may wish to acquire colonies; if they are too small to become colonial powers, they find other means than through ownership of territory to expand their interest abroad. Indeed, in a culture of bigness all states, large or small, follow the extension of their multifarious interests abroad and in so doing lay the foundations for the United Nations.

The field of power politics may be used as an example of the interrelationship of political and economic bigness. National or state defense has proved to be dependent upon the relative size of the organizations within the state. Big business has become the bulwark of military effort, as indispensable as a large population and army. Subject to the degree of efficiency shown, the country with a large, highly developed bureaucracy has as great an advantage over one without such an instrument of administration as a large state has over a small one. Let any skeptic in doubt about the significance of magnitude reflect upon the recent fate of Czechoslovakia.

As large-scale organizations have developed they have tended to assume responsibility and exert influence far beyond the limits of their immediate interest. Political, economic, social, and cultural forces can scarcely be separated from each other. Each expresses merely a facet of a total culture, and merges so immediately into the others that one has difficulty in distinguishing among them. As a few examples will reveal, the dynamic character of bigness imposes a functional interdependence upon the parts. A business may be said to be an economic enterprise. If it remains small, it affects society primarily in the economic sphere; but a large corporation employing hundreds of thousands of persons, using the capital resources of several million

individuals, turning out products essential for the maintenance of the standard of living of an entire nation and operating on a budget of hundreds of millions or possibly several billions of dollars, can scarcely be regarded as purely or mainly an economic institution. It has constitutional and political problems within its own corporate limits which are similar to those of government. Its decision to locate a branch factory in a town or to remove it to another place may spell prosperity or ruin to the community. Its policy on dividends may affect the standard of living of a population the size of that of Belgium or larger. Its salary and wage scale may determine whether its employees work in peace or in a state of potential or actual rebellion. Its demands upon government for free services may impose heavy burdens of general taxation. Its influence upon political parties may be too powerful to withstand. It may support an orchestra and a theater for its employees; it may increase the wealth of the community to the point of enabling the people to afford exceptional schools and entertainment. Is the corporation an economic, a political, a social, or a cultural institution? The answer seems to be self-evident: it is all of these, with its primary purpose being economic but with its impact being total.

Perhaps one might argue that a trade union differs from a corporation in that its interest remains exclusively social, that is, concerned with the social welfare of its members. We know from experience during recent decades, especially in some European countries, that a trade union depends for its success upon the welfare of the business and of the nation, or the world, of which it is a part. It has economic interests in common with business, and participates in politics along with all other elements of a society. Its cultural enterprises may be even more developed than those of a corporation. Again, one must conclude that it operates within the total culture, has interests in all aspects, and differs from the other elements, the corporation and the like, solely in that it approaches the whole from the angle of labor.

A similar analysis of the role of a church, a consumers' organization, or a national association of club women would arrive at a similar answer; and, as for the role of government, the evidence is so clear that one may overlook the similarity between its interests and functions and those of a trade union, a corporation, and the other kinds of big organizations. The ease with which persons at all levels transfer from employment in government to that in business, a trade union or other large-scale institution tells its own story. Public interest and private

interest can no longer be sharply separated; they express at most differences in degrees, and we are in need of new terms to denote not merely their differences but their commonalty.

The new concept of property or wealth may offer further evidence of the intermingling of public and private affairs brought about by bigness. Property formerly meant something tangible, a piece of land, a house, a factory. For most people the term now refers to economic, social, political or cultural rights in some enterprise. One may own stocks in a corporation, bonds of private or governmental origin; one may have pension rights from a corporation or social security claims upon a government; one counts upon the right to free education and other additions to real income; one enjoys certain material advantages from membership in a trade union. In addition one may own a piece of tangible property; but in the aggregate one counts all these sources of material aid as property or its equivalent, and would hardly bother to consider whether they belong in the category of private property or derive from public sources. A pension remains a pension, whatever anonymous organization, private or public, pays it.

International conflict has partaken of the character of the large dimensions of our modern society, for war provides a frank and ruthless indicator of the nature of the societies involved. At the same time that bigness has made possible these inclusive holocausts, it has established the foundation for international peace. We are still living in accordance with the practices of international relations of relatively small and, in comparison with our own, relatively powerless states. What could an army of Louis XIV or Napoleon accomplish against one trained and equipped in modern ways? Those relatively small states lived in a sufficiently self-dependent manner to be able to go to war occasionally and even profit from the outcome. In our culture of bigness and interdependence; the continuation of practices from an entirely different kind of society has proved to be ruinous. This fact has pointed the way to a solution. The big state, the big corporation, the big trade union have created the beginnings of a world society without which the United Nations would be impossible. For the first time in history mankind has the facilities for achieving world peace. While national prosperity and national defence depend upon large-scale activity, international organization and the foundations of peace rest equally upon this solid structure, and by virtue of the inclusive geographic and functional range of bigness the two interests, the

national and the international, are becoming supplementary or even identical.

The study of modern dictatorship lends evidence to the view that these authoritarian regimes are established where the organizations of bigness have not penetrated or where they have done their work but partially. Russia, China, Spain, most of Italy, the new states of Eastern and Southeastern Europe were all countries of agrarianism and slight industrialization, of undeveloped tertiary services and government. They had not created the institutions of bigness necessary to enable the population to utilize its own resources. The one possible exception to this general statement is Germany; but even this country had cultivated bigness only in certain lines and had not allowed it to expand beyond the limits imposed by the desire on the part of the élite to continue to dominate over the rest of the population. The army, the bureaucracy, big industry, and large landed estates were used for this purpose, with the educational system and the political system both suffering from class restrictions imposed upon them, with trade unions struggling to become accepted as legitimate parts of the society, and with other social organizations of the potentially free and initiating type (e.g., League of Women Voters) conspicuous by their absence or so specialized in function as to have little or no influence upon the whole society. As a body of institutions enabling a total society to work freely together, bigness did not exist in Germany.

In many areas of life bigness cannot function effectively. These have to do with the highly subjective aspects of man's life, the regions in which man cultivates his personality or maintains his dignity and sense of value of himself. They concern direct inter-personal relations, and involve one in the intimacies of the many face-to-face situations of life. The most striking example may be offered by artistic creativeness. No amount of bigness, of mass production, of bureaucratism can do other than introduce and maintain conditions most suitable for individual self-expression; for, Stalin notwithstanding, the creative act is a personal, subjective one, and cannot be coerced or ordered from above. Intellectual activity requires a large degree of freedom for the individual: the material must be shaped in one mind or by the common action of a congenial, cooperative group, each member on the alert to be creative. The intimacy and joy of family life can be furthered by bigness, but they are not subject to its beck and call and can easily be destroyed by it.

The greatest problem arising out of bigness so far has to do with these inter-personal relations. How can one retain the qualities of humanness, of neighborliness, in a corporation, a government, or any other large institution? How can one make certain that inducements and channels for advancement remain numerous and open, and that personal ability is esteemed? While we have by no means found the answer, it does appear that bigness stimulates an awareness of these problems and by way of the study of personnel administration and other kindred subjects seeks to solve them. In doing so it receives assistance from other instruments in our society. As long as educational opportunities remain open, as long as taxation prevents fortunes from becoming too hereditary and providing the basis for a caste organization of society, we shall remain what one author has called an "open society." The nature of bigness seems to incline in this direction. It imposes such responsibility upon its leaders and diffuses responsibility at so many levels that it must have ability at its disposal. If one organization falters and inclines to stagnate, others will take its place. If business does not perform up to standard, government, trade unions, cooperatives and the like will take over. And behind them all is the spur of knowledge.

Herein lies the greatest source of hope for society. The existence of big organizations in all aspects of life assures the continuation of competition and the spur to individual initiative and creativeness. As we have seen, each has an interest in all aspects, and is therefore in a position from its standpoint to stir up the others and threaten them with new competitive action. None has the same interests exactly as the others; each has a different social basis for its strength, and therefore would have difficulty in aligning tightly with others to establish a new rigidity. If corporation and trade union form a monopoly, the government backed by all the voters, the educational institutions backed by knowledge, the church, may join forces to disrupt it. A system of checks and balances is established within an interdependent society, a society that realizes the essential value of both competition and cooperation, and that utilizes both to preserve freedom. Once the full array of large organizations exists, the possibility of authoritarianism declines to insignificance.

In a developed society bigness is under constant pressure to cater to the public and perform services of value. Each organization must cultivate public relations; an entirely new subject of study springs up, and public service becomes intellectualized and institutionalized.

Vested interests develop to watch over the improvement of public relations, and once again democracy is protected by formalizing the means of its own furtherance. The multiplicity of interests which bigness makes possible for each of its organizational units assures the existence of things in common with many elements in society and enhances that essential sense of representation on the part of each individual and each institution. The wider the interests, the more diverse the kinds of organizations, especially of a private origin, the greater is the vitality of freedom. The failure on the part of a society to organize these many private spontaneous associations with their multifarious purposes should be considered as a most serious symptom of decay and a warning of the approach of the would-be panacea of authoritarianism. The great danger from bigness to the society of freedom lies in the possible establishment of monopoly, whether in a business, in politics (dictatorship and one-party system), or in any other line of activity. As long as we can maintain the conditions of competition, bigness as such is not a curse but a blessing.

Bigness should be a self-regulating system of freedom. In some parts the government operates with most efficiency; in others, the educational system; in others, the church; in others, business. There is no need to demand that they all conform to any single dogma about ownership of property or the like. What is fundamental is that all means, all organizations further the cause of freedom and personal initiative within the limits imposed by the need among equals to cooperate, and that, above all, they aid the individuals in society to act to the fullest of their ability. The society of bigness places responsibilities upon its members such as no other society has ever done. These responsibilities are no longer borne by an élite but have to be shared by everyone. Bigness is creating a varied body of institutions which will, again for the first time in history, enable us to utilize our abilities for our own and the common good. If improperly developed bigness, like any other regime, can degenerate into authoritarianism; if properly used, it will make democracy a reality.



## *Chapter V*

### **THE SOCIETY OF PROCESS**

During the past hundred years institutions and ways have developed and spread which make it possible to eliminate both social stagnation and cultural crises. The history of some of these institutions reaches back to a much earlier date, but the full array covering the important aspects of modern life did not emerge until the industrial revolution. Taken as an integrated whole, these institutions and ways have provided the basis for the full development of the potentiality of bigness. This unique society may be characterized as that of process, but our experience with it has been so limited in time that we cannot yet grasp the wealth of its implications. The past offers no precedents, for man has never before possessed comparable instruments for utilizing natural and human resources. Modern industrialism has enabled us to smooth out the course of change, making it continuous and peaceful. Both bearers of the new culture and obstacles to it are present in our western society, and the question of which will win out remains unanswered. It should be worthwhile, however, to identify the institutional resources for and against the achievement of this new culture, and this and the following chapter will be devoted to that purpose. The separate analysis of forces present in varying degrees in every national manifestation of our western culture is recognized as artificial, but is employed for the sake of clarity.

Common patterns of organization and methods are evident in all the major aspects of modern society. In the economy, the social and occupational structure, in politics and government, in the fields of education and knowledge, in the areas of aesthetic creativeness, one finds a highly diversified division of function, a continuous, even gradation and transition from one function and one area to another, a close working relationship between theory or policy and practice, and a strong sense of interdependence and even of social responsibility. The indispensability in our vocabulary of concepts denoting change reflects the extent to which we have moved from the primarily static society of the period prior to modern industrialism. Change has occurred in every society, and terms like dynamic, function, development, process, and expansion are employed in a cultural crisis as well. The distinctive feature about change in the society of industrialism arises

from the fact that it has been accelerated beyond all understanding on the part of persons in earlier periods of history, except those possibly of cultural crises, and that the structural transformations are no longer limited to the spasmodic periods of crisis but have become normal manifestations of adjustment of institutions and habits to changing conditions of life. Instead of having recourse to chance and violence, we are able to predict and plan, to anticipate and avoid, to utilize consciously our many resources for creating a good society. Man has at last found a way of life in keeping with his own growing and developing character.

The basic factor in making possible the society of process has been the machine driven by mechanical power. This instrument has given man control which he never before possessed over his natural environment. It has enabled him to produce goods almost at will, undeterred by weather or other natural phenomena. In contrast with agriculture, where production has been limited by climate, soil, and seasonal rhythm, the machine has made production continuous. The material basis and the actual method of production have become characterized by process. The difference between an agricultural, localistic economy, static in character within the seasonal cycle and limited in potentiality, on the one hand, and the uninterrupted, almost limitless productivity of the machine on the other, has changed our way of life. We think and act in terms of process. We expect the machine to supply us with opportunities not merely for earning a living but for getting ahead. We have taken from it the conception of society and the economy as dynamic and expanding, as subject to human control. The vested interests and the habits created by virtue of the machine do not allow us to withdraw from this dynamic activity. We follow the forms of behavior which the machine has made possible. The machine requires rational, systematic handling; it is orderly, and it works in calculated relations with other machines. The gear symbolizes its coordination and cooperation and interdependence with others. The operations of the complex of interdependent machines in the economic process have to be continuous and functional; they avoid extremes; they require smooth and easy transitions from one mechanical act to the next. The machine enables and encourages the practices of prediction and planning. It provides the opportunity and inducement to individuals to set rational objectives and formulate policies for the future. It stimulates the development of these qualities of character in individuals and society, and thereby tends to overcome the habits of

dependence upon accident and fate which the limited economy of the Old Regime encouraged people to accept. It enhances the sense of human power and importance with respect to the present and the future.

The vast increase in wealth has augmented the individual's self-confidence to an unprecedented degree. Mystical or supernatural stimuli and sources of power have declined in social significance; the individual and society can check the validity of belief by reference to accomplished fact. They may fear war and disease, and be shaky in their confidence about being able to distribute the goods which they produce; but basically they have a deep conviction that man can overcome these obstacles to a good life, and they search for ways of doing so.

The increase in wealth has expanded those functions in society which serve the individual and which thereby cultivate the ways of social welfare. Of these functions, the two most important for the preservation of freedom are commerce and distribution, on the one hand, and the professions, on the other. Commerce and distribution have inherently a tendency toward individualism, for they act at the points at which industry has to adapt itself to society. They bring the industrial and other products to the individuals for their selection, and come into immediate relation with the ultimate consumer. The reaction of the consumer to the goods offered him determines the future of the industry: the consumer as an individual must be satisfied; otherwise the industry must change its product or go under. Commerce and distribution, therefore, constitute the social antennae of production, and keep industry in close and constant relation with the individuals of which society is composed. By enabling the individual to choose among the goods offered, they create conditions necessary for him to develop personal tastes and habits. He has freedom to choose what he eats, what he wears, in what kind of a house he lives. For the first time in world history, the numerous and varied opportunities enable him to cultivate his own special interests. He can express his personality by the way in which he lives.

The freedom of the individual as consumer provides an indispensable foundation for liberty in all other spheres of life. The degree of freedom of choice in an industrial economy indicates the extent to which liberty is allowed in general in that society. Since commerce and distribution, by catering to individual tastes, stimulate the general practice of freedom, one would rightly expect that authori-

tarian societies would reduce the importance of these economic functions. Where some ideology, Nazism or communism, is ranked superior to the welfare of the individuals, commerce and distribution will be used, not as means to enhance individualism and freedom, but as instruments of control and guidance. They will occupy a much lesser position than industry, for the latter produces goods which the authoritarian powers need in achieving the goal of their "ism." If production served the individuals, neither could be controlled in the interest of the "ism"; production would supply commerce and distribution with materials to satisfy individual wants, and freedom would result.

Commerce and distribution provide much of the economic basis of the middle class, the class which most nearly lives in accordance with the conception of process. The name itself indicates that function; the middle class occupied in the Old Regime the middle position between the peasantry and the nobility, and served as the middle man for goods and services. Each of the other two classes had in the Old Regime a primary relationship to human beings on one side, but on the other was the earth and the supernatural powers. In each of these two cases the class tended to develop habits and standards of social rigidity. In contrast, the primary relations of the middle class were all with human beings. This class lived by dealing with other people, by buying and selling, by performing services for others. It had to cultivate social attitudes of rationality, calculation, and planning; it had constantly to consider the standpoint and interests of others. Each member had to depend on his wits; each had to think of the effect of his action upon others, for each felt himself to be dependent upon the good will of others. Credit had to be established, and credit, which is basically a moral achievement, indicates the measure of one's position in the total, functioning society. A middle class individual had to be fully acquainted with the personalities composing his market. He had to know what these individuals did, what their credit rating was, what they had to sell and to buy, what were their tastes, their strong points and weaknesses. His success depended upon the clientèle with which he dealt or might deal. He had to be alive to opportunities and to take risks, petty or large, depending upon the degree of his own initiative. He had to be self-dependent within a setting of social interdependence, and he came to feel self-confidence and self-importance as he moved ahead in his work. His position in society kept alive the sense of individualism, entre-

preneurship, and freedom; and, since the middle class was so numerous and the range of possible independent enterprises so wide, both as to the amount of initial capital involved and as to the skills required, this class provided the basis for the society of process. The blending of self-interest and social interest, the dependence of social mobility upon the individual's own action, enabled the members to keep alive those indispensable social qualities of reasonableness, hopefulness, and cheerfulness. As industrialism developed these middle-class qualities supplied the basic characteristics of the new society.

In the middle class, the professions serve as a special kind of middle men. They mediate between man and man, as lawyer or labor expert, and between man and nature by guiding him in the utilization of nature for social advantage. They institutionalize easy and smooth change; if crises occur they act as experts to resolve them quickly and efficiently. They are the instruments of social and individual improvement; it is their function to serve at the social frontier. They deal with people or concern themselves with things for the benefit of people; and they bring to these tasks over and above the profit motive a strong sense of professional responsibility to society. As such, they act as the bearers of practical humanism. One need only consider a society without them to appreciate the extent to which they eliminate ignorance, neglect, irrationality, and brutality as means of dealing with social problems. One can gauge the extent to which a society has accepted the ways of process by the number and coverage of the professions. An authoritarian society does not care for them except as instruments for increase of power and social control. A society with much of the Old Regime extant institutionalizes social welfare only to the extent that it is forced to. The achievement of the Welfare State depends upon the free development and use of the professions.

Industrialism has enabled a complex society to emerge which offers the individuals the opportunity to cultivate their special abilities and to realize their potentialities on a scale unprecedented in history. The division of function makes possible and necessary the utilization of individual gifts. Even apart from the economy of specialization it permits individuals to fulfill themselves and thereby to be content with their accomplishment. The great diversity of occupations reflecting the functional interrelationship of the machine process creates easy gradations from one occupational and social level to another. An individual can see opportunities for improvement in his position just ahead and within reach. He perceives an orderly process of social

mobility around him, and knows that his achievement depends substantially upon his own efforts. While extremes of wealth and power are present, they are cushioned by an integrated system of intermediate roles which prevent them from being sharply contrasted. The individual is encouraged by the situation to keep his reason in close relation to actuality: the more he does so, the better for him. He is not inclined to act in despair and resort to violence. He is schooled in the machine process and the resulting integrated society to curb excessive emotionalism in favor of calculated ways of gaining an attainable, practical objective. The dynamic society of industrialism, in which the individual has the opportunity to reach a position commensurate with his ability, has replaced the society of status, of sharply separated extremes, of immobility. We live in a society in which potentiality forms a part of actuality, and the individual is constantly led to consider the significance of moving into the future.

The society of industrialism has stimulated the growth of institutions appropriate to the dynamic processes. Three such institutions have proved to be especially capable of the elaboration which is needed in this kind of culture; the corporation, the parliamentary government, and the political party. All of them originated in an agrarian society, where their presence attests to the fact that dynamic ways have not been created by the modern economy alone but had politics and economics as parents before the days of the machine process. These three institutions have solved common problems of providing a form within which the process of change can occur without revolutionary destruction of the form. They offer a set of commonly accepted rules in accordance with which the enormously varied life can move. In their most complete stage of development they have enabled fundamental problems of social organization to be solved for the first time in history, the problems of succession, continuity and change, efficiency and flexibility, leadership, policy-making, and initiative. They have enabled the individual and society to live in freedom.

Government shares the common characteristics of the society of process by employing the principle of representation. Everyone and every organization, irrespective of whether it operates chiefly in politics or not, feels and claims that it has some representative qualities, that it stands for something apart from itself. Representation acts as one of the basic mores in a democratic society: without this ideal in each member, democracy would soon be supplanted by an authoritarian creed. The institutions of political parties in a multiple-party society

and of frequent and regular free elections make certain that the initiative of private individuals and organizations will be stimulated and given an opportunity for expressing their views. The competition for leadership will enable the public to choose among candidates for its favor. In this way the relations between governing and governed are kept close. The former must renew its sanction and stand the test of keeping up with changing conditions of society and of knowing and satisfying the wishes of the voters. The election enables stock to be taken, grievances to be aired, new policies to be formulated and tested. It enables each person to participate in public affairs in a responsible way by working within the political party and by voting.

In the society of pluralism, government has to emphasize certain responsibilities which under autocracy play a minor role. Both it and the political parties within their limits have to arbitrate among competing interests; they have to set norms for the whole; they must formulate policies, secure their approval and execute them. They must watch after the welfare of the whole and make certain that in a society of multiple interests the fact of interdependence is not lost from sight in the competitive scramble for advantage. Government has the major responsibility of making certain that no one interest gains control to the detriment of society and ultimately of itself, that the interests all function together, and that the ideal of process guides the operations of the whole. In order to do so it has expanded its structure to keep pace with the elaboration of the social, economic, and cultural life.

The question has become acute, as it did in the eighteenth century, of how to meet the need for a vast bureaucracy while preserving popular government. The problem has not actually been solved, as anyone can see from the inability of a representative assembly in any large state to exercise intelligent and effective control over the budget of the war department. Nonetheless, certain measures have been taken to prevent the bureaucracy from becoming addicted to bureaucratism, to government as an end instead of a means. Training programs have been developed to instill in officials and prospects for official positions a sense of social responsibility. Democratic ways of public administration are constantly being sought and improved so that the hierarchical relationship of superior-inferior within the bureaucracy does not become rigid and prevent ability from arising to a higher position. The study and practice of public relations have been widely expanded; professional personnel for that purpose has been introduced into the bureaucracy, and a conscious endeavor made

to institutionalize the ideal of keeping the bureaucracy in close touch with the public, responsive to its wishes, and helpful with expert knowledge. The creation of advisory bodies of laymen for each major bureaucratic agency, either of a continuing character or on an *ad hoc* basis, attests to the seriousness of these endeavors; and experiments have been tried, and will no doubt continue, to relate advisory organizations of this kind to the legislative assembly itself. Thereby the latter may be able to obtain expert advice on proposals or activities of the professional bureaucrats and be in a position to judge the relative merits of the latter's proposals. It will have an instrument, even though not one of continuing activity, with which to counterbalance the bureaucracy. Nonetheless, in spite of this development, the weakest point in popular government remains that of the failure of the legislative branch to devise means for controlling the vast executive organs.

The political institutions have advanced further along the road toward realizing the objective of constitutional freedom than the corporation. Apart from a few outstanding progressive exceptions, the corporation seems to have reached that stage in constitutional development which in the field of government was attained, for example, in France under Louis Philippe. A few thousand voters elect a council which advises the executive and passes on policy matters and budget, but is essentially dependent upon the leadership of the executive and does not exercise much authority. The analogy is not quite accurate, and proponents of *laissez-faire* deny that the administration of a corporation can ever become subject to constitutional control after the model of popular government. These proponents assert that the exercise of such control will wreck the freely functioning market, destroy the possibility of making a profit, and undermine our political and social along with our economic freedom. In spite of this criticism, the amount of experimentation being carried on at the present time with forms of constitutionality and responsible government in a corporation shows that not even the distribution of power within the corporation is free from the dynamic, experimental habits of thinking and acting of the society in which the corporation has achieved a leading role. The introduction of public ownership, the creation of semi-public corporations, and the elaboration of public control over many branches of business have signified the intention of the political voters to try to subject at least certain corporations to the ways of democratic government, whether by means of subordinating them to the general control of a popularly elected parliament, by putting repre-



sentatives of the employees, government, and public on the policy-formulating board of directors, or by setting up legal standards of behavior and creating a body of inspectors. One does not know at present whether these methods will succeed; but one can say with assurance that the experimentation will continue and that the corporation shares the fundamental characteristics of its institutional form with the parliamentary government and the political party. The three are all big, they have a bureaucracy, and they institutionalize change.

Each of the three institutions has a legal personality which enables it to survive the death of any particular individual leader. It operates as a super-individual, anonymous form into which the individuals fit and out of which they go to be replaced by others. In each of the institutions, the question of succession has been solved by peaceful means. The leaders emerge through competition, first to enter the system and then to rise within it. They gain their position after a severe apprenticeship; they must learn how to lead it to operate within the total society. This process of social and occupational solution particularizes the give-and-take between the society within the institutions and that outside. The institution and society are kept in general agreement on standards of behavior and objectives. The variety of tasks in each institution allows for the use of a diversity of ability, with efficiency even if slowly achieved being the ultimate criterion. Competition in the exercise of initiative on the part of individuals seeking to rise to leadership is supplemented by competition among policies offered by these individuals. The formulation and choice of policies is thereby kept in close relation to the public. A proposal will lose out, if not reasonable, feasible, and clearly formulated, and its sponsors, the individuals aspiring to leadership, will give way to persons of more efficiency. Continuity of policy and leadership is assured if the public approves; change is introduced if the public wishes. In each case the institution provides the abiding framework within which the process takes place.

The institutions possess the characteristics of a complicated division of function, a high degree of interrelatedness among the parts, and an ever-widening range of relations with institutions and social forces outside them. Each institution has the quality of flexibility and adaptability. The allocation of power among the organs in each can vary according to circumstances and needs without breaking up the whole. At one time it may be advisable for the executive to have more than usual authority, whether he be the president of a corporation, the

president or prime minister of a country, or the chairman of the executive committee of a political party. At another time the legislative: the board of directors, Congress, the National Committee may be of most significance; at another time, the judicial function, at another, the electorate. Each institution is constantly set for action in a mobile society; it has to keep responsive, creative, and free, or competition from others will set up similarly organized, successful rivals.

In a society of complex process, politics acquires a meaning which it lacks under authoritarianism. The methods of parliamentary government and of elections suit the needs of trade unions, a corporation, a school class, in fact, of any organization involving directly a large number of persons. The ways of political discussion, decision, and action are used in so varied a range of activities that one may literally describe ours as a political society. With the growing interdependence of all elements in society it is difficult to find any one part or any one act which does not have political significance.

Power has become widely distributed. It resides no longer solely or mainly in formal government, but is exercised by any individuals organizing themselves for action. The ways of influencing society and shaping the future are so numerous that each individual and each group, irrespective of occupation or social position, wields a certain degree of power. The degree depends upon the significance of the institution through which one works, the efficiency of the performance of one's function in society, and the free acceptance of one's action by others. The term political pluralism describes this condition of decentralization of power, and indicates why political ways have come to be commonplace in the inter-personal, inter-group, and institutional relations of our society.

The significance of the political factor may be best perceived by means of contrast with the Old Regime or with an authoritarian system. In the traditional and in the totalitarian sense, politics means concentrated power at the disposal of superiors over inferiors. It implies inequality and the habit of employing extreme force ultimately to resolve problems. It assumes that those in authority know best and that their word should obtain. It eliminates the use of negotiation and compromise in favor of issuing commands. In the practice of the bureaucracy it develops strong habits of legalism and literalness, as against free interpretation by an intelligent person of the meaning of the order and of the best way to execute it. It creates sharp and abrupt gradations in a hierarchy of those who give and execute orders, thus

destroying the flexibility, mobility and adaptability of the democratic process. It makes for social, intellectual, and moral rigidity, whereby individuals are reduced to automatons under the absolute power of one individual supported by an élite. In international affairs, the same habits of rigid, authoritarian thinking and acting are applied. The ruler and the state are noted for the power they wield. They go to war as the accepted way of solving all issues. Their social organization is based on the exercise of ultimate, physical power, hallowed by tradition.

In our society politics has become a way of solving social problems. It implies the use of free discussion, reasonableness, enlightened self-interest, equality among the participants, adaptability, and the willingness, if it seems best, to accept a compromise. It recognizes the value of employing power in the negotiations, but understands that in this complex culture power has a varied content and that the use of physical force culminating in human destruction may be the least efficient display of power. Too much concentration of power, whether it be in the political, economic, intellectual, or other sphere of activity, diminishes the initiative of the other participating individuals and induces decline. In the relatively simple society of the Old Regime where authority consisted primarily of the ability to manipulate human beings, and when material resources were few in number and the economy not yet very interdependent, one person could monopolize the governing function without direct injury to the welfare of others. The society of industrialism requires the voluntary contribution of his best talent by each individual, irrespective of his occupation; and dereliction of duty by any one person affects the welfare of all the others. Elected representatives may and often do possess power in negotiations which persons in the Old Regime never had; but confronting others of comparable strength and being schooled in the ways of the society of process, they recognize the value of exercising power in a reasonable way.

The disinclination to use physical force is evident in the conduct of international affairs. The free democracies with an industrial economy and culture of long standing do not like to go to war. Their tradition of private initiative has led them to distrust the power-state and to recognize the essential identity of individuals as social beings, irrespective of nationality. Private international relations have acquired such widespread significance that students of international affairs have taken them for granted and have scarcely begun to treat

them as part of their formal subject. Bringing peoples together with peoples has become the ideal and the objective; the question of how it can be accomplished has tended to solve itself as the multitude of private organizations in free countries have taken the step beyond the borders of their own states and come together in international organizations without reference to power politics. Educators, dentists, potato-growers, scientists, and trade unionists have developed their own international relations. Pluralism has gained hold in this field, and the foundations of a new international society have been laid. The complexity and fluidity of dynamic industrialism have rendered the conduct of old-style international relations too wasteful to be efficient, too simple to be realistic; the privatization of international relations has taken place as the natural expression of the variegated composition of the society of process. The government, in turn, has taken the role of arbiter among and general guide to these private interests, whenever necessary, and of providing the international machinery for enabling them to function; it leaves a wide scope to private international relations.

The growing significance of the concept of national income offers evidence of our sense of interdependence. Although mainly developing out of the need in wartime to know the actual and potential amount of resources available for the conduct of society under those critical conditions, the concept has proved to be of essential value in peacetime as well. The government, private business, and major social organizations like trade unions all find it of increasing value. Labor uses it as the basis for estimating how much of the national income it is receiving or should receive. Business, especially big business, but even small business organized into associations capable of calculating such data, finds it essential for planning production; it must know the size of the total income in order to be able to estimate how much of that income will or can be made available for the purchase of its products. Others in the private sector regard it as equally useful. The government is coming to employ the information as the basis for its fiscal policy, in the consideration and planning of both its national and its international economic policy.

As the conception of the welfare state has become accepted in both practice and theory, the government has had to plan its fiscal policy in terms of the total social situation. It is expected to use public finance as the major means of preventing booms and depressions and of maintaining the economy on an even keel. Full employment has come to

be regarded as eminently desirable and realizable, and fiscal policy must provide whatever resources over and above those in the private sector of the economy are necessary to achieve that condition. The experience of full employment and maximum production in war has set the standard for peacetime, and planning for that objective has become accepted. Fiscal policy therefore has acquired social purpose. Taxation has become increasingly progressive: that is, it varies according to the ability to pay, according to income or turnover. In a society of process, so-called regressive taxes, like a fixed land tax, decline in importance. Fiscal policy knows how to seek revenue where taxation does least injury to the economy by retarding private initiative to the least extent commensurate with general welfare; but by such means as inheritance taxes it also aims at equalizing economic and social opportunities and preventing new castes based on hereditary wealth from arising. Through such means it seeks to maintain equality of opportunity and to prevent large capital power from falling into the hands of incompetence. It helps thereby to keep alive competition. In developing a tax policy by which everyone, rich and poor, pays taxes in accordance with his ability, it preserves the sense of dignity of even the poorest citizen; it enables him to share in the maintenance of the whole. All participate alike, even if in different financial amounts, in supporting the state; but all do not share alike in receiving benefits from the state. The poor and low-income tax-payers may receive an increase in their real income from government services far greater than the amount of taxes they pay. The public finance system thereby contributes to the preservation of democratic equality, self-respect and mutual aid. It does so on the basis of an analysis of the national income. Without tyranny or rigidity it plans the flexible use of the government income and expenditure for the greatest advantage to the whole society.

Similar objectives are evident in government ownership or other forms of participation in business. Government ownership or regulation of business has proved beneficial to society in those cases in which private initiative has failed or has been unable to develop facilities, such as power resources, essential for a wide expansion of private enterprise. It has also intervened to prevent monopolies from developing or from abusing their power. It has sought to safeguard public interest against the failure of capitalism to take the initiative. It has done so in accordance not with any dogma about the blessings of nationalization or collectivism but with social welfare.

Undoubtedly the heart of the society of process is the free market. Since the criterion of the society of process consists of the maximum creative activity of its members, it follows that the kind of society which evokes the greatest initiative and effort on the part of individuals will be the most efficient. The economic system which measures the long-run efficiency of private initiative in terms of service to society affords a practical example of that utilitarian identity or at least close kinship of private interest and public interest which has characterized the society of industrial development in its most creative period. The terms employed to describe the free market economy could be equally applied to the system of political freedom. It is an old saying that democracy must be won anew every day; so must profit. The individual must serve his own interest by serving the public interest in both democratic politics and the free market. He has to assume the initiative and work with others on a free and cooperative basis, or democracy and free enterprise economy both fail. The habits of self-reliance and initiative, of consideration of others and cooperation, are essential to the one as to the other. In politics the democrat organizes institutions which assist the private person in association with others to solve the problems of government in a condition of freedom. In business he organizes the market through the establishment of banks, exchanges, and other institutions of comparable free character. He can participate in these in varying degrees or withdraw without suffering physical violence. He has helped set up the rules governing each, and if he can win enough support he can bring about a change in these rules. In both political and economic organization he has to act as a free and responsible member of a society with common interests and purposes and standards of behavior. Whether the institutions work or not depends in the last analysis upon him. Handicaps to individual influence become greater as bigness develops in either government or business; but they have been compensated for by the increase in the variety and power of the instruments at one's disposal to overcome them. Since the individual has the vote, he and others can turn their political power against economic abuses; they can direct their economic interests against political acts which they dislike. They have at least a double weapon at their disposal, whereas almost all people, especially of the lower classes, in the past have had only one: they were devoid of political power. When one recalls that similar behavior is useful in each field, one appreciates the supplementary nature of democratic

politics and free-market economics in maintaining our society of process.

The social position of the individual has come to depend not upon caste or class but upon one's training and occupation, upon the degree of social power one possesses. Sharply defined class distinctions have given away to social mobility. Birth counts for far less than what one does. Middle-class standards are accepted by all and widely separated extremes are absent. The social structure expresses the richly varied and highly integrated range of occupations and skills. The dynamic society puts all the classes of the Old Regime and of early industrialism into its mould, and prints upon them common characteristics. Royalty becomes superfluous and disappears, or if unusually adaptable it assumes the role of a symbol or ceremonial object. The autocrat by divine right has no place in a society of rationality, efficiency, and science. The aristocrat shares a similar fate. The qualities that made him useful in the Old Regime have to give way to those of a bourgeois. If he refuses to change, he is sooner or later eliminated for incompetence; if he accepts the ways of the industrial society, he soon ceases to be a nobleman and becomes in his interests and habits a bourgeois. With the peasant the same process of cultural change occurs. His contacts with the urban market require him to learn to deal with the bourgeoisie on their own terms; he must take on their ways, and he has a strong economic inducement to do so. The more he becomes like the bourgeois, the better he is able to maintain himself in a capitalistic economy. His development from a serf to a subject to a citizen within a century and a half or less has been most rapid after industrialism began to impose its tempo upon him. Nor has the proletariat fared very differently. This class, the creation of industrialism, has had to fight its way to recognition as citizens of equal worth with those of the upper classes. In the society of process it has achieved this goal; it has gained a high degree of equality of economic power by way of trade unions. It has ceased to think and plan exclusively in terms of its own group interest and has come to consider itself a responsible part of a whole society. It has ceased to be a class-conscious proletariat and has become a member of the common society of industrialism, with patterns of behavior and cultural objectives similar to those of the rest of the society and with opportunities for ability to rise in the occupational and social scale. Economically, politically and culturally, these social groups tend to conform to patterns of life of in-

dustrial society. They enter politics, become ministers of state, seek profits, vote, pay taxes, go to school, aim at a higher income and a better life than at present, strive to rise in society. They behave like the bourgeoisie, the leaders and pattern-setters of this culture.

During the merging of the old classes into the new functional society, the essential instruments of the change have developed in the form of numerous private organizations. The number and variety of these organizations express the vigor of initiative and creativeness among individuals and reflect the character of the society as a whole. The private organizations enable the members who singly would wield little influence in society to exert the power of numbers and to maintain their interests against institutions which by virtue of the nature of their organization have ready at hand the instruments of power. The value of organization in creating the conditions of mutual respect in a condition of freedom should be contrasted with the social troubles that arise out of a relationship of strong versus weak, of superior versus inferior. A wealth of organizations enables groups of dissimilar functions to negotiate as peers and to come together for a common purpose. Large numbers of otherwise unimportant persons and groups thereby develop the means to express their common wishes, to formulate policies, and to exert pressure toward realizing these policies. Since they live in a society of organizations, they learn to compromise, to act rationally, and to value general agreement arrived at by free discussion. Organization has, for the first time in history, enabled propertyless individuals to wield political power, the foundation of freedom and democracy. It has supplied the basis for extending from government to the whole of society that system of checks and balances which has proved to be so useful in the preservation of liberty. A society with a multiplicity of organizations, private and public, shows thereby the healthy state of its activity. It has institutionalized liberty, equality, and fraternity.

Leadership in the society of industrialism tends to develop common qualities, irrespective of whether it functions in politics, trade unions, corporations, education, or any other part of society. It is not selected on the basis of family or cultural background and training; it may come from any of the traditional classes and may have gone through any one of a number of types of training. The essential characteristics of leaders in this industrial society consist of the ability to lay down and to execute policies, to take calculated risks, to organize and handle people in relation to things and for action, to have the self-confidence



to exploit opportunities. Leadership, therefore, goes to those who control most power in society. This power may be social, economic, political, or cultural; but in any case since these areas merge into each other, the individuals exercising power in one of them must have the general knowledge and insight for acting in several. They may move from business to politics to education without having to change the basic forms of their behavior. The organizations through which they work are so large and so dependent on public good will that they impose these common qualities upon their leaders. The amount of social power varies with the occupation. The banker or the steel manufacturer possesses the prestige and authority in the community which result from the importance to the entire economy and therefore to the entire community of his business. The candy-bar manufacturer could expect to attain no such social power. One would hardly expect a popular novelist to be powerful politically or economically by virtue solely of his ability as novelist. Nonetheless, even the successful ball player or novelist has to have a sense of public relations, or know enough to employ someone to have it for him. The personnel with the most power constantly varies in origin and occupation; but it must maintain itself by constantly being efficient in its work. In a society of such extraordinary mobility as that of industrialism the competitive pressure from below is heavy and continuous.

The culture of industrialism is built upon knowledge. At no time in the history of the world has knowledge carried as much prestige as at present. The twentieth century may be accurately described as the century of education, for knowledge and research have come to permeate the entire society. Industry, commerce, banking, agriculture, and government depend upon knowledge to provide the indispensable means of handling problems. The standard of living and the level of activity in a country can be gauged by observing the value attached to and the use being made of knowledge. Rumania has far richer natural resources than Switzerland, but no one could assert that it compares with the latter in efficiency of utilization. The difference lies in the failure of the Rumanians to apply intelligence in the exploitation of the natural resources for the benefit of the whole society.

Knowledge has become a social venture of a highly individualized character. It can be developed solely by way of individual persons, but to achieve its best results for many purposes it must be cooperative. So far the limits of personal ability to develop knowledge have not been reached. The more education is made available, the greater the

emancipation of individual energy and ability and the richer becomes society. Education shares the same qualities as democratic politics and the free-market economy. It prospers most in a state of freedom and of self-disciplined individualism, and it teaches self-discipline by its requirement of objective analysis. It is cumulative in its impact, for wherever the level of culture is highest and the economy is most complex, the demands made upon knowledge will be greatest. In such a society, knowledge acquires a regulator: it must stand the test of practical application. In a pre-industrial society learning was mainly concerned with holy matters or served as a mark of social prestige. In neither case could its social value be tested, for apart from offering religious consolation and guidance it had little social utility. Its high prestige depended upon its mysteriousness, its general inapplicability to life. The reputed decline in prestige of the educator in the society of industrialism actually proves the contrary: it provides a sign of the growing usefulness of knowledge. The man of knowledge has become accepted as an indispensable co-worker, as practical in his job as the steel manufacturer in his and bearing a large amount of social power. He has become accepted as an essential force in our culture and subjected to standards of efficiency comparable to those of other occupations. Far from losing prestige, the educator and man of knowledge have risen in general esteem to a peak which they never reached before. The evidence is seen in a contrast between the superiority felt toward knowledge by the aristocrat, with his emphasis upon an all-round elegant personality unencumbered by learning, and the great respect paid it by the bourgeoisie, the middle class, and the proletariat, the ingredients of the society of modern industrialism.

Education has become a main means by which the individual gains his place in the social scale. Intellectual ability opens the way to advancement, irrespective of birth; and the lack of that ability leads to decline. In a dynamic culture which requires efficiency in leadership and in adaptation intellectual training is necessary to enable one to keep up the pace. The ideal of economy in the use of natural resources has from necessity been transferred to the area of education: a society cannot afford to waste the human talent at its disposal by not allowing its people to receive an education. General, free schooling therefore becomes a social necessity, with the state helping the talented on occasion by additional funds. Class education has given way in the welfare state to democratic education.

The interdependence of all forms of knowledge and of knowledge and life has tended to increase in direct proportion to the interdependence of the branches of industrial culture. General education has gained recognition as indispensable to enable the individual to be a good citizen and to relate his expert knowledge to the whole of knowledge and its application. The distinction between pure and applied science has become not one of kind but of degree. Practicality cannot be used as a standard solely for the one and not the other; it applies to both. Moving from the educational field of activity to that of business to that of government to that of trade unionism and back again, the expert or professional person employs his knowledge alike in each of them, and gains in perspective. He subjects his ideas to such a rich diversity of practical tests that he profits intellectually from the experience and is able to serve each institution better than he otherwise would have. The increasing interrelatedness of society is evident in the similarity of the problems which he is called upon to handle in each position, whether private or public.

The person of knowledge becomes the balance-wheel of society. He is trained in objectivity and sees the whole. He stands above special interests of the worker or business man, and being primarily concerned with efficiency and social welfare rather than private profit he acts as a creative and a stabilizing force for the benefit of all. His training in objective analysis of the whole prepares him to be the formulator of policies. The worker or business man may think it useful to gain a private advantage at the expense of the general welfare. The expert knows that his own welfare depends upon that of the entire community. He is the living expression of the functional interdependence of our society.

In the experimental method the society of process has developed an instrument which is useful in every aspect of life and sums up the characteristics of our culture. The method shares with democracy the necessity for team-work among individuals under leadership, each one participating with his full knowledge and initiative in the achievement of a common, agreed-upon objective. The experimental method requires for efficiency the equalitarian participation in a common enterprise of theoretical expert and of tool-making expert, of original designer of new instruments to test a theory, and of expert in the application of the new knowledge in practical life. Like representative government it includes in its range of usefulness the most abstract, theoretical, or policy, matters, and the most concrete problems of execution.

While building upon existing knowledge it aims to improve upon the current situation by providing guidance for the future. It therefore combines past, present, and future and supplies continuity and sequence. While concerned with the present, it is interested not merely in the what but in the how, in action. Like the free market economy it provides a means for the integration of individual effort and initiative and interest and the social process for the furtherance of both individual and social welfare. By nature it can prosper only under freedom where it can test theories by facts, and check facts against policies. Dogmatism destroys its effectiveness as thoroughly as despotism or hyper-subjectivity.

The social sciences offer an example of the extension of the experimental method from science and technology to social problems. Our culture has become so complex in its social structure that experts on social relations have had to be developed. In a society as mobile as ours it was to be expected that human beings would devise new programs of training and action to take care of new social needs. If all the problems with public implications were left for power politics to settle, our society would be in a constant state of near or actual civil war. The solution of as many problems as possible by objective, private means has become essential, and the social sciences have offered the methods of doing so. After the facts of a social problem are studied objectively, a reasonable and acceptable policy for the solution of the problem is formulated and, if accepted, is executed.

The humanities have participated in the achievement of the society of process and have benefited from the gains. Aesthetic creativeness depends as much upon freedom as scientific creativeness. While literature, art, music, and the other humanities serve as the bearers of enduring individual and social values, they have also sought to improve upon these values, to find new ones and new ways of expressing them. The experimental method has received as widespread application in these fields as in any other; but since aesthetic creativeness is more individualistic than the sciences or the social sciences, experimentation has been more restricted to the utilization of forms and materials in portraying the varied subject matter of our culture. That the humanities have been aware of the important role which they play in our society can be seen from the diversity of their efforts to interpret and evaluate our common experience. In this society of industrialism the aesthetic products are full of social meaning; they criticize the

ideals in vogue, issue warnings against ways which are detrimental to humanity, and offer guidance into the future. They seek to preserve aesthetic values in a culture which is inclined to over-emphasize materialism and practicality. Thereby they help to make the ideal of process a reality.

The society of process provides practical outlets and functions for intellectuals who in past ages became the theorists and leaders of radical movements. The great increase in the number of opportunities for reformers to be socially useful and the reality of social interdependence have disciplined reformers to think, not about destroying the existing culture and starting anew, but about working in a practical way within the present culture. They tend to accept the ethics of the experimental method, to keep theory and fact in working relationship, and to recognize the importance of the time factor. They have accepted the social discipline of industrialism, the emphasis upon method, upon the how as well as the what. A dynamic society has constantly to check its values, to test their applicability and use, and to choose among competing ideals. Policy-making is fundamental and continuous. Reform has taken so central a place in our thinking and acting that the type of radical of the pre-industrial regime is an anachronism. His function has become normal and subjected to experimental control.

The culture of process appears to have broadened and deepened man's moral sense. The evidence in favor of this view may seem casual and unconvincing; but when compared with that about conditions prior to modern industrialism it is impressive. In our society of interdependence individuals have upon them the pressure of self-interest as well as of social interest to behave in a moral way. In an age largely or purely agrarian the inducements to good behavior had to be primarily personal, for self-sufficiency precluded the applicability of much economic or social pressure. With the coming of industrialism the area of personal responsibility greatly enlarged. The individual is expected to conform to common standards irrespective of the law: if he fails to do so, he as well as others will suffer. Traffic signals exist for the benefit of all, and few can be watched by the police. In a factory or office the reliable performance of his task by each person is in large measure necessitated by the fact that one's colleagues working on other parts of the same project exercise a check on what one is doing and create an *esprit de corps*. The efficacy of modern taxation mainly depends upon the inner controls of conscience developed by the ex-

perience of common responsibility and benefit, by the awareness that dereliction of duty will lead to the breakdown of social organization and hurt each and every person. In the case of modern science one can imagine that experts might without ever being caught spread disease germs enough to eliminate their opponents; but the great increase in the power of these experts must have been accompanied by the augmentation of their self-discipline. Wherever the ways of process obtain, there seems to evolve this awareness on the part of the individuals of their increased moral responsibility. If further evidence were required, it could be found by referring to the absence of this feeling among not all but many persons living under an authoritarian regime. The willingness of Nazi doctors to experiment on human beings, the indifference of communists to morality, the tendency among people under an authoritarian regime to abide by the letter, not the spirit, of the law and to revere and fear a policeman—all these are signs of a difference in the extent to which moral standards permeate the society. Of course one must speak in broad terms, for the incidence of violations of legal and moral codes remains high in our society as well. The point of difference is that our culture of process imposes upon the individuals a greater degree of personal responsibility and offers a wider range of free social checks and controls than any other culture has ever done. It holds out the promise of unprecedented improvement in our general moral standards.

The centers of the society of process have been the cities; for the presence of large numbers of people living in a small space entails a wide division of function and a highly developed system of inter-relatedness, or the society cannot exist. The richest diversity of occupations, personalities, and groups can be supported where experience is richly varied and the velocity of social as well as economic circulation is high. The urban situation tolerates few rigidities other than those institutional forms through which change is channeled. The imposition of rigidity means ultimate decay, for it slows down the tempo and deprives the individuals of the opportunities for improvement which they see everywhere around them. In this man-made city, the most social of all man's creations, institutionalized freedom is essential; society has acquired too great a fluidity to be subject to absolute control. Relations are so varied that dictatorship meets obstruction in the long run in asserting its domination against the will of the participants. Diversity of views, interests, and intentions will occur in spite of controls; heresy is natural to this environment.

Tolerance and a high degree of equality become practiced as realistic acceptance of the inordinate difficulty of enforcing dogmatic uniformity. Social and intellectual mobility reaches its greatest speed, and individualism becomes standard. A basic personality structure develops which is quite different from that of the pre-industrial regime. It calls for an all-round personality who is also a specialist, an individual well established in the sense of his own importance and in his respect for the importance of others, an entrepreneur, a cooperator and policy-maker, an equalitarian individualist, independent and socially interdependent. The type of personality of industrialism carries within itself all the basic qualities of democratic government, the free market economy, the experimental method. It personifies urbanism functioning at its richest simultaneously for individual and society. It personifies the society of instrumentalism, the society of process.

## *Chapter VI*

### **REPRESENTATION**

The essence of representation in society consists of the fact that some one represents other persons or things. The term does not imply identity of the representative with that which he represents, for in social life such identity is contrary to nature. It carries, rather, the sense of democratic equality at its best, of commonalty in the midst of rich diversity. It infers that sufficient common interests and ways prevail to make representation possible, and that enough variety exists to prevent it from ever becoming ossified.

Since nature and society are subject to constant change, it follows that the principle of representation conforms to the character of life, and expresses one of the basic values. Interests and ways need some instrument by which the facts of change can be reflected in the total organization and conduct of society. They require an institution through which they can be channelled without disrupting the totality. Representation provides the answer.

Any organization which is not built upon brute force must to some extent practice the idea of representation. The mere fact of organization means that except in the case of small and relatively simple societies a few must be selected to attend to many items of business for all the members. Even simple associations like that of the citizens of a Swiss forest canton or that of the estate of the nobility in a Prussian county of the Old Regime had to select some one to call meetings, preside, and attend to necessary business during the intervals between the assemblies. The question thus becomes one, not of whether representation is worthwhile, for on that issue we have no choice, but one of how to make this natural principle of social organization as effective and efficient as possible.

Every system of organization claims that its leaders in some way and to some degree represent the will of the people. Hitler was certain that he understood intuitively the wishes of the Germans and carried them out; and the communists claim that they express the interests of the public even though the latter may be forced to accept that view. It is possible that for a short time during a crisis a dictator may feel and act as the people wish; but the contradiction between the meaning of the term as used by authoritarian regimes and that used in the regime



of a free people need not cause confusion. Representation to be genuine entails free elections held at frequent, regular intervals in which individuals or parties compete for the right to represent the society. It requires that freedom of speech, press and assembly must obtain in order for the candidates to campaign for support, and for the electorate to have an intelligent basis on which to choose. In its fullest form it means equal, universal suffrage for men and women and the abolition of any special privileges for office-holding. In other words, it implies the existence of those conditions which in part or whole we have had in western society for decades. The type of representation employed in totalitarian regimes violates all these standards, is a sham, and in this essay will not be considered. Representation means what the term implies, and no mysticism or intuition either of Nazi or Marxian origin should detract from the fact that we possess institutions which make representation an objective reality and provide a clear-cut check on whether or not it actually exists.

It used to be asserted that under the representative system a dictatorship of a majority may be established which is as bad as that of an absolute monarch. This view developed in the agrarian, pre-industrial society with a static conception of interests: namely, that interests do not change for long periods of time, that facilities for enlightenment are deficient or entirely lacking and that people will have little or no occasion or opportunity to modify their views. It must be evident that in the age of industrialism this conception can no longer hold. The shift of interests and the spread of information and ideas are occurring constantly, and the composition of a majority soon changes. While certain interests and groups have a more stationary and conservative character than others, marginal forces which wish change always exist even among these, and interests have such a complex character that they are in a continuous state of modification. A majority could not remain stable long enough to establish a dictatorship of numbers.

The value of representation to society may be clarified by an analysis of the extent to which the principle was employed in the Old Regime. The most cumbersome and inefficient organization in that order was the Polish diet, a body of feudal, sovereign nobles, each armed with an absolute veto over any piece of legislation. Representation was reduced to the minimum responsibility of calling the diet together and presiding over its sessions until violence stopped the proceedings. Legislation of any consequence could not emerge from

this aristocratic rabble, for the members would not give up any of their absolute power and rejected any suggestion that they might all have enough interests in common to justify the delegation of powers to certain chosen leaders. By no stretch of the imagination could these nobles be considered to represent the country. From the standpoint of both efficiency and representation they ranked far below the contemporary institution of the absolute monarchy to be found in other countries.

The monarch developed instruments of organization by the aid of which he claimed to represent the entire people. Irrespective of whether he regarded his power as derived from the people or directly from God, or from both, he exercised authority at least to some extent for the sake of all social groups and was able to perform some services of common interest. The need for actual direct representation of the population in the Old Regime did not appear to be pressing, for social alignment and interests remained about the same from year to year, and change took place so slowly that people were scarcely aware of it. The physical handicaps upon transportation and communication and the narrow margin of subsistence prevented the lower classes from being much concerned with other than local affairs.

In spite of its improvement over feudalism as a principle of organization, absolutism failed to keep up with the requirements of changing society. It largely wrecked the institutions like the town council and the county and other assemblies built at least in part on the elective system, and it developed no facilities for preserving the efficiency of absolutism as a representative of developing interests. The term itself signifies a strong if not overpowering drive toward ossification, for it tolerates the presence of no stimulating, competitive force which would keep it alive and responsive to new conditions of society. It could have dealt with this problem by introducing new and efficient institutions of representation; but in doing so it would have destroyed itself. Absolutism seems to have faced an inescapable dilemma: if it endeavored to preserve its authority, it would be eliminated as a handicap to social change; if it acquiesced in the demand for a more responsive government and organization of society, it would disappear. In either way it seemed doomed to be supplanted by some new institutions and ways for enabling people to work together. It succumbed to the far more efficient system of representation.

As the need for organization expands, representation becomes increasingly important. In the Old Regime the only large organization

had to do with government. All the other areas of society, with few exceptions like joint stock companies, remained small in social composition and in scope of operation. Consequently, the representative principle was first found useful in government and the rest of society remained organized on simple, local foundations. With the coming of bigness and interdependence the significance of this principle has grown in proportion, until in our modern industrial culture representation has become a basic characteristic. Not merely government and political activity but economic, social and cultural aspects of our society have grown large and elaborate, and unless other ideals than social efficiency have predominated we have found it essential to develop the institutions of representation in all these lines. A trade union cannot be organized like the old Polish diet any more than an educational institution, an industry, a church, or a women's club. The fact of bigness has inclined each, irrespective of purpose, to institute means of allowing and encouraging the maximum participation in its affairs of all individuals or interests. It has led to the creation of an instrument that will draw together the common interests in the organization and enable them to function without the imposition of any monopoly. Recognizing that the diversity of interests of each individual or organization will lead each to participate in a variety of associations, modern society has utilized this extraordinarily flexible and adaptable principle of representation as a unifying instrument in a culture of maximum diversity. Membership and loyalty have become pluralistic, to the benefit of both individuals and society.

Since the concept representation signifies that some one represents someone else or some thing, it can only be used on a wide scale in a society of individuals intellectually capable of recognizing the similarity of interests among numerous groups of varied purpose. It requires a high level of education such as our advanced cultures have been developing. The peasant of the Old Regime grasped the general meaning of the principle and applied it in his own local sphere; but to comprehend the complex ways in which it can and must be successfully employed at present, depends upon a degree of education and a kind of practical experience which the peasant could not have had. It entails an understanding of other interests and of total situations, of flexible means and adaptable ways, which no localistic, agrarian society could have provided.

Where the individual has a high regard for himself and is in turn highly regarded by others, where he feels that he represents something

of consequence, the ideal of representation can be generally executed in all aspects of a society. The peasant of the Old Regime could be proud of his work and knew that the welfare of society depended upon him; but he never had the means to make his importance count in the direction of the affairs of the whole society. His successor in our age can do so, and for that purpose he utilizes the principle and practice of representation.

Irrespective of the nature and purpose of the organization in which it is applied, the concept of representation in its fullest form imposes a common procedure and common characteristics upon those who use it. The organization may be a political party, a school class, a trade union, a women's club, a church society, a parliamentary body, a civic association: whenever it employs the principle of representation it has with greater or lesser degree of ceremony to go through a common process. Some one must be a candidate for leadership; someone must nominate him as candidate; others must react to his candidacy by supporting or opposing it or remaining neutral; the candidate and his supporters must campaign for office; an orderly system of election must be abided by; the winner must look after the welfare of both supporters and opponents and the indifferent, and the loser must acquiesce in the verdict and loyally cooperate with his opponents. Each step in the process must conform to the ideal of standing for something in addition to one's own immediate and personal interests.

The intellectual and moral implications of the representational procedure can be felt throughout society. They conform to the fundamental mores. Becoming a candidate, either on one's own initiative or on that of others, can only occur as an expression of individual private initiative. The same act of initiative for leadership is demanded as in the economic sphere. Others must assume the responsibility of organizing support for the candidate, thus encouraging the moral habit of voluntary cooperation. The candidates compete for votes by offering proposals for public service, as business and professional men compete for customers. The acceptance of the verdict of the election by winner and loser puts into practice the ideal of good sportsmanship; and the recognition on the part of the winner that he must look after the general interest and not that of his party alone enhances the spirit of fair play and the appreciation of the existence of common, public welfare. The fact that neither side relaxes its vigilance and competitive zeal for the leading position, and that the contest for the public favor must be renewed keeps acute the demand for efficiency. The

process can and intrinsically does call forth and preserve the western ideals of individualism, competition, cooperation, and public-mindedness. It brings about increased awareness on the part of the individual of his own and of social interests and values. It requires both toughness and fair play, disagreement and toleration. It is based on a sense of mutual respect and acceptance of common ideals of society in the midst of controversy over means and policies to further those ideals. It serves as the main spring for our culture: without it we should have to go the way of authoritarianism; with it, we can continue to be free and creative.

Once the representative is elected, he must perform functions which again are similar in any type of organization. The primary one pertains to the making of policy, and since he has had to gain office in competition with others he will have gone through a process of learning what the public wants and of thinking through the question of what the public needs and of what it will tolerate. As new problems are constantly emerging, in order to be re-elected he must keep in touch with his constituency. Because of the multiplicity of interests seeking his aid he must cultivate the habit of judiciousness, an essential element in making policy. His second major responsibility involves the supervision of the executive agencies. In a small organization this consists mainly of guiding and checking the activity of a few employees; to assure efficient operation in a large one requires proportionately more time and energy.

The representative system provides the means for enjoying the benefits of bigness without having to suffer the disadvantages of authoritarianism. It enables us to keep bigness responsible to the public or rather to the variety of publics according to the purpose of the particular organization. Persons in positions of authority are subject to the popular control of the voters, citizens, members of a trade union, stockholders in a corporation, at regular intervals and thereby are prevented from entrenching themselves and forming a caste. Rigidity and incompetence are excluded by the necessity of leadership's having to submit to criticism and competition from interested rivals. The presence of these checks and balances assures that no one person obtains permanent control and that no dictatorial regime is established. The system is auto-stimulating to activity on the part of private individuals in behalf of both personal and general interests. It develops a standard for public service which affects the bureaucracy, and turns the minds of the members of that awkward institution toward

thinking of means to improve relations with the public and to make itself representative. As long as the bureaucracy is subject to the direction and critical review of a representative body functioning in a culture the unifying principle of which is representational, it will have to respect the ideal of responsible governance. The system of representation therefore provides the greatest assurance that free and democratic ways will be preserved.

The successful employment of the principle of representation depends upon whether among a diversity of interests a common denominator is present. This common denominator may be called the national, the public or the general interest, the trade union or corporation interest, or by the name of any other organization in question. In any case it creates the basis for that which we normally associate solely with the state, namely politics. The reason for the exclusive use of this term in relation to the state is clear. Since politics refers to the means of dealing with the area of common concern among a multiplicity of interests, the word has been employed to refer primarily to that organization of the largest common denominator, the state. It seems evident, however, that this monopolization is unjustified. Common interests are present in all other associations of people, and members differ about the interpretation of these interests. In doing so they engage in politics, and one can legitimately refer to political activity in any and all of the organizations of society. The inner affairs of a church require the use of political means as much as do the problems of a state, although certainly not in the same proportion. An economic organization may be considered a form of special interest; but any corporation consists of the diverse interests of workers and employees, managers and owners, and one might well add of the producers of its raw materials and the consumers of its goods. In the inter-action of these interests within the corporation there occurs the equivalent of political activity within the state. The case is even clearer when one studies how the corporation is related to other economic interests in society. We normally think of its being connected by the direct line of cost and profit; but when the lines of connection become general, when the corporation perceives its dependence upon the total cultural situation outside its immediate control, it turns to the use of politics in the state sense. It recognizes the supplementary nature of economics and politics, and employs in state affairs the same methods of handling the public aspects of private issues that are used on matters within the lesser but nevertheless complete public of the corporation. Politics

supplies the means of dealing with those problems that arise in the region where private affairs take on or reveal their general character and are subject to controversial interpretation and judgment about advisable policies.

The presence of the area of common concern among diverse interests within any organization necessitates the discussion by the participants of the general issues. Private interest has to be related to public interest, and each individual must gauge the connection between them. In this way each person is led to think not merely in selfish or private terms but to consider the interest of the whole. The quality of his character will be revealed in the manner in which he relates these two interests, but even in an extremely egocentric case he must at least be aware of the general welfare.

The question has often been asked whether by turning man's attention away from moral and aesthetic affairs to the stuff of current public activity political discussion tends to lower intellectual standards. There appears to be every reason for answering in the negative. The consideration of the practical problem of relating private and public interests imposes upon each person the necessity of thinking about the fundamentals of organized life. Depending upon ability and turn of mind, the individual may probe all the problems that concerned Plato and Aristotle. He may be led into theoretical considerations of the public good and of how the individual is involved in it. He has to some degree to understand the nature of process, the importance of timing, the appropriateness of methods to purpose. He gains an appreciation of character in action, of the value of a nice combination of objective and subjective standards. Each individual is forced by the situation to take a stand in public on general affairs, and each is thereby trained to become, if he has the temperament and inclination, a public leader. This is the area of civic education of the most practical kind because it has a personal basis. It encourages open discussion, the testing of mind against mind, respect for the views of others, and the willingness to compromise. It stimulates self-confidence, self-expression, private initiative in public affairs. It throws the ultimate responsibility for general conditions back upon the private individual. It imposes duties upon him, and keeps as many matters of public import as possible within the voluntary area of activity. It is difficult to understand why anyone should regard this kind of experience and training as intellectually stultifying. Never before in history has man enjoyed

such opportunities and such stimuli to the development of all his faculties. Never before have all organizations tended to cultivate the same pattern of public-private, general-particular, social-individual thinking as they do at present.

Moral and aesthetic experience and values permeate our lives. We tend to comprehend the moral ones, but not the others. Nevertheless, the habits of thought of representation should help us equally in the case of both. An appreciation of the relevance of means to ends affords a fundamental criterion for insight not merely into a political act but into a work of art. Admiration for political techniques, for the ability to get things done, should open one's eyes to the appreciation of craftsmanship even in the carving of a statue. The sense of the importance of form which must be cultivated in order to cooperate with others in public life can readily be transferred to the sphere of music. Representation should not be confused with identity in art (where it is erroneously called "realism") any more than in politics. If some senators can lay claim to be representative of their states, why cannot a painting by Picasso be regarded as a representation of reality? The former express certain views and interests held by their constituencies; the other, certain things and reactions to life. Neither expresses or represents the totality. The practice of representation should encourage society to be as tolerant of experimentation and novelty in art as it is in science and politics. It should enable society to accept the portrayal of the diversity of objects and factors in art as in other activities of life, to comprehend the rights of art to be not photographic but representational in the same way as politics.

Social training in freedom is so pertinent to aesthetic training that one is astonished at the absence of carry-over from the one to the other. Unfortunately, the humanities have not as yet been related with much effectiveness to the actual experience of non-aesthetics. This relationship largely remains to be accomplished; but the representational pattern of our culture provides the intellectual and spiritual criteria which could readily be adapted to this purpose.

Since finding the principle of representation to be the most efficient and economical form of organization, the society of industrialism has experimented with possible bases for it. Numbers have been most commonly used—numbers of citizens in state elections, numbers of workers in trade union elections, numbers of tons of coal or steel in distribution or production quotas by a cartel, numbers of workers, numbers of stocks, numbers of associations, size of capitalization, size



of payroll, and so on. The quantitative unit seems to afford the most clear-cut and equitable means of measuring and comparing degrees of power; but others, such as expert knowledge and typicalness, are likewise employed. The bases vary in accordance with the character and purpose of the organization, and an understanding of the adaptability of the concept of representation to different situations and needs requires an analysis of each.

The simplest and purest basis of representation is that of being human. The absolute equality of biological and spiritual units of society receives recognition in those associations which owe their existence to the need on the part of all humans alike in them for certain common services. The outstanding example is offered by the modern state. This institution is expected to supply to all citizens without partiality the essentials of protection, civic rights and guidance in common affairs. It depends in turn upon the support of each citizen. The equalitarian trend of the modern state as seen in the use of universal, equal suffrage rests upon the presence of actual needs and actual functions. As the state is organized in this way, the political party has likewise to be, and the civic association follows suit. In the latter a common purpose or objective may hold together a highly diversified number of persons and interests; and the equal vote may be the main means of expressing that common concern. The butcher, the pastor, the manufacturer, the worker may all desire the development of a park and other civic improvements; they may reveal their equal concern about these matters by giving the civic association an equalitarian constitution. In the case of other organizations built upon human equality a situation obtains similar to that of the state, but they accept the principle for different reasons. The church regards each individual as important as every other because of the equality of souls in the eyes of God and the tradition of brotherly love. In many associations, especially those of a voluntary character, a school class, for example, the matters in hand may be sufficiently inconsequential to permit the general pattern of equal suffrage to be applied merely as an act of training in social conformity. The trade union has from the beginning been organized in accordance with the fact that its personnel, actual and potential, owns little or no other than personal property and sells its physical, human skill to the employer. Each member is therefore unencumbered by outside property interests, and stands on an equal material basis with the others. Each member earns a living in the same manner as every other one, through the use by an employer of his

personal biological and intellectual resources. Although the existing members may try to exclude potential ones from full participation for a time, the trade union has tended to utilize the numerical, equalitarian, human basis for representation in the same way as the state, and because of its size it approaches the inclusive model of the state as nearly as any other association.

The problem becomes complicated as soon as the factor of property and the necessity to make a profit become involved. Property can be used as the foundation of representation only with the sacrifice of human equality. One share in a corporation may carry the right to one vote, but the number of shares owned and thus the influence exercised by individuals will differ. One may argue that equality is preserved by means of the equality of the shares; but the fact remains that shares, property and the corporation exist for the sake of human beings, and that the most elemental kind of equality is that of persons. Since the amount of property rights held by individuals varies, it follows that the use of property as a basis of representation renders a situation of social equality impossible.

The second factor; namely, that of having to earn a profit, creates even more difficulty for the application of the idea of representation than the fact of property. The necessity to show a profit is used to justify the statement that power must be commensurate with responsibility, that a person in charge of the corporation's welfare cannot wait for, or necessarily abide by, the will of a majority. Representative government may work in the conduct of state affairs, it is said, where the executive does not have to assure the earning of a profit and at best has merely to maintain conditions in which private interest can do so. It may act in leisurely fashion, the argument continues, and unlike a business is not compelled by competition to make quick decisions. The conclusion is then drawn that the idea of representation can be applied in business only in a conditional sense.

If the line of reasoning were entirely correct, a conflict would exist between the constitutional organization of business and of government, and one would be forced to fear that the authoritarian form might win over the democratic in the entire society. Fortunately, the case is neither so simple nor the difference so pronounced. The constitutions of business and government appear to be developing in the same general direction. The authoritarian argument was formulated in the period when property largely took a tangible form and business organizations were small. With the rise of bigness and its concomitants,

tangible rights in property and intangible property, the conditions have been created which render representation both possible and necessary for efficiency. The change from ownership of tangible property to that of intangible forms, from immediate personal relations of small-scale operations to the impersonal managerial relations of bigness, has forced business to begin to use the principle of representation in much the same way and for the same reason that its large-scale predecessor, government, did. The replacing of owners by managers as the heads of big enterprises has meant the substitution of pluralism for absolutism. The manager, the employees, labor, the owners of the stocks and bonds, the public, all have interests in the business. Some are property interests, others like those of labor or the public are rights or interests, like the right to work, or the right to service. One interest may be mainly financial, another personal, another social, another that of prestige; very likely, each participant has a combination of these interests. They all wish to share in the conduct of affairs. Just as the increase in the circulation of money helped to undermine caste distinctions in the Old Regime, so in our culture the expansion of the institutions of interests and of intangible property has brought social and occupational groups together. Each provides a common denominator; each has an equalitarian influence. Thus, not merely individual persons but property units as well are being organized in accordance with the principle of representation.

It may be that in spite of the advantage of bigness the effective use of the representative system is augmented by the preservation of tangible property in areas of the economy over and above those of agriculture and trade. The psychological impact of each property relation supplements and balances that of the other: the intangible stresses interdependence and mutualness; the tangible emphasizes personal responsibility. The latter provides an ultimate source of initiative and creativeness: the individual in intimate relation to something material within his immediate grasp and possession. The former encourages the practice of considering individual activity from the viewpoint of the social good. Representation affords the means for bringing the two into cooperation.

The elaboration of the concept of representation may be seen in the structure of joint-production boards. Differences in forms of ownership hardly affect the outcome: the board operates on the same principle whether the business is privately owned, that is, by private stockholders, or is owned by the state. These boards are a product

primarily of the two world wars of this century, when management, labor, and the public realized that in order to assure victory over the enemy all must cooperate to the maximum. Labor and management therefore organized the boards to improve production. Labor was recognized formally as having an interest in the welfare not merely of the state but of the particular corporation in which it worked. The question of ownership of stocks did not need to be raised. In so far as consumers' representatives or representatives of the public selected by the government participated in over-all boards for an entire industry, and they usually did, the affairs of business became subject to supervision by even more widespread interests.

The recognition of labor's concern with a business by the addition of several of its representatives to the board of directors has not advanced much beyond the stage of experimentation. As education grows and expert knowledge in many fields develops among labor and employees and a sense of responsibility not merely for the interests of labor but for the general welfare continues to expand, it is entirely probable that the legislature of a bigness will seek to improve upon its guidance of the enterprise by representing more interests than it does at present.

Bigness has created the need for one kind of representation which at first view may seem inconsistent with the general principle. The institution of the foreign service arose in modern times with the national monarchy. The practice of not electing but appointing representatives of this sort has continued and expanded as other organizations of life have grown large. Today we have many examples of this practice, state representatives abroad, representatives of the public on the board of directors of public corporations, representatives of management on joint-production committees, representatives of the public on labor relations boards, representatives of trade unions on national or international committees, representatives of a profession on a board, and so on. All are called and claim to be representatives, and all are appointed. Do they fulfill the functions and satisfy the conditions of representation, or are they examples of creeping authoritarianism?

The practice of appointment may be genuinely representational or not, depending upon who exercises the power, who is selected, what is accomplished. The same conditions could be listed for any other act in our complex society. An advisory board may be appointed by some organization head merely as a cover; the board may or may not permit itself to be abused in this way. If the appointer is subject to control

by an authentically representative group, the delegate may be regarded as a genuine expression of his function. Certain of the appointed representatives, like the members of the foreign service, administer policies which, usually with their help, are set for them. If the appointee possesses expert knowledge which enables him to act on behalf of the best interests of the group, he may also be considered to be genuine. He keeps the ideal and the practical in close cooperation, and sets standards for the group involved. A labor representative on a labor relations panel will express the views of the milieu out of which he comes and into which he will return. His expert knowledge, enhanced by the experience on the panel, will enable him to do more than represent the status quo; it will enable him to represent that which should be. In this sense any expert acts the part of educator and leader in transforming the social conditions. He helps to create new situations to be represented, and as a leader of his group he does much of the thinking for it. He may do so while remaining merely an expert or he may try to gain support for his ideas by becoming an elected leader. If he remains merely an expert his position will be different from that of an elected representative. While he has functions similar to those of the latter, he does so by virtue not of election but of his expert knowledge, and his position as representative is derivative. If the system of election were abolished, the expert would quickly adapt himself to the new form of governance.

The conception of functional representation has emerged in recent decades as a possible substitute for numerical representation. It may be considered an extension into the sphere of the state of the system which has been developing in large corporations. Functional interests are represented, not primarily as collections of equal individuals but as separate even though interdependent interests. This kind of representation is subject to the same limitation as that of some appointed experts: each represents a special part, not the commonalty, not the human being as such. The action of a functionally representative assembly just as that of the expert should in the public sphere not be decisive, for such bodies can only act on the basis of compromise and the general welfare will suffer. The advice of functional assemblies and of experts may be sought, and the more clearly institutionalized this expression of interests becomes the better for everyone; but on issues of general, public policy the practice of representation requires that the decision rest with those selected on the basis of numerical

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equality in frequent, periodic elections. This is the heart of the representative system.

Society has had to achieve a means of balancing responsibility with authority. It has sought and found instruments for maintaining structure and continuity in the midst of change. For that purpose it has taken the system of checks and balances and cooperation of representative governance developed in the sphere of state and is successfully introducing it into every aspect of organized life. A bureaucracy composed of permanent or relatively permanent employees and imbued with a representational feeling, an executive staff or management selected by and responsible for guiding and supervising the work of the others—this complicated machinery enables representative government to work in a society of bigness. It seems doubtful whether prior to our machine age it could have functioned. Conditions of large-scale interdependence have made it possible.

Any big organization of varied interests may be abused by one or all of the participants. Each interest may demand more than its fair share of the product and in the competitive fight may be willing to run the risk of crippling or wrecking the regime. Whether it does so, whether the representative system is a success or failure, depends ultimately upon the moral standards of the participants. The institution tends to cultivate habits of consideration of the general interest; but neither it nor any institution affords an absolute assurance against wilful violation of its purpose. It will help to achieve the society of process, if human beings employ it to that end. It will become either an arena for fighting interests or a means of social cooperation and freedom according to the behavior of the individual participants.

## *Chapter VII*

### **OBSTACLES TO PROCESS WITHIN THE SOCIETY OF INDUSTRIALISM**

It is evident to anyone living in a free industrial society that the achievement of the ideals of process confronts formidable obstacles. The most important of these are characterized by authoritarianism, and are so different in structure that they will be analyzed at some length in the next chapter. Others arise out of the situation of bigness and process, and although not intrinsically hostile to freedom they may become so. The presence of each indicates the manifold complexity of this culture, the capacity of an institution or a way of doing things to be creative or destructive. In the society of process the fact of continuous change in an interdependent whole requires constant attention to the efficiency of the parts and constant exercise of imagination for devising means to counter the destructive elements and to guide the process in the right direction. If we do not recognize the risk involved and take precautionary measures, we may permit our culture to be damaged or even destroyed.

The sources of danger range from institutions to social groups to policies. The bureaucracy has still to be subjected to full popular control. The welfare state may create its own destroyer in the form of collectivization or public ownership. The problem of monopoly continues to plague us. Even more important is the question whether personalities can be developed which are stable, reasonable and judicious, and capable of operating our complicated and dangerous system of life. The tempo of change may be too great for us to construct the educational resources for coping with it. We have not yet succeeded in solving fundamental social problems, one of which, the security of the middle class, has proved of disastrous effect. Will these difficulties prevent the achievement of the society of process?

While the bureaucracy offers no great menace to the survival of a free society, it must be regarded as an instrument for either good or evil, depending upon how it is used. Necessary in any large organization, including the military, the bureaucracy shares the fate of its master. If bigness is subordinated to the general good, either by representative control or by competition or some other means, its administrative machinery will serve the same objective, or the entire organization may

go under. The chance exists, however, especially in government, that the bureaucracy may gain control and exploit the organization for the sake of the administration. In that case, the means becomes the end; vitality is reduced to the amount necessary to continue the functioning of the bureaucracy; expansion consists merely of increasing the number of officials or of agencies, the new ones to perform duties which the old ones should have attended to or in a police state to watch over the loyalty of the existing ones. The process of bureaucratic proliferation can theoretically reach no conclusion until everyone has become an official, each controlling the other. But bureaucratism may become a disease long before this state of saturation has been reached.

The difficulty which representative assemblies and the executive authority, whether in government or in large private organizations, have in controlling their administrative agency seems to be inherent in the nature of the bureaucracy. Not merely the cumbersomeness of a vast organization may prevent adequate checking on operations: it takes a bureaucrat to catch a bureaucrat; but likewise the officials are subject to the desire for power, the desire to take on more and more functions and expand the number of personnel in their agencies. They face the constant temptation of professional experts to abuse their expert knowledge for the increase of their power. If the agency of control, whether legislative or executive, refuses to agree to the expansion, it may be correct in its judgment but by rejecting the advice of its experts it also runs the risk of injuring the public. If it accepts the advice, it may be acting wisely, but it may to the detriment of the public be the victim of a bureaucratic empire-builder. If it sets up a body of experts to scrutinize the proposals of the existing ones, it will have started a chain reaction and bureaucratism will be well under way. It would be exaggerating to label the bureaucracy an anti-democratic institution. It may or it may not be. Although its hierarchical structure resembles that of the military, and the tendency of the institution lies in the direction of authoritarianism, society can control it and make it serve the cause of democracy. The free culture of industrialism has plenty of resources to prevent this bureaucratic ossification; but any major variation from the society of process, let us say in the direction of totalitarianism or communism, will lead to such elaboration of bureaucratism as to reduce or even cripple the functioning of industrialism itself.

It is a well established fact that collectivism under communism means the end of freedom and the transfer of all power to the dictator.



Whether nationalization in a socialist society of free elections, civil liberties, and free government bears the same tendency poses one of the most disputed questions of our time. It seems to be recognized that nationalization increases the costs of operation of an enterprise, but that for certain economic functions public welfare in general may profit from transfer of responsibility to the state. The argument arises over the point at which the disadvantages outweigh the benefits. The formula, "freedom under planning," does not solve the question of how much of one is compatible with how much of the other. The most convincing answer that has been given is that government ownership and control should be extended only in so far as they assist private enterprise, that nationalization as such solves no problems but merely transfers these problems to the sphere of government. Thus nationalization withdraws economic enterprises from the discipline of the competitive, free market and involves them in politics. The standards of business activity no longer are set by economics, but are formulated in political controversy and lose their objectivity. Political expediency instead of profit becomes the criterion; and as costs of production and distribution thereby increase, the political demand will be made to extend control or ownership to additional economic resources in order to protect the existing public investment. Since political interest decides the matter, who can say whether the entire economy will not fall under its power?

The opponents of collectivism argue that the supplanting of economic by political standards will mean the reversal of the social process of industrialism. Bureaucrats will replace entrepreneurs; public political risk will assume the functions of private risk; the government will decide what is to be produced and distributed, to whom, and at what price. The entire responsibility for efficiency and economy will pass from the multitude of private individuals, each with his economic enterprise, whether it be store or farm or industry, to the single authority of the government. The power of the executive branch and its bureaucratic agency will be so enormous that popular control, the governmental system of checks and balances, will prove to be impossible. Individual freedom will succumb to political expediency and it in turn to outright authoritarianism. Administrative decrees will take the place of free and responsible policy-making; efficiency will be measured in terms of political popularity rather than according to the objective standards of profit and loss; bureaucratism will supplant private initiative. The government will wrap its economic organs in

red tape and file them in cabinets. Thus run the arguments of the critics of nationalization, and so far no convincing refutation has been offered. The society of process would again be threatened with destruction by dogma and its instruments of social and intellectual rigidity.

Since bigness characterizes our economic organization, it has aroused the question of whether it can be subjected to popular control. With its tendency toward monopoly, it cannot be socially disciplined by the free market to the extent that its small predecessors were. The presence of a powerful government may not suffice as counter-balance in the long run, for the constitutional organization of business may be antithetic to that of government, and undermine it. In government popular control has been exerted by means of representation based on equal suffrage. Each human being by virtue of the fact that he is a human being possesses the same voting power as every other. The elemental fact of humanness is thereby recognized as basic in running the elemental institution of social organization, the government. As one approaches the area of business, however, the institutions are organized on the basis of property rights and not of human ones. At present, the system of representation in business seems to be antithetic to that in free government, and whether the two systems can exist alongside each other, whether the one will undermine the other, or whether some compromise by way of an amalgamation of the two will occur, cannot as yet be stated. Present evidence points toward compromise, for trade unions are steadily forcing on big business organization the recognition of the rights of numbers of equal human beings, and business is pressing upon government the claims of property to be represented. Furthermore, the twentieth century offers no important instance of the revival of the practice of the first part of the preceding century of basing political voting power upon property rights. Vestiges of that practice have been eliminated, and the corporative state has so far had little success. The major additions to the art of governance in this century have been the introduction of equal, universal suffrage and of the one-party system. Even in the latter case, the popular political organizations have tended to assert control over the institutions representing property.

A second dilemma arising out of the fact of bigness may assume greater significance than that concerning governance. Industrialism has created conditions favorable to the development of monopolies. Science and technology have encouraged this trend, and the social sciences have assisted in the creation of administrative and policy-

making institutions for transforming potentialities into facts. The inducements to organize monopolies have been so strong that anti-trust and anti-monopoly legislation has so far failed to be effective, and government control or regulation of legally accepted monopolies, as in Germany, has scarcely been more successful in defending the public interest. Monopolies are subject to the major criticism that they easily slip into a state of relative inefficiency because of the lack of competition, but that they are nonetheless able to command a larger share of the national income than their economy of production justifies. They therefore may benefit at the expense of others, and in times of economic crisis they may maintain their own profit to the detriment of general welfare. They tend toward rigidity in a type of economy requiring flexibility and constant adjustment. The most promising solution to this problem has developed in Sweden, where the cooperatives or other private organizations have curbed monopoly by assuring the conditions of competition.

Bigness can be used for the general good if people understand issues and are competent to work out solutions. In the society of process, success or failure depends upon the ability of human beings to an unprecedented extent. Democratic methods and instruments are present or can be developed in abundance if people know how and will do so. The great problem arises as to whether society has enough general intelligence to comprehend the issues which it faces. Are these too complex for the public to understand before it is too late? So much expert knowledge is required before one can pass judgment on the basic issues in the military, economic, social, political, cultural fields, that democracy in government as well as in society may fail. The responsibility put upon education at all levels from kindergarten to graduate school is enormous. If education does not enable the public to understand the problems, our society will fall into the hands of experts subject to control by persons with power but devoid of intelligence about how to use it. In that case, either an authoritarian rule will have to be set up or our civilization will be destroyed. Either alternative is repulsive.

Even in the case of experts, danger to society may arise from individuals who have enormous power as scientists but are emotionally unstable or hostile to the free society in which they live or are social robots willing to serve any master. When experts worked with gunpowder or dynamite, they could be dangerous to merely a handful of people; at the present day, in a society accustomed to total war, an

unstable expert may possess the power to destroy thousands or millions. One may reply that scientists, for example, biologists, in the past had similar means of destruction and did not use them, that mankind has proved that it can be trusted, that scientific devotion also cultivates the ideal of service and responsibility to society. These arguments undoubtedly have weight, and the weight can be increased by proper education. It seems to remain true, however, that at no age in the past has knowledge possessed such potential danger to society as at present and has the need to understand and control it on the part of the general public been as great. If the public fails to keep up, it may unwittingly turn the responsibility of control over to a secret police, which may in time become masters of us all. The police state will then have supplanted democracy by serfdom.

The danger might not appear so real if industrialism did not work with such speed. Issues of fundamental importance arise so fast that the public may not even know of their existence before it is too late to act. Representative government tends to function slowly; it waits for the public to understand problems and crystallize its judgment before the representatives pass the necessary laws. This process may require several years for completion, and by that time the matters in both internal and international affairs may have been decided by default. Will the public prefer to maintain its ease, its intellectual sloth, rather than to keep alert on these issues and preserve its democratic way of life? The times seem to require a fine combination of high intelligence on the part of the general public, a pervading sense of public service on the part of the experts, and an extraordinarily resourceful and conscientious leadership by the elected representatives to keep the two others in close cooperation. Basic values of freedom must be preserved in a culture so dependent upon change that society may regard change as an end instead of a means and so lose its liberty. Again the key seems to be found in education.

The most frequent criticism leveled at industrialism has been that of having accentuated insecurity. Booms and depressions, excesses in each direction, are regarded as inevitable manifestations, with great inducements to spend beyond one's means in prosperous times and with the certainty of mass unemployment at others. The most severe critics have even discovered a law about this phenomenon, and have derived further solace in assuring themselves thereby of the collapse of free industrialism in favor of communism. The claim of the existence of any such law may be dismissed as unsupported by objective

evidence; but it is undoubtedly true that as contrasted with an agrarian, localistic economy, industrialism has augmented the degree of uncertainty about the future. Entrepreneurial risk plays an integral part in keeping industrialism alive and vigorous, and risk implies insecurity. At the same time this society has developed means, again on an unprecedented scale, for coping successfully with the problem. One may say that for the first time in history democracy has become possible. The economy of abundance has supplanted the economy of want, and has placed the responsibility for organizing these resources for the benefit of all squarely upon man himself. In recent decades students of society have worked out methods of reducing insecurity to a minimum. Their proposals are associated with the ideal of the welfare state, and include the cooperation of private and public enterprise for a common objective, in which private enterprise becomes conscious of its social duties and plans to meet them, and where the state assumes the role of balance wheel. Each performs those functions essential for social security and welfare consistent with its character; the government assumes those which private enterprise is unable or unwilling to handle. It does so as the popularly-controlled instrument of the general public. There remains no excuse for permitting large-scale unemployment to occur; we know how to avoid this calamity, if we will.

In this century the group most unstable in its social and political ideals has been not the workers but the salaried middle class. The workers have learned to organize themselves into powerful trade unions able to defend their interests and effectively to express their views on public affairs. They have recognized their stake in industrialism and have been seeking ways of participating constructively in the conduct of the economy. The salaried middle class has on the whole so far been unable to develop comparable occupational organizations. In contrast to the workers, it has lacked the strength of numbers and has not acquired the habits of protecting its interests by any such instrument as a strike. It has cherished pretensions to social position for which it has lacked the economic foundation; and instead of developing its own instruments for establishing that foundation, it has sought to gain its end through politics. Lacking other than some personal property and related to industrialism less in an economic sense than in a cultural one, it has become a staunch advocate of the welfare state. In some cases it has done so under a nationalistic guise, in others, by way of a kind of middle-class socialism, in others, by following the lead of conservative critics of *laissez-faire*. In all instances, wherever

pinched it has turned to politics to secure it against unemployment and to supplement its real income, and on many occasions it has been willing to sacrifice its liberty for these material ends. Of all the social groups it has constituted the least dependable support of freedom under industrialism and has been the boldest and most reckless experimenter in governmental, social, and political organization. Whether it will continue to be a source of insecurity or whether it will fulfill the indispensable function in a free society indicated by its name will continue to depend upon the effectiveness of industrialism in providing full employment and maintaining social and occupational mobility according to proved ability. In spite of its behavior in fascism, Nazism, and similar forms of totalitarianism, the salaried middle class possesses the qualities for being an essential support of the society of freedom.

## **Chapter VIII**

### **THE SOCIETIES OF POWER AND RIGIDITY**

The realization of the culture of industrialism cannot be regarded as inevitable. Apart from the obstacles of its own making industrialism confronts three others, each of major significance: namely, institutions and forces which have survived from the Old Regime, and the ideologies of nationalism and communism, which were shaped prior to or at the beginning of industrialism and up to the present have expanded their power. Alien to free society, these forces have violated the nature of industrialism by demanding the concentration of power and imposing rigidity upon its processes. In the degree of concentration of authority and the resulting rigidity the three differ among themselves according to the differences in their objectives; but by virtue of their authoritarianism they have fundamental qualities in common, and need to be analyzed both on an individual basis and as a common phenomenon.

Reduced to its essential elements the concept of power contains two kinds, social and physical power. Social power may be called that which employs intellectual and spiritual means, and respects the rational and moral nature of man. Physical power implies the use of physical or material force toward human beings. Both are normally present in society to some degree, for each tends to supplement the other. The character of a society depends upon the degree to which each is used. If social power predominates, the regime is organized in accordance with the ideals of freedom and democracy; if physical power has the superior role, freedom will have succumbed to authoritarianism. In this study the concept power will be used to refer to the regime in which the exercise of physical power has been extended to the farthest point in modern times and has thereby supplied a standard against which we can judge the nature of various types of social organization. We have already discussed in the chapter on the society of process the kind of culture characterized by social power; we shall now concentrate upon the analysis of the situation in which physical force is employed to handle social problems, and shall note the kind of institutions and ways which conform to the needs of the full use of power.

A power regime means that authority is concentrated in the hands of one or a few persons as a monopoly group. If this were not the case,

the power would soon be distributed in the course of action among many groups, interests and individuals, and emphasis would shift to social and away from physical power. There can be centralization of power even in a democracy for certain purposes; but it is limited by the milieu of freedom and by the actuality or possibility of control by the legislative or other popular body at any time. To concentrate authority means exactly what it says. It creates conditions in which the institutions and methods are mutually consistent and supplementary. The regime has a basic character structure of its own, a structure the antithesis of that of freedom, one best denoted by the concept rigidity.

Power is a function of the nature of the situation. If things are going well in society, the emphasis can be placed upon the widest possible spread of authority on an equalitarian basis. Of course power can never be equally distributed among individuals and groups, for individuals differ in ability and the social significance of occupations is subject to wide variations. Nevertheless, as long as power is distributed according to the rules of efficiency and economy with relatively equal opportunities for all, one may say that it is being utilized in a social and not in a physical sense. In those circumstances it sets up its own checks and balances and provides its own channels and forces for smooth change.

As soon as power begins to be concentrated, one can tell that difficulties are arising, that rigidities are being built up, that some kind of situation is being created which calls for emergency measures. Hence the introduction of authoritarianism betrays the existence of exceptional problems which stimulate certain social groups to believe that they can be solved by force and to try to act on that assumption. Voluntary effort within free organizations is eliminated in favor of the concentration of power to meet an emergency. Some social power remains present, for otherwise the authorities would lack any support and be unable to maintain themselves; but most reliance is placed upon the actuality or threat of physical coercion. It may be that those who advocate the use of physical force are the creators of the situation seeming to require the concentration of power. It may be that they refuse to accept the need for change, for peaceful, reasonable reform, and prefer to protect their interest by coercion rather than to make the necessary effort to achieve in a developing, changing society about the same position and function that they had in the old or the existing one. The call for the concentration of power thus comes from one of



two groups, either from the group which is trying to preserve the position and function that are no longer efficient in society and can be saved only by the exercise of force (like the Junkers in Prussia in the present century or the militarists in Spain), or from the group which holds to some ideal of such an extreme nature that it can only be imposed upon society by force. The use of power therefore means that one is trying to coerce time. One group, that of the conservatives or reactionaries, wishes to force time to stand still or to go backward; the other group, that of the radicals, wishes to make time rush into the future over the murdered body of the present. Neither trusts the normal change or rate of change of a peaceful, reasonable society.

The attitude which individuals and groups take toward power reveals their ethical values. Irrespective of the nature of their verbal assertions, the individuals and groups who demand and seek to acquire physical power over others show thereby their low estimate of people. They may try to justify their attitude by pious phrases about the future. The fact remains that they trust neither their fellow men nor the steady course of social development. They want to coerce their fellows into one line of action at a speed set by themselves. If they did not despise and mistrust their fellow men, they would not seek extraordinary power over men. They would have faith in the general decency of human beings and in the natural process of social change. Instead, they feel a hatred toward all who do not agree with them and set up dogmas as standards of loyalty. All who adhere to the dogmas are of the elect and saved; all who oppose them are enemies either to be controlled and exploited for the sake of the dogmas or to be destroyed. The formulation of dogma constitutes one aspect of the general situation of power just as do mistrust toward and hatred of one's fellow men. Given the desire for power, hostility toward society, adherence to a dogma, the other manifestations will follow. They are all parts of that which we may call a power situation.

Power may be said to impose a kind of psychological logic upon its practitioners, a logic whose ultimate force is curbed only to the extent that feelings of humanity may continue to function. As power becomes more concentrated, these feelings decline in significance. Whether there exists a zero point for them seems to be doubtful, for in that state the power individual would be utterly incapable of working with anyone and would have to be dispatched as a maniac; but the willingness to sacrifice millions of lives for a dogma and the creation of machinery organized on the basis of mistrust reveal the extreme of action to which

power may lead its wielders. The fact that one's relations with others are marked by mistrust indicates that one attributes to others the same hostility that one feels toward them. The devotees of power realize that the preservation or achievement of their dogmas will require fundamental retardation of change or fundamental change in society and that this can be accomplished only by coercion. They expect the hostility of others to be manifested and they recognize that they can only maintain themselves or achieve their future objectives by the employment of physical force. They therefore set up or plan to set up the institutions and to introduce the methods necessary to achieve their purpose.

Some of these institutions and methods are basically different from the ones found in a free society, while others are similar but occupy an entirely different place and serve a different purpose. All act as means for the concentration of power and thus are enemies to that social pluralism found in a free society. In a power situation the executive side of government predominates; the legislative and judicial serve as its tools. The existence of the command-obey relationship follows from the fact of concentration of authority; if cooperation and mutual respect prevailed, there would be no such need. Orders are issued from above because most of society cannot be trusted. If society were willing to accept the measures, force would not be necessary; therefore the centralization of power would not be needed; therefore the executive would not predominate over the other parts of government, and the ways of functioning of a free government in a free society would obtain. Discussion could be engaged in and general agreement reached among equals. Once a power situation is created, the shift from these institutions and ways of freedom to those of coercion becomes inevitable. What are the means which an authoritarian regime employs?

Certain distinctions must be made between three kinds of authoritarian societies, that which endeavors to preserve or restore the Old Regime, that which devotes its energies to nationalism, and that which seeks to achieve communism. The common features already pointed out are balanced by a few basic differences that grow out of the difference in purpose. The analysis of these is essential for gauging the extent to which power is concentrated in each regime and the extent therefore to which instruments are necessary to achieve that concentration.

The culture with least concentration of authority is that dominated by the social structure and ideals of the Old Regime. Interest in maintaining the status quo kept this society from seeking to centralize power beyond that point necessary to preserve the existing order. The authoritarianism depended upon many instruments of control and left them considerable leeway in keeping the rest of society in order. The system may be called a sort of pluralistic authoritarianism, an endeavor to hold back the hands of the clock with a small expenditure of energy. That it was authoritarian in nature became evident whenever circumstances weakened it and encouraged the suppressed social elements to try to introduce liberal, equalitarian reforms.

From the Old Regime have survived institutions and ways in every aspect of life—the power state, war, authoritarian governance, class structure, the military, and the vestiges of localism. On the European continent they have remained dominant in most countries well into the present century. Two world wars and the accompanying revolutions have practically eliminated the social and political structure, and industrialization has increasingly overcome the economic localism; nonetheless, the impact of the forces from the Old Regime has been fundamental in bringing about our present situation. It has been greater in much of Europe than that of the ideologies of nationalism and communism, which gained their opportunity for violent domination primarily because of the non-acquiescence of the elements of the Old Regime in the emergence of the new culture of industrialism.

The vestiges of the Old Regime placed the preservation of the social, political, and cultural forms of the past above the use of the developing instruments of industrialism for social improvement. Being conservative the members of the old order were inclined to accept anything new only to the extent that they thought it would preserve their power. They did so not because of any excessive degree of selfishness but in the conviction that social order was equivalent to the preservation of the status quo. They believed in and practiced authoritarianism, social inequality, and social orderliness amounting to rigidity, ideals which were contrary to those of industrialism. Authoritarianism meant the exclusion of the lower classes from responsible participation in government. It implied the monopoly of political wisdom by the hereditary élite, the disbelief in the ability of the masses to understand and decide political issues. It relegated the overwhelming majority of the members of the state to the role of citizens of a lower order, with gradations even among these. Those citizens who acquiesced in

the authority of the *élite* were accepted as followers worthy of trust; those who refused were treated as actual or potential enemies of society. The middle class belonged to the former group, the Socialist proletariat to the latter. They were all expected to acquiesce in the fact of social inequality as a concomitant of authoritarianism. Without it one could not be certain who might compose the *élite*; one could not count on the continued value of established contacts and alignments. Equality would force continuous adjustment to new faces and groups, to new situations. One would have to learn new methods of leadership and rule, and might find oneself inferior in ability to the new man who had risen through competition. Even the peasants might think equality of opportunity attractive and learn to favor popular education, popular and responsible government, and other means of sharing in the whole social process. The *élite* would encounter criticism of and open objection to the use of political power for the social and economic gain of the few. It might have to employ physical force to maintain its hold, and since its fate would be at stake it would be willing to do so.

Economically the social forces of the Old Regime usually adapted themselves sufficiently to modern industrialism to take advantage of the opportunities for increased wealth and power. They joined the capitalistic process and attempted to control it. In that case, they soon had to accept the capitalistic personnel in the *élite* and sought to impose their standards of authoritarianism, inequality, and orderliness upon the new members. The task did not prove difficult, for capitalists tended to regard their own rise to affluence as proof of the validity of inequality and to consider full authority as essential for the conduct of their business. They might hedge at acknowledging the appropriateness of the term "absolute monarchs in business," and prefer some softer expression, like "power commensurate with responsibility"; but since efficient businessmen considered it advisable to be adjustable, they were inclined to adopt the mores of the society in which they operated. If they lived in a democracy, they conformed as nearly as a powerful entrepreneur or manager could to its standards, and sought to develop some system in which an appropriate amount of authority and inequality of achievement would be recognized as in keeping with a free society. If they lived in an authoritarian society of inequality they easily accepted these norms from the Old Regime.

In this century Europe has had many national societies in which the economy failed to keep up with industrialism. It does not matter

whether the society depended mainly upon agriculture or industry. A country like Denmark may be aptly called an agricultural factory: it imports feed and processes bacon, butter, cheese, and eggs for sale in the industrial markets of England and Germany. It offers a model of the new industrial society. Investment is high, economic turnover is speedy, savings are large, education and knowledge are considered indispensable, social and political equality is standard, health is excellent, and the society is progressive, peaceful, efficient, and well organized. The contrast between Denmark and most other countries of the continent is striking. One might use Poland or Rumania as examples; but since these are relatively new states it might be fairer to select a country like France. This nation has by and large refused to adjust to industrialism. In the early nineteenth century it began to keep its birth-rate low and to prefer to preserve the existing forms of French culture rather than to imitate the British and later the Germans in becoming highly industrialized. The French people have retained a much larger percentage of the population in agriculture than with modernization of methods and machinery was necessary. They have accumulated large amounts of savings but have preferred to make foreign loans rather than to invest the savings in their own economy. The peasants and the middle class shopkeepers have used their great political power to keep down taxation and to prevent the government from taking the initiative in encouraging the expansion of economic productivity. The result has been low productivity, low turnover, inadequate home investment, and, in fact, an almost stagnant economy and society, retaining the cultural characteristics of the first half of the nineteenth century, a pre-industrial society. Social services are few; the labor movement tends to be retarded in growth and radical in objectives; organization is haphazard and inchoate in political parties, labor unions, in fact in every popular line. The élite in business are few in number but are organized efficiently for wielding power; their social and political views continue to be authoritarian and uncompromising like those of the early stage of industrialism. Continuity and consistency of policy and the institutional basis for equality, compromise, and cooperation are lacking. Politics are erratic and action tends toward extremes. In spite of the French Revolution much of the Old Regime has persisted.

Even within a country of a high degree of industrialization there remain areas which should be characterized as static. A small town may stagnate for lack of stimuli coming from industry. Humanistic

interest may remain at a minimum. Opportunities for spiritual and intellectual activity may be limited to the church, the movie and the beer parlor, and the school will primarily serve the purpose of transmitting the mores and maintaining social discipline. In a country like Germany, highly industrial as it is, education even if more efficient than before has preserved a class character about as rigid as it had been under absolutism. In France class structure of education has persisted along with emphasis upon a verbal type of training. Pupils and students have been taught to think and to express themselves fluently on traditional literary historical subjects, with little regard being paid to checking the validity of ideas against realities of life. Education has failed to cultivate those habits of individual responsibility for action and social behavior which develop with the application of the experimental method in all areas of knowledge. The absence of attention to sports in the schools reveals the retention of pre-industrial standards and the failure to appreciate the need for a well-rounded, independent personality and social being. Under such conditions the bases of authoritarianism survived.

Since a monopolistic system requires an exclusive basis of operation, both nationalism and communism preserved the power state from the Old Regime, and, except as far as possible on their own terms, refused to make concessions to inter-state cooperation. Thereby they have proved to be two of the greatest obstacles in the present century to the achievement of the society of industrialism. A consideration of the political map of Europe will reveal how detrimental to economic efficiency has been the division of the continent into many small or medium-sized independent states. The only state which has sufficient size to support a well-developed society on the basis of its own resources is Russia, and potentiality has not become actuality even there. If one could lift the political boundaries and make Europe an economic and cultural unit, one would have sufficient space, people, and resources for a flourishing economy. Division of function would then accord with natural advantage. Large-scale production could occur with savings in costs and efficiency in output; a wide diversity of occupations could be supported; the number of professional personnel could increase; the surplus population could be put to work; with improved economy of production and distribution the standard of living would rise; more services could be provided for the people; private organizations as well as public ones could develop on a large scale and would be able to exert mutual

stimulation and control in favor of equality and self-government. The contrast with the rigid, isolationist structure of either nationalistic or communist society is apparent. How can a state of two million, ten million or even fifty million people afford a complex division of function? It lacks an adequate market within its own borders and dares not depend too heavily upon foreign markets for fear of suddenly having none and being forced to support a large unemployed. Not even Germany with its sixty-five million or so has been able to afford the large-scale mass production of the United States. Every state that has tried to improve its economy has suffered from lack of means to earn funds for investment. The wastage from small-scale duplication of industry and even agriculture in each national state for the sake of self-defence has been enormous; and in the communist states, even apart from the inefficiency of communism as a form of cultural enterprise, the attempt to transform a peasant, agricultural economy into a highly industrialized one within a few years on the basis of local resources alone has necessitated an appalling reduction in the standard of living and exploitation of the population. The effect of communist exclusiveness toward the non-communist world has been contrary to the nature of industrialism. In the case of both nationalism and communism one perceives the deleterious effects of a closed political system upon the potentiality of industrialism for human betterment.

The conduct of international relations, which has proved in this century to be the greatest source for the increase of power and rigidity, differs with the kind of society. The difference in the methods employed has both justified our feeling some hope for the future and enhanced the difficulties in the present. Small states which enjoy a high standard of living under industrialism tend to be pacific. Their social structure is adjusted to industrialism. They know that they possess little opportunity for initiating decisive action in international power politics, and they neither try nor wish to do so. They adhere to other standards of conduct. If the small state suffers from cultural backwardness and is accustomed to violent action in internal affairs, it follows the same pattern of violent behavior in the conduct of international relations. A similar difference in behavior characterizes the big states endowed with a large population, an extensive land mass, a flourishing industry, and a high standard of living. Bigness does not necessarily cause them to use violence or become bullies. The evidence seems to show that the willingness to employ violence

depends upon the cultural habits and ideals of the people involved. The big state has behaved according to the pattern set by its élite. Where the leaders have come from the society of authoritarianism and privilege or from the society of the dogmas of nationalism or communism, power politics on a grandiose scale with war defined as "an extension of diplomacy into action" has been normal. In contrast with the small state, the power of the big state has proved to be too tempting for these social elements to resist exploiting it, and their mores have called for their doing so. In other big states the standards have been different. In a large country with all the potential elements of military strength, the society may be so pluralistic that the state cannot control the resources sufficiently to utilize them for power politics. The action of the government may be checked and balanced, and the citizens may be entirely hostile to militarism and war and to the concentration of power in the hands of any group. They may prefer the ideals of good living, reasonableness, and cooperation to those of the conspicuous display of power; in fact, they may despise the latter as contrary to the nature of human beings and society. They will go to war solely if confronted with a big power state under the control of groups with entirely different cultural ways and ideals, accustomed to the use of physical power and taking the aggressive. The principle of balance of power then comes into action, bringing in its wake competition in armaments and a condition of international tension, and producing the usual course of events culminating in war. In that case the free, pluralistic large state will have already lost its freedom in international affairs and will have been reduced to the level of international behavior of the big power state. Economics, culture, food, everything will be used as instruments of international competitiveness; the period of total warfare, whether cold or shooting, will have begun.

The continuation of the use of war as a proposed means of solving problems has been more antithetic and caused more harm to the developing society of process than any other factor. The outbreak of war has resulted from the action of all those forces which are hostile to the society of freedom; for war implies that rigidity in thought and action has taken the place of imaginative, flexible creativeness, that reasonable solutions could not be found, that adjustments could not be made, that a dogmatic impasse has been reached which could be overcome solely by killing, that destruction has supplanted process.



The impact of war upon the society of industrialism has varied according to the degree of involvement among the participants. Nonetheless, while some may be able to profit temporarily at the expense of others, in the long run all participants suffer. Even those who seem to have gained will have to aid the others to recover, for in an interdependent industrial world war has proved that autarchy is impossible: it has become dangerous in all respects for one people to be affluent and the others poor.

War forces structural changes upon the involved countries at such a fast tempo that subsequent difficulties appear to be inevitable. The capital resources destroyed during the conflict must subsequently be replaced. Since each major participant will have become poorer, it will most likely need outside aid in order to prevent the standard of living from declining sharply. Imports will be essential; but the supply of foreign exchange may have been exhausted or radically reduced to pay for the war, and foreign loans may be required. During hostilities the country will have been unable to raise enough taxes in so short a time to cover expenses; it will have had to borrow vast sums from its citizens and will have put in circulation large amounts of credit instruments. After the war when the pressure of military action has ceased and the public wishes to spend its savings for consumer's goods, the threat of inflation will arise—too few goods in proportion to the available amount of money. Such radical changes within so short a span of time in the size and distribution of national income, in the character and purpose of production, in the use of man-power, in the functions of government, create crucial structural difficulties for years to come.

The pressure for action on a large scale to cope with the vast problem forces the government to assume responsibilities which are new in kind and scope. Among them the problem of investment has fundamental significance as the key to economic recovery from the war damages; and since the private investors are in the main poorer than before the war and unable to supply enough funds, the government speedily and increasingly assumes responsibility for investment. To do so, it has to make certain that sufficient sums are placed at its disposal. It becomes the main instrument for capital accumulation and thereby for savings. With reduced real income just after a period of war-time sacrifice for the state, the citizens demand social security and increased services from the government, and force it to take further responsibilities for which it has not been intended or

equipped. Although the war may have weakened or even destroyed the structure of society, the population may have drawn one conclusion from the war experience which was crucial for the future. It may have inferred from the fact of full employment and maximum productivity in time of war that the same conditions could be achieved in peace, that general welfare was attainable. It demands that the government, the instrument of the people, make this expectation real. On top of the profound transformation during the war is added this equally profound change in social standard and objective. Reforms are expected within a few years which normally would possibly have been achieved over decades. The tension of war is continued in social, economic, and political terms long after the fighting has ceased, and militates against the creation of a new social order. The old society is past; the new one has to be nurtured in the most difficult conditions.

Experience has proved that a modern war can be fought most effectively by that society which in its nature is most hostile to war. The society of free industrialism with self-government, individual initiative and responsibility, high standard of living and culture, can most successfully bear the strain and provide the essential psychological as well as material resources. It can adjust quickly to the emergency, for it can tap the resources of all its citizens and does not have to depend entirely upon initiative from above. It is accustomed to the free, competitive elimination of incompetence irrespective of birth, rank, dogma, or party affiliation. The same characteristics that enable a people to carry on the war effectively have proved equally valuable in the post-war period. They make possible the peaceful adjustment without revolution or civil war. The characteristics of the society of process once again prove superior in achieving positive results to those of dogmatic social and other forms of rigidity. The tragedy of this situation arises out of the fact that the peoples of process averse to war are confronted by almost super-human tasks which may incline them toward pessimism and fatalism and diminish their initiative. It requires a society with strong intellectual and spiritual reserves to utilize the institutions of process in government and other fields of activity for overcoming the structural difficulties created by an unwanted war.

It is usually stated that the constitution of the military was set in the age of absolutism and that we have unwittingly preserved in the age of liberty a pattern of behavior from an alien culture. The assertion may be historically correct, but scarcely supplies an adequate

explanation. The fact is that the nature of the society bears little relationship to the fundamental structure of the military. Under any regime the military has one purpose, to win wars, to win by being prepared to kill the enemy. To act with force in the gravest crisis, the military must be drilled to absolute obedience; it must do that which is contrary to the nature of man, namely, to kill his fellowmen. The military exists for crises; it is moulded to a rigid pattern of behavior and organization. The hierarchical structure of command-obey relationship rendered necessary for the performance of its duty makes it an authoritarian, anti-democratic force even in the most free society. If international conditions require a great expansion of the military element, it may be that even in a democracy the character of the military will come to impress itself upon the entire society. In an age of total war, the military expenditure exerts upon the economy the greatest influence of any part of the public budget; the military control may become dominant over scientific and technological research; the military spirit may enter schools and shape social behavior by way of compulsory military training; the officer may be esteemed as the élite of society in position and conduct; the military form of relationship may prevail over the equalitarian, civilian one in handling labor disputes or any other purely civil problems. The military way of life may dominate over the civil to such an extent that the instrument supposed to safeguard the good life may become the monopolist of life. The military has shown itself, slowly to be sure, capable of adapting the achievements of industry, science, administration, and education to its needs. Will it end by absorbing them all and permeating them with its rigid spirit? Nazism and communism have sought to prevent this outcome by purges of the officers' corps, especially the top ranks, and by preserving control through the monopoly party. Democracy has its traditional social organization as defense against militarism. But, in a highly competitive international system with the threat of total war in the offing, will either or any of these forms of society be able to keep militarism within bounds? The answer can only be in the form of a conjecture.

While both Nazism and communism have inherited from the Old Regime the power state and utilize it to the fullest of their ability, they differ in their attitude toward other institutions and forces of the former society. Nazism claimed to be most devoted to the nation; it placed the nation above all other forms of existence, and subordinated all elements in the country and outside, if possible, to the

welfare of that social group. In doing so it was torn between the desire to realize the ideal of nationalism and to respect that which the nation had achieved and was at present. Thus Nazism would not be as radical as communism in its effort to replace the status quo by something of the future. Also it would not deny the members of the adored nation all rights of initiative in serving the nation. Communism could sharply separate the trustworthy from the others, and handle the latter with ruthlessness. Nazism could not be quite so simple and crude, for all Germans belonged to the glorious band of the socially elect and were potentially good. Nazism was prevented by its ideology from imposing as complete an authoritarian structure upon its people as communism did on its. Nazism shared with the advocates of the Old Regime the will to preserve the forces of social organization and individual initiative which it thought could serve its objective. It kept such institutions as private property and tried to utilize them for the interest of the nation. Its nationalism inclined it to retain some connections with present and past while it drove madly toward the future. Communism had no past and, prior to coming to power in 1917, no present; it had, it felt, only a future, and it sought to destroy the past and present in order to achieve the future. Thus the plans of social organization of communism were much more radical than those of Nazism, just as those of Nazism were greater than the ones of the surviving elements of the Old Regime. Nazism resembled its more extreme competitor most clearly in its handling of internal enemies and especially of non-German peoples, for in these cases nationalism called for an attitude of superiority, therefore of scorn, therefore of hatred and mistrust, and led easily and directly to exploitation. Anti-Nazis and non-Germans were outsiders, just as non-communists were to the communists, and had no rights. They should be treated in any manner which would benefit the ism.

We shall concentrate upon an analysis of the organization of power under the communists, but it should be remembered that much of the analysis applies with equal force to the German effort for world domination. The communists required a greater concentration of power because they wanted to destroy more and to create a completely new kind of society. They have achieved the most complete institutionalization of power of modern times.

The desire to reform radically or to transform society in a hurry can be implemented only by a dictatorship, the institution meant for ruthless action. A dictator can act quickly and decisively because he

is uncontrolled by any outside force. Discussion and negotiation are reduced to the minimum needed to enable the dictator to arrive at a decision and to work out the implementation of his order. The dictator confers with a small group for the sake of speed and of preserving power, for consultation with a large group might lead to delay in decision and open a way to organized opposition. The fact of dictatorship thus restricts the extent to which consultation may be allowed.

The dictator requires instruments of execution which are directly subject to his command. He cannot use voluntary associations for fear that these might object to his orders, wish to negotiate, delay action, and even sabotage the regime by developing a strong opposition. Therefore dictatorship expands the bureaucracy as the ready instrument of operations accustomed to carrying out orders from above. The bureaucracy has a kind of a-moral attitude toward its work; it tends to feel no responsibility other than that of executing orders, and leaves to superiors the questions of policy, of right and wrong, of whether a measure will benefit society. The dictator extends the domain of the bureaucracy to all aspects of life, for he knows that in order to preserve his authority he must control all phases. The exercise of private initiative in one area might quickly spur other groups to request the same right, to argue and complain, and the dictator's power might crumble away. In that case he could not introduce the social changes that he desires and might soon find himself superfluous. Thus the bureaucracy takes over more and more functions, until in the Soviet Union one may without exaggeration label every person a state official. Some have to perform those functions which are assigned to a bureaucracy in any big society; but the rest of the population belongs essentially to the government and can at any time be called to perform some additional direct services for the state. The dictator must be able at will to utilize the social elements for the furtherance of the dogma. The ever-expanding bureaucracy is his instrument.

Unfortunately for the dictator, reliance upon a bureaucracy involves him in a dilemma. How can he make certain that the bureaucracy is reliable? Since he has deprived himself of popular means of checking on his agencies, he must create new bureaucratic organs to watch over existing ones. This chain-like process appears to be endless, for who will watch the watchers? The answer is found in several ways. First and foremost are the instruments for exerting physical

force, the army and the police, and among the branches of the latter especially the secret police. These are the institutions of mistrust, the cardinal psychological feature of a dictatorship. The army provides the background of reassurance that the regime can maintain itself; but, except in the one capacity of training personnel in the command-obey relationship which a dictatorship requires, it enters very little into internal affairs. The army serves the purpose that it has in any society with universal military training, namely, defense of the realm against foreign opponents and civic training in accordance with the ideals of the regime, in these cases the ideals of communism or Nazism. Since the dictator has to force his will upon his own people, his major concern is to hold his power and accomplish his objectives within his own country. The secret police become indispensable and are multiplied in number and diversified in function until they watch over all aspects of life. The process culminates in the organization of secret police to spy upon the other secret police. They provide the main means of dictatorial check and balance.

Since no dictatorial system can rely solely upon physical force to keep it in power, instruments are needed to supply a degree of popular leadership and participation in the regime. These are found in the creation of a monopoly party and in the adaptation of representative institutions to dictatorial ways. Thereby the dictator has an organization for gauging the state of opinion and for guiding the people in the desired direction. He cannot allow the free play of discussion and popular decision, for in that case he would no longer be a dictator and in a position to accomplish his own objective. The monopoly party answers his needs; for it is supposedly popular, it reaches into all branches of society, it is composed of natural leaders as they arise and are absorbed into the system, and it is subject to control from the top. This is a model instrument of what the communists call centralized democracy.

The retention of representative institutions based on popular elections is used to supplement the work of the monopoly party. It might seem to be sufficient evidence of popular support for the regime; but the facts do not bear out this view. A dictatorship renders it impossible to determine whether the people advocate, tolerate, or hate the regime. Nor can the dictator himself be sure on this point; hence he takes no chances and preserves the full apparatus of control. In this array of apparatus belongs the system of representation. Candidates for office are officially or unofficially selected from above and

are altogether reliable. The use of a single list assures that as a rule no competitors will appear. It may be that at the lowest level of social organization in places of slight power significance rival candidacies may be tolerated; but the practice is not encouraged, for it might develop habits of discussion and popular settlement of problems and might tend to undermine the foundations of dictatorship. In case of need voting may be open, whereas counting may be secret and subject to arbitrary decision about the public will. Then the representative assemblies are used to support the dictatorship in two major ways. First, they express what appears to be public approval, indeed enthusiastic approval, for the bills proposed by the dictator (the assembly, except on local affairs at a low governmental level, has little or no power of initiating bills) and supply a *carte blanche* for all the acts of the regime. Secondly, they provide an outlet for public criticism of the manner in which the policies and laws of the regime are executed. They do not criticize these policies and laws; they discuss merely the manner in which these are implemented. In this way they avoid criticizing the dictator and his immediate staff of policy-makers; rather, they afford a release for some popular grievances and act as a check and balance with respect to the bureaucracy. Thus the dictator can employ an entirely docile body of carefully chosen representatives of the public to help him keep watch over the bureaucracy and assure the loyalty and improve the operations of that organization. Like the monopoly party, the representatives act as useful means of control over the public and the bureaucracy and of loyal support to the regime.

Since dictatorship means that all social elements are mistrusted, that problems are handled by force, it follows that the system will include the institutionalization of the blood purge. Insecurity of life and tenure on the part of the dictator and his supporters means insecurity of life and tenure for everyone else. The stakes are the highest, the objective the most exalted, the dogma the most rigid. Therefore anyone who opposes or even seems to oppose the regime in word, deed, or thought must be eliminated by physical force. He has not merely committed a misdemeanor or a crime; he has committed sacrilege; he has endangered the regime; he has established a source of infection for others; he must be destroyed; both actual and potential opposition must be blotted out. The extreme of dictatorship entails the extreme of docility. The pattern of violence permeates the behavior of the entire regime.

The impact of dictatorship upon society brings about atomization. The natural associations of human beings that spring up in the normal course of events are broken. Not even the family is spared; some members may favor the regime while others dislike it. In this case they will be unable to trust each other. The general atmosphere of mistrust pervades the entire culture. The individual must stand alone and be organized in groups artificially created by the dictatorship. Want of outlets for individual initiative leads to reliance upon directives from above. Private initiative carries too great danger of offending the dictator and losing one's life. The system of representation allows so little influence to the voters and those elected that artificial stimulants have to be administered to assure participation. The functions devolve more and more upon the monopoly party. Experience advises against one's taking an active part in affairs; and, since all affairs are public, the citizens tend to remain quiescent, to wait for strict orders from above and to preserve their lives and what passes in such a regime as liberty. The purge proves to be an inefficient and uneconomical means for controlling opponents; but it is no more so than dictatorship is as an instrument of social organization. Since all normal relations of mutual confidence and natural association are excluded, it serves the purpose well enough of keeping the dictator in power. If the latter used gentler, persuasive means, he would no longer be a dictator.

The atomization of society is enhanced by the introduction of caste and privilege. The absolute monarchy of the Old Regime was built upon the foundation of sharp class differentiation. One social group was set off against another, each had a place in the hierarchy, and each helped to control the other. Absolutism depended upon the inequality among the groups and the inability to cooperate for common ends. The phrase "Divide and rule" describes not merely the Hapsburg policy, but that of any authoritarian regime, including Nazism and communism. In these two systems the original dogma was equalitarian, and the individuals from all groups and occupations were encouraged to join the movement and rise in it according to their ability. After the systems came into power it became evident that they utilized the principle of equality of opportunity in order to select an able few as members of the monopoly party. The party members formed the new élite, a new caste, with privileges, rights and responsibilities different from those of the rest of society. Within the party the privileges varied according to position in the hierarchy.



The resulting sharp separation of the chosen few party members from the masses has provided the basis of social atomization. The regime rests upon this foundation of division into two parts of unequal importance, the one to lead, the other to follow. Inequality spells the exclusion of mutual trust and natural organization among the entire population. Dictatorship necessitates inequality just as it does hierarchy, the purge, mistrust, in fact all the manifestations of a disintegrated society held together by coercion.

Since an authoritarian regime is endeavoring to accomplish an objective which at least a potentially dangerous part of its public does not wish, the dictator must utilize every means at his disposal for the purposes of propaganda. Physical coercion must be supplemented by intellectual and spiritual coercion. No dictatorship dares to introduce toleration; for, if it did, it might soon find itself eliminated. The propaganda must be directed exclusively toward the one objective: it must arouse passionate hatred of enemies and elevated love of the ism and its supporters. Art, music, science, literature, every form of expression in life must be subjected to the superior judgment of whether it furthers the propagation of the regime. It serves in its way the same function as the monopoly party, the bureaucracy and the secret police; they are all used to control behavior. Every artist or composer is thus a state official, a tool of the dictator. He has no private capacity; he cannot express himself in his work; he must express the ideas of the dictator. The obverse side of propaganda consists of censorship. The society must be controlled not merely in what it can read, see or listen to, but in what it cannot read, see or listen to. The control of thought has both the positive and the negative aspects, and both mean blinders and intolerance.

The regime may theoretically advocate the creation of a society of personalities; but since it wishes these individuals always to agree with the will of the dictator, it succeeds only in achieving an automaton. The opportunities for individual initiative are eliminated altogether or are so restricted that a person of independent and particular character cannot develop. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the regime has much interest in personality. All the evidence points to the conclusion that it finds most useful a mass of rather nondescript human units ready to be moved at the order of the dictator and responding with human enthusiasm and machine-like precision. The criteria which history has provided for judging the attitude of a regime toward individual personality are subject to such arbitrary

handling in the Nazi and communist regimes that one may speak of their total psychological if not of their total physical absence. The result upon human behavior is about the same in either case. Such criteria as due process of law, civil rights, emphasis upon professional services and consumers' goods industries, upon the distributive functions of an economy—these and similar benefits for the public are found wherever a high respect for the individual determines the functions of governance. They are present in the authoritarian systems solely to the extent necessary to enhance the authoritarian power. The public must receive some material consideration, lest the regime be weakened by too great indifference or even opposition; but the main purpose even of social aid continues to be the augmenting of that which in a normal society is not an end but a means, namely, power.

In a power regime human life is cheap. The fact that power is concentrated in the hands of a dictator reveals an attitude of scorn and aversion toward human beings as such; otherwise, the dictator would cease to claim and assert his degree of authority and accept the free judgment of his fellows. He rates the ism superior in importance to the people who live under it, the method or organization of living more significant than the living. Liquidation of life is made easy; exploitation of personality is reduced to the simplicity of either-or. The adage, "To err is human, to forgive, divine," does not hold, for a dictator demands rigid behavior. He fears that to err once may be a harbinger of further trouble, and prefers to take no risks. Judging others by his own motives, he eliminates risks by the educational corrective of hard labor until early death. Since the elders will have all lived under a different regime, he cannot fully trust them. Some may be loyal party workers, but the possession of another possible standard than that of the ism renders them suspect. The regime justifies its authoritarian character by this fact; and, while eliminating physically many of the mature people and controlling the rest, it bases its main hope upon the youth, that is, always upon those who are not yet developed personalities. Will the regime be satisfied with them, once they become adults? The evidence seems to show that a dictatorship cannot be satisfied, that it lives on mistrust, that its exercise of total power is anti-social, and that under it human life will remain cheap.

A power situation leads to the reference of all affairs to the top for decision. Even under communism the natural tendency of a

dictatorship to become more centralized has revealed itself. The concentration of power in the hands of a monopoly party might seem to permit discussion and some method of popular decision within the ranks of that party; but the logic of circumstances opposes any such solution. The members are accustomed to thinking in terms of power. They would not be content with a majority decision, for such a procedure would imply respect for the views of the weaker group, the minority, and might contaminate all participants with the liberal ideals of a free man in a free society. For a party devoted to action discussions take up too much time; they may confuse and slow down action or deprive the members of the will to do.

If the decisions affect questions of dogma, the minority may assert that its ideas are correct and may refuse to accept the views of the majority. In this case physical force alone can render a decision, and such a crude and inefficient method for solving controversies may endanger the party's control. From the start, therefore, a monopoly party dictatorship tends to become a monopoly one-man dictatorship. It is advisable for all matters to be referred to one person for solution, and for all other participants to keep an open mind until the one man speaks. Dictatorship, the concentration of power, then reaches its ultimate form. There can be no more complete authority on earth than that of a single individual. This individual seems undivided and final. The weakening effects of discussion are prevented. The finality of authority is achieved, and persons now know what is the truth, what is wisdom. The dynamics of power have created a figure in the image of power. If an individual with the necessary qualities of character does not exist, he would have to be created; for the system demands a ruler by divine right, even if the term divine has to be interpreted in a Marxian sense. The leader-principle asserts its inevitability in communism as in Nazism.

Power limits the understanding of other people and situations. It is based on psychological restrictions and causes a narrowing of the imagination and a fixing of interpretations. It warps the minds of those who wield it, and permits them no new, contrary, or conditioning experience which may educate them along other lines. Their experience is always that of power. They think solely in terms of exercising power or of being subjected to the menace of power and the loss of authority to others. They tend to simplify and misunderstand motives. Their dogma, as in communism, may incline them toward a cool, rational analysis of a situation and caution in policy-

decisions and execution; but if they deem it necessary to take chances, as in the seizure of power, the industrialization of industry and the collectivization of agriculture, they will do so with the full exercise of ruthlessness. One can expect communists in other countries upon occasion to act in a similar manner. The Nazis took extreme chances continuously, for their type of personality and ideal placed far less restriction on action and emphasized the necessity of violent daring. They were emotional, whereas the communists stress calculation. In the final analysis, however, both have led to intellectual and emotional rigidity and the loss of efficiency. Their lack of freedom has precluded them from understanding any regime except one like their own. In fact, the evidence supports the view that in the years 1939 to 1941 the communists were too calculating even to understand the thinking of their fellow dictators, the Nazis, and that the Nazis reciprocated by being incapable of comprehending the tenacious power of the Soviet Union.

The concentration of authority leads to inter-personal relations that may be rough and harsh. One must show power; and if one has it, one may easily become short of temper and blunt in manner. A negotiator inclines toward rigidity, for he has to abide precisely by instructions from above and a slip in following the prescribed line may be fatal to him. He is not trusted; he has no leeway; when one is dealing with dogmas or is acting on the instructions from a divine-right dictator, mistakes are not tolerated or forgiven. The negotiator has no right to adjust the line of policy in accordance with the needs of new circumstances which he may encounter. If he veers away from the written letter his superiors, limited in their experience and unable to understand the new situation, may or will see evidence of deliberate sabotage or unconscious deviation. So manners in negotiations have to be inflexible and rude, first because the other side to the discussion may be hostile, and second because one must leave the impression with superiors of absolute trustworthiness. If negotiations are being carried on with representatives of a foreign country, the need for brusqueness is even greater. For these representatives are actual enemies, and to get along personally with them, to agree with them on any point, may lead the authorities at home to doubt one's loyalty. The preservation of an attitude of hardness, intolerance and defiance becomes standard for anyone negotiating with foreigners, just as the adherence to the literal meaning of instructions and a hard-

headed defiant attitude become standard in negotiations with one's fellow countrymen at home. Orders are orders and must be carried out.

Where power is concentrated, changes in policy are sudden and unpredictable. No particular need is felt to explain them to anyone, for the public cannot object even if it wished to. The incentive to prepare the public for a change, except in grave emergencies when the decision for action lies with some other power (Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, for example), is lacking. In international affairs the result is grave distrust on the part of others, which the dictator is incapable of understanding. In internal affairs the regime appears to be equally arbitrary, but the dictator can ignore the reaction of the public even if he is aware of any surprise and uncertainty. He has lost the ability to comprehend the effect of his actions upon others. When his sudden acts are not understood, he becomes angry and suspicious and fears deliberate, planned hostility. Then he becomes even harder to deal with than before, and more inclined to use the instrument he knows best, physical power. The regime shows the tragic effects upon inter-personal and inter-national relations of the absence of freedom, the lack of mutual trust and respect and of intellectual and emotional balance. It goes from one extreme to the other.

A dictatorial regime appears to have an affinity for bigness and to regard it as essential. The dictator's role as that of the largest force in the society leads him to hold in the highest regard all those factors which augment power, and physical dimensions claim a major place in his attention. Bigness provides the dictator with more instruments for action in both internal and international affairs, more shoes and cloth, more steel for weapons. It enables him to exercise more control over the people by affording centralized administrative agencies with actual power stretching by way of a bureaucracy to the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. A large mass of small social and economic units would be difficult to control, as the communists perceived in the case of the peasantry; the solution was bigness in industry and agriculture. The ideals of the regime, equality in the case of the communists, the protection of the little man in the case of the Nazis, have to be sacrificed; the real need for power far outweighs the interest in theoretical consistency. The industry, agriculture, the bureaucracy, the army, everything must be on a sufficient scale to overwhelm any opponents, to accomplish any task. Although

the relation claimed to exist has yet to be proved, the communists assert a special reason for bigness; namely, that it provides the psychological basis for communism by organizing all in inter-dependent groups in the factory around the machine or on the large farm around the tractor station. The Nazis wished the same kind of conditions to obtain as one of the bases of their creed. The interest in bigness on the part of both dictatorships arose from the desire for more and more power.

In the long run the problem of change causes the dictator more trouble than any other factor. The definite tendency of a monopoly toward rigidity conflicts with the natural fact of movement and development. Each change may seem like a threat to the authoritarian structure; and since conditions of society cannot be absolutely controlled even by the communists the latter are persistently compelled to deal with ever-new situations. The dictator therefore confronts a number of fundamental dilemmas from most of which he has so far been unable to escape, indeed from which he cannot escape without the loss of his dictatorial power. The first is that of exercising monopoly authority for the achievement of a cultural objective, vague as it may be, in which that authority will not exist. Whether the ideal be communism or national socialism, the problem facing the dictator is that of how to make his power position superfluous. Do the psychological and institutional effects of power render him incapable of both guiding and submitting to this transformation? The evidence seems to lead to the conclusion that he will sacrifice the objective or put off its realization indefinitely and will hold on to his power. He will not allow society to become stabilized and normal for the same reason: he would eliminate himself as the dominant force, and he dare not trust his fate to people over whom he rules. The dictator is his own captive.

A second dilemma arises from the fact that the dogma must be regarded as perfect and sacrosanct even though situations develop for which it offers no guidance or in which it can be applied solely by arbitrary compulsion. To this dilemma the dictatorships have apparently found a solution, a variant on the one that the church perfected centuries ago. They create a succession of earthly demi-gods, each one of whom has the power to interpret the original dogma and to express new absolute truth. After Marx and Engels came Lenin, after Lenin came Stalin, after Stalin some one else will have

to assume his functions, just as would have had to be the case after Hitler. The process may be awkward, but so far it works.

The crucial dilemma continues to be that of preserving the authoritarian control while maintaining the individual initiative necessary to enable the regime to be efficient and powerful. The dictator cannot organize society under his rigid control and expect individuals to be voluntarily enterprising. If he relaxes his power and the absolutism of the dogma, he ceases to have the authority to execute the dogma; if he does not concede some freedom to his people, he cannot expect them to show the vigor and enthusiasm necessary for the regime to develop its maximum force. He is caught between the need to retain his physical power and the need to increase the general power of the regime by encouraging the exercise of social power. He faces the difficult fact that an authoritarian government does not dare utilize the full resources, especially the intellectual and spiritual ones, of the society over which it rules.

It should be clear that authoritarian regimes tend toward foreign conquest. The leaders are constantly thinking along the lines of imperialism, and fear induces them to endeavor to crush competitors outside their control. They play the politics of balance of power whenever they must (the emotional Nazis far less than the calculating communists); but they always strive to destroy the balance and bring all elements in life under their control. Their aversion to opposition and their mistrust of everyone, especially of those beyond their reach, induce them constantly to be pushing outward in the international arena with all kinds of forces at their disposal. Since they do not understand foreign peoples or those living under free conditions, they tend to make mistakes, especially in this field, and to bring on conflicts.

The shortcoming of a dictatorship for the development of power is most clearly revealed in international relations, where the dictator cannot exercise control and must submit to competition. Here he faces the crucial test of the efficiency of his system, and the evidence of history argues against him. Since the French Revolution at least history has shown that a country is made strong in the long run by the vigor and enterprise of all its citizens and that any kind of dictatorial system weakens the will of the citizens to fight. They are so accustomed to having things done for them that they lose interest in the question of who issues the orders. Like the soldiers of the eighteenth century, they will fight in war because they have to, but

in their hearts they will wish for peace and freedom. Since the French Revolution every authoritarian regime in the western world except communism has been overthrown in international wars. The power monopolists have made enough mistakes to stir up forces which bring about their downfall. They could not develop the strength among peoples held in subjection necessary to defeat others who lived in freedom. The one area outside their control has proved to be the source of their undoing.

Since a power regime cannot allow normal conditions to obtain without rendering itself superfluous, it follows that it must either preserve a condition of atrophy among its people or assure the occurrence of a regular succession of crises. As long as it adheres to the ideals of its dogma, it cannot cease the endeavor to achieve them. It may be that in time persons will gain control who are content merely with the exercise of power for its own sake; but among the communists that stage has not been reached and it seems improbable that it will be for many years. The actuality seems to be as follows: communism is an unnatural, forced, unworkable system of social organization, and the attempts to make it work assure the occurrence of crises at fairly regular intervals. The people have to be stirred out of their apathy; and since the leaders admit no flaw in the system or its dogma, they find scapegoats among the personnel. Then a great purge takes place, the wicked are destroyed, the dictatorship has proved once more the necessity for its continuation, and matters revert to the usual state of apathy until the next crisis. The communist system thus contains all the elements within itself for assuring the steady repetition of crises to justify the retention of the dictatorship.

What may be the outcome? It is difficult to foretell, but an attempt must be made to do so. In order to be efficient, bigness in modern industrial society requires individual initiative and freedom. Perhaps sufficient social elements in the USSR will learn to recognize how much more could be achieved under other conditions than communism. Perhaps the elements of a new society will develop as they did in France in the eighteenth century and will in time overthrow the existing regime in favor of a new one of freedom. The difficulty about accepting this view arises from the fact that the industrial society of Germany did accept dictatorship. It does not seem likely that industrialism alone will suffice to stimulate to action the believers in freedom. As long as censorship, control of thought and speech and all of the significant activities of life remain in the hands



of the dictatorship, it may be impossible for any alternative ideals to be formulated and spread widely enough to create a common basis for action. The dictatorship will therefore most likely be able to maintain itself indefinitely, provided it does not become involved in an international conflict with free peoples. In this case the inferiority of its internal strength in comparison with that of societies enjoying the fruits of voluntary individual and group action should be apparent. If or when foreign forces of emancipation are able to join with internal forces seeking the same objective, the outcome should be the creation of a peaceful and free society. But the hard fact remains that, as far as one can judge from history, power can be eliminated solely by power. Physical power with little support from society must be overthrown by physical power with full support from society. The opposition must come both from within the country and from outside, and the more complete it is the shorter the struggle. Absolute power will then have compassed its own downfall. The emphasis upon the physical aspect of power will have been supplanted by that upon the social, and man will have gained conditions in harmony with his own nature.

## **Chapter IX**

### **CONCLUSION**

The analysis of the types of cultural situations given in these chapters would be incomplete without an estimate of the values which each offers for the welfare of the individual and of society. Intellectual and spiritual factors must be considered as well as material ones, for man's nature requires that physical conditions facilitate psychological development. The organism must receive encouragement to grow in the fullest sense of the term, or personal and social difficulties will arise.

From this point of view the cultural crisis is seen both to emancipate and to repress social energy. It is certainly a hard and severe time in which to live. In the past the cultural crisis has shown a balance in favor of emancipation. In our century it has come to mean primarily destruction. The purposes for which the individuals were supposedly freed during these recent upheavals are contrary to the finest human ideals. A cultural crisis has become a situation of tragic waste and grave risks; and since ways have been developed for achieving structural change in a normal and peaceful manner, it is justifiable to assert that in our industrial society a cultural crisis is an extravagance.

The other cultural situations dealt with are sharply divided into two groups, one characterized by bigness and process, the other by power and rigidity. To the former belongs the society of industrialism, to the latter the vestiges of the Old Regime and the societies of nationalism and communism. The groups have a sufficient number of qualities in common to enable one to perceive the degree to which they are all affected by the experience of living together in the same world at the same time. Industrialism underlies them all except localism and provides the material wealth by which they exist. Nonetheless, each differs from the other in the organization and in the efficiency of utilization of these resources. The society of process realizes the intrinsic qualities of industrialism most fully, for it has introduced into all aspects of life the method of process developed in completest form by modern industry. Freedom, functionalism, cooperative interdependence, private initiative in all parts of society, self-government, these and other similar conditions are most con-

ducive to both. In contrast, the other cultures sharply restrict or even forbid the exercise of these ways. Bigness may also be said to exist in each kind of regime. Certainly both Nazism and communism and for the sake of power politics even the remnants of the Old Regime wish to encourage the establishment of big industry, a big bureaucracy and a big army. All three, however, seek to prevent bigness from spreading to other areas of society. They fear especially the formation of large-scale social organizations which express the interest of the diverse elements in the population in taking an active part in shaping the course of their own lives. As in the case of industrialism, the fullest realization of the qualities of bigness therefore occurs in the society of process. Power may also be said to be generated wherever human beings organize in society, for the mere fact of numbers imposes the necessity of allocating authority to a few. The dogmatic regimes seek to concentrate power to a far greater extent than any free society; for they aim to force their dogma upon the people. Again, one may conclude that the distinction in the degree of power sought manifests a difference in the kind of society. That of freedom actually possesses more power than the others; but it is a kind of power which is highly decentralized and can only with difficulty be brought to a focus for physical use.

The distinction between the two types of culture may be seen from the attitude of each toward the fundamental social ideals and practice of freedom and change. It may be claimed that the existence of institutions imposes definite limitations upon the exercise of freedom and that therefore liberty does not and cannot exist. If Nazism and communism had not put forth their spurious arguments, it would scarcely be worth replying that institutions may also create the conditions essential for freedom to operate and for anarchy on the one hand and dictatorship on the other to be avoided. A society that lives under the banner of freedom may be expected to accept the natural fact of change in all parts of life and to establish the organizations for enabling change to serve the best interests of man. The question becomes one of the extent to which the two kinds of regimes assure the permanence of these ideals by way of institutions and the development of habits of behavior.

The society of process operates in freedom; the others can exist only in its partial or total absence. Freedom of opportunity characterizes the one, but in the others preference is given to those who conform most carefully to the dominant mores or dogmas. The one

practices equality before the law and equality of opportunity according to ability and achievement; the others build society upon status or similar fixed forms. Inequality is to be found in each; but in one it varies according to the showing of the free individual and in the others according to birth, party affiliation or some other suprahuman standard. One places its primary emphasis upon the individual and makes institutions and ideas subordinate to his welfare; the others elevate a dogma or a social system to a place of superiority, and force the individual to serve standards imposed upon him from outside. In the society of process creativeness is open to all and is encouraged, whereas in the others it is restricted to the reliable few and, in addition, its results must conform to the letter of the dogmas. The one accepts the implications of the experimental method, whereas the others impose the limitation of service in behalf of the dogma.

In any culture social extremes exist which will be in some kind of functional relationship. But in the society of process the extremes will be united in a mobile complexity of social and occupational groups that merge easily and smoothly into one another and permit no sharp breaks in the functioning continuity of the social structure. The society of rigidity manifests the contrary kind of organization. In that of the Old Regime status and privilege divide the castes or classes into precise compartments. Under communism and Nazism, party membership creates an élite as severely distinct from the rest of society as the aristocracy was in the Old Regime. Even though in diverse ways, hierarchical status characterizes the societies of rigidity. In that of the Old Regime birth determines one's position; in that of nationalism membership in a particular nation sets one off from people of all other nations; in that of Nazism and communism one's relation to or position in the monopoly party fixes the social position. In the society of process whether economic, social, political or cultural affairs are concerned, the individual can turn to that field which suits him best; he can change as he wishes and is able to; he is his own master, and the welfare state will assist him in having the opportunities to develop himself. In the society of rigidity, the individual's fate is decided by the élite. While mobility may be almost entirely lacking in the society of the Old Regime, it will be possible in that of Nazism and of communism. But the degree and the objective of mobility will be set, not in accordance with the welfare of the individual, but according to the advantage in furthering the dogma as determined by the party. In the society of process

constant peaceful adjustment will be normal, with trial and error deciding what has lost its efficiency and what inventions should be introduced. Efficiency, economy, individual and social welfare set the standards for change. The society of rigidity adopts other standards and methods. The groups of the Old Regime tend to be conservative and to accept change only in so far as it helps to preserve their power. Nazism and communism make change conform to the regime: if it serves the interest of the dogma, it is acceptable; if not, it is prohibited. Something may be outworn, expensive, and in actuality a handicap; but if the élite believes that the system calls for its preservation, it is retained. Process is tolerated solely within the limits set by the dogma.

The contrast in the method of inducing change is equally pronounced. The society of the Old Regime scarcely bothers about making changes unless forced in self-defence to do so; then the elite divides into two main groups, one for essential reforms, the other opposed, but both favoring the retention of power by the elite. While differing fundamentally in the means approved, the other two rigid types of society develop a more complicated method of change. Each institutionalizes change; that is, each has institutions through which and by which change is channelled. But whereas the society of process employs peaceful, rational, careful handling of a problem with the preservation of the right of all interested parties to be heard, the others funnel all such activity through the monopoly party. Since in this case any proposals for reform involve the validity of dogmas, the sponsors are exposed to the danger of being considered heretics and eliminated by violence. Regular purges and other forms of brutality therefore become integral institutions of change. The habits and methods of war are employed as normal in time of peace. In fact, peace does not exist; its presence is not recognized. The rigid devotion to a dogma of conquest for the spread of the dogma precludes any possibility of living together with peoples of other ideals except on terms of a compulsory armed truce. Violent contrasts are emphasized within the society itself between the believers and the unbelievers, between the loyal and the others; the state of war has to be maintained at home as well as abroad. Rigid ways of thinking and acting are essential to prevent the human beings from settling into the peaceful ways of general sociability, compromise, and individual freedom normal to a human personality. Once the insti-

tutional and dogmatic controls of rigidity are relaxed, the society will tend of its own accord to develop the ways of process. These ways are the natural ones in any society; they are the only ones in which the culture of industrialism can be fulfilled.

The analysis of the cultural situations provided in these chapters leads one to reaffirm the validity of views expressed many times in the past about the conditions for the good life. Since man is a developing social being, he must have the opportunities to cultivate his abilities in freedom. Rigidity therefore in any form proves destructive, and should be eliminated in favor of institutions and ways by which experimentation and change can take place. The history of social development should be written in terms of the opportunities which each culture offers for the human being to be active and creative. Whenever the opportunities are numerous and varied, man has tended to seize the advantages offered and to function at his best. Happiness has accompanied creativeness, and the great periods of civilization have occurred. Whenever instruments of rigidity have deprived man of these opportunities, creativeness has decayed, happiness has been drugged into apathy. Even though nationalism and communism offer some opportunities for development to some individuals, the essential rigidity of their dogmatism and the exclusiveness of their institutions of control are bound to deprive these systems of efficiency and health. They cannot compete successfully with a freely functioning democracy endowed with institutional forms for enabling its citizens to be creative, to become personalities, and to take the initiative for their own and for society's improvement. The society of process has the natural gifts of man working in its favor. For it to be destroyed would be a physical and a moral catastrophe.

For the first time in history man possesses the facilities to achieve a life of freedom and creativeness. Bigness has placed the materials at his disposal, and process has afforded the means for utilizing them to the fullest. Every aspect of life is affected by these two characteristics; for all parts have become inter-dependent. The social, aesthetic, and political are closely related to the economic, and *vice versa*. Common kinds of organization and behavior are to be found among them all, with a wide leeway in each for individual action. In spite of the seeming confusion within our own culture the society of industrialism, of bigness and process is moving in a uniform direction. In many aspects it has hardly advanced beyond the introductory stages, but it appears to be permeating the totality with its ideals

and ways and to be developing a unified culture. One can see the outlines of the future in numerous respects: the institutions and habits of cooperative interdependence, of mutual respect, of well-rounded personality, reasonableness, representation, and many others have already been or are being started and all possess common qualities.

We know not merely in theory but in practice what is essential for the good life. For the first time in history methods are being worked out continuously by which ethical ideals as old as written records may actually be implemented. Possessing the materials and developing the institutions for planning, we recognize the importance of the process of policy-making and execution. Within the limits set by nature we are independent of fate and can shape our own future. The responsibility might seem overwhelming if we did not dispose of such rich material and human resources. Many of these are not yet utilized; but we are aware of their existence and we believe that man can avail himself of them, that in the normal course of human events the knowledge, the methods and the occasions will emerge. Man is acutely conscious of the fact that he holds the decision about his own destiny: he can make of it largely what he will. Was man ever confronted with such a thrilling prospect?