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# A Battle for the Children: American Indian Child Removal in Arizona in the Era of Assimilation

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# A BATTLE FOR THE CHILDREN

## American Indian Child Removal in Arizona in the Era of Assimilation

by  
Margaret D. Jacobs

IN 1906, HELEN SEKAQUAPTEWA “awoke to find [her] camp surrounded by troops.” She later recalled that a government official “called the men together, ordering the women and children to remain in their separate family groups. He told the men . . . that the government had reached the limit of its patience; that the children would have to go to school.” Helen went on to relate how “All children of school age were lined up to be registered and taken away to school. Eighty-two children, including [Helen], were taken to the school-house ... with military escort.” Helen Sekaquaptewa, a Hopi girl from Oraibi, was just one of many American Indian children who, from the 1880s up to the 1930s, were forced by U.S. government agents to attend school against the wishes of their parents and community. To some observers, then and now, this confrontation symbolized a clash between civilization and savagery, between education and ignorance. A careful examination of these battles between government officials and Indian families, however, reveals a more complex picture.<sup>1</sup>

In the late nineteenth century, the U.S. government adopted compulsory schooling for *all* American children. Under the federal policy of assimilation, however, many Indian children were removed from their families and tribal communities and sent to distant boarding schools. Many families and communities, like Helen Sekaquaptewa’s

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at Oraibi, fiercely resisted efforts to remove their children. Other families reluctantly complied with the policy, while still others actively promoted boarding-school education. Some children never adapted to the institutional regimen; a number of them even died in the unfamiliar environment. Others adjusted and endured, while some thrived and flourished. Yet, the fact that some Indian people cooperated with the government's scheme to institutionalize their children, and that some Indian children made the best of their forced education, should not lead us to take a benign view of boarding schools. It is important to remember the principal aims of the boarding-school system and the methods employed by government officials to fill the classrooms.

The experiences of the Hopis and Navajos (Dine) in Arizona offer poignant case studies for examining the dynamics of the government's practice of removing Indian children from their families for the alleged purpose of education. Initially, neither the Hopis nor the Navajos opposed formal American education for their children. Many of them, however, actively resisted sending their children away to boarding schools. If the government had only wanted to educate American Indians, it could have adopted methods that would neither have engendered resistance nor brought about great upheaval in Indian communities. After all, other assimilation efforts directed toward immigrants, African Americans, and Mexican Americans during the same period never entailed the wholesale and systematic removal of children from their families' custody and care. The fact that the government adopted child removal as a policy toward American Indians suggests that it had motives beyond assimilation. Ultimately, the federal policy and practice of child removal arose from the desire to punish and control Indian people.

After decades of Indian wars, government authorities in the late nineteenth century turned to assimilation as the solution to the so-called "Indian problem." The idea of assimilating Indians by removing children from their communities originated in 1875 with an experiment conducted upon Kiowa, Comanche, and Cheyenne prisoners of war incarcerated under the command of Captain Richard Henry Pratt at Fort Marion near St. Augustine, Florida. Pratt proposed to "rehabilitate" the prisoners by cutting their hair, replacing their native dress

with military uniforms, and introducing them to military discipline, Christianity, and American education. In 1879, Pratt received federal funds to open Carlisle Institute, a boarding school for Indian children, at Carlisle, Pennsylvania.<sup>2</sup>

The government eventually adopted Pratt's plan for assimilating and remolding young Indians. By 1902, it had established 154 boarding schools (twenty-five of them off-reservation) and 154 day schools for about 21,500 Native Americans. Although they were not completely successful, officials envisioned an orderly progression of Indian children filing first through a day school, and then an on-reservation boarding school, before spending at least three years at an off-reservation school. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas Morgan proudly proclaimed in 1894 that "the Indians are not only becoming Americanized, but they are by this process of education gradually being absorbed, losing their identity as Indians, and becoming an indistinguishable part of the great body politic."<sup>3</sup>



Walpi. (AHS/SAD MS 1195)

Initially, some Hopi leaders seemed enthusiastic about educating their children. When Agent William Mateer first encountered the Hopis in 1878, he reported that many villagers had inquired about schools. Relations between the agent and the Hopis quickly soured the following year, however, when he proposed to establish a boarding school fifteen miles from the nearest Hopi village. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) put the plan on hold.<sup>4</sup>

During a week-long visit in 1886, agent S. S. Patterson found the people in four of the villages on First Mesa “very friendly and communicative.” He claimed that their leaders were willing to send sixty to seventy students down the mesa to a school the government proposed establishing at Keams Canyon. Patterson even reported finding “an inclination among some of the Moquis [Hopis] to come down from the rocks and mesa tops and live in the bottom land near their cornfields . . . if they were assisted . . . to build houses.” In early 1887, twenty Hopi leaders petitioned the BIA to open a school among them. Apparently, some parents were willing to accept education, so long as they could see their children regularly. They resisted, however, sending their children farther away. When Pratt and the superintendent of the Santa Fe Indian School arrived a few weeks later, they failed “to procure pupils for their respective schools.”<sup>5</sup>

In the other three villages that Patterson visited in 1886, and especially in Oraibi, he encountered stiff resistance to the idea of establishing a school at Keams Canyon. While the school would not be far from villages on First Mesa, it would be thirty-five miles distant from Oraibi on Third Mesa. Nevertheless, the government opened Keams Canyon School in October 1887. As it turned out, even at First Mesa very few Hopi parents moved down from the mesa or allowed their children to attend school in Keams Canyon. And so began decades of conflict between the Hopis and the U.S. government.<sup>6</sup>

The Indian Bureau escalated the situation when David Shipley took over as Indian agent at Fort Defiance. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Morgan notified the new agent in 1890 that “In regard to the demoralized condition of the Keam’s Canon [*sic*] School in which you state that but four children remain, and that something must be done to induce the people to send their children to school, you are directed



*Oraibi homes. (AHS/SAD MS1195)*

to visit each of the Moqui villages . . . and to take such steps as are authorized to induce them to place their children in school.” Shipley responded by dispatching troops to Oraibi, the most recalcitrant of the Hopi villages. On December 28, the soldiers summarily removed 104 children to Keams Canyon.<sup>7</sup>

Shipley’s highhanded action opened a decades-long struggle between Oraibi villagers and the government. When many Oraibi parents refused to send their children back to school after the 1892 summer holiday, the government responded by forcibly removing eight children to Haskell Indian School in Lawrence, Kansas. Although the BIA persuaded Lololoma, a “Friendly” Oraibi leader, to approve a new day school at the foot of Third Mesa and commit Oraibi children to attend it, other Hopi leaders (whom the government dubbed “Hostiles”) opposed Lololoma on this and other issues. A confrontation between the two factions in 1906 led to the expulsion of the so-called “Hostiles” to the new village of Hotevilla.<sup>8</sup>

Not only Oraibi villagers resisted the government. In the winter of 1893–94, the Hopis on Second Mesa, as well, refused to send their



children to boarding school. In response, Lieutenant S. H. Plummer, the acting agent at Fort Defiance, ordered the Navajo police “to compel Moquis of the three villages ... to furnish their quota of children for . . . school.” Plummer warned that they not take more than the quota because Keams Canyon School was already overcrowded! A few weeks later, he reconsidered. With two feet of snow on the ground, a temperature of 17 degrees below zero, and twenty-five cases of mumps at the Keams Canyon School, he instead ordered the school’s superintendent to “suspend all issues of Annuity Goods and all work on houses and wells for the Moquis of the second mesa” until the children arrived. Withholding annuity goods, guaranteed by treaties, became a common method of coercing parents to send their children to boarding schools. Despite these attempts literally to starve the Hopis into submission, problems—especially at Oraibi—continued. By 1894, only ten Hopi students attended Keams Canyon School. Many Hopis were so embittered by the government’s attempts to force their children to attend boarding school that they began to oppose even day schools.<sup>9</sup>

Not all Hopi children shared their parents’ opposition to the government schools. Edmund Nequatewa, for example, worked for a summer with his uncle who attended Keams Canyon School, and wanted



*Keams Canyon Boarding School. (AHS/SAD MS1195)*

to return with him to the school in the fall.” I thought it would be great fun,” Nequatewa explained. Don Talayesva (called “Sun Chief in his as-told-to autobiography) had witnessed Navajo and African-American policemen dragging off to school children from his village of Oraibi. He also had observed how white teachers cut the childrens’ hair, burned their clothes, and gave them new names. He eventually decided to take matters into his own hands. “In 1899 it was decided that I should go to school,” Talayesva recalled. “I was willing to try it but I did not want a policeman to come for me and I did not want my shirt taken from my back and burned. So one morning in September I left it off, wrapped myself in my Navajo blanket, . . . and went down the mesa barefoot and bareheaded.” Talayesva arrived at the New Oraibi School at the foot of the mesa and “entered a room where boys had bathed in tubs of dirty water.” He immediately “stepped into a tub and began scrubbing myself.”<sup>10</sup>

When a few Oraibi families decided to enroll their children in the Reams Canyon School, Talayesva opted to join them. “My father was poor and I could not dress like some of the other boys,” he explained. Superintendent Charles Burton rewarded Talayesva’s mother with “fifteen yards of dress cloth” and his father with “an axe, a claw hammer, and a small brass lamp.” Officials also allowed Talayesva’s father to select either a shovel or a hoe and supplied his parents with “two loaves of bread and some bacon, syrup, and meat.” Boarding schools sometimes presented an attractive option to an impoverished Hopi family like that of Talayesva.<sup>11</sup>

At the end of his first year at Keams Canyon, Talayesva returned to Oraibi for the summer. Before he could voluntarily return to school in the fall, “the police came to Oraibi and surrounded the village, with the intention of capturing the children of the Hostile families and taking them to school by force.” Talayesva described how “they herded us all together at the east edge of the mesa. Although I had planned to go later, they put me with the others. The people were excited, the children and the mothers were crying, and the men wanted to fight.” Not wishing to be herded like an animal or to ride in the wagon with the other children, Talayesva asked if he could ride double on horseback with one of the policemen.<sup>12</sup>

Like Talayesva, Polingaysi Qoyawayma, as a young girl, was both intensely curious about the new day school at the foot of the Oraibi mesa and tired of evading government authorities. She “wondered if perhaps it might be better to allow herself to be caught and have the worry over. It was an irritating thing to have to be on guard every minute.” After her sister and several friends eventually were caught, Qoyawayma disobeyed her mother and went down the trail, “dodging behind rocks and bushes when she met villagers coming up the trail, then sauntering on, nearer and nearer the schoolhouse.” Qoyawayma admitted that “no one had forced her to do this thing. She had come down the trail of her own free will. If she went into that schoolhouse, it would be because she desired to do so. Her mother would be very angry with her.”<sup>13</sup>


Like Talayesva, Qoyawayma wanted to share in the material wealth she saw among white people. “The white man had abundant supplies of food, good clothing, and opportunities to travel,” she observed. She wanted to enjoy “the good things of the white way of living.” It was, in fact, the promise of oranges in southern California that led Qoyawayma to dream of attending the Sherman Institute boarding school in Riverside. When her parents refused to sign the consent form, Qoyawayma stowed away on a wagon bound for the train station at Winslow for the trip to California. Although the driver discovered his stowaway and summoned her parents, Qoyawayma refused to budge. She eventually “won her weaponless battle for another sample of white man’s education.” As Qoyawayma’s case illustrates, the BIA school system deeply undercut the authority of Indian parents and guardians.<sup>14</sup>

Of course, not all Hopi adults opposed enrolling their children in boarding schools. Edmund Nequatewa’s grandfather, who had “put a claim on [him] when [Edmund] was sick” and had gained the right under Hopi custom to guide the boy’s upbringing, decided to send Nequatewa to school. “You must learn both sides,” the old man explained, “otherwise you will never find out who is right and what the truth is in this world.” Nequatewa’s grandfather believed that the Elders had told of the coming of the *Bahana* (European Americans) and that “the *Bahana* is supposed to have a great knowledge of wisdom that he was to come and teach the people—the truth.” Therefore, he advised Nequatewa, “whatever you do here at school, try to learn all you can, because you have only a limited time.”<sup>15</sup>

Nequatewa’s story suggests that Hopis who supported the boarding schools did not necessarily do so out of a desire to assimilate or modernize. Rather, they saw the government institutions as manifestations of an earlier prophecy. When Nequatewa’s grandfather eventually sent him off to Phoenix Indian School, he reminded the young man: “Don’t forget what I am sending you down there for. And if that book really contains the truth, you will surely learn something. And when you do, come back someday and study the people here. Study the Hopi and get into all the ceremonies. . . . Find out all you can and listen to everything that is being done or said in any ceremony.”<sup>16</sup>

While some Hopis supported the schools, many others remained unconvinced that American education would benefit their children. As Qoyawayma’s mother saw it, “the *Bahana* does not care how we feel toward our children. They think they know everything and we know nothing. They think only of themselves and what they want. I don’t know what they are going to do to our children, down there in that big house. It is not the Hopi way of caring for children, this tearing them from their homes and their mothers.”<sup>17</sup>

For Hopis who were already suspicious, conditions at the schools only confirmed their reservations and further upset them. Edmund Nequatewa described how children were locked in the dormitories at night. Lacking adequate sanitation facilities, the Indian boys had to urinate through holes in the floorboards. One night, several desperate boys tried to teach school officials a lesson. According to Nequatewa, they “decided that they will just crap all over the floor.” Instead of un-



Edmund Nequatewa. (AHS/SAD MS1195)

locking the doors, authorities responded by supplying the children with buckets. This solution scarcely improved conditions in the dormitories. Laura Dandridge, a matron at Keams Canyon between 1899 and 1902, complained in 1903 that the policy of locking the boys in their dormitory from 7:30 P.M. to 6 A.M. was dangerous to their health. "I have seen the pails running over with filth in the morning, the odor, even after cleaning the floor, being unbearable," she testified.<sup>18</sup>

Dandridge was also among the many employees and students who observed the harsh disciplinary measures in the government schools. The former matron alleged that two Reams Canyon teachers, W. W. Ewing and C. W. Higham, "each carried a club varying in size . . . from three-fourths of an inch to one and one-half inches in thickness and two to four feet in length, when marching the Hopi children to the school-room from the place of line up." She recalled that "should any of the children get out of step, or take hold of his or her companion's hand, or for any other slight and trivial offense, the offending boy or girl in the company would receive a whack from the club thus carried." Dandridge also reported that Mr. Commons, another school employee, had whipped a boy named Leslie for "acting smart," dragged him by the hair, and then choked him until he fainted. Fi-



Keams Canyon school building. (AHS/SAD MS 1195)

nally, she claimed that Hopi children were whipped or forced to carry heavy rocks as punishment for speaking their language.<sup>19</sup>

Deplorable conditions and physical abuse at the boarding schools horrified Hopi parents. Gertrude Lewis Gates, a white critic of BIA policy, asserted that "all Hopis object to corporal punishment of their children. Mr. Burton [the superintendent] allows it. Boys and young men of 16 and 18 years of age are slapped, struck with wooden paddles, and rawhided at the [Keams Canyon] boarding school." According to Gates, "one boy was whipped until he fainted and was detained in the teacher's room over night to recover. His back was so sore he moved with difficulty for several days, and complained of being hurt internally. This because he used a word of Hopi at the table."<sup>20</sup>

During the 1890s, a number of white allies like Dandridge and Gates questioned the government's methods toward the Hopi. Even some government officials questioned the wisdom of forcibly removing children from their homes to attend boarding schools. Thomas Donaldson, in his 1893 census bulletin and report on the Hopis, asked: "Shall we be compelled to keep a garrison of 250 to 300 men at the Moqui pueblos in order to educate 100 to 200 children at a distance from their homes? We began with soldiers and Hotchkiss guns. Are we to end in the same way? Such civilizing has not heretofore been a pronounced success."<sup>21</sup>

In 1899, journalist Charles Lummis, who had spent many years living with Indian people in the Southwest, took up the Hopis' cause in his magazine, *Out West*. Lummis asked his readers to imagine a scene in which "we should see the little [Hopi] village surrounded by . . . armed Agents of Civilization, the houses invaded; parents and children scared out of their gentle wits, and hauled, shoved and knocked about; screaming children of three or four years old dragged forcibly from their weeping mothers and driven off through the snow down to the school-house, and left after school to clamber back up the icy cliff almost naked to the weather."<sup>22</sup>

Lummis particularly opposed Superintendent Burton's regime at Keams Canyon and hired Gertrude Lewis Gates to gather information about Burton's intimidation of the Hopis. Gates reported how "one sad faced mother broke into sobs and cries when she came to tell me



that Mr. Kampmeier [a government employee] had taken her two children, and she went wailing through the streets to her still house. Later in the day she and her husband told me how Mr. Kampmeier had twice with doubled fist struck at her standing between him and her children crying with fear; the girl told him she was afraid to go to school for fear she should die as did her elder brother, for whom the family mourn daily." Thomas Varker Keam, a long-time trader among the Hopis who had been instrumental in establishing the boarding school that bore his name, added his voice to the growing criticism of Burton's harsh methods.<sup>23</sup>

Burton, as his critics charged, pursued the government's policies with a vengeance. In February 1903, he set off with a doctor, a mechanic, a carpenter, and five policemen from Keams Canyon to Oraibi in eight inches of snow and ten-degree-below-zero temperatures to round up children for the boarding school. Burton claimed that after he had gathered together ten children, a group of fifty "hostiles" attacked the government party, forcing them to draw arms. Two days later, Burton returned with twelve additional policemen to Oraibi, where they arrested seventeen men and "voluntarily" enrolled thirty-six more school children.<sup>24</sup>

Belle Axtell Kolp, a teacher at the Oraibi day school, described the incident differently. Kolp alleged that "men, women and children were dragged almost naked from their beds and houses. Under the eyes and guns of the invaders . . . many of them [the Hopis] barefooted and without any breakfast, the parents and grandparents were forced to take upon their backs such children as were unable to walk the distance (some of the little ones entirely nude) and go down to the school building, through the ice and snow in front of the guns of the dreaded Navajo [policemen] ,"<sup>25</sup>

Tension remained so high that the government resorted to sending even adult Hopis off to school. During the 1906 Oraibi crisis, the army arrested "twelve of the most obstinate" Hopi leaders who "sternly refused to adopt the white man's education," and escorted them as prisoners of war to the Carlisle Institute. Five years later, Carlisle officials boasted that the experience had "absolutely converted [the Hopis] to education and civilization." Commissioner of Indian Affairs Fran-

cis Leupp did not stop there, however. He also ordered Tewaquaptewa, Lololoma's successor as leader of the so-called "Friendlies," to be taken with his wife and children to Sherman Institute, where they should be properly civilized.<sup>26</sup>

Despite harsh punishment, the battle for Hopi children continued. Throughout his superintendency of the Hopi reservation from 1911-1919, Leo Crane repeatedly requested that troops be sent to Hotevilla to force the "Hostile" dissenters to send their children to boarding school. In 1911, Crane removed fifty-one girls and eighteen boys, all the children who had survived a measles epidemic that had decimated Hotevilla earlier that year. Almost all of the children taken suffered from trachoma. "It was winter, and not one of those children had clothing above rags; some were nude," Crane wrote. Interestingly, he cited the children's diseased and bedraggled condition as proof of the necessity and humanity of removing them from their families, rather than as evidence of the need for additional government aid and support for the ailing and impoverished Hopis.<sup>27</sup>



Hotevilla. (AHS/SAD MS 1195)





*"A progressive Hopi family." (AHS/SAD #43461)*

In the face of Crane's harsh methods, the Hopis found novel ways to resist forced schooling. Crane acknowledged as much when he attempted to "have guilty men punished for wilfully [sic] continuing what I have been pleased to term 'child prostitution' among the Hopi—a method adopted to defeat education." The frustrated superintendent brought several Hopi men into civil court for the statutory rape of two girls—"not more than thirteen years old"—who had become pregnant. As "there are no maternity wards in connection with classrooms," Crane lamented, these girls "could never be cared for in the schools now." The courts declined to charge the men with rape, however, and the girls evaded boarding school.<sup>28</sup>

Over the course of more than three decades, a significant number of Hopis at several villages had moved from supporting education to opposing vehemently nearly all attempts to school their children. What had happened to erode Hopi support for American education? From the available records, it appears that the Hopis favored education so long as it did not involve removal of their children. When it became clear that the government not only wanted to establish day schools in or near Hopi villages, but intended to remove children from their families and communities, some Hopis simply and quietly refused to send their children to school. Others openly resisted efforts to enroll their children in boarding school, occasionally resorting to early marriage, pregnancy, or some other subterfuge.

While it might have cost more in the short run to have established more day schools, by doing so the government could have carried out its stated goal of educating Hopi children without alienating their families. The Hopis' clashes with government officials over schooling suggest that education was not the aim, or at least the sole aim, of assimilation policy. Rather, the government used the forced removal of children as a method of controlling and punishing the Hopis, especially the recalcitrant residents of Oraibi and later Hotevilla, for their determination to maintain and govern their own communities. The same story was repeated among the Navajos.

Even as the government employed Navajo policemen to round up Hopi children, the Navajos fought their own battles over forced removal to boarding schools. Originally, the government had promised to build

day schools for the Navajos. In Article 6 of their 1868 treaty, the Navajos had agreed “to compel their children male and female between the ages of six and sixteen years to attend school.” In return, the government had promised “that for every thirty children . . . who can be induced or compelled to attend school, a house shall be provided and a teacher competent to teach . . . who will reside among said Indians and faithfully discharge his or her duties as a teacher.” In 1869, the government contracted with the Presbyterian Church’s Board of Foreign Missions to establish the first day school for the Navajos at Fort Defiance. However, internal quarrels, high rates of teacher turnover, and lack of funding plagued the Fort Defiance school and prevented the opening of others.<sup>29</sup>

Several years later, the Fort Defiance agent pleaded with the government to make good on its promises. As yet, not one school-house had been constructed, although the agent estimated that “30 to 50 houses and as many teachers will be required to carry out the obligations of... ‘Article 6’ of this Treaty.” Initially, the Navajos—like the Hopis—did not oppose the formal education of their children. In fact, in 1876 a group of Navajo leaders requested that the government establish a day school in the Chuska Valley so that their children could attend classes while still living at home. Instead, the government sought to remove Navajo children, first into reservation-based schools and then on to distant boarding schools.<sup>30</sup>

Also like the Hopis, many Navajos developed an intense aversion to sending their children to off-reservation schools and were suspicious of the aims of on-reservation schools. When Agent Galen Eastman oversaw construction of a boarding school at Fort Defiance in 1882, he was dismayed to discover that many Navajos “condemn[ed] and . . . curse[d] the school” for hoarding surplus annuities and supplies. Many of the Navajos employed subterfuge to prevent their children from being taken to school. Rose Mitchell remembered that “the agents were sending out police on horseback to locate children to enroll [at Fort Defiance]. The stories we heard frightened us; I guess some children were snatched up and hauled over there because the policemen came across them while they were out herding, hauling water, or doing other things for the family. So we started to hide ourselves in different places whenever we saw strangers coming toward where we were living.”<sup>31</sup>

Agent Eastman claimed to have made a breakthrough when he convinced a group of women reformers to pay for the schooling of twenty Navajo children, if Captain Pratt retrieved them. In October 1882, Pratt took eleven boys and one girl back to Carlisle with him. Two of the boys were sons of Manuelito, one of the most recalcitrant of all Navajo leaders. No doubt interpreting Manuelito’s permission as quite a coup, Eastman commended Pratt’s ability to overcome the “reserve and prejudice of this people against schools.”<sup>32</sup>

Eastman’s optimism faded less than a year later, when two of the children taken to Carlisle (including one of Manuelito’s sons) became sick. Pratt sent the two boys back to the reservation, where Manuelito’s son died seven days later. Manuelito could not understand why his son had not been sent home sooner and why his brother did not accompany him. D. M. Riordan, the new Navajo agent, informed Pratt that “the effect is very bad . . . all the relatives of the boys now with you are anxious and alarmed . . . Manuelito demands positively that the boys be sent home.” Riordan also reported that he had been told “Manuelito was very violent after the death of his son; that he said he didn’t care now what his people did, they might rob and plunder as they please.” Clearly more concerned over the Navajos’ growing resistance to schools and white settlement than with the death of Manuelito’s son, Riordan bemoaned the “feeling of superstitious dread with which these people associate the cause of education.”<sup>33</sup>



D. M. Riordan. (AHS/SAD #1619)



Although the Fort Defiance agency changed hands many times over the next decade, the memory of this event remained ever-present among the Navajos. Pratt failed to recruit any more Navajo students during this period. Instead, agents tried to convince parents to send their children to schools in Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Durango, and Grand Junction, where they would be closer to the reservation. Rioridan's successors assured parents that they could visit their children at school and that the students would return safely to their homes.<sup>34</sup>

Still, the government failed to take Navajo concerns seriously. Around 1891, Agent David Shipley took several Navajo children, "without the knowledge or consent of the parents," to the Grand Junction Indian School in Colorado. S. H. Plummer, Shipley's successor at Fort Defiance, reported in 1893 that "some of the children ran away and traveled overland in winter, many suffering from frost bite and exposure. This has prejudiced the Navajos very much against all leaving the Reservation and I am still contending with this prejudice in securing pupils for the school here."<sup>35</sup>

In another case, a Navajo boy, Milford Cleveland, had been taken without his parents' consent to Fort Lewis Indian School in Durango, Colorado. Granted a furlough to visit his father on the reservation, Cleveland never returned to school. His father insisted that the boy stay put at home. Upon hearing of the incident, the superintendent of the Grand Junction Indian School refused to grant other Navajo parents' requests to send their children home for visits. This exacerbated many Navajos' opposition to any government schooling. As Agent Plummer explained to the commissioner of Indian affairs, in one district on the reservation "the parents are willing and anxious to have their children in school, but are still afraid to trust them here for fear they will be sent to some school off of the Reservation." Plummer later explained to his supervisors that "The violent prejudice now existing among the Navajos to the removal of children to non-reservation schools is due, in a great measure, to the feeling that when children are taken off of the Reservation they are lost to the parent as much as if buried."<sup>36</sup>

An incident in 1892 further soured many Navajos on education. Father Berard Haile, a Catholic priest at St. Michael's Mission on the reservation, speculated in the 1930s that Agent Shipley "must have re-

ceived instructions to 'fill the [Fort Defiance] school' and compel the Navahos to do so. Like wildfire the news spread that the agent had instructed his police force to grab up every child of school age. The force even did this when parents were absent from home." According to Haile, "To say the least, these methods created excitement and bad feeling which more persuasive methods could have avoided."<sup>37</sup>

Shipley focused his efforts in the area of northeastern Arizona around Round Rock, Lukachukai, and Redrock. Black Horse, a local leader, called a meeting of Navajo families to discuss what could be done. According to Navajo Killer, one of the attendees, "This alone was definitely decided, that 'we will not place our children in school.'" But the families disagreed about how to keep their children out of school. Some favored negotiation, while others said, "The fact is that at present only by talk we are beginning to be whipped, therefore, if you fail by pleading, let us fight on that account, regardless of consequences."<sup>38</sup>

Shipley, accompanied by his policemen and the pro-boarding-school Navajo leader Chee Dodge, confronted the recalcitrant Navajos at Round Rock. "Do you mean [to remove] all children?" Black Horse asked. "All of them beginning from the small ones up to those who are full grown," Shipley replied. Navajo Killer remembered that "Black



*Toreva Indian School children. (AHS/SAD MS 1195)*



Horse continued to plead with him [Shipley], saying that it should not be done by force.” After a heated exchange of words, Shipley finally announced: “But you will have to do it, that’s settled!” To which, Black Horse responded: “But we shall not do it, that’s settled!”

At this point, Black Horse jumped up and grabbed Shipley. “Then disorder began,” Navajo Killer recalled, as the Indians dragged the agent outside. “After quite a while,” according to Navajo Killer, “the captured agent was released, and he too returned inside with blood strewn along his path.”

Temper, however, remained hot. Navajo Killer noticed that some of the angry Navajos “happened to secure an axe, with which . . . Ugly Bit-ani threatened the door, while others were preventing him from it, which merely stirred the excitement. ‘Knock the door in, set fire to the house!’ they were shouting in confusion.” Peace was eventually restored when other government agents arrived and assured the Navajos that they would not forcibly compel their children to attend school.<sup>39</sup>

To placate the angry Navajos, the next agent, Plummer, took a different approach than he did with the Hopis under his charge. Instead of wielding the stick—withholding annuities—he dangled the carrot. In 1893, he offered axes to any Navajo parents who sent their children to school. He also assured parents that their children would not be transferred from the on-reservation school to an off-reservation boarding school. Still, the Navajos did not rush to accept Plummer’s generosity. Plummer added pails and coffee pots to the offer and tried playing various Navajo groups off one another. For example, he admonished Navajos around Gallup that “they better send their children in pretty quick” because the school was filling up fast. They wouldn’t “want the Navajos on the North and West side to have all the benefit of the school.”<sup>40</sup>

Plummer lashed out angrily when his carrot approach failed. When the Navajos in the San Juan area continued to ignore the agent, he fumed to a white contact there that “The San Juan Indians need not expect anything from me in the way of issues and they will not have a day school until I am convinced by their bringing their children, or some of them, [to boarding school] here, that they intend and wish to place their children in school.” Tellingly, the San Juan Navajos

wanted a day school in their vicinity, but they opposed removing their children to a distant school.<sup>41</sup>

Plummer’s carrot dangling seems to have had the greatest appeal during hard times on the reservation. Many Navajos consented to send their children to boarding school in the mid-1890s, when drought and the low price of wool produced economic hardship. Families who found it difficult to support their children at home may have used the boarding schools as a way of surviving through tough times.<sup>42</sup>

Navajo parents not only battled government authorities but sometimes disagreed with their own children over education. Like the Hopi girl Qoyawayma, some young Navajos were intensely curious about the government schools and wanted to attend them. Rose Mitchell and some of her siblings wanted to attend school, but her parents refused, only allowing one of their granddaughters—a child of Mitchell’s oldest sister—to go.<sup>43</sup>

Navajo families debated among themselves the benefits of government education. “Bill Sage” (a pseudonym) recalled that his older brother had tried for some time to persuade him to attend boarding school, although their parents opposed it. Finally, as Sage recalled it, “My brother took me to another hogan and told me he wanted me to go to school. . . . [H]e told me it would be a good thing for me to do. He said the white man would get me to talk English. He said he didn’t have enough money to buy clothes or food for me, and it would be ‘Lots better for you to go there.’” After two or three conversations, Sage finally said, “Yes, I’ll go.” As Sage explained it, his brother promised that “I would wear nice shoes, a coat, hat, pants, shirt. That made me go, I guess.”<sup>44</sup>

In the case of Irene Stewart, a Navajo girl who was living with her grandmother in Canyon de Chelly, Stewart’s father decided to have her taken to Fort Defiance boarding school. One day when her grandmother “had gone to the canyon rim to pick yucca fruit and cactus berries to dry for winter food,” a mounted Navajo policeman carried Stewart on horseback all the way to Fort Defiance. “My father said that Grandmother wouldn’t give me up to be put in school,” Stewart recalled, “so he had told the agency superintendent . . . to send a policeman to pick me up. Years later I was told that Grandmother took this very hard, and that her dislike for Father increased.”<sup>45</sup>

Obviously, not all Navajos opposed boarding-school education for their children. Chee Dodge, whom agent Riordan had appointed head chief of the Navajos and chief of police in 1884, had accompanied agent Shipley to round up children at Round Rock and helped rescue Shipley from the angry mob. Dodge, unlike many of his compatriots, “was a strong proponent of education throughout his life and



*Henry Chee Dodge. (AHS/SAD #12938)*

saw that most of his children went to top institutions.” Dodge, however, bypassed the government schools and sent most of his children to Catholic academies in Salt Lake City and Denver.<sup>46</sup>

Dodge, in fact, was such a strong proponent of boarding schools that in 1944 he wrote the House Committee on Indian Affairs to protest Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier’s new policy of promoting day schools on the reservations. “All day schools should be eliminated and more boarding schools established,” Dodge declared. “Eliminate any effort to teach Navajo language in the schools in that Navajos have to learn English to compete with other people in employment.” It should be remembered, however, that Dodge was a member of the wealthy Navajo elite whose perspective on schooling surely did not represent that of most Navajos.<sup>47</sup>

Many Navajo parents not only objected to having their children removed but also protested the deplorable conditions and abuse within the schools, which was often documented by the teachers. For example, Cecile Carter, an Anglo woman who taught kindergarten at the Fort Defiance school in 1903, alleged that Superintendent J. C. Levengood—whom she accused of having “a record as black as any in the service”—“did not treat the children well.” According to Carter, Levengood failed to ensure that the children were kept clean or that their clothes were properly mended. Students under his supervision developed sore eyes and other diseases. About sixty or seventy children ran away, claiming that they had been beaten or shaken by either the superintendent or his wife. Carter testified that Levengood punished the boys by making them stand for hours in line in the dormitory basement. At other times, he forced misbehaving students to stand in a corner for hours with their eyes to the wall.<sup>48</sup>

Mary E. Keough, a matron in the girls’ dormitory at Fort Defiance, also complained about Levengood. In Keough’s eyes, the superintendent “proved himself from the very first to be arrogant and tyrannical.” She testified that “my north dormitory, where twenty-seven girls slept all winter, and my clothing room where sixty-one girls dressed and undressed for school, church, etc., went without stoves when the thermometer often registered fifteen and twenty degrees below zero. The children would beg to be allowed to sleep in my private room or

their sitting room that they might not suffer from the cold.” When pipes burst in the girls’ bathroom, “the whole year the bath room floor was submerged [under] from one to six inches of water.” Keough reported that “I repeatedly asked Mr. Levengood to have the necessary repairs made, but to no avail.”<sup>49</sup>


Greatly concerned Navajo parents sought ways to exercise parental authority, extend parental protection, and maintain contact with their children while they were away at school. They repeatedly asked Indian agents to have their children write to them. Agent Plummer responded to one such request by asking that the superintendent of the Grand Junction Indian School “have the Navajo boy known as Rip Van Winkle write to his father. His father would like to know if the boy is learning a trade and if so what it is.”<sup>50</sup>

Hearing from their children regularly was particularly important for Navajo families who had grown all too familiar with the cavalier attitudes of government officials. Rose Mitchell was both enraged and devastated when Chinie Boarding School officials informed her that her daughter, Pauline, had died. “We had heard there was a sickness over at the school,” she recalled. “But because we had gotten no word, we thought . . . Pauline . . . wasn’t one of the ones affected by that. Here, these men had come to tell us this sickness had already killed her and some of the other children. We didn’t even know she was sick since they didn’t let the children come home on weekends. . . . The officials had never notified us about any of it. The same was true with the other parents whose children passed away at that time; they weren’t notified, either. So, lots of people got angry.”

She went on to relate how “The officials said they had already buried the children who had passed away. That, too, upset us. We should have been asked about it, to see if we wanted to do it according to our own ways. But it was too late.”

Finally, Mitchell explained how the school administrators’ callous actions had made her and her husband “very sad, and also angry at the schools and the way they treated parents of the children who were enrolled there.”<sup>51</sup>

Officials at the Albuquerque Indian School brought home Mitchell’s other daughter, whom she called Mary No. 2, when the girl be-



*Polacca Indian School. (AHS/SAD MS1195)*

came ill. Unfortunately, Mary No. 2 lived only a few days after returning to the reservation. Mitchell and her husband were outraged, once again, that the school had failed to notify them of their second daughter’s illness and had not sent her home sooner. “When they brought [Mary No. 2] home shortly before she died, she was all run down; even though she was already a grown woman, she looked like she was starved and hadn’t had anything to eat for a long time; she had no flesh on her,” Mitchell wrote. Understandably, Mitchell and her husband refused to send their next two children to school.<sup>52</sup>

Some parents sought the help of traders, missionaries, and other English-speakers in Navajo country to have their children sent home for the summers. A man named Warrto explained to Superintendent S. F. Stacher at Pueblo Bonito Boarding School that “I would like very much to have all my boys come home this summer as I have work for them. Some of them will have to work on the farm and others tend the sheep.” Boarding school administrators rarely granted these requests, primarily because they found “it is an endless job trying to get them [the students] all back by September first.” Superintendent Stacker ob-



served that, although some parents dutifully returned their children in the fall, “it takes a policeman to get [other children] back with a fuss included.” And, like the Hopis, some Navajos “want their girls to marry and thereby get away from the necessity of sending them back to school.” Agents, therefore, tried to control the Indian children during the summer by routinely sending them off individually to work in white households, or as teams to do farm labor.<sup>53</sup>

Once their children returned from school, Navajo parents sought to re-establish bonds and regain influence over them. “Bill Sage” did not recognize some of his family members when he returned home after several years at boarding school. Sage recalled his father coming to pick him up. “There were three men and one woman there,” he explained. “After I shook hands with these people, I knew one of them was my father, but I didn’t remember him.” Sage repeated the experience when he arrived home. “My two sisters and my brother were there,” he noted. “I remembered my brother but had forgotten all about my two sisters.”<sup>54</sup>

The family held a Blessingway ceremony (or “Sing”) to reintegrate Sage into his family and acquaint him with Navajo ways. “After I had been to school I wasn’t trying to believe the Navajo way,” Sage remembered. “I believed the American way. I didn’t know any more of the Navajo way than when I went to school.” The ceremony sought to undo the years of boarding school education. Sage recalled that, as the Sing progressed, he “spoke English to two boys there, my sister’s boys. One of them went to school at the Mission. We talked English together. They told us we must not speak English during the Sing.” He also remembered that “At the start of the Sing, the Medicine Man talked to him, saying that Bill had been to school and learned a lot of white man’s ways. But he was not a white man and what would he do with learning all that? It wouldn’t make him white, he would still be Navajo. White man’s ways are one thing and Navajo ways are another, and he had better learn the Navajo way.” Afterward, Sage asked his father why they had held the Sing. His father replied: “We didn’t want to put you in school, your brother did that. We all were so glad to get you back here without anything wrong with you. All the Navajo do the same thing when [they] have sent children to school—they put on

the Blessing Way for their children. That’s the way we Navajos work it when our children go to school.”<sup>55</sup>

Despite the efforts of the Fort Defiance agent, the mobile sheepherding Navajos more successfully managed to evade the government’s education program than did the sedentary Hopi. In 1890, only eighty-nine children, out of a Navajo school-age population of 6,090, were enrolled in school. The government, still trying to force children



Tom Pavate's daughters, 1920s. (AHS/SAD MS 1195)

into the boarding schools, built only one day school on the reservation during the 1890s. Later in the decade, a few churches established mission schools and in the early 1900s, under the administration of Commissioner of Indian Affairs Francis Leupp, the government began constructing more day schools. Navajo school attendance increased steadily to 1,881 children by 1918. Navajo parents seem to have happily sent their children to the newly created day schools, submitting more applications for enrollment than there were available places.<sup>56</sup>

At the same time, most Navajos continued to oppose removal of their children to any of the government boarding schools. By the early 1900s, only 136 students attended the Navajo Boarding School. Parents also sternly resisted sending their children to off-reservation schools, the next step in the government's assimilation plan. For example, in 1894 only two of twelve Navajo boys who allegedly requested to attend Santa Fe Indian School were able to obtain their parents' consent.<sup>57</sup>

Conflict between Navajos and the government over schooling and the forced removal of their children continued for decades. As late as 1932, according to testimony given at a Senate subcommittee hearing, government agents on the reservation were employing brute force to compel Navajo children to attend school. "In the fall the government stockmen, farmers, and other employees go out into the back country with trucks and bring in the children to school," Dana Coolidge testified. "Many apparently come willingly and gladly; but the wild Navajos, far back in the mountains, hide their children at the sound of a truck. So stockmen, Indian police, and other mounted men are sent ahead to round them up. The children are caught, often roped like cattle, and taken away from their parents, many times never to return. They are transferred from school to school, given white people's names, forbidden to speak their own tongue, and when sent to distant schools are not taken home for three years."<sup>58</sup>

With the appointment of John Collier as commissioner of Indian affairs in 1933 and passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Indian education shifted toward day schools. When Collier's new policies went into effect, there were only six day schools in Navajo country. Thirty-nine new day schools opened in the autumn of 1935, and by the end of the decade, Collier had built eleven more day schools.

Moreover, the curriculum now emphasized Navajo language, culture, and history, along with more conventional subjects. Still, memories of brutal child removals, coupled with Collier's stock-reduction program, hindered government efforts to win the Navajos' trust. Like the Hopis, the Navajos harbored decades of resentment over attempts to remove children from their care and custody.<sup>59</sup>

Many historians have characterized the government's boarding school policy as a well-meaning, albeit misguided, attempt to educate and assimilate American Indians. After all, who could dispute the value of education? The experiences of the Hopis and the Navajos in Arizona, however, suggest a more sinister motive behind the BIA's tragic policy. The outright use of force and violence, the withholding of annuity goods that were guaranteed by treaty, and the utter contempt for parents' rights to the custody and care of their children imply that the government's actual intention was to punish and control Indian people. After all, efforts to assimilate other groups of Americans who were neither white, middle-class, native-born, or Protestant did not involve taking their children. In fact, many missionaries and reformers opposed as harsh and unnecessary the government's policy of removing Indian children in order to assimilate them.

Because assimilation involved the removal of Indian children, it did not represent a break from the earlier policy of military subjugation of native peoples. Rather, it was a continuation of this policy in another guise—that of education. To dispossess Indian communities of their children constituted an assault and a threat at least as damaging as the government's attempts to dispossess Indian nations of their land. Neither the Hopis nor the Navajos took this threat lightly. Thus, many of them fought relentlessly to control the destiny of their children.

#### NOTES

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4. William Mateer to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (CIA), March 31, June 1, 1878, Letters Sent and Received, 1878; Mateer to CIA, June 6, 1879, Letters Sent, 1879, both in Box 1, Records of Moqui [Hopi] Pueblo Agency, Record Group (RG) 75, National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Region (NARA-PAC), Laguna Niguel, California. See also Mateer to CIA, January 1, 1879, *ibid.*
5. S. S. Patterson to J. D. L. Atkins, August 26, September 1, October 1, 1886, Letters Sent, Navajo Agency, Fort Defiance, Box 6, vol. 10, RG 75, NARA-PAC. Harry C. James, *Pages from Hopi History* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), p. 106.
6. Scott Rushforth and Steadman Upham, *A Hopi Social History: Anthropological Perspectives on Sociocultural Persistence and Change* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), p. 125; James, *Pages from Hopi History*, pp. 106–107.
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11. *Ibid.*, pp. 94–95.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 101.
13. Qoyawayma, *No Turning Back*, pp. 21, 24.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 54.
15. David A. Seaman, ed., *Born a Chief: The Nineteenth Century Hopi Boyhood of Edmund Nequatewa*, as told to Alfred Whiting (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1993), pp. 96, 97, 106.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
17. Qoyawayma, *No Turning Back*, p. 18.
18. Seaman, ed., *Born A Chief*, pp. 91–92. Laura Dandridge affidavit, July 13, 1903, 1.1.1008, Charles Lummis Papers, Braun Library, Southwest Museum, Los Angeles.
19. Adaliza de Vee affidavit, April 10, 1903, 1.1.1131, *ibid.*, confirms the incident with Leslie. According to Dandridge to Gertrude Lewis Gates, December 28, 1902, 1.1.1625A, *ibid.*, Superintendent Burton dismissed Dandridge in 1902.
20. Report on Hopi affairs, in Gates to Lummis, December 27, 1902, uncatalogued Sequoyia League papers, Lummis Papers.

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22. Charles Lummis, *Bullying the Moqui*, ed. by Robert Easton and Mackenzie Brown (Prescott, Ariz.: Prescott College Press, 1968), p. 17.
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24. Quoted in Lummis, *Bullying the Moqui*, pp. 80–84.
25. Belle Axtell Kolp affidavit, quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 42–50. For more on Lummis's campaign and Kolp's affidavit, see James, *Pages from Hopi History*, pp. 123–29.
26. *The Redman*, vol. 5 (February 1913), pp. 247, 248; James, *Pages from Hopi History*, p. 138. See also, *The Redman*, vol. 4 (January 1912), p. 211.
27. James, *Pages from Hopi History*, p. 166; Crane, *Indians of the Enchanted Desert*, pp. 157–80 (quotes from p. 173).
28. Leo Crane untitled manuscript, n.d., pp. 416–18, folder 5, MS 256, Leo Crane Collection, Cline Library Archives and Special Collections (CLASC), Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff.
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32. Eastman to Miss Williams, September 8, 1882; to CIA, October 16, 1882, Letters Sent, Navajo Agency, Fort Defiance, Box 3, vol. 2, RG 75, NARA-PAC. See also Iverson, *Dine*, p. 83.
33. D. M. Riordan to Richard Henry Pratt, August 13, September 27, 1883, Letters Sent, Navajo Agency, Fort Defiance, Box 3, vol. 2, RG 75, NARA-PAC. The other Navajo child died soon after Manuelito's son.
34. S. S. Patterson to “The Chiefs and all Good Navajos,” September 24, 1886, *ibid.*, Box 5, vol. 5.
35. Acting Indian Agent to CIA, December 18, 1893, *ibid.*, Box 7, vol. 20.
36. *Ibid.*; Plummer to CIA, December 20, 1894, Letters Sent, Navajo Agency, Fort Defiance, Box 7, vol. 20; and [fall 1894], *ibid.*, Box 8, vol. 20, RG 75, NARA-PAC. See also Acting Indian Agent to O. H. Parker, December 18, 1893, *ibid.*, Box 7, vol. 20.
37. Father Berard Haile, “The Roundrock Incident of 1893,” pp. 1–2, folder 13, Box 6, Berard Haile Papers, AZ 132, Special Collections, University of Arizona Library, Tucson.
38. “The Account of He-who-killed-a-Navajo” (1937), pp. 9, 12, 13, transcript of interview by Albert Sandoval, *ibid.* Haile also refers to the interviewee as Navajo Killer. For more on this incident, see Robert W. Young and William Morgan, eds., *The Trouble at Round Rock* (Phoenix: Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1952).
39. “The Account of He-who-killed-a-Navajo,” pp. 17, 18, 20, 22.



40. See Plummer to Mrs. Whyte, December 18, 1893 and January 8, 1894; to Henry Dodge, n.d. [1893]; to Frank Walker, December 20, 1893, and January 19, 1894, all in Letters Sent, Navajo Agency, Fort Defiance, Box 7, vol. 20, RG 75, NARA-PAC.

41. Plummer to Mrs. Whyte, January 29, 1894, *ibid.*

42. Plummer to CIA, January 31, 1894, *ibid.* Plummer claimed that he had convinced the Navajos that they need not fear the boarding schools. His letter, which describes the poor economic conditions on the reservation and the rising number of students, suggests more pragmatic reasons for Navajos enrolling their children in school. See also Brenda Child, *Boarding School Seasons* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998).

43. Mitchell, *Tall Woman*, pp. 62–63.

44. “Life Story of Bill Sage (a pseudonym),” p. 33, draft 2, part 1, MS 216, folder 3, Box 1, Dorothea C. Leighton and Alexander Leighton Collection, CLASC. Bill Sage and his family were off-reservation Navajos living in New Mexico. The author thanks Alexander Leighton for permission to quote from this collection.

45. Irene Stewart, *A Voice in Her Tribe: A Navajo Woman's Own Story*, ed. by Doris Ostrander Dowdy (Socorro, New Mex.: Ballena Press, 1980), p. 15.

46. Iverson, *Dine*, p. 88–91; Carolyn Niethammer, “*T'll Go and Do More*”: *Annie Dodge Wauneka, Navajo Leader and Activist* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), pp. 18, 24–27.

47. Quoted in Niethammer, “*T'll Go and Do More*,” p. 65.

48. Cecile Carter to Lummis, July 28, 1903, 1.1.689, Lummis Papers. In a letter to Lummis on August 14, 1903, Carter claimed that Levengood fired her for interference and insubordination when she complained of the diseased and dirty condition of children at Fort Defiance.

49. Mary E. Keough affidavit, August 27, 1903, 1.1.689, *ibid.*

50. Plummer to Superintendent U.S. Indian School Grand Junction, January 22, February 2, 1894, Letters Sent, Navajo Agency, Fort Defiance, Box 7, vol. 20, RG 75, NARA-PAC.

51. Mitchell, *Tall Woman*, pp. 178–79.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

53. “Warrto” to S. F. Stacher, n.d.; Stacher to Superintendent Perry, May 29, 1926; [Stacher] to Superintendent Paquette, June 12, 1920, all in Box 84, Pueblo Bonito Boarding School file, Eastern Navajo Agency, RG 75, NARA-PAC.

54. “Life Story of Bill Sage,” pp. 44, 45.

55. *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 63, 64–65.

56. Bailey and Bailey, *A History of the Navajos*, pp. 168–69.

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58. Quoted in David H. Dejong, *Promises of the Past: A History of Indian Education in the United States* (Golden, Colo.: North American Press, 1993), p. 118.

59. Peter Iverson, *The Navajo Nation* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 40–41; Iverson, *Dine*, pp. 172–76.