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Abstract
This article reviews the social psychological literature on attentional focus and causal attributions as they apply to social phobia. Excessive self-focused attention is increased by physiological arousal, interferes with task performance under some conditions, increases the probability of internal attributions, and intensifies emotional reactions. Social anxiety is also associated with a reversal of the self-serving bias for causal attributions. Implications of these findings for the maintenance and treatment of social phobia are discussed.

Modern specialization within psychology often inhibits the cross-fertilization of ideas between clinical psychology and other specialties. Personality and social psychologists can contribute to our understanding of clinical syndromes by providing a knowledge base of the psychological processes and characteristics of normal individuals. Clinical researchers can then examine whether disturbed individuals act in similar ways under similar circumstances. Such comparisons may increase our understanding of behavior disorders and suggest possible interventions.

This paper examines how knowledge of two areas of social psychological research—attentional focus and causal attributions—can enhance our understanding of social phobia. Excessive self-focused attention has been implicated in the development and maintenance of social anxiety by a number of theorists (Hartman, 1983; Schlenker & Leary, 1982). This paper will review the relationship between attentional focus and physiological arousal,

performance, attributions, and emotional reactivity. We will also examine how the causal attribution patterns of socially anxious individuals differ from those of nonanxious persons and consider what implications this may have for the maintenance and treatment of social phobia.

Self-Awareness and Social Anxiety

Twenty years ago Argyle and Williams (1969) postulated that during any social interaction the individual must be aware of both the self and the other. If there is not an appropriate balance of these two perspectives, attempts at social interaction will be ineffective and may result in undesirable social outcomes. Sarason (1975) has suggested that for socially anxious individuals, this balance is disrupted by a pattern of excessive negative self-referent thinking known as anxious self-preoccupation. Indeed, studies have found that social anxiety is associated with high frequencies of self-focused thoughts (e.g., Hope, Heimberg, Zollo, Nyman, & O'Brien, 1987; Johnson & Glass, in press). However, little is known about the role of excessive self-focused attention in social anxiety. As will be seen below, social psychologists have examined the causes and consequences of excessive self-focused attention in nonanxious individuals. The results raise some interesting hypotheses about the relationship between attentional focus and social phobia. Before reviewing specific studies, the various types of self-focus will be defined.

Self-focused attention can result from both situational and dispositional factors (Buss, 1980). Situational self-focused attention, known as self-awareness, may be induced by the presence of an audience, a mirror, or a video camera. The use of an audience to induce self-awareness is most relevant to social anxiety, especially since an "audience" may be defined as the presence of one other person (e.g., Baumeister, 1984). The Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS) was developed to measure dispositional tendencies to focus attention on the self, referred to as self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Three factors are represented in the SCS: (a) *private self-consciousness*, an awareness of one's own thoughts and feelings, (b) *public self-consciousness*, a general awareness of the self as a social object, and (c) *social anxiety*, discomfort in the presence of others. Self-awareness and self-consciousness have been studied extensively and appear to have similar effects on behavior (Buss, 1980).

Public self-consciousness is thought to be more closely related to social anxiety than private self-consciousness. In fact, a number of researchers have proposed that social anxiety will not occur in the absence of public self-consciousness (Buss, 1980; Fenigstein, 1979; Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Although data from our laboratory have not supported this assertion (Hope & Heimberg, 1988; Hope, Heimberg, & Grochowski, 1988), public self-consciousness was positively associated with various measures of social anxiety. Furthermore, private self-consciousness appeared to be related to social anxiety via public self-consciousness. Given the relatively large overlap between public and private self-consciousness in some samples *(r* = .54, Turner, 1978), including a sample of social phobics *(r* = .53, Hope & Heimberg, 1988), the effects of both types of self-consciousness will be considered below.

Self-Awareness and Arousal

Several researchers have examined the relationship between attentional focus and physiological arousal. Wegner and Giuliano (1980) hypothesized that an increase in salient internal stimuli, such as heart rate acceleration during physical exertion, would increase self-focused attention. They demonstrated that fast running in place led to self-focus, presumably because the salient physiological stimuli served to focus attention inward. When McDonald, Harris, and Maher (1983) proposed that it was the unusualness of running in place, not physiological arousal, that resulted in increased self-awareness, Wegner and Guiliano (1983) replicated their previous findings, controlling for unusualness of the activity. Subjects who had just *ascended* stairs (physiologically aroused) were more self-aware than students who had just *descended* the same stairs (not aroused).

Like Wegner and Giuliano (1980, 1983), Fenigstein and Carver (1978) posited that awareness of physiological processes (e.g., heart beat) increases self-awareness. In their study, subjects were assigned to one of four conditions: heart monitoring apparatus with audio-feedback, heart monitoring apparatus without audio-feedback, no heart monitoring with background noise, no heart monitoring–no background noise. All four groups were then asked to make attributions about their responsibility for the outcome of various hypothetical situations. The no-noise, noise, and heart rate monitoring without audio-feedback groups rated their personal responsibility equally, while the heart monitoring with audio-feedback group attributed significantly more responsibility to themselves than the other three groups. Fenigstein and Carver concluded that the presence of information concerning one's own physiological state led to a state of self-focus, which in turn resulted in self-attributions of responsibility. (The relationship between attentional focus and attributions will be discussed further below.)

Although it appears that physiological arousal (or awareness of physiological processes) leads to self-focused attention, the opposite does not appear to be the case. Carver and Scheier (1981) found that increased self-awareness (induced by a mirror) did not result in increased physiological arousal (as measured by Palmar Sweat Index). However, Carver and Scheier measured arousal while subjects copied German text. Perhaps heightened self-awareness would have an impact on arousal in a more complex or evaluative task (such as public speaking, heterosocial interaction, or job interview).

The relationship between physiological arousal and attentional focus has important implications for social phobia. Many social phobics experience intense physiological arousal when exposed to anxiety-provoking events (Borkovec, Stone, O'Brien, & Kaloupek, 1974), and they may be painfully aware of their arousal. In fact, social phobics give very accurate estimates of their heart rate arousal in phobic situations, more so than other phobic individuals Johansson & Öst, 1982). Thus these data suggest that physiological arousal induces self-focused attention in social phobics who are then vulnerable to its effects on task performance and emotional reactivity (see below). However, since social phobics vary in the degree of arousal they experience in their phobic situations (Heimberg, Hope, Dodge, & Becker, 1988; Öst, Jerremalm, & Johansson, 1981), excessive self-focused attention may be most problematic for those social phobics who experience more intense physiological reactions.

Self-Awareness and Task Performance

According to limited-capacity attentional models (e.g., Wine, 1980) excessive self-awareness should result in performance decrements because the increase in self-attention leaves insufficient attentional resources to focus adequately on the task at hand. Indeed, in work with test anxious subjects, Wine (1971) has demonstrated that an anxious response to testing situations is associated with excessive test-irrelevant thinking, and that as test-anxious individuals are taught to focus more on the test, their performance improves. Similarly, subjects instructed to focus on a concept-attainment task performed better than subjects instructed to focus on themselves during the task (Brockner, 1979). Brockner also included the SCS and reported that high self-consciousness (total SCS scale score) was associated with poorer task performance, particularly when that performance occurred in the presence of a mirror.

Baumeister (1984) reported a series of five experiments on the effects of self-consciousness and pressure on performance in a motor-coordination task. In the first two, self-attention (manipulated by instructions to self-focus) was detrimental to performance. In the third experiment, subjects high in private self-consciousness performed more poorly than low private self-conscious subjects, a finding which is consistent with the notion that self-attention is detrimental to task performance. On the other hand, subjects *low* in public self-consciousness performed *more* poorly than high public self-conscious subjects, especially when told to focus on themselves. In the fourth experiment, male subjects were led to believe that they had either done better (low pressure) or worse (high pressure) than a female confederate on the first trial of a task. High public self-conscious subjects did better than all other subjects, especially when being observed by the female confederate. Baumeister concluded that individuals low in dispositional public self-consciousness were more susceptible to choking under pressure because they were less accustomed to performing under the pressure that is induced by being characteristically self-aware (high public self-conscious). However, an alternative interpretation of these results deserves mention. Subjects high in public self-consciousness, who by definition are very aware of themselves as social objects, may have been motivated to make a favorable impression and found the situation (performance of a motor-coordination task) a riskless medium in which to operate. In other words, the situation was not threatening enough for the detrimental effects of self-focusing to influence high public self-conscious subjects. Baumeister's final experiment supports the latter explanation. He approached individuals playing videogames in an arcade and offered to pay for their game if he could observe them. Although subjects were instructed to do the best they could, their scores decreased an average of 25 percent compared to pre-experiment levels. According to Buss (1980), the presence of the experimenter should have induced public self-awareness in the subjects. Also, the ambiguity and unusualness of the situation (being approached by a stranger who wants to watch your performance for his research) likely made it somewhat threatening. This combination of high public self-awareness and social threat inhibited performance.

Stephenson and Wicklund (1984) examined the effects of self-consciousness on subjects' ability to guide a blindfolded confederate through a maze task. The subject sat facing the

confederate so she was forced to adopt the confederate's perspective when giving instructions (left, right , etc.). High private self-conscious women made fewer perspective-taking errors than low private self-conscious women.

Obviously there is conflicting evidence about whether self-focused attention facilitates or debilitates performance. An early study by Liebling and Shaver (1973) may help explain the mixed findings. Liebling and Shaver had subjects copy Swedish prose in the presence or absence of a mirror. They also manipulated level of evaluation by telling half of the subjects that the task represented a measure of intelligence. The presence of the mirror facilitated performance in the low evaluation condition and reduced performance under evaluative conditions. Thus it appears that self-awareness is only detrimental when one's motivation to perform well is high.

In summary, it appears that instructions to focus on the task at hand facilitate performance. The presence of self-focusing stimuli such as a mirror are detrimental to performance but only if the subject is somehow vulnerable due to another factor such as social evaluation. Dispositional self-consciousness, on the other hand, has been inconsistently related to task performance. In some cases, high public or private self-consciousness is associated with superior performance, in other cases, with inferior performance. However, none of the studies cited above examined the effects of self-consciousness on performance at various levels of another variable such as self-esteem or social anxiety. Perhaps like mirror-induced self-focused attention, the effects of dispositional self-consciousness are seen only in combination with a third variable. Recent data from our laboratory indirectly support this hypothesis. Hope et al. (1988) found a positive association between public self-consciousness and social anxiety (both measured with the SCS) but only for socially anxious subjects. Public self-consciousness and social anxiety were unrelated in nonanxious subjects.

Burgio, Merluzzi, and Pryor (1986) also demonstrated that self-focused attention is detrimental only under some conditions. In this study male subjects, prescreened to be neither extremely high or low in social anxiety, interacted with a female confederate over the telephone either in the presence (high self-awareness) or absence (low self-awareness) of a video camera. Half of the subjects had high expectancies for success, half low expectancies. Low expectancy/high self-aware subjects talked less and had shorter conversations than low expectancy/low self-aware subjects. Furthermore, low expectancy subjects were rated as less skillful by judges than high expectancy subjects, but only when the video camera was present. High and low expectancy groups did not differ on skill ratings in the absence of the camera. In other words, self-focusing stimuli disrupted the performance of subjects, but only if they already lacked confidence in their social abilities.

Given that, by definition, social phobics have low expectancies for success in social situations, one would expect that excessive self-focused attention would have detrimental effects on their performance in those situations. To our knowledge, only one study has examined attentional focus and performance among social phobics. Hope and Heimberg (1988) found that high public self-consciousness was associated with poorer performance on a behavioral test among social phobics awaiting treatment. Again, by definition the social phobics lacked confidence in their ability to perform socially and this, in combination with high public self-consciousness, appears to have disrupted their performance.

Self-Awareness and Emotional Reactivity

Several studies have looked at the relationship between emotional reactions and self-consciousness. Scheier and Carver (1977) found that both high private self-consciousness and the presence of a mirror intensified subjects self-reported reactions to pictures of nude women or violent atrocities. Mirror presence or high private self-consciousness also predicted greater elation and depression subsequent to reading affect-laden sentences. The authors concluded that mirror-induced self-awareness and self-consciousness resulted in increased attention to affective states, thereby intensifying self-report of affective reactions.

Fenigstein (1979) extended these findings by examining the effects of self-focused attention on affective reactions to positive and negative social interactions. In the first of two studies, high public self-conscious women were more sensitive to interpersonal rejection. He suggested that attention focused on the self as a social object increased the salience of rejection and its subsequent implications for self-esteem. In the second experiment, subjects were given either favorable or unfavorable feedback in an interview situation, and self-awareness was manipulated by exposing half the subjects to a mirror. Increasing self-awareness (mirror present) heightened negative responses to negative feedback and tended to increase positive reactions to positive feedback.

The results of the Scheier and Carver (1977) and Fenigstein (1979) studies suggest that self-awareness intensifies emotional reactions. A key aspect of social phobia is avoidance of noxious stimuli, that is, anxiety-provoking social interactions. If self-focused attention serves to heighten such aversive reactions, one would expect that self-focused attention would relate to avoidance behavior among social phobics.

Focus of Attention and Causal Attributions

A number of studies have found that the direction of attentional focus influences causal attributions. For example, if subjects are instructed to focus their attention toward one of the actors in a situation, they will attribute more responsibility for the outcome of that situation to that actor than to others in the situation (Taylor & Fiske, 1975). Similarly, one would expect that self-focused individuals would make more self-attributions than non-self-focused individuals. A number of studies support this hypothesis.

Duval and Wicklund (1973) found that subjects facing a mirror (high self-awareness condition) attributed more responsibility to themselves for the outcome of hypothetical situations than subjects who were not facing a mirror (low self-awareness condition). In another study, high private self-conscious subjects attributed more responsibility to themselves for the outcome of hypothetical situations than did low private self-conscious subjects (Buss & Scheier, 1976). Public self-consciousness did not effect attribution patterns. However, as Buss and Scheier noted, the hypothetical situations used were not particularly social in nature.

Fenigstein (1984) demonstrated that in social situations public, but not private, self-consciousness influences expectancies for the outcome of situations. Groups of subjects were told that one of them had been randomly chosen for a demonstration for the group. The demonstration was described as enjoyable and interesting (positive) for half of the subjects and as discomforting (negative) to the other half. Subjects rated the likelihood that they would be chosen. Whether the expected outcome was positive or negative, subjects

high in public self-consciousness rated themselves as more likely to be chosen for the demonstration, a phenomenon dubbed "over-perception of self as target." Private self-consciousness was not related to this phenomenon.

Thus it appears that self-focused attention is associated with internal causal attributions. However, the relationship between self-awareness and self-attributions may be mediated by a third variable—the success or failure of the outcome. In a study by Federoff and Harvey (1976), subjects delivered relaxation instructions to confederates in the presence or absence of a video camera. A meter provided false feedback clearly indicating success or failure of the instructions. When subjects were self-aware (presence of a camera), they made internal attributions for success and external attributions for failure. In fact, when they expected success but failed, they tended to blame the confederate. Non-self-aware subjects did not differ in their attributions for success and failure. Federoff and Harvey suggested that in such an unfamiliar situation the presence of the camera aroused subjects' self-esteem concerns which resulted in a self-protective attributional pattern known as the self-serving bias (see below).

It should be noted that one study failed to find a relationship between attentional focus and attributions. Ellis and Holmes (1982) instructed subjects to focus either on themselves or on an interviewer during an interaction and then had them rate to what extent their own behavior, the situation, and the personality of the interviewer were responsible for the interviewer's behavior. It was predicted that the subject's focus of attention would determine causal attribution. However, the focus of attention manipulation did not influence causal attributions for the behavior of the interviewer.

In summary, it appears that self-focused attention is related to over-perception of the self as target and self-attributions. Thus social phobics' over-perception of themselves as the focus of others' observation (noted by Butler, this issue) may reflect excessive self-focused attention. Furthermore, if social phobics are self-focused, they are likely to attribute the outcome of social situations to themselves . Given that socially anxious individuals have a selective memory for negative interpersonal feedback (O'Banion & Arkowitz, 1977) and are overly sensitive to such feedback (Smith & Sarason, 1975), these self-attributions will often be for failure.

Causal Attributions and Social Anxiety

Over the years social psychologists have identified a phenomenon known as the "self-serving bias" in causal attributions. According to the self-serving bias, people tend to attribute success to internal causes such as skill or ability and to attribute failure to external causes such as bad luck or task difficulty (cf., Miller & Ross, 1975). Zelen (1987) proposed that a reversal of the self-serving bias may underlie what he calls the "performance neuroses," a group of disorders which includes social anxiety. A number of studies suggests that the self-presentational concerns of socially anxious individuals cause reversal of the self-serving bias.

Using a methodology similar to the one employed by Federoff and Harvey (1976) in the study described above, Arkin, Appelman, and Burger (1980) compared the attributions for success or failure of high and low socially anxious subjects. Subjects acted as therapists in a mock desensitization session and received false feedback on the success or failure of their

intervention. Level of evaluation was manipulated by having half the subjects believe their report of the session would be reviewed by a committee of psychologists immediately after the intervention and that they would be present at the review, while the other subjects were told a committee would review their report at a later date and that they would not be present at the review. All subjects were videotaped (comparable to the high self-aware condition in Federoff and Harvey). Nonanxious subjects followed the typical self-serving bias. They attributed more responsibility to themselves for positive than for negative outcomes, a replication of the high self-aware condition in Federoff and Harvey. However, socially anxious subjects did the reverse. They took more responsibility for failure than success, particularly when evaluation was imminent. Arkin et al. suggested that the anxious subjects adopted a "cost" orientation toward the committee evaluation. They felt the committee would be less displeased if they took responsibility for the failure. On the other hand, the nonanxious subjects adopted a "reward" orientation; if they took responsibility for a positive event and made it seem they had nothing to do with a negative event, they would impress the committee.

Teglasi and colleagues (Teglasi & Fagin, 1984; Teglasi & Hoffman, 1982) have produced additional data suggesting that social anxiety is associated with reversals of the self-serving bias. Teglasi and Hoffman (1982) compared subjects who responded to an advertisement recruiting shy people placed in a university paper with volunteers from a psychology class. The subjects made attributional ratings for social and task-oriented scenarios which had either positive or negative outcomes. Shy subjects took more responsibility for negative outcomes and less responsibility for positive outcomes than nonshy subjects. Interestingly, this attributional pattern was only found for the social scenarios, suggesting the reversal of the self-serving bias is situation-specific. Using a different methodology, Teglasi and Fagin (1984) essentially replicated their earlier findings. Girodo, Dotzenroth, and Stein (1981) also reported that high but not low social self-esteem was associated with a reversal of the self-serving bias when subjects made attributions for the success and failure of heterosocial events.

One study (Miller & Arkowitz, 1977) failed to support the notion that social anxiety influences causal attributions for social outcomes. High and low socially anxious male subjects were asked to have two five-minute conversations with a female confederate, who was instructed to be either warm or cold. Miller and Arkowitz hypothesized that high socially anxious individuals would attribute failure (confederate coldness) to themselves and success (confederate warmth) to the situation, but that low socially anxious subjects would do the reverse. However, the required interaction effect was not significant.

Miller and Arkowitz's study differed from the studies that did find reversals of the self-serving bias in that it utilized actual interactions (rather than written scenarios) without concrete feedback on success or failure (unlike Arkin et al., 1980). There is evidence that, under such conditions, anxious subjects may not adequately perceive the differences between friendly and aloof confederates. Heimberg and colleagues (Heimberg, Acerra, & Holstein, 1985) found that socially anxious subjects failed to distinguish between similar and dissimilar potential interaction partners, although a preference for similar others had been repeatedly demonstrated in nonanxious subjects (Bryne, 1971). In another study, Hope, Heimberg, and Klein (in press) asked high and low socially anxious women to recall

information about their interaction partner and the content of the conversation following a moderately structured heterosocial interaction. Anxious subjects recalled less information and made more recall errors than nonanxious subjects. Both of these studies suggest that exposure to an anxiety-provoking interaction disrupts the social information processing of anxious individuals. Thus, Miller and Arkowitz's subjects may have failed to distinguish between an aloof and friendly confederate. Consequently, their attributions did not differ for the two types of interactions. Unfortunately, Miller and Arkowitz did not provide adequate detail in their report to examine the validity of this hypothesis.

Implications for Social Phobia

In summary, it appears that self-focused attention: (a) is increased by physiological arousal, (b) interferes with task performance if the person is somehow made vulnerable by another factor such as low self-esteem or low expectancies, (c) may increase the probability of internal attributions, and (d) intensifies emotional reactions. High social anxiety is associated with a reversal of the self-serving bias of causal attributions. Applying these concepts to social phobia leads to the following scenario: Physiological arousal when entering an anxiety-provoking situation leads to increased self-focus and concern that arousal is visible to others (McEwan & Devins, 1983). Given the already low expectancy for success, the social phobic's self-focus interferes with his or her performance which *may* lead to negative feedback from the interaction partner. Even if no negative feedback is given, overperception of the self as target induced by self-focused attention may cause the social phobic to make internal attributions for neutral or ambiguous feedback. The less than ideal outcome is then attributed to himself or herself. Throughout the encounter, increased self-focus heightens the social phobic's perception of the aversiveness of the situation which may increase the probability he or she will avoid similar situations in the future. At any point, increased physiological arousal would be expected to heighten self-awareness which, in turn, exacerbates the other effects. Finally, any interaction that is perceived as successful would be discounted by attributing the success to external causes. Thus reversal of the self-serving bias helps maintain the disorder in spite of experiential evidence disconfirming social phobics' low expectancies for success. The self-presentational model of social anxiety (Schlenker & Leary, 1982) may help explain why social phobics engage in this particular attributional style.

According to Schlenker and Leary, social anxiety occurs when a person desires to make a particular impression but doubts he or she will be successful. Recently, Leary and Atherton (1986) further defined the doubt portion of the model and emphasized the importance of low self-efficacy in social anxiety. Low self-efficacy, in combination with social phobics' tendency to overperceive themselves as the focus of others' attention, may make the reversal of the self-serving bias a viable strategy for impression management. If the individual fails in a social interaction, others will undoubtedly notice. Therefore it is better to acknowledge the failure than to make a second blunder by not recognizing the first failure. If a social interaction proceeds successfully, then the social phobic will not want to take credit for the success out of fear that others will then expect equally effective performance in the future. Thus, the reversal of the self-serving bias serves as a self-handicapping strategy designed to minimize the damage to self-presentational goals in the current situation

and reduce others' expectancies in future situations. In fact, self-handicapping among the socially anxious has been reported by a number of researchers (e.g., Baumgardner & Brownlee, 1987; Snyder & Smith, 1986).

The importance of attributions in social anxiety is further underscored by studies that show that the effects of social anxiety are diminished when an external attribution for potential poor performance is provided. For example, telling socially anxious subjects that background noise would interfere with their conversation with a confederate produced less heart rate reactivity (change from baseline) during the initial minute of an interaction than when they were told the noise would not interfere (Leary, 1986). Nonanxious subjects did not react to the noise manipulation. Subjects giving speeches exhibited fewer speech dysfluencies when they were told that their arousal was attributable to subliminal noise compared to subjects for whom the noise explanation was not offered (Olson, 1988). Interestingly, neither study found effects for misattribution on self-report measures of anxiety.

Implications for Treatment of Social Phobia

The issues discussed above have a number of implications for the treatment of social phobia. First, excessive self-focused attention likely contributes to the cognitive and behavioral deficits associated with the disorder. Therefore, treatment strategies that reduce self-focused attention should be effective interventions. Given that physiological arousal increases self-awareness, interventions aimed at reducing arousal, such as relaxation training and some pharmacotherapies, should be particularly useful with physiologically reactive social phobics . Alternatively, Hartman (1983) has suggested that excessive self-focused attention can be reduced directly by teaching clients strategies that redirect their attention to the interaction partner(s) or the situation. Secondly, we have noted a number of cognitive distortions which may be amenable to cognitive-behavioral techniques. These distortions include overperception of the self as the focus of others' attention, excessive internal attributions, particularly for failure, and excessive external attributions for success. The latter distortion , discounting their role in successful social experiences, is particularly dysfunctional in that it does not allow social phobics to gain confidence following positive interactions. Not only does this help maintain the disorder prior to treatment but it can sabotage treatment efforts as well by maintaining low expectancies for successful social interaction. In fact, Alden (1987) demonstrated that socially anxious subjects were unwilling to accept positive feedback following a social interaction and discounted the feedback by attributing it to unstable factors. Therefore, clinicians must be alert to social phobics' tendency to make external or unstable attributions for improvement.

In conclusion, social psychologists' studies of attentional focus and causal attributions can facilitate our understanding of social phobia. However, the majority of the studies reviewed in this article utilized analogue populations. Clearly more research is needed with clinical samples. The work of social psychologists helps us know which questions merit "attentional focus" and offers tested methodologies to employ in finding the answers.

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