The Civilizing Process and Its Discontents: Suicide and Crimes against Persons in France, 1825–1830

Hugh P. Whitt

University of Nebraska-Lincoln, hwhitt1@unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/sociologyfacpub

Part of the Family, Life Course, and Society Commons, and the Social Psychology and Interaction Commons

https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/sociologyfacpub/496

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sociology Department, Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
The Civilizing Process and Its Discontents: Suicide and Crimes against Persons in France, 1825–1830

Hugh P. Whitt
University of Nebraska—Lincoln

A spatial analysis of data for French départements assembled in the 1830s by André-Michel Guerry and Adolphe d’Angeville examines the impacts of modernization and resistance to governmental “Frenchification” policies on measures of violence and its direction. In the context of Unnithan et al.’s integrated model of suicide and homicide, high suicide rates in the northern core and a predilection for violence against others in the southern periphery may be consistently interpreted in terms of theories of the civilizing process and internal colonialism. Alternative explanations of southern violence in 19th-century France are explored and rejected, and additional theoretical applications are suggested.

Nineteenth-century French intellectuals were deeply concerned about perceived increases in suicide (Giddens 1965) and crime (Wright 1983). This article explores regional patterns of suicide and interpersonal violence in France (1825–30), extending the integrated model of suicide and homicide (i.e., “lethal violence”; Unnithan et al. 1994) to include insights drawn from treatments of the historical development of “modern” ways of think-

1 My thanks to Stephen Mennell for patiently guiding me through some of the finer nuances of the theory of the civilizing process; J. Clark Archer, Glenn Deane, Dan Hoyt, and Julia McQuillan for useful advice on methodological issues; Michael Friendly, Jennifer Lehman, Marshall Olds, Nicole Smith, Jordan Stump, and the late Louise G. Cook for sharing insights into 19th-century French language, culture, and sociology; and Paul Olson, Philip Schwadel, Les Whitbeck, J. Allen Williams, and AJS reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Direct correspondence to Hugh P. Whitt, 718 Oldfather Hall, University of Nebraska—Lincoln, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588-0324. E-mail: hwhitt@unl.edu

2 The weight of the evidence (e.g., Lodhi and Tilly 1973; McDonald 1982; Wright 1983; Gillis 1989, 1994) suggests that concern with increasing suicide rates was justified but that, contrary to prevailing 19th-century beliefs, crime, especially violent crime, was actually decreasing for the nation as a whole. See below.

© 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0002-9602/2010/11601-0006$10.00
Suicide and Violent Crime


From this perspective, regional patterns of violence in 19th-century France can be theoretically understood as resulting at least in part from the existence of and clash between two disparate cultural traditions, the modern urban-industrial culture of the core and a culture in the periphery that resisted externally imposed modernization. Building on the classic work of Henry and Short (1954) on the “choice between suicide and homicide,” Unnithan et al. (1994) maintain that suicide results when people blame themselves for their misfortunes, while homicide reflects external attributions of blame. Bendix (1959), Elias (2000), and Inkeles (1960, 1966, 1969), among others, point out that the modernization of the West was accompanied by growing internalized impulse control and the turning inward of aggressive impulses, implying that modern bourgeois cultural themes led to the development of guilt and self-blame, predisposing those in the urban-industrial core toward suicide. Indeed, Freud (1962, p. 81) saw the sense of guilt “as the most important problem in the development of civilization, . . . the price we pay for our advance in civilization.” At the same time, the internal colonialism that characterized the process of nation building in France, as in the British Isles (Hechter 1999), Italy (Gramsci [1926] 1978), and elsewhere, led to the development in much of the periphery, where traditional cultures were threatened, of violent “reactive” or “oppositional” subcultures of honor (Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1967; Hackney 1969; Hechter and Levi 1979; Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985; Rose and McClain 1998; Anderson 1999; Corzine, Huff-Corzine, and Whitt 1999; Hechter 1999; Blok 2001) characterized by external attributions of blame (Hackney 1969).3

Unnithan et al.’s (1994) integrated model of suicide and homicide dis-

3 The emphasis on attributions of blame in the integrated model contrasts with the focus on norms legitimating the use of violence in Wolfgang and Ferracuti’s (1967) treatment of the subculture of violence. Unnithan et al. (1994) extend the conceptualization of culture well beyond the strictly normative dimension to include cognitive definitions of reality and explanatory styles, including the ways in which persons in particular social settings characteristically make sense of the causes of problematic situations by assigning blame to self or others (Corzine et al. 1999). Their conceptualization of culture has much in common with treatments of the concept of habitus by Elias ([1939] 2000, see below) and Bourdieu (1984); Miller’s (1958) concept of “focal concerns” (especially “fate”); Hall and Hewitt’s (1970; see also Hewitt and Hall 1973; Stokes and Hewitt 1976) discussion of cultural catalogs of “quasi-theories” that people use for understanding and dealing with problematic situations; and Swidler’s (1986) conceptualization of culture as a “‘tool kit’ of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct ‘strategies of action’” (p. 273).
tinguishes between factors that produce violence and those that affect its
direction, seeking to identify (1) structural strains and negative life events
that affect the size of the stream of lethal violence (suicide plus homicide)
and (2) culturally based internal and external attributions of blame that
divert lethal violence into suicidal or homicidal channels (the proportion
of the total expressed as suicide). The focus is on the implications of
theories of the “civilizing process” (Elias 2000) and internal colonialism
for the direction of violence against self or others, but I also explore
linkages of these theoretical traditions to rates of suicide and interpersonal
violence per se and to total violence.

19TH- AND EARLY 20TH-CENTURY PERSPECTIVES ON LETHAL
VIOLENCE, THE “PROGRESS OF CIVILIZATION,” AND INTERNAL
COLONIALISM

Nineteenth- and early 20th-century European scholars discovered empiri-
cal relationships between suicide and crimes of violence, anticipating
the theoretical themes that guide this study. Beginning with André-Michel
Guerry (1802–66) and Adolphe d’Angeville (1796–1856) in the 1830s,
French moral statisticians, like their better-known Belgian counterpart
Adolphe Quetelet (1796–1874), began documenting and mapping geo-
graphical variations across départements in rates of violent crime and
suicide.4 Guerry ([1833] 2002) provides a systematic analysis of official
data on what we would today call social problems, including, but not
limited to, crime and suicide (see Beirne [1993], Whitt [2002], and Friendly
[2007] on Guerry’s life and work). D’Angeville ([1835] 1969) also presents
data on crime and suicide, but he concentrates on the extent to which
the Industrial Revolution had penetrated into the French nation (Le Roy
Ladurie 1969). Both data sets for French départements survive. This ar-
ticle expands and refines theoretical ideas beginning to emerge in rudi-
mentary form in the 19th and early 20th centuries, merging Guerry’s data
with d’Angeville’s and analyzing these data using modern spatial econ-
ometric methods.

Guerry, whose maps (see fig. 1) show that southern France was more
violent but persons in the north were more likely to commit suicide, was
struck by the apparent negative relationship across regions between rates
of suicide and crimes of violence. He suggested a cultural explanation for
these patterns, arguing that France was composed “of several distinct

4 Quetelet’s ([1831] 1984) analysis of the propensity for crime at different ages was
apparently the first empirical study in sociology and criminology (Lottin [1912] 1969),
but Guerry’s and d’Angeville’s contributions appeared soon afterward, in 1833 and
1835, respectively.
Fig. 1—Guerry’s maps of crimes against persons (1825–30) and suicide (1827–30). Source: Guerry, 1833
nations, each with its own language, manners, customs, and traditional prejudices” that influenced how people in different regions behaved (Guerry 2002, p. 77). Later 19th-century theorists (Masaryk [1881] 1970; Morselli 1882; Ferri 1883–84) elaborated on his findings and ideas. Indeed, modern integrated suicide/homicide theory (Unnithan et al. 1994; Henry and Short 1954) owes much to the theoretical tradition he began. Guerry’s findings were repeatedly replicated (Maury 1860; Despine 1868), and a consensus developed that there is an “antagonism” (Despine 1868) between suicide and violent crime. Violence against self and others came to be regarded as “two sides of the same coin” (Tarde 1886; see also Gillis 1994) that vary inversely across geographical areas and over time. By the 1880s, Luigi Bodio (Actes du premier congrès international d’anthropologie criminelle [hereafter Actes] 1886–87) and Enrico (Henry) Morselli (1882) had prepared maps for Italy, Austria, and Germany that showed north-south patterns similar to Guerry’s for France. Nonetheless, the increase in suicide rates with distance from the equator applied only as far north as the temperate zone at approximately 50°–55° north latitude, the most industrialized part of the Continent (Morselli 1882), suggesting that a proclivity for suicide diffused outward from industrial centers. Tomáš (Thomas) G. Masaryk (1970) and Enrico Ferri (1883–84) assembled long-term time-series data that showed that suicide rates were generally increasing and those of homicide decreasing in European nations during the 19th century.

Morselli (1882; Actes 1886–87) and Ferri (1883–84) independently proposed a theoretical model to explain why there is an inverse relationship between suicide and homicide across geographical areas and in long-term time series but “parallelism” with respect to such variables as sex and the seasons of the year. According to this theory, both suicide and homicide result from two separate causal processes, one of which leads to the production of violence while the other affects its direction against self or others. Suicide was thus a “safety valve against crime” (Tarde 1886). Durkheim ([1897] 1951, p. 340) characterized this theory, which both he and Tarde (1886) opposed, as conceptualizing suicide and homicide as “two different channels of a single stream, fed by a single source, which consequently cannot move in one direction without receding to an equal extent in the other.” At a session devoted to these patterns at the First International Congress of Criminal Anthropology (the “Congress of Rome”) in 1885, Morselli (Actes 1886–87) suggested several possible explanations for the north-south gradients, including climate, topography, ethnicity, education, religion, and social class. He even speculated that the patterns might be due to differences in hair color (blondes prefer suicide; brunettes, homicide). Elsewhere, he (Morselli 1882; see also Durkheim 1951, chap. 3) added customs and cultural characteristics to this list,
suggesting on the basis of both geographical distributions and long-term trends that suicide increases and homicide decreases with the progress of civilization. Similarly, Masaryk (1970) argued that “suicides are the bloody sacrifices of the civilizing process” (p. 169) but that “everywhere that murder frequently occurs, suicide is infrequent and vice versa” (p. 142, italics in both quotes in the original translation). Ferri (1883–84) echoed this position, suggesting that suicide and homicide are both forms of personal violence with similar causes in life’s hardships but that less civilized people kill others while those who are more civilized kill themselves (Marra and Orrù 1991). Belief in a connection between suicide and such aspects of modern life as urbanization, education, secularization, and industrialization was widely held among 19th-century intellectuals, both before and after Morselli, Ferri, and Masaryk (Giddens 1965; Kushner 1993). Durkheim (1951, p. 106; cf. Durkheim [1893] 1933, p. 247), who shared this view, noted that “suicides followed along” when scientific, artistic, and economic activity shifted from the north to the center of Italy after the capital was moved from Florence to Rome in 1871.

On the other side of the coin, Italian political and intellectual leaders a generation after Guerry agonized over what to do about the “Southern Question” or “Southern Problem” (Mack Smith 1954, 1969; Schneider 1998; Moe 2002)—the presence in southern Italy and Sicily of what leaders in the industrial north considered a lawless “barbarian” region. At the time of the Risorgimento that led to the unification of the Kingdom of Italy as a highly centralized unitary state (1859–61), Prime Minister Camillo di Cavour asserted the north’s ability to solve the Southern Problem through moral suasion, or force if necessary (Zariski 1983; Riall 1992; Moe 2002), but the attempt to impose modernity through the coercive power of the state backfired. The “virtual civil war” that ensued accentuated the cultural gulf between regions (Moe 2002) as the domination of the south by force failed to translate into cultural consent (Urbinati 1998). The northern attitude of superiority and its program to impose economic, political, and cultural unity produced growing resentment (Schneider and Schneider 1998), leading to increased violence rather than reducing it (Blok 1974). Reports to their northern colleagues by military and governmental officials of the newly unified nation stationed in the south (Mack Smith 1968; Zariski 1983; Moe 2002) painted a picture of a violent region held back by deficiencies in industrialization, education, the enforcement of laws, and civic virtue. Giuseppe Govone, an Italian general stationed in Sicily, remarked on leaving his command in 1863 that, as a result of “hatreds, vendettas, and outlawries, we have an official list of 1,500 homicides in two years, and the real figure would be more like a thousand a year” (Govone [1863] 1968, p. 372). Official quantitative data on population, industry and commerce, institutions, practices, and violent deaths
(accidents, suicides, and homicides) published in the *Statistica del Regno de Italia* by the Ministero di Agricultura, Industria, e Commercio beginning in 1862 gave empirical support to such characterizations, showing, for example, that in 1866 the homicide rate of the south (23.64 per 100,000) dwarfed that of the north (5.23 per 100,000; Patriarca 1998).

Moe (2002, p. 171) quotes the Neapolitan Giovanni Manna as lamenting that a northerner claiming to be “friend, associate, brother, instead aims to be master and superior.” Manna’s comments were echoed by his fellow southerner Antonio Gramsci (1978, p. 246), who diagnosed the chronic problem in terms of what Hechter (1999) would later call “internal colonialism,” arguing that the “Northern bourgeoisie has subjugated the South of Italy and the Islands, and reduced them to exploitable colonies.” While some modern scholars (e.g., Blok 1974; Palloni 1979; Riall 1992) offer alternatives to Gramsci’s (1978) internal colonialism interpretation, they generally agree that the Piedmontese attempt to use the political power of the state to establish social and cultural hegemony was a failure, alienating southern elites and peasantry alike and leading to an increased level of violence that persisted until well into the 20th century (Blok 1974).

In summary, 19th- and early 20th-century theorists grappled with the relationship of suicide to homicide and crimes of violence, the relationships of both to the Industrial Revolution and the growth of modern bourgeois civilization, and the question of why the violence of less-developed areas persisted (and perhaps increased) despite externally imposed attempts to modernize them. Similar issues guide the modern theories of the civilizing process and internal colonialism that inform this article.

**THE CIVILIZING PROCESS . . .**

When 19th-century European scholars spoke of the progress of civilization, they meant not only economic growth but also the replacement of traditional worldviews by “civilized” ways of thinking. Masaryk (1970), in particular, emphasized the meaning of civilization, linking increases in suicide rates to the decline of religion and the growth of secularism. Similarly, Durkheim (1951, p. 106) argued that the high suicide rates of northern France and Germany, “the two principal areas of European civilization,” reflected “ideas and sentiments” which reappeared, “but with less intensity” in neighboring areas such as northern (and, later, central) Italy and southern England and Belgium, which shared “a somewhat similar way of life.”

Although he says nothing about suicide, Norbert Elias’s theory of the civilizing process (Elias 2000, 1983, 1996; see also Blok 1974; Mennell 1989, 2007; Dunning and Mennell 1998; Mazlish 2004) has been the dom-
Suicide and Violent Crime

inant paradigm guiding modern research on long-term secular trends in European rates of violent crime (for applications of Elias’s theory to penology, see Garland [1990, 1991]). Elias (2000) uses the term “civilization” and related concepts such as “civilized” in two different ways, one emic and the other etic (Mennell 2007, p. 25; see Headland, Pike, and Harris [1990] on the emic-edic distinction). The emic (i.e., popular and native) sense of these terms refers to historical European understandings of civilization and what it means to be civilized, as revealed in both French and German writings on the topic and “manners books” that spelled out standards of civilized behavior. In the etic (i.e., technical and analytical) sense, the civilizing process bears on unplanned and unintended changes in “habitus,” a term Elias used well before Bourdieu (1984) to indicate learned and shared ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving that are so deeply ingrained as to appear to be second nature (Mennell 1989, 2007).

The crucial dimension of the civilizing process in this technical sense is a gradual shift of the balance between external and internal constraints in favor of greater internalized impulse control, foresight, and rationality.5 Beginning with the transition from feudalism into “the court society” (Elias 1983) and continuing with the growth of market society, gradual historical changes in social organization such as an increasing division of labor, urbanization, population increase, and the growth of trade in a money economy were accompanied by shifting configurations of intergroup competition for power, prestige, and honor, the growth of social differentiation, widening chains of interdependence, and the concentration of monopolies of violence and taxation in the hands of the absolutist state. Using materials such as the instructions contained in European manners books from the 13th century to the 19th, Elias (2000) traces changes in taken-for-granted habitual standards of behavior and ways of thinking about such aspects of civility as bodily functions, table manners, and behavior in the bedroom that originated in the upper classes and then exerted pressures on the strata below them to exercise self-constraint over their feelings and behaviors. For Elias (2000), these changes in habitus were accompanied by decreasing violence. Following Huizinga ([1924] 1956), he argues that medieval people were more violent than those of the modern period because they were temperamentally more volatile and subject to sudden mood swings. Long-term reductions in impulsive private violence followed state formation and the establishment of state monopolies of physical force. The willingness to use violence at a moment’s notice

---

5 The emphasis on impulse control in the theory of the civilizing process is compatible with Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) general theory of crime and Tittle’s (1995) control balance theory, which link predatory crime and deviance to poorly developed self-control.
had survival value in the dangerous, uncertain, and unpacified society of the Middle Ages (Blok [2001, p. 206], who links these conditions to cultures of honor). In contrast, because of the increased probability of punishment under conditions of strong control by an effective monopolistic state, people increasingly exercised self-constraint over their aggressive impulses, and impulsive outbursts such as brawling became less common.

Violence still occurred, but it was increasingly pushed behind the scenes or channeled into wars, highly ritualized forms of violence such as dueling (Elias 1996), and contests such as sport. As Spierenburg (1994, p. 703) notes, “although Elias himself never explicitly said so, the possession of a psychic equipment of emotional control in theory allows for the use of controlled violence. A carefully planned act of killing . . . may be compatible with a ‘civilized’ personality on the part of the perpetrator . . . . We cannot automatically assume that homicides of this type will be rare in complex societies.” In this regard, Gillis (1994) notes that the extension of literacy affected the types of homicides committed, repressing crimes of passion—domestic homicides and those based on jealousy and anger—but not cold-blooded murders motivated by financial gain. Similarly, Spierenburg (1994) finds that impulsive violence became less prominent in Amsterdam relative to premeditated killings beginning in the mid-1700s, largely because of decreases in the incidence of tavern brawls. Lacour’s (2001) study of early modern rural Germany, however, fails to verify a trend away from straightforwardly impulsive violence. In her data, uncontrolled angry violence was dominant throughout the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, with rates of rational, planned, willful instrumental violence remaining low in comparison throughout the entire period. Indeed, Parella (1992) finds that, contrary to Spierenburg’s hypothesis, murders for financial gain were replaced in the département du Nord in northern France during the 19th century by family murders based on intense emotional disputes. The jury is still out on the relationship of civilizing processes to impulsive and controlled “faces of violence” (Spierenburg 1994).

The downward trend in violence was sometimes reversed under “de-civilizing” conditions of increasing danger and fear (Elias 2000, pp. 531–32n; 1996, p. 301; see also Blok 1974, p. 213; Dunning and Mennell 1998). Elias (1996) and others point to such examples as war, economic downturns, shifting power ratios between classes, rapid social change and population movements, and periods of weakened state control (Mennell 2007).

Gillis’s (1989) study of the relationship between state surveillance and homicide in 19th-century France supports the hypothesis that compliance to state monopolies of power played a role in the civilizing process and the reduction in interpersonal violence over time. Other “disciplining institutional arrangements” (Eisner 2001), including those associated with urbanization (Zehr 1975; Gillis 1994), the expansion of literacy and secular
Suicide and Violent Crime

education (Gillis 1994), religious movements such as the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter Reformation (Ruff 2001), and such changes in the organization of work as bureaucratization, the expansion of manufacturing, and the growth of capitalism (van Krieken 1989; Eisner 2001) undoubtedly also contributed to the development of increased impulse control.

Despite Elias’s silence on the relationship between the civilized habitus and suicide, Durkheim (1951), Morselli (1882), Masaryk (1970), Ferri (1883–84), and Freud (1962) suggest that the cultural changes associated with the civilizing process may have affected patterns of suicide as well as violence against others. Eugen Weber (1976, p. 496) notes that in 19th-century France the “vices [of the core] tended to be those of the new society (suicide, illegitimacy), their crimes to be against property rather than persons,” while the periphery was “violent in both crime and politics.” Traditional ideologies of the 18th century were replaced in the 19th by the view that individuals were responsible for their own fate (Bendix 1959; Inkeles 1960, 1966, 1969). The modern worldview, by promoting self-control, individualism, self-responsibility, and a belief in the possibility of dominating one’s environment for one’s own purposes rather than being dominated by it, should promote internal attributions of blame and a turning inward of aggressive impulses. Like Henry and Short (1954), who relate the “choice” of suicide over homicide to superego strength and a sense of guilt, Elias (2000) links the civilizing process to superego formation, and van Krieken (1989) suggests that it was accompanied by a shift from an emphasis on shame to one based on guilt. Whitt, Gordon, and Hofley (1972; Unnithan and Whitt 1992; Unnithan et al. 1994) have argued in the context of cross-national variations in economic development and lethal violence in modern nations that a culturally based modern worldview channels violence inward against oneself. If one believes that success is possible through one’s own efforts, failure can only be blamed on oneself. This implies that the civilizing process should be accompanied by an increase in the ratio of suicide to total violence.

Taken together, a number of modern studies, like those by the 19th-century scholars cited above, can be interpreted in the context of the hypothesis that the civilizing process tends to channel violence in the direction of suicide. Lane (1979) finds that while Philadelphians in the late 19th century increasingly chose suicide over homicide as the city industrialized. French homicide rates fell during the 19th century (Lodhi and Tilly 1973; McDonald 1982; Wright 1983; Gillis 1989, 1994), and Baller and Richardson’s (2002) reanalysis of Morselli’s (1882) 1872–76 cross-sectional data on French départements a half century after Guerry indicates that high suicide rates prevailed in the region centered on Paris and low rates in peripheral areas of Brittany and the southwest. Gillis (1994), whose
study includes both suicide and homicide, suggests that literacy or something closely associated with it may actually have increased the rate of nonaccidental violent death (i.e., the sum of suicide and homicide rates) while at the same time transforming the way in which violence was expressed. Homicide rates fell over time as a function of increasing literacy, but the increase in suicide rates was almost eight times greater than the decrease in homicide, implying that the proportion of lethal violence expressed as suicide (i.e., the suicide rate divided by the combined rate of suicide and homicide) increased over time. Declines in homicide similar to those in France have been observed in other European nations (e.g., Zehr 1975; Gurr 1981; Eisner 2001, 2003; Ruff 2001). Eisner (2001, 2003) notes that homicide rates first fell in England and the Netherlands, the “pioneers of the modernization process,” early in the 17th century and later slowly spread to other nations as they modernized.

. . . AND ITS DISCONTENTS

This article supplements Elias’s perspective with one based on theories of internal colonialism (Blauner 1969; Hackney 1969; Hechter 1999). The two theoretical traditions are compatible. Elias’s (2000) emphasis on state formation is paralleled by Hechter’s (1999, p. 17) characterization of internal colonialism as a process whereby “a state characterized by sectional, or otherwise competing economies, polities, and cultures, within a given territory, is transformed into a society composed of a single all-pervasive . . . ‘national’ economy, polity, and culture.”

The internal colonialism model suggests that policies aimed at establishing political and economic dominance, reducing regional cultural diversity, and curbing violence backfire by contributing to the development in the periphery of oppositional cultures of honor that predispose persons to attack others in response to external threat. Traditional cultures are frequently hostile to modernism, especially when it is imposed by outsiders who view themselves and their culture as superior. In both classical and internal colonialism, the colonized, faced with what they define as an external enemy bent on subjugating them and destroying their culture, respond with violence (Fanon 1965; Memmi 1967; Blauner 1969; Hackney 1969). The colonized tend to take on we-they thinking (Memmi 1967), to stress themes such as honor, dignity, respect, and manliness that characterize cultures of honor (Blauner 1969; Hackney 1969; Bachman 1992; cf. Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1967; Gilmore 1982; Nisbett and Cohen 1996; Eisner 2001, 2003), and to develop “a worldview that locates threats to the region outside the region and threats to the person outside the self” (Hackney 1969, p. 925). Much of this violence is political, but it can also
be expressed as in-group violence devoid of clear political overtones (Fanon 1965). Clark (1965, p. 86), writing in the context of the metaphorical internal colonization of the African-American inner city, suggests that this pattern “may mean that the victim of oppression is more prone to attack his fellow victim than to risk aggression against the feared oppressor,” but it may also be interpreted in terms of a generalized culturally based tendency to attribute blame for one’s troubles to others rather than oneself (Miller 1958).

It can be argued that Elias’s (1996) concept of decivilizing processes implicitly includes internal colonialism as a special case. Elias (1996, p. 6) suggests that decivilizing processes increase the level of physical danger, affecting the habitus in such a way that people “begin to doubt their own intrinsic worth, feel humiliated and degraded, and are prone to wishful thinking about the revenge they would take on the perpetrators of this situation.” Indeed, he and Scotson (Elias and Scotson 1994) suggest in their theory of relations between established and outsider groups that “domination of one section of mankind over the others is bound to have a boomerang effect” (p. xxxii) because stigmatized outsiders tend to “hit back” (p. xxviii) “by behaving badly with great deliberation, . . . doing the very things for which they [are] blamed as an act of revenge against those who [blame] them” (p. 129; see also Cohen 1955).

The two theories also agree that, historically, the edic meaning of civilization to those in the core formed the ideological basis for efforts to establish political, economic, and cultural unity. Elias notes in The Civilizing Process (Elias 2000, p. 41) that self-satisfied French (and English) bourgeois intellectuals began using “civilization” as the antithesis of such terms as “barbarism” beginning in the 18th century. The we-they thinking in this dichotomy is summed up the perceived superiority of the West over “earlier societies (or ‘more primitive’ contemporary ones)” in terms of its technology, science, manners, “and much more” (Elias and Scotson 1994), p. 5). Shortly before the turn of the 19th century, the dichotomy between civilization and barbarism became a “rallying cry” for French national expansion and bringing the benefits of civilization to “uncivilized” people through colonialism (Elias 2000, p. 43; see also Ford 1990; Conklin 1999; Mazlish 2004). Similarly, Blauner (1969, p. 396; see also Reece 1979), writing in the internal colonialism tradition, points out that under classical colonialism, the Western core’s “objective superiority in technology and military power buttressed the West’s sense of cultural superiority,” leading the colonizing power to carry out a policy “which constrains, transforms, or destroys indigenous values, orientations, and ways of life.” Both theories agree that such conditions promote increased violence.

Elias and Scotson (1994) share with internal colonialism models an emphasis on unequal distributions of power and the hypothesis that the
“bad behavior” of outsiders reflects assaults on their self-image (e.g., stigmatization) by members of the establishment. Similarly, Blau ner (1969, p. 401; see also Memmi 1967, p. 128) suggests that acceptance is the initial response to attempts by “colonizers [to] use their culture to socialize . . . colonial elites into an identification with the colonial system,” but acceptance turns to radical rejection when the colonized, realizing that acceptance is bought at the price of one’s group and inner identity, move radically toward rejection of the dominant culture.”

But there are differences. Elias’s treatment of decivilizing processes in *The Germans* (Elias 1996) stresses the importance of physical threat, emphasizing the survival value of violence under conditions of weak or weakened state control, while internal colonialism models, like Elias and Scotson (1994), link violent cultures of honor to assaults on the self-images of those subjected to political domination, economic exploitation and dependency, and the destruction of their culture. These assaults, as Elias clearly recognized, may or may not involve physical threat.

A second difference, both between the two theories and within the internal colonialism paradigm itself, revolves around issues of intentionality. A recurring criticism of the theory of the civilizing process is that it emphasizes unplanned and unintended consequences of civilizing (and by implication, decivilizing) processes for the content of habitus, to the relative neglect of “the civilizing offensive” (Mitzman 1987) through which groups of people “consciously and deliberately set out to civilize social life” (van Krieken 1989, p. 199). The imposition of bureaucratic rules and conscious efforts by schools, Christian missionaries, and urban reformers to inculcate “civilized” behavior are part of this civilizing offensive (van Krieken 1989). Elias’s work, taken as a whole, assigns lesser importance than do internal colonialism models to these intentional civilizing initiatives.6

Internal colonialism models differ among themselves on the question of intentionality. There are two versions of internal colonialism theory. Clark (1965), Carmichael and Hamilton (1967), and Blau ner (1969, 1972) use a colonial analogy as a metaphor that serves as a useful way of understanding the effects on the African-American community in the United States of political repression, economic dependency, and cultural disruption, arguing that these processes have consequences regardless of intent. Blau ner (1969, p. 393; see also Carmichael and Hamilton 1967;

---

6 Elias (2000) does not entirely exclude deliberate attempts to inculcate civilized behavior. Ironically, the manners books he uses to document the edic meanings of civilization had these very functions for the civilized habitus. Moreover, his discussions of childhood socialization (e.g., p. 60) and the implications of edic meanings of civilization for colonialism (p. 43) deal explicitly or implicitly with conscious and deliberate civilizing processes.
Suicide and Violent Crime

Blauner 1972), for example, distinguishes colonialism as a form of social, economic, and political system (i.e., classical colonialism) from internal colonialism as a process that need not be based on official policy or conscious intent. In internal colonialism as a process, colonization in a figurative sense results in the African-American inner city from the uncoordinated actions of individual members of an elite in pursuit of their own self-interests in the context of institutional racism, not from policy initiatives by a nation-state, as in classical colonialism. Nonetheless, “the distinction between deed and intent has no great significance” (Blauner 1969, p. 402, quoting Memmi 1967, p. 130). This differs from Hechter’s (1999) conceptualization, which emphasizes intentional state-building processes. Without denying that the attitudes and actions of elites may have similar unintended decivilizing consequences even when they are not consciously intended to threaten nonelites or civilize them (Elias and Scotson 1994), this article, like Hechter, conceptualizes internal colonialism as a conscious and deliberate civilizing offensive on the part of the nation-state, focusing on the unintended reactions of those in the periphery to the civilizing process under conditions in which the civilized habitus is externally imposed as a matter of state policy (see Hackney 1969; Bachman 1992).

Internal colonialism has been used as a framework for understanding individual and collective violence among a variety of peripheral populations, among them African-Americans (Clark 1964, 1965; Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Blauner 1969, 1972), Mexican Americans (Moore 1970), Southerners in the United States (Hackney 1969), Native Americans (Bachman 1992), regional ethnic minorities in France (Beer 1980) and other European nations (Zariski 1989), and Catholic and Palestinian terrorists in Northern Ireland and Israel, respectively (Price 1977). While the internal colonialism paradigm provides important insights into processes leading to the formation of violent reactive subcultures, the model is usually employed in an ad hoc or post hoc fashion (Hind 1984, p. 553) as one of several possible plausible explanations (e.g., Hackney 1969; Bachman 1992). Other than Beer’s (1980) study of ethnic activism in 20th-century France, I know of no prior attempt to operationalize the concept and test its relationship to violence or its externalization. Beer (1980) conceptualizes internal colonialism in terms of uneven development, measuring it by low levels of urbanization and economic development. This study, in contrast, treats unintentional civilizing processes such as urbanization and development as analytically and empirically distinct from conscious and deliberate national policies of internal colonialism. The internal colonialism model as conceptualized in this study implies an element of resistance to the intentional coercive policies of the state missing
in both Beer’s (1980) conceptualization and in the theory of the civilizing process.

FRANCISATION: THE CIVILIZING OFFENSIVE IN 19TH-CENTURY FRANCE

The 19th-century French civilizing offensive was a continuation of a centuries-old program aimed at achieving national political, economic, and cultural unity through francisation (“Frenchification”). Tilly (1986, p. 72) characterizes southern France, with its distinctive culture and language, as a “different world” from the urban, industrial north. Indeed, observers in the first third of the 19th century (e.g., Malte-Brun 1810–29; Dupin 1827; Guerry 2002; d’Angeville 1969) concluded that there were two Frances, divided by what became known as the St. Malo–Genève Line. Themselves apologists of progress, modernism, and industrialism, they referred paternalistically to the area north and east of the boundary as the “illuminated France” and the territory to the south and west as the “dark France.” Weber (1976, p. 494) notes that “this geographical division was in effect the division between urban and rural France—better still, between the poor, backward countryside and the areas of France, rural or not, that were to some degree permeated by the values of the modern world.”

The St. Malo–Genève line was paralleled by cultural, structural, and socioeconomic differences. Various languages and dialects prevailed in much of the periphery. These dialects, sometimes mutually unintelligible with French and one another, were spoken to the exclusion of the national language in schools and churches in much of the hinterland (Weber 1976; de Planhol and Claval 1994). Weber (1976) reports that as late as 1879 a folktale was published in no fewer than 88 different patois and dialects. Indeed, according to a map prepared by Abel Hugo in 1835 (Weber 1976, p. 68) only 20 départements, all of them in a contiguous area centered on Paris, were wholly French speaking. Even 30 years after Guerry (1833) wrote his Essai sur la statistique moral de la France, about a quarter of the French population spoke no French (Weber 1976).

De Planhol and Claval (1994) point to regional differences in material culture and to the use of unwritten “customary” rather than written law in the periphery. “Infrajudicial modes of conflict resolution” (Ruff 2001) such as dueling, vendettas, and the use of clergy or locally prominent laymen as arbitrators had been used in defense of personal honor since at least the medieval period. Dueling had been illegal since 1602 but had
Suicide and Violent Crime

not entirely disappeared by the 19th century. Vendettas, used by both nobility and bourgeoisie to avenge offenses to honor, continued in isolated upland regions of the Languedoc and in Corsica well into the 1800s despite the growth of state justice.

McPhee (1992, p. 233) argues that “the process of francisation is as old as the French state itself.” Pounds and Ball (1964; Elias 2000) characterize French history since the Middle Ages in terms of the gradual expansion of a central core in the vicinity of Paris into the periphery (see fig. 2). Indeed, Weber (1976, p. 485) argues that the eventual consolidation of the French state may be seen as the development of an internal “colonial empire” shaped over the centuries by annexation and conquest. Initially, the subjugation of the periphery was primarily political and administrative (Pounds and Ball 1964; Levi 2000). Nonetheless, an essential historical continuity between the 19th-century francisation program and conscious efforts to produce cultural uniformity may be traced back at least to the 17th century (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985). Ideological justifications for francisation, however, shifted over time. Cardinal Richelieu’s (1585–1642) policies centered on molding France into a culturally unified nation with its own national identity and uniform obedience to the crown (Kimmel 1988; Levi 2000), themes echoed in Louis XIV’s (1643–1715) attempt to centralize control over virtually all aspects of national life (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985; Safran 1992). Efforts “done on behalf of modernity” (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985, p. 76) to reduce or eliminate cultural differences across regions, especially those involving language and religion (Weber 1976), were intensified with the French Revolution and continued, after a brief lapse under Napoleon, with the Restoration and the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution. By 1789 French revolutionary leaders, who had come to disdain the popular culture of the periphery as “superstitious” and “priest-ridden,” saw it as their mission “to complete the job of national integration that the monarchy had botched” by attempting “to replace local patois, customs, and beliefs with a national language, school system and scientific reason” (Mitzman 1987, p. 674). Jacobins such as Danton and Robespierre, in particular, retained the ancien régime’s emphasis on standardization and centralized control (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985) but buttressed it by an ideology based on Revolutionary patriotism and Enlightenment themes of rationality, republicanism, and secularism. In 1790, the Constituent Assembly, in a deliberate attempt to erase cultural dif-

7 See Elias (1996; see also Dunning and Mennell 1998) on the rise of dueling among German middle-class university students during the Second Empire (1871–1918) as a reflection of a code of honor under which the demanding and giving of satisfaction served as a means for gaining respect and acceptance from the aristocracy. In France, as in Germany, duels seldom attracted the official attention of the authorities.
ferences and build a more homogeneous nation, dissolved locally elected assemblies and regional parlements, replacing France’s traditional provinces with artificial départements headed by officials appointed in Paris (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985; McPhee 1992). Départements were smaller than the old provinces. Their boundaries, which in many cases cut across provinces, were drawn in such a way as to facilitate administrative control; none of the communes into which départements were divided was more than a day’s ride from the chef-lieu or préfecture (i.e., départements capital). McPhee (1992, p. 38) maintains that dissolving provincial governments was a “pre-emptive victory of the new state” that “undercut larger provincial and ethnic unities” that resurfaced after 1787.

Regional variations in laws and punishments were eliminated under a national system of justice (McPhee 1992), and law enforcement officers (the Gendarmerie Nationale, established in 1791) were sent from the core into isolated rural areas which had for centuries relied on unwritten law and informal social control (Ruff 2001). By 1811, départements préfects,
who headed the political and civil police under the Ministry of the Interior, could also draw on 30,000 gendarmes, agents of the Ministry of War who patrolled the countryside from barracks in the préfectures (McPhee 1992).

Other Revolutionary policies imposed restrictions on the power of the Catholic Church and required the exclusive use of French rather than “backwater dialects” (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985, p. 76) in classrooms that were to be wrested from the Church and brought under centralized state control. The Civil Constitution of the Clergy nationalized the Catholic Church in 1790, freeing it from influence from the Papacy, appropriating and selling its lands, subordinating it to the “new ‘religion’ of the national state” (Kohn 1967, p. 41), and allowing the election of clergy and bishops by popular vote with participation by freethinkers and non-Catholics as well as Catholics. By 1792, divorce and prostitution, which the Church bitterly opposed, had become legal, and the state had replaced the Church as the repository of records of births, marriages, and deaths (Kohn 1967, p. 42; McPhee 1992). In theory, at least, education was to be secularized, modernized, and placed in the hands of a comprehensive national public educational system so as to instill “a civil religion which would be detached from the religion of the past and would create national unity and pervade all aspects of life” (Kohn 1967, p. 78).8

The changes imposed by the Revolution met with popular resistance, with counterrevolutionary activity concentrated in the south, the southwest, and west (Tilly 1990). A “bloody civil war” in which the peasantry rose in support of their clergy and against military service continued from 1792 until 1799, when Napoleon subdued counterrevolutionary activity in the periphery (Tilly 1990, p. 57).

Like the leaders of the ancien régime and the Revolution, Napoleon was a great centralizer (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985), but he saw value in Catholicism and little advantage in linguistic francisation (Grillo 1989, p. 39).9 His policies toward religion replaced the Revolution’s iron fist with a velvet glove. Although his goal remained centralized control in service to the power of the state, he reversed coercive Revolutionary policies aimed at secularization through dechristianization, seeking by such measures as the Concordat of 1801 to “create a community of citizens beyond confessional divisions” (Boudon 2002, p. 68). His regime supported

8 The francisation of education was a piecemeal process that was completed only with the establishment of universal centrally administered mandatory public education (éducation laïque) in the early 1880s (Tiryakian and Nevitte 1985; McPhee 1992).
9 By his own admission, Napoleon, whose native tongue was Corsican, spoke French poorly, having learned it as an adult (Kohn 1950; Grillo 1989). He remained conscious of his Corsican identity. Indeed, Kohn (1950, p. 21) quotes him as saying that his pride and honor would tolerate no insult to his country—Corsica—even though in his youth he was often jeered by his fellow students as a foreigner.
religious pluralism, granting religious liberty to Catholics, Protestants, and Jews alike in a religiously neutral state, but religious institutions were regulated and financed by the Ministry of Worship, whose major objectives were to use religion to promote Enlightenment values while at the same time co-opting religious institutions to shore up state power and control (Boudon 2002).

The francisation program was rekindled after the Bourbon Restoration of 1814. By Guerry’s time, the French civilizing offensive was increasingly legitimated by the doctrine of progress and the idea of the “mission civilatrice” (Ford 1990; Conklin 1999), an ideology based on an attitude of superiority that maintained that being civilized carried with it an obligation to extend the benefits of civilization to less-civilized areas, both overseas or in the less developed regions of one’s own country, whether the colonized wanted to become civilized or not. By the 1820s, the French government had embarked on an aggressive program of francisation aimed at promoting secularism and modernism by breaking down localism, regionalism, and linguistic diversity (Weber 1976; McPhee 1992). Roads and canals (and, later, railroads) were to be built to link core to periphery, and persons from different regions were to be mixed together through conscription. In short, as Roche (1954, p. xiii) puts it, “all local interests and traditions had been sacrificed to the general and supreme interest of the nation.” Roche (1954, p. 51) notes that Septentrionels (northerners) “put ‘to fire and sword’ the southern towns,” engendering in southerners an “inferiority complex . . . belonging to a conquered race.”

Like other colonized peoples, the targets of the francisation program would be expected to see the source of threats as outside the region and the self. Septentrionel policies of francisation met with considerable resistance in the Méridional (southern) periphery. Méridional loyalties were more local than national, and those in the periphery strongly resisted efforts by the central government to create cultural and linguistic unity. Hackney’s (1969, pp. 924–25) classic study of Southern violence in the United States characterizes the American South after the Civil War and Reconstruction as a “violent colonial region” that developed a “siege mentality” in the face of such externally imposed threats as “abolitionists, the Union Army, carpetbaggers, Wall Street and Pittsburgh, civil rights ag-

10 Mennell (1989, p. 125) suggests that the civilizing process in France proceeded “mainly through the unplanned consequences of processes like improved communications, urbanization, industrialization, migration, and military conscription” (my emphasis), but that the use of the expanded educational system was “intentional.” Nonetheless, such things as the expansion of the system of roads, the way in which conscription was handled (see below), and the imposition of restrictions on the Catholic Church were clearly intentional civilizing offensives reflecting at least in part an internal colonialist ideology based on the mission civilatrice.
Suicide and Violent Crime

HYPOTHETSES

In sum, both the suicides of the urban-industrial core and the violence of the periphery may be theoretically understood by incorporating elements of theories of the civilizing process and reactions to internal colonialism into the integrated model of suicide and homicide. Although my major theoretical focus is on the direction of violence (i.e., whether it is expressed as suicide or attacks on others), both theory and prior research also suggest a number of hypotheses linking civilizing processes and internal colonialism to the total level of violence (i.e., suicide plus homicide) and to suicide and homicide rates themselves.

Civilizing Processes

An expanded version of Elias’s (2000) theory of the civilizing process that includes suicide as well as interpersonal violence predicts that, all else being equal, suicide rates should increase and rates of interpersonal violence decrease with the growth of the civilized habitus. This implies that violence should be channeled against the self as suicide to the extent that by 1820s départements had been touched by unplanned and unintentional
civilizing processes such as industrialization, urbanization, and the growth of literacy, but against others as interpersonal violence in areas less affected by the changes in habitus that accompanied these processes. Gillis’s (1994) time-series analysis, which shows that 19th-century French suicide rates increased more rapidly than homicide rates decreased, suggests that there should be a positive relationship in cross-sectional data between total violence and these measures of civilizing processes.

Internal Colonialism

The internal colonialism model makes no predictions for suicide, but both it and Elias and Scotson (1994) suggest that external threats to the targets of civilizing offensives tend to backfire, increasing interpersonal violence. This implies that, holding unplanned and unintentional civilizing processes constant, both total violence and the tendency for violence to be externalized should be greatest in areas in which cultural values, especially those involving language and religion, were most threatened by francisation policies imposed by the state.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

Data to assess the impacts of unplanned civilizing processes and resistance to internal colonialism on violent crime and suicide are drawn primarily from figures for French départements published in the 1830s by Guerry (2002) and d’Angeville (1969). Linguistic data, which neither of these sources provides, are from Weber (1976). Corsica was excluded for technical reasons involving missing data and the inability of GeoDa 0.9.5-i (Anselin 2003), the software package used for spatial regression analysis, to process islands. Removing Corsica is conservative, since it was an extreme outlier, by far the most violent and least developed of all départements. Though technically a part of France, it more closely resembled a foreign colony. This reduces the number of cases in all analyses to the remaining 85 continental départements.¹¹

Dependent Variables

The analysis includes four dependent variables drawn from Guerry’s (2002) tabulations: the rate of crimes against persons, the suicide rate, the total violence rate (TVR), and the “suicide/violence ratio” (SVR). The TVR

¹¹ Although they were established to break up the cultural and ethnic unity of the old provinces, départements are small enough to be relatively homogeneous.
Suicide and Violent Crime

is the sum of rates of suicide and crimes against persons, while the SVR is the suicide rate divided by the TVR. These latter two variables are variants of the composite measures of the amount and direction of lethal violence, respectively, used in Unnithan et al.'s (1994) integrated model of suicide and homicide and in a number of studies of the impact of modernization (e.g., Whitt et al. 1972; Lane 1979; Unnithan and Whitt 1992; He, Wells, and Maguire 2003), internal colonialism (e.g., Hackney 1969; Bachman 1992), or religion (Weaver 1997; Jensen 2001) on lethal violence. They differ from the measures employed in these previous studies by substituting the rate of crimes against persons for the homicide rate, which is unavailable in the départmental tabulations.

Guerry's (2002, pp. 143–45) crime figures represent formal accusations (indictments) rather than convictions or crimes known to authorities. He makes no distinction between types of crimes against persons in his départemental data, but a separate tabulation of the number and types of these crimes for the nation as a whole (Guerry 2002, p. 19) indicates that some minor offenses involving little or no violence (e.g., bigamy, perjury, and blackmail) were included. Nonetheless, just under 40% of the crimes against persons were homicides (murder, manslaughter, infanticide, poisoning, or parricide), and an additional 42.8% involved some type of assault. Thus, some 83% of crimes against persons in the nation as a whole included a violent component. Homicide is often an assault gone bad; the two differ little in their motivation (Gurr 1981; Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Indeed, as Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990, p. 34) remark, “the difference between homicide and assault may simply be the intervention of a bystander, the accuracy of a gun, [or] the weight of a frying pan.” The data on crimes against persons seem a reasonable alternative to figures on homicide per se, but it is impossible to tell from Guerry's tabulations whether the percentage of crimes against persons that involved violence varied systematically across départements or whether violence against others was planned and premeditated or the result of impulsive outbursts. Thus, the data cannot be used to test Spierenburg's (1994) hypothesis that carefully planned premeditated violence is compatible with the civilized habitus.

The TVR and the SVR have theoretical meaning in the integrated model (Unnithan et al. 1994) as measures of the amount and direction of violence, respectively. The TVR measures the combined rate of total violence, whether suicide or violence against others:

\[
TVR = S + V,
\]

(1)

where \( S \) = the suicide rate and \( V \) = the rate of crimes against persons.
If the SVR is expressed as a proportion as in the tables below rather than as a percentage as is sometimes done,

\[ SVR = \frac{S}{TVR}. \]  
(2)

It obviously follows that

\[ S = (SVR) (TVR) \]  
(3)

and

\[ V = (1 - SVR) (TVR). \]  
(4)

The crime and suicide data suffer from the same defects as modern official data and require the usual cautions, but we would expect greater undercounting than in the modern era (Douglas 1967; Lodhi and Tilly 1973; Zehr 1975; Gurr 1981). Despite evidence cited by Gould (1999) that efforts by central authorities to suppress violence were unusually aggressive in areas regarded as “troublesome and backward,” systematic undercounting of both crime and suicide was undoubtedly greater in the periphery than in the core. Ruff (2001), writing of a slightly earlier period in French history, notes that many offenses never entered official records because they occurred in rural areas far removed from the cities where police barracks and courts were located, and that there were various disincentives to reporting crime to authorities. Except in the case of homicide, which was prosecuted at crown expense, the victim, not the state, bore the cost of prosecution. Moreover, both infrajudicial modes of dispute resolution and “a code of silence, bred of fundamental distrust of police and judicial officials” (Ruff 2001, p. 119) further hindered reporting in peripheral areas.

Guerry (2002, p. 122) himself pointed to several sources of inaccuracy in the suicide data, which fail to include all known suicides. The data are based on lists submitted by Crown Prosecutors which included only those suicides that were judicially verified because circumstances suggested that a crime might have taken place. Like Douglas (1967) more than a century later, Guerry (2002, p. 123) considers the possibility that many suicides were excluded because “family interests and affections combine to conceal incidents of this sort from public scrutiny.” Indeed, he estimated that the number of actual suicides was perhaps double the number reported in his data, with some cases never being investigated and others being classified as accidents, especially falls and drownings, a pattern that persists to this day (Whitt 2006). There are undoubtedly biases in the suicide data based on religion and region. We would expect more substantial undercounting in isolated peripheral areas and in locations where the Catholic Church was strongest (van Poppel and Day 1996). French Calvinists (Huguenots), however, occupied much of the southwest (Benedict 1991),
Suicide and Violent Crime

where reported suicide rates were lower than in the traditionally Catholic but increasingly secular north.

Guerry expressed rates of crime and suicide as the population at risk divided by the number of events. High values correspond to low levels of violence. To avoid confusion, his reported values have been converted into rates per 100,000 population per year that are more familiar to today’s researchers. These rates were used to construct the TVR and the SVR.

Civilizing Processes

Two measures, modernization and urbanization, are included to tap Elias’s (2000) concept of the civilizing process. Both 19th-century theorizing and the theory of the civilizing process emphasize cultural changes associated with the new order, but neither Guerry (2002) nor d’Angeville (1969) provides direct measures of worldviews or ways of thinking. We must of necessity be content with structural proxies that indicate the extent to which French départements had modernized and urbanized.

Modernization.—Guerry’s (2002) data include figures on literacy, wealth, and the development of commerce and industry. Literacy, perhaps the best available single measure of cultural modernization (Gillis 1994), is the percentage of young men called up in the military draft who could read and write (1827–30). Guerry coded wealth as a rank ordering based on the per capita tax on personal and movable property in each département (1821). The coding of his rankings has been reversed so that high scores indicate the greatest per capita taxation. This variable would be expected to yield a conservative estimate of the difference in wealth between the core and the periphery, where resistance to taxation was endemic (Weber 1976). The development of commerce and industry is measured by the number of trade licenses per capita issued in 1830.12

The remaining measures of modernization are from d’Angeville (1969). The number of persons employed in industry per 1,000 population taps involvement in the new industrial order and exposure to bureaucratic discipline. The number of doors and windows in dwellings per capita in 1831 reflects Elias’s (1983) observation that the structure of dwellings is an indicator of social structure. Like literacy, this variable comes closer than the others to tapping the civilized habitus per se. It indicates the growth of an elite who valued luxury and could afford to pay the door-and-window tax imposed under the Directory (Castelot 1895; Weber 1976).

Because preliminary analyses suggested that these five indicators of unplanned civilizing processes are highly correlated, they were subjected to a principal components analysis to avoid multicollinearity. A single factor, with an eigenvalue of 3.16, emerged, showing that the indicators are all drawn from the same universe of content. This factor accounts for 63.2% of the common variance of the indicators. The factor loadings of .733 for literacy, .742 for wealth, .830 for business licenses, .917 for doors and windows, and .735 for industrial employment were used to construct the single measure of modernization used in regression analyses.

Urbanization.—Like Elias (2000), Gillis (1994) and Zehr (1975), among others, view urbanization as a factor in the civilizing process, and it may seem curious that it is not included as an indicator of modernization. As Urbinati (1998, p. 141) suggests for Italy, however, in 19th-century France “the city was not necessarily more progressive than the countryside. . . . Urbanization and industrialization did not always and everywhere go together.” For example, the Mediterranean port of Marseilles, the cultural center of Provençal regionalism (Roche 1954), occupied a semiperipheral status in early 19th-century France. Although it had long been a thriving commercial center, it was touched by the social transformations of the Industrial Revolution only after the large-scale introduction of the factory system after 1830; there were only 100 factory workers in the city in 1829 (Sewell 1974).

Guerry (2002, pp. 73–75) notes the existence in his day of a belief that population concentration in urban areas reduces crimes against persons because it “softens morals” and because the lower probability in urban areas of escaping the pursuit of justice has a deterrent effect. On the other hand, a counterargument could be made that the rate of violence against others should be higher in the cities, where rural-to-urban migration in the 19th century engendered poverty, inequality, and the growth of the classes dangereuses (Chevalier 1973; Beirne 1987; Gillis 2004). Although Guerry’s impressionistic examination of his data suggested to him that the ratio of rural to urban population has little actual effect, figures from 1831 on the percentage of the population residing in rural areas and small towns were drawn from d’Angeville (1969). Because this measure is highly skewed, largely because of the influence of Paris, the reverse-coded natural logarithm of percentage rural was used as the indicator of urbanization. Urbanization correlates only .428 with the modernization factor.
theoretical or historical basis. As Khleif (1978, p. 109), points out, “destruction of culture starts with the destruction of language.” Speaking an “inferior” language may be regarded in the dominant core as a sign of inferiority, but those in the periphery are likely to regard it as a badge of honor (Khleif 1978; Reece 1979). This aspect of resistance to francisation was measured negatively by the percentage of schoolchildren who were able to speak French in 1863 (Weber 1976). The remaining indicators are from Guerry (2002). The number of Catholic priests per capita may be interpreted as measuring resistance to internal colonialism because of the anticlerical thrust of the French civilizing offensive and the Catholic Church’s stance against modernism (Pescosolido and Georgianna 1989; Ford 1990). Similarly, conscription was “a school for the fatherland” (Weber 1976, p. 298) consciously used by government authorities as a means of reducing regional cultural differences. Desertion reflected loyalties to family and community and political opposition to the national government. Upon returning home, many deserters and other conscripts from the periphery intentionally unlearned the French they had learned during their 8-year tour of duty (Weber 1976). This form of resistance is captured by the number of military desertions per capita.

A principal components analysis revealed that these three variables combine into a single factor with an eigenvalue of 1.51 that accounts for 50.3% of their common variance. This factor, with loadings of −.743 for speaking French, .597 for Catholic clergy per capita, and .776 for military desertion, was used to measure resistance to internal cultural colonization in the regression analyses.

Control Variables

*Distance from Paris.*—Distance from Paris is something of a catch-all variable. It serves as a proxy for omitted variables, such as the strength of state control and the expected extent of undercounting in the suicide and crime data, which would be expected to be systematically related to distance from the capital. Alternatively, it may be conceptualized as indicating spatial diffusion from core to periphery. Guerry (2002, p. 128) notes that suicide rates fell off in all directions with distance from Paris. This pattern was especially evident along the roads linking the capital to Lyon, Strasbourg, Nantes, and Bordeaux, suggesting a pattern of diffusion along transportation routes from an epicenter in Paris of either a propensity for suicide or more accurate counting. Tarde (1903) distinguished between (1) the law of close contact, one aspect of which is spatial contiguity, and (2) the law of imitation by inferiors of superiors, which includes
spatial diffusion from great cities to surrounding areas. Baller and Richardson’s (2002) spatial analysis suggests the importance of close contact between neighboring départements for the geographical patterning of suicide in 19th-century France, but, because the spatial lag coefficient $\rho$ (see below) models only symmetrical diffusion between nearby places, their analysis fails to consider asymmetrical diffusion outward from a single origin in the vicinity of Paris.

A fully adequate measure of diffusion from core to periphery would require time-series data on both civilizing processes and dependent variables such as the suicide rate and the suicide-violence ratio (see Cork 1999). Although Guerry (2002) provides suicide (p. 125) and crime (p. 72) time series for larger regional units, these series are too short to establish secular trends, he does not supply them for individual départements, and neither he nor d’Angeville (1969) provides time series for variables measuring the civilizing process and resistance to francisation. The measure used in this study, Euclidean distance between Paris and départements centroids, is a greatly oversimplified substitute that assumes that the influence of Paris in the early 19th century decayed as a function of distance, all else being equal. This assumption would be problematic for Elias (2000), who argued that the civilized habitus often diffused more quickly within elites separated by long distances than it did to nonelites or to nearby locations. Nonetheless, distance from Paris reflects the process of distance decay posited in Tobler’s (1970, p. 236) “first law of geography,” which states that “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things.”

Northeast versus southwest.—This variable, captured by whether the départements’ centroids are northeast (1) or southwest (0) of the St. Malo–Genève Line, is based on the distinction drawn by Guerry, d’Angeville and other 19th-century scholars between the “illuminated France” in the northeast and the “dark France” in the southwest. Although it taps whether a département was part of the core or the periphery, it assesses the effects of anything associated with location in the northeast versus the southwest that is not captured by the other variables included in the equations. While this might include unmeasured aspects of the civilizing process and/or resistance to francisation, alternative interpretations of the dummy variable for northeast are possible. Among these is that it tests the hypothesis, seldom considered by sociologists, that the physical environment and culture were intertwined in the development of a set of pan-Mediterranean cultures of “honor and shame” (e.g., Péristiany 1966;

---

13 Tarde’s (1903) third law, the “law of insertion,” which is not explicitly modeled in this article, states that the new replaces the old, implying that modernism should replace traditional worldviews.
Suicide and Violent Crime

Schneider 1971; Davis 1977; Gilmore 1982) whose cultural codes centered on themes of manliness and a propensity to use force or the credible threat of force to defend honor and resources. The northeast versus southwest dummy variable partially controls for the possibility that southern France was more violent in the 19th century because it was part of a violent Mediterranean cultural region whose origins go back to ancient times, not because of reactions to recent events such as the francisation program. It also controls for climatic influences. Koeniger (1988), for example, argues that southern heat and humidity aggravate preexisting tensions, catalyze violent outbursts, and bring people together in outdoor settings where violent confrontations are more likely to occur, thus predisposing southerners, in France and elsewhere, toward a way of life that encourages violence.

Analytic Strategy

Spatial aspects of the data analysis explore the geographical patterning and spatial clustering of all four dependent variables and their relationships to modernization, urbanization, resistance to internal colonialism, and the control variables.

Spatial clustering.—Global Moran’s $I$ (Anselin 1988) taps the average amount of spatial clustering in the data taken as a whole, while LISA (Local Indicators of Spatial Autocorrelation) maps (also known as Moran scatterplot maps; Anselin and Bera 1995) based on local Moran’s $I$, statistics provide visual assessments of how scores cluster into regions and of the extent to which each département’s scores are influenced by those of its neighbors. Global Moran’s $I$, which is analogous to a correlation between départemental scores on the dependent variable and scores in neighboring départements, is calculated as

$$I = n \sum_i \sum_j w_{ij} z_i z_j \sum_i z_i^2,$$

where $n$ is the number of observations (85) and $z_i$ and $z_j$ are departures of scores in the $i$th and $j$th département, respectively, from the mean of the dependent variable, and $w_{ij}$ is an element of the matrix of spatial weights ($W$) discussed below. Values of $I$ range between $+1$ and $-1$. Scores significantly greater than zero indicate clustering and positive autocorrelation (Anselin 1988). Values of $I$ significantly less than zero seldom occur, but when they do they indicate negative autocorrelation, indicating that areas tend to have low scores on the dependent variable if their neighbors have high scores, and vice versa. Theoretically, positive values of $I$ are consistent with interpretations based on neighborhood spatial
diffusion or contagion, but negative values suggest the operation of deterrence processes (Tolnay, Deane, and Beck 1996).

The local Moran statistic for each département, $I_i$, used in the construction of LISA maps, is given by

$$I_i = \left( \frac{1}{\sum w_{ij}} \right) \sum w_{ij} z_j.$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

Significance levels for both $I_y$ and $I_i$ are inferred from reference distributions based on a random permutation procedure. In each permutation, values of Moran’s $I_y$ or $I_i$ are calculated over observations (i.e., départements) that have been relocated to randomly generated spatial coordinates. The curve representing the distribution of these hypothetical values over a large number of permutations (9,999 in this study) forms the sampling distribution, and areas under the curve are used to assess statistical significance (Anselin 2003, 2005).

LISA maps categorize départements with significant values of local Moran’s $I_i$ ($P < .05$) into four groups based on dependent variable scores in the département itself and the weighted average ($\sum w_{ij} y_j$) of the scores of its neighbors. Only departments in which $y_i$ and $\sum w_{ij} y_j$ are both above (high-high) or both below the mean (low-low) are shaded in the LISA maps shown in figure 3. These maps omit low-high and high-low combinations, which indicate significant negative local spatial autocorrelation. This occurs primarily at the margins of regions with uniformly high or low rates.

**Spatial econometric regression models.**—When the units of analysis are geographical areas such as French départements, the assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression are violated to the extent that scores on dependent variables and/or their residuals as estimated by OLS regressions are spatially autocorrelated. Although Moran’s $I_y$ is calculated over dependent variable scores, which are also used in constructing Lisa maps based on $I_i$, it may also be calculated over OLS residuals (i.e., prediction errors; $I_e$). Clustering of either type is indicative of spatial dependency. Clustering on the dependent variable violates the OLS assumptions that observations are independent and that error terms are uncorrelated. As a result, OLS parameter estimates will be both biased and inefficient. On the other hand, if prediction errors cluster but the dependent variable does not, parameter estimates will be unbiased but nonetheless inefficient (Anselin 1988; Anselin and Bera 1998).

In spatial econometrics, these two types of spatial dependency are handled, respectively, by spatial lag regression models, which are sometimes referred to as network effects models, and by what are variously called spatial error, spatial autoregressive (SAR), network disturbances, or spa-
tial moving average (SMA) models (Leenders 2002). In spatial lag regression, the model is specified in matrix terms as in equation (7):

\[ y = \rho Wy + X\beta + \epsilon, \]

with 

\[ E[\epsilon] = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad E[\epsilon \epsilon'] = \sigma^2 I, \]

where \( y \) is a column vector of \( n \) sample observations on the dependent variable, \( X \) is an \( n \times k \) matrix of observations on \( k \) independent variables including a unit vector, \( \beta \) is a column vector of regression parameters, \( \epsilon \) is a column vector of unobserved disturbances with expected values of zero and variance \( \sigma^2 \), \( I \) is an identity matrix, \( W \) is an \( n \times n \) matrix of spatial weights with elements \( w_{ij} \) that specifies the degree of interdependence or connectivity between each pair of observations on the basis of a criterion specified a priori by the researcher, and \( \rho \) is the spatial lag coefficient (Land and Deane 1992; Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley 2006). By convention, \( w_{ii} \) denotes the influence of area \( j \) on area \( i \), \( w_{ij} \) is set equal to zero, and entries in the \( W \) matrix are in row normalized form (i.e., each row sums to 1.0).

Spatial error regression uses the weighted values of the OLS residuals to model the error structure in the data, as in equations (8a) and (8b):

\[ y = X\beta + \epsilon, \]

\[ \epsilon = \lambda We + \nu, \]

where \( \lambda \) is the spatial error coefficient, \( \nu \) is a column vector of disturbances from equation (8b), and all other elements of the equation are defined as in equation (7) (Beck et al. 2006).

Although Anselin et al. (1996; Anselin 2005) recommend choosing between spatial lag and spatial error models on the basis of OLS diagnostic statistics, this study uses spatial lag rather than spatial error regression models. The diagnostics involve a comparison of the values and significance levels of global Moran’s \( I_y \), \( I_e \), and their corresponding normalized forms (Lagrange multipliers and robust Lagrange multipliers). A flowchart provided by Anselin (2005) can be used in deciding whether an OLS specification will suffice and, if not, whether to use a spatial lag or spatial error model. Nonetheless, the theoretically based necessity of including local neighborhood diffusion in the model dictates the use of spatial lag models rather than choosing between specifications on statistical grounds alone. If, as Blauner (1969) argues, internal colonialism involves more than just processes of contact and acculturation, it becomes necessary to control for neighborhood spatial diffusion when examining the effects of
resistance to internal colonialism on the amount and type of violence across départements. This cannot be done with a spatial error model. Baller et al. (2001) show that the $\rho$ coefficient in spatial lag models (eq. [7]) is readily interpretable in terms of the spatial diffusion of the dependent variable across neighboring geographical areas if it can be assumed that the process has reached equilibrium, but that the $\lambda$ coefficient (eq. [8b]) has no clear-cut substantive interpretation. A significant $\lambda$ indicates that the regression model is misspecified, either (1) by failing to include all relevant exogenous variables (Anselin 1988, 2003; Anselin and Bera 1998) or (2) by assuming that a relationship is linear when it is actually nonlinear (Leenders 2002). Baller et al. (2001) also show that spatial error processes are subsumed within spatial lag models, so there is no danger in using a spatial lag specification even if the diagnostics suggest the use of a spatial error model. Moreover, Beck et al. (2006, p. 30) find spatial error models “odd” because “space matters in the ‘error process’ [eq. (8b)] but not in the substantive portion of the model [eq. (8a)],” an assumption that is “hard to defend in many applications.”

The criterion used to construct the $W$ matrix used in the calculation of Moran’s $I$, the construction of LISA maps, and the estimation of spatial lag regression must be carefully chosen, since the choice of criterion affects all aspects of the analysis (Baller et al. 2001; Leenders 2002). As Leenders (2002, p. 25) puts it, “Change $W$ and get different estimates. The difference can be substantial.” This study uses first-order “queen” contiguity weights in which the weight ($w_{ij}$) for each pair of départements is coded one if their boundaries touched and zero otherwise (before conversion into row-normalized form). Baller and Richardson (2002) justify this specification of $W$ on the basis of the assumption that news of suicide, and hence imitation, was unlikely to spread beyond a département’s immediate neighbors. A similar argument can be made for news of crimes of violence, which spread by word of mouth or was disseminated through print media, especially pamphlets and newspapers. The newspapers of the early 19th century, like the broadsheets from which they evolved in the 17th century, emphasized news of crimes of violence, much of it sensationalized (Gillis 1994; Ruff 2001; Baller and Richardson 2002). They were often available in coffeehouses, and even those unable to read could hear them read aloud at local gatherings (Ruff 2001).

Despite the decision to report spatial lag models, OLS diagnostics indicate that a spatial error model would be more appropriate for crimes against persons. Results for both lag and error specifications are reported below for this dependent variable. Other criteria for specifying $W$ (higher-order contiguity weights, distance bands of varying sizes, and matrices using the “$k$-nearest-neighbor” criterion) and alternative measures of in-
ternal colonialism and the direction of violence were also explored. While findings from these exploratory analyses differ in detail, neither the choice of measurement strategies nor the criterion used for specifying the W matrix affects substantive conclusions except as noted below. I also explored the possibility, suggested by Baller and Richardson’s (2002) analysis, that different processes operated in the north and the south of France by including terms for the statistical interactions of the modernization factor, urbanization, and internal colonialism with location north or south of the St. Malo–Geneva Line. For example, the civilizing process might be expected to have stronger effects in the northern core, while those of internal colonialism might be stronger in the peripheral south. None of these interactions, however, is significant for any of the dependent variables.

FINDINGS
Spatial Patterns
Baller and Richardson (2002) report strong evidence of spatial clustering of high suicide rates in the industrial northeast and low rates in Brittany and the southwest in Morselli’s (1882) data for the period 1872–76, roughly half a century later than those used in this study, but their analysis does not include crimes against persons or the two composite dependent variables (the TVR and SVR). Clustering on dependent variable scores is moderate to strong, suggesting the operation of neighborhood diffusion or imitation processes and alerting us to spatial autocorrelation. Global Moran’s $I_y$ is .610 ($P < .001$) for the suicide rate, lower than the value of .749 reported by Baller and Richardson (2002) for their 1872–76 data, but nonetheless quite high. Values of global Moran’s $I_y$ are .378 ($P < .001$) for the rate of crimes against persons, .468 ($P < .001$) for the TVR, and .699 ($P < .001$) for the SVR.

LISA maps based on local Moran’s $I_i$ are shown in figure 3. High rates

---

14 Military desertion is arguably a cleaner, more direct behavioral measure of resistance to internal colonialism than either not speaking French or the number of Catholic priests per capita, both of which could conceivably have other interpretations (see below). I explored what happens when speaking French and priests per capita are dropped from the equations and military desertion alone is used to measure resistance to internal colonialism.

15 The SVR is not the only possible measure of the direction of violence against self or others. I also ran regressions substituting the true ratio of suicide (S) to crimes against persons (V) (i.e., $S/V$; Porterfield 1949) for the SVR. When regressed against the SVR, the residuals show that this measure gives higher scores than the SVR predicts to départements with extreme disparities in either direction between rates of suicide and crimes of violence and lower scores to those with roughly equal rates.
Fig. 3.—Moran scatterplot (LISA) maps of crimes against persons, suicide, total violence, and the SVR (high-low and low-high omitted).

of crimes against persons cluster in two sets of contiguous southern départements in close proximity to one another. There is much less clustering of low rates, which appear in four départements in the industrialized area north of Paris and in a narrow band running to the northwest from the département of the Rhone (Lyons) in the southeast.

High rates of suicide cluster only in a group of contiguous départements in the immediate vicinity of Paris, while low rates are found just east of the Bretagne peninsula and in a band stretching northeastward from the Spanish border to the Massif Central. With respect to imitation and neighborhood diffusion, the LISA suicide map resembles the one constructed by Baller and Richardson (2002) for the period 1872–76, but there are fewer départements with significant values of local Moran’s I, in the 1827–30 data, and the clustering of low suicide rates in Brittany found by Baller and Richardson (2002) for the later period is conspicuously absent despite
the use of the same criterion for specifying the weights matrix in the two studies. These differences would appear at first glance to reflect a half century of diffusion, but a cluster of low suicide rates reappears in Brittany when an alternative specification of the $W$ matrix based on each département's five nearest neighbors is substituted for first-order queen contiguity. The differences between the two maps may thus be merely artifactual.

The map for total violence shows significant clustering of high rates in the vicinity of Paris, where suicide makes a major contribution to the TVR. Low values are more scattered but are generally in peripheral areas in Brittany, the Pyrenees, and the Massif Central.

The map for the SVR shows that violence tends to be turned inward in the core and outward in the southern periphery. All départements in each of the two clusters are contiguous. With the exception of the absence of low rates in the northwest, the areas of clustering of high and low values are in the same general locations as those in the suicide map, but they are larger in both cases.

**Zero-Order Relationships**

Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations of all variables included in the spatial lag regression models reported below. The average départemental rate of crimes against persons (5.92) was slightly higher than the suicide rate (5.06 per 100,000 population per year). The suicide rate’s greater variability (a standard deviation of 4.74 compared to 2.90) accounts by mathematical necessity for its stronger relationships to the TVR and SVR.

In light of Guerry’s (2002) observations based on his maps, it is surprising that the suicide rate and the rate of crimes against persons are uncorrelated ($r = -0.08$). However, it is understandable why Guerry (2002, p. 130) concluded on the basis of an impressionistic examination of the patterns that “with . . . few exceptions . . . départements where the lives of others are most often attacked are precisely those where people most rarely make attempts on their own, and *vice versa*.” Spatial relationships of crimes of violence and suicide to other variables may have convinced Guerry that there was an inverse relationship between attacks on others and suicide even though no such relationship actually existed. In his data, suicide and crimes against persons vary in opposite directions with distance from Paris ($r = 0.455$, $P < .001$ for crimes against persons, and $r = -0.513$, $P < .001$ for suicide). Moreover, rates of suicide are higher and those of crimes against persons lower north of the St. Malo–Genève Line. For suicide, $r = 0.439$ ($P < .001$), but the correlation for crimes of violence ($r = -0.185$) is insignificant by the two-tailed test reported in
# TABLE 1

**Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Variables Included in Spatial Regression Analyses (N = 85)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variables:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Rate of crimes against persons</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Suicide rate</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) TVR (Suicide rate + Rate of crimes against property)</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>.516***</td>
<td>.852***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) SVR (Suicide rate / TVR)</td>
<td>.425</td>
<td>.185</td>
<td>-.485***</td>
<td>.741***</td>
<td>.380***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilizing processes:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Modernization</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-.093</td>
<td>.680***</td>
<td>.534***</td>
<td>.671***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Urbanization</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>.304</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.595***</td>
<td>.572***</td>
<td>.305**</td>
<td>.428***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Resistance to internal colonialism</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.524***</td>
<td>-.346**</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>-.669***</td>
<td>-.453***</td>
<td>-.117</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control variables:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Distance from Paris</td>
<td>204.1</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td>.455***</td>
<td>-.513***</td>
<td>-.201</td>
<td>-.686***</td>
<td>-.539***</td>
<td>-.110</td>
<td>.634***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Northeast (1) vs. Southwest (0)</td>
<td>.376</td>
<td>.484</td>
<td>-.185</td>
<td>.439***</td>
<td>.280**</td>
<td>.532***</td>
<td>.714***</td>
<td>.154</td>
<td>-.432**</td>
<td>-.689***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* *P < .05 (two-tailed).
** *P < .01
*** *P < .001.
Suicide and Violent Crime

table 1 and barely significant by one-tailed test ($P = .045$). As Guerry suggests, the correlation of the rate of violent crime with urbanization ($r = .119$) is statistically insignificant. The suicide rate, however, increases with urbanization ($r = .595$, $P < .001$).

A Brief Methodological Excursion: Multicollinearity in Spatial Lag Regression Models

Most of the correlations among the independent and control variables (7 of 10) are statistically significant, and several of them, in particular the correlations of modernization with location in the northeast ($r = .714$, $P < .001$) and of distance from Paris with both location above the St. Malo–Gene`ve Line ($r = -.689$, $P < .001$) and resistance to internal colonialism ($r = .634$, $P < .001$), are quite strong. This pattern of correlations raises the specter of multicollinearity. A check of collinearity diagnostics revealed that the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the independent and control variables in the OLS equations corresponding to the spatial lag models are all less than 3.0, well below the value of 10.0 that is generally accepted as indicating serious multicollinearity (Cohen et al. 2003), but the magnitude and direction of regression coefficients can change appreciably at VIFs substantially lower than this typically suggested threshold (Cohen et al. 2003), and Graham (2003) demonstrates that VIFs as low as 2 can sometimes create problems.

Despite the absence of serious multicollinearity problems in the OLS models, all regression coefficients for location in the “illuminated” France northeast of the St. Malo–Genève Line in a preliminary set of spatial lag models (not shown) are opposite in sign from the corresponding zero-order correlations, and, in the case of the suicide rate and the SVR, both the correlation and the regression coefficient are statistically significant. For the suicide rate, $r = .439$ ($P < .001$), but $\beta = -.215$ ($P < .01$). Similarly, for the SVR, $r = .532$ ($P < .001$) while $\beta = -.200$ ($P < .05$). The $r$s, but not the $\beta$s, are consistent with theoretical expectations. The OLS equations are better behaved than the spatial lag models, where the $\beta$s for the northeast dummy are negative for suicide and the SVR but not statistically significant. For suicide, $\beta = -.210$ ($P > .07$). For the SHR, $\beta = -.168$ ($P > .10$). The problem of wild unanticipated swings between significant positive correlations and significant negative $\beta$s, which Cohen et al. (2003) identify as a symptom of multicollinearity, occurs only in the spatial lag regressions, and only for the northeast dummy variable.

Multicollinearity undetected by OLS collinearity diagnostics has apparently crept into the spatial lag models because of the inclusion of the spatial lag as an additional term on the right side of the equation. The source of the problem is clear if one remembers that, in the presence of
spatial clustering, independent variables that are highly correlated with the dependent variable will also tend to be highly correlated with its spatial lag. VIFs based on OLS equations not including the spatial lag will miss the contribution of the lag to multicollinearity in the spatial lag model. Pattanayak and Butry (2005, p. 1002) take passing notice of the existence of this problem, but, because the literature on spatial econometrics is apparently silent on how to assess multicollinearity in spatial lag regression models, I devised a quick and dirty approach that should suffice as an ad hoc heuristic tool.16 Most variance inflation factors calculated by this admittedly crude procedure remain below 3.0, but those attached to the spatial lags of suicide and the SVR (VIF = 3.99 and 5.48, respectively), and distance from Paris (VIF = 3.96 for crimes against persons, 3.94 for suicide, and 4.59 for the SVR), are cause for concern. VIFs for the northeast dummy variable are lower, in the range of approximately 3.2 for all four dependent variables, but still potentially problematic. Together with the pattern of significant positive $r$ and significant negative $b$s, these VIFs highlight the need to eliminate multicollinearity problems in the spatial lag equations before proceeding further.

The simplest way of dealing with multicollinearity is to eliminate one of the offending variables from the equation, but doing so would introduce methodological or theoretical difficulties depending on the variable being dropped.17 In situations in which dropping a variable is inadvisable, Graham (2003) recommends retaining all independent variables and using “residual regression,” which involves replacing the least important of the offending variables by its residuals from an equation in which it is regressed against another independent variable with which it is highly correlated. This ignores the shared contribution to $R^2$ of the residualized variable, but it allows the estimation of its direct effects. Clearly, one should not make too much of the significant negative relationships of location in the northeast to the suicide rate and the SVR after controls. Both anomalous relationships disappear after multicollinearity is dealt

16 The usual OLS collinearity diagnostics can be generalized across dependent variables, but, because the lagged dependent variable is included as a predictor in spatial lag regression models, checking for multicollinearity in these equations requires the computation of a separate set of VIFs for each dependent variable based on auxiliary regressions in which each independent variable, including the spatial lag of the appropriate dependent variable, is treated in turn as dependent with respect to all other predictors. I estimated these auxiliary regressions in OLS.

17 Spatial lag regression, which is necessary for unbiased and efficient parameter estimation, requires that the spatial lag be included in the model. Both theoretical considerations and Guerry’s (2002) empirical findings militate against dropping distance from Paris, and the northeast dummy variable is necessarily included as a way of checking for alternative explanations of southern violence such as climate and the presence of ancient Mediterranean cultures of honor in the south.
Suicide and Violent Crime

with as in table 2 by replacing distance from Paris by its residuals when regressed on the northeast dummy variable using OLS. 18

Substantive Findings
OLS diagnostics support the use of spatial lag specifications for suicide, the TVR, and the SVR, but, as was noted above, they suggest that a spatial error model would be more appropriate for crimes against persons. For methodological purists, the results of both lag and error specifications are reported in table 2 for crimes against persons, but only spatial lag results are shown for the other dependent variables. Pseudo-$R^2$, the squared correlation between observed and predicted values, and log likelihoods based on unstandardized data are included as measures of goodness of fit.

*Crimes against persons.*—Regardless of specification, explanatory power is weaker for the rate of crimes against persons than for the other dependent variables. Pseudo-$R^2 = .433$ ($P < .001$) in the lag model, and the spatial error model fares only slightly better (Pseudo-$R^2 = .457$, $P < .001$). Resistance to internal colonialism is the only significant measured predictor in either model ($\hat{\beta} = .375$, $P < .001$ for spatial lag, and $\hat{\beta} = .517$, $P < .001$ for spatial error). 19 The spatial lag model provides evidence of neighborhood spatial diffusion ($p = .372$, $P < .001$). As would be expected from the OLS diagnostics, the $\lambda$ coefficient for the spatial error specification is even larger ($\lambda = .464$, $P < .001$), suggesting the influence of spatially patterned variables omitted from the model for rates of crimes against persons. Because distance from Paris has no significant effect, table 2 suggests that we can eliminate the possibility that these omitted

---

18 In the present context, location above or below the St. Malo–Gene`ve Line would probably be the least important predictor. Distance from Paris was chosen for residualization because logistic regression rather than OLS would have been appropriate had the dichotomous northeast dummy variable been treated as dependent. Dropping either distance from Paris or location in the northeast leads to similar but not identical conclusions. Regardless of the dependent variable, the effect each of these variables becomes nonsignificant when the other is dropped from the equation.

19 The effect of internal colonialism on the rate of crimes against persons is weaker when this variable is measured only by military desertion, barely failing to reach statistical significance by one-tailed test in the spatial lag model ($\hat{\beta} = .159$, $P = .055$) and barely reaching it ($\hat{\beta} = .214$, $P = .039$) in the spatial error model. The only other substantive change when the percentage of the population speaking French and Catholic priests per capita are dropped from the measurement of internal colonialism is that distance from Paris, insignificant in table 2, becomes highly significant. In the spatial lag model $\hat{\beta} = .391$ ($P < .01$), and in the spatial error model $\hat{\beta} = .558$ ($P < .01$). Pseudo-$R^2$'s are reduced from .433 to .378 and from .457 to .372 for spatial lag and spatial error models, respectively, lending support to the use of the internal colonialism factor rather than military desertion alone.
variables vary systematically with proximity to the capital. LISA maps over the residuals can sometimes help identify the source of misspecification, but one based on local values of $I_e$ (not shown) suggests no obvious candidates.

These findings support the internal colonialism perspective but cast doubt upon the hypothesis derived from theories of the civilizing process that modernization and urbanization decrease violence against others by increasing self-control. Neither modernization, urbanization, nor other factors that might be expected to be associated with the civilizing process (proximity to Paris and location in the northeastern core) are significantly related to the rate of crimes against persons after controls. Moreover, the absence of a significant coefficient for the dummy variable for the north-east militates against alternative explanations of southern violence in terms of climate or the presence of pan-Mediterranean subcultures of honor and shame. All else, including internal colonialism, being equal, persons in the southern periphery were no more likely than those in the northern core to attack others.

Suicide.—In marked contrast, the suicide rate is significantly related to all predictors except resistance to internal colonialism ($\beta = .083$, NS). Pseudo-$R^2$ is .744 ($P < .001$), much higher than the corresponding figure for crimes against persons, and the effects of modernization ($\beta = .336$, $P < .001$), urbanization ($\beta = .242$, $P < .001$), and distance from Paris ($\beta = -.224$, $P < .01$) are significant.

These findings appear to support theories linking the civilizing process, including urbanization, to suicide. The absence of a significant relationship between suicide and resistance to internal colonialism was expected, since internal colonialism theory makes no predictions for the suicide rate. The extremely strong spatial lag term ($\rho = .579$, $P < .001$), which taps neighborhood diffusion, supports Tarde’s (1903) law of close contact (see also Baller and Richardson 2002). Apparently, modernization, urbanization, and local neighborhood diffusion processes were largely responsible for the higher suicide rates in the core in the vicinity of Paris.

Total violence.—Theories of the civilizing process and resistance to internal colonialism make no explicit predictions for the total violence rate, but Elias (2000) can be read as suggesting that changing standards of impulse control should decrease the total in the absence of decivilizing processes, and, to the extent that internal colonialism is decivilizing as suggested above, there is some basis for suggesting that resistance to internal colonialism should be associated with higher total violence rates. Contrary to this interpretation of Elias, findings for the TVR seem to indicate that both the civilizing process and reactions against it increased the total level of violence in 19th-century France. The TVR increases significantly with modernization ($\beta = .361$, $P < .01$), urbanization ($\beta = .
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Spatial Lag</th>
<th>Spatial Error</th>
<th>Suicide, Spatial Lag</th>
<th>TVR, Spatial Lag</th>
<th>SVR, Spatial Lag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>8.84*</td>
<td>18.88***</td>
<td>26.56***</td>
<td>.544***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.92)</td>
<td>(3.81)</td>
<td>(4.27)</td>
<td>(6.42)</td>
<td>(.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilizing processes:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization factor</td>
<td>.353</td>
<td>.461</td>
<td>1.60***</td>
<td>2.01**</td>
<td>.059***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.397)</td>
<td>(.441)</td>
<td>(.452)</td>
<td>(.668)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>.795</td>
<td>.594</td>
<td>3.77***</td>
<td>4.75**</td>
<td>.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.886)</td>
<td>(.878)</td>
<td>(.977)</td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
<td>(.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance to internal colonialism</td>
<td>1.09***</td>
<td>1.51***</td>
<td>.396</td>
<td>1.43**</td>
<td>-.036**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.330)</td>
<td>(.378)</td>
<td>(.347)</td>
<td>(.526)</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from Paris (residualized by northeast)</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.010*</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>-.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.0002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Northeast (1) vs. southwest (0) of the St. Malo–Genève Line

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.250</td>
<td>-.656</td>
<td>-.594</td>
<td>-.475</td>
<td>-.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.754)</td>
<td>(.973)</td>
<td>(8.32)</td>
<td>(1.21)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \rho \) (spatial lag)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>.372**</th>
<th>.579***</th>
<th>.499***</th>
<th>.544***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.116)</td>
<td>(.096)</td>
<td>(.107)</td>
<td>(.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.372]</td>
<td>[.597]</td>
<td>[.499]</td>
<td>[.544]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \lambda \) (spatial error)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>.464***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.464]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo-\( R^2 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>.433***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.464]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log likelihood

|                      | -189.31 | -187.27 | -198.64 | -231.00 | 79.54  |

Note.—Maximum likelihood estimation, standard errors in parentheses; standardized regression coefficients in brackets, \( N = 85 \).

* \( P < .05 \) (two-tailed).
** \( P < .01 \).
*** \( P < .001 \).
Suicide and Violent Crime

.261, \( P < .01 \)), and resistance to internal colonialism \((\beta = .257, \ P < .01)\). There is also strong evidence of local neighborhood diffusion \((\rho = .499, \ P < .001)\), but neither distance from Paris nor location in the northeast is significant. Pseudo-\(R^2\) is .588.

**Direction of violence against self or others.**—When theories of the civilizing process and the development of oppositional subcultures in response to internal colonialism are incorporated into the integrated model, they imply that both processes should affect the “choice” between suicide and interpersonal violence, as measured by the SVR. As expected, the relationship of the SVR to modernization is strongly positive \((\beta = .318, \ P < .001)\) and that of resistance to internal colonialism negative but somewhat weaker \((\beta = -.192, \ P < .01)\). These variables appear to be largely responsible for the greater preference for suicide over violence against others in both urban areas and in the northeastern core. After controlling for modernization, resistance to internal colonialism, and the other variables in the model, the SVR does not vary significantly with urbanization \((\beta = .042, \ NS)\). The relationship between distance from Paris and the SVR is negative, as theory suggests, but it reaches statistical significance only by one-tailed test \((\beta = -.155, \ P < .05)\), and the strongly positive zero-order relationship between location in the northeast and the SVR \((r = .532, \ P < .001)\) disappears after controls \((\beta = -.092, \ NS)\). The significant spatial lag coefficient \((\rho = .544, \ P < .001)\) provides strong evidence of neighborhood spatial diffusion, but the insignificant coefficient attached to distance from Paris \((\beta = .0002, \ NS)\) provides little evidence of diffusion from core to periphery. Pseudo-\(R^2\) is .757 \((P < .001)\), markedly higher than those attached to crimes against persons and the TVR and slightly higher than the pseudo-\(R^2\) for the suicide rate.

**Summary and conclusions.**—Findings from the spatial regressions in table 2 are for the most part understandable from a theoretical perspective based on the incorporation of aspects of theories of the civilizing process and internal colonialism into Unnithan et al.’s (1994) integrated suicide/homicide model. We can conclude that suicide and total violence (the
TVR) vary directly with the civilizing process, whether measured by the modernization factor or urbanization. The tendency to “choose” suicide over homicide (the SVR) also varies directly with the modernization factor, but urbanization is unrelated to the direction of violence. Also in accord with theory, internal colonialism is associated with higher rates of crimes against persons, total violence, and a propensity to attack others rather than oneself, but not with the suicide rate. The negative relationships of distance from Paris to the suicide rate mirror Guerry’s (2002) empirical findings and Tarde’s (1903) hypothesis that imitation or diffusion processes flow outward from great cities. Finally, the large and highly significant \( \rho \) coefficients for all four dependent variables may be interpreted as evidence of local neighborhood cultural diffusion processes that produce geographical clustering and spatial autocorrelation, while the strong \( \lambda \) coefficient in the spatial error model for crimes against persons indicates the influence of important but unknown spatially patterned variables omitted from the model.

DISCUSSION

Although he was wrong about the inverse relationship between suicide and crimes against persons in his data, Guerry (2002) already knew in the 1830s that suicide was concentrated in the industrial north and crimes against persons in the less-developed south. Beyond suggesting that cultural differences had something to do with it, however, he did not know why. Theoretical developments later in the 19th century and into the 20th would perhaps have allowed him to suggest (1) what aspects of Septentrional and Méridional cultures led to a preference for suicide or for homicide and (2) why these cultural differences existed in the first place. Modern integrated suicide-homicide theory (Unnithan et al. 1994) answers the first question in terms of culturally based internal and external attributions of blame, and tentative answers to the second are provided by the historical experiences of the civilizing process (Elias 2000) and the formation of reactive cultures of honor in reaction to 19th-century policies of francisation based on the mission civilatrice.

Nonetheless, evidence for the theory of the civilizing process is mixed. Elias (2000) would lead us to believe that the civilizing process should reduce the rate of crimes of violence, but there is little relationship one way or the other between crimes against persons and either the modernization factor or urbanization. Indeed, if one focuses on the signs of the coefficients rather than significance levels, the relationships of modernization and urbanization to crimes against persons are positive rather than negative as theory suggests.
Guerry’s (2002) and d’Angeville’s (1969) reports do not permit testing Spierenburg’s (1994) hypothesis that the civilizing process was accompanied by a shift from impulsive to controlled violence. If impulsive violence (i.e., homicides and assaults resulting from spur-of-the-moment eruptions of anger) decreased while carefully planned premeditated violence increased with modernization or urbanization, the two might well have cancelled each other out. Another possibility is that the lack of relationship results from the contamination of the measure of crimes against persons by the inclusion of nonviolent crimes such as perjury and bigamy. Additional research disaggregating types of violent crime (see Parrella 1992; Gillis 1994, 1996, 2004; Spierenburg 1994; Lacour 2001) and eliminating nonviolent crimes against persons might resolve these issues. At least as early as 1841, the annual Compte général de l’administration de la justice criminelle en France (Département de la Justice et des Cultes 1843; see Gillis [1989, 1994], Wright [1983], and Whitt [2002] on the Comptes), earlier volumes of which contained Guerry’s (2002) raw data on suicide and crime, included detailed breakdowns by département of the incidence of premeditated (assassinat) and unpremeditated (meurtre) homicides, various types of assaults, and their apparent motives (e.g., greed, domestic tensions, hatred, and sudden anger in the context of gambling disputes or tavern brawls). Indeed, the Comptes include data by département on some forms of violent crime (violent robberies on the public roads and elsewhere) classified by Guerry and the French legal system as crimes against property rather than against persons.21

On the other hand, both modernization and urbanization are strongly associated with higher suicide rates. These findings support theoretical observations by Morselli (1882), Masaryk (1970), and Weber (1976) linking the progress of civilization to suicide and the connection drawn by Freud (1962) between civilization and a sense of guilt. While the theory of the civilizing process does not explicitly consider suicide, the existence of such a relationship follows from the connection posited by Elias (2000) between the civilizing process and superego formation. Indeed, Mennell (1989, p. 125) argues that Weber’s (1976) Peasants into Frenchmen, which lists suicide among the “vices of the new society” (p. 496), may be regarded as extending Elias’s work into the 19th century.

When viewed within the framework of the integrated model, the re-

---

21 Guerry (2002) used the first six volumes of the Compte général as his source of raw data on crime and suicide. I do not have access to these editions, which tabulated crime data for 1825–30 and added suicide in 1827. The Comptes were immensely detailed. Quetelet (1984) noted soon after they made their appearance that they included tabulations of crimes of each type by département, fine-grained age and sex categories, the seasons of the year, and even the hour of the day that thefts were committed in Paris (Whitt 2002).
gressions for the TVR and the SVR, respectively, indicate that the major impacts of modernization per se (as opposed to urbanization) in 19th-century France were to increase suicide, thereby increasing total violence and channeling violence toward the self and away from others (Gillis 1994). Urbanization also increased total violence but did not affect its direction as measured by the SVR, perhaps because it had opposite effects on the urban bourgeoisie (increased suicide rates), for whom urbanization was a civilizing process, and the dangerous classes (increased violent crime), for whom it was decivilizing.

By and large, the evidence presented in this article also supports the internal colonialism model. The internal colonialism factor is strongly associated with higher rates of crimes against persons and more moderately with both total violence and a tendency to externalize as measured by the SVR. Findings from the spatial lag regressions are thus largely consistent with both theories.

Nonetheless, the data do not provide direct measurements of attributions of blame, changes in habitus, resistance to internal colonialism, or the formation of reactive cultures of honor, all of which must be theoretically inferred from the essentially structural measures upon which the modernization and internal colonialism variables are based. While the modernization factor has considerable face validity, alternative readings are possible for two of the variables included in the internal colonialism factor—Catholic priests per capita and the percentage of schoolchildren who could speak French. The inclusion of these variables in the internal colonialism measure is based on the Catholic Church's opposition to all things modern in the face of the French civilizing offensive and the assumption that non-French-speaking areas were prime targets for the francisation program. Nonetheless, many residents of the French periphery learned to speak French through peaceful acculturation because of its survival value in a French-speaking nation (McPhee 1992). Viewed in this way, learning French may be conceptualized as part of the civilizing process. Similarly, following Durkheim (1951; see also Baller and Richardson 2002), Catholic priests per capita may be interpreted as measuring social integration rather than resistance to internal colonization. Time-honored Durkheimian theories link suicide to low levels (Durkheim 1951) and homicide to high levels (Durkheim [1898–1900] 1983) of social integration. The two theoretical readings are not incompatible. External threat tends to increase cohesion (integration) (Coser 1956; see Markides and Cohn [1982] for some of the conditions under which this pattern applies), and Durkheim (1983, pp. 110–20) suggests that political, religious, and family integration heighten passions, promoting a concern with honor and increased rates of homicide.

Although this article concentrates on civilizing processes and resistance
to internal colonialism, the analysis permits the evaluation of Tarde’s (1903) theory of diffusion, which receives strong support. Indeed, local neighborhood diffusion, tapped by the spatial lag parameter $\rho$, is the strongest predictor of the suicide rate, total violence, and the SVR and second only to resistance to the internal colonialism factor as a source of variation in rates of violent crime. Similarly, findings for distance from Paris support Guerry’s (2002) empirical generalization that suicide rates fell off with increasing distance from the capital, Morselli’s (1882) observations about diffusion of a proclivity for suicide outward from the most industrialized areas of Europe, and Tarde’s (1903) theory of diffusion from great cities.

The internal colonialism model has proved controversial, especially among historians and political scientists (Palloni 1979; Hind 1984), and the analysis above allows the evaluation of other possible theoretical interpretations of the externalization of violence in the south. One alternative explanation focuses on the effects of climate and geography on culture and human behavior (Koeniger 1988). Another posits centuries-old Mediterranean cultures of honor and shame (e.g., Péristiany 1966; Davis 1977). Still other competing theoretical readings have perhaps been most fully developed in the context of the situation in the United States, where, as in 19th-century France, homicide rates have historically been higher and suicide rates lower in the South than in the North (e.g., Hackney 1969; Gastil 1971; Whitt, Corzine, and Huff-Corzine 1995; Baller and Richardson 2002; Messner, Baller, and Zevenbergen 2005). Roche (1954, p. 39) draws an explicit parallel between southern France and the Southern United States, characterizing the Midi as a “Dixieland in France” separated from the north by its own imaginary “Mason-Dixon line.” Hackney’s (1969) internal colonialism interpretation of Southern violence in the United States touched off a protracted debate that continues today over when the South became more violent and the relative importance of cultural factors and structural conditions such as Southern poverty (e.g., Loftin and Hill 1974). Gastil (1971) points out that the Southern pattern of violence existed well before the Civil War. This implies that something other than internal colonialism was responsible, but it does not preclude a cultural explanation. Chu, Rivera, and Loftin (2000) suggest that by the turn of the 21st century the weight of the evidence had shifted in the direction of cultural explanations, in particular Nisbett and Cohen’s (1996) thesis that Southern violence in the United States originated among Celtic herders faced with the necessity of defending themselves against the theft of their livestock and unable to rely on central authorities to protect them. According to the herding-culture thesis, these ancestors of present-day Southern whites developed violent cultures of honor that they brought with them to the United States. The herding-culture thesis should
apply to all times and places where central authority is weak and a low threshold for defensive violence has economic value. Indeed, Schneider (1971) makes an essentially identical argument, suggesting that Mediterranean cultures of honor and shame stretching back millennia (see also Péristiany 1966; Davis 1977) arose in the absence of effective state institutions from the necessity for pastoral herders and subsistence farmers to protect their land and livestock.

Like the theory of the civilizing process, theoretical interpretations based on the influence of climate and geography, ancient Mediterranean cultures of honor and shame, or herding cultures imply that the pattern of southern violence in France considerably antedated the Industrial Revolution, but theories of internal colonialism suggest that it is of more recent origin. Guerry and d’Angeville’s data do not in themselves allow us to settle the argument over when violent cultures of honor first arose in southern France. In support of interpretations based on climate or the existence of pan-Mediterranean cultures of honor and shame, there is some evidence (e.g., Greenshields 1994; Ruff 2001) that isolated southern regions of France were exceedingly violent as early as the 1500s, and the Lisa maps and the zero-order relationships in table 1 indicate that the south remained more likely to externalize violence in the first third of the 19th century. On the other hand, Chu et al. (2000) find little evidence in support of the herding-culture proposition in the American South after controlling for poverty, and the regression analyses presented above suggest that the Midi, where the climate was warmer and Mediterranean cultures of honor and shame presumably existed, was not significantly more violent than the northeastern core after controls. Moreover, the historical relationships between the core in the vicinity of Paris and the peripheral south since the early Middle Ages seem to fit the internal colonialism paradigm. Internal political colonialism began more than a millennium ago with the expansion of the domaine royale of the House of Capet into the periphery, where the conquered duchies and counties strongly resisted their involuntary incorporation into the French nation-state (Pounds and Ball 1964; see also Elias 2000). The timing of the development of resistance to internal colonialism, however, varied considerably across French provinces. Unlike the southern periphery, the Breton peninsula had relatively low rates of violence in the 1820s. Although Brittany had been annexed some 300 years previously, it was not until 1901 that Bretons faced the Law on Associations, a concerted effort under the Third Republic to eradicate local Breton culture by closing Catholic schools and replacing them with compulsory secular public education (Ford 1990). Breton resistance reached violent proportions in 1902 and continued well into the 20th century (Reece 1979; Ford 1990).

Chu et al. (2000) point out that the herding-culture-of-honor proposition
Suicide and Violent Crime

in Nisbett and Cohen’s (1996) theory is analytically separable from the linkage between cultures of honor and violence. Cultures of honor need not have their origins among primitive herders and subsistence farmers, nor need the threat be economic. They can arise from a variety of historical sources of external threat to economic, political, or cultural values, including, but not limited to, internal colonialism. Indeed, as Gilmore (1982) notes, some researchers explicitly implicate colonial relationships between core and periphery in their interpretations of the origins of Mediterranean cultures of honor and shame, treating the entire region as a periphery that shared a common relationship of subjugation to the northern European core.

At a highly general level, I would suggest that violent cultures of honor tend to arise when a population experiences a high level of external threat to its central economic, political, or cultural values and when external authority is either weak or is itself perceived to be the source of threat. This hypothesis subsumes both responses to internal colonialism and the herding-culture thesis as special cases. These conditions, which Elias (1996) would regard as decivilizing processes in which force or the threat of force has survival value, are met in many situations. They apply to historical experiences ranging from the violence of the western American frontier (Nelsen, Corzine, and Huff-Corzine 1994; Mennell 2007) and southern Italy (e.g., Gramsci 1978; Blok 1974; Moe 2002) to the development of cultures of honor among blacks in the inner cities (e.g., Clark 1965; Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Rose and McClain 1998; Anderson 1999); the historical experience of Native Americans (Bachman 1992); the responses of the colonized to imperial colonialism (e.g., Fanon 1965); and, arguably, Islamist hatred of all things Western in the face of globalization, Western political, economic, and cultural hegemony, and the American occupation of Iraq (Stump 2000; Snyder 2003).

It is theoretically interesting that those facing extreme external threat, for example Japanese kamikaze pilots in World War II, Islamist suicide bombers, and the mass suicides at Masada in 70 CE, Jonestown in 1978, and Waco in 1993 (if the latter were in fact suicides) sometimes respond with suicide as well as externalized violence. Bachman (1992), who uses a combination of strain theory and an internal colonialism model to interpret responses of Native Americans to economic deprivation and the destruction of indigenous cultures, finds that they have high rates of both homicide, which theory predicts, and suicide, which it does not. Bachman (1992, p. 26) argues that Native Americans “live in such a state of frustration and blocked opportunities that both inward and outward forms of aggression are readily utilized and tolerated.” This “fatalistic” subculture provides “two cultural channels for aggression resulting from blocked opportunities.” The integrated model of suicide and homicide (Unnithan
et al. 1994), which guides the research in this study, predicts that extreme frustration and blocked opportunities would be expected to increase the total violence rate (suicide plus homicide) by increasing rates of suicide, homicide, or both. The French data offer some limited basis for such a generalization. Although the coefficient for the suicide rate is not statistically significant, the signs of the relationships of resistance to internal colonialism to the TVR and rates of both crimes against persons and suicide are all positive. I would argue that members of besieged groups sometimes turn to voluntary death in “last resort” situations involving threats to self-identity (Girard 1993) that they interpret in the context of a culture of honor. They choose altruistic or fatalistic suicide (Durkheim 1951) not because they blame themselves but because they define the situation as hopeless and see suicide as the only honorable thing left to do. Indeed, suicide may represent a final symbolic act of defiance affirming the threatened identity as “an inalienable part of the self” (Girard 1993, p. 554) and casting blame for one’s death upon the perceived oppressor (Bachman 1992, p. 109). In the long run, the complete or near-complete disintegration of traditional culture may lead to the replacement of resistance by a pervasive sense of hopelessness (cf. Markides and Cohn 1982) that leads to both attacks on others and anomic suicide among those caught between two cultures.

On the other hand, a sense of collective purpose and in-group solidarity may be replaced among highly acculturated members of peripheral populations by a focus on private interests and goals (cf. Clark 1965, pp. 84–85; Markides and Cohn 1982). They are less likely to strike out at others, and their suicides, like those in the core, in all likelihood involve egoism and self-blame.

Finally, this article seeks to point to the richness of the data collected by Guerry and d’Angeville, whose départemental data sets are a largely untapped resource for sociologists, geographers, and historians (but see Friendly 2007). In addition to the variables used in this study, Guerry provides data by département on crimes against property, illegitimacy, infanticide, elder abuse (crimes against parents), playing the lottery, giving to the church and to charity, and the birthplaces of Paris prostitutes. D’Angeville gives figures on infant mortality, life expectancy, average height of residents, marriage and birth rates, lawsuits, salaries, food consumption, elections, and various aspects of the military draft and primary education. Their data collection efforts were highly competent and their analyses insightful even by today’s standards, but they lacked the multivariate techniques that are now our stock in trade.
Suicide and Violent Crime

REFERENCES


—. 2003. GeoDa 0.9 User’s Guide. Urbana-Champaign, Ill.: Center for Spatially Integrated Social Science.


American Journal of Sociology


Suicide and Violent Crime

American Journal of Sociology


Suicide and Violent Crime


183
American Journal of Sociology

Suicide and Violent Crime


American Journal of Sociology