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“Don’t Confuse Patriotism with Nationalism”: A Literature Review and An Analysis of Two
Domains of Post-WWII Nationalism in Germany

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Abstract

This thesis includes a literature review that is an examination of nationalism and patriotism as psychological constructs as well as an analysis of two post-World War II domains of nationalism in Germany. In the psychological literature, there is a very important distinction to be made between the concepts of nationalism and patriotism. As nationalism and patriotism remain relevant areas of study by scholars due to more global citizens than ever before, it is vital to understand the distinction between the two. The goal of the literature review is to demonstrate how nationalism and patriotism differ substantially, how patriotism also takes on various forms, how major determinants such as socialization contribute to nationalism, how certain brain structures function with each construct, how these concepts change over time, and how both relate to the degradation of outgroups in very different ways. By clarifying factors that are significantly related to nationalism such as socialization and degradation of outgroups, the analysis of two post-World War II domains of nationalism in Germany builds upon this psychological foundation by considering how fairy tale films and soccer both foster and display nationalism. Using films, the goal of the analysis is to argue that nationalistic themes are depicted in fairy tales films and the game of soccer. The various facets include for the fairy tales, superiority over other countries and anti-capitalism, and for soccer, the intense emotional identification and the us versus them dynamic of exclusion. This thesis contends how nationalism is not a thing of a past; it is still present today.

Keywords: German, psychology, nationalism, patriotism

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**“Don’t Confuse Patriotism with Nationalism”: A Literature Review and An Analysis of
Two Domains of Post-WWII Nationalism in Germany**

Many countries are becoming increasingly aware of crimes occurring that appear to be linked to nationalism. For instance, in Germany, the country that will be analyzed in this thesis, a Google search of “nationalism crimes germany” brings up roughly eight million results that include recent stories discussing right-wing terror, a far-right problem, and its severity. The same Google search also creates results that explain Germany’s past of nationalism, which is a long, turbulent history. One Google search shows how nationalism can be assessed both in the past as well as modern day.

This presents first, the question of what differences lie between patriotism and nationalism because the two concepts both involve having pride for one’s country but when does the national pride go too far? The distinction between patriotism and nationalism is important to clarify since the outcomes related to each concept differ greatly. By knowing the specific differences in their relationships to other concepts such as the determinants that contribute to nationalism and the degradation of outgroups, science can guide society towards not only a better understanding of national identities but better prevention of violence and hate toward outgroups by using the information about the determinants.

Hence, the following thesis will begin with a literature review that investigates this distinction between nationalism and patriotism with five separate psychological studies that each clarify the differences in their own way. Starting with an evaluation of different types of patriotism by Schatz, Staub, and Lavine (1999), the literature review then moves onto Dekker, Malová, and Hoogendoorn (2003) analyzing the determinants of nationalism among other

relationships. This is followed by a study from Takeuchi et al. (2016) that investigates the brain correlations of gray matter density for both patriotism and nationalism. Then comes Davidov's (2011) study that assesses the stability of these concepts over time in numerous countries and Blank and Schmidt (2003) specifically explore the relationships in Germany between nationalism and patriotism and the degradation of outgroups.

Following this literature review, the next major section of the thesis is an analysis of two domains of post-World War II nationalism in Germany. The purpose of this section differs from the literature review's purpose of clarifying the distinction between patriotism and nationalism by focusing on Germany's displays of nationalism. This was intentional due to the positive relationship found by Blank and Schmidt (2003) between nationalism and the degradation of outgroups as well as anti-Semitism and the information from the Human Rights Watch's (2021) "World Report 2021: Germany" that states "crimes committed based on far-right and antisemitic ideology remain a serious concern" (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Both the results from Blank and Schmidt (2003) and the information from the Human Rights Watch (2021) indicate the importance behind investigating domains where nationalism is being displayed and fostered, especially as national socialization was shown to be a major contributor to nationalism by Dekker et al. (2003).

The two domains that are analyzed include fairy tale films or "Märchenfilme" and soccer or "Fußball." Both domains are evaluated using films since the film medium can have a powerful influence on its viewers (Blessing, 2010, p. 234). For the fairy tale films, "Das Zaubermännchen" (Engel, 1960) and "Wie heiratet man einen König" (Simon, 1969) are

analyzed, whereas soccer is investigated with a historical fiction film, “Das Wunder von Bern” (Wortmann, 2003), and a documentary, “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen” (Wortmann, 2006).

“Don’t Confuse Patriotism with Nationalism”: A Literature Review

Many researchers over the past 25 years have focused on finding the distinction between patriotism and nationalism to create a definition for these terms. This has caused the literature to have numerous interpretations as to where the boundary between nationalism and patriotism should lie exactly. Shedding light on the distinction between nationalism and patriotism as well as understanding national identities as a whole more clearly is becoming increasingly important in society today as the world currently has what is estimated as 80 million people displaced from their home of origin due to the ‘Refugee Crisis’ (International Rescue Committee, n.d.). This article seeks to not only clarify the distinction between nationalism and patriotism but also to discover how possible factors such as socialization, brain structures, the stability over time, and the degradation of outgroups may influence these psychological constructs in an individual.

The Various Differences Between Nationalism and Patriotism

Schatz, Staub, and Lavine (1999) sought out to evaluate patriotism in the forms of blind and constructive patriotism to investigate their relationships to nationalism. Schatz et al. (1999) defined blind patriotism as “a rigid and inflexible attachment to country, characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism” while constructive patriotism pertained to “an attachment to country characterized by ‘critical loyalty,’ questioning and criticism of current group practices” (p. 153). The definition of nationalism in this study involved one thinking their nation is superior when compared to others and having an

orientation that leans toward national dominance. To give a brief overview of this section, through two separate studies using self-report surveys, Schatz et al. (1999) found that blind patriotism had a stronger relationship with national attachment and a strong correlation to right-wing authoritarianism. They also uncovered that blind patriotism was positively related to a preference for symbolic behaviors (e.g., the flag), political conservatism, cultural contamination, pro-U.S information, and nationalism, and negatively related to constructive patriotism and political efficacy (Schatz et al., 1999).

Two studies were conducted in the United States using exploratory factor analysis in the first study and confirmatory factor analysis to validate and replicate the findings in the second study. The studies hypothesized first, that “although both blind and constructive patriotism would be positively related to degree of national identification and attachment, they would exhibit differential relations with the cognitive and behavioral criteria” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 155). Second, another hypothesis was that constructive patriotism and political efficacy, knowledge, information gathering, and activism would all be positively associated with one another. However, the third hypothesis expected blind patriotism to be negatively associated with these same variables. Moreover, Schatz et al. (1999) anticipated in the fourth hypothesis that “blind but not constructive patriotism would be positively associated with nationalism and with perceived threats to national security (national vulnerability) and national culture (cultural contamination)” (p. 156). Along with this, the fifth hypothesis expected that blind but not constructive patriotism would be positively correlated with conservatism. All of these five hypotheses were tested in both studies, but the second study by Schatz et al. (1999) assessed two additional hypotheses. These were that sixth, blind patriotism and a preference for symbolic

(e.g., the flag, the colors) instead of instrumental behaviors would be positively related and seventh, that “individuals with high scores for blind patriotism would show a preference for pro-U.S. over anti-U.S. information” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 164).

To test all of the hypotheses except the last two listed, the first study by Schatz et al. (1999) had 291 undergraduate students from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst participate for extra credit. 164 were female and 127 were male. The mean age of the participants was 20.35 and 86.9 percent of them identified as Caucasian, which displays the limitation of a non-representative sample. Others identified as Asian or Pacific Islander (3.8 percent), African American (2.7 percent), Hispanic (2.1 percent), American Indian (1.4 percent), and other (3.1 percent).

A self-report survey was administered to all participants. Schatz et al. (1999) measured blind and constructive patriotism using 19 items and national attachment using 17 items surrounding “positive identification with and feelings of affective attachment to country” (p. 156). Scores of national attachment were unit weighted and summed. Six items pertained to nationalism on the survey. Then, three items were asked for cultural contamination and another three items for political efficacy. For example, one statement that people rated on a scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree involved how the adoption of foreign culture practices would “trouble me because it might change or water down American culture too much” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 157). As for political efficacy, the statements measured dealt with people’s perceived power and ability to alter political policies. National vulnerability was also measured in participants using ten items about the United States and their belief that it is “vulnerable to foreign aggression and must constantly be on guard” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 157). A political

knowledge quiz was in the survey as well with six items previously used by other researchers in this field. Political information gathering and activism were assessed by asking participants to estimate the number of hours per week that they engage in political information and activism behaviors. Lastly, their political ideology was also recorded through self-ratings.

Using a constrained two-factor exploratory factor analysis, results from the first study by Schatz et al. (1999) found that “blind and constructive patriotism represent distinct constructs,” meaning that there was support for the first hypothesis in that both concepts exhibit differential relations with the cognitive and behavioral criteria. Moreover, findings showed that although both blind and constructive patriotism were positively associated with national attachment scores, they are expressed in different ways by participants. Along with this, Schatz et al. (1999) discovered that “the relationship between blind patriotism and national attachment was significantly stronger than the relationship between constructive patriotism and national attachment” (p. 160). This indicates that the terms share a core patriotic sentiment but each differ in how the sentiment affects an individual’s cognitions and behaviors.

Another finding was that blind patriotism and political conservatism were positively related to one another, which was in support of the fifth hypothesis. The second hypothesis that constructive patriotism and political efficacy, knowledge, information gathering, and activism would be positively related, and blind patriotism would be negatively related to these variables was also supported by the findings. Political efficacy and political information gathering were found to be significant positive predictors for constructive patriotism. On the other hand, cultural contamination was a significant negative predictor for constructive patriotism but a significant positive predictor, along with nationalism and national vulnerability, for blind patriotism. These

findings are consistent with the findings in the next study that involve right-wing authoritarianism and blind patriotism. Support was provided to all of the proposed hypotheses from Schatz et al. (1999) that were analyzed in this first study.

A second study was conducted by Schatz et al. (1999) to replicate and validate the findings of the first study as well as examine both types of patriotism in the context of symbolic behaviors and right-wing authoritarianism. 253 undergraduate students in psychology classes at Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi and Northern Illinois University participated in the study. 199 were female and 53 were male along with one person in the study who did not specify their sex. The large majority of the participants (60.9 percent) were European American. The study was completed in large groups by participants from Northern Illinois University and at home by participants from Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi.

A self-report survey was administered to collect data. Most of the variables were measured identically to how they were in the first study. Schatz et al. (1999) assessed the new variable of symbolic versus instrumental behaviors using 14 choice items involving one option that represented a symbolic behavior and the other an instrumental behavior. An example of a choice item for a symbolic behavior was that “children should learn to say the Pledge of Allegiance in school” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 165). As for instrumental behavior, one particular choice item discussed how “children should learn about our system of government in school” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 165). A different measurement of eight items was used for political knowledge than in the first study by Schatz et al. (1999) since they expanded the constraints of the variable to include their interest and behavior as well as their knowledge. The participants had their information-processing preference analyzed through four pro-U.S., four anti-U.S., and

two neutral article titles that were presented to participants. After being presented with the article titles, Schatz et al. (1999) asked participants to place an X by the article title that they would be most interested in reading. By the end, all titles were rank-ordered by participants and given an interest rating ranging from definitely would not like to read this article at one to definitely would like to read this article at seven. The last new measurement added to this study was a right-wing authoritarianism scale by Altemeyer (1998) as cited in Schatz et al. (1999) (p. 166).

Results of the second study replicated and validated the findings of the first study by Schatz et al. (1999). Blind patriotism was positively associated with the conservative political ideology and the American Republican political party identification. Furthermore, the relationship between right-wing authoritarianism and blind patriotism was strongly correlated. In contrast, constructive patriotism was not associated with either right-wing authoritarianism or conservative political ideology. Support was found for the sixth hypothesis involving symbolic versus instrumental behaviors. This sixth hypothesis that blind patriotism and a preference for symbolic (e.g., the flag, the colors) instead of instrumental behaviors would be positively related was uncovered in that blind patriotism “was positively associated with the belief that symbolic behaviors were more important to the country than instrumental behaviors” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 167). Schatz et al. (1999) also discovered that “individuals with high blind patriotism scores concern themselves with abstract aspects of development and attachment to their country” (p. 167). There was no association found between constructive patriotism and either symbolic or instrumental pro-U.S. behaviors.

However, a relationship was discovered between constructive patriotism and political knowledge, interest, and behavior that Schatz et al. (1999) predicted. Despite both types of

patriotism showing an increased interest in politics, Schatz et al. (1999) found that “only constructive patriotism was positively associated with greater knowledge about politics and more frequent politically relevant behavior” (p. 168). Furthermore, the study indicated that blind patriotism is related to an increased preference for pro-U.S. information. Hence, the lower the blind patriotism score, the weaker the preference for “exposure to information that glorifies rather than criticizes the country” (Schatz et al., 1999, p. 168). Overall, the differences between constructive and blind patriots found by Schatz et al.’s (1999) second study indicated that blind patriots are more likely to identify with the American republican political party and a conservative ideology, be linked to right-wing authoritarianism, prefer symbolic behaviors as well as praise in articles about their country, be less knowledgeable about politics, and engage in political behaviors less frequently.

One similarity between the two studies conducted by Schatz et al. (1999) was the population sample. Although several universities from across the United States were utilized, all participants in both studies were undergraduate students. Moreover, the majority of students in both studies were Caucasian. The data collection method for both studies was also the same since both studies used a self-report survey. Moreover, despite having two more additional hypotheses and three additional variables tested in the second study, relatively similar hypotheses and variables were examined. Lastly, both studies used a type of factor analysis. Differences were also present between the studies conducted by Schatz et al. (1999) in that nationalism was looked at as a variable in the first study more so than it was in the second study. Similarly, although the second study replicated and validated the findings of the first, it investigated symbolic versus

instrumental behaviors, more facets of political knowledge, and right-wing authoritarianism, which were not assessed in the first study.

By combining the information from the two studies, the findings are more attractive because the second study used confirmatory factor analysis that validated the findings of the first study, which used an exploratory factor analysis. This replication of the findings in a second study makes the findings more reliable as a whole, even despite the many limitations of the studies that include only having undergraduate students in the sample, a largely Caucasian sample, and only taking place within one country. The discovery that there is an empirical distinction between blind patriotism and constructive patriotism is now backed by two consecutive studies as well as the finding that blind patriotism predicts increased nationalism. These results enhance the literature's understanding of the relationship between patriotism and nationalism. This is notable since this Schatz et al. (1999) study has set a precedent for many other studies to come such as Dekker, Malová, and Hoogendoorn (2003).

The Determinants of Nationalism

Similar to how Schatz et al. (1999) strived to evaluate patriotism, Dekker et al. (2003) studied nationalism to present a clear, consistent terminology for the term and to identify its main determinants using three empirical studies in different states to provide various contexts. To give a brief overview of what is to come in this section, Dekker et al. (2003) conducted three studies in three separate countries to analyze nationalism in terms of what factors determine it, finding that there is empirical evidence for a hierarchy involving national attitudes. Dekker et al. (2003) also discovered that auto-stereotypes had the most effect on national attitude by being a positive predictor for it along with a few other factors including national emotions and attitude toward

outgroups. Evidence was also gathered, showing that the highest stage of nationalism is separate from the proposed and supported hierarchy.

Dekker et al. (2003) tested seven hypotheses that will be reviewed here. First, they hypothesized that there are one neutral (national feeling) and five positive attitudes (national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, and nationalism). Second, a prediction was made that these national attitudes reside in a cumulative hierarchy from national feeling to liking to pride to preference to superiority to nationalism. Third, the hypothesis by Dekker et al. (2003) expected that if no positive national attitudes were present, then negative national attitudes such as national alienation, national shame, national disgust, and national hate would be found instead. Fourth, the hypothesis was that a distinction can be made between several different positive or negative “regional-national” attitudes while the fifth hypothesis involved international attitudes and predicted that these attitudes can be distinguished by “particular regions of the globe, its people, the world, and humankind” (Dekker et al., 2003, p. 348). The sixth hypothesis was that individuals are likely to “combine moderate positive attitudes on one level with positive attitudes on another level” (Dekker et al., 2003, p. 348). Lastly, the seventh hypothesis by Dekker et al. (2003) also predicted a nationalism explanatory hypothesis, in that when an individual has developed nationalism, it can be explained by all of the following variables:

intense positive national emotions that were previously experienced; national behaviors with a high intensity that were previously performed; extremely positive beliefs about one’s country and people; highly negative attitudes toward national or ‘ethnic’ minorities living within the country, and other foreign countries and people; a strong concern about

one's (family's) political, economic, social, and cultural future; and a very low sense of positive self-identity (p. 353).

All of these hypothesized variables that explain a person's nationalism are then influenced by aspects of a person's national socialization, such as "the frequency and intensity of national rituals as well as national (or nationalistic) education, information, and/or persuasion from various socializers" (Dekker et al., 2003, p. 353).

To test the first two hypotheses proposed, the first study in the Netherlands by Dekker et al. (2003) was conducted on 849 secondary school students, ages 15 to 18, with Dutch nationalities that were invited to participate in the study through their schools. There was no clarification in the study regarding how the participants obtained their Dutch nationalities. Although Dekker et al. (2003) included all school types and denominations in the data sampling, "students from Catholic and Protestant Christian schools and middle general-education schools were slightly overrepresented" in comparison to students from other schools such as non-confessional public schools (p. 354). An anonymous self-report survey that lasted 50 minutes was administered to collect data during school hours. All classes were included except for history/constitution and society classes to limit potentially biased responses towards being more socially desirable. The survey measured national attitudes (national feeling, national liking, national preference, national superiority, nationalism, national alienation, national shame, national disgust, and national hate) with 14 statements.

Correlation coefficients were computed with 567 participant scores. Using a Mokken scale analysis, results indicated that "with the exception of the liking-preference correlation, the correlations between the different attitudes at the shortest distance were higher than those

between attitudes at a larger distance in the hypothesized hierarchy” (Dekker et al., 2003, p. 356). Hence, the first and second hypothesis tested in the first study were supported. Distinctions could be made so the first hypothesis was supported, but the second hypothesis was only partially supported since the liking-preference correlation was not high.

To assess nationalism in another type of state, another study was completed in Slovakia, a newly-formed independent country. In this second study, Dekker et al. (2003) investigated the first and second hypotheses as well as the seventh hypothesis regarding nationalism and its development. Students from the Political Science Department of Comenius University conducted interviews with 635 participants in their homes to gather data. The sample was not representative of the Slovakian population since half of the participants were ages 14 to 20 and fewer men than women were interviewed. However, this was due to the major obstacle that Dekker et al. (2003) faced regarding the Slovak Ministry of Education forbidding them from collecting data in secondary school classes. A self-report survey similar to the first study on national attitudes was used. Twenty-six items involving Slovak national emotions, national auto-clichés, auto-stereotypes, national behaviors, negative attitude toward outgroups, concern about one’s future, sense of positive self-identity, and national socialization were measured.

Using multiple regression analysis, Dekker et al. (2003) discovered that “national emotion had the most effect on national attitude” with national auto-stereotypes, attitude toward outgroups, and positive attitude toward nationalistic leaders, described as charismatic leaders who have concentrated on national education and communication, following closely behind (p. 358). Results indicated support for the first and second hypotheses that positive national attitudes can be distinguished empirically and that these positive attitudes do form the proposed

cumulative hierarchy. Moreover, the seventh hypothesis on explaining the determinants of nationalism was supported partially since auto-clichés, previously performed national behaviors, concern about the future, and sense of positive self-identity were not strong predictors for a person's positive national attitude in the way that national emotions, auto-stereotypes, attitude toward outgroups, and national socialization were.

To test these conclusions from this study in an additional type of state, Dekker et al. (2003) conducted another study in Basque Country in northern Spain. In the third study, all seven proposed hypotheses were tested by Dekker et al. (2003). The sample was 774 secondary school students ages 14 to 18 who were contacted through their schools. Twenty-five schools “were selected on the basis of school type: private or public school, linguistic model of the school, and the geographic location” (Dekker et al., 2003, p. 358). Data was collected through a self-report survey that was administered to all participants with 37 positives and eight negative Basque regional-national items. Results exhibited support for the second hypothesis of a hierarchy, but unlike what was predicted, the attitude of regional-national liking was more common among participants than the attitude of regional-national feeling. Dekker et al. (2003) believed this was likely the effect of there being no independent Basque country, since Basque country is located in Spain, speaks its own Basque language, and desires to secede from Spain. Consequently, high correlations were discovered between all of the individual attitude subscales, except for with preference and superiority, but especially between nationalism and the neutral attitude of regional feeling. A Mokken scale analysis showed the trend that despite the exception of preference and feeling/nationalism, “correlations between attitudes at the shortest distance

were higher than those between attitudes at a larger distance” in the proposed hierarchy (Dekker et al., 2003, p. 359).

Along with this, respondents’ answers to 25 items regarding Spain provided evidence against Dekker et al.’s (2003) predictions that participants were more likely to have the attitude of national liking than national feeling, despite two nationalism items that provided support for the hypothesis. The most important finding was that the nationalistic attitude had high correlations with several attitudes such as feeling, liking, and pride that are lower in the cumulative hierarchy. Dekker et al. (2003) believed “the high levels of support for three of the nationalistic items (Spanish blood, common origin, part of one Spanish family)” were the reason behind this finding (p. 361).

With a Mokken scale analysis program, Dekker et al. (2003) concluded that since the data gave evidence for the proposed hierarchy regarding national feeling, liking, pride, preference, and superiority but not nationalism, the highest stage of nationalism is separate from this hierarchy and should be treated as being its’ own phenomenon. Support was found for the first hypothesis since Basque youth were able to be categorized into five different groups based on their attitudes. Results also displayed support for the sixth hypothesis that individuals would combine regional-national attitudes with positive national attitudes. However, there was no substantial support for the expectation that “very positive or extremely positive regional-national attitudes exclude such positive national attitudes” (Dekker et al., 2003, p. 363). Since “the numbers of respondents with negative Spanish attitudes tended to increase as their positive Basque attitudes increased,” Dekker et al. (2003) found support for their hypothesis that negative national attitudes and very positive regional-national attitudes are combined by individuals (p.

363). It is important to note here that due to the specific context of Basque country, these findings will likely not generalize very broadly.

As for the seventh hypothesis, a backward regression analysis was completed. The analysis included the explanatory variables of “attitudes toward Spain (national liking, national shame, and nationalism), the value of maintenance of Basque culture, the auto-cliché of increase in political liberties, and the socialization variables of reading newspapers and having heard nationalistic statement” (Dekker et al, 2003, p. 363). Dekker et al. (2003) found that these factors accounted for 64 percent of the total explained variable in the attitude of Basque nationalism, showcasing that all four of the explanatory variables analyzed are key determinants for nationalism.

Similarities between all of these studies conducted by Dekker et al. (2003) were the method of data collection and the lack of a representative data sample. Each study utilized a self-report to measure variables and gather data to analyze. Furthermore, the limitation of each study was the population sample since they all involved a very specific group of people, which could make the results less generalizable. Differences were also apparent in that each study gathered data in a different state (the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Basque country) and the second study was not conducted with the same population sample as the other two (secondary school students). These differences are important to consider because having different populations studied in different states may make the findings less generalizable. Additionally, the first study examined only the first two hypotheses, whereas the two other following studies investigated the nationalism explanatory hypothesis among others. The third study had substantially more hypotheses that were tested than the other two studies by Dekker et al. (2003). Each study used a

variety of different data regression techniques such as Mokken scale analysis, multiple regression analysis, and more to find results. There was not one signal method of regression that was completed in each of the three separate studies. However, the first and third study both used Mokken scale analysis as well as Pearson's correlation coefficients.

By combining the information from all three of these studies, the findings are more attractive since the results show that there is significant support across different types of government states and historical backgrounds for being able to distinguish between national attitudes and having a cumulative hierarchy ranging from national feeling to liking to pride to preference to superiority. However, the lack of support for nationalism in this hierarchy and the conclusion by Dekker et al. (2003) in the third study that nationalism is a separate phenomenon itself indicate the severity of variables that contribute to the development of nationalism. As a result, the findings regarding the seventh hypothesis in the second and third study indicate that national emotions, auto-stereotypes, attitude toward outgroups, and national socialization all contribute to the attitude development of nationalism in individuals. This was displayed through the 64 percent of this variance that was determined by these same concepts of national emotions (national liking, national shame, and nationalism), the maintenance value of Basque culture (auto-stereotypes), the auto-cliché of political liberties (attitude toward outgroups), and socialization through hearing nationalistic statements as well as reading newspapers (national socialization).

The findings in the Dekker et al. (2003) study are in agreement with the literature as a whole on nationalism and patriotism. It expands upon the investigation that was conducted by Schatz et al. (1999). While Schatz et al. (1999) analyzed constructive patriotism, blind

patriotism, and nationalism, this study by Dekker et al. (2003) went further to distinguish six national attitudes that correspond with the three concepts. Constructive patriotism appears to be related to national feeling, liking, and pride. Blind patriotism is associated with national preference and nationalism corresponds to national superiority and nationalism.

The Brain Associations with Nationalism and Patriotism

As these associations have been solidified and technology has progressed further, researchers such as Takeuchi et al. (2016) are proposing new lines of research with questions that seek to discover how patriotism and nationalism function within the brains of individuals. Takeuchi et al. (2016) studied nationalism and patriotism in the brain using differences in gray matter structure. The purpose was to be the first study to assess nationalism and patriotism in terms of their associated brain structures to further the literature's understanding of these phenomena. To explain briefly what is to come in this section, Takeuchi et al. (2016) assessed the brain in-depth to discover differences in gray matter for nationalism and patriotism. For nationalism, Takeuchi et al. (2016) found that individuals with higher nationalism scores show a greater gray matter density (rGMD) in their posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) as well as their orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), which for the PCC is similar to what the brain scans displayed for individuals with low compassion and for the OFC is similar to the images of those who had higher feelings of superiority over others. As for patriotism, the major findings were that individuals with higher quality of life (QOL) displayed higher patriotism and that individuals with high patriotism scores show less rGMD in their rostralateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC).

Takeuchi et al. (2016) hypothesized that individual nationalism would be associated with differences in the social-related areas and limbic neural mechanisms of the brain such as the

amygdala while individual patriotism would be associated with areas of the brain such as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) that are relevant to a person's well-being. The study by Takeuchi et al. (2016) included 777 participants with 433 men and 344 women and an average age of 20.7 years. All of the participants were right-handed and either in university, college, postgraduate studies, or one year removed from these institutions. The participants were invited to partake in this study "as part of an ongoing project investigating associations among brain imaging, cognitive functions, aging, genetic, and daily habits" (p. 2).

As studies that conduct an exploratory whole-brain search typically have a very low statistical power, a whole-brain analysis was conducted on participants to test this hypothesis using a neuroimaging technique called voxel-based morphometry (VBM) to assess the regional gray matter (GM) density (rGMD). Along with this neuroimaging technique, Takeuchi et al. (2016) utilized a National Identity Scale with a five-point Likert scale to measure nationalism and patriotism. Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrix was also used to measure intelligence and "adjust for the effect of general intelligence on brain structures" to ensure a credible analysis (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 3). Several additional questionnaires such as the Temperament Character Inventory, Beck Depression Inventory, the Narcissistic Personality Inventory, the Quality of Life (QOL) measure, and the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory were also administered to assess various factors respectively like cooperativeness, depression, sense of superiority, positive feelings, and aggressiveness. Data was collected from the MRI by taking "high-resolution T1-weighted structural images" and pre-processed using Statistical Parametric Mapping software (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 3).

Using multiple regression analysis, Takeuchi et al. (2016) found that significantly higher nationalism scores were given by males whereas sex had no association with patriotism. Results indicated that “the nationalism score was significantly and positively correlated with the feelings of superiority score and trait anger score and was significantly and negatively correlated with the cooperativeness score” (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 4). For patriotism, a significant, positive correlation with the average QOL, assessing positive feelings, was found as well as a weak but significant, positive correlation with the social acceptance vs. social intolerance score. Both patriotism and nationalism had no relationship with negative emotions such as depression or suicidal ideation.

Takeuchi et al. (2016) discovered partial support for the proposed hypothesis involving nationalism in that “participants with a greater sense of nationalism showed greater rGMD in areas of [posterior cingulate cortex] PCC and [orbitofrontal cortex] OFC and the smaller rGMD of the area in the right amygdala” (p. 7). To simplify, this finding suggested that high nationalism scorers display greater rGMD in their PCC, which is similar to the displays of low compassion in this area. Hence, those with low compassion and higher nationalism had greater rGMD in a particular area of their PCC, leading to the display of the “psychological characteristics of nationalists including their lack of compassion, e.g., ... intolerance to minorities, xenophobia, and ethnic violence” (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p.7). Moreover, participants with high nationalism scores also had greater rGMD in their OFC, which was similar to the images of the OFC in participants with higher feelings of superiority over others. This finding suggested that those with higher feelings of superiority over others and higher nationalism had greater rGMD in this area of their OFC, which is in agreement with “the definition of

nationalism (a positive evaluation of one's own group, which is inherently related to the derogation of others)" (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 8).

Along with the greater rGMD displays in the PCC and OFC of those with high nationalism, Takeuchi et al. (2016) found an association in the amygdala but this time, with smaller rGMD. Since participants with smaller rGMD in their amygdala had higher suicide ideation scores and participants with higher nationalism displayed similar small rGMD in this area, Takeuchi et al. (2016) stated that "subjects with higher nationalism may have neural mechanisms that overlap with those of subjects with suicide ideation" (p. 8). Furthermore, despite having no association with an rGMD cluster of any size, individuals with higher nationalism expressed more anger traits. In summary, evidence was uncovered that shows there are distinct differences between the brains of nationalists and patriots.

As for the proposed hypothesis on patriotism, Takeuchi et al. (2016) found full support. Results showed a significant negative correlation between patriotism score and the rGMD in the rostralateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC). To further explain, this means that "participants with higher patriotism have smaller rGMD in RLPFC, and this may be because participants with higher subjective well-being had higher patriotism and smaller rGMD in RLPFC" (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 8). Hence, those with high patriotism scores and high well-being had small rGMD in their RLPFC. Another finding was that subjects with higher quality of life (QOL) also displayed higher patriotism than those with lower QOL. Moreover, high patriotism scorers showed high feelings of security, high self-enhancement, and high attachment to one's father, which the literature "associate[s] with better moods, higher social skills, less selfishness, and less problematic behaviors" (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 8). Thus, individuals that classify as patriots, or

a person who has pride in one's nation that is independent of "comparisons with other countries," demonstrated not only higher social acceptance but greater subjective well-being (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 1).

This study by Takeuchi et al. (2016) contributes to the literature as a whole since it is the first to examine specific brain structures concerning nationalism and patriotism. Hence, more studies should be conducted to replicate these findings to ensure the findings' validity, reliability, and generalizability. Replicating the findings of Takeuchi et al. (2016) will also account for any error in the study that may have occurred.

The Changing Nature of Nationalism and Constructive Patriotism

Just as Takeuchi et al. (2016) were the first to conduct a study of the brain and patriotism along with nationalism, Davidov (2011) was one of the first researchers to conduct a longitudinal test involving the stability of patriotism and nationalism over time in several different countries. Davidov (2011) conducted a longitudinal test involving twenty-two countries and their respective participants' scores at three total time points of nationalism and constructive patriotism, with two of the time points in 1995 and then one in 2003. The purpose of this study was to provide valid measurements as to how these relevant concepts may change over time. This was done to ensure social scientists have more information regarding the equivalence of nationalism and constructive patriotism over time. To clarify briefly what will be concluded in this section, Davidov (2011) found that a change did occur between 1995 and 2003 for both nationalism and constructive patriotism (CP). A total of half of the countries underwent significant changes in nationalism and approximately 80 percent of the countries experienced significant changes involving their CP.

Davidov (2011) relied on the definition of nationalism that states “an idealization of the nation... the conviction of one’s own national superiority and the generalized positive judgment of one’s own nation” (Blank and Schmidt, 2003, as cited in Davidov, 2011, p. 89). For a definition of patriotism, Davidov (2011) turned to research by Easton (1975) and described the concept as rejecting “an idealization of the nation” and reflecting “a constructive and critical view of it (Easton, 1975, as cited in Davidov, 2011, p. 89). It is important to understand what definitions Davidov (2011) utilized for these terms since multiple definitions exist. Davidov (2011) expected that a change in national attachment would occur between 1995 and 2003, causing it to be able to be computed by analyzing the International Social Survey Program’s (ISSP) national identity data for each of the 22 countries (Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, West Germany, East Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United States of America).

To test this hypothesis, data was used from the ISSP’s National Identity Module two newest releases in 1995 and 2003. Although 24 total countries were in the 1995 data set and thirty-five countries were in the 2003 data set, Davidov (2011) used the 22 countries that were in both data sets to inspect change in nationalism and constructive patriotism (CP). 55,370 total respondents from 22 countries participated. 28,257 were interviewed in the 1995 study and similarly, 27,113 in the 2003 study. Five questions were asked to participants with two of them measuring nationalism and three of them involving CP. The CP questions were measured on a four-point scale and the nationalism questions were assessed with a five-point scale. To interpret the data that was gathered, Davidov (2011) compared construct means over time and interpreted

the data using three levels of invariance: configural, metric, and scalar. Each of these levels of invariance was needed to test for any invariance in the study to ensure that the comparisons being made were valid and reliable.

Results of the Davidov (2011) study supported the hypothesis that a change would occur between the two distinct times in respect to both nationalism and CP. Davidov (2011) found that 11 countries had a significant change in their mean level of nationalism between 1995 to 2003. In Hungary, Russia, and Slovakia, the mean level of nationalism increased. The Philippines also exhibited a positive, significant change over time similar to these three countries in their mean level of nationalism, but it could not be interpreted as significant as the scalar invariance was not “established overtime for this construct” (Davidov, 2011, p. 96).

Furthermore, Davidov (2011) gave additional support for the hypothesis surrounding nationalism because eight countries had a mean level of nationalism that decreased between 1995 and 2003. These countries were: Austria, Bulgaria, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. As for CP, results found that a significant change occurred in 18 countries (Davidov, 2011). In eight countries, CP increased between 1995 and 2003. These countries included: Australia, Great Britain, Hungary, the Philippines, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, and the USA. While in ten other countries, CP decreased significantly over this time-span. Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, West Germany, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, and Slovakia were these countries. Hence, as 50 percent of the countries experienced significant changes in nationalism and roughly 80 percent of the countries underwent significant changes in CP, the study by Davidov (2011) concluded that nationalism, as well as CP, are concepts that seem to be able to experience change over time. The literature as a whole has

lacked longitudinal studies so to the best of my knowledge, Davidov (2011) has been one of the first studies to investigate the macro-level changes of patriotism and nationalism over time by using specific comparability measurements.

Nationalism, Patriotism, and Degradation of Outgroups in Germany

To take a closer look at nationalism and patriotism in Germany since the next portion of this paper will be focusing on this country's nationalism, a study by Blank and Schmidt (2003) will uncover how outgroups tend to be treated when nationalism and patriotism are at the forefront. Blank and Schmidt (2003) sought to answer numerous questions involving national identity, nationalism, patriotism, and the degradation of foreigners as well as minorities. The purpose was to explore the following concerns:

Can nationalism and patriotism, as specific forms of support for one's nation, be conceptually and empirically distinguished from national identity? How common are nationalism and patriotism in Germany? Is there a negative association between nationalism and attitude toward minorities and foreigners, and a positive one between patriotism and attitude toward minorities and foreigners? Is national identity, in its impact on the degradation of 'others,' influenced by the two types of attachment to one's country? Can we distinguish between different types of nationalism and patriotism? (Blank & Schmidt, 2003, p. 290).

To give a brief overview of this section, Blank and Schmidt (2003) discovered that national identity is the general concept with nationalism and patriotism as subdimensions. The study by Blank and Schmidt (2003) also found that despite no significant differences between the former East and West German resident subsamples, nationalism was positively related to the

degradation of foreigners as well as anti-Semitism while patriotism was negatively related to these same variables.

To assess these questions, first, Blank and Schmidt (2003) hypothesized that the higher the positive national identity of an individual, the higher their degree of nationalism would be. Similarly, they predicted a second hypothesis that the higher the positive national identity in a person, the higher their degree of patriotism would also be (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). The third and fourth hypotheses involved nationalism, the degradation of foreigners, and the degradation of Jewish citizens specifically. The third hypothesis was that “the higher the degree of nationalism, the stronger the degradation of foreigners” and the fourth hypothesis was that “the higher the degree of nationalism, the stronger the degradation of Jewish citizens” (Blank & Schmidt, 2003, p. 295). Lastly, the fifth and sixth hypotheses proposed by Blank and Schmidt (2003) centered around patriotism, the degradation of foreigners, and the degradation of Jewish citizens in particular. Unlike the third and fourth hypotheses, the fifth hypothesis predicted that the degradation of foreigners would be weaker as the degree of patriotism heightened and the sixth hypothesis expected that the degradation of Jewish citizens would also be weaker as the degree of patriotism increased.

To test these hypotheses, Blank and Schmidt (2003) collected data through a representative postal survey from 1996. The first wave of the self-report survey that was administered involved 985 former West German residents and 372 former East German residents between the ages of 18 and above. After excluding East-West and West-East migrants as well as those surveys from participants with missing values, the third-wave sample was made up of 396 former West German residents and 175 former East German citizens. It is important to note that

Blank and Schmidt (2003) refer to the participants throughout the majority of their study as “East and West Germans” but they made clear in the abstract that the data collected was from former residents of these territories (p. 289).

To measure national identity, Blank and Schmidt (2003) utilized three indicators by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). The nationalism scale that was used in the study “consisted of an indicator of general national pride, three indicators of pride in specific achievements, and three items by Schatz et al. (1999) on uncritical conformity” (Blank & Schmidt, 2003, p. 297). In total, to measure nationalism in Germany, the study assessed the variables of national pride, nationalism, feelings of superiority, ingroup favoritism, and national-related tendencies of idealization. On the other hand, to measure patriotism, the study analyzed pride in democratic institutions, support for welfare state benefits, support for political co-determination, tolerance toward minorities/outgroups, and nation-related expression of a general attitude. Lastly, the degradation of outgroups was measured with three indicators. Anti-Semitism was also assessed using three separate indicators since this specific form of minority discrimination plays a central role in atrocities.

Results from the Blank and Schmidt (2003) study found that there is no significant difference between the concepts of nationalism and patriotism in former East and West German residents. They found that “the standardized estimates show only one small significant difference in factor loadings between East and West Germans,” which was national identity (Blank & Schmidt, 2003, p. 302). Using covariance matrices as input, results showed that pride in the nation and its aspects can be successfully used as a measure for both patriotism and nationalism. Hence, despite no significant differences between the East and West subsamples, Blank and

Schmidt (2003) gave support for the first and second hypotheses surrounding positive national identities, nationalism, and patriotism, solidifying the idea that national identity is the general concept and nationalism and patriotism are subdimensions of it.

Moreover, the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth hypotheses were also supported by the results. The corresponding coefficients indicated that degradation of outgroups with .98/.98 and anti-Semitism with .68/.81 are the results of nationalism in individuals. To contrast this finding, the study showed that as patriotism increases, there is a decrease in the degradation of outgroups with -.49/-.49 as well as anti-Semitism with -.41/-.48. Anti-Semitism and general degradation of outgroups were positively correlated. Lastly, the explained variance was statistically significant in the difference between the West German and East German subsample in that anti-Semitism is explained by 27 percent in the West German subsample but explained by 38 percent in the East German subsample.

In short, despite a couple of significant differences between the West and East German samples, overall, they did not differ very much regarding nationalism and patriotism. Both nationalism and patriotism were related to a positive national identity. Nationalism was positively correlated with the degradation of foreigners and anti-Semitism whereas patriotism was negatively correlated with the degradation of foreigners and anti-Semitism. These findings contribute to the literature as a whole by assessing the national identities of Germans and finding no substantial difference between West and East Germans, making it in agreement with the literature as a whole. As this study took place in 2003, it seems relevant to mention briefly that the following year after this study, these differences may have changed significantly in Germany as the most nationalist party, the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), earned ten

percent of the vote in the two German states of Brandenburg as well as Saxony (Dempsey, 2004). Thus, future research needs to be conducted to assess the current states of patriotism and nationalism in Germany.

The Expanding Influence of Patriotism and Nationalism

These five studies all shared a common theme: there was an ability to distinguish empirically different types of national identities or attitudes such as patriotism and nationalism. Results from Schatz et al. (1999) indicated that blind patriotism is a significant positive predictor for nationalism and blind and constructive patriotism are expressed in different ways since they represent different constructs. Similarly, Dekker et al. (2003) found support for the hypothesis that positive national attitudes can be distinguished empirically, including in their third study when the Basque youth were all categorized into five different national-attitude-based groups. Moreover, Takeuchi et al.'s (2016) study supported this theme in that depending on the patriotism or nationalism score of the participant, it resulted in different brain structures being affected, leading to different empirical associations between the concepts. Just as Takeuchi et al.'s (2016) provided support for an ability to distinguish between the concepts, Davidov's (2011) discoveries on how the concepts can change over time relied on measures that differentiated between nationalism and patriotism. Lastly, Blank and Schmidt's (2003) findings shared this theme since they solidified the idea that patriotism and nationalism are two subdimensions comprising the general concept of national identity. In conclusion, all five studies provide evidence or rely on the theme that national identities or attitudes, including nationalism and patriotism, can be distinguished from one another using empirical means.

Along with this common theme, four of the five studies, excluding Davidov (2011), also had a recurring finding surrounding variables either related to the treatment of others or the maintenance of the culture such as cultural contamination, auto-stereotypes, attitude toward outgroups, the auto-cliché of political liberties, the maintenance of the culture, cooperativeness, compassion, feelings of superiority, and the degradation of outgroups as well as anti-Semitism. Schatz et al. (1999) found that cultural contamination, which is “characterized by a heightened concern that foreign influences erode the homogeneity and distinctiveness of national culture,” was a significant positive predictor along with nationalism and national vulnerability for blind patriotism but a significant negative predictor for constructive patriotism (p. 155). Likewise, Dekker et al. (2003) uncovered in their second study that auto-stereotypes and attitude toward outgroups also had a strong predictive value on nationalism in participants. This finding was replicated in their third study involving the Basque culture since two of the major determinants for nationalism were the participants’ value of the maintenance of Basque culture, or auto-stereotypes, and the auto-cliché of political liberties, or attitude toward outgroups.

Takeuchi et al. (2016) made several discoveries surrounding cooperativeness, compassion, and feelings of superiority with nationalism. Participants’ “nationalism scores” were positively correlated with their “feelings of superiority score” and negatively correlated with their “cooperativeness score” (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 4). Individuals with low compassion and high nationalism scores both displayed greater rGMD in their PCC, which was associated with the lack of compassion in nationalists as shown by their intolerance to minorities. Blank and Schmidt (2003) also displayed this theme involving the treatment of others in their explicit study of the degradation of outgroups and anti-Semitism. It was found in the Blank and Schmidt (2003)

study on former East and West German residents that as nationalism increased in an individual, the degradation of outgroups, as well as anti-Semitism, also increased. This was unlike patriotism, where their findings indicated a decrease in the degradation of outgroups and anti-Semitism as patriotism increased. It should also be noted due to the exclusion of the fourth study from this recurring theme in the literature that although Davidov's (2011) study lacked a variable involving the treatment of others, future research could explore their finding that the mean level of nationalism increased in Hungary, Russia, and Slovakia to identify how the country's attitude toward outgroups may be a factor affecting nationalism as a whole.

Consequently, the findings of the five articles also differed because certain aspects of the concepts were only assessed in certain studies, making each study have a somewhat different focus and leading to different results. For example, Schatz et al. (1999) studied political knowledge, information-gathering, and activism as well as conservatism, symbolic vs. instrumental behaviors, and selective focus of information. None of the other studies analyzed these variables so Schatz et al. (1999) provided the literature review results that showed how blind patriotism is a strong predictor for nationalism and blind patriots tend to be less politically knowledgeable, more conservative, Republican, prefer symbolic behaviors, and reading pro U.S. information. This differs substantially from the Dekker et al. (2003) study where the focus of the study was to investigate national attitudes as a hierarchy and factors that lead to the development of nationalism. As a result, regional-national attitudes were also studied and this was the only study to mention how region rather than country could be an aspect of a person's national identity. Other factors such as concern for the future among others were also measured that were

not present in the other research, giving more substance to the evaluation for determinants of nationalism.

Likewise, Takeuchi et al. (2016) also went in a different direction than the other studies presented since this was the first study to be published analyzing brain structures of gray matter and nationalism as well as patriotism. The findings differed from the others since they resulted from a method of gathering data that included not only a self-report survey or interview but scans of the brain. This led to unique findings that none of the other studies discovered such as that high patriotism scorers showed similar brain scans as subjects with high quality of life and that they also displayed high feelings of security, high self-enhancement, and a high attachment to one's father. Davidov (2011) focused on a different facet of these constructs and assessed the concreteness of patriotism and nationalism over time, which none of the other studies did as they were not longitudinal tests. His findings indicate that they can change over time, which was substantiated in multiple countries. Lastly, Blank and Schmidt (2003) provided findings involving both East and West Germans following the reunification of Germany and was the only of these studies to find that there is no difference between nationalism and patriotism in East and West Germans. Additionally, unlike other studies, a very specific type of degradation of outgroups/minorities was measured to evaluate anti-Semitism in Germany and its' relationship with nationalism. Just as predicted by Blank and Schmidt (2003), their findings showed a strong positive correlation between nationalism and anti-Semitism.

By combining the findings of the five studies, it is possible to gather a more complete view of the relationship between patriotism and nationalism, their characteristics, and how each concept relates to the treatment of outgroups. This thorough perspective also provides the

opportunity to learn how the literature fully supports that there is not only an ability to distinguish between various national attitudes but that there are numerous empirical findings that declare nationalism and patriotism as being separate phenomena.

The strengths of the sources include the variety of themes that were covered such as brain structures and stability over time, the variety of countries that the studies were conducted in, the different methods of study such as longitudinal, the replicated findings in the studies, and that the findings in each study either were the first contribution to the literature or were in agreement with previous research. In contrast, there were a few weaknesses to the sources used in this literature review. These include firstmost that the most recent source is from 2016. Moreover, limitations also were apparent in that the studies all lacked diversity in the population samples and the samples may not be generalizable as mostly young people participated in the studies and each researcher analyzed specific countries and regions.

In conclusion, the driving force behind this literature review involves the common themes that emerged throughout the studies, which were the apparent differences between patriotism and nationalism that can be empirically distinguished and the relationship between nationalism and, as categorized in numerous ways throughout the studies, the degradation of outgroups or minorities. It is important to recognize the relationship between blind patriotism and nationalism to understand how patriotism and nationalism may be confused with one another at times. This perplexity makes this literature review even more relevant as the studies have shown that constructive patriotism and nationalism stem from, are characterized by, and predict very different outcomes, especially when it comes to the treatment of people who are not in the same group they are in.

With the world experiencing what has been called the ‘Refugee Crisis,’ which according to the International Rescue Committee (n.d.) involves approximately 80 million displaced people and refugees, investigations of national identities by researchers such as Schatz et al. (1999), Dekker et al. (2003), Takeuchi et al. (2016), Davidov (2011), and Blank and Schmidt (2003) are key in providing research that will help to clarify why some individuals do not want to open their borders when there are people in need. A similar discussion has been taking place in Germany, which will have two domains of nationalism discussed in the next portion of this paper. The Norwegian Refugee Council (2020) noted that Germany received 1,191,000 refugees or 1.5 percent of their population. This statistic alone shows the significance behind understanding nationalism and the degradation of outgroups to prevent ethnic violence and more. Future research should continue to assess this relationship by analyzing how ethnicity may play a role in nationalism and answering new questions such as how stable is the association of nationalism and the degradation of outgroups over time.

Two Domains of German Post-WWII Nationalism

Now that I have shown the psychological discussion on patriotism and nationalism, I am going to be talking about nationalism because the empirical relationship found by Blank and Schmidt (2003) between the degradation of outgroups and nationalism as well as the brain correlations displayed by Takeuchi et al. (2016) are causes for concern, whereas nonconcerning, almost completely opposite findings were found for patriotism. Instead of continuing to argue that there is a difference between patriotism and nationalism as backed by evidence in multiple studies from the literature review, I decided to concentrate on nationalism rather than patriotism

since the relationships found involving nationalism pose threatening outcomes. Nationalism will be considered in terms of where it is being fostered and displayed within Germany after World War II. The next major portion of this thesis will involve an analysis of two domains that exhibit and promote nationalism, fairy tale films and soccer. The purpose of this analysis is to not only bring light to these ideas, but to argue as a whole that nationalism is not just a thing of the past as ideas surrounding the concept continue to be depicted in films today, which is why the analysis evaluates four separate films. The films, “Das Zaubermännchen” (Engel, 1960) and “Wie heiratet man einen König” (Simon, 1969), are discussed in the “Märchenfilme” (fairy tale films) section, whereas a historical-fiction film, “Das Wunder von Bern” (Wortmann, 2003), and a documentary by the same director, “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen” (Wortmann, 2006), are examined in the “Fußball” (soccer) section.

To give some brief historical context, the division of Germany after World War II in 1949 set the precedent for the following four decades of German history. The resulting two German states of West Germany, or the Federal Republic of Germany, and East Germany, or the German Democratic Republic created “an ‘iron curtain’ dividing West from East, the free world and democracy from dictatorship and communism,” thereby creating two separate states with separate political systems, foreign relations, culture, German identities, and living standards, among numerous other contrasting themes that lasted for roughly fifty years (Fulbrook, 2015, p. 136). Thus, when Germany reunified officially as one state in the fall of 1990, tensions were high between “Wessis” (westerners) and “Ossis” (easterners) due to the coalescence of two societies that had developed upon starkly different ideologies.¹

¹ In the West, the ideology was liberal democracy and in the East, it was democratic centralism based on Marxist-Leninist theory (Fulbrook, 2015, p. 142).

This is important to the discussion of nationalism in Germany since the concept became prevalent once again contrastingly in both West and East Germany as well as after Germany's reunification. I say 'once again' because Germany has a long history of nationalism. The concept plays a central theme in Germany's development from well before Hitler's reign to the present time.² Two domains of German post-WWII nationalism that will be analyzed in-depth are introduced in the upcoming sections: fairy tale films with the "Märchenfilme" produced by the "Deutsche Film-Aktiengesellschaft," or DEFA, in East Germany during the 1960s; and sports-related nationalism with "Fußball" as depicted in films by Sonke Wortmann in the 2000s during the now unified Germany. Although these domains may appear inharmonious together, fairy tales and sporting events both bring out stereotypically German passion through the common perception of "Märchen," or fairy tales, as belonging to Germany and the widely-held importance of "Fußball," or soccer. Both of these domains within Germany offer a site for individuals to express their national identities, causing German nationalism to often be on display in fairy tales and sporting events. For that reason, each of these distinct locales will be argued as fostering and displaying nationalism to an extent in their respective Germany.

"Märchenfilme"

In this section, I will give a brief background on "Märchenfilme" and explain the relevance behind these films to a discussion on nationalism. From there, I will go on to analyze two specific films, "Das Zaubermännchen" (Engel, 1960) and "Wie heiratet man einen König" (Simon, 1969), that were made in East Germany to show how they fostered and displayed

² For instance, there was concern with the German national identity in Prussia following and during the Napoleonic era as well as with "the crisis in Franco-German relations in 1840" and these are just two out of numerous junctures (Breuilly, 1990, p. 659, 662).

nationalism. An integral aspect of East German (GDR) culture was their state studio, known as DEFA (“Deutsche Film-Aktiengesellschaft”), that produced “twenty-three feature-length live-action films for children based on tales by the Brothers Grimm” from 1946 to 1990 (Shen, 2011, p. 70).³ “Märchenfilme,” or fairy tale films, were an inherent part of the GDR as a result of the influence the medium of film can have on its viewers, especially when the film industry is compassed by the state (Blessing, 2010, p. 234). Combined with the fact that DEFA both “claimed to be the true inheritor of a rich German film tradition” and “enabled a lively national cinema for the GDR that, as a very public national industry, proved East Germany’s legitimacy as a sovereign state that was not the weaker sister of the larger, western half of Germany,” the films exhibit a variety of nationalistic ideas, such as believing one’s country is superior to others (Blessing, 2010, p. 238). The underlying goal of DEFA, where a majority of the filmmakers were very loyal to the party, was to create not only a distinct ‘national cinema,’ but to also teach future generations through their films how to become good citizens of the GDR (Blessing, 2010, p. 235-236).

Although Haase (1993) argues that some people see adaptations of the classic Grimm fairy tales as “monument desecration” (p. 383),⁴ the common attribution of Grimm fairy tales as

³ The Grimm Brothers’ tales have been said to promote nationalistic ideas just as much as political figures, even before DEFA adapted them. The two brothers seemingly always “emphasized the Germanness of their tales” and were convinced that their strength, which included the talent they had for writing, came “from the soil of the German Fatherland” (Snyder, 1978, p. 1, 10). Snyder (1978) suggests that the praiseworthy, ‘Germanic’ traits in the stories include “authoritarianism, militarism, violence toward the outsider, and the strict enforcement of discipline” (p. 2). Whether the Grimms consciously or unconsciously stressed these particular traits, their fairy tales, which originated from folk tales and were spread through word-of-mouth by peasants, have, per Snyder (1978), made these traits crucial elements of the German national character (p. 4).

⁴ Haase (1993) argues that some people might view something as minor as changing the German spelling of Snow White from the original, *Sneewittchen*, to the modern form, *Schneewittchen*, as “monument desecration” (p. 383-384).

the property of the “Volk,” or the German word for people of a nation,⁵ further reiterates “Märchenfilme” as a relevant moment of German nationalism. While some traditionalist Germans may watch with horror and anguish as the classic Grimm tales are modernized, Goritsas (2017) argues that DEFA “sought to preserve and recreate a fairy-tale environment tailored to an enlightened social realist aesthetic in the service of modernity, be it for educational purposes, moral lessons of right and wrong, entertainment, social and/or political concerns” (p. 123). The focus of this analysis will be on DEFA films from the 1960s since films in this time-period were “co-opted to serve the official rhetoric that the newly established proletarian state is antifascist and anticapitalist” (Shen, 2011, p. 71).⁶ A common theme that emerges throughout many DEFA “Märchenfilme”, such as “Das Zaubermännchen” (Rumpelstiltskin) and “Wie heiratet man einen König” (How to Marry a King) among others, is anti-capitalism. The presence of anti-capitalistic ideas like denouncing greed, a lack of decorum, and collectivism all reinforce the cultural norms of the GDR that aim to show that the GDR was not the “weaker sister” of the Federal Republic of Germany or West Germany, but that they were, in fact, the superior sister (Blessing, 2010, p. 238).

The usage of unrealistic fairy tales to push real-life cultural norms onto citizens will be argued as promoting nationalism because, as Dekker et al. (2003) discovered, a major determinant for the development of nationalism is national socialization, which involves “the processing of affective messages from others about one’s country and people” (p. 349). National

⁵ “Das Volk,” is a word that is still utilized in Germany. However, Germans are careful to use this word given the context because “Volk” has been marked by discourses on nationalism. For instance, a type of music in Germany called “Volksmusik,” which would translate in English to “folk music,” is no such thing. “Volksmusik” is widely considered as fascist since the Nazis used this music to urge their “cynical and ultra-reactionary goals of German fascism” (Wicke, 1985, p. 149).

⁶ Films in the 1970s moved from the same critique of regimes exhibited in the 1950s and 1960s to an inward critique of the GDR (Shen, 2011, p. 71).

socialization is seen within fairy tale films in the form of discreet messages that foster nationalism, and like Mummendey, Klink, and Brown (2001) explain, nationalism “includes the view that one’s country is superior to others and hence should be dominant” (p. 160). East Germans were expected to be modest, obedient citizens who should each expect to be treated the same as every other East German, work for what they had, and not own any ornate material items as Western German consumerism necessitated (Fulbrook, 2015, p. 188-189). Despite the view that East Germany was starting over from the Nazi ideology leading up to and throughout WWII, there was still tension since although East Germans “could indulge in a little national pride” (Fulbrook, 2015, p. 189), the fairy tales that DEFA launched towards the public projected cultural norms that emphasized the GDR’s superiority over the West, thereby fostering nationalism. “Das Zaubermännchen” directed by Engel (1960) and “Wie heiratet man einen König” directed by Simon (1969) are the two specific films that will now be analyzed in-depth.

“Das Zaubermännchen”

In this subsection, I will firstly compare the Grimms’ fairy tale to the DEFA film adaption and then go on to describe how the DEFA film fosters nationalism through promoting anti-capitalism and labor-intensive viewpoints. Similar to the Grimms’ fairy tale “Rumpelstiltskin”, the film, “Das Zaubermännchen” (Engel, 1960), involves a miller lying about how his daughter can spin straw into gold. When the king hears this, the daughter is brought to the king’s castle to demonstrate her skill and provide money to the state. Knowing that she possesses no such talent, the daughter is upset. Then, Rumpelstiltskin appears out of nowhere. He indicates that he will spin the straw to gold if she gives him something valuable in return. The daughter agrees. The first time, she gives him her treasured necklace. After the king returns to

see the gold she has spun, she is ordered to spin again and again. The second time, she gives away a ring. However, the third time Marie must spin, she lacks a valuable item to give Rumpelstiltskin so she agrees to give away her first-born child. Following this arrangement, she marries the king and becomes pregnant. When Rumpelstiltskin appears to collect his end of the bargain, he agrees to give the peasant's daughter three days to find out his name.

This is where the DEFA adaptation differs from the Grimms' tale. In the film, she discovers his name through the help of her friend, Hans, but in the Grimm fairy tale, the daughter finds out the name through a messenger. This is significant since Hans is one of the characters who has a role that is not in the original Grimms' tale. Along with how Rumpelstiltskin's name is discovered, other differences between the two versions are, most importantly, apparent in the portrayal of the main character, Rumpelstiltskin, and then, the naming of the characters. Rumpelstiltskin is depicted more cruelly in Grimms' version, which makes the audience less sympathetic towards him. DEFA frames Rumpelstiltskin very differently as I explain below.

Since a film requires more length than a short fairy-tale story, the characters naturally have more room to develop, but an important distinction lies in which characters in "Das Zaubermännchen" are given a specific name. Where the Grimms' tale gives only the one name of Rumpelstiltskin, the DEFA film gives many. This is a stark difference between the two because the Grimms' version centers around just one name in that the daughter is never named and has to figure out the one name to keep her child. Meanwhile, the DEFA film gives a name to the peasant's daughter (Marie) and the miller (Kunz). However, in spite of this general tendency of naming more characters in DEFA, the king still lacks a name, just as the Grimm fairy tale king did.

The lack of a name for the king and king's treasurer in the DEFA film points to a socialist aesthetic as Engel (1960) was trying to keep the public from relating to the characters that held roles which are not labor-intensive. This is to prevent viewers from developing ideas that one does not have to work to earn their role in society, which would not have promoted the cultural norms that lead to national socialization. By showing that the characters who were successful and superior did not give in to greed, an anti-capitalist economy is being encouraged rather than a capitalist one.⁷ This is apparent in the film because film watchers never get to see a shot that is filmed from the king's or his treasurer's point-of-view. This is unlike other characters such as Hans, who is an industrious worker at a mill and ultimately uncovers the infamous name of the tale.

By not showing the audience the perspectives of the king or his treasurer and displaying point-of-views from laborers like Hans, Engel (1960) is reinforcing this idea that he does not want the public to identify with capitalism since being greedy and selfish is associated with Western consumerism, which is the opposite of what contributes to East German superiority where labor is done by everyone. Thus, despite the king's transition from a greedy man who goes along with his treasurer's desires for more gold to a loving husband and father willing to do anything to figure out Rumpelstiltskin's name in the film, the king keeps his title. As the title of a king displays a hierarchy in the kingdom, withholding a name from the king not only urges viewers not to identify with the character but to reject the hierarchy that occurs when a king is in

⁷ It is important to note that the miller, Kunz, received a name in the DEFA film and the king's treasurer did not. I believe this is because even after his daughter married a king, his status as a miller never went away. In fact, his daughter's marriage to the king led him to start to work as Kunz went from not working in the beginning to having to work at the end. Hence, the addition of a name to the miller contributes to promoting the common East German theme of labor since one must contribute to society through work as shown in their "in theory no unemployment" (Fulbrook, 2015, p. 195).

charge. Having a king goes against the socialist agenda of putting the means of production in the hands of the workers. Hence, the king stands as an anonymous force because giving the king a name would make it not only seem like a king can be anything other than a selfish, greedy man, but that a class hierarchy is a righteous system.

Along with a lack of names for certain individualistic characters who show Western capitalistic ideals, DEFA's change in renaming the story "Das Zaubermännchen", which translates to little magic man, was deliberate as they wanted the character of Rumpelstiltskin to be viewed differently than in the Grimm fairy tale. They challenged the previous notion that Rumpelstiltskin is inherently bad by spreading anti-capitalistic views that make the West seem inferior; thereby, making West German capitalism, which is equated to greed, unappealing to viewers. For instance, rather than being seen as cruel for wanting to take a child away from the birth parents, Rumpelstiltskin is presented as justified in his lofty stipulation. He demands the child from the king and future queen since he fears what would occur if a child had "to grow up among people for whom gold is the most important thing" as depicted in the film (Engel, 1960, 0:43:10). East German culture was taught to repudiate any form of greed; hence, anti-capitalism was a common theme among "Märchenfilme", making it even the goal of a partnership between DEFA and another film studio, Barrandov, in Czechoslovakia, which was state-socialist during this time.⁸

"Wie heiratet man einen König"

⁸ The Socialist Unity Party of Germany (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland*) pressed heavily for films with other State-socialist countries to be made. It was not acceptable for DEFA to only be working with partners from capitalist states such as West Germany, France, and more (Silberman, 2006, p. 21). Thus, an alliance between DEFA and Barrandov was created and films, such as *Drei Haselnüsse für Aschenbrödel*, were developed and watched on screen (Skopal, 2018, p. 136, 140).

Likewise, it is not just in “Das Zaubermännchen” where the hidden tendencies of nationalism were spread by degrading capitalism;⁹ the film, “Wie heiratet man einen König,” also promotes GDR nationalism by making the powerful look dense. In this subsection, I will compare the Grimm fairy tale to the DEFA film and discuss not only the idea that the powerful appeared foolish but how the courtyard acted as an egalitarian space for everyone. Based on the Grimm fairy tale, “Die kluge Bauerntochter” (the clever peasant’s daughter), the film “Wie heiratet man einen König” (how one marries a king), directed by Rainer Simon for DEFA in 1969, follows a somewhat similar storyline to the predecessor Grimm story. Both involve a peasant and his wise, clever daughter who outsmarts the king in a trial of wits to prove her “Klugheit,” her cleverness. This trial of wits was to free her father, who ended up in prison after finding a gold piece and reporting it to the king who questioned where and how he found the gold. Both versions have the one task involving three riddles of having to “come to me [the king] not clothed, not naked, not riding, not walking, not in the road, and not of the road, and if thou canst do that I will marry thee” posed by the king to the peasant’s daughter and likewise, both depict the peasant’s daughter successfully passing this riddle “by dressing in a fishing net, having her net tied to a donkey, and carrying her just above the ground by using the ruts in the road” (Grimm & Grimm, 2019; Simon, 1969, 0:33:40, 0:35:00-0:40:00). Since she successfully solves the riddle, a marriage follows.

⁹ Another example where anti-capitalism notions are common throughout the film is *Das hölzerne Kälbchen*, or the Little Wooden Calf, since at the end, the little farmer, who crafted a wooden calf as he had no calves of his own, has “wiped out the entire village and becomes a rich man” (Shen, 2011, p. 75). By clearing the whole village of calves, he has shown individualistic, egoistic motivations, which the film views critically as bad. Such selfish actions could only be present in a capitalistic society, not in a society like the GDR.

Lastly, both versions involve an argument at the end between the couple due to the king's decision in a dispute among soldiers to give the foal either back to its owner or back to where it was at, which was not in the land of who it belonged to. The queen was then confronted by the foal's rightful owner and she gave him advice on how to get his foal back. Upon hearing of his queen's actions behind his back, the king told her to leave and take what she deemed most precious. Clever as always, the peasant's daughter, or queen, put a sleeping aid in the king's drink and brought him home with her; hence, when he woke up, he was told how he was most precious to her and they stayed together.

While "Wie heiratet man einen König" resembles the Grimm tale it is based on in many ways, Simon (1969) adapts this film by adding a beginning scene where the king takes requests and complaints in the courtyard. This scene allows the audience to start to see the type of king he is through his actions and interactions with the peasants in his kingdom. The courtyard in "Wie heiratet man einen König" allows the audience to see how the king and his courtiers in this film are portrayed as dense, "stupid, corrupt, and preposterous" (Shen, 2011, p. 81), as shown when the king comes out of his palace, playing chess by himself, and then proclaims that he won the game (Simon, 1969, 0:05:43). Other examples out of numerous within the film of people the film positions as stand-ins for contemporary capitalists are when the king does a magic trick with the money he receives for a peasant and keeps half of the money for himself even though the peasant rightfully deserves it all as compensation and when the king continuously shoots a rifle in the air at nothing (Simon, 1969, 0:10:26, 0:23:42). These displays of idiocracy associate the king title, which is traditionally coupled with a righteous hierarchy just like in "Das Zaubermännchen," to stupidity and ignorance; thereby, equating any system where richer classes profit off the poor,

whether it be the monarchy of the film or the capitalism of the West German neighbors, to be worthless and a joke. As a result, this implies that capitalism makes people lesser in that they are foolish.

Added to this display of stupidity among the powerful, Simon's (1969) film also promotes the idea that the courtyard of the palace is "unpretentious and accessible to everyone" (Shen, 2011, p. 81). There is underlying tension between my previous argument and the current one I will make since I am arguing that the monarchy is run by fools, but even though they are laughable, they keep a very egalitarian courtyard. However, these arguments are not really pitted against each other because the people, not the monarchy, were the ones who kept the courtyard functioning properly while the king and his courtiers made jokes. This is seen throughout the movie, such as in the scene where the king does a magic trick (Simon, 1969, 0:10:26), in that chaos only started among the people after the king came and acted his usual silly self.

The courtyard is shot in numerous long shots that show everyone on stage and promote the idea of collectivism. This aim of collectivism is also seen in the farmer's daughter's plan when she outwits the king in the last riddle because the peasants help pave the way for her to solve the riddle. They let her use their items such as a fishing net without question and as she makes her way back to the courtyard "not clothed, not naked, not riding, not walking, not in the road, and not on the road" (Simon, 1969, 0:34:26), the peasants start to fight out against the guards and follow the farmer's daughter back to the courtyard to show the king that she has solved the riddle (Simon, 1969, 0:36:24). Moreover, when she and the king decided to have a wedding, the entire kingdom was invited and celebrated together (Simon, 1969, 0:46:25). Thus, it can be explicitly said that every major scene in the film involves a variety of people all

working together, fighting together, and celebrating together. This contributes to the fostering of nationalism in East Germany as East Germans believed they were collectively starting over, which would require every citizen to get behind the idea that East Germans were all in this together.

No to Decorations, Yes to Collectivism

In this subsection, I will consider how both of the films of “Das Zaubermännchen” and “Wie heiratet man einen König” take an oddly non-socialist idea of a woman marrying a king to utilize the charming, traditional aspect of a fairy tale to draw the audience in. They share the same themes of little decoration and huge collective efforts to display and foster nationalism. Both films display a lack of decoration, which fosters nationalism in that lavish decorations are not present in the DEFA films as they are in films that were created in the West. In “Das Zaubermännchen,” the gold that Marie spins for the king is arguably the shiniest object filmed other than the items that Marie offers Rumpelstiltskin towards the end of the film in an attempt to keep her child (Engel, 1960, 0:42:36). Even the powerful in the film adorn themselves with little jewelry and live in a less lavish palace as compared to the live-action fairy tale movies that were made in West Germany years before these movies such as “Sissi” (Marischka, 1955) or that are made today in Hollywood such as “Beauty and the Beast” (Condon, 2017) and “Cinderella” (Branagh, 2015), among others. With Sissi in “Sissi” coming from a higher class family, it is relevant to note that even her plain clothes are more embellished than Marie’s in “Das Zaubermännchen.” Moreover, despite both Belle and Cinderella in the remaining respective films coming from a lower-class family, they still are also wearing more lavish clothes at the end of their films than Marie. In “Wie heiratet man einen König,” the wedding of the peasant’s

daughter and the king is also depicted relatively plainly as compared to the weddings in the quasi historical movie, “Sissi” (Marischka, 1955), that has many fairy tale characteristics (a girl in the forest) as well as in the current fairy tale Hollywood films, “Beauty and the Beast” and “Cinderella.” The peasant’s daughter’s dress in “Wie heiratet man einen König” is red, a color that is coincidentally related to labor movements. When this red dress is placed next to the dresses of women marrying into royalty in films like “Sissi” 14 years before “Wie heiratet man einen König,” or movies such as “Beauty and the Beast” or “Cinderella” that are made today, it severely lacks embellishment and decorum. This is apparent even after taking into consideration the minute gold accents on the sleeves of the peasant’s daughter’s dress (Simon, 1969, 0:46:23). While it is not certain that DEFA purposely left out having the actors wear lots of jewelry and major gold accents on the dresses they wear, it is definite that the audience would notice what the actors were wearing. Hence, viewers may have perceived this as being able to achieve a ‘happily ever after’ without needing the displays of wealth and power that the West partakes in.

Country-wide efforts are shown in both films as well, which also promotes nationalism by indicating that a collectivist society is superior to individualistic societies. “Das Zaubermännchen” showcases these efforts when the entire kingdom is searching for Rumpelstiltskin’s name (Engel, 1960, 0:53:17). Despite the effort being a failure and having only Hans, an individual, discover the name, the country-wide effort is significant since the Grimm version of Rumpelstiltskin does not have one (Grimm & Grimm, 2001a). Having the entire kingdom search is promoting collectivism since although it is one family’s problem, everyone is working together to solve the one issue as if it were their own. Similar efforts are also shown in “Wie heiratet man einen König.” This film depicts the country-wide effort when the peasant’s

daughter has solved the riddle and is riding to the courtyard while the rest of the peasants are all fighting against the guards so that she can get through successfully (Simon, 1969, 0:36:24).

Collectivism is shown here since the rest of the peasants are helping the peasant's daughter, even though the fate of the riddle may be of little importance to them. The idea of working together and helping one another despite getting nothing in return is very influential in collectivism and by having these scenes in these "Märchenfilme," these collectivist ideas spread at large to demonstrate how collectivism grants a fairy tale ending. Without these country-wide efforts, both films would have ended very differently. I argue that Hans would have never known to search for the name if a country-wide effort of collectivism had not taken place first since Marie never told anyone about the deal with Rumpelstiltskin until the king said that they will need help from the whole kingdom. Hence, I do not believe Marie would have told Hans about the situation if the entire kingdom had not known. Moreover, collectivism allowed the peasant's daughter to outsmart the king, which individualism would not have done.

I analyzed these two films to contend how they differently display anti-capitalistic ideas that promote nationalism in each respective context. The analysis of "Das Zaubermännchen" delves into the plot to show how minute storyline details such as names of these characters can promote nationalism. The investigation of "Wie heiratet einen König" indulges less into the plot and explains the presence of nationalistic ideas through viewing anti-capitalism as it is shown in the specific types of shots being used and particular scenes that emphasize the GDR's superiority over the greedy West. By examining one film's plot and the other film's mise-en-scene and cinematography, I focused on specific anti-capitalism themes in both films. I could have done it the other way around and discussed how the plot's details of "Wie heiratet man einen König"

may also be presenting anti-capitalism themes and vice versa for “Das Zaubermännchen” with the aesthetics. I also could have talked about many other “Märchenfilme” and critiqued how each show glimpses of nationalism hidden within them.

In conclusion, although East Germany never intended to foster nationalism *per se*, both films do so by promoting anti-capitalistic ideas that contribute to the nationalistic view of East Germany being superior to countries with capitalist economies and consumerist ideologies such as West Germany. The films both also take this oddly non-socialist idea of a woman marrying a king to utilize the charming, traditional aspect of a fairy tale to draw the audience in. A common feature of a fairy tale is that it is not realistic and takes the reader to an imaginary realm; thus, people typically do not expect to leave the viewing of a DEFA film with new ideas about reality. However, by seeing the depiction of ideas that are familiar to their reality of East Germany, a new sense of pride in their country might have appealed to citizens since the films extend to “audiences an opportunity to learn about their society’s mores and their own role in a nation” (Blessing, 2010, p. 233). Despite East Germans' lack of indulgence in national pride, the use of films are based on Grimm fairy tales, which are widely considered as nationalist. Indeed, “the Nazis demanded that every German household own a copy of the Grimm collection,” make it hard to believe that the viewers were not affected by the nationalism that would be brought forth (Harshbarger, 2013,p. 492).

“Fußball”

In this section, I will analyze how soccer displays and fosters nationalism in a similar fashion as the fairy tale films did. For the discussion, I will start with a theme of either emotional identification or the us versus them dynamic and then, I will argue how the films I am

investigating show these nationalistic themes. The two films are from the same director, Sönke Wortmann, but one is a historical fiction film from 2003 called “Das Wunder von Bern” and the other is a documentary from 2006 called “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen.” As with fairy tales, German culture has always been proud of their “Fußball” (soccer). Indeed it is the most popular sport in the country according to the interest of the population from 2018 to 2020 (NCES, 2020). Even the people who are not ecstatic with joy about the sport are still able to become intrigued when the “Weltmeisterschaft” (World Cup) begins and “Deutschland” is playing. According to a study by Ismer, Beyer, Solms-Baruth, and von Scheve (2017) conducted in 2002, even the 16 percent, which is a really small percentage, of the German population who had “no special interest in football” was able to become interested in the World Cup (p. 559).¹⁰ During the World Cup in 2006, which was held in Germany, 83 percent of the total German population watched at least one of the World Cup matches that were on television (Ismer et al., 2017, p. 559).¹¹ These numbers are consistent with my personal experience of traveling to Germany and being told that to get the full, authentic German experience, I should attend a “Fußballspiel” (soccer game). What most people do not contemplate is what the sport can promote within the country, which is nationalism.

Expressions of German ‘banal nationalism,’ to use Schiller’s (2015) term/coinage, are becoming the norm during European football championships (p. 177). Ervedosa (2020) argues that when the nature of the game of soccer is considered alone, it “operates with a strong

¹⁰ In this same study by Ismer et al. (2017) from 2002, “40 percent of the population over 14 years old belonged to the euphoric type with regard to football, with both a very high level of interest and emotional attachment to the sport” (p. 559). This further shows the popularity of soccer in Germany, particularly for the youth.

¹¹ This trend has continued. Similar figures were also found for the German population’s viewing of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa (Ismer et al., 2017, p. 559).

mechanism of identification and exclusion which is also key in nationalist narratives” (p. 45). Meanwhile, Ismer et al. (2017) argue that various scholars tend to view major football events as Janus-headed since their efforts on social inclusion either bring a diverse audience together or promote exclusion and rejection of prejudiced and minority groups such as “migrants, ethnic or religious minorities, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) groups or persons with disabilities” (p. 554-555). This shows how soccer can have profound effects, making it logical to contend that soccer in Germany is capable of fostering nationalism.

Two major questions arise when thinking about Germans and their soccer: why is it that Germans regard “Fußball” so highly and closely to their national identities; and what implications does this have for fostering nationalism? These provoking questions surrounding “Fußball,” German identity, and post-WWII nationalism will be analyzed in-depth by taking a step back in time to the early 2000s to view a unified Germany that had been in place for around 10 years and how Sönke Wortmann, a film director, affected and reflected the country’s perception by displaying the “Fußball” phenomenon in Germany through a historical-fiction film, “Das Wunder von Bern” in 2003, and a documentary, “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen” in 2006.

German identities have a strong root in “Fußball” because, given the country’s history, many Germans were wary of identifying emotionally with their country due to “being regularly confronted at school and in the media with the horrors of the Holocaust” (Ervedosa, 2020, p. 49). This created a longing for positive identification with Germany, which was a wish that became even more deep-seated once East Germany and West Germany were reunified on the 3rd of October in 1990 (Ervedosa, 2020, p. 49). Recently, soccer has become one area that Germans

feel they can showcase their national pride without fear of association with nationalism or right-wing extremism (Sullivan & Dumont, 2014, p. 97).¹² Sullivan (2014) claims that “the [2006] World Cup may therefore have provided an opportunity to experience a form of unconstrained national pride, which some members of a new generation appeared to want to experience as a depoliticized and largely enjoyable new effect” (p. 129). Understanding why Germans hold soccer so closely to their national identities is important to grasp because, just as “Märchenfilme” unconsciously fostered nationalism in believing one’s country is superior to others, “Fußball” displays nationalism by forging an intense emotional identification with one’s own country, similarly creating an us (Germany) vs. them (any other country) dynamic of exclusion.

The Emotional Identification in “Fußball”

In this subsection, I will show how both of Wortmann’s (2003, 2006) films promote positive, emotional identification to Germany, which is an aspect of nationalism. Given many Germans’ constant state of evaluating their national identity, many have avoided politics altogether. Political attitudes following the disasters of the war could be characterized by feelings such as apathy, weariness toward politics, and concern about how they will get through their day-to-day living (Fulbrook, 2015, p. 117-118). This worn-out attitude toward specific politics that wanted to continue with forms used in the past is the foundation of the popular political position of “ohne mich” (without me) to discussions on re-arming Germany (Fulbrook, 2015). This avoidance of politics by many during the 1950s that lingered for decades made it so that the

¹² To further explain this point, the full quote from the text reads “international football tournaments give many Germans the opportunities to demonstrate unified support for the national team and encourage a form of national pride that many Germans no longer associate with nationalism and right-wing extremism” (Sullivan & Dumont, 2014, p. 97).

majority of Germans sought to feel some sort of pride in their country elsewhere, for instance in “Fußball”. The sport of “Fußball,” like other team sports, is inherently driven by identifying strongly with one’s team and competing against others. Both of these mechanisms are shown in Wortmann’s films “Das Wunder von Bern” (2003) and “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen” (2006). “Das Wunder von Bern” and the strong, emotional identification in “Fußball” will be discussed in-depth first. Then, “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen” will be considered in the ways it draws Germans to identify strongly with their “Fußball.”

Das Wunder von Bern. The Wortmann (2003) film, “Das Wunder von Bern,” depicts the 1954 World Cup that was held in Switzerland. It is a story about a fictional character who is a young boy named Matthias and his fictional family as his father, Richard, comes back from being a prisoner of war in Russia during World War II, depicting the real history that was taking place during this time. In this movie, Matthias embodies the German youth while his father represents the collective guilt Germans faced for their actions in the war. Along with this, Matthias’ friend, Helmut Rahn, who was a real-life soccer player but is fictionalized in this film through his portrayal by the actor Sascha Göpel, plays “Fußball” for the German National Soccer Team. Simultaneously, as Matthias’ father is struggling to re-connect with his family after experiencing trauma and spending so many years apart, a reporter, Paul, and his wife, Annette, are traveling to Bern to cover the 1954 FIFA World Cup. All three parties of Matthias and his father, Helmut Rahn, and the reporter along with his wife end up at the final game between Germany and Hungary in Bern, Switzerland to witness the Germans win, which is the titular “Wunder” (miracle).

To summarize briefly the movie, “Das Wunder von Bern” begins with Matthias and his family receiving news that the father will be returning home. There is tension surrounding this for the entire family since 11 years had gone by while the father was away at war. For Matthias especially, he had never met his father before and already had a strong male figure in his life that he considered his role model, Helmut Rahn. Matthias went to all of Rahn’s soccer games, called him the “boss” and was even his bag carrier at many games. Numerous events take place that increased the tension between Matthias and his father, including his father killing Matthias’ beloved pet rabbits to feed the family. Eventually, as Rahn leaves to play in the World Cup, Matthias begins to understand his father’s point-of-view more and his father does the same for him about Matthias’ love for soccer. At the end of the film, the father borrows a car to drive his son and him to see the 1954 World Cup finale in Bern. This act shows Matthias how much his father does love him, despite the father’s struggles that are depicted in the movie of finding work, ending up working in a mine, and the trauma he endured that continues to fog his mind.

Looking back on this victory in Bern for the Germans that has been equated to a miracle, the film quickly became a major hit in Germany, especially as the “narrative of the ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ (the industrial miracle of post-war Germany symbolically expressed in the 1954 World Cup) reappeared in debates” (Daffner, 2011, p. 99). Wortmann touched a nerve in German society when he turned this myth into a major motion picture film. Blecking (2015) explains how already on the first weekend after the release, “380,000 moviegoers were going to see ‘Das Wunder von Bern’ in the theatres and the movie found its place on the box office hits list as three million Germans were said to have seen the film” (p. 197, my translation). Its popularity can be attributed to the feel-good emotions such as pride, hope, inspiration that arise

after watching a movie depicting the country one identifies with as a winner after substantial failures (Sullivan & DuMont, 2014).¹³ There are definite elements within “Das Wunder von Bern” that push the German audience to identify strongly and positively with their country. These components include the depiction of the German National Soccer Team’s training and an infamous quote from a real-life reporter, Herbert Zimmermann, from the finale at Bern who is portrayed in the film through a voice recording.

Arguably, the most important scene in the film shows the fierce passion in the players as they play soccer harder than they ever have before in what BILD (a popular German tabloid) called the “Battle of Bern” during the final game between Germany and Hungary to earn the title of the 1954 FIFA World Cup champion (Schiller, 2015, p. 180). However, the build-up throughout the movie to this major event is just as noteworthy in fostering the audience’s feeling that this is *their* team that *belongs* to them. There are aspects of the film that indicate how vital it was to the Germans that their team was well-trained. It was as if they were right alongside their team playing on the soccer field themselves as they prepped for and competed in the World Cup as they watched the team on television and listened in on the radio. For instance, the team’s training was also televised and the commentator not only introduced all the players by their name and their hometown but also made remarks on their skills (Wortmann, 2003, 0:22:40). For example, one included Paul Mebus’s introduction where the narrator paused to say how if all the other player’s skills have not yet commanded one’s respect, check out Paul Mebus and his “Fußfertigkeit” (footwork) as he is shown dribbling the soccer ball intensely (Wortmann, 2003,

¹³ A finding from Sullivan and Dumont’s (2014) study showed that after watching German soccer, there was “a significant increase in ‘proud to be German’ scores pre-game to post-game” (p. 101). This is relevant as a sense of group pride is being drawn in the movie in a similar fashion that a soccer game does.

0:23:19). By focusing on their skills such as footwork along with where they are from within Germany, a national identity is being forged that includes various local identities.

Along with television, radio was depicted within the film as a way for the Germans to catch up on the team and feel like they were a part of the journey. This also aligns with what was happening in real life at the time the movie is set. Both East and West Germans listened in on the game in Bern, just as the movie displayed, making it “einen gesamtdeutschen Ereignis im geteilten Land” (an all-German event in the divided country) (Blecking, 2015, p. 199). The radio was shown as a crucial medium to the team’s training in terms of keeping spectators up-to-date on the team’s progress in the film when a turning point happened with the fictional characters of Matthias and his father who left for war before he was born. This occurred when Matthias turned off the radio soccer announcements to listen to his father instead, which was a big gesture since Matthias, like many, was deeply invested in the German National Soccer Team so turning off the radio let his father know that he was as important as soccer to him (Wortmann, 2003, 1:10:02).

Similar to Matthias following the games intensely, reporters also went wild over the World Cup, which is depicted in the film. One particular incident, that shows how deep the devotion to German soccer is, happened during the intense final game between Germany and Hungary. This incident was both depicted in the film and happened in real life. As Toni Turek, the German goalkeeper, blocked the goal of Hungary when the game was tied, Herbert Zimmermann declared profusely with great emotion that “Turek, du bist ein Teufelskerl! Turek, du bist ein Fußball-Gott! (Turek, you are a hotshot! Turek, you are a soccer God!)” (Wortmann, 2003, 1:35:23). To equate a person to a godly figure displays the true lengths that Germans felt about their team. They were to be prayed to, worshipped, and upheld just like a God. Blecking

(2015) describes this, stating that “Zimmermanns exalted, performed report with quasi-religious zeal, in which he stylized the German goalkeeper Toni Turek as a veritable ‘Fußball-Gott’, struck then the heart of an emerging, understood, all-German community” (p. 200, my translation).

The passion behind the World Cup that nears godly devotion is further shown earlier in the film when Richard, Matthias’s father, goes to church and asks to speak with the priest. Rather than discussing what Richard has on his mind, the priest immediately begins discussing how unbelievable it is that the German National Soccer Team is in the world finale with a boy from their town shooting the goal (Wortmann, 2003, 1:07:52). Then, to stop the conversation about soccer, Richard has to explicitly say that he is not there to chat about “Fußball”. By comparing Turek to a type of God and seeing how even priests were devout to German soccer, “Das Wunder von Bern” shows the extent of strong identification that was confined in the hearts of Germans for their team.

Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen. In parallel to his previous film, “Das Wunder von Bern,” Wortmann (2006) released a documentary film on the German National Team in the 2006 World Cup called “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen.” The film follows the team behind the scenes as they prepare to play in the 2006 World Cup and documents their entire journey from the first game until their final game for third place against Portugal. The film premiered on October 3rd in 2006, which is the Day of German Unity, making it “a spectacle of national importance” as Daffner (2011) describes. I believe the premiere on the Day of German Unity was intentional to show the significance of the 2006 World Cup as an event with the full capability to re-ignite the German pride for their country. This is shown in that October 3, 2006

landed on a Tuesday, which is not a typical day to host a film premiere. This premiere had the power to get the Germans to identify strongly with Germany again and help “the country to like itself again” as Daffner (2011) notes.

Interestingly, the documentary’s name plays on Heinrich Heine’s 1844 epic poem “Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen” with the same reference to fairy tales (“Märchen”) but Wortmann’s (2006) is not satire like Heine’s (1915) is.¹⁴ Wortmann (2006) takes a poem written by a classic poet and changes the title from winter to summer, letting the contrast between his work and Heine’s (1915) be known. In “Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen,” Heine (1915) recalls his journey across Germany and sneers at aspects of German life, such as in chapter 4 with a stanza about the Cologne Cathedral. Heine (1915) writes, “He [The cathedral] should be the spirit of Bastille / And the crafty Romans thought: / In this huge dungeon will / The German common sense wither!” (my translation). This suggests that the Germans are losing their common sense due to religion and that the cathedral will end up the same as the fortress of Bastille or as a prison, which is the complete opposite of what Wortmann (2006) wished to make his target audience feel. Wortmann (2006) states that despite his reservations and skepticism toward the national flag and anthem due to the country’s devastating past, “the World Cup in 2006 finally confirmed his positive feelings about Germany since the national team embodied the ‘perfect image of the new modern Germany,’” which is related to his belief that “the German football team is an idealized construct of the imagined German community” (Daffner, 2011, p. 100). Hence, Wortmann’s (2006) film, “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen,” fostered these same

¹⁴ The reference to Märchen in both the epic poem by Heine (1915) and the documentary film by Wortmann (2006) further provides evidence on how Germans consider fairy tales as an aspect of their national identity.

feelings of positive identification toward Germany with not only its premiere date and title but also with German public figures such as Angela Merkel being in the film and the specific camera shots.

Besides the famous “Fußball” players participating in the 2006 World Cup themselves, the movie had influential, well-known German figures depicted throughout, leading the audience to recognize many of the people in the film. This recognition brought Germans closer to the center of the event and Ismer et al. (2017) found that the closer the distance between people and the center of the event or ritual, “the more powerful and successful in creating emotional energy and group attachment the ritual will be” (p. 558). Hence, when Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, first appears in the film at the beginning during a press briefing and gives a speech of encouragement to the team (Wortmann, 2006, 0:17:38), she not only ignites a fire within the team but also the entire country when she uses “we” to speak on the behalf of all of Germany. Merkel explains how we (Germany) will do what we can to help the team win (Wortmann, 2006, 0:18:51). Thus, although Angela Merkel says that politics and football are different things, Wortmann (2006) shows the politician in charge of the country in the documentary showing support for the team to show the relevance of this event to the country to those who may be speculative about its power, which is similar to how a political documentary would want to show a football player showing support for a party to appeal to non-typical viewers and encourage them to vote. Despite political party lines, even if one disliked Angela Merkel, they see the significance in the event as the chancellor is responding to it. It gives the platform a wider range of an audience to reach to get them to emotionally invest and identify with the team or political

party.¹⁵ This demonstrates how “Fußball” is of major concern to politics. The concern for “Fußball” due to the intense feelings that it can give is further backed when Angela Merkel attends the movie premiere on German Unity Day.

Along with the portrayal of public figures, the way that “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen” is shot as a movie also motivates the audience to identify closely and strongly with the German team and nation through the “forbidden places” that Wortmann captured in the film that were strictly behind the scenes (Daffner, 2011, p. 103). These forbidden places include the bus, the football field, hotel rooms, and locker rooms. These off-limit locations are made accessible by Wortmann (2006). In the locker rooms, as shown in screenshot one, Wortmann (2006) takes shots from an angle that makes it seem like he should not be in that room (0:48:35). Shooting from this angle makes these scenes that much more interesting to viewers since they are placed in a position where the suspense and curiosity are increased as they have to guess what it would feel like to belong in that room. In one specific scene especially, Wortmann does not show the face of Oliver Kahn, the goalkeeper who was benched during the final game against Portugal, leaving the “viewer to imagine the intensity of emotions that must be going through Kahn’s head” (Daffner, 2011, p. 103). By having to speculate on what Kahn was feeling, the viewer is more likely to identify with him and feel excessive passion toward the winning as well as Germany. This, coupled with the fact that “we [Germany] are not as rich as other nations in terms of national events and symbols which provide a strong collective experience” (Schiller, 2015, p. 181), made the audience susceptible to these deliberative camera shots by Wortmann

¹⁵ Along with Merkel, the film also has Michael Schumacher, an infamous German Formula 1 racing driver, and Xavier Naidoo, a top-hits German singer. Both of these German figures are also used in similar ways as Merkel to urge the audience to identify strongly with the German team and nation.

(2006) because the 2006 World Cup was made into a collective, national event with profound meaning.

Both films during the early 2000s set out to urge Germans to identify strongly with their country and understand the intense meaning behind the 1954 World Cup and 2006 World Cup for Germany. In “Das Wunder von Bern,” a deep identification with Germany was fostered in the film through the narration of the team’s training that showed how important it was for Germans to experience a win after traumatic losses and the devotion to Fußball as shown in the comparison of Turek to a ‘Fußball-Gott’ and the deep interest of a priest in the games. Similarly, “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen” fostered a strong, emotional identification to Germany by utilizing German public figures such as Angela Merkel and capturing footage that feels exclusive, leading viewers to interpret the feelings in the scene as their own. Each film had not only this ability to elicit excessive feelings of identification but also an us versus them dynamic of exclusion, where the concept of nationalism truly thrives as “nationalism is seen as inherently related to out-group derogation” (Mummendey et al., 2001, p. 160).

Us Versus Them Dynamic

In this subsection, I will consider how both films by Wortmann (2003, 2006) display the dynamic of us versus them, which promotes nationalism. Contrary to identification, exclusion is also demonstrated within the premise of “Fußball” as the fact that only one team can win the game. This creates the dynamic that it is either *us* or *them* who will leave the field as winners, which mirrors nationalism as a mindset that promotes the “derogation of other nations” (Takeuchi et al., 2016, p. 1). By pitting one nation’s team against another nation’s team, the World Cup encourages chants that depreciate the capability the other nation has. Even those who

are just watching the game at home will feel a loss due to the strong identification that has made this team and their victories belong to them. Ismer et al. (2017) recount George Orwell's commentary of football as "'war minus the shooting' that activates the 'combative instincts of both players and audiences'" (p. 554). Thus, when a team such as the German National Soccer Team does lose such as during the first game against Hungary in the 1954 World Cup or in the semi-finals game against Italy in the 2006 World Cup, these games were considered deep losses by a wide array of people, especially since the "spectacle[s] [took] on the form of national culture" through the sports films that depicted these events (Daffner, 2011, p. 109). Hence, I next analyze "Das Wunder von Bern" and "Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen" regarding their us versus them dynamic that promotes out-group derogation by emphasizing the victory of the in-group.

Das Wunder von Bern. Fifty years after the "German myth" of the miracle at Bern, Wortmann (2003) decided, in his own words, to take the mass medium of film and use it to "introduce this 'German myth' to Germany's next generation" (Daffner, 2011, p. 99). His motive was to preserve a German myth that the victory for West Germany in Bern put Germany back in the global and political upper leagues because one year after the win, the last prisoners of war came home and another year later, "das Wirtschaftswunder" (the economic miracle) started (Blecking, 2015, p. 203; Wortmann, 2006). The linking of the economic miracle that took place and the miracle at Bern in the film and elsewhere created the myth that if West Germany had lost against Hungary in the World Cup, the German economy would likely not have recovered as fast as it did after the win. This German myth that was reintroduced and reaffirmed in Wortmann's (2003) film, "Das Wunder von Bern," captures the strong identification Germans have with the

1954 World Cup and asserts a large amount of pressure on the significance of the event in German history. This increased tension surrounding the outcome of the game is displayed in the movie through the dynamic of us versus them. The other nickname for “Das Wunder von Bern” was “Den Sieg der Unseren” (The Victory of Us). The film about this victory of “us” (Germany) has many notable moments of this dynamic, including the blatant question of “Bist du für uns oder bist du gegen uns?” (Are you with us or are you against us?), the actions in the film of the fictional reporter, Paul Ackermann who is played by Lucas Gregorowicz, and the speeches the real-life German National Soccer Team coach, Sepp Herberger, as portrayed by actor Péter Franke, gives the team in the film.

One particular scene that demonstrates the dynamic of us versus them in “Das Wunder von Bern” happens after the devastating loss against Hungary. Rahn was benched most of the game and makes the decision of going out to a bar to drink, going against Herberger’s strict instructions. Then, Rahn wakes up the next morning to his roommate and captain of the team, Fritz Walter, asking him a blatant question (Wortmann, 2003, 0:49:43). Walter asks Rahn, “Bist du für uns oder bist du gegen uns?” (Are you for us or are you against us?), showing that there is no neutrality. One is either with the team or against the team. By asking Rahn which one he was, it displays how Rahn’s decision to go out was making it appear like his position as being for the team is unclear. There could be no uncertainty surrounding whether a person, especially a player, was for the team representing the nation or not.

This point is further illustrated through the constant surveillance of the team and their activities by real-life reporters such as Paul Ackermann played by Lucas Gregorowicz in the film. The film’s display of him wanting to know every action of the team is indicative of how

important it was for the nation to feel like the entire team is fully dedicated and equipped to win. For instance, when the fictional Paul Ackermann and his wife noticed members of the team in the bar they were at, Ackermann remarks that they are definitely going against Herberger's rules and insists on moving closer to hear what the players are saying (Wortmann, 2003, 0:44:02). Later, Ackermann and his wife end up dropping Rahn off at the steps of the team's house and, although Ackermann notes what a story it would be, he does not write it so that Herberger does not know the events (even though he still finds out about them) (Wortmann, 2003, 0:46:46). The reporter was aware of the magnitude that the story could have, both for Rahn's soccer career and the nation. This helps craft the image of national solidarity since if it came across that a player was against the team, then it would have been hard for the public to believe in it since the sport follows the us versus them dynamic very strictly, which is also shown in the speeches given by Herberger.

Sepp Herberger was the coach of the German National Soccer Team for the 1954 World Cup. Ultimately, he led the team to becoming champions, but it was not without several speeches to uplift the team and put down the opposing team. For instance, Wortmann (2003) displays the us versus them dynamic during a discussion before the final game against Hungary (1:19:52). In this talk, Herberger talks about how the Hungarian team does not know them or how strong they (Germans) are and the Hungarians do not know that they are strong enough "zu schlagen" (to defeat) (Wortmann, 2003, 1:21:50). The phrase "zu schlagen" makes sense in this context as the Germans are setting out to win against the other team, but it is also interesting to point out that just like in English with the phrase 'to beat', "zu schlagen" can also mean 'to beat', 'to hit', and 'to punch' among other things. This draws back onto what George Orwell recounts about soccer

and how it has war-like qualities since although “zu schlagen” in this context means to defeat the other team, one wrong translation and it could be suggesting that the other team will be punched (Ismer et al., 2017, p. 554). Regardless of the word choice, his speech clearly divides the Germans and the Hungarians as he talks about a ‘they’ and a ‘we’ while suggesting that the Hungarian team has no idea what they are up against.

In a similar fashion as the discussion before the final game against Hungary, various polarizing sentences are said during half-time of the finals when Germany and Hungary are tied two to two. Herberger shouts aggressive phrases like “it stands two to two”, “we could be world champions”, “pay attention”, and “fight, fight” (Wortmann, 2003, 1:32:21). During this, the camera shots follow exactly where Herberger moves as he looks at every player he passes by in the eye and explains further how the Hungarians are angry and they are going to start the second half ready to go (Wortmann, 2003, 1:32:36). Herberger discusses the game as if it were a battle and he was a general in his passionate shouting of “kampf, kampf!” (fight, fight!) and his deep enunciation of “the Hungarians are angry” (Wortmann, 2003, 1:32:35). It comes down to whether it will be us (Germany) or them (Hungary) and explicit strategies are discussed and made to tire out the Hungarians so that the Germans will win. For instance, Hedigkuli, a Hungarian player, is singled out during Herberger’s pre-game discussion and his name is circled to emphasize the task Herberger assigned to the German player, Klaus (Wortmann, 2003, 1:21:15). The weaknesses of the Hungarians, or the out-group, were to be capitalized on, fostering an environment where nationalistic tendencies would likely result as one team sees themselves as superior over another.

Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen. Similar displays also appeared in Wortmann's (2006) "Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen." With the 2006 World Cup being largely considered a major "turning point in modern Germany's self-understanding and endorsement of public expressions of national pride," it is important to explore all facets of how nationalism could be encouraged through a movie such as "Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen" by Wortmann (2006) (Ismer et al., 2017, p. 555). This popular movie that still holds the top spot for "football DVDs" on Amazon in Germany and holds a majority of positive reviews, almost five stars (Amazon, n.d.), all citing the "magic summer of 2006" builds a strong identification in viewers to Germany by the ways mentioned previously above and through exclusionary tactics (Daffner, 2011, p. 97). These us versus them exclusionary strategies against out-groups are shown through coach Jürgen Klinsmann's dialogue to the soccer team about other nations and the slogan of "Für Deutschland - durch Deutschland" (For Germany - through Germany).

During the 2006 World Cup, Klinsmann had become a famous German figure to the country. When the documentary premiered on German Unity Day, the familiar face of Klinsmann was likely not a surprise to the audience. His advocacy of going against the German mentality of standing still by using positive thinking and having the courage to change was also likely not a new revelation (Daffner, 2011, p. 101). However, with the film being shot in the unique way it was with behind-the-scenes out-of-touch places, these scenes depicted on the big screen gave a new perspective on Klinsmann that greatly emphasized the us versus them dynamic. For example, during the game against Argentina, Klinsmann urges his team to think only on the game from the first second on (Wortmann, 2006, 0:48:48). This sentence appears

normal since when a person is playing a sport, they should be focused on the game, but Klinsmann goes on further.

He talks about how “alle Nationen sagen da will keiner mehr gegen Deutschland spielen” (All nations say that they do not want to play against Germany anymore), bringing England and Sweden into the conversation even when they are playing against Argentina (Wortmann, 2006, 0:49:25). As a result, Klinsmann introduces more than just the two teams (Germany and Argentina) that are playing to suggest that no nation takes them seriously. This game is more than just against Argentina; it has become against every nation who doubts Germany. It becomes something more than just the World Cup in this moment and this passion is heard in Klinsmann’s voice when he says to his team that they must make them zip their lips to take back their words (Wortmann, 2006, 0:49:25). It is not a should, but a must, indicating the intensity of the statement and showing how one cannot doubt their country at all because if one does, then one is for the other nations. This word “for” leads to the next display of exclusionary tactics in the documentary, which is the slogan “Für Deutschland -- durch Deutschland” (“For Germany -- through Germany”).

Throughout the documentary, Wortmann (2006) captures huge crowds of German fans. At the end, enormous swarms of fans are shown in Berlin, Germany’s capital city, as the bus full of players drives through the crowd that includes police officers and soldiers (Wortmann, 2006, 1:55:57). While the scene shows these images, the slogan “Für Deutschland -- durch Deutschland” is heard repeatedly. The thought that only Germans are for Germany and it is through Germans across all of Germany for Germany that third place was earned in the 2006 World Cup shows the large possibility of derogation of out-groups taking place.

These out-groups may include those living in Germany who have become German citizens but do not have stereotypical German features or resemble what many consider to be German. Hence, when Germany played Turkey in a Euro 2008 tournament and the large Turkish population in Berlin was considered, Sullivan and Dumont (2014) wrote that “the strong connection between nationalism and derogation of immigrants would lead us to expect that when Germany wins an important game over a country such as Turkey, attitudes toward Turkish people in Germany would become less positive” (p. 97). Although it was found that the decrease was not significant enough to support this hypothesis, a significant negative correlation was discovered “between the positive and negative affect scale (PANAS) pride item and Turkish association (TA) and between the post-game team identification item score and TA” (Sullivan & Dumont, 2014, p. 104). This means that there is still a relationship, albeit complicated, between nationalism and the derogation of immigrants that occurs when Germany plays another nation in soccer that has a large population in their country, which is why it is important to understand how “Fußball” acts as a post-WWII domain of nationalism in Germany.

Both films give a platform to nationalism by fostering an us versus them dynamic that can lead to the derogation of outgroups since they are not a part of the superior in-group. “Das Wunder von Bern” and “Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen” each display this exclusionary dynamic during speeches made by the soccer coaches. Herberger, as portrayed by actor Péter Franke and Klinsmann, played by himself, both say phrases that emphasize the superiority of Germany and the lesser nature of the team they are playing against. Klinsmann even brings other nations that are not even playing at the time into the conversation such as England and Sweden, making the ‘them’ that Germany is against bigger than just one nation. Each film also has other

aspects involving language that emphasize the importance of the in-group of the Germans over the out-group. Noticing how critical of a role language can play in the development of nationalism should be an indicator that as long as a strong, intense identification with a country is being encouraged and an us versus them dynamic is being relied upon, the concept needs to be discussed to minimize the inherent nationalistic tendencies within the game of “Fußball.”

Nationalism Today

Nationalism is still prevalent today; it is not a thing of the past. As many countries including Germany keep their borders open to refugees, such as those from the Syrian Refugee Crisis, the relationship between the derogation of outgroups and nationalism is especially crucial to assess and monitor. Many psychological studies have shown not only the difference between patriotism and nationalism but have found various predictors of nationalism that are important to note. As described in the literature review, these include firstly, from Schatz et al.'s (1999) study, that there is a significant positive predictor of cultural contamination with nationalism in blind patriotism as well as a strong correlation between right-wing authoritarianism and blind patriotism. Next, Dekker et al. (2003) discovered that national emotions, auto-stereotypes, attitude toward outgroups, and national socialization were all strong predictors for a person's national attitude, which can develop into nationalism. To add to this, Takeuchi et al. (2016) assessed the brain and found that those with low compassion and higher nationalism show it in their brains through greater rGMD in their PCC, displaying psychological characteristics of nationalists. Furthermore, nationalism was proven to change over time by Davidov's (2011) study and a Blank and Schmidt (2003) study in Germany supported their hypothesis that as

nationalism increases, there is an increase in the degradation of outgroups as well as anti-Semitism.

Knowing that two domains of post-WWII nationalism include fairy tales and soccer, these predictors from the literature review such as national emotions, auto-stereotypes, attitude toward outgroups, and national socialization should all be considered heavily as to what role they play in fairy tales and soccer for Germany. One should think about how many contemporary films continue to show many of the same tropes I discussed largely above such as strong emotional identification and the us versus them dynamic. If similar tropes that foster and display nationalism are present in many films today, it suggests that socialization through films has allowed nationalism to remain a dominant concern for many countries, especially Germany. The finding by Blank and Schmidt (2003) that the higher the nationalism scores, the higher the degradation of outgroups propounds the idea that having a national cinema is harmful. On the other hand though, since higher patriotism is linked to lower degradation of outgroups, the findings by Blank and Schmidt (2003) also imply that a patriotic cinema has the ability to have different outcomes than a national one.

Taking into consideration that a patriotic cinema could highlight these same tropes in different ways that do not harm others, I believe it is still important that current and future film directors are aware of the danger within these tropes when they utilize them. Believing one's country is superior to all others is not patriotism and this shows in the gray matter in a person's brain (Takeuchi et al., 2016). Film directors should be encouraged to use their film medium to show a different perspective to the us versus them dynamic that creates negative attitudes toward outgroups. Perhaps, a soccer film could be made that shows both views of the players and fans.

Seeing the connection between current psychological research on nationalism and Germany's post-WWII history with nationalism can aid the country well in the future by showing Germans that although it may seem like their country has struggled more than others, they do not need to prove their superiority or degrade other nations to show their German pride.

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Screenshot Caption

Screenshot 1. Wortmann, S., Spiess, T., Hadding, H., Kremin, M., & Feikes, S. (Producers), & Wortmann, S. (Director). (2006). *Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen* [Screenshot by Youtube]. Germany: Little Shark Entertainment & WDR Westdeutscher Rundfunk.

