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## The French Colonial Mind, Volume 2

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# THE FRENCH COLONIAL MIND

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VOLUME 2

FRANCE OVERSEAS

*Studies in Empire and Decolonization*

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SERIES EDITORS:

A. J. B. Johnston, James D. Le Sueur,  
and Tyler Stovall

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# THE FRENCH COLONIAL MIND

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VOLUME 2

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*Violence, Military Encounters, and Colonialism*

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Edited and with an introduction by Martin Thomas

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA PRESS ··· LINCOLN AND LONDON

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## Acknowledgments

In this second collection of essays on aspects of attitudinal formation, normative standards, and ways of thinking and doing among French colonial officials in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, our focus is on violence, repression, and conflict. To be sure, the chapters treat these issues differently. Some do so singly and with reference to specific individuals, events, or crises. Others do so more broadly, considering how various forms of coercion became embedded in colonial practices over time. What unites them is their attempt to tease out the connections between colonialism and violence, whether physical and material or psychological and intangible.

Once again, it is my pleasure to thank all those who have helped bring this edited collection to fruition. This, and its partner volume, *The French Colonial Mind, Volume 1: Mental Maps of Empire and Colonial Encounters*, are products of a conference held at the University of Exeter's Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies in April 2007. The conference was hosted by the Centre for the Study of War, State, and Society, which received essential backing from the Leverhulme Trust and the University of Exeter's Department of History. My job as editor has been made much easier by the advice and generosity of others. Claire Keyte and Andrew Thorpe at Exeter helped make the conference possible. Heather Lundine, Bridget Barry, Joeth Zucco, and Jim Le Sueur at the University of Nebraska Press provided invaluable guidance. Jane Curran's copyediting was, once again, exemplary. Insights from the two anonymous readers helped us make essential improvements to individual chapters. Other friends and colleagues, among them Jennifer Sessions, Dan Branch, Ruth Ginio, Jim House, Patricia Lorcin, Peter Jackson, and Herman Lebovics, enriched the book by helping us think through the ideas discussed here. Finally, my thanks to the contributors: their hard work has made this book possible.



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## Introduction

### *Mapping Violence onto French Colonial Minds*

MARTIN THOMAS

#### *Mental Maps, Disorder, and Colonial Violence*

It was political scientist Alan Henrikson who introduced us to the term “mental maps” as a determinant of social action.<sup>1</sup> The idea that the attitudinal outlooks embedded in minds as a result of cultural formation and past experience are integral to political choices has gained purchase ever since. Among the specialist communities quickest to recognize the usefulness of the “mental maps” idea have been Henrikson’s fellow political scientists, international historians, and scholars of the “missing dimension” of intelligence service activity interested in processes of cognition—the way the world is understood—and resultant analytical thinking.<sup>2</sup> Historians of empire and colonialism have, by contrast, tended to use the idea of mental maps piecemeal, sometimes to explain the diffusion of Orientalist thinking, sometimes to account for (usually misguided) policy decisions, but more often in a rather nebulous way to illustrate the misapprehensions of European publics about the colonial empires held in their name.

The first volume of this collection on French “colonial minds” suggested that one issue uniting the various people and events described is that thought normally precedes action. But the actions of those in positions of colonial power in the French Empire were also, to a greater to lesser extent, reflective of established patterns of behavior. Furthermore, as the phrase implies, a pattern of behavior necessarily took shape over

time through repetition and reinforcement of certain actions.<sup>3</sup> In the case of army or police organizations, such repetition and reinforcement could entrench certain patterns of behavior, sometimes disbaring consideration of alternative perspectives that cut against the grain of prevailing military assumptions about subject populations and how they were to be regarded, policed, or otherwise “controlled.” The organizational cultures of France’s colonial security forces, in other words, often acted as a barrier to reflective engagement with colonial peoples. As a result rarely were innovations, whether in operational practice or in military cultures, internally generated outside crisis conditions. Only after dramatic political failures or violent outbreaks were attitudes likely to change, which is part of what Edgar Schein, a leading theorist of organizational culture, terms the process of “trauma learning.”<sup>4</sup> But were colonial military minds susceptible to such learning in less overtly violent times?

Here we come to perhaps the most challenging and often the most revealing aspect of colonial minds at work: those situations in which, it seems, thought hardly preceded action at all. Indeed, in some instances historians posit that the behavior of Europeans in unfamiliar colonial settings was anything but rational. Numerous colonial encounters, from initial contact to protracted exposure, have been described in terms of irrationality, mental disorder, even madness, or, less dramatically, as the abandonment of European norms and manners, the dread outcome of which was “going native.”<sup>5</sup> A distinct subdiscipline of “colonial” psychiatry, many of whose practitioners and critics achieved lasting notoriety, looked on the racial differentiation inherent to colonial societies as pivotal to new delineations of mental disorder and supposed African inferiority that helped entrench colonial power.<sup>6</sup>

The metaphor of psychiatric disorder will also be familiar to anyone acquainted with the work of Martiniquan psychiatrist and anticolonial revolutionary Frantz Fanon, as well as to scholars of decolonization more generally. As Ann Laura Stoler has recently reminded us, Fanon’s central concern with the lasting physical distress, the personal degradations, and psychological disorders left among Algerians scarred by French colonial rule was very much a study in the ruination of minds.<sup>7</sup> And as Benjamin Brower and Marnia Lazreg have emphasized in the same context, any study of colonial “official thinking,” whether in the

first phases of imperial conquest or in the final years of colonial collapse, must engage with the cruelties and coercion perpetrated as part of the imperial claim to govern groups and communities judged subordinate and inferior.<sup>8</sup>

If Fanon's primary purpose was to explain the injustices of colonialism in terms of their corruptive effects on the minds of colonizers and colonized alike, his preoccupation with violence—whether that perpetrated in the name of the colonial state or that demanded of colonial subjects freeing their bodies and purifying their minds through acts of insurrection—suggests that the study of colonialism must encompass the study of violence. Such investigation must attempt at least two things. First, we need to define what is meant by violence. The chapters to follow are dominated by physical acts of violence, most collective, some individual. But the authors recognize that violence could also be otherwise. It might be cultural—the denigration of established ways of life or particular ethnicities or religions, for instance. It could be social—and here one thinks of the destruction of customary practices, communal bonds, and economic relationships. And it was sometimes psychological—creating insecurity as a form of coercive practice. Violence, then, covers a wide spectrum from physical injury to societal disruption and the inculcation of fear.

Just as there were multifarious forms of violence, so, to paraphrase Benjamin Brower, colonial violence was informed by a “multiple logic.” Violent acts imposed new forms of social exclusion. Destruction or seizure of resources created new economic hierarchies. Both provided physical evidence of imperial “reach” far beyond established centers of colonial power. The use of force, on some occasions, reflected presumptions about the impossibility or pointlessness of political compromise. It mirrored official understanding about how colonized communities understood displays of power. And it revealed deeply racist precepts about the nature of permissible killing in “uncivilized” societies.<sup>9</sup> Perhaps more familiar in the conquest period, these tendencies resurfaced during France's wars of decolonization during which anticolonial insurgents and their civilian backers were denied the rights accorded to enemy combatants.<sup>10</sup> State repression, at its most extreme during the Algerian War, brings us to another unsettling problem: the muting effects

of violence on colonial minds—and voices. Colonial civil and military administrators imposed certain silences in respect of violent acts practiced for “reasons of state.”<sup>11</sup> Their tendency to censor and censure was compounded by the efforts of their anticolonial opponents to expose the levels of violence practiced against them before the court of international opinion.<sup>12</sup>

Confronting the specificity of colonial coercion raises a second challenge: the need for a typology of violence to tease out its specifically “colonial” dimension. If this explains Fanon’s near obsessive concern with the subject, it also indicates why most studies of colonial violence tend to concentrate primarily on the perpetrators of violence and their particular relationship with identifiable centers of colonial power, whether these were governments, regional administrations, police and army commands, or major corporate employers.<sup>13</sup> Putting French violence first takes us some way to identifying the colonial element in the subject, but it does not alone suffice. For the violent actions described above could be seen as simple variants of state violence practiced within acutely unequal societies and predicated on the control or conversion of a dominant social group. This does not mean, however, that we should reject the colonial state as a primary agent of colonial violence; far from it. Perhaps more than anything else, what makes the violence described in this volume different—and singularly colonial—is its duality. For colonial violence was both constitutive of colonial power and destructive of it. And these opposing processes often proceeded simultaneously. The contradiction here may be unraveled if we think in terms of conflicting short-term needs and longer-term goals. Violence as repression was typically applied to impose colonial order in the short term. But its prevalence undermined longer-term efforts to reconstruct colonized societies to suit the requirements of the colonizing power. Violence could silence opposition, but it was an insecure foundation on which to build a supposedly better society. The ways in which French colonial minds wrestled with this contradiction take us to the very essence of French imperialism.

Sometimes routine state violence or military repression provoked acts of spectacular counterviolence, which left entire army units wiped out. Catastrophic losses like the October 1950 “Cao Bang disaster” during

the Indochina War, which left 4,800 troops either dead or missing, or the Palestro “massacre” southeast of Algiers in May 1956 in which 19 recently arrived *rappelés* and their section commander were fatally ambushed sent shock waves through metropolitan opinion. These transgressions of the usual asymmetry between state repression versus anticolonial violence seared themselves into official memories of colonialism.<sup>14</sup>

Confronted with such dilemmas, perhaps not surprisingly the rulers of empire increasingly conceptualized its stresses in literal terms. Once social and political disorder in colonial territory was addressed in terms of a psychological crisis afflicting those who ran the show, could the end of colonial dominion be very far off? This was precisely what happened in France’s postwar colonial service when senior officials sought to diagnose and cure the alleged “malaise” among administrators trying to govern an empire they no longer entirely controlled or understood. On the other side of the colonial-anticolonial divide, Herman Lebovics has stressed how frequently the rulers of empire made use of psychological terms and diagnoses, albeit erroneously, to pathologize colonial rebellion and anticolonial activity more generally as evidence of antisocial behavior rather than as a logical reaction to years of discrimination.<sup>15</sup>

As the chapters in this volume indicate, it is in the realm of colonial violence that the apparent disjuncture between rationality and actions, between sanity and psychiatric disturbance, between order and disorder, is most striking. If, as Caroline Ford has argued, the boundaries between religious violence and organized political protest in France became more porous during the nineteenth century, so, too, with the horrendous exception of repression of the Paris Commune in 1870, instances of collective violence in French society were less Rabelaisian, less highly ritualized, less self-consciously hellish than they had been in early modern France, most notably during the protracted religious warring of the sixteenth century. Violence had not gone away, but the codes of violent public behavior had changed.<sup>16</sup> By the interwar period, political violence in metropolitan France, still recurrent and endemic, was nonetheless rationalized as either ideologically driven or part of the lingering, traumatic aftermath of the Great War.<sup>17</sup> Colonial violence was represented differently in France at the time, not as politically organized and functional and bound by certain accepted limits, but as culturally



derived, dysfunctional, and potentially unlimited. What went generally unacknowledged was that such violence was often the result of colonial intervention or perpetrated by the French themselves.

The forms and scale of colonial violence, as well as the range of violent circumstances investigated here, confirm that French men and women both confronted and perpetrated violence in numerous ways. Some were products of rebellion, others the by-product of war. But what of less sensational occasions where the actions of Europeans appear, superficially at least, to have been unthinkingly violent? Was the casual violence meted out to a domestic servant, a plantation worker, or an intrusive street hawker carefully thought through, or was it merely a conditioned, almost reflex, response? Michael Vann's chapter in this second volume of the collection suggests, for instance, that French violence in colonial Hanoi was as casual as it was habitual. Were the stereotypical characterizations of indigenous traits the result of personal evaluation or merely the repetition of attitudes prevalent in the colonial milieu of the officers' club, the settler's home, or even the governor's residence? How far was colonial stereotyping derivative of the prevalent French biomedical thinking and masculine honor codes to which Robert Nye's work has alerted us? If, as seems likely, a readiness to use violence was essential to the socialization of young European men serving or working in colonial territories, then perhaps we may be able to discern distinctly colonialist attitudes to violence itself.<sup>18</sup> Bringing these viewpoints together, it is tempting to suggest that colonial violence reflected the predominantly masculine—and often highly macho—worlds of white colonial society, and that violence was also integral to the fabric of productive relations in colonial economies marked by labor-intensive industries, coercive practices, and, at least until 1936, official resistance to legal recognition of workers' rights.<sup>19</sup>

### *Sociologies of Violence*

Consideration of the parameters of colonial violence is made easier by engaging with the ideas of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Originally brought to prominence by his ethnographical research into Algeria's Kabyle Berber and Arab communities in the latter stages of the Algerian War, Bourdieu had much to say about forms of violence.<sup>20</sup> To appreciate

this, one needs to dwell a little on his ideas of “capital” and “symbolic violence.” Rejecting Marxist materialism and structuralism, Bourdieu conceptualized capital as the various currencies of power in any given social arena or field. Individuals and groups seek to accumulate such capital to enhance their social status and power. This capital could be material and economic—tangible assets and resources—but it could also be intangible: the cultural capital conferred by linguistic ability, specialist knowledge, and academic qualification; or the “symbolic capital” conferred by high office, career achievement, or public reputation. This search for prestige, for elevated social status, while not uniquely colonial, was clearly manifest among officials, traders, settlers, and missionaries whose capacity to dominate or influence others rested, in part, on their acquisition of such symbolic capital.<sup>21</sup>

Bourdieu’s theories are doubly relevant to us here because of his suggestion that possession of such capital also enhanced the ability of social actors to undertake acts of “symbolic violence,” that is, to impose their own normative standards and social meanings on other sections of society. In other words, armed with their advantages in capital—be it material, cultural, or symbolic—dominant social actors could legitimate their own prevailing standards and expectations about individuals’ behavior and deference to colonial authority as the normal way of things, as the way the world should be. Herein lay the ultimate irony: for the very success of symbolic violence such as this derived from the fact that those inculcated to accept these normative standards as superior and unchallengeable rarely perceived such domination as an act of violence in itself.<sup>22</sup>

In this sense the art of successful domination is subterfuge. To take a couple of examples, each from colonial Vietnam: evolving statist conceptions of socioeconomic development, or *mise en valeur* in the Vietnamese territories, justified French control in terms of heightened productivity, increased national output, and, in consequence, the amelioration of poverty.<sup>23</sup> Yet the prevailing modes of colonial production, from plantation agriculture to rubber extraction and mining, remained labor intensive, highly exploitative, and always poorly paid. The entire modernization project had labor coercion and continued impoverishment at its core.<sup>24</sup> At the same time, French imposition of educational

curricula that systematically denigrated precolonial cultures while lauding France's historic achievements illustrated Bourdieu's conception of symbolic violence in practice.<sup>25</sup> If we can see forms of violence in the printed word of the schoolroom, then surely it was also present in the adult world of colonial workplaces and private lives. Put simply, how should we read such quotidian facets of colonial rule: the low-level but persistent colonial violence, the petty prejudice, or the ingrained racism of some colonial minds? Were they born of the colonial encounter, or were they products of attitudes and assumptions developed over time, sometimes in France itself? Was colonial violence part of European efforts to sustain order, or did it reflect the breakdown of order whether at the national, local, or even familial level?

Again, other sociological approaches may help us here. Expanding on the work of Donald Black and Roberta Senechal de la Roche, the social theorist David Sciulli draws a conceptual distinction between consensual and nonconsensual types of "orderly behavior." He suggests on the one hand that orderliness may reflect individuals' capacity for social control, but on the other hand that orderly behavior may also be the outcome of social integration. As Sciulli explains it, "Individuals are controlled when it is not possible for them simply to recognize and understand in common what is expected of them; in their fear and anxiety, they are supine. By contrast, individuals' orderliness may be a product of their possible social integration when the rules or duties orienting their behavior are at least kept recognizable and understandable."<sup>26</sup> Sciulli's ideas are useful when considering violent interactions between colonial overseers and colonized subjects because they suggest that external imposition of "orderly behavior" amounted to a form of social engineering built on the premise that the colonial subjects to be made "orderly" were incapable of integration into a colonial order that was alien to them. Colonial subjugation, in other words, stemmed from the institutionalization of repressive social control within the bureaucratic and legal fabric of the colonial state. Whether or not colonial control stemmed directly from military conquest, it seems reasonable to suggest that violence was integral to the structures of colonialism: its economic foundations, its institutions, and its governing precepts.<sup>27</sup>

The full implications of this argument bear amplification. Just as the

organized use of violence might be constitutive of order, in this case the consolidation of the administrative apparatus of the colonial state, its demands and its practices, so resistance to it might be destructive of that order.<sup>28</sup> To borrow sociological terminology, collective violence, or the coordinated inflicting of physical damage by a group, is not abnormal or “deviant”; rather it is a form of social control capable of coherent explanation. As the leading social theorist Charles Tilly has warned us, while it is rash to claim that such violence conforms to any generic laws or theories, discrete patterns of collective violence may be discerned nonetheless.<sup>29</sup> We have, it seems, come a long way from Gustave Le Bon’s elaboration of “crowd theory” in the 1890s. Far from being symptomatic of mass hysteria or the derangement of a collective “crowd mind” as Le Bon suggested, group violence may be justified, either as a form of social protest in the absence of permitted nonviolent alternatives, or, on the opposing side of the political divide, as a means to suppress such protest.<sup>30</sup> Its form and frequency is also conditioned by the “conflict structure” that pertains in the society in question; in other words it is substantially contingent on the extent of social division, economic iniquity, and perceived cultural difference between the parties involved.<sup>31</sup> To use the language of political psychology, levels of political violence are likely to reflect patterns of socialization in a particular community as well as the form and extent of centralized state control over that community.<sup>32</sup> To paraphrase Jeff Goodwin’s work on revolutionary movements after 1945, violent protest is typically pursued by groups that discern “no other way out” of their societal condition.<sup>33</sup> If we take these indicators as our yardstick, endemic violence in colonial societies is unsurprising both because the socialization of dependent peoples as colonial subjects denied them basic rights and resources, and because, paradoxically, colonial state control was typically too weak or remote to enforce rigid popular compliance in all circumstances. Furthermore, the sense of embattlement among colonial elites nurtured threat perceptions about the local populations around them that became manifest in heightened levels of repression whenever the colonial state seemed especially vulnerable to dissent or overthrow.<sup>34</sup>

Yet, as Roberta Senechal de la Roche has argued convincingly—if provocatively—a double standard lurks in much of the sociological lit-

erature on collective violence in sharply unequal societies. While the violence perpetrated by those suffering discrimination or oppression has been rationalized and in many cases defended or excused, that of the dominant groups in such societies is usually depicted as not only indefensible but irrational too.<sup>35</sup> Adapted to our analytical context, the violence of the colonial oppressed is commonly depicted by academics as a normative response—maybe even a laudable one, but the counter-violence it triggered from state authorities is typically seen as both unjust and abnormal. Looking back from a post-empire perspective, we are therefore confronted with an exact inversion of the way in which colonial minds viewed the violence of colonizers and colonized. If Senechal de la Roche is right, then surely it is incumbent on us to exercise particular care when interpreting the violent actions of the rulers of empire and the outlooks and normative standards that lay behind them.

### *Rationalizing Colonial Violence*

Such actions signified a reflection and a reinforcement of behaviors commonly observed in intercommunal colonial relations. This is not to reduce the Frenchmen and Frenchwomen of empire to mere “colonizer” stereotype. Not all resorted to violence. Not all denigrated indigenous society or, to use their own parlance, the *indigènes* they employed, they knew, or, in many cases, they lived alongside. Take, for instance, Albert Memmi, the Tunis-born novelist and teacher who first articulated the supposedly binary opposition between rulers and ruled in his 1957 book, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, and who conceded that those on each side of his equation were trapped there by circumstance, not choice.<sup>36</sup> Memmi drew on his childhood experiences as a Jew in a predominantly Muslim colonial city and was writing just as Tunisia neared independence from France. He found himself trapped between the opposing categories he described. He recognized, nonetheless, that colonizers sustained their privileged position by accepting and sometimes working for a fundamentally racist political system, and a system upheld by coercing and excluding those that it identified as inferior. Colonialism, in other words, was inherently violent, and its wrongs could only be rectified by destroying it.<sup>37</sup>

Memmi’s insight was to accept that there could be no halfway house on the road to decolonization. Yet others before him genuinely believed

in the progressive potential of colonialism and aspired to contribute to it. Individuals such as these sought to cultivate dependent populations rather than to expropriate from them, albeit on their own terms.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, some of the bitterest critics of colonial coercion and racial abuses emerged from settler communities or colonial careers. But one thing remains inescapable. The European populations spread across the French empire inhabited societies in which the differential treatment and the differential characterization of people were fundamental to the functioning of the colony. And, whatever its roots in colonial conquest, in the political forms of the colonial state, in the economic structures of empire, such differentiation was deeply embedded in colonial minds. This was not a uniquely French phenomenon. Nor was it reducible to a single, generic racism derived from particular racial theories.<sup>39</sup> Nor were discriminatory actions explicable simply as the product of a long-standing foreign occupation. Yet, for all that, differential treatment of people according to their ethnicity, gender, or sexuality, whether actual or presumed, was prevalent among settlers, officials, and missionaries; in short, among Europeans in the colonies.

Institutionalized discrimination and the high incidence of low-level, banal violence across racial and communal divides cannot be reduced to a simplistic binary characterization of hegemonic colonial violence versus determined anticolonial popular resistance. For one thing, the colonial “presence” in many of the dependent territories colored blue, pink, or orange on the European classroom walls of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was far less entrenched and altogether more fleeting than imperialist publics “back home” were led to believe. In many places the “colonial state” hardly amounted to any kind of functioning administrative provision at all.<sup>40</sup> For another, European colonial bureaucrats such as those vying for influence across late nineteenth-century tropical Africa typically justified the violence of conquest not as enforced subjugation but as transient pacification, as the displacement of the apparently endemic feuding between what veteran anthropologist Jack Goody describes as “acephalous ‘tribal’ groups” by the orderliness of fixed state boundaries, new legal regimens, and white-officered constabularies.<sup>41</sup> Perhaps most important of all, an accretion of rules, regulations, and customary practices made the use of violence routine.

What one historian has recently termed “the banality of brutality” was a sedimentary process in which arbitrary arrest, collective punishments, coercive interrogation techniques, and denial of basic rights of redress were all layers on which endemic security force violence was built. To those acculturated to practice it, such violence was not exceptional or inexcusable, but the logical outcome of past precedent—the way “to get things done.”<sup>42</sup>

Even the use of corporal punishment, whipping and caning in particular, to coerce African labor or mete out instant discipline to alleged wrongdoers was frequently excused by Europeans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as not only expedient but readily understood by those who experienced or witnessed it. According to the defenders of such practices, inflicting physical pain helped bring order both to colonial society and to naive, disorderly African minds. It was no coincidence that whereas flogging was banned in the British Army during the 1870s, whipping and caning persisted within Britain’s colonial forces in Africa until 1946.<sup>43</sup> The institutionalization of colonial violence through legal procedure and regimens of punishment was thus depicted as progressive and modern, part of the transition from precolonial disorder to colonial order. Progressive it may have been claimed to be, but colonial violence was also clearly systemic. It was in part bound up with the political obligations, social structures, and economic processes imposed by European rule, in part facilitated by European understandings of how order in dependent societies could and should be maintained.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, as international efforts to codify binding laws of war gathered momentum during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the imperial nations ensured that colonial rule was exempted from putative restrictions on the rights and actions of occupying powers.<sup>45</sup> Not until the composition of the United Nations General Assembly was transformed by an influx of formerly colonized Afro-Asian states in the 1950s were levels of colonial violence finally exposed to sustained and hostile international scrutiny.<sup>46</sup> Prior to this, as we shall see, just as violence was writ large in colonial experience, so it was integral to the attitudes and cultures of practice of numerous colonial authority figures.

A number of the chapters in this volume also show that the colonies were laboratories for organized violence, where new forms of suppres-

sion, punishment, and political control were practiced and refined. Colonial borrowing of metropolitan policing methods and the interplay between colonial and metropolitan ideas of urban planning and social regulation in cities indicate that experimentation in forms of social control was an interactive process between the empire and mainland France.<sup>47</sup> Innovation in organized colonial violence, whether in terms of legal restrictions and punishments, policing dissent, or reconfiguring colonial cities to facilitate segregation and surveillance, was necessarily a continuous process, but it reached a new intensity in the years immediately after World War I. There were several reasons for this. One was population movement. While the French never colonized their empire with Anglo-Saxon enthusiasm, economic pressure, the greater accessibility of colonial territory, and the expansion of colonial bureaucracy and commerce in the interwar years sent tens of thousands of new colonists to the empire. The new arrivals soon registered their presence in material change such as the growth of settler-inhabited *nouvelles villes* in the cities of French North Africa and Vietnam, which gave concrete expression to the economic and cultural hierarchies of colonialism.<sup>48</sup> Also apparent after 1918 was a growing tension among politicians, legislators, and officials over the long-term direction of colonial policy in the aftermath of a conflict so shockingly destructive that it rendered formulaic rhetoric about the civilizing potential of European cultures outmoded and trite. Genuine antipathy to empire remained a minority interest, the preoccupation of Communist activists, colonial students resident in France, and surrealist artists determined to demythologize received wisdom about French imperial benevolence.<sup>49</sup> Yet in the political mainstream too, French colonial minds were adjusting to different currents of opinion about the long-term justifications for empire. Numerous government members, senior officials, academics, writers, and other social commentators, none of them anticolonialists, recognized that France's imperial purpose required some measure of reinvention, perhaps even more radical reevaluation. This rethinking underpinned major colonial policy shifts informed by reconfigurations of race, ideas of colonial citizenship, and the essence of French identity.<sup>50</sup>

For others, empire remained an unimpeachable project, but one whose fixity could only be sustained with the new technologies of



coercive power more readily available after the Great War. It was no coincidence that imperial conflicts of the 1920s became at once the preferred sites of experimentation for new weapons of war—military aircraft, armored vehicles, poison gas—and the dumping ground for surplus military hardware left over from the years 1914–18. Colonial rebels, dissentient colonial communities, and even recalcitrant colonial taxpayers faced lethal violence delivered on an unprecedented scale by airplanes, tanks, and machine guns.<sup>51</sup> This trend toward greater lethality in repressive violence was prefigured before 1914 in more widespread use by colonial security forces of weaponry considered unacceptable in intra-European conflict. The dum dum bullet, designed to maximize bodily trauma and blood loss, stands as a ghastly exemplar of this shift.<sup>52</sup> Using high-technology weapons (by the standards of the day) to assure even greater asymmetry in colonial violence (keeping white casualties down while killing as many opponents as possible) became still more prevalent as European militaries built on their experiences of the Great War. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the widespread turn to “air policing” as a cheap but deadly form of colonial control. In the expanded French and British colonial empires that took shape after World War I newly available apparatus of imperial coercion made the open skies—the very air—over the North African Maghreb and the Fertile Crescent of the Middle East a new type of political, military, and cultural space. Politically, mastery of the air emphasized the apparent superiority of Western industrial modernism, underscoring the right to rule of imperial nations. Militarily, the airplane offered new possibilities of force projection, destructive power, and consequent strategic advantage. Politically, coercive bombardment transcended the temporal divide between initial imposition of colonial authority through the threat, or use, of indiscriminate violence and the subsequent maintenance of imperial power through more selective violence targeted against dissident populations, whether as an end in itself or as an instrument of broader deterrence.<sup>53</sup>

Other key post–World War I changes help us understand what made such repressive violence appear natural and unavoidable to its European practitioners. To adapt Zara Steiner’s comment about the peacemaking of 1919, none of the usual bases for state identity—language, religion,

ethnicity, geography, ideology—commanded universal assent as a basis either for individual colonial statehood or for common identity across the French Empire as a whole.<sup>54</sup> Concepts of what it was to be truly, authentically French, whether citizen or worker, and not some ersatz, colonial alternative were also fast becoming more ethnically and culturally exclusive.<sup>55</sup> The year 1919 marked a moment of huge significance in the crystallization of racist attitudes in France for another reason: the mass expulsion of factory workers, as well as other unskilled and semiskilled laborers, recruited from the colonies to assist the war effort in metropolitan France.<sup>56</sup> As Tyler Stovall notes, “The vaunted exoticism and fascination with empire of the interwar years arose not just from the colonial presence in wartime France, but also from its abrupt termination once the war was over. . . . In sending imperial subjects back home, the French inadvertently gave racial distinctions a new, and permanent, place in the metropole itself.” In Stovall’s pithy summary, “the very nature of Frenchness was conditioned by race.” The inescapable conclusion is that one of the most critical factors in making early twentieth-century minds “colonial” was a sense of “whiteness” that became synonymous with a more exclusive, ethnocentric idea of French national identity in the 1920s and beyond.<sup>57</sup>

It is also worth remembering, however, that French colonial minds did not solely define the limits of social inclusion and exclusion in terms of whiteness. Officials and settlers were often suspicious of colonial fellow travelers, individuals who may have been employed by the colonial state or French commercial enterprises, but who remained either ideologically hostile to, or profoundly disillusioned with, the imperial project. The colonies, after all, were sometimes a refuge for the escapee, the outsider, or the felon, let alone the adventurer or the dissident. From 1895 onward in French West Africa, for example, police surveillance of white Europeans was sometimes as rigorous as that of African colonial subjects. Indeed, transgression of acceptable norms of European behavior, whether culturally or politically, carried with it the threat of expulsion, incarceration, or even, in extreme cases, more violent criminal punishment.<sup>58</sup> Nor were settler communities homogeneous. Ethnic tensions, particularly among the various Latin communities of French North Africa, were by the 1920s intensifying amid the ideological frictions

spilling over from southern Europe. Here, too, suspicion, stereotyping, even sedition, infected European colonial minds.<sup>59</sup>

The accumulated experiences of the 1930s Depression, the upheavals of defeat, regime changes, and “liberation” in World War II, and the proliferation of anticolonial violence as pressure for national independence gathered momentum after 1945 inevitably swayed colonialist outlooks. But neither local disorder nor extraneous factors proved sufficient to decolonize colonial minds to the extent that peaceful transitions from empire to nation-state became possible in French Africa or Southeast Asia.<sup>60</sup> Rather, the violence of colonialism entered its last and bloodiest phase. In a quantum leap from the protests and containable rebellions of the pre-1939 period, wars of decolonization and unprecedented violence gripped Indochina, Madagascar, and French North Africa. Cumulatively, these conflicts spanned generations. Their immediate origins were evident in the disputed colonial heritage of World War II, in arguments over precisely who or what would resume the levers of power throughout the empire and with what longer-term objectives. Their final acts were part of the supposedly postcolonial international order of the 1960s. In many cases, sites of colonial violence would morph into sites of internationalized conflict as Cold War pressures, regional rivalries, and contested political successions provoked renewed struggles for power in which the French found themselves largely observers.<sup>61</sup>

Violence, then, was as intrinsic to imperial decline as it was to imperial expansion. But was it merely the unprecedented breadth and scale of decolonization’s violence that marked it out as different from its prewar antecedents? Or are the patterns of collective violence in French colonies after 1945 much the same as before? At the geopolitical level, new elements might be sought in the intrusion of Cold War rivalry and the growing part played by foreign proxies that arose from it.<sup>62</sup> The consolidation of stronger organized nationalist groups and the fundamental changes promised by Fourth Republic reformism each altered the terrain on which contested colonial politics were fought. Deeper socioeconomic changes also made empire something of a powder keg in the postwar world. Industrial concentration and attendant labor disputes, urbanization and heightened demographic pressure, plus the reconfiguration of trade between the colonial world, France, and the capitalist West: all

presented harder challenges to colonial authorities.<sup>63</sup> Rapidly changing cultural expectations in the colonies and in France about permissible interventionism and permissible levels of violence—about what colonial administrations could or should be doing—added to the weight on official minds.<sup>64</sup> Also striking after 1945 were the growing regional imbalances within French colonial violence, between what became war zones—in Southeast Asia, Madagascar, and North Africa—and wide swathes of territory, principally in West and Equatorial Africa and the island territories, where organized political violence remained rare. The settler presence, proximity to Cold War front lines, the amount of French capital—human and commercial—at stake: each played a role in such variation. But none is sufficient to explain it outright. In those regions where colonial impasse prevailed, oppositional violence and counter-violence gained intensity meanwhile. The result was to warp colonialist attitudes into grotesque self-parody. For some, most infamously in the upper reaches of the colonial military, erstwhile imperial ideals of sacrifice, public service, and cultural transmission became twisted into a last-ditch defense of the colonial presence, seemingly at any price. Exploring diehard colonial minds in the age of decolonization resolves itself into a disturbing exploration of how political circumstances, cultural misreading, authoritarian impulses, and closed organizational cultures give rise to extreme violence.<sup>65</sup>

*Chapter Content: Volume 2*

The first of this volume's two sections is focused on "cultures of violence in the French Empire." The Algerian colonial experience is writ large here, as it is throughout the volume, and it is to France's premier African colony that we turn in William Gallois's essay, the first of the six essays in this section. His is a careful reconsideration of changing depictions of the French Army's bloody work of Algerian conquest from the 1830s to the 1850s. Creeping southward colonization, first into the fertile lands beyond the coast, then toward the Sahara's northern reaches, was never the "peaceful penetration" initially promised by its advocates. Punitive raids or *razzias*, collective punishments, even the slaughter of entire town populations and quiet toleration of slavery, all would mark out the Algerian conquest for decades ahead.<sup>66</sup> Gallois suggests that this

process, through which mass violence entered the normative practice of Algerian colonial rule, gave rise to multiple French “mental maps,” each with distinctive perspectives on whether and how the conquest should proceed. Far from being united and supportive, French political opinion emerges as diffuse and dissentient in Gallois’s account. Thus, the policy of settler colonization adopted in the late 1830s stirred powerful, Enlightenment-inspired intellectual opposition, which drew on the anti-imperialism of writers such as Montesquieu. Division was also apparent between French liberals, who were quick to identify the colonial army with the suppression of domestic liberal dissent, and a broader popular culture, exemplified by pamphlets, pictures, cartoons, and songs, which venerated the Armée d’Afrique as a colonial reincarnation of Napoleon’s *grand armée*.

Gallois then turns to consideration of this army, its leadership, and its recourse to increasingly brutal forms of violence and collective punishment. Forever identified with General Thomas Bugeaud, the infamous methods used to terrorize Algeria’s population hinged on the *razzia*—the destructive raid in which civilians were terrorized, their property burned, their livestock killed, and their crops seized or destroyed. Devised as a form of deterrence, this strategy also deliberately blurred the line between civilian and combatant, the noncommittal and the insurgent.<sup>67</sup> Sexual violence was also part of the repertoire of French terror, holding a mirror to the darkest reaches of colonial minds as military commanders essentialized the Algerian population as an undifferentiated enemy against which violent acts of whatever sort were justified as, at once, instrumental in hastening subjugation and outside the realms of warfare between “civilized” cultures. The brutality of the conquest also became inscribed on the minds of its perpetrators in other ways. Gallois describes how officers’ writings and reflections on their participation in massacre returned time and again to metaphors of madness and of a dystopian universe made real in Algeria. Thus, the leading colonial minds of the Armée d’Afrique increasingly cast themselves as victims, not instigators, of the violence and societal breakdown they described.

Metaphorical madness is meshed with actual evidence of mental disorder in Bertrand Taithe’s searing analysis of the Voulet-Chanoine Affair, one of the ghastliest and bloodiest episodes of colonial conquest run

riot in black Africa. The “affair” achieved notoriety in 1890s France, not because of the horrendous levels of violence perpetrated against the affected population of Upper Nigeria by a roving French military column, but because two of the junior officers in charge of this expedition murdered their French commanding officer before wreaking still more widespread havoc. Taithe shows that much may be learned about French colonial minds from the three themes that dominated French popular representation and political discussion of the Voulet-Chanoine Affair.

First, as mentioned above, a military expedition gone disastrously wrong only became a political scandal because of the murder of one officer by two others who were apparently driven to insanity by their personal encounters with colonialism. Linked to this, the second theme was a propensity to employ psychological and psychiatric explanations to explain the course of events. This Taithe identifies as a tendency to pathologize the French colonial mind, something that, as we have seen, would recur until the closing events of decolonization. Behind this lay a deeper assumption: namely, that the unfamiliarity of African colonial environs had an inherent capacity to derange European minds.<sup>68</sup> The third theme was also perhaps the most telling. For all its savagery and casual violence, the story of the Voulet-Chanoine column’s gory progress across the African interior still lies *within* the spectrum of colonial conquest violence, albeit at the extreme end of that spectrum. In other words, this descent into the heart of darkness was not all that exceptional, its Conradian horror notwithstanding. Only the murder of a French officer by others made it so. Taithe’s vivid and shocking account of the Voulet-Chanoine expedition reminds us that colonial conquest could be the very antithesis of the selfless heroism in the face of horrific local violence portrayed in the popular press of the day.

Routine violence, admittedly of less severity, also lies at the heart of Michael Vann’s discussion of daily life in the settler districts of colonial Hanoi. As Vann describes it, French settlement in Hanoi was born in violence, nurtured in violence, and died in violence. Even where actual assaults did not occur, the threat of native attacks was omnipresent in Europeans’ lives.<sup>69</sup> This is what Milton Osborne called the “background anxiety” of settler existence.<sup>70</sup> Vann concedes, however, that the paucity of available statistics impedes precise sociological analysis of the

quality and quantity of European brutality, making any assessment of the random and daily acts of violence impressionistic. The picture that emerges is of corporal punishment as utterly routine, alongside racial intolerance and arbitrary violence against a Vietnamese workforce. None of this had much legal repercussion, at least for its perpetrators, but all of it served to reaffirm colonial domination.<sup>71</sup> Yet, as Vann makes clear, in French colonial minds Hanoi was supposed to be different. The city was often held up to contemporaries as a “model” colonial capital, whose boulevards, *beaux arts* culture, and refined European taste supposedly made it an island of tranquility amid a sea of rural hardship, piracy, and feuding warlords. The demographic reality belies this image: Hanoi remained at least 90 percent *indigène*, and urban violence within its supposedly tranquil confines was a daily occurrence. The city also contained numerous sites of notorious violent acts whose symbolic importance resonated—albeit in contrasting ways—in the minds of the French, Vietnamese, and Chinese communities. The locations of a spate of café bombings in 1913 or of the attempted poisoning of the city garrison retained their poignancy for Europeans for years to come. So, too, for the Vietnamese did the public execution grounds in which large numbers of the country’s early nationalists met their end. The colonial Hanoi that Vann describes was one in which French and Vietnamese colonial minds would always remain completely at odds.

Joshua Cole’s expert treatment of the intercommunal violence that erupted in the Algerian city of Constantine in August 1934 also links issues of colonial mind-set with those of urban space. He suggests that “colonial spaces” should be seen as, in some ways, “exceptional spaces” in which violence played a central part.<sup>72</sup> The point is proven by Cole’s investigation of the findings of the Algerian government’s commission of inquiry into Constantine’s 1934 riots. The commission took 126 depositions and reports in the four months to October 1934 in its attempt to attribute responsibility for the killing of twenty-four Jews and four Muslims during the two days of disorder. Far from illuminating the deeper causes of this intercommunal friction, the resultant official report rehearsed a number of stereotypes and clichés regarding Jewish and Muslim character traits and the role of Jews in the local economy, in local politics, and in local culture. This inquest—a devastating example

of an official colonial mind at work—articulated a vision of urban space in which *indigènes*, *Israélites*, and settlers only emerged insofar as they conformed to the bureaucratic characterization of a city demarcated into separate *quartiers*, within which particular communities could be expected to behave in certain ways. In this reading of events, the Jews of Constantine were an essentially tribal community within the city and thus, perversely, were responsible for their own persecution.

Cole's argument goes further. He also reinterprets the anti-Semitic violence of August 1934 and, in particular, the prominent role of local Algerian Muslims within it, in light of the complex identity politics of interwar Algeria in which categories of citizen and subject were more highly politicized than ever. Much as local Jews strove to capitalize on their status as citizens of the republic, Muslim community leaders wrestled with the contradictions of constitutional and legal provisions that enfranchised a narrow Muslim elite while still excluding the majority of their co-religionists. Cole's conclusion tells us a good deal about the sometimes dreadful consequences of how colonial minds worked. His chapter illuminates the devastating consequences of the ways in which the French authorities enshrined ethno-religious difference in differential legal rights and limited access to the privileges of citizenship. Appreciating the resentments fired by each of these discriminatory practices is critical in understanding what, superficially at least, has usually been interpreted as an explosion of endemic intercommunal violence—something emotive and visceral rather than highly politicized. Far from it: Constantine's deadly riots in August 1934 demonstrated that colonial constructions of difference—in housing, in law, in citizenship rights—complicated supposedly binary oppositions between European, Jewish, and Muslim populations, making the frictions between them less ethnically or religiously derived and more the product of Algeria's stumbling progress toward mass politics.

Samuel Kalman's chapter retains the focus on interwar Algeria but investigates a different community of colonial minds, those of the *pièdes-noirs* settlers of the immediate prewar years, most notably in Oran, the most settler-dominated city in the colony. In his reassessment of *colon* support for the French ultrarightist movement, the Croix de Feu and its post-1937 incarnation as the Parti Social Français (PSF), Kalman uncov-



ers the specifically colonial factors that underpinned European support for this quasi-fascistic group. His chapter dissects the public discourse of local PSF leaders, their violently anti-Semitic rhetoric in particular, and contextualizes this language of violence by revisiting some of the ultrarightists' most notorious practices. In doing so his essay places the exploitative nature of Algerian intercommunal relations, the de facto segregation in the urban space of Algeria's major cities, as well as rising settler fears of Algerian integral nationalism at the heart of the Croix de Feu/PSF appeal.

As Kalman demonstrates both here and elsewhere, the language of hatred and the political violence it posited were instrumental in extreme rightist action and integral to the collective identity of ultrarightist supporters, especially within the settler *quartiers* of Algeria's major towns. For all their odious invective the ultrarightists in France were significantly less violent than their counterparts in Algeria.<sup>73</sup> For, as Kalman argues, the glorification of violence in the febrile atmosphere of interwar Algeria was also symptomatic of something more, something attributable to distinctly colonial minds. Echoes of the demographic insecurity that nurtured the virulent racism apparent in Algeria's settler culture during the interwar years were, for instance, to be found in the continuing appeal of triumphalist Algerianist writings, typified by the work of Robert Randau, as well as in the persistent use of crude racial stereotypes in the settler press.<sup>74</sup> Kalman picks up these cultural undercurrents and concludes that an underlying anxiety pervaded the minds of those settlers drawn to the ultraright. Despite the virulence of their language and the violence of their activities, a sense of vulnerability about the irresistible force of Algerian Muslim nationalism characterized their outlook. Put simply, behind the extreme right's discourse of colonial domination—racial and political—lay an abiding fear in the settler mind, that of being swamped by the Muslim majority.

A different form of violence in Algeria, this time French-directed, is central to my essay, the last in this first section. It revisits the colossal state retribution meted out in the immediate aftermath of the May 1945 rebellion in the Constantine region of eastern Algeria.<sup>75</sup> Official blindness to the fatal weakness of the colonial state, part rhetoric, part self-deception, is fundamental to an understanding of what followed the

initial revolts in and around the towns of Sétif and Guelma. The colonial authorities' refusal to admit either the extent of Algerian loathing for them or the possibility of their overthrow by revolution from below tells us much about the "colonial minds" that directed the officially sanctioned killings over the summer of 1945. The state violence occasioned by the uprising represented far more than a simple restoration of colonial order. Echoing William Gallois's chapter on the early colonial period, I argue that colonial rule created the socioeconomic circumstances in which an essentialized view of undifferentiated *indigènes*, or Muslim Algerians, as inferior, savage, and inherently prone to violence became intrinsic to the actions of security forces and settler vigilantes.

As evidence accumulated of the savagery of the killings and sexual violence in Sétif, Guelma, and, especially, the smaller settlement of Périgotville, so the tendency among an enraged settler community to ascribe collective guilt, to impugn the entire Muslim population as inherently vicious, increased.<sup>76</sup> There are parallels here with the ways in which European colonial populations in other empires chose to read other episodes of collective violence, and, again, Ann Stoler's work is particularly useful. In her analysis of Dutch responses to 1920s outbreaks of worker unrest in Java's plantation belt Stoler discerns a distinct interpretive pattern to colonial readings of dissent: "Here it is not violence per se that justified armed police, intelligence networks, a penal code, and physical force, but violence of a particular sort, stripped of its validity and exposed as the response of irrational and rapacious elements. It had to be shown as something outside rationality: as an unreasonable response according to the canons of Western thought."<sup>77</sup> Security force analyses of the Algerian situation depicted violent indigenous protest in the same way. Intelligence assessment disconnected the practice of violence by colonial subjects from socioeconomic conditions or political grievances, denying its perpetrators any voice by insisting that the killing of Europeans marked an atavistic return to the savagery inherent to Algerian identity.<sup>78</sup> As James McDougall notes, this insistence on inherent Algerian savagery was integral to French colonial thinking and made recourse to violence against colonial subjects seem logically imperative.<sup>79</sup>

In its scale, its severity, and its target selection the French repression let loose on eastern Algeria from May to August 1945 combined all that

was worst about colonialism—intercommunal mistrust, socioeconomic discrimination, cultural supremacy, and security force banality toward acts of extreme violence perpetrated against a subject population.<sup>80</sup> My essay suggests that this consensus about the need for overwhelming retributive violence ignored the tangible socioeconomic crisis that was integral to the original outbreaks. By obscuring the very real material hardships occasioned by food shortages and a breakdown in eastern Algeria's foodstuff distribution networks in the latter stages of World War II, the colonial authorities achieved two objectives. First, they absolved themselves of blame for Algerian radicalization. Second, they negated rational explanations for popular participation in attacks on European settlers. As I contend, the Sétif uprising demonstrated the capacity of political parties, religious groups, and Muslim cultural associations to harness popular anger over long-standing economic hardship and cultural marginalization to nationalist political ends, something that the colonial minds of French officialdom in Algiers and Paris were reluctant to concede. Little wonder, then, that after Sétif there was no going back, that colonial and nationalist minds were closed to the possibility of compromise.

Volume 2's second section, "Colonial Minds and Empire Soldiers," also comprises six chapters. Collectively, they focus squarely on questions of attitude, perception, and stereotyping in the characterization and treatment of distinct strata of colonial society, including French colonial troops, Muslim populations, and African women in mixed-race relationships. The prevalence of eugenicist ideas about what was socially, racially, and sexually acceptable and what, in turn, was morally reprehensible is evident within several of the colonial minds analyzed here. So, too, was an awareness that while "acceptability" was relative, its boundaries determined by local circumstance, colonists and officials nonetheless defined their normative standards against certain benchmarks of public behavior that required the preservation of French dignity and prestige at all costs.<sup>81</sup> Predominantly, these were men of influence bound up in the codes of masculinity that Robert Nye has identified as integral to the ethics of French professional elites during the Belle Epoque and afterward.<sup>82</sup> Nowhere more so than in the arena of

interracial sex, a subject whose symbolic importance, whether in terms of punitive regulation, boundaries transgressed, or bitter proof of masculine colonial power, makes it central to any consideration of colonial minds.<sup>83</sup> Contrary to what we—with twenty-first-century minds—might consider the worst sexual transgressions, “scandalous” behavior among serving imperial officials signified actions that undermined French colonial standing rather more than activities that might, in hindsight, be considered cruel, criminal, or morally reprehensible.<sup>84</sup> Owen White’s chapter touches on all of this section’s central themes: colonial minds, bodies, and power relationships. His chapter makes extensive use of diaries and private letters to shed new light on four interracial relationships that took place in different parts of French West Africa during the 1890s and 1900s. The sensitivity of his account challenges us to rethink ideas of colonial iniquity and sexual exploitation by confronting deceptively difficult questions. Were loving relationships between French men and African women either possible or sustainable in a colonial context? Were such unions inherently exploitative? If we know something of the answers in relation to African women, albeit inevitably too little, we know less about the Frenchmen involved, whose intimate thoughts have tended to become lost in sensationalist or recriminatory depictions of interracial colonial sex.<sup>85</sup>

White’s examination is of the most personal aspect of the colonial mind, perhaps the most impervious to dispassionate analysis. As he suggests, it is easy to find reference to such relationships, many of them depicted in exoticized, Orientalist language. It remains much harder to establish what such unions meant, especially to the two people involved. At one extreme there were undoubtedly numerous cases of clear sexual exploitation, often implicating those in high authority. To take but one example, Governor-General of French West Africa François Clozel, while on tour in northern Côte d’Ivoire, ordered daily “requisitions” of African women for him and his retinue, something that disgusted anthropologist Maurice Delafosse and others who witnessed it. Martin Klein has also demonstrated that the French Sudan of the 1890s was a colony run by and for the French Army, and a place where local women were often treated as part of the spoils of conquest, as *de facto* sex slaves.<sup>86</sup> Here the violent and exploitative nature of interracial sex

conformed closely to the stereotypical, two-dimensional characterization of white men using powerless black women. Moreover it is apparent that any interracial relationship typically involved the removal of indigenous women or girls from their familiar spaces and local cultural environments to European ones. These new locations and spaces became charged with colonial meaning as a consequence. Nonetheless, in uncovering the more intimate reaches of the French colonial mind, White's essay points the way to a subtler, more multifaceted approach to interracial relationships, and so to the most intimate dimensions of colonial thinking, in the early years of French dominion in West Africa.

J. Kim Munholland's essay revisits a well-known colonial military career, that of Ernest Psichari. Often depicted in heroic terms, Psichari, in the twenty years before he died on the Western Front, followed a distinct, but not unusual, political trajectory. It began with his upbringing in a secular, republican, liberal family and ended in espousal of ardent nationalism and high Catholicism. The path that connected these two contrasting outlooks was his protracted colonial military service. Even as a republican Dreyfusard, Psichari was ardently nationalist, but from a colonial viewpoint he increasingly perceived metropolitan bourgeois society as decadent and spiritually empty. Munholland shows that Psichari was increasingly driven by fear of the power of radical Islam to overturn French imperial achievements. His vision grew more millenarian and racially exclusive as a result. Psichari's remedy to what he articulated as an impending "clash of civilizations" was a more vigorous, Catholic-tinged pursuit of the civilizing mission. As Munholland makes plain, the development of Psichari's colonial mind suggests that we need to rethink the categories of republican, nationalist, imperialist, Left, and Right, rejecting any simplistic antagonism between them.

Joe Lunn's consideration of colonial minds and African military bodies focuses upon the enormous numbers of young West African men conscripted into the French Army to help fight the Great War. At one level the massive recourse to African military manpower was rooted in fears of France's worsening demographic disparity next to Germany. At another level the placement of armed colonial units in the front line was a logical next step for French military thinkers long accustomed, like their British counterparts, to the exploitation of African labor for

portage and colonial campaigning.<sup>87</sup> But as Lunn illustrates, only by considering the assumptions of those army officers in charge of the process can one appreciate the form that this conscription eventually took.<sup>88</sup> As Richard Fogarty, another outstanding scholar of colonial soldiery in World War I, points out, the enforced recruitment of empire troops offers the starkest evidence of the contradictions inherent in a “republican imperialism” that sought to reconcile universalist ideas with the entrenched racial hierarchies of colonialism. By identifying whiteness with authority, maturity, and competence, the French military necessarily invested nonwhiteness with the opposite traits: indiscipline, immaturity, and lesser intellectual capacity.<sup>89</sup> The one quality supposedly left to the empire’s “martial races” was their unquestioned capacity to fight. It was from this first principle that the concept of a *force noire* arose. The idea was initially propounded by a small coterie of career officers in the Sudanese units of the colonial army. They drew upon their own observations of West Africa’s “warrior races” and their reading of the hierarchies that they claimed to exist between them.<sup>90</sup> Ardent proponents of the prevailing martial race theories of the day, these officers insisted that West Africans would make redoubtable infantry and outstanding assault troops.<sup>91</sup> Crude racism also underpinned their arguments: certain Africans were allegedly attuned to particular military tasks because they were accustomed to being beasts of burden, to endurance. Others were supposedly equipped with “lesser” nervous systems, making them more tolerant of pain and suffering. And according to General Charles Mangin, the foremost architect of the *force noire* scheme, West African soldiery had no conception of scientific progress, a contention repeatedly used to justify differential treatment of colonial troops in Europe. Tracing the development of the *force noire* from initial conception to ultimate deployment, Lunn demonstrates that for many of the 140,000 soldiers involved, the working of the French colonial military mind had devastating consequences.

Where Joe Lunn’s essay indicts French military officials for their attitudes and behavior prior to and during World War I, Martin Alexander’s contribution does much the same by focusing on the fate of West African troops in the Battle of France during May–June 1940. Alexander notes the relative lack of interest, whether official, historical, or popular, in the

actions of colonial troops during this brief but bloody campaign next to their participation in the protracted trench warfare of 1914–18. With the notable exceptions of historians Myron Echenberg, Nancy Lawler, and, more recently, Raffael Scheck, African losses in the summer of 1940 remain little studied.<sup>92</sup> Yet, as Gregory Mann has suggested, the *tirailleurs*' contribution to the defense of France in both world wars did more than anything else to change the ways in which colonial obligation, whether that of rulers to ruled, or of subjects to the mother country, was articulated in twentieth-century France. Indeed, the discourse of colonial sacrifice and reciprocal duties still inflects contemporary thinking about the rights of France's African immigrant communities today.<sup>93</sup> This marks something of an advance on the racist caricatures so convincingly exposed by William Cohen's work on French attitudes to black Africans before the twentieth century, and demonstrates once more the formative influence of wartime experience on French attitudes, both public and private.<sup>94</sup> Martin Alexander's essay builds on this, discerning a peculiarly colonial mixture of officer paternalism and abiding infantilization of African soldiers, with clear echoes of the characterization of colonial troops evident in World War I.<sup>95</sup> Alexander examines the recruitment, training, and eventual deployment of colonial army divisions in the Battle of France, all factors immensely revealing of the persistent tropes that marked out French military thinking about the utility and purpose of colonial soldiers. Alexander shows how little military minds had altered in the twenty years from 1919 to 1939. By focusing on particular units through a series of four detailed—and heart-rending—battle case studies in which colonial infantry found themselves pitched into the battle for France from first encounters to final surrender, Alexander shows that senior military commanders remained in thrall to stereotypes familiar from the earlier Franco-German conflict. Colonial units were, once more, expected to play an assault role to which they were quite unsuited in the face of markedly superior German equipment. In describing the inevitable, tragic outcome, Alexander brings us face to face with the consequences of false assumptions in the French military mind.

The final two essays in this volume investigate lesser-known elements of the violence of Algeria's decolonization. Their perspectives on colonial minds are unusual. The historical and present-day focus on extreme acts

of violence perpetrated on colonial or occupied populations perhaps obscures the more pervasive, indeed omnipresent experience of psychological terror and routine acts of lesser violence against civilian populations that were a more or less daily occurrence. Such was certainly the case in late colonial Algeria, the focal point of Neil MacMaster's essay. His is a study both of colonial and anticolonial minds as well as of the victims of the uncompromising thinking among the strategists of the Algerian War. MacMaster argues convincingly that the quotidian terror meted out by both sides was just as central to colonial rule—and to revolutionary movements' efforts to overthrow it—as the more spectacular killings of which more is now being written.<sup>96</sup>

The most salient—and damning—point here is that both sides, the colonial state and its anticolonial opponents, were utterly intolerant of *attentisme*, of civilians who sought, quite understandably, to straddle the political fence. Neither side forgave the noncommittal, making it impossible for civilians to shield themselves from the conflict by avoiding taking sides.<sup>97</sup> This intolerance developed into a full-blown strategy of compliance terrorism.<sup>98</sup> It was particularly effective as practiced through the Front de Libération Nationale's collection of prohibitions—bans on smoking, drinking, fraternization, as well as its ruthless punishment of any cooperation with the colonial state. Focusing on the FLN's smoking ban and efforts made by French military and civil authorities to countermand it, MacMaster provides a revealing point of entry into the social reality of the Algerian War and the mind-sets of those who fought it. His conclusion is clear: we should read the Algerian conflict as more of a civil war than is widely assumed.

Mathilde von Bülow surveys another facet of the Algerian War in the final essay in this closing section. Her chapter examines a particular facet of the internationalization of the conflict by discussing French police and intelligence service monitoring of FLN activists and Algerian immigrant workers in Paris, northeastern France, and West Germany from 1957 to 1962. In its account of arbitrary arrests, expulsions, detentions without trial, and even summary killings, von Bülow's essay describes the working of security service minds driven toward increasingly extreme acts of violence. The catalyst here was the reorganization and relocation to Cologne in West Germany of the FLN's former covert network in main-



land France.<sup>99</sup> Using an array of recently declassified French and West German state documents, the essay traces the blurring of distinctions between terror and counterterror as the fight against the FLN's covert apparatus in Western Europe became more desperate. It also reveals how the violence perpetrated by the French security services escalated beyond the control of politicians, civilian officials, and diplomats. It is a frightening insight into the workings of security service minds as they struggled to counteract the growing successes of the FLN as a revolutionary organization committed to the overthrow of French colonial rule.

Robert Aldrich surveys the issues raised across the two volumes in a reflective conclusion, a chapter in its own right, which discusses how we might usefully understand concepts of a "colonial mind." He examines the long-term shifts in historical approaches to France's troubling colonial past, reminding us in doing so that any academic analysis of colonial minds must acknowledge factors liable to shape the interpretations of those doing the analyzing. Aldrich therefore evaluates the development of a French "national memory" of empire, relating this to changing historical readings of French colonialism. He discusses the phenomenon of "postcolonial forgetting" or the "occultation" of colonial misdoings. Evidence of such forgetting extended beyond France to many of its former colonial territories where a number of single-party states, themselves rooted in erstwhile anticolonial nationalist movements, have been proscriptive and highly selective in their representation of the colonial past.

Matters began to change in the 1980s as interest in problems of collective memory grew dramatically, not least in French scholarship where Annalist and structuralist, often Marxist, approaches to history had, by then, lost their *avant garde* luster. Yet the colonies remained strangely absent from this process, initially at least.<sup>100</sup> As Aldrich suggests, something akin to a "thirty-year rule" seemed to apply to the study of colonial memory. A certain inverse equation was also at work here: space only opened up for the empire to command public attention as debates over Nazi occupation and Vichy collaboration slowed. Media interest was stirred by the impending thirtieth anniversary of Algerian independence in 1992, but extraneous events in former colonial dependencies were perhaps more significant. New Caledonia's 1980s *événements* compelled recollection of the Algerian War. So, too, did

Algeria's tragic descent into bloody civil war after the annulment of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) electoral triumph in 1991.<sup>101</sup> The trial of Maurice Papon and media reexamination of torture cases in Algeria added momentum to the study of colonial memories and representations of empire in France.<sup>102</sup> It is this increasing memorialization, itself deeply politicized, that leads Aldrich to pose the critical question: who is the proper "guardian," if any, of colonial memory?

It bears emphasis, of course, that the sum total of the essays in both volumes might be dismissed as nothing more than the ruminations of the scholastic postcolonial mind, as the thoughts and ideas of rarefied academics—predominantly white, predominantly "Anglo-Saxon" (to use the French phrase)—attuned to the specialist debates that hold sway in the early twenty-first century and writing in an international climate in which accusations of a revival of Western colonialism, albeit in new guises, are commonplace. This may be true. But the fact that perspectives on empire and colonialism change over time is surely to be applauded. If these essays contribute to that process, they have done their job.

### Notes

1. Alan K. Henrikson, "The Geographical 'Mental Maps' of American Foreign Policy Makers," *International Political Science Review* 1:4 (1980), 496–530; Henrikson, "Mental Maps," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

2. Thomas W. Smith, *History and International Relations*, Routledge Advances in International Relations and Politics, vol. 9 (London: Routledge, 1999), 188; Philip E. Tetlock, "Theory-Driven Reasoning about Plausible Past and Probable Futures in World Politics: Are We Prisoners of Our Preconceptions?" *American Journal of Political Science* 43:2 (1999), 338; Richard Heuer, *The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (Washington DC: Center for Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1999); all cited in Milo Jones, "History in Foreign Affairs, 1965–2000," *BISIS Journal of International Studies* 1 (2004), 36–40. See also Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1990). The latest work to integrate all three approaches is Stephen Casey and Jonathan Wright, eds., *Mental Maps of the World War Era* (Basingstoke UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

3. For consideration of this phenomenon at the extreme, violent end of this spectrum of behavior, see Kathleen E. Taylor, "Intergroup atrocities in war: a neuroscientific perspective," in *Medicine, Conflict and Survival* 22 (2006), 230–44.
4. Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992), 36; for parallels with lack of doctrinal innovation in the interwar French Army, see Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).
5. Johannes Fabian, *Out of Our Minds: Reason and Madness in the Exploration of Central Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Nicola J. Cooper, *France in Indochina: Colonial Encounters* (Oxford: Berg, 2001).
6. Jock McCulloch, *Psychiatry and the "African Colonial Mind"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Jonathan Sadowsky, *Imperial Bedlam: Institutions of Madness in Colonial South-West Nigeria* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Lynette Jackson, *Surfacing Up: Psychiatry and Social Order in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1908–1968* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Richard C. Keller, *Colonial Madness: Psychiatry in French North Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
7. Ann Laura Stoler, "Imperial Debris: Reflections on Ruins and Ruination," *Cultural Anthropology* 23:2 (2008), 193. I am very grateful to Ann Stoler for sharing with me her insights regarding forms, practices, and legacies of colonial coercion.
8. Benjamin Claude Brower, *A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France's Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844–1902* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), part 1; Marnia Lazreg, *Torture and the Twilight of Empire: From Algiers to Baghdad* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), especially chapter 7, "Conscience, Imperial Identity, and Torture," and chapter 10, "Moralizing Torture."
9. Brower, *Desert Named Peace*, 6–21.
10. Raphaëlle Branche, "Si tu veux la paix, contrôle la guerre: Les Conventions de Genève dans la guerre d'Algérie," in *L'idée de paix en France et ses représentations au XXe siècle*, ed. Robert Vandenbussche and Alain-René Michel (Lille, France: CRHEN-O, 2001), 385–92.
11. Raphaëlle Branche and Jim House, "Silences on State Violence during the Algerian War of Independence: France and Algeria, 1962–2007," in *Shadows of War: A Social History of Silence in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Efrat ben-Zeev, Ruth Ginio, and Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 115–16.

12. Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), part 3.
13. Two highly polemicized examples covering the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, *Coloniser, Exterminer: Sur la guerre et l'Etat colonial* (Paris: Fayard, 2005); Yves Benot, *Massacres coloniaux, 1944-1950: La IVe République et la mise au pas des colonies françaises* (Paris: Editions la Découverte, 2005).
14. We await a detailed academic study devoted to Cao Bang, the worst French loss of the Indochina War before the siege of Dien Bien Phu, but we now have an outstanding treatment of Palestro: Raphaëlle Branche, *L'embuscade de Palestro, Algérie 1956* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2010).
15. Herman Lebovics, *Imperialism and the Corruption of Democracies* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 14-21.
16. Caroline Ford, "Violence and the Sacred in Nineteenth-Century France," *French Historical Studies* 21:1 (1998), 101-6.
17. For discussions of interwar extremist violence on left and right, see Allen Douglas, "Violence and Fascism: The Case of the Faisceau," *Journal of Contemporary History* 19:4 (1984), 669-87; David Berry, *A History of the French Anarchist Movement, 1917-1945* (London: AK Press, 2002), chapter 7, and Berry, "'Fascism or Revolution!' Anarchism and Antifascism in France, 1933-39," *Contemporary European History* 8:1 (1999), 51-71; Samuel Kalman, "Faisceau Visions of Physical and Moral Transformation and the Cult of Youth in Inter-War France," *European History Quarterly* 33:3 (2003), 343-66; Georges Vidal, "Violence et politique dans la France des années 1930: Le cas de l'autodéfense communiste," *Revue Historique* 308:4 (2008), 901-22.
18. For British Empire examples of this male socialization to colonial violence in practice, see Keith Breckenridge, "The Allure of Violence: Men, Race and Masculinity on the South African Goldmines, 1900-1950," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24:4 (1998), 669-93, and especially 667-77. But, for another South African case study in which white women played a central role in collective violence in the colonial workplace, see Jeremy Krickler, "Women, Violence, and the Rand Revolt of 1922," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 22:3 (1996), 349-72. As Elizabeth Collingham notes, "British sensitivity to the slightest hint of a challenge to their dignity or authority meant that they frequently met any act which suggested insolence with physical violence." See Collingham, *Imperial Bodies: The Physical Experience of the Raj, 1800-1947* (Oxford, 2001), 142. The most insightful treatment of interracial violence in the British Empire is now Martin J. Wiener, *An Empire*

on *Trial: Race, Murder and Justice under British Rule, 1870–1935* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

19. See, for instance, the literature on forced labor in Francophone black Africa during the early twentieth century, such as Bouboucar Fall, *Le travail forcé en Afrique occidentale française (1900–1946)* (Paris: Karthala, 1993); Dennis D. Cordell and Joel W. Gregory, “Labour Reservoirs and Population: French Colonial Strategies in Koudougou, Upper Volta, 1914 to 1939,” *Journal of African History* 23 (1982), 205–24; Richard L. Roberts, *Two Worlds of Cotton: Colonialism and the Regional Economy in the French Sudan, 1800–1946* (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1996); Jean Filipovich, “Destined to Fail: Forced Settlement at the *Office du Niger*, 1926–45,” *Journal of African History* 42:2 (2001), 239–60; Ibra Sene, “Colonisation française et main d’oeuvre carcérale au Sénégal: De l’emploi des détenus des camps pénaux sur les chantiers des travaux routiers (1927–1940),” *French Colonial History* 5 (2004), 153–71.

20. Bourdieu’s early fieldwork resulted in the publication of his first book, *Sociologie de l’Algérie*, by Presses Universitaires de France in 1958.

21. Peter Jackson, “Pierre Bourdieu,” in *Critical Theorists and International Relations*, ed. Nick Vaughan Williams and Jenny Edkins (London: Routledge, 2009), 98.

22. Jackson, “Pierre Bourdieu,” 99; see also Jackson, “Pierre Bourdieu, the ‘Cultural Turn’ and the Practice of International History,” *Review of International Studies* 34:1 (2008), 155–81.

23. Van Nguyen-Marshall, *In Search of Moral Authority: The Discourse on Poverty, Poor Relief, and Charity in French Colonial Vietnam* (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 33–34, 133–34; see also Nguyen-Marshall, “The Moral Economy of Colonialism: Subsistence and Famine Relief in French Indo-China, 1906–1917,” *International History Review* 27:2 (2005), 237–58.

24. Martin J. Murray, “‘White Gold’ or ‘White Blood’?: The Rubber Plantations of Colonial Indochina, 1910–40,” *Journal of Peasant Studies* 19:3–4 (1992), 42–63; Pierre Brocheux, “Le prolétariat des plantations d’hévéas au Vietnam méridional: Aspects sociaux et politiques (1927–1937),” *Le Mouvement Social* 90:1 (1975), 55–86. For a parallel case in West Africa, see Emily Lynn Osborn, “‘Rubber Fever,’ Commerce and French Colonial Rule in Upper Guinée, 1890–1913,” *Journal of African History* 45:3 (2004), 445–65.

25. Marie-Paule Ha, “From ‘Nos Ancêtres les Gaulois’ to ‘leur Culture Ancestrale’: Symbolic Violence and the Politics of Colonial Schooling in Indochina,” *French Colonial History* 3 (2003), 101–17; Gail Kelly, “Colonialism, Indigenous Society, and School Practices: French West Africa and Indochina, 1918–1938,” in *Education and the Colonial Experience* (New Brunswick:

Transaction Books, 1984), 9–32. See also Fanny Colonna’s now classic volume, *Instituteurs algériens 1883–1939* (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1975).

26. David Sciulli, “Response to Senechal-Courage and Care in ‘Blackian’ Social Theory: A Word in Praise of Senechal de la Roche,” *Sociological Forum* 11:1 (1996), 130.

27. H. L. Wesseling’s *Imperialism and Colonialism: Essays on the History of European Expansion* (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), chapters 1–2 on colonial wars are useful here. My thanks to the University of Nebraska Press readers for pointing this reference out to me.

28. Regarding multidisciplinary approaches to the relationship between violence and social order, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud, “Introduction: Integrating the Study of Order, Conflict, and Violence,” in *Order, Conflict, and Violence*, ed. Kalyvas, Shapiro, and Masoud (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1–3, 10–12.

29. Charles Tilly, “Repression, Mobilization, and Explanation,” in *Repression and Mobilization*, ed. Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston, and Carol Mueller (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 211–14.

30. For details of Le Bon’s impact in Third Republic France, see Susanna I. Barrows, *Distorting Mirrors: Visions of the Crowd in Late Nineteenth-Century France* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1981); Robert Allen Nye, *The Origins of Crowd Psychology: Gustave Le Bon and the Crisis of Mass Democracy in the Third Republic* (London: Sage, 1975). For expressions of the collective violence as social protest view, see Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century, 1830–1930* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).

31. Roberta Senechal de la Roche, “Collective Violence as Social Control,” *Sociological Forum* 11:1 (1996), 105–16. Regarding the related concept of “partisanship” as an explanatory tool for collective violence in divided societies, see Senechal de la Roche, “Why Is Collective Violence Collective?” *Sociological Theory* 19:2 (2001), 126–44.

32. Marc Howard Ross, “A Cross-Cultural Theory of Political Conflict and Violence,” *Political Psychology* 7:3 (1986), 428–31.

33. Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out. States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), especially chapter 7 on “persistent insurgency.”

34. This argument concurs with Kathleen A. Mohoney-Norris, “Political Repression: Threat Perception and Transnational Solidarity Groups,” in *Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics*, ed. Christian Davenport (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 72.

35. Senechal de la Roche, “Collective Violence as Social Control,” 98–99.

36. Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (reprint, Boston: Beacon, 1991); originally published in French as *Portrait du colonisé—portrait du colonisateur* with a preface by Jean-Paul Sartre in 1957, the book did not appear in English translation until 1965.

37. Lawrence R. Schehr, “Albert Memmi’s Tricultural *Tikkun*: Renewal and Transformation through Writing,” *French Forum* 28:3 (2003), 60–61. I am grateful to Ruth Ginio for her advice on this point.

38. The phrasing borrows from Kalyvas, Shapiro, and Masoud, *Order, Conflict, and Violence*, 3.

39. Ann Laura Stoler, “Racial Histories and Their Regimes of Truth,” *Political Power and Social Theory* 11 (1997), 181–83.

40. Ricardo Roque, “The Razor’s Edge: Portuguese Imperial Vulnerability in Colonial Moxico, Angola,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 36:1 (2003), 107–9; see also the landmark article by Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, “Coping with the Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State, 1895–1914,” *Journal of African History* 20:4 (1979), 487–505.

41. Jack Goody, “Establishing Control: Violence along the Black Volta at the Beginning of Colonial Rule,” *Cahier d’Études Africaines* 38:150/1 (1998), 227–34.

42. Matthew Hughes, “The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39,” *English Historical Review* 124:507 (2009), 314–29.

43. David Killingray, “The ‘Rod of Empire’: The Debate over Corporal Punishment in the British African Colonial Forces, 1888–1946,” *Journal of African History* 35:2 (1994), 201–4.

44. For affirmation that colonial violence was common in other empires and inherent to them, see the following examples drawn from British India: Rana P. Behal, “Power Structure, Discipline, and Labour in Assam Tea Plantations under Colonial Rule,” *International Review of Social History* 51 (2006), supplement, 143–72; David Arnold, “Industrial Violence in Colonial India,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22:2 (1980), 234–55; Arnold, “The Armed Police and Colonial Rule in South India, 1914–1947,” *Modern Asian Studies* 11:1 (1977), 101–25; Subho Basu, “Strikes and ‘Communal’ Riots in Calcutta in the 1890s: Industrial Workers, Bhadrakol Nationalist Leadership and the Colonial State,” *Modern Asian Studies* 32:4 (1998), 949–83; Jordanna Bailkin, “The Boot and the Spleen: When Was Murder Possible in British India?” *Comparative Studies of Society and History* 48:2 (2006), 462–94.

45. Karma Nabulsi, “Traditions of Justice in War: The Modern Debate

in Historical Perspective,” in *Order, Conflict, and Violence*, ed. Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

46. Martin Thomas, “France Accused: French North Africa before the United Nations, 1952–1962,” *Contemporary European History* 10:1 (2001), 91–121; P. E. Hemming, “Macmillan and the End of the British Empire in Africa,” in *Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role*, ed. Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 1995), 112.

47. Take, for example, the adaptation of paramilitary gendarmerie policing in nineteenth-century France to the French North African territories and the adoption of colonial-style identity checks and restrictions on freedom of movement in mainland immigration control during the interwar years. See, respectively, Clive Emsley, *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; reprint, 2002), especially chapter 7; and Clifford Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). Regarding the links between colonial urban planning, social control, and political surveillance, see Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980); David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870–1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Zeynep Çelik, *Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: Algiers under French Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

48. William Hoisington Jr., “In Search of a Native Elite: Casablanca and French Urban Policy, 1914–24,” *Maghreb Review* 12:5–6 (1987), 160–65; Nicola Cooper, “Urban Planning and Architecture in Colonial Indochina,” *French Cultural Studies* 11:1 (2000), 75–99.

49. Sophie Leclercq, “Le colonialisme mis à nu: Quand les surréalistes démythifiaient la France coloniale (1919–1962),” *Revue Historique* 310:2 (2008), 315–24; Claude Liauzu, *Histoire de l’anticolonialisme en France du XVIIe siècle à nos jours* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2007), 138–56, 160–74.

50. Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 126; Alice L. Conklin, “‘Democracy’ Rediscovered: Civilization through Association in French West Africa (1914–1930),” *Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines* 145:37 (1997), 59–84; Benoît de l’Estoile, “Rationalizing Colonial Domination: Anthropology and Native Policy in French-Ruled Africa,” in *Empires, Nations, and Natives: Anthropology and State-Making*, ed. Benoît de l’Estoile, Federico Neiburg, and Lygia Sigaud



(Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 44–47; Byron D. Cannon, “Irreconcilability of Reconciliation: Employment of Algerian Veterans under the *Plan Jonmart*, 1919–1926,” 24:1–2 (1999), 42–50.

51. M. P. M. Finch, “*Outre-Mer* and *Métropole*: French Officers’ Reflections on the Use of the Tank in the 1920s,” *War in History* 15:3 (2008), 303–8; David Killingray, “‘A Swift Agent of Government’: Air Power in British Colonial Africa, 1916–1939,” *Journal of African History* 25:4 (1984), 429–44; Sebastian Balfour, *Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), chapters 4–5; Michael Paris, “The First Air Wars: North Africa and the Balkans, 1911–13,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 26:1 (1991), 97–109.

52. Edward M. Spiers, “The Use of the Dum Dum Bullet in Colonial Warfare,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 4:1 (1975), 3–14.

53. Priya Satia, “The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia,” *American Historical Review* 111:1 (2006), 26–32, 40; Phillip S. Meilinger, “The Historiography of Airpower: Theory and Doctrine,” *Journal of Military History* 64:2 (2000), 471–72; Charles Townshend, “Civilisation and ‘Frightfulness’: Air Control in the Middle East between the Wars,” in *Warfare, Diplomacy and Politics: Essays in Honour of A. J. P. Taylor*, ed. Chris Wrigley (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), 142–62.

54. Zara Steiner, “On Writing International History: Chaps, Maps, and Much More,” *International Affairs* 73 (1997), 536.

55. Herman Lebovics, *True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900–1945* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), xii–xiv; James E. Genova, *Colonial Ambivalence, Cultural Authenticity, and the Limits of Mimicry in French-Ruled West Africa, 1914–1956* (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 146–68; Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918–1940* (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 188–215.

56. Stovall makes equally plain that popular belief in clearer racial differentiation in France also had its wartime antecedents; see his “The Color Line behind the Lines: Racial Violence in France during the First World War,” *American Historical Review* 103:3 (1998), 739–69.

57. Tyler Stovall, “National Identity and Shifting Imperial Frontiers: Whiteness and the Exclusion of Colonial Labor after World War I,” *Representations* 84 (Autumn 2003), 52–72, quotes at 52–53.

58. See Kathleen Keller, “On the Fringes of the ‘Civilizing Mission’: ‘Suspicious’ Frenchmen and Unofficial Discourses of French Colonialism in AOF (1918–1939),” *French Colonial History* 9 (2008), 103–29; and Keller, “Colonial Suspects: Suspicious Persons and Police Surveillance in French West Africa, 1914–1945,” PhD diss., Rutgers University, 2007.

59. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères archive (MAE), Paris, Série K: Afrique, sous-série: Défense Nationale, vol. 31, EMA (État-Major d'Armée) 2e Bureau to Sous-direction d'Afrique, "A/S Contre-espionnage en Tunisie," 5 July 1932; Juliette Bessis, *La Méditerranée fasciste: La Tunisie et l'Italie mussolinienne* (reprint, Paris: Karthala, 2000). For Franco-Italian tensions in Tunisia in the pre-1914 period, see Mark I. Choate, "Identity Politics and Political Perception in the European Settlement of Tunisia: The French Colony versus the Italian Colony," *French Colonial History* 8 (2007), 97–109.

60. For detailed analysis of the part played by a reactionary colonial administration in triggering conflict—in this case, the start of the first Indochina War—see Stein Tønnesson, *Vietnam 1946: How the War Began* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).

61. The now-classic study of the internationalization of France's severest colonial conflict is Connelly's *Diplomatic Revolution* (note 12). For the colonial roots of at least some postcolonial violence in Africa, although not in former French territories, see Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

62. For an unsurpassed global analysis, see Orde Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

63. For numerous insights here, see Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 204–30 *passim*.

64. Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapters 7 and 8.

65. Building on George Armstrong Kelly's *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947–1962* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), Martin Alexander traces this warped military logic and the alienation that underpinned it with forensic clarity in his "Seeking France's 'Lost Soldiers': Reflections on the French Military Crisis in Algeria," in *Crisis and Renewal in France, 1918–1962*, ed. Kenneth Mouré and Martin S. Alexander (Oxford: Berghahn, 2002), 242–59. The definitive study of extreme military violence in the Algerian War is Raphaëlle Branche, *La torture et l'armée pendant la Guerre d'Algérie: 1954–1962* (Paris: Gallimard, 2002). See also Lazreg, *Torture and the Twilight*.

66. Brower, *Desert named Peace*, parts 1–3.

67. In this context, see Cheryl B. Welch, "Colonial Violence and the Rhetoric of Evasion: Tocqueville on Algeria," *Political Theory* 31:2 (2003), 235–64. For a very different interpretation of Tocqueville's views on Algerian

conquest, see Mourad Ali-Khodja, “Tocqueville orientaliste? Jalons pour une reinterprétation de ses écrits politiques et de son engagement en faveur de la colonisation française en Algérie,” *French Colonial History* 7:1 (2006), 77–96.

68. See F. Buret and M. A. Legrand, *Les Troupes coloniales: Maladies du soldat aux pays chauds* (Paris: Ballière, 1897); Michael Osborne, *Nature, the Exotic, and the Science of French Colonialism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

69. This view is also central to a seminal article by Ann Stoler, “Perceptions of Protest: Defining the Dangerous in Colonial Sumatra,” *American Ethnologist* 12:4 (1985), 642–58.

70. Milton Osborne, “From Conviction to Anxiety: Reassessing the French Self-Image in Vietnam,” Flinders University Asian Studies lecture 7, 1976, 1–27.

71. Vann’s argument parallels that of Micheline Lessard regarding the growth of racially derived economic nationalism in northern Vietnam; see her “‘Organisons Nous!’ Racial Antagonism and Vietnamese Economic Nationalism in the Early Twentieth Century,” *French Colonial History* 8:1 (2007), 171–202.

72. In this sense, Cole’s argument builds on the pioneering work of Janet Abu-Lughod regarding colonial urban segregation and the “dual city” phenomenon; see, in particular, Abu-Lughod, *Rabat*.

73. See his “*Le Combat par tous les moyens: Colonial Violence and the Extreme Right in 1930s Oran*,” *French Historical Studies* 34:1 (2011), 125–53.

74. Peter Dunwoodie, *Writing French Algeria* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 148–49; David Prochaska, “History as Literature, Literature as History: Cagayous of Algiers,” *American Historical Review* 101:3 (1996), 671–711.

75. My focus here is on issues of political economy and peasant hunger, contrary to much recent work on Sétif, which is principally concerned with the intercommunal tensions behind the violence. This includes the most recent, excellent additions to the literature, Jean-Louis Planche, *Sétif 1945: Histoire d’un massacre annoncé* (Paris: Perrin, 2006) and Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, *Guelma, 1945: Une subversion française dans l’Algérie coloniale* (Paris: Editions la Découverte, 2009). The scale of French repression is still bitterly disputed. Conservative French estimates count between 3,000 and 7,000 victims; Algerian government figures up to 40,000 killed.

76. Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, “La milice, le commissaire, et le témoin: Le récit de la répression de mai 1945 à Guelma,” *Bulletin de l’Institut d’Histoire*

*du Temps Présent* 83 (premier semestre, 2004), 12–19; Marcel Reggui, *Les Massacres de Guelma: Algérie, mai 1945: Une enquête inédite sur la furie des milices coloniales* (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 2006).

77. Ann Laura Stoler, *Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra's Plantation Belt, 1870–1979* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 48.

78. Similar stereotypes re-emerged in Western readings of civil conflict in 1990s Algeria; see Yacine, “Genealogy of Violence,” 23–24.

79. James McDougall, “Savage Wars? Codes of Violence in Algeria, 1830s–1990s,” *Third World Quarterly* 26:1 (2005), 120–22.

80. For analysis of collective race killing in another colonial location dominated by acute racial discrimination and postwar economic disruption, see Jeremy Krikler’s discussion of collective violence in the 1922 Rand Revolt in South Africa: “The Inner Mechanics of a South African Racial Massacre,” *Historical Journal* 42:4 (1999), 1051–75.

81. As Emmanuelle Saada points out, colonial law provided legal frameworks designed to uphold the prestige of the colonial state and the dignity, or standing, of French officials; see Saada, “The Empire of Law: Dignity, Prestige, and the ‘Colonial Situation,’” *French Politics, Culture, and Society* 20:2 (2002), 98–120, especially 98–105.

82. Robert Nye, “Medicine and Science as Masculine ‘Fields of Honor,’” *Osiris* 12:1 (1997), 60–79.

83. Sexuality and empire remains a burgeoning field of inquiry. Seminal works include Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Luise White, *The Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Owen White, *Children of the French Empire: Miscegenation and Colonial Society in French West Africa, 1895–1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); David M. Pomfret, “Raising Eurasia: Race, Class and Age in French and British Colonies,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51:2 (2009), 314–43; Robert Aldrich, *Colonialism and Homosexuality* (London: Routledge, 2002); and Christelle Teraud, *La Prostitution coloniale: Algérie, Tunisie, Maroc (1830–1962)* (Paris: Payot, 2003); Teraud, “Urbanisme, hygiénisme, et prostitution à Casablanca dans les années 1920,” *French Colonial History* 7 (2006), 97–108.

84. See, for example, Erdmute Alber, “Motorization and Colonial Rule: Two Scandals in Dahomey, 1916,” *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 15:1 (2002), 79–92.

85. For a useful case study on African women, see Jeremy Rich, “‘Une Babylone Noire’: Interracial Unions in Colonial Libreville, c. 1860–1914,” *French Colonial History* 4 (2003), 145–70.

86. Martin Klein, *Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapter 5.

87. David Killingray, "Labour Exploitation for Military Campaigns in British Colonial Africa 1870–1945," *Journal of Contemporary History* 24:3 (1989), 483–89.

88. Lunn's focus on the quasi-intellectual roots of martial race theory departs from the bulk of work on French responses to the *tirailleurs*, which concentrates on stereotyping and popular attitude. As examples: Annabelle Melzer, "Spectacles and Sexualities: The *mise en scène* of the *Tirailleur Sénégalais* on the Western Front, 1914–1920," in *Borderlines: Gender and Identities in War and Peace, 1870–1930*, ed. Billie Melman (London: Routledge, 1998), 213–44; Christian Koller, "Race and Gender Stereotypes in the Discussion on Colonial Troops: A Franco-German Comparison, 1914–1923," in *Home/Front: The Military, War and Gender in Twentieth-Century Germany*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 134–57; Nicole M. Zehfuss, "From Stereotype to Individual: World War I Experiences with *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*," *French Colonial History* 6:1 (2005), 137–58.

89. Richard S. Fogarty, *Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914–1918* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 130–31, 270–71.

90. Éric Deroo and Antoine Champeaux, *La Force noire, gloire et infortune d'une légende coloniale* (Paris: Tallandier, 2006).

91. Fogarty, *Race and War*, 85–87; Joe Lunn, "'Les Races Guerrières': Racial Preconceptions in the French Military about West African Soldiers during the First World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 34:4 (1999), 517–36.

92. Myron Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960* (Portsmouth NH: Heinemann, 1990); Nancy E. Lawler, *Soldiers of Misfortune: Ivoirien Tirailleurs of World War II* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1992); Raffael Scheck, *Hitler's African Victims: The German Army Massacres of Black French Soldiers in 1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

93. Gregory Mann, "Immigrants and Arguments in France and West Africa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45:2 (2003), 363–67, 373–74.

94. William B. Cohen, *The French Encounter with Africans: White Responses to Blacks, 1530–1800* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 62–63.

95. Officers' paternalist attitudes to their colonial troops are also discussed in Zehfuss, "From Stereotype to Individual," 140–46.

96. MacMaster's argument here echoes that of James C. Scott, whose conceptualization of forms of peasant resistance to colonial rule stresses quotidian, semiclandestine forms of resistance—what he terms “infrapolitics”—over more blatant actions. See Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 183–97.

97. Neil MacMaster shows elsewhere how Algerian women, in particular, suffered from such “for or against us” zero-sum logic. See his *Burning the Veil: The Algerian War and the “Emancipation” of Muslim Women, 1954–62* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), chapters 4–9.

98. The term was popularized by Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson in her book *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962* (Stanford CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978).

99. Details of this relocation were first described in print by one of its key participants: Ali Haroun, *La 7e Wilaya: La Guerre du FLN en France 1954–1962* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986).

100. It has often been noted that with the exception of a single chapter by French historian Charles-Robert Ageron, Pierre Nora's influential multivolume collection on French historical memory neglected the colonial empire. See Ageron, “L'Exposition Coloniale de 1931: Mythe républicain ou mythe impérial?” in *Les lieux de mémoire*, vol. 1: *La République*, ed. Pierre Nora (Paris: Gallimard, 1984). For critiques of this omission, see Daniel J. Sherman, “The Arts and Sciences of Colonialism,” *French Historical Studies* 23:4 (2000), 708; Eric Jennings, “Remembering ‘Other’ Losses: The *Temple du Souvenir Indochinois* of Nogent-sur-Marne,” *History and Memory* 15:1 (2003), 7; both cited in Gregory Mann, “Locating Colonial Histories: Between France and West Africa,” *American Historical Review* 110:2 (2005), note 15.

101. For discussion of this, see Hugh Roberts, *The Battlefield: Algeria, 1988–2002: Studies in a Broken Polity* (London: Verso, 2003); David L. Schalk, “Of Memories and Monuments: Paris and Algeria, Fréjus and Indochina,” *Historical Reflections* 28:2 (2002), 241–53.

102. William B. Cohen, “The Sudden Memory of Torture: The Algerian War in French Discourse, 2000–2001,” *French Politics, Culture and Society* 19:3 (2001), 82–94; Raphaëlle Branche, “La mémoire dans tous ses états: Désirs et verities, volontés d'oublis: la torture pendant la guerre d'Algérie,” *Cahiers Français* 303 (September 2001), 70–76.