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TEXTILES AND TRADE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN

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INTRODUCTION

Any discussion of the textile trade in Tokugawa Japan (1600-1867) requires that the socio-economic and political context first be outlined. Japan was a state divided into many separated political jurisdictions, with around one-quarter of the country controlled directly by the Tokugawa Shogunate and the other three-quarters under the local control of around 265 local barons or daimyo. While each of these local power-holders was subordinated to the shogun and required to spend half his time in attendance on the shogun at the Tokugawa capital of Edo (modern Tokyo), within his own domain he was an autonomous ruler. Each daimyo owed fealty to the Tokugawa, but they paid no taxes and were left alone so long as they were not abusing the residents of their domains. Tokugawa power was centered in the Kantô plain around Edo but included direct control of the major cities of Edo, Kyoto, Osaka, and Nagasaki as well as the foreign trade conducted out of Nagasaki with Dutch and Chinese merchants.

Major features of the Tokugawa era were domestic peace, following a century of warfare in the battles for unification before 1615; the political integration of the country through the system of alternate attendance required of the daimyo; urbanization; and economic growth together with greatly expanded demands for consumer goods. As a consequence of urbanization and the withdrawal of most samurai from the villages into the cities, the agrarian model of society with a clear separation between warrior-bureaucrats and aristocrats at the top of society and farmers, artisans and merchants supplying their needs broke down. Over the course of the Tokugawa era, increased commercial agriculture and by-employment activities by farmers blurred the distinctions between handicraft industries and trade, on the one hand, and farming, on the other. This had a major impact on the textile trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.¹

While largely secluded from the outside world, Tokugawa society was by no means static and unchanging. Between 1600 and 1867 the economy became increasingly monetized and commercialized, farming

shifted from subsistence to market oriented cropping patterns, and new systems of production and distribution developed. In the seventeenth century Kyoto and Osaka were the primary foci of commercial activity. The Kinki region surrounding the imperial capital of Kyoto and Osaka had long been the center of the Japanese economy and of handicraft industrial production. While Kyoto was the center of silk textile production, Osaka became a center for the cotton trade. When cotton cultivation and processing expanded in the sixteenth century, the Kinki region was of major importance.

THE COTTON TRADE

By the early seventeenth century cotton had replaced linen as the staple fiber for Japanese commoner clothing. Cotton became a major commercial crop in the Osaka region and Osaka and nearby market towns developed as cotton processing centers. By the end of the seventeenth century merchant and artisan guilds developed to focus the marketing and processing of seed cotton into cloth on the city of Osaka. Protective trade associations or kabunakama were designed to regularize business procedures and trade routes and control access to the cotton trade. On the one hand guilds assured consistent quality and prices for cotton goods; helped define roles in the collecting, processing, and distribution of seed and ginned cotton, cotton yarn, and cotton cloth; and brought order to a complex system of economic relationships. On the other hand, once established the guilds limited innovation, restricted access, and monopolized various aspects of the processing and marketing of cotton and cotton textiles. In the 1660s and 1670s the Osaka city magistrates authorized guilds for cotton buying, shipping, processing and sales. The guilds helped stabilize the cotton trade, assisted government control of commerce, and helped preserve the separation between cotton cultivators and those who processed and marketed their crops. In a context in which handicraft industry and trade were seen as potential contaminants of the purity of self-sufficient agricultural villages, the kabunakama in the cotton trade were important for preserving the separation of commerce and agriculture. They also assured that regular supplies of cotton would be available for the urban residents of Osaka and, to a lesser extent, Edo.

As cotton cultivation became increasingly common as a cash crop in Kinki area villages, cotton processing also increased. Initially villagers processed enough cotton to provide cloth for household consumption. But

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from the 1730s on, cotton cultivating villages increased the volume of processed goods they produced. This was especially true for cotton ginning and the dominant position of Osaka cotton ginners was challenged. Local cloth production increased as well and this threatened the position of the Osaka cotton weavers. The Osaka guilds of seed and ginned cotton dealers, processors and shippers declined in influence and appealed to the city government for protection. In 1772 the Osaka city government ordered all those competing with the Osaka cotton guilds to join them and abide by their regulations. The city government stepped in to reinforce the position of the Osaka cotton guilds. In doing so, the city government demanded new monetary contributions from the guild members, and these licensing fees strengthened ties between the cotton merchants and the city administration.²

Similar actions were taken to defend the interests of the guilds of cotton cloth merchants. During the 1770s and 1780s, they too formed revised trade associations in association with the Osaka city government. Included were the Osaka cotton cloth wholesalers nakama (momen ton'ya nakama) and the Osaka cotton cloth dealers nakama (nanakumi momen'ya nakama). The cloth wholesalers purchased cotton cloth and sold it to the cloth dealers for storage and distribution. While a licensed monopoly the wholesalers guild offered to admit any newcomers who could afford its license fees and wished to enter the trade. The cotton dealers guild included merchants who warehoused and shipped cotton cloth to Edo and other areas of Japan as well as local retailers. Each of its seven member groups had long histories, with the Edo shippers association dating back to 1616.

The reinforced kabunakama served several purposes. First, they enhanced the cotton merchants access to the juridical power of the city administration to protect them from outside competition. Second, they intensified the pressures on guild members to adhere to established business practices and limited the ability of guild members to innovate. Third, they provided a new source of revenues--through licensing fees--to the city government. Finally, they helped insure the stability of the cotton trade and the supply of cotton goods to the city. Severe penalties including threats of fines or expulsion from the trade helped keep members in line and retarded changes in the operation of the Osaka cotton trade. While prior to the 1770s guilds had defined spheres of activity and regulated the Osaka cotton trade, by the 1770s more formal me-

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chanisms with closer ties to government power were required. Reorganized kabunakama protected the interests of the Osaka cotton merchants. Direct sales by rural cotton producers, new marketing and distribution strategies by rural jobbers and transport merchants, and increased rural processing of cotton collectively weakened the dominant position of the Osaka guild merchants in the cotton trade. Kabunakama formation in the 1770s and 1780s served to reassert Osaka merchant controls and limit the expansion of rural processing and trade.³

Village processors and merchants were not the only sources of competition for the Osaka cotton merchants. Local daimyo also worked to augment their incomes from the cotton trade. In 1785, Wakayama domain tried to establish a ginned cotton buying office in Osaka to improve access to supplies for its domain sponsored reeled yarn industry. The domain tried to evade the Osaka guild system and buy directly from ginned cotton shippers in Osaka. The Osaka guild merchants protested to the city government that this violated their monopoly rights and Wakayama domain was forced to follow established market procedures. The city government protected the cotton merchants' interests against an encroachment by Wakayama domain.⁴

A more serious domain challenge came in 1821. Himeji domain established a domain monopoly for marketing its bleached cotton cloth and omitted the Osaka cotton cloth merchants. Until 1821, all Himeji cloth exports passed through the Osaka cloth merchants and the new domain monopoly abruptly altered the marketing system. The new monopoly increased domain revenues from cotton exports. By shipping cloth directly to the higher priced Edo market, all profits went directly into the domain treasury and the Osaka merchants were excluded. The impact of this and other challenges to the Osaka cotton merchants was dramatic. White cotton cloth imports to Osaka declined from 8 million tan (12 yard bolt of cloth suitable for one garment) in 1810 to an average of 3 million tan between 1832 and 1841. At the same time the price of cloth increased in Osaka by 50 per cent, even though cloth production in Himeji and elsewhere increased. The dominant position of the Osaka cloth merchants in the Kinki cotton trade was shattered.⁵

Rural competition and challenges to the dominant position of the Osaka cotton merchants continued from the mid-eighteenth century. For example, northeast of the city of Sakai near the modern city of Yao were

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three groups of rural cotton cloth traders. All were formally organized by the 1750s, had established business regulations and attempted to limit outside competition. Yet their regulations illustrate the problems they faced in controlling the rural cotton cloth trade. Admonitions against roadside sales and under-the-counter transactions suggest both were common. Members competed for cloth supplies as evident from the effort to discourage such practices. One member of the Yao cotton cloth traders guild was Wataya Kichibei, whose shop Watakichi was a large-scale trader of cotton cloth, ginned cotton, cotton yarn, and other dry goods from the 1750s into the twentieth century. In 1759, for example, Watakichi sold 21,428 bolts of white and striped cotton cloth, 1720 spools of cotton yarn, and 273 kan (8.72 lbs.) of ginned cotton. Originally a seed cotton dealer, in the 1750s Watakichi became a major cloth wholesaler. Sales fluctuated from year to year with 52,178 bolts sold in 1826, 33,676 bolts sold in 1852, a high of 79,275 bolts sold in 1864 and only 35,297 in 1868. Documents which survive indicate that Watakichi sold directly to merchants from Omi and did not go through the Osaka cloth traders guilds on route. While Watakichi was one of the larger rural cloth merchants, he was not unique in his independence from the Osaka cotton guilds. It was this kind of competition in the 1760s and 1770s that encouraged the Osaka merchants to reorganize their guilds and request additional monopoly rights from the Osaka city government. As Watakichi illustrates, it was difficult to control competition outside of the city of Osaka.⁶

A major transition point in the Osaka cotton trade occurred in 1823 when 1007 cotton cultivating villages in Settsu and Kawachi, provinces near the city of Osaka, complained to the Osaka city magistrate that the Osaka cotton wholesalers guild was restraining trade. The guild was accused of disrupting shipments through Osaka, Sumiyoshi, Sakai, and Nada and confiscating goods until it received its normal commission. This limited the market for village cotton and enabled the Osaka guild to unilaterally determine the price of seed cotton. The Osaka guild defended itself and claimed only to be exercising its long established rights in the cotton trade. Yet, with 1007 villages claiming hardship for over 10,000 households of cotton cultivators, the Osaka city magistrate was faced with a difficult decision. At issue was continued government support for the kabunakama in the Osaka cotton trade. The suit challenged the commercial policies of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

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In its decision, the government did not deny the monopoly rights of the Osaka cotton wholesalers guild, but it sanctioned free trade outside of the city of Osaka. This set a precedent which reduced the willingness of the Shogunate to interfere in the Kinki cotton trade. The decision abrogated the responsibility of the city government to protect the Osaka cotton guilds from outside competition. While the decision focused on seed cotton sales, its impact was far greater. Important legal barriers to structural change in the Kinki cotton trade disappeared as a result of the 1823 dispute. Thereafter, unrestricted rural trade would further undermine the position of the Osaka cotton merchants.⁷

THE SILK AND LINEN TRADES

Similar changes are evident in the silk and hemp trades during the Tokugawa era. New cropping patterns, weaving and spinning technology transfers to new regions, and the expansion of rural cloth processing and trade as by-employments challenged the position of established textile production and marketing systems. The Kyoto Nishijin silk textile industry is one example of this process. Kyoto developed as a center of silk textile production in the Heian era (794-1185). The Nishijin district of the city became the center of silk weaving in the late fifteenth century. By the mid-sixteenth century the weavers guild received both shogunal and imperial protection as the source of luxury silks for upper class samurai and court consumption. From the 1590s demand for silk increased among both samurai and wealthy commoners and Nishijin weavers flourished. By 1706 there were over 2,000 households of guild weavers in Kyoto.⁸

Guilds were important both to restrict access to the weaving trade and assure access to imported yarns from China. In 1655 the yarn importing guild (Ito wappu) was abolished and fierce competition for reduced supplies of yarn developed in Kyoto. Increased demand and reduced supplies resulted in rapid yarn price increases which the city government attempted to regulate. From the late seventeenth century the Shogunate encouraged domestic production of silk yarn in northern Japan and the Kantô region. This helped supply the demands of the Nishijin weavers and eventually replaced imported Chinese yarns. At the time of the great Nishijin fire of 1730, around 7,000 looms were in operation in Kyoto. The fire destroyed over 3,000 looms and severely affected the Nishijin weaving industry.

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As domestic sericulture expanded so did provincial silk spinning and weaving. Tangô, Kiryû, Nagahama, Isezaki, Hachioji, Gifu and other areas competed with the Nishijin silk industry. In the 1730s the superior looms and weaving technology of the Nishijin weavers spread to regional production centers. The 1730 fire accelerated this diffusion as many weavers were displaced from Nishijin and welcomed invitations to migrate elsewhere. Once rural silk production increased much of the cloth was shipped to Kyoto for further processing and sale. The Nishijin weavers quickly challenged this invasion of their primary market.⁹

In 1744 the Nishijin weavers petitioned the Kyoto city magistrates for protection from imports of provincial textiles. Constraints on silk imports attempted to restrict competition in Kyoto, but the city government was powerless to control rural production. A limit of 36,000 tan (12 yd. bolt) of cloth from Tangô and 9,000 tan from Kiryû illustrates the scale of rural imports. To reinforce their position the Nishijin weavers in 1745 formed a kabunakama of takabata (tall loom) weavers, designed to stifle competition from both provincial weavers and outsiders in the city of Kyoto as well as control the actions of guild members. Even while this kabunakama was forming new weavers proliferated in and outside of Kyoto. Efforts to strengthen the weavers guilds in the 1750s and 1760s illustrate the severity of the competition. A major fire in 1788 sent more Nishijin weavers to the provinces as many apprentices left their masters and became independent. In 1800, a further reorganization of the kabunakama also failed to stifle outside competition.¹⁰

In 1816, the weavers guild attempted to stop weavers from leaving Kyoto and relocating in the provinces. Despite this and other actions, competition continued to undermine the position of Nishijin. Kyoto weavers still produced the finest silk textiles, but rural competition was a serious threat to the Nishijin silk industry. In 1833, 1836 and 1837 bad weather devastated the rice crops and caused severe famine throughout Japan. The market for silk textiles collapsed and many weavers left the craft. In the provinces, where weaving was usually a by-employment rather than a full-time occupation, the recovery of the weaving industry was more rapid after the famine ended in 1838 and competition for silk yarn intensified. Silks from Tangô, Nagahama, and Kiryû

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flooded the Kyoto market and destroyed the remnants of the Nishijin monopoly. The elimination of all guilds by the Shogunate in 1841 furthered the destruction of the Kyoto silk industry. The 2219 houses of takabata weavers were reduced to 1201 households by 1852; 456 of these weavers were new entrants to the craft. Rural competition had eliminated the dominant position of the Nishijin weavers. While the imported Jacquard loom would help restore the industry in the late nineteenth century, silk textile production had spread to regions far from the control of the Nishijin weavers and outside the jurisdiction of the Kyoto city government or the Tokugawa Shogunate.¹¹

As centers of rural silk weaving proliferated, among the most important were Tangô, Nagahama, and Kiryû. Let us briefly examine each of them. While the Kiryû area had a long history of textile production, it was not nationally important until the mid-Edo period. Most weaving was concentrated in the Kiryû Shinmachi area or in the 54 villages which comprised Kiryû domain, now included in Gunma and Tochigi Prefectures north of modern Tokyo. Because of poor farm land, silk and paper production were important sources of supplementary income. By the late Tokugawa era, Kiryû was the second most important area for silk production after Nishijin. Sales of Kiryû silk to Edo and Kyoto date from the 1680s and 1690s. By 1718, seventeen transport merchants were shipping silk from Kiryû and in 1722 the Mitsui house opened an Echigoya branch shop in Kiryû to purchase local textiles. By 1738 local weavers used high quality production technology brought from Kyoto. Kiryû produced both silk twill cloth and silk yarns. Kiryû silk competed effectively with Nishijin as both shared common technology and used similar yarns. Located close to major areas of silk yarn production and two days from Edo by land or water, Kiryû could compete with Nishijin in major urban markets. Because the area was divided administratively into many separate jurisdictions under Tokugawa banner men (hatamoto) control, no single authority could regulate the by-employment activities of local farmers. This facilitated the rapid expansion of silk weaving in the area.

In 1731 the market days for Kiryû silk were changed to help Kiryû Shinmachi develop as a major silk market in competition with Omama, the dominant market in the area. The town grew substantially, especially after the 1738 introduction of takabata looms from Kyoto. Better looms increased output and weaving quality and by 1744 Kyoto weavers were complaining about the com-

petition from Kiryû. Until the 1770s most Kiryû silk was white cloth, but thereafter dyers appeared in Kiryû and dyeing increased. Water wheels improved yarn quality and figured textile production increased after 1786. This made Kiryû silk more comparable to Nishijin silk and made Kiryû the focal point of the Kantô silk industry. In the nineteenth century, Kiryû faced regional competition from Ashikaga and other Kantô textile centers. Efforts to control competition in the Kiryû region are evident in 1781, 1797, 1835, 1838, and 1846. Just as Nishijin lost its monopoly to Kiryû, Kiryû Shinmachi lost its position as the primary Kantô silk market after 1832 when a rival market opened in Ashikaga where traders could evade the controls of the Kiryû textile guilds.¹²

Tangô silk crepe (chirimen) was another major source of competition for the Nishijin weavers. The Kaya valley in Miyazu domain was a silk production region until the seventeenth century when the local daimyo relocated weavers to the castle town of Miyazu. In 1722, new weaving technology came to the region from Nishijin and silk crepe production developed as an important by-employment industry. The closeness of Tangô to Kyoto made access to new weaving technology easier than in Kiryû, as local merchants regularly travelled to the imperial capital. Domain authorization of silk crepe production after 1722 resulted in a rapid increase in the number of looms. The Kaya valley had 205 looms in 1764-71, 423 in 1775, 503 in 1803, and 496 in 1829. By 1803, 956 looms existed outside the castle town of Miyazu with most weaving concentrated in the Kaya valley. Weavers in Miyazu domain prospered after the transfer of silk crepe weaving technology from Kyoto to Tangô. Nearby Mineyama domain also saw expanded weaving.

All Tangô silk crepe was shipped to Kyoto for dyeing and sale. A marketing and distribution system controlled by Kyoto guild merchants dominated trade and used advanced payments to weavers to monopolize access to Tangô silk. Kyoto was also a major source of yarn for Tangô weavers. In 1769 Kyoto yarn dealers suspended provincial yarn sales to protect Nishijin weavers from excessive rural competition. This policy failed as rural yarn dealers stepped in to supply the demand and silk crepe production continued to increase. Competition in the Tangô silk trade developed between Miyazu castle town merchants and Kyoto merchants, with the former supported by the domain government, and also between rural and castle town cloth and yarn traders. The rural weavers asserted their independence whenever

possible. In 1820 a slump in the silk crepe weaving industry resulted in an effort by weavers from Miyazu, Mineyama, and Kumihama domains to collectively organize an independent organization to represent their interests in the textile trade. At each level of production and distribution, Kyoto merchants, Tangô castle town merchants, and provincial weavers asserted their own interests in the silk trade. This became particularly intense in the 1820s, just when the Kinki cotton trade experienced aggressive efforts by rural merchants and producers to assert their independence from Osaka guild controls.¹³

Nagahama silk crepe (chirimen) was another source of competition for Nishijin silks. The area around modern Nagahama city in Shiga Prefecture was an important sericulture and weaving center during the second half of the Tokugawa era. Nagahama silk production emerged between 1738 and 1752 as a form of by-employment activity in this part of Hikone domain. The local product was known as Hama or Nagahama chirimen and was largely marketed in Kyoto. In the 1750s the Nishijin weavers objected to imports of Hama chirimen and the city magistrate supported their objections and banned Hama chirimen from Kyoto. Hikone merchants turned to the domain government for support. Discovering that domain tax goods could be freely sold in Kyoto, the domain office arranged to sell the cloth through the domain office in the city. Merchants were appointed to inspect the cloth for quality and serve as sales agents for Hikone cloth. In 1763 the Kyoto magistrate approved the direct marketing of Hikone cloth and production of Hama chirimen increased. By 1797 the volume of cloth shipped to Kyoto was 8,000 to 13,000 rolls per year. In 1799 the domain ordered that all yarn, cotton wadding, and cloth produced in the domain as well as all chirimen be designated as official tax goods and sent to the Kyoto domain office. This created a domain products monopoly in Hikone. Regulations for chirimen production and sales were revised in 1815 to increase domain profits from the trade. In 1829 Hikone opened a domain products sales office in Edo in order to avoid paying commissions to Osaka merchants for transporting and marketing domain goods. In 1857 a domain products office was opened in Nagahama to certify the quality of Nagahama silk and reinforce the dominant position of the domain government in the silk trade. Hikone domain used its export controls over Nagahama chirimen as an important source of supplementary income and opened domain products sales offices to compete directly with guild merchants in Kyoto, Osaka, and Edo.¹⁴ Other examples of the chang-

ing nature of the textile trade in the Kantô region can be seen in the production and marketing of Gunma silk yarns and Maoka cotton cloth. Both prospered in the early nineteenth century in competition with textile products from other regions of the country.¹⁵

The history of Nara bleached linen (Nara zarashi) provides an analogy to the Nishijin silk weaving industry. The Nara area, the dominant source of this luxury fabric in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, developed a highly specialized and tightly organized system of production and distribution. By the mid-eighteenth century the system was breaking down due to both increased independence by rural merchants and artisans and also to competition from other regions of the country. Like Nishijin silks, Nara zarashi was dependent on yarn supplies from other regions as local production was insufficient to meet the demand from weavers. The Yamato region provided only 10 to 20 percent of the necessary linen yarns and 80 to 90 percent came from other areas of the country. Increased linen production in Echigo, Omi, Nôto, and Satsuma competed with Nara zarashi after 1737 and production declined from 230,000 bolts (2 tan) in the 1730s to 150,000 bolts in the 1750s, and only around 100,000 bolts in the 1830s. Domain sponsored linen weaving in hemp cultivating domains enabled lower cost production and faced the Nara weavers with serious competition which undermined their dominant position.¹⁶

CONCLUSIONS

What generalizations can be drawn from the above discussions of the textile trade in Tokugawa Japan? First, urbanization increased the demand for textiles and stimulated production. Second, the importation of cotton cultivation in the sixteenth century and its wide diffusion throughout Japan resulted in cotton displacing linen as the staple fabric for clothing in the seventeenth century. Third, In the seventeenth century, both the Tokugawa Shogunate and the regional daimyo tried to concentrate textile production in cities and towns and separate handicraft production from farming. Fourth, urban merchants established an elaborate network of guilds to regulate the production, marketing, and distribution of silk, cotton, and linen cloth and the raw materials required to produce them. Fifth, the Shogunate as the national government and the domain governments in the provinces assisted the creation of urban merchant monopolies. The timing of guild formation differed from one area to another, with Osaka and Kyoto taking the lead in the seven-

teenth century, but guilds of textile merchants and artisans are found throughout the primary textile production regions by the mid-eighteenth century. Many of these guilds were reinforced with additional legal rights in the late-eighteenth century, a symptom of the increased competition from rural traders and producers.

Sixth, a major feature of the textile trade was the diffusion of cotton, silk, and linen processing technology and trade away from the cities and into the provinces. This is especially evident in the Kinki region around Osaka and Kyoto and the Kantô region around Edo.¹⁷ Provincial merchants competed with those from the central cities and rural merchants and artisans competed with those based in urban areas. This was true in the silk, cotton, and linen trades. Seventh, a further source of competition was domain monopolies which by-passed the systems of marketing and distribution controlled by Osaka, Kyoto, and Edo merchants. The result of this and other sources of competition was the decline of urban guild dominance and of Kinki regional dominance of the textile trades in the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Eighth, a major constraint which limited the effectiveness of urban merchant guilds was the lack of uniform national authority. The Tokugawa Shogunate controlled Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto and around 25 percent of Japan's farm land. The rest was divided among 265 daimyo domains, court nobles, and Tokugawa bannermen. No single authority could impose its will beyond the limits of its own jurisdiction. The provinces of Settsu and Kawachi surrounding Osaka and much of the Kantô region surrounding Edo were divided among many separate administrative jurisdictions. The authority of city magistrates was limited beyond the city borders, and thus they had limited capacity to intervene on behalf of urban guilds faced with rural competitors. Finally, the economic and social changes experienced by Tokugawa society resulted in many farm households turning to cash crops and by-employments as sources of supplementary income. Textile production and trade were two major areas of involvement. Villages engaged in sericulture turned to yarn production. Those located nearby often turned to weaving. Cotton growing villages learned to gin and then spin their seed cotton harvests and others turned to weaving, not just to clothe their families, but to sell for cash. Income from non-farming activities became a major source of farm household income throughout Tokugawa Japan. The distinctions between merchants, artisans, and farmers blurred as did many of the dis-

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tinctions between urban and rural patterns of production and consumption. Tokugawa Japan was a time of transition. The textile trades provide a good illustration of some major features of economic and social change.¹⁸

NOTES

1. For a general discussion of Tokugawa commercial history see William B. Hauser, 1974. Economic Institutional Change in Tokugawa Japan: Osaka and the Kinai Cotton Trade. London: Cambridge University Press, pp. 7-58.
2. Hauser, Economic Institutional Change, pp. 59-73.
3. Hauser, Economic Institutional Change, pp. 73-80.
4. Hauser, Economic Institutional Change, pp. 83-84.
5. Hauser, Economic Institutional Change, pp. 103-106.
6. Hauser, Economic Institutional Change, pp. 148-151.
7. Hauser, Economic Institutional Change, pp. 97-100, 160-165.
8. Gotô Yasushi, 1960. "Nishijin ori." In Chihôshi Kenkyûkai ed., Nihon sangyôshi taikei, Vol. 6, Kinki chihôhen, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, pp. 32-36.
9. Gotô, "Nishijin-ori," pp. 36-38.
10. Gotô, "Nishijin-ori," pp. 38-40. Sawada Akira, 1967. Edo jidai ni okeru kabunakama kumiai seidô, tokuni Nishijin oriya nakama no kenkyû, Kyoto: Daigakudô Shôten, pp. 88-93, 107-114.
11. Gotô, "Nishijin-ori," pp. 41-44.
12. Ichikawa Kôsei, 1959. "Kiryû no orimono," In Chihôshi kenkyûkai ed., Nihon sangyôshi taikei, Vol. 4, Kantô chihôhen, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, pp. 287-307.
13. Ikeda Hiromasa, 1960. "Tangô chirimen," in Chihôshi Kenkyûkai ed. Nihon sangyôshi taikei, Vol. 6, Kinki chohôhen, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, pp. 70-85.
14. Egashira Tsuneharu, 1960. "Hama chirimen," In

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Chihôshi kenkyûkai, ed. Nihon sangyôshi taikei, Vol. 6, Kinki chihôhen, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, pp. 58-69.

15. Yamada Takemaro and Inoue Sadayuki, 1959. "Gunma no ki-ito," In Chihôshi kenkyûkai, ed. Nihon sangyôshi taikei, Vol. 4, Kantô chihôhen, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, pp. 257-286; Aoki Kôji, 1959. "Maoka momen," ibid., pp. 248-256.

16. Kimura Hiroshi, 1960. "Nara zarashi," In Chihôshi kenkyûkai, ed., Nihon sangyôshi taikei, Vol. 6., Kinki chihôhen, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, pp. 90-103.

17. On this issue see William B. Hauser, 1974. "The Diffusion of Cotton Processing and Trade in the Kinai Region in Tokugawa Japan," Journal of Asian Studies, 33, 4: 633-649.

18. Addendum: Throughout the text I have used "linen" and "hemp" alternatively to refer to the Japanese word asa. Asa usually refers to hemp or ramie, and includes all plant-derived fibers except cotton. Western style linen is made from flax which was not grown in Japan until modern times.