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Intellectual Property's Lessons for Information Privacy

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Intellectual Property's Lessons for Information Privacy

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I. INTRODUCTION

Although most may assume the contrary,¹ absent special circumstances, individuals have no right in their personal information.² Today's companies routinely collect data on online consumer behavior and use that data for targeted advertising. Web sites send cookies to Web browsers that record not only our trips to the cookie-sending Web site, but also subsequent visits to all other sites in our online travels.³ Meanwhile, Internet service providers install software directly on customer computers or, in the case of "deep-packet inspection," hardware on our routing devices that tracks the online traffic coming in and out of our homes.⁴ These technologies produce rich consumer profiles revealing when, where, and who we travel with in the online world. The technologists then sell these profiles to third parties for the sole purpose of beaming back personally tailored advertisements to our computer screens.⁵ Although steps are taken to keep data collected online anonymous, recent exposés reveal how easy it is to extrapolate a particular identity from a few scraps of online data.⁶ Information

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1. See JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., AMERICANS REJECT TAILORED ADVERTISING AND THREE ACTIVITIES THAT ENABLE IT 4 (2009).
 2. See, e.g., *United States v. Miller*, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976); see also Patrícia Sanchez Abril, *Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online Interpersonal Privacy*, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 702 (2010) ("[C]ourts have generally held that one cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in materials published online."); Jane B. Baron, *Property as Control: The Case of Information*, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 379 (2012) ("The law does not ensure that individuals will control the personal data collected about them."); Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., *The Polysemy of Privacy*, 88 IND. L.J. 881, 885 (2013) ("[T]he surreptitious collection of private information regarding web surfing habits, or medical records, is generally legal.").
 3. Dustin D. Berger, *Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting*, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 3, 7–8 (2011); Neil M. Richards, *The Dangers of Surveillance*, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936–41 (2013).
 4. Berger, *supra* note 3, at 11–13; Peter Whoriskey, *Every Click You Make*, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2008), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-04-04/news/36854706_1_web-sites-service-providers-consumer-data.
 5. DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 623 (2d ed. 2006); Steven C. Bennett, *Regulating Online Behavioral Advertising*, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 899, 901 (2011).
 6. See Paul Ohm, *Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization*, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010); Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller Jr., *A Face is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A2; Bruce Schneier, *Why 'Anonymous' Data Sometimes Isn't*, WIRED (Dec. 13, 2007), http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/12/securitymatters_1213. In an example that should concern anyone paying for health insurance, one researcher was able to unmask participants in an anonymous study of genetic information just by matching the participant's birth date, gender, and zip code with publicly available records. Gina Kolata, *Hunt for DNA Sequences Leaves Privacy Compromised*, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2013), <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/health/search-of-dna-sequences-reveals-full-identities.html>.

profilers routinely fail to secure the online data they collect, potentially subjecting consumers to online threats and identity theft as personal information falls into the wrong hands.⁷ Online tracking poses real dangers, but the current legal and regulatory framework is largely impotent to deal with them.

Revelation of these practices has galvanized public and political opinion.⁸ A substantial majority of American consumers support greater restrictions on and penalties for use of personal information collected online.⁹ Recent legislative and regulatory initiatives call for vigorous consumer protections against online data collection and marketing. The Federal Trade Commission recently requested “targeted legislation” to provide greater control over the practices of information brokers.¹⁰ Multiple bills are pending in Congress, including legislation setting mandatory timetables for the safe disposal of collected information,¹¹ “Do Not Track Acts,” which would allow consumers to opt

7. Berger, *supra* note 3, at 21–22; Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, *Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws*, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 101–02 (2009).

8. The word “privacy” can mean many things. Even when narrowed to its legal definition, the word can implicate the right to be free from unreasonable government searches and seizures, the right to make certain essential human decisions without government interference, or the right to have your home be free from certain trespasses and surveillance. In this Article, I am only interrogating one type of privacy concern: control over personal information.

9. TUROW ET AL., *supra* note 1, at 3–4. This holds true even for young adults who grew up with the Internet. *Id.* at 16. Moreover, even if the demographic data were more mixed, I am not sure that we would want to simply wait for norms to change to justify privacy intrusions. To a large degree, the law, just by being there, helps inform social norms. Charles Fried argued long ago that privacy requires a sense of personal security, and this sense can only be supplied by providing individuals with concrete legal protections. Charles Fried, *Privacy*, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 493 (1968). So as lawyers, as policymakers, and as business leaders, we should think about what an appropriate safeguard of privacy would look like and not just “react.” It will be easier for technologists to embody appropriate norms in code once we figure out what those norms are, and one way to do that is through law. Pamela Samuelson, *Privacy as Intellectual Property?*, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1169 (2000).

10. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE iv (March 2012); *see also* Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, *Privacy on the Books and on the Ground*, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 289–90 (2011) (discussing the FTC’s recent willingness to use its regulatory authority to prevent online data collection and dissemination practices that are out of line with consumer expectations).

11. Application Privacy, Protection, and Security Act, H.R. 1913, 113th Cong. (2013); Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 1841, 112th Cong. (2011); *see also* S. 501, 2013 Leg. (Cal. 2013) (requiring social networking Web sites to remove personal identifying information upon request). Relatedly, the European Union is moving toward creation of a “right to be forgotten,” giving online subjects the right to have their collected data erased. *Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such*

out of online data collection,¹² and limitations on the solicitation and gathering of online data from children.¹³ For citizens and legislators, the question is not whether steps should be taken to enhance consumer privacy, but how consumer privacy should be protected.

Despite the groundswell in favor of greater data privacy, there is a real possibility that none of these legislative initiatives will succeed. In reviewing new information privacy laws, courts will be faced with the separate question of how to balance such protections with the right to free expression. This is because a company's decision to collect our personal data, share it with others, or repackage it into advertisements can be labeled *speech*. Various authorities, including the United States Supreme Court, maintain that setting privacy limitations on data sharing represents a government effort to censor expression.¹⁴ Although the party facing censorship is typically a corporation using personal information for advertising purposes, commercial speech enjoys constitutional protection¹⁵ regardless of the corporate

Data (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 16(1), at 33 (Jan. 25, 2012), available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0010:FIN:EN:PDF>.

12. Do-Not-Track Online Act, S. 418, 113th Cong. (2013); Consumer Right to Financial Privacy Act, H.R. 2571, 113th Cong. (2013); Do Not Track Me Online Act, H.R. 654, 112th Cong. (2011); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2013) (requiring disclosure as to how a commercial Web site responds to a browser's "do not track" signals).
13. Do Not Track Kids Act, H.R. 1894, 112th Cong. (2011); see also S. 568, 2012–13 Leg. (Cal. 2013) (California bill requiring Web sites to permit minors to remove posted content upon request).
14. *Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.*, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011); FRED H. CATE, *PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE* 30 (1997) (describing privacy as "an antisocial construct . . . [that] conflicts with other important values within the society, such as society's interest in facilitating free expression . . ."); Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, *Is Data Speech?*, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014); David Post, *Cyberprivacy, or What I (Still) Don't Get*, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 249, 251 (2011) ("[O]ne person's privacy is very often another person's infringement of the freedom to speak."); Neil M. Richards, *Intellectual Privacy*, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 390 (2008) ("Indeed, when it comes to database regulation, many feel that any government regulation of private information flows raises serious First Amendment issues."). These concerns over the free speech implications of data privacy apply to even the most recent regulatory proposals. As described by law professor Jeffrey Rosen, "[Do Not Track] represents the biggest threat to free speech on the Internet in the coming decade." Jeffrey Rosen, *The Right to Be Forgotten*, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012), <http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/64-SLRO-88.pdf>.
15. In a number of cases, the Court has cited the public's interest in the free exchange of information to prevent government regulation of advertising. *E.g.*, *Sorrell*, 131 S. Ct. at 2670–71; *Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr.*, 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002); *Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro*, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977); *Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.*, 425 U.S. 748, 769–70 (1976).

status of the speaker.¹⁶ In short, laws protecting data privacy inevitably need to be reconciled with the First Amendment.¹⁷ Under current law, judges on the alert for threats to free expression and bound by higher authority may believe they have little choice but to strangle these fledgling efforts at online privacy in their cradle.

A recent case before the Supreme Court, *Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.*, illustrates the problem.¹⁸ At issue was a Vermont law restricting pharmaceutical marketers' access to and use of prescription data for advertising purposes.¹⁹ Pharmacies sold prescribing data to the marketers, which resulted in targeted sales pitches to doctors.²⁰ Vermont banned the practice (with limited exceptions) unless a prescribing doctor's consent was obtained first.²¹ Vermont's legislature passed the law, in part, to protect "the privacy of prescribers and prescribing information."²² Applying "heightened judicial scrutiny" to the law,²³ the Court struck it down as an unconstitutional burden on protected speech under the First Amendment.²⁴

Sorrell suggests broad recognition of the use of online information as "speech."²⁵ The Court condemned the First Circuit, which had upheld a similar state law, for characterizing the prescriber-identifying information at issue "as a mere 'commodity' with no greater entitlement to First Amendment protection than 'beef jerky.'"²⁶ Instead, the

16. *Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock*, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012); *Citizens United v. FEC*, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–900 (2010). This makes some sense given that many corporations are media organizations and nonprofit political advocacy organizations. Eugene Volokh, *Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You*, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1083 (2000). On the other hand, there is scholarly literature criticizing the equivalence between corporate and individual speech rights in the Court's jurisprudence. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, *Against Freedom of Commercial Expression*, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583 (2008).

17. Bambauer, *supra* note 14, at 59–60.

18. *Sorrell*, 131 S. Ct. 2653.

19. *Id.* at 2659.

20. *Id.* at 2659–60.

21. *Id.* at 2660.

22. *Id.* at 2681 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(a)).

23. *Id.* at 2664 (majority opinion).

24. *Id.* at 2672.

25. There is some dispute over the effect of the *Sorrell* decision. While some commentators viewed it as a signal of defeat for privacy advocates, others suggested that the Vermont statute's unique characteristics limited the decision's reach. Compare Ashutosh Bhagwat, *Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy*, 36 VT. L. REV. 855 (2012) (speculating that *Sorrell* would preempt forthcoming privacy regulation), with Agatha M. Cole, Note, *Internet Advertising After Sorrell v. IMS Health: A Discussion on Data Privacy and the First Amendment*, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283, 304 (2012) (maintaining that the *Sorrell* "decision was narrow and left much to be resolved").

26. *Sorrell*, 131 S. Ct. at 2666 (quoting *IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte*, 550 F.3d 42, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2008)).

Court explained, “the creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.”²⁷ Although Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan dissented, a six-judge majority, including Justice Sotomayor, agreed that the government’s effort to restrict use of personal prescribing information was an unconstitutional abridgement of speech. This suggests that a stable coalition on the Court deems the use of collected consumer information as speech protected under the First Amendment. Hence, lower courts evaluating new information privacy laws (and the legislators drafting them) will need to construe such laws as speech regulations and square them with constitutional protections for free expression.²⁸

Sorrell is just one case, and it may be able to be distinguished by courts reviewing other information privacy laws.²⁹ Because the Vermont law forbid the use of prescription data for marketing, but not for other purposes such as “educational communications,” the majority deemed the speech restriction content-based and, hence, deserving of particularly exacting First Amendment review.³⁰ Another statute might be more carefully drafted. Even so, as it stands now, there is no recognizable, effective jurisprudential mechanism for reconciling information privacy with free expression.³¹ The *Sorrell* decision offers no guidance on how to determine when a state’s interest in consumer privacy is sufficiently compelling to rebuff a First Amendment challenge.³² Before *Sorrell*, various privacy laws from the analog era were subjected to First Amendment review. Rather than representing a balance of two competing interests, however, the Supreme Court treated the First Amendment as an unyielding trump card for defend-

27. *Id.* at 2667.

28. Previous scholarship suggesting that dissemination of online data is not “speech” for First Amendment purposes, *see, e.g.*, Neil M. Richards, *Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment*, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149 (2005), appears not to have swayed the Court. *See also* CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 398, 417–18 (D. Minn. 2009) (finding that the First Amendment protects not only names and likenesses, but also “biographical data”).

29. *See* Cole, *supra* note 25, at 305.

30. *Sorrell*, 131 S. Ct. at 2663–64.

31. Bambauer, *supra* note 14, at 71 (criticizing *Sorrell* decision for its lack of guidance on how to balance speech and privacy); Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, *The New Intrusion*, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 265 (2012) (“Scholars have struggled to make sense of the public disclosure tort’s interaction with the First Amendment for decades.”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, *Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment*, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 14 (2012) (“the privacy cases leave many unanswered questions about the scope of protection for disclosure of private facts”); Christina M. Gagnier, *On Privacy: Liberty in the Digital Revolution*, 11 J. HIGH TECH. L. 229, 248 (2011).

32. Bambauer, *supra* note 14, at 71.

ants.³³ Repeatedly, the Court invalidated actions for common law privacy violations on free-speech grounds.³⁴ Statutory privacy protections exist as well but, like their common law cousins, no clear paradigm for assessing their constitutionality has come to the fore.³⁵ In sum, existing privacy law offers little guidance to a court trying to balance free speech with information privacy.

As a result, judges seeking guidance need to turn to precedents outside of privacy law. As with legal restrictions on the use of online data, intellectual property law necessarily bumps up against constitutional safeguards for free expression. Intellectual property laws, just like proposed data privacy laws, prevent others from engaging in expressive activity and thereby implicate the First Amendment. Laws permitting authors to stop dissemination of infringing works, trademark holders to block unauthorized use of their brands, and celebrities to shut down traffic in their personas all proscribe speech.³⁶ Unlike proposed data privacy laws, intellectual property law has been on the books for decades. The result has been a raft of judicial decisions considering the proper balance of intellectual property rights and free speech.

Studying the different ways in which intellectual property law addresses expressive concerns offers a variety of models for resolving the

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33. Danielle Keats Citron, *Mainstreaming Privacy Torts*, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1828–29 (2010); Neil M. Richards, *The Limits of Tort Privacy*, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 357 (2011). See, e.g., *Fla. Star v. B.J.F.*, 491 U.S. 524, 533–37 (1989) (holding the First Amendment barred liability for publishing name of rape victim obtained from police report).
34. See, e.g., *Bartnicki v. Vopper*, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (holding the First Amendment prevented application of anti-wiretapping statute to media defendants); see Richards, *supra* note 14, at 388.
35. Bambauer, *supra* note 14, at 72 (“Very few cases have raised First Amendment challenges to data privacy statutes.”); Bennett, *supra* note 5, at 931. The overall problem lies in the statutes’ narrow nature. Most of the statutes were enacted before the phenomenon of targeted online advertising took hold and only cover specific regulated entities like hospitals and banks, not all online data users. William McGeveran, *Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing*, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1138–39 (2009). For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) only applies to “covered entities” that do not include most health-related Web sites or the data miners who provide consumer information to such sites. *Id.* at 1139. When asked to interpret existing privacy statutes in a manner broad enough to encompass data miners and associated advertisers, courts have balked. See *In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig.*, 320 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2003); *In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig.*, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
36. Not only that, but such laws are likely content-based, thereby justifying particularly searching First Amendment review. Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, *An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free Speech*, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 67–68 (2013); Jed Rubenfeld, *The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality*, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 5–6 (2002).

impending conflict between data privacy and the First Amendment. Yet intellectual property's models for calibrating free-speech interests have been ignored by courts and rejected by privacy scholars. This Article remedies that failure. The Article begins in Part II by discussing the largely unexamined parallel between intellectual property law's treatment of expression-based defenses and the similar accommodations that will need to be incorporated into data privacy law. Part II also addresses potential objections to modeling privacy law on intellectual property. Although there are some important conceptual differences between intellectual property and privacy protections, these differences are outweighed by their similarities, at least when it comes to the specific issue of how to harmonize such protections with expressive freedoms.

Parts III through V delineate the doctrinal mechanisms judges have built into copyright, trademark, and publicity rights law for balancing the interests of intellectual property owners with free-speech concerns. Part III describes how intellectual property law deems particular categories of plaintiff communication to be worthy of protection and unworthy of First Amendment privileges for unauthorized users. Part IV notes how intellectual property law uses speaker intent as a proxy for First Amendment interests. Part V details specific doctrinal mechanisms used to evaluate the expressive importance of an intellectual property defendant's speech contribution. Parts III through V also describe how courts could use these mechanisms to evaluate the constitutionality of new data privacy laws. By borrowing from intellectual property, courts can respond to the current public demand for restrictions on data use while still protecting the key expressive interests at the heart of the First Amendment.

II. DEFENDING THE IP LAW/PRIVACY LAW ANALOGY

Both information privacy and intellectual property implicate the First Amendment. Restrictions on the collection and use of personal information limit speech. By declaring certain expressive activities to be infringing, intellectual property law does the same thing. Years of common law development have generated an extensive doctrinal apparatus for addressing free-speech concerns. As a result, intellectual property law offers a potential template for courts struggling to balance new data privacy laws with the Constitution's right to free expression.

Nevertheless, many legal scholars reject comparisons between intellectual property and information privacy law. Instead, they propose mobilizing another legal regime—contract law—to balance privacy and free speech concerns. Given this scholarly backdrop, this Article begins by making the case for analogizing intellectual property to data privacy. (Those already convinced of the salience of intellec-

tual property law to data privacy issues can move ahead to Part III.) This Part explains why the similarities between intellectual property and information privacy, at least on the narrow issue of accommodating free speech, outweigh the differences. It refutes the arguments of intellectual property skeptics while also demonstrating contract law's inability to resolve the tension between data privacy and free speech.

A. Intellectual Property's Relevance to Information Privacy

Just like privacy regulation, intellectual property law often finds itself in tension with the First Amendment. Copyright, trademark, and publicity rights laws all limit communication by deeming a particular activity as infringing.³⁷ Hence, just as privacy regulation for on-line data use can be viewed as a government rule that prohibits some speech, intellectual property law awards certain rights in expression to one group while preventing others from using the same or similar expression.

While sharing data privacy's inherently speech-restrictive nature, intellectual property offers specific doctrinal accommodations for expressive interests. These accommodations possess two critical strengths, which augur in favor of their export to the information privacy context. First, intellectual property has a long history of balancing ownership rights with free speech. New privacy law protections are more likely to take root if they can be modeled on an existing area of law. Legal innovations enjoy greater acceptance if they appear based in a longstanding legal tradition.³⁸ Judges concerned with reversal from courts above may find more comfort in borrowing from an established area of law than by creating a new body of legal doctrine out of whole cloth.³⁹ As a result, drawing a parallel to intellectual property law's doctrinal accommodations for free speech may stand a better chance of success than other privacy law innovations. These accommodations boast a long pedigree, one that has typically been validated when considered by the Supreme Court.⁴⁰ Legitimacy con-

37. Although less discussed, patent and trade-secret protection also have the potential to silence speakers. See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, *COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX* 170 (2008); Dan L. Burk, *Patenting Speech*, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 142–45 (2000).

38. See Bambauer, *The New Intrusion*, *supra* note 31, at 229; Citron, *supra* note 33, at 1835–36. The history of proposed hate speech laws is instructive. As documented by Anita Bernstein, proposed hate speech torts failed to win approval, in part, because they appeared to be too much of a departure from tort law in general and, relatedly, too inconsistent with traditional free speech doctrine. Anita Bernstein, *How To Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes*, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539, 1546, 1557 (1997).

39. Citron, *supra* note 33, at 1835–36; Melanie R. Kay, *Environmental Negligence: A Proposal for a New Cause of Action for the Forgotten Innocent Owners of Contaminated Land*, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 149, 169 (2006).

40. *E.g.*, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–91 (2012); *Eldred v. Ashcroft*, 537 U.S. 186, 219–21 (2003); *S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm.*, 483 U.S.

cerns may loom especially large in the data privacy context considering that new privacy regulations will compete with the constitutionally protected right to free speech.

Second, intellectual property law is not monolithic: it addresses free speech concerns in a variety of ways. As detailed below, judges and legislators trying to accommodate free expression while addressing privacy concerns have a menu of options to choose from if they decide to borrow from intellectual-property jurisprudence. This is a strength, yet one that most privacy theorists do not acknowledge.⁴¹ Under these options, speakers can receive immunity from infringement suits by demonstrating certain kinds of speaker intent, a particular reshaping of existing expressive content, or that the speech's subject falls into a predetermined, favored category. These defensive options offer a rich template for calibrating expressive interests, a potential improvement from the few simplistic and overly speech-protective precedents that currently set the boundary between information privacy and free expression.

B. Answering the Intellectual Property Skeptics

Despite these strengths, many scholars reject analogies between intellectual property and information privacy. The scholars' objections boil down to three concerns: differences in supply, underlying rationales, and terminology.⁴²

First, some skeptics maintain that any analogy between intellectual property and data privacy is inapt because the former deals with a problem of scarcity not found with the latter. At root, intellectual property rights are justified by the natural scarcity in intellectual goods that would result if we allowed unrestrained market forces to work their will.⁴³ If creators lacked the ability to prevent unauthorized use of their works, they would no longer create with sufficient frequency, and information products would be in too short supply. To

522, 565 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the descriptive fair-use defense prevents trademark law from restricting an excessive amount of speech).

41. *E.g.*, DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 27 (2008) (stating general objection to extending intellectual property concepts to personal information); Bambauer, *The New Intrusion*, *supra* note 31, at 222 (contending that the intellectual property analogy is inapt because IP laws prohibit the propertization of the "raw facts" that would be the target of data privacy laws).

42. Note that the perceived incompatibility of intellectual property and privacy regulation is a particularly American view. By contrast, in Europe, there has been a greater willingness to construe both types of protection in similar terms. See Arthur Rizer, *Dog Fight: Did the International Battle over Airline Passenger Name Records Enable the Christmas-Day Bomber?*, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 77, 82 (2010).

43. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, *The Upside of Intellectual Property's Downside*, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 922 n.2 (2010); Mark A. Lemley, *The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law*, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997).

fix this problem, intellectual property law not only awards creators the legal right to stop unauthorized uses, but it also makes these rights freely alienable.⁴⁴

Personal data, by contrast, is not in short supply. Instead, our online activities cause the continual generation of more and more personal information, whether we like it or not.⁴⁵ Given the ever-increasing amount of personal data revealed online, skeptics argue there is no need to grant individuals an alienable right resembling an intellectual property right to encourage the creation and dissemination of more of that data.⁴⁶

The disjunction between intellectual property law's efforts to stimulate the creation and dissemination of new works and privacy law's contrasting efforts to restrict the flow of information should give us pause. Consumers do not need legal prompts to create more personal data because life in a wired world does this for us already. As a result, some of intellectual property law's provisions would be an ill fit for information privacy concerns.⁴⁷

44. See James Gibson, *Once and Future Copyright*, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 217 (2005).

45. Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Nathan Good, *The Web Privacy Census*, BERKELEY LAW (Oct. 2012), <http://law.berkeley.edu/privacycensus.htm> (finding use of tracking cookies on every one of the 100 most-visited online Web sites). Even attempts to cover one's online tracks are likely to fail. Online evidence of adultery forced the resignation of CIA Director David Petraeus, even though Petraeus and his paramour were careful not to exchange emails, instead composing messages in an electronic draft folder that could be checked by either party. Donna Leinwand Leger & Yamiche Alcindor, *Petraeus and Broadwell Used Common E-mail Trick*, USA TODAY (Nov. 13, 2012, 9:40 PM), <http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2012/11/13/petraeus-broadwell-email/1702057/>.

46. *E.g.*, Mark A. Lemley, *Private Property*, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545, 1550 (2000). Others make a somewhat different argument, contending that, by giving individuals a property right in their data modeled on intellectual property rights, the law would force the commoditization of something that is inherently personal. Baron, *supra* note 2, at 398. Under this view, personal data should be quarantined from marketplace forces, not traded like stocks and bonds. Samuelson, *supra* note 9, at 1138.

47. For example, copyright law allows a co-author of a copyrighted work to license the work without the other co-author's approval. The licensor need only provide her co-author with a proportional percentage of revenue secured by the license. The reason for such a rule is to encourage distribution of copyrighted works to society at-large. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., *COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY* 122 n.5 (3d ed. 2010). It would not make sense to adopt a parallel rule for private information created jointly, perhaps by two individuals involved in an intimate relationship. See Sonja R. West, *The Story of Us: Resolving the Face-Off Between Autobiographical Speech and Information Privacy*, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 589, 616–17 (2010). Likewise, trademark law requires that a mark be used in a public fashion before rights can attach. *Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc. v. Surgical Techs., Inc.*, 285 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 2002). A similar rule would not make sense for personal data, which the data subject wants to keep private.

Yet just because the commodity at issue in intellectual property (creative output) is naturally scarce and the commodity at issue in informational privacy (personal data) is naturally abundant does not mean that the one legal regime has nothing to tell the other. The markets for the subject of a legal entitlement may differ, but once the legal entitlement has been established, lawmakers need to decide how to construe that entitlement when it clashes with another legal protection. Even after the initial entitlement is constructed, based on its natural abundance or scarcity, defenses to that entitlement still need to be built to take competing interests into account.⁴⁸

Moreover, these defenses must be based on more than the scarcity concerns that triggered the original entitlement. Supreme Court precedent holds that content-based government regulation of speech warrants strict constitutional scrutiny *regardless* of the amount of speech actually restricted.⁴⁹ The interfaces developed to balance intellectual property rights and speech incorporate a host of other normative goals—autonomy interests, fairness concerns, opportunities for democratic participation—separate from the incentive-based rationales animating much of the rest of copyright, trademark, and publicity-rights law.⁵⁰ Hence, it is the way that intellectual property law addresses defenses based on free expression, not the way this law promotes the initial creation and licensing of creative goods, that should be of most interest to privacy scholars, particularly in the wake of the *Sorrell* decision.

Second, some contend that intellectual property and privacy law have little to tell each other because of their different theoretical underpinnings. Intellectual property is most often justified in utilitarian terms.⁵¹ Copyright's constitutional basis is the promotion of "useful arts," not the dignitary values of artists and inventors.⁵² Similarly, modern trademark law is described instrumentally—it protects consumers from inefficient searching and encourages business investments in product quality.⁵³ Even the right of publicity, which blocks unauthorized commercial uses of one's persona, may be promoted as a necessary tool to encourage the creation of captivating celebrity personas.⁵⁴ In contrast, privacy regulation is typically justified in terms

48. See West, *supra* note 47, at 606 (contending that merely granting a right does not tell lawmakers/courts how to resolve the tradeoff with other rights).

49. *Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley*, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972).

50. See William Fisher, *Theories of Intellectual Property*, in *NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY* 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).

51. See Brett Frischmann & Mark P. McKenna, *Intergenerational Progress*, 2011 *WIS. L. REV.* 123, 129–30.

52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

53. See *Bertford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Corp.*, 419 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2005).

54. *Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc.*, 717 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2013).

of personal dignity and autonomy.⁵⁵ Disclosure of personal information against one's will is often objected to because of the emotional harm it inflicts on the data subject, not because of instrumental concerns over the market for personal information.⁵⁶ As a result, some scholars suggest that importing the utilitarian intellectual property framework to privacy law is an inappropriate use of economic regulation to resolve questions of civil liberty.⁵⁷

Again, these differences, while perhaps showing that privacy protections should not be exact replicas of intellectual property rights, do not militate against studying the way intellectual property laws negotiate the First Amendment. In actuality, the theoretical bases for intellectual property law are mixed. It is simply not accurate to argue that intellectual property's purposes are antithetical to the goals of privacy regulation.⁵⁸ Although intellectual property tends to rely more on utilitarian justifications than privacy law, it also routinely draws on personhood theories. The right of publicity is based, to a large degree, on the argument that individuals naturally have a right to control management of their personae.⁵⁹ "Labor-dessert" theory, which holds that individuals have an inherent right to enjoy the fruits of their labors, plays a large role in copyright and trademark jurisprudence.⁶⁰ For example, trademark dilution law seems largely justified by a labor-dessert view that those who build up a brand name deserve a legal shield from competing uses threatening to dim that brand's signaling power.⁶¹ Similarly, copyright law decisions frequently in-

55. HELEN NISSENBAUM, *PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE* 81–84 (2010); Samuelson, *supra* note 9, at 1128.

56. M. Ryan Calo, *The Boundaries of Privacy Harm*, 86 *IND. L.J.* 1131, 1133, 1142 (2011). Some have made the case that failure to safeguard online privacy will drive suspicious consumers away from the Internet. See Bennett, *supra* note 5, at 906. But this argument is much less prevalent than arguments based on autonomy and dignitary concerns.

57. Samuelson, *supra* note 9, at 1143; West, *supra* note 47, at 615. Another concern is that using IP-style protections to protect an individual's dignitary interest in personal information will make intellectual property law as a whole more incoherent. See Samuelson, *supra* note 9, at 1140.

58. See Nita A. Farahany, *Searching Secrets*, 160 *U. PA. L. REV.* 1239, 1255 (2012) (arguing that copyright law seeks to vindicate privacy interests and, therefore, should be employed as a metaphor for search-and-seizure law).

59. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, *THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY* § 2:1 (2d ed. 2009); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, *Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of Constructed Persons Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century*, 2001 *U. ILL. L. REV.* 151, 158–60; Mark P. McKenna, *The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition*, 67 *U. PITT. L. REV.* 225, 231 (2005).

60. See Jeanne C. Fromer, *A Psychology of Intellectual Property*, 104 *NW. U. L. REV.* 1441, 1447 (2010); Justin Hughes, *The Philosophy of Intellectual Property*, 77 *GEO. L.J.* 287, 305 (1988).

61. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, *Owning Mark(et)s*, 109 *MICH. L. REV.* 137, 154 (2010).

voke natural rights in assessing the scope of a particular copyright.⁶² Given that many of the theoretical bases behind intellectual property mirror those advanced in favor of privacy protections, and intellectual property law has developed several mechanisms for balancing the rights of creators with the speech rights of downstream speakers, it makes sense to look for potential lessons in this area of expression-based defenses.

Finally, some object that because intellectual property law awards “property” rights to individuals, it is not a good fit for the different issues surrounding information privacy.⁶³ Those holding this position maintain that property rights must have explicit boundaries and that privacy is too broad of a subject to be confined within the property box.⁶⁴ Intellectual property can accommodate free speech in its particular fashion, the argument goes, because there are well-defined contours to intellectual property rights that can be pitted against expressive concerns. The same accommodations would not work for privacy regulation, however, as privacy’s vague boundaries would chill an excessive amount of speech by commercial actors who cannot determine where privacy begins or ends.⁶⁵

It is true that privacy is notoriously hard to define. Robert Post once lamented, “Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all.”⁶⁶ Yet, as with the other critiques, this objection should not forestall examination of the way intellectual property law balances free speech. Although it is true that the term “privacy” is subject to multiple definitions, privacy’s contours become more obvious when we focus on a particular legal entitlement in personal information. This Article leaves aside the two most familiar areas of privacy regulation: the decisional privacy rights used to justify intimate personal choices like the right to elect to have an abortion and residential privacy rights that protect against government intrusions in the home. Instead, the particular question addressed here is how to balance restrictions on the collection and dissemination of online consumer data with rights in free expression. Narrowing the focus to on-

62. See JOHN TEHRANIAN, *INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU* 38 (2011); Wendy J. Gordon, *A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property*, 102 *YALE L.J.* 1533, 1548–49 (1993).

63. See Bambauer, *The New Intrusion*, *supra* note 31, at 231.

64. West, *supra* note 47, at 615.

65. Volokh, *supra* note 16, at 1116; see also Harry Kalven Jr., *Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?*, 31 *L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.* 326, 327 (1966) (criticizing privacy as a “less precise way of approaching more specific values” like freedom of speech).

66. Robert C. Post, *Three Concepts of Privacy*, 89 *GEO. L.J.* 2087, 2087 (2001).

line uses of personal information brings a potential right in data privacy into a sharper, more definable focus, thereby alleviating some concerns over the fuzzy contours of “privacy,” as that term is popularly used.

In addition, we should recognize that intellectual property rights are not always known for their crystal-clear boundaries. For example, legal entitlement to copyright is dependent on a judicial determination that the work at issue is an expression rather than an idea.⁶⁷ This is a notoriously hazy distinction that can be impossible for creators to assess *ex ante*.⁶⁸ Similarly, the scope of someone’s right in a particular trademarked term depends on judicial evaluation of the likelihood of consumer confusion, an infamously fluid and unpredictable appraisal.⁶⁹ Instead of throwing up their hands at intellectual property’s vagaries, courts have stepped in to announce principles for reconciling these admittedly indefinite rights with the competing right to free expression. Hence, the argument that intellectual property has clear boundaries and, therefore, can be conceptualized as “property” while online privacy rights are unknowable and unworkable under the property rubric is unconvincing.⁷⁰ Once some protection for data privacy has been established (whether it is characterized as a “property” right or not), we are still left with the question of how to balance that protection with free speech concerns.⁷¹

67. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (stating that copyright protection does not extend to ideas).

68. *Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.*, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); Rubinfeld, *supra* note 36, at 14.

69. See Ann Bartow, *Likelihood of Confusion*, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 761–64 (2004); Barton Beebe, *An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement*, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1583–84 (2006).

70. In broader terms, we should not be overly influenced by the word “property” and somehow assume that every facet of a system of property rules is incompatible with a system of liability rules. The description of intellectual property rights as “property” does not prevent a comparison with any other legal protection that does not have the word “property” stamped on it. The distinction between property and nonproperty legal regimes can be a bit of a red herring. As Bill McGeeveran points out, any legal protection or restriction can be construed as a “property” right. McGeeveran, *supra* note 35, at 1163; see also Jane B. Baron, *The Contested Commitments of Property*, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (2010) (suggesting academics have largely ignored questions about property’s stability over time and “its very status as a distinctive field of study”).

71. The explicit recognition of intellectual property in the Constitution does not make the way intellectual property negotiates the First Amendment somehow inapplicable to the data privacy-free speech interface. Although information privacy is not explicitly recognized in the Constitution, neither is trademark protection or the right of publicity.

C. The Insufficiency of Contract

One final development in the recent information privacy scholarship deserves mention. A number of legal scholars have concluded that the free-speech/privacy conflict can be best managed through private ordering.⁷² Consumers that resent the liberties taken by online providers with their personal data simply need to negotiate contractual terms that will provide them greater control. Perhaps the most appealing aspect of a contractual approach is that it promises to protect privacy while avoiding First Amendment challenges. In the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence, there is little concern with individuals giving up their speech rights via contract. The Court has been clear: contracts not to speak are constitutional.⁷³ As First Amendment scholar Eugene Volokh notes, "The great free speech advantage of the contract model is that it does *not* endorse any right to 'stop people from speaking about me.' Rather, it endorses a right to 'stop people from violating their promises to me.'"⁷⁴

Unfortunately, problems with the contractual approach outweigh its merits. Contract can only play a limited role in reconciling free speech with increased data privacy given the structural power imbalance between individual consumers and data users, cognitive difficulties inherent in making privacy choices, and contract law's particular legal limitations.

A close look at the dynamics of online commerce and communication reveals serious flaws in the market between data subjects and users for better privacy terms. Consumers face collective action problems in attempting to push online providers into offering more protective terms of service.⁷⁵ Part of the problem is that individual harm from data misuse is usually minimal, thereby making it unlikely that large groups of online consumers will band together to negotiate better terms of service. Moreover, data misuse often occurs without consumer awareness.⁷⁶ As a result, online entities may be concerned with their corporate reputations, but they also appear somewhat immune to public backlash over their use of personal data. For example,

72. See, e.g., McGeveran, *supra* note 35, at 1158; Samuelson, *supra* note 9, at 1171; Volokh, *supra* note 16, at 1057–61; see also *In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data*, 724 F.3d 600, 614–615 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding no constitutional barrier to government acquisition of cellphone location data and urging consumers to find a "market" solution to their privacy needs); M. Ryan Calo, *Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere)*, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012) (exploring use of "visceral notice" to address online privacy concerns).

73. *Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.*, 501 U.S. 663 (1991); see also *Abril*, *supra* note 2, at 708 (noting that the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld self-imposed speech restrictions, even when the information is of legitimate public concern).

74. Volokh, *supra* note 16, at 1061.

75. Bamberger & Mulligan, *supra* note 10, at 254.

76. Cole, *supra* note 25, at 287–88.

despite being viewed in many circles as a privacy scofflaw,⁷⁷ Facebook enjoyed a historic initial public offering, reaching a peak market capitalization of \$104 billion, and currently has 1.11 billion subscribers.⁷⁸ Most online providers typically confront their data subjects with a one-size-fits-all offer: give up your personal information or forego the proffered online services.⁷⁹ Given the importance of online participation, both socially and economically in modern life, it is unrealistic to expect consumers to choose the latter option.⁸⁰

Even without these structural barriers, consumers would still have trouble evaluating proposed privacy terms. A consumer agreeing to disclose personal information has little sense as to the universe of third parties likely to also have access to this information.⁸¹ Consumers understand that their own disclosure might result in a particular item of data being used by the Web site they make the disclosure to. But they have no way of knowing when their personal data, perhaps voluntarily offered to one business, has been passed along to the business's other divisions or subcontractors,⁸² or, even more disturbing from a privacy perspective, sold to unknown entities, which may have a very different purpose and corporate philosophy than the business to

77. Charlie Warzel, *For Privacy, Americans Trust Facebook Less Than the NSA*, BUZZFEED (Sept. 12, 2013, 4:15 PM), <http://www.buzzfeed.com/charliewarzel/survey-for-privacy-americans-trust-facebook-less-than-the-ns> (discussing recent survey showing that 61 percent of respondents "do not trust Facebook at all" to protect their personal information and privacy, a poorer showing than other entities such as Google, the Internal Revenue Service, and the National Security Agency).

78. Josh Constine, *Facebook's Growth Since IPO in 12 Big Numbers*, TECHCRUNCH (May 17, 2013), <http://techcrunch.com/2013/05/17/facebook-growth/>; Lee Spears & Sarah Frier, *Facebook Set for Public Debut After IPO Seals \$104 Billion Value*, BLOOMBERG.COM (May 18, 2012), <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-18/facebook-set-for-public-debut-after-ipo-seals-104-billion-value.html>.

79. McGeveran, *supra* note 35, at 1126; West, *supra* note 47, at 611. Some maintain that the unilateral nature of online contracting can be changed, thereby providing consumers with more control over their data and alleviating concerns over government restrictions on how consumer data is used. Two scholars propose a privacy-contracting regime akin to the Creative Commons model used to facilitate licensing of copyrighted works. See Abril, *supra* note 2, at 722; Shubha Ghosh, *Informing and Reforming the Marketplace of Ideas: The Public-Private Model for Data Production and the First Amendment*, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 653, 703-05. But other problems with the market for online terms make this unlikely. First, private ordering is more plausible in the IP context because data subjects face a more coercive, less robust bargaining process than holders of intellectual property. Second, consumers face particular cognitive difficulties when attempting to bargain for greater privacy. These difficulties may cause them to overlook or even reject contractually available privacy safeguards. See *infra* notes 83-91 and accompanying text.

80. See McGeveran, *supra* note 35, at 1127.

81. TUROW ET AL., *supra* note 1.

82. Bennett, *supra* note 5, at 937; see also Berger, *supra* note 3, at 22 (maintaining that such sharing among corporate partners and contractors is routine).

which they made the original disclosure.⁸³ In the ecology of the Web, thousands of unrelated Web sites all participate and share data in a single advertising network.⁸⁴ Survey evidence shows that consumers do not know that businesses track a person's entire online history as opposed to just their transactions with one particular Web site.⁸⁵ They do not realize that disclosures of data to different Web sites can be combined to develop robust profiles sometimes so precise so as to remove the cloak of consumer anonymity.⁸⁶ Most online shoppers would be shocked to discover that retailers like Target and Amazon combine myriad bits of online data from thousands of sources to identify and predict the intimate details of their customers' lives, such as their reading habits or an undisclosed pregnancy, all in an effort to make their sales pitches more effective.⁸⁷

Greater transparency will not resolve these problems. Cognitive biases skew assessments of the costs and benefits of greater privacy protection. Even with more disclosure of where data goes and how it is used, consumers cannot accurately assess (1) the risk of loss of personal information from participating in behavioral targeting (i.e. data breaches); and (2) the magnitude of potential harms from such a loss.⁸⁸ Optimism bias tends to cause consumers to go for the immediate reward of an online transaction rather than looking for alternatives with better privacy terms. We want more privacy but are unwilling to delay gratification in order to get it. At the same time, we minimize the costs of future harms from privacy violations.⁸⁹ Thanks to these cognitive handicaps, even highly motivated consumers accidentally trigger undesired privacy settings when they navigate online interfaces.⁹⁰ Studies demonstrate that the mere existence of a privacy

83. Calo, *supra* note 56, at 1133–35; Ohm, *supra* note 6.

84. Berger, *supra* note 3, at 8; Richards, *supra* note 3, at 1938–40.

85. Calo, *supra* note 56, at 1149; H. Brian Holland, *Privacy Paradox 2.0*, 19 WIDENER L.J. 893, 899 (2010).

86. SOLOVE, *supra* note 41, at 118; Bennett, *supra* note 5, at 905; Berger, *supra* note 3, at 4; Calo, *supra* note 56, at 1149; Steve Lohr, *How Privacy Vanishes Online*, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/technology/17privacy.html?_r=1&.

87. Neil M. Richards, *The Perils of Social Reading*, 101 GEO. L.J. 689, 698–99 (2013); Charles Duhigg, *Psst, You in Aisle 5*, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 12, 2012, at § 6, at 30.

88. Berger, *supra* note 3, at 24; Holland, *supra* note 85, at 897, 907; see also Daniel J. Solove, *Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy*, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1452 (2001) (contending that consumers frequently lack the ability to assign the proper value to their personal information).

89. Calo, *supra* note 56, at 1149 n.106 (arguing that consumers sell their data too often and too cheaply because of “privacy myopia”); Holland, *supra* note 85, at 903 (citing evidence of human difficulty in forecasting long-term risks).

90. Berger, *supra* note 3, at 28; Gagnier, *supra* note 31, at 251–52.

policy, *regardless of its actual contents*, tends to increase consumer disclosure.⁹¹

Finally, contract law itself imposes several impediments on those seeking greater privacy protection. Contractual protections only apply to the original transacting parties.⁹² Because the nature of online data collection and sharing typically involves the collection of data by one party and its use by another party, consumers relying on contract would often be left with no recourse against the actual data user.⁹³ Another shortcoming relates to the nature of contract damages. The majority of undesired online disclosures yield minimal, intangible harms. In the aggregate, these harms produce significant social costs,⁹⁴ but considered individually, they are harms that contract law

91. Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer King, What Californians Understand About Privacy Online (Sept. 3, 2008) (unpublished article), *available at* http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262130; Holland, *supra* note 85, at 899; *see also* Somini Sengupta, *Letting Down Our Guard with Web Privacy*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2013 (discussing academic research revealing inability of consumers to understand online privacy policies). The calculation required of online consumers assessing privacy policies is arguably *more* difficult than the challenge of evaluating the benefits of a bargain faced by a copyright holder. An artist giving up rights in her work may not know exactly how it will be used, but the basic contours of the work are self-evident. Music is meant to be listened to, books are meant to be read, sculptures are meant to be put on display and visually appreciated. Even if someone not part of the original contract between creator and buyer ends up with the work, the probable use by the ultimate possessor of the copyright is relatively clear. There are of course exceptions, but even an artist who would rather not have her work used in a particular fashion (e.g., as an advertisement for a product that is personally unappealing to the artist) knows that she runs this risk by assigning her copyright to someone else. An online shopper, however, has very little sense of who will ultimately review her personal data or for what purpose.

92. Abril, *supra* note 2, at 715.

93. Suggestions have been made to remedy this contract law shortcoming by imposing an additional “duty of confidentiality” on third parties that use personal data. *See* Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, *Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability*, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1667 (2009). Yet under American law, duties of confidentiality can only apply to parties in an existing relationship. Citron, *supra* note 33, at 1850. In addition, even when a confidential relationship exists, if the information at issue comes to be possessed by a third party, the individual can no longer claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. SOLOVE, *supra* note 41, at 139. In other words, a duty of confidentiality might be imposed on the original Web site that took your information, but not on the data broker who purchased and used your information. Moreover, if the data at issue becomes known to anyone else and the original Web site is not responsible for the initial dissemination, the Web site cannot be liable for breach of confidentiality. *See id.* at 139–40.

94. *See* SOLOVE, *supra* note 41, at 132 (discussing how the potential for unforeseen uses of personal data “generates fear and uncertainty over how one’s information will be used in the future, creating a sense of powerlessness and vulnerability”); Calo, *supra* note 56, at 1142 (arguing that the mere perception of being observed online can cause significant psychological harm).

currently refuses to recognize.⁹⁵ Hence, consumers might find themselves with a contractual right to prevent privacy violations but lacking sufficient proof of damages to actually exercise that right.⁹⁶ In addition, contractual privacy solutions still implicate free expression. Contracts designed to ensure privacy can chill speech. Parties might enter into an agreement not to disclose certain sensitive personal details, but outside disclosure of these details could also be in the public interest depending on the nature of the information and how it was to be used.⁹⁷ A contractual legal regime allowing too much restriction on the sharing of data could impoverish the discourse.⁹⁸

Given these problems, contract law cannot resolve the tension between enhanced data privacy and free speech.⁹⁹ Instead, additional

95. Abril, *supra* note 2, at 706–07; *see also* SOLOVE, *supra* note 41, at 127–28 (discussing judicial reluctance to recognize data “insecurity” as a legally cognizable problem).

96. Another problem with a contractual solution is that it would likely *increase* the complexity of the marketplace for privacy, thereby compounding the cognitive challenges faced by concerned consumers. As Jane Baron has noted, one of the strengths of property law is its use of strong, relatively crude signals to create social ordering. Baron, *supra* note 2, at 388; *see also* Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, *The Morality of Property*, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007) (arguing any property system must have an element of moral significance in order to survive). The law of trespass is a blunt tool, but people know what it means. By contrast, a regime made up of millions of individual contracts tailored to each consumer’s unique privacy preferences increases the costs of online commerce, as well as the costs of governing, when entities, unknowingly or not, commit an infraction. Baron, *supra* note 2, at 388. Too much individual privacy tailoring poses insurmountable challenges for contract law. Basing privacy protection on personal preferences would create an unstable legal environment, ultimately harming both data subjects and data users. SOLOVE, *supra* note 41, at 70.

97. *See* Andrew J. McClurg, *Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality*, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 908 (2006). For example, evidence shows that restrictions on the disclosure of patient medical records can hamstring medical research, delaying the discovery and removal of dangerous drugs from the marketplace. *See* Barbara J. Evans, *Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era*, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 456 (2009).

98. This is not to say that contract has no role to play in addressing privacy concerns. Intellectual property law diagnoses situations where increased formalities are meant to improve the bargaining process. For example, assignment of a copyright cannot be oral. It has to be in writing. 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2006). The same is true of trademark assignments. 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(3) (2012). When asked to relax these rules based on industry custom or an analysis on the subjective mindset of the contracting parties, courts have balked. *E.g.*, *Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen*, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990); *MVP Entm’t Inc. v. Frost*, 149 Cal. Rpt. 3d 162, 164–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). Similar formalities may need to be legislated in online privacy contracts to put consumers and data users on a more equal footing.

99. *See* James Grimmelman, *Saving Facebook*, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1178–87 (2009) (contending that efforts to improve Facebook’s disclosure policies will be ineffective in resolving privacy concerns).

regulatory responses and doctrinal accommodations will be needed. As discussed below, intellectual property law offers different models for balancing privacy with free speech. One approach focuses on the plaintiff's speech subject. Instead of analyzing what the defendant has done with the plaintiff's materials, the court must categorize *the intellectual property holder's* expressive project and render a decision as to *the defendant's* free speech rights on that basis. Another approach focuses on the defendant's intent, using evidence of motive to divide infringing use from permissible expression. A final method assays the expressive potential of the defendant's speech, leaving questions about the defendant's intent or subject of the plaintiff's original expression largely to the side. Parts III–V investigate the soundness of each of these models and discuss how they can be implemented in a combined fashion to bridge the privacy/free speech divide.

III. FREE SPEECH AND SUBJECT MATTER

One potential starting point in weighing expressive rights against other interests is to focus on the expression's subject. The thought behind such an approach is that some subjects of communication are more critical to the goals behind the First Amendment than others. Courts trying to achieve a balance between intellectual property rights and free expression have built doctrines that weigh free speech defenses by categorizing the subject of the original communication. This Part describes these doctrines, as well as their potential application to the privacy/free speech divide.

A. Copyright's Focus on Speech Subject

To some degree, all intellectual property regimes employ free speech safeguards based on the intellectual property holder's speech subject. For example, the type of trademark held by the plaintiff is relevant to building a case for trademark infringement, which requires a showing of "likelihood of confusion."¹⁰⁰ Under established doctrine, those holding a more distinctive or unique mark (e.g., Apple for computers) have an easier time demonstrating infringement than those holding a less distinctive mark (e.g., eMachines for computers).¹⁰¹ Hence, built in to the fabric of trademark law is a presumption against trademark protection for words considered critical to downstream expression.

100. *See, e.g.,* Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that likelihood of confusion is the "core element of trademark infringement").

101. Courts routinely assess "mark strength" in the likelihood of confusion analysis, investigating the degree of both inherent distinctiveness and acquired marketplace distinctiveness a mark possesses. *E.g.,* Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003).

In a parallel manner, the type of celebrity at issue can impact the success of a right of publicity claim. The right of publicity gives individuals a right to block unauthorized commercial uses of their personas. Given the importance of celebrities to daily discourse, serious free speech concerns are raised by the right. As a result, both courts and legislatures have created defenses immunizing some journalistic uses of celebrity names or images. Some courts evaluating “newsworthiness” defenses to right of publicity claims ask whether the subject of the defendant’s expression was of “public concern.”¹⁰² If so, the subject’s publicity interests must be sacrificed to the First Amendment. For example, given his prominence in popular culture, one court deemed stories of Clint Eastwood’s romantic dalliances a matter of “public concern.”¹⁰³ At least one state right-of-publicity law draws a distinction between appropriation of a famous personality and appropriation of a persona without commercial value.¹⁰⁴ Persons falling into the latter category enjoy a much more limited scope of protection and, hence, must submit to more unauthorized uses.¹⁰⁵

The categorization approach is most evident in copyright law. The primary accommodations copyright law makes for free speech involve categorization of the plaintiff’s work. Less attention is paid to what the defendant actually does with that plaintiff’s work. When the plaintiff’s communication falls into a disfavored category identified with free speech interests (ideas, raw facts, or “scenes-a-faire”), copyright’s expressive defenses pack their greatest punch. When the plaintiff’s communication falls into a favored subject category viewed as less essential to downstream expression (e.g., fictional works), free speech concerns recede. Copyright law does this through two particular judicial innovations: (1) the idea/expression dichotomy; and (2) the fair-use defense. According to the Supreme Court, their existence ex-

102. *E.g.*, *Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n*, 409 F. Supp. 2d 15, 23 (D.D.C. 2006); *Joe Dickerson & Assocs., LLC v. Dittmar*, 34 P.3d 995, 1003 (Colo. 2001). On the other hand, courts largely ignore the type of trademark at issue when determining a defendant’s eligibility for any of trademark’s three affirmative defenses to infringement. This omission is particularly striking given the obvious free speech concerns at stake in granting trademark rights in a merely descriptive trademark. *See generally* Lisa P. Ramsey, *Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment*, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095 (2003).

103. *Eastwood v. Superior Court*, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 423 (1983).

104. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 63.60.020, 63.60.040 (2012).

105. *Id.* But under most analyses, the prominence of the celebrity persona is not specifically acknowledged in deciding how to balance First Amendment concerns with the right of publicity. Instead, to state a claim under the right of publicity, a plaintiff must merely show the defendant’s unauthorized use of her identity and resulting injury. *Browne v. McCain*, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2009). As we will see, instead of categorizing the plaintiff’s expression, in the main, publicity rights law relies on very different mechanisms to accommodate free speech interests. *See infra* Part V.

empties copyright law from the more searching judicial review one might expect for government regulation of expression.¹⁰⁶

For our purposes, two points regarding these measures bear emphasis. First, courts largely examine the kind of communication created by the plaintiff, not the defendant's use of that communication. Under the idea/expression dichotomy, an author can be awarded a property right in a particular expression (thereby preventing other speech) but not in the idea behind the expression. The thought behind this copyright principle is that ideas are too valuable to be monopolized by one party. Instead, they remain in the public domain as building blocks for other creations.¹⁰⁷ Courts apply the dichotomy by placing the communication that the plaintiff is trying to protect in one of two categories: "idea" or "expression."

Over time, courts have attached additional speech protective mechanisms onto the idea/expression edifice. Again, these mechanisms require categorization of the plaintiff's speech. Copyright law's merger doctrine reasons that when the plaintiff's subject matter is susceptible to only one or a limited number of possible expressions, the subject matter may not be copyrighted.¹⁰⁸ This is another judicial mechanism for accommodating First Amendment principles and, again, the focus is on the plaintiff's work, not the defendant's use of that work.¹⁰⁹

Similarly, judges have created the scenes-a-faire doctrine, which allows others to borrow stock characters, themes, and scenic elements from a copyrighted work in order to portray a particular time and place.¹¹⁰ Unlike the merger doctrine, the scenes-a-faire doctrine does not involve an expression that is impossible to separate from its underlying idea. Rather, it takes certain dramatic conventions employed by the plaintiff and removes them from copyright protection to further expressive interests.¹¹¹ For example, particular plot details in a ro-

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106. *Golan v. Holder*, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–91 (2012); *Eldred v. Ashcroft*, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003); *Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enters.*, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); see also *Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc.*, 402 F.3d 881, 893 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing the dichotomy as a "major First Amendment protection"); Neil Weinstock Natanel, *First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder*, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1086 (2013) ("First Amendment scrutiny of copyright law is unwarranted so long as the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use privilege . . . remain 'undisturbed.'" (quoting *Golan v. Holder*, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–91 (2012))).
107. *E.g.*, *Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*, 618 F.2d 972, 978–89 (2d Cir. 1980).
108. *E.g.*, *Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co.*, 379 F.2d 675, 679 (1st Cir. 1967) (granting summary judgment for defendant because of limited number of ways to express sweepstakes rules).
109. Pamela Samuelson, *Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective*, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 320 n.6 (2003).
110. *E.g.*, *Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc.*, 607 F.3d 620, 624–25 (9th Cir. 2010); *Hoehling*, 618 F.2d at 979.
111. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:28 (2012).

mance novel—a husband and wife endure a miscarriage, separate, reunite, rediscover their love for each other, and, in the end, expect another child—are too “standard” in the romance novel genre to enjoy copyright protection.¹¹² Although judges first applied the scenes-a-faire doctrine in the context of dramatic works, they have since expanded it to protect all manner of speech, including computer code.¹¹³ As with the idea/expression dichotomy, courts examine the plaintiff’s communication to determine whether it falls into the category of an unprotectable scene-a-faire.

Copyright’s fair-use defense also trains its attention on the plaintiff’s speech subject. As affirmed by the Supreme Court, “the nature of the interest at stake is highly relevant to whether a given use is fair.”¹¹⁴ The defense requires a court to interrogate four factors:

- the purpose and character of the use;
- the nature of the original work;
- the amount and substantiality of the original work taken;
- the market harm to the original.¹¹⁵

Three of the four fair-use factors focus on what has been borrowed from the original rather than on the use made by the infringer. Hence, the second factor asks a court to examine “the nature of the original work.” According to the Supreme Court, “This factor calls for recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others.”¹¹⁶

The third and fourth factors also require an analysis of the original communication. The third factor assesses the amount and substantiality of the original work taken.¹¹⁷ For this factor, a court must analyze the substantiality of the taking from the perspective of the plaintiff’s work, not the defendant’s.¹¹⁸ To wit, in one case applying this factor, it did not matter that the material copied from a book on sales techniques comprised only a small fraction of the ultimate work

112. *Rucker v. Harlequin Enters.*, No. 4:12-cv-01135, 2013 WL 707922 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2013).

113. 2 PATRY, *supra* note 111, at § 4:26; *Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.*, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).

114. *Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.*, 471 U.S. 539, 552–54 (1985).

115. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). If anything, the fair-use defense looms even larger in the judicial imagination as a surrogate for First Amendment concerns than the idea/expression dichotomy. As stated by the Second Circuit, “absent extraordinary circumstances, ‘the fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of first amendment in the copyright field.’” *Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc.*, 489 F.3d 474, 482 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting *Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd.*, 996 F.2d 1366, 1378 (2d Cir.1993)).

116. *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).

117. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012).

118. *Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters.*, 533 F.3d 1287, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2008); *NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst.*, 364 F.3d 471, 480 (2d Cir. 2004).

created by the defendant.¹¹⁹ What was important, in evaluating the third factor, was the amount of material taken from the original.¹²⁰ As explained by the Supreme Court in an earlier case interpreting the third factor, “[A] taking may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial with respect to the *infringing* work.”¹²¹

The fourth factor requires the court to determine the amount of market harm to the original. In evaluating this factor, courts inquire as to the worth of the original, as well as potential future derivative works that could be made from the original. Plaintiffs profit when they can show an effect on a market they are exploiting, thinking about exploiting, or could potentially exploit for their work.¹²² External benefits to parties other than the plaintiff are not considered in the fourth factor.

This is not to say that the defendant’s behavior has no bearing on copyright fair use. Some comparison of the defendant’s work to the plaintiff’s work is necessary to assess the third and fourth factors. Moreover, as described below, the first fair-use factor engages directly with the defendant’s work itself by analyzing its “purpose and character.”¹²³ In general, however, the fair-use analysis represents an effort to categorize the plaintiff’s original communication and its importance to downstream expression. In applying factors two through four, courts scrutinize the plaintiff’s work to evaluate the strength of the defendant’s speech interest.

The second notable characteristic of copyright’s two main expressive defenses is that they privilege the use of *factual* information by others. In describing the idea/expression dichotomy, courts sometimes equate ideas with “facts” or “discoveries.”¹²⁴ For example, when copyright was asserted in model building codes that had been subsequently adopted by two municipalities, a Web site operator that posted the codes raised the idea/expression dichotomy as a defense to infringement.¹²⁵ The Fifth Circuit recognized the defense, holding that the codes were “facts” and, therefore, not copyrightable.¹²⁶ The

119. *Letterese & Assocs.*, 533 F.3d at 1314–15.

120. *Id.*

121. *Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.*, 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985).

122. *E.g.*, 4 PATRY, *supra* note 111, at § 10:151 (2012); *Rogers v. Koons*, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir. 1992); *Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood*, 150 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 1998).

123. *See infra* subsection V.A.1.

124. *E.g.*, *Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.*, 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991); *Harper & Row*, 471 U.S. at 560; *Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc.*, 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 2008).

125. *Vecek v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc.*, 293 F.3d 791, 800–01 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).

126. *Id.* at 801–02.

justification for such a rule is to promote information exchange.¹²⁷ As explained by the Fifth Circuit, the dichotomy furthers expression “by permitting the free flow of information in facts and ideas from their emergence.”¹²⁸ The Supreme Court has ratified this First Amendment privilege for facts (at least in copyright law), holding that the “fact/expression dichotomy” prevents facts alone and compilations of facts lacking originality from being copyrighted.¹²⁹

Judges similarly privilege factual speech when evaluating a copyright defendant’s fair-use defense. Free speech rights rise to the foreground when courts identify the plaintiff’s work as informational, rather than a work of entertainment.¹³⁰ In analyzing the “nature of the original work” under the second fair-use factor, judges shield unauthorized use of factual works while being less willing to recognize a fair-use defense for use of fictional creations.¹³¹ Much turns on whether the original work is considered “factual” or “creative.”¹³² A copyright infringement suit against the compiler of an unauthorized *Harry Potter* reference guide illustrates the point. In rejecting the compiler’s fair-use defense, the court explained that the “creative nature” of the original *Harry Potter* books tipped the balance in favor of their author.¹³³ Once it had identified the nonfactual nature of the original communication, the court could downplay the defendant’s free speech interests. On the other hand, an unauthorized biographer of L. Ron Hubbard won his fair-use defense, in part, because the biography’s original sources were deemed factual.¹³⁴ The biographer quoted extensively, without permission, from Hubbard’s writings.¹³⁵ Yet because the quoted works dealt “with Hubbard’s life, his views on religion, human relations, the Church, etc.,” the court concluded that they were “factual or informational,” thereby favoring the defendant on the second fair-use factor.¹³⁶

127. *Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God*, 227 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The public interest in the free flow of information is assured by the law’s refusal to recognize a valid copyright in facts.” (quoting *Harper & Row*, 471 U.S. at 558)).

128. *Veeck*, 293 F.3d at 802.

129. *Feist Publ’ns*, 499 U.S. at 349–50, 363–64.

130. *Stewart v. Abend*, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (“[F]air use is more likely to be found in factual works than fictional works.”). For example, the fair-use defense favored a plaintiff that held copyright in video games and disfavored a plaintiff suing for infringement of the copyright in its aircraft maintenance manuals. *Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Camp Sys. Int’l, Inc.*, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1378 (S.D. Ga. 2006); *Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA*, 948 F. Supp. 923, 934 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

131. Barton Beebe, *An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005*, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 611 (2008).

132. *See id.*

133. *Warner Bros., Inc. v. RDR Books*, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

134. *New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Carol Publ’g Grp.*, 904 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1990).

135. *Id.* at 154.

136. *Id.* at 157.

B. Categorization and Information Privacy

In sum, copyright's idea/expression dichotomy and fair-use defense focus on the original work to determine whether its protection via copyright represents a threat to free expression. Creative activity that is particularly necessary as raw material for other creative output, like "facts," "scenes-a-faire," or highly informational works, is singled out as inappropriate for copyright protection. Applying a similar method to information privacy would focus attention on the particular data meant to be safeguarded, not on how or why that data was used by the defendant. Courts would need to identify *ex ante* species of data that should and should not be available for use by others.

This categorical approach makes some sense and should be utilized by courts evaluating First Amendment challenges to information privacy laws. In many ways, privacy law already operates under a categorical approach. Just as the objective in copyright is to identify communicative materials that are necessary for downstream creation, the goal for privacy law is to identify personal data that is particularly sensitive or intimate.¹³⁷ Both common law and statutory privacy protections attempt to pinpoint types of personal information that are highly sensitive and attach limits to their collection, use, and dissemination by others. The common law tort for public disclosure of private facts prevents public use of personal information if the information publicized "would be highly offensive to a reasonable person" and is not of public concern.¹³⁸ Similarly, existing data privacy statutes target discrete, sensitive information like medical histories and financial records for heightened regulation in the interest of consumer protection.¹³⁹

As currently employed by the courts, the categorical approach to information privacy seems to adequately safeguard restrictions on the use of especially sensitive personal information from First Amend-

137. *See* Abril, *supra* note 2, at 696 ("U.S. privacy tort law is configured to protect privacy as defined by content, rather than social relationships or interpersonal understandings of confidentiality.").

138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). Even if personal details are revealed that the plaintiff finds highly upsetting, much more is needed before the "highly offensive" element of the tort is satisfied. *Sidis v. F-R Pub'g Corp.*, 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940). As noted *supra*, scholars argue that this tort is largely ineffective at protecting personal information, both in the offline and online realms. *See also* Rodney A. Smolla, *Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News*, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1999) (stating that the tort exists "more 'in the books' than in practice").

139. For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) sets out very specific privacy rules regarding "individually identifiable health information" for those in the health care and insurance industries. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102–160.103 (2012). Other statutes regulate disclosure of financial information, but only in very specific contexts. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(b) (2012).

ment challenges. An illustrative example is credit-report regulation. Even after accepting that records of consumer credit performance constitute “speech,” courts have applied only intermediate scrutiny to laws restricting the use of such records and held in favor of government regulators.¹⁴⁰ For example, a privacy statute preventing a credit-reporting agency’s sale of targeted marketing lists survived a First Amendment challenge.¹⁴¹ In deciding that the privacy interest in one’s credit information outweighs free speech interests, the courts have highlighted two characteristics of the data at issue. First, credit-report information is tailored to individual consumers. As a result, it is not a subject of “public concern” and, therefore, is considered less essential to free expression.¹⁴² Second, credit-report information is personally sensitive.¹⁴³ Significant harm to the individual can result from one unwanted disclosure. In the credit-report cases, First Amendment concerns appropriately receded once the data’s private, sensitive nature was identified.¹⁴⁴ The decisions in the credit-report cases appear to match public sentiment for keeping certain personal data private and restricting outside speech that uses such data. One can envision similar results when it comes to upholding limits on the use of personal data involving health or sexuality.¹⁴⁵

Exclusive reliance on the categorical approach would be a mistake, however. A solitary focus on the plaintiff’s communication would

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140. *See* *Trans Union Corp. v. FTC*, 245 F.3d 809, 818–19 (D.C. Cir. 2001); *Individual Reference Servs. Corp. v. FTC*, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2001), *aff’d sub nom. Trans Union LLC v. FTC*, 295 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002); *see also* Richards, *supra* note 28, at 1164 n.67 (discussing application of intermediate scrutiny in credit-reporting cases).
 141. *Trans Union Corp.*, 245 F.3d at 819.
 142. *Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.*, 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985); *Individual Reference Servs. Corp.*, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 40–41.
 143. *Trans Union Corp.*, 245 F.3d at 818–19; *Toomer v. Garrett*, 574 S.E.2d 76, 82–83, 90 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding privacy claim against state officials for disclosing personnel file that included “sensitive” information, including employee’s credit history).
 144. What data collectors were actually doing with the credit-report information—translating it into customized marketing lists to be sold to outside businesses—was relatively unimportant to this analysis. This is notable given the credit-report regulation’s obvious role in restricting a particular kind of speech—advertising—that enjoys First Amendment protection in a multitude of other contexts. *E.g.*, *Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly*, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001); 44 *Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island*, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
 145. *See, e.g.*, *Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.*, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1125 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (finding no constitutional violation from “Privacy Rule” promulgated by Department of Health and Human Services that restricted doctor communications). *But see* Beverly Cohen, *Regulating Data Mining Post-Sorrell: Using HIPAA to Restrict Marketing Use of Patients’ Private Medical Information*, 47 *WAKE FOREST L. REV.* 1141, 1173 (2012) (questioning whether the *Sorrell* decision places some HIPAA privacy restrictions in jeopardy).

come at a cost for consumers. Take, for example, copyright law's general willingness, both through the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair-use defense, to privilege unauthorized uses of factual information. While there may be reasons for such a policy in copyright law, when it comes to privacy law, a similar free ride for use of factual data makes little sense. Use of personal information, even when not of a sexual or financial nature, can cause real harms. Instrumentally, this information can be aggregated to unmask consumers, revealing things they wished to keep secret,¹⁴⁶ as well as to track the online behavior of children.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, the mere perception of being surveilled by others produces psychic harm.¹⁴⁸ These concerns over the collection and use of quotidian, everyday data motivate current legislative proposals like "Do Not Track" acts and restrictions on the use of "like" buttons on Web sites targeting minors.¹⁴⁹ These proposed laws would prevent some types of factual speech. Copyright's categorical willingness to immunize fact-based speech, if exported to the data-privacy context, would stymie these laws and allow these harms to continue.

The copyright approach to free speech and factual data also clashes with an unacknowledged judicial intuition toward speech involving truthful, factual details. When confronted with First Amendment challenges to the regulation of such speech (as opposed to laws affecting more abstract literary, artistic, or ideological speech), courts have bent constitutional doctrine to justify government regulation of such speech. In describing this phenomenon, Ashutosh Bhagwat maintains that these decisions make sense because speech involving factual details can threaten greater social harm than other types of expression while simultaneously being less necessary to listener self-governance.¹⁵⁰ For example, in *Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists*,¹⁵¹ the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court's decision to issue an injunction shutting down an abortion protest Web site listing the names and home addresses of current abortion providers, as well as the names of abortion providers that had been killed or wounded.¹⁵² It justified this

146. Calo, *supra* note 56, at 1131.

147. Somini Sengupta, *Facebook Objects to a Privacy Law*, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2012), <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A03E5D91F38F93BA35753C1A9649D8B63>.

148. Calo, *supra* note 56, at 1142–46; Richards, *supra* note 3, at 1948–52.

149. See Do Not Track Kids Act of 2011, H.R. 1895, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(2)(A) (2011); Andrew Couts, *Facebook Says Child Privacy Law Shouldn't Apply to "Like" Button*, DIGITAL TRENDS (Oct. 2, 2012), <http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/facebook-coppa-like-button/>.

150. Bhagwat, *supra* note 25, at 876.

151. *Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists*, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).

152. *Id.* at 1088.

decision by characterizing the Web site as a “true threat,”¹⁵³ even though the Web site clearly did not meet the “true threat” standard.¹⁵⁴ Yet one can understand why the Ninth Circuit rejected the anti-abortion activists’ First Amendment defense. Given the potential harm unleashed from the Web site’s specific disclosure of abortion provider addresses, and the arguable irrelevance of those addresses to any rational conception of self-governance, free speech interests seem less important and privacy concerns more relevant. Depending on context, factual data sometimes needs to be deemed *less* important to expressive needs, not more important.

The ultimate problem with an exclusively categorical approach is that it omits other concerns that are critical to reconciling privacy interests with free speech. Although information relating to sexual habits and financial disclosures appears to be firmly within information privacy expectations, this is not the sort of information that is valued by data aggregators.¹⁵⁵ Instead, today’s advertisers prize the information gleaned from everyday online revelations. But there can be strong privacy interests in what appears, in the abstract, to be relatively innocuous information. For example, addresses are normally considered public information and not subject to privacy restrictions. But addresses can become extremely private depending on the circumstances of their revelation, particularly when revealed to others who could potentially do the subject harm. When the anti-abortion protestors in the *Planned Parenthood* case revealed the names and addresses of abortion providers, their speech posed dangers deserving of constitutional recognition. Context matters. For this reason, a focus on the data rather than the activities of the data user is a good start but an incomplete solution for the divide between privacy and free speech.

IV. INTENT

Another way to reconcile free speech with privacy is to look to the intent behind the speaker’s expression. For all three intellectual property regimes analyzed in this Article, the speaker’s mental state plays a role in calibrating First Amendment interests. Inquiries into bad faith and commercial motivation represent explicit and central parts

153. *Id.*

154. According to established doctrine, speech can only be a “true threat” if it demonstrates an intent to commit violence. *Virginia v. Black*, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). However, there was no evidence in the facts of the case that the abortion protestors that operated the Web site intended to commit violence. *Planned Parenthood*, 290 F.3d at 1091–92 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

155. See McGeveran, *supra* note 35, at 1138 (maintaining that most social-networking sites would hesitate before using sensitive financial or sexual information out of fear of offending potential customers).

of the doctrinal balance between intangible property rights and the right to free expression. The experience of intellectual property law suggests that evidence of intent should play an important, yet limited, role in judicial analysis of First Amendment challenges to data privacy laws.

A. Improper Motive and Free Speech

The motivations relevant to calibrating intellectual property rights with free speech can be divided into two broad areas: “bad faith” and “commercial motivation.” Considerations of bad faith can be found in expression-based defenses for all three of the intellectual property regimes discussed in this Article. Courts have probed user bad faith when construing copyright’s fair-use defense,¹⁵⁶ and defendant “good faith” has been referenced in cases evaluating First Amendment defenses to right-of-publicity claims.¹⁵⁷ Yet bad faith has greatest salience when considering expression-based defenses in trademark law.

To state a claim for trademark infringement, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating ownership of a valid trademark and use of that mark by the defendant in a way that is likely to confuse consumers.¹⁵⁸ Even if the plaintiff carries his or her burden of proof as to these two elements, a defendant may escape liability through two judicially created “fair use” defenses: descriptive and nominative fair use. These defenses provide some important breathing room for free expression even when that expression could potentially confuse some consumers.¹⁵⁹ Descriptive fair use exempts unauthorized mark uses that accurately describe a defendant’s product. Hence, even though a food products manufacturer held trademark rights in the term “Fish-Fri,” a rival manufacturer could also use the term to describe its own batter mix for frying fish.¹⁶⁰ Nominative fair use applies when a defendant uses a mark not to brand its own product but to identify the plaintiff’s product. For example, when a newspaper used the trademarked term “Boston Marathon” to report on the famous race, it satisfied the nominative fair-use defense.¹⁶¹ The newspaper was allowed

156. William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, *Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody*, 11 *CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.* 667, 685 (1992). In general, however, such inquiries into defendant intent are rare. Beebe, *supra* note 131, at 607–08 (“The data suggest that considerations of fairness, propriety, and good or bad faith have not played a significant role in our fair use case law—notwithstanding the frequency with which opinions intoned that fair use is an ‘equitable doctrine.’”).

157. *Estate of Presley v. Russen*, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1359–60 (D.N.J. 1981).

158. *Hensley Mfg., Inc. v. Propriide, Inc.*, 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009).

159. *See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.*, 543 U.S. 111 (2004).

160. *Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc.*, 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983).

161. *WCVB-TV v. Bos. Athletic Ass’n*, 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991).

to use the trademark because it used the mark to identify the race, not to market a race of its own.¹⁶²

As articulated by the courts (and, in the case of descriptive fair use, also by statute), both of these defenses require an evaluation of the defendant's mindset and are unavailable to those judged to be acting with improper motives. In evaluating the descriptive fair-use defense, courts are statutorily required to look to whether the defendant used the mark "in good faith."¹⁶³ Nominative fair use, a strictly common law construction, is similar. The Third Circuit states that the nominative fair-use test requires an examination of "the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark,"¹⁶⁴ adding that "[i]t is the circumstance in which a court does not find bad intent but does find confusion that a nominative fair use defense will be most useful."¹⁶⁵ In a similar vein, the Ninth Circuit requires an analysis of whether the defendant used "only so much of the mark . . . as is reasonably necessary to identify the products or services,"¹⁶⁶ an inquiry that some describe as synonymous with investigating the defendant's intent.¹⁶⁷ As characterized by one federal appellate judge, "the *entire* 'nominative fair use' defense asks whether the use was made with the intent to confuse."¹⁶⁸

A different inquiry into speaker mental state asks not whether the defendant acted in bad faith, but rather whether she was commercially motivated. If so, free speech interests are deemed less pressing and the rights of the intellectual property holder tend to take precedence. Again, this type of mental-state inquiry is common to copyright, trademark, and right-of-publicity law.

In copyright, the first factor of the fair-use defense explicitly requires courts to consider "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature."¹⁶⁹ Some courts have described the first factor as an inquiry into commercial motive.¹⁷⁰ Unauthorized use of copyrighted material in an advertising context is particularly frowned upon since the advertiser's primary intent in us-

162. *Id.*

163. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006).

164. *Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc.*, 425 F.3d 211, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2005).

165. *Id.* at 227 n.7.

166. *New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g*, 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).

167. Douglas L. Rogers, *Ending the Circuit Split over Use of a Competing Mark in Advertising—The Blackstone Code*, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 157, 192 n.214 (2006).

168. *Lendingtree*, 425 F.3d at 243 (Fisher, J., dissenting).

169. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).

170. *E.g.*, *Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc.*, 387 F.3d 403, 408–09 (5th Cir. 2004); *New Era Publ'ns Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt and Co.*, 873 F.2d 576, 591 (2d Cir. 1989).

ing the work seems to be to sell a product.¹⁷¹ This holds true even if the plaintiff's original communication was also intended to sell a product.¹⁷² Evidence of commercial motivation may negate a defendant's other, more laudatory reasons for using copyrighted material. For example, despite its journalistic importance, an unauthorized re-broadcast of copyrighted footage of the beating of truck driver Reginald Denny during the 1992 Los Angeles riots on a television newscast was deemed not to be fair use given a finding that the newscaster was motivated by profit.¹⁷³

On the other hand, noncommercial motivations are looked on favorably. In one seminal copyright fair-use analysis, the Supreme Court determined that when individual users of video recording devices made unauthorized copies of copyrighted television programs for the noncommercial purpose of privately watching their favorite shows at a more convenient time, such activity was fair use.¹⁷⁴ Central to the Court's determination was its perception that the users lacked a "commercial motivation" in making their unauthorized copies.¹⁷⁵

In a similar fashion, some courts place great weight on commercial motivations in deciding what should triumph—a celebrity's right of publicity or an unauthorized user's free speech interests. For example, courts in Missouri employ a "predominant purpose test," which asks whether the motivation behind the use of a person's identity is commercial exploitation or expressive activity.¹⁷⁶ If the predominant purpose is commercial exploitation, then the defendant's First Amendment defense fails. In the main case setting out this test, the court relied on evidence that the defendant, a comic book publisher, used a professional hockey player's persona in its *Spawn* comic books to induce hockey fans to purchase its comics.¹⁷⁷ This evidence led the court to conclude that the use of the hockey player's persona was predominantly a "ploy" to sell comic books, and the court, therefore, found in favor of the hockey player.¹⁷⁸ In other words, the publisher's commercial motivation negated a potential First Amendment defense. Outside of Missouri, other courts have used commercial intent to

171. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][1][c] (2012).

172. *Id.*

173. *L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc.*, 305 F.3d 924, 939 n.13 (9th Cir. 2002).

174. *Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*, 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).

175. *Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.*, 802 F. Supp. 1, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (interpreting the *Sony* decision).

176. *John Doe v. TCI Cablevision*, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).

177. *Id.* at 366.

178. *Id.* at 374.

downplay the First Amendment interests of right-of-publicity defendants.¹⁷⁹

Trademark law also scrutinizes commercial motives. In addition to the descriptive and nominative fair-use tests, trademark law's third major initiative to safeguard expressive activity, the *Rogers* test, asks whether use of the plaintiff's trademark is (1) "artistic[ally] relevant" to the defendant's work; and (2) whether use of the plaintiff's trademark is "explicitly misleading."¹⁸⁰ If the court answers yes to the first question and no to the second, the defendant escapes liability. Even more so than trademark's two fair-use defenses, the *Rogers* test has the potential to immunize a great deal of expressive activity from trademark infringement claims. Overall, courts have interpreted its two prongs in a defendant-friendly manner, adopting a broad view of what is artistically relevant¹⁸¹ and ensuring that the "explicitly misleading" standard puts the plaintiff to a higher burden of proof than the standard likelihood of confusion analysis.¹⁸² Yet courts also posit that only noncommercial expression is eligible for the *Rogers* safe harbor.¹⁸³ Hence, it is of enormous importance for defendants seeking the protection of *Rogers* to convince the court that their trademark use was not commercial.

Often, the commerciality question is determined by reference to the defendant's intent.¹⁸⁴ For example, the Third Circuit rejected a

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179. *E.g.*, *Matthews v. Wozencraft*, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that fictional novel could violate individual's publicity rights if it was "a disguised advertisement for the sale of goods or services" (quoting *Rogers v. Grimaldi*, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989))); *Estate of Presley v. Russen*, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1360 (D.N.J. 1981) (rejecting First Amendment defense for Elvis tribute act because "the primary purpose" was to expropriate the value of the likeness of the singer).
180. *E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc.*, 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008).
181. *E.g.*, *id.* at 1100; *Roxbury Entm't v. Penthouse Media Grp., Inc.*, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
182. *E.g.*, *Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.*, 296 F.3d 894, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2002); *Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publn's Int'l, Ltd.*, 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993); *Volkswagen AG v. Dorling Kindersley Publ'g, Inc.*, 614 F. Supp. 2d 793, 801–02, 810 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
183. *Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc.*, 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008); 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:144.50 (4th ed. 2012).
184. To be fair, courts sometimes also take an objective approach, basing their decision on the type of product bearing the defendant's expression. They typically view use of a trademark in a film or song as noncommercial. *See, e.g.*, *Mattel*, 296 F.3d at 900–02; *Winchester Mystery House v. Global Asylum, Inc.*, 210 Cal. App. 4th 579, 590–94 (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 24, 2012); *see also* *Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc.*, 851 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (page in *Sports Illustrated* issue paid for and created by grocery store chain congratulating Michael Jordan on his basketball achievements considered "non-commercial speech" exempt from trademark false-endorsement claim because it did not tout a particu-

Rogers defense advanced by the National Football League (NFL) when it used, without authorization, the voice of legendary sports announcer John Facenda in its twenty-two minute film *The Making of Madden NFL 06*.¹⁸⁵ Facenda's estate sued for false endorsement, contending that fans hearing his voice on the film would assume that he had lent his approval to the film and the videogame it was describing, *John Madden Football*.¹⁸⁶ The NFL maintained its periodic use of Facenda's voice represented an artistic choice for a documentary film, not an effort to confuse consumers.¹⁸⁷ The court rejected this argument, explaining that the NFL's "economic motivation" rendered the film commercial speech.¹⁸⁸ Because no one in the film had anything negative to say about the videogame, the court did not believe the film had a "documentary purpose."¹⁸⁹ The court found that the film was only meant to serve as an advertisement for the Madden videogame.¹⁹⁰ As a result, the use was commercially motivated, and the NFL could not take advantage of the *Rogers* defense.¹⁹¹

The Ninth Circuit performed a similar analysis when Vanna White sued for the unauthorized use of her persona in a print advertisement for Samsung VCRs.¹⁹² White sued under the same trademark cause of action used by Facenda's estate.¹⁹³ Samsung responded to White's suit with a free speech defense based on parody.¹⁹⁴ The use in question featured only a robot dressed in a gown, pearls, and blonde wig standing next to the Wheel of Fortune letterboard above the caption: "Longest-running game show, 2012 A.D."¹⁹⁵ The court accepted White's claim that consumers viewing the ad would mistakenly think she had endorsed Samsung's product.¹⁹⁶ It then brusquely rejected Samsung's free speech argument, explaining that trademark law's po-

lar product). On the other hand, more tangible merchandise such as T-shirts and coffee mugs is usually deemed commercial and, hence, not eligible for *Rogers*' protection. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2012); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398–99, 403 (8th Cir. 1987). But see Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1339–40 (N.D. Ga. 2008).

185. Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008).

186. *Id.* at 1014.

187. *Id.* at 1016.

188. *Id.* at 1017.

189. *Id.* at 1018.

190. *Id.* at 1017.

191. *Id.* at 1016, 1018. See also Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts, No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, Inc., 2011 WL 2457678, at *4 n.1 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011) (describing *Rogers* test as interrogating "intentional use of another's intellectual property for commercial profit").

192. White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).

193. *Id.* at 1397.

194. *Id.* at 1401.

195. *Id.* at 1396.

196. *Id.* at 1400.

tential for censoring advertising presented no First Amendment concerns.¹⁹⁷ Even if Samsung meant to spoof the famous letter turner, perhaps making fun of Ms. White's longevity and robotic demeanor, the court found it potentially dispositive that Samsung also meant to confuse consumers regarding White's endorsement.¹⁹⁸ Ultimately, the court's decision hinged on its belief that Samsung intended the commercial as an advertisement.¹⁹⁹ Once it decided that Samsung primarily intended a "knock-off," not a "parody," it was able to ignore the free speech implications of a judgment in White's favor.²⁰⁰

B. Information Privacy and Proscribed Motivations

The discussion above reveals that one method for balancing societal interests with expressive rights is to scrutinize speaker motivations. Intellectual property law, particularly trademark doctrine, hinges the success of its expression-based defenses on showings of speaker "good faith" and noncommercial motive. This method attempts to protect First Amendment values by only restricting speech made with the wrong intentions.

To many First Amendment scholars, however, it is unclear why a speaker's motive should ever matter, particularly when primary consideration is given to the First Amendment interests of listeners.²⁰¹ If First Amendment interests are meant to turn on the value or harm of the speech to others, the speaker's state of mind should be disregarded.²⁰² The motivations of communicators seem largely irrelevant if the First Amendment is meant to facilitate the search for truth or provide information for democratic self-governance.²⁰³

Nevertheless, as in intellectual property law, intent should have some role in assessing information privacy's First Amendment bound-

197. *Id.* at 1401.

198. *Id.* at 1400–01.

199. *Id.* at 1401.

200. *Id.* On the other hand, without evidence of commercial intent, *Rogers* can be an effective tool for defendants. To take one example, when high-end resort operator Club Med sued the maker of a film titled *Club Dread* for trademark infringement, the court looked favorably on the filmmaker's *Rogers* defense. In determining whether there was a likelihood of confusion, the court faulted Club Med for failing to offer any evidence of the filmmaker's intent to confuse consumers. Most significant for our purposes, later on in the opinion, the court highlighted the evidence of such intent (or lack thereof) to hold that the filmmaker was "likely to succeed on its First Amendment claim under *Rogers* and its progeny." *Club Méditerranée, S.A. v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.*, No. 04–20273–CIV, 2004 WL 5589591, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2004).

201. Bhagwat, *supra* note 31, at 47.

202. Larry Alexander, *Free Speech and Speaker's Intent*, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 21 (1995).

203. See Richards, *supra* note 14, at 394 (describing these as the "two principal theories of the First Amendment . . . recognized by courts and scholars").

aries. There are three main reasons for using intent to assess the constitutionality of data privacy laws. First, from a practical perspective, judges can easily incorporate an analysis of intent into their larger consideration of the constitutionality of information privacy laws. Many other areas of the law focus on evidence of mental state, including some pockets of First Amendment jurisprudence.²⁰⁴ From criminal law to tort law, judges routinely must assess a defendant's inner thoughts in order to determine whether there has been a legal violation. Hence, there is a level of judicial comfort with examinations of intent. As mentioned, a doctrinal innovation is more likely to take root if it resembles other, more firmly established legal standards.²⁰⁵

Second, and more importantly, some consideration of intent makes sense when other values behind the First Amendment are considered. When speaker interests are taken into account, intent's relevance becomes clearer. Much of First Amendment law is justified by reference to speaker autonomy.²⁰⁶ Leslie Kendrick writes persuasively that it is improper to hold speakers strictly liable for speech-related harms precisely because of these autonomy concerns.²⁰⁷ A legal regime that did nothing to acknowledge speaker mental state would not show a proper regard for speaker interests in being able to freely and openly communicate.²⁰⁸

Third, some consideration of intent is necessary when punishing speech to avoid undesirable chilling effects. Strict liability for speech-related acts potentially stifles expression. By requiring some evidence of a culpable mental state before holding a speaker liable, the law pro-

204. Speaker mental state has been used by the Supreme Court as the constitutional fulcrum to reconcile some aspects of tort law with the First Amendment. In actions for libel, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the publisher's "actual malice" must be demonstrated; otherwise, the publisher's First Amendment interest prevails. *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 287–88 (1964); *Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell*, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). Similarly, the Supreme Court allows punishment of speech that incites violence but only after proof of specific intent. *Virginia v. Black*, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).

205. See *supra* notes 39–40 and accompanying text.

206. See, e.g., *Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos.*, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995); see also C. Edwin Baker, *Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech*, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 1000 (1978) ("[I]n a just social order the law must respect one's choice of speech content."); Robert Post, *Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence*, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1525 (1997) ("To compromise individual autonomy is to compromise the foundation of the democratic value of collective self-determination.")

207. Leslie Kendrick, *Free Speech and Guilty Minds* (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19 cmt. d (1998) ("Most courts express[] concern that imposing strict liability for the dissemination of false and defective information would significantly impinge on free speech . . .").

208. Kendrick, *supra* note 207, at 23.

vides notice to those whose speech may cause sanctionable harms and offers breathing space to those who (even if misguidedly) wish to speak out of noble intentions.²⁰⁹ Thus, when evaluating a data user's First Amendment defense, some consideration should be paid to the motivations guiding their data use.

These arguments have not gone unnoticed by some information privacy scholars. In assessing First Amendment limits on information-privacy protections, they recommend greater attention to speaker interests and speaker mental state (and less of a focus on the category of personal information used by the speaker).²¹⁰ For example, Jane Bambauer calls for an invigoration of the common law tort against "intrusion upon seclusion" to address modern privacy concerns.²¹¹ Under Bambauer's conception of the tort, certain observations of human activities would be prohibited if the observation "incorporates a sufficient amount of intent."²¹² Part of this approach would require scrutiny of the reasons behind the defendant's use.²¹³ Similarly, Daniel Solove urges courts to resolve the privacy/free expression boundary by adopting a more contextual approach.²¹⁴ He contends that by going beyond study of the data itself and determining which motivations for secondary data use are acceptable and which should prevent application of a First Amendment defense, privacy law could more effectively address consumer injury.²¹⁵

Ultimately, intent's role in representing speaker interests makes it a necessary part of balancing information privacy with free speech. But, for two main reasons, intent should not be a deciding factor in most cases and its consideration should be closely cabined. First, strenuous reliance on defendant intent offers little information for potential litigants. Requiring courts to address the data privacy/free speech balance by focusing exclusively on defendant motivation could yield unintended consequences.²¹⁶ Although courts may be comforta-

209. *New York Times Co.*, 376 U.S. at 279; Leslie Kendrick, *Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect*, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633 (2013).

210. Bambauer, *The New Intrusion*, *supra* note 31, at 207–08; SOLOVE, *supra* note 41, at 47.

211. Bambauer, *The New Intrusion*, *supra* note 31, at 231.

212. *Id.*

213. *Id.*

214. SOLOVE, *supra* note 41, at 47.

215. *See id.*; Daniel Solove, *The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure*, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 976–77 (2003).

216. For example, some legal authorities already maintain that all uses of online data are "commercial," suggesting a relatively free hand for government regulation. *E.g.*, *Trans Union Corp. v. FTC*, 245 F.3d 809, 818–19 (D.C. Cir. 2001); *see* McGeeveran, *supra* note 35, at 1163; Richards, *supra* note 14, at 1192. But this is completely at odds with the approach taken by the Supreme Court in *Sorrell*. The pharmaceutical marketers in that case were engaged in commercial activity, but the Court had no trouble asserting that important First Amendment inter-

ble intuiting a defendant's mental state, motive is hard for parties to assess in advance of litigation. In the trademark context, courts have given themselves wide latitude in determining bad faith.²¹⁷ The Second Circuit explains that "any evidence that is probative of intent to trade on the protected mark would be relevant to the good faith inquiry" necessary to show descriptive fair use.²¹⁸ Proof of intent to confuse consumers surely seems relevant to this inquiry, but courts sometimes construe bad faith more broadly and seize on any behavior that seems to transgress standard commercial practice. For example, a defendant's decision not to purchase a readily available license to use the trademarked song title "Sing, Sing, Sing" meant that it could not defend its use of the term "Swing, Swing, Swing" to sell golf clubs as fair use.²¹⁹ In another case, the court highlighted the "hidden" nature of metatag use of trademarks in rejecting a nominative fair-use defense for such behavior.²²⁰ Trademark holders suing for infringement and defendants seeking the safe harbors of descriptive or nominative fair use can find themselves on uncertain ground, not knowing how a court will elect to interpret "bad faith."

It is not only that "bad faith" is an amorphous category. Inquiries into motive are inherently messy.²²¹ Privacy scholars attempt to give content to an information-privacy mental-state requirement by using words like "deliberate," "obnoxious," and "a sufficient amount of intent," and contend that these terms will be concretized over years of common law development.²²² But these words seem plagued with the same inherent opacity as "bad faith."

Second, limiting the regulation of online data usage to acts done in "bad faith" could short circuit regulatory efforts. Such proof could be simply too hard for plaintiffs to come by and result in inevitable First Amendment victories for data collectors and users. History shows that intent requirements can sap the effectiveness of once promising legal innovations, particularly when it comes to calibrating privacy and free speech. One need look no further than the unrealized potential of longstanding common law privacy torts. Although states are divided on this issue, the general trend is for common law private dis-

ests were at stake, enough so to strike down Vermont's data privacy law. *Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.*, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011).

217. As Bill McGeveran notes, some courts have merely reused their analysis of the intent factor from the likelihood-of-confusion analysis to determine "good faith" for purposes of the fair-use defense. See William McGeveran, *Rethinking Fair Use*, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 86 (2008).

218. *E.M.I. Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopolos, Inc.*, 228 F.3d 56, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2000); see also MCCARTHY, *supra* note 183, at § 11:49 (discussing statutory descriptive fair use).

219. *E.M.I.*, 228 F.3d at 66-67.

220. *Tdata Inc. v. Aircraft Tech. Pub.*, 411 F. Supp. 2d 901, 910-12 (S.D. Ohio 2006).

221. West, *supra* note 47, at 638.

222. Bambauer, *The New Intrusion*, *supra* note 31, at 231-35.

closure claims to require proof of intent; negligent disclosures are insufficient to trigger liability.²²³ Intrusion upon seclusion claims also require intent.²²⁴ There is wide agreement that by requiring proof of intentional conduct, courts have eviscerated these causes of action.²²⁵ On the whole, plaintiffs simply cannot come up with, or lack the financial will to try to locate, sufficient evidence of intent to prosecute these actions. A similar emphasis on intent in balancing new data privacy protections with free speech concerns might produce parallel results, in effect immunizing all data uses that are not obviously committed in “bad faith.” The result would be a new round of measures designed to safeguard privacy interests that would founder on the rock of too-stringent mental-state requirements.

The better course is to presume that commercially motivated uses of personal data deserve less First Amendment protection than most other types of data usage. Apart from this presumption, speaker intent should be relevant only in exceptional cases. First Amendment claims for commercially motivated use of data should be greeted more skeptically than noncommercial ones. For example, in the *Sorrell* case,²²⁶ the use of prescribing data to market brand-name drugs to physicians was commercially motivated and, hence, should have triggered a lower tier of First Amendment review. This would have happened if the *Sorrell* court had assessed First Amendment interests in the same manner as intellectual property law. For example, under trademark doctrine, evidence of the speaker’s commercial motive causes courts to downplay First Amendment interests (in the form of the *Rogers* test).²²⁷ Employing commercial motive in this fashion makes some sense given the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine (ignored in *Sorrell*), which singles out speech made to propose a commercial transaction for a lesser brand of First Amendment review.²²⁸ It also follows intellectual property law’s longstanding precedent—whether through the right of publicity’s predominant purpose test, the first factor of copyright fair use, or application of trademark’s *Rogers* test—of downgrading First Amendment arguments made by commercially motivated speakers.²²⁹

223. *See, e.g.*, *Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co.*, 973 A.2d 702, 711 (D.C. 2009); *Hudson v. S.D. Warren Co.*, 608 F. Supp. 477, 481 (D. Me. 1985).

224. *Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch.*, 687 A.2d 1375, 1380–81 (Md. Ct. App. 1997); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.

225. *See Citron, supra* note 33, at 1828.

226. *Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.*, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).

227. *See, e.g.*, *E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc.*, 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008).

228. *E.g.*, *Bd. of Trs. of N.Y. v. Fox*, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).

229. With some justices calling for the general abandonment of the commercial speech doctrine, see 44 *Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island*, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); *id.* at 522–23 (Thomas, J., concurring in part), learning the particular lessons of intellectual property law with regard to com-

Apart from consideration of commercial intent, courts and legislators should limit the number of proscribed motivations eligible for consideration. A generalized inquiry into “bad faith” should be avoided. Instead, to avoid some of the problems that have plagued both trademark’s fair-use defenses and the common law privacy torts, unacceptable motivations for data collection should be specifically described in new information privacy statutes. One could envision proof of intent to defraud consumers automatically invalidating a data user’s free speech argument. Perhaps exceptions for collection and use of personal data motivated by scientific research or law enforcement purposes could be written into the new data-privacy laws. Outside of these clearly delineated boundaries, however, speaker motivation should not control when weighing information privacy against free speech.²³⁰ Instead, a third consideration needs to be added to the mix.

V. ASSESSING THE DEFENDANT’S SPEECH CONTRIBUTION

Thus far, we have considered two potential mechanisms for calibrating privacy with free speech. One trains its attention on the subject of the speech, i.e., the plaintiff’s original communicative contribution. Another scrutinizes the defendant’s motives. A third approach examines the defendant’s activity, not for evidence of bad faith or commercial motivation, but to assess the defendant’s contribution to public discourse. This approach is particularly prevalent in cases addressing First Amendment challenges to the right of publicity. Judicially devised doctrinal defenses evaluate the defendant’s speech contribution and determine free speech interests on that basis. Similar measures, considered in conjunction with the first two approaches, could offer a more balanced means for calibrating data privacy with free speech, one that would uphold the constitutionality of tailored limitations on the collection and use of online personal data.

A. IP’s Formalized Mechanisms for Assessing New Expression

All three intellectual property regimes, at times, scrutinize the defendant’s speech contribution to determine whether the property right at issue should yield to First Amendment interests. Trademark courts sometimes engage in an ad hoc balancing test designed to safeguard a defendant’s valuable expressive activities. In this test, a court scrutinizes the manner in which the defendant uses the plaintiff’s trade-

mercial motivation becomes all the more imperative if meaningful data privacy protection is to be realized.

230. Cf. Joseph Blocher, *Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning Means for the First Amendment 51* (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing value of clarity in First Amendment doctrine).

mark.²³¹ If it is recognized from the outset that the defendant is using the plaintiff's mark in a socially valuable, expressive way, the court will apply that understanding to the multifactor likelihood-of-confusion test.²³² One commentator describes this as “putting a discrete judicial finger on the scales in favor of the defendant.”²³³ This approach has been used to protect the unauthorized use of trademarks for purposes of parody and political speech.²³⁴

The right of publicity and copyright law adopt similar but much more formalized approaches. By potentially allowing celebrities and authors to block downstream expression, the right of publicity and copyright threaten new speech. In assessing this threat, courts have articulated two defenses meant to balance intellectual property interests with the First Amendment: transformativeness and newsworthiness.

1. *Transformativeness*

In assessing a First Amendment defense to a celebrity's charge of publicity-rights infringement, courts examine the “transformativeness” of the defendant's expressive activity. This is an independent and absolute defense to a prima facie violation of the right of publicity. First articulated over a decade ago by the California Supreme Court in *Comedy III Productions v. Saderup*:

[The transformativeness] inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one of the raw materials from which an original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in question.²³⁵

This is a broad standard for First Amendment immunity from suit. The *Saderup* court was careful to note that “transformative” contributions could take a wide range of forms and should not be limited to types of speech already well-recognized under the First Amendment, such as parody.²³⁶ Under the transformativeness analysis, unauthorized use of the persona in a new context or to make an unexpected expressive point is protected speech.²³⁷

231. 6 McCarthy, *supra* note 183, at § 31:139.

232. *Id.*

233. *Id.*

234. *E.g.*, Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1057 (10th Cir. 2008); MasterCard Int'l v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm. Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1050–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

235. *Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.*, 21 P.3d 797, 800–01, 809 (Cal. 2001).

236. *Id.* at 809.

237. Other courts have followed the California Supreme Court's lead. In determining whether an artist's representation of Tiger Woods was transformative, and therefore immune from an infringement suit, the Sixth Circuit ignored whether the artist intended to profit from Woods's celebrity. What was critical in determining the proper weight of the expressive interests at play was the presence of “sub-

The transformativeness standard is best understood in contrast to the previous mechanisms discussed for balancing intellectual property rights with free expression. In assessing transformativeness, a court analyzes the defendant's expressive project, not the type of expression first created by the plaintiff. This approach emphasizes the defendant's contribution to public discourse, not the legal entitlement held by the plaintiff. For example, when right-of-publicity defendants have appropriated celebrity personas and turned them into video game avatars, the courts have looked to the degree of change to the persona. When Sega took singer Kieran Kirby's likeness but also contributed a dissimilar physique, different costumes, and portrayed her as a twenty-fifth-century news reporter, the court concluded that a "transformation" had taken place.²³⁸ On the other hand, when video game manufacturers import college athletes into their games without somehow altering their appearance or expected role, transformation has not been found and the defendant's First Amendment argument fails.²³⁹

The transformativeness inquiry ignores considerations of intent. For example, when DC Comics published two comic books featuring characters with names and physical features similar to two real-life musicians, rockers Johnny and Edgar Winter, the Winters sued for violation of their right of publicity.²⁴⁰ DC Comics asserted a First Amendment defense.²⁴¹ In response, the Winters maintained that the comic book manufacturer had intentionally borrowed their likenesses to generate interest and stimulate sales.²⁴² The California Supreme Court explained that, in evaluating whether DC Comics' use was transformative and, consequently, protected under the First Amendment, such evidence of intent was "irrelevant."²⁴³ "The question is whether the work is transformative," the Court noted, "not how it is marketed."²⁴⁴ Similarly, when a video game manufacturer used the name and most popular song of the rock band The Romantics without

stantial transformative elements," which meant that the work was "entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment." See, e.g., *ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc.*, 332 F.3d 915, 951 (6th Cir. 2003).

238. *Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc.*, 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 59 (2006).

239. *In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.*, 724 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013); *Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.*, 717 F.3d 141, 166 (3d Cir. 2013) ("If we are to find some transformative element, we must look somewhere other than just the in-game digital recreation of Appellant."); *Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc.*, No. 10-03328 RS, 2012 WL 3860819 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012); *Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.*, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).

240. *Winter v. DC Comics*, 69 P.3d, 473, 476 (Cal. 2003).

241. *Id.*

242. *Id.* at 479–80.

243. *Id.* at 479.

244. *Id.*

permission, the determinative issue was the manufacturer's addition of "numerous creative elements," not the manufacturer's intent to trade on The Romantics' popularity.²⁴⁵

Transformativeness is also a consideration in copyright fair use and, as with the right of publicity, it requires an assessment of the defendant's speech contribution. Unlike the other three copyright fair-use factors, the first factor engages with the defendant's appropriation by inquiring into its "purpose and character." In considering the first factor, courts will inquire as to whether the defendant's use was "transformative." Copyright's transformation analysis has been used to immunize a broad array of unauthorized uses of copyrighted materials, particularly when those uses serve an entirely new purpose from the original. For example, the Google search engine's unauthorized creation of "thumbnail" copies—reduced, lower-resolution versions of the copyrighted, full-sized images featured on third-party Web sites—to create a searchable index was considered transformative and, therefore, fair use.²⁴⁶ So was an artist's unauthorized use of a photographer's "serene," black and white, naturalistic photographs of human subjects for a "crude and jarring" collage that incorporated color and distortion.²⁴⁷ On the other hand, unauthorized uses that do not employ the original work for a new purpose will not be deemed transformative. For example, the unauthorized photocopying of scientific journal articles for use in laboratories was not considered transformative and, therefore, did not constitute fair use.²⁴⁸ The Second Circuit concluded such copying is disfavored under the first factor, even if undertaken for "archival" purposes, because it "merely supersedes the objects of the original creation."²⁴⁹

2. *Newsworthiness*

In addition to the transformativeness defense, courts have created an alternative standard for reconciling the right of publicity with free speech interests. A newsworthiness defense exempts journalistic uses of celebrity, even when the journalism at issue consists only of mun-

245. *Romantics v. Activision Publ'g, Inc.*, 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762, 766 & n.3 (E.D. Mich. 2008).

246. *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).

247. *Cariou v. Prince*, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013).

248. *Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.*, 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1995). In other cases, courts have recognized exact copies made for a completely, separate purpose from the original as being transformative under the first fair-use factor. *E.g.*, *Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.*, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).

249. *Texaco*, 60 F.3d at 919–20 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

dane celebrity gossip.²⁵⁰ (Newsworthiness is not a consideration under copyright fair use.²⁵¹) Courts adjudicating California law have described this inquiry in an open-ended fashion, characterizing the analysis as whether the defendant's work "concerns a matter of public interest."²⁵² Although one court has attempted to limit the definition of public interest,²⁵³ others hold that even works of entertainment receive constitutional protection under the newsworthiness exception if they fulfill an "informative role."²⁵⁴

As with the transformativeness defense, the newsworthiness defense focuses on the nature of the defendant's contribution, not the character of the interest held by the plaintiff. The exemption applies to any use of celebrity personae in a presentation deemed to be "news."²⁵⁵ In this context, "news" has been defined generously, applying to much more than just conventional news sources and covering much more than political journalism.²⁵⁶ Courts have also been generous in determining which personas can be newsworthy, even suggesting in a recent case that "liking" something on Facebook is "newsworthy" to the user's circle of Facebook friends.²⁵⁷ By defining "news" in such a broad manner, courts train their First Amendment analysis on the defendant's use of the celebrity material rather than on the type of subject matter that the celebrity plaintiff is claiming an interest in.

250. *See, e.g.*, *Toffoloni v. LFP Publ'g Grp., LLC*, 572 F.3d 1201, 1208 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2009); *Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp.*, 870 F.2d 85, 87–88 (2d Cir. 1989).

251. The Supreme Court explicitly rejects any special First Amendment defense in copyright cases for news reporting. *Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enters.*, 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985); *see also Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc.*, 688 F.3d 1164, 1183 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Waving the news reporting flag is not a get out of jail free card in the copyright arena."). In fact, courts adjudicating fair-use defenses are quite willing to second-guess journalistic assertions regarding the importance of particular copyrighted material to a particular news article or broadcast. *E.g.*, *L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9*, 108 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997); *see Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra* note 36, at 18–21.

252. *Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc.*, No. 10-03328 RS, 2012 WL 3860819, at *6–*7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012); *Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.*, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *5–*6 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 8, 2010).

253. *See, e.g.*, *Hilton v. Hallmark Cards*, 580 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2009).

254. *Davis*, 2012 WL 3860819, at *7; *Gionfriddio v. Major League Baseball*, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400, 410 (2001); *Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc.*, 15 Cal. App. 4th 536, 543 (1993).

255. *Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co.*, 745 F.2d 123, 131–32 (2d Cir. 1984).

256. *E.g.*, *C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.*, 505 F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007); *Chapman v. Journal Concepts, Inc.*, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1084–85, 1096 (D. Haw. 2007); *Time Inc. v. Sand Creek Partners, L.P.*, 825 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D. Ind. 1993).

257. *Fraley v. Facebook*, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 804–05 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

Also like the transformativeness defense, in determining newsworthiness, the motive of the journalist/defendant is not a consideration. As explained by one court:

[T]he fact that a publication may have used a person's name or likeness solely or primarily to increase the circulation of a newsworthy article—and thus to increase profits—does not mean that the name or likeness has been used for trade purposes within the meaning of the statute Whether an item is newsworthy depends solely on the content of the article—not the publisher's motive to increase circulation.²⁵⁸

This can hold true even if the defendant obviously employed the plaintiff's persona for a commercial purpose. For example, when the *San Jose Mercury News* took quarterback Joe Montana's likeness not only for its front page, but also to sell commemorative posters, the court immunized the use under the newsworthiness exception.²⁵⁹

B. Evaluating the Speech Contributions of Data Users

Both the transformativeness and newsworthiness defenses focus on the defendant's expressive project. Adapting these defenses to information privacy law would represent a major legal innovation. As stated above, when the First Amendment and privacy protections conflict, courts currently look to categorize the information at issue instead of examining the context in which that information is being used.²⁶⁰ For the most part, this has resulted in First Amendment immunity for those using information others wish to keep private.²⁶¹

The right of publicity's focus on the defendant's speech contribution offers a critical missing ingredient for addressing the constitutionality of new information privacy laws. Perhaps publicity rights law has so much to offer in the data privacy context because of its own origin as a type of quasi-privacy interest.²⁶² By itself, merely categorizing the plaintiff's communication fails to engage with the real harms of data privacy. Similarly, exclusive or undue emphasis on the defendant's mental state could lead to unpredictable results, potentially immunizing virtually all third-party data usage from regulation. Although analyses of speech categories and speaker intent have their place in reconciling privacy with free expression, the transformation and newsworthiness tests offer a much-needed additional component to any such reconciliation. The tests provide a richer, normative framework for courts that allows for consideration of important, yet

258. *Messenger ex rel. Messenger v. Gruner Jahr Printing & Publ'g*, 727 N.E.2d 549, 552 (N.Y. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

259. *Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.*, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 642, 643 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).

260. *See supra* Part III.B.

261. *See supra* note 2 and accompanying text.

262. *See Mark Bartholomew, A Right is Born: Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern Lawmaking*, 44 CONN. L. REV. 301, 309–11 (2011).

heretofore neglected, interests. In short, they present a better opportunity for *balance*.

The transformativeness and newsworthiness tests have two particular qualities that recommend their application in the data-privacy context. The first is their track record of actually balancing free speech concerns with other societal interests, instead of simply demanding an overriding deference to the First Amendment. One criticism of existing privacy torts is that they are conceptualized at a level of individual injury.²⁶³ As a result, any court weighing that individual injury against the broader societal interest in free speech will always find the latter more compelling.²⁶⁴ Commentators argue that this has unfairly doomed the privacy torts to failure.²⁶⁵ For example, the common law tort for revealing private facts has largely been read out of existence by courts concerned with safeguarding the expressive output of the press. A media defendant invoking the larger social interest in free expression will always trump the single plaintiff complaining about violation of her individual privacy.²⁶⁶

This has not been the case, however, with the publicity-rights tort. In determining whether the newsworthiness defense is satisfied, courts have noted potential consequences not only for audiences for celebrity speech but also to the incentives necessary for creative presences like actors and musicians to function. Rather than simply asking if the defendant's expression is "news," the courts undertake a larger inquiry into whether the defendant's use of the celebrity persona represents a real counterpoint to the celebrity voice. Hence, the newsworthiness defense has been upheld when the speech at issue represents some sort of news reporting²⁶⁷ or "editorial opinion,"²⁶⁸ but it has been disallowed when the defendant's expression was designed to sell rather than inform.²⁶⁹

Second, by focusing on the defendant's speech contribution, the transformativeness and newsworthiness defenses allow for the consideration of multiple normative frames, including the autonomy interests of both listeners and speakers and the fairness concerns of consumers. Some have noted that the *Sorrell* decision is rooted in a single First Amendment perspective—one that views the market for

263. See Richards, *supra* note 28, at 1155.

264. See *id.*

265. West, *supra* note 47, at 628.

266. Diane L. Zimmerman, *Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren & Brandeis's Privacy Tort*, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983).

267. *New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc.*, 971 F.2d 302, 309–10 (9th Cir. 1992).

268. *Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.*, 255 F.3d 1180, 1185–86 (9th Cir. 2001).

269. *Fraley v. Facebook*, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 805 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

online speech as controlled by equally autonomous actors.²⁷⁰ Under what Shubha Ghosh labels the “classic liberal perspective,” the *Sorrell* Court viewed doctors, pharmaceutical marketers, and consumers as all equally capable of making informed decisions regardless of the marketers’ ability to use prescribing information to generate individually tailored commercial appeals. Under the liberal perspective, data-collecting businesses pose no threat to consumers because government actors can alert consumers to undesirable data collection practices, and consumers can simply opt out of such practices. As a result, there is little need for legal safeguards against data collection and use.

In contrast to the Court’s approach in *Sorrell*, in applying the transformativeness test, courts have demonstrated a nuanced recognition of the tradeoffs between free speech and other social interests. The expansive nature of the transformativeness test has encouraged courts to engage with free speech issues on multiple normative fronts. Rather than being limited to the liberal perspective, another First Amendment perspective, personal autonomy, is front and center in these discussions. For example, in evaluating the “transformativeness” of an unauthorized painting of Tiger Woods, the Sixth Circuit noted not only the First Amendment’s goal of advancing knowledge through “a free marketplace of ideas,” but also its “fulfillment of the human need for self-expression,” an autonomy interest.²⁷¹ Similarly, when a federal court recently had to determine the duration of publicity rights under New Jersey common law, a decision with direct implications for free speech, it noted that one of the rationales for recognizing a right of publicity remains its protection of “an individual’s interest in personal dignity and autonomy.”²⁷² The plaintiff was the purported beneficiary of Albert Einstein’s publicity rights under his will.²⁷³ The defendant, an advertiser that used Einstein’s image without permission, contended that whatever rights the beneficiary held, they were no longer valid since Einstein had been dead for more than fifty years.²⁷⁴ Ultimately, the court denied the plaintiff’s request for a right of longer duration, explaining that “the personal interest that is at stake becomes attenuated after the personality dies.”²⁷⁵ Hence, the court adopted an autonomy perspective, calibrating the temporal length of the right according to one’s personal interest in self-fulfillment.

270. Ghosh, *supra* note 79, at 705–06; Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? *The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS*, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012).

271. *ETW Corp v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc.*, 332 F.3d 915, 955 (6th Cir. 2003).

272. *Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Gen. Motors*, 903 F. Supp. 2d 932, 937 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

273. *Id.* at 933.

274. *Id.* at 941.

275. *Id.* at 937.

Courts have also evaluated the free speech/publicity rights balance from a fairness perspective, assessing the power dynamics of the different speakers and audiences involved. The *Sorrell* decision suggested that the only remedy for problematic speech (like individualized marketing based on pharmacy prescription data) is more speech, regardless of the costs to patients, prescribing doctors, or the Vermont health care system.²⁷⁶ The right of publicity's transformativeness test does not assume, however, that more speech is a cure all for any speech with socially deleterious consequences. Instead, it asks whether the speaker is truly making an expressive contribution. If not, the speaker loses First Amendment protection because it is not actually providing a competing voice. For example, when the Tenth Circuit had to decide whether right-of-publicity claims brought by major league baseball players for the unauthorized use of their names and likenesses on parody baseball cards should yield to the First Amendment, it determined whether the cards were transformative.²⁷⁷ In doing so, it considered the effect of its decision on the allocation of societal resources.²⁷⁸ Only after assuring itself that the supply of celebrity images for public discourse would remain robust, even after the defendant's unauthorized uses were allowed, did the court uphold the defendant's First Amendment defense.²⁷⁹

Relatedly, the "newsworthiness" defense responds to "fairness" concerns by allowing the press, in some circumstances, to balance out the communicative abilities of celebrities with a countervailing force. In assessing newsworthiness, courts indirectly inquire into fairness by asking whether the defendant's expression "concerns a matter of public interest" and is "informative."²⁸⁰ Newsworthy speech can be viewed as speech that potentially counters already established voices in the communicative marketplace. For example, judges show special solicitude for unauthorized use of celebrity press conferences or interviews, reasoning that the media serves an important function in disseminating information that the persona at issue would like to restrict or at least manage differently.²⁸¹

So how might the more balanced and defendant-focused approach to free speech concerns described above look in practice if applied to current initiatives to regulate online privacy? Some proposed "Do Not

276. See *Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.*, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011).

277. *Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n*, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (1996).

278. *Id.* at 272.

279. *Id.* at 974-75.

280. *Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc.*, No. 10-03328 RS, 2012 WL 3860819, at *6-*7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012); *Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc.*, 15 Cal. App. 4th 536, 543-44 (1993).

281. See, e.g., *Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd.*, 692 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1982); *Falwell v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd.*, 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1210 (W.D. Va. 1981); *Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp.*, 337 N.Y.S.2d 949, 953-55 (Sup. 1972).

Track” legislation would restrict the use of online search histories to create targeted advertisements.²⁸² Despite the apparent constitutionality of a “Do Not Call” registry,²⁸³ a law limiting online advertising would definitely raise free speech concerns.²⁸⁴ Other “Do Not Track” provisions limit the collection of information about a person’s online activities.²⁸⁵ This could produce free speech challenges, as well.²⁸⁶ A full description of how to evaluate the constitutionality of all pending data-privacy legislation is beyond the scope of this Article. Below is an initial sketch of a better, more balanced scheme, relying on the three approaches employed in intellectual property law and using potential “Do Not Track” legislation as its chief example.

In a preliminary analysis of new data-privacy laws, a court should consider the first two approaches discussed in this Article—categorization of the data at issue and evaluation of the data collector’s intent. Using these two approaches, courts should find some legislation prohibiting data collection and tracking uncontroversial. Certain data subject matters (financial information, health records) are already likely to be deemed “sensitive” and weighty enough to survive a First Amendment challenge. Similarly, proof of intent to defraud data subjects should render any free speech appeals null. Further, constitutional analysis would not be required.

Most cases will not involve such extreme examples. Instead, most online data use involves everyday, nonsensitive information, and most data collectors specify their collection practices in opaque terms of service rather than engaging in out and out fraud. Hence, additional First Amendment review will be needed. It should not be enough, however, to determine that the data collection at issue in these situations is “speech.” This was the move suggested by the Court in *Sorrell*, and it gave overwhelming deference to the expressive rights of data users and short shrift to both state and consumer interests. Rather than automatically validating the free speech interests of data miners and online advertisers because the information they collect seems less than sensitive and they do not act in “bad faith,” a court interrogating “Do Not Track” or another kind of data-privacy law should note the commercial motive behind such data collection and further review the law under an intermediate level of scrutiny.

282. Peter Swire, *Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data Protection vs. Data Empowerment*, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1400–02 (2012).

283. *Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC*, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).

284. Rosen, *supra* note 14, at 88; Swire, *supra* note 282, at 1400–01.

285. See Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the International Association of Privacy Professionals Second Annual Conference: The FTC and Consumer Privacy Protection (Dec. 7, 2010), available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/101207iapp.pdf.

286. Swire, *supra* note 282, at 1400–02.

The court should then examine how the data will be used by defendants, paying special attention to autonomy and fairness concerns. Autonomy concerns should rate low in a court's estimation of the free speech interests of most commercial data users. Rather than furthering a personal point of view, data mining is used simply to pinpoint consumer interests in the hopes of finding a viable marketing target. On the other hand, from the perspective of consumers, autonomy is the main justification for a "Do Not Track" regime. It prevents unwanted surveillance and revelations that are undesired and unintended. At the least, it allows consumers to choose just how their personal information should be exposed to others and what the particular audience for that exposure should be. Just as courts construing the right of publicity have chosen to weigh the autonomy interests of celebrities and downstream speakers in determining whether an unauthorized use is transformative or newsworthy, a similar approach should be undertaken with regard to tracking restrictions and free speech arguments.

Fairness concerns also need to be part of the decision, even though they were not considered in *Sorrell*.²⁸⁷ The newsworthiness defense concerns itself with power imbalances. Celebrity speakers wield immense power over the dissemination of their personas in society. A privilege for newsworthy uses of those personas is an attempt to inject a counterbalance to that power, making possible alternative and uncontrolled communications about public figures. Under a fairness perspective, it is important to recognize that, without protections like "Do Not Track," consumers have little opportunity to shape how their personal information is used by others. As discussed earlier, nonparticipation or resort to contractual safeguards is not a realistic option for those individuals seeking some protection from the efforts of online data collectors.²⁸⁸

A focus on the defendant's use of online data would not defeat all First Amendment challenges to data privacy laws. In some situations, the data user's autonomy interests may loom larger. Scientific research using collected individual data suggests greater autonomy concerns on the part of data users, as such users seek to use aggregated information to present important expressive content. Although a long way from practical implementation, technological innovations portend potential ways to give consumers more control over their data disclosures, regardless of the privacy policies of the Web sites they consult.²⁸⁹ If such technologies take hold, the fairness calculation between consumers and data collectors may need to be reconceived.

287. *Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.*, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011)

288. *See supra* Part II.C.

289. *See, e.g.*, Malcolm Burnley, *How to Protect Your Privacy Online*, ATLANTIC, June 2013 (describing browser add-ons that display icons informing online users as to

This speaks to a larger point about the need for an adaptable method for calibrating information privacy with the First Amendment. “Transformativeness” and “newsworthiness” are broad concepts. Rather than this ambiguity being a detriment, it permits a certain amount of flexibility as legal decision-makers respond to greater knowledge of existing technology. Whereas judges may once have viewed simply creating an avatar based on a real-life celebrity as transformative, this may no longer, by itself, represent a significant expressive contribution and, hence, merit less speech protection.²⁹⁰ Similarly, uses of personal data that once seemed innovative may become commonplace and, therefore, deserve less regulatory deference. The key is to implement a richer framework for balancing information privacy and free speech. Otherwise, despite the significant harms that can arise from data collection and use, First Amendment arguments will always legitimate such behavior. By borrowing from intellectual property’s playbook, information privacy law can support a constitutionally level playing field between consumers and commercial actors.

VI. CONCLUSION

There is an inherent tension between the desire to keep information private and the desire to share that information with others. Online technology amplifies the clash between the two desires by both allowing for more and more data to be compiled on individual consumers and by making it easier for that data to be repackaged and communicated to others. In figuring out how to resolve this tension, courts and legislatures do not need to reinvent the wheel. A similar tension exists between the legal system’s award of rights in intangible creations to individual actors and the need for downstream actors to utilize those creations. One side wants to hold on to information; the other wants to broadcast it to others. As a result, intellectual property law has developed and refined a variety of approaches for addressing free speech concerns.

One approach, best represented by copyright law, weighs free speech interests by focusing on the subject matter of the plaintiff’s communication. Another offers defendants a variety of speech-protect-

how each Web site visited will treat their data); Drew Olanoff, *Burn Note Comes Back with a Vengeance, Aims to Protect Your Private Messages with New Mobile Apps*, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 26, 2013) (discussing concept of “ephemeral messaging,” whereby emails, photos, and other shared data are automatically destroyed after a set period of time), available at <http://techcrunch.com/2013/03/26/burn-note-comes-back-with-a-vengeance-aims-to-protect-your-private-messages-with-new-mobile-apps/>; Ryan Tate, *Why Facebook Would Pay \$3 Billion for Snapchat (And Why It Shouldn’t)*, WIRED, Nov. 13, 2013 (discussing Snapchat and potential difficulties in integrating it with Facebook).

290. See *Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.*, 717 F.3d 141, 166 n.39 (3d Cir. 2013).

tive defenses that depend on whether the defendant acted under a proscribed motivation. A final approach evaluates the defendant's expressive output. Defenses for "transformativeness" and "newsworthiness" examine the societal contribution offered by the defendant's speech, forcing courts to analyze the costs and benefits of the defendant's expression from a variety of perspectives. These approaches for accommodating free expression are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they can all be implemented to offer a richer framework for constitutionally calibrating new data privacy laws. Moreover, these approaches, when considered as a group, offer balance, something lacking in the *Sorrell* decision and needed if courts are to uphold new and necessary data-privacy measures.