

University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln

---

DOD Military Intelligence

U.S. Department of Defense

---

5-1951

## Organization for Technical Intelligence

Army General School

Robert L. Bolin depositor

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/dodmilintel>



Part of the [Defense and Security Studies Commons](#), [Military and Veterans Studies Commons](#), [Other Engineering Commons](#), [Peace and Conflict Studies Commons](#), and the [Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Commons](#)

---

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the U.S. Department of Defense at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in DOD Military Intelligence by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

UB  
251  
.U6  
074  
1951

COURSE: OIC \_\_\_\_\_

AOC \_\_\_\_\_

EIC \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

U.S. ARMY MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE

# ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL


FORT RILEY, KANSAS



INSTRUCTOR'S FOLDER OF A UNIT OF INSTRUCTION

## FOR INSTRUCTORS ONLY

DECLASSIFIED BY UNCLASSIFIED BY  
AUTHORITY OF E.O. 12958, 1 R  
BY RAWLEY ON 8 MAR 85



ORGANIZATION FOR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE I-2905

### SUBJECT AND FILE NUMBER

SUPERVISORY SECTION: INTELLIGENCE \_\_\_\_\_ TRAINING \_\_\_\_\_ P & A \_\_\_\_\_

DATE PREPARED ay 1951

DATE REVISED \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

PROPERTY OF US ARMY

DECLASSIFIED





EXERCISES IN INSTRUCTION  
FOR THE ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL

ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL

I-2905

DEPARTMENT OF RESIDENT INSTRUCTION

ORGANIZATION FOR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

INSTRUCTOR FOLDER

ERRATA SHEET  
(29 June 1951)

Page 2: Section I, par 2b:

- ADD: (12) FT-F-152-1, Foreign Firing Tables for Soviet Howitzer, 152-mm Model 1943; Howitzer, 152-mm, Model 1938; Howitzer, 152-mm, Model 1909/30; March 1951.
- (13) Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 3-1951, Underwater Crossings, March 1951.

Page 2: Section I, par 2c:

DELETE: Entire paragraph.

Page 21: par 14d, Answer (2):

DELETE: -- and I-2901-B --

I-114F-51

EXERCISES IN INSTRUCTION  
FOR THE ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL

RESTRICTED

I-2905

ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL

DEPARTMENT OF RESIDENT INSTRUCTION

INSTRUCTOR FOLDER

SECTION I

SUBJECT: Organization for Technical Intelligence.

TIME ALLOTTED: 110 minutes. COURSES PRESENTED TO: OIC, EIC. TYPE: C.

COORDINATION WITH OTHER COURSES, IF ANY: I-2901, Introduction to Technical Intelligence.

SUPERVISORY SECTION: Intelligence.

TO STUDENTS PRIOR TO CLASS: Student Summary, I-2905, with Annex I.

NEEDED BY INSTRUCTOR TO CONDUCT INSTRUCTION:

INSTRUCTOR FOLDER:

1. DETAILED LESSON PLAN, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, COMPLETE.  
See Section IV, herein.
2. TRAINING AIDS:
  - a. CHART: I-2901-2 - Flow of Materiel and Intelligence.
  - b. ENVELOPE: I-2901-A (Training Aids Pool) containing publications:
    - (1) ST-F-9-201, Ordnance Intelligence Users Guide for Soviet 120mm Mortar, August 1950.
    - (2) SF-F-9-206-1, Ordnance Intelligence Users Guide for Soviet Light Machine Guns (Degtyarov type), October 1950.
    - (3) ST-F-9-215-1, Ordnance Intelligence Users Guide for Soviet Submachine Guns, November 1950.
    - (4) ST-F-9-2000-1, Soviet Ordnance Materiel, Chapter 1, Small Arms.
    - (5) FT-F-82-1, Foreign Firing Tables for Soviet Mortar, 82mm, March 1951.
    - (6) FT-F-122-2, Foreign Firing Tables for Soviet Gun, Self-Propelled, and Gun, Tank, 122mm, March 1951.
    - (7) Set of twelve (12) Approximate Penetration Charts for Soviet T-34-85 and KV 85 Tanks.
    - (8) TB SIG F-200-RU, Soviet Switchboard, Type K-10, 1 March 1951.
    - (9) Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 1-1950, North Korean Mine Warfare (June-November 1950), 8 December 1950.

RESTRICTED



# RESTRICTED

I-2905

- (10) Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 1-1951, North Korean Stream-Crossing Equipment, 22 January 1951.
- (11) Engineer Intelligence Notes No. 2-1951, North Korean Mine Warfare (Supplement Number Two), 27 February 1951.

o. ENVELOPE: I-2901-B (Archives) containing publications:

- (1) Foreign Small Arms Ammunition Interchangeability, November 1950, CONFIDENTIAL.
- (2) Foreign Artillery Ammunition Interchangeability, November 1950, CONFIDENTIAL.
- (3) Complete Round Data for Soviet Ammunition, Bombs, Grenades, Mines, and Rockets, December 1950, CONFIDENTIAL.
- (4) DA Pamphlet 30-4-1, Foreign Military Weapons and Equipment, Volume 1, Artillery, 1 January 1951, SECRET.

3. MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR RETENTION FOR SUBSEQUENT CLASSES: None.

ISSUED TO STUDENTS IN CLASS: None.

## SECTION II

ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS FOR CONDUCT OF THIS SUBJECT TO INCLUDE

SCHEDULE CARDS, FORM 4'S, ETC.

STUDENT'S STUDY ASSIGNMENT: Study: Student Summary I-2905, with Annex I; ST 30-15-1, AGS (September 1950), Chap 6.

STUDENT UNIFORM: Uniform of the Day.

INSTRUCTOR ASSISTANT(S): None.

CLASSROOM OR FIELD AREA REQUIREMENTS: Classroom per platoon with sliding panels and arm chairs.

REHEARSALS: Instructor assigned this subject should rehearse sufficiently to insure complete understanding of the subject material contained in the Student Summary, Detailed Lesson Plan (Section IV of this folder) and the accompanying training aids.

## SECTION III

MATERIAL FOR INSTRUCTOR

STUDENT SUMMARIES: I-2905.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: FM 3-25 (August 1944), pars 1-7, 25-27.

FM 5-5 (October 1943), C5, par 272.

FM 30-5 (February 1951), pars 12, 29c, 33c-f, i, 101, 129g.

FM 100-10 (September 1949), pars 114c, 185.

FM 101-5 (July 1950), par 111, pp 176, 183-184, 203, 207, 212, 238.

# RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

I-2905

Special Text SIG 650-ST-28, Signal Corps Intelligence, The Signal School, (November 1950).

Special Text 30-15-1, Army General School, (September 1950), Chap 6.

Engineer Technical Intelligence Teams, The Engineer School (1949).

Information Letter Number 34, The Ordnance School (September 1949).

T/O&E 3-500 (10 April 1950).

T/O&E 5-398T (6 April 1945).

T/O&E 5-399T (6 April 1945).

T/O&E 9-500 (14 October 1944) with C2 (5 August 1949).

T/O&E 10-500 (10 January 1945) with C1 (10 November 1948).

T/O&E 30-600 (20 October 1948) with C1 (12 September 1950).

RESTRICTED

# RESTRICTED

I-2905

## SECTION IV

### DETAILED LESSON PLAN

1. SCOPE. Technical intelligence responsibilities of personnel at all echelons of command. Cycle of technical intelligence.

2. METHOD. This two hour period of instruction is a conference during which questions are put to the class and a guided discussion conducted by the instructor.

3. TIME SCHEDULE. This is a two hour conference with time utilized approximately as follows:

a.	Introduction-----	3 minutes.
b.	Cycle of Technical Intelligence-----	10 minutes.
c.	Responsibilities of All Individuals-----	12 minutes.
d.	Responsibilities of Bn and Regt1 S2s-----	8 minutes.
e.	Responsibilities of Division G2-----	7 minutes.
f.	Special Staff Officers Responsibilities-----	10 minutes.
g.	Break-----	10 minutes.
h.	Technical Intelligence Coordinator Detachment-----	8 minutes.
i.	Technical Service Intelligence Detachments-----	12 minutes.
j.	Theater Chiefs of Service Responsibilities-----	8 minutes.
k.	Chiefs of Technical Service Responsibilities-----	8 minutes.
l.	AC of S, G2, GSUSA, Responsibilities-----	3 minutes.
m.	Air Force Materiel-----	3 minutes.
n.	Direction of Collection-----	5 minutes.
o.	Summary-----	<u>3 minutes.</u>

TOTAL 110 minutes.

4. INTRODUCTION (3 minutes). If the enemy antitank weapons have greater range and penetrating power than ours; if their portable bridge can be laid faster and carry heavier loads; if enemy clothing keeps soldiers dryer and warmer; if the enemy launches an attack with lethal gas against which there is no prepared defense, our troops must operate at a serious disadvantage. If we begin production on a new tank with no knowledge of what antitank weapon a possible enemy has or what he is building, we would have no idea as to whether our tank can withstand his firepower. On the other hand if we do not develop the anti-

RESTRICTED



# RESTRICTED

I-2905

tank weapon which will stop the enemy's tank, our troops would have difficulty in breaking up the enemy's armored attack. How then are we to know what the potential enemy has? This is the responsibility of the assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence, United States Army.

As we have already determined the mission of intelligence is to provide the commander with accurate, timely and adequate knowledge of the enemy and areas of operation to assist him in making sound and timely decisions. One part of this "accurate, timely and adequate knowledge" is the enemy's weapons and equipment. This is called technical intelligence. We have defined Technical Intelligence as intelligence pertaining to the principles of design and operation, nomenclature, physical characteristics, and performance of material used by foreign armed forces.

The technical services of our Army have the job of assuring timely and adequate supply of our combat forces with weapons, munitions and equipment superior to those of the enemy. With recent world-wide scientific and technological progress, this responsibility grows in importance and it becomes difficult to maintain a constant advantage. Therefore information on the enemy's material must be sought after with an increasing effort on the part of all personnel in our Armed Forces as well as personnel of all other governmental agencies who may travel or work in foreign countries.

## 5. CYCLE OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE (10 minutes).

a. Instructor Comment: The production of technical intelligence follows the same cycle with the same four basic steps as the production of combat intelligence.

b. QUESTION: WHAT ARE THESE FOUR BASIC STEPS?

Answer: (1) Direction.

(2) Collection.

(3) Processing of information.

(4) Dissemination of intelligence.

c. Instructor Comment: The U.S. Army is assigned the mission of protecting this nation against "all enemies, both foreign and domestic." To prepare itself for the accomplishment of this mission, the Department of the Army must know the capabilities and limitations of all nations, both friendly as well as enemy; and consequently the AC of S, G2, has the mission of providing for the collection and evaluation of information and the production and dissemination of intelligence on foreign countries. Here we have the direction. As part of this direction effort the AC of S, G2, will direct the collection of information on foreign weapons and equipment.

d. QUESTION: FOLLOWING THE ASSIGNMENT OF A MISSION WHAT IS THE NEXT ACTION TAKEN?

Answer: The Essential Elements of Information are announced.

e. Instructor Comment: The Essential Elements of Technical Requests will originate in the technical services and in the Office of the AC of S, G2, GSUSA. These requests will be compiled by the AC of S, G2,

# RESTRICTED

# RESTRICTED

I-2905

f. QUESTION: WHAT IS THE SECOND STEP IN THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE?

Answer: Collection.

g. QUESTION: WHAT ACTION WILL THE AC OF S, G2, GSUSA, NOW TAKE?

Answer: He will formulate his collection plan. This plan is a breakdown of specific orders and requests to available collecting agencies.

h. QUESTION: WHAT ARE HIS AVAILABLE PRIMARY COLLECTING AGENCIES IN PEACETIME?

Answer: Military Attache System, State Department, Naval and Air Force Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Some other sources are occupation Forces and other scattered outposts the Army mans.

i. Instructor Comment: One of our most prolific sources of information today is the interrogation of refugees and returning PWs.

j. QUESTION: WHAT SECONDARY SOURCES DOES THE AC OF S, G2, GSUSA, HAVE IN PEACETIME?

Answer: A critical study of foreign technical manuals, foreign training pamphlets, U.S. arms manufacturers who export or have exported to foreign countries, photographs and drawings, foreign newspapers and radio broadcasts, foreign scientific publications, textbooks, and foreign arms manufacturers.

k. QUESTION: WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL SOURCE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION IN WARTIME?

Answer: Our own troops.

l. QUESTION: THE COLLECTION EFFORT IS THE DIRECTION OF WHAT INDIVIDUAL?

Answer: The G2/S2.

m. Instructor Comment: It has been brought out by both Generals Eisenhower and Bradley that intelligence has been somewhat neglected in the past World War. Technical intelligence has been an even more neglected field. However, with the increasing complexity of modern weapons

RESTRICTED

# RESTRICTED

I-2905

and equipment this phase of intelligence must be emphasized. All personnel from the top down to the Regimental and Battalion S2, to the infantry platoon leader and to individual rifleman must be made aware of their role in this collection effort.

n. QUESTION: WHAT IS THE THIRD STEP IN THE PRODUCTION OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE?

Answer: Processing of information.

o. QUESTION: WHAT DOES THIS STEP INCLUDE?

Answer: This step includes the recording, evaluation and interpretation of information.

p. QUESTION: WHAT IS THE FINAL AND MOST CRITICAL STEP IN THE PRODUCTION OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE?

Answer: The dissemination of the intelligence to all units and individuals concerned in time to meet their requirements and to be of use.

6. RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL INDIVIDUALS (12 minutes).

a. QUESTION: WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROPER HANDLING OF CAPTURED MATERIEL?

Answer: All individuals in the Army and all those attached for duty with its forces are responsible for proper handling.

b. QUESTION: WHAT DOES PROPER HANDLING OF CAPTURED MATERIEL ENCOMPASS?

Answer: It encompasses the prompt turning in or reporting the presence of captured materiel to the commanding officer of their own or nearest army unit.

c. QUESTION: ARE CERTAIN TYPES OF MATERIAL EVER EXCLUDED FROM THIS PROCEDURE? IF SO, NAME SOME WHICH MAY BE EXCLUDED AND UPON WHOSE AUTHORITY ARE THEY EXCLUDED?

Answer: Yes, certain items may be excluded upon authority of the theater commander. These items may include certain common equipment too damaged for analysis or use, or common enemy publications or manuals of which an abundance has already been received and no further

# RESTRICTED



# RESTRICTED

I-2905

use may be made of the item.

d. Instructor Comment: If the equipment is not common, then regardless of damage it should be turned in or the notification of its presence given to the unit commander.

e. QUESTION: UPON CAPTURE, ENEMY MATERIEL BECOMES THE PROPERTY OF WHICH AGENCY?

Answer: The government.

f. Instructor Comment: Wrongful appropriation or loss through damage or negligence can be punished under the Articles of War. However, during the last war our government authorized the retention of certain types of equipment by our troops as souvenirs.

g. QUESTION: WHAT SHOULD A RIFLEMAN DO IF HE COMES ACROSS AN UNFAMILIAR ENEMY CARBINE?

Answer: Immediately call his squad leader or the leader of his patrol or outpost and show him the weapon. If one of these persons is not available, the rifleman should get the carbine to his squad leader as soon as practicable and notify him as to the time, place and circumstances of capture.

h. Instructor Comment: The squad leader now turns it over to the platoon leader and notifies him as to the time, place and circumstances of capture. The weapon is then sent to the company commander with the information as to its capture.

i. QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNIT COMMANDER IN REGARD TO CAPTURED ENEMY MATERIEL IN HIS ZONE OF ACTION OR OPERATIONS?

Answer:

- (1) Properly safeguarded.
- (2) Reported to the intelligence officer of next higher headquarters.
- (3) Left in position, if immediate use or destruction is not necessary. If contact with the proper technical service cannot be made, captured materiel should be promptly evacuated through channels.

j. QUESTION: YOU ARE A RIFLE COMPANY COMMANDER AND ONE OF YOUR MEN HAS CAPTURED A NEW TYPE OF ENEMY CARBINE THAT YOU HAVE NEVER

# RESTRICTED

# RESTRICTED

I-2905

SEEN. WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

Answer: Since this weapon can be easily carried I would send it to the Battalion CP and notify the Battalion S2 as to its place, time and circumstances of capture.

k. QUESTION: WHAT SHOULD YOU DO AS A COMPANY COMMANDER IF A LARGE ENEMY GUIDED MISSILE LANDED IN YOUR AREA AND FAILED TO EXPLODE?

Answer: Place guards to keep persons away from the area and notify the battalion commander or Battalion S2 and ask for instructions.

l. QUESTION: ARE NAME PLATES FROM CAPTURED EQUIPMENT REMOVED AND TURNED IN? WHY?

Answer: No. Nameplates are never removed from the equipment. They must be left on the equipment in order to specifically identify a certain nameplate with a specific piece of materiel.

m. QUESTION: IS DATA FROM NAMEPLATES OR MARKINGS EVER TAKEN?

Answer: The data found on nameplates is extremely important and in certain cases units may be specifically ordered to turn in nameplate data.

n. QUESTION: HOW MAY THIS DATA BE OBTAINED?

Answer: It may be obtained by photographing or sketching, using the moulage process (spreading a liquid over the marking which will harden and peel off) or taking rubbings.

7. RESPONSIBILITIES OF BN AND REGTL S2s (8 minutes).

a. QUESTION: WHAT INDIVIDUAL ON BN AND REGTL LEVEL IS RESPONSIBLE TO HIS COMMANDER FOR THE DIRECTION OF THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ON ENEMY MATERIEL?

Answer: The S2.

b. QUESTION: AS A BN S2 WHAT DO YOU DO WHEN A NEW ENEMY CARBINE IS TURNED INTO YOU?

Answer: The S2 must first ascertain the time, place and circumstances of capture. The S2 is then responsible to see that this

# RESTRICTED

# RESTRICTED

I-2905

weapon is immediately reported to the regimental S2. The carbine is then sent by the fastest means available (message center, personal visit, or supply officer) to the regimental S2.

c. QUESTION: AS A REGTL S2 WHAT DO YOU DO WHEN YOU RECEIVE NOTIFICATION OF THE CARBINE?

Answer: Upon notification of the new weapon, report the time, place and circumstances of capture to the division G2. When the weapon arrives turn it over to the S4 for immediate evacuation to the installation, prescribed in the Administrative Order (or in the Intelligence of Logistics Annex to the Operations Order.) where it will be turned over to the Division Ordnance Officer.

d. QUESTION: AS A BN S2 WHAT ARE YOUR ACTIONS WHEN A LARGE ENEMY GUIDED MISSILE IS REPORTED BY ONE OF THE FRONTLINE COMPANIES?

Answer: Assure that the missile is adequately guarded to prevent any unauthorized personnel or souvenir hunters from disturbing it. The Regtl S2 should be immediately notified of its presence and guards requested from a reserve unit in order to free your own troops for their frontline mission.

e. QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE ACTIONS OF THE REGTL S2?

Answer: He immediately notifies the division G2 of its presence. Guards are arranged for to relieve the front line battalion troops guarding the missile.

f. QUESTION: AS A BN S2 WHAT ARE YOUR ACTIONS IF ONE OF YOUR COMPANIES RUNS OVER AN ENEMY SIGNAL INSTALLATION OR UNDERGROUND FACTORY?

Answer: These are highly valuable installations and every effort must be made to secure them against any possible damage or loss. Regtl S2 should again be immediately informed of the capture and guards requested.

g. QUESTION: AS A REGTL S2, WHAT ARE YOUR ACTIONS?

# RESTRICTED

# RESTRICTED

I-2905

Answer: He immediately informs the division G2 and arranges

for guards on the installation.

h. QUESTION: WHAT OTHER SOURCES MAY THE REGTL S2 USE IN CARRYING OUT HIS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ON ENEMY MATERIEL?

Answer: IPW personnel.

i. Instructor Comment: While interrogation at this echelon is purely for immediate tactical usage, questions may be asked of PWs and civilians in regard to types of weapons and equipment they use. Any indication of new weapons or equipment should be noted, and further interrogation of this prisoner recommended. Due to the available time at this echelon actual interrogation of any technical nature will probably be done on an army or higher level.

8. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIVISION G2 (7 minutes).

a. QUESTION: WHAT TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES ARE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS OF DIVISION AND ABOVE CHARGED WITH?

Answer: (1) Insuring that captured materiel is promptly turned over to the interested technical service.

(2) The collection of information on enemy materiel. (For this purpose the special staff officers are charged with certain responsibilities which we will discuss shortly.)

(3) Insuring coordination of effort among the arms and services in the collection of information on enemy materiel.

(4) The prompt transmission of technical and other information from document translations, prisoner of war interrogations, target analysis, other technical services, etc., to appropriate special staff officers in order to assist them in fulfilling their technical intelligence missions.

RESTRICTED



# RESTRICTED

I-2905

(5) Prompt dissemination down, up, and laterally,  
of technical information received from the  
technical services.

b. QUESTION: WHAT ACTIONS WILL THE DIVISION G2 TAKE WHEN  
THE NEW ENEMY CARBINE HAS BEEN REPORTED TO HIM?

Answer: He will notify Corps G2 and the special staff  
officer responsible for the item as to the time, place, and circumstances  
of capture and its disposition (to the Division Ordnance Officer at the  
installation prescribed in the Administrative Order or in the Intelli-  
gence or Logistics Annex to the Operations Order).

c. QUESTION: WHAT ACTIONS WILL THE DIVISION G2 TAKE IN RE-  
GARD TO THE GUIDED MISSILE AND THE ENEMY SIGNAL INSTALLATION?

Answer: He will notify Corps G2, the Division Ordnance  
Officer and the Division Signal Officer as to the time, place and cir-  
cumstances of capture. He will also arrange for guards on the installa-  
tions in order to release the front line units from guard responsibility.  
These guards will probably be from the Division MP Company.

d. QUESTION: WILL INTERROGATION DETACHMENTS BE ABLE TO FUR-  
NISH THE G2 MUCH TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON ENEMY MATERIEL? WHY?

Answer: Generally no. The interrogation detachments while  
able to speak the enemy language are limited in that their primary mis-  
sion at this echelon is to procure information of a tactical nature to  
answer immediate needs. Certain information as to numbers and types of  
weapons may come under this classification. When this mission is ac-  
complished little time remains for technical interrogation. Also the  
interrogator does not have sufficient technical experience to acquire  
the type of information desired by the technical services.

e. Instructor Comment: There are cases when the answers to  
certain specific questions are desired. For example it may be extremely  
important to ascertain whether a common machine gun is being made out  
of a new lighter metal. In cases of this nature this specific EBI may  
be announced by higher headquarters and disseminated to IPW detachments.  
The questions then asked would be, "Is your machine gun easy to carry?"

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

I-2905

Can you carry it yourself? Does it take a cart to transport it? Do we need to attach wheels to your mount in order to move your machine gun? These relatively simple non-technical questions which may be answered by any machine gunner may provide the bit of information necessary to complete an otherwise foggy and incomplete picture, or confirm predictions and indications.

9. SPECIAL STAFF OFFICERS RESPONSIBILITIES (10 minutes).

a. Instructor Comment: We have already stated that captured materiel if easily transportable will be sent back to the special staff officer at the installation prescribed in the Administrative Order or in the Intelligence or Logistics Annex to the Operations Order. Also, the G2 will, upon the receipt of any information pertaining to enemy weapons or equipment, inform the special staff officer of it.

b. QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPECIAL STAFF OFFICERS OF ALL ECHELONS?

Answer: (Note: These responsibilities may be brought out by allowing each student to offer one responsibility for discussion. After it has been thoroughly discussed, move on to another.)

(1) Supervision of technical intelligence activities of his service to ensure maximum recovery and collection, and the fullest exploitation and utilization of the resulting information and materiel under the general staff supervision of intelligence officer.

(2) Instructor Comment: There is a great need for this cooperation between the technical services. This will materially benefit each service. As an example: the discovery by an ordnance officer of an abandoned enemy tank brings out the need for liaison between ordnance, signal, engineer, chemical, and quartermaster. All of these agencies are interested in some aspect of that tank. The Signal Corps wants information on the radios, telephones and visual signalling devices; the Corps of Engineers wants information on the infra-red night driving device; the Chemical Corps wants the chemical smoke shells the tank fires; the Quartermaster Corps wants to know about the gasoline in the tank; and of course the Ordnance Corps will have interest in the ammunition, armament, engine, chassis, etc.)

RESTRICTED

# RESTRICTED

I-2905

- (3) Collection and dissemination, in conjunction with the intelligence officer, of technical information (including tactical capabilities and limitations, markings and nameplate data) on enemy materiel which corresponds to items of United States equipment for whose issue his service is responsible.
- (4) Technical supervision of the collection of captured materiel pertaining to his service.
- (5) Instruction of using personnel (our own troops) in the characteristics, use, and interchangeability of enemy materiel with United States or other equipment.
- (6) Implementation and operation of system of evaluation of captured enemy materiel (to include processing, packing and shipping).
- (7) Submission of complete reports (to include photographs) on the processing of captured enemy material, and the information and intelligence derived therefrom to the intelligence officer of his headquarters and the appropriate special staff officer of the next higher headquarters.

c. QUESTION: WHAT ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES DO COMMANDERS OF TECHNICAL SERVICE UNITS HAVE?

Answer: They must insure that all individuals under their command are on the alert to recognize and pick out modifications and new types of enemy equipment.

d. Instructor Comment: This is extremely important at the Division Trains Area and at all captured enemy equipment dumps. Here technically qualified personnel will have constant contact with their type of enemy equipment and any small change or modification should be picked up by these individuals.

# RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

I-2905

It should be emphasized here that it is extremely important to be able to recognize immediately any new models and any significant modifications of standard enemy equipment. The sooner that these are reported, the sooner we may be able to achieve the four objectives of technical intelligence.

e. QUESTION: A TRUCKLOAD OF ENEMY SMALL ARMS ARE DELIVERED TO THE DIVISION ORDNANCE COMPANY. AMONG THE ARMS SEVERAL GAS MASKS AND A SNIPERSCOPE IS FOUND. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH THESE ITEMS?

Answer: The gas masks should be reported to the Division Chemical Officer, and the sniperscope to the Division Engineer.

f. QUESTION: WHAT ACTIONS WILL THE DIVISION ORDNANCE OFFICER TAKE WHEN THE NEW ENEMY CARBINE IS DELIVERED TO HIM?

Answer: He will inform the Corps Ordnance Officer of its capture to include time, place and circumstances and assure its evacuation to the Army Ordnance.

10. BREAK (10 minutes).

11. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATOR DETACHMENTS (8 minutes).

a. Instructor Comment: The responsibilities of the intelligence officers at this level and above are the same as we previously discussed. However, normally beginning at corps level he has several persons within his section who devote their entire time to technical intelligence.

b. QUESTION: WHO ARE THESE PERSONS?

Answer: Technical Intelligence Coordinator Detachment.

c. Instructor Comment: There are four types of detachments. Refer to Annex I of your Student Summary and note under the heading Military Intelligence Service, the organization and employment of these teams. You will notice that the CJ detachment is authorized on the basis of one per 25,000 troops in a field army. This may lead you to believe that these detachments are sometimes found as low as division or separate task force. This is true, but the normal allotment is one per corps and that is the way they are being used in Korea.

d. QUESTION: ARE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATOR DETACHMENTS NORMALLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO UNITS BELOW THEATER LEVEL?

Answer: Teams are normally assigned to theater, which will in turn assign the detachments to armies, corps, and divisions as required. One technical intelligence coordinator detachment will normally remain assigned to theater as the senior team under the theater

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

I-2905

G2, and technical intelligence coordinator for over-all coordination of technical and scientific intelligence collecting and disseminating agencies throughout the theater.

e. QUESTION: WHAT DUTIES ARE ASSIGNED TO THE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATOR?

- Answer: (1) General staff adviser to the commander and staff on technical and scientific intelligence matters. In this function he does not supersede the special staff officer as the commander's technical advisor, but, rather advises the commander concerning the overall technical intelligence plan and the coordination of effort.
- (2) Organization of the G2 Technical Intelligence Section.
- (3) Preparation of basic plans for the collection and dissemination of technical and scientific intelligence.
- (4) General Staff supervision and coordination of technical and scientific intelligence collecting and disseminating agencies.
- (5) Assisting special staff officers in obtaining enemy technical documents and prisoner of war interrogations pertaining to material for which they are responsible, and in obtaining items of captured enemy material in which they are interested, but for which another service has the primary responsibility for the production of intelligence.

12. TECHNICAL SERVICE INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENTS (TSIDS) (12 minutes).

RESTRICTED



g. QUESTION: WHAT REPORTS DOES THE DIVISION INTELLIGENCE OFFICER RECEIVE OF TSID ACTIVITIES?

Answer: He will receive TSID reports through the respective technical services, and intelligence produced is a result of their activities through intelligence channels.

h. QUESTION: WHAT TECHNICAL SERVICE INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENTS ARE PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED, PROPOSED OR UNDER STUDY?

Answer: Chemical Corps, Corps of Engineers, Ordnance Corps, Medical Corps, Quartermaster Corps, Signal Corps, Transportation Corps.

i. Instructor Comment: Take out Annex I to your Student Summary and note the size and normal attachment or assignment of these detachments. In Korea the only variation of this has been the extensive and valuable use of the Ordnance Detachments at division level.

j. Instructor Comment: There is a difference between the work of technical service intelligence detachments and the information which all technical service personnel can offer. For example, an ordnance maintenance officer in a combat area may observe an abandoned enemy tank and give the local S2/G2 information which will lead to the identification of a new enemy unit in the area. The same tank, when inspected by the ordnance technical service intelligence detachment, may then provide the theater intelligence officer with detailed data as to the characteristics of that particular tank model.

k. QUESTION: UPON WHAT TWO MAIN POINTS DOES THE SUCCESS OF THE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MISSION DEPEND?

- Answer:
- (1) The ability of the detachments to recognize information that may yield technical intelligence.
  - (2) Rapidity and accuracy with which information is collected, evaluated and disseminated.

l. QUESTION: WHAT ARE SOME OF THE ITEMS TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL ARE CONSTANTLY ON THE LOOKOUT FOR?

Answer: (Note: Several students may be called upon to bring out the entire answer.)

- (1) New items of enemy equipment.
- (2) Design changes in materiel.

RESTRICTED

I-2905

- (3) Changes in manufacturing techniques.
- (4) Quality and type of material used in production.
- (5) Information concerning packing, storage and maintenance techniques.
- (6) Data concerning place of manufacture and date of manufacture.
- (7) Data concerning rate of production.
- (8) Other information of technical, tactical, or strategic significance such as evidences of material shortages, as shown by substitution of non-critical materials for critical materials in the construction of enemy munitions.
- (9) Combat experiences as to the effect of standard and new enemy materiel and equipment on U.S. or Allied equipment.

m. QUESTION: DO THE TSIDS HAVE ANY PARTICULAR COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE DUTIES? WHAT IS IT?

Answer: Yes, certain of these detachments provide advice regarding the characteristics and capabilities of enemy sabotage devices, signal communication equipment and similar technical matter.

13. THEATER CHIEFS OF SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES (8 minutes).

a. QUESTION: WHAT DO WE MEAN WHEN WE SAY THAT A SERVICE HAS THE "RESPONSIBILITY FOR ISSUE" OF AN ITEM? GIVE EXAMPLES.

Answer: When a service has the "responsibility for issue" it means that the service handles all the issuance of a certain item whether they develop it, design it or not. As an example the signal corps has the responsibility for issuance of the radio SCR 300 and Ordnance has the responsibility for the issuance of an M1 rifle.

b. QUESTION: WHAT DO WE MEAN WHEN WE SAY THAT A SERVICE HAS THE "RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESIGN" OF AN ITEM?

RESTRICTED



# RESTRICTED

I-2905

Answer: When a service has the "responsibility for design" it means that the service is charged with the design, testing and procurement of an item. For example, Ordnance is charged with the design of weapons and the Engineers with river crossing equipment.

c. QUESTION: DOES IT EVER HAPPEN THAT ONE SERVICE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DESIGN WHILE ANOTHER SERVICE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ISSUE? GIVE EXAMPLES.

Answer: Yes. The air force is responsible for the development of photographic equipment and the Signal Corps is responsible for its issue. The mine detector used within the A & P Platoon of the Infantry Battalion is designed by the Corps of Engineer but is the responsibility of the Signal Corps for issue. Some of the new equipment (Geiger counters, etc.), are Signal Corps design and Chemical Corps issue. Tools of certain nature are of Ordnance design but Quartermaster issue.

d. QUESTION: WE HAVE ALREADY DISCUSSED THE SPECIAL STAFF OFFICERS' TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE DUTIES. WHAT ARE SOME ADDITIONAL DUTIES A THEATER CHIEF OF SERVICE HAS, BASED UPON HIS SERVICE'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR ISSUE?

Answer: (1) Preliminary operator's and maintenance instructions for use within the theater, this to include all available information of value in the operation and maintenance of captured material by our troops.

(2) Necessary arrangement to fully exploit enemy material captured in large quantities.

e. QUESTION: WHAT ARE SOME ADDITIONAL DUTIES A THEATER CHIEF OF SERVICE HAS, BASED UPON HIS SERVICE'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESIGN?

Answer: (1) Processing of material for namoplato data and rubbings in accordance with existing Department of the Army directives.

# RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

I-2905

- (2) Preliminary expert analysis as to characteristics of materiel.
- (3) Delivery of selected samples of materiel to the chief of his army or service in the zone of interior for final analysis and report.
- (4) Transmission of copies of information described in (2) and (3) above to the chief of his army or service or to the establishment named by him.

f. QUESTION: ARE THERE ANY ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES A THEATER CHIEF OF SERVICE HAS IN REGARD TO TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE? NAME IT.

Answer: Yes. He must insure that captured enemy materiel and information collected within the theater based on his service's responsibility for issue is transmitted at the theater level to the service having design responsibility.

14. CHIEFS OF TECHNICAL SERVICES RESPONSIBILITIES (8 minutes).

a. QUESTION: AFTER CAPTURED MATERIEL HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND PROCESSED AT THEATER LEVEL DEPOTS WHAT BECOMES OF IT?

Answer: The materiel or a few samples of it is then shipped to depots in the zone of interior where detailed analysis is performed by the technical service having primary responsibility.

b. QUESTION: WHAT GOVERNS THE "PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY" FOR AN ITEM?

Answer: Directives defining primary responsibility for production or procurement of items of U.S. Materiel will govern the delineation of primary responsibility between the services for the production of intelligence on similar items of foreign materiel.

c. QUESTION: IS THERE ANY COORDINATION BETWEEN SERVICES ON PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE ON CAPTURED MATERIEL OR IS IT ONLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SERVICE HAVING RESEARCH OR DESIGN RESPONSIBILITY?

RESTRICTED

# RESTRICTED

I-2905

Answer: The service having design responsibility will coordinate with any other services who may have issuing responsibility for the item.

d. QUESTION: DISCUSS THE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHIEFS OF THE TECHNICAL SERVICES?

Answer: (Note: These responsibilities should be discussed one at a time with all information brought out through student discussion prior to approaching another responsibility.)

- (1) The production and maintenance of current intelligence, concerning the design, performance, manufacture, storage, military requirements, and maintenance of all foreign weapons and military equipment and the necessary military organizations, installations, and techniques pertaining thereto.
- (2) Preparation of operator's technical and maintenance manuals, similar in form and content to those issued by U.S. Army Technical Services for essential items of equipment when prescribed by the Department of the Army. Full instructions will be included respecting suitable fuels, lubricants, ammunition, tools, accessories, spare parts and the like. (Note to Instructor: Show contents of Envelopes I-2901-A and I-2901-B and have them available after class for students to see.)
- (3) The dissemination of intelligence derived from captured materiel to agencies under the control of the chief of the producing service in accordance with established procedure and the dissemination of such intelligence in suitable form

# RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

I-2905

to the AC of S, G2, Intelligence, GSUSA, for further dissemination.

- (4) Preparation of such visual training aids as may be desirable.
- (5) Processing captured materiel and distribution as directed, or authorized by the Department of the Army to meet the needs of training establishments in the Zone of the Interior after intelligence requirements have been met.
- (6) Preparation of Field or Technical Manuals as appropriate to provide organizational and operational guidance for their various Technical Service Intelligence Detachments.

15. AC OF S, G2, GSUSA, RESPONSIBILITIES (3 minutes).

QUESTION: WHAT ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE IS THE A/C OF S, G2, GSUSA, CHARGED WITH?

Answer: (Note: These aspects may be brought out by allowing each student to offer one aspect for discussion. After that aspect has been thoroughly discussed, another student may give another.)

- a. Insuring integration and uniformity of effort, among the services, in the collection of information on enemy materiel.
- b. Reviewing intelligence produced by the services from captured materiel to insure coordination and conformance with current intelligence standards.
- c. Disseminating finished intelligence on captured materiel to authorized agencies.
- d. Promulgating policies for the handling and allocation of captured materiel for intelligence purposes.
- e. Collection of information in accordance with the specific

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

I-2905

requests of the services and insuring complete initial dissemination of all pertinent data to the agencies primarily interested.

16. AIR FORCE MATERIEL (3 minutes).

a. QUESTION: WHAT DISPOSITION IS MADE OF ENEMY AIR SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT?

Answer: Enemy air supplies and equipment (including aircraft equipment carried in aircraft or by airrows), namoplates, and enemy air base maintenance supplies and equipment, (excluding bombs, mines, and aerial torpedoes) are turned over to intelligence officer of the nearest air force unit.

b. QUESTION: WHAT DO YOU DO IF NO SUCH UNIT IS LOCALLY KNOWN OR AVAILABLE?

Answer: A radio report is made to the intelligence officer of the nearest air force headquarters. The material is safeguarded until disposition is directed by proper authority.

c. Instructor Comment: One of the best examples of the Air Force can produce in the realm of strategic technical intelligence was shown in the movie "A Scrap of Paper" which you have already seen in your period on documents. You recall the incident when a study of broken Jap airplane connecting rods disclosed an extreme shortage of chromium. We not only determined the shortage, but Strategic Air was able to do something about it and further decrease the supply.

17. DIRECTION OF COLLECTION (5 minutes).

a. Instructor Comment: We have thus far seen the movement of materiel up through channels and the resultant dissemination of intelligence. Let us now start at another point in the production cycle and follow the direction of collection effort from there.

b. Assume we are at war with country X. We know the characteristics of their 98-mm antitank gun. In general it is a poor weapon in that it takes a long time to emplace, and has a carriage which will allow it to be towed only at speeds less than 25 mph. From the battlefield the Department of the Army receives several reports that almost immediately after liaison planes had flown over an area which had no large weapons and no facilities for camouflaging any, extremely effective antitank fire was felt. After immediate reinvestigation and aerial photography, nothing was visible with the exception of two of the old 98-mm antitank guns three miles to the rear of the source of the firing. At approximately the same time a report has come in to DA from sources within the enemy country that this old 98-mm antitank gun had been seen traveling at 45 to 55 miles per hour down dirt roads near a training center.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

I-2905

With these two reports in Ordnance Intelligence, it was thought that possibly a new type carriage was in use for the old gun. As a result Ordnance Intelligence prepared a specific request for information on a new carriage for the 98-mm antitank gun. This request went to DA G2 who immediately sent a cable to the theater G2. The theater G2 immediately sent out directives to the theater ordnance Officer and down through intelligence channels. At Army level the EEI goes to the IPW personnel who have time to actually search for these answers. At Corps, G2 calls in his Technical Intelligence Coordinator, briefs him as to the information desired. He in turn passes this request out to the TSIDS and the divisions. In the meantime the theater Ordnance officer has also initiated requests through his channels to obtain the desired information.

After a thorough search of all captured material depots and supply dumps no new modification of the existing carriage may be found. However, as the obtaining of this information was essential the technical intelligence coordinator at III Corps advised his G2 to send out several seemingly unimportant questions to the IPW personnel at division. These questions to be directed at all personnel having anything to do with the 98mm antitank gun.

- (1) How long does it take you to place your gun into action? Take it out of action?
- (2) How fast do you ride down a road when towing your gun?

He also disseminated that the answers of from 15 to 20 minutes for the first question and never above 25 MPH for the second question, were the standard answers. If any prisoners gave answers which varied from the standard answers for both by large amounts, they were to inform Corps G2 immediately. Results of these were nil until one day when a prisoner claimed that his gun was placed in and out of action in less than three minutes and could be towed at speeds up to 60 MPH. The TIC through his IPW source had received a small but vital piece of information. The Ordnance TSID at Army was notified and the PW was marked for further interrogated with the help of the Ordnance specialists at Army level. The resulting information from the PW showed that his unit was equipped with the same 98mm gun, however, with a new carriage. This information was passed up and down intelligence and technical channels and a limited attack ordered in the sector in which the PW's unit was known to be active. The attack was a success, and a new 98-mm gun was captured. The Ordnance TSID on hand (they had been informed of the impending attack by the TIC), and the weapon was promptly evacuated under the TSID supervision.

Here we may see how new weapons may be anticipated and searches initiated for them.

18. SUMMARY (3 minutes). a. In summary, I would like to show you this chart (Instructor will uncover Chart I-2901-2) as it reviews for us in graphic form the flow of captured material, the flow of technical information and dissemination of technical and scientific intelligence.

b. Let us first note our normal command channels as shown by the black line.

c. Next note our flow of captured material from the troops

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

I-2905


to the Division Trains Area, on through Army Depots to Communication Zone Depots and Ports to the Ports and Depots of the Zone of the Interior.

d. Next note the TSIDs who came under the administrative and operational control of the Special Staff officer of each service.

e. Finally note the constant flow of technical information and dissemination between the special staff officer and the G2 of all echelons, the special staff officers with higher and lower headquarters, and the G2 with higher and lower headquarters.

RESTRICTED





- Command channels.  
 - - - - - Flow of technical information and dissemination of technical and/or scientific intelligence  
 . . . . . Flow of captured material.
- ① Control of division trains is primarily vested in G-4
  - ② Normally attached
  - ③ Normally assigned
  - ④ Teams retained by theater headquarters are primarily analysis teams

CHART I-2901-2

# RESTRICTED

I-2905

ARMY GENERAL SCHOOL

DEPARTMENT OF RESIDENT INSTRUCTION

STUDENT SUMMARY

## ORGANIZATION FOR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

### SECTION I

#### OUTLINE OF CONFERENCE

1. SCOPE. Technical intelligence responsibilities of personnel at all echelons of command. Cycle of technical intelligence.

2. INTRODUCTION. Technical intelligence is becoming increasingly important every day with the complicated scientific and technical instruments we use in fighting a war. During World War II technical intelligence produced many very valuable bits of intelligence which greatly assisted our own troops. As an example when the German Tiger tank first appeared, we could find no anti-tank weapon that would knock it out. Everything bounced off. Finally, a tank was captured and immediately studied. Frontal armor was found to be  $10\frac{1}{2}$  inches in thickness, and we had nothing that would penetrate it. However, it was found that the armor on the flanks and rear was much lighter. Thus, we were able to pin the Tiger down in direction by one opponent and send others to the flank or rear from which points the tank could be successfully dealt with. The German "88," one of the finest artillery pieces developed during the war, always gave us lots of trouble. However, study developed the fact that the muzzle could be depressed only to a certain angle below the horizontal. As a result of this study, troops were told that when they found an "88" emplaced on a hill, they were perfectly safe from its fire in the valley beneath, and that they could even approach its position safely by going up the slope below the angle which it was capable of firing.

3. CYCLE OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE. The production of technical intelligence is no different from the production cycle for combat intelligence. First comes the direction of effort—the result of the commanders mission—and followed by the announcement of the Essential Elements of Information either within the Operations Order or in the Intelligence Annex. After the EEI the intelligence officer takes the second step—Collection. He formulates his collection plan. In peacetime, the available collecting agencies are primarily the Military Attaché System, the State Department, Naval and Air Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Secondary sources are a study of foreign technical manuals, foreign training pamphlets, U. S. arms manufacturers who export or have exported to foreign countries, photographs and drawings, foreign newspapers and radio broadcasts, foreign scientific publications, textbooks, and foreign arms manufacturers. During wartime, we have the important additional source of our own troops who come in contact with foreign weapons constantly.

The third step is the processing of information which includes the recording, evaluation and interpretation of the information the collecting agencies have sent in. The final and most critical step is the dissemination of intelligence to all units and individuals concerned in time to meet their requirements and to be of use.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL INDIVIDUALS. a. Individual and unit commander responsibilities for proper handling of captured enemy material

RESTRICTED

# RESTRICTED

I-2905

are discussed in Special Text 30-15-1, AGS, September 1950, par 74.

b. Nameplates are never removed from the equipment. They must be left on the equipment in order to specifically identify a certain nameplate with a specific item of material. Occasionally personnel may be ordered to turn in nameplate data from a certain type of equipment. If this is ordered, no nameplate will be removed, but the data will be taken either by photographing the plate, sketching it, using moulage process (use of liquid which will harden on the plate and then peel off), or by taking rubbings.

5. INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS' RESPONSIBILITIES. a. Intelligence officers are responsible that captured material is promptly turned over to the interested technical service; or, if that is not practical, insuring that the material is evacuated through supply channels.

b. They are also charged with the responsibilities as listed in Special Text 30-15-1, AGS, September 1950, par 78.

6. SPECIAL STAFF OFFICERS' RESPONSIBILITIES. These responsibilities are discussed in Special Text 30-15-1, AGS, September 1950, par 75.

7. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATOR DETACHMENTS. a. The organization of the Technical Intelligence Coordinator Detachments is found in Annex I.

b. The duties of the Technical Intelligence Coordinator Detachments are discussed in Special Text 30-15-1, AGS, September 1950, par 80.

c. This detachment is commanded by a Technical Intelligence Coordinator who is an assistant to the intelligence officer. His duties are:

- (1) General Staff advisor to the commander and staff on technical and scientific intelligence matters. In this function he does not supersede the special staff officer as the commander's technical advisor, but, rather advises the commander concerning the overall technical intelligence plan and the coordination of effort.
- (2) Organization of the G2 Technical Intelligence Section.
- (3) Preparation of basic plans for the collection and dissemination of technical and scientific intelligence.
- (4) General Staff supervision and coordination of technical and scientific intelligence collecting and disseminating agencies.
- (5) Assisting the special staff officers in obtaining enemy technical documents and prisoner of war interrogations pertaining to material for which they are responsible, and in obtaining items of captured enemy material in which they are interested, but for which another service has primary responsibility for the production of intelligence.

# RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

I-2905

8. TECHNICAL SERVICE INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENTS (TSIDS). a. These detachments are shown in Annex I and discussed in general in Special Text 30-15-1, AGS, September 1950, par 77.

b. The two main points upon which the success of the technical intelligence mission depends are:

- (1) The ability of the detachments to reorganize information that may yield technical intelligence.
- (2) Rapidity and accuracy with which information is collected, evaluated and disseminated.

c. TSID personnel are constantly on the lookout for:

- (1) New items of enemy equipment.
- (2) Design changes in material.
- (3) Changes in manufacturing techniques.
- (4) Quality and type of material used in production.
- (5) Information concerning packing, storage and maintenance techniques.
- (6) Data concerning place and date of manufacture.
- (7) Data concerning rate of production.
- (8) Other information of technical, tactical, or strategic significance such as evidences of material shortages, as shown by substitution of non-critical materials for critical materials in the construction of enemy munitions.
- (9) Combat experiences as to the effect of standard and new enemy materiel and equipment on U. S. or Allied equipment.

d. Certain of the TSID provide advice to intelligence officers regarding the characteristics and capabilities of enemy sabotage devices, signal communication equipment and similar technical matter.

9. THEATER CHIEFS OF SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES. a. When a service has the "responsibility of issue" it means that one service does all the issuance of a certain item whether they develop it, design it or not.

b. When a service has the "responsibility for design" it means that the service is charged with the design, testing and procurement of an item.

c. The responsibilities are discussed in Special Text 30-15-1, AGS, September 1950, par 76.

10. CHIEFS OF TECHNICAL SERVICES RESPONSIBILITIES. a. The production and maintenance of current intelligence, concerning the design, performance, manufacture, storage, military requirements, and maintenance of all foreign weapons and military equipment and the necessary military organizations, installations, and techniques pertaining thereto.

RESTRICTED



b. Preparation of operator's technical and maintenance manuals, similar in form and content to those issued by U. S. Army Technical Services for essential items of equipment when prescribed by the Department of the Army. Full instructions will be included respecting suitable fuels, lubricants, ammunition, tools, accessories, spare parts and the like.

c. The dissemination of intelligence derived from captured material to agencies under the control of the chief of the producing service in accordance with established procedure and the dissemination of such intelligence in suitable form to the AC of S, G2, Intelligence, GSUSA, for further dissemination.

d. Preparation of such visual training aids as may be desirable.

e. Processing captured materiel and distribution as directed or authorized by the Department of the Army to meet the needs of training establishments in the Zone of the Interior after intelligence requirements have been met.

f. Preparation of Field or Technical Manuals as appropriate to provide organizational and operational guidance for their various Technical Service Intelligence Detachments.

11. AC OF S, G2, GSUSA, RESPONSIBILITIES. These responsibilities are discussed in Special Text 30-15-1, AGS, September 1950, par 82.

12. AIR FORCE MATERIAL. Enemy air supplies and equipment (including aircraft equipment carried in aircraft or by aircrews), name plates, and enemy air base maintenance supplies and equipment (excluding bombs, mines and aerial torpedoes) are turned over to the intelligence officer of the nearest air force unit. If no such unit is locally known or available, a radio report is made to the intelligence officer of the nearest air force headquarters. Material is safeguarded until disposition is directed by proper authority. Since enemy materiel provides an excellent source for technical intelligence, it is essential that captured enemy materiel of this type reach the proper authority.

13. SUMMARY. a. Captured materiel presents special problems, including segregation of materiel of new or unusual design, dangerous items, and usable enemy supplies and equipment. Captured materiel, except Air Force equipment, which appears to be of new design or to contain new materials, is turned over, either direct or through technical intelligence detachments, to the special staff officer of the appropriate supply branch who is responsible for spot evaluation and transmission of appropriate information to the appropriate intelligence officer. Expedited delivery of the item to the theater of operations special staff officer for further technical analysis.

b. Captured enemy materiel becomes the property of the United States immediately upon capture. Consequently, it must be safeguarded and treated in the same manner as all other Government property.

## SECTION II

### CONDUCT OF INSTRUCTION

1. TYPE OF CLASS: Conference.
2. TIME ALLOTTED: One hundred ten (110) minutes.



RESTRICTED

I-2905

SECTION III

ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS

1. REFERENCE MATERIALS:

a. Required: Study Student Summary, I-2905; Special Text  
15-1, AGS, September 1950, Chap 6.

b. Supplemental:

(1) FM 30-5 (February 1951), pars 12, 29c, 33c-f, i, 101,  
129g.

(2) FM 100-10 (September 1949), pars 114c, 185.

(3) FM 101-5 (July 1950), par 111, pp 176, 183-184, 203,  
207, 212, 238.

2. BRING TO CLASS: Student Summary, I-2905, with Annex I.

3. UNIFORM: Uniform of the Day.

4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: None.

RESTRICTED

Technical Service	Present Status	Designation of Detachment	OFF	EM	Aggre- gate	Vehi- cles	Allocation
Chemical Corps	T/O&E 3-500 10 Apr 50	Cml Tech Svc Intel Det, IA	3	5	8	4	Assigned to the theaters of operations as required by subordinate commands.
		Cml Tech Svc Intel Det, IB	3	7	10	4	
Corps of Engineers	T/O&E 5-398T 6 Apr 45 T/O&E 5-399T 6 Apr 45	Engr Tech Intel Det (Combat)	1	3	4	2	1 asgd to corps, 1 asgd to army.
		Engr Tech Intel Det (Research)	3	6	9	3	1 asgd to army.
Medical Department	Proposed T/O&E	Tech Svc Intel Det (Medical) Type 1	4	4	8	1	1 per theater hq.
		Tech Svc Intel Det (Medical) Type 2	1	1	2	1	1 per theater hq, 1 per COM Z, 2 per army.
		Tech Svc Intel Det (Medical) Type 3	1	1	2	1	2 per army. All medical TSIDs asgd to theater and asgd or atched as needed to commands of all levels.
Ordnance Corps	T/O&E 9-500, C2, 5 Aug 49	Ord Tech Intel Det, EG	1	2	3	1	1 asgd to corps, 1 asgd to army.
Quarter- master Corps	T/O&E 10-500, C1, 10 Nov 48	QM Tech Intel Det, KA	1	2	3	1	Allotted on basis of 1 for each corps in theater, asgd to theater and atched to army, corps or div as operations require
Signal Corps	T/O&E 11-1033 (Proposed)	Sig Intel Unit, Type C	4	10	14	6	1 per corps.
		Sig Intel Unit, Type B	25	28	53		1 per army.
		Sig Intel Unit, Type A	50	81	131		1 per theater hq. (Detachments are normally asgd to the Sig Sec of the Hq indicated, but may be asgd or atched to Sig Sec of a subord or sep com as required.)
Military	T/O&E 30-600, 20 Oct 48, with C1, 12 Sep 50	Tech Intel Coordinator Det, CI		3	3	1	Augmentation team to augment combinations of TIC detachments and avoid excessive use of officers.
		Tech Intel Coordinator Dets, CJ	1	2	3	1	1 per 25,000 troops in a field army; 1 per 30,000 troops in the communications zone.
		Tech Intel Coordinator Det, CK	1	2	3	1	1 per 4 CJ teams.
		Tech Intel Coordinator Det, CL	1	2	3	1	1 per 3 CK teams.

I 1148 51

RESTRICTED

ANNEX I

RESTRICTED

I-2905