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FM 30-16

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Reference

**FM 30-16**

Reference

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL**

**TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE**

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**TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE**

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\*This manual supersedes FM 30-16, 19 September 1966, including all changes.



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## CHAPTER 1

### GENERAL

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#### Section I. INTRODUCTION

##### 1-1. Purpose

*a.* This manual sets forth doctrine and establishes procedures for the management, planning, and collection of information which, upon evaluation and production into intelligence, is reported and disseminated as Army technical intelligence. It provides guidance for commanders, staff officers, and other personnel and units and aids in understanding the concept and role of technical intelligence in the overall intelligence requirements of the commander.

*b.* Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommendations to improve its clarity or accuracy. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded direct to the Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Intelligence Agency, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219. Originators of proposed changes which would constitute a significant modification of approved Army doctrine may send an information copy, through command channels, to the Commanding General, USACDC, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facilitate review and follow-up.

##### 1-2. Scope

*a.* The contents of this manual deal primarily with technical intelligence organizations and the objectives and functions of technical intelligence operations. The manual outlines procedures and establishes broad principles regarding the role of military intelligence units engaged in technical intelligence activities, and identifies those sources and agencies available

to assist in accomplishing the technical intelligence requirements of the commander. Engineer topographic and terrain intelligence are discussed in FM 5-30 and 30-10; they are not included within the scope of this manual.

*b.* The material presented herein is applicable to general war, limited war, and cold war situations, to include stability operations; nuclear and nonnuclear warfare environments; and employment of, and protection from, chemical, biological, and radiological agents.

*c.* This manual is in consonance with the following International Standardization Agreements which are identified by type of agreement and number at the beginning of each appropriate chapter in the manual: STANAG 2084, and SOLOG 94 (Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Documents and Equipment); STANAG 2097 (Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc Army Weapons and Equipment).

##### 1-3. Definitions

*a.* For definition of terms used see AR 320-5.

*b.* The relationship of intelligence and technical intelligence is set forth below:

(1) Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all information concerning one or more aspects of foreign countries or areas which are immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of military plans, policies, operations and development of military equipment. Technical intelligence, which is one aspect of military intelligence, plays a vital role in the tactical and strategic intelligence picture and therefore must be considered as part of an overall

integrated intelligence effort. All tactical commanders and staff officers should employ technical intelligence in planning and maintaining the security of their commands.

(2) Technical intelligence is that intelligence concerning foreign technological developments and the performance and operational capabilities of foreign materiel, which now or may eventually have a practical application for military purposes. As with all other intelligence, it is the end product resulting from the collection and processing of technical information. The scope of technical intelligence is broad. It includes all technical aspects of foreign equipment, supplies, installations, facilities, communications, and captured or abandoned items which have a practical application in furthering military operations. The scope also includes captured friendly and allied equipment and materiel which may have been in the hands of a hostile force. Technical intelligence, then, contributes primarily to the extension of the combat intelligence effort. (See appendix B for categories of technical intelligence.)

#### 1-4. Scientific and Technical Intelligence

a. Scientific and Technical (S&T) Intelligence includes that foreign intelligence relating

to basic and applied research in natural and applied sciences and in applied engineering techniques. Also included are the scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapons systems, and other materiel; production methods employed in their manufacture; and related technology pertaining to materiel operation, and logistic support.

b. Within the Department of the Army, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) has general staff responsibility for all matters pertaining to intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The organizational element within ACSI which exercises general staff supervision over S&T intelligence activities of the Army is the Scientific and Technical Division, Directorate of Foreign Intelligence. This division monitors intelligence produced and the intelligence activities involved in this production to determine that weapons and equipment, scientific, nuclear, chemical, missile, space, and electronic requirements levied on DA production facilities are fulfilled. This division also provides DA representation on scientific and technical committees and working groups of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB).

## Section II. THE STRATEGIC EFFORT

### 1-5. Introduction

a. The objectives of strategic technical intelligence are to—

(1) Determine capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of foreign technology, materiel, facilities, and installations.

(2) Exploit foreign technologies for the benefit of U.S. Forces.

(3) Assist in the development of effective countermeasures by providing intelligence to the overall military research and development effort.

(4) Provide materiel and information upon which to base the training of all armed forces personnel.

b. The overall military technical intelligence program is vital to the U.S. strategic/national, scientific, and technical intelligence effort. The

technical intelligence organization of the Department of Defense (DOD) includes elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the three services or military departments: Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

### 1-6. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

a. DIA coordinates the intelligence activities of the three military departments and satisfies the intelligence requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and DOD. In the area of technical intelligence, DIA is responsible for the overall management and review of all technical intelligence activities throughout DOD.

b. The action element of DIA for its technical intelligence responsibility is the Directorate of Scientific and Technical Intelligence. Direct

communication or coordination is authorized between this directorate and the external technical intelligence agencies on nonpolicy matters relating to the production of S&T intelligence. The principal producers of technical intelligence within DOD are—

(1) Directorate of Scientific and Technical Intelligence of DIA (DIASST).

(2) Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) of the U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC).

(3) Missile Intelligence Directorate (MID) of the Army Missile Command of USAMC.

(4) Medical Intelligence Office of the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army.

(5) Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center (STIC) of the Department of the Navy.

(6) Foreign Technology Division (FTD) of the Department of Air Force.

### 1-7. Strategic Role of DA Agencies

*a.* ACSI, DA, with general staff responsibility for all S&T intelligence activities in the Army, performs the following functions:

(1) Formulates policies and procedures which insure that S&T intelligence activities of the Army are carried out in the most efficient and productive manner.

(2) Supervises the preparation and execution of the Army S&T intelligence program, in coordination with DIA, and provides for its integration into the DOD Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP).

(3) Coordinates requirements for technical intelligence originated by the DA staff and major subordinate commands to insure that they are fulfilled.

*b.* The U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) is responsible for commanding, operating, and managing two major CONUS-based Army S&T production agencies: the Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) and the USAMC Missile Intelligence Directorate of the Missile Command. USAMC, through its subordinate agencies, is responsible for providing U.S. strategic planners, the military research and development effort, and the military S&T effort with timely and appropriate technical intelligence with the exception of medical S&T intelligence.

*c.* The Surgeon General of the Army is responsible for commanding, operating, and managing the Medical S&T Branch which is part of the Medical Intelligence Office.

*d.* The Chief of Engineers has DA staff responsibility to provide program guidance to Army component commands on requirements for military geographic intelligence, as outlined in FM 5-30. Within the Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Army Topographic Command (USATOPCOM) is the primary element that deals with national level, strategic intelligence.

*e.* The U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA) is responsible for the exploitation of cryptologic and other materiel in support of its assigned mission areas as outlined in AR 10-122 and FM 32-10.

*f.* Oversea commands are responsible for collecting and producing S&T intelligence within their capabilities and in accordance with validated DIA requirements, and for exploiting and evacuating materiel to CONUS as appropriate. Reference AR 755-26 and AR 381-9.

### 1-8. Strategic Procedures

*a.* A requirement for technical intelligence may be originated by any agency or consumer within the Army. Frequently, however, a research and development (R&D) activity or major CONUS command may originate this requirement upon military intelligence resources.

*b.* Requirements are prepared using DD Form 1497 for intelligence production requirements (IPR) and forwarded to DIA. Within DA, requirements, as reviewed and approved by ACSI, are forwarded to DIA for validation and tasking. The DIA tasking procedure recognizes the need for direct departmental support in order to enable the production agencies to provide support to DA and intermediate headquarters for quick reaction needs, briefings, and special purpose documents. Direct support tasks in response to such requirements may be levied by the ACSI, DA, on the FSTC, the Missile Intelligence Directorate, or the Medical Intelligence Office. The CG, USAMC may levy direct support requirements on FSTC and the Missile Intelligence Directorate. The Surgeon General may levy direct support requirements on the Medical Intelligence Office. The Army organization for strategic technical intelli-




Figure 1-1. Organization for strategic technical intelligence.

Figure 1-1. Army organization for strategic technical intelligence.

gence is shown in figure 1-1. As requirements are satisfied, the information and/or materiel are forwarded direct, or through major overseas command channels, to CONUS. Unless specific instructions to the contrary are given by a DA agency, all items for CONUS exploitation will be forwarded to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, ATTN: STEAP-FI, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21005, in accordance with provisions of the theater command. After foreign materiel has been received at Aberdeen Proving Ground, the decision as to the site of actual exploitation of medical materiel is determined by the Surgeon General or his designated agent. A detailed exploitation plan will be furnished ACSI by the agency designated to perform the exploitation.

c. The major DA S&T intelligence production effort in CONUS is located at FSTC, Missile Intelligence Directorate, and the Medical Intelligence Office. To consolidate the efforts of

these organizations, DIA has established a system which standardizes S&T intelligence management and production procedures for the overall DOD S&T intelligence production effort, and has assigned certain responsibilities for production within DIA and to the military departments.

d. Final technical intelligence reports are disseminated to various consumers in accordance with previously submitted statements of intelligence interest (SII). A continual feedback of information from oversea producers to DIA and from DIA and CONUS-producing units to the oversea major commands is essential to the effectiveness of the entire technical intelligence program. The distribution of technical information from CONUS-producing units is made by DIA to the oversea command to insure that military intelligence units are kept abreast of important foreign technical and scientific trends and developments.



## CHAPTER 2

### ARMY TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

#### Section I. INTRODUCTION

##### 2-1. General

The United States must strive to maintain a position superior to all enemies and potential enemies in any given area of technology and be alert to the future technological developments of all nations. In order to obtain this position the objectives of technical intelligence are to:

- a. Determine foreign technical materiel threats as they affect strategic and tactical planners and commanders.
- b. Determine foreign technological capabilities and limitations.
- c. Provide information from which military countermeasures are developed.
- d. Provide information which will enable U.S. Forces to use foreign materiel and facilities.
- e. Exploit new developments for U.S. military needs.
- f. Obtain and exploit items in the DIA Registry, Foreign Materiel Requirements Listing (FMRL).
- g. Provide input on a continuous basis to the overall national integrated S&T intelligence program in consonance with theater policies.
- h. Provide the technical intelligence aspects for tactical and strategic studies on characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of foreign facilities, equipment, installations, materiel, and resources.
- i. Determine efficiency of friendly munitions and ordnance.

##### 2-2. Mission of Tactical Technical Intelligence Units

a. The mission of Army tactical technical intelligence units is to provide assistance to tactical commanders through the selective examination, evaluation, and classification of technical

information derived from exploitation of foreign equipment, materiel and facilities, and provide assistance in establishing security measures to prevent foreign examination of U.S. equipment and information.

b. Tactical Technical intelligence units/personnel at all levels perform a twofold mission:

(1) They advise and assist the commander and staff in meeting tactical planning needs in technical areas.

(2) They assist the strategic S&T intelligence effort by supporting theater DA and DOD agencies in the overall integrated technical intelligence collection and analysis effort.

(3) They assist with training of units in collection procedures.

(4) They advise units of current technical intelligence requirements.

c. U.S. Army tactical technical intelligence units are provided primarily to support the field army commander's technical intelligence requirements. These military technical intelligence units provide on the spot field analysis, detailed analysis, and limited operational data from field testing. These units are often in a position to make recommendations for exploitation and/or countermeasures. Detailed analysis and evaluation are performed by the technical intelligence company of the field army and/or higher echelons. Final and detailed technical analysis beyond field army and/or theater resources is performed in the appropriate CONUS producing unit.

d. Technical intelligence elements at all echelons operate as functionally integrated teams to insure maximum coordination, collation, and exploitation of foreign arms, equipment, and materiel.

e. Prompt exploitation at the lower echelons

provides usable tactical intelligence, assists in the production of strategic technical intelligence, facilitates military training, and assists the overall national research and development effort.

f. In unified or specified commands, the factors of distance and processing time from the zone of interior may make it desirable for the commander's intelligence organizations to perform certain functions normally associated with CONUS units. In such cases the unified or specified commander advises the higher echelon concerned of the functions being performed. He also insures that his action does not interrupt the flow of information to the higher echelon. Included among these functions may be:

(1) Publication of technical intelligence bulletins.

(2) Publication of intelligence of a general orientation nature.

(3) Preparation and dissemination of other intelligence studies and documents which would lose utility if delayed by preparation in the zone of interior.

## Section II. FIELD ARMY ORGANIZATION FOR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

### 2-4. Field Army Echelon

a. *General.* The collection of technical information and the production and dissemination of technical intelligence in the field army area of operations require extensive activity coordination, and continuity of effort. The field army G2 is responsible for the direction and staff supervision of the entire technical intelligence effort within the field army. He is assisted by technical intelligence staff personnel organic to the field army headquarters which is augmented by a technical intelligence coordinator and other technical intelligence personnel from the army headquarters support section of the Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army. These personnel normally constitute a technical intelligence division or branch within the field army G2 section. Staff policy, guidance,


### 2-3. Theater Organization for Technical Intelligence

a. The technical intelligence organizational concept for theater army is based upon theater requirements and the assigned technical intelligence mission. Requirements are generated by the technical intelligence needs of the command and its subordinate elements. The technical intelligence mission and guidance for its accomplishment will normally be provided to the theater army commander by the theater commander. Specific tasking as a result of DIA validated production requirements will follow this same channel.

b. The theater army G2 will develop a functional organization for his G2 division which reflects the usual theater army mission of coordination and supervision of operational, administrative, and territorial responsibilities. Normally, the special intelligence branch of the G2 division includes a S&T section which assists the G2 in fulfilling his technical intelligence responsibilities. Upon receipt of collection directives and other technical intelligence requirements, the theater army G2 publishes specific directives which are sent through intelligence and technical channels to collection agencies.

requirements, and directives pertaining to technical intelligence collection and production are formulated by the technical intelligence staff element of the field army G2 section and forwarded through MI channels for execution by the technical intelligence company.

b. *Technical Intelligence Company.* The technical intelligence company operates under the direct control of the Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army (TOE 30-25E). Figure 2-1 shows the organization of this military intelligence battalion. The Technical Intelligence Company (TOE 30-34G) provides for the functionalized execution of the technical intelligence mission, exclusive of collection, within the field army. Figure 2-2 shows the organization of the technical intelligence company. This grouping in one company of various technical



----- ATTACHED TO CORPS - DIVISION - SEPARATE BRIGADE

Figure 2-1. TOE 30-25E, Military intelligence battalion, field army.




Figure 2-2. TOE 30-34, technical intelligence company.

Figure 2-2. TOE 30-34G, technical intelligence company.

skills provides a capability for a coordinated technical intelligence effort; an interchange of skills, knowledge, and experience; and a consolidation of specialized technical skills to insure the varied functional technical intelligence support necessary for the field army. This unit is normally located in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Field Army Support Command (FASCOM). For a detailed discussion of the technical intelligence company see FM 30-9.

### **2-5. Corps Echelon**

The duties and functions of the corps G2 technical intelligence section are similar to those of the technical intelligence division or branch of the G2, field army (para 2-4a). To augment the organic technical intelligence coordinator of the corps G2 section, a technical intelligence

coordinator and other technical intelligence personnel are provided by the attached military intelligence detachment supporting the corps (TOE 30-18). These are staff coordinating personnel and normally are not employed in an operational role.

### **2-6. Augmentation**

Cellular functional technical intelligence teams from TOE 30-600 may provide augmentation to the military intelligence organization supporting field army, corps, and division as required. These augmentation teams are organized based on seven collection areas: quartermaster, signal, chemical, transportation, medical, engineer, and ordnance. AR 310-10 describes the procedures for obtaining authorization for these augmentation teams.



## CHAPTER 3

### TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONALIZATION

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#### Section I. GENERAL

##### 3-1. Overall Concept

The five functional areas of technical intelligence activities are communication-electronic intelligence, weapons and munitions intelligence, general supply and equipment (to include maintenance) intelligence, mobility intelligence, and medical intelligence. The proper organization and employment of the technical intelligence specialists in support of these functional areas is critical to mission accomplishment. When employed as functional teams, technical analysis and evaluation is accomplished more effectively. Personnel must not be given analysis tasks which can be more

efficiently performed by other field army or theater assets. Each functionally organized technical intelligence team must be tailored to perform the required mission. Teams must be flexible in their operations since personnel will be required to perform extensive coordination and liaison internally for mission success. Teams should be "tailored" to perform a specific technical intelligence function with consideration given to the training and capabilities of the technical specialists. The functionalized areas of interest of technical specialists will frequently overlap. When possible, functional teams should be composed of personnel having related functional qualifications.

#### Section II. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE

##### 3-2. Objectives

a. The primary objectives of communications-electronics intelligence are to:

(1) Provide communication-electronics equipment intelligence concerning the capabilities and limitations of foreign communication systems, both civilian and military.

(2) Provide the field army with intelligence on foreign communications equipment and systems.

(3) Provide data for possible application in developing new U.S. electronic equipment and devices.

(4) Provide communications-electronic equipment intelligence for strategic and tactical planning.

(5) Assist in providing tactical and strategic estimates on enemy communication capabilities to include the complete order of battle of enemy units operating in a specified area of operation.

b. In meeting the above objectives, there is a continuous need to examine, analyze, and test communications-electronic equipment and devices and to analyze foreign communications equipment diagrams, and schematics. Recent communication trends and developments necessitate that the scope of communication-electronic equipment intelligence be broadened to include wire, radio, teletypewriter, television, satellites, telemetering devices, electronic instruments, photography, computers, radar, facsimile, and laser communication equipment or devices.

c. Communications-electronics specialists maintain extensive liaison with other intelligence elements, particularly those of the U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA). USASA is tasked with the mission and responsibility of exploiting, on a timely basis, all known or suspected sources possessing possible target exploitation (TAREX) or other information of

USASA interest as outlined in FM 32-10 and AR 10-122.

d. In order to properly evaluate and interpret information concerning foreign communications-electronics research and development, and to keep abreast of civilian and industrial communications projects, a technical library must be established. It should contain communication and electronics information concerning details and performance data on a wide variety of items.

e. Data in the following areas are of primary interest to communications-electronics equipment intelligence production:

- (1) *Radio equipment.*
  - (a) Output Power.
  - (b) Frequency Range.
  - (c) Bandwidth.
  - (d) Modes of Operation.
  - (e) Circuitry design.
  - (f) Antennas design.
  - (g) Antijamming devices.
  - (h) Tube structure.
  - (i) Transistors.
  - (j) Equipment ruggedness.
  - (k) Major modifications.
  - (l) Modules.
  - (m) Power requirements.
- (2) *Telephone equipment.*
  - (a) Types of operation.
  - (b) Power requirements.
  - (c) Working limits.
  - (d) Type signal.
- (3) *Switchboards.*
  - (a) Line capacity.
  - (b) Protection.
  - (c) Power requirements.
  - (d) Cord circuits.
  - (e) Types of operations.
- (4) *Teletype equipment.*
  - (a) Method of transmission and receiving.
  - (b) Type of signal.
  - (c) Speed.
  - (d) Power requirements.
  - (e) Line current.
  - (f) Signaling code.
- (5) *Facsimile.*
  - (a) Maximum size of copy.
  - (b) Type of recording.

- (c) Drum speed.
- (d) Scanning lines.
- (e) Audio carrier frequency.
- (f) Type modulation.
- (g) Bandwidth.
- (h) Power requirements.
- (6) *Carrier equipment.*
  - (a) Channel capacity.
  - (b) Bandwidth.
  - (c) Line side operation.
  - (d) Loop side operation.
  - (e) Transmission media.
  - (f) System range.
  - (g) Operating levels.
  - (h) Signaling frequency.
  - (i) Type modulation.
  - (j) Power requirements.

f. Other general areas of interest to communications-electronics equipment intelligence are—

- (1) Acoustic equipment.
- (2) Missile guidance devices.
- (3) Power equipment.
- (4) Meteorological equipment.
- (5) Electronic countermeasures equipment.
- (6) Guided missile control systems.
- (7) VT fuse information.

### 3-3. Capabilities of Communications-Electronics Specialists

a. Communications-electronics specialists are capable of:

- (1) Exploiting intelligence from foreign communications materiel.
- (2) Assisting in the exploitation of foreign scientific communications-electronics information.
- (3) Evaluating enemy communications-electronics equipment information as received on a day-to-day basis.
- (4) Supervising the collection and evacuation of enemy communications-electronics equipment.
- (5) Coordinating with and providing limited assistance, as may be required, to other intelligence activities such as USASA and strategic intelligence elements.
- (6) Maintaining, evaluating, and inter-

preparing information concerning military and civilian research and development.

(7) Assisting in the exploitation of foreign communications complexes and facilities by U.S. Forces. This may require communications-electronics personnel to accompany combat elements whose missions include the capture of communications bases or targets for prompt analysis and exploitation.

(8) Coordinating with and conducting periodic briefings to division and higher command headquarters informing them of the equipment being employed by the foreign units within their area of operation or adjacent areas and the known capabilities and limitation of all enemy communications and electronics units.

(9) Interrogate all enemy captives or returnees who possess information concerning

enemy or foreign communications and electronics equipment or the manner in which it is employed.

(10) Process all captured documents dealing with communications and electronics equipment to obtain immediate combat technical intelligence as well as detailed technical data.

b. Signal personnel, in addition to their normal technical intelligence capabilities, are capable of:

(1) Providing recommendations on the disposition of fixed and special communications installations and/or equipment.

(2) Providing limited analysis concerning radiac equipment and meters as well as electronic components of chemical and/or biological detection and warning devices and instruments.

### Section III. WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS INTELLIGENCE

#### 3-4. Objectives

The objective of weapons and munitions intelligence is to provide technical intelligence evaluation and analysis of:

a. Free rockets, guided missiles, and associated equipment including guidance and launching equipment.

b. Foreign weapons and combat vehicles to include tanks, towed and self propelled guns, howitzers, and armored personnel carriers.

c. Nuclear and nonnuclear ammunition, to include rocket and warhead sections.

d. Chemical, biological, and radiological weapons and munitions, to include smoke and flame weapons and munitions.

e. Propellants, explosives, and pyrotechnics, to include mines.

f. Demolition techniques, barriers material, mine field layouts.

#### 3-5. Capabilities

Weapons and munitions specialists have the capabilities to:

a. Provide technical guidance to corps technical intelligence collection teams and to evaluate the technical information received from them.

b. Inspect foreign vehicles and weapons to determine modifications and changes.

c. Identify, examine, and submit reports on tactical capabilities of foreign weapons and munitions.

d. Assist in the breakdown and assembly of equipment and in the testing of vehicles, equipment, and accessories.

e. Assist in analysis of parts, assemblies, engines, power trains, and chassis for collation, updating, and incorporation of data in technical manuals and handbooks.

f. Assist in the production of technical intelligence from factory markings.

g. Assist in the identification and evaluation of flamethrowers, smoke generators, and other chemical weapons and munitions.

## Section IV GENERAL SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE

### 3-6. Objectives

a. The primary objectives of general supply and equipment intelligence are to:

(1) Provide general supply and equipment intelligence on enemy supplies and resources. Specific areas of interest are subsistence, individual clothing and equipment, general supplies, petroleum, maintenance, and services such as graves registration, laundry, and bath.

(2) Provide the field army with such supply and equipment intelligence, based on immediate exploitation of materiel and information acquired, as may be significant or contributing to the immediate tactical mission.

(3) Provide materiel and information for exploitation at theater army or CONUS level.

b. Technical intelligence analysis of enemy combat service support, supply and equipment must include consideration of enemy economic factors (e.g., food, agriculture, and industrial production), the enemy labor force, and enemy technological capabilities. In this regard, close coordination between technical intelligence and strategic intelligence elements at field army is imperative. Since analysis of enemy economic factors are parts of civil affairs operations, changes in their fields are missions normally assigned to civil affairs units and staff elements.

c. Examination of captured items must be continuous and must include consideration of the applied sciences which made development of the items possible. Increase, decrease, or change in a nation's supplies gives indication of a change in that country's combat service support capabilities. All analyses must be made with consideration of the social and cultural environment of the country concerned.

### 3-7. Capabilities of Supply, Equipment, and Maintenance Specialists

a. Supply, equipment, and maintenance specialists have the following capabilities:

(1) Determining the design, performance, source, and methods of manufacture, and methods of storing times.

(2) Examining supply and maintenance

organizations, installations, and storage depots.

(3) Determining characteristics, limitations, vulnerabilities, and military potential of military and civilian facilities.

(4) Processing and abstracting information from foreign commodities and equipment acquired in a field army area of responsibility.

(5) Preparing technical intelligence reports and studies concerning such items as petroleum, food, clothing, and equipment.

(6) Assisting in the training of field army personnel in supply and equipment intelligence.

(7) Producing and maintaining information and intelligence concerning foreign materiel and commodities.

(8) Assisting in the analysis of foreign storage, packing, and preparation of food and equipment.

b. Supply and equipment technical intelligence specialists include highly trained chemical personnel for operating the CBR agent sampling and analyzing kit. Chemical personnel evaluate chemical defense equipment, including individual and collective protection equipment, to include protective clothing and decontamination equipment and supplies.

c. In conjunction with other technical intelligence specialists, supply and equipment specialists provide a capability to the field army for supervising battlefield collection of a wide variety of items. For example, through the use of mobile laboratories available at theater level, the analysis, evaluation, and identification of captured foreign petroleum products and facilities for U.S. tactical uses are facilitated.

d. Other areas of technical intelligence to which supply and equipment specialists can contribute are analysis of:

(1) Troop subsistence supplies.

(2) Commodity items.

(3) Food spoilage and contamination.

(4) Packaging and marking.

(5) Data concerning draft animals.

(6) Individual and collective protection equipment, protective clothing, and decontamination.

e. Supply and equipment technical intelli-

gence personnel may assist order of battle sections by identification of enemy uniforms, in-

signia, and decorations, and by maintaining supply and equipment files.

## Section V. MOBILITY INTELLIGENCE

### 3-8. Objectives

The objectives of mobility technical intelligence cover most aspects of engineer and transportation activity at all echelons of the foreign military organizations. Engineer and transportation support has become increasingly more important in all types of military operations. Mobility technical intelligence specialists will usually be involved in both strategic and tactical technical intelligence. (See FM 30-5 for the interrelationship of combat and strategic intelligence.) The field army technical intelligence company will have to meet the needs of the theater and lower levels. Frequently, the same items of mobility intelligence may be needed by various levels within the field army and the theater. Mobility technical intelligence will play an important part in the overall strategic and tactical planning for field army and theater forces.

### 3-9. Capabilities

a. Transportation mobility specialists contribute to the production of technical intelligence concerning foreign air, land, and water transportation equipment of immediate or potential military importance. This intelligence concerns characteristics, conditions, development, organization, materiel, operation, maintenance, construction, performance, capabilities, and limiting factors of foreign transportation equipment and supplies. Mobility technical intelligence is necessary for contingency planning and emergency operations. Transportation specialists will need to produce intelligence on adjacent friendly countries for use by technical and strategic planners and combat service support elements since U.S. Forces may often use another nation's transportation system.

b. Mobility specialists can contribute to the following:

(1) Integration and coordination of the transportation collection effort, to include esti-

mates of capabilities of transportation facilities and systems.

(2) Evaluation, interpretation, processing, and dissemination of transportation information and data to include estimates of capabilities of transportation facilities and systems.

(3) Assistance in the preparation of transportation estimates.

(4) Assistance in the interrogation of civilian and military personnel having transportation intelligence information.

(5) Assistance in strategic transportation planning.

(6) Evaluation of new transportation modes, systems, and related equipment.

(7) Assistance in determining an estimate of foreign capabilities to transport missiles and nuclear weapons.

(8) Evaluation of economic and technical aspects of foreign transportation systems.

(9) Compilation of data on foreign transportation modes, systems, facilities, and equipment.

c. Engineer mobility specialists contribute to limited analyses and evaluation of technical intelligence concerning the following:

(1) Foreign engineer equipment to include its capabilities.

(2) Foreign construction operations, techniques, and resources.

(3) Materiel quality and shortages.

(4) Foreign depots, dumps, and supply points.

(5) Water-crossing equipment and techniques.

(6) Demolition techniques, barrier materials, and mine field layouts.

(7) A bibliography of foreign military and civilian engineer specialists and engineer order of battle.

(8) Studies to evaluate the destructive capability of nuclear weapons.

## Section VI. MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE

### 3-10. Objectives

a. Medical intelligence is that category of intelligence which concerns itself with man as a living organism and those factors which affect his efficiency, capability, and well-being. Although medical intelligence is a functional entity and should not be fragmented, strategic requirements indicate the need for intelligence concerning the relatively broad areas of foreign medical technical developments, performance, and operational capabilities.

b. Medical technical intelligence is not primarily materiel oriented. Examination, evaluation, and classification of medical materiel are only segments of the total medical technical intelligence effort. Medical intelligence must retain integrity so that the end product will include all available information, immediately or potentially significant, which affects the health and welfare of men and animals in actual or potential areas of military operation. Such information is vital in both strategic and tactical planning and may influence military operations.

c. The theater command can provide valuable assistance and guidance for the field army medical technical intelligence effort. The theater surgeon can coordinate the employment of medical units in support of medical intelligence activities and arrange for support of field army medical intelligence activities by theater level units as appropriate. The theater surgeon and his staff can assist the field army G2 in determining potential tactical and strategic implications of fully evaluated medical intelligence produced by field army technical intelligence elements.

d. The field army surgeon can assist in providing requirements for medical information/intelligence to the command G2. The intelligence produced may be coordinated and evaluated by the field army surgeon and staff as necessary.

### 3-11. Capabilities

a. Medical specialists are capable of performing the following specific technical intelligence functions:

(1) Collect, examine, classify, and evaluate raw information concerning non-U.S. health problems, training, and materiel used by foreign medical services.

(2) Provide medical intelligence information to the field army surgeon through G2 for professional evaluation prior to dissemination.

(3) Assist in the interrogation of selected prisoners of war, refugees, defectors, and escapees to obtain medical information.

(4) Assist in the investigation of medical aspects of incidents involving diseases or enemy CBR operations.

(5) Accomplish initial examination and evacuation of captured foreign medical materiel to include escort of live cultures to CONUS.

(6) Assist in the compilation of environmental data pertinent to health aspects of military operations.

(7) Provide technical staff advice on medical intelligence to include the scope of medical subjects to be incorporated into medical unit training programs.

(8) Provide limited analysis of drugs, serums, and antibiotics.

b. Medical information of potential technical intelligence value is primarily obtained by:

(1) Direct observation of patients and medical service operations, both military and civilian.

(2) Discussions with personnel involved directly or indirectly with medical service operations (enemy, allied, or civilian).

(3) Study of military and civilian reports and publications of a medical or technical nature.

(4) Interrogation or interview of prisoners of war, refugees, evacuees, displaced persons, and friendly escapees.

(5) Examination of foreign medical materiel, facilities, and personnel protective devices.

(6) Coordination with Civil Affairs public health teams who obtain information on the public health services and facilities in an area of operation.

(7) Review of foreign individual medical records, statistics, and health reports to assist

in further evaluation of the efficiency of friendly materiel used.

(8) Evaluating foreign capabilities through reviewing and interpreting individual immunization records and contemplated or existing preventive medicine programs. (Prophylactic immunizations, drugs, protective drugs, clothing, and insect repellents.)

c. In addition to the above medical technical intelligence personnel are able to—

(1) Assist in the identification of CBR agents.

(2) Assist in the evaluation of CBR weapons.

(3) Provide information and data on medical aspects of enemy combat operations.

(4) Assist, as required, in the preparation of medical studies and reports of tactical significance.

(5) Collect data regarding foreign military and civilian medical facilities.

(6) Provide advice on communicable diseases.

*d. Special Warfare Capabilities:*

(1) Medical intelligence contributes significantly to the planning, preparation, and execution of activities related to unconventional warfare, stability operations, and psychological operations by:

(a) Providing information on the best approach to foreign and primitive cultures.

(b) Recommending the adoption of techniques to reduce interpersonal stress developing in small isolated detachments working in a foreign culture.

(c) Advising the planning staff on the medical evaluation of ethnic groups in operational areas or potential areas of commitment concerning those factors which affect their efficiency, capability, and well being.

(2) The medical intelligence officer in support of guerrilla forces will work closely with the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF). He will assist the J2 in determining medical intelligence requirements, establishing EEI and ascertaining which agencies can fulfill the special medical intelligence requirements for the support of the guerrilla forces. The Medical Intelligence Officer will provide information concerning the level of medical training suitable to the guerrilla force as well as physical and other medical limitations affecting their performance.

(3) The nature of the enemy and the presence of both friendly and hostile civilians, in stability operations, place additional requirements upon the command for medical intelligence. In addition to determining the receptivity of the local people to western medical practices, medical intelligence can assist in intelligence activities involving close coordination with and participation in civil police type operations such as:

(a) Documentation of civilians (and registration).

(b) Informal interrogations.

(c) Maintenance of extensive dossiers.

(d) Medical civic actions.

(4) The detailed intelligence required for psychological operations often is complementary to the accomplishment of the medical mission. Medical personnel are concerned with the attitudes of friendly forces, the enemy, and the civilian populace as they affect the health, medical practices, morale, and the individual's well being. This large area of mutual interest indicates the need for close coordination and liaison between the psychological operations personnel and medical intelligence personnel.

## Section VII. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

### 3-12. Objectives

The objectives of CBR technical intelligence are—

a. The collection, examination, evaluation, identification, and dissemination of information on equipment, materiel, and documents pertaining to radiological operations and to

chemical and biological operations under conditions of nuclear or nonnuclear warfare.

b. The collection of samples of chemical, biological, and radiological agents employed against friendly forces; the identification of chemical agents and/or transmittal of samples to a supporting general chemical laboratory

for chemical and toxicological analysis; the transmittal of biological samples to a supporting medical laboratory for microbiological analysis; and the collection and forwarding of radiological samples to a supporting general chemical laboratory for determination of radioisotopic composition.

*c.* The collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information pertaining to the enemy's capability of and techniques and procedures for: decontamination, individual and collective protection, CBR agent detection and identification systems, warning of CBR attacks, impregnation and reimpregnation of clothing, field laboratory services, fallout predictions, and radiological monitoring and survey operations.

*d.* The collection and dissemination of information on the enemy's capability for chemical and biological production, their storage installations and stockpiles, and tactical operations under conditions of nuclear and nonnuclear warfare.

*e.* Assistance, within the technical intelligence company capabilities, in developing field countermeasures against chemical and/or biological operations under conditions of nuclear and nonnuclear warfare and against radiological operations.

### 3-13. Capabilities

Chemical personnel in technical intelligence units are capable of providing the following assistance:

*a.* Examining, evaluating and identifying captured CBR materiel.

*b.* Examining, evaluating, and identifying, when possible, equipment related to CBR operations.

*c.* Preparing and forwarding samples of biological agents to medical laboratory facilities for identification.

*d.* Preparing and forwarding samples of chemical and radiological agents to the general chemical laboratory.

*e.* Providing technical assistance to staffs at army and corps levels on CBR matters.

*f.* Maintaining liaison with the theater general chemical laboratory.

*g.* Preparing intelligence reports on CBR matters and estimates of enemy capabilities and intentions for employing CBR agents.

*h.* Analyzing and identifying enemy-delivered chemical agents within the limitations of the CBR agent sampling kit and the CBR agent analyzing kit.

## CHAPTER 4

### TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

#### 4-1. General

Planning of the collection effort involves basically the same procedures and considerations regardless of the type of information desired—combat, strategic, or technical. The collection of technical information is but one facet of the overall collection effort of a command. See appendix B for the major categories of technical intelligence used for planning purposes. Planning, a continuing process, involves initially the establishment of general policies and procedures for the collection and production effort. Subsequently it involves modification and expansion of the plan to support specific combat missions and operations of the command. The key to effective collection of technical information is the tactical commander and his unit; consequently, incorporation of technical intelligence planning into the planning for specific missions or operations of tactical units is essential to the production of effective technical intelligence. Preparation of technical intelligence plans is performed by the intelligence officer or staff at each echelon of command. The technical intelligence unit commander is responsible for internal planning of his unit's operations.

#### 4-2. Initial Planning

Initial planning will be directed more to the establishment of policies and procedures for the collection and production effort than to the specific intelligence requirements of the command. Initial planning must include provisions for—

- a.* Proper training of members of the command in recognition, handling, and reporting of foreign equipment, materiel, and documents.
- b.* Insuring retention in place, if practicable, of new or unusual items of captured enemy equipment and materiel for initial analysis and

exploitation by appropriate technical intelligence personnel.

- c.* Safeguarding captured equipment and materiel against looting, unauthorized destruction, or retention as souvenirs.

- d.* Standardized reporting of captured enemy equipment and materiel and dissemination of reports to higher and other appropriate headquarters.

- e.* Insuring availability of technical intelligence personnel, as required, in conjunction with specific missions or combat operations.

- f.* Supervision and direction of the evacuation of captured or abandoned enemy equipment and materiel from collecting points through or to the field army area.

#### 4-3. Planning Procedures

- a.* It is imperative that technical intelligence management, planning, collection, and production procedures be standardized to minimize duplication of effort and dissipation of resources. Standardization of planning and reporting procedures facilitates production, selection of resources for collection, programming, meeting time schedules, and dissemination of technical intelligence.

- b.* Development of the technical intelligence plan involves the following steps:

- (1) Determination of the technical intelligence requirements based on the mission of the command and the requirements of higher headquarters.

- (2) Determination of priorities to insure efficient utilization of collection resources.

- (3) Balancing of requirements with collection and production capabilities.

- (4) Selection of appropriate collection agencies and issuance of orders and requests for specific information.

- (5) Formation of appropriate functional

teams to insure maximum equipment and materiel exploitation.

(6) Review of vital technical intelligence support areas to determine adequacy of equipment tags, evacuation procedures, provisions for establishment of specific collecting points, and other administrative and logistical items and procedures.

c. The planning effort is continued by the supervision by the intelligence officer or member of his staff over the collection effort to insure compliance with orders, monitor incoming information, and insure that the overall technical intelligence plan is working effectively.

d. Technical intelligence planning must include consideration of technical intelligence production, its responsiveness to needs, and the cost of the overall production effort.

#### 4-4. Technical Intelligence Plan

a. The detailed preparation of the formal technical intelligence plan is accomplished by the technical intelligence coordinator who is attached to the intelligence staff at corps and higher levels. He coordinates the plan with technical intelligence units and with other general and special staff elements. The purpose of the plan is to establish procedures for the following:

- (1) Collection and processing of technical information.
- (2) Handling of foreign equipment and materiel.
- (3) Dissemination of technical intelligence.
- (4) Organization for intelligence task force operations.
- (5) Employment of the functional technical intelligence teams.

b. A recommended format for the technical intelligence plan is contained in appendix C. The plan when issued is an appendix to the intelligence annex of the operations order.

c. Supporting technical intelligence plans will be prepared at subordinate echelons by the appropriate intelligence officers.

#### 4-5. Technical Intelligence Requirements and Priorities

##### a. Technical Intelligence Requirements.

(1) *General.* The command intelligence officer, in coordination with the technical intelligence unit commander, will determine the technical intelligence requirements of the command and the order of priority. Technical intelligence requirements serve to focus the attention of intelligence agencies of the command on the current specific technical information needs; they also serve as the basis for orders and requests issued to implement the collection effort.

(2) *Formulation of Requirements.* Formulation of technical intelligence requirements is accomplished in a manner parallel to that of the formulation of combat intelligence requirements. The following considerations, with occasional modifications, will serve as guides in formulation of technical intelligence requirements:

- (a) Enemy technical capabilities.
- (b) Enemy technical vulnerabilities.
- (c) Weather and terrain information.
- (d) Technical order of battle information.
- (e) The next or forthcoming mission or operation of the command.
- (f) Prevention of technical surprise to the command.
- (g) Technical information needs of higher and adjacent headquarters.

(3) *Technical Information Needs of Higher Headquarters.* Each echelon of command receives the technical information requirements of the next higher echelons, integrates them with those of the command, incorporates them into collection directives, and disseminates the directives to subordinate echelons for guidance in collection planning. Many of these requirements originate at DA and DOD level and are forwarded in the form of collection directives or specific intelligence collection requirements (SICR).

b. *Priorities.* Priorities are utilized to direct the collection resources of a command toward definite objectives in priority of their needs. Requirements from higher headquarters will include specific priorities. Priorities of the local command will be governed by command SOP which will guide the intelligence officer in assigning priorities to the technical intelli-

gence requirements. Recurring technical requirements should be programmed in advance and priorities changed in accordance with the critical dates involved (e.g., to meet recurring deadlines for annual studies in specific technical areas).

*c. Requests for Technical Intelligence.* Requests originating within the field army will be forwarded to the appropriate command through intelligence channels. Such requests must be as specific as possible. If they are based on previous technical and/or combat in-

telligence reports, such reports must be fully identified. Overstatement of requirements must be avoided. Requests for technical intelligence will follow theater policies. As a minimum, they should include the following:

- (1) Requesting organization.
- (2) Specific requirement.
- (3) Scope of requirement.
- (4) Reason for requirement.
- (5) Pertinent data of assistance to technical intelligence personnel.
- (6) Date desired.
- (7) References (if applicable).



## CHAPTER 5

### COLLECTION AND COLLECTION AGENCIES

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#### Section I. INTRODUCTION

##### 5-1. General

*a.* Technical intelligence collection teams are dependent almost entirely on other units (particularly tactical units) for the acquisition of foreign equipment, materiel, and documents. For this reason frequent liaison and coordination with all types of units are essential to stress the importance of technical intelligence requirements, particularly those with high priority. Close coordination with intelligence personnel operating at lower echelons is particularly important since their operations throughout any area enable them to acquire significant technical intelligence information and materiel. Most items of technical intelligence interest will be acquired initially by tactical units in the course of combat operations. Tactical or other units may also acquire items by discovery in an overrun area, seizure (in raids), or requisitioning, purchase, or confiscation (e.g., as by civil affairs units).

*b.* The intelligence officer or staff, in developing the technical intelligence plan, will select those collection agencies which can best fulfill the needs of technical intelligence. The technical intelligence company should make frequent recommendations to the command intelligence officer or staff for inclusion the technical intelligence plan of the company's specific equipment and materiel needs as well as requirements for essential technical documents, manuals, and photographs. When only component elements of a piece of equipment are required, identification must be sufficiently precise to preclude the unnecessary collection of the complete item. Collection agencies must be made aware of the potential value of new or unusual items of opportunity, i.e., an item not included in requirements or wanted lists.

*c.* Many priority technical intelligence collection requirements generated by programs at national and DOD levels will be distributed to collection agencies in the form of the Registry, Foreign Material Requirements Listing (FMRL). Such equipment, when obtained, must be evacuated immediately (see chapter 6). Technical intelligence collection personnel at corps must maintain familiarity with this list, and tactical units and other collectors must receive instructions on the action to be taken should such listed items be acquired.

##### 5-2. Coordination

*a.* Frequent coordination between technical intelligence elements and all types of units within the field army is essential and will facilitate and supplement the technical information collection effort. Necessity for coordination with tactical units has been mentioned. Invaluable assistance may be obtained by technical intelligence personnel through coordination and liaison with such diverse units as air defense, signal, intelligence, Army aviation, and general and special staff elements. The advantages of coordination with units of the field army support command and its subordinate facilities should not be overlooked.

*b.* Accomplishment of the following coordination objectives will contribute immeasurably to the technical intelligence collection effort:

- (1) Prompt securing and reporting of foreign equipment and materiel by capturing units.
- (2) Location and identification of foreign items and technical information obtained by means other than capture.
- (3) Acquisition of background and collat-

eral information pertaining to foreign materiel.

(4) Maintenance of current knowledge (by technical intelligence personnel) on technical trends and developments.

(5) Determination of the potential for collecting new or any previously unacquired items of foreign materiel.

(6) Orientation of combat, combat sup-

port, and combat service support units and personnel on their technical intelligence roles, and determination of their requirements for technical intelligence.

(7) Comparison and exchange of information, as authorized, with allied collection and technical intelligence agencies, as well as with those of other U.S. services and agencies.

## Section II. COLLECTION AGENCIES

### 5-3. Introduction

A collection agency for technical intelligence is a person, unit, organization, or instrumentality which may collect or acquire foreign materiel, equipment, or data. Acquisition may be through routine collection by troops, research, observation, analysis and evaluation, or interrogation. Technical intelligence collection agencies include:

- a. Combat troop units (including Special Forces operational detachments).
- b. Military intelligence units (e.g., interrogation, counterintelligence, imagery interpretation, and special collection elements).
- c. Corps technical intelligence teams.
- d. Psychological operations units.
- e. Strategic intelligence elements.
- f. Long range reconnaissance patrol units.
- g. Civil affairs units.
- h. Engineer topographic and terrain units.
- i. USASA units.
- j. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units.
- k. Military Police units.
- l. Combat service support units.

### 5-4. Combat Troops

Units in contact are usually the first to encounter new or modified foreign materiel and equipment, often with related operating instructions or other accompanying technical documents. The intelligence officer at each level must insure that captured equipment or documents are recovered for technical intelligence exploitation. Vital technical intelligence materiel and equipment, particularly new discoveries, should not be destroyed prior to technical in-

telligence exploitation, circumstances permitting. Enemy equipment, materiel, documents, and logistical complexes must be promptly safeguarded and reported through intelligence channels so that the maximum technical data may be obtained. This is of special importance in the case of documents relating to enemy communications-electronics system, e.g., code books, call signs, frequency tables, signal operating instructions (SOI), standing signal instructions (SSI), cryptographic data and items, and encrypted items. Items, control knobs, and switches of communications equipment should not be moved until they have been photographed or their positions recorded. The foregoing considerations must be included in all operational plans and in briefings at each level of command. They should be emphasized in unit training programs.

### 5-5. Military Intelligence Units

The activities and operations of military intelligence units within the field army result in access to or acquisition of numerous technical documents, data and items of information on foreign equipment and materiel. Military intelligence personnel have frequent contact with military and civilian personnel who are excellent sources of technical information. The functions of interrogation, counterintelligence, and special collection elements result in the acquisition of information of great significance to technical intelligence. These elements are responsive to specific requests for technical information. Imagery interpretation elements are particularly helpful in establishing collection potential and confirming certain aspects of technical intelligence.

### 5-6. Corps Technical Intelligence Collection Teams

Technical intelligence collection teams are trained in the collection of and search for items of technical intelligence interest and related data and information. Targets of their collection and search activities include foreign equipment and materiel, facilities, methods, techniques, and technical activities. Collection teams are available from the field army, Technical Intelligence Company TOE 30-34, and/or the cellular teams available from theater army, TOE 30-600.

### 5-7. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Units

Personnel of PSYOP units in support of theater, field army, corps, and division may lend assistance in special skills, technical knowledge, and use of such equipment as radios, loudspeakers, and printing equipment. The peculiarity of psychological operations indicates that specific requirements which such units may fulfill are best met by direct coordination of technical intelligence personnel with PSYOP units.

### 5-8. Strategic Intelligence Elements

The strategic intelligence elements at theater and field army, in their research and study effort, develop information which is of value to the overall technical intelligence effort. Such elements will be responsive to broad technical intelligence requirements, mainly those involving higher echelons of enemy forces.

### 5-9. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP)

The extended depths into enemy area at which LRRP operate provide an opportunity for them to obtain information on new or previously unacquired materiel, locations, estimates of weapons ranges, and other technical data.

### 5-10. Civil Affairs Units

a. The civil affairs organization consists of staffs, units, and functional teams. Civil affairs units provide command support or area sup-

port to tactical or administrative units and are assigned to support civil affairs operations at specific echelons of command or level of government. The size and capabilities of civil affairs units and cellular functional teams may vary; however, the personnel assigned to them are trained specialists who are technically qualified to provide assistance in various specialized functional areas which are considered to be in the normal range of technical intelligence units. These areas include—

- (1) Food and agriculture.
- (2) Public communications.
- (3) Public health.
- (4) Public transportation.
- (5) Civilian supply.
- (6) Public works and utilities.
- (7) Commerce and industry.

b. Among potential sources of civil affairs units are:

- (1) Civilian technicians among refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons.
- (2) Military personnel with technical backgrounds.
- (3) Civilian technicians and scientists associated with foreign governments or forces.
- (4) Governmental technical documents, specialized libraries, and archives.
- (5) Industrial and scientific records.
- (6) Technical blueprints, plans, manuals, or other information containing technical intelligence in the mobility, communications-electronics, weapons and munitions, chemical, biological, and medical fields.

c. Direct assistance to technical intelligence units may be provided by civil affairs units in the procurement of technical materiel/equipment, identification of foreign technical personnel, and recruitment or hiring of civilian technicians, scientists, professional people, and skilled craftsmen and laborers. Civil affairs personnel may procure—

- (1) Civilian equipment.
- (2) Medical instruments, drugs, and other medical supplies.
- (3) Civilian motor vehicles, construction equipment, and materials.
- (4) Fuels, lubricants, greases, and propellants.

### 5-11. Engineer Topographic and Terrain Units

Engineer topographic and terrain units are designated the responsibility for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of topographic information and terrain intelligence. They normally function at theater, field army, and corps levels, with the division engineer having the responsibility at division level. Their special skills and technical knowledge in the field of topography and terrain intelligence relate closely to many categories of technical intelligence and may be of assistance in collection planning as well as in the analysis and exploitation of foreign materiel and technical documents.

### 5-12. USASA Units

Technical intelligence units must coordinate all efforts in the field of communications-electronics intelligence with the appropriate USASA units. USASA is tasked with the timely exploitation of all known or suspected sources possessing possible target exploitation (TAREX) or other information of USASA interest as outlined in FM 32-10 and AR 10-122. TAREX personnel are thoroughly conversant with USASA technical operations requirements and can brief and lend assistance to technical intelligence personnel in determining proper disposition of materiel of interest to USASA.

### 5-13. Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Units

*a. General.* Technical intelligence personnel should be familiar with EOD activities and responsibilities (AR 75-15, AR 75-14) in view of the importance of foreign explosive ordnance to technical intelligence. The danger of fires, explosions, burns, and accidental functioning of explosive ordnance and the possibility that abandoned items may be boobytrapped dictate the need for assistance of EOD personnel to disarm or evacuate such items. FM 9-6 discusses the recovery and evacuation of ammunition. FM 31-45 discusses EOD operations and responsibilities in support of technical intelligence.

*b. Foreign Ammunition.* Foreign ammunition is of great value to the intelligence effort.

Samples of ammunition are of major value to the research and development efforts of the Army, and may also have immediate tactical significance. Particularly, new or modified items of foreign ammunition are of great significance. Information on foreign ammunition is invaluable to order of battle intelligence; evaluation of probable enemy courses of action, capabilities, and vulnerabilities; and development of countermeasures. Strategic value may derive from markings, materials used, or the mere fact of existence of a certain item. Of tactical concern is the knowledge of employment, effectiveness, and possible countermeasures. Ammunition, duds, components, and fragments may reveal the type and caliber of enemy supporting weapons. Recovered sabotage or booby-trap devices may provide valuable indications of probable enemy courses of action. Manufacturing methods and details of design are valuable to research and development agencies of the Army. Information of the following items is of value:

- (1) New items of enemy explosive ordnance with complete technical data on construction, markings, and functioning.
- (2) Design or changes in design of known explosive ordnance.
- (3) Changes in manufacturing techniques.
- (4) Quality and type of material and explosive content.
- (5) Packing, storage, and maintenance techniques.
- (6) Place and date of manufacture.
- (7) All documents relating to the foregoing, including sources or potential sources of information.

*c. EOD Operations.* Close coordination is essential since technical intelligence personnel must rely on EOD personnel for disposal and evacuation of explosive ordnance, and conversely, EOD units are obligated to notify technical intelligence personnel of the types and locations of new items of foreign materiel and munitions. Recovery and evacuation of explosive ordnance and related items are discussed in chapter 6.

*d. Reports.* All information collected by EOD personnel on first-seen foreign explosive ordnance must be reported immediately through EOD control centers to EOD staff of-

ficers. At staff level such reports will be placed in intelligence channels for distribution to all interested levels of command.

(1) *Preliminary Technical Report (PRE-TECHREP)*. This report is prepared by EOD personnel upon recognition of an item of explosive ordnance as an item of technical intelligence value. It is forwarded by the fastest means available to the EOD control unit for distribution to intelligence personnel and other EOD units. A tentative render safe procedure (RSP) (for EOD use only) will be included whether it is necessary to render the item safe or not. When it is necessary to render the item safe, the EOD team should obtain all essential information for safe procedure. This report alerts technical intelligence teams so that they may be dispatched to the site, and provides other EOD units with information on new items of explosive ordnance.

(2) *Complementary Technical Report (COMTECHREP)*. These reports are prepared by technical intelligence teams or in their absence, and when requested by the G2 or his representative, by EOD personnel. This report will be as complete and detailed as possible. When prepared by EOD personnel, it will be forwarded by the fastest means available through the EOD control unit to the technical intelligence company.

#### 5-14. Military Police Units

*a. Collection.* As collection agencies, military police units and personnel, particularly criminal investigators, are well suited to assist in such functions as:

(1) Collecting and reporting items of foreign materiel on the FMRL.

(2) Locating specific technical items of equipment.

(3) Locating personalities and activities within a specialized technical field.

(4) Reporting items of potential technical intelligence value obtained from prisoners of war and civilian internees.

(5) Reporting items of potential value confiscated or captured in raids.

*b. Materiel Obtained by Military Police.* The different items of foreign materiel subject to confiscation from prisoners of war include arms; ammunition; military equipment (except mess equipment, metal helmets, and protective masks); military documents, such as military codes and ciphers; pictures and maps or sketches of military installations or implements of war; and signal devices. All other property taken from prisoners is grouped in the category of retained or impounded property and must be accounted for or ultimately returned to the prisoner if the capturing forces assume custody.

*c. Marking of PW Materiel.* Procedures for marking foreign materiel of potential technical intelligence value that is taken from PW should include means of positively identifying the materiel with the PW. This is necessary because prisoners and materiel will often be evacuated through separate channels and accurate identification of the PW will facilitate future location. This would also facilitate the identification of certain property which must eventually be returned to the PW by regulations.



## CHAPTER 6

# RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF FOREIGN EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS

(STANAG 2084, SOLOG 94)

### Section I. INTRODUCTION

#### 6-1. Concept

a. Within a theater of operations, captured items are exploited at predesignated collecting points at division, corps, field army, and theater. Technical intelligence collection teams are sent forward of the division collecting points to examine captured items at or near the scene of acquisition and to arrange for evacuation if necessary. Captured items, except Class V, can be evacuated directly from the division collecting point to the technical intelligence company at field army for exploitation. Collecting points for Class V Ordnance should be either the conventional or special ammunition supply points (to include missiles). Detailed information for recovery and evacuation flow of Class V Ordnance is contained in FM 9-6. FM 31-45 provides EOD services information.

b. The immediate headquarters of the unit finding or acquiring items of foreign equipment, materiel, and related documents is responsible to obtain and provide prompt disposition instructions as to whether the items will be evacuated through technical intelligence or logistics channels, and to assist the acquiring unit in safeguarding, recovery, and evacuation of the items, as required. Technical intelligence elements are responsible to provide prompt instructions on the need for and the evacuation of foreign items for technical intelligence purposes. They will perform on-site analysis and are also responsible to exploit, secure, and store all items of foreign materiel while in technical channels.

c. Intelligence officers and staffs at all echelons are responsible to insure that prompt in-

structions concerning the need for and evacuation of foreign materiel for technical intelligence are provided to the acquiring unit. They must coordinate with their logistics counterparts concerning the policies and procedures governing the recovery and evacuation of foreign materiel. They also provide supervision over the evacuation of foreign materiel through intelligence channels.

#### 6-2. Disposal and Transfer

a. Items evacuated through technical intelligence channels will be returned to logistics channels when no longer required for technical intelligence purposes. Before such transfer, however, a technical intelligence element must ascertain that there is no further requirement from higher echelons or other agencies for the item in question.

b. Foreign air and naval materiel, equipment, and related technical documents will be transferred to U.S. Navy or U.S. Air Force technical intelligence or logistics channels at the lowest practical level. Until transfer, such items will remain in Army technical (or logistics) channels, as appropriate.

c. The acquisition of foreign materiel, in itself, will not necessarily vest title in the United States. This is true in the case of items acquired incident to belligerent or peace-keeping operations (e.g., acquired by capture or confiscation) where ownership of foreign property (materiel) is regulated by international law. Where there is doubt, the matter should be referred to the Staff Judge Advocate.

## Section II. RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF MATERIEL

### 6-3. Collecting Points

Collecting points are facilities to which abandoned or unserviceable U.S. and captured foreign materiel is evacuated for classification, segregation, and proper disposition. Collecting points operate where needed throughout the theater of operations. In the field army area, one or more collecting points are provided for each corps area and for the field army service area. These are generally operated by the Collection and Classification Company (TOE 29-139). In the division areas, collecting points are operated by the division maintenance battalion. Evacuation flow through the collecting points is shown in Figure 6-1. Detailed information on recovery and evacuation procedures is contained in FM 29-22 and 29-30.

### 6-4. Equipment and Materiel Recovery

*a.* Responsibilities for recovery and evacuation of foreign equipment and materiel at various levels are similar to those for U.S. materiel. The discovery of items of foreign materiel, however, will be reported by the capturing unit through intelligence channels. Items for which there are no disposition instructions should not be evacuated until coordinated with technical intelligence elements. The capturing unit must submit a spot report (chapter 7) to the intelligence officer of its higher headquarters. The capturing unit may be directed to evacuate the item to the collection and classification company or guard it and leave it in place for on-site preliminary examination by technical intelligence personnel. When materiel does not have to remain in place for intelligence evaluation and the discovering unit is incapable of evacuating it, the unit may request evacuation assistance directly from the command responsible for direct support maintenance. Evacuation may be direct from a maintenance collecting point to the technical intelligence company at field army.

*b.* Foreign materiel may be of value for technical intelligence purposes, or it may be utilized by friendly forces. Foreign materiel should be cleared from the battlefield or destroyed to prevent recapture or reclamation by

the enemy or by guerrilla forces. Technical intelligence elements of the military intelligence battalion and the intelligence officers of all commands are interested in captured or abandoned items of foreign materiel. Procedures must be established for the screening and evacuation of materiel. Implementing instructions are published by subordinate commands in the form of directives and SOP. Items of foreign materiel being evacuated directly to the field army support area are reported through higher headquarters to the technical intelligence company and held until disposition instructions are provided or responsibility is assumed by the technical intelligence company or another activity. Items which are of no use either for technical intelligence or for equipping friendly forces are demilitarized and disposed of as directed by higher headquarters. Only as a last resort, however, is medical materiel to be destroyed. Captured medical materiel may be used to treat PW's and indigenous personnel after such supplies have been declared safe by U.S. medical authority.


*c.* Transportation elements of supported units are responsible for transporting foreign materiel from collecting points with the assistance of maintenance units as required, based on instructions from technical intelligence elements.

### 6-5. On-Site Analysis by Technical Intelligence Collection Teams

*a.* The objective of on-site analysis (after foreign materiel is acquired) is to obtain information of immediate tactical value to combat forces. Information to be obtained includes the following:

- (1) Determination of equipment operational characteristics, performance, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.
- (2) Identification of new significant weapons.
- (3) Analysis for modifications.
- (4) Possible countermeasures.
- (5) Identification and proper handling of radioactive materiel.

*b.* In the event of acquisition of a large number of like terms of equipment or materiel, the



- 1--Capturing Units
- 2--Main Supply & Evacuation Route
- 3--Collecting Points
- ← Normal Evacuation Flow
- ← Alternate Evacuation Flow

(Use depends upon the nature of the item, the availability of transportation, the current situation, etc.)

Figure 6-1. Captured equipment evacuation flow.

technical intelligence collection teams must examine the materiel and obtain all available information relative to lot numbers, date of manufacture, and factory markings that may assist in providing information on the item. A sufficient number of items must be evacuated for detailed evaluation. The remaining items are then processed through normal evacuation and/or salvage supply channels.

#### 6-6. Marking and Tagging

a. The capturing unit is responsible for tagging items of foreign materiel. To facilitate segregation, collection, analysis, and evacuation of materiel for intelligence purposes, weather-resistant equipment tags, produced locally within the theater, are securely attached to the item itself and to the shipping container (Figures 6-2 and 6-3). This responsibility must be clearly established by command SOP.

b. An outgrowth of the capture of foreign equipment is the need for an effective "war trophy" policy. Care must be taken to insure that "items wanted" are not retained as souvenirs nor destroyed unnecessarily by the capturing unit. Provisions should be made with the host country to insure that all firearms are properly registered and conform to existing firearm laws.

c. Equipment tags accompany the materiel to its final destination. Article 103, Uniform Code of Military Justice, is printed on the reverse side of the tag to forestall tampering (Figure 6-3).

d. In addition to the establishment of proper safeguards, all military personnel should receive, in conjunction with intelligence training, instruction in equipment tagging and in the consequences of failure to execute this responsibility. Troops must be indoctrinated not to deface original markings on materiel at the time of its capture.

e. Tagging, marking, crating, and preparation for shipment to CONUS is the major responsibility of the recovery and shipping section of the technical intelligence company in accordance with field army and theater policies. The section must depend upon field army support command elements for the preparation and shipment of bulky items.

#### 6-7. Evacuation Guidance

The general plans, policies, and procedures for evacuation of all foreign equipment and materiel are prescribed by the joint/unified/theater and field army headquarters. These general plans are based upon DA and DOD policies and guidance. Each command echelon within the field army must insure that its plans are in accordance with field army directives and the overall field army technical intelligence plan.

#### 6-8. Recovery and Evacuation of Explosive Ordnance and CBR Munitions

a. The primary interest of technical intelligence units in explosive foreign ordnance has been mentioned. However, the assistance of EOD personnel in the examination, movement, and evacuation of explosive ordnance is mandatory. First-seen foreign ordnance items should be rendered safe by EOD personnel if possible. If this is impossible, the item should be rendered safe in place by destructive methods which will minimize damage to the item. Complete photographic coverage of the item in place, both before and after destructive safing should be obtained. Foreign, explosive-type chemical or biological ammunition, after being rendered safe, is forwarded through technical intelligence channels to the general chemical laboratory for extraction of samples of the agent filling. Extracted chemical agent samples are analyzed by the chemical laboratory, and extracted biological agents samples are forwarded to a medical service laboratory for identification.

b. Unidentifiable items and those required by higher authority should be recovered whenever possible, even at considerable risk. Recovery of components or fragments of such items may be equally important. Recovery is invaluable to technical intelligence and to CONUS-based research elements in the development of disposal methods and tools.

c. The following guidelines apply to the recovery and evacuation of explosive ordnance:

(1) New or unknown types of foreign explosive ordnance recovered by EOD personnel must be turned over to technical intelligence units for disposition. Security classification of

TO BE AFFIXED TO CAPTURED  
ENEMY EQUIPMENT

**DO NOT DISTURB**

NOMENCLATURE: \_\_\_\_\_  
 SERIAL NO: \_\_\_\_\_  
 DATE CAPTURED: \_\_\_\_\_  
 WHERE CAPTURED: \_\_\_\_\_  
 CAPTURING UNIT: \_\_\_\_\_  
 CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 CONDITION: \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTICE**

THIS EQUIPMENT IS BEING  
HELD FOR:

ANALYSIS  
 UTILIZATION  
 SALVAGE  
 DESTRUCTION

BY AUTHORITY OF JOINT/  
 UNIFIED /THEATRE /FIELD  
 ARMY COMMANDER:

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Unit)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Unit)


**DO NOT DISTURB**

(DO NOT DISTURB)  
(In language of area of operations)

PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CAPTURED EQUIPMENT

Figure 6-2. Equipment marking tag.



*Figure 6-3. Reverse side of equipment marking tag—Article 103.*

the items and their components will not be lower than SECRET.

(2) Foreign nuclear weapons or components, to include sabotage devices, are evacuated through technical intelligence channels.

Security classification of such items will not be lower than SECRET RESTRICTED DATA.

(3) Security and technical escorts are required to provide safety control for shipments of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other haz-

ardous items of explosive ordnance. Within the field army, technical intelligence personnel will coordinate with appropriate staffs to establish the need and arrange for technical escorts. For shipments to CONUS, the theater intelligence officer determines the need and arranges for technical escorts.

(4) Collection of technical intelligence data will in many instances entail dismantling of the ordnance and stripping of fuzes and other dangerous components for analysis and evaluation. These operations will be performed only by experienced EOD personnel. Dismantling and stripping are conducted only in response to a specific requirement for such action which has been placed through technical intelligence or EOD staffs.

(5) Captured mines and boobytraps should be analyzed or tested only by trained weapons/munitions specialists. Extreme caution must be exercised when taut wire and pull releases or similar releases are encountered. Unusual mechanisms used as boobytraps should be reported immediately by the finding unit through intelligence channels to the tech-

nical intelligence company by spot report. Countermeasures must be coordinated with EOD personnel. Final disposal of explosive components or hazardous materials associated with such devices and with recovered ammunition is the responsibility of EOD personnel.

### 6-9. Security and Escort

Many items of foreign materiel acquired by U.S. Forces and determined to be of technical intelligence value will require safeguarding in storage as well as during evacuation. Such items may be sensitive due to their criticality or because of a U.S. classification assigned (para 6-8 and 7-13). Initially, the finding unit is responsible for safeguarding materiel, based on instructions from the next higher headquarters, to prevent looting, loss, destruction, or recapture by the enemy. Military Police elements normally provide physical security at storage and during evacuation when foreign materiel is sensitive or of special value. Particular attention must be paid to the peculiarities of nuclear weapons escort and the technical escort requirement for CBR materiel.

## Section III. RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS

### 6-10. General

Doctrine for the handling of captured documents is contained in FM 30-15, Intelligence Interrogation. Technical documents, as they are of concern to technical intelligence, are those documents usually found with materiel which relate to technical design or operation of the materiel. Such technical documents may also be acquired separately from the equipment or materiel they concern (e.g., from prisoners of war, from files in overrun areas, found on the battlefield). It is essential that technical intelligence personnel coordinate closely with interrogation elements to facilitate exchange of information.

### 6-11. Evacuation

a. Technical documents should be evacuated with the materiel to which they concern. If the operational situation prevents evacuation of the materiel, the documents should be identified

with the materiel by means of an attached sheet marked "TECHDOC" listing the precise location, time and circumstances of capture, and a description, as detailed as possible, of the materiel. Adequate and sufficient photographs of the equipment should be produced and evacuated with the document.

b. Documents obtained through liaison with interrogation elements should be accompanied by a report of pertinent information obtained from prisoners of war.

c. The general guidance in this manual concerning recovery and evacuation of materiel pertains also to technical documents. However, the diverse nature of documents acquired and their frequent interest to various agencies and commands dictate the necessity for technical intelligence personnel to be familiar with the categories of documents and appropriate handling procedures stipulated in FM 30-15.



## CHAPTER 7

### PROCESSING, DISSEMINATION, AND USE

(STANAG 2084, 2097; SOLOG 94)

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#### Section I. PROCESSING

##### 7-1. General

a. The wide range of technical proficiency necessary for mission accomplishment will not always be found within the technical intelligence collection elements or the technical intelligence company. Assistance from medical, ordnance, signal, engineer, and other specialized agencies and units will have to be sought. Within the technical intelligence company itself, a coordinated effort of diverse specialists is necessitated by the broad range of the technical equipment/materiel acquired.

b. Processing of technical information involves recording, evaluation, and interpretation of the collected information. In urgent situations technical information can be processed as received without waiting to collect supporting information, particularly if background files and an adequate data base have been established and maintained. For example, information/intelligence containing data on foreign missiles capable of carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads, the early use of which is a probability, is so urgent that no delay between acquisition of the information and dissemination can be permitted.

##### 7-2. Recording

Technical information and data are recorded in journals, workbooks, and technical intelligence files to facilitate evaluation and interpretation. Recording involves reducing information and data to written or graphic form and aids technical analysts in grouping related items of information. It expedites the preparation and dissemination of technical intelligence reports, however, the recording step may be omitted to

permit rapid evaluation, interpretation, and immediate dissemination of urgent tactical information to the unit(s) concerned.

##### 7-3. Evaluation

a. Evaluation includes determining the pertinence of the information, the reliability of the source and the agency from which the information was derived, and the accuracy or credibility of the information. The system of evaluation is described in FM 30-5 and has been standardized for use by NATO forces and other allies.

(1) Evaluation involves systematically arranging all pieces of information and comparing known data with the current state of the art, a continuing process at all appropriate echelons. As technical information flows to the technical intelligence company, it must be associated with all related data including previous technical reports.

(2) Technical evaluation must take into consideration the industrial and scientific base and capabilities of foreign nations. Evaluation estimates based solely on U.S. standards must be avoided inasmuch as foreign equipment and materiel may appear wholly inferior when judged only by U.S. standards.

b. Technical information received from intelligence sources and agencies will consist primarily of reports on the use of new or modified items of foreign materiel, the capture of materiel and documents, and extracts of technical information from intelligence reports. These reports normally will have been given an evaluation by the collecting agency and/or the appropriate intelligence staff. Such evaluations

notwithstanding, technical intelligence personnel are obligated to re-evaluate each item of information based on their technical data base and technical experience.

c. Technical evaluation includes the following considerations:

(1) Does the information concern foreign materiel known or suspected to be in use in the area of operations?

(2) Will the information have an immediate effect on the command mission?

(3) Is the use of new materiel by the enemy indicated, or are increased enemy capabilities indicated?

(4) What is the immediate effect on forces in combat?

(5) Does the information have present or future value; if so, to whom?

#### 7-4. Interpretation

Interpretation consists of analysis, integration, and deduction. It is the mental process of determining the importance of information, integrating this with other technical data, and making a deduction as to the value and significance of the information.

a. *Analysis.* Analysis requires a thorough knowledge of foreign equipment and materiel to include past technological trends, developments, and tactical doctrine on equipment use. It involves more detailed research as the volume of technical data increases. Analysis within the technical intelligence company is centralized in the evaluation and analysis platoon.

b. *Integration.*

(1) Integration is the combining of numerous isolated elements of technical informa-

tion with other technical data to form one or more logical conclusions. Technical intelligence conclusions are made with primary emphasis upon the tactical mission. This phase of interpretation requires judgment, experience, varied background knowledge, and knowledge of scientific methods. Formulated technical hypotheses (conclusions) should be tested for validity and reliability.

(2) The technical intelligence company must integrate the technical information provided by all intelligence collection agencies to construct an objective assessment of foreign capabilities.

c. *Deduction.* Deduction, the last step in interpretation, consists of deriving meaning from the hypotheses that have been developed and tested. Deduction provides answers as to the meaning and significance of technical intelligence and data in relation to the tactical situation and area of operation.

#### 7-5. Processing by Intelligence Staff Sections

The processing discussed above does not replace the normal intelligence processing within the G2 staff elements. Technical intelligence is integrated with all other intelligence by the G2 staff and, as one facet of the intelligence product, enables the G2 staff to arrive at an estimate of the capabilities, limitations, and future courses of action of foreign military forces. It is re-emphasized that, as in all steps of technical intelligence production, close coordination between the technical intelligence company and the organic technical intelligence element of the G2 staff is mandatory.

## Section II. ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

### 7-6. Considerations

a. The producers of technical intelligence must keep in mind that actual and potential foreign capabilities, limitations, and probable courses of action are under continuous development at the field army, theater, and national levels. Based upon the technical intelligence produced, new requirements for U.S. equipment, doctrine and countermeasures may

evolve. Intelligence that will assist in the preparation of new U.S. military equipment, doctrine, and countermeasures must be considered by the technical intelligence producer during the entire technical intelligence production cycle.

b. Factors to be considered by tactical technical intelligence units and staff officers include, but are not limited to, the following:

- (1) Effects of terrain and weather.
- (2) Characteristics, performance, and effectiveness of foreign equipment and materiel.
- (3) Effectiveness of countermeasures against foreign equipment.
- (4) New design features and modifications of old and/or new equipment.
- (5) Overall combat intelligence requirements.

### 7-7. Technical Reference Library

a. Technical intelligence processing, research, analysis, and evaluation cannot be conducted without a current data base. The need for specific data requirements, performance characteristics, equipment descriptions, and operational limitations of materiel, and the extensive need for integration and collation of technical information covering wide technical areas necessitate the establishment of a technical intelligence reference library by the technical intelligence company. As a minimum, the technical library should include—

- (1) Technical Bulletins.
- (2) Foreign Equipment Handbooks (by country).
- (3) Foreign Materiel Catalog (FOM-CAT) TB 381-5 series.
- (4) DIA Scientific and Technical Intelligence Registers.
- (5) Organizational and Logistical Data Handbooks.
- (6) Enemy tactics and operational concept studies.
- (7) Technical equipment documents and studies.
- (8) Order of battle handbooks.
- (9) Foreign Tables of Organization and Equipment.
- (10) Foreign materiel exploitation reports.
- (11) Equipment vulnerability studies.
- (12) Threat studies and assessments.

b. This technical reference library will provide not only accurate and timely technical information and intelligence references, but will serve to aid interested field army units and agencies with limited and specialized technical information and thereby reduce the need for direct technical support. Selection of library references should be based on the needs of

combat, combat support, and combat service support users and field army requirements.

### 7-8. Use of Experts and/or Organizations

a. The technical intelligence company will sometimes require assistance from military and/or civilian personnel or organization to assist in the technical analysis of materials to fulfill a special tactical or strategic mission. This may occur when the expertise needed to solve a highly technical and complex problem which is not available within the technical intelligence company. Therefore, maintaining an up-to-date "Technical Expert File" (of names) will prove invaluable. When utilized, these "experts" should work directly with the technical intelligence company, and must possess the proper security clearance; they should be used as consultants/advisors for a short period of time. The most important criterion governing the use of these individuals is that such service should normally be voluntary.

b. Experts whose training could be of special assistance to technical intelligence units for analysis and production services include—

- (1) Ammunition maintenance technicians.
- (2) Guided missile maintenance personnel.
- (3) Nuclear weapons specialists.
- (4) Ammunition supply specialists.
- (5) Data processing personnel.
- (6) Electronic countermeasures personnel.
- (7) Cryptographic personnel.
- (8) Communications security analysts.
- (9) Optical specialists.
- (10) Explosive ordnance specialists.
- (11) Petroleum product analysts.
- (12) Guided missile propellant and explosive specialists.
- (13) Geographers, geologists, and/or construction specialists.
- (14) Photography experts.
- (15) Communications specialists.
- (16) Weapon systems analysts.
- (17) Chemists, physicists, and biologists.
- (18) Radar specialists.
- (19) Indigenous surgeons and medical specialists.

(20) Transportation operations and movements specialists.

(21) USASA TAREX personnel.

### 7-9. Photography

a. Photographs, diagrams, and charts (valuable sources of permanent information for technical analysis and evaluation) are used by technical intelligence analysts to supplement their finished reports. Photographs of materiel acquired in fast-moving tactical situations can be sent to the rear by technical intelligence collection teams prior to evacuation of the actual equipment. The photograph may be the only item available to the analyst if the equipment becomes lost, damaged, destroyed, or recaptured. Technical intelligence collection teams at corps must be cognizant that one of their first responsibilities should be to photograph, diagram, or sketch in place all items of intel-

ligence value. As many different angles as possible should be portrayed.

b. Photographs must be analyzed, evaluated, and compared. They should be accompanied by appropriate written descriptions to enhance their value to the analyst. Skill and training of the analyst are essential to maximum exploitation of photographs. All photographs should contain a ruler, scale, or other measuring comparison to portray relative size of an object.

c. Long-range reconnaissance patrols, special forces operational detachments, and other intelligence collection elements may photograph special items of technical intelligence interest when operating behind enemy lines. Use of such units for technical intelligence missions must be coordinated at the appropriate echelon, and personnel must be thoroughly briefed on technical intelligence requirements prior to dispatch.

## Section III. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

### 7-10. Reports

Six types of technical intelligence reports are used in technical intelligence collection and production. These are—

a. *Spot Report*. This oral or written report (FM 30-5) is prepared by the acquiring units and/or intermediate command echelons to report rapidly, by electrical or other means, the acquisition of foreign materiel and technical documents. Such reports are forwarded through intelligence channels to the technical intelligence company. Corps may use this report as a basis for dispatch of technical intelligence collection teams if none are in the acquisition area. The basic items of this report should include as a minimum:

- (1) Who is reporting (unit).
- (2) What is being reported.
- (3) Where and when (coordinates).
- (4) How much materiel.
- (5) Condition of materiel.
- (6) Whom to contact.

b. *Preliminary Technical Report (PRETECHREP)*. This report is prepared and transmitted by the quickest possible means through intelligence channels on all captured foreign materiel. It is prepared by corps technical in-

telligence collection teams or the capturing unit. The preliminary report contains a general description of the equipment and places emphasis on alerting tactical units to significant technical information of immediate tactical importance. It is prepared in the format shown below:

- (1) Date found, location (map reference).
- (2) Type of equipment and quantity.
- (3) Origin.
- (4) Brief description with distinguishing marks.
- (5) Technical characteristics with an immediate value.
- (6) Name of the commander of capturing unit.
- (7) Time and origin of the message.
- (8) Tentative render safe procedure (RSP) (for EOD use only).

c. *Complementary Technical Reports (COMTECHREP)*. These reports are prepared by technical intelligence collection teams operating throughout a corps area in support of corps elements and supplements information in the PRETECHREP. The formats of these reports are given in appendix D. When the situation does not permit Air Force technical intel-

ligence teams to arrive at the scene of captures or downed enemy aircraft prior to destruction, recapture, or loss, Army technical intelligence personnel will initially examine and submit COMTECHREP Type A. This report will then constitute the only information which can be provided to Air Force technical intelligence. In the event items of enemy navy materiel are acquired, Type A report format can be modified for reporting such acquisition.

*d. Detailed Technical Report (DETECHREP).* This report is the responsibility of the technical intelligence company at field army. No format can be specified because of the diversity of its content.

*e. Technical Document Report (TECHDOC).* This report is prepared on all captured enemy technical documents such as maintenance handbooks, operation manuals, drawings, and sketches. No format is prescribed.

*f. Special Technical Report.* This report is prepared as required by field army G2 staff elements and higher echelons to provide input to studies and plans. It contains special information on items of significant intelligence interest. No format is prescribed and content is governed by the nature of the technical intelligence desired.

## 7-11. Nomenclature

All technical intelligence report nomenclature should be, to the extent possible, in consonance with overall unified/joint/theater policies and guidance. Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc army weapons has been NATO-standardized (STANAG 2097). Principles of this nomenclature are as follows:

*a.* Nomenclature of the country of origin for Soviet Bloc army weapons, equipment, and vehicles is used whenever it is known. If unknown, a short descriptive title will be devised and used as an interim measure only. Short interim titles will be issued by higher headquarters (theater, joint, or unified command) as soon as possible after sighting details have been received. Description titles, as well as interim titles, should include the country of design and manufacture (when the country of manufacture is different from the country of design) or

the best estimate thereof; should include a question mark after the country name, when appropriate; and should become progressively more specific, e.g.:

(1) E. German (?) Hand Grenade M 1960.

(2) E. German copy of Sov Hand Grenade M 1960.

(3) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand Grenade M 1960.

(4) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand Grenade A.KG-3.

When the manner in which information was obtained warrants protection of a confidential source or method, the originating (reporting) agency will assign an appropriate security classification.

*b.* Nomenclature for any given piece of equipment will include an adequate description to show:

(1) The role of the equipment, e.g., medium tank, howitzer, antitank gun.

(2) Type of chassis, when applicable (assumed to be wheeled unless otherwise stated), e.g., half-tracked, tracked.

*c.* The caliber of all weapons will be referred to in millimeters and will always be placed immediately preceding the description of the weapon. The abbreviation "mm" for millimeters will be used.

*d.* The year when the equipment was first seen or known to exist will be indicated by use of the letter M and the four figures of the year. These figures will become a part of the title, e.g., 100-mm Field Gun M 1964.

*e.* The items to be included in the title of each group of weapons and equipment, as well as examples of these titles are shown in appendix E.

## 7-12. Report Credibility

All technical reports produced by the technical intelligence company should bear the following statement on the cover to give official credence to the report:

This is a United States Army Technical Intelligence Report. The data contained herein was derived through limited testing, analysis, and examination utilizing U.S. Army Laboratory and test facilities.

### 7-13. Security Considerations

*a. Classification.* Technical reports from the technical intelligence company are classified in accordance with appropriate Army regulations in the 380-series. When equipment is acquired through a friendly foreign government, the specific security classification assigned by that government must be adhered to and given equivalent protection by being assigned to Group 1 in accordance with AR 380-6.

*b. Security Policies.*

(1) At times, technical intelligence involves sensitive security equipment/materiel and will require stringent security controls by the technical intelligence unit. A unit technical intelligence SOP on security is mandatory in order to provide a security framework adequate to support operational requirements. The technical intelligence SOP must be precise, yet flexible. The following guidelines are provided:

(a) Requirements for sensitive technical intelligence materiel in support of assigned missions must be carefully planned and should be revised periodically.

(b) Information and materiel should be disseminated on a need-to-know basis in accordance with specific security regulations.

(c) Care must be taken not to overclassify.

(2) Indigenous personnel may be utilized in some situations. Because of the sensitive nature of many areas of technical intelligence, information should be released to such personnel only after:

(a) It has been determined that release of the information is in the best interests of the United States.

(b) The security requirements imposed by security regulations and procedures have been complied with concerning release of sensitive information.

(c) Care has been taken to furnish only that information for which an explicit need-to-know has definitely been established.

(3) Special provisions must be prescribed by technical intelligence units for handling all captured communications and electronic equipment and documents. This equipment and related documents must be classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher and designated "crypto," and tagged and evacuated to the nearest USASA element as soon as practicable. Examples are as follows:

(a) Speech security devices.

(b) Teletypewriter security devices.

(c) Data security devices.

(d) Off-line encryption devices.

(e) Document, manuals, circuitry diagrams, and all ancillary equipment.

(4) The following items must be classified SECRET or higher and evacuated to the nearest USASA element:

(a) Key lists.

(b) Code books and sheets.

(c) Encrypted messages.

(d) Signal operating instructions.

(e) Map coordinate overlays.

## Section IV. DISSEMINATION AND USE

### 7-14. Dissemination

*a. Methods.* Timely dissemination of technical intelligence reports is of maximum importance to tactical, combat support, and combat service support commanders. The methods used to disseminate technical intelligence depend upon the detail and urgency of the intelligence and upon the intended users. Primary consideration must be given to the needs of the tactical users. The spot report, PRETECHREP, and COMTECHREP are used nor-

mally for initial reports of acquisition of materiel and supplementary information. The most common means of disseminating processed technical intelligence are:

(1) Detailed technical reports.

(2) Technical intelligence bulletins.

(3) Technical reviews and summaries.

(4) Special technical reports.

(5) Special technical studies and estimates.

(6) Handbooks.

- (7) Technical pamphlets.
- (8) Briefings.
- (9) Liaison visits.

*b. Dissemination of Explosive Ordnance Information.* Technical intelligence on explosive ordnance may be disseminated from any level where it originates. Pertinent extracts should be provided to EOD personnel at all levels to permit development of new EOD tools and render-safe procedures, as required. EOD control units will insure that pertinent information contained in PRETECHREPS and COMTECHREPS is disseminated to each EOD unit under its control and to other EOD control units if appropriate. The Foreign Science and Technology Center, U.S. Army Materiel Command, makes available foreign ammunition items, reports, and evaluations required for study and use in developing EOD tools and render-safe procedures. Secrecy of EOD tools and render-safe procedures is important to prevent the enemy from learning the development of effective disarming procedures.

#### **7-15. Use of Technical Intelligence**

*a.* The user units and agencies are even more diverse than the technical fields concerned. It is beyond the scope of this manual to specify even the general requirements of various units and agencies. The requirements for higher echelons, intelligence staff sections, and commanders have been discussed. All units and agencies must familiarize themselves with the

capabilities and limitations of technical intelligence, and must insure incorporation of their technical intelligence needs into the technical intelligence collection and production plans. The advantages of coordination and liaison to insure receipt of pertinent technical intelligence reports and information cannot be over-emphasized. Technical intelligence personnel of units and intelligence staffs must develop familiarization with the technical needs of the many different units. It must also be recognized that it is a rare technical item that is of interest to only one unit or agency.

*b.* Examples of specific technical intelligence interests are as follows:

(1) Military Police units have a continuing interest in foreign physical security devices and intrusion detection alarms, traffic control devices, police and investigation equipment, police record systems, riot control munitions, industrial defense equipment, and boobytraps. It is obvious that some or all of these items will also be of interest to tactical troops, counter-intelligence elements, civil affairs units, EOD, and others.

(2) Psychological operations units are interested in items of technical intelligence, not for their technical intelligence value, but for their possible use in psychological operations (e.g., defective weapons and ammunition, and documents which would tend to discredit the enemy).



## CHAPTER 8

### STABILITY OPERATIONS

#### Section I. INTRODUCTION

##### 8-1. General

*a.* The scope of insurgent warfare may encompass elite and professionally trained military forces as well as local guerrillas or part-time fighters and noncombatants. There will be substantial differences in armament, organization, training, equipment, and overall effectiveness. Technical intelligence collectors and analysts must take cognizance of these differences in their analyses. Familiarity with insurgent tactics, doctrine, and organization will greatly enhance the technical analysis and evaluation capabilities of the technical intelligence unit.

*b.* Technical intelligence personnel must be thoroughly familiar with the characteristics, capabilities, and performance of the small arms and weapons originating in many friendly and unfriendly nations. The insurgent usually has a limited capability to perform modifications to weapons and materiel. If these modifications are not carefully analyzed and evaluated, their significance and the conclusions drawn can be misleading. Technical intelligence derived during stability operations often has serious national and political consequences; it must, therefore, be accurate.

##### 8-2. Special Considerations

*a.* Technical intelligence emphasis, goals, and priorities in stability operations will differ slightly from those in limited and general conflict. The basic principles of technical intelligence remain unchanged. However, some procedures may vary and additional considerations will be necessary in applying these principles. Military units, for example, may be dispersed for independent/decentralized operations. Movement of technical intelligence personnel must be by the fastest means available. Evacuation of foreign equipment and materiel

must be performed by the most secure means available, usually by air, to prevent recapture or loss. The insurgent's equipment and materiel normally is less sophisticated in the early phases of internal conflict than that of a conventional enemy; their weaponry consists primarily of small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars obtained from friendly, neutral, and hostile nations. Such equipment is often augmented by primitive, but nevertheless effective, weapons such as crossbows, man-traps, and sharpened stakes.

*b.* Arms caching and weapons smuggling are frequently resorted to by the insurgent. Arms caches may be of political and tactical significance. Arms caches and logistical stores should be carefully analyzed and evaluated for technical intelligence, usually in a combined effort with the host country. The discovery of arms caches, when carefully exploited by functionally integrated technical teams, may lead to valuable intelligence about the overall insurgent tactical situation. Normally all captured equipment and materiel becomes the property of the host country, and for this reason combined operations, liaison, and coordination are important to insure full exploitation. The disposition of foreign materiel may be governed by status-of-forces or other agreements, thus complicating the collection and analysis problems. As in a conventional situation, close coordination of technical intelligence personnel with military units and all U.S. government departments and agencies engaged in collection is important. Combined (U.S.—host country) technical intelligence operations are particularly effective in improving the overall collection capability due to the language ability and area knowledge of the host country military personnel.

## Section II. RESPONSIBILITIES

### 8-3. Technical Intelligence Emphasis

a. In stability operations, technical intelligence personnel perform the normal duties described for conventional operations, but particular emphasis must be placed on the following:

(1) Training host country combat personnel, as necessary, in technical intelligence collection and evacuation procedures.

(2) Coordinating technical intelligence matters with other services having a technical intelligence interest and with the host country.

(3) Assisting in the organization and development of a host country technical intelligence capability, if required.

(4) Performing increased on-site technical intelligence analysis and evaluation of enemy equipment and materiel.

(5) Providing technical advice and assistance to host country military technical intelligence personnel, as required.

(6) Assisting in adapting ideas and techniques of insurgents for use by U.S. Forces.

b. Equally important for the technical intelligence analyst and the intelligence community is the ever-present danger of capture of friendly weapons and equipment. An examination of the serial numbers of recaptured weapons will reveal which friendly unit lost the item, when, and possibly to whom. The movement of the enemy unit may possibly be traced. Coordination throughout the intelligence community will assist in determining whether the item was held by the capturing enemy unit because of obvious and known needs for the materiel or whether the item might have been transferred to another enemy unit with greater need for the specific item.

### 8-4. Role of the Unit Intelligence Advisor

a. The intelligence advisor plays a basic role in technical intelligence collection by coordinating host country requests for technical intelligence support, providing technical intelligence advice, and informing U.S. intelligence staffs when significant discoveries of insurgent equipment, materiel, or arms caches are made by the unit to which he is attached. Technical intelligence collection/analyst personnel must keep the unit intelligence adviser informed of important guerrilla weaponry developments in addition to helping him maintain a technical intelligence items wanted list.

b. Since the unit intelligence advisor is responsible for advising and training host country forces in all aspects of intelligence, to include technical intelligence, a mutual flow of technical information between the advisor and advisee is highly advantageous. Mutually defined goals and objectives between advisor and advisee are essential.

### 8-5. Combat Service Support Role

If and when the insurgency movement progresses, technical intelligence becomes more conventional in its support of tactical operations. Technical intelligence also assumes its normal role in combat service support. The establishment of a combined U.S. and host country technical intelligence center may become advisable. In this event, the channeling of technical intelligence reports and dissemination of processed technical intelligence should be precisely established by SOP.

## Section III. PROCEDURES

### 8-6. General

a. Prior to initial commitment of U.S. combat forces, the early detection and identification of equipment and materiel used by hostile forces assume paramount importance. Identification of outside logistical sources of supply is imperative and assists in the determination of

diplomatic action, overall strategy, force structure, and military equipment which should be deployed for successful mission accomplishment.

b. The capabilities and knowledge of U.S. Military Attaches, Military Assistance Advisory Groups, or Military Missions present in a

foreign country experiencing insurgency can supplement the technical intelligence data base and facilitate initiation of the U.S. military technical intelligence collection and analysis effort.

### 8-7. Analysis

*a.* Technical intelligence collection and analysis becomes more complicated in stability operations inasmuch as the combined political or military objective often is more than merely seizing and holding terrain. Information on the technical characteristics of insurgent weapons must be continuously updated and expanded as the weapons or modifications appear. When a blockade is used to stop the flow of arms and ammunition to the insurgent, technical intelligence analysts must be particularly thorough in collection, analysis, and evaluation. For example, supply shortages and small changes in the chemical composition of propellants and demolitions might be indicators of the potential effectiveness of the blockade.

*b.* It is imperative for political/military purposes that technical intelligence personnel keep abreast of outside military assistance furnished the insurgent such as modern air defense missiles, guns, propellants, communications-electronics equipment, and petroleum products. For example, analysis of new missile propellants may give vital indications of enemy tactical capabilities.

### 8-8. Investigative Data

*a.* The technical intelligence collection teams have a responsibility to conduct weapon and ammunition cache investigations and make reports thereon. Numerous caches, depots, salvage points, and small factories may be discovered over a period of time and should be exploited to the extent possible. The weapons and ammunition discovered may be a mixture from numerous nations, and statistical data must be maintained on all weapons, ammunition, and supplies captured or found by U.S. and friendly forces.

*b.* One of the most important problems facing technical intelligence specialists will be planning for the exploitation of arms caches. Priorities must be established with primary consideration given to tactical needs. If the

number of caches discovered is so great as to cause the involvement of all technical intelligence specialists, exploitation of caches will have to be on a selective basis. The entire analysis effort can be materially assisted by proper troop orientation on all aspects of technical intelligence, close coordination with major tactical headquarters, and placement of emphasis on the items wanted list.

*c.* Tunnels and excavations are frequently used by the insurgents to provide protection for personnel and supplies and may contain a wide variety of potential intelligence information that should be collected. The following checklist should be used by tactical units in submitting tunnel information reports:

- (1) Location (coordinates).
- (2) Evaluation of construction.
- (3) Specialized underground areas (classroom, training).
- (4) Installation of communications facilities.
  - (a) Internal to internal.
  - (b) Internal to external.
  - (c) Use of special antennas.
- (5) Power available.
- (6) Alternate/emergency power system.
- (7) Storage facilities (effect of weather on)
  - (8) Assessment of construction quality of internal operational facilities (shops, tool-making, repairs).
  - (9) General assessment of health facilities.
    - (a) Waste disposal.
    - (b) Water facilities.
    - (c) Contamination.
    - (d) Care of sick and wounded.
    - (e) Assessment of medical standards.
  - (10) Assessment of training facilities (if applicable).
  - (11) Measures taken against severe weather.
  - (12) Assessment of political propaganda indoctrination (documents, newspapers, magazines, printing presses).
  - (13) Evaluation of use of environmental resources.
  - (14) Evaluation of local/commercial resources (lumber, cotton).

- (15) Special items of interest.
- (16) Recreation facilities.
- (17) Assessment of defensive areas.
- (18) Internal security or warning devices.
- (19) Assessment of intelligence or intelligence-related activities.
- (20) New field expedients (of major and constant interest).
- (21) Neutralization action (i.e. destroyed, partially destroyed, CS gas).

*d.* Information on the use of primitive weapons, such as poisonous spikes, crossbows, and deadfalls, must be widely disseminated together with appropriate countermeasures.

### 8-9. Logistical System

Although the logistical system of the insurgent may be rudimentary and primitive, the technical intelligence analysts may be required to deal with a variety of commodity items for intelligence purposes (e.g., salt rations, agricultural products, primitive drugs, and serums). The capability of the insurgent's logistical system to support sustained military operations may be determined in part through technical analysis of commodity items.

### 8-10. Combined Operations

*a.* A major problem of technical intelligence is the acquisition of the necessary language skills and experience to perform technical analysis and evaluation of technical equipment in a foreign country. Therefore, combined operations with the host country forces are usually imperative. Host country military personnel who possess some limited technical training are used to assist in overcoming language and area problems.

*b.* Indigenous technical intelligence personnel who are thoroughly familiar with the culture and environment of the insurgent are an asset to the analysis, evaluation, and collation of certain types of technical data and information. For example, the habits of guerrillas living in underground tunnels may be useful in evaluating and updating important technical data. Classrooms, billets, hospitals, and stored materiel may be indicators to valuable intelligence.

*c.* Civil affairs units may assist in the acquisition

of necessary linguistic and technically qualified civilian personnel. In stability operations, civilians having technical knowledge may come under civil affairs control, especially upon liberation of an area from insurgent control. Their evacuation for interrogation purposes may not be desirable because of the attitude of the civil population at the time. However, the civil population may be screened by U.S. or host country civil affairs units or police elements. When civilians having technical skills are identified as possible contributors to technical intelligence, they should be referred to technical intelligence elements.

### 8-11. Strike Operations

*a.* An important characteristic of stability operations is the extensive use of strike operations. These offensive operations include reconnaissance in force, raids, coordinated attacks, and search and destroy and search and clear operations. Strike operations are terminated by withdrawal from the operational area upon mission accomplishment; the holding of terrain is not emphasized.

*b.* Technical intelligence collection teams coordinating with tactical units must emphasize to such units that the destruction of potentially valuable technical equipment/materiel and facilities should, when possible, be avoided during strike operations. Technical intelligence personnel must continually brief tactical elements on current items wanted lists and other items of significant intelligence interest. Proper planning, implementation, and dissemination of the operations order can minimize the loss of potential intelligence in all aspects of stability operations.

### 8-12. Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols

*a.* The long-range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) company has a limited capability to acquire and exfiltrate small portable items of enemy equipment or materiel. Technical intelligence requirements, however, should not interfere with primary patrol missions.

*b.* LRRP companies of the corps or their equivalent command structure will have an extensive use for technical intelligence. Special technical reports and data should be furnished

for special missions. The nature of the LRRP mission may necessitate observation, identification, and reporting of enemy equipment and materiel over a period of 3 to 5 days. Such missions require as background the most current technical information and data. Prior to dispatch of the LRRP on certain special missions, technical intelligence personnel may be requested to provide a general technical briefing on foreign equipment and materiel that will facilitate accurate identification of enemy equipment and materiel which may be observed or used by the enemy to detect such patrols.

### 8-13. Psychological Operations

a. Psychological operations are widely used in an insurgency environment. The discovery of insurgent propaganda equipment requires analysis by a functional team consisting of supply, chemical, and equipment personnel to analyze the printing presses, chemicals, inks, and paper being used. Such analysis is necessary to assess guerrilla methods and determine sources of supply. Communications-electronics specialists can assist psychological operations personnel in the analysis of loudspeakers and radio broadcasting equipment.

b. The technical intelligence aspects of operable foreign radio and television stations and printing facilities are important in furthering the field army psychological operations capability. Such installations and facilities should be turned over to civil affairs, psychological operations units, and communications-electronic specialists for maximum exploitation.

c. Radio broadcasting and printing facilities can be used to further enhance the overall technical intelligence effort. Specific items of

equipment desired can be advertised with an offer of monetary reward to potential defectees.

### 8-14. Boobytraps and Mines

a. Explosive mines and boobytraps are used widely by the insurgent for harassment of military operations. It is essential that technical intelligence specialists keep abreast of these munitions developments. The employment of explosive ordnance materiel must be analyzed on a continuous basis. For example, duds can easily be modified and used as boobytraps.

b. The weapons and munitions specialists, in coordination with EOD personnel, can provide the following principal information when such weapons and tactics are used:

- (1) Fragmentation radii.
- (2) Modifications to boobytraps and mines.
- (3) Construction of locally manufactured mines.
- (4) Principal fuzing systems (pressure, pull, chemical).
- (5) Types of munitions (bomb, grenade, artillery, mortar).
- (6) Fuze ingredients and structures.
- (7) Modifications to fuzes.
- (8) The use of "commercial devices" or materiel.
- (9) Foreign manufactured items used in mines and boobytraps.
- (10) Use of triggering devices (battery or blasting machines).
- (11) Use of chemical devices.
- (12) Use of large bombs.

c. Dissemination of technical intelligence concerning boobytraps and mines should include countermeasures training data.



## APPENDIX A

### REFERENCES

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#### A-1. ARMY REGULATIONS

(C) 10-122	U.S. Army Security Agency (U).
75-14	Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
75-15	Responsibilities and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
190-60	Physical Security Standards for Nuclear Weapons.
310-31	Organization and Equipment Authorization Tables of Organization and Equipment.
320-50	Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.
380-series	Military Security.
381-9	Army Scientific and Technical Intelligence.
755-26	Captured Enemy Equipment and Other Foreign Materiel.

#### A-2. ARMY SUBJECT SCHEDULES

30-46	Technical Intelligence Personnel.
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#### A-3. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLETS

310-3	Military Publications Index of Doctrinal Training, and Organizational Publications.
310-4	Index of Technical Manuals, Technical Bulletins, Supply Manuals, Supply Bulletins, and Lubrication Orders.

#### A-4. FIELD MANUALS

3-1 (Test)	Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Combat Service Support, TASTA-70.
5-25	Explosives and Demolitions.
5-30	Engineer Intelligence.
5-31	Boobytraps.
8-10	Medical, Service Theater of Operations.
9-6	Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations.
9-15	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit Operations.
19-1	Military Police Support, Army Divisions and Separate Brigades.
19-4	Military Police Support, Theater of Operations (when published).
19-40	Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.
29-22	Maintenance Battalion and Company Operations (Nondivisional).
29-30	Maintenance Battalion and Company Operations in Divisions and Separate Brigades.
30-5	Combat Intelligence.
30-9	Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army.
30-10	Terrain Intelligence.
30-15	Intelligence Interrogation.
31-23	Stability Operations—U.S. Army Doctrine.

31-45	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service.
(C) 32-5	Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U).
(S) 32-10	USASA in Support of a Field Army (U).
33-1	Psychological Operations—U.S. Army Doctrine.
33-5	Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures.
41-10	Civil Affairs Operations.
55-8	Transportation Intelligence.
100-5	Operations of Army Forces in the Field.
100-10	Combat Service Support.
(C) 100-20	Field Service Regulations—Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) (U).
101-5	Staff Officers' Field Manual; Staff Organization and Procedures.

**A-5. TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT**

TOE 30-18	Military Intelligence Detachment, Corps.
TOE 30-25	Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army.
TOE 30-34	Military Intelligence Company, Technical Intelligence.
TOE 30-600	Military Intelligence Organization.

## APPENDIX B

## MAJOR CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

Major categories of technical intelligence interest used for planning purposes include:

1. Science and Technology
  - a. Medical sciences.
  - b. Physical sciences.
  - c. Chemical sciences.
  - d. Research and development.
  - e. Materials.
  - f. Military equipment production.
  - g. Missiles and rockets.
2. Nuclear
  - a. Nuclear materials.
  - b. Weapons and munitions.
  - c. Nuclear reactors.
  - d. Nuclear power systems.
  - e. Nuclear propulsion.
3. Communications and Electronics
  - a. Radio.
  - b. Telephone equipment.
  - c. Carrier equipment.
  - d. Facsimile equipment.
  - e. Radar.
  - f. Computers.
  - g. Reconnaissance and surveillance equipment.
  - h. Electronic countermeasures.
  - i. Laser.
  - j. Telemetry.
  - k. Other.
4. Chemical and Biological (CB)
  - a. CB agents.
  - b. Weapons and munitions.
  - c. CB defensive equipment.
    - (1) Individual and collective protection equipment.
    - (2) Detection and identification devices.
    - (3) Alarms and warning devices.
    - (4) Decontamination equipment.
    - (5) Equipment for prophylaxis and therapy.
5. Ground Combat Systems
  - a. Combat vehicles (wheeled and track).
  - b. Support/logistical vehicles.
  - c. Artillery.
  - d. Air defense equipment.
  - e. Infantry weapons.
  - f. Ammunition, munitions, fuzes.
  - g. Antitank equipment.
  - h. Individual equipment and/or supplies.
  - i. Special warfare weapons.
  - j. Maintenance equipment.
  - k. Amphibious equipment.
  - l. Camouflage equipment.
  - m. Fire support equipment.
  - n. Airborne equipment.
  - o. Target acquisition equipment.
  - p. Construction equipment.
  - q. Mine warfare equipment.
  - r. Bridging.
  - s. Psychological warfare equipment.
6. Aerodynamic Systems.
  - a. Bombers.
  - b. Fighters.
  - c. Drones.
  - d. Helicopters.
  - e. Reconnaissance aircraft.
  - f. Other.
7. Missiles.
  - a. Aircraft-launched missiles.
  - b. Ground-to-ground missiles.
    - (1) Short-range missiles.
    - (2) Intermediate range missiles.
    - (3) Long-range missiles.
  - c. Air defense missiles.
  - d. Anti-tank missiles.
  - e. Anti-missile missiles.
  - f. Space systems.
  - g. Submarine/ship-launched missiles.
8. Sensor Equipment
  - a. Optical.

- b. Acoustic.
  - c. Radar.
  - d. Photographic.
  - e. Electronics, to include telemetry.
  - f. Infrared.
  - g. Other.
9. Information Storage and Retrieval.
- a. Electronic data processing equipment.
  - b. Document processing equipment.
  - c. Manual equipment.
  - d. Machine translation equipment.
- e. Real-time ADP equipment.
  - f. Telemetry support equipment.
  - g. Graphic display equipment.
10. Logistics
- a. Transportation nets, air, rail, water, motor, pipeline.
  - b. Transport and terminal operations equipment.
  - c. Terminal facilities, to include beaches.
  - d. Cargo container systems.

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**APPENDIX C**

**EXAMPLE OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLAN**

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Appendix \_\_\_\_\_ to Annex \_\_\_\_\_ (Intelligence) to Operation Order.

1. General
  - a. References.
  - b. Purpose and scope.
  - c. Period covered.
  - d. Subordinate elements required to support similar plans.
  - e. Priorities.
2. Organization
  - a. Intelligence Agencies (at each echelon).
    - (1) Organization.
    - (2) Functions.
    - (3) Subordinate agencies functions.
    - (4) Supporting agencies.
    - (5) Liaison and coordination.
  - b. A subparagraph for each functional area of technical intelligence as it relates to paragraph 2c.
    - (1) Weapons-munitions.
    - (2) Communication-electronics.
    - (3) Supply and equipment.
    - (4) Chemical.
    - (5) Mobility.
    - (6) Medical.
  - c. Each technical intelligence team should know the following:
    - (1) Mission.
    - (2) General organization.
    - (3) Functional team structure.
    - (4) Allotment of technical intelligence personnel.
    - (5) Specific functions and responsibilities.
    - (6) Location of collecting points at each echelon.
    - (7) Availability of chemical and medical laboratories in the theater.
3. Personnel
  - a. Military policies concerning:
    - (1) Responsibilities of capturing unit.
    - (2) Handling captured enemy materiel.

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- (3) Handling abandoned equipment.
  - (4) Handling technical facilities and installations.
  - (5) Authority for destruction of captured materiel when necessary.
  - (6) Taking custody of enemy materiel from capturing units.
  - (7) Technical intelligence collection team operations in forward area.
  - (8) Preliminary examinations and analysis.
  - (9) Reports to be rendered.
    - (a) To tactical units.
    - (b) To technical intelligence company.
  - (10) Coordination and liaison with combat intelligence personnel.
  - (11) Equipment evacuation.
  - (12) Markings and tags.
- b. Civilian
- (1) Policies concerning civilians in an area of military operations having a technical knowledge.
  - (2) Limitations on activities of individuals and groups.
  - (3) Policies concerning evacuation of civilian personnel.
  - (4) Interrogation of civilians having a technical knowledge.
4. Direction
- a. Important policies governing overall technical intelligence collection and analysis (trophies, souvenirs, theater policies).
  - b. Amplification of items wanted lists.
  - c. Special technical intelligence targets.
  - d. Policies governing publishing requirements.
  - e. Support to be provided by the field army and its subordinate support elements (i.e. FASCOM, general and direct support elements).
  - f. Additional support requirements necessary and by whom rendered.
  - g. Preparing EEI and other intelligence requirements.
  - h. Host country agreement (if applicable).
5. Collections
- a. Documents
    - (1) Procedures for collecting technical documents.
    - (2) Forwarding and handling of technical documents.
    - (3) Responsibilities for translation of technical documents.
    - (4) Responsibilities for analysis, evaluation, and dissemination of technical data.
    - (5) Handling of timely technical data.
    - (6) Channels for forwarding.
  - b. Prisoners
    - (1) Procedures for selecting personnel with technical knowledge.
    - (2) Responsibilities of interrogator personnel.
    - (3) Technical intelligence cooperation with interrogators and other combat intelligence personnel.
    - (4) Handling of military personnel with technical knowledge.
    - (5) Handling of civilian personnel with technical knowledge.

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- (6) Channels for evacuation.
- (7) Ultimate disposition (civilians, defectees).
- (8) Reports to be rendered.
- c. Materiel
  - (1) Specific unit responsibilities.
  - (2) Examination policies.
  - (3) Evacuation channels.
    - (a) Primary.
    - (b) Alternate.
  - (4) Destruction policies (authority to determine whether a target should be destroyed).
  - (5) Policies in regard to significant new equipment.
  - (6) Sensitive or classified equipment.
  - (7) Safeguarding.
  - (8) Marking.
  - (9) Ultimate disposition.
- d. Facilities and Installations.
  - (1) Procedures for collecting, analyzing, and reporting information.
  - (2) Areas of primary overall intelligence and technical intelligence interest.
  - (3) Channels for forwarding facilities data.
  - (4) Disposition and dissemination of facilities data.
- 6. Processing
  - a. Records and/or files required to be maintained.
  - b. General policies governing preparation of technical reports.
    - (1) Preliminary reports (PRETECHREPS).
    - (2) Detailed technical reports (DETECHREPS).
  - c. Liaison and coordination between personnel of the technical intelligence company and other intelligence elements concerning evaluation and interpretation of technical information.
- 7. Dissemination
  - a. Scope.
  - b. Content.
  - c. Editorial assistance.
  - d. Types of reports.
  - e. Special reports.
  - f. Policies governing dissemination.
- 8. Functional and Task Force Operations
  - a. Theater and/or theater army policies.
  - b. Scope and priorities.
  - c. Effort that may be expended on missions.
  - d. Additional support sources if needed.
  - e. Procedures for collecting and reporting data.
  - f. Responsibilities for direction of operations.
  - g. Limitations on units and individuals.
  - h. Security.

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- i. Safeguarding components of intelligence value.
- j. Host country agreement.

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**APPENDIX D**  
**COMPLEMENTARY TECHNICAL REPORTS (COMTECHREP)**  
(STANAG 2084)

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1. COMTECHREP—TYPE A  
To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately following initial examination of enemy aircraft. (To be completed to the extent possible by Army technical intelligence personnel in event that Air Force technical intelligence personnel are not available.)
  - A. Date and location of crash and map of reference.
  - B. Type of aircraft and:
    - (1) Overall length.
    - (2) Overall wing-span.
  - C. Identification and distinguishing marks.
  - D. Type of engine(s) and condition.
  - E. Cause of crash; number, location and caliber of projectile strikes; condition of aircraft.
  - F. Armament:
    - (1) Guns of all types, installation positions, quantity.
    - (2) Ammunition and number of magazines.
    - (3) Bombs and bomb installations.
    - (4) Mines and mine carriers.
    - (5) Rocket projectiles and carriers.
    - (6) Pyrotechnics, number and type.
  - G. Armor plate; quantity, positions, thickness, strikes, penetrations.
  - H. Number of crew and fate.
  - I. Wings and control surfaces, leading edge protection against balloon cables by cutters, strengthening or other special devices; de-icing.
  - J. State if samples are obtainable of:
    - (1) Gasoline.
    - (2) Oil.
    - (3) Coolant.
    - (4) Hydraulic fluids.
    - (5) De-icing fluids.
  - K. Internal equipment; state condition and whether bombsights, radio, photographic equipment and electronics equipment and instruments are standard. If not, specify modifications, alternations or omissions. Obtain radio frequency setting, if possible.
  - L. Landing gear: type and condition.
  - M. General remarks and special points or unusual features not mentioned.
  - N. Name plates photographed:
    - (1) Airframe.
    - (2) Engine.
    - (3) Others.

- O. Other information.
- P. Name of individual in charge of technical intelligence team making examination.
- Q. Time and origin of message.
- 2. COMTECHREP—TYPE B
 

Used for reporting information about ammunition, missiles, bombs, shells, rockets, projectiles, mines, torpedoes, etc., and submitted by the fastest available means immediately following initial examination. Only those headings for which information is available are reported.

  - A. Nationality, designation and mark number.
  - B. Description. (Type and category, i.e., tactical missile—cruise).
  - C. Overall length of missile, including fuze, tail, vanes, and fittings.
  - D. Maximum diameter of missiles/munitions.
  - E. Shape and design of missiles/munitions (streamlining shells).
  - F. Length and width of tail.
  - G. Span of vanes.
  - H. Thickness of casing at nose.
  - I. Thickness of casing at sides.
  - J. Thickness of casing at base.
  - K. Material of body.
  - L. Material of tail or vanes.
  - M. Color and marking of nose.
  - N. Color and marking of body.
  - O. Color and marking of tail or vanes.
  - P. Weight and nature of main filling.
  - Q. Total weight of missile/munition.
  - R. Method of suspension.
  - S. Warhead weight, type, and detonation method.
  - T. Fusing systems and markings.
  - U. Anti-handling of boobytrap devices.
  - V. Method of propulsion.
  - W. Date and location of missile/munition.
  - X. Other information.
  - Y. Name of individual in charge of the technical intelligence team making examination.
  - Z. Time and origin of message.
- 3. COMTECHREP—TYPE C
 

To be submitted within 72 hours following the acquisition of an item of captured equipment not covered under Types A and B.

  - A. Date found, location (map reference).
  - B. Type of equipment and quantity.
  - C. Origin.
  - D. Description with distinguishing marks (additional details).
  - E. Conditions of equipment.
  - F. Technical characteristics of immediate tactical value (additional details).
  - G. Recommended disposal.
  - H. Name plates photographed.
  - I. Photographs taken.
  - J. Other information.
  - K. Name of chief of team.
  - L. Time and origin of message.

## APPENDIX E

## TITLES OF GROUPS OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

(Annex "A" (D of A) to STANAG 2097)

		COUNTRY OF ORIGIN—
Type of Equipment	Items in Title	Examples
Small Arms	Caliber	7.62mm Pistol M 1964
Infantry antiaircraft (AA) Weapons	Description	12.7mm AA Machinegun M 7963
Infantry antitank (AT) Weapons	Sighting year	82mm AT Launcher M 1964
Hand Grenades	If antitank (AT) Sighting year	Hand Grenades M 1964 AT Hand Grenades M 1964
Artillery	Caliber Description If Self-propelled (SP) Sighting year	100mm Field Gun M 1964 152mm SP Gun M 1965
Rocket Launchers	Caliber Description Number of rounds Sighting year	240mm Rocket Launcher (16-round) M 1964 One Round Rocket Launcher M 1964
Tanks	Weight class If amphibious Sighting year	Medium Tank M 1964 Light Amphibious Tank M 1964
Armored Personnel Carriers	If amphibious If tracked or half-tracked Sighting year	APC M 1964 Amphibious Tracked APC M 1964
Assault Guns (SU's)	Description Caliber (without mm) Sighting year	SU-100 M 1964
Soft Skinned Vehicles including wheeled amphibians	If amphibious If tracked Description Type of drive (wheels) Sighting year	Truck, 4x2 M 1964 Amphibious Truck, 4x4 M 1965 Tracked Amphibian M 1964
Engineer Equipment	Description Sighting year	Trencher M 1964 Pontoon M 1964
Radars	Description and Type Sighting year	Tactical Control SAM Radar M 1964 Surveillance Field Radar M 1964 Fire Control Antiaircraft Radar M 1964
Missiles	Role Sighting year	SSM 1964 SAM 1964 (Use STANAG 3236 when applicable)



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