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Beyond the Looking Glass: Dreams and Somnial States and Spaces in Nineteenth-Century British Literature

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BEYOND THE LOOKING GLASS: DREAMS AND SOMNIAL STATES AND SPACES IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH LITERATURE

by

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BEYOND THE LOOKING GLASS: DREAMS AND SOMNIAL STATES AND SPACES IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH LITERATURE

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Poised between a waning magico-theological tradition of symbolic dream interpretation and the rising influence of scientific dream theories, which equated dreaming with disorder, the dream occupied a unique space in nineteenth-century Great Britain. Dreams were coming untethered from signification, as natural philosophers deemed their content indecipherable and chaotic. Yet vestiges of early modern beliefs could still lend supernatural power and polyphony to dreams.

This was not simply a matter of making a binary choice between two ways of thinking about dreams but instead a site of collisions and coalescences. I contend that the ways in which dreams were conceptualized in nineteenth-century Great Britain made them uniquely capable of evoking affect. After mapping the historical and theoretical framework of this argument, I explore transportive dream visions in Romantic and Victorian poetry and the shifting use of revelatory dreams in Gothic novels, discussing what I term the "tandem dream sequence" in the latter. Lastly, I discuss dreamlike states and dreamy spaces in the context of a correlation that I have found between the emergence of the private bedroom in middle-class Victorian homes and Britons' theories of dreams. If we do not take into consideration the affective potential of dreams as they were conceptualized in nineteenth-century Great Britain, we miss essential elements of the literary dreams and somnial states and spaces in nineteenth-century British literature.

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INTRODUCTION

THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS

"I'll tell you all my ideas about Looking-glass House," Alice says to Kitty in Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There* (1871). "You can just see a little peep of the passage in Looking-glass House … and it's very like our passage as far as you can see, only you know it may be *quite different on beyond*." Alice determines to "pretend that the glass has got all soft like gauze, so that we can get through." And following the logic of dreams, since this is a dream, what she imagines comes to pass: "And certainly the glass was beginning to melt away, just like a bright silvery mist" (127, emphasis added).

We often expect literary dreams to serve solely as allegories, the purpose of which is to mirror the themes of the waking narrative. However, the purpose of the titular "looking-glass" in Alice's dream is not merely to mirror. The objects that Alice had seen reflected in the looking glass when she was awake do continue to appear "quite common and uninteresting" after she passes through the looking glass, "but … all the rest was as different as possible. For instance, the pictures on the wall … seemed to be all alive…" (127). In this nonsensical dreamland, pictures are not simply representations of the people they are images of but rather come alive as distinct entities. I propose that we take a cue from Alice's journey through the looking-glass and attempt to think dreams beyond representational logic. There can, of course, also be worthwhile metaphorical analyses of

such works. But I contend that the ways in which dreams were conceptualized in nineteenth-century Great Britain lend themselves to affective, or emotional, intensity.[1]

The Affective Intensity of Dreams

As an example, in Charles Robert Maturin's *Melmoth the Wanderer* (1820), Alonzo recounts a nightmare that, in many ways, mirrors his current circumstances as a prisoner of the Spanish Inquisition, but for which symbolic analysis would fall short of capturing the most salient characteristic:

> Towards the morning I slept,—Oh what a sleep was mine!—the genii, or the demons of the place, seemed busy in the dream that haunted me. I am convinced that *a real victim* of an *auto da fé*[2] ... never suffered more during his horrible procession to flames temporal and eternal, *than I did during that dream*. (Maturin 182, emphasis added)

Alonzo's assertion that his nightmare is more intense than the sufferings of an actual auto da fé victim is remarkable, especially considering that when he has this dream, he is awaiting a judgment that could condemn him to being burned alive in a similar ceremony; he is not in a position to take it lightly. His narrative comprises one of the interwoven stories within stories of characters' encounters with Melmoth, a man who,

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[1] The term "affect" is sometimes used interchangeably with "emotion" or "feeling," although they have different meanings in affect theory. Affect comprises the "phenomenal unaccounted-for quality of sensations" (Cohn 2015, 20), experienced as an immediate "non-conscious … intensity" (Shouse 2005).

[2] The "auto da fé" originally referred to "a religious ceremony … held by the Spanish or Portuguese Inquisition prior to the punishment of prisoners, such as … heretics." But the term became associated with the punishment that followed, coming to mean "the execution of a sentence of the Inquisition; esp. the public burning of a heretic…" ("Auto-da-fé, n.").

having gained supernatural powers by selling his soul, must wander the earth tempting others to sell theirs (538).

The dream is so intense that when Alonzo awakens to find Melmoth before him—having again inexplicably entered Alonzo's locked cell—he nearly sells his soul on the spot in exchange for freedom from the Inquisition. Up until this point, he has withstood the torment and coercion of both the Inquisition and Melmoth (175). But his affective response to the nightmare temporarily overcomes his mental fortitude: "With an impulse I could not resist,—*an impulse borrowed from the horrors of my dream*, I flung myself at his feet, and called on him to 'save me'" (182-83, emphasis added). This impulse is the immediate and most powerful outcome of Alonzo's dream. Any symbolic component of the dream is secondary to the affect that it evokes.

This nightmare does not merely reflect the themes underlying the waking narrative of the novel but instead bleeds into waking reality. In making the argument that this, or any, character's dreamt experience can affect the waking narrative, I hope not to validate the former by subsuming it to the latter, thereby reaffirming the subordination of dreams to waking reality; instead, I endeavor to expose a reversal of what we might generally expect, whereby the dream is not simply influenced by, but rather influences, the waking reality that surrounds it.[3] Alonzo's dream is, in fact, so intense that when he tells his story years later, he describes it in greater detail than he does the questioning and dungeonlike conditions to which he is subjected in waking reality (182-83); the

[3] Similar examples include Ebeneezer Scrooge's transformation at the end of Charles Dickens's *A Christmas Carol* (1843, 110), Catherine's assertion that dreams have "altered the colour of [her] mind" in Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights* (1847, 62), and Jane's decision to leave Thornfield Hall after having a dream in which she is commanded to "flee temptation" in Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre* (1847, 325).

nightmare seems to have had a greater impact on him than his waking experiences as a prisoner of the Spanish Inquisition.

When Alonzo reflects on Melmoth's presence in his cell on the night of his auto da fé dream, he ponders "whether this inscrutable being had not the power to influence my dreams," evoking the belief that dreams can be influenced by supernatural powers (183). This belief, key to the magico-theological tradition of the early modern era, was waning when Maturin wrote *Melmoth the Wanderer*, as scientific dream theories were becoming increasingly influential, and yet it retained a foothold in the consciousness of the nineteenth-century British public.[4]

On the other hand, the dream theories of natural philosophers, or as they were later known, scientists, had gained predominance in British discourse on dreams.[5] When Alonzo observes that a story he had been told in waking reality comes to pass in his auto da fé dream, he ascribes this to the fact that "our thoughts in dreams wander" (183). This comment expresses an assumption that was central to scientific dream theories of the 1700s and 1800s. That is, that the content of dreams is derived not from the supernatural but rather from one's own impressions of recent events and the mental associations that these impressions conjure in the imagination, which together create the "thoughts" that "wander" in dreams.

As Ronald Thomas argues, even "at the outset of the Victorian age," in many ways, "dreams belonged as much to the supernatural world as to science" (1992, 6). It is my contention that the collisions and coalescences of different dream theories and beliefs

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[4] See Bann 2009, 664; Bernard 1981, 198; Lang 1899, 29; Newnham 1830, 36; and Perkins 1999, 107.

[5] See Corbin 1990, 514; Ellenberger 1970, 303; Handley 2016, 11; and Whyte 1960, 70.

throughout the long nineteenth century,[6] including the concept of the dream as a powerful conduit to the supernatural, made dreams uniquely capable of evoking affect.[7] The historical and theoretical context presented in this introduction lays the foundation for subsequent chapters, in which I explore the ways in which nineteenth-century British writers mobilized this potential through the use of literary dreams, depictions of somnial states, and the creation of somnial spaces through dreamlike atmosphere.[8]

Historicizing the Dream: From Premonition to Pathology

When Alonzo speculates that Melmoth might have induced his nightmare, the reason he thinks this might be possible is that although Melmoth is not a demon himself, he might have enlisted the aid of one:

> I know not … nor is it a problem to be solved by human intellect, whether this inscrutable being *had not the power to influence my dreams*, and dictate to a tempting demon the images which had driven me to fling myself at his feet for hope and safety. However it was, he certainly took advantage of my agony … (183, emphasis added)

[6] The long nineteenth century is used to describe the period between 1789-1914. However, because my study focuses on pre-Freudian dream theories, Sigmund Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899) marks the end of the period that this dissertation explores.

[7] Affect is a "non-conscious … intensity" that is experienced with a sense of immediacy (Shouse 2005). I would argue that the state of dreaming has a heightened potential for affect in itself, as dreams can produce scenarios that would not occur in waking reality, while suspending disbelief for all but the rare lucid dreamer. It would be difficult to interpret one's dream while still dreaming it; in this manner, the dreamer is generally prevented from performing dialectical analysis while in the dream, so their response cannot be mediated by dialectical thought until they awaken.

[8] "Somnial" refers to that which is "Of or relating to dreams" ("Somnial, adj."). I use the term to refer to both standard sleeping dreams and the wide range of nebulous "dream states" (Vrettos 2002, 197).

Although scholarship on literary dreams has tended to center on the impact of Sigmund Freud's theories, focusing on the influence of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899), this does not constitute the only, or the first, major change in the Western world's understanding of dreams. By the end of the nineteenth century, Britons' ideas about what dreams could do, be, or mean had already undergone a massive shift. Freud entered a scientific discourse that had risen in prominence over the course of the nineteenth century, with a "decisive period" peaking in the last two decades of the century (Ellenberger 1970, 303). From the 1700s onward, Enlightenment interest in the mind had spurred the work of natural philosophers on sleep, dreams, reveries, the imagination, and the related "pathological states" of "fainting, ecstasy, hypnosis, hallucinations, dissociation," and "drugged conditions" (Whyte 1960, 70). These medical philosophies "reshaped" the ways in which sleep and dreams were understood (Handley 2016, 11).

Before roughly the seventeenth century, there had been a "near-universal acceptance of dreaming as integral to the lives of individuals and communities," according to Jonathan Crary (2013, 105). Oneirocriticism, or symbolic dream interpretation, was a common practice, as it was believed that dreams held the potential to communicate revelations to the dreamer.[9] As Sasha Handley writes, during the early modern era, "sleepers were understood to travel between consciousness and unconsciousness, between the earthly and supernatural realms, and between life and death on a nightly basis" (2016, 72). The potential for sleep to bridge the abyss between the material world of the living and the realm of the supernatural conferred a special

[9] "Oneirocriticism" refers to "the art or practice of interpreting dreams" ("Oneirocriticism, n.").

power upon dreams. An enigmatic dream might contain a vital premonition, and in a dream about a deceased friend or family member, one might be able to communicate with the dead. In this view, spiritual entities were not simply dreamt *of*; they could be fully present with the dreamer. Moreover, sleep and dreams were believed to make one more susceptible not only to the auspices of the divine or to the influences of ghosts, but also potentially to the powers of the demonic[10] (Handley 71).[11]

Over the course of the Enlightenment, such ideas began to transition from the domain of actual belief to the province of fiction. The belief that dreams could actually reveal truths and communicate warnings was increasingly "marginalized and discredited" (Crary 105). These beliefs could and, to some extent, still can be observed; supernatural dreams continue to appear in Gothic works, and bedtime prayers are a vestige of the caution regarding the sleeper's vulnerability to otherworldly forces. But during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, belief in revelatory dreams was falling out of favor as a consequence of the influence of the Romantic movement, Enlightenment era "scientific interest in the brain," and philosophical works on the phenomena of the mind, (Whyte 130). Because of the latter two, nonfiction discourse on sleep and dreams did not diminish. To the contrary, the publication of scientific texts on the subject was on the rise in the 1700s and 1800s (Colson 1990, 165–66). These works focused primarily on classification and etiology, eschewing the notion that the content of dreams might hold

[10] In the eighteenth century, some Britons still believed that "poor-quality sleep, or sleep that was indulged without bedside devotions, weakened the Christian's defenses against the Devil" (Handley 71).

[11] Supernatural dreams influenced by beneficent and evil supernatural forces alike appear in Gothic literature. Although the stereotypical Gothic revelatory dream forewarns or reveals a truth, Gothic dreams can also facilitate the schemes of an evil entity; a prime example, depending on how one reads it, is Alonzo's dream in Maturin's *Melmoth the Wanderer*.

significance, and it became a mark of cultural enlightenment to ridicule the unscientific belief in revelatory dreams (Greenwood 1894, vii).

A large portion of the general public, but especially those who were educated, would have had at least some familiarity with the dream theories discussed in scientific discourse. Since the eighteenth century, much of Europe had become enchanted by what Richard Colson terms a "vogue for scientific lectures and entertainments" (165). Throughout the early 1800s, new "literary and philosophical" societies continued to spring up. Interest in such discourse became "unusually widespread," although initially only "within a British cultural elite," according to Colson. As the Victorian period progressed, interest in scientific theories and studies spread even further, "far beyond the artisans, educated upper middle class, and aristocratic boundaries … involving many elements of the middle class and the working class" (165-66). Scientific dream theories entered the consciousness of the general public.

However, vestiges of belief in the potential for dreams to reveal truths, foretell the future, and generally be affected by the supernatural remained in British culture in different forms, including as elements of Gothic literature. Moreover, there were still fervent holdouts who continued to espouse this belief; among them were enthusiasts of secular spiritualism, which experienced a surge in popularity in the nineteenth century (Bann 2009, 664; Lang 1899, 29).[12] Secular spiritualists believed that nighttime visions

[12] Collections of prophetic dreams, such as *Mrs. Blair's* Dreams and Dreaming (1843) and Catherine Crowe's *The Night Side of Nature* (1848), were popular during the long nineteenth century (Bernard 198). The Society for Psychical Research published numerous letters detailing people's accounts of prophetic dreams they had had that were proved to be true in *Phantasms of the Living* (1886). Magazines such as *Chambers's Journal*, *Blackwoods*, *London Magazine*, and *Gentleman's Magazine* published similar anecdotes as well as opinion pieces supporting the possible existence of revelatory dreams; in one of these

could bring the dreamer into contact with the dead, although they tended to focus on the potential for well-meaning supernatural figures to visit their dreams as opposed to demonic forces (Hayward 2000, 197, 147). Alternatively, religious spiritualists limited the supernatural potential of dreams to the domain of the divine. To this point, Mrs. Blair, the editor of *Dreams and Dreaming* (1843), asserts that the revelatory dream is a moral directive sent from God "for the comforting of his tired people" (Blair 1843, i). Another category of holdouts were the readers of the inexpensive genre of chapbooks known as dream books (Perkins 1999, 104). Despite the lofty purpose that Blair ascribes to revelatory dreams, the majority of Britons interested in oneirocriticism seem to have turned to this disparaged but common form of street literature.

Power and Dream Books

In *The Literature and Curiosities of Dreams* (1865), Frank Seafield characterizes dream interpretation, or "oneirocriticism," as "at present in the sere and yellow leaf of its fortunes." According to Seafield, oneirocriticism "sprang up to meet us like a god" but "retires from us with the hang-dog expression of a rebuked costermonger." He observes that dream interpretion, once the "revelation of the divine," had been reduced to "an instrument by which *a chap-book pedlar* [sic] may best ascertain what is the smallest number of lies which Cinderella will insist on in return for her penny, without considering herself cheated" (134, emphasis added). The type of "chap-book" to which he refers was known as a "dream book," "dreamer" (Perkins 103), or "Dream Key"

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opinion pieces, James Hogg, the author of *The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner* (1824), questions the scientific certainty that dream content is meaningless (Perkins 107).

(Corbin 514). Dream books provided A-to-Z lists of universal dream symbols and the revelatory meaning of each symbol (Perkins 103-4). Such books also frequently included prophetic almanacs and fortune-telling guides (106).

In spite of, or perhaps as a reaction to, the increasing number of scientific texts on dreams, the dream book became, "in Britain at least, the most dominant form of chapbook," according to Maureen Perkins (104). Associated with "ghosts and fairies" (Newnham 1830, 36); "table rappings, séances, and house haunting" (Bernard 197); and tawdry street literature (Perkins 105), dream books occupied a lowly status in nineteenth-century literary culture. Writers and publishers of dream books commonly attributed their content to ancient writings by unknown authors in foreign lands in an apparent effort to add credence to the content while distancing themselves from it (Perkins 106). In fact, in the opening pages of *The True Fortune Teller* (1850), the publisher includes a disclaimer of sorts: "The foregoing pages are published principally to show the superstitions which engrossed … a past age, and which are happily disappearing before the progress of an enlightened civilization" (24). By all accounts, the readers of dream books were not purchasing this common form of street literature to educate themselves in the belief systems of past ages; it is much more plausible that publishers used such statements to make an excuse for their involvement in the perpetuation of the genre.

The demographic believed to have purchased dream books attests to the influence that societal roles likely had over how people viewed dreams. Corbin observes that although some members of the working class were familiar with scientific dream theories, dream books were bestsellers mainly among members of the lower class (514). Additionally, the intended audience appears to have been primarily female, as the vast

majority of dream symbols in dream books relate to courtship, marriage, and good fortune; all of these, according to dream books, might be deduced by the universal symbols within premonitory dreams (Perkins 106). For instance, *The New Infallible Fortune Teller* predicts that "a virgin dreaming *she* has put on new garments, shews an alteration in her condition by way of marriage." It also affirms that "if *a woman* dreams she is with child, it shews sorrow and sadness" (1818, 12, 13). The symbols are universal, but the readers are usually assumed to be women.

As the century progressed, the dream book's male readership diminished further, and by the end of the century, it seems to have disappeared. Whereas earlier editions of dream books had occasionally addressed a male reader, the genre shifted to exclusively targeting female readers (Perkins 110). I postulate that this might, at least to some extent, be a consequence of the widespread belief that men were the more rational sex. Men would likely have been exposed to greater ridicule for endorsing a belief in premonitory dreams and for purchasing a chapbook intended to indulge the superstitions of women. As Perkins writes, "In the nineteenth century, men who would admit to premonitory dreams were challenging the norms of middle-class masculinity of their day" (107). The influence of these norms is reflected in Seafield's gendered ridicule of the dream book as an "instrument by which a chap-book pedlar [sic]" may scam a naïve "*Cinderella*" (134, emphasis added).

An association of superstitiousness, especially about dreams, with lower-class, female characters appears in nineteenth-century British novels, manifesting in how characters of different genders and class treat such ideas. For example, a reverence for premonitions sometimes enters the narrative through a female servant or through her

influence. In Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights* (1847), when Catherine begins to tell Nelly Dean about her dream, Nelly is resistant because she fears the supernatural power of dreams: "Oh! don't, Miss Catherine! … We're dismal enough without conjuring up ghosts and visions to perplex us." As Catherine persists, she repeats, "I won't hear it, I won't hear it!" Later, Nelly tells Lockwood, "I was superstitious about dreams then, and am still; and Catherine had an unusual gloom in her aspect, that made me dread something from which I might shape a prophecy, and foresee a fearful catastrophe" (72). Similarly, in Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre* (1847), Jane knows how to interpret her recurring dream about a small child because she remembers having overheard a female servant, Bessie Leaven, tell another female servant that "to dream of children was a sure sign of trouble, either to one's self or one's kin" (223). This premonitory symbol is ostensibly proven to be accurate, both when Bessie dreams of a small child and when Jane does (223-25).

Conversely, the stereotype of the superstitious female character is reversed in Wilkie Collins's *The Woman in White* (1860) when Walter Hartright makes a comment that could be interpreted as slightly superstitious. Miss Halcombe, whose rational mind is celebrated throughout the novel, rebukes him, "Whatever women may be, I thought that men, in the nineteenth century, were above superstition" (61). Her reference to the century underscores the assumption that their period must be more enlightened than, for instance, the "past age," a time in which, according to the publisher of *The True Fortune Teller*, people had been "engrossed" by "superstitions that are happily disappearing before the progress of an enlightened civilization" (124).

Thus, a determining factor in the readership of dream books might not have been a lack of enlightenment so much as a lack of agency within the socioeconomic system. Education probably played a role in the fact that men stopped purchasing dream books. But this might also have been related to the association of rational thinking with middle-class masculinity, making any belief that might be viewed as irrational also potentially emasculating, as well as to men's greater potential for upward social mobility.

After all, dream books might have provided reassurance to disempowered members of society, such as lower-class women, by affirming that a greater, mysterious power might improve their situation. As Perkins points out, the "interpretations [of dream books] position the meaning of dreams outside the workings of the mind, implying an external set of forces that will decide destiny" (108). In a rapidly changing society in which the living and working conditions of the lower class were often reprehensible, the hermeneutic offered in dream books could provide "order and meaning in the apparent confusion" (107). The interpretability of the premonitory dream might have offered some comfort, in contrast to scientific characterizations of dreams, which made them synonymous with disorder.

Disordering the Content of Dreams

In *Melmoth the Wanderer*, Alonzo recalls that at one point in his auto da fé nightmare, a story that he had heard about a girl being condemned to death comes to pass in the dream: "*Our thoughts in dreams wander*; I had heard a story of an auto da fé, where a young Jewess, not sixteen, doomed to be burnt alive, had … exclaimed, 'Save me…' … Something like this *crossed my dream*" (182-83, emphasis added). As we have

seen, in spite of Alonzo's speculation that the nightmare might have been demonically induced, he also describes it in terms of his thought processes. The scene with the young Jewish girl appears because "our thoughts in dreams wander," and Alonzo characterizes it as having "crossed my dream" in the same way that one might remark that an idea had "crossed my mind." The assumption underlying the use of these phrases is that the content of dreams originates in one's own recent impressions and imaginative associations; this resonates with the claims made by natural philosophers.[13]

The consensus among nineteenth-century natural philosophers was that dream content has its origin in the impressions of recent memory, which are "jumbled" together by our imagination, along with any mental associations they conjure in the mind (Macnish 1834, 49). Regardless of the minor differences in terminology among these texts, they illustrate the currents of scientific thought that were influential in the nineteenth century. Considering the prevalence of these concepts in scientific dream discourse and the "unusually widespread" interest in the subject among Britons, who attended "scientific lectures," societies, and publications (Colson 165-66), we can expect these ideas to have informed the reading public's understanding of literary dreams.[14]

Moreover, scientific discourse on sleep and dreams had been growing since the eighteenth century (Ellenberger 303; Whyte 70). For example, the discussion of dreaming in David Hartley's *Observations on Man* (1749) was a forerunner to the studies of

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[13] Although the setting of Alonzo's narrative predates the nineteenth century, I suggest that the author's familiarity with nineteenth-century dream theories, like other aspects of the culture in which he lived, very likely influenced his writing.

[14] Even in the disclaimer that prefaces *The True Fortune Teller* (1850), a book of decoding premonitory dreams, there is a statement promoting scientific dream theories: "It is hoped, therefore, that the reader will not attach the slightest importance to the solutions of the dreams as rendered above, *as dreams are generally the result of a disordered stomach, or an excited imagination*" (24, emphasis added).

nineteenth-century natural philosophers on the subject, as they expanded on the work of preceding periods.[15] According to Hartley, the content of dreams is "deducible from the Impressions and Ideas of the preceding Day" (384). These impressions and ideas are linked together through the imagination's irrational chains of "association," which lend themselves to "great Wildness and Inconsistency" (385).[16] Hartley's "Impressions and Ideas" become, in W. Newnham's *Essay on Superstition* (1830), "the *recollected impressions* of the preceding day, or of some antecedent period": "It will often happen that the dream may be traced to some thought or action which has occupied the attention *during the day*, and which will be reproduced at night in dreams, *grotesquely associated* with other persons and things…" (179, emphasis added).

Similarly, in *On the Phenomena of Dreams, and Other Transient Illusions* (1832), Walter Dendy theorizes that the content of dreams is made up of "*Impressions* of memory," which "by *fanciful association* become imagination." According to Dendy, as a result of the imagination's fanciful associations, these ideas become linked in "the grossest absurdity" as "images in this chain" (41, emphasis added). An analogous explanation appears in *The Philosophy of Sleep* (1834), in which Robert Macnish[17] attributes dream content to the "resuscitation or re-embodiment of thoughts which have formerly … occupied the mind" (49). The use of the word "resuscitation" creates an

[15] Hartley's work influenced Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who was familiar with many eighteenth-century dream theories, although he eventually became dissatisfied with most, if not all, of them. Like nineteenth-century natural philosophers, those writing in the eighteenth century "attributed the origin of dreams at least in part to" the physiological impact of "somatic or sensory causes" (Ford 1998, 162).

[16] Hartley follows the "associationist tradition" (Ford 80), which John Locke similarly applies to dreams and reveries in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689, XXXIII).

[17] Robert Macnish was a popular Scottish writer on natural philosophy and a renowned surgeon, known as "The Modern Pythagorean." His treatise, *The Philosophy of Sleep*, was "well received," and multiple editions were printed (Anderson 1863, 59).

almost anthropomorphized image of the process. As in other scientific dream theories, the imagination links these resuscitated thoughts in a "train of *associations*" (44, emphasis added); for Macnish, this "connecting chain" has the potential to link the dreamer's "jumbled thoughts" in "absurd combinations" (49). Following the same line of thought, in *Inquiries Concerning the Intellectual Powers* (1839), John Abercrombie[18] affirms that dreams are generally rooted in recent waking impressions and thoughts, which can include emotions. In dreams, "recent events and recent mental emotions … follow one another according to associations over which we have no control," writes Abercrombie (198), emphasizing the dreamer's powerlessness in controlling how the dream unfolds.

According to these natural philosophers, the imagination associates impressions and ideas that have arisen in the dreamer's recent waking experiences. But whereas the imagination is restrained by reason when one is awake, it has the power to create a private, internal chaos when one is dreaming. This is the source of the incongruous, irrational, and incomprehensible elements of dream content. Affirming that the imagination is the predominant power in dreams, Hartley writes that dreams consist of "nothing but the *Imaginations*, Fancies, or Reveries of a sleeping Man" (384, emphasis added).[19] Newnham concurs that "the sleeping senses," including reason, are "incapable of exerting their regular influence in controlling the wanderings of the intellectual faculties" (165-66). Likewise, for Dendy, the imagination of the dreamer overrules the "faculty of judgment." He identifies rational judgment as the only faculty that

[18] John Abercrombie, another Scottish physician, attended the University of Edinburgh and published in medical journals. His works "achieved wild popularity" ("Abercrombie, John").

[19] In Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651), an earlier antecedent to these works, the chapter "Of Imagination" calls dreams "the *imaginations* of them that sleep" and "the silence of sense" (I.384-89).

consistently becomes completely "inert" when people dream (22), making the dream a space in which judgment is not merely impaired but fails to function. Newnham also theorizes that "erroneous perceptions are occasioned" in dreams because "*reason and judgment* [are] suspended" (167, emphasis added).

This suspension of reason and judgment can create "trains of association … generally of the wildest character," according to Newnham (167, emphasis added). Consequently, in the view of these natural philosophers, the content of dreams can become replete with "Wildness and Inconsistency" (Hartley 385) to such an extent that the experience of dreaming approaches that of "madness" (Dendy 56), as there is "a strong analogy between dreaming and insanity" (Macnish 45). In other words, associations unfold in nonsensical configurations in dreams, as the imagination overpowers the dreamer's ability to reason.

Thus, natural philosophers dismissed the idea that dreams could be rationally ordered or even necessarily particularly meaningful, arguing against the belief that dreams could create the circumstances for an "independent flight of soul" (Dendy 26-27).[20] Scientific texts characterized dreams as holding little to no potential to impart meaning, connoting the idea of meaning in dreams with interpretable messages originating in otherworldly forces. Considering the preponderance of these scientific dream theories, along with the British public's interest in them, these texts mark a point of divergence from the belief that dreams could contain symbolically coded messages

[20] *Sleep and How to Obtain It* asserts that "the only warrant for supernatural dreams is derived from the miraculous ones recorded in the Bible." By making this type of claim, writers of scientific texts on dreams were able to validate Biblical dream interpretation while maintaining that "miracles ceased" after Biblical times and that, likewise, dreams were no longer "supernatural or prophetic" (1880, 102).

from an external divine, demonic, or otherwise supernatural entity. Dreams were becoming synonymous with disorder, the imagination, and the irrational.

Disordering the Causes of Dreams

Disorder was ascribed not only to the content of dreams but also to their cause. This presents a striking contrast to our expectation that dreaming can occur as a matter of course in normal patterns of sleep. Dendy contends, "The dream, I believe, never occurs in sound or perfect sleep, for then all the senses are quiescent or uninfluenced" (19-20). And according to Macnish, "In healthy, wholesome, intense sleep," there "can be no dream" (40). One can observe these theories appearing in the discourse of the general public, as one issue of a popular periodical, *Chambers's Journal* (1876), advises the reader, "No one dreams when he is sound asleep. Dreams take place only during an imperfect or perturbed sleep" (56-59). A consensus was forming that dreams would emerge only out of sleep that was not sound, complete, perfect, healthy, or wholesome.

The cause, or causes, that natural philosophers might ascribe to the occurrence of Alonzo's dream in *Melmoth the Wanderer* would likely be one or more of the ways in which his mind, body, or sleeping environment had become disordered. Such factors might include Alonzo's heightened emotional state, especially in the wake of his recent encounters with Melmoth and the inquisitorial court; the fact that the nightmare occurs as Alonzo is beginning to fall asleep while trying to remain awake and is, therefore, in a liminal, transitional period between wakefulness and sleep; and of course, the physiological effects of the other conditions to which he is subjected as a prisoner of the

Spanish Inquisition, including the sleeping environment of his cell.[21] The occurrence of dreams was attributed to the influence of natural phenomena, including the position of the body, physiological disorder ranging from indigestion to more serious conditions, and the transition between sleeping and waking (Macnish 1834, 18, 58, 39, 24).[22]

According to Newnham, "Any cause which has powerfully excited their brain, whether this may have been exercise or disease," has the capacity to produce a dream (171). Abercrombie maintains that the onset or intensification of a dream can result from the "[excitement]" caused by "some bodily feeling of uneasiness, perhaps an oppression at the stomach, at the time when the dream occurred" (Abercrombie 198-99). More specifically, Macnish blames indigestion for some unpleasant dreams, recommending that his readers abstain from eating two or three hours before bedtime (274).

It is significant that dreaming was attributed to symptoms of minor and major states of physiological disorder is significant. For nineteenth-century natural philosophers, dreams are not merely intensified by disorder; the dream is itself a form of disorder. "Dreaming is one of [the mind's] diseases," Newnham asserts, surmising that dreams are a consequence of the "perverting influence of the fall" of mankind (165). Whether through physiological, mental, or spiritual disorder, dreaming was increasingly considered a form of disordered sleep.

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[21] Of the effect of the space in which one sleeps, Macnish writes, "A change of bed will sometimes induce dreams; and, generally speaking, they are more apt to occur in a strange bed than in the one to which we are accustomed" (1834, 53). Obviously, his intended audience does not include prisoners of the Spanish Inquisition, but this is one of the factors that, he argues, could affect the quality of sleep.

[22] The work of mid-nineteenth-century philosophers builds on that of *Zoonomia, or The Laws of Organic Life* (1794), in which Erasmus Darwin theorizes, "The trains of ideas, which are carried on in our waking thoughts, are in our dreams dissevered in a thousand places by the suspension of volition, perpetually falling into new catenations" (XVIII.9). As a result, "sensations of pleasure and pain are experienced with great vivacity in our dreams" (XVIII.2). In the nineteenth century, Macnish takes this idea to an extreme: "A dream may be considered as a transient paroxysm of delirium" (45).

Many natural philosophers took an etiological[23] approach to their studies, listing and categorizing the causes of dreams.[24] Their study of dreaming has the characteristics of a pathology, with disease or disorder at the root. For example, Hartley asserts that dreams, made up of "Imaginations, Fancies, or Reveries of a sleeping Man," are:

> … deducible from the Three following Causes; viz. First, the Impressions and Ideas lately received, and particularly thought of the preceding Day. Secondly, The State of the body, particularly of the Stomach and Brain. And Thirdly, Association. (34)

His list includes both mental and physical causes, and he addresses the role of impressions and associations in producing the content of dreams.

Dendy also categorizes the causes of dreams into three types (45), although he does so in a more complicated manner. The first cause that he lists is "the predisposing cause," which he identifies as "the influence of black blood on the brain" (56).[25] In addition to this physiological predisposition, with its connection to disease or disorder, there is a second physiological cause more closely related to the timing in the period of sleep. This is "the exciting cause," which creates an "impression on the extremities or … nerve" when one is in a state of "departing or returning consciousness" (45). Dendy refers to this intermediate state as "slumber," and it is the state in which one dreams (19-

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[23] I describe this discourse on dreams as "etiological" because natural philosophers focused on "assigning … a cause or reason" to dreams ("Aetiological | Etiological, adj.").

[24] These works also typically classify a range of dream states. Some assign different terminology to this process. Macnish avoids settling on a "cause," but is willing to discuss the "origin" of a dream: "Dreams generally arise without any assignable *cause*, but sometimes we can very readily discover their *origin* … The disordered state of the stomach and liver will often produce dreams" (52, emphasis added).

[25] This problem of "circulation" can result in other issues, including "indigestion" (57).

20). Slumber involves a "half consciousness which is essential to the phenomena of dreaming" (20). If one does not fall immediately asleep, then, one will experience dreams, since for Dendy, the dream "never occurs in sound or perfect sleep, for then all the senses [including the imagination] are quiescent or uninfluenced" (19-20).

And finally, the third and final type of cause, Dendy writes, is "the proximate cause of the dream consists in a recurrence of ideas—*memory*—I would consider the origin of mode of impression of a sense, and the mode of recurrence of such impression, the excitement of the dream" (57). Thus, while the content of dreams is described as the product of the dreamer's disordered thoughts, the phenomenon of dreaming is contingent upon a physiological disease, or disorder, or a period of bodily disorder.

Disordering the Dream

This idea that dreaming never occurs in perfect, profound, or complete sleep—in short, in orderly sleep—recurs in nineteenth-century scientific dream theories. Like Dendy, in *Chapters on Mental Physiology* (1852), Henry Holland[26] refers to the "state intermediate between sleeping and waking" as "slumber" and identifies this as the period in which dreams occur. Holland describes dreams as "those strange aberrations of thought ('the mimicry of reason,' as Dryden well calls them), in which volition is dormant, and memory awake only to furnish incongruous images to the dream" (86-87).

Macnish similarly describes the period in which one dreams as "slumber" and contrasts it with sound sleep, as he considers "dreaming" to be a state of "incomplete

[26] Henry Holland was the "physician-extraordinary to Queen Victoria" (Schatz 2015, 75).

sleep." He reasons that since the mind is producing dreams, it must be partially active, and that dreaming must, therefore, involve "the active state of one or more of the cerebral organs while the remainder are in repose…" (10). According to Macnish, "In healthy, wholesome, intense sleep," there "can be no dream" (40), in contrast to which, dreams "disappear altogether" when one experiences profound sleep because the absence of dreams shows that "the brain is left to thorough repose" (24).

Recalling Dendy's description of slumber, Macnish pinpoints the "gradual process of intellectual obliteration" that occurs during the transition between wakefulness and sleep as a period in which one experiences "a sort of confused dream—a mild delirium which always precedes sleep" (24). In the same vein, Dendy maintains that "such derangement of the manifestations of mind … as we term a dream" can ensue only as a result of a "disturbed condition of the brain" and that dreaming comprises a "slight and transient delirium" (55-56). This is not an analogy for Dendy, who writes, "The ideas arising in slumber may truly be considered as a species of delirium, forming figures and situations of the most heterogeneous description" (40). In these ways, these scientific texts presented dreams as deviations from restful sleep that emerge in states of physiological disorder and disease or in the liminal, disordered period of transition when one is half-awake and half-asleep.

Accordingly, such dream theories likened the "absence of truth" and "want of cohesion" in confusing dreams to temporary insanity (Newnham 163), with Seafield even dedicating a chapter to "Analogies of Dreaming and Insanity."[27] One mark of the insanity

[27] In addition, in 1899, the first chapter of Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* would similarly contain a section on "The Relations between Dreams and Mental Diseases."

inherent in the dreaming state is the sense of immediacy that suppresses dialectical thought. According to Abercrombie, "The [false] impressions which arise in the mind are believed to have a real and present existence" (198). As a result of the "quiescent condition of the reasoning powers," "the mind is wholly subject to the sceptre of other faculties," so that "whatever emotions or images they invoke, [dreams] seem to be real" (Macnish 83). As Newnham observes, the dream "may appear to be almost rational and consecutive" to the dreamer, although upon awakening, one will recognize in it "a want of cohesion in the causes and consequences," "an absence of truth," and a "deviation from correct thinking" (163). Dreaming was synonymous with disorder, writ large. Considering this characterization of dreaming as a state of disordered sleep—the result of half-waking, half-sleeping moments best described as delirium—which is brought on by physiological disease or disorder, I advance the idea that one might refer to them as, in nineteenth-century terms, a form of sleep disorder.[28]

What's more, the wildness of a dream can easily become heightened. In *The Book of Dreams and Ghosts* (1899), Andrew Lang maintains that even the slight disorder manifested by a minor irregularity in the sleeping environment can affect a dream. "As a rule dreams throw everything into a dramatic form," Lang writes. "Some one [sic] knocks at our door, and the dream bases a little drama on the noise" (12). And although even the liminal transition between falling asleep and awakening entails a "mild delirium" (Dendy 24), the "dreams of disease" are most likely to "present a great variety" of the "wildest

[28] In addition, in nineteenth-century scientific texts, dreams are presented alongside what we would typically consider sleep disorders. For instance, Macnish notes that somnambulism "bears a closer analogy than a common dream to madness," since the sleepwalker passes through waking reality under the delusion induced by a dream (148).

character" (Newnham 160-61). Macnish concurs, "The visions, indeed, which occur in a state of fever are highly distressing" (66). Not only can the emotions of waking reality enter into dreams; dreams can also create intense affective experiences.

Overwhelmingly, these works characterize the dream as a phenomenon in which the imagination seizes control, and the dreamer is made a sort of captive participant. The imagination connects the impressions left by recent events, ideas, and emotions, amalgamating them with other images and ideas, making connections that the dreamer would not otherwise make. In a space of such wildness and fanciful inconsistency, there is great potential for dreams and dreamlike states to break the laws of dialectics, social convention, and physics. In terms of the third, Macnish highlights the "apparent expansion of time in dreams" (60). And as Lang points out, temporality and spatial boundaries cease to signify as they would in waking reality: "In dreams, time and space are annihilated … amidst a grotesque confusion" (3). The sleeper's suspension of disbelief, resulting from an absence of reason, makes this absurdity possible, for "nothing … however monstrous, incredible, or impossible, seems absurd" in a dream (Lang 84).

The concept of the dream was coming untethered from the revelatory purpose to which it had once been attributed, and it had not yet been rendered comprehensible by the interpretive framework that Sigmund Freud would apply to it in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899). Although nineteenth-century natural philosophers ascribed the content of dreams to the fragmented memories of the dreamer's waking experiences, they had not had Freud's epiphany that the hermeneutic of the dream book could be combined with an etiology of interior causes and individually-generated content.

Natural philosophers deemed the content of dreams indecipherable, discouraging symbolic dream interpretation. Ironically, in their efforts to rationalize and exert control over dreams and sleep, these pre-Freudian theorists actually enhanced the dream's perceived potential for affect. The content of the dream, as an experience that one could neither control in the moment nor make sense of through interpretation later, attained a greater sense of immediacy.

An Impulse Borrowed from a Dream

The literary dream occupies a nebulous, liminal existence, as it is both a part of the surrounding waking narrative and set apart from it, as a space of exception, in which divergences, deviations, and impossibilities are possible. In the dream that affects Alonzo so powerfully in *Melmoth the Wanderer*, scenarios that would be impossible to recreate in a waking narrative with any semblance of realism intensify the dream's affective force. In the nightmare, Alonzo sees himself suffer: "I saw myself; and this horrid tracing of yourself in a dream,—this haunting of yourself by your own spectre, while you still live, is perhaps a curse almost equal to … the punishments of eternity" (182). His own image is reflected back to him, while he looks on from a nonexistent, spectral sort of space, viewing the horror in his own eyes and the anticipatory prelude of the religious ceremony preceding his suffering. In *Feeling in Theory*, Rei Terada's description of "auto-affection," which consists of the "representation of one's own sensations and ideas to oneself," seems germane to this scene (2001, 25).[29] Alonzo's experience takes the form of

[29] In contrast to "affect," which she accepts to be "unconscious and pre-reflexive," she contends that "auto-affection" and "full-blown emotions" respond to "the representationality of mental representations as such" (18).

literal self-differentiation possible within the space of the dream. When he sees himself suffer as if from someone else's perspective, observing his own expression of fear and pain, the experience intensifies the torment.

Next, the dream's ability to transform one person into another is used in service of increasing Alonzo's suffering. He sees the Jewish girl plead for mercy, only to be denied it, recreating the story that he had heard in a scene that is moving and horrifying. But the horror escalates when, as in the manner of dreams, one person transforms into another: "I saw the supplicant rejected; the next moment the figure was that of my brother Juan, who clung to me, shrieking, 'Save me, save me.'" After watching his beloved brother endure pain, powerless to save him, Alonzo then experiences the torture first-hand: "The next moment *I* was chained to my chair again…" The ceremony prolongs his anticipation of pain, as "the fires were lit, the bells rang out, the litanies were sung…" And then, he recounts, "My feet were scorched to a cinder,—my muscles cracked, my blood and marrow hissed, my flesh consumed…" Alonzo's protracted suffering culminates in the flames engulfing him, at which point, he awakens to his own screams (182-83).

When he awakens and sees Melmoth, he feels "an impulse I could not resist,—*an impulse borrowed from the horrors of my dream*," to throw himself at Melmoth's feet and, repeating the words of the supplicant, who was first a Jewish girl and then his brother, to beg the evil entity to "save me" (182-83, emphasis added). The nightmare almost leads to a transformative change in Alonzo's character and the nature of his soul, which he is on the verge of relinquishing in exchange for immediate freedom from the cell of the Spanish Inquisition.

This reaffirms that the most striking and noteworthy effect of the dream is not its symbolic meaning but rather the impulse that it evokes. Alonzo's plea for salvation, which he makes before he has a chance to rationally consider his choice or to muster up the mental fortitude that he has consistently exhibited up to this point is the result of the force of affect. In the words of Elisha Cohn, affect is the "phenomenal, unaccounted-for quality of sensations." This "unaccounted-for quality" arises from the fact that affect is "always prior to and/or outside of conscious awareness" (Shouse 2005, n. pag.). The irresistibility of this horror-induced impulse suggests that it precedes conscious awareness or decision-making, positioning it in the realm of affect.

Affective Potential

It is my contention that nineteenth-century scientific dream theories, in combination with the influence of the early modern's magico-theological tradition still prevalent in British culture, emphasize the capacity of dreams to evoke affective intensity. For this reason, affect theory provideS unique insight into the lens through which authors and readers conceptualized literary depictions of dreams during this period. Moreover, in my study of somnial states and spaces, I find that the foremost effect is their generation, or depiction, of dreamy affective states, such as reverie, trance, and atmospheric sensations of dreaminess.

While teh term "affect" is sometimes used interchangeably with "emotion" or "feeling," its non-conscious quality differentiates it from feelings, which are "personal and biographical," and from emotion, which is "the projection/display of a feeling." As opposed to emotions, which have a performative role in social interaction and can be

influenced by the culture in which one lives, or feelings, which can be explained through self-narrative, the "intensity" of affect is a "non-conscious experience" of "intensity" (Shouse). An example would be the realization that one is nervous because one's hands are shaking. Similarly, Jeremy Gilbert uses the involuntary movement that can occur in response to music as an example of the "force" of "non-significatory affective power" (2004, n. pag.).

The most significant way in which affect theory differs from traditional analytical approaches, including Freudian analysis, is that it focuses on these sensations rather than solely on their symbolic interpretation. Affect is, according to Gilles Deleuze, "non-representational," as it cannot be reduced to signifiers (1978, 2). Thus, resistant to interpretation, affect has a formal reality, meaning that it exists as something in itself rather than as the symbol or the inaccessible signified of something else. Operating as "an unmediated experience" (Massumi 2002, 2), affect encompasses a physiological sensation that is simultaneously a "mode of thought," that is, "insofar as it is non-representational" thought (1978, 2).

Of course, representational approaches can also provide valuable contributions to scholarship on literary dreams. But affect is non-representational and non-dialectical to such a degree that even the dialectical component of matter-of-fact narration can dampen our receptivity to it (Massumi 86).[30] Therefore, exclusively symbolic interpretation,

[30] "Matter-of-factness dampens intensity," Brian Massumi states, citing an empirical study that monitored children's physiological responses to varying versions of a short film about a melting snowman. The most intense response coincided with the silent version of the film, likely because it did not disrupt their affective experience. Conversely, the children responded the least to the version in which a voice-over narrated the scenes as they occurred, ostensibly because the simple narration actually "interfered with the images' effect" (86). Our experience of affect evoked by, or in, literature is necessarily mediated, but this does not preclude us from informing our approach to texts with a cognizance of the operations of affect.

which does not take affect into account, risks not only overlooking this intensity in nineteenth-century literary dreams, but also hindering our ability to recognize it. Describing the representational, and therefore, dialectical, thought, Deleuze and Felix Guattari write, “all signs are signs of signs” (1987, 112). In contrast to the dialectical thought underlying, for instance, linguistic signification, affect is felt with immediacy, whether it exerts an influence on the character who is dreaming or the reader’s vicarious experience of it.

Dreaming the Virtual

When a character is depicted dreaming or experiencing an affectively unique somnial state or space in nineteenth-century British literature, the concept of the dream as the realm of a disordered and disordering imagination, capable of producing “absurd combinations” of ideas through its varied repetitions of memories (Macnish 49), can create a space with elements of what Deleuze, borrowing from Henri Bergson, articulates as the “virtual.”

According to Deleuze, the virtual is a plane on which the recollections and intensities of the past are repeated, but with differences, in the present (1994a, 29–31). The virtual is real, but conceptual, related not only to the potential for change but also to memory (1994a, 279). In the virtual, “the present that [the past] was” commingles with “the current present in relation to which it is now past” (2004, 29). This coexistence of the past with the present seems akin to Lang’s observation that the dialectical delineations of “time and space are annihilated” in dreams (3). Moreover, with the “faculty of judgment” rendered “inert” (Dendy 22), “reason … suspended” (Newnham 167), and the

force of the imagination unburdened with these dialectical processes, the resulting "Wildness and Inconsistency" (Hartley 385) of dreams, as conceptualized in nineteenth-century Great Britain, create the potential for non-dialectical thought and unmediated intensity of affect. Experiences from different periods of life can become conflated, or conversely, monsters can approach at impossibly swift speeds.

In terms of the latter, the continued familiarity with, and for some, belief in, the idea of the supernatural dream makes the dream space potentially one in which the imaginative force is met with a supernatural one. The divine, demonic, or otherwise supernatural might also enter the space of the dream. Consequently, the space of the dream has the potential become, to borrow a concept from Mikhail Bakhtin, "polyphonic" (1984, 176). For Bakhtin, there is a possibility in this for the creation of a "plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses" in which all are "fully valid voices," a state that is disruptive to hierarchical thinking (176, 6).

Shifting back into Deleuzean terms, the "multiplicity" that this would entail, and of which the virtual is capable, can serve as an "escape" from "dialectics," or binary thinking (1987, 32). The capacity for disruption in these concepts echoes nineteenth-century natural philosophers' characterizations of dreaming as a "deviation" from "correct" thinking (Newnham 163). In the same vein, Macnish's observation that there is a close connection between "dreaming and insanity" (Macnish 45) also calls to mind the Deleuzean use of the term "schizophrenization" to describe the generation of multiplicities (1977, 53).

The thinking of Deleuze and Guattari on multiplicity and the virtual have implications for the unconscious: "The past is therefore the in-itself, the *unconscious*, or

more precisely, as Bergson says, the *virtual*" (2004, 29, emphasis added). Favoring the schizophrenized, polyphonic unconscious, they argue against the representational analysis typified by the fixed Oedipal signifiers of Freudian dream interpretation: "Wouldn't it be better to schizophrenize … the domain of the unconscious, so as to shatter the iron collar of Oedipus…?" (1977, 53).

Like the Deleuzean unconscious, the unconscious as viewed in nineteenth-century terms is very different from the Freudian version. As described by natural philosophers, it seems to possess the characteristics of the virtual, meaning that it can function as a "rhizomatic"[31] space, which operates through multiplicities instead of binaries, and with the potential to generate new affects. Furthermore, the potential "multiplicity" of the virtual coincides with Deleuze's contention that the unconscious is "fundamentally a crowd"; there is a possibility for this space to become an "assemblage" of the self that is "polyvocal" (1987, 29), or in Bakhtinian terms, "polyphonic" (1982, 170), rather than stable or single-minded.

The dream was considered a realm of the unconscious even before the publication of Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Whyte 1960, 130). Jill Mattus concurs, "The recognition of a realm of feelings and memories that exists below or beyond ordinary consciousness certainly predates the nineteenth century" (2009, 34). Moreover, Nicholas Rand's characterization of nineteenth-century ideas of the unconscious is reminiscent of Deleuzean multiplicities: "The drawn-out attempt to approach and define the unconscious

[31] Deleuze and Guattari describe the "rhizome" as a root-like system of multiplicities, in contrast to an arborescent system, which operates by the binary logic of dialectics and representations. During dreams, flights of fancy can become Deleuzian "lines of flight," transporting the dreamer out of the rigidly imposed, hierarchical, arborescent context of totalizing dialectical principles and into dynamic, constantly changing, interconnecting associations (1987, 8).

brought together the spiritualist and psychical researcher of borderline phenomena (such as *apparitions*, spectral illusions, … *trance* …)," along with the psychologist and the psychiatrist interested in "mental disease" and "abnormal ideation," "the physiologist and the physician who puzzled over sleep, dreams, sleepwalking, anaesthesia," "the neurologist concerned with … the *physiological basis of mental life*," "the philosopher interested in … *emotions*, consciousness," and "the *imagination* and the creative genius" (2004, 262-63, emphasis added).

Moreover, according to John Miller, the unconscious as viewed in the nineteenth century is "enabling," in contrast to the "custodial" unconscious that Freud would later conceptualize (1995, 17, 18). Mattus concurs that for the Victorians, the unconscious lends its psychic power in a spirit of "accessibility" (2009, 34). Conversely, the Freudian version holds its mental contents in what Miller refers to as a state of "detention" (29). In the context of dreaming, this sense of accessibility explains the free reign that the imagination is able to access, even to the point of creating elements of the irrational and, in terms of affect, the nonrational.

Jill Mattus affirms that nineteenth-century dream states are linked to affect, which figures into her Victorian trauma studies. She notes that in the mid-nineteenth century, "powerful emotion is figured as a state of *entrancement*" (2007, 184, emphasis). Shock, trauma, and fright, states defined by their affective qualities, were commonly described as dreamlike states (69, 82). In fact, the "dazed condition" that can be caused by trauma was considered "very closely allied to, if it be not identical with, the state induced in purposive experimental hypnosis" (qtd. in Mattus 69). Moreover, the relationship of the emotions to the trance state into consideration suggests that dreams have commonalities

with experiences such as hallucinations; mesmerism, the antecedent to hypnosis; and reverie. In fact, Athenia Vrettos asserts that "dreaming" and "dream-state" could refer to many types of dreamy mental states in the nineteenth century (2002, 197).[32] I add to these the somnial spaces in which atmosphere can affect characters and vice versa.

While representational analysis maintains a foothold in literary analysis, an increasing number of scholars, such as Audrey Jaffe (2016) and Elisha Cohn (2015), have begun to employ affect theory in their treatment of nineteenth-century literary dreams and reveries. In much of this work, though, scientific dream theories and the influence of early modern belief in the supernatural have been secondary. On the other hand, Helen Groth and Natalya Lusty highlight a historical focus on "the incongruity of dreams and their approximation to insanity" (2017, 34), but affective potential is not their main concern.

Exciting work on affective states, with a foundation in nineteenth-century science, is being undertaken by literary critics such as Jill Mattus (2007) and Athenia Vrettos (2002). The predominant current in this scholarship, however, is in trauma studies, which is important, but limits the scope and does not necessarily address dreams or dream states. Additionally, the vast majority of scholarship on these subjects does not relate the dreams or somnial states to the dreamy spaces from which they emerge, and few consider both science and superstition as key influences in conceptualizations of dreams. I hope to build on the impressive work that has been done on this subject by opening a new channel of inquiry exploring dreams as well as dreamlike states and spaces over the

[32] One issue for scientists studying mesmerism was how to differentiate it from "ether *dreaming*," a term they used to describe the state of being under anesthesia (Winter 2000, 183, emphasis added).

course of the long nineteenth century. I will take a nimble approach, informing this study with historical and affective context, in the manner and to the degree that is useful.

To this end, I begin this dissertation by exploring the use of transportive dream visions in Romantic and Victorian poetry. In these visionary experiences, the dreamer is transported by a supernatural force or through a dreamlike state of consciousness to new places, thought processes, or states of being. First, I discuss three poems in which transportive dream visions subvert the expectations, rooted in medieval dream poetry, for them: Percy Bysshe Shelley's "Queen Mab: A Philosophical Poem" (1813), Melesina Trench's "Laura's Dream; or, the Moonlanders" (1816), and Robert Browning's "Bad Dreams III" (1890). Next, I explore three poems in which altered state of consciousness takes the place of the supernatural: Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "Frost at Midnight" (1798), Alfred, Lord Tennyson's "The Lotos-Eaters" (1832), and Christina Rossetti's "Goblin Market" (1862),

The focus of chapter two is on the varied and shifting dynamics of dreams in nineteenth-century Gothic novels. This can be seen, first, in a comparison of the treatment of sympathy in Charles Dickens's *A Christmas Carol* (1843) and Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre* (1847). While these are very different novels, both center on the revelations generated through somnial scenes for which a key element is a nineteenth-century understanding of sympathy. In the second section of this chapter, I trace a striking shift in the use of dreams and somnial spaces through a study of Sir Walter Scott's *The Antiquary* (1816), Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (1818), and Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights* (1847). All three novels mobilize a generally overlooked convention that I have

observed in Gothic literary dreams, which I refer to as the "tandem dream sequence," but in different ways that illuminate the trajectory of the dream's role in the Gothic tradition.

In chapter three, I combine historicism with close reading. In the first section, I investigate a possible connection that I have found between the emergence of the private bedroom in middle-class Victorian homes and a concurrent shift in how Britons conceptualized their dreams. The environment in which these changes occurred also figures into this investigation, with particular attention to the issues of class, gender, and propriety. In the second section, the conceptual framework supporting the idea of the private bedroom informs my exploration of dreams and somnial spaces in Charles Dickens' *Dombey and Son* (1848). Here, too, the cultural context of class, gender, and propriety come to the fore. I focus on chapter 43, "The Watches of the Night," but place the scenes in context with the wider novel. Of particular interest in "The Watches of the Night" are, first, the somnial atmosphere, generated by dreamy nighttime reverie, sleep-watching, and portentous foreshadowing, and second, the optative [33]reflections that these spaces facilitate.

This application of historicism is crucial because Britons' views of actual dreams must have informed how they conceptualized literary ones, especially as the realist novel was emerging in the mid-nineteenth century (Watt 1957, 32). Of course, literary dreams can, like waking narratives, also be analyzed through symbolic analysis; the oneirocritical tradition dating back centuries has enforced this hermeneutic. But it is my contention that by failing to take the historical context of sleep, dreams, and somnial states in nineteenth-

[33] Andrew Miller applies the term "optative reflections" to "what if…" meditations on what might have been "had circumstances been different" (2007, 119).

century Great Britain into consideration, we miss essential elements of the dreams as well as the somnial[34] states and spaces in nineteenth-century British texts. I hope, like Alice in *Through the Looking-Glass*, to pass through the reflective surface of interpretive analysis and to explore what lies beyond.

[34] My use of the term "somnial," a term referring to that which is "Of or relating to dreams" ("Somnial, adj."), is informed by nineteenth-century conceptions of dreaming. For this reason, it is expanded to include not only sleeping dreams, but also a wide range of nebulous "dream states" (Vrettos 2002, 197) as well as literary scenes that adopt the characteristics of sleeping and waking dreams.

CHAPTER ONE

TRANSPORTIVE DREAM VISIONS IN ROMANTIC AND VICTORIAN POETRY

Even before the publication of Sigmund Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899), a shift was underway in the predominant thinking about what it meant to dream and what dreams could mean or do. In 1798, roughly one century earlier and the year in which William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge published *Lyrical Ballads*, the theories of natural philosophers had already gained a foothold over the early modern stance that the sleeping state made the soul vulnerable to the spiritual world. According to this belief, "sleepers were understood to travel" not only "between consciousness and unconsciousness" but also "between the earthly and supernatural realms, and between life and death on a nightly basis" (Handley 2016, 72). Through a dream, a sleeper could be transported to the spiritual realm, making the dream a potential medium for a premonitory vision, an encounter with a deceased loved one or with another spiritual or supernatural entity, or a sublime experience of heaven.

However, over the course of the Enlightenment, these ideas had become increasingly "marginalized and discredited" (Crary 2013, 105). Dreams, as conceptualized in the long nineteenth century, comprised the site of a collision between and coalescence of spiritual belief, superstition, and pre-Freudian scientific theory. For the latter, there was an increasing emphasis on, and intensification of, the role of the imagination as a disordering force. According to Walter Dendy and other natural philosophers, dreaming "never occurs in sound or perfect sleep" (1832, 19), connoting dreams with disorder.

Dreaming was considered the symptom of a disordered state of the body, mind, or soul. But dreams could also generate further disorder. The content of dreams was attributed to the recollected impressions from the preceding days, which the sleeping mind had “grotesquely associated” together in jumbled “trains” of thought “over which we have no control” (Newnham 1830, 179; Abercrombie 1839, 198; Newnham 167). The wildest dream might even take the dreamer into a “transient paroxysm of delirium" approaching “madness” (Macnish 1834, 45, 148).

I propose that this emphasis on the imagination as a disordering force and, as a result, its potential for subverting the rational conventions of waking reality, made the dream temptingly subversive territory for the Romantics. Romantic poets drew from and subverted the mythos surrounding the transportive dream vision, while Victorian poets, in turn, mobilized those elements to their own ends.

Two major approaches to the transportive dream vision emerge in these works: first, a subversion of the content expected within such a vision, as in Percy Bysshe Shelley’s “Queen Mab: A Philosophical Poem” (1813), Melesina Trench’s “Laura’s Dream; or, the Moonlanders” (1816), and Robert Browning’s “Bad Dreams III” (1890); and second, a morphing of the transportive dream vision's elements into the depiction of a somnial, or dreamlike, state within waking reality in the form of a reverie or trance, as in Coleridge's "Frost at Midnight" (1798), Alfred, Lord Tennyson's "The Lotos-Eaters" (1832), and Christina Rossetti's "Goblin Market" (1862).

I. MYTHOPOETIC CHANGES IN PERSPECTIVE IN PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY'S "QUEEN MAB"

An Atheistic Celestial Vision

In a subversion of expectations, Percy Bysshe Shelley depicts a grand celestial vision with an atheistic message in "Queen Mab: A Philosophical Poem" (1813). He conceived of and wrote "Queen Mab" between 1811 and 1813, and the message that it conveys against blindly following the authority of "priest, conqueror, or prince" (IV.237) resonates with the ideas in his concurrent works, *On the Necessity of Atheism* (1811) and *Declaration of Rights* (1812). That he would make his first major poem a nine-canto dream narrative in blank verse in order to explore these subversive ideas suggests an awareness that the dream, as it was conceived of in this period, had subversive potential.

To draw this out, he reimagines the fairy queen and contemporary dream mythos by calling on a combination of early modern beliefs and pre-Freudian scientific theories about sleep and dreams. The main character, Ianthe, is introduced through a description that likens sleep to death. Her deep slumber, which is so uninterrupted as to resemble death, is treated as an indication of a clear conscience, a "sinless soul" (I.17-18, 11). A disordered inner state is one of the causes that nineteenth-century dream theorists attributed to disrupted sleep (Newnham 1830, 160-61). Additionally, the emphasis on the connection between sleep and death invokes the premodern belief that sleep and dreams serve as a threshold between the living and the dead.

Recalling the early modern concept of the "power [of sleep] to transport men and women between the earthly kingdom and a … world of spirits" (Handley 2017, 30), a

supernatural entity appears to transport Ianthe to celestial realms: The mythical Queen Mab transports Ianthe's spirit into a celestial realm. Shelley intensifies the scenario by reimagining Queen Mab; in this case, she is not the small, trouble-making fairy described by Shakespeare as bringing fanciful dreams to sleepers in *Romeo and Juliet* (1597), but instead a powerful "Queen of spells" who detaches Ianthe's spirit from her body, proclaiming, "I am the Fairy Mab: to me 'tis given / The wonders of the human world to keep" (I.21, 63). She is, in Shelley's version, a powerful and potentially revolutionary figure.[35]

Her power to invoke images, scenes, and figures from the past functions in a manner akin to the work of the imagination in a dream as conceptualized by natural philosophers. Queen Mab seems to summon the contents of Ianthe's dream vision from a jumbled multiplicity of memories and trains of thought. Multiplicities of images and ideas co-exist in the space of a single dream, recalling what Gilles Deleuze characterizes as the *virtual*, a realm that is, in some ways, consistent with pre-Freudian characterizations of the potential of dream content. The virtual is a plane on which the intensities of the past—the recollected impressions to which natural philosophers refer (Newnham 179)—as well as ideas and affects unfold in a multiplicity of different combinations. The virtual is not a way of describing only the possible or the fake; rather,

[35] David Hartley's *Observations on Man* (1749), which Shelley read and thoroughly annotated (Wroe 2010; 40), describes dreaming in terms of an imagination run amuck. A forerunner to nineteenth-century dream theorists, Hartley emphasizes the "great Wildness and Inconsistency" created by the imagination's "association" of the dreamer's impressions and ideas (Hartley 385). In particular, Shelley makes special note of a passage on "'frightful dreams, agitations, oppressions' at night, which, because they cause uneasy states of body in the waking hours, 'leave vestiges of themselves'" that remain with the dreamer after they have awakened (Wroe 40). This suggests an interest in the potential of the dream to create a lasting impression— and, in literary form, possibly even to influence readers to effect political change.

it is considered real, even though it does not occur in the *actual* (1994a, 29-31), or in this case, even though it is not currently occurring in waking reality. This can foster new forms of thinking, as multiplicities can replace the binary dialectics that typically govern reason and language in the waking world. In a coincidentally appropriate turn of phrase, Deleuze writes, "One of the essential characteristics of the dream of multiplicity is that each element ceaselessly varies" (1987, 30).

In "Queen Mab," the elements that Ianthe is shown do ceaselessly vary. The eruption of multiplicities emerging from impressions of the past, the present, and the imagined, especially as these elements are injected into the celestial vision, guide her to engage in subversive thought. This vision, facilitated and guided by a revolutionary-minded Queen Mab, is inhabited not only by the ideas from Ianthe's own mind, as when she recollects seeing an atheist burned as a child (VII.2), but also by the supernatural entity of the fairy queen and, therefore, any ideas, images, or other entities that she chooses to reveal or to conjure. With the flick of her wand, Queen Mab summons and then waves away the phantasmal Ahaseurus, who seems to be a representation of Xerxes.

After he shares his dark interpretation of God and the world, he is made to vanish again as "Fast as the shapes of mingled shade and mist … Flee from the morning beam: / The Matter of which dreams are made / Not more endowed with actual life / Than this phatasmal portraiture / Of wandering human thought" (VII.266-75). In this dream, Ahaseurus appears only to be real insofar as he is a real idea— that is, as an element of the virtual, but not of the actual. The dream encapsulates the potential of the supernatural, following early modern belief, to enter dreams, but also of the imagination to influence dream content, as was argued by nineteenth-century natural philosophers (Dendy 1834,

41).[36] Thus, the indeterminate space of the dream, through the coalescence of these influences, becomes a virtual realm.

Multiplicities of the Virtual

Remarkably, the multiplicities within this celestial vision center not on the celestial, but instead on the human. In a sudden turn, the fairy queen shifts the focus of the virtual dreamscape from the grandeur of the heavens to the temporality of earth. After gazing upon "the immense of Heaven" and finally arriving at the "Hall of Spells" (II.42), Queen Mab calls Ianthe's attention away from it, noting that the "pleasurable impulses" to be found in the "celestial palace" would immure them in a sort of "prison" (II.60-61). Instead, Queen Mab has brought her spirit to this place because only "a spirit's eye" could recognize the world, and they could "behold / Each action of this earth's inhabitants" from "no other place / But that celestial dwelling" (II.85-87).

In these "aerial mansions," where multiplicities of ideas from the past and from the imagination can ceaselessly vary, "matter, space and time … cease to act" (II.90-91). As Queen Mab tells her, "the past shall rise," and Ianthe shall "behold the present" and learn "The secrets of the future" (II.65-67). Looking upon the world is intended to cause Ianthe to gaze inward as well, so that she can "Learn to make others happy," take in the fairy's lessons about Heaven and Hell on earth, and through virtue, "pursue / The gradual paths of an aspiring change" that must, in turn, change the world around her (II.63, IX.147-48). This transportive dream vision thus initiates a Deleuzean "line of flight,"

[36] See the introduction for a discussion of nineteenth-century natural philosophers' dream theories.

moving through the virtual and leading to a "change in assemblage" (Deleuze 1987, 438) in Ianthe, with the hope that, once changed, she will play the role of a human Queen Mab in the world.

This dramatic shift from gazing upon heavenly grandeur to gazing outward and inward resonates with the mythopoetic shift whereby Romantic poets were reimagining what Northrop Frye describes as the "traditional metaphors of the Western world" (1968, 31). The conventional Western metaphor of the "great chain of being"—an inherently hierarchical relationship in which humanity stands above nature but looks upward to the divine—was, during the Romantic era, being supplanted by the theory of the "great chain of life." By contrast, the great chain of life can be envisioned as a horizontal chain connecting humanity with the natural world and focusing the gaze inward rather than upward (Gaull 1988, 352-53). Queen Mab's act to change their perspective from the celestial to the human sets the stage for further mythopoetic reimagining.

Shelley takes advantage of the virtuality of the dreamscape to create a space in which new metanarratives, or interpretive myths, are acted out and applied to human history—and, more specifically, to humanity's relationship to the divine, to one another, and to nature. For instance, the view seems to zoom in and out, just as the passage of time seems to be able to speed up or down. First, Ianthe witnesses one great civilization after another rise and fall through history. Then, the series of varying structures of authority, the greatness of which are undercut by the weaknesses of man, compels her to view not only her own civilization, but humanity itself, as *other*.

In a reversal, the view zooms in, so that even "the smallest particle" can be seen as a great civilization (II.232), and then zooms out to focus on the corruption of a single

king, who serves as an example for others in power, to reveal the corruption of power. This king, like his ancestors and descendants, struggles to achieve "one moment / Of dreamless sleep" as a result of his troubled conscience (III.66-67)—again associating dreamless and, therefore, "perfect," untroubled sleep to a virtuous soul and unclouded mind (Dendy 1832, 19; Macnish 1834, 40). The king cannot give up "The scorpion that consumes," so his soul cannot assert its humanity (III.87, 92). The incompatibility of power and virtue becomes a central focus of the poem (III.98, 150-153).

Affective Fluidity

Transitions between these myriad civilizations, between the cantos that follow, and between shifts in ideas and images of "life, in multitudinous shapes" (VI.235), more generally, are facilitated by the fluidity of time and space through which Ianthe can view a "flood of ages combating below" (II.254). One component of this is the sense of immediacy produced by the fact that this is not a conversation in which Ianthe is recounting the dream as a memory to be described upon awakening. Unlike most poems about dreaming, this is narrated instead as an experience that unfolds on the page for the reader. Another element of this sense of fluidity is the affective quality of Queen Mab's form of education; ideas and emotions can jump from one to the next as in a dream, and Ianthe's spirit is characterized as having "*felt* / All knowledge of the past revived" (II.244-47, emphasis added).

The sensations that make this virtual space possible are also generated through references to the movement of water, to a slippage of time that organizes Ianthe's single night of dreaming into several, and to repeated references to dreams and the fancy. The

ocean, tempests, waves, and other forms of water are repeatedly referenced, enhancing the sense of fluidity that governs the rapid variations as well as the affective intensities that accompany them; one standout, for example, is the "flood of ages" (I.116, III.136, IV.29, VII.225). The ocean and the sky are portrayed similarly, with the universe characterized as having a "depth" of unboundedness at one point (II.255).

In addition, the series of days that pass within this single night have a similar function in navigating the affective experience for Ianthe as well as for the reader. Often these references convey hope, as in references to "tomorrow" (IV.25) or to the "brighter morning" that "awaits" (V.251). And the repeated references to sleep and dreams over the course of the poem, such as the phrase "lulled to their portioned sleep," contribute to, and intensify, the somnial sensation of the vision (VIII.7). Combinations of the three appear as well, as in "the slumbering sea" (VIII.24). This sense of fluidity also resonates with the ripples or waves in which affect might be transmitted.

Such allusions act as an affective shorthand by which changes in mood, tone, and perspective can occur in a manner that feels seamless and is organic to the movement through the narrative, which might, considering the number of scenes and ideas covered, otherwise seem disjointed.

These create a space in which Shelley can engage in a mythopoetic reimagining that culminates in a vision of hope for the future and a call to action. In Wordsworthian fashion, Shelley depicts nature as inherently good, with a divine quality of its own (III.191-92), in a striking contrast to the corruption of the world of humanity (V.147-162). As the dream narrative unfolds, the mythos that Shelley is dramatizing becomes

clearer and more explicit, with a description of man growing up and becoming more corrupt, along with a narrative of how man "makes" God to gain power (VI.101-110).

Subverting Authority

Shelley highlights this corruption as an inherent concern not just attendant upon civilizations overall, but upon authority figures, specifically, whether "priest, conqueror, or prince" (IV.237). It seems to be wrong even to hold such a position because those who do so inevitably embrace power for themselves and fail to combat oppression. Furthermore, those who have held these positions of power have used God as an excuse for violence, making God a means of oppression. Heaven and hell also come increasingly to the fore at the midpoint of the poem, which Shelley conceptualizes not as places in the tradition of Western Christianity, but rather, as states that one can inhabit, affectively and spiritually, while on earth (IV.210-229, VI.70-71). The conclusion, which turns the focus onto the future, is hopeful. Yet while there is an effort to make it affectively powerful—and a vivid description of Ianthe finding it so—this hopeful passage is not nearly as long or as specific as the darker characterizations of past and present.

Ultimately, Shelley merges elements of early modern and nineteenth-century scientific dream theories to reimagine the mythos of Queen Mab; figures of authority, especially those in Western Christian orthodoxy; and the transportive dream vision itself. His powerful version of Queen Mab guides a young woman's soul through a transportive dream vision, so that she can attain an enlightened spiritual state, which turns out to embrace atheism—and the fairy queen transports her to the heavens not to look upon them, but instead to gain a new perspective on the world.

II. Memory and Affect in Melesina Trench's The Moonlanders

The Intensity of the Fever Dream

Melesina Trench's "Laura's Dream; or, The Moonlanders" (1816) is another transportive dream vision that unfolds through a dialogue primarily featuring two female characters, one of whom is the dreamer, but it is entirely focused on the dream vision's location in space.[37] But the content is also not what readers would likely have expected from a celestial dream vision.

Like Percy Bysshe Shelley's "Queen Mab: A Philosophical Poem" (1813), "The Moonlanders" invokes the early modern belief that one is especially vulnerable to spiritual forces while asleep—spiritual forces that could facilitate an interaction with the divine or deceased, or a voyage to glimpse heaven itself, as in William Blake's "The Chimney Sweeper" (1789a) and "The Land of Dreams" (1789b). In each case, the dreaming protagonist's proximity to death—either being close to dying or having had a loved one recently die—is the reason for each of their respective visions of heaven. As in such poems, "The Moonlanders" begins by establishing that Laura has been very ill (I.31-34), and if her illness is grave enough to have brought her close to death, then a genuinely divine vision might seem plausible.

A scenario in which a young woman who is close to death has a celestial vision would have created expectations of glimpses of the divine, as the report of a divine vision

[37] Although Trench is unlikely to have read "Queen Mab" (1813) while writing "The Moonlanders" (1816) (Behrendt 2019, 76), her work shares several similarities with "Queen Mab"; the transportive dream vision is a dream of slumber, unfolded for the reader primarily through a dialogue between two female characters, and the protagonist is a young woman whose dream transports her into space.

would still have conjured early modern associations. However, Laura is not given a glimpse of heaven by an angelic host anxious to soothe her fears of death; instead, she is transported to an Edenic arcadia on the moon. Even though this idyllic environment is not the afterlife qua Western Christianity, it is "*a* blooming Eden," albeit, again, not *the* Eden (220, emphasis added). And while Laura's experience is not with an angel or a deceased beloved family member, she meets the spiritually and emotionally enlightened moonlanders, and she experiences a way of life that is more joyous and virtuous than that found in human societies. Unlike the anti-divine celestial vision in Shelley's "Queen Mab," "The Moonlanders" does not explicitly oppose the idea of the divine. But like Shelley, Trench does reimagine the mythos associated with the celestial dream vision.

Intriguingly, Trench embraces the ambiguity inherent in the beliefs and theories surrounding dreams, as Laura's account of her dream is prefaced by an explanation for it that is scientific rather than supernatural. She has had a fever, and as her mother tells her that the vividness and intensity of her dream are likely the products of the "Phantoms of a wand'ring brain" which have "sprung from [her] pain" (Trench 1816, I.35, 12, 11). Along somewhat similar lines, according to David Hartley (1791), fever can cause fitful or unnaturally disorienting, deep sleep akin to the drugged sleep caused by "opiates," although "Fever" can also cause "Delirium" (54-55). This also echoes the common observation by nineteenth-century natural philosophers that, in the words of W. Newnham, the "dreams of disease" often "present a great variety" (1830, 160-61).[38] Robert Macnish also highlights the affective intensity of such dreams, writing that "the

[38] Although Trench would not have read these later works of natural philosophy, they demonstrate the current of trends in scientific dream theory. As natural philosophers were influenced by one another, these suggest which ideas were likely rising in dominance in the period preceding their publication.

visions … which occur in a state of fever are highly distressing" (1834, 66). The illness that has brought Laura close to death, potentially increasing her likelihood to receive a celestial visitation, has also supplied a reason to believe that the dream was the product of her fevered imagination.

Despite the fact that the dream's intensity could, counterintuitively, invalidate it as a genuine vision, it is also this intensity that poses the strongest counterargument to discrediting it. Laura's intense emotional response makes her feel certain of its reality, and as she recounts the dream, its vividness leads her mother to find it increasingly compelling as well.

The sense of reality that Laura experiences in the vision extends to smelling appealing aromas, eating and tasting, drinking, and falling asleep within the dream, only to reawaken still within it, multiple times. Laura even has a dream while asleep, ostensibly, on the moon. This second dream closely resembles what one would expect of a typical, non-supernatural dream, as it consists of fragments of her past recollections and thoughts (II.25-34), making the contrast between it and Laura's time on the moon more striking and thereby lending further credence to the idea that her voyage to the moon was truly a transportive vision. Ultimately, Laura's intense emotional response to her time with the moonlanders leaves her changed, possibly forever (II.308-13).

The Spirit Guide

And yet even though the dream has such an impact on Laura, her experiences on the moon do not appear to have been orchestrated with the express purpose of achieving this. There is no evidence that Laura has been summoned to, or has herself invoked, the

vision of the moonlanders.[39] Shelley's fairy queen selects Ianthe because her soul, in its "naked purity," has been "Judged alone worthy of the envied boon" of the knowledge that, through the perspective gained by leaving earth, has the potential to improve human civilizations (I.132, 123).

Such rationale is absent from "The Moonlanders"; there does not seem to be a reason for Laura, specifically, to be transported to the moon, and Aurelio, the moonlander who serves as her guide, seems to lack the clarity of purpose of a Queen Mab figure. He does make sure that Laura is cared for and directs her attention to specific scenes, as when he takes her hand and, "with mild command," takes her to witness the birth of a moonlander who is emerging from the soil (I.259, 258). But his direction never reaches the level of Queen Mab's dramatic, repeated commands to Ianthe to "Behold … Behold! … Behold! …" (II.109, 111, 112). Moreover, whereas Ianthe's vision is meant to promote progress on earth, Laura's focus remains on the moon rather than on any positive changes that she might be able to make in the world as a result of her celestial vision. Instead of conveying a message, the conceit of the transportive dream vision allows Trench to imagine a place that is not Heaven, but for which the environment is celestial and ideal.

[39] This is unlike the transportive visions that William Blake's child characters have of heaven, Ianthe's transportive vision in "Queen Mab," or even the reverie-turned-transportive-vision in Anne Laetitia Barbauld's "A Summer Evening's Meditation" (1773). Even Barbauld, who envisions herself transported through space, can, as the driving force of her own reverie, imagine a vision that answers her own curiosities, desires, or wonder. And of course, the boys in Blake's "The Chimney Sweeper" and "The Land of Dreams" receive much needed comfort when death is near. Similarly, in Blake's "Milton: A Poem" (1810), the fictionalized Milton is guided to revelatory enlightenment through a vision that is uniquely meaningful to him.

The English Dream Vision Poem

In fact, the focus on visiting the moon might follow more closely in the tradition of seventeenth-century lunar voyage texts (Kittredge 2007, 19) than that of celestial dream visions. But the work does also adopt the conventions of medieval English dream vision poetry (Behrendt 2019, 76). Following these conventions, "The Moonlanders" consists of a dream report, which unfolds in verse and is structured as J. Stephen Russell describes the genre: The poem begins with an introductory frame narrative, transitions into the report of the dream, and ends with a brief epilogue, which often leaves the ending of the dream and any resulting resolution or conclusion in a fragmented state (Russell 1988, 5-6).[40]

Along these lines, "The Moonlanders" has just such a hasty, fragmented ending, as Laura's departure from the moon occurs suddenly, and the cause of it is debatable. Having come to love Aurelio, Laura is struck with jealousy at the realization that a recently born female moonlander is meant to be Aurelio's soulmate. Jealousy cannot be sustained in the idyllic environment of the moon: "On that fair orb, so near to Heaven, / No second pain was ever given. / This jealous anguish could not last" (II.300-02). Then, "In one wild moment all was past" (II.303). It is possible that the feeling of jealousy has been extinguished, the idyllic environment of the moon changing Laura, as Stephen Behrendt argues (2019, 79). But it is also possible that, as Katharine Kittredge contends (2007, 29), the fact that such an emotion cannot be sustained in this environment means

[40] While "Queen Mab" achieves immediacy through the fact that the narrative occurs in real time, and the dialogue is not the recounting of the dream, but rather the conversations of the characters in it, Trench's poem, like Blake's two poems about children having visions of heaven, holds to the convention of the "dream report," the dreamer's recounting of their dream which structures medieval dream vision poetry.

that Laura must automatically be expelled from it. Kittredge's argument is convincing, considering the rapidness of Laura's departure: "Sleep on my senses softly stole, / And hushed the tempest of my soul, / Till wafted from that happy seat, / I wakened at my Mother's feet" (II.303-07). Although the tempest of her soul is hushed, the work ends on a disheartening note, with Laura asserting that her life on earth can never make her as happy as her time on the moon, for she now "can only wish to live / While she [Memory] her charmed cup will give" (II.312-13).

Laura is not left with an impulse to facilitate revolution and progress on earth, as seems to be the case at the end of "Queen Mab," and despite her soul's tempest being hushed, she does not even seem to have overcome her jealousy of Aurelio's partner. But she also does not make a frenzied attempt to record her memories of the moonscape, in case she begins to forget them, or to think of rebuilding a similar paradise on earth, as Samuel Taylor Coleridge feels a compulsion to do at the end of "Kubla Khan; Or, A Vision in a Dream" (1816a, 42-43, 45).[41] Laura's memory of the moon, the affective intensity that it has induced, and her inability to shift her focus from it seem, together, to render such action unnecessary.

Instead, Laura's memories will serve as sustenance for her time on earth, and although this might not be entirely positive, it is incredibly similar to the role that memory plays in William Wordsworth's conception of the pastoral reverie. For Wordsworth, "Those shadowy recollections, / Which, be they what they may, / Are yet

[41] Trench's arcadian scene is not the pleasure dome that Coleridge envisions in "Kubla Khan" (1816), nor does Trench make herself the dreamer-poet as Coleridge does, but the speaker in each poem emphasize the importance of recalling the dream later. For Coleridge, this centers on a failure to remember: "Could I revive within me / Her symphony and song … I would build that dome in air" (42-43, 45).

the fountain-light of all our day, / Are yet a master-light of all our seeing; / Uphold us—cherish— and have power…" ("Intimations Ode" 1807; VI.2-6). Even after he has left the harmonious state of reverie, then, Wordsworth is able to relive those sentiments through the power of memory. Laura's celebration of memory positions it more as a sustaining force than a light: "To Memory shall Laura raise / The votive hymn of prayer and praise, / For I can only wish to live / While she her charmed cup will give" (II.310-13). But both cherish their memories of a way of living connected with nature and childlike innocence.

Wordsworthian Affective Attunement

This is not the only similarity between "The Moonlanders" and Wordsworth's depictions of recollecting his time spent in nature. Laura's dream, while not itself a reverie, adopts the characteristics of a Wordsworthian reverie inspired by nature. For Wordsworth, the affective connection that he feels in nature is spiritually uplifting. In "The World Is Too Much with Us" (1802), he articulates humanity's capacity for connecting with the natural world in terms of being in tune, or musically attuned, to it: "For this, for everything, we are out of tune; / It moves us not…" (8-9). Humanity's alienation from nature amounts to a sort of musical dissonance. The moonlanders' way of life provides a solution to this dissonance, as they are "attuned to milder sweeter grace" (I.60). Their actions and feelings even emit scents and music; in fact, Laura realizes that Aurelio loves his moonlander soulmate because he is "Diffusing as he floats along / 'The floods of odor and of song'" (I.145-46). Moreover, the moonlanders live in harmony with nature, both figuratively and literally. As they move through their environment, branches

move out of their way at the touch of a hand, and birds fan them and bring them berries when they sense that these services are needed (I.262, 78, 87). Through a state that might be described as perpetual reverie, the moonlanders commune with and understand their world through affect, and for this reason, they do not need to speak (II.155).

The dialectical process of using language, or any sort of representational analysis, dissipates affect by mediating one's experience of it. Eric Shouse describes affect as an experience of "intensity" that is "always prior to and/or outside of conscious awareness" (2005).[42] Dreams have the power to suppress dialectical thought, and in this dream vision, the moonlanders are able to navigate their world through their expressions of, and responses to, affect alone. There is a form of affect transmission between them; this occurs when "one intensity is folded into another" (Shouse). The moonlanders interact with their natural environment through these affectively intense interactions through which they remain in harmony with one another. Everything and everyone capable of experiencing affect is attuned to one another, and their affect transmission seems integral to the virtue and joy that fill their life in this environment.

This perfect attunement seems to result not only from the goodness of the moonlanders, but also from the fact that the natural world on the moon is different from nature on earth. First, it is non-violent, resolving the problem that Blake identifies with viewing nature as a perfect representation or embodiment of the divine. His poem "Night" (1789) highlights the violence that is inherent even in the natural world, a fact

[42] Although the terms "affect," "feelings," and "emotion" are generally used interchangeably, the non-conscious quality of affect differentiates it from feelings, which are "personal and biographical," and from emotion, which is "the projection/display of a feeling." While emotion can play a performative role in social interactions, the social encounters themselves are embedded in a pre-personal, "non-conscious experience" of affect, or "intensity" (Shouse).

that causes the angels to weep, affirming that even the harm that carnivorous animals must do to one another to survive is contrary to the spirit of the "blessing" that angels "pour" over the creatures as they sleep (9-10, 25, 15-16). The living creatures on the moon are neither carnivorous nor violent. Second, there is no decay or death, processes upon which the natural world on earth is reliant (I.187-88). Instead, the moonlanders' mode of life appears to be "Reversing Nature's general law," as their birth consists of emerging from the clay, and they begin life looking aged and grow younger as they increase in spiritual development over time (II.99). This disrupts, or at least reverses, the linear notion of temporality that governs waking reality on earth, recalling Andrew Lang's remark that "in dreams, time and space are annihilated" (1899, 3). The earthly temporal marker of time, age, does not apply in the same way on the moon.

This association of youth with goodness presents yet another connection to William Wordworth's philosophy. For Wordsworth, the capacity for experiencing an intense, close, uplifting connection with nature is dependent not only on a poetic sensibility, but also on a connection to a sense of innocence intrinsic to childhood, which carries with it a sensation of dreaminess that he describes as as "The glory and the freshness *of a dream*" (I.5, emphasis added) in "Ode: Intimations of Immortality" (1807). This is connected to childhood and the divine: "Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting … But trailing clouds of glory do we come / … / Heaven lies about us in our infancy!" (V.1, 7-9). As the child grows older, his age, or rather the worldliness that accompanies it, alienates him from nature and its dreamy sensations. When the child learns to "fit his tongue / To dialogues of business" (V.13-14), he mediates the sensations through which he has communed with nature through language. This recalls the dampening effect of

dialectical thought on affective intensity. As Brian Massumi explains, affect is "an unmediated experience," the intensity of which can be diminished even by the use of language, which hinges on dialectical thinking (2002, 2, 86).

One leaves behind the "glory and the dream" of a harmonious coexistence with nature for life in the world, with its dialectical mediation of "dialogues" (IV.22). The uncorrupted, or at least less corrupt, childhood vision is the ideal lens for perceiving the divine in nature, a sensation to which Wordsworth attributes the sensation of dreaminess: "There was a time when meadow, grove, and stream … To me did seem / Apparell'd in *celestial light*, / The glory and the freshness *of a dream*" (I.1, 2-5, emphasis added). "The Moonlanders" presents a literal version of this idea that communing with nature connects one to the divine within nature. First, they are born by emerging from the soil—that is, from nature. And then, through a reversal of the development of the child in the poem, who loses his connection with nature over time, the moonlanders grow younger through the spiritual enlightenment that they maintain through affective connection with the natural world.[43]

[43] However, as Kittredge and Behrendt point out, even though the moonlanders live in harmony with one another and their environment, their society remains hierarchical, a point where Trench's imagination fails to transcend the internalized conventions of nineteenth-century Great Britain. Not only are the birds and plants subservient to the humanoid moonlanders; the female moonlanders seem to be under the dominion of their male counterparts. All moonlanders have soulmates, with whom they will live forever, but the female moonlanders emerge after their male counterparts, recalling the creation of man in the Biblical Eden, where Eve is created after, because she is created for, Adam (I.145-46).

Moreover, the male moonlander is born with wings, whereas his female counterpart only gains her wings when, united with him, she is ready to rise from that plane of the moon into an even more enlightened, purer plane. She does not grow wings until the couple is at an apex of spiritual enlightenment and about to transition to a higher plane of enlightenment; in this moment, her wings appear once the male moonlander gazes upward to Heaven and lays his hand on her head (I.184-86). The order and manner of this process suggest that the male acts as a mediator between the female moonlanders and the divine.

Reimagining Society and Bearing Affect

In addition to mobilizing the Wordsworthian idea of dreaminess as an affectively intense sensation attendant upon one's communion with nature, Trench associates affective intensity with dreaming through her use of different forms of the same word. I propose that her uses of the verb "bear," the past tense "bore," and the past participle "borne" evoke connotative associations among the three. First, Trench uses the word "borne" to describe the sensation of being carried away. Laura experiences this sensation when she first begins to dream and is "borne" to the higher sphere of life on the moon (I.24). Then, she experiences it again when she has a dream while still inhabiting the moon during the primary dream vision. She is "On memory's painted pinions *borne*" into the dream within her dream (II.29, emphasis added). She might have been "borne" to the moon by a winged moonlander, emphasizing the sensations of transport to which Trench ascribes Laura's passage into her dreams, but there is no mention of this occurring. On the other hand, since the way in which she is transported is an affective, rather than a literally transportive, experience, this also calls to mind the idea of a "transportive" experience being one that evokes affect. Unlike Ianthe in "Queen Mab," Laura does not travel into the depths of space on a carriage from which she can admire the views en route, but there is still a feeling of being supernaturally, or affectively, transported when she begins to dream.

A second way in which Trench uses a form of the word "bear" is in her description of the birth of a new moonlander. Since this process consists of them emerging out of the "maternal clay" of the moon, the female moonlanders attend the newly emerged beings but do not give birth to them in a biological sense. In fact, the

word “born” is conspicuously absent from the actual birth, or emergence, of the nascent moonlander. Witnessing one of these clay births, Laura recounts that upon the moonlander’s emergence from the soil, the female moonlanders “*bore* him” together to the place where they would care for him (I.343). Childbirth is transformed into a literal act of carrying, a duty shared by a group of female moonlanders, who despite not having given birth to him, treat the nascent moonlander with “soft maternal tenderness” (I.330, 343-46). They do not seem to be nurses, nannies, or governesses, although they care for him communally. In this manner, Trench diverges from both human physiology and nineteenth-century conventions of motherhood.

The most evocative way in which a form of the word “bear” appears in the poem is in the context of affect. This happens multiple times: Laura describes her happiness on the moon in terms of her soul’s inability “To *bear* the bliss it cannot speak” and characterizes the sweet scents as “too exquisite to *bear*” (I.207, 214-17, emphasis added). And most significantly, when Laura is beginning to tell her mother about her experiences with the moonlanders, she expresses the need to be taught “how to *bear* the joys of Heaven” (I.24, emphasis added). This line closely resembles the black child’s words in William Blake’s “The Little Black Boy” (1789), as Behrendt points out (84). In the poem, the boy repeats his mother’s lesson that “we are put on earth a little space, / That we may learn to *bear* the beams of [God’s] love” before moving on to Heaven (13-14, emphasis added). In “The Little Black Boy,” as in “The Moonlanders,” the speaker of the poem must learn to bear celestial joys while on earth. However, there is an implication in Laura’s case that the heavenly is not yet to come, but has passed from her life, possibly forever or, at least, as long as she lives (II.312-13).

In this manner, Trench displaces the idea of bearing a child[44] into the contexts of being transported into a potentially transcendent state or, at least, a more enlightened realm, communally carrying a weight, and bearing intense emotions.[45] The repeated uses of three very similar-sounding forms of the same word creates a connotative association between them in the mind. Passage into the higher, Edenic realm by, in Laura's case, entering a higher, somnial realm becomes associated with bearing the weight of an intense affective experience, both of which might be communal endeavors.

The last seems to be the most relevant to the state in which Laura is left—overcome with her memory of the moonlanders, which both sustains her through her ordinary life and seems to create the need for that sustenance through the contrast of her quotidian waking life with the Edenic life on the moon. She might never again be attuned to the environment on the moon, and ironically, this is a direct result of the emotional state that being there evoked.

Memory and Affect

Ultimately, through this amalgamation of divine vision and space voyage, "The Moonlanders" presents a larger question about memory and affect. Trench plays out Wordsworth's template of invoking a state of reverie through a divine communion with nature and then recollecting on its memory to bring about another contented reverie later on. However, she shifts it to a context in which these elements are intensified—as the

[44] Although the summary under the heading "CANTO FIRST" describes the moonlanders as being "born," this form of the word is conspicuously absent from the poem itself.

[45] Trench's own physically and emotionally difficult experiences with childbirth and her grief over the deaths of multiple children might have influenced her reimagining of birth (Kittredge 33). I hypothesize that this might also have led her to displace the idea of childbirth onto these other forms of the word.

environment and its inhabitants are so idyllic, even childlike, as to make the moon Edenic—and Laura's emotions are likewise intensified. Joyful memories are placed in stark relief with an unhappy present, and the way in which it is borne is likened to the pain and joy of childbirth—a situation salient for Trench, who chose to forego conventional approach to motherhood in favor of cultivating an exceptionally close relationship with her son and then, after his death, grieved by journalling about her memories of him (Kittredge 19, 31). In "The Moonlanders," the focus on the moonlanders' joyful state of existence, temporarily experienced by Laura through her transportive dream vision, becomes a meditation about, and a vehicle for questioning, how to bear the memories of emotionally intense experiences.

Although "Queen Mab" and "The Moonlanders" do not offer visions of heaven or messages from God, both poems are celestial insofar as they transport the dreamer through the heavens as well as to a higher plane of enlightenment. In "Queen Mab," the chariot's position in the heavens provides a superior perspective on the world, whereas in "The Moonlanders," the view is of the celestial body itself, which offers a superior perspective on how to live than would be possible in the world. But transporting the dreamer through the heavens enables these poems to retain the connotation with the divine which early modern belief ascribed to revelatory dreams.

Moreover, despite the fact that the supernatural entities facilitating these visions are not the angels of Blake's "The Chimney Sweeper" (1789) or "Night" (1794), nor the beneficent ghosts of a Gothic tale such as Clara Reeve's *The Old English Baron* (1777) or Ann Radcliffe's *The Romance of the Forest* (1791), the revelations, or experiences, can be said to come from outside the dreamer. In this way, it bears a strong similarity to

the supernatural dream of the magico-theological tradition. In Laura's case, the subtext underlying Trench's word play—that ascension through bearing an intense affective weight, with communal assistance—might, to some degree, leave space for indeterminacy. But if one is to believe her assertion that she was literally transported to the moon, then the affective experiences have also been brought out by the external influence of living among the moonlanders.

III. Challenging Revelations in Robert Browning's "Bad Dreams III"

Self-Revealing Visions

Robert Browning's "Bad Dreams" series—which comprises the context for "Bad Dreams III" (1899), the poem on which this section will focus—marks a further departure from the early modern paradigm of the dream vision. Namely, the revelations, such as they are, come from within, and there is no identifiable guide or messenger to lead the dreamer to enlightenment. In this sense, the series produces an intensification of the inward identity-seeking that Northrop Frye observes in Romantic poetry (1968, 31). The reactions that the dreams evoke in the man, in particular, do tend to reveal more about him—and, due to the poems' ambiguous and polysemous nature, possibly also more about some of the readers who are analyzing them—than about truths external to the self. But despite this tendency toward symbolic interpretation of the unconscious, the "Bad Dreams" series repeatedly underscores the unreliability of symbolic interpretation.

In fact, the "Bad Dreams" poems challenge the notion that the dream state can serve as a medium for the divine or the deceased to convey revelations. This is perhaps

unsurprising, considering Browning's disapproval of spiritualist trends of the period, such as seances (Thomas 1989; Casey 2009), and the struggle to attain revelations which emerges in his poem "Reverie": "For a veil is rent between / Me and the truth which passed / Fitful, half-guessed, half-seen, / Grasped at—not gained, held fast" (V.2-5). In this light, these dreams are "bad" not only because of how they make the dreamer feel, but also because they are forced into the form of a revelatory dream, when they might not contain revelations or any revelations they do contain have been misunderstood.

Exploring Potential

Each poem in the series features a different dream, ostensibly recounted in a conversation between a man and a woman who seem to be lovers and are likely married (Schwarz 1980, 400). The dream report, as it had been codified in the medieval dream vision poem (Russell 1988, 5-6), serves as a vessel for each of Browning's fragmented dramatic monologues. But Browning fragments the poems themselves to the extent that it can even be difficult to discern who is speaking; in the case of "Bad Dreams III," for example, the person describing the dream might be the woman rather than the man, as is generally assumed.

The first two to three poems consist of the man's dream reports, with the exception of the last three stanzas of "Bad Dreams II," in which the woman responds and briefly summarizes a dream of her own. Her response is likely provoked by the fact that the man is expressing anger toward her for something that she did in his dream. He says, "The fact and each circumstance / Dare you disown? Not you!" (II.1-2). The fact that the events happened in a dream does not deter him from suspecting her and demanding an apology: "'A mere dream'— never object! / *Sleep leaves a door on hinge* / Whence soul,

ere our flesh suspect, / Is *off and away*" (XV.2-5, emphasis added). This justification recalls the early modern notion that dreams can reveal truths as a result of "sleep's power to transport men and women [in their dreams] between the earthly kingdom and a transcendent magical world of spirits" (Handley 2016, 30).

On the surface, his anger at her for something she did in a dream is obviously ludicrous. On the other hand, the revelation that the man has just gained from the dream preceding this one does, at least initially, seem to have some veracity to it. In "Bad Dreams I," he dreams that his lover has ceased to care for him, telling him, "Faith gone, love estranged" (I.4), and that he continues to love her, anyway. In the dream and in the moments of first awakening, he is relieved both that her love is not estranged and that, even if it were, his love for her would endure. His strong affective response to the short nightmare leads him to conclude that he would continue to love her, even if this were to happen in waking reality (II: 3-4).

The dream serves as a practice drill for waking reality, a space of potential for a hypothetical "What if?" scenario. The dream creates a space for what Andrew Miller terms "optative reflections," or meditations on how one's identity might be different "had circumstances been different" (2007, 119). Because he reacts with steadfast love in the dream, when disbelief is suspended and he believes that the event has really occurred, he feels that he has uncovered insight into himself. The revelation that "Bad Dreams I" offers is one of self-discovery, making it a revelatory dream only in the sense that it leads him to experience an epiphany. It is the affective response that holds weight, not an interpretation of symbols. The latter would mediate affect; as Gilles Deleuze writes, "All

signs are signs of signs" (1987, 112), whereas affective intensity is, in Eric Shouse's words, "always prior to and/or outside of conscious awareness" (2005).

Unfortunately, "Bad Dreams II" essentially calls his bluff, soon casting doubt on his constancy and, as a result, also the use of dreams to gain insight in such a manner. He believes his lover to have betrayed him, although what exactly he believes her to have done is unclear because the situation is permeated in images that can only be read as metaphorical. One might take the description of the "Devil's palace ring," where "his Damned amused their king," at face value (VIII.4-5), concluding that the man has "dreamed of her taking part in an orgiastic dance in hell" (Schwarz 1980, 402). This is possible, but the overall scene, with a group of dancers that is "a— possibly festive crew!" (II.5), might also satirize the conventions of marriage arrangements not based on love. The ball, as a social engagement in which eligible men and women would interact, is a fitting setting for such a dream. The reciprocal movements of the people's "Hands and feet" in the dance signal their intentions for "plighting troth," even though the "partners [are] enforced and loth [loathe]" to participate (III.4-5). The women are "trulls" because there is an exchange. The devil is present at this spectacle, but even worse, so is his lover. "Bad Dreams II" is an elaboration on "Bad Dreams I," the accusation originating in the man's fear that she does not actually love him.

The fact that the poem does not end with the accusation, but instead with the woman's response, makes it possible to read the dream not only as a reflection of unconscious fears about waking reality, but perhaps more importantly, as the impetus for an affective response, an emotionally charged scene, and a part of a larger conversation. Along these lines, "Bad Dreams IV" provides a more complete response from the woman

than do the stanzas at the end of "Bad Dreams II." In "Bad Dreams IV," the woman narrates a dream in which she is a ghost, and her lover, who has come to clean her gravestone, is feeling regret for his verbal abuse and finally realizing her value. She addresses him as "you" as she begins to recount the dream, but in the second stanzas, enters a more detached mode and characterizes him in the third person: "That strong stern man my lover came: / — Was he my lover?" (I.4, II.1-2).

This shift creates a sense of dreamy indeterminacy while also subtly posing the question of whether his treatment of her has been loving. At the culmination of the dream, the woman's ghost strives to communicate with him, but is unable to do so. In this hypothetical situation, the revelatory dream fails in a different way, while still revealing a truth about their relationship; even as a ghost, she is not able to gain access to his dream state—a space of vulnerability—in order to convey a message to him. In service of her argument, though, it is also a hypothetical situation which, whether she actually dreamt it or not, seems intended to make the man regret his accusation.

A Transportive Vision

Contextualized by the other dreams in the series, "Bad Dreams III" is an outlier placed at the center of this exchange. Each poem in the series centers on a pseudo-revelatory dream or the failure of one and plays a clear role in the exchange of dream reports between the lovers. In contrast, even though "Bad Dreams III" seems most likely to be another dream of the man's, it could arguably be recounted by either the man or the woman, as it has few distinguishing or personal elements. Moreover, while there is no guide to lead the dreamer through the transportive dream vision, it epitomizes the

extremes of which a revelatory dream is capable: almost impenetrably obtuse symbolism, oddly coupled with an epigrammatic, excessively spelled-out moral.

"Bad Dreams III" is also unique in the series in the way in which it evokes a sense of dreamlike transport. The second stanza begins with the dreamer exclaiming, "On, soul!" (II.1), suggesting that he is commanding his soul to fly across the dreamscape. The dreamer addresses his soul as if it were separate from the rest of him, since his soul is the only part of him that can move in the dream. "Proud solitary traverser, / My Soul, of silent lengths of way—" (II.9-10), he says, recalling the early modern concept to which he has alluded in "Bad Dreams II." The exhortation, "On, soul!" (II.1), also calls to mind the opening scene of Shelley's "Queen Mab," in which its titular character commands Ianthe's soul to arise, underscoring the fact that there is no helpful, talkative fairy queen to assist these characters in understanding these dreams.

At its outset, in following the five-line stanzas of "Bad Dreams II," "Bad Dreams III" creates a sensation of greater intensity by removing false starts or pauses. Each stanza is roughly twice as long as the stanzas in the preceding poem, and there are no conversational moments. It begins, "This was my dream: I saw a Forest" (I.1). A similar, albeit more intense, relentlessness of images and ideas occurs in Lord Byron's "Darkness" (1816), which has a similar, immediately-to-the-point opening line: "I had a dream that was not all a dream" (I.1). Like "Darkness," "Bad Dreams III" depicts a scene of massive destruction, although it begins with two images of ideal places.

This focus on the visions of a location to which the dreamer has been transported, combined with grand-scale visions of the consequences of humanity's moral weaknesses, is reminiscent, in different ways and to varying extents, of Elizabeth Barrett Browning's

"The Dream: A Fragment" (1826), "Vision of Life and Death" (1833), and even "An Island (My dream is of an island place)" (1837) as well as of Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "Kubla Khan" (1816a). As in "The Dream: A Fragment," the vision transports the speaker in Browning's "Bad Dreams III" back in time, where he sees "a Forest / Old as the earth" (I.1-2). The fact that there is "no track nor trace / Of unmade man" implies that the brutish, Caliban type of creature dwelling there is not a less evolved version of man but instead something more primal, such as an embodiment of desire or impulse (I.2-3).

Yet the forest itself is both beautiful and sublime, with towering trees, the tops of which Browning likens to architectural friezes. And in the second stanza, the speaker takes in the vision of a city at the height of architectural achievement, which is untouched by mire and which even the dreamer's soul is apprehensive of leaving a mark upon, in case he is "sanctioned," or penalized, for doing so (II.6-7, 10-12). As in "Queen Mab," the city, and connotatively civilization itself, is found to be ephemeral, for in the final stanza, the forest and the city begin to destroy one another, "each devouring each" in a primal struggle with sexual word choices such as "upthrusting" (III.3, 6-8). The poem concludes with the moral, "Oh, Nature—good! Oh, Art—no whit / Less worthy! Both in one—accurst!" (III.10-11).

The Temptation and Failure of Interpretation

Despite the internal logic of the dream, its relevance to the actual dreamer is ambiguous, making the purpose of the revelation unclear. In Byron's "Darkness," it is evident that nature has turned against mankind, but in "Dreams III," both turn against each other. The dream seems to be steeped in metaphor, and yet, even in conversation

with the three other poems, it is almost impenetrably polysemous. The forest might symbolize a primal existence of mankind, in general, and the baser instincts of the man who has dreamt it, more specifically; this might make the city a metaphor for civilization or orthodoxy, or simply for the woman. But the city's domes and spires, in combination with the implications that it is a pinnacle of achievement, suggest that it could be Rome, in which case, the forest is one of corruption.

Taking the interpretation that seems most relevant to the "Dreams" series as a whole—that the city stands for conventions and ideals, while the forest represents the baser elements of human nature, which are at the fore of the man's treatment of the woman—one is still left wondering why this must always be the case and what action the man should now take. The revelation does not provide enough clarification to reveal, possibly even when one accounts for the fact that, historically, revelatory dreams can require expert interpretation. Even the affective quality of the final scene of destruction is limited, dampened by its almost tauntingly metaphorical structure. Ultimately, it is also an example of a failed revelation, but remarkably, a failure resulting from the extremes of representation.

In contrast, the next three poems make reality dreamlike not by exploring real issues within dreams but rather by bringing the sensations of the dream into a reality that might be waking, sleeping, or a combination of the two—whether through reverie, as in Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "Frost at Midnight" (1798), a pseudo-catatonic trance state, as in Alfred, Lord Tennyson's "Lotos-Eaters" (1832), or mesmeric desire, as in Christina Rossetti's "Goblin Market" (1862).

IV. Nature, Affect, and Reverie in Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "Frost at Midnight"

Associationism in the Dream State of Reverie

In contrast to the first three poems in this chapter, Percy Bysshe Shelley's "Queen Mab: A Philosophical Poem" (1813), Melesina Trench's "Laura's Dream; or, the Moonlanders" (1816), and Robert Browning's "Bad Dreams III" (1890), Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "Frost at Midnight" (1798) makes waking reality dreamlike rather than presenting an account of a dream experienced while in a state of slumber. The reverie in "Frost at Midnight" is a waking, yet pseudo-somnial experience, and I postulate that it functions as a transportive vision experienced while awake. It is similar to the imagined voyage in Anna Laetitia Barbauld's "A Summer Evening's Meditation" (1773), but is more inward-looking, manifesting the influence of natural philosophers' dream theories through the associationist train of thought; a communion with the divinity inherent in the natural world in a manner reminiscent of the early modern tradition of the divine dream vision; and the somnial atmosphere evoked by late night sleep-watching.

Associationism in the Reverie

This dream vision transports Coleridge mentally, and potentially spiritually, along the trajectory of a vivid, *associationist* chain of thought.[46] As he sits by the fire, gazing

[46] Association leads one memory— the "recollected impressions of the preceding day, or of some antecedent period"— to follow one that somehow recalls it to the sleeping mind (Newnham 1830, 179). Such associations might be comprised of, or inspired by, the "Impressions and Ideas of the preceding Day" (Hartley 1749, V.91, 384). Even so, they are more than the memories themselves, as they incorporate "whatever emotions or images they invoke" (Macnish 1834, 83).

into the film on the grate of the fireplace, he recalls how as a child at boarding school, he would similarly gaze into the fire on solitary evenings. On those nights, he would dream of home and its pastoral environs, falling into a state of reverie similar to that dramatized by the poem. He recounts how, "With *unclosed lids*, already had I *dreamt*," referring to a state of daydream, or reverie.

After daydreaming, what he had dreamed of during his the initial state of reverie would continue into the dreams he had after falling into a state of slumber: "So gazed I, till the soothing things, I *dreamt*, / Lulled me to sleep, and sleep prolonged my *dreams*!" (III.3, 12-13, emphasis added). By referring to daydreams and dreams alike as "dreams," he implies that he perceives strong similarities between the two. As Jennifer Ford observes that in the poem, "The mood described … creates its own type of dream, and sleep becomes an extension of that dreaming state. The usual divisions between waking and sleeping … are forgotten" (1998, 90). The fact that his reverie can shift seamlessly into dreams suggests that they have similar mental process.[47]

Coleridge was influenced by, and named his son after, David Hartley, and although he would eventually come to reject Hartley's theories in later years (Ford 17),[48] the concept of associationism in the works of Hartley and other natural philosophers appears in this poetic account of the state of reverie. In the first volume of *Observations on Man* (1749), Hartley writes of the state of reverie,

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[47] David Hartley refers to reverie as a form of thought so closely related to dreaming that terminology can be used almost interchangeably or, at least, in conjunction: "Dreams are … the Imaginations, Fancies, or *Reveries* of a sleeping Man" (1741, V.91, 383, emphasis added).

[48] Later, he would call Hartley's theories "the scant & ragged Breeches of the modern Hartleio-Lockean Metaphysics," disenchanted with the natural philosopher, in large part, because his theories did not fully account for the causes of dreams (qtd. in Ford 17).

> A Reverie differs from Imagination only in that a Person being more attentive to his own Thoughts, and less disturbed by foreign Objects, more of his ideas are deducible from Association, and fewer from new Impressions. It is to be observed, however, that in all the Cases of Imagination and Reverie the Thoughts depend, in part, upon the then State of Body or Mind. (V.91, 383).

Like dreams, then, reveries are made up of impressions and associations, and they can, also like dreams, be influenced by the state of the body or mind.[49] Additionally, as in dreams, the affective state can influence reveries: "Joy or Grief, will make all the Thoughts warp their own way, little or much" (Hartley V.91, 383-84).

In *Zoonomia, or The Laws of Organic Life* (1794), with which Coleridge also became familiar (Ford 16), Erasmus Darwin writes that in sleep, the "nerves of sense" are as "alive and susceptible to irritation in that state, as when we are awake; but that they are secluded from stimulating objects, or rendered unfit to receive them," whereas "in complete reverie the reverse happens." In reverie, one is "exposed to their usual stimuli," but is not excited into action, or not to a great enough degree "as to produce attention or sensation" (XIX.8, 174). Contrary to Darwin's view, Coleridge is awake to the sensations around him, although they do not compel him to leave his reverie.[50]

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[49] On dreams, Hartley writes, "Dreams are, in part, deducible from the Impressions and Ideas of the preceding Day … That the State of the Body affects our Dreams … Lastly, We may perceive ourselves to be carried on from one thing to another in our Dreams partly by Association" (Hartley V.91, 384).

[50] As Darwin continues, he theorizes on reverie in an extreme form, which creates an overlap between waking reverie and slumber. He diagnoses sleepwalkers as being "affected with reverie to so great a degree, that it becomes a formidable disease," since even their sleeping bodies cannot receive stimuli (XIX.2, 171). The extreme form can be a "disease of the epileptic or cataleptic kind" (V.9, 174). Coleridge is clearly not diseased or sleepwalking in the poem, but this excessive form of reverie points to the possibility that normal reverie is on the same spectrum as sleep and other somnial states.

Additionally, although mid-nineteenth-century natural philosophy would not have influenced this particular poem, their work is clearly informed by these eighteenth-century writers, and by confirming which eighteenth-century theories continued into the next century, they lend insight into the predominant currents of thought. For instance, building on Locke's application of associationism to both reverie and dreams, Robert Macnish states explicitly, "A state of mind somewhat analogous to that which prevails in dreaming, also takes place during reverie."[51] He observes a "defect in the attention" (1834, 244), reminiscent of the way that "reason and judgment [are] suspended" in dreams (Newnham 1830, 167). Macnish comments that reverie is "often the prelude of sleep," which also resonates with Coleridge's memories of falling asleep mid-reverie.

Henry Holland also describes the experience of slipping from a state of reverie into a dreaming state. Attempting to show "how completely these states graduate into each other" (1852, 87), Holland describes the transition from "voluntary abstraction" into "unconscious reverie," or dreams. He describes a scenario in which "The mind [has been] kept for some time, as often happens, in a state intermediate between sleeping and waking" (86).[52] Both Walter Dendy and Macnish pinpoint this intermediate state of "half-consciousness," which both also refer to as "slumber," as that in which dreams occur

[51] Macnish expands, "There is the same want of balance in the faculties, which are almost equally ill regulated, and disposed to indulge in similar extravagancies. Reverie proceeds from an unusual quiescence of the brain, and inability of the mind to direct itself strongly to any one point: it is often the *prelude of sleep*. There is a defect in the attention… (Macnish 1834, 244, emphasis added). As a side note, Macnish makes a reference to the "Eolian harp" in his description of reverie (245), recalling Coleridge's poem "The Eolian Harp" (1796).

[52] In Holland's scenario, "the mind … shifts to each side of the imaginary line; and the moments of waking consciousness afford … notice of the *slumbering* moments which have intervened—of those strange aberrations of thought ("the mimicry of reason," as Dryden well calls them), in which volition is dormant, and memory awake only to furnish incongruous images to the *dream*" (86, emphasis added). One can also enter a state of reverie while in the process of awakening, according to Holland (31-32).

(Dendy 1832, 20; Macnish 10) (Dendy 1832, 20; Macnish 10). This suggests that one can shift easily from a state of reverie into a dreaming state because both have commonalities with waking and sleeping states, and just as reverie can shift into dream, dreams occur in the transitional period between wakefulness or in this case, between reverie and sleep.

In this manner, Coleridge's reverie, both in its remembered form and in the active form that comprises the poem, adopts an associationist train of thought that is similar to, and possibly on a spectrum with, the dreams experienced in a state of slumber. Since he is attentive to the sensations of the natural world around him, in opposition to Darwin's description of reverie, it is also possible that Coleridge's form of reverie has more in common with sleep, in which one's sleeping body receives external stimuli. Consequently, it is possible that Coleridge's reverie is even more dreamlike than eighteenth-century conceptions of reverie might expect.

Associationist Reverie as Transport

Coleridge's mind catapults from the present moment to memories of the past, to what he envisions for the future, and back. This nature-inspired reverie appears to alter his state of consciousness to the extent that, although he is not asleep, his thought pattern seems, to some extent, to adopt a pattern akin to that of a dreamer. Like Ianthe in "Queen Mab" and Laura in "The Moonlanders," whose sleeping bodies remain in bed while their souls are transported elsewhere, Coleridge is mentally, and possibly spiritually, transported to other times and places while physically remaining in the same place.

As his nighttime reverie mentally transports him from one idea, image, or sentiment to the next, it follows a chain of mental associations. As Harold Bloom

describes, in “Frost at Midnight,” Coleridge is “carried back to his own childhood” and “by an *associative progression* is prepared to brood on the future of his slumbering infant” (Bloom 1961, 198, emphasis added). As discussed earlier, in dreams, the imagination was believed to associate recent recollections with other memories and ideas. This form of logical progression, the chain of association, was the process that was commonly believed to govern, but also to go haywire in, dreams.

Through association, the mind moves from the impressions and sensations left from “recent events and recent mental emotions” to others that the imagination associates with them (Abercrombie 1839, 198). In Coleridge’s case, the very recently passed previous minute, during which he has sat by the fireside holding his baby, calls to mind similar instances in his own childhood and consequently, also in the childhood that he envisions for his son; all are connected through the imagination, but also, because of the overarching tendency of this reverie, through the desire to commune with the divinity of the natural world.

The associations made by the waking mind were believed to be more rational and, therefore, more meaningful than the unhinged trains of thought believed to overtake the sleeping mind while enthralled by the dreaming state. In the midst of a dream, ideas were expected to “follow one another according to associations over which we have no control” (Abercrombie 198). Coleridge can exert greater control over the associative trajectory of his daydreams than his dreams. If, as Hartley theorizes, one is “more attentive to his own Thoughts” in reverie than in a dreaming state (Hartley V.91, 383), then this is why. In contrast, Coleridge would later describe his nightmares as causing

"anguish" and "agony" through the "shapes and thoughts that tortured me" as well as sensations and ideas that became "all confused" (1816b, II.2, 5, 15).[53]

In this transportive reverie, Coleridge, like Barbauld in "A Summer Evening's Meditation," is guided, it seems, by his imagination, or "idling Spirit," which in Barbauld's case, "makes a toy of Thought" (Barbauld II.5, 7, 6). Of course, Coleridge cannot always control the state of reverie, either; in "Dejection: An Ode" (1802), he describes his inability to be transported into a pleasant reverie. It is because an affective quality that nature usually evokes in him is missing: "I see, *not feel*, how beautiful they [the clouds and the moon in the night sky] are!" (II.18, emphasis added). The nature-induced reverie is not a commonplace experience that can reliably be generated at any moment that one is outside of the city; it consists of a sort of reverent communion between the poetic soul and the natural world which requires a certain affective state.

As in Shelley's *Queen Mab*, Coleridge's reverie creates a space reminiscent of Deleuze's concept of the virtual. He is transported mentally through time and space, but also, in a striking manner, into a space of multiplicities. The ideas loop through a cycle in which elements are repeated, but with differences; he gazes into the fire, reflecting on the natural surroundings around him, and then remembers gazing into the fire as a child. Then, by recalling a childhood memory of dreaming of home— that is, by remembering having remembered— he begins to imagine how his son Hartley's childhood will differ from his own. The theme of reflection in the poem, embodied in imagery depicting the

[53] Coleridge's own ideas about association and the etiology of dream content were ambivalent throughout much of his life, as he felt that associations alone failed to encompass dreams' "complex links between subjective and physiological processes" and potentially spiritual elements (Ford 1998, 16, 17-18).

relationship between the clouds and the landscape, resonates with this sense of repeating an idea, yet with a difference.

Moreover, the somnial state of reverie can inspire the imagination. Although "Kubla Khan" (1816a) recounts a dream that Coleridge experiences in a state of slumber, the great potential that it emphasizes for creating realities of a wide range implies that, due to the somnial characteristics of the reverie, it too has the potential for imaginative creation. This space of multiplicities increases the potential for an increased affective experience. Along these lines, a defining characteristic of affect is that it is both thought and physiological, and dreams and dreamlike states bridge the space between the eternal and the ephemerally affective for Coleridge. The imagination is not only idealistic, but also material in itself (Ford 100). The material— an affective state— is necessary for reaching the immaterial, and paradoxically, the dream and the materiality of nature are dependent on one another for this cyclical relationship to function.

Ultimately, since one can control a daydream to a greater extent than most people, excepting the rare lucid dreamer, who has the ability to control the content of a dream, one does not expect a Queen Mab or Aurelio to appear; no guide seems necessary. And yet for Coleridge, the state of reverie is not without the sense of there being a sort of spiritual guide or of him yielding some control to a guiding spirit.[54] "Frost at Midnight" begins by evoking the "secret ministry" of "Frost" (I.1), a ministry that connects Coleridge to the divine, perhaps especially, or essentially, because it is viewed through the lens of Coleridge's poetic sensibility and a mind in the state of reverie.

[54] According to Ford, the theories that emphasized the passivity of the dreamer also appealed to Coleridge, considering his frequent nightmares (Ford 1998, 17).

Thus, the spirit of the imagination, especially in its attunement to the spirit of the natural world, exerts some control over the associations that Coleridge makes in his reverie, akin to the way in which the imagination, according to natural philosophers, exerts control in dreams. This lends it a nuance beyond what the natural philosophers attribute to reverie, evincing that the reverie in "Frost at Midnight," demonstrating the concept of reverie that Coleridge and Wordsworth articulate, and which influences other poets' work to different degrees, is unique to the Romantic poet.

Nature as a Conduit to the Dream Vision

Even while natural philosophers' works on dreams were becoming more influential over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Colson 1990, 165), vestiges of the early modern belief in the potential for divine dream visions still remained present in people's ideas of dreaming (Thomas 1992, 6),[55] and they are present in the Romantic conception of the reverie—mobilized by an affective attunement with nature. The connection that natural philosophers recognized between the mental processes at work in dreams and reveries emerges from the setting's atmosphere in "Frost at Midnight." Coleridge's reverie begins with observations of sleep; he watches his sleeping baby as well as the world around him, which seems also to be sleeping, or slumbering, "in this hush of nature" (II.2). The hushed, dreamy atmosphere makes the "goings-on" outside seem as "Inaudible as dreams" (I.12-13, 7), implying that these may be dreams that the natural world is experiencing in slumber.

[55] Ronald Thomas asserts that even "at the outset of the Victorian age," in some ways, "dreams belonged as much to the supernatural world as to science" (1992, 6). See also Bann 2009, 664; Bernard 1981, 198; Lang 1899, 29; Newnham 1830, 36; and Perkins 1999, 107.

Unlike the depiction of nature in Blake's "Night" (1789), Coleridge does not imagine that angels are "pour[ing] blessing" on the sleeping flowers, animals, and people at night (II.5-8), nor does he envision a humanoid angelic guide like those in Blake's poetic depictions of dream visions. There is no Queen Mab or Aurelio in this waking transportive vision, either. Instead, the divine inhabits, or is communicated through, the "lovely shapes and sounds" of the natural world, which are "intelligible / Of that eternal language, which thy God / Utters" (IV.16-18). Thus, the frost, which "performs its secret ministry" at midnight, both contributes to the dreaminess of the nighttime scene and affects Coleridge, even from the other side of the window, inspiring his reverie (I.1). Although Coleridge is not walking through the woods outside, it is when he is inspired by, and has mentally transported into a conversation with, the divine essence of the natural world— present in the frost, but also in the cry of the owlets, the film of the low-burning fire, and arguably his own baby— that his reverie begins.

I propose that such reveries have the potential to serve as spiritually significant communions with nature, because Coleridge and Wordsworth reshaped the concept of the celestial vision into their articulation of the state of reverie. This can then draw from the early modern connection between sleep and an enhanced sensitivity to the spiritual realm. As Sasha Handley explains, in the early modern era, sleep and dreams were believed to make one's soul more vulnerable to being affected by divine or otherwise supernatural forces (2016, 71).

It is my contention that the early modern concept of the soul's vulnerability to the supernatural in sleep morphs into the Romantic concept of the poet's affective sensibility to the divine in a state of reverie. Moreover, as "sleepers were understood to *travel*" not

only “between consciousness and unconsciousness,” but “between the earthly and supernatural realms” as well (72), their dreamlike reverie becomes transportive.[56]

For Coleridge and Wordsworth, the nature-inspired reverie is a conduit for the celestial, communicating through an “eternal language” of the divine, who inhabits the world around them, with “Himself in all, and all things in himself” (IV.18-19). The phrase “eternal language” is reminiscent of Coleridge’s references to a “language of dreams” in his notebooks. And with a walk, in reverie, through a pastoral setting,[57] “images and sensations” are foremost in his “language” of dreams. It is “antithetical to the language used in waking life” (Ford 56), affirming the unmediated, affective intensity that he attributes to dreams. The dialectical nature of language mediates affect (Massumi 1987, 86). Because affect is “non-representational,” it cannot be reduced to signifiers (1978, 2); affect has a formal reality, existing as something in itself rather than as the signifier or signified within the order of signs. The fact that Coleridge’s perception of his dreams is affectively oriented, requiring its own non-dialectical “language,” points to the space of dreams and reveries being spaces with the potential for affective intensity.

Thus, the Romantic reverie, like the dream visions of Blake’s characters, can enable the dreamer to have a transportive experience of communion with the divine. And as in Blake’s work, those closest to nature and, therefore, most likely to dream such dreams are children, since “Heaven lies about us in our infancy” (Wordsworth 1807a,

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[56] The Romantic poet can, in a sense, “sleepwalk” through the natural world akin to the way that Blake’s fictionalized Milton sleepwalks through his celestial vision; both experience the divine as they gaze inward and outward, inspired by pastoral visions.

[57] This recalls the Rousseauan concept of the state of reverie, “when,” Rousseau writes, “I find my mind entirely free … [in] solitude and meditation … when I am entirely myself … and when I can truly say, I am what nature designed me” (Rousseau, 1796; “First Walk”).

V.9). Adults, like Blake's sleep-walking Milton, have the poetic sensibility to fight against falling "out of tune" with nature (Wordsworth 1807b, 8). In Coleridge's reverie, the celestial intervention is not an interaction with angels, but instead, divine inspiration in the capacity of a poetic sensitivity to nature. The frost and other natural forces seem to have a more nuanced relationship to the divine for Coleridge than the "celestial light" that Wordsworth ascribes to nature in the "Intimations Ode" (I.4). Yet Coleridge advances the idea that, in Bloom's words, "the eternal language the Great Being is compelled to use is that of Nature" (198-99).

This mode of transportive reverie, in which one is more attuned to the natural world, not only has the potential to increase affect, but is also dependent on it, as the lack of affective attunement, and resulting lack of inspiration, in "Dejection: An Ode" reveals. It is a defining component of the reverie.[58] Through the affectively attuned lens of his dreamlike reverie, Coleridge views the film on the grate as that "fluttering stranger" (1798, IV.3). This portends the arrival of a friend, according to Bloom: "The film on the grate was called, in popular superstition, a stranger, and was supposed to portend the arrival of some absent friend" (197). As a child at school, Coleridge would hope and watch impatiently for such an arrival; as an adult, his expectation strikes him as meaningful in a different way. The stranger portended by the film on the grate seems to be embodied in the divine, which arrives in the form of all that is natural, including possibly his own son. His guide, then, is nature, but more specifically, the divinity within

[58] The type of affective state that is essential for this communion with nature is, at least for Wordsworth, synonymous with the sensation of dreaminess: "There was a time when meadow, grove, and stream, / The earth, and every common sight, / To me did seem / Apparell'd in *celestial light*, / The glory and the freshness *of a dream*" (1807a, I.1-5, emphasis added).

it, one with which he can commune through a transportive state of reverie.[59] As a somewhat dreamlike state, the reverie creates a sense of the virtual, guiding him mentally and spiritually, in what seems to be a monologic sort of conversation poem, but which he implies functions as a conversation— a communion between himself and nature through the divine, transportive experience of the reverie.

V. Dissociated Moonlanders in Alfred, Lord Tennyson's "The Lotos-eaters"

A Drug-Induced Somnial State

In "The Lotos-eaters" (1832), Alfred, Lord Tennyson reimagines the sailors of Homer's *The Odyssey* (1614), first, as remaining on the island of the soporific, hypnotic Lotos plant instead of being dragged back to the ship to continue to Ithaca and, second, not so much losing their memories so much as dissociating from them. In Tennyson's reimagining, the sailors remain in their attenuated state, which produces a dampening of consciousness as a result of ingesting the Lotos that has been shared with them by the

[59] Nature is a different sort of guide than the guides in other transportive dream vision poems. As in Coleridge's "The Eolian Harp" (1796), the natural world plays on his imagination to inspire and commune by evoking uplifting ideas and emotions: "Nature is a divine inspiring force: And what if all of animated nature / Be but organic Harps diversely framed / That tremble into thought," he asks (1796, IV.1-3), implying that an affective connection, evoked through the idea of music that can "tremble into thought," between nature and the poet. This is the sort of attunement between nature and the poet that "Frost at Midnight" presents. Resonating with the imagery of reflection in the poem as well as the free associations of thought through ideas reflected back in different manners, his mood makes nature reflect his own thoughts back to him. But there is more to this than reflection, as nature is not merely the metaphor representing his thought to him, but rather the inspiring force for that thought.

people already on the island. They are mentally transported to a distance away from what has been their painful waking reality:

> To each … the gushing of the wave
> Far far away did seem to mourn and rave
> On alien shores; and if his fellow spake,
> His voice was thin, as voices from the grave;
> And deep-asleep he seem'd, yet all awake,
> And music in his ears his beating heart did make. (IV.3-9)

The shores nearby feel so far removed as to strike them as the shores of another planet, and the voices of their fellow sailors seem ghostly, lending an eerie, supernatural sensation of otherness and invoking the early modern connotation of the dream state with the potential for receiving visitations from ghosts. Their drug-induced state, bordering on and intersecting at nineteenth-century concepts of trance, reverie, somnambulism, hypnagogic experiences, and symptoms associated with opiate use, is decidedly dreamlike: "Falling asleep in a half-dream! / To dream and dream …" (X.4). To nineteenth-century readers, this sort of drugged state would have been considered a dream state, as the terms "dreaming" and "dream-state" were used to describe a range of dreamy mental and emotional states (Vrettos 2002, 197).

A Dissociative Dream State

Apathy, a consequence of the narcotic-induced dissociation, makes them "careless of mankind" (XIII.11), and the sailors lose the motivation to endeavor to return not only to Ithaca, but further, to their own lives. It is better, they think, to "Let what is broken so

remain" rather than undergoing the painful process of striving to reconcile the "confusion" of a reality replete with pain, death, and toil, which has begun to feel "worse than death" (XI.12, 15). Their inner turmoil and suffering appear to be more difficult for them to battle than the external conflict they have faced up to this point. Having survived the war and multiple obstacles to making progress across the sea, they succumb to their physical, psychological, and emotional exhaustion.

Yet as Paul DeMan contends, tracking Kantian ideas of "apatheia," "feeling *nothing* is *feeling* nothing," which would be different from "suppression" (Terada 2001, 82, 86). Even while they withdraw from feeling, they feel a sense of absence. There is some sense of the "euphoria" that, according to DeMan, "freedom from pleasure" in "apathaeia" can produce (DeMan, qtd. in Terada 86). is a part of their experience. But this apathy is not an all-consuming sensation, as they cannot escape feeling entirely; they do experience a sensation of "mild-minded melancholy" that is palpable in their lamentations (X.11). The "memory of [their] wedded lives" and "last embraces of [their] wives" still remain "Dear" to them, albeit in a distanced sense, as if parts of a life remembered by the ghosts themselves who have long since entered the afterlife (XI.1-2).

The attenuating symptoms of Lotos ingestion do not oppose this feeling of melancholy. For instance, the sounds of their heartbeats in their ears exemplify the way in which their attention is turned inward, although without the potentially inspiring effect of an uplifting acquisition of insight or enlightenment. The sensation of turning inward is, in fact, one that Tennyson's beloved friend, Arthur Henry Hallam, attributed to melancholy. To the extent that even the external noises of the island sound like music set to resonate with their moods, the sounds produced both "in the stream" where "the long-leaved

flowers weep / And from the craggy ledge" where "the poppy hangs in sleep" play parts in creating the island's "sweet music" (VII.1, 10-11).

In this manner, as the sailors' surroundings lull them further into their trancelike state, they seem to become increasingly attuned to a mood promoted by the atmosphere on the island. As Sianne Ngai contends, "our moods are not 'private' or 'personal,'" but are "essentially public, part of the 'world' instead of something *in* the self," because they form the lens that "enables things to *matter*" (2005, 43). The distancing sensation that the sailors experience creates an overall distancing sensation, reminiscent of the sensation of viewing a work of art at a distance rather than of being in the world. Along similar lines, the mood or tone of an artwork can become, as Ngai writes, "euphoric" or "melancholic" through a consensus of critics and spectators, depending on its "affective bearing, orientation, or 'set toward' its audience and world" (43).

This seems an apt way of understanding the mood of "The Lotos-eaters" not only because the rhythm becomes correspondingly hypnotic as the sailors' sensations merge with it, but also because the melancholic mood, in particular, has an aesthetic quality to it. In Susan Wolfson's view, "As a sensation, "melancholy is wrought with sorrow, loss, or pain," and yet the Romantic perspective on a melancholic mourning of what has been lost can be "an achingly *gorgeous* evocation of what is so utterly gone" (2014, 438, emphasis added). I submit that melancholy connotes an aesthetic quality in connection with the melancholic sensation of distancing, as a spectator would be at a distance from a work of art.

Dissociated from what has been a painful reality, the sailors' imaginations conjure vivid, defeatist visions of what they would find at the end of the long, arduous journey

home. They imagine themselves coming home to families who have already mourned them, with wives who have moved on and sons who have received their inheritances, and to whom they would appear "like ghosts to trouble joy" (XI.4-5, 6). Faced with the option to be mentally transported away from such painful waking realities, these visions justify and keep them in their attenuated state. Unlike the sailors in the original *Odyssey*, it is not a matter of dragging the few who have imbibed back to the ship, as all of the sailors seem destined to remain on the island of the Lotos-eaters indefinitely.

Attuned and Attenuated

I hypothesize that the sailors' transformation into Lotos-eaters plays out what might have happened if, in Melesina Trench's "The Moonlanders" (1816), Laura had remained indefinitely with the alien race on the moon, even though she had not experienced the requisite spiritual growth.[60] In both poems, the dreamer's transportive vision involves leaving one's homeland and integrating into another culture. And like the outer space setting of "The Moonlanders," the Lotos-eaters' island has its own form of "sweet music," which can be experienced through the natural elements, such as in interpreting "hearing the downward stream" as music (X.1).

But unlike the music on the moon, which resonates throughout nature with the intense affective experiences of the moonlanders, the sound of the Lotos-eaters' island is a "Music that brings sweet sleep down from the blissful skies" (VI.7). In one sense, it is akin to the role of music Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "The Eolian Harp" (1796), in which

[60] This is not to say that Tennyson must have read Melesina Trench's "Laura's Dream; or, the Moonlanders" (1816), but rather that because of the similarities between the two works, exploring the ways in which they contrast is revealing.

musical attunement produces an affective attunement between the poet and nature (IV.1-3). Music is an especially fitting conduit for affect, since it need not be accompanied by language, which can mediate affect, as Jeremy Gilbert's description of the affective response of involuntarily tapping one's foot to music exemplifies (Gilbert 2004, 9).

On the other hand, in the sailors' case, their attunement to the music of the island is not uplifting or enlightening. It is also likely an auditory hallucination based on the sounds of the island, and as such, one aspect of the altered, attenuated lens through which the sailors experience the melancholic, distancing sensation that demotivates them and depletes their capacity to care. The reader's expectation, cultivated through conventional narratives of heroic figures that include the original Odysseus, or Ulysses, himself, is likely for the sailors to rally, and yet the rhythm and scansion of "The Lotos-eaters" instead threatens to lull the reader into a similar hypnotic state.

Whereas the moonlanders aspire to grow wings and ascend to the next plane of enlightenment, the sailors remain on the island in a desire to "fold [their] wings" and experience tranquility. In the second stanza of the Choric Song, they lament, "… we toil alone / We only toil … Nor ever *fold our wings*, / And cease from wanderings, / Nor steep our brows in slumber's *holy balm*" (VII.4-5, 8-10, emphasis added). The folding of wings and the peace that must follow would, they believe, evoke a sensation approaching awe. This recalls the early modern idea that sleep can the soul more sensitive to the spiritual world (Handley 2016, 71).

The sailors, like Laura in "The Moonlanders," view the exotic location, along with the affective experience that they expect to receive from each respective place, as a means of escaping the inferior circumstances of waking reality. Although Laura is not

permitted to remain on the moon, the inhabitants of the island seem, at least as far as the sailors or readers are aware, amenable to accommodating the newcomers. In fact, there is not a lot of information about the island's native inhabitants. In the words of Beatrice Russell, "despite the patronizing—and worse, exploitative—attitude toward other cultures" in much of the sort of travel literature that inspired the Lotos-eating fantasy, Tennyson's use of what he viewed as exotic at least "helped [him] regard as contingent what elsewhere was treated as natural: humans' supposed fitness for innovation and progress" (2015, 378). Tennyson's awareness of his own distance from the subject of his inspiration might have contributed to his capacity to reimagine societal norms. Similarly, in "The Moonlanders," the moon creates a space for Trench to reimagine the world in ways that would address the affective weight of past struggles.

Willing Away the Will

Of course, in contrast to the moonlanders' environment of enlightenment and progress, the sailors on the island of the Lotos-eaters imagine inevitable failure in possible courses of action and are unable to withstand the unreasonableness of the world any longer. This is melancholic, but what's more, it is defeatist. The sailors become apathetic and unmotivated, although the opportunity to rest is a welcome contrast to the unrelenting toil, struggle, and war. Erik Gray and other critics have noted that "The Lotos-eaters," especially the 1832 edition, exemplifies "the paradox [that Tennyson's early poetry frequently explores] of deliberately willing away one's will, actively renouncing agency" (2009, 46).

This paradox stops appearing in Tennyson's later works, and when he revised "The Lotos-eaters" for the 1842 version, he added a passage that arguably has the greatest potential to condemn the sailors for remaining on the island; it is the passage with a new "strident rhythm" that begins, "We have had enough of action, and of motion, we," and ends "… to live and lie reclined / On the hills like Gods together, careless of mankind" (VIII.11).[61] This 1842 revision communicates a message to his readers that the Lotos-eaters are not to be celebrated and that he would condemn the Lotos-eaters (Gray 51). It evinces an anxiety about being associated with this melancholic act of passivity.[62]

Tennyson lived in a period of shifting ideals; while the Victorian era witnessed an increasing celebration of activity and progress, his formative influences were the Romantics, who explored and, to the Victorian mind, possibly indulged in melancholy. The reader might anticipate that the sailors will eventually rally or, as in the original Greek version, be dragged back to their ship by a sober compatriot. But instead of triumphantly depicting the reanimation of the sailors by a spirit of hope, activity, or progress, the verse threatens to lull the reader into a similarly soporific mood.

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[61] Gray observes, "It is notable that 'Oenone' and 'The Lotos-Eaters,' originally published in 1832, were both heavily revised for their republication ten years later. The final section of the latter, for instance, was entirely rewritten: the lines I have just quoted [including '… to live and lie, and the strident rhythm they introduce, were new in 1842 (51).

[62] He does seem to have been associated with their melancholy and altered state of consciousness when the first edition was published. In a review of the 1832 edition, John Croker calls it "a kind of classical opium-eaters," writing, "Our readers will, we think, agree that … the singers of this song must have made pretty free with the intoxicating fruit. How they got home you must read in Homer: — *Mr Tennyson — himself, we presume, a dreamy lotos-eater*, a delicious lotus-eater — leaves them in full song" (1833, emphasis added).

According to Roger Platizky, "Although Tennyson never directly mentions opium in 'The Lotos-Eaters,' the poppy, which was known as the 'plant of joy' since 4000 BC," the descriptions of this mysterious plant would have called to mind associations with opium for nineteenth-century readers, although Tennyson resisted being associated with opiate use. Yet it would have seemed to fit the characteristics of the Lotos: "In the early nineteenth century, the effect most commonly associated with opiates was tranquility" (2002, 210-211).

While their restful state is not aligned with the spirits of the age, to say that their rest is decadent and self-indulgent would be reductive. Wolfson argues that the alienation and melancholy are not solely effects of the Lotos, since the sailors are already alienated and melancholy: "Ulysses's crewmen are no languorous decadents … They are battered veterans of a long war, whose long, long voyage home feels like another endless war" (442). Of course, it is the Lotos that brings out these feelings and depletes their motivation to go on, but it also makes it possible for them to find some respite.

To that end, it is striking that the sailors complain of toil; they must also be affected by their traumatic experiences of the horrors of war. And yet the temptation of the Lotos flower seems to be framed as a desire to escape work. The decision of the Lotos-eaters to remain on the island challenges the work ethic of the rising middle class and the celebration of progress.

The island of the Lotos-eaters provides Tennyson with a space for rethinking what is possible "in the negative space of progressive narratives" (Russell 2015, 378), just as the moon provides Trench with a space for reimagining how emotions can be borne. Ultimately, "The Lotos-eaters" explores "experiences that occur in the negative space of progressive narratives" (378), producing an affective space that can serve as a respite from the need for constant progress and production—both in the context of nineteenth-century Great Britain and of the poem itself. On that note, Elisha Cohn (2015), pointing out the "mood of languor" in Tennyson's early work, argues that for Tennyson, "poetry becomes a pervasive, almost mesmeric force" in itself. Intriguingly, while the attenuated state that the sailors experience after ingesting the Lotos plant in "The Lotos-eaters"

serves to separate them from the desire for activity, the trance state in Christina Rossetti's "Goblin-Market" (1862) also an effect of the ingestion of flora, does the opposite.

VI. Desire as Transportive Trance in Christina Rossetti's "Goblin Market"

The Transport of Desire

Much like Tennyson's "The Lotos-eaters" (1832), Christina Rossetti's "Goblin Market" (1862) features an attenuated trance state that is produced following the consumption of plant life of exotic or mysterious origins.[63] Whereas the Lotos that the sailors are given on the island immediately produces the trance state, the preternatural fruits in "Goblin Market" initially seem only to induce euphoria and temporal disorientation; after consuming the fruit, Laura is unsure whether it is "night or day" but is obliviously excited about tasting the fruit again (V.25-26). Even her sister, Lizzie, who does not eat the fruit, "Knew not was it night or day" after being covered in its juices during her interaction with the goblin men (XXII.3).[64] Such temporal disorientation is typical of dreams, since time can operate differently in dreams, but it is also reminiscent of the sensation of awakening in the middle of a dream. It is possible that merely

[63] In "Goblin Market," the goblin men call out to the maidens in their own country, but the fruit they peddle is "Plucked from bowers / Where summer" somehow supernaturally "ripens at all hours" (VI.11-12). In Tennyson's "The Lotos-eaters" the sailors find the plant, including its fruit, on an island far from their homeland: "Branches they bore of that enchanted stem, / Laden with flower and *fruit*, whereof they gave / To each, but whoso did receive of them, / And taste," with the consequence that "to him the gushing of the wave / Far far away did seem to mourn and rave … And deep-asleep he seem'd, yet all awake, / And music in his ears his beating heart did make" (IV. 1-5, 8-9, emphasis added).

[64] In addition, judging from her invitation to Laura to "Hug me, kiss me, suck my juices," she might be somewhat euphoric too (XXIII.5).

interacting with the supernatural creatures or their offerings might engender somnial sensations, especially since the goblin men only appear once the sun begins to set, a period of dusk associated with dreaminess (VIII.13-14, 16). After Laura's encounter with these dreamlike supernatural creatures, she is mentally transported into a new state of consciousness. In this trancelike state, she is increasingly oblivious to waking reality, consumed with desire: "She dreamed of melons as a traveler sees / False waves" (XIV.9). She begins to have visions of the fruit that she cannot find as if it were a mirage.

Strikingly, unlike "The Lotos-eaters," in which the sailors simply eat what is freely offered to them and then discover the plant's effects, "Goblin Market" details each choice and warning leading up to Laura's decision to purchase the fruit. This slow progression of temptation underscores the consciousness and sobriety with which she makes these decisions. She is curious about the goblin men's cry to "Come buy" from the outset, and unlike Lizzie, "bowed her head to hear" them (I.4, 19, 31; II.15, 3). Despite Lizzie's exhortations, including the cautionary tale of Jeanie, who wasted away after consuming the fruit (II.11, 35; VI.7-19),[65] "Curious Laura," with her "sweet-tooth," chooses to linger (II.38; V.1; III.1). Curious, desirous, and in the absence of her protective sister, who has fled to avoid temptation, Laura cannot restrain herself from awaiting the goblin men in the twilight: "Laura stretched her gleaming neck … Like a vessel at the launch / When its last restraint is gone" (III.5-6). This emphasis on Laura's loss of self-restraint, in combination with the forbidden appeal of the fruit and the description of her waning vitality using the words "Her tree of life drooped from the

[65] Although the reader does not learn about Jeanie until Laura has already eaten the fruit, Lizzie begins the tale with "Do you not remember Jeanie," showing that Laura already knew the story (VI.7).

root," are evocative of the tale of the Garden of Eden (XII.8). And although there is no explicit rebuke from a higher power, there are Lizzie's "wise upbraidings," and Laura is subsequently exiled from accessing the fruits (VI.2; XII.2).

The Schizophrenized Space

The goblin men are the stuff of dreams. They are not serpentine, despite this being a temptation narrative, but are instead, in an absurd, dreamlike fashion, simultaneously supernatural, humanoid, and animal-like. Their animal attributes reinforce their roles not only as otherworldly tempters, but also as somewhat exotic; even discounting their supernatural status, the wombat and ratel are not native to Great Britain (II.44, 45).[66]

Moreover, the fact that they only appear at nighttime (VIII.13-14, 16) emphasizes the sense that they are creatures out of a dream, or nightmare, who enter the waking world just as it prepares for sleep and becomes deterritorialized by dreaminess. Their arrival at dusk recalls the early modern belief that the supernatural could enter one's dreams at night and that because sleep and dreams made people vulnerable to the power of the supernatural, "poor-quality sleep, or sleep that was indulged without bedside devotions, weakened the Christian's defenses against the devil" (Handley 2016, 71). In this case, as night falls, young maidens are susceptible, or vulnerable, to the goblin men, either because of their curiosity or possibly in connection to their being young maidens

[66] Their dove-like "cooing" of "loves," as well as the feline-faced goblin (II.47-48, 40), evoke the connotation of cats with feminine sexuality in art (Brody 2001, 108; Moffitt 1994, 24).

out alone at night. The goblin men attempt to evoke the maidens' desire for their fruits, a desire that manifests both in terms of sensuality and commerce.[67]

As I have been emphasizing, the space of the dream as it was conceptualized in nineteenth-century Great Britain exhibits a striking similarity to the "schizophrenized" Deleuzean plane of the virtual.[68] As Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari conceive of it, schizophrenia, "as a process," constitutes "desiring-production" (1977, 130). The Deleuzean schizophrenic is, through the upheaval of dialectical thought, a producer of desire, lending it the potential for revolution or for capitalism (116). According to Deleuze and Guattari, schizophrenia lies "at the end, as the limit of social production determined by the conditions of capitalism" (130). In short, if the goblin men are creatures of a schizophrenized somnial space, they are the producers of desire.

Laura's first taste of the fruit is an affectively transportive experience. She enters a trance state, into which she has been affectively transported, after the "occursus," or affective encounter, which she experiences in meeting the goblin men. This occursus diminishes her "power of acting" (Deleuze 1978, 13). It also causes a "change in assemblage," a metamorphic change in her nature (1987, 438), as she is transported into an attenuated trance.

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[67] There is, as scholars have noted, a sensuality to the fruits and the appeal of the goblin marketplace that makes the maidens' desire for them synonymous with, or very similar to, sexual desire. It is also a temptation that is directed only to maidens by the goblins, which is stressed by the four repetitions of "brother" and the frequent use of "man" with "goblin" (IV.8, 10). While they are sometimes referred to simply as "goblins" (I.2; II.15; XVI.5), they are not only "little men" (II.24), but consistently "goblin men" or, in the end, "goblin merchant men" in Lizzie's warnings (II.11; II.18; VI.4, 6; XXIII.11). Lizzie's cautions stress the fact that they are male: "We must not look at goblin men" (II.11), "You should not peep at goblin men" (II.18), and "Twilight is not good for maidens; Should not loiter … In the haunts of goblin men" (VI.4, 6). This underscores the idea that desire is the driving force of the narrative.

[68] See the introduction for a more comprehensive explanation of this.

Transported into the trance state, Laura finds that her desire has only been intensified and focused. This change takes effect almost immediately; when Laura comes home from purchasing it, she tells Lizzie, "I ate and ate my fill, / Yet my mouth waters still; / To-morrow night I will / Buy more… (VI.25-28). The euphoria that she seems to exhibit, both in her general exuberance and in her inattention to the reminder about Jeanie's death, becomes a continually intensifying trance state, because the fulfillment of her desire is deferred. When Laura awakens the next day, she falls into "an absent dream … sick in part" as she is overtaken by the desire to taste the fruit again, and she begins "longing for the night," the time when the goblin men appear (VIII.13-14, 16).[69] However, as it turns dark, and Lizzie complains of wanting to return home because she can "hear the fruit-call," Laura realizes that she has lost the ability to hear, and possibly even to see, the goblin men (XII.2). Despairing of ever again experiencing the pleasure that she now associates with the fruit, she falls further into, or at least remains in, her "absent dream" (VIII.13).[70]

Her desire manifests as this attenuated trance state. Laura's dream state can be seen as a sleep disorder with multiple symptoms. She becomes insomniac in her obsessive thirst, as, unable to sleep, she "…sat up in a passionate yearning , / And gnashed her teeth for balked desire, and wept / As if her heart would break" (XII.14-16). During the daytime, she loses interest in waking reality, no longer completing her

[69] Foreshadowing the potentially infinite deferral of fulfilling her desire, the fact that Laura feels "sick in part" recalls the proverb that "Hope deferred maketh the heart sick: but when the desire cometh," meaning that it is fulfilled, "it is a tree of life" ("Goblin Market" VIII.14; *King James Bible*, Proverbs XIII.12). The proverb also resonates with Rossetti's description of her vitality as "Her tree of life" XII.8).

[70] One can imagine the sailors of the original *Odyssey*, dragged back to the ship and tied to it, experiencing similar symptoms of withdrawal.

domestic chores, as well as her appetite: "She no more swept the house, Tended the fowls or cows, / Fetched honey, kneaded cakes of wheat … But *sat down listless* in the chimney-nook / And *would not eat*" (XV.1-6, emphasis added). And as Laura pines away, she "Seemed knocking at Death's door" (XVII.2).

In this manner, the pseudo-somnial state is in danger of leading to her death, recalling the poetic treatment of sleep as synonymous with death in Rossetti's "The Dead City" (1847), "Sleep at Sea" (1864), and "Sound Sleep" (1864). This listless, all-consuming process of pining away calls to mind not only the final sense of living only for what is remembered in "The Moonlanders," but also the pining away of the knight in John Keats's "La Belle Dame sans Merci" (1820), who, like the Laura of "The Moonlanders," is in love, or lust or limerence, with a supernatural yet humanoid being of the opposite sex. The knight of "La Belle Dame" is consumed by a trance state in which he yearns for an elfin woman, which seems reminiscent of the way in which the Laura of "Goblin Market" pines away. According to Dorothy Mermin, in "Goblin Market" as well as "La Belle Dame," "the sexualized imaginative world is infinitely attractive but sterile and destructive, and those who commit themselves to longing for it waste away … cut off from natural human life" (1982, 108).[71] The fact that the object of desire for Laura is fruit does not, within Rossetti's imagined world, mean that it has less potential for passionate intensity than love or lust for a person.

[71] The unnaturalness of the goblins' fruit resonates with this sense of the trancelike state being unnatural. She enters a state that is neither completely awake nor completely asleep, akin to Coleridge's reverie in "Frost at Midnight," and yet Laura's consumption of the fruits might even be described as a form of communion with plant life, similar to Coleridge's nighttime communion with nature, although the goblins are of a supernatural realm. However, the goblin men's fruit is not natural but supernatural, and it turns out to be life-giving only when given freely from one sister to the other.

Consuming and Desire

There is another dimension to Laura's desire. The danger of desire in the goblin marketplace lies not only in its appeal to sensuality or all-consuming destructiveness, but also in the fact that it is a marketplace. The maidens are not offered fruit for free as in "The Lotos-eaters," "La Belle Dame," or even "The Moonlanders." Taking into consideration the focus on desire, its sexual connotations, and the physical payment of the strand of hair, a token of intimacy in Victorian relationships, there is an underlying sense of prostitution. The idea of a woman engaging in commerce with men, especially after dark, rather than remaining in the domestic sphere with her sister, would also have carried this association. At the foundation of such connotations was the gendered separation of the spheres, whereby Victorians identified the domestic sphere and domestic work as the proper domain and occupation, respectively, of women, or at least of women whose socioeconomic and martial statuses did not require them to work. Laura loses the ability to complete domestic tasks as she falls further into the trance state, yearning for the fruit that has become scarce.

This second taste of the goblin fruit does something that, in terms of the operation of desire in capitalism, seems very rare. That is, Laura realizes her dissatisfaction with the fruit. According to Todd McGowan, generally, "the consumer searches for the commodity that will provide the ultimate satisfaction," but because commodities cannot truly do this, the consumer is left desiring something else or something more (2016, 38). This leads to a "movement forward from commodity to commodity" that is only satisfying insofar as it manages to satisfy what he believes is an "unconscious drive to fail" to satisfy (38). This resonates with the manner in which Laura's thirst is only stoked

by her first taste of it: “I ate and ate my fill, / Yet my mouth waters still; / To-morrow night I will / Buy more… (VI.25-28).

It is only when Laura consumes the fruit in a different mode that she is freed of her desire for it. The fact that this only happens once the commodities are destroyed while also being consumed with no profit to the goblins suggests that the scene of destruction is what makes this possible. As Albert Pionke writes, Lizzie “refuses to succumb to commodity fetishism” by refusing the mysterious appeal of the exotic fruit, and in her gift to her sister, she “reimagines the market, not as an abstracted cash nexus, nor as a system of barter, but as a gift economy” (2012, 898, 903).

Moreover, when this happens, Laura suffers a spasm, a physiological experience that removes her from her trance state: “Swift fire spread through her veins … Met the fire smouldering there / And overbore its lesser flame” (XXVI.1-4). This is a manifestation of “Life out of death,” and the next morning, “Laura awoke as from a dream” (XXVII.1, 14). The spasm is the physical experience of escaping the trance state. There is a physical component to affect, just as there is a physical component to the transportive experience of entering this desiring trance as well as escaping it. According to Elisha Cohn, some Victorian medical discourses linked “‘spasm’ to effeminacy, physical weakness, and moral laxity,” and yet it was also “an attractive concept precisely because it was conceived as uncontrollable and feminine” and presented “thought as pulse” (2016, 132). In other words, the spasm was considered affective—simultaneously physical, emotional, and psychological. And in this case, it marks Laura’s escape from the listless trance state generated by the desire for more goblin fruit.

The transportive dream state within this narrative poem recalls the dream states that Elisha Cohn describes as “lyrical narrative pauses,” a “suspension” of the development of the *bildungsroman* (2016, 5). In Laura’s case, this suspension is negative, but of course, in the form of the reverie, it can also be positive. Ultimately, such trancelike states complicate the dialectic of either being asleep or awake; Coleridge’s reverie, the drugged trancelike state of Tennyson’s reimagined sailors, and the despondent listlessness that overcomes Laura obfuscate the boundaries between the two, creating a liminal space between dreaming and waking, of which a particular affective state is the precondition, consequence, or concurrent condition.

CHAPTER TWO

DREAMING UP MONSTERS, GHOSTS, AND SPIRIT GUIDES: SUPERNATURAL AFFECT IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY GOTHIC NOVEL

Positioned at the intersection of a waning magico-theological tradition of symbolic dream interpretation and natural philosophers' dream theories, which likened dreaming to insanity, dreams seemed to nineteenth-century Britons to span a uniquely nebulous, liminal space. Dreams in Gothic literature occupy an especially contested space in terms of allegory and affect, as they evoke and emphasize terror and horror, yet have made extensive use of premonitory dreams, which are typically symbolic. In literary dreams, especially in the Gothic genre, elements of the supernatural and the scientific could conflict and converge in unexpected ways. Scientific texts classified dreams as the nonsensical products of the imagination; at most, natural philosophers granted their potential to denote disorder in the sleeper's imagination or psychological, emotional, or physical state (Newnham 1830, 165; Dendy 1832, 19, 55-56; Macnish 1834, 24).[72] The ideas and memories that comprised the stuff of dreams were increasingly linking them to the "interior life of the individual rather than the external interventions of spirit guides" (Hayward 2000, 144), but unlike the visiting spirits, such dreams could not be expected to provide important guidance.

Following what remained of beliefs originating in the early modern tradition and, to some extent, the increasingly popular interest in secular spiritualism, dreams were still believed by some to have the potential to serve as a conduit to otherworldly messages and

[72] See the introduction for a more comprehensive discussion of nineteenth-century texts on dreams.

visitations (Bann 2009, 664). According to this logic, in the revelatory dream, "the spirit visitors, freed from the constraints of space and time, granted the dreamer a privileged insight into their current or future life" (Hayward 2000, 147). In literature, as in life, dreams can contain the characteristics that were perceived as the hallmarks of a nonsensical dream, a supernaturally significant dream or, with unsettling ambiguity, both.

Remarkably, in many Gothic novels, characters tend to overlook the possibility that what seems to be a revelatory dream might not be one of only two alternatives—reality or a dream—or even one of only two types of dreams—revelatory or nonsensical—but that it might, in fact, issue from an evil supernatural source or even one with independent agency. Likewise, in terms of the general British consciousness, that possibility similarly fails to appear in the typical dream book, a popular genre of street literature using universal symbols to decode dreams, typically to tell one's future. [73] This vestige of the early modern oneirocritic tradition became, "in Britain at least, the dominant form of chapbook" (Perkins 1999, 104). The use of universal symbolism hinges on the premise that there must be some good or, at least, truth to be derived from interpreting one's dream. Such a hermeneutic does not account for the possibility that dreams might be supernatural in origin without using signifiers to reveal truths.

However, as both scholarly and popular interest in scientific dream theories grew over the course of the long nineteenth century (Greenwood 1894, vii; Whyte 1960, 70; Ellenberger 1970, 303; Glance 1991, 25), so did the opportunities for questioning or reassessing what dreams could do. And of course, the shifts in how actual dreams were

[73]According to one dream book, "a virgin dreaming she has put on new garments, shews an alteration in her condition by way of marriage," and according to another, "if a woman dreams she is with child, it shews sorrow and sadness" (qtd. in Perkins 106).

conceptualized had ramifications for how dreams were imagined in fiction. Literary dreams might have the potential to do more than offer a symbolized clue to a concealed truth about the waking narrative or the dreamer's mind.[74] Through this evolution in meaning, dreams were coming untethered from the assumption that, if interpreted correctly, they would inevitably, supernaturally communicate a revelation that was true and beneficial to the dreamer.

The varied and shifting dynamics in the model of the revelatory Gothic dream, including its origins and relationship to affect, can be seen, first, in a comparison of the treatment of sympathy in Charles Dickens's *A Christmas Carol* (1843) and Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre* (1847), and second, through a study of Sir Walter Scott's *The Antiquary* (1816), Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (1818), and Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights* (1847), I will demonstrate another point of divergence from the understanding of dreams as accurate symbols of deeper truths of waking reality—the use of juxtaposition to intensify fear.

I. Supernatural Sympathy in Charles Dickens's *A Christmas Carol* and Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre*

The dreamlike supernatural scenes in Charles Dickens's *A Christmas Carol* (1843) and Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre* (1847) hinge on sympathy—evoking an

[74] In this representational aspect, Sigmund Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* (1899) brought dream theories back to a semiotic context; for him, the dream originates in the unconscious instead of the supernatural. The distance between the dream and its influence seems greater, as an analyst must "disentangle its meaning" not from its "manifest content," but from the "latent dream-thoughts" (221).

affective response of sympathy, emerging from a supernatural quality of sympathy, or both—thereby mobilizing early modern beliefs about dreams to give the dreams import in waking reality.

Somnial Specters in *A Christmas Carol*

In *A Christmas Carol*, Ebenezer Scrooge ponders whether he is awake or asleep as soon as Marley's ghost first speaks to him. Scrooge initially attempts to remain calm by paraphrasing then-popular scientific theories about the origins of particularly strange and unsettling dreams. He doubts that what he is seeing is real because "a slight disorder of the stomach," such as "an undigested bit of beef, a blot of mustard," or "cheese," "makes [his senses] cheats" by invoking this strange dream. "There's more of gravy than of grave about you, whatever you are!" (45). Scrooge's denunciation aligns with the prevailing scientific thought; as Walter Dendy writes, "Indigestion, and that condition which is termed a weak or irritable stomach, constitute a most fruitful source of dreams" (1832, 46-47).[75] The reality of the ghost seems at first to depend on whether or not this is a dream. However, the premise of the question is flawed because the implication is that if it is a dream, then it must be nonsense and cannot be real. However, if dreams can serve as a conduit between the realm of the supernatural and the material world (Handley 30), then even if the ghosts' visits are dreams, they can still be real. In fact, the supernatural visits being dreams could actually support the idea that they are real. They have the

[75] The connection between meals and dreams was present in early modern thought as well, as it was thought that avoiding heavy meals could prevent unpleasant dreams (Ekirch 2005, 320).

quality of transportive dream visions, as Scrooge is transported to different times and places, where he witnesses visions revealed by his supernatural guides.[76]

The context supports this idea, as Scrooge awakens, even if momentarily, in his bed, or is returned to his bed, after each of his visits from the Ghosts of Christmas Past, Present, and Future.[77] The spirits' ability to take him to different times and places in the flash of a thought—along with the fact that each visit must occur simultaneously (110)—highlights the "apparent expansion of time" (Macnish 60) and nonlinearity of time and space that nineteenth-century natural philosophers observed was characteristic of dreams (Lang 1899, 3).[78]

Moreover, the scenes revealed by the Ghost of Christmas Past, in particular, unfold in a way that aligns with Dickens's own theory about how dreams unfold.[79] In a letter to Dr. Thomas Stone, upon the latter's submission of an article on dreams to *Household Words*, Dickens argued that dreams have more to do with the distant past than with the recent past, except in insignificant details or in "a sort of allegorical manner" if

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[76] See Chapter One for a discussion of transportive dream visions in poetry.

[77] He seems to be transported there after his visit from the Ghost of Christmas Past, as he "barely had time to reel to bed, before he sank into a heavy sleep" (70). But the transformation of the Ghost of Christmas Future into his bedpost seems more like the fragmented end of a dream (110).

[78] According to Jacob Marley's ghost as well as the number of chimes that Scrooge hears from the clock, each of the three spirits' visits begins at one o'clock in the morning or at least after midnight, ostensibly on subsequent days (54, 71, 94). But after his final visit, he realizes that only one night has passed (110). This also resonates with Scrooge's declaration that he will "live in the Past, the Present, and the Future" at once, so that "The Spirits of all Three shall strive within [him]" (110).

[79] Dickens was conversant in and had strong opinions about the dream theories of his time, having "read something on the subject and … long observed it with the greatest attention and interest" (Winters 1948, 985). In a long letter to Dr. Stone, in response to an article on dreams submitted for publication in *Household Words*. In the letter, Dickens cites a number of his own dreaming experiences as evidence against some of the theories that Stone endorses (984). Stone states that dreams interweave the "very strong impressions received during the day," so that "the lover dreams of his mistress" and "the man of science of his discoveries." Dickens, on the other hand, writes that "the influence of the day's occurrences and of recent events is by no means so great (generally speaking) as is usually supposed" (986).

something has been on one's mind (1851, 277-78).[80] On this point, Dickens diverges from the majority of scientific dream theories at the time, which tended to focus on the influence of recent memories and emotions (Hartley 384; Newnham 179; Dendy 78; Macnish 49; Abercrombie 198). Notably, the Ghost of Christmas Past does not take Scrooge to a scene from the preceding day, but instead begins with his childhood. Although his recent behavior does relate to the tableaux that he observes, the scenes that he is shown of the recent past are of other people's lives, not the recent memories that nineteenth-century dream theorists would have expected from Scrooge's own mind (68). Ultimately, the scenes' proximity to what Dickens considers dreams to be and do makes it likely that Scrooge really is dreaming.

And yet he does seem to be awake, at least in terms of how we would view him today, during the hallucinatory visions that portend Marley's arrival. Marley's face appears to him, superimposed on his door knocker, before he has even entered the house, let alone fallen asleep (42). He also sees the phantom locomotive hearse and additional images of Marley's face, and hears the bells in the house ringing, apparently of their own accord, and the ominous clanking of Marley's chains, before going to bed (42-44). Even taking such descriptions at face value, supernatural phenomena and hallucinatory experience were commonly discussed under the heading of dreams.[81] If Scrooge is

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[80] This contrasts with the bulk of influential contemporary scientific writing on dreams (Hartley 1791, 384; Newnham 1830, 179; Dendy 1832, 93). In *The Philosophy of Sleep*, though, John Macnish makes a few similar statements, such as the following: "I believe that the dreams of the aged, like their memory, relate chiefly to the events of early life, and less to those of more recent occurrence" (1834, 84).

[81] The connection between ghosts and dreams suggests that if ghosts can appear in dreams, then spectral appearances can be thought of as somnial phenomena. This is evidenced by the subject's treatment in popular writing, such as Andrew Lang's titling of his text *The Book of Dreams and Ghosts* (1897) and Catherine Crowe's inclusion of the chapters "Waking and Sleeping" and "Allegorical Dreams, Presentiments, &c." in her book about ghosts, *The Night Side of Nature, or Ghosts and Ghost Seers* (1848).

hallucinating, or having visions in a manner that is the physiological equivalent to hallucinating, such experiences would still fall under the category of a dream state in the context of Victorian science (Vrettos 2002, 197; Winter 2000, 183; Mattus 2009, 69, 82).[82] Henry Holland asserts that the symptoms of "insanity," such as hallucinations, "may often with fitness be called a waking and active dream" (1852, 110). Taking all of this into account, Scrooge's hallucinatory experiences, whether supernatural, hallucinatory, or both, can also be considered dream states.

Spectres, Sympathy, & Spectacle

Even at their most dramatic, threatening, and brutally honest moments, the ghosts in Charles Dickens's *A Christmas Carol* (1843) have a benevolent goal; they are working to facilitate the redemption of Ebenezer Scrooge by cultivating his capacity to sympathize with others. It is because Marley's ghost feels sympathy for Scrooge that the latter has these somnial spectral experiences; Marley wants to give his old friend a taste of the observations that he has made while wandering the world as a ghost, witnessing others' lives and learning to feel sympathy for them. The ghosts' purpose, as Audrey Jaffe writes, is to cultivate sympathy in Scrooge (1994, 255). The defining characteristic of sympathy for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thinkers was what Adam Smith calls "fellow-feeling," which John Jervis puts in twenty-first century terms as "feeling *as* other-oriented … other-oriented feeling in its virtual state, perhaps" (1759, 3; Jervis 2015, 94).

Even Robert Macnish added a chapter on "Spectral Illusions" to the second and further subsequent editions of his unsuperstitious and, by Victorian standards, scientifically grounded *Philosophy of Sleep* (1838).

[82] See the introduction for a more detailed discussion of this.

A requirement for feeling for, or with, the other is to have some idea of the other, making "changing places in fancy with" them essential (Smith 3).

To this end, the three Christmas spirits take Scrooge through time and space to witness others' experiences and even to observe his younger self from what is essentially the perspective of a different person. Scrooge's character development hinges on becoming a sympathetic spectator of these living, moving tableaux of people's private lives. This transportive dream vision evokes a sense of the virtual in the spirits' capacity to disrupt the rules that govern time and space in waking reality. The purpose is for this "occursus," or affective encounter, to lead to a "change in assemblage" (Deleuze 1987, 438) in Scrooge. Intriguingly, Audrey Jaffe's point that such a change requires the spirits to restore a part of Scrooge's past self to his present self (1994, 30) underscores the Deleuzean idea of an "assemblage" Scrooge is, in fact, composed of a "multiplicity" (Deleuze 1987, 30) of parts. And as we learn through his revisiting of himself at different periods in his life, it is made up of a multiplicity of selves too. The painting that Andrew Miller associates with the "psychic receptivity" necessary for his "moral regeneration" is that of the affective absorption and shared interior space shown in the painting *Dickens' Dream* (1997, 331). The 1875 oil painting by Robert William Buss portrays a dozing Dickens, absorbed in dreaming up characters, with the space of the dream depicted as a sphere of a colorful multitude of Dickens's characters. I submit that the painting is, in a sense, a visual rendering of the unconscious as a virtual space qua the dream.[83]

[83] As Lancelot Whyte and Henri Ellenberger argue (1960; 1970), dreams were considered a realm of the unconscious even before the publication of Sigmund Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899).

Both the unconscious and its connection to dreams predate Freud, and it would have been nineteenth-century philosophers who would have influenced these fictional and artistic depictions of dreams. The unconscious as described by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari has a striking resemblance to Victorians' understanding of dreams.[84] Their idea of intensities of the past intermingling with ideas and affects, all linked and re-formed in multiple iterations through the imagination within the virtual space of the unconscious (1987, 29-34), could be a description of the dream as characterized by eighteenth- and nineteenth- century scientists (Hartley 1749, 384; Newnham 1830, 179; Dendy 1832, 78; Macnish 1834, 49; Abercrombie 1839, 198). Moreover, the spirits' extraordinary access to Scrooge's unconscious, especially by way of his dreams (Handley 72), only adds to the sense of the space of a dream having the potential become, to borrow a concept from Mikhail Bakhtin, "polyphonic" (1984, 176), or as Gilles Deleuze similarly terms it, "polyvocal" (1987, 29).

These virtual elements are underscored by the idea of *Dickens' Dream* as a space of the unconscious, which is assembled out of multiple interactions between different characters and, in a broader sense, multiple selves. The sensation of dreaminess that accompanies the supernatural phenomena in *A Christmas Carol* evokes the idea of the dream as a space of multiplicities as well as spiritual openness. The result is a space in which all of this feels, within a Gothic narrative, possible. Without the sensation of dreaminess, it would be very difficult to set a scene commensurate with the extraordinary circumstances—the transports through time and space, the appeal to sympathy through a

[84] See Chapter One for a longer discussion of the dream as a virtual space.

spectatorship of others' lives with the purpose of redeeming him, or the multiplicity, and gaining a Bakhtinian polyphonic quality (176), and intensified accessibility to Scrooge's mind through the virtual—that would seem to the reader to make possible the "chance and hope" that Marley's ghost has procured for Scrooge in arranging for him to be visited by the Ghosts of Christmas Past, Present, and Future (50).

Transformation in *A Christmas Carol*

In cultivating this dreaminess and its connotation of otherworldly potential, the scene in which Marley's ghost appears ticks off the archetypal characteristics of the supernatural dream as it was depicted in early, foundational Gothic works. Scrooge has a vision of Marley's ghost while preparing for bed in Marley's old chambers, which happen to consist of a suitably Gothic "gloomy set of rooms" (41). He even has this dream on the same night that Marley died seven years ago and in Marley's former bedroom (38), drawing from the Gothic convention of the ghost that appears to the dreamer when the dreamer is sleeping in a bedroom that they once inhabited, died in, or both.[85] Moreover, the manner in which the phantoms emerge out of the dreaminess of these solitary bedroom scenes is akin to the flash of Marley's corpselike stare as it appears on the door knocker amid the "fog and darkness" of the winter evening (39).

However, the capacity of Marley's ghost to generate supernatural pyrotechnics such as this is short-lived; another early Gothic characteristic that this ghost exhibits is, as Jennifer Bann points out, his relative lack of power (2009, 663, 676). Due in part to the

[85] Some examples, to be further expanded on in the relevant footnote in the section on *The Antiquary* archetypal Gothic ghost dreams, can be found in Clara Reeve's *The Old English Baron* (1778), Ann Radcliffe's *The Romance of the Forest* (1791), and Sir Walter Scott's *The Antiquary* (1816).

rising cultural influence of secular spiritualism over the course of the nineteenth century, the ghosts in later Gothic works tend to have less power or individuality than those in later ones (Bann 664-65, 676).[86] Marley's spirit is unable to exert agency on his own behalf; he can offer Scrooge an opportunity to redeem himself, but it is too late for him or any of the myriad other phantoms who populate the city (Dickens 50). Moreover, Marley can only speak to Scrooge for a limited time and does not seem to know, or cannot disclose, how he has come to be temporarily visible to Scrooge (49).

Although he and the other ghosts appear to lack the psychological complexity that Bann identifies in the ghosts depicted in later Gothic works, the afterlife has wrought a dramatic transformation in them. This is caused not only by the greater understanding of humanity that they have acquired in circumnavigating the globe, but more specifically, by their affective development in learning to feel sympathy for others. Like Scrooge, the ghosts of the people who were selfish when they were alive have been, or are being, fundamentally changed by what they witness. The scenes that the Christmas spirits curate for Scrooge function as what Mary Anne Doane calls "scenarios," real-life, moving tableaus that are embedded in, and can convey the cultural significance of, Victorian values (qtd. in Jaffe 1994, 257).

Each scenario, which might also be referred to as an encounter, or "occursus," can evoke a positive or negative response insofar as it is empowering or diminishing (Deleuze 1978, 6). Through this process, Marley's ghost and Scrooge undergo a

[86] Bann argues that because of the ways in which adherents of spiritualism depicted ghosts, "spiritualism newly imagined spectrality as something inherently powerful and transformative" (665). By around the 1860's, "death began to bring freedom: shackles, silence, and regret were cast aside, and ghosts became active figures empowered rather than constrained by their deaths" (664).

transformation in character, or change in assemblage. Deleuze refers to this sort of a transformative change as "becoming." This is not simply an imitation of a different person, nor is it solely "an experienced sympathy" (1978, 173). Although feeling an affinity with someone and imagining oneself in their place[87] are not equivalent to fundamental change, sympathy was, in the minds of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers, the foundation for such transformations. For Scrooge and Marley's ghost, witnessing the lives of other people is "transformative," and each experiences a "change in assemblage" as a result (438).

Thus, Marley's ghost visits him with good intentions, and although he is powerless to act on his desire to respond to what he sees, observing others has cultivated his sympathy, and he wishes for Scrooge to have the opportunity to change while he is living. The unseen voyeurs observe others, including younger and, later, dead versions of Scrooge. In response, Marley's ghost and Scrooge experience a one-sided form of affect transmission, enacting a response to what they see without being seen or responded to. Their response accords with David Hume's concept of sympathy (Jervis 100) and the way in which, as Eric Shouse writes, "one intensity is folded into another" through affect transmission (2005, par. 14). It is because Marley has, in death, experienced this process of becoming that he has gained the desire to act differently and to help Scrooge make this change while still alive. This attribute is fairly common to the ghosts that appear in dreams and visions in earlier supernatural fiction, but it is mobilized or subverted through varying iterations of the supernatural entities in Gothic novels.

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[87] These are key aspects of "sympathy," as described by Adam Smith in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, which continued to be an influential text into the nineteenth century (1759, 3).

The Reality of Dreams in *Jane Eyre*

The dream/reality dialectic, and eventually the permeability of the threshold separating the two, play major role in discussions of the Gothic dream in Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre* (1847). Unlike Scrooge, Jane acknowledges her belief in the power of the supernatural to affect one's dreams. As a preface to her description of her recurring dreams of caring for a child, she affirms, "I never laughed at presentiments in my life, because I have had strange ones of my own" (223). However, she prefaces another dreamlike supernatural scene with the equivalent of Scrooge's contention that "a slight disorder of the stomach" is to blame for the vision of Marley's ghost (45): she proffers a rational explanation before she recounts how she heard Mr. Rochester's voice, despite their distance apart, in a pseudo-hallucinatory experience that amounts to an auditory waking dream.

Since Jane's intense late-night conversation with St. John Rivers has already heightened her emotions when she hears Rochester's voice, she leaves it to the reader—albeit perhaps disingenuously, considering the end of the novel—to determine whether the voice that she has heard is the product of otherworldly aid or the delirium of her fancy (426).[88] This presents a recognizable dialectic between the dream as the inconsequential

[88] It might seem necessary to gesture toward the explainable supernatural in this instance because it is the only intense supernatural intervention that is not a sleeping dream; the reader might not otherwise be able to suspend disbelief, even by the conventions of the reality constructed by the novel. But for Victorian readers, even this would have the hallmarks of a dream state; a mental state such as emotional overwhelm or shock could be considered a "dream-state" (Vrettos 2002, 197). Moreover, according to contemporary scientific texts, symptoms of "insanity," including an escalation from emotional instability to delirium or hysteria, "may often with fitness be called a waking and active dream" (Holland 1852, 110). A hallucination would, then, constitute a waking dream.

product of the imagination and the dream as a real encounter with the supernatural, presenting the second dialectic that arises once one has determined that an experience was a dream: whether it is a supernatural, revelatory dream or the work of fancy.

It is also an acknowledgment of the readers' role in determining what is real, or a real premonitory dream, makes explicit Jaffe's argument that "Realist space—space as it is constructed in the realist novel—must represent what 'everyone' agrees constitutes the real." As Jane's, or Brontë's, references to the reader underscore, "this consensus is confined to a limited and proscribed circle: its imagined readers" (Jaffe 2016, 25). *Jane Eyre* shows an awareness of these imagined readers; the novel is replete with instances in which the imagined reader is mentioned and addressed, the climactic example famously being, "Reader, I married him" (457).

Of course, dreams cannot be subject to the same tenets of waking reality; it is an exception. But is an exception that is deemed acceptable; realism allows it precisely because it is a dream and, therefore, a place for realism to displace what is too fantastical even for a fictional waking reality. As Jaffe suggests, though, realism is itself already fantastical, and dreams and daydreams can be appropriated for a narrative of their realization. And yet just as "it is necessary to draw a circle around that uncertain and fragile center, to organize a limited space" of what constitutes the real (Jaffe 2016, 24), one can imagine the same of the space that constitutes what is considered a dream, especially in a realist, or primarily realist, novel. The consensus must be based on a shared understanding of what a dream might be said to be or do.

But unlike a fictional depiction of waking reality, which Walter Kendrick describes as a glass that "the reader simultaneously sees … and pretends that he does not

see" (1980, 6-7, qtd. in Jaffe), one need not pretend that one does not see the further fiction of a dream; it is generally presumed to be a fiction by the fictional characters themselves. Thus, Jane can explicitly tell the reader that "whether what followed was the effect of excitement [or a supernatural event] the reader shall judge" (426),[89] without making herself a completely unreliable narrator.[90]

Considering the nebulous, contested state of dreams and dream states in nineteenth-century Great Britain, I postulate that the greatest uncertainty about the dream would, in fact, be the threshold that demarcates it. This is not an exterior of hard glass that Jaffe describes as the metaphorical container of realism, but rather a permeable membrane ostensibly expected to limit what is dreamlike to the domain of the dream. When Jane hears Mr. Rochester's voice and runs out into the night, the spaces delimiting the dream and waking reality coalesce (427).

The reader is free to doubt that this auditory waking dream is a real supernatural phenomenon, at least at this point in the narrative, without challenging the foundation of the narrative. Of course, this is not the difference between waking reality and a dream, but between a supernatural waking dream and a non-supernatural, hallucinatory waking dream. Ultimately, the end of the novel does support the reading of it as a real supernatural event when Rochester tells her that he called to her in the moments that she inexplicably heard his disembodied voice and recounts the words that she spoke into the wind (426-27, 455).

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[89] While it is not a sleeping dream, I contend that it can be considered an auditory waking dream. And as is the case with most fictional dreams in realist, or primarily realist, texts, the foundation of the narrative is not challenged if the reader questions its supernatural import at that point in the novel.

[90] Any doubt that a reader might feel would not be impossible to dismiss; it would not reach the level evoked by the unreliable narration in Henry James's *The Turn of the Screw* (1898), for example.

Representation in Jane's Dream Visions

When Rochester confirms his part in their supernaturally enabled vocal exchange, shortly after Jane has seen the dream about Rochester's stately home being reduced to ash has literally come true, both Jane and the reader can make a definitive determination, retrospectively, that her auditory waking dream was supernatural and that her sleeping dream was premonitory. This means of judging a premonition by the waking reality that it precedes means that one's understanding of it must be deferred. Moreover, unless a dream reveals a literal vision of the future, then one must interpret it before one can compare it to the waking events that follow. A common approach to oneirocriticism, demonstrated by the popularity of dream books in the nineteenth century (Perkins 104), was to begin with the premise of a universal semiotic system. For instance, Jane has recurring dreams of a small child, an image believed by some to be "a sure sign of trouble, either to one's self or one's kin," just before learning that her aunt is dying and has asked for her (223-25).[91]

Having been established as a presage of trouble, the image of the child appears again in Jane's nightmare about Thornfield Hall. Not long after she has become engaged, she dreams that Thornfield Hall is a "dreary ruin" (287). Other minor details of the dream, such as the child in her arms, are not realized later in waking reality, although Jane discovers ten months later that the stately home has indeed become a "blackened

[91] A similar superstition appears in a nineteenth-century dream book: "If a woman dreams she is with child, it shews sorrow and sadness" (qtd. in Perkins 106). The fact that Jane overhears this from Bessie Leaven, a servant, makes sense, as the people most likely to believe in premonitions were presumably those who read dream books, and their typical readership was uneducated, lower-class, and female (Perkins 104).

ruin" (432). The real Thornfield Hall appears "as [she] had once seen it in a dream"—presenting a strong contrast from the relationship between the daydreams originating in her imagination and the reality of her "handiwork" when she tries to paint them (432, 128). While it might have been a coincidence for her to dream of a child in the days preceding the news of her aunt's poor health, the literal realization of her vision of Thornfield Hall confirms that the dream was of supernatural origin.

The process of deferral implicit in decoding a symbol to attempt to discover what it signifies and describing signs using other signs, runs counter to affect, as it is "an unmediated experience" of intensity (Massumi 2002, 2). Even the linguistic "matter-of-factness" of narrating an experience "dampens intensity" (86). As a consequence, if one focuses solely on interpreting their dream, this analytical process can distance them from the affective response that the dream has evoked. Additionally, the retrospective aspect of checking whether the premonition has been realized in the future presents an additional level of deferral. Affect is experienced with immediacy, as it is "always prior to and/or outside of conscious awareness" (Shouse 2005, par. 15), whereas interpreting and then checking for accuracy of representation defers meaning not only through dialectical distancing, but also to a future point in time.

Moreover, practically speaking, by the time that the dream has already come true, it is too late for a supernatural monition to be understood and heeded. Focusing on the confirmation that the supernatural is real shifts the function of the dream from conveying a warning or other revelation to simply presenting an accurate representation of waking reality.

Jane's Presentiments

When Jane reflects on the inexplicable presentiments that guide her, she frames the otherworldly aid that she receives as "signs," not only the indicators of where to go, but also presumably symbols that might, if understood, reveal the future. And yet Jane's, or Brontë's, focus in the reflection on "presentiments," "sympathies, and "signs" is not on premonitions, but "presentiments," the intuitive feelings that seem to originate not in waking reality, but instead in the supernatural:

> Presentiments are strange things! and so are sympathies; and so are signs… Sympathies, I believe, exist (for instance, between far-distant, long-absent, wholly estranged relatives…) whose workings baffle mortal comprehension. And signs … may be but the sympathies of Nature with man. (223)

These presentiments seem often to be triggered by dreams, as Jane reflects on them in the context of her recurring dreams that feature the image of a child. This underscores the importance of affect in Jane's responses to the dreams that seem, but have not and cannot yet be determined to be, premonitory. She takes these intuitive affective experiences seriously: "I never laughed at presentiments in my life" (223). A presentiment is, essentially, a sentiment felt in advance of the event in waking reality.

Since the vision of Thornfield Hall cannot be shown to be a premonition until what it foretells comes true, Jane must decide how to respond to it before knowing that it is revelatory. Fortunately, the dream is not convincing because of its representational accuracy or clever coding, but rather because of Jane's affective response to it. If these "signs" did not evoke an affective response in her and did not give her the feeling that

they might, even by a slim chance that is illogical, convey a truth, they would not hold the same weight.

The focus of Jane's reflection on "presentiments," not "premonitions," seems noteworthy, especially since this passage precedes the description of a recurring dream that seems likely to have been premonitory; for days, Jane has recurring dreams of a small child, an image believed to be "a sure sign of trouble, either to one's self or one's kin," and then learns that her aunt is dying (223-25).[92]

It is in Jane's reflection on presentiments that she comes the closest to speculating about their origin: "signs, for aught we know, may be but the sympathies of Nature with man." In this context, "sympathies" must refer to more than just sympathizing with someone who is in pain: "Sympathies, I believe, exist … whose workings baffle mortal comprehension" (223). The sympathies to which Jane alludes are affinities that can create a sense of interconnectedness beyond what is logical and would be expected in the rational waking world.

Supernatural Sympathies in *Jane Eyre*

These "sympathies" are central to Jane's understanding of the somnial experiences through which she sometimes receives signs and presentiments. Moreover, there is overlap between the conceptions of dreams and sympathies: Dreaming connotes an openness to the spiritual realm, and sympathy creates connections not only between

[92] A similar superstition appears in a nineteenth-century dream book: "If a woman dreams she is with child, it shews sorrow and sadness" (qtd. in Perkins 106). The fact that Jane overhears the superstition from Bessie Leaven, a servant, makes sense because the people most likely to believe in premonitions were probably the people most likely to read dream books, and the typical readership of the dream book was uneducated, lower-class, and female (Perkins 104).

people, but also, as the allusion to the "sympathies of Nature with man" suggests, apparently between people and nature (223). This sense of the extraordinary interconnectedness generated by sympathy hinges on a psychic receptivity reminiscent of Samuel Taylor Coleridge's openness to nature in "Frost at Midnight" (1798). But it also suggests a different idea of sympathy than we tend to have today.

According to Adam Smith, whose work remained influential into the nineteenth century, sympathy requires the imagination. He argues that "our fellow-feeling for the misery [but also, in a less commonly used sense, to a range of emotions, desires, and feelings] of others" is a consequence of "changing places in fancy with" the person. The feeling of affinity with the other means "that we come either to conceive or to be affected by what he feels" (1759, 3). Through the imagination, one can better understand what another feels, be affected by it, or presumably, both; it is not necessarily an emotion in itself but closer to a correspondence of emotions. The role of the imagination in forming connections is striking, as the imagination is also central to the space of the dream as it was conceptualized in the nineteenth century. Natural philosophers largely followed David Hartley's assertion that dreams consist of "nothing but the Imaginations, Fancies, or Reveries of a sleeping Man" (1749, 384). Along these lines, in Sir Walter Scott's *The Antiquary* (1816), the title character articulates the perspective generally held by the well-educated, especially men, when he responds, "Of dreams! … what should I think of them but as the deceptions of imagination when reason drops the reins?" (1816, 131).

In contrast to Smith, David Hume conceptualizes sympathy as taking effect with greater immediacy. Hume's characterization of sympathy relates more to affect transmission, to the extent that the passing of one sentiment to another person can seem

"even [like a] contagion." For Hume, one must share the same feelings as the other (Jervis 100, 113). This idea of affect transmission is described by affect theorists as occurring with immediacy; this consists of a folding of one intensity into another (Shouse 2005, par. 14). A defining characteristic of affect is that it is an "*unmediated* experience" of intensity, operating "prior to and/or outside of conscious awareness" as when someone involuntarily taps their foot to music (Massumi 2002, 2, emphasis added; Shouse par. 15). Thus, there is a tension between the idea of sympathy as a sentiment mediated by the imagination and the idea of sympathy as an unmediated sensation. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze uses the term "intensity" to describe affect, but he also acknowledges its connection to "sensibility" and to Hume, whose *Treatise of Human Nature* he cites and, at points, builds on (1994a, 313, 70-73). Sympathy bridges the self and the other, but with or without nonconscious immediacy depending on how the word is conceived.

It is worth noting that these philosophical arguments about sympathy likely differ, to some degree, from how the word is used not only today, but also in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Jervis 94). The word usage timeline for "sympathy" in the *Oxford English Dictionary* reveals that until around the fin de siècle, its use extended further beyond the limits of the material human world. In fact, one sense of the word, albeit used infrequently, was the "relation between two bodily organs or part" ("Sympathy, n."). If body parts can be described as having sympathy with one another, then it might apply to other things or creatures, including plants and animals, that are not human.

On this point, although Hume states that it is easier to sympathize with those who are similar to oneself, he extends sympathy beyond humanity: "there is no human, and indeed *no sensible, creature*, whose happiness or misery does not, in some measure,

affect us, when brought near to us, and represented in lively colours" (qtd. in Jervis 108, emphasis added). However, Hume's emphasis is on how any creature that is capable of sensations can affect humans, whereas the *Oxford English Dictionary* suggests that even body parts might have been understood to be in sympathy with one another. This conception of the sentiment better contextualizes Jane's allusion to the "sympathies *of* Nature *with* man"—that is, how nature sympathizes with humans (223, emphasis added).

Another nineteenth-century understanding of the word frames it in terms that seem especially applicable to affect theory:

> [An] … *affinity* between certain things, by virtue of which they are similarly or correspondingly affected by the same influence, *affect* or influence one another (esp. in some *occult* way), or attract or *tend towards* each other. ("Sympathy, n.," emphasis added)[93]

This underscores, first, the potential to influence affective states. In a similar vein, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari emphasize the capacity to "affect" and to be "affected": "what [a body] can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with … the affects of another body" (1987, 257). Affective potential is a Spinozan concept that Deleuze describes as the "power (*puissance*) of acting," "the force of existing" (Deleuze 1978, 3), the "capacity for existence," and in almost the same words as the *OED*, the "capacity to affect or to be affected" (Massumi 1987, xvii).

Second, this dictionary entry reveals that the way in which one might "affect or influence" another, even "[*especially*] in some occult way," can be an aspect of sympathy

[93] An example of its use in terms of an occult sense of attraction is James Smith's reference to it as "magnetic"—a term synonymous with the mesmeric, or hypnotic—in *Panorama Science & Art II*: "The cures said to have been performed by magnetic sympathy" (1815, 181, qtd. in "Sympathy, n.").

("Sympathy, n.," emphasis added). While I might propose "otherworldly" [94] as a synonym better suited to the novel than "occult," the inclusion of a mystical dimension is noteworthy. The sense of interconnectedness at the foundation of sympathy seems to have been capable of being elevated to a form of preternaturally powerful affinity. This brings the occult into the realm of affect and vice versa, shedding a light on Jane's description of sympathies that "baffle mortal comprehension" in bringing together "far-distant, long-absent, wholly estranged relatives" (223). Of course, this can be read as referring to the fact that if estranged family members sympathize with one another, they might be more likely to reunite; Jane forgives the aunt who treated her cruelly, an act possibly attributable to sympathy. Or it might refer to the compassion that motivated the unknown uncle who, without needing to see Jane to imagine the needs and desires that she might have, sought her out (242-43). But if the mystical dimension can be applied to the idea that the likeminded "attract or tend towards each other," this could also clarify how Jane inexplicably wanders to the home of the Riverses, the caring, "far-distant" cousins she had never met, when she is in need ("Sympathy, n."; Brontë 223).

In the end, though, despite the supernaturally charged interconnectedness that brings Jane to the Riverses' door, this affinity does not mean that they are all like-minded. Jane respects St. John Rivers, but she cannot agree to join him in a loveless marriage and serve as missionaries together. One night, as he makes his argument again, she finds herself wavering in her determination not to accept his proposal, and it is at this point that a voice intervenes. This is the product of a mystical nonfamilial affinity with Mr.

[94] I use "otherworldly" because Jane's dreams are mystical in a way that is not counter to nature and connects to an immateriality within it. In the Victorian era, "otherworldly" could refer to the "immaterial," even including immaterial powers of "the intellect or imagination" ("Otherworldly, adj.").

Rochester and one of the primary examples of the role of voice in dreams and dream states. Of all of the somnial scenes in *Jane Eyre*, the ones that compel her to make the most momentous changes are those that foreground voice. The most powerful, besides the auditory waking dream, is her dream of the white lunar form (325, 426-27).

The Voices in Jane's Dreams

The dream in which Jane receives the command to "flee temptation" convinces her to make one of the biggest changes, leaving Thornfield Hall in the middle of the night, as well as the closest that the novel comes to showing the reader a supernatural entity who appears in, and possibly induces, a dream (325).[95] This message, which Jane believes herself to hear while asleep and dreaming, is the culmination of a series of images, which frame the more impactful and final moment, which is an auditory command. Jane has the dream after learning that Mr. Rochester is already married, and feeling distressed, her mind goes to other distressing moments in her life. Like the daydreams that morph into sleeping dreams in Coleridge's poem "Frost at Midnight" (1798),[96] Jane is "transported in thought to the scenes of childhood" and then dreams of the strange "light," or "gleam," that frightened her to the point of syncope when she was locked in the "red-room" as a child (324).

[95] This is an atypical version of the Gothic trope in which a heroine has a premonitory dream that she is in danger of being taken advantage of by a deceitful man; Jane has already learned about Bertha Mason, so the warning is not about the deceit, but her going along with it. Another version of it appears in Wilkie Collins's *The Woman in White* (1859), except that despite warnings, some of which have to do with dreams, Laura Fairlie does marry the already married Sir Percival Glyde. Mary Elizabeth Braddon reverses this model in *Lady Audley's Secret* (1862) by making the woman the one who is already married.

[96] See Chapter One for more about Coleridge's treatment of reverie in "Frost at Midnight."

However, this time, Jane is not frightened by the possibility that the gleam could be supernatural. The dream unfolds, and the gleam appears to be moonlight, until the moon transforms into what appears to be a celestial, humanoid being: "… then, not a moon, but a white human form shone in the azure, inclining a glorious brow earthward. It gazed and gazed on me" (324). This moment recalls the role of spectatorship in Adam Smith's concept of sympathy, suggesting that the figure is directing its sympathy toward Jane, first, by viewing her. Then, the gleam of moonlight physicalizes the act of the imagination, imagining itself as a human, by literally adopting a human form. Yet this performance of sympathy also seems to be just that—a performance. It does not seem disingenuous, but it likely does not indicate a response that is taking place at that moment; rather, it presents a sort of pantomime intended to express a sympathetic connection to Jane.[97] Having created this buildup, the focus shifts to its voice:

> It *spoke* to my spirit: immeasurably distant was the *tone*, yet so near, it *whispered in my heart*— "My daughter, flee temptation." "Mother, I will." So I answered after I had waked from the trance-like dream. (324-25, emphasis added)

Each word of this concise statement, framed as the culmination of a dream in which a spiritual entity has descended to the earth to turn its gaze dramatically on Jane, is significant. The first two words establish the relationship of the white form to Jane. The second two, "flee" and "temptation," establish how it views her situation, removing the sort of peripheral affective noise that has left Jane muddled. These words are all

[97] The alternative, that the spiritual entity gazes on Jane, sees her in that moment, and then decides to guide her, seems absurd; people would constantly be having dreams in which spiritual entities appeared to them, but then simply dissipated every time the person's situation did not evoke their sympathy.

emotionally loaded; Jane never knew her mother, and "temptation" would call to mind Biblical narratives. Jane almost immediately departs into the darkness that night.

In studies in affect theory, voices can be said to express and to indicate. Rei Terada observes, "The face," which "does not even have to be interpreted" through an analytical process, "is to visibility what the voice is to audibility … it has the greatest reputation for expressivity" (2001, 53). "Expressivity" suggests a movement outward, a bifurcation of the interior and the exterior. Like the expression on a face, the tone of a voice can "express" insofar as it represents an interior experience to the outer world, and the manner in which this happens differs depending on the cultural context. Conversely, Edmund Husserl argues that the voice can "indicate," which Terada explains as "an indexical gesturing toward things by vocal or other signs" (28). In other words, the tone of a voice can provide an important part of the unique context in which the words are used. According to Terada, indication is to expression what affect is to emotion (28). Whereas emotion expresses, affect does not represent something interior; in fact, a voice can change tone apart from the awareness of the speaker as part of a change in affect.

One can imagine different tones of voice in which the appellations "My daughter" and "Mother" are spoken, but it would be difficult to imagine them spoken in a way that would not have a powerful affective resonance. The words themselves have an indexical role as well; spoken by speakers in a different situation would completely change what, or who, they indicate. Taken literally, the words "My daughter" and "Mother" might lead some readers to deduce that the spirit is, in the tradition of earlier supernatural dreams, actually the ghost of her mother. However, Jane does not entertain this thought, making it unlikely (325). The supernatural element of this scene is not, in fact, solely the white

form but also the space of the dream itself, a space shared by the white form and Jane. It is the mystical interconnectedness of an intense, otherworldly form of sympathy. This sharing of space is similar to the way in which the ghosts in *A Christmas Carol* have access to, and intimate knowledge of, Scrooge through "their miraculous internal availability to the miser" (Miller 1997, 326). Similarly, in *Jane Eyre*, the white maternal form seems to understand Jane and guides her from the perspective of one who is presumably outside of time, with knowledge of the past, present, and potential future (Jervis 116).

The instruction that Jane receives from the white maternal form is not the first voice she has heard whose origin might be otherworldly but could also be attributed to Jane's own mind. It is also not the first voice she has heard after seeing an image of the night sky. When she is teaching at Lowood, and her beloved mentor Miss Temple leaves the school, she realizes that she no longer feels a reason to stay, and one night, she finds herself pacing. It is past bedtime, a little after her roommate has stopped snoring, and Jane proceeds to have an intense dialogic discussion with herself in her own mind. Finally, "feverish with vain labour," she looks out at the stars before, shivering, she creeps back to bed (87). And in this moment, a suggestion comes audibly into her mind that does not seem to have been her own idea. She playfully refers to the speaker as a separate entity, while seemingly assuming that the idea must actually have been her own: "A kind fairy, in my absence, had surely dropped the required suggestion on my pillow; for as I lay down it came quietly and naturally to my mind—"Those who want situations advertise; you must advertise in the—*shire Herald*" (88). This voice offers advice just after Jane has been gazing, with unanswered questions on her mind, at the night sky,

situating it in the context of nighttime, and therefore dreamy, associations. The idea comes "naturally," just after she looks out at the stars, akin to how the instruction that she receives from the white form in a dream follows an image of moonlight.

It is not surprising that Jane seems to assume that this voice is the vocalization of her own thoughts, since the idea does not arrive with the pomp and grandeur that one might expect of the supernatural. It is not vocalized by a divine, yet humanoid, maternal form made up of white moonlight, nor is it prefaced by an awe-inspiring, hallucinatory vision of a spectral locomotive hearse, or proclaimed by a fairy "queen of spells" mid-flight across the heavens in a majestic chariot (324; Dickens 1843, 43; Shelley 1813, I.21, 63). Jane's "kind fairy" must be a practical creature, having talked her through how to post the advertisement like the supernaturally staffed help line of a magical employment agency. And yet the advice is unexpected in a way in which the ideas posed in her internal back-and-forth had not been. One consequence of this strange, dreamlike moment is a blurring of the distinction between her own consciousness and the influence of what might be a spiritual entity who can penetrate her thoughts. Another, in terms of the narrative, is that she leaves Lowood to accept the position of governess at Thornfield Hall, setting the rest of the novel's events into motion.

Three chapters from the end of the novel, a voice addresses Jane in an intense nighttime scene one last time, and like the previous times, the experience leads her to leave her current home. Jane is on the verge of capitulating to St. John Rivers's proposal for a loveless marriage when she frantically implores "Heaven" to "show [her] the path" and hears Mr. Rochester's voice call her name three times. Like her moon figure dream and the auditory waking dream of the kind fairy, this moment is also affectively intense.

She is "excited more than [she] had ever been," which serves both as a condition for otherworldly intervention and as a plausible non-supernatural explanation for what happens next (426). She experiences an intense sensation of awakening:

> … the room was full of moonlight. My heart beat fast and thick … Suddenly it stood still to an inexpressible feeling that thrilled it through, and passed at once to my head and extremities. The feeling was not like an electric shock, but it was quite as sharp … it acted on my senses as if their utmost activity hitherto had been but torpor, from which they were now summoned and forced to wake… (427)

These descriptions highlight her physiological responses, underscoring her response as affective, since affect is physiological (Gilbert 2004, par. 9; Massumi 2002, 86).

Although the supernatural power that facilitates this is again unidentified and unidentifiable, this auditory waking dream is at least partially a consequence of Jane's own capacity for the supernaturally charged form of sympathy at its core: "It was *my* time to assume ascendency. *My* powers were in play and in force" (427).[98] Her receptivity to the sympathetic supernatural aid that she receives is a concept of power resonant with affect—that is, her ability to be "affected" and the ways in which her own "affects … can or cannot enter into composition with … the affects of another body" (1987, 257), or in this case, a supernatural force. This is possible through what Angela Hague describes as the "nonrational, unconscious modes of knowing and … intuitive consciousness"

[98] In some ways, this form of supernatural imagination, or intuitive consciousness, might come naturally to Jane, but it seems likely that this develops as part of the emotional education of Helen Burns—the girl who is first introduced to the reader as the school's noble-minded daydreamer. Upon first seeing Helen standing in punishment, the young Jane wonders, "I have heard of day-dreams—is she in a day-dream now?" (52). Helen's capacity to calmly enter into a daydream or reverie, and to make it a positive experience, is indicative of the reflective, humble, balanced approach that she takes to life.

explored by Brontë, whom Hague approvingly calls a "trance writer" (1990, 584). This sense of an "intuitive consciousness" seems an apt description for the mindset—resonant with a certain affective state,[99] or put differently, a "mode of knowing" that is "nonrational" and pre-conscious—amenable to this supernatural form of sympathy (Castle 1987, 236).[100]

Along these lines, Jane does not see herself as having the powers of a witch or fairy, despite Mr. Rochester's teasing. Instead, she feels that a "Mighty Spirit" has replied to her supplication (427-28). The spirit's power does not strike her as being in opposition to the natural world, but rather, following the Romantic tradition,[101] supports the idea that the spiritual is embedded within nature. For Jane, this is distinct from superstition: "Down superstition! … This is not thy deception, nor thy witchcraft: it is the work of *nature*" (427, emphasis added). Jane's openness to the supernatural—or, as the early Romantic poets would term it, the divinity—within nature draws on the connotation, through early modern belief, of dreaming with a susceptibility to the supernatural.[102]

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[99] I have found a link between dreams and openness, both to the supernatural and to heightened sympathetic affect transmission, in the sleeping scenes of Ann Radcliffe's *The Romance of the Forest* (1791) and *The Italian* (1796). The heroine of each respective novel is spared when a would-be killer is moved by the emotions shown on her face as she sleeps (272; 234-35). In the same vein, in the former, LaMotte, like the guilt-ridden Lady Macbeth (ca. 1611), discloses his schemes in his sleep (248-49). Similarly, sleep-talking reveals information in Charles Robert Maturin's *Fatal Revenge* (1807, 266).

[100] An argument made about Radcliffe's *The Mysteries of Udolpho* (1794), while a very different novel, seems applicable to *Jane Eyre*; although Jane never definitively explains away the potentially supernatural elements, Terry Castle's argument that "The supernatural is not so much explained … as it is displaced" highlights a revealing aspect of Brontë's novel (Castle 1987, 236). In *Jane Eyre*, the supernatural is displaced, or at least placed, onto the affective realm of the dream. The power of the intuitive foregrounds what Robert Heilman calls "the triumph of the intuitive" in *Jane Eyre* (290).

[101] Scholars have commented on the Romantic themes in *Jane Eyre*, including her relationship to nature and tensions between "reason … and feeling-imagination-intuition" (Lodge 1970, 132). Jane reflects on the latter when she meets Eliza and Georgiana as adults: "Feeling without judgment is a washy draught indeed; but judgment untampered by feeling is too bitter…" (240). This balance grounds Jane, and her passion and affinity with nature do not incline her to go feral like Catherine in *Wuthering Heights*.

[102] See the sections on Wordsworth and Coleridge in Chapter One for a more thorough discussion.

Reverie can, assuming the openness of the daydreamer, allow one to commune with the immaterial and otherworldly divinity that is within the material forms of nature; analogously, Jane's receptivity to nature means that nature can have an affinity with her, elevating sympathy to the level of the otherworldly.[103]

II. Dreaming up Monsters in Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* and Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights*

In Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (1818) and Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights* (1847), Frankenstein's creature and Catherine's ghost, respectively, make their first appearances in scenes permeated by nightmarish intensity. In each novel, a narrator awakens from a terrible dream just before encountering the disturbingly unnatural or supernatural being. Consequently, a nightmare-imbued atmosphere frames the emergence of both preternatural characters.[104] I posit that the terror that these scenes evoke is, to some extent, effected through their subversion of earlier models of the Gothic dream, in which the dream and reality were mediated by representation.

In *Frankenstein* and *Wuthering Heights*, this effect is the product of a generally overlooked convention of Gothic literary dreams, which I will refer to as the "tandem

[103] Jane's understanding of this immateriality in terms of mighty spirits who are in harmony with the Christian God is reminiscent of Wordsworth's allusion to paganism in "The World is Too Much With Us" (1807): "For this, for everything, we are out of tune; / It moves us not," Wordsworth writes. "Great God! I'd rather be / A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn; / So might I, standing on this pleasant lea, / Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn…" (1807, 13-18). This feeling of being "out of tune" could also be characterized as failing to be in harmony, or in sympathy, with the natural world.

[104] I consider the creature in *Frankenstein* to be preternatural because his strength is superhuman, his genesis is unnatural, and he is partly nonhuman since some of his body parts come from the slaughterhouse (Shelley 32).

dream sequence." I will use this term to describe situations in which an ordinary dream prefaces and thereby provides a foil to a second, more noteworthy dream or dreamlike occurrence. Both Shelley and Brontë draw on this Gothic tradition of the tandem dream sequence, but with distinctive and revealing differences. I contend that through their unique approaches to employing the tandem dream sequence, these novelists use the conflicted status that dreams held in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Great Britain to heighten affective intensity and to construct ideas of Gothic monstrosity.[105] Central to this study are the methods by which Shelley and Brontë mobilize the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries' shifting ideas about what dreams were and could do.

The Reality of the Dream in *Wuthering Heights*

Although *Wuthering Heights* was published twenty-nine years after the original 1818 publication of *Frankenstein*, I begin with *Wuthering Heights* because Brontë draws on the connotations of the earlier, magico-theological, oneiric tradition to a greater extent than Shelley does. The most prominent example of this is the scene in which Lockwood has two nightmares while sleeping in the bed that once belonged to Catherine.[106] First, Lockwood dreams that he has been condemned for "odd transgressions," an accusation that makes him aggressively defensive, and he is on the verge of being mobbed by a "multitude" of angry churchgoers when he abruptly awakens (20). This nightmare

[105] It seems to me that the same is true of the use of dreams and delirium throughout *Frankenstein* and *Wuthering Heights*, as nineteenth-century associations of dreaming with delirium, trances, disorder and the supernatural inject each narrative with nightmarish sensations evocative of the monstrous.

[106] The presence of Catherine's childhood closet bed, which as Lockwood recognizes, has become "old-fashioned" by the nineteenth century (15), is a material reminder of the ways of life and beliefs of an earlier time, one in which the idea of a supernatural dream might not be discredited.

incorporates some of his recent memories, as the chapel in the dream is the same one that he has encountered in waking reality: “We came to the chapel. I have passed it really in my walks” (19). This detail aligns with the scientific conception of dreams as “the Impressions and Ideas of the preceding Day” or very recent past (Hartley 1749, 384).

On the other hand, his nightmare also presents a “most curious character,” as Lockwood had “never imagined previously” the strange sins of which he is accused in the dream (19). This too could have a rational explanation, though, since he fell asleep reading one of Catherine’s journal entries about her rebellions against strict religiosity (16). Additionally, from the perspective of pre-Freudian dream theorists, the fact that Lockwood feels “sick … dizzy and faint,” combined with “the effects of bad tea and bad temper” (15, 18), could be to blame for the nightmare’s absurdities. The “dreams of disease” were believed to be of the “wildest character,” and even milder maladies, such as bodily discomfort, were remarked on as the disrupters of sleep and dreams (Dendy 1832, 24). Thus, featuring a “re-embodiment of thoughts which have formerly … occupied the mind” and “become jumbled together” in a “connecting chain” of “absurd combinations” (Macnish 1834, 49), this first nightmare, while upsetting, exhibits the characteristics commonly attributed to dreams by nineteenth-century scientists.

Lockwood awakens from it and then falls back asleep, only to have another nightmare. In contrast to the first, though, this nightmare does seem noteworthy. He dreams that he is in the same bed in which he has just been sleeping, making it seem very much as if he were still awake. In the dream, a branch tapping against the window irritates him, provoking him to rise from the bed and reach out the window in an attempt

to stop it.[107] It is at this point that what begins as a seemingly ordinary dream shifts into a potentially supernatural nightmare, for instead of a branch, he touches the clinging, "little, ice-cold hand" of what appears to be the child-aged ghost of Catherine Earnshaw. His encounter with this apparently supernatural entity evokes a similar affective response as the first dream, and he responds to the corporeal manifestation of the long-dead Catherine with extreme aggression. The ghost's efforts to enter the bedroom are met with terror and violence. When she clings to him and wails to be "let … in," Lockwood desperately and cruelly scrapes her hand against the shattered glass of the window to deter her. Even as blood pools, she refuses to let go, and he refuses to let her in (20-21).

Their confrontation ends abruptly when Lockwood cries out in the waking world, startling both himself and Heathcliff, who storms the bedroom to investigate. After initially raving that the room must be "haunted … swarming with ghosts and goblins," Lockwood eventually discounts the vision as another "ridiculous nightmare" (22, 23). His certainty that the room is haunted diminishes once he is no longer reeling from the intensity of the dream. Once he can consider the dream from the waking perspective of rational scientific thought, as defined by nineteenth-century dream theorists, he is able to apply dialectical analysis and dismiss it. This aligns with the thinking of twentieth- and twenty-first-century affect theorists, who underscore the adialectical and nonrational aspects of affect (Massumi 2002, 2; Deleuze 1978, 2). Since interpretation requires dialectical thought, and the absorption of dreams typically precludes this, Lockwood

[107] It would strike Victorian readers familiar with dream theories as especially plausible that hearing a branch tap against the window, even while asleep, would cause one to dream about it. As Macnish writes, "During sleep the system is peculiarly apt to be acted upon by all external impressions" (30). The influence of an external stimulus on a dream, such as a dream of drowning or suffocation if one's head slips under a pillow, is also remarked upon by Sigmund Freud (1899) and Audrey Jaffe (2016, 120).

thinks about his dream is utterly changed once the absorption of the dream diminishes and is supplanted by the logic of waking reality. In other words, it is rare that one would be able to perform an interpretive analysis of one's dream while dreaming it.

Unlike Lockwood, Heathcliff does not go through the motions of convincing himself that the dream is meaningless. Upon learning of it, he falls into an "uncontrollable passion of tears" and implores, "Come in! … Cathy, do come" (23). His desperate plea for Catherine's ghost to return suggests that he believes in the reality of the supernatural, calling to mind the early modern belief that sleepers could "travel between consciousness and unconsciousness, between the *earthly and supernatural* realms, and between *life and death* on a nightly basis" (Handley 2017, 72, emphasis added). In this case, Catherine's ghost seems to have penetrated Lockwood's dream by accident in her quest to return home. Now that his nightmare has dissipated, so too has the ghost, and despite Heathcliff's entreaties, she has become inaccessible. The affective intensity that has been wrought seems to transfer to Heathcliff, who feels a "violent emotion" without even having experienced the dream himself. His belief in its preternatural reality contrasts strongly with Lockwood's own final assessment of it as "ridiculous" (23).

Although Lockwood's confrontation with Catherine does seem to have been a second nightmare, that fact would not, according to the magico-theological view of dreams, preclude the spectral visitation from being real. Considering the view that dreaming held "the power to transport men and women between the earthly kingdom and a … world of spirits" (Handley 30), the fact that Catherine appears in a dream makes it more, not less, likely to be real. Moreover, by beginning the dream with Lockwood rising from his bed, Brontë heightens the sensation of reality for Lockwood and readers alike.

The reader is free to wonder both whether a ghost really visited Lockwood's dream and possibly whether the second dream was, as Lockwood believes, even a dream at all. Ultimately, the coupling of the two nightmares, the second of which is more intense, realistic, and unsettling than the first, destabilizes the clear delineation between what is real and what is dreamt. It is easy to separate the first dream from waking reality, but not so with the second. And because the two are juxtaposed in this tandem dream sequence, the ways in which the second dream fails to be so easily categorized are emphasized. Its apparent verisimilitude, the intensity with which it overtakes Lockwood, and the ease with which Heathcliff is convinced of its veracity make it far more difficult to dismiss.

The tandem dream sequence emphasizes the contrast between the first and second nightmares, a contrast that suggests that the uniqueness of the second dream might be attributable to its source being truly supernatural. This question is never definitively settled, resulting in a sense of disturbing indeterminacy. Moreover, by invoking the magico-theological dream tradition, Brontë disrupts the binary by which one separates dream from reality. And yet from the perspective of nineteenth-century dream science, the novel could still technically satisfy the dictates of a realism that would discount supernatural interpretations of the dream. Following this logic, Lockwood dismisses the possibility of the dream being supernatural by assuming that its source is a combination of his recent memories, his imagination, and his environment.

The Antiquary as a Model of the Tandem Dream Sequence

In both *Wuthering Heights* and *Frankenstein*, the tandem dream sequence increases the intensity of a perceived supernatural threat. In each novel, the narrator has a

nightmare, awakens from it, and immediately afterward has a dream or an intensely dreamlike experience in which the spectral "waif" or "monster," respectively, attempts to invade the narrator's bedroom (Brontë 20; Shelley 35). This commonality seems neither insignificant nor incidental. According to Herbert Gallagher, it is likely that the novel *Frankenstein* influenced Brontë's writing of *Wuthering Heights* (2004, 164).[108] Moreover, it is also possible that both Shelley and Brontë were influenced by Sir Walter Scott's *The Antiquary* (1816), the novel that I propose as a model of the conventional Gothic use of the tandem dream sequence. First, *The Antiquary* appears on Shelley's reading list for 1816 (Marshall 1889, 157), the year that she began writing *Frankenstein*. And second, Brontë's childhood fondness for Scott is well known to scholars, who have argued for the likelihood that she must have read Scott's Waverley novels, including *The Antiquary* (Dry 1937, 19; Gilmour 1983, 367).[109]

Additionally, the tandem dreams of Lockwood in *Wuthering Heights* and Lovel in *The Antiquary* are remarkably similar.[110] Lovel, like Lockwood, is spending the night as a guest in someone else's home when he begins to have a dream featuring an amalgamation

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[108] Gallagher focuses on other similarities between the two novels and gives evidence for the probability that Brontë would have read *Frankenstein* (2004, 164).

[109] There is also an iteration of the tandem dream sequence in Emily's sister Charlotte's *Jane Eyre*, published only two months after *Wuthering Heights* (1847). On the night that Jane dreams that Thornfield Hall is a "dreary ruin," that premonition follows a dream that is clearly connected to her emotional state—a juxtaposition that highlights the significance of the latter, especially in retrospect, when the reader learns that the stately house has indeed become a ruin. Moreover, upon awakening from the Thornfield Hall dream, Jane's fear is further intensified, as she sees a vampiric-looking intruder, Bertha Mason. Bertha is arguably a ghost of her former self as a result of her untreated mental illness and her confined life in the attic, from which she can sometimes be heard moaning hauntingly (287).

[110] Lovel in *The Antiquary* also recalls Edmund and Lord Arthur Lovel in Clara Reeve's *The Old English Baron* (1799), suggesting a potential line of influence from Reeve's early Gothic work to the later Gothic writers Brontë and Shelley. In *The Old English Baron*, Sir Philip has a revelatory dream that unfolds in a manner similar to the tandem dream sequence; the dream begins as "strange and incoherent" images, but then, the dreamer is transported to a location that is significant to Lord Arthur Lovel's death and sees Lovel's ghost (13-14).

of the previous days' impressions. As Lovel's memories merge with the images on a tapestry at which he has been gazing, he dreams that through a series of metamorphoses, he and several of his acquaintances are transformed into various animals. At this point, Lovel's dream, like Lockwood's first nightmare, aligns with the characteristics that nineteenth-century scientists theorized were the hallmarks of an ordinary, nonsensical, meaningless dream. Then, there is a shift in tone. And just like Lockwood, Lovel mistakenly believes that he has awakened when, in fact, a second dream that is more emotionally intense than the first has begun. In Lovel's second dream, the images of the huntsmen and animals become fearfully animated, and a man matching the description of Aldobrand Oldenbuck, the long dead former inhabitant of the bedroom, appears. He points with otherworldly import to a phrase in an unknown language, which Lovel later translates from German to English to glean the message (Scott 99, 131).

Thus, as in *Wuthering Heights*, the juxtaposition between the first dream, which is clearly inspired by recent impressions, and the second, potentially supernatural dream underscores the greater significance of the latter. Both Scott and Brontë draw on the nineteenth-century debates about what dreams could be and do; *The Antiquary* even includes a debate between two main characters on the subject (130-31). However, the differences between their uses of the tandem dream sequence are also significant. *The Antiquary* follows more of the Gothic literary conventions of a supernatural dream. First, Lovel's vision conveys a message from a benevolent spirit who has a strong connection to the place where he is sleeping, as Aldobrand Oldenbuck once inhabited the chamber where Lovel has fallen asleep. This is similar to Catherine's return to her childhood bedroom in *Wuthering Heights*, but unlike the ghost in *The Antiquary* or, for that matter,

the ghosts that typically appeared in earlier Gothic literary dreams, Catherine's ghost does not come with the intention of providing assistance to the dreamer. She is motivated by her own desire rather than any feeling of benevolence toward Lockwood.[111] Unlike Aldobrand, she is not visiting a descendant or even someone for whom she cares.

Another key difference is the fact that the revelation in Lovel's dream must be translated and turns out to be relevant to his circumstances, whereas Catherine conveys no tantalizingly obscure message, but instead, a clearly expressed desire. Although she is not empowered enough to enter the house through the window, she exhibits the characteristics that Jennifer Bann associates with ghosts more often in later Gothic works, when "ghosts became active figures" (664). Lockwood's nightmare is irrelevant to Lockwood himself because Catherine has not come to convey a message to him, whereas the meaning of Aldobrand's revelation is directly relevant to Lovel.[112] Intriguingly, both ghosts' hands are featured dramatically, but Catherine's does not gesture toward a revelatory missive; instead, she simply grasps desperately at Lockwood. Ultimately, Lovel's dream in *The Antiquary* follows the expectations set by a long tradition of Gothic literary dreams.[113] In contrast, Brontë, eschewing these expectations, presents Catherine

[111] Similarly, the young protagonist of *The Old English Baron* dreams of his deceased parents when he is sleeping in the apartment that they had inhabited while alive (Reeve 23–24), and in Radcliffe's *The Romance of the Forest*, Adeline dreams of her father's murder while sleeping in the castle where he died (108). See the section on *Jane Eyre* for additional examples.

[112] By inspiring Lovel to persevere in the quest to uncover his ancestry, the dream leads him to the revelation that his birth was legitimate, making it socially acceptable for him to pursue the woman he loves.

[113] Examples include the explicitly supernatural dreams that appear in Walpole's *The Castle of Otranto* and *The Old English Baron*, but also the ambiguous dreams that strongly suggest the supernatural, as in Radcliffe's *The Romance of the Forest* and *The Italian*.

not as a benevolent spirit with a revelatory purpose, but rather an inexplicable inhabitant of a nebulous, indeterminate realm of the supernatural.[114]

The use of the tandem dream sequence leads one to believe that, in *Wuthering Heights*, as in *The Antiquary*, the second dream must hold greater import. But there is, it seems, nothing to be done about the message imparted by Catherine's ghost; it is not an offer of aid, but an unanswered and unanswerable plea for help. Brontë's version of the supernatural dream is uniquely terrifying, which I attribute, in large part, to the fact that it fails to follow the convention of offering an interpretable revelation. Brontë mobilizes the shift in dream science away from oneirocriticism, and yet she does so while retaining the vulnerability of the sleeper to otherworldly forces. Moreover, as she dispenses with the conventions of the decodable premonition, she introduces an even greater sense of indeterminacy to the experience of the dream—its possible conflation with waking reality.

Additionally, while the ghost in *The Antiquary* is not especially frightening, the sensation of awakening from a nightmare, only to discover that a preternatural being is invading the room, sets a heightened tone for what ensues in *Wuthering Heights*. If the first dream were only a benign foil to the second, it need not be frightening, but because it is, that intensity only escalates. The unexpected appearance of a young girl whom one might, theoretically, imagine having climbed up the tree in order to knock at the window need not elicit such fear. But to Lockwood, she is an invading, otherworldly force whose intentions are not necessarily benevolent, and this makes her monstrous. Thus, Brontë's

[114] The convention of being visited by a benevolent spirit had been disrupted by the use of demonic Queen Mab figures, as in Matthew Lewis's *The Monk* (1796) and Charles Robert Maturin's *Melmoth the Wanderer* (1820).

use of the tandem dream sequence increases the affective intensity of the scene, especially because in employing this device, she also draws on the early modern belief that supernatural entities of all forms and intentions can intrude upon one's dream, while constructing the dream neither as an easily dismissed product of the imagination nor as a decodable message from a benevolent spirit.

The Nightmare of Reality in *Frankenstein*

Mary Shelley's use of dreams, allusions to dreaming, and dreamlike states in *Frankenstein* also intensifies affect but with striking differences to the approach that Brontë would later take.[115] *Frankenstein* develops the conflict between the title character and the creature through an initial series of scenes redolent of the tandem dream sequences of its predecessor, *The Antiquary*, and its successor, *Wuthering Heights*. Frankenstein encounters the preternatural entity in an oneirically charged scenario as well. As a consequence, the development of the creature as a monstrous figure, particularly from the perspective of his creator, is embedded in ideas of dreaming. After Frankenstein has brought the creature to life, he falls asleep in a state of exhaustion as well as "horror and disgust." But instead of finding respite, he "[passes] the night wretchedly," suffering from the "wildest dreams." At one point, he dreams that he is embracing his fiancée, only to find that her body has turned into the decaying corpse of his dead mother (34). This imagery commingles some of the recent impressions, events,

[115] Although *Wuthering Heights* was published twenty-nine years after the original 1818 publication of *Frankenstein*, I address *Wuthering Heights* first because it exhibits earlier Gothic traits.

and fears in Frankenstein's life, thereby following the scientific characterization of the dream as consisting of a chain of associated impressions (Abercrombie 1839, 198).

The immediate effect of this nightmare is its affective intensity. Like Lockwood in the later novel *Wuthering Heights*, Frankenstein has an incredibly disturbing dream and then experiences the sensation of awakening from it, only to discover that a preternatural being—in this case, the creature that he has brought to life—is on the verge of entering his bedroom.[116] Frankenstein is clearly awake, and yet the ensuing scene creates the sensations of a nightmare and carries the undertone of a preternatural threat. He is in the bed, it is night, and the dream of death and decay has set the tone for this encounter. When the creature appears, a ghostly manifestation of the dead come to life,[117] the "horror" of his "countenance" seems, to Frankenstein, to go beyond what "even Dante could … have conceived" (35). Despite his scientific mindset and the time that he has spent working on the creature's body, Frankenstein cannot see him dispassionately. His creation appears before him like the hallucinations of a fever dream:

> I started from my sleep with horror; a cold dew covered my forehead, my teeth chattered, and every limb became convulsed; when, by the dim and yellow light of the moon, as it forced its way through the window-shutters, I beheld the wretch—the miserable monster whom I had created. (34-35)

[116] Whether Lockwood is asleep or not, he experiences the *sensation* of awakening from a nightmare, and this occurs just before his encounter with the child-aged ghost of Catherine.

[117] This not only recalls Frankenstein's dream, but also serves as another way in which Frankenstein's creature is similar to the ghosts in *Wuthering Heights* and *The Antiquary*.

Although this initial encounter begins with Frankenstein awakening, the cold sweat and chattering teeth are symptoms of fever that would not be contrary to a fever-induced hallucination, which in nineteenth-century parlance, could be called a "fever dream."[118]

This bedroom scene adopts the role of the second dream in the tandem dream sequence. To Frankenstein, the creature's grin is "strange," and his gaze is not neutral; he appears to peep eerily at his creator from behind the bed curtain, striking an ogre-like pose akin to that of the incubus in Henry Fuseli's 1781 oil painting *The Nightmare*. The creature reaches out his hand, a gesture that Frankenstein could have interpreted as a benign greeting or even an invitation to touch fingers in a sort of accidental reenactment of Michelangelo's painting of the fingers of God and man touching in *The Creation of Adam* (ca. 1508-1512). But instead, the encounter is imbricated in the sensations of horror with which he has responded to his nightmare, and he interprets the creature's gesture as a menacing effort "to detain him."[119] To "escape" from this "monster," he flees his home altogether (35).

This interaction is especially significant because although Frankenstein has seen the creature's lifeless body, it is only at this moment that he sees him act as an animated, living being with a will of his own. The scene presents the creature's first steps, sounds, and gestures through the lens of a perceived violation—the breaching of Frankenstein's private bedchamber—and a potential for violence. The nightmare preceding the moment

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[118] Hallucinations were considered a dream state in the Victorian era (Vrettos 2002, 197).

[119] Both the creature in *Frankenstein* and Catherine's ghost in *Wuthering Heights* appear at windows and reach a hand toward the narrator (Brontë 21; Shelley 35). Similarly, in *The Antiquary*, Aldobrand points dramatically to a message (Scott 131). For an in-depth analysis on hands in Victorian novels, see Chapter One, "Shifting from Gaze to Grasp: 'Odious Handiwork' in *Frankenstein*" Peter J. Capuano's *Changing Hands* (2015).

and the moment itself become conflated. In Shelley's reappropriation of the tandem dream sequence, the creature is not confined to a literal dream. By substituting the second dream with this interaction, she injects waking reality with the sensations of a nightmare. Preternaturally fast, capable of tracking Frankenstein across great distances while remaining unseen, and willing to commit unspeakable horrors, the creature moves through time and space like the product of the dreaming imagination (65). This is, in a sense, exactly what he is.

The Realization of Frankenstein's Dream

Frankenstein refers to his scientific goals as his "dreams" and "visions" (22), but in this case, the word "dream" is not simply a synonym for "ambition." The very process of creation is marked by the delirium of a feverish "trance," at least partially caused by the "ardour" of his "feelings," which "exceeded moderation" and "bore [him] onwards like a hurricane." This causes him to "feel" a "resistless, and almost frantic impulse" (32), which is disturbingly single-minded; compelled by an "almost frantic impulse," he obsessively focuses on this "one pursuit" (33). The trance seems to be the product of this affective intensity. According to nineteenth-century natural philosophers, falling under the influence of such intense emotions could indeed rise to the level of a trance or dream state (Mattus 2009, 82).

Pre-Freudian scientific texts emphasize the potential for dreams and dreamlike states, including trances, to disrupt dialectical thought, social conventions, and with unique relevance to Frankenstein's project, the laws of physics. A dreamer's suspension of disbelief, produced by an absence of reason in dreams, makes absurdities possible, for

"nothing … however *monstrous*, incredible, or impossible, seems absurd" in a dream (Lang 1899, 84, emphasis added). Notably, this trance state is conspicuously absent when Frankenstein sets out to assemble a female companion for the male creature, and he aborts this experiment partway through (114-15), suggesting that the heightened affective state of the trance is essential to the completion of the creative process.

Additionally, the onset of the "slow fever" that contributes to Frankenstein's overwrought condition underscores the physiological dimension of affect; his physical health is not separate from his state of mind, and one of affect's defining characteristics is that it does not bifurcate the body and mind. This is because affect is both physiological and a mode of thought (Deleuze 1978, 2). Moreover, considering the overlap of the trance and the dream, the influence of this fever on dreaming could be expected to propel him to extremes, since fever dreams tend to possess a greater degree of wildness.[120] W. Newnham writes that "dreams of disease" tend to "present a great variety" (1831, 160-61), and Robert Macnish notes how "highly distressing" the "visions … which occur in a state of fever" can be (1834, 66). Disease was seen to escalate the irrational tendencies that these theorists already considered to be present in the phenomenon of dreaming; Macnish describes it as a "transient paroxysm of delirium" similar to "madness" in its capacity to deceive the dreamer (45, 148).[121] Frankenstein seems cognizant of the madness that readers would expect to accompany his dream state, along with the strangeness of his dream and how unlikely it was for him to realize it, as he self-

[120] Fever dreams are associated with the absurdities of which Gothic tales are capable. In the epigraph to the second edition of *The Castle of Otranto*, commonly considered the first Gothic novel, Walpole quotes Horace's *Ars Poetica*: "Idle fancies shall be shaped *like a sick man's dream*, so that neither foot nor head can be assigned a single shape" (63, emphasis added).

[121] Even the transition between falling asleep and awakening entails a "mild delirium" (Dendy 24).

consciously prefaces his narrative with the assertion that he is "not recording the vision of a madman" (30). The creature, standing at "eight feet in height" and possessing skin that "scarcely covers the work of muscles and arteries beneath" (33-34), could indeed be the figment of a feverish trance; and again, to a certain extent, he is.[122]

For Victorian readers, Shelley's use of the word "trance" would have called to mind a "mesmeric trance." According to Fred Kaplan, mesmeric trances were perceived as facilitating the emergence of a different self, one that was "often radically different from the *conscious* self" (1975, 118, emphasis added). As Frankenstein's creation comes to life, his horror at what he has created comprises an awakening that could be seen as akin to a return to consciousness. At the pivotal moment of the experiment, just as he is "infusing life into an inanimate body," he undergoes a profound, abrupt awakening: "The beauty of the *dream* vanished" (34, emphasis added). As he reflects later, "Dreams that had been my food … were now a complete hell to me" (35). In retrospect, he views the delirious fervor that has compelled him to work tirelessly on his creation as "but a passing trance" (32). Once the creature enters the reality of the waking world, he ceases to be confined to the dream world of Frankenstein's mind. When Frankenstein faces, in all actuality, the watery eyes, black lips, and translucent flesh of the being that he has created, he feels, with physical immediacy, "breathless horror and disgust" (35). Having initially envisioned the experiment as a grand enterprise that would culminate in scientific triumph, Frankenstein discovers that what he had deemed beautiful as a scientific dream appears hideous to him in waking reality.

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[122] In another sense, the fictional creation is, according to Shelley, a figment of her own "waking dream" (169).

Consequently, once the creature is brought to life, he is thrust into a harsh reality in which his creator has deemed him a "monster" and a "demon" (34). Even before committing any wrongs, the creature is, to some extent, already condemned by what Deleuze terms the "superpower of the signifier" (1987, 112). Language reflects the power dynamics of the waking world, and in the waking world, meaning is assigned through the dialectics of language. Binaries such as good and evil, past and present, and life and death structure waking experience in a way that they do not structure dreams.[123] The waking world defines and interprets the creations of dreams from the outside, with different rules of governance.

This characterization of dreaming lends itself to affective intensity. The primacy of affect, as a sensation that strikes with immediacy, precludes the normal functioning of dialectical logic. The Deleuzean concept of the virtual is characterized by its potential for nonlinear and nonbinary thought (Shouse par. 14). In contrast, the dialectically-governed waking world fits affect theorist Brian Massumi's characterization of the "faculty of judgment in representational dialectics as a "policeman" (2002, xi). Once the creature leaves the virtual dimension of scientific visions and dreams, Frankenstein perceives him as a deviation from the socially and morally acceptable. Within the realm of the dream, the dialectics and hierarchies embedded in this recognition had, quite literally, not signified. But having been cast in the role of the monster and treated as such, the creature eventually begins to act like one. As the figment of a delirious trance and the realization of a nightmare, he is both a product and a producer of affective intensity. Following his

[123] Welcoming the potential of the virtual to enable a transition from dialectical thought to nondialectical affects, nonbinary and nonlinear multiplicities, and a new concept of difference, Deleuze even affirms, "Difference must leave its [Platonic] cave and cease to be a monster" (1994a, 29).

appearance in Frankenstein's bedroom and the associated emergence of the dream into the waking world, waking reality itself adopts a nightmarish quality, propelling the narrative to extremes.

As eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scientists challenged the magico-theological tradition of oneirocriticism, they also turned the dream inward. Instead of linking the dreamer to an otherworldly, spiritual realm in which the sleeper might communicate with the dead, the divine, or even the demonic, the dream could reveal the private, unconventional and even immoral associations of one's own imagination. In place of communal speculations on the meaning of one's dream, natural philosophers studied it as a disorder. As we have seen, most of these scientists, focusing on the etiology of the disordered state, identified as possible causes the environment, the sleeping position, or the disordered state of the body, the brain, or the conscience (Macnish 274; Abercrombie 198–99; Newnham 1830, 160–61). As a result, instead of offering a transcendent glimpse into the spiritual realm, the dream became increasingly privatized.

Analogously, Frankenstein's trance-induced pursuit of a scientific dream enacts a performance of increased privatization. While immersed in his project, Frankenstein distances himself from his friends and family. Later, he suffers further isolation, as these friends and family members die. Feeling guilty but also compelled to keep the creation of the "monster" a secret (35), he is plunged further into isolation and a life characterized by an unexpected, even chaotic, chain of causes and effects. In this manner, just as the creature's invasion of the bedroom marks the intrusion of the dream into waking reality, and this intrusion is intensified by Frankenstein's heightened emotional state,

Frankenstein's interactions with the creature ultimately transform his reality into a waking nightmare marked by isolation.[124]

The Affective Potential and Sources of Gothic Dreams

In *Wuthering Heights*, Catherine makes an overt claim for the significance of dreams, specifically in terms of their capacity to have a lasting effect on a person. As she tells Nelly Dean, "I've dreamt in my life dreams that have stayed with me ever after, and changed my ideas; they've gone through and through me, like wine through water, and altered the colour of my mind" (62). What she describes might be characterized by Deleuze in Spinozan terms as an *occursus*, or an affective "encounter" (Deleuze 1978, 6). An occursus can act as either a positive or a negative force. Whereas good encounters are empowering, a "bad encounter" can be destructive (1978, 6). Such encounters can transform a person through a change in their elemental makeup, which Deleuze describes in terms of *becoming*: "Becoming is neither an imitation nor an experienced sympathy, nor even an imaginary identification" (1987, 173). It is a concept that underscores not only the potential for change, but also the constant state of change that is cultivated by the repetitions and multiplicities on the plane of the virtual.

In *Wuthering Heights*, different dreams and dreamlike states seem to connect through, and provide access to, a shared virtual realm, which unfolds into and flows back from the actual (1994a, 29–31). In the dream that Catherine recounts to Nelly Dean, she

[124] An 1818 reviewer of *Frankenstein* wrote, "We must protest against the waking dreams of horror excited by the unnatural stimulants by this later school [of Gothic fiction]; and we feel ourselves as much harassed, after rising from the perusal [of this book] as if we had been over-dosed with laudanum, or hag-ridden by the night-mare" (Anon. 1818, 432).

is sent to Heaven, complains about it, and is thrown out onto the moors, where she cries for joy at the prospect of being returned home (62). This dream, which she has as a child, seems to presage the beginning of the narrative for the child-aged ghost who confronts Lockwood in his dream. Moreover, the delirious trance-like states that overtake Catherine when she is an adult seem to provide both ostensibly nonsensical images as well as possibly premonitory images of a future after she has died.[125] In the dreams and deliriums that interlink on this supernatural-imbued plane of the virtual, repetitions unfold in nonlinear atemporality, even literally, in the novel itself. For instance, the experience of the child-aged ghost wandering the moors is revealed, first, through Lockwood's dream, which shows Catherine struggling to return to Wuthering Heights from outside, and later, in her account of her dream, which reveals a glimpse of the joy that she will initially feel upon arriving on the moors as a ghost.

Brontë's approach to the supernatural dream seems to evoke a quality Bakhtinian polyphonic quality (176) so powerful that multiple places, times, and people, including Lockwood, can occupy this virtual realm of dreams and deliriums. The nondialectical plane of the virtual—or, in other words, the power of this supernatural realm of the dream—has the potential to generate a wide variety of affective experiences. In fact, Catherine prefaces her conversation with Nelly by asserting "I'll give you a feeling of how I feel" (62). Her focus is on her own affective experience and the transmission of affect.

[125] For more, see Tricia Ayrton's analysis in Chapter 11 of *Dream and Literary Creation in Women's Writings in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Hervouet 2021).

The production of affect is, of course, also evoked by the appearance of her ghost at the window of the bedroom where Lockwood is sleeping; in this case, affective intensity permeates her emergence in the narrative in such a way that Lockwood views her as monstrous. Even in life, though, she and Heathcliff interact with others in ways that could be termed monstrous, as their own effective intensity drives them to make selfish and self-destructive decisions. On this point, Gilles Deleuze observes, "When Emily Brontë traces the bond between Heathcliff and Catherine, she invents a violent affect, like a kinship between two wolves" (1994b, 175). In their case, affective intensity seems not only to be generated by the supernatural version of the virtual that Brontë creates, but also to drive it.

As a disordered and disordering force, the affective potential of the dream, as conceptualized in nineteenth-century terms, disrupts the reality of the waking world in *Frankenstein* and *Wuthering Heights*. Through the use of the tandem dream sequence and their depictions of delirious trance states, Shelley and Brontë intensify affect to develop different ideas of Gothic monstrosity. Moreover, in both novels, it is the tandem dream sequence that introduces the emergence of the dream in waking reality. The result is the subversion of dialectical, representational thought, including the delineations that structure the concepts of time, space, and the real, as well as the binary of life and death.

In this light, while it could be argued that Frankenstein undergoes the effects of a destructive occursus, and Catherine experiences *becoming* in the form of a becoming-ghost, I submit that the primary occursus of each novel consists of the interplay between the realm of the dream and waking reality itself—an interplay that the use of the tandem dream sequence underscores. Ultimately, the fractured glass through which Lockwood

and Catherine struggle characterizes the force that I believe these dream elements exert. Rather than solely functioning as a reflective glass to mirror waking reality, the dream worlds of *Frankenstein* and *Wuthering Heights* impact the narrative with monstrous intensity, threatening to break into waking reality with the force of a nightmare.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ORDER OF SLEEP AND THE DISORDER OF DREAMS: SOMNIAL STATES AND SPACES IN CHARLES DICKENS'S *DOMBEY AND SON*

The private bedroom became a hallmark of the rising middle class in nineteenth-century Great Britain. One century earlier, it would have been normal for different family members to share a bedroom and sometimes even a bed with one another, a servant, or a visitor. In contrast, middle-class Victorians came to view the private bedroom as a necessity for the maintenance of propriety and public hygiene. It could also be a sanctuary for privacy and, for those who could afford embellishments, an expression of individuality. This shift toward privatization permeated the entire home, manifesting materially in the addition of walls to create a greater number of single-purpose rooms, the inclusion of fewer doors to make those rooms less accessible, and the use of heavy curtains to shield the inhabitants from public view (Crook 2008, 22-23).

Over roughly the same period of time, dream theories were also undergoing a form of privatization. Fewer people were interpreting dreams as potential premonitions, with the consequence that dreams could no longer be attributed to a divine or otherwise supernatural entity—that is, a being that was external to oneself and could reach beyond the limits of this ephemeral, material world. It seemed that only in fiction or the biblical past[126] could dreams connect dreamers with something outside of themselves. Instead, Britons were espousing scientific dream theories that emphasized internal factors, such as

[126] There was an idea that people had had revelatory visions in biblical times, but that they were no longer possible: "*In limine*, I assert my belief that the days of special inspiration are past, and that we cannot, rationally, now regard the visions of slumber as revelations or prognostics" (Dendy 1832, 70).

the sleeper's physiological state, processes of the mind, and—slightly more externally, but still with an internal focus—the interior of the bedroom.

One's sleeping environment can, of course, affect how one sleeps, so why would it not affect the way in which one would conceptualize the phenomena accompanying that sleep? The early modern experience of dreams—perhaps awakening between the first and second sleep, and discussing the potential portent of a dream with a loved one who has been sleeping nearby—would be very different from the nineteenth-century middle-class experience of dreams— possibly awakening from a nightmare alone in one's bedroom and wondering solitarily what disordered state had caused one to dream. As A. Roger Ekirch writes, "communal sleep afforded persons a trusted comrade in whom to confide on a level of intimacy rare for daytime relationships" (2005, 281).

Moreover, a conceptual corollary of this was in effect on a grander scale. I argue that the privatization of the bedroom was intertwined not only with wide-scale societal changes but also with the progressively internal focus of scientific dream theories, which an increasing number of Britons were espousing[127] or, at least, claiming to believe.[128] I also contend that this correlation between sleeping spaces and the dreams that emerge within them informed literary uses and depictions of sleep, dreams, and sleeping spaces. Despite these massive shifts in how people lived and how they conceptualized their

[127] In light of the stark contrast between the private bedrooms of the middle class and the communal, often makeshift sleeping spaces of the lower classes, it seems likely that such differences might have affected the ways in which different classes conceptualized dreams. Not only would the educated have been discouraged from reading premonitions into their dreams; the experience of awakening from a nightmare alone in a private room would be very different from doing so in a communal sleeping space.

[128] Even while dream interpretation was being denigrated, the fortune-telling guide known as the "dream book," an inexpensive genre of chapbook providing keys for interpreting one's dreams, remained popular. In fact, it was the most popular genre of chapbook in the nineteenth century (Lang 1899, 29; Perkins 1999, 104), suggesting that it might have been what we would today call guilty-pleasure reading.

experiences or the ways in which such changes must have informed their premises about life—and therefore literature, especially in that of authors striving for a degree of realism—contemporary literary scholars are doing excellent work on sleep or dreams and dream states in nineteenth-century Great Britain, but usually without connecting conditions of sleep with dreams or with somnial states or spaces.[129]

The societal concerns that intersected in the material space of the private bedroom, which this chapter will highlight in terms of privacy, gender, class, and propriety, are prominent in Charles Dickens's novel *Dombey and Son* (1848). First, the scenes set in and around bedrooms are remarkably frequent and foregrounded, and second, dreams and sleep are frequently referenced and evoked. This, in itself, is not surprising. Dickens had a great interest in sleep and dreams, reading up on contemporary dream theories and even formulating some of his own (Winters 1948, 984). All of Dickens's major works, and many of his shorter works, feature at least one scene of dreaming or sleeping. This novel has a high number of them; in *Dombey and Son*, even the dog dreams. Moreover, moments of sleep and slumber are often observed not only by the reader, but also by other characters. Parental figures watch over slumbering youths, family members attend the beds of loved ones in sick rooms, and at one point, a would-be lover stands outside at night to gaze up at what he mistakenly believes to be the window of his beloved's bedroom.

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[129] See Elisha Cohn (2016, 20) on depictions of reverie and affect in Victorian novels. See Jill Mattus (2007, 69) and Athenia Vrettos (2002, 197) on dreams and dream states in nineteenth-century Great Britain. See Catherine Perkins on dream books in nineteenth-century Great Britain (1999, 104). See Jonathan Crary (2013, 105) on the shift away from early modern magico-theological dream interpretation. See A. Roger Ekirch (2005) and Sasha Handley (2016) on early modern sleep patterns and conditions, and see the former on the shift away from early modern sleep. See Judith Flanders (2004, 9) and Catherine Hall (1990, 74) for references to the private bedroom in the Victorian home.

Dickens was also fascinated by mesmerism, the Victorian forerunner to hypnosis intended to place a patient in a trance state (Kaplan 65). The frequency, verisimilitude, and intensity with which Dickens describes sleeping states has led neurologist J. E. Cosnett to call him a keen "Observer of Sleep and its Disorders" (qtd. in Greaney 1).

Additionally, the concerns surrounding views of the Victorian middle-class private bedroom come to the fore in the novel, especially in the chapter "The Watches of the Night." This chapter stands out as an almost eerie interlude between the dramatic events, clandestine meetings, and entertaining subplots that permeate much of the novel. In contrast to some of the more eventful chapters, "The Watches of the Night" is comprised of two prolonged nighttime scenes featuring somnial states and spaces.

As a result of this connection between these bedrooms and the nighttime reveries of those who sleep, dream, and tread within them, these scenes shift into the realm of what Gilles Deleuze and other affect theorists refer to as the "virtual." Elisha Cohn has linked the virtual to Victorian depictions of reverie, arguing that these fictional moments of reverie can create a "lyric mode." This lyric mode provides "a narrative annex or respite," which disrupts the forward motion of the *bildungsroman* (2016, 20). The bedroom scenes in "The Watches of the Night" adopt the sort of lyric mode that Cohn describes. However, I contend that in these scenes, this is linked not only to the characters who experience the reverie, but also to the places where this lyric, dreamlike mode emerges. The material environment of each private bedroom introduces meaning and intensity that should be taken into consideration.

To analyze the connection between the advent of the private bedroom in middle-class British homes during the long nineteenth century, its connection to dreams, and the

representations of both in *Dombey and Son*, I have organized this chapter into two sections. In the first section, I argue that there is a correlation between sleeping spaces and the ways in which the inhabitants of these spaces conceptualized their dreams. In the second section, I demonstrate how this plays out in *Dombey and Son*. While I focus on and perform close readings of passages from the chapter "The Watches of the Night," I contextualize my analysis of these scenes in terms of the wider novel. Moreover, I also make connections to other chapters with scenes that take place in or relate to bedrooms. My historicization of the bedroom, in connection with the shifting conceptions of sleep and dreams in the nineteenth century, informs my analysis of their roles in *Dombey and Son*.

I. The Order and Disorder of Sleep: Privatizing Bedrooms & Dreams

The sleeping body acquired a new set of needs, regulations, and meanings in the nineteenth century, as the "individual bed" came to be "regarded as an essential ingredient of civilized society" in Great Britain, according to Tom Crook (2008, 15). The middle class's concerns with propriety, sexuality, and the gendered separation of the public and private spheres manifested and intersected in their perception of the private bedroom. Historically, for all but the aristocracy, family members of different ages and genders would habitually have slept in the same room and sometimes the same bed. But as the century progressed, there was a greater perceived need for boys and girls, parents and children, and the young and the old to sleep apart (Crook 15, 22-23; Flanders 2004,

9).[130] I argue that this individuation of bedrooms reflects the intensified individuation of gender roles.

Thus, promoted by the ideal of propriety, the recomposition of the middle-class home was imbricated in the Victorian belief in the Doctrine of Separate Spheres. This separation of gendered spheres caused a change whereby, as Peter Capuano writes, "middle-class women became economically and spatially separated from the site of work for the first time in history." In the "dominant agricultural realm" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, daily tasks had been undertaken by both genders, but as industrialization moved work away from the home, labor had become redefined as "off-limits to middle-class women" (2015, 75).

Manuals provided advice on how to organize the private bedrooms with a view to promoting higher-quality sleep. In the "General Management of Sleep" (1834), Robert Macnish, whose 1827 study was in Dickens's library (Winters 984), covers a range of minutiae. These include the proper sizes and proximities of beds and bedrooms; the ideal selection and arrangement of mattresses, pillows, blankets, curtains, furniture, and lighting; and the best positions for sleeping soundly (267-82). He also writes, "A change of bed will sometimes induce dreams; and, generally speaking, they are more apt to occur in a strange bed than in the one to which we are accustomed" (53). Of course, the premise that controlling the material conditions of the sleeper could affect sleep quality would not necessarily strike us as remarkable, since the places where people sleep could, of course, affect how well they sleep. However, Macnish suggests that by following his advice, one

[130] It was even argued that all adults should have their own beds because "the system of having beds in which two persons can sleep is always, to some extent, unhealthy" (Richardson 1880, qtd. in Reiss 29).

might be able to make dreams "disappear altogether" (24). It seems that the absence of dreams, supposedly an indicator of "complete" sleep, was one of the reasons to change the way in which bedrooms were organized.

Alongside this rising concern with sleeping environments, there was, as discussed in the introduction, a growing interest in dreams—not as premonitions to be decoded, but rather, as the subjects of scientific study. The publication of scientific studies on dreams was on the rise, as was the readership of such texts (Colson 1990, 165-66). Scientific interest in sleep and dream states was growing (Whyte 1960, 70), as was general, widespread interest in the scientific views on the subject (Ellenberger 1970, 303; Colson 1990, 165-66). These works focused primarily on classification, categorizing sleep disorders and states, and etiology, speculating about the causes of dreams. The majority attributed dreams to internal influences, both within the person—in terms of the body, brain, or conscience (Macnish 274; Abercrombie 1839, 198-99; Newnham 1830, 160-61)—and, as the popularity of Macnish's work evinces, in terms of the interior space of the bedroom.

The Age of the Bed

As we will see in Dickens's novel *Dombey and Son*, the private bedroom held special significance for the rising middle class in nineteenth-century Great Britain (Flanders 2004, 23). But the privatization of sleeping spaces had begun much earlier, and understanding Victorian domestic spatialization requires an understanding of that larger context. It was at the outset of the early modern era that "sleeping bodies were gradually accorded their own space apart from others" (Crook 15), as a separate, lockable

"chamber" came to be added off the hall for sleeping (Ranum 1989, 217). In fact, Carole Shammas has, "only half in jest," dubbed the early modern era "The Age of the Bed" (1990, 169, 158). Before then, the typical European home had consisted of a single multipurpose "hall" containing all of the materials deemed necessary for sleeping and eating. These early sleeping spaces included bedding material but were free of bedsteads or curtains (Ranum 217).

In contrast, the bedchamber, with its lock, accommodated activities for which privacy might be desired, including not only sleep and sex, but also prayer, the storage of precious items, dressing and undressing, and the birth and nursing of babies (Ranum 218-19).[131] This lockable chamber was primarily a feature of the dwellings of the wealthy, but it proliferated; by the eighteenth century, it was normal to sleep in a chamber that was separate from the rest of the home (Crook 15-16). This suggests that the bedroom was not merely one of many domestic spaces to be privatized, but rather—dating from the early modern era—likely the point from which domestic privatization emanated.[132]

And just as sleeping bodies were becoming increasingly sequestered, the impulse to share the contents of one's dreams was also diminishing.[133] Before the "Age of the Bed" (Shammas, 169, 158), there had, according to Jonathan Crary, been a "near-universal acceptance of dreaming as integral to the lives of individuals and communities." Dreams had the potential to be worthy of discussion with family and

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[131] Those in search of greater privacy could, in some bedchambers, make use of a *ruelle*, the space between the bed and the wall; an alcove, the recess in a wall; or a hidden compartment (Ranum 1989, 220).

[132] Jonathan Crary points out that although the concealment of sexual activity and the security of prized possessions are thought to have been factors, sleeping could in itself merit the security of a locked room; most convincingly, he cites Thomas Hobbes's description of the "defenselessness of an individual sleeper" in *Leviathan* (1651) as a vivid example of "the insecurity of the state of nature" (2013, 25).

[133] See the introduction for a detailed account of this change.

friends, making Crary's emphasis on their value to "communities" noteworthy (2013, 105). Ekirch similarly observes that European "households" attached greater significance to the "explanatory and predictive powers" of dreams before the seventeenth century (2001, 344).[134] There had been a communal aspect to the valuation of dreams.

However, around the seventeenth century, the validity of discussing or speculating about the mystical interpretation of a dream, "a subject both universal and determinedly individual in its approach" (Edwards 2018, 205), was becoming widely "marginalized and discredited" (Crary 105). In *On the Phenomena of Dreams* (1832), Walter Dendy offers a rational explanation for a prophetic dream that Oliver Cromwell reportedly had predicting his rise to power, arguing, "This constant dwelling on the subject must have imparted a like character to the dream of his slumbers" (78). In Dendy's view, Cromwell's dream only reiterated his own ambitious thoughts, as "This constant dwelling on the subject must have imparted a like character to the dream of his slumbers" (78). Dreams were shifting out of the realm of communal discussion and into the category of a phenomenon that would remain private. In fact, Dendy makes a comment criticizing those who feel tempted to share their dreams:

[134] Ekirch argues that the change in sleeping patterns from segmented to consolidated sleep could also have influenced the experience of dreams. Pre-Enlightenment sleepers would awaken for a period of time after what they called their "first sleep" before eventually returning to sleep for a "second sleep.": "Not only were these visions unusually vivid, but their images would have intruded far less on conscious thought had sleepers not stirred until dawn." He argues convincingly that "segmented sleep" would also have integrated the dream more into waking life. For the pre-industrial sleeper, the dream would have seemed less like a disorder and more like a part of everyday life (2001, 344). Assigning the dream exclusively to the nighttime, in combination with the diminished memorability of its contents, likely conferred onto the dream an aura of mystery. It is possible that the transition from segmented sleep to consolidated sleep may have contributed to the eventual nineteenth-century association of dreaming with disorder.

> When the vivid sensation, from the memory of a pleasant dream, has ceased, there may still be pleasure to the dreamer on his narration of the vision … Epictetus has left us a caution regarding this infliction. 'Never tell thy dream, for though thou thyself mayest take a pleasure in telling thy dream, another will take no pleasure in hearing it. (25-26)

Even in a treatise in which Dendy discusses dreams at length, he dissuades others from disclosing their own dreams.

Thus, during the same period in which sleeping was beginning to be conceptualized as a private experience, the content of dreams was also starting to be thought of as a phenomenon to be kept private. The fact that the valuation of dreams shifted during "The Age of the Bed" reaffirms that a connection exists between the ways in which dreams were perceived and the conditions in which they were dreamt.

Moreover, by the nineteenth century, the primary ways in which Britons thought of dreaming were increasingly influenced by the works of natural philosophers or, as they came to be called, scientists. Natural philosophers focused on internal causes of dreams and classifications of disordered sleep, and these scientific dream theories were turning the subject inward. The ideas and memories that comprised the stuff of dreams linked dreams to the "interior life of the individual rather than the external interventions of spirit guides" (Hayward 2000, 144), since unlike visiting spirits, such dreams could not be expected to provide important guidance. And meanwhile, the domestic space of the home and the bedroom, specifically, were likewise becoming increasingly private.

Bedliness and Civilization

"*Bed* is the *home* of the home … *sweet* within sweet," affirms an 1877 edition of the British journal *The Sanitary Inspector* (Crook 23, emphasis added). This description recalls the nineteenth-century idealization of the "home" as a "place of sweet delights" (Hall 1990, 74). It also suggests that a certain quality of "bedliness," rooted in the idea of a cozy, private bed, was at the core of the middle-class cult of domesticity—a quality that is conspicuously absent from Dombey's home in Dickens's *Dombey and Son*. Just as the bedchamber provided sleepers with privacy, the "bedly" home shielded private life from the invasive public gaze.[135]

The Gentleman's House, an 1864 architectural text, lists "privacy" as the "primary classification" of the ideal house, ahead of numerous other characteristics including "comfort," "convenience," and "cheerfulness" (qtd. in Flanders 31). Making the home the "quintessence of privacy" was key to its status as a "refuge" (Hall 74; Flanders 5). In the introduction to the 1851 census, the writer asserts that the ideal home "throws a sharp well-defined circle round [a man's] family and hearth—the shrine of *his* sorrows, joys and meditations" (qtd. in Hall 74, emphasis added). This underscores the shift from the communal to the private and its relationship to the home as a domestic refuge. The idea of the home comprising a male refuge from the public sphere, ostensibly following a day of work outside the home, contrasts sharply with the eighteenth-century sites of male rejuvenation, such as clubs, coffeehouses, gin shops, and street gatherings (Flanders 5). In *Dombey and Son* as well, as Dombey's failure to separate the commercial sphere of

[135] This was quite literally the case, as the airy, open windows of the eighteenth century were replaced by thick curtains in the nineteenth (Flanders 8).

work from the domestic sphere of the home—encapsulated by his ill-fated decision to ask his business manager, Carker, to manage his new wife, Edith—which leads Carker to enter into Edith's private bedroom, where he begins to made advances on her (648-52).

The private home would not be complete without the private bedroom, to conceal and enclose its inhabitant, along with anyone else permitted inside, during sleep, sex, periods of illness, or the processes of giving birth or dying (Ranum 218-19; Crook 16). The "bedly" home was marked by these same ideals of concealment and enclosure, and was a locus of domesticity—in the words of Judith Flanders, "a projection of the feminine, an encircling, encouraging, comforting aura that was there to protect a husband and," in a womblike manner, to protect "children from the harshness of the world" (13). This domesticity was entrenched in the idea of propriety, to which the separation of the domestic and public spheres was key.[136]

A bedroom ordered by standards of propriety must, even while extending its cozy atmosphere into the rest of the home, be a private one. To suit the new standards of decency, the preferred number of bedrooms rose, along with the individuation of other rooms in the home.[137] A middle-class home required as many as four to eight bedrooms, and a lower-class home would ideally contain at least two in order to separate the sleeping bodies of parents and children, or if possible, three, to separate the children's

[136] The classification of sleepers according to their roles within the household separated dormant bodies around the same time that the genders' waking lives were increasingly diverging. The doctrine of separate spheres was presented as an old and therefore "natural" concept (Hall 93). While that was a misrepresentation, one might actually consider it an intensification or reversal of an older concept, insofar as the upper classes had long prided themselves on their own separation from the uncultured masses who worked. Around the nineteenth century, the domestic sphere, coded as feminine, was deemed a space of non-work, since the toil of women was generally considered labor, not work. As it was subordinated to the masculine world of work, the latter was elevated. This ennoblement of work, as dramatized in Ford Maddox Brown's painting *Work* (1865), was, thus, supported by the doctrine of separate spheres.

[137] Architects even gave bedrooms fewer doors to limit the possibility of intrusion (Crook 22-23).

bedrooms by gender once they had outgrown their nursery (Flanders 9). This individuation of bedrooms ostensibly diminished the perceived potential for sexual transgression (Corbin 1990, 494-95).[138]

As we have seen, historically, the hall in which Britons had slept was shared and multi-purpose; Victorians, however, might interpret such a commingling of purposes as a figurative form of moral degradation (Hall 82). An overlap between the domestic sphere, a womblike space, and the public, commercial sphere might even imply a symbolic prostitution.[139] Rooms became organized by rational schemes according to their purposes (Guerrand 366; Perrot 1990, 346). In this manner, the ideal home seems to have been not only an "essential ingredient of civilized society" (Crook 15), but in fact, also a microcosm of it. To this point, George August Sala, a nineteenth-century journalist, lists the "distinguishing characteristics" of the "present" order of British "civilisation [sic]" as "subdivision, classification, and elaboration" (1859, 218). The Victorian middle-class home seems to have been subjected to this three-fold civilizing force, as it was increasingly subdivided into a greater number of smaller rooms, each of which was

[138] The privatization of sleeping spaces lowered the perceived potential for infidelity or incest, although Victorians worried that it might facilitate masturbation, a practice associated with immorality and illness; children's rooms were placed close to their parents' rooms for ease of surveillance (Corbin 494-95).

[139] It was important that the domestic sphere remain set "apart from the sordid aspects of commercial life" (Flanders 5). As the title character of Sir Walter Scott's *Guy Mannering* (1815) reflects, "It is disgusting … to see the scenes of domestic society and seclusion thrown open to the gaze of the curious and vulgar." Even "under the most favourable circumstances," such a scene would be "melancholy," but the "confused state of the furniture, displayed for the convenience of being easily viewed and carried off by the purchasers," is "disagreeable" (105). Mannering views this intrusion of the commercial sphere into the sanctuary of the domestic as vulgar, highlighting the sense of exposure.

classified by hierarchy, function, and complex, alternating divisions of public and private (Flanders 9).[140]

Properly run homes—and therefore, also properly managed households—comprised part of the foundation for the rising middle class and by extension, Victorian society as a whole. The stability of the nuclear family, patriarchal power, and social and moral order must have seemed at least partially dependent upon the careful management of the domestic ideal, even in its most minute, material details (Hall 74).

Views of the Individual

Wealthy Britons, such as the Dombeys, were able to turn their rooms into spaces expressive of their individuality. Thus, continuing through Sala's list of three characteristics of British "civilisation [sic]" (218), we come to the third civilizing element, "elaboration" (Flanders 9). To this point, the "private kingdom" of the bourgeois home would, to the extent that its inhabitants could afford it, be enhanced with gardens, greenhouses, private staged concerts, and the accumulation of works of art, souvenirs, photographs, books, and magazines. Accumulation governed the interior design of the period, as "fabrics, hangings, silk, and carpets covered every bit of free surface" (Guerrand 1990, 369). In *Dombey and Son*, for example, this manifests in the extensive renovations to which the home is subjected in preparation for Edith's arrival and the descriptions of, and sentimental attachments to, private bedrooms (441-42, 190, 461).

[140] The dining, drawing, and morning rooms were "designed for receiving outsiders," while the bedrooms and the study were limited to family members, and servants lived in the kitchen, scullery, and their own bedrooms (Flanders 9).

In nineteenth-century British culture, even accumulation and decorative elaboration were rationalized in moralistic terms. According to *The Practical Housewife* (1855), it is "a good policy" to make the home "attractive as well as comfortable," since "men are free to come and go as they list" (Philp [sic] 2). A properly domesticated space could promote propriety by encouraging men to inhabit domestic spaces instead of public ones where they might encounter temptations. Along similar lines, a "regularity of form" and "conformity" in home decor were generally associated with "respectability" (Flanders 34).

Within the middle-class home, the bedroom underwent this process, not only subdivided by occupants and classified by each one's societal role, but also elaborated with interior decoration. In this manner, in addition to reflecting the separation of familial roles, the private bedroom, with its own unique accumulation of material elaborations, created a space for individuality. Alain Corbin argues that the "private bedroom" was "identified with its occupant," giving "proof" of the "individual." A range of socially encoded objects testified to the station, role, and personality of the room's inhabitant (480-81). In this manner, the enclosed nature of the individual bedroom both reaffirmed individual subjectivities and secured them within permissible roles.

Yet dreams threatened to release individuals from their socially acceptable roles, a sense that we will find highlighted in *Dombey and Son* in the exploration of potential that occurs within an atmosphere of dreaminess and in the bedroom scenes of sleep and trancelike reverie. While dreaming, individuals could be mentally transported out of their bedrooms and tempted to transgress the dictates of propriety, albeit not in waking reality. Even while locked inside a private bedroom, people's dreams could take them beyond the

"new walls" that defined their "private life" (Corbin 513). No longer considered by the educated to be universally interpretable, dreams were seen as disordered phenomena in which the imagination ran riot, uncontrolled by reason, and dreaming was described by some dream theorists as a form of sleep disorder. Ultimately, even if one were to follow the instructions in Macnish's "General Management of Sleep," striving for that state of perfect sleep in which dreams "disappear altogether" (24), one would likely still experience dreams.

Diary records of dreams during this period reveal various forms of impropriety, such as the "allure of purchased sex," "licentiousness of imperial revelry," and even "incest dreams." According to Corbin, there was also an upsurge in recorded "dreams about travel, stagecoaches," and "trains," literally adopting themes of transporting dreamers elsewhere. He reports that "revolutionary acts" also became a "leitmotif in dream literature," speculating that this might have been the result of anxieties about revolution (Corbin 513, 515). Regardless of the validity or invalidity of psychoanalytical interpretation, it is noteworthy that revolutionary themes were connoted with dreaming, a phenomenon synonymous with disorder, with the potential to disrupt sleep, the security of the private bedroom, and by extension, metaphorically, possibly also civilization.

The Anarchy of Communal Sleep

The desire to further privatize, and thereby civilize, the spaces in which people slept did not end at the threshold to the bourgeois home. According to Crook, "The spatial ordering of sleep was a key means through which this self-consciously civilizing society confronted some of its manifold discontents." Some of these discontents were

corollaries of the "problems of urbanization," or more specifically, "the unruly mass" of working-class "bodies" accumulating in the cities (16). The circumstances in which the working poor lived were, in fact, severe. In *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (1845, n. pag.), Frederick Engels assembles records that include descriptions of their sleeping environments, many of which seem to have resembled the single halls of early European dwellings preceding the advent of the bedchamber.

Those describing working-class living conditions underscored the communal aspect of their sleeping arrangements. "It is nothing unusual to find a man, his wife, four or five children, and, sometimes, both grandparents, *all in one single room*, where they eat, *sleep*, and work," comments a pastor in the largest working-class district of London (Engels, emphasis added).[141] Some families received boarders who would "*sleep in the same bed* with the married couple," notes another observer (Engels, emphasis added).[142] While Engels's study was not motivated by outrage at the failure to observe bourgeois standards of propriety, his records of others' accounts suggest that some first-hand observers bordered on interpreting the lack of privacy as a moral failing in the workers themselves. For example, a writer for an English sanitary journal characterizes the squalor of one poor family's dwelling with more revulsion than empathy: "A straw-heap often [serves] the whole family for a bed, upon which men and women, young and old,

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[141] The spaces in which they slept offered little comfort the same pastor continues, "Many, indeed, have no other covering for the night than … rags, and no bed, save a sack of straw and shavings." Similarly, Engels documents a family compelled to sell their "bedstead" and "bedding" for food; they slept on "as many old rags as would fill a woman's apron." Some of the workers in these recorded narratives possessed "bedsteads"—but "such bedsteads and beds!" Others shared beds "without bedsteads," sometimes "teeming with vermin," or simply slept on "mouldy straw, mixed with rags," "a heap of filthy straw or quilts of old sacking," or "the bare floor" (Engels).

[142] A dwelling like this appears in *Dombey and Son*: "In an ugly and dark room, an old woman, ugly and dark too," is introduced to the reader in a room with "a heap of rocks, a heap of bones, a rigid bed, two or three mutilated chairs or stools, black walls and blacker ceiling" (526-27).

sleep in *revolting* confusion." Similarly, another family is described as sleeping "in an *indiscriminate* heap, where all alike [were] *degraded* by want, stolidity, and wretchedness" (Engels, emphasis added).

Laborers themselves associated class mobility with the private bedroom to the extent that class ambition was characterized in terms of "bedroom fantasies" (Corbin 505). Thus, for members of the wealthy bourgeoisie, like the fictional Dombey, who has a private bedroom suite (654), privatization contributed to a sense of identity as a member of the affluent rising middle class. This presents a striking contrast to the conditions of the working class as well as to those of unhoused Britons, which I will discuss next. The danger of becoming homeless is evoked powerfully in connection with Florence in *Dombey and Son*. Working-class living conditions might be one of the better-case scenarios for the homeless, but both would be a reduction in circumstances for Florence, and such dangers arise when she finds herself homeless in the novel (753).

In the nineteenth century, Britons who were unhoused slept in spaces that were completely public and clearly not designed for that purpose, such as "passages, arcades, in corners," and on "the benches in parks." The "luckiest" were able to "find a bed" for a night, but most shelters were overcrowded, and the lodging houses available to them usually contained "four, five, six beds in a room" into which "four, five, or six human beings are piled." This was not only an issue of comfort, but also of propriety, as "young and old, drunk and sober, *men and women*" were bunked together "*indiscriminately*," and of health, as "sick and well" would "sleep in the same room, in the same bed" (qtd. in Engels, emphasis added).

But as some of the first-hand accounts imply, such "indiscriminacy" was often seen by the middle and upper classes as "a sign that workers were sexually primitive and uncivilized" (Perrot 351). Widespread concern about "indecent practices in communal sleeping arrangements among the laboring poor" grew, as "the general Victorian squeamishness about sex extended the campaign to all matters involving shared bedding" (Reiss 2017, 29).[143] Although the reason for improving the homes of the lower classes was ostensibly rooted in a concern for public health, cleanliness was connoted with virtue, and the middle class's motivation seems at least partially to have been inspired by an implicit threat to propriety and order. Communal sleeping spaces could not maintain domestic order, or the perception of it, as they failed to individuate sleepers, to conceal their physicality, or to contain, or at least to appear to contain, sexuality within boundaries considered acceptable. Lacking the individuated homes and bedrooms congruent with the ideals of bourgeois domesticity, the laboring poor and the unhoused were in danger of being seen as primitive masses in need of civilization.

Civilizing Dream Spaces

Again, a parallel can be drawn between the treatment of sleeping spaces and that of dreams. The heightened public discourse about the need for individual bedrooms paradoxically meant that there was a focus on the bedroom with the purpose of shielding it—or, at least, its contents—from public focus. The public sought access into, and knowledge of, communal sleeping spaces in order to make the spaces less accessible.

[143] In some cases, it was probably true that, as was assumed, "bedfellows proved more willing to transgress social mores" (Ekirch 2005, 28), but not in all cases, especially, one must suppose, among many of the related family members who slept next to one another.

Correspondingly, the heightened interest in, and discourse on, scientific dream theories, evidenced by the growing number of publications and lectures on the subject (Colson 165-66), paradoxically meant that focus settled on the dream in a way that trivialized, and thereby discouraged communal interpretations of, its contents.[144]

The impulse to privatize and sanitize, as facets of a larger inclination to impose order, was influencing both the environment in which one slept and how one conceptualized the dreams that one had there. Dream theorists focused their attention inward, privatizing the dream both in terms of how it was conceptualized and to what extent it could be appropriately discussed.[145] The categorization of dreaming as disruptive and potentially improper made it a threatening force, especially within the context of the civilizing impulses of nineteenth-century Great Britain.

II. Deleuzean Virtuality in the Victorian Bedroom: Sleep-Watching & Trancelike Reverie in Charles Dickens's "The Watches of the Night"

The Bourgeois Bedroom and the Night Watch

This framework demarcating the conceptual limits of the private bedroom comes to the fore in Dickens's *Dombey and Son* (1848), especially in chapter 43, "The Watches of the Night." The chapter's portentous tone and nighttime scenes, in which the past, present, and potential future intermingle, evoke the sensations of a dream, perhaps especially one in which the dreamer is visited by a spirit. In fact, the character Florence

[144] See the introduction for more on differences in beliefs about dreams in relation to class.
[145] See the introduction for a comprehensive discussion of nineteenth-century dream theories.

visits the bedrooms of her sleeping father and "half-waking" stepmother (662), moving quietly through the house like one of the ghosts in *A Christmas Carol* (1843), who watch the living but typically remain unseen.

At this point in the novel, Florence's beloved brother, Paul, has succumbed to illness and died. Since Florence's biological mother had died shortly after giving birth to him, Florence has enthusiastically welcomed her stepmother, Edith. Unfortunately, Dombey has been consumed by the thought of preserving the legacy of his shipping house, Dombey and Son, which he had hoped to share with Paul. Initially merely neglectful of Florence, Dombey has become increasingly resentful toward, and estranged from, her—first, because she was not born a son and therefore, cannot fill the role of "Son" in "Dombey and Son"; second, because his son, Paul, seemed to prefer Florence to him; and finally, because when Paul dies, Dombey is left only with the daughter does not want. Moreover, most recently, he has begun to feel resentful of Florence's close friendship with his new wife, Edith. To him, Florence's presence seems to be equivalent to the conspicuous absence of his male heir.

In the nighttime scene in "The Watches of the Night," Florence remains unseen by her sleeping father, and although her stepmother sees her, it seems to be through an altered state of consciousness, or a dreamy, ghostly haze. Adding to the similarity to Dickens's Christmastime ghost story, both parents are, like those exhorted by the ghosts they cannot see or hear in *A Christmas Carol*, in need of redemption (660-62).

In this somnial space, Florence can do what she could not do if Dombey were awake; just as actual dreams can mentally transport the dreamer outside their bedroom, the liminal nighttime setting allows her to cross the threshold into her father's room. She

sneaks into Dombey's bedroom out of concern for his health. He is in bed recovering from wounds sustained while being thrown from a horse, an accident which, while deeply upsetting to Florence, does not trouble her stepmother, Edith. In fact, it is on this night that Dombey and Edith began to sleep in separate bedrooms—or rather, separate bedroom suites—an indication of their disconnect and, more specifically, a consequence of Dombey's resentment toward Edith for not submitting to his will (654).[146]

In contrast, Florence has asked repeatedly to visit Dombey's sick bed, both to check on him and to seek reassurance in the night as she had done as a small child (659). Dombey's bad-tempered, elderly housekeeper, Mrs. Pipchin, has not passed Florence's requests on to him, although even if she had, he almost certainly would have denied them (657). He has posted Mrs. Pipchin at his bedroom door ostensibly as his caretaker, but on this night, in a role that more closely approximates that of a night watchman, calling to mind the chapter title. The night watch was made up of men paid to patrol the streets at night before the development of the modern police force in the 1820s. Their duty was primarily "to keep the streets clear of people that had no real business in them" (Ekirch 2005, 78). While their main duty was to deter criminal activity, they also sometimes checked people's doors to make sure that they were locked, chanted "the calls of the watch" to announce the time throughout the night, and became the subject of popular contempt for acting with negligence, cowardice, or ineptitude. They were replaced by a modern police force through reform led by Sir Robert Peel in the 1820s (78-82, 332).

[146] Dombey has "his bed prepared in his own apartments down stairs" (653-54).

Recalling the primary duties of the night watch, the servant, Mrs. Pipchin, seems to have been posted at Dombey's door to dissuade the rest of the household from wandering into the hallway and, particularly, from entering Dombey's room. Her presence makes the already private room even more isolated, a role that is analogous to the night watchmen's policy of checking that doors were locked (Ekirch 79). But as a result of her ineptitude at policing this threshold,[147] she has fallen asleep, giving Florence an opportunity to creep inside.

The fact that Dombey even has a private bedroom suite apart from the bedroom suite that he had been sharing with Edith is an indication of his success in business. The multiple private bedrooms are a display of the bourgeois ambition that seems to have propelled the success of his shipping house, Dombey and Son. However, his own "bedroom fantasies," as his dreams of greater success and legacy might have been referred to by a member of the working class (Corbin 505), have, like the bedrooms themselves, isolated him from his family. Initially merely neglectful of Florence, Dombey has become increasingly resentful toward, and estranged from, her—first, because she was not born a son and therefore, cannot fill the role of "Son" in "Dombey and Son"; second, because his son, Paul, the younger sibling to Florence, seems to prefer Florence to him; and finally, because eventually, Paul succumbs to illness and dies, leaving only the daughter whom Dombey does not want. To him, Florence's presence appears to be equivalent to the conspicuous absence of his future male heir.

[147] Ineptitude could reportedly be attributed to many night watchmen as well (Ekirch 80).

Dombey's desire to isolate himself, but also to be joined in this isolation by the one person with whom he thinks he can share his small empire, is described using the metaphor of a locked room; he mourns his "lost child, who was to have divided with him his riches, and his projects, and his power, and allied with whom, he was to have *shut out* all the world as with a *double door* of *gold*" (297, emphasis added).[148] Strikingly, in "The Watches of the Night," Dombey's room is described as having "doors" (659), plural, suggesting that there is literally a double door to this room and bringing to mind the figurative "double door of gold" in the context of this chapter (297). Dombey's self-isolation is attached to his wealth; the desire for riches and power have driven him to alienate those around him, and the conveniences that his riches and power have afforded him make it possible for him to continue to do so.

Anarchic Violations of Privacy

In fact, the rage with which Dombey would respond to the violation of his private bedroom, had he known about it, is played out in the chapter immediately following "The Watches of the Night," when Susan, Florence's maid, enters Dombey's bedroom without an invitation. After having "haunted the hall and staircase" all morning, Susan works up the nerve to confront him about his treatment of his daughter. Like Florence, Susan finds Mrs. Pipchin dozing and sneaks past her. She knocks first and waits until Dombey says, "Come in!" But when she announces her desire to address her employer, he becomes "so lost in astonishment at the presumption of the young woman as to be incapable of giving

[148] This calls to mind the demarcation of the early modern bedchamber, the likely origin of the privatization of the home, by its separation from the rest of the home and household and by its lockability.

… utterance" (665). His shock only increases when she begins to admonish him for his cruelty to Florence. Then, they both realize that, as a result of his present infirmity and his position on the bed, he is unable to reach the bell-rope to call for help, and Susan takes advantage of the situation to continue her admonishment (666). Their positions are temporarily reversed, as the maid makes her employer a captive audience.

Throughout their interaction, Dombey consistently rebukes Susan in gendered terms. First, he demands, "What do you mean, woman! … How do you dare?" Then, he cries out, "*Woman* … leave the room" (666, emphasis added). Breathless in his outrage, Dombey reveals the significance that he attaches to his role in the house, the privacy that his bedroom should entail, and their gender and class differences. He pants, "A *gentleman*—in his own house—in *his own room*—assailed with the impertinencies of *women servants*!" (668, emphasis added). This generalization to the plural form of "servants" underscores the larger issues of privacy, gender, and class. When Mrs. Pipchin is awakened by the uproar and joins them, she insults Susan by implying that her class and impertinence are signs of sexual impropriety. She calls Susan a "hussy" twice (668), although it might be worth noting that "'young hussy' … was Mrs. Pipchin's generic name for female servant" (124). However, she adds to this the insults "bold-faced *slut*" and finally, "saucy baggage." After condemning Susan in terms that make a gender and class-based assumption about her morals, Mrs. Pipchin fires her (669, emphasis added).

While Susan's infraction is not limited to entering a gentleman's private bedroom, this alone was initially enough to enrage Dombey. Additionally, although Florence is, of course, not a servant, and it seems unlikely that Mrs. Pipchin would accuse her of sexual impropriety for visiting her father's sick room, Dombey's intense reaction to Susan

simply entering his room underscores the subversive nature of Florence's surreptitious visit to his sick bed. And as we have seen, this was a visit that Florence makes amidst a dreamy nighttime atmosphere that lends itself to the exploration of potential and a visit that shecould not have made had her father not been sleeping.

Views of Other Bedrooms

The close association of the private bedroom with its inhabitant(s) is not always an element of self-isolation, of course, since the private bedroom could also provide a space for the expression and exploration of individuality. The "private bedroom" was "identified with its occupant" (Corbin 480-81). To contextualize Dombey's use of his old apartments for privacy-turned-isolation, it is useful to understand the other characters' relationships to their rooms. Because Paul is ill, he spends a lot of time at home and becomes familiar with "things that no one else saw," such as the details of wallpaper patterns, musing, for instance, on the "miniature tigers and lions running up the bedroom walls" (190).

Even more important, however, are the views from the windows of the rooms that he inhabits. For a period of time, he looks out his bedroom window every night, both to look for Florence, who would pass by, and to spend time "watching the *waves* and clouds at twilight, with his earnest eyes, and bursting the window of his solitary cage when birds flew by, as if he would have emulated them, and soared away!" (192, emphasis added). This view of the waves and the sympathetic connection he feels to the seabirds hold meaning for him. At another point, when he and Florence visit the beach, he drifts in and out of sleep on his lounger until, "Awaking suddenly," he listens carefully and then asks

Florence what the waves are "saying": "'The sea, Floy, what is it that it keeps on saying? I know that they are always saying something. Always the same thing. What place is over there?' He rose up, looking eagerly at the horizon … far away" (128-29). The fact that Paul slips out of a dream and immediately into listening to the waves suggests that there is a commonality between dreaming and the sea.

In the novel, the sea conveys the ideas of death, the eternal, and affect. For instance, its association with the eternal appears when Florence's mother dies in childbirth, the narrator observes that "the mother drifted out upon the dark and unknown sea that rolls round all the world" (21). Later, recalling this moment, Paul ponders "why the sea should make me think of my Mama that's dead" (171). The sea is not merely a symbol for the eternal, though; instead, it is characterized as producing affective intensity, as in the description of "gentle Florence" being "tossed on an uneasy sea of doubt and hope" (435). Moreover, the affective quality of the sea is connected with dreamy nighttime imagery, as in a later scene, after confessing her love to her new husband, Florence sits with him, watching "the solemn path of light upon the sea between them and the moon" (721). The sea's affectively intense movement is linked with a dreamy nighttime scene at other points as well. For example, earlier in the novel, Paul seems to be rocked to sleep by the sea: "The restless sea went rolling on all night, to the sounding of a melancholy strain—yet it was pleasant too—that rose and fell with the waves, and *rocked him, as it were, to sleep*" (205, emphasis added). In a similar vein to this soporific scene, the "dark, dark river" is associated with "the sea" in the chapter "What the Waves were always saying" (249).

The sea does not speak in words, but rather, connects with characters on an affective level suggestive of what is beyond the linear, dialectical logic of the waking world. It runs counter to the values of Dombey, whose inclination is not to look for what is beyond the world of commerce or to value others except according to the narrow logic of how they can further his money-making and legacy-leaving ambitions. In contrast, Paul, "at his own bedroom window," experiences "crowds of thoughts" not about the logic of business but instead about what is beyond his present life and the people he cares about. His mode of thinking takes on a lyrical form in itself, as Dickens uses repetition to create a rhythm reminiscent of waves moving through the ocean; Paul's thoughts "came on, one upon another, one upon another, like the rolling waves" (218-19).

The idea that an individual would be closely identified with the space in which they slept—a relatively new concept unique to those with rooms of their own—appears in other ways in the novel, almost to the point of comprising a mystical connection.[149] For example, when the house is being renovated in preparation for Edith's arrival as Dombey's new bride, Florence asks if she can move from her current bedroom to the room that had belonged to her brother. At this point, Paul has died, and her request highlights her desire to keep the memory of him close (461). It also seems apt that as she strives unsuccessfully to win her father's love, she moves into the room of the sibling her father preferred. On the other hand, this might also have the effect of reminding Dombey both of the closeness that Paul felt with Florence but do not feel with him and of the

[149] I propose that this link between the bedroom and its inhabitant might have contributed to the Gothic motif of a character sleeping in the room that once belonged to someone who is deceased and awakening to see their ghost. Dickens uses this motif in *A Christmas Carol*, when Jacob Marley's ghost appears in his old bedroom and plays with it in the short story "The Ghost in Master B's Room" (1859).

erroneous idea that he has Florence instead of Paul; she takes his room but cannot fill his role as Dombey's heir because she is not a son.

Paul's bedroom also has significance to her in relation to her in relation to Walter, who is a friend to Florence and works for Dombey until he is sent to the firm's counting house in Barbados, en route to which his ship is reported as lost. When Florence thinks that Walter has drowned, she reflects that she had come to see him as a brother and that "Walter had been brought in to see [Paul], and was there then—*in this [Paul's] room*" (549, emphasis added). Years later, when she flees from home in response to Dombey striking her, Florence finds herself at the quarters of the Midshipman, the place where Walter, her declared brother and future husband grew up, and where Captain Cuttle invites her to stay and tells her to sleep. He settles her into the room that formerly belonged to Walter's uncle, Solomon Gills (723, 728). This non-communal sharing of bedrooms seems to foreshadow her growing intimacy with Walter; she moves from the room of the family member who had been closest to her to the room of Walter's closest family member, and ultimately, she and Walter ostensibly become each other's closest family member when they are married.

Notably, when Florence takes up residence at the wooden Midshipman, Captain Cuttle's repeated promises to protect her might seem a little overdramatic, if endearingly so. After all, when he assures Florence that she is "as safe here as if you was at the top of St. Paul's Cathedral, with the ladder cast off," he kisses her hand "with the chivalry of any old knight-errant" (728). Strikingly, in an echo of the allusions to the night watch in the chapter "The Watches of the Night," he assures her, "I never sleep now. I might be a Watchman" (730). And true to his word, after knocking on her door and waiting before

peeking in to check on her—under the watchful eye of her other guard, her loyal dog, Diogenes—Captain Cuttle duly "took his post of watch upon the stairs" (733). On another night, the text confirms that he views her presence in the room as making the space itself somewhat sacred, or at least, "charmed": "Captain Cuttle … guarded Florence to her room, and watched at intervals upon the charmed ground outside her door—for such it truly was to him—until he felt sufficiently easy in his mind about her, to turn in" (753). While this recalls the almost mystical connection that a bedroom's inhabitant seems to have to their bedroom, his actions might strike one as superfluous when one considers that no one is looking for her.

However, the connotations that Dickens's readers might apply to the laboring poor and the homeless, especially in relation to their sleeping arrangements, explain why, even if Captain Cuttle appears silly, his actions serve an important purpose. His chivalric protection of Florence is a safeguard against any associations of impropriety that might otherwise be applied to her. Dickens has raised the stakes by making her truly homeless—a point that he emphasizes multiple times. When she tells her story, Walter "knew now that she was, indeed, a homeless wandering fugitive" (753). Her status as a "wandering fugitive" might seem exaggerated, since she has only wandered from one home directly to another, but legally, she is unprotected, and her father would have the right to retrieve her or have her locked away. Similarly, on her first night, her desperate state is framed by the captain's careful guardianship:

> Florence slept upon her couch, forgetful of her *homelessness* and orphanage [insofar as her mother and stepmother are dead, and she has been disowned by her father], and Captain Cuttle watched upon the stairs. A louder sob or moan than

> usual, brought him, sometimes to her door; but by degrees she slept more peacefully, and the captain's watch was undisturbed. (734, emphasis added)

Having made Florance homeless and left her to sleep in a residence inhabited by a man, where there are no women or servants, Dickens takes steps to ensure that her virtuous reputation is not tarnished. Even without a home or family, and desperate for a place to stay, she never enters the realm of fallen women, or the working-class or unhoused Britons who were forced to sleep communally and "indiscriminately" (Engels) and to whom members of the middle class were apt to attribute impropriety, especially sexual impropriety in cases of shared sleeping spaces (Perrot 351).

The Angel in the House

By keeping Florence out, Dombey both transgresses and intensifies Victorian social mores. His home and his desire for privacy have all the trappings of bourgeois propriety. But his obsession with financial success is excessive.[150] The strictures of privacy in the Victorian home allow for familial intimacy, but Dombey strives to shut Florence out, both literally and emotionally; he has not allowed her to make the home a domestic refuge because he has been focused on his son, who was to be his business partner, heir, and the one with him he wanted to "shut out all the world" (297). As Stacey Kikendall highlights, "Paul is never as isolated as Dombey is or wishes him to be," because he and Florence "actively seek out others' gazes" with the desire to build

[150] In this way, he is similar to Scrooge in Dickens's *A Christmas Carol* (1843) and to Bounderby in Dickens's *Hard Times* (1854).

community, whereas Dombey does not (69).[151] By the point at which "The Watches of the Night" takes place, he has lost Paul and been left with Florence, whom Paul seemed to choose over him. At this moment, his demand for extreme privacy has exiled Florence from the domestic role of the caretaking "angel in the house," the figure of ideal Victorian womanhood celebrated in Coventry Patmore's 1854 poem by that name.

In this context, Florence's visit to her father's sick bed reaffirms her place in the domestic sphere, although her uninhibited passage through rooms that her father would not approve of her entering is also a threat to his authority. As a refusal to respect the household rules governing the individuation of these bedrooms, Florence's nighttime visit is, in some sense, a refusal to respect the individuation of gender roles that Dombey, the family patriarch, has attempted to enforce. This positions her nighttime passage through the house as a subversion, albeit momentary, of patriarchal power.

Even beyond the seclusion that Dombey has sought, the additional obstacle of Mrs. Pipchin's authoritative presence and Florence's new concern that her father could be mortally wounded raise the stakes of her secret visit. Florence is only able to enter Dombey's bedroom because the stalwart Mrs. Pipchin has fallen asleep at her post, and the outer door to his apartments is "partly open," while the doors to his private bedroom are "partly closed" (659-60). This liminal state of the doors, neither completely open nor completely closed, resonates with the scene's exploration of potential; they have the potential to be open or closed or to remain in this state.

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[151] Stacey Kikendall describes Dombey's "disciplinary" gaze in contrast to his children's gazes, which "reinforce their connection [to each other]," as seeking a reflection in a mirror rather than looking beyond it: "The only gazes he accepts are those that act as a Lacanian mirror, reflecting himself" (69).

Optative Sleep-Watching

Now, as a sleep-watcher, Florence gazes upon her father, a powerless, ailing, sleeping man, in a temporary reversal of their power dynamic. Sleep-watching connotes, in Steven Connor's words, "a fantasy of power over the body" (Connor 16). This relationship is akin to the position of the mesmerist, the nineteenth-century precursor to the hypnotist. There were reports of mesmerists, who were almost invariably men, taking advantage of their patients, who were almost invariably women (Kaplan 1975, 188-92). The vulnerability of the sleeping state and of the dream state of one placed in a mesmeric trance seems to have struck Dickens, since as Fred Kaplan points out, he had a strong interest in mesmerism, but would not allow anyone to watch him sleep or to mesmerize him (65).

In this scene, Florence reverses the power dynamic that has marked her relationship with Dombey. Yet any fantasy of power that Florence might be playing out is of an innocent kind: For just a moment, she softly kisses her father, lays her head down next to his, and puts her arm around him (660). This is an act that would not be possible in regular waking reality.

Many of Dickens's texts are rife with sleep and sleep-watching, which as Michael Greaney also observes, places the sleep-watcher in a position of power over the vulnerable sleeper. In the case of Dickens's sleeping characters, this vulnerability seems also to be emotional, as the sleeping characters' body language is unguarded, revealing aspects of their personalities that might be hidden during the day (2014, 4). In this moment, for example, Dombey's face is stripped of the "disturbing consciousness of her" visible on his face like a "cloud that had darkened her childhood" (660), suggesting that

there might still be some compassion in him and that the two might one day reconcile. Based on how he looks when he is sleeping, "He *might have* gone to sleep … blessing her" (660, emphasis added). As Florence has this thought, she is seeing what could be rather than what is, an act that is made easier by the dreamlike sensation of unreality that the eerie nighttime setting has generated.

Florence's wish informs her view of her father, which is described in terms of a dream: "Florence loved [her father] still, but, by degrees, had come to love him rather as some dear one who had been, or who *might have been*, than as the hard reality before her eyes…. The father whom she loved [was] a vague and *dreamy* idea to her" (703, emphasis added). Andrew Miller argues that these "optative reflections," meditations on what might have been "had circumstances been different," reveal an essential element of the realist novel, of Dickens's novels especially, and out of all of Dickens's novels, especially of *Dombey and Son* (2007, 119).[152]

Mesmerist, Spirit Guide, or Night Watchman

The dreamy nighttime setting of "The Watches of the Night" lends itself to such reflections, especially as it becomes punctuated with the narrator's portentous exhortations. Breaking from the role of describing the scene, the narrator urges Dombey to awaken from sleep and from the torpor of his resistance and to reconcile with his daughter. "Awake, unkind father!" the narrator addresses him. "Awake now, sullen man!

[152] Andrew Miller highlights the novel's attention to the fact "that there are counterfactual lives each character is pointedly not living, defining mirror existences that have branched off along other lines than that which year she is, in fact, traveling … *Dombey* is particularly rich in its address of this contingency, crowding its pages with possibilities" (119).

The time is flitting by; the hour is coming with an angry tread. Awake!" After Florence kisses her father, the narrator makes a second direct address that goes unheard: "Awake, doomed man, while she is near! The time is flitting by; the hour is coming with an angry tread; its foot is in the house. Awake!" (660).

However, the order ultimately highlights an unfulfilled potential, as Dombey will not act on them in this moment: "He may sleep on now," the narrator comments, presumably to the reader, with a note of resignation, but also a rueful knowledge of the future. "He may sleep on while he may. But let him look for that slight figure when he wakes, and find it near him when the hour is come!" (660-61).[153] This series of three pronouncements gesture toward an alternative path, and these optative reflections on the potential of inhabiting the alternative identities that such a path would involve is supported by the dreamlike atmosphere of the scene.

The narrator's commands contribute to this atmosphere, as they are a cross between mesmeric command, ordering the sleeping person to awaken; the directive of a spirit guide's powerful, disembodied voice in a dream;[154] or recalling the chapter title, also the chant of a night watchman's calls every hour throughout the night. Many chants of night watchmen offered moral instruction, announced the time every hour on the hour, or did both. For example, in a reference to the passage of time similar to those made by the narrator, one advised, "Men and children, maides and wives, / 'Tis not late to mend

[153] The maid Susan's admonishment is, thus, a second version of this that he can hear.

[154] It seems reminiscent of the disembodied voice's command to "Flee temptation!" which is addressed to the title character of *Jane Eyre* in a particularly portentous dream (Brontë 1847, 325). These commands similarly originate in a disembodied voice that, like the supernatural guide in Jane's dream, does not have a physical existence and—as the narrator omnisciently foreshadows the future—seems to have a supernatural knowledge of what lies beyond the present moment.

your lives. / Lock your doors, lie warm in bed— / Much loss is in a maidenhead" (qtd. in Ekirch 78).[155] This suggests that one of "the watches of the night" could comprise the role of the narrator as a sort of omniscient night watchman. These elements contribute to making the atmosphere decidedly dreamlike.

While Florence is engaged in a reverie about the past, the present, and the future, these scenes evoke the sensations of a dream, and as the narrator steps into a role marked by its relation to dreams—as mesmerist, spirit guide, night watchman, or a cross between them—the narrative itself becomes dreamlike. Akin to Scrooge's dreams, which as supernatural dreams, are both dreamt and real, the realm of the dream enters into the realm of waking reality.

Theories of Somnial Spaces

Nineteenth-century scientific discourse of the time tended to characterize dreaming as a disordered and potentially disordering phenomenon (Macnish 83, 148). Robert Macnish, whose 1827 study on dreams was among Dickens's books and was, in general, well-read, writes that dreams "disappear altogether" in profound, perfect sleep—making the dream a symptom of physical, mental, emotional, spiritual, or environmental disorder (24); in dreams, the imagination, uninhibited by reason, chaotically links impressions of both actual and potential events.

This is especially true in light of Dickens's view of dreams, which as discussed in the previous chapter, attributed the content of dreams to memories of the distant past—

[155] Another chant in northern England went, "Ho, watchman, ho! / Twelve is the clock! / God keep our town / From fire and brand, / And hostile hand; / Twelve is the clock!" (qtd. in Ekirch 78).

highlighted in Florence's regression to her childhood habit of coming to her father's bedroom—or to the emotional intensity of recent events rather than solely to strange associations of the recent events themselves (Dickens 1851, 277-78).[156] Although Dickens's views on dreams were, to a great extent, aligned with the predominant scientific discourse, his own theory diverges in this manner from the prevailing belief that dream content originates in recent events.

In this dreamlike setting, the significance of the distant past is foregrounded in Florence's regression to her childhood habit of visiting her father's bedroom: "It was a long, long time, she thought, since she used to make her nightly pilgrimages to his door!" And yet, consistent with the sensations of a dream, during which one can confound different periods of time, the past does not seem so distant to her in this moment: The next line reads, "It was a long, long, time, she *tried* to think, since she had entered his room at midnight, and he had led her back to the stair-foot!" She approaches Dombey's bedroom with "the same child's heart within her, as of old: even with the child's sweet timid eyes and clustering hair" (659).

Reflecting Dickens's belief that dream content originates in such memories, but that the emotional register of one's dreams is often evoked by recent emotions, Florence's concerns about her father's wounds and their strained relationship generates an impulse to seek closeness with him, but leads to thoughts of other periods of time. The stillness of

[156] He makes this argument in an 1851 letter to Dr. Thomas Stone about the latter's possible submission of an article on "Dreams" to the weekly magazine *Household Words*. He comes closer to outlining a dream theory of his own in this letter than in his 1852 and 1861 essays, "Lying Awake" and "Night Walks," respectively. "The influence of the day's occurrences and of recent events is by no means so great (generally speaking) as is usually supposed…. My own dreams are usually of twenty years ago. I often blend my present position with them, but very confusedly" (Dickens 1851, 276).

Dombey's face calls to mind "the faces that were gone." As Florence thinks about her mother and Paul, whose sick beds she watched at the side of before they died, her reverie shifts from them to potential futures, with gloomy thoughts of her father's death and her own (660). Thus, delineations of time and space lose the distinctions they have in waking reality, and affective intensities can emerge.

Potential and Virtuality

In these scenes, the narrative develops aspects of the virtual, making it uniquely capable of conjuring a multiplicity of potentials and affects. As discussed in the introduction, the virtual is a plane on which the affective, or emotional, intensities of the past unfold in a multiplicity of combinations (Deleuze 1994, 29-31). It is comprised of impressions and ideas from actual, lived experience, which repeat in different ways and new combinations (Deleuze 1987, 30). This occurs in a manner that is, as we have seen, resonant with nineteenth-century theories of the chaotically linked impressions of the dreaming mind.

Thus, the connection that Dickens makes to the distant past, or at least to the not-so-recent past, combined with the affective intensity of the recent past, contribute to this sense of the virtual; these variations engender the optative reflections through the multiplicity of potential "if only…" reveries. These questions of potential arise naturally out of the reverie through which Florence sees the repetitions of memories in the scene that is presently before her. In these variances of memories and experiences, potential outcomes that might not have occurred, but could still, emerge.

Elisha Cohn has linked the virtual to Victorian depictions of reverie, arguing that these fictional moments of reverie can create a "lyric mode." This lyric mode provides "a narrative annex or respite," which suspends the progress driving the *bildungsroman* (2016, 20). The bedroom scenes in "The Watches of the Night" adopt the sort of lyric mode that Cohn describes. Such moments can create a sensation of "parabasis," which according to J. Hillis Miller, comprises the "eternal moment suspending, for the moment at least, any attempt to tell a story through time" (1992, 66). Although Miller discusses this parabasis in relation to Phiz's illustrations in Dickens's novels, and there are no illustrations in the chapter "The Watches of the Night," I propose that in these scenes, the narrative itself already plays the role of producing the effect of parabasis. Moreover, the narrator's direct address of Dombey recalls the Greek definition of "parabasis" as the break during which the chorus directly addresses the audience. The rhythm and portentous note of the narrator's address, combined with this slippage or even suspension of time, creates an atmosphere that seems decidedly dreamlike. The dreamlike scenes of "The Watches of the Night" foreground the sense of potential in this dreamlike parabasis. Not all potential futures will be actualized, but they can be explored in these scenes.

As the narrative itself develops the sensations of a dream, both Florence's and the narrator's reflections shuffle with ease through the past, present, and foreshadowed future, and the liminal potentials of what could have been or could yet be. In this manner, the dreamlike atmosphere of the chapter creates a sort of slippage in time. The moment has "the solemnity to her of death *and* life *in one*," again highlighting the liminality of this scene in which potentials can be explored (661, emphasis added). There is a momentary suspension of the regular, chronological understanding of time in anticipation

of the mysterious "hour" that has an anthropomorphized and spatialized presence, with its "foot … in the house" (662). Meanwhile, Florence looks upon her sleeping father, whose movement is suspended, echoing the way in which the narrative itself seems to be temporarily suspended during this period of sleep-watching.

The content of these reveries is comprised of memories of actual events, the foreshadowing of future ones, and even a sense that Florence, like a spirit visiting one's dreams, may visit the dreaming mind, manifested in the form of the individual bedroom, of each parent.[157] Not only does Florence see the potential for alternatives to their present circumstances in Dombey's sleeping face; when she enters her stepmother's room, she witnesses Edith speaking in a trance of the "half-waking dreams" and unwittingly becomes a sort of a second inhabitant of Edith's dreaming unconscious mind as well.

The Encroachment of the Commercial Sphere

The concerns of middle-class ambition, gender norms, and propriety are key to understanding not only Dombey, but also Edith. When Florence first meets Edith, who has just become engaged to Dombey, their introduction is preceded by a raucous scene of home renovation. These changes are being made in preparation for Edith's arrival in her new position as Dombey's bride. Florence arrives home one day to find a "full chorus" of "men … at work." The imagery underscores solutions to upward and downward mobility, potentially in relation to socioeconomic status, with "labourers … coming *up and down*"

[157] Although the early modern era's magico-theoretical tradition of dream interpretation was losing credibility, dreams still held the connotations from early modern beliefs about dreams, which posited that during sleep, there was an increase in one's vulnerability to spiritual visitations, both good and evil, that made it possible for one to travel between the living and the dead, and for the dead to inhabit one's dream (Handley 2017, 72).

ladders amid a "labyrinth of scaffolding" and "tramping *up and down stairs*" (441-42, 459, emphasis added). Moreover, the text emphasizes the encroachment of the "workmen," members of the commercial sphere, on this domestic space: "The enchanted house was no more, and *the working world had broken into it*, and was hammering and crashing…" (459, emphasis added). Recalling the first section of this chapter, the intrusion of the working world on the domestic sphere had connotations of prostitution.

In this case, the scene of home renovation foreshadows other encroachments of the commercial sphere on the domestic, including Dombey's choice to bring his business partner, Carker, into his home, essentially to manage his wife (648-52).[158] Carker's duties in this role enable him to spend private time with Edith, during which time he makes it clear that he wants her to become his mistress. At one point, while in Edith's rooms, Dombey's "right-hand man" adulterously kisses Edith's left hand. At this moment, "she realizes that both Dombey and Carker desire to claim her hand" and maims her left hand in an act of rebellion; through this act, Dickens presents a parallel in the domestic sphere to the idea of Carker as a poor right-hand man in business (Capuano 2023, 67).

When Edith leaves Dombey, she dumps the expensive jewels and clothes that Dombey has given her on the floor of her dressing room, tramples on them, locks the door, and takes the key. Through this violent destruction of property, the forfeiture of what's left in her private, locked bedroom suite, and afterward, the apparent devaluation

[158] Carker's "very commodious and well-arranged," "elegant" home suggests that he is more motivated by self-interest than by his duty to Dombey: "Mr. Dombey, entering the house, noticed, as he had reason to do, the complete arrangement of the rooms, and the numerous contrivances for comfort and effect that abounded there" (641).

of herself as a fallen woman, Edith disengages from the culture of consumption with a sacrifice resonant with the spirit of George Bataille's *Accursed Share* (1971).[159]

Upon meeting Carker, who had believed that she would leave Dombey for him, at their rendezvous point, it is the design of the bedroom that allows Edith to make her escape. After refusing to sleep with him and announcing that her goal was only to use him to spite Dombey, she evades his grasp by fleeing through a side door that connects their bedroom with another. Her escape is, thus, framed by the extra, hidden door out of a bedroom, recalling the decrease in the number of doors that were designed to enter into, or in this case, out of, bedrooms. Since the number of doors was diminishing in an effort to prevent adultery, it is ironic, but perhaps also apt, that this door both allows her to avoid a potential sexual assault and plays a role in her escape from her marriage. Ultimately, her departure and the apparent adultery create a scandal that, combined with Carker's treachery, lead to the downfall of the firm, lowering Dombey's socioeconomic status as easily as the workmen had moved up and down the ladders in his home.

Even before these events take place, though, the construction scene also foreshadows the reader's discovery that Edith has only married Dombey for his money, a step taken under pressure and which wounds her pride, triggering a deep depression and a sense of desperation. When Florence enters her bedroom in "The Watches of the Night,"

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[159] For Bataille, one cannot view a person, including oneself, as a commodity "without at the same time estranging himself from his own intimate being" and entering what Bataille calls "the order of things" (56, 59). The alternative to this focus on commodification, which Bataille terms "the order of things," is "the intimate order." This latter condition entails experiencing the world through a sense of immediacy that precludes viewing others as the means to an end. One way that Bataille gives for disengaging from the order of things is through the profitless consumption of value: "The meaning of this profound freedom is given in the destruction, whose essence is to consume profitlessly whatever might remain in the progression of useful works. Sacrifice… does not have to destroy as fire does … but this separation has the sense of a definitive consumption…" (58, emphasis added).

she finds Edith consumed by “such first motion that it terrified her” (661); Edith is mulling over her reasons for marrying, Dombey’s tyrannical dictates, and Carker, who at this point, has kissed her hand, leading her to wound it earlier that day.

Half-Waking Reverie

As with the door to Dombey’s bedroom, the door to Edith’s bedroom is in a liminal state. Closed but “not fastened within” (661), it conveys a sense of potential; it could be locked, opened, or left in the intermediate state of being closed but not locked. atmosphere of the nighttime scene contributes to a sensation of dreamlike unreality. She is “partially undressed” and sitting before a fireplace that has gone cold, amid an atmosphere of nighttime dreaminess. Like the liminal state of the door, her partial state of undress reflects her suspended state and the potential at this moment, when she must decide what choice to make. This partial state of undress resonates with the change in what Deleuze and Felix Guattari might refer to as “assemblage.” According to Deleuze and Guattari, the assemblage, comprising “the unconscious in person,” can undergo a change upon the crossing of a certain threshold (36), akin to the way in which an alcoholic might, upon reaching a threshold, become capable of resisting alcohol (438). On this night, she is at a pivotal moment, on the brink of relinquishing her state of privilege and, finally, her life, in response to the negative affective experiences that she is experiencing.

As Florence enters the bedroom, Edith appears to be in a state that is a combination of reverie and trance. This has been induced by an intense affective experience with Carker: “Her eyes were intently bent upon the air,” exhibiting an air of

abstraction, while "in their light, and in her face, and in her form, and in the grasp with which she held the elbows of her chair as if about to start up, Florence saw such fierce emotion that it terrified her" (661). As the sentence continues, it picks up speed, resting with emphasis on the intensity of affect apparent in Edith's demeanor. Edith's expression upon Florence calling out to her underscores her absorption in her own introspective thrall of reverie.

According to Natalie Mera Ford, reverie was a "site of conflict" in the 1800s in terms of what sort of state it comprised. But reverie was generally considered an "undirected *trancelike* cognitive mode." Like dreams, though, the content of reverie is characterized by the "associationist tradition" that Locke applies to dreams, in general. In other words, the mind links together chains of ideas based on the generally chaotic associations that one's mind makes while in this state (1998, 80, emphasis added).[160] Reverie, a dreamlike state, might, then, overlap into the conditions of trance, in the conceptualization of these states in the nineteenth century.

Jill Mattus, who draws from Victorian literature and studies of shock from the mid-nineteenth century and fin-de-siecle, argues convincingly that "powerful emotion is figured as a state of *entrancement*" in nineteenth-century works (2007, 184, emphasis). According to an 1888 study on shock, the "dazed condition" associated with intense traumatic experiences was thought to be "very closely allied to, if it be not identical with the state induced in purposive experimental hypnosis" (Page, qtd. in Mattus 69). According to Mattus, shock, trauma, and were frequently described as "dreamlike" in the

[160] Locke describes "Reverie" as "When Ideas float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the Understanding" (1689, XIX.1, 3). Since one engages in reverie while still awake, it can also seem dangerously close to hallucinations..

nineteenth century (69, 82). Athenia Vrettos asserts that "dreaming" and "dream-state" could refer to many types of dreamy mental states in the nineteenth century (2002, 197). This dreaming quality attendant upon Edith's trancelike reverie, or reverie-like trance, echoes the dreamy atmosphere in the house.

Unsurprisingly, then, Macnish compares the suspension of action to sleep: "There is some analogy between suspended animation and sleep." But because he does not find the trance state "striking" enough for a lengthy discussion, he prefaces, "I will only consider [it] insofar as the resemblance holds good between it and sleep," which is in respect to that "resemblance … between syncope and sleep" (200). The trance state is also decidedly dreamlike in his experience, as he observes that those in a state of trance recall their experiences as having felt "as if [they] were in a dream" (206). Moreover, he remarks that although "the remote causes of trance are hidden," the two main causes with which he is familiar are "a fit of terror" and "hysteria," both affectively intense (202).

In "The Watches of the Night," Edith describes her affective state to Florence in terms of dreaming: "I have had bad dreams," she tells Florence. "Nothing can change them, or prevent their coming back" (662). Through the repetition of the phrase "I have dreamed…" as the opening to each of three passages of reverie, Dickens creates an analog to the three times that the narrator directly addresses Dombey. Paradoxically, the narrator's commands, which seem intended to be heard, are heard by no one but the reader, whereas the reverie, which is typically an internal process, is spoken aloud.

Like the narrator's commands, though, Edith's words and trancelike tone evoke associations with mesmerism, contributing to the sensations of virtuality in the house and through this dreamy atmosphere, facilitating optative questions of potential:

> "I have dreamed,' said Edith in a low voice, "of a pride … that has been galled and goaded … that, rightly guided, *might have led* perhaps to better things…" She neither looked nor spoke to Florence now, but went on as if she were alone. (662-63, emphasis added)

In this manner, Edith ponders the role that her pride has played and a potential alternative present. Then she considers her choice to marry Dombey, which she regrets, longing for an alternative past: "'I have dreamed,' she said, 'of such indifference and callousness … that it has gone on with listless steps even to the altar, yielding to the old, familiar, beckoning finger … while it spurned it…!'" The intensity of her emotions grows: "And now with gathering and darkening emotion, she looked as she had looked when Florence entered" (663).

Lastly, as affective intensity increases, she dwells on the rage that now provides her with new motivation:

> "And I have dreamed," she said, "that in a first late effort to achieve a purpose, it has been trodden on, and trodden down by a base foot, but turns and looks upon him. I have dreamed that it is wounded, hunted … but that it stands at bay, and will not yield; no, that it cannot if it would; but that it is urged on to hate."

This rage portends her final acts, motivated by the desire to defy Dombey. But at this point, she slips out of her trancelike state, seeming to see Florence anew: "Oh Florence! … I think I have been nearly mad tonight!" (663). As dreams and dream states were considered analogous with madness,[161] this remark further affirms the resonance between

[161] See the introduction for a discussion of this.

her trancelike reverie, which has qualities of dreaminess, and her dreamy nighttime surroundings.

Sleep-Watching and Dream-Watching

The chapter closes with an image of a sleeping space that has become communal, although it is a private bedroom, because of the closeness of the relationship between Edith and Florence. It is also an image of disordered sleep, or slumber, as Florence's strong emotions enter her actual dreams:

> … Florence … gradually fell into a gentle slumber; but as her eyes closed on the face beside her, it was so sad to think upon the face downstairs, that her hand drew closer to Edith for some comfort; yet, even in the act, it faltered, lest it should be deserting him. So, in her sleep, she tried to reconcile the two together, and to show them that she loved them both, but could not do it, and *her waking grief was part of her dreams*. (664, emphasis added)

As Edith attentively watches Florence sleep, the power dynamic of sleeper and sleep-watcher seems to switch; even though Edith is the sleep-watcher, she looks to Florence for her potential redemption.

Ultimately, when Florence enters Edith's private bedroom, a space associated with its inhabitant, she also, like a spirit visiting a person's dream, seems temporarily to gain the ability to witness Edith's darkest thoughts. Inhabiting the private bedrooms of her father and stepmother appears to give her a glimpse, albeit a hazy one, into the workings of, or at least, the potential within, the unconscious through their dreaming minds. The Dombey house is a space of disorder. But on this night, the potential of the disordered

dream state subverts the binary logic of patriarchal authority; affect gains primacy. These nighttime scenes introduce unauthorized sleep-watching and reverie into the house. They transform into moments of reverie and thereby add a sensation of virtuality to the private bedrooms, conjuring a multiplicity of potentials and affects that explore the themes intertwined with the privatization of the bedroom—namely, the rising middle class, privacy, propriety, and gender—in the context of the household.

CONCLUSION

BEYOND THE LOOKING-GLASS

Poised between a waning magico-theological tradition of oneirocriticism and the rising influence of scientific dream theories that connoted dreaming with disorder, the dream occupied a uniquely nebulous, liminal space in nineteenth-century Great Britain. It is my contention that this was not simply a matter of making a binary choice between two ways of thinking, but instead a site of collisions and coalescences. Dreaming was coming untethered from signification, as natural philosophers were theorizing that it could only produce a private, internal chaos and could not impart meaning. Their identification of physiological disorder as a direct cause of the intensity that dreams can exert, while rendering the content of dreams indecipherable, disrupts the representational process of symbolic interpretation. Ironically, in their efforts to rationalize and exert control over dreams and sleep, these pre-Freudian theorists actually enhanced the dream's perceived potential for affect, whereas the provocative theory that Sigmund Freud would later articulate actually domesticates the dream by making it again interpretable.

Within the space of the dream, the imagination could create associations between ideas, unhindered by judgment and reason, and serve as a conduit to the spiritual realm. Both—especially in combination, since the dream is a space of indeterminacy—can, to borrow a term from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, produce a "schizophrenized" dream (1977, 533). In this polyphonic space (Bakhtin 1987, 29), affect is intensified. The content of the dream, as an experience that one could neither control in the moment nor make sense of through interpretation later, attained a greater sense of immediacy. For this reason, affect theory can provide unique insight into the lens through which authors and

readers conceptualized literary depictions of dreams during this period. Moreover, in my study of somnial states and spaces, I find that the foremost effect is their generation or depiction of affectively unique modes, such as reverie, trance, and atmospheric sensations of dreaminess.

The Romantic poets, to whom this was temptingly subversive territory, used the form of the English dream vision poem for new purposes, mobilizing the wild associations of which the dream was deemed capable as well as the potential for supernatural or affective transport, in transportive dream visions, and Victorians tested their limits through revelations replete with self-doubt and transportive trance states. As an example of the first, Percy Bysshe Shelley's "Queen Mab: A Philosophical Poem" (1813), creates a glittering, boundless, celestial dream vision to communicate an atheistic premise. He also advances his argument for making positive change not on the basis of the inspiration that the dreamer will glean from the life-changing experience of seeing the celestial, but rather from the perspective that this will give her of Earth. Conversely, the vision could offer the dreamer a view of such a superior place that she could forever be negatively affected by it, as in Melesina Trench's "Laura's Dream; or, the Moonlanders" (1816). Conversely, the transportive dream might fail to provide revelation, as in Robert Browning's "Bad Dreams III" (1890).

Scenes of transport became internalized or affective transport for other poets. In Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "Frost at Midnight" (1798), reverie is transportive, and the relationship between an otherworldly divine and the dreamer morphs into a relationship between the Romantic poet and the divine in nature. The transportive affective experience accompanying altered consciousness serves this purpose in Alfred, Lord Tennyson's "The

Lotos-Eaters" (1832) and Christina Rossetti's "Goblin Market" (1862). These transportive flights of fancy become Deleuzean lines of flight, as they lead the dreamer into realms of the virtual through dreams, reveries, and trances with elements of the virtual, which intensify affect and heighten the potential for dramatic change.

In the second chapter, I trace the shifting use of the Gothic revelatory dream. Charles Dickens's *A Christmas Carol* (1843) and Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre* (1847) feature beneficent supernatural figures, but even when premonitory dreams, famously rooted in symbolism, are experienced, affect is the essential quality of them. Sympathy and the supernatural become entwined in both novels. Secondly, the differing uses of a convention that I refer to as the "tandem dream sequence," which appears in Sir Walter Scott's *The Antiquary* (1816), Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (1818), and Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights* (1847), also highlight key shifts in the Gothic revelatory dream. The image of the looking-glass with which I began this dissertation is, in the Gothic, replaced by the fractured glass through which Lockwood and Catherine struggle in *Wuthering Heights*, characterizing the force that I believe the Gothic dream has the potential to exert. It does not function solely as a reflective glass to mirror waking reality, yet even conceptualized as a window, the dream threatens to break into waking reality with the force of a nightmare.

And finally, I explore a correlation between the emergence of the private bedroom in middle-class Victorian homes and a concurrent shift in how Britons conceptualized their dreams, as the latter were being turned inward through their own shift of privatization. The somnial states and spaces in the bedroom scenes in Charles Dickens' *Dombey and Son* (1848) reveal the ways in which these shifts toward privatization,

spatially and conceptually, inform the series of dreamy nighttime scenes. And in both the first section, in which I discuss the relationship between the privatization of the bedroom and a similar shift affecting conceptualizations of the dream, and second, in which I explore the potential of scenes in private bedrooms in Dickens's novel, the cultural context of class, gender, and propriety come to the fore.

This historicist approach is crucial because Britons' views of actual dreams must have informed how they conceptualized literary ones. Ultimately, I argue that if we do not take the affective intensity of sleep, dreams, and somnial states, illuminated by historical context, into consideration, then we will miss essential elements of the dreams as well as the somnial states and spaces that characterize so many nineteenth-century British texts. To return to the image with which I began, then, I argue that we should emulate Alice's journey in *Through the Looking-Glass*, exploring what lies beyond the reflective surface instead of looking only to the reflective mode of exclusively representational interpretation.

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